

The Impact of (Counter-)Terrorism on Public (In)Security in Nigeria: A Vernacular Analysis.

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, to the

University of East Anglia

School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies

Norwich, December 2018

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Abstract

In Nigeria, the ongoing conflict between the state and insurgents has resulted in widespread insecurity, primarily in the Northeast. While much has been done on explaining the insurgency, very little has been done to address non-elite understanding of both phenomena in non-institutional settings. To achieve this aim, this study asks: How do various publics in Nigeria understand and discuss (counter-)terrorism? What are the implications of these understandings for security?

Drawing on four months of critical ethnographic field work on Internally Displaced Persons at camps in Northern Nigeria, this study collected data primarily via forty-one in-depth interviews, participant observation, and field notes. Using discursive psychological analysis, the study examines how various publics in Nigeria construct their various versions of the Self, Other, terrorism and counterterrorism and how they position themselves within talk (and text). The thesis provides an original, in-depth analysis of public understandings and constructions of (counter-)terrorism, which offers a rich understanding of both Boko Haram and Nigerian counterterrorism. It captures what people's knowledge is about the security project and how they understand, interpret, support, reformulate and sometimes resist the ongoing security project

Four overarching arguments are advanced. First, they construct Boko Haram and state violence as a game which has implications for normative evaluations thereof. Second, publics advance an identity-based discourse on (counter-)terrorism, suggesting that it is a form of identity domination by both state and non-state actors. Third, they also advance an interest-centred discourse which constructs (counter-

)terrorism as interest-oriented and rationality-based, suggesting that it serves various economic interests. Public knowledge on (counter-)terrorism is therefore characterised by a competition between these two main discourses, i.e., the interest-based discourse and identity-based or ethno-religiously-oriented discourses. Four, publics argue that counterterrorism has focused on retaining political offices and maintaining political control over the country.

Declaration

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing, which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except where specifically stated in the text. It has not been previously submitted, in part or in whole, to any university or institution for any degree, diploma, or any other qualification.

In accordance with the School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication guidelines, this thesis does not exceed 100,000 words, and it contains less than 150 figures.

Signed:

Date:

Akinyemi Oyawale (PPL)

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

#BBOG	Bring Back Our Girls
AQIM	AL Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
BH	Boko Haram
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
CJTF	Civilian Joint Task Force
CNN	Cable Network News
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CT	Counterterrorism
DSS	Department of State Security
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
GTB	Guarantee Trust Bank
IO	International Organization
ISWA	Islamic State West Africa
ISWAP	Islamic State West Africa Province
LTTE	Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MURIC	Muslim Rights Concern
NGO	Non-Governmental organisation
NYSC	National Youth Service Corps
PIRA or IRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
UN	United Nations
ANC	African National Congress
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States

Dedication

For *Adetokunbo*

My *Shooting Star* elder brother, who shined so brightly but too briefly. Keep resting
with God.

Acknowledgments

Without God, I am nothing and it is to him that my greatest gratitude is due. I will like to express my sincere gratitude to my parents, Professor and Deaconess Oyawale for not only giving birth to me but for raising me and inculcating in me, very important values; for their unwavering support and belief in me and for nurturing a little acorn which shall become an oak. Secondly, I wish to thank my main supervisor, Professor Lee Jarvis for the continuous world class support I have received throughout my PhD study. His patience, tolerance, motivation, and immense knowledge made this work possible and I am very grateful. Thirdly, I wish to appreciate my second supervisor, Dr Alexandria Innes, for her support and critical feedback, and senior colleagues in the department, Professor Lee Marsden and Dr Elizabeth Cobbett for their mentoring and support during periods of uncertainty, doubts and apathy. I wish to thank the former coordinator of the UEA Arts and HUM Outreach and Public Engagement team, Dr Kim Ridealgh for giving me opportunities to discuss my work with high school and college students under the Widening Participation scheme.

I thank my friends and colleagues in Arts 01.13 – which we cheekily call ‘the Dungeon’ – for its remoteness and sub-zero level. It has not always been easy being locked away from the real world and having a tug of war with keyboards in a battle of attrition – we almost always never win; in my case, this keyboard has survived and outlived my incessant assaults. You have all made these four years here very memorable and worthwhile and I hope that can all hold our heads high as we move on to change the world with the skills and knowledge we have acquired. Finally, I wish to thank Rachel Sit, my siblings Mr Olusegun and Olusola Oyawale, nieces and every well-wisher.

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Background

Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) or Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP), which was formerly known as Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād, but colloquially referred to as Boko Haram (BH), has engaged various state and non-state actors in a ten year regional insurgency, spanning sections of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad (Awosusi, 2017). Although there is no consensus about when the group was founded, its current incarnation was established in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, Northeast Nigeria in 2002, where its founding leader – a charismatic Islamic preacher – Mohammed Yusuf garnered a large following for his vitriolic sermons (Campbell, 2014; Chothia, 2012). Despite various skirmishes with the Nigerian government, the attempt to 'annihilate' the group in 2009 through a massive crackdown, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of suspected insurgents, including Mohammed Yusuf, led to a one year hiatus where the group managed to regroup and launch a comeback (Adesoji, 2011).

The response to Boko Haram has been multidimensional and multifaceted in that while the primary actors have been Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad, multiple state and non-state actors such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, the European Union, Benin Republic, and the African Union – through its Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) – have significantly contributed to efforts to counter the group's influence in the sub region. Regarding the CT or COIN (counterinsurgency hereafter) approach adopted, actors have adopted a broad spectrum techniques over the years such as militaristic, non-violent means such as

deradicalisation or other palliative measures that seek to bring the group to the negotiation table, education schemes and poverty alleviation programmes (Abubakar, 2014; Walker, 2012; Zenn et al., 2018).

The insurgency that has ensued has led to massive loss of lives, which is estimated to be over thirty thousand, by the Nigeria Security Tracker (Campbell and Harwood, 2018). Besides the loss of lives, there is an ongoing humanitarian crisis with over 2 million citizens currently displaced from Northeast Nigeria as a result of the actions of both state and non-state actors (Council Norwegian Refugee, 2002; Emmanuelar, 2015). Various other (in)security experiences ranging from physical insecurity concerns such as loss of property, ongoing concerns with health, violence, and poverty to ontological insecurity, such as being removed from their homes in the Northeast, make insecurity an ongoing concern which requires an in-depth study to investigate how people understand and construct their ongoing experiences of (counter-)terrorism in everyday life (Jarvis and Lister, 2013b; Jarvis and Lister, 2016).

Although there have been growing academic studies examining both terrorism and counterterrorism in Nigeria, these have mostly failed to account for the views of ordinary Nigerians in non-institutional settings. To be clear, a normative argument could be advanced that those who are most impacted by terrorism and counterterrorism are mostly marginalised and excluded from debates and discussions of security and insecurity. With intentions of explaining the insurgency with intentions of finding the best ways to counter it, much of the attention has centred on top-down investigations into the group's tactics and ideology rather than how people construct their experiences of both terrorism and counterterrorism which

could provide a better understanding of both phenomena. These studies can be viewed as mostly problem-solving in a Coxian sense, in that they take the status quo for granted and seek to find solutions to Boko Haram. They attempt to make the state work (better), rather than stepping outside this security framework to ask how the state may be implicated in the ongoing problem (Cox, 1981).

In this study, I attempt to fill this gap by examining vernacular discourses on Boko Haram and the Nigerian state. By filling the gaps discussed so far, my study makes an important contribution by broadening existing literature on vernacular security, which has been primarily Western-centric. The study adopts a discursive psychological analysis to address the various ways in which publics from Northeast Nigeria make sense of the world through their constructions of various versions of reality. Discourse in this sense is both ideational and material in that it is through discourse that people construct the world, rather than merely describing a reality that is 'out there', waiting to be discovered (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

1.2 Research Questions

This thesis answers two overarching questions with two sub-questions:

1. How do publics from the Northeast understand and discuss (counter-)terrorism in their everyday lives?
 - a. What do publics from the Northeast do with their talk?
 - b. How are various versions of reality and identities constructed through talk?
2. What implications do lay discourses on (counter-)terrorism have for security?

The first main and sub questions seek to identify ways in which individuals and communities from Northeast Nigeria understand and discuss terrorism and

counterterrorism in 'lay' talk. As detailed further below, my thesis focuses primarily on civilians who are non-experts in security and who have lived in the Northeast within the last seven years. In particular, I am interested in what they do with their talk regarding the various versions of the world and constructions of reality and identities. The second question addresses the implications of these vernacular discourses for security by answering these questions with in-depth accounts and narratives of security from publics in Nigeria; this research sought to understand the nature of vernacular discourses of terrorism and counterterrorism in Nigeria and what implications they have for security both within and outside Nigeria.

1.3 Original Contribution

This thesis makes three original contributions to knowledge. First, it offers an original, in-depth discursive analysis of public perceptions, conceptions and constructions of (counter-)terrorism in Nigeria which offers a rich understanding of both Boko Haram and Nigerian CT, thus making it possible to know what people's knowledge is about the security project and how they understand, interpret, support, reformulate and sometimes resist the ongoing security project (Jarvis and Lister, 2013b; Bubandt, 2005). Second, I trace these constructions/conceptions to underpinning assumptions about socio-political life – including the importance of self-interest, or religious beliefs, in influencing behaviour – thus providing a new dimension of engagement with security that had hitherto been overlooked thus bringing back the public as an important referent of security. While expert knowledge is important, the contention here is that a successful security policy should engage with these vernacular experiences rather than attempting to impose top-down elitist

versions of security which are removed from the everyday realities of ordinary citizens.

Third, following from these, this thesis helps to broaden contemporary research on counter-terrorism – traditional and critical – by moving beyond a Western-centric focus and delving into rich cultural and historical conceptions of security and constructions of the state and terrorism. It is important to emphasise that while we do now have some understanding of how publics in the West talk about terrorism, counter-terrorism, and (in)security, among others, we have far less in the context of states such as Nigeria. This neglect of non-Western contexts is problematic given the importance of such states in most assessments of terrorism/counter-terrorism.

My research aims, and objectives are two-fold. First, it seeks to build on a growing body of research that seeks to examine lived-experiences of (in)security, i.e., the various understandings of terrorism and counterterrorism by non-elites. To achieve this, I investigate (in)security in Nigeria, through examining how various publics understand and construct their experiences of (counter-)terrorism in their everyday conversations. Second, I ask what implications these findings have for policy and security research.

1.5 Thesis Structure

This thesis is divided into seven substantive chapters. In **Chapter 2**, I examine the historical, cultural and political context of Boko Haram (BH) and Nigerian counterterrorism (CT). This chapter emphasises the importance of examining both phenomena in relational terms because of their ‘mimetic’ relationship over the years. To be clear, BH and CT have both developed and evolved alongside each other.

In **Chapter 3**, first, I address the gaps in (counter-)terrorism literature by discussing how key themes in contemporary International Relations and security studies are mainly Western-centric and fail to address key questions about (in)security more broadly and (counter-)terrorism in particular. I argue that critical security studies, while addressing key questions related to lived experiences of (in)security through their interpretivist epistemology, often falls short of its full potential through excluding the experiences of those from the Global South. Second, I provide the theoretical and conceptual framework that will be used to fill these gaps in literature and knowledge, i.e., discursive psychology, which combines insights from poststructuralism and symbolic interactionism, while adopting postcolonial and African feminist perspectives to situate the research within studies from the Global South. In **Chapter 4**, I operationalise how these conceptual tools will be used in making sense of the data that was collected from people's lived experiences in Nigeria. I discuss the methods adopted in negotiating and analysing data mainly semi-structured interviews, participant observation and field notes which enhanced the discourse analysis that was carried out.

In **Chapter 5**, I begin the empirical discussion of my thesis by introducing the first of two main discourses that publics in my research advanced in their construction of BH and CT experiences in Nigeria. This chapter argues that publics advance an Identity Discourse in their lay constructions of (counter-)terrorism, creatively interweaving ideas around ethnicity and religion to construct versions of the Self, Other and the world. In **Chapter 6**, I address the second prominent discourse that people adopt to make sense of and construct their experiences of (counter-)terrorism in Nigeria. From lay discourses on Boko Haram and the state, citizens construct BH

and CT to be driven by interests of privileged elites and political leaders. Public views on CT and BH are usually constructed as one or the other, i.e., as identity-oriented or interest-driven, making Identity Discourses and Interest Discourses the two most important discourses in Nigerian views of (in)security. In **Chapter 7**, I assess the implications of my findings for security, make recommendations for further study, and conclude my thesis by summarising my over-arching arguments.

1.6 Central Argument

The overarching argument of this thesis is that publics from Northeast Nigeria discuss the violent relationship between terrorism – embodied by Boko Haram – and counterterrorism – embodied by the Nigerian state – as a game. To be clear, while there are various emphases on the benefits of counterterrorism, there are views that the increasingly mimetic relationship that it shares with terrorism could blur the lines between legitimate and illegitimate violence, which are clearly distinguished in elite political discourse. In this regard, assumptions about the legitimacy of state measures to counter terrorism cannot be taken for granted as citizens constantly evaluate these practices based on shared repertoires which are local and often outside the rational calculations of state projects, which often seek to achieve top-down security. It is important that this assertion should not be misconstrued as game theory or any other adaptation of economic models to international relations but rather that state and non-state actors are locked in an intractable battle for supremacy which posit citizens as both the means to supremacy and the ultimate prize of this ‘conflict’. These goals appear to be incompatible.

Proceeding from the earlier overarching argument, this thesis makes five central arguments. Publics in Nigeria transgress the 'state-non-state' binary of public political discourse through advancing two prominent discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism. Rather than construing terrorism and counterterrorism as emerging from state and non-state actors – with the former being legitimate and the latter being illegitimate – they advance a 'interest' and an 'identity' discourse on (counter-)terrorism in Nigeria. First, terrorism and counterterrorism are constructed as a form of identity tussle where both the state and Boko Haram are engaged in a battle for religious and ethnic domination. Islam, Christianity, Fulani, Glavda, and Kanuri, among others are the prominent identity positions that interviewees take within this context.

Second, interviewees advance an 'interest discourse' which constructs (counter-)terrorism as interest-oriented and rationality-based, suggesting that it serves various economic interests of state and non-state actors. Public views on (in)security and knowledge of (counter-)terrorism are characterised by a purposive adoption of either or both of interest-based and identity-oriented interpretative repertoires. Third, citizens combine both repertoires to argue that counterterrorism has been directed towards winning or retaining political offices and to maintain political control over the country. Fourth, the vernacular transgression of the moral supremacy of the state to deploy legitimate violence against non-state violence through viewing both phenomena as engaged in a game for supremacy has implications for normative evaluations thereof. Finally, in contribution to studies on non-elite conceptions of security and vernacular discourses on terrorism, counterterrorism and the state, this thesis argues that views of publics are far more nuanced and share more similarities

than the Global North vs Global South or Western vs non-Western dichotomies may assume and there are similarities in the ways in which publics across these imagined frontiers understand and practice security in non-institutional settings.

1.7 Importance of the Study

This study makes contributions that transcend understanding terrorism and counterterrorism alone but also the state, government, communities, broader socio-political and socio-economic life in Nigeria. The findings of this research will contribute not only to the immediate environment impacted by Boko Haram and CT but to the larger society. Findings in this study is important in shedding more light on the humanitarian crisis in Nigeria, where over two million citizens have been displaced from the Northeast, resulting in serious hardship and everyday suffering (Emmanuelar, 2015).

Nigeria is an important actor and contributor to peacekeeping operations by the United Nations, African Union, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), among others, which makes its stability of paramount importance. Likewise, BH is a key player in terrorism both within the region and beyond, which makes understanding the group important. Understanding how CT and BH activities interact to impact on people's (in)security, will thus serve to contribute to the understanding of these two phenomena and essentially to finding solutions to all problems of (in)security.

1.8 Conclusion

This introductory chapter has provided the overarching purpose of my PhD thesis which aims to examine the impact of (counter-)terrorism on the security of publics in

Nigeria. To achieve a coherent progression of the phenomena, this thesis advances from historical, cultural and geographical contexts, thus setting the scene for the other chapters that will follow.

Chapter Two: Historical and Political Context of (Counter-)Terrorism in Nigeria

2.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the historical and political context of (in)security in Nigeria through examining the trajectories of Boko Haram and counterterrorism. While Boko Haram has been an ongoing challenge to security, it could also be argued that counterterrorism measures have also contributed to the (in)security experience of citizens. The most apparent of these are the rising death toll, damage to property and the widespread displacement of people from the communities in the Northeast. The overarching purpose of this chapter is to examine how various interrelated events such as: the founding of the group in 2002; the various skirmishes with state security services; the eventual state crackdown in 2009 which resulted in the death of the group's founding leader Mohamed Yusuf; the group's re-emergence with greater ferocity and sophistication under a new self-styled leader, Abubakar Shekau; the labelling of the group as a 'terrorist' organisation and the escalation of the conflict in the Northeast have all significantly impacted on (in)security experiences in Nigeria.

This chapter advances three main arguments. First, there is a need to treat terrorism and counterterrorism as relational rather than treating one as a response to the other, which could presuppose the claim that the latter is always legitimate and achieves 'security', while and the former is always illegitimate, thus engendering 'insecurity'. The view here is that these normative claims are top-down and elitist, meaning that they are strengthened by elite discourses to serve a particular purpose. It is important to examine the experiences that citizens construct through their

accounts and their normative claims about both phenomena. Second, 'statist' approaches to (in)security foreclose the possibilities of research projects that can step outside the status quo and critically examine the impact of both phenomena. Third, Boko Haram and state measures both interact to create dynamics of (in)security which can best be understood through a framework that offers an in-depth understanding of both phenomena within the rich political and historical context of the political community which is now known as Nigeria.

The chapter proceeds through first (re-)constructing Nigeria's political history. This is achieved through a postcolonial mapping which attempts to (re)think the country's geographical and political history. Second, I unpack the terrorism concept by identifying the various challenges involved in defining it. Third, I address the identity of Boko Haram by examining the group's evolution through three phases where the enemy has been constructed differently, to serve the purpose of the group. Fourth, I address counterterrorism in Nigeria and how it has maintained a mimetic relationship with terrorism over the years, where both actors have copied the tactics of the other by attempting to outdo each other. Fifth, I address the legal framework adopted to counter Boko Haram, especially the legislations passed to increase state powers. Seventh, I address human rights concerns with both terrorism and counterterrorism, and finally, I examine the vernacular experiences of (counter-)terrorism in Nigeria.

The final section concludes through identifying gaps in academic literature on Boko Haram and Nigerian counterterrorism, specifically, the lack of an in-depth investigation of the impact of counterterrorism on the security of individuals and communities in northeast Nigeria, and how this research will augment and advance

current debates on the impact of (counter-)terrorism on individuals and communities, which are mostly 'Westerncentric'.

2.2 (Re-)Constructing Nigeria's Political History

Terrorism, counterterrorism and (in)security more broadly can best be understood within the historical context of the political entity now known as Nigeria. A caveat at this point is important as a historical context makes no claims to objective narration of history through language or truth more broadly but rather that a historical construction of Nigerian history can shed more light towards understanding experiences of people who imagine themselves as belonging to the political entity that today is referred to as Nigeria and consider this to be a collective identity that they share with others. As against other forms of analysis that seem to reify states and the institutions that they delegate authority to, thus attempting to analyse problems that emerge within that system to proffer solutions about how it can be best remedied, Nigeria can best be understood as a social construction within the context of this study (Cox, 1981).

Even a hardened classical realist like Hobbes agrees to some degree that the state was constituted through social interaction, i.e., the sovereign or Leviathan came to be through a 'social contract' by individuals who were in 'continual fear, and danger of violent death; [where...] the life of [wo]man, [was] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short' (Hobbes, 1980). This Hobbesian fear meant that the creation of the state, i.e., a covenant, was out of necessity and fear of unbridled freedom of expression by humans, rather than divine, as espoused by Robert Filmer (1980) in his seminal work, *Patriarcha* where he argued that the state was natural as the family and the

sovereign enjoyed omnipotence through authority conferred through divine imprimatur. To be clear, even hard-line realists who reify the state as being 'out there' do acknowledge the importance of its social constitution (Biersteker and Weber, 1996). What this suggests is that the sovereign state is neither timeless nor natural, which has stronger implications for postcolonial climes like Nigeria, far removed from European origins of modern conceptions of state sovereignty, authority and legitimacy (Biersteker and Weber, 1996).

The political history of Nigeria often begins with the 'discovery' of the country by Europeans, and there is usually a progressive narrative of how successive British governors-general ruled over diverse people, which culminated in their independence (granted by the Queen); or a regressive narrative which details a past that was rarely documented but rather transmitted through oral history and tradition. This 'break' from the past has implications for various non-state groups who have challenged the legitimacy of the Nigerian state through making historical claims to authority and power, which could appeal to sections of the population that may view themselves as excluded from the current political structure (Anugwom, 2000). That past which was constructed as 'uncivilised' through colonial discourse still underpin various imaginings of community that are advanced as better alternatives to the current political community (Ekeh, 1975).

Two examples serve the purpose of discovering 'Africa' or 'Nigeria', which can be understood as 'discovery' narratives. First was the 'discovery' (of the source) and the course (flowing towards the Atlantic Ocean) of the River Niger which traverses the country from the northwest through the northcentral, where it splits the country into roughly three unequal parts before it empties into the Atlantic ocean in the Niger

Delta (Short and Stauble, 1967). Scottish explorer, Mungo Park is often credited with 'discovering' the River Niger, being the first European that reached it in 1796, while contracted to the African Association¹ that had been established two years earlier (Thompson, 1814). English explorers, Richard and John Lander are often credited with 'discovering' the termination of the River Nigeria into the Atlantic Ocean in the Niger Delta (Lander and Lander, 1832). The second relates to cultural and religious practices that were considered an indicator of 'primitivism' and 'barbarism' – at least from a religious perspective at the time – which was stopped by the European 'saviour' (Hardage, 2010).

The narrative of the 'abolition of the killing of twins'² (in Nigeria) by British Presbyterian missionary Mary Slessor exemplifies this construction of local practices as backward and local populations requiring being 'saved' from their own cultural and religious dogma (Hardage, 2010). What is important for this study and its situation within Nigeria's historical context is not to reject these views per se, but to understand them as representations of history that served (and still serve) a particular purpose, rather than a neutral account. As Cox (1981: 128) argues, theories and perspectives are always purposive and serve particular interests even when they are not immediately obvious. This representation of the Nigerian Other within the international community is often reproduced in public discourses and

¹ The African Association, officially known as The Association for Promoting the Discovery of the Interior Parts of Africa was established in London on 9 June 1788. It was saddled with the responsibility of exploring the hinterlands of Africa which had been a mystery to much of Europe, especially with inconsistent and sometimes conflicting historical reports by Arab geographers and cartographers and Greek historians (for example, Herodotus). The overarching objective of the association was to discover the origin and course of the Niger River and locate Timbuktu which was considered at the time as the 'lost city' which had an enormous cache of gold. The establishment of the African Association began the age of Age of African exploration or 'discovery' [of African hinterlands].

² Mary Slessor is often credited with 'ending' the killing of twins in Nigeria.

serves as a lens through which various state actions are interpreted; this may be a tendency to often view actions of the postcolonial state as 'illiberal' and short of the practices of 'advanced' and 'civilised' societies (Said, 1978). Boko Haram, just as other local uprisings are also always represented as a form of 'traditional' or 'pre-modern' 'revival' or renaissance, where *primordial* society is 'fighting back', against the Western project, the secular state (Appadurai, 1996; Adesoji, 2010; Ekeh, 1975).

What is important for this study is the identity and power relations that these versions of history have constituted and how allusions to the various geographical, cultural and religious boundaries that were 'negotiated' through the colonial process serve as frames, metaphors, commonplaces and interpretative repertoires for Nigerian publics to make sense of everyday life and position themselves in the world (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). I argue that these institutions are neither natural nor 'out there' but are continuously practiced through social dialogues meaning that they are shared intersubjectively and transmitted through various narratives or what can be understood as cultural discourses which are then reproduced by various subjects who consider themselves to belong to those collectives (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

2.2.1 (Post-)Colonial Cartographies

Studies on Boko Haram and counterterrorism have usually examined them in isolation rather than together, and much of this work is ahistorical (Agbibo, 2013c; Aghedo and Osumah, 2012; Akinbi, 2015; Akinola, 2015). When they have been historical, much of these efforts have been directed towards searching for 'roots' of movements or insurrections with the goal of finding solutions to the problems that confront the Nigerian state (Abubakar, 2014; Aghedo and Osumah, 2012; Anyadike,

2013; Bamidele, 2012; Igboin, 2014; Murtada, 2013). In a way, they can be viewed as problem-solving in a Coxian sense (Cox, 1981). It is important to address Nigerian history through the various identities that the colonial experience has occasioned, to properly understand how conflicts of interest or insurgences such as Boko Haram are not necessarily the 'resurgence' or a 'barbaric' past but rather, a version of the world and a political history that should be taken seriously, rather than discarded or demonised (Loimeier, 2017).

While the history of colonial Nigeria is a tale of political repression and economic exploitation of the colony by the metropole, the history of postcolonial Nigeria (Ahazuem and Falola, 1987), until recently, can be viewed as a tale of *coups d'état* (Abutudu, 1990). The various coups have not only set a dire antecedence for power transition but more importantly, they have served to polarise communities through interpretations and representation of these events as attempts by perpetrators to dominate others within the Nigerian political and economic power structures (Igwarra, 2001). These are usually interpreted primarily through ethno-religious lenses, but also with significant economic implications; 'us' vs 'them' narratives, so to speak (Diamond, 1988). These effects cannot be overstated as the coups and counter-coup of January, and July 1966 had a significant impact in the devastating Nigerian Civil War between 1967 and 1970 (Jorre, 1972; Stremlau, 2015). The vicious cycle of violence continued as power transitioned from one military dictator to another – with intermittent interruption, such as between 1979 and 1983 – until power was eventually transferred to a democratically elected government in 1999, with the sudden death of the military dictator, General Sani Abacha in June 1998, proving extremely pivotal (Obi, 2004).

There are usually broad divisions of the country along geographical lines, i.e., the Northern and Southern Nigeria, which is as a vestige of 'pre-amalgamation' entities, Southern and Northern Protectorates of Nigeria, but these divisions have significant religious and cultural connotations (White, 1981; Okonjo, 1974). When they are invoked, they are never neutral statements but usually ideological, with various stereotypical insinuations. The first of these is that the North is predominantly Muslim and the South is predominantly – albeit to a lesser extent – Christian; second is that the South is more progressive while the North is more conservative; the third is that these divisions matter and that conflicts and political offices should be balanced along these broad divisions which means that events and political outcomes are assessed based on how it serves to balance the interests of people divided along these lines equitably.

Contemporary Nigeria has various overlapping geographical, political, ethnic, religious and economic frontiers. The country is divided into 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), which serves as its administrative capital, while these are further grouped into the six geopolitical zones - Southwest, South-south, Southeast, Northcentral, Northeast, and Northwest – discussed earlier (Eze et al., 2014). However, while the Northern and Southern Protectorates no longer serve as official geopolitical divisions, they still feature prominently in public discourse, serving as an imaginary 'iron curtain' of ideas, political and religious affiliation, and other forms of identity allegiances. These various overlapping identities are important in understanding the various discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism in Nigeria (Sergie and Johnson, 2014; Weate, 2014; Yusuf, 2017; Zenn et al., 2018).

Nigeria has approximately 190 million citizens (Akinyemi and Isiugo-Abanihe, 2014). Regarding religious affiliation, they are almost equally divided into Christianity and Islam, with a minority of citizens still embracing their 'traditional'³ religious beliefs (Eboh, 2011; Paden, 2015). Other flexible identities such as 'tribe'⁴ and language feature prominently in public discourses and serve as a source of ontological security to many people who may view them as providing a sense of belonging to a particular community (Ekeh, 1975). The main languages (numerically) are Hausa, mostly spoken in the North, Yoruba, which is mostly spoken in the Southwest, Igbo, which is primarily spoken in the Southeast, and Tiv, Nupe, Ijaw, Igala, Ogoni, Urhobo, Esan, Efik, Idoma, and Itshekiri, among others, making up a significant portion of the population (Blench, 2011; Ibrahim and Lyman, 2004; Aito, 2002). It makes sense to view a Nigerian not as someone who has a particular identity but as someone who actively practices multiple identities, accentuating them creatively within various contexts, situated and delimited by historical, normative and contextual factors (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

Ethnicity, Religion and the Politics of Difference in Nigeria

Much has been made of ethnic and religious differences in Nigeria (Igwarra, 2001). There have been so-called 'ethnic' conflicts which may often be interpreted as 'ethno-religious', suggesting that both identities overlap to *cause* conflicts, which may be construed as a form of structural determinism, ignoring the agency of various

³ This is not a neutral language as it usually distinguishes between traditional and modern which has an undertone of 'primitiveness'.

⁴ 'Tribe' usually has a negative connotation and is not a neutral term, which is duly acknowledged.

actors who actively or passively influence outcomes in these conflicts, rather than merely being ‘puppets’ of their ethnic and religious affiliations.

One of the key tensions between the Nigerian secular state and various communities in Northern Nigeria has been the role that religion has to play in politics and everyday life (Jan Michiel, 2016; Kendhammer, 2013; Ostien and Dekker, 2010; Sanusi, 2007; Suberu, 2009). The culmination of this dialectical tension was the adoption of sharia law as the civil and criminal law in nine Muslim-majority and Muslim-dominated sections of three Muslim-plurality states since the return to democracy in 1999 (Jan Michiel, 2016; Kenny, 1996; Ostien, 2007). These thirteen are ‘Zamfara, Jigawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Kaduna, Katsina, Yobe, Niger, Kano, Sokoto, Kebbi, and Borno’ and are all in Northern Nigeria (Ibrahim and Lyman, 2004: 1)⁵. These developments have increasingly made religion very salient in public discourse and also in the various narratives and frames of interpreting the world in contemporary Nigeria.

Sharia is often viewed as a compromise by the Nigerian government to incorporate sharia law into the legal – at the appeal court level – structure of the state, while still maintaining the secular political system of popularly elected public officials and a supreme court as the highest court in the country (Loimeier, 2017). In a way, it is a form of co-optation which many ‘ardent’ religious enthusiasts have criticised (Sanusi, 2007). While this ‘compromise’ is a putative view, it ignores the history of much of Northern Nigeria today being governed under strict sharia law, within the Sokoto Caliphate and its various emirates. This caliphate was established during the Fulani Jihad of 1809 – which was led by *Usman dan Fodio* – and lasted for almost a century

⁵ Kaduna, Niger and Gombe only have sharia in areas with large Muslim populations.

before it was eventually defeated by British colonialists in 1903 (McKay et al., 2011; Last, 1967). Similar conquests occurred on the northernmost part of the country with the Kanem Bornu Empire – founded around 700AD – eventually falling to European colonialists after almost a millennium under various Islamic dynasties, i.e. since adopting Islam in 1068 AD till it was defeated in 1900 (Lange, 1993; Lange, 2011). While the Sokoto Caliphate was dominated by the Hausa/Fulani (Kanya-Forstner and Lovejoy, 1994; Last, 1967; Lovejoy and Hogendorn, 1990), the Kanem-Bornu was dominated by the Kanuri ethnic group (Hiribarren, 2016; Lange, 1993; Walker, 2013).

This context is important to this study as it captures the various historical and cultural dynamics that have shaped the identities of individuals and groups that today make up Nigeria and more importantly, so-called tropes of ‘Northern’ vs ‘Southern Nigeria’, ‘Northern conservative’ vs ‘Southern progressive’, and ‘Northern Muslim’ vs ‘Southern Christian’ among others. As the maps below will show, some of these past epochs feature in the various overlapping imagined communities that people construct while they draw and re-draw the various identity cartographies that constitute the contemporary Nigerian subject. There are no suggestions that the identities discussed here are in any way exhaustive.



Figure 1: A Map of Nigeria Showing the States that have Adopted Sharia Law (Source: Homeland Security Watch, 2012).




Figure 2: A map of Nigeria showing the Ethnic Groups Constituents. Source (Bakare, 2015).



Figure 3: A Map of Nigeria Showing the 36 States and the Federal capital Territory, Abuja (Source: The United Nations, Department of Field Support Cartographic Section, 2014).

2.3 Unpacking the Terrorism Concept

While contemporary public discourse is replete with terms such as ‘terrorism’, ‘terror’ and ‘terrorist’, there is no consensus on the exact meaning of these terms. Whilst ‘terrorism’ as a concept has an ancient history – with the Thuggees, Sicarii Zealots, and *Nizari Ismailis* particularly worthy of mention (Sloan and Anderson, 2009; Houen, 2002) – the term has both Latin – *terrere* – and French – *terrorisme* – origins and in its modern sense, can be traced to the French Revolution of 1789 and was adopted by the head of the Montagnards faction of the Jacobins, Maximilien Robespierre, during the ‘Reign of Terror’, which occurred between 1793 and 1794

(Blanning, 1997). It is often cited that Maximilien Robespierre (in)famously proclaimed during the French Revolution in 1794 that '[t]error is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible' (Scurr, 2012; Robespierre, 1794). Terror here was sanctioned by 'state' authority, and it was considered positive in that it served the interest of the people through expediting justice against so-called enemies of the people. This section will adopt some notable definitions to show how the term has been problematic and why the search for a consensus definition may be futile.

At a UN General Assembly meeting in September 2003, UN secretary general, Kofi Anan proposed a definition of terrorism thus: 'Any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act' (Reynolds, 2005). Further definitions such as that adopted by US State Code, describes terrorism as 'the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives' (Code, 2000). What these definitions show is that terrorism is a violent activity, that is illegal, and that it is usually targeted at an audience making it a form of communication, driven by the socio-political or ideological goals of the perpetrators (Jackson et al., 2011).

From a Nigerian perspective, the Nigerian Terrorism [Prevention] Act 2011 defines an 'act of terrorism' as 'an act which is deliberately done with malice, aforethought and which', could be gravely injurious to a state or 'international organization' (IO hereafter), performed with the intent to coerce a state or an IO, to intimidate the populace by disrupting their day to day activities (National Assembly, 2011). Such

an act involves the threat or use of violence against individuals or communities but also against government infrastructure and private property (National Assembly, 2011). This definition agrees with much of the common definitions of terrorism, especially by state actors as it leaves very limited room for state actions to be considered terroristic. The common themes are that it is violent, premeditated, has social and political objectives and deliberately targets civilians.

With the intension of developing a consensus definition for the concept, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman came up with a comprehensive definition that synthesised elements from a questionnaire that was distributed to academics. They came up with a comprehensive definition:

Terrorism is an anxiety inspiring-method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby -- in contrast to assassination -- the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 28).

Despite this broad and inclusive definition, which gives room for both state and non-state actors and describes particular conditions and elements that must be present for an act to be considered terroristic, a universally acceptable definition for the concept remains elusive and some have suggested that the attempts to reach a consensus 'should be abandoned altogether' (Greene, 2017: 431).

Attempts to officially define terrorism in moral terms have generated much controversies, especially during Kofi Anan's proposal to define terrorism as 'inevitably' and 'unconditionally' wrong (Reynolds, 2005). Some leaders from the Middle East viewed this as an attempt to favour powerful countries who occupy smaller countries, thus making their resistance against such occupying forces always unacceptable (Reynolds, 2005). This view that so-called terrorist acts could serve the interest of some constituents against a larger enemy has led to the cliché that 'one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter' which emphasises the importance of perspective (Seymour, 1975). In practice, this moral dimension has meant that the label has often been used as a pejorative term to demonise and disenfranchise political opponents and those that people disagree with (Jackson et al., 2011). Nelson Mandela is a good example of this where he was labelled as the leader of a terrorist organisation (African National Congress), for his role in the anti-Apartheid movement (Jackson et al., 2011).

To advance this argument further, the various typologies of terrorism are problematic in that they essentialise particular concepts that are shared by groups and then manage to shoehorn various other groups into that category which, very often may further obfuscate what categorisation was meant to achieve, i.e., clarity (Jackson et al., 2011). In this sense, religious, nationalist, left-wing, far-right, lone-wolf, anarchist forms of terrorism are bellowed with utmost confidence by scholars, whereas, what the groups and individuals that are bracketed within these categories have in common may be minuscule in comparison to what differentiates them. What this means is that assumptions about a group's ideology and objectives play a part in how it is countered, which may have severe implications for (in)security of citizens.

Within critical terrorism studies, 'terrorism' is not regarded as being 'out there', but rather as a label that can be assigned to a variety of political forms of violence or criminal activity (Jackson et al., 2011). One of the major consequences of labelling groups in particular ways is that they provide a framework and spectrum of permissible measures to counter them. That Boko Haram was constructed as a religious, and more importantly, an 'Islamist' terrorist organisation had several underlying assumptions. The first assumption was that the group could be viewed as sharing notable characteristics with other 'jihadi' groups such as al Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, thus aligning with arguments about the 'new terrorism' (Neumann, 2009: 14). From this perspective, these groups were generally perceived as being anti-dialogue and with a knack for unprecedented destruction, regarding their transcendental goals (Gunning and Jackson, 2011). In a way, religious or new terrorists according to James Woolsey, 'don't want a seat at the table [dialogue]; they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it' (Griffin, 2005: 2). This assumption could foreclose the possibilities of non-violent means of conflict resolution.

The second assumption was that since the Boko Haram shared an ideology with a global jihadi network, it also shared their objective of establishing a global Islamic state and also sharing their virulent hatred for the West. This is one of the reasons why the group's colloquial name, 'Boko Haram' has been more enduring and popular than the other names which it has officially called itself. The fact that *Boko Haram* – translated as Western education (or civilisation) is forbidden – captures an 'anti-education', 'anti-Western education' and in extension, 'anti-modernity', agenda, it helped to sum up the idea that Boko Haram's primary agenda was to attack the West

(Peters, 2014). This Western discourse can be viewed as being comparable to Osama Bin Laden's re-enactment of the 'Crusader imagery', releasing a fatwa titled, the 'Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places' (Porter, 2002: 871). These constructions have served the purposes of both parties in constructing the enemy in particular ways to make violence permissible.

Finally, the terrorism label also serves to delegitimise and demonise actors who may have 'genuine' grievances by conjuring memories of destruction and evil, which are associated with other actors that have been so 'labelled'. It may be interesting to consider what Boko Haram, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Timothy McVeigh, Nelson Mandela, Hamas and al Qaeda all have in common, despite all falling under the 'signifier', terrorism' (Bishop and Mallie, 1987; Gunaratna, 2002; Hroub, 2000).

From the foregoing, it can be argued that Boko Haram is not a terrorist organisation per se, but rather a 'collection' of insurgencies that adopt terrorist tactics, amid several other tactics such as guerrilla tactics and sometimes conventional methods, to further their political goals (Comolli, 2015). This is important because, through reducing the group or groups to the tactical dimension of the insurgency, many social and cultural aspects of the group have been overlooked, which have implications for the experiences of people who live in those parts of the country and how they construct their experiences of the state and other citizens. For example, by construing the group as merely engaging in 'pointless' violence, it becomes possible to view them as maniacs, which forecloses particular measures that could be adopted to resolve the conflict or even a better understanding of the historical and

cultural elements that surround the group's emergence and continued 'survival' or existence (Jackson et al., 2011).

2.4 Who are Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah?

To properly situate *Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah* or Boko Haram (BH hereafter) within its cultural and political context, it is important to examine how the group emerged and has evolved to be one of the most active and destructive militant groups in the world. Although colloquially known as 'Boko Haram', the group's official name is *Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah* – formerly *Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād* (Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad) – which can be translated as Islamic State's West Africa Province or ISWAP as it is sometimes referred to in the media and public discourse (Solomon, 2012; Sergie and Johnson, 2014; Oladipo, 2015; Withnall, 2015). The group declared allegiance for the Islamic State or *Daesh* in 2015 which occasioned the name change, but there have been recent reports of a schism which has fragmented the group into various factions. The two main factions are ISWAP that is led by Mohammed Yusuf's eldest surviving son *Abu Musab al-Barnawi*, retaining strong ties with *Daesh* and Abubakar Shekau's Boko Haram, which both compete for supremacy (Onuoha, 2016).

Several leading authors and commentators on the subject have held various assumptions that may be convincing *prima facie* but less so on closer scrutiny. For example, authors such as Solomon (2012: 6), Agbiboa (2013b: 433), (Last, 2009: 10), among others have suggested that the term 'boko' is a derivative of the Hausa term for 'book', which is incorrect as the Hausa word for book is '*littafi*' (Newman, 2013). The Hausa are a major ethnic group located in the Sahel, West Africa (Hill,

1972; Muhammad, 1968). With the Fulani, they make up one of the three majority ethnic groups in Nigeria, alongside the Yoruba and the Igbo (Falola and Heaton, 2008). Muhammad (1968) submits that, 'boko' originally denoted 'something (an idea or object) that involves fraud or any form of deception' and thus it extended to 'any reading or writing which is not connected with Islam'(Newman, 2013).

The group's founding leader Mohammed Yusuf confirmed in an interview with journalists in 2009 that his angst was against Western influences that contravened the fundamental tenets of Islam, regarding challenging the supremacy and omnipotence of Allah (Boyle, 2009). For example, scientific explanations of precipitation and Darwinian evolutionary theory were two of his foremost reviled 'Western' doctrines which from a Wahhabi perspective is a form of *bid'ah*⁶ (Boyle, 2009). He also adds that Darwinian theory of evolution, or arguments that the earth was spherical rather than flat, were un-Islamic and should, therefore, be vehemently rejected (Last, 2009; Boyle, 2009). Similarly, in a video released by the successor to Yusuf, Abubakar Shekau, he stresses that 'secular education, sport and music [...] as a result of this today, many Muslims lose [sic] their Islam'. This would suggest a particular, distinct meaning of what constitutes 'haram' to them rather than the popular interpretation of 'boko' meaning Western education as taught in schools. Boko Haram then could be understood as 'fraudulent influences are forbidden' or less succinctly, Western influences that contravene the tenets of Islam are forbidden.

As with many other terrorist groups, several difficulties abound in attempting to research them and especially, acquiring reliable information about their activities.

⁶ *Bid'ah* refers to innovation in religious matters.

Due to the clandestine nature of their operation, very little information is available, and that which is available is inconsistent and often marred with controversies surrounding authenticity and reliability (Walker, 2012). This situation is further complicated by the incompetence of, and internal disagreements within, the Nigerian police (Walker, 2012). Similarly, on occasions when the group has divulged information to the press, such information has been unreliable. For example, they have sometimes distanced themselves from attacks that were attributed to them. Likewise, robbers and other local actors have appropriated their methods without having any connection with the group (Walker, 2012). Furthermore, there have been attacks that have been wrongly attributed to the group such as a 'failed bombing in March 2012 of a church in Bauchi [which] was said by the police to have been plotted by a rival Christian organization' (Walker, 2012: 7). These all show the complexity involved in constructing a stable ontology of Boko Haram, within the Nigerian context.

2.4.1 Construction of the Enemy: Three Phases of Boko Haram Violence

To properly situate Boko Haram within the Nigerian public and vernacular discourses, it is important to examine how the group's target and *modus operandi* has evolved since its inception in 2002. This transformation can be divided into at least 'three phases' which have significantly targeted and impacted on various publics in particular ways. The phases are the anti-state, anti-minority and 'blanket' phases respectively. The phasal claim here does not suggest or imply a particular teleological argument but rather that how people view the group through their experiences of violence and 'persecution' may have changed through the choices of target that the group made during these 'phases'. It is also important to add that they

are just a heuristic to understanding Boko Haram's transformation over almost two decades. This is also important because each 'phase' did not replace the previous one but rather incorporated a broader target into existing 'enemies' that the group constructed through the various discourses of the infidel.

The anti-state phase was characterised by almost exclusive anti-state behaviour and was usually a 'defensive' phase where the group may have avoided violence or confrontation with the state authorities as much as possible, since they had very limited capacity to mount much meaningful resistance or campaign against the Nigerian security forces (Agbibo, 2013a; Campbell, 2014). Much of this was based on passive resistance through disobeying 'secular' laws that supposedly contravened Islamic tenets (Loimeier, 2012). Typical examples were the Kanama and motorcycle helmet incidents. In the former, militants fled to Kanama village, on the Niger Republic border to escape from the Nigerian army but their presence in the community led to conflicts with locals and especially the police (Maiangwa and Uzodike, 2012). The latter was a helmet incident where members of the group, who had been on a burial procession, were attacked by security forces for refusing to obey traffic laws that required them to wear motorcycle helmets (Comolli, 2015; Walker, 2012).

The 'minority' phase added to but did not replace the initial enemy, the state. It began around 2011, marked by the group's resurgence from the annihilation attempt by Nigerian forces under a new leader, Abubakar Shekau (Abubakar, 2014; Adesoji, 2010; Agbibo, 2014). Within this phase, the primary targets were Churches and areas with a high concentration of religious and ethnic minorities, alongside the earlier state targets (CNN Library, 2017; Comolli, 2015). During this period, there

were arguments that Boko Haram was a continuation of longstanding ethno-religious conflicts as targets spread to other parts of the country such as the Northwest and Northcentral geopolitical zones. There were massive attacks on bus stations, the UN building, police headquarters, and shopping malls, among others in the FCT. There were also massive attacks on churches, most notably the deadly attack on St. Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, a satellite town of Abuja in 2011 which resulted in heavy casualties (Omadjohwoefe, 2013). This phase involved many indiscriminate attacks which would have also led to many non-ethnic or non-religious minority deaths, but attacks on minority targets were more prevalent (Campbell and Harwood, 2018).

The 'blanket' phase can be traced to 2015, but there are possibilities that it began earlier (Campbell and Harwood, 2018). The redefinition of the 'infidel' was evident in a video released by Boko Haram's leader Abubakar Shekau: 'fight the infidels, kill the infidels, gun them, kill them in whichever way you can and take their souls in order to purify the land' (Sahara Reporters, 2018). By invoking the concept of *takfir*, it has become possible to construct the enemy in particular ways through labelling Muslim that does not engage in Boko Haram's *jihad* as a '*Kafir*'⁷, thus making them legitimate targets. This has had serious consequences on a diverse set of individuals and communities in Northeast Nigeria (Zenn and Pieri, 2017: 281). *Takfirism* is an Islamic doctrine that entails the expulsion of so-called nominal or 'moderate' Muslims based on accusations of apostasy (Zenn and Pieri, 2017). From 2015 onwards, the 'blanket' phase has been characterised as a broadened construction of the enemy and significant attacks on Mosques and areas with almost exclusive or high Muslim

⁷ Kafir is an Arabic term meaning 'infidel', 'rejector', 'disbeliever', 'unbeliever', 'nonbeliever'.

populations which has called into question the arguments that Boko Haram is anti-Christian or ethno-religious, with significant attacks directed towards ethnic Kanuri – the so-called ethnic base of Boko Haram – neighbourhoods (Campbell and Harwood, 2018). Some people may argue that the ‘blanket’ phase was an inevitable situation when almost all other priority targets had been displaced from the Northeast.




Figure 4: A graph showing the evolving nature of Boko Haram's targets. Source: Campbell and Harwood (2018).

2.4.2 Boko Haram, Violence and the ‘Mimetic’ Relationship with Counterterrorism

Boko Haram violence has not occurred in a vacuum and has evolved concerning the various measures that the state has deployed to combat the group. At the onset, the group was self-styled as the Nigerian Taliban for their reverence of the Taliban in Afghanistan in its insurgency against the US (Goodson, 2011). The group’s first base in 2004, was in Yobe State, Northeast Nigeria and was named ‘Afghanistan’ to express their intention of replicating a similar model of Islamic rule in this part of

Nigeria (Onuoha, 2012). State response at this time was passive and mostly reserved for situations where members had confrontations with other members of society or had encounters with law enforcement agents. The group also enjoyed the patronage of some political elites regarding offering access to the grassroots during governorship and local elections in Borno State. For example, Buji Foi, who was extrajudicially executed by the police for allegedly serving as a Boko Haram financier, had served as the Commissioner of Religious Affairs in Borno State under Governor Ali Modu Sheriff (Solomon, 2012).

Membership of the group is difficult to ascertain as it has cut across the full strata of society and it is possible to find representations from a diverse set of ethnic and religious identities within Boko Haram. Membership cuts across class – from the wealthy to the impoverished – across ethnicity, i.e. while they have been predominantly Kanuri, there are significant Hausa, Fulani, and other ethnic groups represented within the group's membership, which makes attempts to find a reliable connection extremely difficult (Campbell and Harwood, 2018). Attempts to be consistent have resulted in reported links between Boko Haram and the 'Wretched of the Earth', which in most cases are the *Almajiri*⁸, translated as 'street children' (Adibe, 2014; Onuoha, 2012). While this may be partly true, much of the assumption can be linked to particular intensions to make causal links between poverty and lack of education on one side and a propensity for engagement in violence or more specifically, terrorism on the other side (Abubakar, 2014; Agbiboa, 2015; Agbiboa, 2013c; Akinola, 2015; Anyadike, 2013). These arguments have usually highlighted

⁸ *Almajiri* is an education system in Northern Nigeria which dates back to the Kanem-Bornu Empire. The term is derived from Arabic term, *Al-Muhajirun* which refers to someone who leaves home in search of knowledge. In contemporary use, it usually describes children who travel from home to work as beggars on the streets. According to reports, there are over 7 million *Almajiri* in Nigeria today.

the Northeast corridor as a particularly vulnerable section of the country and statistics of extremely low literacy and poverty levels far below the national average as pointers to why Boko Haram exists (Agbiboa, 2013c). These arguments are convincing *prima facie* but are less so on closer scrutiny.

Nigeria has a history of Islamic ‘fundamentalism’, such as Abubakar Gumi’s Izala Movement⁹, which was established by seasoned intellectuals, and Ibrahim Zakzaky’s Islamic Movement – a Shia militant group – which originated from the Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, Kaduna State (Ben Amara, 2011). Mohamed Yusuf himself was a graduate of theology from the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, and some of the founding members of Boko Haram were students from leading tertiary institutions in Northeast Nigeria who had been inspired by Yusuf’s polemic sermons (Boyle, 2009; Sergie and Johnson, 2014). Some reports have it that their initiation ritual involved public display of a break from Western education by ripping their academic certificates apart before being initiated into the group (Onuoha, 2012: 3).

Mimesis with Counterterrorism

The mimetic relationship with CT is longstanding. Various tactics have been adopted by the other in what can be construed as a ‘game’ to outdo the other. For example, abductions and incommunicado detentions of family members of suspected militants were common actions by state security operatives in their quest to coerce militants into turning themselves in and also deterring future militants who may consider the consequences of their actions on their loved ones more carefully (Campbell and

⁹ The Izala Movement was actually founded by Sheikh Ismaila Idris but was inspired by the teachings and under the blessing of Abubakar Gumi.

Harwood, 2018). However, this approach backfired spectacularly as Boko Haram adopted similar tactics with much more devastating consequences. The culmination of Boko Haram's campaign of abductions was the Chibok Girls abduction which led to the infamous 'Bring Back Our Girls' campaign (Litoff, 2014). The mimesis did not end there with Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau releasing a video afterwards mocking the movement with a parody: 'Bring Back Our Army', alluding to Boko Haram militants who were detained in state prisons across the country (Molly, 2014). It makes analytical sense to view this relationship as (counter-)terrorism rather than examining them independently of the other.




Figure 5: A chart showing estimated Boko Haram related deaths between 2011 and 2018 (Campbell and Harwood, 2018).

As showed in the chart above, the conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian state peaked between 2014 and 2015 and has declined steadily since then, regarding deaths but other aspects of the conflict such as displacement has persisted (Hsu et al., 2017; Campbell and Harwood, 2018).

Funding, Community and Support

Funding is an integral part of any coordinated human political agitation, and several questions have been asked about Boko Haram's sources of funding, especially regarding transnational networks of cash flow and local benefactors. How Boko Haram funds its several activities such as the acquisition of advanced ammunition, the remuneration of recruits, the funding of community services, among others remains unclear. However, there have been several reports that the group generates its funding from various sources such as donations from wealthy politicians in northern Nigeria, financial backing from other international terrorist organisations such as al Qaeda and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), engagement in organised crime such as smuggling, black marketing, bank robberies, and ransom from hostage takings (Onuoha, 2012; Olowosagba, 2014).

Some of the services they render to their members and sympathisers include 'helping the less privileged; sustaining the widows of those that died in the Jihad; giving alms to the poor and needy (Zakat); and for the prosecution of Jihad, among others' (Onuoha, 2012: 3). Bank robberies in Northern Nigeria, mainly at Guarantee Trust Bank (GTB), Access Bank, and other commercial banks in Yobe State, Katsina State, Bauchi State, and other parts of northern Nigeria have been linked to the group (Abubakar, 2014). In total, it is suggested that over thirty of such robberies might have taken place in 2011 alone according to the Nigerian Central Bank (Agbibo, 2013b). The caveat here is that much of these claims are mostly unverifiable reports with sometimes dubious veracity.

What is so 'Religious' about Boko Haram?

Addressing arguments surrounding religious terrorism is important. These arguments have been adopted to religion to make two claims: religion (or religious fundamentalism) causes violence (Lefebure, 2000) and religious terrorism is different from other forms of 'secular' terrorism because of its transcendental goals which are 'uncompromisable' as against 'secular' organisations who have less absolutist and more realistic political objectives (Neumann, 2009; Juergensmeyer, 2003). The connection between religion and violence has an established history in Western thought (Cavanaugh, 2009), especially in terms of arguments about religion being implicated in the various 'religious' wars such as the Thirty Years' War (Parker, 2006), or atrocities such as Spanish Inquisitions (Kamen, 2014), and how it has often been viewed as blessing the various imperial wars and projects (Carey, 2008).

These arguments have been adopted by experts to explain Boko Haram terrorism, rather uncritically. The point here is not that Boko Haram does not adopt religion to advance its goals and objectives, or that militants are not Muslims for that matter, the argument here is that much of these arguments are reductionist and usually ignore various other important factors in favour of religious determinism. To be clear, what is believed by some to distinguish Islamic terrorism from other forms of terrorism such as suicide terrorism has been identified in secular groups such as the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka (Pape, 2005; Pape, 2003). Activities of organisations that are labelled as 'religious' are varied and usually present in various other 'non-religious' groups, which makes such arguments largely unconvincing (Gunning and Jackson, 2011). Therefore, while it is expedient to accept the popular or self-ascribed label of 'religious terrorism' to Boko Haram and

other self-proclaimed religious organisations, it is important to ask what benefits such classifications will offer in understanding the groups better and in dealing with the threats and challenges that they pose.

So far, this chapter has chronicled the origin and evolution of Boko Haram. In the first section, I gave a brief exposition about the origins of terrorism in Africa, terrorism in Nigeria, especially through the repressive measures adopted by Nigerian military regimes against citizens, origin of Boko Haram in Nigeria and also a brief political history of the country. This has provided a platform for the subsequent section which will explore and examine state response to the group's activities.

2.5 Counterterrorism, Militarisation and the Securitisation of Boko Haram

Boko Haram presented a problem to the Nigerian state which was at the same time familiar and novel. Familiar in the sense that there has been a long history of insurrections and conflicts that in one way or the other challenged the supposed sanctity of Nigerian sovereignty, and novel in the sense that with the exception of the Biafra crisis in the late 60s, none of the insurrections had managed to achieve the ferocity that Boko Haram soon managed in the three years that followed the near-crushing 2009 military campaign against the group (Adesoji, 2010; Adesoji, 2011; Aghedo and Osumah, 2012). The most familiar connections that experts and those in the know made at the time was Boko Haram's purported similarity with *Yan Tatsine*, in terms of the shared antipathy that both groups displayed towards constituted authority which probably played a part in the attempt to try old solutions for a new problem thus resulting in the coercive campaign meant to militarily crush the group in 2009 (Loimeier, 2012; Adesoji, 2011).

In the face of this ambivalence, there was an urgent need for the government to define the threat to various audiences, most importantly, the Nigerian public and the international community. It is not inevitable that the 'terrorist' label was assigned to Boko Haram as it could have as well been referred to as a 'rebellion', 'riots', 'religious violence' 'criminality', among others (Heath-Kelly, 2016). From the definition of terrorism, 'political' rather than economic objectives, targeting civilians, sending a message to a wider audience and use or threat of violence are considered to be essential in defining what is terrorist or not. If these are applied to various past and present conflicts in the country, then it is clear that these characteristics are all leitmotifs of conflicts in Nigeria. The various ethnic and religious conflicts in the North and Southern parts of the country, most notably the Kaduna/Enugu, Kano and Plateau 'riots'; the ongoing herdsman/farmer crisis; and other inter-tribal conflicts may be viewed as a form of terrorism. A more critical approach may incorporate the various state actions that have incorporated tactics that can be 'considered' terroristic, opening up possibilities of state terrorism (Blakeley, 2009; Riegler, 2012).

The argument so far is not that everything or every form of violence should be considered terroristic, the central plank of this section so far is that, as with the terrorism concept discussed in the preceding section, there is nothing in Boko Haram that makes it 'terroristic' and as such the labelling of the group as such by the government served to make 'things' possible. The succeeding sections address the various measures and discourses that have served to designate Boko Haram as a terrorist group and how these have interacted to impact on the lived experiences of (in)security of Nigerian publics, especially those domiciled in the Northeast.

Publics can be etymologically traced to the Latin term *publicus*, which refers to the people or the population (Roselaar, 2010). However, this chapter and the entire thesis (except where stated otherwise) adopts a sociological definition of the term as referring to a collective social configuration of people who experience a common challenge or issue. This formation has internal divisions about the best ways to solve this problem, but there is continuous deliberation about the problem (Blumer, 1953: 189). In this sense, publics may refer to Nigerian citizens from the Northeast who are confronted with various forms of violence, state and non-state, 'legitimate' or 'illegitimate', and despite their disparate ideas about how to solve the problem of (in)security, have continuously discussed the problem. It is these 'individual', and 'social' lived experiences of Boko Haram and state counterterrorism, i.e., the discourses on terrorism and CT that this study seeks to explore.

2.5.1 Military Response

Nigerian CT has taken various forms that it has become increasingly difficult to define an exact type of measure or properly adopt a typology within counterterrorism literature to define it. Therefore, disentangling Nigerian counterterrorism in terms of clearly drawing the lines, as has been done within local and international studies on counterterrorism, i.e., coercive vs non-coercive (mainly criminal justice and developmental models), preventive and reactive (the perhaps unsustainable difference between anti-terrorism and counterterrorism) and hard vs soft CT, is a difficult and usually unconvincing endeavour. The overarching argument of this section is that Nigerian counterterrorism has evolved over the years incorporating various measures that can encompass the spectrum of typologies such as Crelinsten's five broad typologies namely coercive, proactive, persuasive, defensive and long-term

approaches. (2014: 2). At various times, Nigerian CT has involved elements of coercion (primarily the army), prevention (boosting intelligence), persuasion (attempts to get insurgents to abandon violence), defence (hardening targets and bolstering resilience), and longer term programmes that address so-called 'root' causes with the Almajiri school system (Taiwo, 2013).

The initial crackdown on BH insurgents in 2009, was primarily a coercive approach which involved an attempt to militarily crush the insurgency in the same manner that the state had managed to end earlier insurrections, most notably the *Yan Tatsine* riots of the late 70s and early eighties (Hickey, 1984; Hiskett, 1987). With the failure of this 'militaristic' approach to totally destroy the group, especially with the well-publicised extrajudicial atrocities by the Nigerian forces against suspected militants, there was an urgent need to adopt a more durable and legal framework which could be more comprehensive and better deal with the increasingly deadly attacks carried out by a resurgent militancy.

2.6 Legal Framework for Countering Boko Haram

Although Boko Haram activities can be traced to 2002 – 1995 by some alternative versions – there was no coherent approach to tackle the group during this period and the group's activities were generally treated as normal forms of criminality or religious fundamentalism, as with other forms of ethno-religious conflicts that the state had witnessed in the past. The view of the group during this period was that of religious fanatics, and much of the measures adopted to combat the group usually involved the police and on occasions when the police were overwhelmed, the military. The military had often served as a last resort when non-state actors seemed

to be too formidable for police forces (Comolli, 2015). This was the case with the Yan Tatsine riots and various heavy-handed crackdowns on insurrections such as the *Odi* and *Zaki-Biam* Massacres in Bayelsa and Benue States respectively (Albert, 2003; Hickey, 1984; Isichei, 1987). Usually, the police are re-introduced to deal with the aftermath regarding detention and working with the courts to conduct prosecution and conviction, if necessary.

The main legal framework that exclusively dealt with terrorism in Nigeria as a distinct form of criminal activity was the Terrorism [Prevention] Act 2011, which was amended two years later as the Terrorism [Prevention] Act 2013. This Act established a legal framework for dealing with terrorism and prosecuting all related crimes. The Terrorism Prevention Act (ACT No. 10) was ratified by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in June 2011 (National Assembly, 2013). This act established new far-reaching powers for the government in their bid to counter terrorism and other related offences. This 'bill gives the police and security forces powers to seal off property or vehicles without a search warrant and allows judges to order the detention of suspects for up to 30 days if they feel it is in the interests of public safety' (Eboh, 2011).

According to these new powers, terrorism-related cases are now to be dealt with by the Federal High Courts with possibilities of punishments of up to a thirty year prison sentence, 'depending on the severity of the charges' (Eboh, 2011). The bill established new conditions for the violation of privacy laws in terms of allowing law enforcement agents such as the 'police and government security officials the right to access post, emails, phone calls or other data if they believe it is in the interests of national security' (Eboh, 2011; National Assembly, 2011). The 2011 Terrorism

Prevention Act was emended in 2013 to provide for 'extra-territorial application of the Act and strengthening of terrorist financing offences; and for related matters' (National Assembly, 2013).

Besides direct government legislation, there have been concerns about certain regulations enacted by governmental institutions and organisations (Akinbi, 2015). For example, the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) which organises a one-year mandatory national service for youths in the country recently banned *burkas* (Muslim head veil) at orientation camps citing security concerns. This drew the ire of certain Islamic rights groups such as 'The Muslim Rights Concern, MURIC' (Premium Times, 2015). The group condemned the action as 'reckless, baseless and preposterous' (Premium Times, 2015). Also, they labelled the declaration of the ban as a display of 'power drunkenness' and an explicit act of 'Islamophobia' by the NYSC Director's General (Premium Times, 2015).

In June 2011, the Nigerian state constituted 'a special military task force in Maiduguri consisting of the army, navy, air force, Department of State Security and the Nigerian Police Force' (Solomon, 2012: 7). This Joint Task Force (JTF) operation was codenamed 'Operation Restore Order' and was specifically targeted at insurgents in the northeast with the main objective of restoring order in the affected communities (Onuoha, 2012: 5). Their achievements included the arrest of key members of Boko Haram such as Ali Saleh, with at least five others in Borno in 2011 (Onuoha, 2012). The partially effective stop and search methods have also been applauded by sections of the population, likewise the ban on the use of motorcycles which had become a weapon of choice for hit-and-run attacks by the militants (Onuoha, 2012).

When it became apparent that the deployment of the JTF did not abate the level of violence, the next step was a declaration of a state of emergency by the federal government in the most affected states in north-eastern Nigeria in May 2013 (Sergie and Johnson, 2014). According to the sitting president at the time, Dr Goodluck Jonathan, 'the governors and other political office holders in the affected states will continue to discharge their constitutional responsibilities' (Irvine, 2013). This was less totalitarian than the previous two states of emergency that the country had witnessed under 'President Olusegun Obasanjo [...] in 2004 and 2006' where 'he removed democratically elected governors and installed appointed administrators to manage the states, both former military officers' (Irvine, 2013; Botelho, 2013). The invocation of a state of emergency paved the way for a massive deployment of military personnel to enforce the constitution and return normalcy to the conflict areas (Sergie and Johnson, 2014).

By restricting free movement, the government believed that the operation of the group would be severely hindered. This move severely hindered the capacity of the sect members to mount attacks in the main cities, although their operations were unhindered in the countryside as attacks continued (Sergie and Johnson, 2014). Furthermore, to restrict the movement of the insurgents and the flow of ammunitions into the country, the government shut its 'borders with Cameroon and Niger Republic, [...] and enforced the] deportation of illegal immigrants mostly Nigeriens and Chadians' (Onuoha, 2012: 5). Additionally, strict curfews were enforced on states in the northeast namely Maiduguri, Adamawa and Yobe. In total, the government established a thirty thousand-strong presence comprising the military,

police, and other security agencies in these communities in a bid to implement the security policy in those affected states (Solomon, 2012).

2.6.1 State-Community Partnership

Besides the formal security measures that existed or that were put in place to tackle the Boko Haram crisis, there have been informal security measures such as local partnerships with vigilantes and hunters. Initially, the partnership was based on information gathering where local expertise and knowledge was exploited to gather actionable intelligence which could serve to augment the counterterrorism efforts of the military. This informal set up has since been formalised, and the Civilian Joint Task Force has been officially recognised by the federal and state governments as an integral part of the fight against Boko Haram.

The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) has supplied local knowhow in the battle against insurgents concerning offering intelligence to serve as a guide to military action. They were offered some training and equipped with machetes, guns and cudgels. However, due to allegations of human rights abuses by the CJTF, especially the widespread use of torture, maiming and extrajudicial executions levelled against them (Sergie and Johnson, 2014), their legitimacy has been questioned. However, Borno State's attorney general has claimed that they were duly registered and are constantly monitored by the authorities to prevent abuse of power (Imam, 2015).

The idea to establish a CJTF was conceived in 2013 when a local young man named Lawal Jafar dared to challenge a suspected Boko Haram member in Maiduguri (Eze and Akena, 2016). He eventually got assistance from other youths, which led to the

apprehension of the suspect. This singular display of courage inspired several other community youths, and it marked 'the beginning of the communal involvement in the fight against Boko Haram, and the birth of CJTF' (Imam, 2015). At this stage, they were operating independently without any organisation of support by the state; however, when several other youths declared an interest, the Borno state government stepped in to recognise them (TRAC, 2015). They were initially 'registered as members of the Borno Youth Empowerment Scheme (BOYES)' although a subsequent training exercise for two thousand male youths from all 15 wards in Maiduguri established them officially as CJTF with a monthly stipend of fifteen thousand Naira¹⁰ (Imam, 2015; TRAC, 2015). While they have been accused of engaging in torture and other very extreme human rights violations, their official duties only require them to act as informants for the JTF or the local police (TRAC, 2015).

To an extent, this could be viewed as citizens operating as detectives or as stakeholder security partnerships where citizens become responsabilized in such relationships to actively participate in the security process (Jarvis and Lister, 2010). While these studies were based on European contexts, they offer some insight into citizen-state relationships when states expect citizens to take an active role in what becomes constructed as a civic responsibility. In a fully blown insurgency like Nigeria where insurgents sometimes overwhelm the military, this could have significant consequences, especially in how communities that are considered to partner with

¹⁰ Fifteen thousand Naira is approximately \$41 at the time of writing.

the government become disproportionately targeted as an attempt by the group to make an example of such communities to deter others.

The approach of the Federal Government can be regarded as heavily militarised in a war model of counterterrorism centred around an offensive approach (Crelinsten, 2009; Pedahzur and Ranstorp, 2001). However, measures have differed across states. For example, in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, the measures employed have been more defensive including hardening of targets, mounting strict roadblocks at strategic areas and deploying JTF patrols. Banks, Federal Ministries, public institutions in the FCT have also been reinforced with metal detectors and round-the-clock security guards (Enietan-Matthews, 2015; The Global Initiative on Civil Society and Conflict, 2015).

The deployment of mainly military personnel to the affected areas has prompted some authors to argue that military solutions are often counterproductive (for example, see Agbiboa, 2014). This sentiment echoes a cliché that ‘there is no military solution’ to terrorism or insurgencies (Gupta, 2002: 86; Germani and Kaarthikeyan, 2005: 15). Although, this has been regarded as a myth by some authors, especially considering the lack of adequate empirical evidence to back it up (for example, see Peters, 2011). For example, Singh (2010) suggests that Sri Lanka’s defeat of the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) contradicts this belief. However, this argument ignores the ethics of conflicts such as principles of *jus in bello* that should guide the conduct of the military during conflict. Reports have suggested that the draconian approach of the Nigerian military has led to deaths, and ill-treatment of innocent locals and these human rights abuses could alienate local populations whose cooperation is vital to the success of the counterinsurgency

or counterterrorism campaign (Amnesty International, 2015c; Amnesty International, 2014a; Amnesty International, 2014c).

2.6.2 Alleged Civilian Atrocities

Some actions by the Nigerian military, police and other security agencies are alleged to have resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths, directly or indirectly (Aghedo and Osumah, 2012: 865). Furthermore, Aghedo and Osumah (2012) argue that their heavy-handedness exacerbates insecurity in the country. This heavy-handedness may be as a result of the state's treatment of the militants as members of the 'international al-Qaeda movement' (Campbell, 2014: 1) which, as discussed, implies that religious terrorists are intransigent, thus making their annihilation the only viable option for states. These labels may impact on the security of particular communities in particular ways where security personnel are deployed to implement aggressive CT policies, in remote areas without adequate support systems and local knowledge, thus hampering CT success.

While these allegations have been well publicised by international NGOs they are often reported from a perspective that is not neutral. It sometimes serves to reinforce particular discourses of 'illiberal' African states regarding contrasting non-Western (mainly US-led coalitions) CT campaigns with so-called Western CT campaigns, which are usually considered liberal (and soft) or 'necessary' when such actions fall outside the realm of permissibility within international law. Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib atrocities come to mind and other forms of torture techniques such as waterboarding or avoiding international law through extraordinary rendition programmes (Satterhwaite, 2006).

Although while not yet proven within the Nigerian context, the gross human rights violations may play into the narratives of these militants and could become a driver of support and sympathy for their cause (Campbell, 2014). This has occasionally been pounced upon by the group in propaganda videos shared with the media (Ansaru, 2015). Boko Haram has also succeeded in provoking severe retaliations by state's forces in the form of crackdowns on communities which further alienates these publics and possibly drives them towards the militants (Mohammed, 2014).

In a particular incident in April 2013, the Nigerian military allegedly extra-judicially executed over 180 unarmed locals and subsequently set over two thousand houses ablaze in a community in northeast Nigeria, in retribution for an earlier fatal attack on a military patrol 'at Baga in Kukawa local government area of Borno State' (Mohammed, 2014: 26). These are allegations that are often denied but antecedents such as the massacres in Odi village in Delta State, and Logo and Zaki-Biam local government areas of Benue State reveal that there are times when the military may have adopted some heavy-handed tactics in dealing with acts of criminality (BBC, 2001; Mohammed, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2001).

Soldiers have also been accused of widespread robbery and looting in conflict areas. For example, it was reported that in Maiduguri, JTF officers invaded homes in the communities harassing people, snatching their mobile phones, and causing widespread panic as the villagers watched in disbelief. They later recounted that it had become 'unfortunate that the people deployed to protect' them had become the perpetrators of such dastardly acts (Mohammed, 2014: 26). Similarly, soldiers were

accused of the theft of the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand Naira (N250,000) by a certain widow in Borno State (Mohammed, 2014).

The atrocities perpetrated by the Joint Task Force were so grave that community leaders and local interest groups demanded their immediate withdrawal, and a subsequent comprehensive investigation (Mohammed, 2014). While there are other actors such as local vigilantes and neighbouring countries when Boko Haram operates on their territories, the main actors of relevance within Nigeria are the JTF and the Department of State Services (DSS) which is also known as the State Security Service (SSS). Also, during the initial rebellion in 2009, before the constitution of the JTF, the police and the military operated independently. It is believed that Nigerian forces have lost the battle for the 'hearts and minds' of locals which is a view that has been reiterated by locals in interviews with journalists and international organisations (Mohammed, 2014: 28). For example, according to a local in one of the affected communities, 'Adamu Mohammed of Bulum-Kuttu: "We don't have [a] problem with Boko Haram; our problem is the police and the military that harass and kill our innocent people. They call every Muslim a Boko Haram"' (cited in Mohammed, 2014: 28).

There have also been substantiated allegations levelled against Nigerian forces of the murder of male youths as well as the 'raping of married women and young girls' (Mohammed, 2014). Due to the inability of the Nigerian forces to stem the tide of the insurgency, coupled with the transnational nature of the operational area of Boko Haram, a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was constituted by countries in Western and central Africa. The MNJTF is a 9000-strong force and is made up of forces from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Republic of Benin.

2.7 Human Rights Concerns/ Impact on individuals and communities

The conflict between the militants and the JTF has resulted in severe suffering for individuals in communities in the northeast due to their inability to carry out normal life's activities. These communities live under extreme fear from the militants, the Joint Task Force and also the Civilian Joint Task Force that not only act as informants to the JTF but have also engaged in punishment of suspected offenders and recently publicised severe abuse of human rights including waterboarding a terrorist suspect (Sahara Reporters, 2015; Amnesty International, 2015d; The Citizen Bureau, 2015). Such acts against suspects who may likely be innocent have further alienated communities and weakened community relations with the state (Solomon, 2012).

The direct impact of the ongoing insurgency is difficult to quantify and this more so when it comes to the number of deaths. The first problem is the inconsistency involved in the reporting of these incidents and the difficulty in verifying the claims made about some of the victims. For example, suspects may have been killed with accusations of being militants, and these are largely unverifiable, as was the case with the attack on military barrack in Giwa, Borno State where several civilians were killed in attempts to repel an ambitious Boko Haram attack (Aghedo and Osumah, 2012; Zenn, 2014). Many suspected militants have died in police or military custody in controversial circumstances with the most high profile of these being the death of Boko Haram's founding leader, Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 (Felter, 2018; Comolli, 2015). Further accusations have involved enforced disappearances and the torture against suspects which makes suspicion a key driver of insecurity for many in the Northeast (Amnesty International, 2014b: 4; Alao et al., 2012).

As the discussion so far has shown, the implementation of CT has had various consequences on different communities in a variety of ways. The points that have been defined so far are neither neutral nor a single truth but rather a version of the reality of CT in the Northeast which has undergone various levels of interpretation and reinterpretation. It is also the case that most accounts are meta-accounts, i.e. they are accounts of accounts which then makes it necessary to understand the various ways in which those who have experienced (counter-)terrorism in the Northeast, construct their experiences of the phenomena. The argument here is that their various versions of reality will help provide a better in-depth understanding of the impact of terrorism and CT on their (in)security in the Northeast.

2.7.1 Allegations of Atrocities

According to an Amnesty International report, 'more than 600 people, mainly former detainees, were killed by the security forces following the attack by Boko Haram on the military barracks in Maiduguri on 14 March' (Amnesty International, 2015b: 4). These actions have been regarded as 'crimes against humanity and war crimes' (Amnesty International, 2014b: 4; Comolli, 2015). Furthermore, there are serious concerns that government forces and 'Boko Haram are committing serious violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and human rights abuses amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity' (Amnesty International, 2015b: 4; Comolli, 2015). Under such circumstances where allegations are made against governments, it is an obligation of the government that an investigation into the matter is initiated and culprits are punished appropriately, within the provisions of international law. According to critics and human rights organisations, the Nigerian government has

been reluctant to properly investigate these atrocities and bring the perpetrators to justice (Amnesty International, 2015a; Comolli, 2015).

2.7.2 (Counter-)Terrorism and Displacement

Displaced citizens in Nigeria include internationally and internally displaced persons. Some citizens have crossed the border to neighbouring countries such as Niger and Cameroon, while others have migrated further south to states that experience less violence. It is important to note that both actions and inactions of the state can impact on the security of individuals and communities significantly. For example, there have been cases where communities have accused the state of negligence, especially when the military has been totally overrun, with dire consequences for local communities that were supportive of the state's CT project which required citizens to serve as informants and 'stakeholders' in the pursuit of their security (Jarvis and Lister, 2010). Besides the immediate civilian casualties that these led to through BH retributions, these successes have served to reinforce and prolong the insurgency through providing ammunition, weapons and morale which are required for the perpetuation of the insurgency (Vanguard, 2017). A very notable incident occurred when at least 480 Nigerian soldiers crossed the border into Cameroon to escape from better equipped and motivated militants around the peak of the insurgency in August 2014 (BBC Africa, 2014b).

There have been 'revolts' and 'mutinies' by junior officers against their superiors or commanding officers in what they have labelled as unfair working conditions that give undue advantage to insurgents. In one of those revolts, soldiers revolted against their commanding officer after being coerced to fight against their wishes which led

to heavy casualties of their colleagues. They revolted against their commanding officer after referring to their involvement in CT as a 'suicide mission' (Associated Press, 2014). The most significant objection involved soldiers of the 7th Division of the Nigerian Army who refused to follow orders to fight Boko Haram citing similar reasons of Boko Haram's superior firepower and neglect by their superior officers, for objection. These objections have often been met with severe punishments, usually the death penalty for the masterminds and extended prison sentences for others at a military tribunal (BBC Africa, 2014a). In one of these cases, 54 soldiers were sentenced to death by firing squad in a military court after they were charged and found guilty of 'mutiny' and 'cowardice' in the campaign against BH (BBC Africa, 2014a).

2.7.3 Internal and External Displacement

With the increasing inability and incapacity of the army to repel Boko Haram attacks and the retributions that followed Boko Haram victories, many citizens from the Northeast have had to flee from their communities (Campbell, 2014). While there are debates and definitional disagreement about the concept of displacement, for this study, it can be broadly understood as the forceful dislodgement of people from their homes or communities by conflict or natural disasters (Mooney, 2005). Displaced persons are usually categorised – based on boundaries – into 'internally' and 'externally' displaced persons or refugees which is not just a nominal differentiation but with legal and political significance (Deng, 1999). This boundary is difficult to sustain in the Nigerian case as most Nigerian citizens have traversed the border with Cameroon various times to escape from insurgent or military violence only to return to Nigerian territory, especially states where there are no ongoing hostilities. In short,

they have shuffled between being IDPs – within camps in Nigeria – and refugees – at camps in Cameroon (Emmanuelar, 2015).

Civilians have fled from conflict areas, especially in the Northeast, with many finding refuge at IDP camps and host communities both within Nigeria and in neighbouring countries like Niger, Chad and Cameroon (Amnesty International, 2014a; Amnesty International, 2014c). According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), it is estimated that as of the first quarter of 2015, over 1.5 million civilians have been displaced in Nigeria, but reports in 2018 show that the number now stands at over 2 million citizens that have been displaced within Nigeria (IDMC, 2015; UNHCR, 2018). Besides Boko Haram and CT, other factors such as communal clashes, mainly herdsmen crisis and natural disasters have contributed to the mounting numbers of internal displacement (IDMC, 2015; Chigozie, 2012).

The point here is not to identify who is responsible for these displacements in order to apportion blame, but rather to attempt to understand experiences of (counter-)terrorism through various accounts and constructions of (in)security in everyday life. Further structural factors such as poverty and exclusion are widespread across Northeast Nigeria which makes attempts to ascertain cause and effect not only extremely difficult but a dubious endeavour. While the national poverty incidence average is 54.4%, Yobe, Bauchi, Adamawa and Gombe have a mean of 74.2% which puts them at a significantly higher poverty level than the national average (UNICEF, 2008). Beyond the displacement of citizens and worsening of their (in)security experiences, some authors have also argued that overreaction on the part of the state or its allies in the fight against terrorism can actually lead to more terrorism by generating sympathy for the terrorists in what is generally known as the

'blow back' effect (Scahill, 2011). This becomes a vicious cycle that can further impact on the lives of individuals and communities negatively.

2.8 Lived Experiences of (Counter-)Terrorism in Nigeria

This study makes four original contributions to current debates surrounding terrorism and counterterrorism. First, it makes an empirical contribution from the ongoing (in)security situation in Nigeria. While there have been studies that have addressed terrorism and counterterrorism in Nigeria these have usually been devoid of the views of people who experience insecurity in their everyday lives. They have been spoken for rather than spoken to or allowed to speak for themselves (Jarvis and Lister, 2013b). Second, it makes a methodological contribution to security research through adopting critical ethnographic methods to research security which attempts to capture the thick description of people's experiences of (counter-terrorism) in Nigeria, paying attention to their local contexts and also their culture (Geertz, 2008).

This bottom-up approach addresses the vernacular dimension of lived (in)security experiences and thus re-centres individuals and communities as security's referent. Third, it makes a conceptual contribution through combining various critical perspectives such as poststructuralism, postcolonialism and feminism and also adopting discursive psychological techniques to examine how they construct their experiences of security and how they position themselves within talk (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Finally, it makes a normative contribution by engaging with the experiences of the marginalised regarding examining how they interpret the world and how they express support or resist various security policies and practices through discourse. Linking this with the earlier conceptual and methodological

commitments, language is a form of social action in that people do things with words (Austin, 1975). To achieve these objectives, this study engages with those individuals and communities, especially IDPs, in identifying how they make sense of (counter-)terrorism and how these are constructed in everyday conversations.

2.9 Conclusion

In Chapter 1, I introduced this thesis by addressing the background of (counter-)terrorism in Nigeria, the research questions that drive this study, my original contribution to knowledge, my research aims and problems, the thesis structure which addressed how this will progress, the central argument which provided my overarching arguments and the importance of my study.

This chapter has taken this further by situating my research within the historical, political, social and cultural context in Nigeria, while situating BH and CT within broader terrorism and counterterrorism literature and debates. The chapter argues that proper critical analysis must step out of the status quo in a Coxian sense and ask questions about how that system came to be, rather than trying to fix such problems. The chapter also argued that Nigerian CT has been inclusive of a diverse array of practices which makes it difficult to pigeonhole it within the main typologies available.

Finally, the chapter argues that rather than being out there, terrorism should be construed as a label which means that there is nothing essential about terrorism but rather a label that can be applied to groups, which achieves various aims. This is evident in how many definitions adopted by states exclude the possibilities of state

terrorism, which means that the same tactic can be adopted by states without such acts being considered as an act of terrorism.

Chapter 3 addresses the various gaps in academic literature by discussing the main themes in counterterrorism and terrorism research, examining the legal dimension of (counter-)terrorism, discussing its various interpretations as discriminatory towards sections of the population (especially minorities), discusses the vernacular turn in security studies, and examines the contribution of ethnographic research.

Chapter Three: Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

3.1 Introduction

In **Chapter 2**, I addressed the historical and political context of (counter-)terrorism in Nigeria through addressing the evolution of Boko Haram and Nigerian CT and how both phenomena have been entangled in a politics of mimesis which has had significant implications for the lived experiences of publics. The lack of historical understanding of both phenomena and especially, the concern with problem-solving has occluded opportunities to examine Boko Haram and Nigerian CT through engaging in a proper critical study that will examine lay discourses on both CT and Boko Haram to identify how people construct their accounts. The overarching argument was that the initial response to the initial phase of Boko Haram insurgency was almost exclusively militaristic. Subsequent concerns about the outcomes of this militaristic approach in terms of doubts about its effectiveness and the implications of the draconian practices on human rights and influence in alienation of communities that could then be open to cooperating with insurgents rather than the state led to a more comprehensive approach. This led to more concerns with ideology and non-military solutions such as deradicalisation and counter-extremism.

In this chapter, I take this further by engaging with prevailing perspectives in literature, to identify the lacuna that this study will be filling and advancing the conceptual framework that will be adopted to fill this gap. Through situating this study in the broader academic literature on terrorism and counterterrorism, the first contention is that, while there have been significant research on both terrorism and counterterrorism – like the lacuna identified in the previous chapter – much of these

studies have not usually studied both phenomena together, either prioritizing the former (mainstream studies) or the latter (critical studies) which misses the relational dimension of both phenomena, especially through how people position both phenomena side by side, comparing and contrasting them.

From contemporary literature on terrorism and counterterrorism, main themes are usually problem solving in that that attempt to identify the various ways in which terrorism challenges the state and subsequently proffer solutions about the best ways in which these problems can be solved. The main themes in this regard are mainly deterrence studies, effectiveness literature and leadership decapitation, which are all concerned with national security, thus ignoring sub-state levels of (in)security such as communities and individuals. With realism's prioritisation of 'power' politics, 'smaller' states in the Global South, especially Africa are *invisibilised* in these studies.

Other studies relating to a more liberal tradition has challenged the propensity of deterrence, effectiveness, and leadership decapitation research of trading liberty of individual citizens for the security of states, thus coining the 'security vs liberty' debate. Counterterrorism projects that have prioritised national security over liberty risks creating more insecurity for individual citizens. A more critical version of this liberty-based research such as the Welsh School and the human security approach reposition the individual as the *referent* of security and thus emphasise the important of preserving individual liberty and rights. Finally, research that have attempted to address language and the everyday experiences of lay citizens have made important contributions to research on terrorism and counterterrorism through examining vernacular discourses of people who experience insecurity. While these

contributions are significant, they currently suffer from a similar 'Westerncentrism' as the other studies discussed above through not including experiences from the Global South. This Chapter addresses how this thesis will go about filling these gaps in the literature.

On the conceptual front, this chapter situates this study within critical terrorism studies. The chapter adopts a composite of discursive psychology and postcolonial theory to properly interrogate African subjectivities within a postcolonial condition. The discursive psychological approach combines insights from poststructuralist and symbolic interactionist approaches to examine how people construct various versions of the world and position themselves through text and talk. Interactionist discursive psychology was proposed by Potter and Wetherell and is a combination of poststructuralism and symbolic interactionism (micro-analysis). Poststructuralism contributes a critical disposition towards labels and so-called objective 'facts' and helps to lay bare, the workings of power, especially in its relationship with knowledge. Postcolonialism and African feminism offer to critique to the unequal power relations that characterise global politics and is used to show how these are not neutral but rather historically constructed; the latter offers a nuanced feminist critique of the power relations within and without Africa.

The chapter starts by addressing the main theoretical framework for this thesis, discursive psychology and then proceeds to discuss their various insights it draws from broader social constructionist approaches to knowledge. It then proceeds to the form of synthetic discursive psychology adopted within this research which is a combination of poststructuralist and interactionist perspectives; and finally

addresses the contributions of vernacular approach, postcolonialism and African feminism to this study.

3.2 Main Themes in Contemporary Counterterrorism Literature

This section addresses the main themes within counterterrorism literature and starts by examining the studies on counterterrorism effectiveness which usually centre on either the capacity of specific counterterrorism measures such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and other forms of precision strikes, or practices such as leadership decapitation (cite Jordan Wilner) and house demolitions to achieve CTs main objectives – as set by its initiators (state or non-state actors), or a more historical analysis of effectiveness. In the latter, larger sample size is adopted over an extended period to examine how terrorist organisations have demised or been defeated (deliberate human effort or agency) or conditions conducive to their cessation of existence (structural causes). These studies generally fall within the first category of theories which seek to explain a phenomenon, i.e., terrorism within this context. This review will proceed along these lines before advancing towards interpretivist approaches to security.

What can be described as ‘traditional’ security studies may be a source of debate (Jackson et al., 2011), it is possible to differentiate international relations approaches and in extension, security studies along two broad lines that were identified by Robert Keohane (1988) at his International Studies Association presidential speech in 1988, i.e. ‘rationalist’ and ‘reflectivist’ approaches which have characterised the Fourth Great Debate¹¹ in International Relations. In this sense, both political realism

¹¹ This may be considered the Third Great Debate by some experts who consider the Inter-Paradigm Debate not to be a Great Debate at all.

in its various incarnations (classical and structural) and liberalism (internationalist and institutionalist) can be regarded as both been integral in the historical arguments that have moulded the International Relations discipline since its 'founding' as an academic discipline almost a century ago, at the University of Aberystwyth, Wales in 1919 (Smith et al., 2010).

A more convincing classification which has broader relevance is the bifurcation of theory into 'problem-solving' and 'critical theory' by Robert Cox (1981). While the former takes the world the way it is, regarding finding problems within the status quo to proffer solutions that can ensure its smooth functioning, the latter steps out of the status quo and ask questions about how it came to be (Cox, 1981; Moolakkattu, 2009). 'Traditional' or 'mainstream' IR can be classified as those approaches that fall into the former category while critical approaches fall into the latter. The next section briefly addresses the main themes in contemporary counterterrorism literature to adequately situate my thesis within broader IR literature which will serve as a point of departure for a critical inquiry on the impact of (counter-)terrorism in Nigeria (Smith et al., 2010).

The first prominent theme within counterterrorism literature relates to various concerns about the 'effectiveness' of counterterrorism more broadly Lum et al., (2006), Jones and Libicki (2008), and van Um and PISOIU (2014; 2011) have addressed questions relating to counterterrorism effectiveness more broadly. Authors such as Jordan (2009) Jordan (2014) Johnston (2012) Price (2012) have investigated the effectiveness of targeted killing as a counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tactic. Jordan (2009) examines the effectiveness of leadership decapitation by distinguishing tactics that work from those that do not, thus making

a case for precision strikes that may serve to decapitate terrorism groups, thus weakening their capacity to carry out normal activities or worse, cease to exist. In a way, these studies all suggest that leadership is important and it is possible to defeat terrorist groups militarily.

Wilner (2007; 2010; 2011) makes a case for deterrent strikes or what can be described as pre-emptive counterterrorism where groups are targeted through attacking things that terrorists attach immense value to. However, Wilner (2007; 2011) himself rightly acknowledges the difficulty of dealing with non-state actors such as al Qaeda as would be the case with state actors such as the USSR, Afghanistan or Iraq. To resolve this 'statist' conundrum in realist reasoning, he suggests that it is possible to identify 'proxies', i.e. things that 'terrorists hold dear' that can be targeted as a message generator to insurgents. For example, this could be family members; their communities may be legitimate targets in this sense.

It could be argued that this may not serve to deter suicide terrorists who are successful when they are killed in the attack, it may be argued that such actions may deter future suicide terrorists from engaging in attacks with reflection on the dire repercussions for those they have left behind. This line of reasoning is advanced further by Benmelech et al. (2013) who uses Israel's counterterrorism project and in particular, Israeli Defence Force's (IDF) house demolitions as a 'deterrent' tactic for would-be suicide terrorists. Benmelech et al., (2013: 1) emphatically conclude 'that selective violence is an effective tool to combat terrorist groups, whereas indiscriminate violence backfires'. What the debate is here is not about the normative dimension of these strikes or the potential for civilian casualties, but rather debates about 'effectiveness' of particular methods in achieving deterrence, which reveals

remnants of Cold War theorising where enemies were state actors, and it was quite possible to identify who the enemy was.

Although these studies ask questions about counterterrorism, their commitment to realism and in extension, the preponderance of the state as the referent object and guarantor of security in international relations (especially powerful ones), limits the scope of their research. Furthermore, to various degrees, they display a very narrow and parsimonious understanding of security. Since security is understood in statist terms such as serving the national interest and achieving national security for particular European and American countries, while unsettling and worsening the security experiences of non-Western societies, it could also be argued that they do not directly address the impact of terrorism and counterterrorism on individuals and communities, but rather, the effectiveness of the latter to combat the former.

From a more realist perspective, the primary concern has been the state which is a product of IR's mainstream positivist epistemology which aspires to science and attempts to develop testable hypotheses and finding patterns that can be generalised (Smith et al., 2010). As already argued, the unit of analysis is almost always the state, thus delimiting the type of questions that could be asked by researchers, the type of methods that could be adopted to obtain data and also the type of knowledge claims that can be made by researchers. Questions such as the ones asked by this thesis, i.e. how individuals and communities understand and discuss (in)security in their everyday lives will be considered not of paramount importance. The ultimate objective is how to conduct research that serves the purpose of 'national' security (Balzacq et al., 2010; Brown, 1986). Research must identify problems that threaten the existence and 'survival' of the state.

Other mainstream approaches have researched what type of macroeconomic and political factors or conditions could lead to terrorism. In this sense, they tend to investigate or link particular determining factors with the occurrence of terrorism, such as poverty, lack of education and political grievances, among others (Agbiboa, 2015; Agbiboa, 2013c; Egiegba Agbiboa, 2013). Advancing from the previous 'statist' lens through which terrorism is viewed, particularly failed, failing, fragile or rogue states are considered dangerous regarding constituting potential breeding grounds for terrorists. Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, and Libya among others have been classified within this category. Counterterrorism then becomes a part of a broader 'humanitarian', 'developmental' or 'democratisation' project which primarily involves stabilising those communities not because of the threat they constitute to their citizens but rather, how they serve as sanctuaries for groups that may have hostile intentions towards the west (Afoaku, 2017; Goodson, 2011; Solomon, 2013).

Highlighting the threats that these 'fragile' states in the Global South pose to the Global North, Dempsey (2006: 2) suggests that threats from terrorists who operate from fragile states such as such as Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia could pose to the US is enormous not only in terms of one-off suicide attacks such as the September 11 attacks but also potentially more devastating ones with the possibilities of acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction (Dempsey, 2006). Bachmann and Hönke (2010: 100) take it further by examining the security-development nexus, and its role in counterterrorism and antiterrorism efforts in Kenya, with concerns about how the threats they may pose to the West.

The fear of Western countries (primarily, the US, UK and France) is that these 'fragile' states may be the next Afghanistan, acting as a springboard for terrorists to

‘commit transnational attacks’ on countries in the Global North (Piazza, 2008: 469). While empirical links between state fragility and terrorism are tenuous at best – for example, studies by Dolek (2008), Hehir (2007) and Ruiz (2013) all prove otherwise – the more important argument here from a postcolonial perspective is the invisibility of those citizens who experience insecurity. It can be argued that they do not exist outside the rational choice calculations of powerful countries, sometimes in connivance with elites in these so-called fragile countries (Goodson, 2011; Solomon, 2013).

Rights-based studies have highlighted various incongruences between the state’s commitments and their conduct in achieving ‘national’ security (Michaelson, 2006). Liberal and human security approaches are very prominent in this regard with the former primarily concerned with what is generally known as the ‘security vs liberty’ debate (Adelman et al., 2007; Donnelly and Whelan, 2017; Foot, 2005; Michaelson, 2006), whilst the latter – depending on the genre – has concentrated on individual insecurities, outside only counterterrorism and terrorism but also ‘[p]overty, population displacement, HIV/AIDS, environmental breakdown and social exclusion (Duffield, 2006: 2), which all impact on the (in)security of individuals and communities. These concerns are important in that they significantly affect the quality of life of citizens in many countries, especially in the Global South, for example in Syria, Uganda and Nigeria where conflicts have displaced millions of people from their homes leading to widespread human suffering (Council Norwegian Refugee, 2002; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2015b; Mooney, 2005).

Despite these attempts to evaluate or assess the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures or examine the best methods to end terrorism, there is considerable

pessimism towards the concept of measurement from a critical perspective (Jackson et al., 2011; van Um and Pisoiu, 2014; Spencer, 2006) or the Eurocentric nature of these projects and their representations from a postcolonial perspective (Said, 2012). Van Um and Pisoiu (2014: 2) assert that critical authors display much scepticism towards 'the use of this concept in general, and the possibility to operationalise and measure it in particular'. In terms of the utility of such endeavours, Spencer (2006: 186) emphasises the unpredictability of terrorists which potentially devalues the utility of specific discernible scientific patterns from past activities; they operate in a 'random-like and uneven' manner which makes generalisability and postulations difficult for what can be considered to be a moving target. The pursuit of observable trends and patterns in the absence of reliable primary data or consistent typologisation, measuring effectiveness or incorporating such findings into future counterterrorism endeavours become even more arduous (van Um and Pisoiu, 2014; Benmelech et al., 2013).

What is evident in these accounts and research endeavours are the a priori assumptions about terrorism and counterterrorism. The identity of 'terrorists' and 'counterterrorists' are treated as given and thus taken for granted. This ontology of the identity of both BH and the state as being out there significantly impacts on the various questions that are permissible and ways of 'knowing'. What this implies is that these researchers ask the wrong questions in attempts to explain terrorism, which is based on Sun Tzu's compelling dictum: 'If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles' (Tzu, 2008: X).

Explaining terrorism becomes a prerequisite for finding 'effective' ways of combating it. Furthermore, 'effectiveness' research such as the decapitation and deterrence

literature is built on a few assumptions (for it to work) or what Weber (2013) refers to as 'myths'. The first is the legitimacy (almost unconditional) of state action, the second is the illegitimacy (almost (unconditional) of non-state action, the third is the intractability of the terrorism problem, especially in terms of assumptions about the nature of what some experts have referred to as 'new terrorism'¹² (Neumann, 2009), which is qualitatively different and more dangerous than other forms of terrorism. These assumptions are not exhaustive as it is possible to identify others that have not been mentioned here.

Another analogous bias which is mirrored by critical approaches (to a large extent), is the disproportionate bias in favour of explaining terrorism rather than researching counterterrorism, or state action, which is based on the earlier argument about legitimacy and thus there is possibilities of state terrorism are foreclosed, and euphemisms such as 'repression' and technical jargons such as 'collateral damage' are used to describe the state's actions and practices. For critical approaches, the concern is mostly with counterterrorism or state responses, especially regarding allowing 'for a normative choice in favour of a social and political order different from the prevailing order' (Moolakkattu, 2009: 443). This provides possibilities for thinking outside the status quo and asking critical questions that could otherwise be impossible.

¹² Advocates of this concept argue that post-9/11 terrorism has constituted a different kind of threat which is different from terrorism prior to 9/11 in that the groups are almost entirely religious, seek mass destruction and are less open to dialogue. This they argue requires a different kind of approach to 'traditional' forms of terrorism.

3.3 Legal Dimension of CT

Some authors have addressed the legal dimension of CT through examining the effectiveness of various CT legislation and how the violation of such laws and norms could be counterproductive. Knudsen (2015) examines counterterrorism legislation in Africa by using Kenya as a case study. He argues that 'counterterrorism laws that focus on expanding government prosecutorial powers can be more problematic than helpful' (Knudsen, 2015). Kimunguyi (2011) examines the roles of local and international actors in countering terrorism in eastern Africa. He argues that the temporal scope of counterterrorism has been short-term, which has adversely affected long term actions to combat root causes that engender the diffusion of terrorism (Kimunguyi, 2011).

Makinda (2006: 30) looks at how CT practice could undermine various 'norms, rules and institutions that underpin security', thus serving to cause more insecurity. In a way, coercive CT practices have resulted in 'deaths of innocent people, undermined democratic governance and eroded civil liberties (Makinda, 2006: 31). From a human security perspective, he argues that the goal of CT should be to guarantee individual liberties and human rights rather than the security of states, thus emphasising the primacy of the individual as the ultimate referent of security (Makinda, 2006: 20). While these studies have primarily investigated African cases, their commitments to human security, which has roots in the Enlightenment project indicates a Eurocentric bias that parades itself under the guise of a cosmopolitan, and universal human. The lived experiences of those who experience violence from terrorism and counterterrorism are usually of little importance with the researcher having a priori knowledge about what various 'marginalised' citizens need.

3.4 Counterterrorism and Discrimination

One of the major tasks of security provision has been to identify threats to particular referent objects. In this sense, for security to be achieved, there is a need to isolate particular features of what may be threatening and thus, secured against through the deployment of a variety of measures. This is not different for antiterrorism and counterterrorism and perhaps more challenging with the enemy not distinguishable from most other people. What the main concerns of the increasingly intrusive and pre-emptive powers of antiterrorism and counterterrorism have been its tendency to construct particular communities as dangerous en masse. In some cases, this may be a form of tendency or predisposition rather than constituting danger per se. This section identifies the various strands of these discriminatory practices and argues that it is important to carry out more studies into how these findings are relevant outside their current European context and also to engage more with the lived experiences of people, rather than quoting stats that may be extremely misleading (Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah, 2010).

3.4.1 Suspect Community Thesis

The first strand of this debate is that of the suspect community which has gained much attention in the UK and primarily argues that antiterrorism policy has designated the entire Muslim community as a 'Suspect Community' in the UK (Awan, 2012; Breen-Smyth, 2014; Nickels et al., 2012; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). Proponents of the suspect community argument draw inspiration from the original 'suspect community' thesis, advanced by Paddy Hillyard (1993), where he argued that the Irish community in the UK had been designated as a suspect community in

response to the Northern Ireland conflicts. This discrimination was initiated through legislative measures such as the Prevention of Terrorism Acts or PTAs, that was introduced by the UK government (Hillyard, 1993). This original argument was based on a criminological and sociological analysis rather than the security studies adaptation, which the concept has undergone (Breen-Smyth, 2014).

As Hillyard (1993) argues, the 1989 PTA contained conditions that could serve as justification for 'reasonable suspicion' by law enforcement agents. Under these conditions, the 1989 PTA stipulates that anyone could be stopped at an officer's discretion, without '[a]n officer [... requiring] any grounds for thinking that they have the information, but merely that the person concerned shall be in a category' (Hillyard, 1993: 19). In other words, there is no need for any concrete intelligence information to justify these actions, thus giving a carte blanche of powers to state agents, which could be subjected to abuse. What this has established is a 'dual system of criminal justice' which is reminiscent of the Irish system where there was a normal 'criminal justice system' for regular offenders that indulged in crimes like 'burglary, murder and rape, whilst a shadow and more draconian system was developed to deal with those suspected of Irish 'terrorism'" (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009: 647).

Through varying parallels between Irish and Muslim experiences, various authors have sought to explore the experiences of Muslim communities in the UK. Husband and Alam (2011) and Hickman et al., (2012) investigated the impact of counterterrorism on the social cohesion of communities targeted with antiterrorism powers. Ragazzi (2016) examines the impact of disproportionate antiterrorism attention on minority communities and asserts that such measures impact negatively

on integration, thus inhibiting multicultural values. Breen-Smyth (2014) introduced a more nuanced and less 'somatocentric' argument where she distances herself from earlier embodied arguments of a Muslim community in favour of an 'imagined one'. She adopts the imagined community concept advanced by Benedict Anderson to advance a performative view of a community, in contrast to a materialist conception of it being something that is 'out there'; her approach offers a critically informed analysis (Breen-Smyth, 2014). Considering the vagueness of the concept but yet impactful nature, she 'proposes a re-examination and a redefinition of the "suspect community"', as (Breen-Smyth, 2014).

Another thread that runs through these themes is a view that counterterrorism and antiterrorism within these societies involve a conscious construction of the 'Other' as someone outside society and is threatening to the Self in that the difference that the Other represents is 'dangerous' (Hillyard, 1993; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). These dangers can be construed as being 'on a continuum with stop and search at one end and shoot to kill practices at the other extreme' (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009: 654). In other words, suspicion has real life material consequences for members of communities that are so designated, which could range from unlawful delays and harassment to more violent encounters such as being shot and killed by officers – for example, the death of Harry Stanley¹³ – based on mere suspicion as has been the case on occasion in the UK (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009).

Although Hillyard's (1993) primary focus was on the criminological and sociological dimensions, i.e., the legal criminal justice system and the way these legal measures

¹³ A Scot who was shot to death by the London Metropolitan police in 1999 based on suspicion of appearing Irish when they received a call from the public about 'an Irishman with a gun wrapped in a bag'.

were experiences by social categories, i.e. the Irish citizens, other authors have expanded this argument to representation. This has primarily involved the examining how Muslims are represented in public discourse, not just the UK but in other Western countries through a re-enactment of long-standing tropes of an 'enemy within', thus, justifying some discriminatory measures against them (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009: 646). The language of an 'enemy within' mirrors historical 'Otherings' such as with the Third Reich – with Catholics and Jews – thus positing Muslims as the 'fifth column' in that they are sympathetic with the enemies of the West who are usually Muslim thus representing a form of 'clash of civilisations' thesis (Huntington, 1993; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Bartov, 1998).

Within the Nigerian context, similar discourses that construct entire communities as being indulgent or sympathetic to Boko Haram have been present (Karlsson, 2016; Marchal, 2012; Olojo, 2013; Opeyemi, 2017). The implementation of sharia across Northern state in Nigeria in at the turn of the millennium is an example that people use to suggest that there is an Islamisation agenda with Boko Haram being viewed as vanguards of this project. This may be viewed by some as an indication that sections of the Muslim dominated parts of the country are sympathetic to various forms of Islamic governance which may be viewed as being on a spectrum to what Boko Haram and some other groups who make 'Islamisation' claims, belong (Loimeier, 2011; Loimeier, 2017).

The suspect community can be linked to broader global trends and developments such as the global discourse of a new form of religious fundamentalism that is constructed as driving a new form of terrorism, which was more devastating and uncompromising. While al Qaeda and their attack on 9/11 served as exemplar of this

'new terrorism' (Neumann, 2009), the tendency of lone actors to self-radicalise, such as with the 7/7 perpetrators and the assassination of Theo van Gogh, revealed that a new global discourse, constructing enemy was necessary (Heath-Kelly, 2016). While paying attention to these discourses is important as (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009) have suggested, assuming the efficiency of elite discourses alone is not enough, but instead, research should engage with the target audiences, i.e., the communities involved to see how these 'speech acts' resonate in their lay narratives (Jarvis and Lister, 2013b). This study looks at the interpretative repertoires which people adopt in making meaning and constructing their experiences of (counter-)terrorism, thus opening possibilities for investigating how various elite discourses are reproduced, reformulated or resisted in everyday interaction (Wetherell and Potter, 1993).

The argument about how a threat is constructed is important because of its significant role in how that threat is combated (Campbell, 1992). Threat definition may influence particular responses that target particular communities disproportionately (Campbell, 1992). From a critical perspective, terrorism is a label which means that it is not 'out there', i.e. it does not have a particular essence that makes it terrorist outside the various constructions that elites usually adopt in political discourse (Heath-Kelly, 2016; Jackson et al., 2011). Likewise, since these studies are based on experiences of antiterrorism in the UK, addressing how non-elites in Nigeria define (counter)terrorism in everyday conversations, using their cultural repertoires becomes extremely important to complement a growing literature on the impact of antiterrorism and counterterrorism impact. The main problem has become not only securing the airports but also importantly, policing the influence of

fundamentalist Islamist ideology which could 'radicalise' Western citizens with Asian or African descent to engage in lone attacks (Qurashi, 2018; Schmid, 2013).

Despite the considerable attention that the suspect community thesis has enjoyed both in academia and within rights advocacy movements, it is not unchallenged. Greer (2014; 2010), has extensively criticised the validity of classifying Muslims as a community, or if some of the heightened attention to sections of the Muslim-dominated areas is not merited, considering the considerable threat that these areas may pose to security in the UK. Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah (2010) have criticised the homogenisation of the Muslim community into what appears to be a united group when there is significant internal diversity among these groups. For them, the presupposition that there is a cohesive Muslim community is too simplistic.

A more detailed critique of the label itself was carried out by Ali (2015: 140), who asserts that the concept of a 'Muslim community' is a problematic 'identity label'. To unpack this label, she differentiates 'between the abstract idea of the Muslim Ummah to which individuals are aligned by declaring themselves Muslim, and the 'Muslim community' in Britain as recipients of government addresses and initiatives' (Ali, 2015: 141). In essence, the former is a form of self-identification with a universal Muslim community and the latter is more local, i.e. the various 'communities' of Muslims around the world. While both may overlap, they are not the same (Archer, 2009). What this suggests is that the foundation of a suspect Muslim community itself may be problematic if it is unclear which of the communities is being 'suspected', and what this could mean for Muslim-majority or Muslim-significant states where suspicion may be more difficult to sustain. This is exactly the case with Boko Haram in Nigeria (Alao, 2013; Bierschenk and Stauth, 2002; Denny, 1987).

Another notable concept is that of a 'supportive community', which incriminates Muslims in general as suspects (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009: 651). This blanket profiling may be counterproductive and may, in fact, undermine what it seeks to achieve, security (Breen-Smyth, 2014). This is so for two main reasons; first, it could silence, marginalise and inhibit the political participation of such a targeted population, which may estrange them from 'democratic processes', thus undermine the chances of peace; and second, it misidentifies people as 'suspect' without evidence, hence subjecting them to pre-emptive actions which may sometimes prove lethal (Breen-Smyth, 2014: 223). Normatively, this is a contradiction to the primary duty of the state, which is to secure its citizens but some of these CT measures have served to achieve the obverse (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009).

The enemy has changed over time, but as this section has shown so far, after 9/11 and 7/7, the enemy has been Islam, although this has changed too from the enemy outside to the enemy within (Breen-Smyth, 2014; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). The second is more bottom-up, where ordinary citizens then act on various narratives that they believe, which becomes the everyday realities of religious discrimination that people experience (Lean and Esposito, 2012). These two dimensions are not as different as they may appear as while antiterrorism powers may give law enforcement officers increased powers to effect particular measures within a particular area, these decisions often allow some prerogative by individual officers which is where the individual and the institutional overlap. This becomes experienced by religious and ethnic minorities disproportionately to the majority of the population.

Generally, what is important about these arguments is how context-specific they are and how they may only be relevant to some European or 'Western' countries. For example, suspecting people based on physical features or discriminating them based on Islam may be a less relevant argument within the Nigerian context where Boko Haram suspects or the communities that they may emerge from have no distinctive physical features that the state or citizens may generalise to discriminate against them in everyday situations. Islam is one of the two most practiced religions in Nigeria, meaning that the concept of islamophobia does not make much sense within the Nigerian context. However, discrimination based on religion (Islam) or Hillyard's original 'Suspect Community', which was based on 'ethnicity', may resonate with some ethnic and religious minorities in the Northeast who may interpret (counter-)terrorism in particular ways (Hillyard, 1993).

What they also show is that in response to terrorism, states have gradually increased their security powers, thus, exploiting the threat that terrorism poses to strengthen further state control over citizens, which is similar to what Foucault (2012) refers to as the 'Panopticon'¹⁴. Panopticism refers to disciplinary apparatuses through which someone 'who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles', which becomes a form of self-regulation (Foucault, 2012: 202-3). This may be viewed as a technique of surveillance where the government attempts to replicate an 'omniscient' God (Lewis, 2013).

¹⁴ Panopticonism is an adaptation of Jeremy Bentham's idea.

A common weakness with these arguments from a discursive psychology position, which drives this research is that identities are generally treated as what people have rather than what people practise, suggesting a static entity that is hardly changing (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). It could also be argued that the suspect community thesis is reductionist. In this regard, it essentialises particular identities and ignores the others without paying attention to how various identities may intersect to create layers of discrimination rather than assuming that 'suspicion' is based only on religion and that Muslims experience discrimination similarly irrespective of other identities such as race, gender and class may intersect to create various forms of 'suspicion' (Crenshaw, 1991).

Andrews (2018) makes a similar argument of 'darkies' being treated as a suspect in certain designated African neighbourhoods where there are discriminatory police and law enforcement powers exercised against minorities. Without treating identities as what people practice but rather what they have as much work on suspect community does, many nuances and active subjectivities that people display through talk in everyday situations are missed and substituted for identities that the researcher finds most important¹⁵. In this study, identities are instantiated through discursive practices which are actively produced within different contexts.

3.5 Identity and Interest Debates in Boko Haram and Nigerian Counterterrorism Research

Studies on BH and CT within the Nigerian context are usually constructed around two main themes, identity and interest. Within identity frames, religious identity is the

¹⁵ Breen-Smyth's work is an exception to this argument.

most prevalent explanatory framework that experts have used to study BH where the group is construed as a manifestation of religious fundamentalism, especially Wahhabism or Salafism (Adesoji, 2010; Adesoji, 2011; Agbiboa, 2014; Akinola, 2015; Chothia, 2012; Comolli, 2015; Igboin, 2014; Karlsson, 2016; Kuna, 2012; Loimeier, 2012; Onuoha, 2014; Onuoha, 2012; Zenn and Pieri, 2017). These studies generally adopt religious fundamentalism as underpinning why the group exists, the implications of their religious underpinning for social relations, and why people gravitate towards the group through a form of radicalisation. Onapajo (2015) and Olaniyan (2014) examine the religious and social implications of Boko Haram insurgency, especially regarding how religious persecution could widen historically tense religious cleavages, suggesting a form of religious fault lines between Christianity and Islam.

Ethnicity has seldom been considered an important factor while studying Boko Haram and counterterrorism, perhaps because of the overlapping identities involved and how, despite suggestions that Boko Haram is dominated by the Kanuri, the group's public discourse has not made this as explicit as its religious discourses. This may be because of the greater appeal that the groups believe that religion has in Nigeria, which serves its interests better than a more restricted ethnic narrative, which may serve a more transnational narrative in the Chad Basin area (Awosusi, 2017). In a way, both narratives serve different purposes, and the group adopts them creatively to achieve divergent goals.

Pieri and Zenn (2016) examine both religious and ethnic narratives that BH adopts through the 'recreation' discourse that the group adopts to achieve legitimacy through referring to two main political communities in pre-colonial Nigeria, the

Sokoto Caliphate and the Kanem-Bornu Empire. When ethnicity is adopted as an explanatory framework for BH, it is usually combined with religion and CT research is much devoid of ethnic frames. Both identities like the various constructions of past conflicts in Nigeria can be viewed as 'ethno-religious, with both ethnic and religious fervour combining to serve the purpose of the group. As Pieri and Zenn (2016) rightly acknowledge, the group seldom portrays itself as a Kanuri group, which may be detrimental to its campaign because of the limited audience it will appeal to but its clever navigation of these socio-cultural multiplicities means that it can still achieve remarkable successes – in fact, its epicentre and most influential base – within historically Kanuri-majority areas that traverse four national boundaries, Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad (Pieri and Zenn, 2016).

In terms of the interest, economics or rational choice-oriented studies, the overwhelming arguments advanced by authors is the 'root cause' thesis, which attempts to establish cause and effect relationships between particular structural factors and terrorism, or link counterterrorism failure to specific economic irregularities – such as corruption – by political elites to counterterrorism failure or ineffectiveness (Agbiboa, 2015; Agbiboa, 2013c; Ayegba, 2015; Ikita, 2014; Ojochemnemi et al., 2015; Olaniyan and Asuelime, 2014). Much of these studies look at terrorism, rather than counterterrorism, and when they do, they often attempt to make suggestions about how CT could work to achieve 'national security' or preserve the status quo. Both Agbiboa (2013c) and Aghedo and Osumah (2012) adopt the relative deprivation thesis to argue that Boko Haram is a result of the disproportionate poverty levels experienced by citizens from the Northeast, in comparison to Nigerians from other parts of the country. In this sense, Boko Haram

exploits grievances by citizens, i.e., the disparity between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' to advance its agenda. Whether monocausal or adopted within a multi-causal argument, root-cause arguments usually fail to explain why some communities engage in terrorism, rather than other types of political violence, while others do not (Jackson, 2007; Jackson et al., 2011).

While these studies have contributed significantly to broader debates on terrorism and counterterrorism through offering non-Western cases, they have some significant weaknesses. The first weakness is that much of the criticisms levelled against mainstream (counter-)terrorism research can be levelled against them for their approach to knowledge which is considered to be 'out there', owing to mainstream positivist epistemology within Nigerian International Relations studies and Political Science which was modelled after the United States, during the Cold War. Many assumptions about Boko Haram and Nigerian CT are based on this possibility of value-free knowledge which applies 'objective' findings from other parts of the world on the Nigerian crisis, thus accepting several taken-for-granted truths about religious terrorism, and global jihadism among others (Gunning and Jackson, 2011). It is also the case that they are largely problem-solving in a Coxian sense and this is evident in the objectives of these studies were to proffer ways to end the BH insurgency. Religion and ethnicity are often treated as stable identities that people have; thus, they can serve as variables rather than as what people practice (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

This study will fill these gaps through providing an in-depth research into how publics construct their experiences of (counter-)terrorism, thus making original contributions through providing primary data on (counter-)terrorism experiences rather than

reproducing much of the same views, whilst neglecting their everyday experiences of those who experience CT and BH first hand. Much of these studies on BH and CT in Nigeria make claims about what publics think without engaging with what those publics know about CT and BH, and how various people could share similar versions of the same phenomena or how the same person could have inconsistent versions of the same phenomena. In short, they speak for those who experience (counter-)terrorism without speaking with them or allowing them to speak for themselves. This study is important as it provides a timely corrective to this problem by allowing publics who experience (in)security in their everyday lives to speak for themselves (Jarvis, 2017; Jarvis and Lister, 2013b). The second part of this chapter, which follows, addresses the conceptual framework that was adopted to collect, interpret and present data. This will advance the ongoing discussion by providing detailed theoretical and conceptual commitments adopted to fill the gaps that have been so far identified in security research, i.e. understandings and constructions of (counter-)terrorism outside the West, and in particular, in Africa or Nigeria, which is not only the most populous African nation but a significant player in its political and security policy and practice.

3.6 The ‘Vernacular’ Turn in International Relations

This chapter began by examining the main themes in contemporary terrorism and counterterrorism literature and progressed through more specific themes that relate to discriminatory counterterrorism policies and practices and the impact of counterterrorism on individuals and communities. This section advances the ongoing discussion by examining current accounts on non-elite knowledge or ‘lay’ understandings and discussions of (in)security in contemporary security literature to

identify the gap which this research will specifically fill. The initial claim here is that while these works provide a rich interview-based analysis of non-elite experiences of (in)security, using a diverse set of analytical, theoretical and methodological tools, they have primarily focused on Western cases, primarily the UK (Jarvis and Lister, 2010; Jarvis and Lister, 2013a; Jarvis and Lister, 2013b; Jarvis and Lister, 2017; Jarvis and Lister, 2016; Jarvis and Lister, 2015). Therefore, there is a lacuna in studies from the Global South, or any specific study on Boko Haram and Nigerian counterterrorism to be precise, that addresses similar questions and concerns through engaging with 'lay' audiences to examine how they understand and discuss (counter-)terrorism in their everyday lives.

Outside terrorism studies, Bubandt's (2005) work on vernacular securities in Indonesia is particularly important in stressing the relevance of vernacular conceptions of security but also providing a framework for how this research endeavour may be carried out. From this perspective, more attention needs to be paid to the signification work of the security concept, through problematizing the often taken-for-granted relationship between the signifier (i.e. security) and the 'signified' (i.e. the idea that it refers) (Jarvis, 2017). Security, as a concept does not have consistent or universal applicability, but rather is historically and culturally produced, locally, in the various ways in which different communities define and manage threats (Bubandt, 2005; Jarvis, 2017). However, through the relationship between knowledge and power, versions of security which specifically emerged in Europe achieved preponderance and have achieved hegemonic status. In academia, this is expressed through *mainstream* approaches, which make claims

about objective reality and positivist epistemology, thus seeking to achieve value-free knowledge, with little attention paid to the context, or local ontologies of security.

The advancement of universal ideas or values is further criticised by Yai (1999: 7) as 'the promotion of dubious universals'. Bubandt (2005: 291) therefore recommends an investigation 'of the ontological grounding and political management of socially specific fears and uncertainties', which, in a way, opens up possibilities of examining very specific meanings and practices of security. Some notable works have since engaged with publics directly to capture their lived experiences through examining 'how citizens [...] construct and describe experiences of security and insecurity in their own vocabularies, cultural repertoires of knowledge and categories of understanding' (Croft and Vaughan-Williams, 2016: 11). These studies have adopted a wide array of methods, primarily focus groups and in-depth interviews on investigating how citizens understand and discuss terrorism (Jackson and Hall, 2016) security projects, anti-terrorism and counterterrorism policy Jarvis and Lister (2010; 2013a; 2017; 2015).

Adopting focus group methods to examine lived experiences of (in)security by ordinary citizens in the UK, Jarvis and Lister (2013b; 2013a) explore how various publics in the UK make sense of and discuss (in)security in their everyday conversations, and the impact of UK anti-terrorism policy on citizenship after September 11 attacks. In the first study, they identified 'six images' of security namely: 'survival, belonging, hospitality, equality, freedom and insecurity' (Jarvis and Lister, 2013b: 158), while the second study looks at the impact of antiterrorism measures on citizenship (Jarvis and Lister, 2013a). What the first study offers is a corrective to the narrow understanding of the security concept through paying

attention to the various meanings that citizens construct in their discussion of (in)security. The six images of security that emerged from this study help to show that security is a heterogeneous concept when detached from the narrow mainstream tradition and also statist policy prescriptions. It will be important to investigate how citizens in Nigeria construct their own experiences of (counter-)terrorism, which will contribute to this growing body of vernacular security.

Jackson and Hall (2016) adopt a discursive psychological approach to examine how 'lay' people talked about terrorism in the UK. Their research assessed lay people's understanding of terrorism, especially discussions surrounding its nature, causes and most effective ways to counter it. In other words, they attempted to uncover the 'main narratives, commonplaces, cultural repertoires, frames, and metaphors lay people used' in vernacular discourses on terrorism (Jackson and Hall, 2016: 295). Their study is innovative in security research by conceiving knowledge as 'situated or occasioned', i.e. experiences constructed by participants are not a product of a process of remembering but rather are co-produced by the participants and the researcher in the research setting (Jackson and Hall, 2016).

What much of these vernacular studies on security, especially Jarvis and Lister (2013b) and Jackson and Hall (2016) but less so with (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2015), have in common is the view of language as performative, i.e. they view language as a form of social action. Hence, through 'everyday discourse, the language of security has important constitutive roles, such that things happen when it is employed' (Jarvis and Lister, 2013b: 169). In other words, 'discourse is the primary medium for social action and is performative and action oriented: people

both do things and construct things through language' (Jackson and Hall, 2016: 295).

These studies also share an important dimension in that since language is viewed as social action, bottom-up resistance becomes possible to through how people engage with security projects, reformulate and resist it in everyday interaction. What is also important is the cliché that to defeat an insurgency requires winning the hearts and minds of citizens, which underscores the significance of the population. Jarvis and Lister, report that their participants responded to antiterrorism measures in three main ways namely, 'opposition to antiterrorism measures', objection to antiterrorism narratives that posited them as 'victims' and 'outsiders', and resistance to antiterrorism powers through opposing measures that curtailed their civil liberties and in particular, participation in the 'public sphere' (Jarvis and Lister, 2013a). In summary, participants generally viewed antiterrorism as anti-democratic and a threat to particular societal values such as equality, civil liberties, and popular participation, among others.

Vaughan-Williams and Stevens (2015: 40) build on this possibility for resistance and more importantly, 'disruptive potential of non-elite knowledge'. At the heart of these 'disruptions' or forms of 'resistance' is the emphasis on the performative dimension of security, thus addressing what security 'does' when it is enunciated by ordinary citizens (Jarvis and Lister, 2013b). Jarvis and Lister (2013b), Jarvis (2017) – building on Bubandt (2005) – Vaughan-Williams and Stevens (2015) and Jackson and Hall (2016) among others, have emphasised how these 'vernacular' views can affect the workings of 'elite' or state security projects through highlighting or capturing the various ways in which ordinary people embrace, reformulate or resist 'top-down'

security projects such as the counterterrorism campaign in Nigeria or even capturing their understanding or disposition towards Boko Haram's practices and ideology. The bottom-line of these arguments is that vernacular understandings and constructions of security are very important and require more attention.

Vernacular understandings and views can be understood as a form of in-depth public opinion about how the government is performing or about how citizens assess their political leaders and elites (Jackson and Hall, 2016). For example, despite the lack of representativeness of these studies (small samples), assessment of some anti-terrorism policies as 'irrelevant' (Jarvis and Lister, 2013a: 757) may serve as an indicator to the government about a need for further research on people's disposition towards particular policies. In the Nigerian context where much of current research has neglected these types of insights into how publics experience CT, how IDPs understand and discuss their experiences of (in)security can provide valuable findings from those that are most marginalised and disenfranchised in current Nigerian social and economic set up. As a normative commitment, this marginalised section of society can get a rare 'seat at the table' (Steinberg, 2008), to make their voices heard.

Further questions can be asked about the legitimacy of studies that tend to speak for people, rather than engage with their lived experiences, especially in studies related to vulnerable people. What claims can be made about victims of Boko Haram for example, without speaking with them or allowing them to speak for themselves? The importance of engaging with their narratives cannot be overemphasised as Mac Ginty and Firchow (2016: 308) argue that, differing 'narratives and framings of the same conflict have potentially serious policy and political consequences' which

suggests that despite so-called elite discourses on security that acquire legitimacy through their claims of providing security for civilians experiencing insecurity, exclusion of everyday understandings and constructions of (in)security may impact on the realisation of this objective.

Another outstanding contribution of these works is their fulfilment of some of the promises of critical research which involves talking to individuals and communities who experience (in)security in their everyday lives, thus resolving the 'lack of primary research criticism' that has often been levelled against terrorism research (Gunning, 2007)¹⁶. This was particularly the case during the 'first wave' of terrorism studies, before the September 11 attacks on the US where the overwhelming source of data for researchers was the media (Jackson et al., 2011: 17).

As Jarvis rightly argues, paying attention to vernacular understandings and constructions of (in)security challenges, rectifies the inclination of mainstream IR scholarship 'to speak for, rather than to (or, perhaps better, with) 'ordinary' people and the conditions of (in)security they experience, encounter or construct in everyday life' (Jarvis and Lister, 2013b: 158). It is important to note the move away from epistemological positivism towards a more interpretivist epistemology which engages with the subject to understand their interpretation of phenomena (Smith et al., 2010). Within the Nigerian context, this could mean problematizing the current statist conceptions of security within policy circles or the priority given to particular ways of knowing by mainstream Nigerian research that prioritises 'scientific' analysis, through making cause and effect connections, with the desire to carry out

¹⁶ Other authors have made similar arguments although mainly referring to talking to 'terrorists'.

value-free research. The argument here is that so-called scientific aspirations are built on the assumption that expert or elites discourses are more scientific or superior to lay, or vernacular discourses, thus marginalising lay discourses and local knowledge (Foucault, 1980; Wetherell and Potter, 1993).

These views matter and even more so in the current political science and international relations episteme which valorises particular ways of knowing over the others (consequently devalorising the other), especially in terms of what is considered valid knowledge and the 'somatocentricity' that constitutes much of Western thought in terms of ordering society on the basis of bodies (Foucault, 1982; Mbembe, 2008; Oyěwùmí, 1997). From an etic perspective, it is believed that a 'scientist' can obtain value-free knowledge; thus their understanding of phenomena may not be necessary. However, from an emic perspective, the views of research subjects are key to understanding the phenomenon under investigation. This may permit the engagement with non-elite, 'non-Western', non-literate (sometimes) 'knowledges' are dispelled as not attaining the level of scientificity required for academic research (Foucault et al., 1997).

As this section has shown and as already discussed in the previous section, there is a lacuna in literature for a research that looks into the various ways in which lay publics in Nigeria understand and discuss Boko Haram and state response, i.e. how they make meaning of both terrorism and counterterrorism, their interpretation of both phenomena and the arguments that they advance regarding causes of terrorism or justifications for counterterrorism (Luckham, 2017; Jackson and Hall, 2016; Jarvis and Lister, 2013b). This research makes empirical contributions by examining vernacular discourses on Boko Haram and counterterrorism, thus

providing a timely contribution from a non-Western context, which enriches current security research. It makes methodological contributions through adopting critical ethnography with in-depth interviews to negotiate rich data from publics who have experienced terrorism and counterterrorism which builds on the important contributions of leading experts in critical terrorism studies such as Jackson and Hall (2016), Jarvis and Lister (2013b; 2010; 2013a; 2017; 2016; 2015), Vaughan-Williams and Stevens (2015; 2016) and Croft and Vaughan-Williams (2016).

What this chapter has shown so far is that this research fills a lacuna in current literature about how various Nigerian publics interpret, manage and 'respond to violence' from Boko Haram and counterterrorism, i.e. state and non-state violence (Luckham, 2017: 112). This is premised on the assumption that these experiences and the way people respond 'differ, sometimes radically, not only from the mainstream statist security narratives but' more importantly, 'from universal conceptions of human and citizen security' (Luckham, 2017: 112). Such an inductive project will seek to capture the richness of their experiences through examining the diverse 'cultural repertoires' that people adopt to make sense of the world and the solutions, justifications, and arguments that they advance (Jackson and Hall, 2016: 296).

Analytically, this thesis contributes to current critical security and vernacular research through adopting a discursive psychology technique which builds on the pioneering work of Jackson and Hall (2016). However, this thesis takes it further through combining these bottom-up social psychological techniques with postcolonial commitments to security, thus highlighting the various layers of power relations that are inherent in international relations and more importantly, how these

dynamics have influenced postcolonial experiences of (in)security of people from the Global South.

Much of the studies addressed have engaged with security across various themes and with a diverse set of theoretical, methodological and ethical commitments. However, what is required is not adding to the various voices of theories or contributing empirically to the growing corpus of works from the Global South thus satisfying some valid but narrow 'exclusionary' arguments about voices of the 'Global South' being silenced through both paucity of academic researchers, i.e. Global North-South 'bibliometric' disparity or the scant empirical evidence from the Global South through a lack of engagement with those voices and experiences of people from spaces that was usually considered 'colonial', thus hierarchizing their voices and the validity of their claims.

The politics of (counter-)terrorism research is further evident in a subtle manifestation of 'Eurocentrism' where there has been evidence of 'case biases' in favour of groups that appear to threaten 'Western' (to be precise, American, British and French) interests. Al Qaeda, Islamic State and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), among others, are important objects of research, especially after September 11 attacks or what can be referred to as the 'second wave of terrorism' research (Jackson et al., 2011: 16). From a policy perspective, the scope of threat was widened from specific individual groups with proximate or distant enemies to a more global threat emerging from a dangerous ideology, i.e. 'global jihadism', primarily Salafi and Wahhabi Islam.

The (re)construction of the enemy in what was initially labelled as the ‘Global War On Terror’¹⁷ by the Bush Administration, invited friends and allies to join the US in a worldwide ‘crusade’ against Islamists resulted in various attempts to establish links between groups that were considered the ‘jihadi’ superpowers, al Qaeda and the Islamic State (after 2011) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Onuoha, 2016). This is not to discredit the various alliances with the IS that Boko Haram has publicised or the corresponding acknowledgement of such affiliations by the former has likewise publicised. The argument here is that the search or emphasis on these alliances as being of ultimate importance is not neutral but rather is influenced by an underlying search for ‘Islam vs West’ or anti-Western themes that fit the pre-eminent terrorism – global jihad – or counterterrorism narrative – Global War on Terror – which served the interest of expanding the gaze and reach of Western¹⁸ security governance almost infinitely across the globe (Zenn, 2018).

This study is based on the premise that the Nigerian CT cannot be detached or isolated from the global and local context which it emerged and how these all combined to play a role in its transformation. Various regimes such as human rights regimes that are put in place and ‘globalised’ through overt or covert activities of intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations have served to ‘discipline’ states (particularly ‘postcolonial’ ones), about what are internationally acceptable standards. The structural powers that superpowers can exert in the international political arena have meant that statement by former US president, George Bush about the alliance of the willing and the polarisation of world politics through false

¹⁷ The Global War On Terror (GWOT) was reviewed in 2005

¹⁸ Primarily Anglo-American but also French.

dichotomisation expressed thus: 'Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists' (Bush, 2001b). There could be no by-standers and countries either needed to take a side or be considered a 'rogue' or a potential 'axis of evil' (Heradstveit and Bonham, 2007).

If ethnographic methods have been neglected in security research more generally then it could be argued that this is even more profound within the African setting and more so in Nigeria (Hultin, 2010). To date, there has been no genuine ethnographic work to study the impact of terrorism and counterterrorism on the security of publics in Nigeria which means that the lived experiences of Nigerians who have experienced (in)security have been largely ignored. Hultin (2010: 105) argues that there is a dearth of African ethnographic research on security and even more so on an ongoing humanitarian crisis such as the Boko Haram conflict which has displaced over two million citizens across four countries around the Chad Basin in Africa (Hsu et al., 2017). This study seeks to address this lack of ethnographic studies on (in)security in Africa, through not only interviewing those who have experienced (counter-)terrorism in their own environment but also achieving some degree of immersion in IDP camps and host communities, which will enhance the understanding of some of their experiences within their cultural, social and everyday context.

There is emphasis on the contribution of non-elite experiences from primary sources, i.e., accounts of people who have experienced or are currently experiencing terrorism and counterterrorism. Ethnographic engagement with those whose lives are most at risk of violence from both state and non-state actors will contribute to the extension of frontiers of terrorism research, partly contributing towards resolving the

‘state of stagnation’ of terrorism research that was discussed by Sageman (2014: 569). As it stands, we do not know much about who Boko Haram are, their goals, and the best ways to counter it from the perspective of those who experience the group’s activities first-hand. Likewise, we know very little about vernacular discourses on counterterrorism, i.e. the interpretation of state’s CT practices, regarding how people view state actions and inactions and how they make sense of counterterrorism measures and respond to elite discourse on security. What this suggests is that despite the apparent significant contributions of various approaches to security research and debate, the elitism within much of these studies such as the constructivist, Copenhagen School, and even much of critical research such as human security and the Welsh School Security Studies research.

As Stanley and Jackson (2016: 224) assert, ‘these approaches have a general inability to grapple with questions such as how [...] audiences receive or consume ideas and discourses’, how these non-elite discourses and narratives may have potentials to shape or transform so-called elitist politics, how non-traditional security practitioners and acquiesce to, modify or reject elite narratives ‘[a]nd how [...] the perimeters of political possibility [could be] reproduced or resisted in the mundane practices of everyday life’. To be clear, concerns with the way the state constructs its security project or how various political actors nationally and internationally construct and discuss Boko Haram, miss very important aspects of how Nigerians who are targeted with these discourses construct their own experienced of the group and the state, and how their engagement with these various discourses could influence their support, resistance or reform of formal security projects in non-institutional settings, such as at IDP camps and in their everyday lives. This thesis

combines a vernacular approach, with critical ethnographic methods such as in-depth interviewing, field notes and participant observation and a postcolonial perspective to address an empirical case of (in)security within the Nigerian setting.

The first part of this chapter has addressed the prominent themes in terrorism and counterterrorism literature that related to how various discourses and (in)actions by state and non-state actors in their bid to combat terrorism have impacted on the security of ordinary citizens. The overarching claim was that despite much effort put into explaining causes of terrorism and how states could make counterterrorism more effective, very little had been done by mainstream studies to pay attention to how those that experience both terrorism and counterterrorism actually understood and discussed their experiences of these phenomena. The discussion then proceeded to more interpretivist studies that acknowledged the importance of lived experiences and engaging with those that experienced both terrorism and counterterrorism first-hand, rather than engaging in problem-solving research, in a Coxian sense. Despite this promise, the claim was that these studies were mostly Westerncentric in that the voices that were amplified were mostly those of the Global North, thus still marginalising the voices of those living with insecurity in the Global South. The second part of this chapter advances the various conceptual tools that will be adopted to fill this gap in literature by proposing a multiperspectival approach which combines discursive psychology, postcolonialism and feminism to examine how various publics in Nigeria understand, conceptualise and construct their experiences of terrorism and counterterrorism in their everyday lives.

3.7 Social Constructionism

Social constructionism is usually used as an umbrella term to classify a group of theoretical orientations or perspectives that have as their overriding commitment the assumption that reality - or the world - is socially constructed, i.e. a product of social interaction (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 102; Burr, 2006). While the eclectic corpus of works that generally fall under this social constructionist label are diverse and may differ on various grounds; it is possible to identify four key components that bind them together (Burr, 2006). The first is their incredulity towards taken-for-granted versions of reality or facts (Burr, 2006: 2), i.e., they problematize the possibility of objectivity or the possibilities of acquiring value-free knowledge of the world as positivists will make us believe. This scepticism towards an objective or neutral reality is further emphasised by Cox (1981: 128) who argues that 'theory is always for someone and for some purpose', thus, accentuating the 'philosophical and theoretical' agenda behind what is usually considered as objective reality.

The second commonality relates to the importance of history and culture in understanding or making meaning of reality, i.e. a view that '[t]he ways in which we commonly understand the world, the categories and concepts we use, are historically and culturally specific' (Burr, 2006: 3), rather than universal as positivist and foundationalist approaches may appear to suggest. This is related to the third commonality which emphasises the sustenance of the meanings we make of reality through 'social processes' (Burr, 2006: 3). Knowledge is intersubjective, in that what people know is a product of their embeddedness and thus, shared with others in particular social formations (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 102). The fourth and final

commonality is the agreement that what we know influences how we act upon the world, hence 'knowledge and social action go together' (Burr, 2006: 3).

Language is not a transparent medium through which people communicate or describe pre-existent mental realities but 'rather, subjective psychological realities are constituted through discourse, defined as situated language use or language use in everyday texts and talk' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 103; Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Shotter, 1993). This is a discursive ontology whereby reality is performative, i.e., meanings are assigned to our 'experiences by virtue of the words which are available, and the resulting meanings contribute to producing the experience rather than being merely a description of the experience or an 'after-the-event' occurrence' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 103). In other words, language transcends its descriptive function or attribute but rather instantiates that which it names (Butler, 2011; Weber, 1998). From this perspective, 'discourse can be said to "construct" our lived reality' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 103), which suggests a high level of reflexivity where people (agents) 'give meaning to experiences' through 'the words available' (structure), i.e. whilst agents' meaning potentials are circumscribed by limited available resources which are historically and culturally constituted.

3.7.1 Defining Discursive Psychology

The primary theoretical framework for this study is discursive psychology (DP hereafter) which provides a basis with the discourse analysis that follows in the next chapter. The point of departure of DP is that it begins with the conceptualisation of 'psychological phenomena as things that are constructed, attended to, and understood in interaction' and that such constructions should be the object of study

(Potter and Hepburn, 2007: 160). What this means is that while DP acknowledges that thoughts, emotions, interests and feelings are expressed by individuals, these phenomena are not considered to have a biological basis (Willig and Rogers, 2017), but rather, are socially constructed, and thus shared with other members of one's society (Wetherell and Potter, 1993), or as symbolic interactionists will describe it, one's 'fellows' (Blumer, 1986).

DP is usually contrasted with the mainstream approach to social psychology, cognitivism, which treats talk/text either as a mirror to an external reality, which is 'out there', or produced by mental schemas that individuals acquire and then adopt to represent reality (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 96). It is both psychological and *discursive* because people commit repertoires to memory and selectively use them as a 'thesaurus' to achieve various forms of individual and social actions (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Potter and Hepburn, 2007). In other words, '[i]t is specifically *discursive* psychology because discourse – talk and texts – is the primary medium for social action' (Potter and Hepburn, 2007: 1, *Italics in original*). People acquire interpretative repertoires and creatively draw from them in everyday talk and texts (Hepburn and Bolden, 2013). DP is rooted in social constructionist orientation, which I discuss in the succeeding section.

3.7.2 Symbolic Interactionist and Poststructuralist Discursive Psychological Concoction

Symbolic interactionism as a social theory that was propounded by George Herbert Mead (1934) but popularised by Herbert Blumer (Blumer, 1986). While they differ in some of their claims and assumptions, it is possible to identify three main premises

which they share. First, they agree that people react to things including inanimate things and other actors based on 'the meanings that the things have for them' (Blumer, 1986: 2). In other words, humans are active meaning-making agents who are constantly engaging in interpretation and constructing meaning by interacting with other entities in the society. Second, people are motivated to act in particular ways through their own identity of the self and that of the other which are both socially constructed (Blumer, 1986). Finally, individuals are situated within particular social groupings or societies that constantly influence (but not cause) their preferences and behaviours (Blumer, 1986).

While interactionism within discursive psychology theorises identity and investigates how people utilise their various identities as means to achieve 'the business of talk', they fail to ask how those identities which people sanction to undertake the signification 'business' came to be (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). Adopting a metaphor to fulfil this task, interactionist approaches concentrate on how people spend money on business transactions, but they do not ask about the source of the money. For them, asking such questions, i.e. questions outside the interaction, imposes the researcher's framework – in what interactionists or conversation analysts refer to as 'intellectual hegemony' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002) (Schegloff, 1997) – on the analysis which corrupts its inherent 'epistemological naïveté' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 106). For example, Schegloff (1997) suggests the preservation of the originality of people's interpretation and argues against distortions occasioned by the introduction of out-of-the-text concepts, categories and social theories. While this may be valuable in a thorough conversational analysis approach with commitments to phenomenology, the critical

approach that this study is committed to necessitate the adoption of social theories to properly make sense of the meanings that people make in their everyday conversations.

Likewise, rather than suggesting the possibility of objectively analysing text, critical research instead calls for the acknowledgement of biases as it is neither possible nor desirable for researchers to distance themselves from that which they study (Billig, 1999). There are power relations throughout the research process, and failure to acknowledge them is unwelcome in critical study. This study acknowledges this entire process of interpretations and biases and continuously reflects on how these and other forms of unequal power relations may influence findings and the research project itself.

From a discursive psychological point of view, identities are produced through impermanent cessations 'closures' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 112) which open possibilities of imagining shared identities or the imagination of community as conceived by Anderson (2006). This is particularly significant in the context of this research through Bubandt's (2005) vernacular conceptualisation of security as socially constructed across various levels which will be discussed in more details in the next section. Through various discourses, people attempt to achieve hegemony, which makes language the vehicle for this social practice, thus, reconceptualising ideology as interest-driven, i.e. people's attempt to impose their own versions of the self, world and the 'Other', on others and maintaining this hegemony of 'meaning-making' through continuous efforts to discredit alternative versions of reality as false or unreal.

The extensive discursive 'resources' which people draw from in conversations and position themselves in text and talk is regarded as an 'interpretative repertoire' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 105). Discursive possibilities are extensive but not endless, i.e., although they are characterised by incompleteness and instability, they are not totally open. From the various identity positions that individuals can occupy in text and talk, people actively choose specific versions from multiple versions available to them (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 11).

While studying discourses has become increasingly prevalent in social research, discursive psychologists prefer to adopt the concept of interpretative repertoires to emphasise the contingent and situated nature of these resources which are not static but flexible. For example, while Potter and Wetherell (1987: 7) explain that 'discourse [primarily refers to] all types of verbal interactions and written texts', but also 'meanings, conversations, narratives, explanations, accounts and anecdotes' (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 3), they prefer interpretative repertoires which specifically denotes a 'clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of speech often assembled around metaphors or vivid images' (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 90). People have more control over interpretative repertoires than poststructuralists such as Laclau and Mouffe (2001) will want to acknowledge but are also delimited by the limited resources available, more than interactionists such as Billig (1999) will want to accept. Likewise, the context and environment also influence what can be said and what cannot through the various norms, sequence of talk, and types of questions among others.

In this study, following Potter and Wetherell (1988; 1993), I use interpretative repertoires to describe the various cultural resources that citizens draw from to make

sense of and discuss their experiences of terrorism and counterterrorism. There is an interpretative process that is involved in 'making sense' of Boko Haram actions as one thing or the other or as interpreting state actions as one thing or the other and of constructing the Self and Others, or in positioning the Self in the world. I look at the intersubjective symbols of meanings and central metaphors that Nigerians use to make terrorism and counterterrorism intelligible in everyday language. Metaphors, tropes, themes, scripts and repertoires are all combined by lay Nigerians to make sense of (counter-)terrorism and advance vernacular discourses on both phenomena.

3.7.3 Synthetic Discursive Psychological Dimension of BH and CT Experience

As already discussed, the discourse analytical approach to this research is a synthetic approach to discursive psychology which is an amalgam of interactionist and poststructuralist strands of discursive psychology. This approach is situated within a broadly social constructionist approach where reality, the identities of the self and the 'Other' are socially constructed and internalised by individuals who share these identities with others within communities. Community in this instance is neither static nor stable but rather fluid and changing; it is always striving for completeness (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). Thus, the objective of this research was to examine how locals from the Northeast of Nigeria rhetorically organised their accounts of security through the various positions of the self, Other, and the versions of the world which they continuously created as stable and true within supple resources which discursive psychologists refer to as 'interpretative repertoires' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002).

Experience is neither what people have, i.e. 'out there' or 'preconditioned psychological states' within the individual, to be revealed to the researcher for example through stable schematic representations and scripts which could make thoughts predictable and stable but rather co-produced, discourses of Boko Haram and counterterrorism within this context are viewed as actively created by interviewees and the researcher within the research setting, and circumscribed or delimited by available linguistic resources (Wetherell and Potter, 1988: 118; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). In other words, participants are both products and producers of discourse.

This research, however, adopts synthetic discursive psychology which is a hybrid of these two strands (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). In other words, 'a poststructuralist interest in how specific discourses constitute subjects and objects is combined with an interactionist interest in how people's discourse is oriented towards social action in specific contexts of interaction' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 105; Jackson and Hall, 2016). This approach also pays attention to people's 'speech acts', i.e. the action-orientation of words and the interpretative repertoires that they draw to achieve this end (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 105). In short, it is the fusion of 'discourse analysis' with 'social theory' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 106).

When people make utterances, they are action-oriented within particular social contexts and situations, thus, making their meanings context-dependent and occasioned (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). Language is a form of social practice which does not only describe experiences but constitutes those experiences making it performative in a poststructuralist sense; people then could be perceived as 'discursive subjects' who position themselves with and through language and do

things with words (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 96-97). This should not be mistaken for reification of discourse as some scholars have criticised adherents of the poststructuralist tradition where the situatedness of language is neglected, and discourses are treated as context-independent (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 105). From a discursive psychological approach, attention is paid to 'the ways in which people's talk is shaped and changed by the specific contexts of interaction in which the talk is situated and to which it is oriented' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 105). Knowledge is viewed as being co-created or co-produced by the researcher and the participants in the research setting.

3.7.4 Language and Post-structuralism

One of the key contributions of poststructuralist (as well as critical constructivist) thought to this research is the critical engagement with knowledge and incredulity towards so-called objective 'truths'. Rather than viewing key concepts in IR such as the state, terrorism, identity, and the world more broadly as 'objective facts', it views them as being constituted through discourse (Heath-Kelly, 2016). In this sense, terrorism is not viewed as a description of a distinct type of political violence that targets civilians, with the intent of communicating fear to a larger audience, but rather as a label that is assigned to particular types of violence and not to others (Jackson, 2007; Jackson et al., 2011). What becomes important is the politics behind these labelling of particular types of activities and whose and what interest they serve (Heath-Kelly, 2016).

It becomes important to study language which is viewed as a form of individual and social action as people 'do things', i.e. perform tasks such as 'get married', and

‘making promises’, among others, with words (Austin, 1975). However, while differentiating between performative (without truth value) and constative utterances (with truth values), and drawing attention to ‘felicity’ and ‘infelicity’ conditions which determine whether the performative act is accomplished, Austin’s (1975: 19) ‘speech-act’ theory appears rather inflexible enough for the type of everyday language that this study looks at. The examples of marital vows and ship naming show attest to this argument (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

An ethnomethodological view of talk liberates it from this weakness by construing talk as being ‘reflexive’ (Weider, 1974). Within this new rendering, written or spoken interaction have a ‘multiformulative and multiconsequential nature’, i.e. rather than being simply ‘about actions, events and situations, [they are] also a potent and *constitutive part of* those actions, events and situations’ (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 21). Returning to the earlier examples, they do not just constitute marriages or naming of ships, which exist outside talk, they form a constitute part of what marriages and ship naming are.

A more suitable view of discourse is as a form of ideological practice, i.e., people try to achieve various tasks through talk and text in everyday context (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and Potter, 1993). These insights have complex roots, but they can be traced to Marxist and neo-Marxist conceptions of ideology, albeit with obvious modifications (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). From a Marxist perspective, ideology has usually been viewed as ‘post-event’, i.e. a form of legitimization for particular economic exploitation by a dominant class in society; in a way, ideology is justificatory, it that it serves to mask various forms of exploitation through promoting a form of ‘false consciousness’ in exploited classes (Eyerman, 1981: 43).

This Marxist conception has been challenged and rearticulated through a combination of insights from Althusser (2006), Gramsci and Buttigieg (1992), and Hall (1988) which all have in common – albeit to varying degrees - the ‘liberation’ of ideology from its Marxist roots of prioritising the economic base (material) over the superstructure (ideational), thus, making the latter as merely serving to conceal the workings of the former, ideology becomes not only constitutive and instantiative of ‘social and economic relations’, but is integral to their sustenance (Wetherell and Potter, 1993). Discourse becomes more active and performative which makes it possible to ask questions about how it is practiced within everyday context, in instantiating and maintaining unequal and exploitative power relations in society. Ideology is not viewed as merely justifying exploitative relations of productions but more importantly implicating it in the constitution and preservation of the various socio-economic relations (Wetherell and Potter, 1993). Combining this view of ideology with the ethnomethodological insights discussed previously, it becomes possible to address the tasks that people accomplish in everyday conversations through talk (Weider, 1974; Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

By looking at vernacular (counter-)terrorism discourses in Nigeria, the primary objective of this study is not to gain ‘objective’ access to ‘real’ (counter-)terrorism experiences through attempting to ascertain their veracity (through claims and counterclaims), but rather to ask what these discourses and utterances do within the context where they are deployed by interviewees in support or negation of a view or position (Jackson and Hall, 2016). I contend that assumptions about ‘truths’ or ‘facts’ are not neutral but rather advance the perspective of one set of intellectuals over others thus, making one version of discourse more valid than competing others

(Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell and Potter, 1993). It should be added that this attention to the action-orientation of talk within 'specific social contexts [which influence] their meanings' through the very distinct ways in which they are used, which emphasises how 'language use is context-bound or *occasioned*' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 97). This attention to 'context', is a corrective to cognitivist psychological and poststructuralist rendering of discourse and language which decontextualises discourses, while focusing more on how they make people subjects (Foucault, 1982; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). It then makes sense to ethnographically understand 'some of the ideological consequences', which emerge from talks about (counter-)terrorism in everyday Nigerian settings (Wetherell and Potter, 1993).

3.8 Discourse, context and qualitative research

Discourse is an integral part of human existence; although it has different meanings within different contexts. For example, when people communicate, they display some form of discourse regarding utilising the various significations available to convey meaning and simultaneously make sense of the responses. Two important definitions of discourse may be helpful at this juncture. First, in a very broad sense, Burr (2006: 32) defines discourses as sets 'of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements and so on that in some way together produce a particular version of events', while Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 141) refer to discourses 'as the fixation of meaning within a particular domain'. It 'is a dynamic form of social practice which constructs the social world, individual selves and identity' through shared meanings and understandings (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 118). Regarding signification, discourses attempt to achieve hegemony, i.e. to fix the meaning of the concept under discussion which has implications for

individuals and communities when such a concept is 'contested', such as security (Gallie, 1955), or terrorism (Jackson et al., 2011).

In this study, the primary object of analysis is discourse. This involves examining the language of terrorism and counterterrorism within the Nigerian context. What this suggests is not that this study is only interested in language for its own sake, but rather that people only make sense of the world through discourse. Discourse then can be construed as constitutive of both terrorism and counterterrorism as well as the various identities of individuals making discourse both ideational and material. The main objective of this study is to identify the prominent discourses on (counter-)terrorism in Nigeria. Through examining the various vernacular discourses on (counter-)terrorism in Nigeria, discursive psychology provides tools for identifying the variations, versions of reality, rhetorical devices, metaphors and interpretative repertoires that publics adopt to construct their various versions of the Self, i.e. their identities, Other, i.e. the identities of others, the state, CT, BH, and the world more broadly (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002).

3.8.1 Discourse Analysis

The discourse analysis performed in this research looked at the bottom-up, vernacular discourses of terrorism and counterterrorism in Nigeria, i.e. how non-elite Nigerians understand and discuss security in their everyday lives. In this sense, the approach to reality in this thesis is a social constructionist perspective which posits that the world and what we know or can know about it are products of social construction; they are intersubjective rather than objective. The discourse analysis carried out in this research is the discursive psychology approach which is situated

within a broader field of social psychology. Whilst social psychology has been dominated by the 'cognitivist' tradition which attempts to explain 'social psychological phenomena in terms of cognitive processes – thinking, perception and reasoning' through the use of experiments within a broader positivist epistemology, thus attempting to identify causal relationships and developing generalizable laws and truths (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 96), a more recent 'discursive approach uses qualitative analytic tools and techniques' thus, radically deviating from the cognitivist orthodoxy within the field (Weatherall et al., 2007: 3).

Building on the concept of the social construction of knowledge, 'discursive psychology [posits] that our ways of understanding and categorising the world are not universal, but historically and socially specific and consequently contingent' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 99). Furthermore, this approach emphasises a high degree of reflexivity where language does not only describe external experience but rather constitutes that experience and the subjective, psychological reality (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 102; Wetherell and Potter, 1988; Jackson and Hall, 2016).

3.9 Lived Experiences of (in)Security

Since the emergence of post-positivism during the fourth debate in IR in the early 1990s, several 'bottom-up' approaches that investigate lived experiences of publics have emerged (Krause and Williams, 1996). These approaches are people-centred in that they seek to investigate the experiences of real people, mostly in real life situations. Jarvis (2017: 4) identifies at least seven bottom-up approaches namely: '[vernacular security], human security, Welsh School of critical security studies [or

school of emancipatory realism], postcolonial security studies, relevant feminist work, ontological security studies, and everyday security studies'. This section will address the contributions of vernacular security studies, postcolonial security studies and feminist perspectives to this research. A combination of these three approaches offers a valid toolkit with which to examine the everyday experiences of (in)security among publics in Northeast Nigeria.

3.9.1 Problematisation of National Security/Statehood?

Many authors have highlighted the contested nature of security, for example, some have cited Gallie (1955: 169) to describe it as 'essentially contested' which suggests an inevitable and continuous disagreement about the appropriate use of the concept globally. While scholars such as Baldwin (1997), Buzan (1991) and Huysmans (1998) among others have all made commendably bold attempts to address questions related to the meaning of security, a vernacular approach according to Bubandt (2005) emphasises the benefits of treating the concept 'as a socially situated and discursively defined practice open to comparison and politically contextualized explication'. In other words, security neither describes a reality that is out there nor a universally homogeneous concept, but rather socially specific ways in which different communities deal with the problem of uncertainty. In short, '[s]ecurity is conceptualised and politically practised differently in different places and at different times' (Bubandt, 2005: 291) which makes it essential to comparatively examine 'site-specific' conceptualisations and practice of security: in this case, within the Nigerian context.

As an 'actor-oriented', 'bottom-up', and non-elite approach to security, 'vernacular security' was introduced by Nils Bubandt through his ground-breaking anthropological work in Indonesia (Bubandt, 2004: 291; Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2015). This approach encourages the investigation into how publics 'construct and describe experiences of security and insecurity in their own vocabularies, cultural repertoires of knowledge and categories of understanding' (Croft and Vaughan-Williams, 2016: 11). This highly inductive approach counteracts the long-standing tendency to silence those who experience insecurity first hand, as has been the case in much of both mainstream and critical research (Jarvis, 2017).

While the concept of national security is ambiguous, platitudes such as 'territorial integrity' or 'national interest' are complimentary phrases that have usually accompanied discourses of national security. Arnold Wolfers (1952) makes this argument when he emphasises the inherent ambiguity of the concept of national security. The concept evolved in the US and was subsequently exported/imported as policy templates or frameworks for most decolonising countries which was both coincidental and deliberate (Bilgin, 2008). It was coincidental in that the post-war period witnessed massive decolonisation and many new countries had just gained 'independence' thus requiring models for self-governance and deliberate in that it served the interests of the US in projecting its image as the new global superpower.

National security has become so widespread that it is difficult for researchers and policy makers to discuss security without foregrounding its centrality. For example, this has meant prioritising the state as the guarantor and referent of security, over upwards – e.g. global – or downwards – e.g. societal and individual – versions of security (Krause and Williams, 1996). What is more is that national security is

associated with particular theories which serve particular interests. With its realist affiliations, state survival becomes the ultimate indicator of security success in an anarchic world characterised by self-help whereas possibilities of 'surviving' states with profoundly insecure citizens of states that constitute insecurity to their own citizens become an overlooked problem (Jarvis and Lister, 2013b).

This reconceptualisation of security as relational and an ongoing process serves to emphasise African agency. The Nigeria that the British 'founded' may not have been the same political and social formations that existed prior to contacts with Europeans and subsequently, colonialism, but, it could be argued that such a Nigeria that was established on a blank slate with total European agency does not exist; the Britain that 'founded' Nigeria itself does not exist. The colonial 'encounter' has and continues to transform both Western and non-Western actors in considerable ways (Bilgin, 2008).

The Nigeria that exists today is a product of ongoing tensions, negotiations and interactions across various levels and by divergent actors. In a way, it may have a similitude to what is considered a Western creation but as Bhabha (2012: 91) asserts it is 'almost the same but not quite'. Sovereignty was neither invented nor created but harnessed and hybridised with European concepts mainly, the Westphalian principle of statehood – i.e., the supreme right of sovereigns to have a permanent army, fortify territories and engage in taxation – and to an extent, a Utrechtian consolidation of these provisions which connected sovereign power and dominance with specific geographical boundaries (Heywood, 2014; Brunet-Jailly, 2005). The imprints of African agency are evident even when they are unacknowledged or understated.

Barkawi and Laffey (2006: 330) identify this distorted history and argue that a critical study on security must attempt to understand 'security relations, past and present, [which] requires acknowledging the mutual constitution of Europe and the non-European world and their joint role in making history'. This requires more attention being paid to not only how the West represents the other but also, how it has represented itself, historically (Bilgin, 2008). The Nigerian state can be construed as being a continuous process rather than an outcome of European the magnanimity and ingenuity, i.e., a political community set up to fulfil ambitions of 'teleological Westernisation' which can then be continuously measured against 'pristine' European sovereignties, (Bilgin, 2008: 6) legitimacies and authority with Western experts and so-called liberal institutions serving as assessors of this process of 'becoming'. This is partly what Shilliam (2013) has referred to as Western 'narcissism', or an obsession with the Self which has roots in Eurocentric/Orientalist discourses that emerged in 18th Century Europe.

These identities are important in both how Boko Haram has been '(re-)invented' as 'anti-Western' and how the measures and discourses adopted by the Nigerian state has been influenced by this 'mimicked' framework and identity of being a state but not quite a Western state (Bhabha, 2012; Kalua, 2009). It is also the break from the past and the demonization of that past that treats all forms of ethnic and religious disagreements as an eruption of a demonised past that serves as a reminder of how primitive and 'barbaric' Africans societies may have been before colonisation and the establishment of sovereign states and outlawing of various self-destructive tendencies inherent in traditional beliefs and dogma (Césaire, 2001).

National security in Nigeria was always an attempt at community building which created a 'statist' scale which is built around sovereignty and territoriality thus unifying various erstwhile independent communities – for example, Sokoto Caliphate, Oyo Empire, Kanem Borno Empire – under a modern state system, thus setting new boundaries for domestic and foreign relations. The Yoruba, the Igbo, the Hausa, and the Fulani, among others, had various unique experiences of community building. Ekeh (1975) captures some of these events by discussing how anti-colonial ideologies made this possible in Western and Eastern Nigeria through forging an identity around linguistic ties; ignoring differences or other conflicts among those communities.

Enclosing 'Nigeria' is in quotation marks here emphasises the need to step out of the status-quo to critically engage with the history behind how the current framework came to be (Cox, 1981). This history is concealed behind an etiological tale that begins with 'discovery' – of natives – by Europeans, their conquest [with little or no resistance] – amalgamation and finally, independence; a teleological narrative with 'civilisation' as its telos. This uncivilised vs civilised, rational vs irrational, and other oppositional comparisons and binaries have a European provenance (Heath-Kelly, 2016; Oyěwùmí, 1997). This can be associated with what Derrida (2016) refers to as the Western ontotheology or 'metaphysics of presence', thus giving preponderance to a 'term [...] through its juxtaposition with its opposite' (Heath-Kelly, 2016: 142). Another argument could be that this 'fetishised' transition from 'traditional' to 'modern' is associated with the Western Enlightenment 'metanarrative of progress' (Younis et al., 1997: 49); advancing from a more 'primitive' state towards modernity (Appadurai, 1996). The reception of the various practices of sovereignty

by the state can be captured through investigating how ordinary citizens engage with, reformulate and resist particular elite state discourses in everyday interaction.

3.9.2 Ethnic and Religious (Ethno-Religious) Identities

A quick definition of ethnicity may be appropriate at this point. Gbadegesin (1981: 4) refers to 'an ethnic group as a group of human beings who are (or believe themselves to be) related by common blood kinship and descent from a common (even if mythical) ancestor, and who speak a common mother tongue'. This definition assumes that ethnicity is what people have, which is essentialist, rather than what they practice. Hence, people may construct themselves as having kinship ties or they may not. This does not mean they have kinship ties or not but rather than such ties require to be constructed in particular ways to achieve the ends that they seek; this is achieved through discursive practice.

A more instrumental definition was advanced by Osaghae (1995: 11), who defines ethnicity as 'the employment or mobilisation of ethnic identity and difference to gain an advantage in situations of competition, conflict or cooperation', showing how it is goal-oriented. Hence, it continuously seeks to position people and things in particular ways which serve to be advantageous to the Self, i.e., an identity that is internalised through 'social interaction' or dialogues – with fellows – and then actively adopted and interpretatively modified to make meanings and act towards others and things, such as political leaders and institutions (for example, the army), other community members, and the state among others (Blumer, 1986: 2).

What this thesis does is not to look at ethnicity, religion and other identities as stable, natural or primordial 'entities', but rather as socially constructed and discursively

practiced through everyday interaction (Willig and Rogers, 2017). This is not to ask if a Nigerian is either Muslim or Christian, Glavda, Kanuri, Fulani, Hausa, or a combination of these identities and then attempt to 'get inside their heads' to reveal 'real' thoughts but rather to examine how they position themselves through talk relating to various entities constructed around ethnicity and religion (Willig and Rogers, 2017). I argue that that identity is not given but rather is intersubjectively constructed through social interaction and expressed as 'psychological states' in everyday interaction (Wetherell, 1998). What this discussion so far has shown is that it is possible to deconstruct the minority/majority binary within the Nigerian context which serves to construct dominance around materiality. The foundation that this section sets for the vernacular discourses that follow is the importance of treating the various identities and subjectivities not as what people have but rather, rather, what they practice.

3.9.3 Economic Interests

The most notable arguments about the relationship between identity and interests have emerged from a Wendtian (Wendt, 1992) perspective, where identity serves to delimit the type of rational choice calculations that actors (mainly the state) can make, thus challenging the neo-realist assumption that states are like 'billiard balls'; they may be bigger or smaller based on their material capability, but they all act in the same way (Mearsheimer, 1995; Waltz, 2010). Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian identities are advanced as the three main identity types that states interpret situations with, thus determining if they will be viewed as 'enemies', 'not enemies' or 'friends' (Wendt, 1992). As with many vaunted criticisms of these formulations, the preponderance of the concept of anarchy, the centrality of states as the ones

‘making’, i.e. interpreting scenarios or encounters, and also the reification of these identities, which allows a value-free positivist epistemological approach all combine to diminish the value of these concepts (Weber, 2013; Zehfuss, 2001). Within the vernacular interest discourse adopted by interviewees, the various identities operate at the sub-national level, and these identities serve to interact and sometimes influence the type of ‘interest-driven’ or rational choice decisions that individuals make in CT and terrorism situations.

Despite these significant overlaps both in broader IR and security studies literature about identity and economics – superstructure and base in more Marxian and neo-Marxian perspectives – when interviewees make identity-oriented arguments, the boundaries of the Self and Other are quite stark and stable; this is less so with economic interest repertoires where boundaries are much more flexible or even undefined sometimes. Economic interest repertoires are significantly more inclusive in that they are almost available to anyone – irrespective of their ethnic or religious identity – especially with the salience of economic interest themes and frames such as bribery and corruption in contemporary Nigerian politics (Abdulmalik and Ayinla, 2017; Akinnaso, 2017).

3.10 Postcolonialism

So far, this chapter has addressed the gaps in literature that this thesis seeks to fill and then the various theoretical and conceptual tools that will be used to fill these gaps. This section addresses a very important perspective within this composite: postcolonialism. There is no straightforward definition for postcolonialism or other

cognate concepts such as postcolonial theory and post-colonialism – in hyphenated form - or even what it means to be colonial and postcolonial.

If it is considered as after, i.e. 'post' colonialism – as some argue – then this could suggest that colonisation has largely ended with the independence of many countries that were under colonial domination. However, this view will be disregarding the complex nature of colonial domination outside the politicoeconomic invasion, administration and physical domination of one people by another. In a nutshell, this temporal differentiation is problematic. Another argument could be that every society has been colonised at some point in their history, which poses the question of whether it is analytically beneficial to talk about coloniser and colonised when every country today could either be one or both at different times of their history. If this previous expansive conceptualisation is dismissed, which form of colonisation – colonialism has various forms – which geographical, political, economic and social entities does postcolonial theory theorise? An answer to this by various scholars would be most former colonies of the West in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Colonialism is a very complex and nuanced activity and more robust conceptualisations have been advanced to unpack the complex workings of the colonising enterprise.

The concept of independence in post-colonial Africa can be challenged through identifying continuities of subjugation and domination such as that entrenched in the neoliberal world order that emerged after the rapid decolonisation moves in much of Africa, thus decolonisation itself as reversing colonisation or achieving freedom can be dismissed as mythic and illusory (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013). Fanon (1961) makes a similar but a belligerently more forceful submission in his seminal work, *The*

Wretched of the Earth, where independence by elites does not suffice for a genuine 'collective catharsis', which requires the unshackling of the local from the violence constituted by colonialism and colonialists through violence against the oppressor, i.e. the European or white. Elites or local politicians only seek to replace the colonisers rather than colonialism, thus serving as intermediaries and perpetuating the various practices of extraversion – in a Bayertian sense – to the detriment of ordinary citizens. Independence could then be viewed as a myth or an illusion of freedom (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013).

As Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013: 3) forcefully argues, rather than a post-colonial world, where decolonisation has resulted in a less-constrained Africa with less Western interference and intervention, a 'postcolonial neocolonized world' better captures various 'structural, systemic, cultural, discursive, and epistemological pattern[s] of domination and exploitation' that have bedevilled Africa and Africans 'since the Conquest (with a capital 'C' to signify it as a multifaceted process rather than an event and to underline its foundational influence on the domination of modern African history by global (i.e., Western) history'. These structures of domination according to Quijano (2000: 342) can be conceptualised as 'coloniality', which he defines as, 'one of the specific and constitutive elements of global model of capitalist power, [which is...] based on the imposition of a racial/ethnic classification of the global population as the cornerstone of that model of power', operating on 'every level in every arena and dimension (both material and subjective) of everyday social existence, and does so on a societal scale'. To be sure, this ubiquity of power establishes and sustains hierarchies of the world and people around the concept of race.

It becomes imperative to identify these power relations that constitute a significant portion of the world as inferior to others and what implications these may have in the lived experiences of citizens in the Global South in terms of their experiences with terrorism and counterterrorism (Quijano, 2000). As will be showed in Chapters 4.3, this requires an immersion in communities that have experienced (counter-)terrorism to engage with vernacular, non-institutional meanings as against the pretensions of value-free studies which seek to find ways in which challenges to the status quo can be resolved or ameliorated.

An important question at this juncture is the slipperiness of the concept of Western or the West as if is often taken for granted what is meant by the West, whether this has a stable discernible ontology independent of other identities and whether it makes sense to question how this identity has come about through problematizing its representations- both by the Self and the Other. A critical way of looking at the Western concept is through paying attention to both material and ideational dimensions of the notion of the 'Western'. From the earlier discussions about a postcolonial neo-colonial state, i.e. African states, where being post-colonial is a myth and freedom from the dictates of powerful Western states, especially Euro-American powerhouses is illusory. The concept of the West can best be viewed in terms of its racialised, hegemonic, subjugating, marginalising and patriarchal actualities or proclivities.

The role which liberal and neoliberal global governance has played in shaping experiences in the Global South, and especially in Africa cannot be overemphasised. However, the definition of 'Western' in this chapter is more of a working one, which on one hand identifies the asymmetric power relations involved in the relationship

between Western and non-Western societies and also pays attention to the prevailing structures and engagement that such historical interactions have legitimised. In the first instance, attention is paid to coloniality of power, thus avoiding the less convincing claims by some authors that colonialism has officially ended. The argument here is that coloniality is ongoing and this can be understood through exposing the 'coloniality of power', which the West, especially Euro-American countries wield over former colonies, especially in Africa and Latin America (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 7). In the second instance, ongoing security projects such as the discursive and practical dimensions of the Western response to 9/11 attacks have means that various projects in Africa have exploited ongoing alliances and colonial connections.

Politically, informal empires have only replaced formal empires, because the latter has increasingly become politically untenable and economically unsustainable (Halperin, 2006). Formal occupation, especially against uncooperative or revolting populations, is expensive as the US discovered in Afghanistan and Iraq (Halperin, 2006). Finally, some Western powers, especially with France, the US and the UK retain (or have in the case of the US) considerable influence in African politics and security practice. France has military ongoing military operations in Mali, Chad and Niger and much of the Sahel, codenamed as Operation Barkhane which evidences the continuous involvement of the West in African affairs and engaging in activities that very often serve the interest of the Western power. This unequal or asymmetric power relationship can only be understood through paying attention to the entangled history of Africa and the West, i.e. through unpacking the historical and cultural context that have characterised the relationship between Africa and the West for

over five hundred years, starting from the slave trade and enduring through colonialism and now manifesting through more insidious ways as global neoliberal governance (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013).

Periodizing postcolonial thought is not an easy task, and much of the debates have centred on what should be captured within postcolonial analysis. This is strongly linked to the argument that almost every society in the world has experienced some form of colonialism in the past and also that there have been varying forms of colonial governance and subjugation, for example, settler colonies and protectorates, among others (Childs and Williams, 2014). In this chapter, the colonial experience referenced to can be traced to 1492, when Christopher Columbus 'discovered' the New World which was immediately followed a few years later by Vasco De Gama's arrival in Calicut (or Kozhikode), in present day India. These encounters can be understood as the initiation of European colonisation of non-Western peoples which marks the starting point for postcolonial critique. What is more important in the context of this thesis is the encounter between Africa and Europe and how these historical relations of power have influenced how African conflicts are represented and addressed.

Said (2012) makes this point when he emphasises the difficulty inherent in theorising about a period, whose boundaries are not only unclear but also sternly contested. In this regard, how does the postcolonial experience offer an adequate analytical framework if there is 'disagreement about what happened in the past' but also more importantly, 'uncertainty about whether the past really is past, over and concluded, or whether it continues, albeit in different forms' (Said, 2012: 3). It is the particular position that Slemon (1993: 6) for example, argues that colonialism persists and is

continuously perpetuated through ‘the modern theatre of neo-colonialist international relations’.

To adopt a contrapuntal approach is to demonstrate ‘a simultaneous awareness both of the metropolitan history and of those other histories against which (and together with which) the dominating discourse acts’ (Said, 2012: 51). Nigeria or the conflicts over national territory or governance cannot be understood outside the colonial history and the various political changes that have occurred over the last two centuries. Whether acknowledged or not, it is within this framework that many intellectuals that seem to ignore this fact explain Boko Haram and the threat it poses to the Nigerian state (Abubakar, 2014; Bearzotti et al., 2015; Blair, 2015). In short, they seek to solve the problems that Boko Haram and other agents pose to the Nigerian state, while taking the status-quo for granted (Cox, 1981).

While his initial work on the in *Orientalism* can be criticised for totally ignoring African experiences, which is a form of exclusion, *Culture and Imperialism* served as a corrective for this oversight. Although Edward Said has not been very influential in IR as he has in other fields such as Sociology and Cultural Studies, some key concepts such as ‘culture, identity and representation; nation and memory; and intellectual responsibility’ and contrapuntal reading of history offer significant methodological and analytical tools for experts in the field of IR to address complex phenomena (Chowdhry, 2007: 102). From a postcolonial perspective, this study pays attention to the unequal power relations between Western and non-Western societies as well as the relationship between knowledge and power (Foucault, 1980).

Another contribution that applies to this research is his call for reflection on the role of intellectuals. Said (1994: 8) suggests a normative commitment to research which recommends that intellectuals challenge the status-quo through 'speaking truth to power'. This research commitment requires taking a stand with the most oppressed, marginalised, 'underrepresented and disadvantaged groups' in society (Biswas, 2007: 119). The earlier argument by Cox (1981) further clarifies this position such that while mainstream theories seek to fix problems or glitches in the status-quo to help it to function more smoothly, critical theories step outside the status-quo to ask how it came to be. What this requires is continuous reflexivity on the part of the researcher about the research process and understanding that it is possible to replace one hegemony with another through imposing one's own perspectives or values on the participants. Speaking truth to power should avoid replacing one power with another, the researchers'.

A postcolonial approach that pays attention to the Eurocentric bias in much of academia and proposes alternative ways in which history can be re-evaluated is what Said (2012) refers to as a contrapuntal reading of history. In what Said adapts from 'western classical music, [he argues that in the counterpoint] various themes play off one another, with only a provisional privilege being given to any particular one', where one does not dominate the other but rather contributes to a polyphonic melody, playing in 'concert and order' (Said, 2012: 59-60). This study seeks to engage with local ways of constructing versions of (in)security, the Self, Other and the world. It is this increasingly acknowledged need to move beyond an empirical and conceptual Eurocentric bias in IR that Biswas (2007: 119) calls for the development of 'a global intellectual posture'. Empirically, events in the 'Global

South' receive less attention, and when they do, as with the case of important security challenges such as al Qaeda and Boko Haram, the primary concern is with how it affects the West. Likewise, postcolonialism calls for attention to various assumptions about identities, especially how particular forms of resistance are constructed as 'illegitimate' while others are not.

A quick critique of some critical approaches to terrorism studies such as the Welsh School and human security approaches reveals this Eurocentrism. With its Critical Theory or Frankfurt School roots, the Welsh School is primarily buoyed by an 'emancipation' project which seeks to liberate 'people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do' (Booth, 1991: 319). While the conception of 'freedom' has evolved over the years, within this context, it may be understood as the helping the oppressed and underprivileged to free themselves (Pieterse, 1992; Peoples, 2011). This 'freeing' of people (especially Africans) assumes that there is a possibility of a 'true security' that is often disguised in universal terms but has a Eurocentric bias.

The representation of Boko Haram within Western discourse (mainly Anglo-American) as 'Islam vs West' (Huntington, 1993), has rendered the local context and victims of actual Boko Haram attacks invisible (Enloe, 1996). This quest has involved a continuous search for 'imaginary' connections or recurrent patterns of targets that can be viewed as 'Western' such as the United Nations building bombing in Abuja (Agbiboa, 2013c), whilst overlooking the overwhelming destruction that Boko Haram has inflicted on local populations, who are not 'Western' by any stretch of the imagination.

What is required is an in-depth study of both Boko Haram and Nigerian counterterrorism within their local contexts with their richness and complexity (Barnard-Wills and Moore, 2010; Said, 2012). Another dimension is associative, i.e. the continuous hunt for clues to link Boko Haram with other groups that have already been constructed as anti-Western which may serve to justify the 'clash of civilisations' thesis of 'Islam vs West' (Huntington, 1993). The 'myth' of Boko Haram being anti-Western forecloses deeper understanding of what Boko Haram stands for and what its actions at the grassroots level in Nigeria, alongside other earlier social movements such as Yan Tatsine could mean for local social and political relations.

3.11 Gender and (In)security

Feminism is neither a coherent theory nor a single analytical perspective but a lens and a way of thinking which incorporates various theoretical viewpoints (Kang et al., 2017: 6; Whitworth, 2008). Notwithstanding the lack of a coherent school of thought, all feminist perspectives have an overwhelming consensus about the ontological importance of gender in understanding the world and in paying attention to how the world is gendered. Besides the commitments of 'mainstream' feminist approaches discussed so far, Critical feminism, more critical approaches to feminism have distinguished between biological categories, 'male and female' and social categories, 'man and woman'.

To varying degrees, feminists challenge the taken for granted views of gender. In expanding this critical explication of 'gender', it then becomes possible to identify how political constellations or structures are 'gendered' which transforms gender from being merely an empirical category into an important political tool in global

political analysis. This sentiment drives the cliché that there is gender everywhere in that unequal power relations that are based on the dynamics of gender, i.e. valorisation of masculinity and devalorisation of femininity, are ubiquitous. Finally, becoming gender-curious or gender-aware can illuminate hitherto ‘invisible actors in security, previously invisible structures of security, and insecurity, and previously invisible dynamics within those matrices’ (Sjoberg, 2016: 52).

Tickner and Sjoberg (2013: 179) define ‘gender as a set of socially constructed characteristics describing what men and women ought to be’. It is associated with ‘social expectations’ about masculinity and femininity and usually vary across communities and cultures (Weatherall et al., 2007). Experts often like to differentiate between sex, which is a biological concept regarding physical attributes such as genitals and hormones, and gender which relates more to the cultural and social attributes or values associated with such differences usually defined by norms of femininity and masculinity. Within this chapter, adopting a ‘social constructionist perspective’, rather than being fixed or treated as something that people have, gender [is understood] as a dynamic, socially created entity that exists in our interactions’ (Weatherall et al., 2007: 192). In short, people practice gender (Weatherall et al., 2007; West and Zimmerman, 1987). This also applies to the myriad other possible subject positions available to the individual in everyday interactions (Weatherall et al., 2007).

Most mainstream feminist perspectives have also been criticised for both being Eurocentric and ignoring non-Western epistemologies. The overarching assumption of feminism is that gender is the most important overarching principle that governs social relations in every society. From a postcolonial feminist perspective, this

universalism ignores non-Western realities where there could be different dynamics that govern social relations. This may foreclose the possibilities of understanding the dynamics that operate in other non-Western societies, thus serving as a form of intellectual 'imperialism'. To emphasise the unique experience of women of colour in the US, Crenshaw (1991) proposes the concept of intersectionality was to capture how various identities and structures of domination intersect to marginalise people such that the 'oppressed' may be overlooked by the various social movements through the 'invisibility' that these layers combine to create. The similar intersection of identities may intersect to worsen the (in)security experiences of individuals in Nigeria, making it important to pay attention to intersectionality.

A second related criticism is related to the Western-centric nature of much of feminism which can be associated with its almost unrestricted universal assumptions about gender. Oyewunmi (1997) critiques this universality, highlighting the somatocentric preoccupation within Western thought, which can be traced to the Cartesian dualism of the 'mind vs the body (or matter)'. This 'binary opposition' can be linked to the earlier identity constructions of the Self and Other in Section 3.4.2 where the Orient is not only exotic but cannot (at least yet) escape from the weaknesses of the body (Oyěwùní, 1997) thus also fitting into an overarching rational/irrational binary.

Her overarching argument is that within the Nigerian or South-western Nigerian setting, gender is a western invention, i.e. the (wo)man being inferior to the man, which constitutes the central argument of all feminist theorising is a Western 'invention' which was imposed on communities in Nigeria during European colonialism. As she succinctly put it, 'Yoruba does not "do gender"' (Oyěwùní, 1997:

42), meaning that the language itself does not give room for the differentiation between gender (social and cultural construct) and sex (biological attributes). While the Northeast may be culturally distinct from the Southwest where Yoruba language is primarily spoken, it is important to be open to possibilities from people's constructions rather than impose any initial concepts on them. Therefore, it is important to capture how people practice their various identities in everyday life, rather than addressing these concerns with *a priori* assumptions.

The 'linguistic' turn in IR, during the Fourth Great Debate, has made it possible to examine language, not as a mirror to outside reality but as constituting that reality (Fierke and Jorgensen, 2015). While this suggests that speaking with African subjects can be subversive toward a Eurocentric or Westerncentric security studies or IR, it must be made clear that it does not necessarily result in the total extrication from a deeply Westerncentric propensity characterised by a continuous and almost insatiable tendency to be indebted to 'DWEMs — dead, white, European males' (Oyěwùmí, 1997: 23). For example, the 'linguistic turn' in European philosophy is indebted to pioneering contributions by Ludwig Wittgenstein and furthered by John Austin (Fierke and Jorgensen, 2015), both Europeans. These insights have offered provided a base for challenging some 'apparently' Westerncentric ideas such as Cartesian dualism, but they are not totally immune to similar overextensions of Western ideals and worldviews (Oyěwùmí, 1997).

Building on these ideas, there are no assumptions about women in Northern Nigeria requiring liberation. To paraphrase Spivak (1988), brown/black women needing to be liberated from brown/black men or even more presciently, brown/black women needing to be liberated from white women – middle class Western feminists

(MCWF). In this study, the primary concern is how people construct their experiences of gender and how it is discursively practiced through talk and text in everyday interaction (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

The quantitative aggregation of individuals who experience (in)security as numbers and data does not capture the nuances and richness of their lived experiences and more importantly, does not amplify their voices within IR scholarship (Sylvester, 2013). A feminist account calls for more attention to be paid to the mundane, unspectacular and quotidian experiences of those who may not be considered to be key or important actors in international politics (Sylvester, 2013; Enloe, 2011). In short, 'the mundane matters' (Enloe, 2011). The experiences of IDPs in Nigeria on (in)security are extremely important in understanding the various dynamics of both terrorism and counterterrorism as they are the ones who experience both phenomena first hand (Enloe, 1996).

As this section has shown, while there are various feminist perspectives, they all converge in drawing 'attention to different ways of thinking about gender, different ways of conceptualising the gendered nature of international security and different ways of responding to the problems of global politics' (Whitworth, 2008: 105). Addressing (in)security in Nigeria through the lived experiences of citizens provides an in-depth understanding of insecurity within its historical and cultural context and also provides a rich tapestry of lived (in)security experiences through capturing how people construct their experiences through various interpretative repertoires, metaphors and frames (Wetherell, 1998). It also fulfils normative commitments to engaging with the real insecurity conditions of those living with 'concrete' insecurities (Booth, 2007). As Jarvis (2013b: 160) argues, it is important to 'decentre' the state,

and recentre citizens in security research more specifically and international relations more broadly, as the ultimate referent of security.

3.12 Conclusion

In the first part of this chapter, I set out to examine the main themes in contemporary (counter-)terrorism literature. I examined various studies that attempted to identify effective ways to combat terrorism by suggesting best ways to defeat terrorists such as decapitation and deterrence. I address legal dimensions and discriminatory CT before discussing the vernacular turn in International Relations and security studies which has increasingly brought attention to lived experiences of (counter)terrorism. The final two sections address ethnographic research in security studies and identity and interest studies on (counter-)terrorism within the Nigerian context, respectively.

To conclude, much of the studies on (counter-)terrorism within mainstream security studies do not ask relevant questions about the experiences of individuals and communities but rather are concerned about the security of states, thus, asking questions about what can solve terrorism problems and preserve state survival. Their concern with national security means that other aspects of security are overlooked. On top of this, they are Westerncentric. Critical studies on security have asked relevant questions about how security is experienced, and the impacts that security project could have on individuals and communities but similar studies on the Global South more broadly or on Boko Haram and Nigerian CT are absent which makes them similarly Westerncentric.

The second part of this chapter combined four main theoretical approaches, feminism, postcolonial studies, constructionism and vernacular security, to offer a

potent composite of perspectives to address the impact of counterterrorism on the security of public in Nigeria. As already discussed, feminism emphasises the value of personal experiences of marginalised people and how security is gendered which provides a method of looking at (in)security from the perspective of silenced and marginalised voices; postcolonial studies provide a framework for addressing how experiences of insecurity in postcolonial societies – especially in Africa have a distinct (in)security experience which is shaped by pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial realities; vernacular security emphasises the importance of local understandings of security and challenges universalist pretensions, elite-knowledge and humanist assumptions; broad constructivist approaches and poststructural approaches emphasise the value of looking at security as discursive, i.e. not out there to be discovered but socially constructed through language.

Chapter Four: Research Methodology and Methods

4.1 Introduction

In Chapter 4, I addressed the various theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of this study. The thesis was situated within broader critical security research, adopting poststructural, postcolonial, feminist perspectives within a discursive psychology approach. These tools serve to fill the academic and policy gaps that I identified in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, namely the lack of 'bottom-up', critical scholarship on Boko Haram and CT in Nigeria, the Westerncentric tendencies of such studies within the European (especially UK) context, and the need to combine methods that could adequately address challenges.

This chapter now introduces the various techniques and methods that I will be taking to negotiate, analyse and present data that will fill the gaps that I identified in the preceding chapters. The methodology for this study is a qualitative methodology which involves adopting a critical ethnography, using in-depth interviews, participant observation and field notes to negotiate data at IDP camps and host communities in Nigeria. This field trip required a significant amount of immersion in these communities throughout the study.

To reiterate, the overarching questions that this study seeks to answer are:

1. How do people understand and discuss (counter)terrorism in their everyday lives?
 - a. What do locals from the Northeast do with their talk?

b. How are various versions of reality and identities constructed through talk?

2. What implications do lay discourses of (counter-)terrorism have for security?

This chapter argues that discursive psychology provides valuable tools to examine how various publics in Nigeria understand and interpret (counter-)terrorism and position themselves through talk and text; it will seek to identify the various metaphors, themes and interpretative repertoires that people adopt in their vernacular discourses on (counter-)terrorism (Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Wetherell and Potter, 1988; Jackson and Hall, 2016).

A serious weakness within traditional security studies is their tendency to aspire to science, thus seeking universal truths that can apply to all contexts. In this sense, concepts and frameworks in the West can be generalised to non-Western contexts. However, this weakness partly exists within some critical studies on security and terrorism where attempts to challenge this scientism have been replaced with similar Universalist ideals such as the emancipatory ideals of Welsh School and human security approaches. Studies that address these non-Western perspectives become important.

The participants of this research were selected from Internally Displaced Person's Camps (IDP Camps), and host communities within the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Niger, and Nasarawa states. The participants were males and females mainly between the ages of 18 to 70. Overall, there were 41 semi-structured interviews with IDPs lasting between 12 minutes to 55 minutes, while there were several other non-

recorded conversations that were documented in field notes¹⁹. The entire observation process lasted for eight weeks which generated 100 pages of field notes. The first and second sites were IDP camps within the Federal Capital Territory, Durumi and New Kuchingoro Camps; the other sites were host communities in Nasarawa and Niger states, which usually serve as satellite towns to the FCT.

4.2 Qualitative research in terrorism and counterterrorism

Qualitative research does not seek to explain phenomena but rather to explore and understand problems or events by engaging with subjects within their natural environment (Denzin and Lincoln, 2009). This involves an attempt to understand how people make meaning of events and their experiences which necessitates the researcher maintaining close interaction and communication with research subjects to explore and understand how they interpret reality (Putney et al., 2007). This research is situated in and contributes to a tradition of critical ethnographic research. Ethnographic research involves the process of observing, describing, depicting and representing lived experiences of people in their own societies (Iphofen, 2013).

Ethnographies generally necessitate studying groups via direct observation and interaction with their cultures and real life interactions, which has implications for the types of methods adopted to collect data (Iphofen, 2013). Experts that adopt this type of research approach usually engage in extended field work where there is direct contact with subjects or participants of the study and methods such as interviews, participant observation and field notes taking have become increasingly

¹⁹ A sample is provided in the appendix.

useful for understating the local meanings that people make of phenomena within their own cultural and social milieu. Within the Nigerian context, I sought to both observe and interact with citizens who were displaced by conflict in the Northeast to understand how they discuss security in their own language, vocabularies and most importantly, attempting to identify interpretative repertoires that they adopted to make meaning of the world and position themselves within various conversations and contexts (Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell and Potter, 1988; Wetherell and Potter, 1993; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002).

While much of ethnographic work is considered conventional, there is a contemporary and subversive strand of critical ethnography which brings an explicitly critical orientation. This means continuously challenging taken-for-granted knowledge and reflecting through the research process (Thomas, 1993; Cox, 1981; Booth, 2007). In other words, this interpretivist approach necessitates an acknowledgement of the researcher's biases and how people are situated within the world in which they are examining thus making all meaning-making endeavours inherently 'value-laden' (Thomas, 1993), rather than viewing such endeavours as the 'value-free' aspiration of much of objectivist or positivist approaches to security studies and international relations. From a critical ethnographic perspective, research is not concerned with 'what is?' but rather 'what could be?' (Thomas, 1993: 4).

Some significant steps were taken to ensure that this research fulfilled the ethics of ethnographic research. While snowballing techniques were adopted in the field, I made sure that the recommendation process was carefully vetted to make sure that adequate preparations were put in place to cater for both foreseen and unforeseen

circumstances. While there were benefits in getting interviewees or camp and community gatekeepers to recommend their colleagues, friends and family that they know to have relevant experiences, I was committed to making sure that participants who made recommendations provide a brief about potential conflicts that may arise or possible experiences that may be traumatising. These referrals were important as they revealed personal trauma beforehand which enabled me to avoid questions or prompts that may have triggered sad and painful memories in participants.

These information were very useful in dealing with sensitive situations. On one occasion, during a game of Ludo, an interviewee discussed how an IDP had lost her entire family and how she had been orphaned by the insurgency. This was documented in the field note and when the interviewee later volunteered to be interviewed, he recommended the IDP he had mentioned. The approach I adopted was to avoid questions that related to her family unless she brought them up herself. In this sense, participants were allowed to navigate traumatic experiences on their own terms without being pushed, coerced or harried into disclosing uncomfortable information. They were made aware at every stage of the research about their power to control their level of participation, i.e. they did not only have the power to refuse to disclose any information without explanation, but they could also discontinue the interview or observation process at any time they found necessary. This power was sanctioned by participants on a few occasions.

In ethnographic research, the main 'goal of the research process is self – reflexivity – what we learn about the self [is] a result of the study of the “other”' (Chiseri-Strater, 1996: 119). Continuous reflexivity is essential regarding continuous questioning of ways in which the various power relations may influence research. The fact that

people are being observed in itself impacts on the outcome of research and the modification of behaviour which is referred to as the Hawthorn effect. As a concept, positionality emphasises the social construction of culture, i.e. culture cannot be viewed as fixed or as an identity which someone has or does not have but rather a product of identity positions that people take in relation to other people within different contexts and at different times (Merriam et al., 2001; Chereni, 2014).

People express imbricated identities which they choose to emphasise or de-emphasise in different occasions, and it is the case that 'positionality' and 'identity' are sometimes used interchangeably within the research context (Chereni, 2014: 1). With this in mind, the researcher paid attention to the various subject positions taken by the researcher in the research and especially how these positions influenced or affected the research process and outcomes. Positionality is multidimensional as there may be several overlying identities that the researcher and participants occupy during the fieldwork, from which people make sense of different situations (Kezar, 2002; Bourke, 2014). These different positions determine the relations and could enhance or adversely affect the quality of research.

Understanding this complexities, I was critical about my own identities, biases and assumptions and how these could influence my field work (Aguilar, 1981). For example, cultural and sub-cultural internal diversity exists in all cultures which means anticipating what the participants may do could prove too costly, especially when identities are actively produced and reproduced; it is an ongoing process of negotiation. Sharing a similar culture or sub-culture with participants does not guarantee being an 'insider' all the time. Likewise, my identity as the expert; coming from outside the IDP camps; travelling from a university in the UK, and also not being

able to speak the local language were various identities that made me an outsider at different times. In this context, positionality entails my occupied locus in relation to my participants in the course of the critical ethnographic practice which is an ongoing discursive production that is neither predictable nor coherent (Chereni, 2014).

It is essential for a researcher to recognise both their own position and that of their participants within various contexts and negotiate them accordingly (McDowell, 1992: 409). This recognition helped me to negotiate the 'insider-outsider' dynamic which is vital in field research. My position in relation to my participants shifted and ongoing reflexivity was essential to manage these changes (Narayan, 1989: 23). Identity markers 'such as education, gender, sexual orientation, class, race, or sheer duration of contacts may at different times outweigh the cultural identity we associate with an insider or outsider status' (Narayan, 1989: 23; Narayan, 1993). There was a continuous reflection on these multiple positions and how it impacted on the researcher-interviewee relationship.

Regarding 'social class', there were several occasions when participants emphasised disparities in identity. For example, there was a day when I had to shuttle between two camps to attend events, the hurried walk was draining which left me exhausted on arriving at the second camp, a participant at the camp yelled: 'Big man', commenting on the researcher's lack of stamina, i.e. exhaustion within a relatively short distance. After watching me gulp a bottle of water hastily, he jokingly quipped that he believed that my current exhaustion was incomparable to their experiences in the Northeast: 'We trekked for weeks, sometimes when we were fleeing from Boko Haram' (IDP 2). This statement was meant to emphasise my

position in relation to IDP experiences in the Northeast. He made me experiences – and anyone who had not experienced their journey first hand, including any reader of this work – an ‘outsider’ who will never fully understand their ‘IDP experience’ in the same way that IDPs have, even if it was unintended. My ‘privileged’ position of in such situations cannot be overlooked.

On another occasion, on my introduction to a group of four IDPs who sat under a tree playing card games, I introduced himself by providing my full name: ‘Akinyemi Oyawale’ which elicited the response: ‘You are Yoruba?’ That I identified as Yoruba through my name – which was unintentional made me an outsider because Yorubas are indigenously from Southwest Nigeria and Boko Haram attacks have primarily occurred in the Northeast, over 800 kilometres from much of Western Nigeria. The vast majority of IDPs were displaced from the Northeast which makes this experiences almost alien to someone from the Southwest. As such, it was implied that I had very little knowledge about life in the Northeast. This is performative, as saying ‘You are Igbo’, ‘You are Hausa’, or ‘You are Kanuri’ could have elicited a similar or different response or possibly a different form of cooperation or resistance, depending on the participant’s cultural and historical interpretation of the various identities.

Researchers always carry their identity baggage with them which may influence participant predispositions towards them. There are historical stereotypes that accompany being associated with any ethnic group or tribe – which can be considered derogatory – and the young IDPs must have evaluated my ethnic identity based on some of these. After this encounter, two of the four men suddenly withdrew their participation, citing personal reasons. This paralleled my encounter at the

second camp where the response was even more telling. I was asked if I was a 'devout' Muslim or not and when I said 'No', and that I was a Christian, the individual who had earlier offered to conduct a camp tour told me that he had 'other things to do' and when asked if it could be rescheduled, he said 'No' and ended the conversation abruptly. While I was yet to brief the IDP about the full ethical code of the research, it was made clear that participants retained the power in research situations to end their participation without explanations or justifications. Religious identity plays an important role in social situations in Nigeria which also played out at the camps – some of which were assigned based on religious identity – and host communities which necessitated continuous attention to cues of unease and important steps taken to remedy them.

There must be much caution in generalising from these fairly isolated incidents, as several other IDPs participated in the session without knowing the researcher's religious and or ethnic identity. Others were aware and even asked the researcher about home and family and how they were doing. These only affirm the unfixed and unpredictability of the various positions that I had to navigate in everyday activities which may reduce the quality of the data obtained or worse, make the research endeavour unsuccessful. Therefore, while I perceived myself as being an insider, being Nigerian, sharing the same religious faith with some of the participants, race, and certain languages such as English and Pidgin English, there were other occasions when I was perceived as an outsider based on religion, age, language, class, ethnicity, education level, and gender, among others. I was not only one making sense of my participants but this was pluridirectional with participants also making sense of my identities and positions throughout the research process. This

was not constant but in flux necessitating my awareness to them and constant reflection and negotiation.

4.2.1 The study design

Study design refers to the various methods, techniques and general strategy that the researcher adopts to address specific problems, and thus coherently answer research questions. It involves decisions about how the researcher will go about collecting, measuring and analysing relevant data (Labaree, 2013; Denzin and Giardina, 2008; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). I adopt an ethnographic approach which combines interviews and participant observation to address the problem of (in)security in Nigeria.

4.2.2 Participant Observation

Participant observation involves the detailed observation and description of the behaviours, actions, activities, attitudes and artefacts of subjects within their social and cultural environment (Marshall and Rossman, 1989). There are different approaches to participant observation, such as external, passive, balanced, active and total participant observation approaches, which depends on the researcher's distance from the participants during the observation process especially regarding the insider-outsider balance. Participant observation mainly involves the immersion of the researcher in a particular research community through which s/he is involved in everyday activities, events, practices and rituals to have a better understanding of what these events mean to those who participate in them (Schensul et al., 1999: 91).

When triangulated with other methods such as interviews and field notes, participant observation serves to enrich the thick description of the phenomena under

investigation as details that may be overlooked by other methods are captured especially when the researcher has a keen eye for details (Kawulich, 2005; McCosker et al., 2001). The field work for this research involved a balanced participant observation approach which meant that I managed to find a balance between being an insider and outsider at various times, while constantly reflecting on the power relations within the various positions occupied during research (Kawulich, 2005). The nature of the research questions and problems necessitated a better grasp of quotidian experiences to better understand people's own lay conceptualisations of security and insecurity.

4.2.3 Field Notes

Field notes refer to the researcher's accounts during research which describes events and activities observed during field practice such as through participation and immersion in everyday activities of people within their cultural, social and natural setting (Emerson et al., 2011). They are significant because they help the researcher to document the various sense-making exercises and interpretations of day to day activities, thus providing important supplementary contextual information for the analysis of other forms of data such as talk. They also play an integral part in serving as a reflexive diary for the researcher to record activities that occur on the field. Within the context of this research, 'reflexivity refers broadly to the relationship between the researcher and the empirical field' whereby s/he continuously questions the various assumptions, biases and power relations present throughout the research process (Eriksson et al., 2012: 11). In this study, the notes taken during the field served as output of participant observation, helping to document what I observed throughout the observation process.

The field notes for this research were taken both *in situ* and afterwards where I initially made comments on events at the field then later spent time developing the ideas and making sense of them. The participant observations were documented in the field notes with comments made about what I had observed and where necessary, I appended a critical reflection. Date and time of events were recorded, the venue of the events, the identity of those involved, sensory impressions such as smell, sights, and sounds among others, critical comments about my interpretation of these events (Blomberg et al., 2017; Van Maanen, 2011).

4.2.4 Interviews

Interviews are one of the most common research tools adopted by qualitative researchers to negotiate data. While other interview methods such as structured and unstructured offer benefits for qualitative research, the semi-structured interview method was the most appropriate for this research. The semi-structured interview method being a hybrid approach combines strengths of structured interviews such as having a pre-planned set of questions but also avoids its shortcomings such as rigidity through adopting the flexibility of unstructured interview methods (Schensul et al., 1999). The main prompts asked about their experiences of security, their concerns about security, their experiences of counterterrorism, their experiences of terrorism and other concerns that they may have²⁰. There was room for further contingent questions when interviewees made points meriting my further elaboration. What this meant was that interviewees were allowed to take control of

²⁰ See Appendix for sample questions.

the discussions as in-depth and as diversely as they thought with my initial guidance and also without straying too much from the themes of the research.

In choosing questions for the interview sessions, I paid attention to how language could impact on the responses that participants could give to questions. I varied my questions with the same participant to see if they were interpreting the questions in the same way. For example, I could ask: What concerns do you have with security? I would later ask: What concerns do you have? In this way, I discovered that the answers were quite varied sometimes as asking about security sometimes invoked direct reference to military, police, and Boko Haram, among others while asking about their concerns was more open and allowed them to think deeply before addressing what they may consider to be the most pressing issue in their lives. This aligns with the vernacular commitments of this research which has a particular strength of 'conceptual emptiness', thus allowing 'for genuinely inductive research into public experiences, understandings, anxieties, and fears' (Jarvis, 2017: 1). They were able to prioritise what was important and what was not. Evidently, the nature of the questions influenced how they prioritised their responses, which I took note of and reflected upon in the course of the field work.

Rather than elite interviews, this research adopted in-depth interviews with ordinary people in an attempt to understand lay discourses of terrorism and counterterrorism in Nigeria and the implications of the findings. This approach aligned with the study's vernacular commitments which necessitates speaking with those most affected by the phenomena under investigation (Jarvis, 2017). Boyce and Neale (2006: 3) define 'in-depth interviewing [as] a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive individual interviews with a small number of respondents to explore their

perspectives on a particular idea, program, or situation'. Talking in various informal settings and during activities made it possible to negotiate data that emerged from everyday conversations.

4.3 The Data Negotiation Process, Analysis and Justification of Claims

Data collection or negotiation refers to the various tools and techniques adopted by the researcher to 'collect' or 'negotiate' data that could help to adequately answer specific research questions that are usually directed towards solving the problems identified by the researcher; in short, they are goal-oriented (Alasuutari et al., 2008; Asghar, 2013). This section addresses the study context within the field and the everyday activities that I engaged in to adequately negotiate data required to understand the various lay discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism in Nigeria. Negotiation is preferred within the context of this research to capture a more active role of the research participants rather than passive where the researcher wields ultimate power to 'collect' data. Instead, it is a continuous process of negotiation where the participants themselves play an active role in producing data.

4.3.1 The Research Context

Most displaced persons in Nigeria may be classified as IDPs, but most have crossed the Nigerian-Cameroon boundary at least twice since the insurgency started in 2009, or gained more intensity in 2013. Likewise, many locals themselves do not construct traveling to Cameroon as traveling abroad, across national boundaries but going to another community where they have families and people who consider members of similar ethnic groups. For example, in the chapter on lay discourse on Boko Haram, there were constructions of Abuja as 'foreign' which suggested that some IDPs did

not view themselves as being within their own country. This shows that while the concept of 'internal' displacement is often taken for granted, views of locals from the Northeast challenge this assumption. It must be added that most participants used the 'IDP' term to refer to themselves.

The research context in Nigeria was the IDP community consisting of IDP camps in Abuja, and host communities in Nasarawa and Niger States. While some IDPs in Nigeria had been displaced by other forms of violence such as the Herdsmen-Farmer conflicts and communal conflicts, the IDPs who participated in this research were those displaced from the Northeast as a result of terrorism and counterterrorism. The IDP camps had approximately 2,500 permanent residents with many others living on a temporary basis. The houses are mostly basha styled with most of the building materials being plastic bags, used roofing materials, clothing and other scrap metal and plastic materials (Appendix D).

One interviewee captures the state of the environment: 'As we are living in this community now, as you see this basha now, it is only water that we see everywhere [leaking roofs]. We sleep inside water every day. If rain starts falling, we have to stand up, and if the rain stops, we have to sleep inside the water' (Appendix E). Further concerns were raised about the basic needs in the huts such as daily essentials and lack of furniture: 'Anybody that can come to help us here there is no mattress and leather to cover the place to protect us from the water. The government treats us as if we are not Nigerian people (Mary, Borno). This view further questions the concept of citizenship, especially in its relationship with the concept of internal displacement which was elucidated in the preceding paragraph. Being within Nigeria's national boundary assumes that they are not refugees since they are

citizens. Hence, the concept of internal displacement as against 'external' displacement but they question the concept of citizenship itself through their view of neglect.

Regarding numbers, it is estimated that over two million Nigerian citizens have been internally displaced from the Northeast since the insurgency started in 2009 (Hsu et al., 2017; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2015a; IOM, 2015). Many initially crossed the border into Cameroon before finding their way to other states with less Boko Haram violence, primarily in the North central region and other parts of Nigeria. Many IDPs live with family members and in host communities while a smaller number live at IDP camps. With the swelling numbers shortly before the field work started, overcrowding was increasingly becoming a problem which officials at the camps had to deal with actively.

IDP camp officials were torn between rejecting arriving IDPs thus exposing them to unknown dangers of being homeless in an unfamiliar city and accepting them, thus further overcrowding the camps which could put more people in danger. This moral dilemma was almost irresolvable as discussed with the officials in the initial conversations the researcher had with them. The huts or basha were not properly planned, and the sanitary conditions were extremely poor which had led to various outbreaks of diseases such as cholera, typhoid fever, malaria and other communicable diseases. These were all brought up by participants both in unstructured conversations as well as in semi-structured interviews throughout the field work.

There could be arguments about investigating (in)security from the perspective of IDPs who are apparently already considered to insecure is a form of case bias. This could further be strengthened by the assumption that their insecurity should be self-evident making this endeavour superfluous. While there is an old cliché that a chain is as strong as its weakest link, thus suggesting that the (in)security or wellbeing of a body politic can only be best understood from the experiences of those most marginalised and disenfranchised; those on the margins of society, so to speak. From a theoretical standpoint, Booth (2007) contends that just as diseases and ailments, insecurity can only be understood from the perspective of those who currently live with the condition. In other words, examining (in)security from the perspective of IDPs provides a powerful understanding of (in)security in Nigeria, writ large. It could further be argued that it is elitist to assume that IDPs already live with (in)security which suggests that elites who have no first-hand experience of their condition assume what IDPs consider to be threatening or what they consider to be their priority.

4.3.2 Access, Ethics and Informed Consent

Access to IDP camps and host communities was negotiated well in advance of the field work through contacting potential gatekeepers via email and telephone. In total, three agencies and non-profit organisations were contacted by the researcher namely, National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Christian Aid and three IDP camps and host communities namely, Durumi and New Kuchingoro Camps in Abuja and host communities in Nasarawa, Abuja and Niger States. The negotiation process occurred in phases. The first phase occurred much earlier, i.e. six months before the field work was expected to take place. This phase involved contact being

made with potential gatekeepers through sending emails (see Appendix G,H,I and J), to the heads of the governmental and non-governmental agencies mentioned earlier.

The choice of organisations contacted was premised upon their experience of working with IDPs in Nigeria since displacement began in the Northeast. The emails described the ongoing research and requested for information on how best to gain access, especially concerning best practices and local conditions and conventions guiding such an endeavour²¹. When the email process did not work regarding getting responses from gatekeepers at the non-governmental organisations and the camps, a different approach was employed involving someone on the ground in Nigeria contacting the camps in person. This seemed to achieve the aims of the research. The phone numbers of camp directors were obtained which made it easier to communicate with them thus, intimating them about the research objectives. I contacted a colleague in Nigeria who phoned the gatekeepers on my behalf which helped with access when I arrived to begin field work.

Gatekeepers are persons or agents who act as intermediaries between the researcher and their potential participants or respondents (Lavrakas, 2008). They usually have a previous or ongoing relationship with the participants which means that they can exercise some degree of control about those that can gain access and about the conditions of the research process (Lavrakas, 2008; Gable, 1994; Fowler Jr, 1993). In conditions where participants are vulnerable, gatekeepers can be extremely important in setting the boundaries of research. This was the case at the

²¹ A sample email is included in the appendix.

initial stage of the field work at the IDP camps in Nigeria where the gatekeeper at one of the IDP camps informed me about the exploitation that the IDPs had experienced in the past from researchers and journalists who ‘exploit’ them without improving their lives.

From the conversation that ensued, it appeared that in much of the earlier cases, journalists and researchers had perhaps failed to communicate the limitations of their work but instead either made false promises to achieve compliance or allowed the participants and gatekeeper(s) to presuppose the benefits of their participation. In this sense, the researcher made sure that there were no false promises and the limitations and benefits of the research were made clear at the very beginning. For example, it was made clear that there were no monetary or material benefits in it for participants, which did not necessarily prevent access but dampened false expectations and sought to repair the integrity of researchers and field workers more broadly.

Consent is very important in research, thus, informed consent was sought from the research participants. They were contacted beforehand about the research, and were provided with full verbal disclosure²², which was made before every interview about what the research entailed and how their consent was not final but ongoing. What this meant was that their consent could be withdrawn at any point during the research or afterwards (within a specific timeframe). Participants were encouraged to ask further questions about how their views will be used, especially concerning anonymising data and maintaining confidentiality.

²² These were recorded before every interview session.

Participants were required to provide verbal consent which was recorded rather than a written consent, due to the risks associated with written consent in cases where coercion from the police or militants was a remote possibility. The risk could be in the form of fear by the participant that their details could be revealed or that I could be coerced into revealing them to a third party. They were assured that their identity will be coded and that the information will be locked away, with access being exclusively mine. By this assurance, they were confident to confide in me with their sensitive information that could potentially implicate the government with the belief that it will be well protected and would not be traceable to them. To achieve this, the data was fully anonymised in such a way that it could not be traced back to them in any way. Their consent was sought and recorded at the beginning of every interview which was immediately transferred to a secure device and password protected to prevent unauthorised access.

To anonymise the data, the names of participants were listed on a confidential sheet and then encoded with labels from A1 to A41, which meant that only the initial anonymising document contained the real names of the participants, which was duly transferred to a password protected computer. This anonymising was further strengthened with the adoption of aliases that were relevant to the names and locations but untraceable to the actual person speaking. For example, there are traditional names and religious names which means that the Christian names were replaced with Christian names, traditional with traditional names and Muslim names were replaced with Muslim names. For example, Samuel could be coded as Philip and Mohamed as Lateef. Spoken consent was preferred to written consent because of the nature of the phenomena under investigation. There were risks of misplaced

written documents or possible intimidation to release these materials which meant that this could potentially put participants at risk. Spoken or verbal consent reduced the possibilities of this occurrence as interviews were transferred from the recorder to a more secure device on a regular basis (Kaiser, 2009). All of these procedures were explained to the participants at the onset as an assurance about their confidentiality, and I gave them a chance to suggest alternative ways which they believed that their confidentiality could be best maintained.

According to Wiles, Crow et al. (2006), to make assurance of 'confidentiality means that what has been discussed will not be repeated, or at least, not without [the] permission' of the party involved. Confidentiality and anonymity are often confused and conflated by researchers; however, they are not the same. While confidentiality in research entails not disclosing the information of participants (which may be impossible due to the objective of research), anonymity refers to reporting these findings in such a manner that the participants are not identifiable and making sure that their identities are adequately protected using diverse techniques to make sure that views cannot be traceable to them (Wiles et al., 2006). The anonymity of the participants of this research was protected by not naming them directly and avoiding the use of labels that could make them identifiable in the research.

While anonymisation made it impossible to trace accounts to individual persons, this is not attainable with references made to communities and other identities like religion, gender or places such as local governments which enrich the discussions, narratives, anecdotes and accounts (Burgess, 2002; Wood, 2006). In the instances where some of these non-personal characteristics are necessary for the narratives and anecdotes, they were retained by the researcher. Total anonymisation could

render some of these accounts difficult to understand and accounts and narratives arduous to follow. The participants were made aware of this and were assured that they had a timeframe to object to it even after the field trip had been concluded. They were assured that their personal identity was safe from the 'general public', other community members, and my colleagues at the university or the officials at the IDP camps and host communities (Madison, 2012: 26).

4.3.3 Sampling Techniques

The participants of this research were selected from Internally Displaced Persons' Camps (IDP Camps), and host communities within the Federal Capital Territory (FCT or Abuja), Niger, and Nasarawa. The participants were males and females mainly between the ages of 18 to 70. Overall, there were 41 semi-structured interviews with IDPs while there were several other non-recorded conversations that were noted in field notes²³. The first and second sites were IDP camps within the Federal Capital Territory, Durumi and New Kuchingoro Camps; the other sites were host communities in Abuja, Nasarawa and Niger states.

The selection of the camps and participants was based on a purposive sampling technique which prioritised gender diversity, common communities of origin (northeast), residence in the northeast during the conflict, and the first-hand experience of counterterrorism through the participants' own acknowledgement or suggestion from other IDPs, camp officials or members of the host communities. Gender diversity was of paramount importance thus the researcher made sure that

²³ A sample is provided in the appendix.

men and women participated in the research almost equally. In total, there were 20 female IDPs and 22 males that participated in the research.

Participants for this study were selected based on purposive or judgemental sampling methods, i.e. non-probability sampling (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). Participants were selected based on the following factors: first, past residence in northeast Nigeria, especially after 2009 when the violence started, which would suggest the experience of the conflict under investigation. On the first introductory session at the camps and with participants, they were briefed about the research objectives, ethics, and how long the research was expected to run. The camp officials played a pivotal role in this regard as they had a list of the camp residents, their date of arrival and their location within the Northeast. Moreover, hailing from the northeast and fleeing from the violence were some of the main preconditions for being accepted as a resident in the IDP camps. For example, I asked camp officials and IDPs: 'Do you know anyone who could have experience on the impact of security in the northeast'? This usually led to referrals of those that they believed had relevant experiences or self-referral in instances where IDPs believed that they had something to share with the researcher.

I also asked interviewees to recommend someone they knew who could participate in the research – via a snowballing approach – thus making it possible to expand the sample size more quickly and significantly within the IDP community (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). This snowballing technique urged existing participants to suggest or recommend potential participants among their colleagues whom they felt could provide vital experience about terrorism and counterterrorism in the Northeast (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). Through contacts in the communities where initial contact

was made, i.e. IDP camps and host communities within Abuja, Nasarawa and Niger states, the research participants grew like a rolling snowball (Atkinson and Flint, 2001).

Gaining access to former residents of the northeast who had experienced both terrorism and counterterrorism in the past offered many benefits despite earlier questions about examining security from the experiences of those currently living with it. Their experiences offered a rich tapestry of description about (in)security in the Northeast without the ongoing risk exposing participants or the researcher to the dangers of the battle fronts. While the most affected communities in the Northeast are Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, IDP camps and host communities offered a chance to investigate these various experiences from multiple perspectives, without having to travel to these different states, thus having a collective view of insecurity that may have been impossible if they had been in the northeast. Finally, IDP experiences provided a further nuances into understanding not just terrorism and counterterrorism or even (in)security more broadly – defined in traditional terms – but rather experiences of everyday life and concerns that may be otherwise overlooked.

Participant Information

S/N	Aliases	Age	Gender	Location	Religion	State of Origin
1	Moses	25-34	Male	New Kuchingoro	Christianity	Borno
2	Sadiya	25-34	Female	New Kuchingoro	Christianity	Borno
3	Asebe	25-34	Female	Durumi	Islam	Borno
4	Yahaya	18-24	Male	Mararaba	Christianity	Borno

5	Audu	18-24	Male	New Kuchingoro	Christianity	Borno
6	Yusuf	65 +	Male	Durumi	Islam	Borno
7	Tenimu	35-44	Male	Unassigned	Islam	Yobe
8	Abigail	35-44	Female	New Kuchingoro	Christianity	Borno
9	Joel	18-24	Male	Nasarawa	Christianity	Borno
10	Sani	25-34	Male	Durumi	Islam	Borno
11	Alimo	25-34	Female	Durumi	Islam	Borno
12	Joy	25-34	Female	New Kuchingoro	Christianity	Borno
13	Kabiru	18-24	Male	Durumi	Islam	Borno
14	Pius	25-34	Male	New Kuchingoro	Christianity	Borno
15	Nojeem	25-34	Male	Unassigned	Islam	Borno
16	Danlami	25-34	Male	New Kuchingoro	Christianity	Borno
17	Ruth	25-34	Female	Unassigned	Christianity	Adamawa
18	Matthew	18-24	Male	New Kuchingoro	Christianity	Borno
19	Veronica	35-44	Female	Durumi	Christianity	Borno
20	Hannah	35-44	Female	New Kuchingoro	Christianity	Adamawa
21	Mary	45-54	Female	Unassigned	Christianity	Borno
22	Mabel	25-34	Female	Unassigned	Christianity	Borno
23	Blessing	25-34	Female	Unassigned	Christianity	Borno
24	Helen	45-54	Female	New Kuchingoro	Christianity	Adamawa
25	Jubril	35-44	Male	New Kuchingoro	Christianity	Borno
26	Lawal	25-34	Male	Niger	Islam	Borno
27	Joyce	25-34	Female	Unassigned	Christianity	Adamawa
28	Salamatu	45-54	Female	Unassigned	Islam	Borno
29	Billikisu	25-34	Female	Unassigned	Christianity	Borno

30	Ramatu	55-64	Female	New Kuchingoro	Christianity	Adamawa
31	Ajifa	65+	Female	Unassigned	Christianity	Borno
32	David	25-34	Male	New Kuchingoro	Christianity	Borno
33	Chris	18-24	Male	New Kuchingoro	Christianity	Borno
34	Marcus	25-34	Male	New Kuchingoro	Christianity	Borno
35	Beatrice	18-24	Female	New Kuchingoro	Christianity	Adamawa
36	Elizabeth	18-24	Female	Unassigned	Christianity	Borno
37	Abdul	25-34	Male	Unassigned	Islam	Yobe
38	Hafeez	25-34	Male	Unassigned	Islam	Yobe
39	Adamu	Undisclosed	Male	Unassigned	Islam	Undisclosed
40	Omeyi	Undisclosed	Female	Unassigned	Christian	Undisclosed
41	Abdulkabir	25-34	Male	Unassigned	Islam	Yobe

Table 1: A table showing the personal information of research participants. All names are aliases, but their details are retained as provided by participants in the course of the fieldwork.

4.3.4 Everyday Activities at Camps and Host Communities

The main objective of this research was to obtain lay talk, i.e. people's everyday discussions and understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism. This made it important to generate rapport which allowed people to be able to feel comfortable about discussing important issues in their everyday lives including activities and events that normally will be attended by people they were familiar with. Despite the participation in everyday events at the camp such as watching television, going to the farm, fetching water and playing Ludo games with IDPs, there were some

important events that the researcher organised in the camp. Some selected events will be discussed in more details in the succeeding paragraphs.

From the various informal discussions with IDPs, it emerged that they often made references to football competitions in the Northeast and how this was no longer possible in their camps and host communities. Football played a very important role in their sense of community and formed much of the discussions they had outside family and community issues. Besides talking about football, IDPs usually played football around the camps on a regular basis and at a nearby field on Saturdays. With the importance that they attached to football, the researcher decided to discuss the possibilities of organising a football event with the help of the IDPs themselves and the authorities of the IDP camps.

From some of the previous discussions, IDPs had mentioned concerns about their lack of trust of people who had come to exploit them without taking time to invest in their communities through getting to know them and participating in their activities. For example, according to this young man: 'Many people come here and just talk, talk, talk to us. They tell us they will do this, they will do that but no, they are only lying' (IDP 1). This was emphasised by the camp chairman during his first meeting with the researcher when he harboured fears that some participants may be reluctant to participate due to their past experiences: 'These people are hungry o²⁴, they think that they are being exploited by mainly journalists and some university students who come here and just vanish without offering them any support or even fulfilling empty promises' (Gatekeeper).

²⁴ 'O' is usually used to emphasise a statement in Nigerian vernacular languages.

After seeking and obtaining permission from the officials of two camps and two host communities, the researcher got approval to host a football tournament which was labelled: 'The Battle of The Camps'. Despite the initial scepticism displayed by some camp members, they were surprised when the trophy for the tournament arrived before the tournament which involved two matches, the first knockout match and the finals. The camps had male teams which made it possible to organise a football match within short notice. It was difficult to achieve gender diversity as women in the camps did not play football or show any interest when contacted.

At one of the camps, most of the young women in the camp were married meaning that there were cultural and religious limitations to their activities, especially when it involves engaging with males, which affected my engagement. They participated as spectators (almost a quarter of the spectators), and also organised the jerseys and kits afterwards. Since the camps were mostly grouped along religious lines, many of the players mirrored this religious dynamic. Players from Durumi Camp were mainly Muslim while New Kuchingoro Camp has mainly Christian players. The host community teams had a mix of both Christians and Muslims with the religion of some unknown. The age bracket was between 14 and 35 years. This match attempted to address the impression that researchers were only there to exploit IDPs which had become commonplace knowledge as mentioned by the chairman on the first visit.

There was a continuous reflection on the part of the researcher to understand how these events and activities could influence researcher-participant relationships both specifically and more broadly. The most significant reaction was the view of the researcher as someone that was 'altruistic' and supportive to their cause which was expressed both verbally and non-verbally at the end of the final match when players

embraced and revealed how happy they were to meet again after years of being just a few miles apart but yet had no contact or communication. This can further be associated with insider-outsider dynamics. For example, it was customary to take shoes off in a Muslim home which was also adhered to at the clinic at the Muslim-majority camp (Tigchelaar, 2006).

I respected the various customs and cultural norms at the camp by watching others and asking when I was unsure. I noticed power relations at the camp through observing that only the nurse and chairman kept their shoes on while all other IDPs respected this custom. However, after much of the activities and in particular the football match, there was a surprising encounter. I was about to take off my shoes as usual when I was urged not to by the nurse in charge of the clinic: *'No Oga, you are one of us now'*.²⁵ The 'one of us' here is important. I had not become one of the IDPs – as this would still require me to take my shoes off – but rather 'one of those' that could wield power like the nurse and the chairman who were exempted from the shoe routine. This power relation was noted, and I reflected on how it could influence research.

I participated in other everyday events such as fetching of water from rivers and the solar powered camp tanks, going to nearby farms with IDPs, and engaging in normal chores, when it was necessary to continue a conversation that had already started or to build trust and rapport. The water supply to one of the camps was solar based, and due to its lack of water pressure, IDPs often had to queue for several hours to fetch water or go to neighbouring sources to fetch water. Residents often whisked

²⁵ Oga means 'Boss' or 'Master' in Yoruba and is used generally across Nigeria even among non-Yorubas.

the water containers on their heads, for women, or pulled them by the handles in plastic containers, for men. These containers were approximately 30-50 litres and were often carried for around 20 to 200 metres depending on the source of the water and the tent of the IDP. This was a very good opportunity to experience how living in these conditions could mean and, although almost impossible, the researcher could build some insider knowledge on the lived experiences of IDPs in the camps.

Some of the daily activities in the camps and host communities included prolonged gathering under trees and tents in central areas to play games such as Ludo and cards. This was a very effective pastime as camp residents were mostly unemployed and had to somehow deal with the boredom occasioned by their displacement from their native communities and unemployment in their temporary abodes in Abuja and environs. From my experiences of growing up in different parts of Nigeria including north, west and central Nigeria, playing games with people was a very good way to build trust, friendship and rapport. This was the case because the parties involved in playing games had to communicate, compete and sometimes argue and share jokes which were important to friendship building.

I was able to engage in the various games that IDPs played at the camp and host communities since I was already conversant with Ludo and cards, albeit there were some basic rules that required acquaintance. Participation in these everyday activities did not only help in the generation of natural talk and organic conversation but also importantly, helped to address positionality, i.e., the researcher-participant power relations regarding the dynamics of games being equal competitors bound by the same rules rather than the unbalanced relationship between the researcher and

the participant. These were vital in improving the researcher-participant relationship by encouraging a different style of interaction.

4.3.5 Interviews and Participant Observations

The main data for this research involved both naturalistic conversations and semi-structured interviews. To negotiate data for this research, the researcher conducted 41 in-depth interviews with internally displaced citizens who were residing in IDP camps and host communities in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Nasarawa and Niger states. I informed my participants at the very beginning of my intentions to interview them at some point in the research and that I would prefer to record the conversation if they would permit but would be able to take notes if they would object to my request for personal reasons.

In the interviews, I used open ended questions to elicit responses from the clients. Rather than using predetermined questions and abiding strictly by them, the interview was carried out using prompts instead. This enabled flexibility and made it possible for the researcher to follow up on points made by the participants during the interview. While much of mainstream security studies has been dominated by secondary research which attempts to find universal truths and laws, authors from the critical studies tradition have looked at how people discuss security in their everyday lives. Prominent authors such as Jackson and Hall (2016), Jarvis (2017), Jarvis and Lister (2013b; 2016) have all carried out bottom-up research using mostly open-ended questions to obtain lay understandings of terrorism, counterterrorism and security more broadly through focus group and conversational methods (Jarvis and Lister, 2013b; Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2015). Finally, as discussed

earlier, since the interview questions were open-ended, they empowered interviewees through allowing them to direct the conversation, giving further insight into what was most important to them which is one of the key objectives of bottom-up and vernacular research (Jarvis, 2017).

I conducted extensive participant observation at the IDP camps and host communities in Nigeria. Being a non-member of the IDP camp and owing to my intention of researching their everyday activities, my presence was made explicit through the initial introduction and subsequent introductions to new members of the group in subsequent events and activities. Understanding the complex power relationships inherent in research situations, I allowed group members to dictate what activities that I could participate in and usually relied on their invitation or sought for their permission before doing so. I also made it compulsory to request for the rules that governed these activities. With these structures in place, I was able to conduct a thorough observation of the various everyday events and activities which contributed to the generation of a more robust knowledge of activities at IDP camps and host communities in Nigeria (Kawulich, 2005).

By maintaining a 'peripheral membership role', I was able to "observe and interact closely enough with members to establish an insider's identity without participating in those activities constituting the core of group membership' (Adler and Adler, 1994: 380). My field work involved a keen observation of activities thus requiring attention to details and attentive listening which helped to start and maintain unstructured conversations with participants; some semi-structured interviews began from this observational setting and the researcher maintained an unassuming outlook during the interactions understanding the importance of body language and non-verbal

cues that could be misread by participants. A continuous reflection on my position and role was necessary, and this was done through asking questions about which ways I believed that my presence or approach could affect participants or influence results (Kawulich, 2005; Dewalt and Dewalt, 1998).

4.3.6 Transcription

Transcription has been defined differently across fields and disciplines. For example, while linguists within the anthropological field define it 'as cultural practice or cultural activity and transcripts as artifacts that possess "temporal-historical dimensions"' (Duranti, 2007: 302; Davidson, 2009: 37), sociolinguists describe it as a form of 'political' practice (Green et al., 1997: 37; Davidson, 2009) thus emphasising the biases of the transcriber and possible selective tendencies in terms of making judgements about speech (Jaffe, 2000). For Ochs (1979: 44), 'transcription is a selective process reflecting theoretical goals and definitions'. While these views all show the different perspectives and approach to transcription, they can be summarised into viewing it as fundamentally theoretical, political, involving representation of the self and others and finally, as interpretative (Davidson, 2009: 47-8).

It is also important to note that when data is transcribed, the transcripts do not depict an objective representation of the sources, for example, interviews or conversations, but rather a selection of what is considered important to the researcher and also an interpretative process of making meaning of what the interviewee was attempting to communicate. From determining what type of transcription method is to be used and what is considered more valuable than others, the 'descriptive categories to use, and

how to display the information in the written and spatial medium of a transcript' (Edwards, 2003).

The transcription adopted in this research was the Jeffersonian Transcription Notation (JTN) system which required very meticulous attention to details in the conversations (Jefferson, 2004). This method of transcription was adopted because the concern not only about what was said but also how it was said, capturing minute contextual information. The transcripts captured fine details of the complex conversations that took place in the field. The recordings were listened to over and over for familiarisation and then transcribed through Nvivo software which made it possible to constantly play, pause, rewind and slow the speed of the audio to achieve the level of detail necessary to capture pauses, hesitations, voice tone, and gaps, among others. After transcription, the audio files and transcripts were linked together on Nvivo which made it possible to repeatedly listen to audio files when there were concerns about the inaccuracy of transcripts.

4.3.7 Coding

The first step in the coding process for the transcripts was to read the materials several times in an attempt to discover themes within the text (Basil, 2003). After specific themes were identified, they were used to categorise the data (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003). While there had been themes that emerged from relevant studies, there was an openness to new ones which required back and forth analysis and selection and discarding of some in the process (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Wetherell and Potter, 1988). Analysis of the text was further enhanced through the identification of 'crisis points' where there were indications that responses, views or

conversations had gone wrong, for example, when conflicts emerged in people's talk which was evident in certain sections where interviewees restated points, hesitated, changed the tone of voice or had general problems with fluency (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 127). Nvivo provided a reliable tool to code a large amount of data and manage them with tools such as nodes hierarchies, i.e., parent and child nodes, folders, and maps, among others (Gibbs, 2002).

A theme is a pattern that runs through a dataset that is identified as important to understanding the phenomena under investigation and thus is valuable to answering particular research questions or solving research puzzles. Repertoires are 'discrete sets of rhetorical formulations and concepts organised around a core metaphor' (Willig and Rogers, 2017: 378). Themes are usually smaller units that can be combined to form larger narratives, repertoires and discourses. Various themes, repertoires, and scripts were adopted by interviewees to construct versions of the world, the Self and the Other (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Jackson and Hall, 2016).

4.3.8 Justifying claims in qualitative research

The main question at this point relates to justifications about the claims, findings, arguments and conclusions made in this research. It is important that justification for qualitative research is different from that of quantitative research where questions about validity and reliability are of paramount importance (Rolfe, 2006; Bernard et al., 2016). This has filtered into debates about research quality where quantitative researchers have criticised qualitative studies based on quantitative criteria and standards (Rolfe, 2006; Denzin, 1978; Denzin, 1970). It is possible to distinguish at least three viewpoints in evaluating research quality and standards: those who want

equal assessment criteria for qualitative and quantitative studies, those who question this first criteria by arguing that a different set of criteria should be developed for evaluating qualitative research, and those who question the former and the latter categories by challenging claims or a need for a set of defined criteria for assessing qualitative research (Rolfe, 2006: 304).

This debate was captured by Sandelowski and Barroso (2002: 2) when they asserted that experts across the academic spectrum that make up the social sciences and humanities 'have sought to define what a good, valid, and/or trustworthy qualitative study is, to chart the history of and to categorize efforts to accomplish such a definition, and to describe and codify techniques for both ensuring and recognizing good studies. In this sense there are widely accepted 'verification strategies' within positivist research that are considered to enhance 'reliability and validity', guaranteeing rigour (Morse et al., 2008: 13).

It can be argued from a critical perspective that the rigid positivist criteria that demand a high level of objectivity and scientificity is a form of hegemony which attempts to discredit other ways of knowing or other forms of knowledge (Foucault, 1980). Lather (2006: 787) argues this point quite forcefully by asserting that 'the goal is a critical counter-"science" ... that troubles what we take for granted as the good in fostering understanding, reflection and action'. Thus, such a counter-hegemonic endeavour must adopt 'a broader framework where key terms such as science, data, evidence, field, method, analysis, knowledge, truth, are no longer defined from within a narrow policy-oriented, positivistic framework' (Lather, 2006: 788), but rather freed from their very narrow 'problem solving' orientation (Cox, 1981). This does not suggest that positivist and other approaches do not have their own value – the

contribution of this approach to research and policy cannot be gainsaid – or that interpretivist epistemology is the only way to know, what this suggests is that better attention has to be paid underlying assumptions that serve to discipline other non-orthodox perspectives.

Regarding justifying the value of discursive research and in particular claims made in this thesis, two key points, validity and political significance further underprop this study's justifications and claim to originality. While not making claims to reliability and validity in positivistic terms, this research makes claims to the validity of the interpretations of the researcher and the political value of the research more broadly. First and foremost, inquisitions about the truth value of participant views are not applicable to discursive psychological analysis because of the conceptualisation of 'truth' which implies an objective reality independent of the individual. According to the synthetic discursive psychological approach adopted in this research, the goal was not to find out if accounts were true or false, but rather, to explore how participants positioned themselves in text and talk and how they created versions of reality which appeared true and real to the participant and also how they tried to convince others of this version of reality while simultaneously discrediting other alternative versions of truth (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002).

Many quantitative research advocates dismiss interpretivist researches and especially discourse analysis as being too relativist in that 'anything goes' and also raise eyebrows about what makes one claim superior to the other in the absence of standardised 'objectivity' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). For example, what makes this version of discourse more valuable than others and why should this be more acceptable than other versions? To ensure validity within the interpretivist approach,

without pandering to positivistic mores, this research focuses on whether the findings of this study is coherent and fruitful (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 125; Wetherell et al., 1987). To achieve the former, the analysis was addressed based on the coherence of the discourse; those that were divergent from the logical flow of discourse were readdressed. The incoherence of discourse makes analysis less convincing to readers. To achieve the latter, 'the explanatory potential of the analytical framework including its ability to provide new explanations' (1987: 171) in comparison to alternative frameworks was addressed.

Second, besides the analytical value that this study has regarding original contribution to academic research, it also has significant political value (Wetherell and Potter, 1993). As Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 117) assert, 'the researcher can judge her/his own and others' research in terms of the role that the research plays in the maintenance of, or challenge to, power relations in society, that is, in relation to the ideological implications of the research'. In this instance, this research serves to challenge the main power structures in Nigeria, for example, in terms of who has the authority or wherewithal to talk about security, whose truth is imposed on the others, minority concerns about being marginalised and subjugated, and an outlet for participants who believe that they are being heard and that their views matter (Jarvis and Lister, 2016). Some may dismiss the latest point as serving a placebo effect, but that would be an imposition of the reader's standards or judgement on the experiences or judgements of the participants.

Similar justifications were made for Wetherell and Potter's (1993) very important study on the Maori in New Zealand and how it served to challenge taken-for-granted truths about racism and stereotypes which earlier cognitivist perspectives only

served to preserve. In more security-related studies, Jarvis and Lister (2010; 2013a; 2013b; 2017; 2016; 2015), Jackson and Hall (Jackson and Hall, 2016) and Vaughan-Williams and Stevens (2015) all emphasise the value of public constructions of experiences of security, through their engagement with vernacular discourses on security. Additionally, their exposure to the study provided them with opportunities to interrogate some of their understandings and thoughts about terrorism, counterterrorism, and security more broadly and to ask questions about things that may have been unclear. The results of this thesis will provide further findings that can furnish local media houses, Governmental Organisations (GOs), and NGOs to advance campaigns and projects that will address the concerns raised by IDPs. Vernacular conceptions of security will help to enrich and expand the very narrow view of the concept, thus providing alternative ways for various state and non-state projects to improve the experiences of citizens. In this regard, Christian Aid, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), are pivotal.

Regarding gathering data, the research adopted triangulation, i.e., of methods namely field notes, in-depth interviews and participant observation as well as well as a triangulation of sources namely, the people's accounts, the existing academic literature and historical sources. However, this research did not seek to unearth the truth about people's accounts regarding their veracity but rather to identify how they position themselves within talk and text and the implications of these implications for security. Despite widespread intersubjective knowledge and experiences, people's accounts are expected to be varied and inconsistent rather than consistent and homogenous. When the relatively small sample size is considered, there are no

claims to statistical representativeness or generalisability as the sample involved in the research was an extremely small sample and generalisation was not one of the research objectives.

The attempt to find universal truths are the same pretensions that the interpretivist approach adopted in this research criticises which is further buttressed with the vernacular security approach which questions the imposition of the subjectivity of the Global North on the Global South as objective. Another technique suggested by Wetherell (1998) in guaranteeing the assessment of discourse analysis is through providing samples of transcripts of interviews which the reader can interpret by themselves to verify the researcher's interpretation. This is important because there is no single way of interpreting texts meaning that alternative interpretations are possible and in fact encouraged; sample transcripts are provided in Appendix K for this reason. The names adopted on the transcripts are the same aliases on the participant sheet and information which may reveal the identity of the participants have been fully anonymised.

The claims made in this section are not a suggestion that 'everything goes' or that any interpretation is boundless, which may imply a chaos. Rather, the claim is that meanings are intersubjectively constructed which necessitates both historical and situated constructions of identities and reality that are shared, such that individual expressions and constructions are circumscribed by the range of possibilities available to the individual. It is this shared framework of meaning that influences the intelligibility and makes one community communicate distinctly with those who share similar frameworks, and this cluster of meanings are best captured through the concept of interpretative repertoires (Wetherell and Potter, 1988; Wetherell and

Potter, 1992). Agents actively select words/actions to convey meaning depending on the context but there are a range of possibilities that delimit what can be said and not said (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

4.4 Questions of Compatibility and Justification for *Multiperspectivalism*

Genuine questions can be raised about the compatibility of the various methods and perspectives presented in this chapter. For example, what is the benefit of combining feminism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism and discursive psychology when it could have been possible to adopt one of these perspectives more thoroughly? While these concerns are valid, especially in terms of risking obfuscation and a legitimate degeneration into a case of ‘too many cooks spoiling the broth’, two primary arguments favour the *multiperspectival* approach adopted in this thesis. First, these perspectives share epistemological commitments to Interpretivism which means that their premises do not necessarily disagree or contradict (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 4). However, I still agree that compatibility alone is not a valid argument for *multiperspectivalism* and that there should be further justification about utility, in terms of the avoidance of doing so for the sake of it. The multiperspectival approach adopted so far necessitates careful weighting of ‘the approaches up against each other, identifying what kind of (local) knowledge each approach can supply and modifying the approaches in the light of these considerations’ (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). What this means is that the choice of what perspectives to adopt is driven by the need of the research and objectives set by the researcher.

As discussed in Chapter 3.10, Postcolonialism – in both its broader and feminist inflection – offers genuine tools to adequately critique vernacular discourses within

communities in the Global South which do not only present local power relations but broader asymmetric global power relations that may be lost in discourse analyses that fail to be cognisant of this (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). To be clear, understanding how various publics in Nigeria construct the world and the various identities of the Self and Other offers further value when such critique is extended to illuminate how they do not just speak as subjects but more importantly, as African subjects which has implications for both the worlds they create and the possibilities for social change which this thesis espouses (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002).

It must be added that the multiperspectivalism that this thesis adopts can be differentiated from eclectic approach which is 'based on a mishmash of disparate approaches without serious assessment of their relations with each other' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 4). Multiperspectivalism pays keen attention to the perspectives adopted and only combines compatible approaches with a view to mitigating their weaknesses. The composite adopted in this research is not without its own weaknesses. It can be argued that DP does not adequately deal with the concept of embodiment or materiality with its primary but not exclusive focus on language – as talk and text. From a more psychological or more materialist approach the critique of DP and other discourse-oriented approaches is the claim that they ignore or are poorly equipped to deal with embodied experiences such as 'physical, gestural and bodily objects' (Wiggins and Potter, 2008: 79). While this can be a valid critique, it may be downplayed as missing the more practical orientation of DP which looks at these 'embodied practices' are expressed and displayed in everyday settings by people (Wiggins and Potter, 2008).

While sharing roots in social constructionism and generally agreeing on epistemology, methodology and ethico-normative commitments, much of the argument advanced earlier against mainstream and critical approaches being Eurocentric could also be levelled against DP and much of the perspectives adopted in this thesis thus retained elements of the asymmetric power relations mentioned. The counter to these arguments is that since the vernacular approach adopted in this study is 'empty', it offers genuine possibilities for inductive research since publics across different settings fill this 'conceptual emptiness' (Jarvis, 2017: 107), with their own 'understandings, imaginaries, conceptions, fears, and insecurities' (Jarvis, 2017: 120) within everyday settings. The adoption of postcolonial and postcolonial feminist perspectives offers genuine tools to critique various '*colonialities* of power' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 18; Grosfoguel, 2007; Mignolo and Escobar, 2013: . Emphasis added by the author).

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter set out to provide the detailed methodological dimension of this research whilst addressing the methods and techniques that the researcher adopted to answer the overarching questions that this thesis has so far outlined and restated in the first section. The second section addressed the meaning of discourse as used within this context and examined the discursive psychology technique that was used to analyse interview transcripts and unstructured conversations captured in recordings and field notes. It then discussed the qualitative nature of this research whilst providing a detailed description of the critical ethnographic method and ethics involved in negotiating data. The section concluded with the lay discourse of terrorism and counterterrorism within the Nigerian context which addressed how the

various views about these phenomena in Nigeria were articulated and made sense of by the researcher. The third section addressed the various methods and techniques that were adopted in the design of the fieldwork exercise in Nigeria. It addressed participant observation, field notes and interviews as the three main methods adopted to gather data at IDP camps and host communities in Nigeria.

The fourth section addressed the data negotiation techniques situating the research within its context in Nigeria, before moving on to address problems of gaining access to the field and participants at IDP camps and host communities; ethics and informed consent. The sampling techniques adopted by the researcher were addressed while the three subsequent subsections address the concept of internal displacement, the researcher's everyday activities at the camps and host communities and interviews and participant observation which essentially implements the various techniques and methods discussed in the research design section. The final section addressed the various steps and approaches adopted in analysing participant data obtained from the field.

The first subsection addressed transcription by detailing the contribution of the Jefferson Notation method to the transcription process and how the painstakingly meticulous approach to transcribing helped in capturing minute details in the participant interviews. The second subsection addressed the approaches to analysing spoken discourse while the final subsection addressed the justification of claims made in qualitative research through questioning the concept validity and reliability which are positivist criteria that are imposed on qualitative research. However, there are also arguments against the dichotomisation of research into

qualitative and quantitative research which suggests that there are very clear boundaries, whereas they should be viewed as being on a continuum.

Chapter Five: '(Counter-)Terrorism as Identity' Repertoire

5.1 Introduction

In Chapter 4, I addressed the methodological commitments of this research. The chapter situated this study within an ethnographic approach which adopted 41 in-depth interviews, participant observation and field notes to negotiate data from IDP camps and host communities in Nigeria. This sought to capture the various lay discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism, which will help to understand the lived experiences of (counter-)terrorism in Nigeria.

This Chapter takes these further by examining vernacular discourses on (counter-)terrorism in Nigeria, through assessing the various ways in which publics in Nigeria understand and discuss counterterrorism in everyday life. The chapter sought to answer the following overarching research question: How do lay publics discuss (counter-)terrorism in their everyday lives? As discussed in Chapter 5.4.5, questions were in the form of prompts which meant that people were in charge of the direction they took the discussion, which I constantly encouraged.

The chapter argues that publics advance an Identity Discourse of (counter-)terrorism through constructing BH and CT as a battle for control of populations in the Northeast based on ethno-religious affiliations and commitments. In this view both BH and CT seek ethno-religious domination of publics in the Northeast and perhaps worked in tandem when their objectives aligned. They also constructed BH and CT conflict in the Northeast as a game, which has implications for their normative evaluations thereof. Finally, they argue that counterterrorism has been directed towards winning

or retaining political offices and to attain or retain political control over the country by elites.

The chapter advances through two main sections with four sub-sections. The first section discusses the various identity discourses and what identity discourses within the Nigerian context entails. The main themes, interpretative repertoires and narratives that people advance are presented in four sub-sections, namely, 'CT as a form of religious, ethnic rivalry', 'Christian and Muslim Positions', 'Religious Discourse on Boko Haram', and 'Ethnoreligious Repertoire Spectrum'. The second section address the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic attempts by speakers in talk.

5.2 Identity Repertoires on (Counter-)Terrorism in Nigeria

From the various arguments that citizens advance in Nigeria, the first cluster of words, metaphors and terms that recur with grammatical consistency is the identity repertoire. In its broadest sense, it refers to the creative combination of ethnicity and religion to understand and construct both versions of the self and of the world. As will be shown, ethnic and religious identities operate in tandem and are flexibly interwoven or sometimes used interchangeably in talk. They generally sought to construct terrorism and counterterrorism as either a religious/ethnic conspiracy by elites or conspiracies within the military as an institution/ individual soldiers. In a way, they argue that CT is directed towards winning or retaining political offices and attain or retain political control over the country in service of one's ethnic or religious community. They also sought to imbue various actors including agents of the state such as soldiers, political and public office holders, and non-state actors such as

Boko Haram militants with various identities within the ethno-religious repertoire. Likewise, their assessment of counterterrorism was primarily couched in either of these frames which were, for the most part, used interchangeably.

5.2.1 Ethnic Frame: CT as a form of 'ethnic rivalry'

Ethnic conflicts have been quite prevalent in Nigeria which is evident in how it has garnered much attention in academic research (Igwarra, 2001). This may partly be because of the significant ethnic diversity of the country and how ethnicity has increasingly served as a tool for social organisation and the imagination of a political community. From the first stand of views that emerged from constructions of CT by interviewees, it was suggested that it was a class of ethnic identities.

David: I am Glavda, we are under Kanuri people. So ... [Major Johnson] complained to us that if you are hiding those terrorist people, I will go away from you. I will go away from you because I cannot tolerate all the terrorist people because they are hiding from you, some are hiding among you and some of them are in the mountains. I am going and won't have anything to do with you. I cannot say anything to you, I'm your brother, Amuda, Chinene, Arboko and Agapalawa are the same; we are the same. Why are you not showing me our enemies? You are not my enemy, just show our enemies to me and don't be hiding them (Borno).

Jubril I am thinking that it is tribalism. if you have your brother that is working for government then they will bring they will carry your name to fix in Red Cross, SEMA²⁶, NEMA²⁷ to pay but if you don't have your brother that works there then nobody to fix your name to give you something. That is tribalism and it is not good. urm... Like, like, like in Borno now the thing that they do in Borno now, if you are not Kanuri they will not give you something. In Borno majority carries the vote and they are mainly Kanuri.

²⁶ State Emergency Management Agency.

²⁷ The National Emergency Management Agency of Nigeria.

Even the governor is Kanuri, you don't have even, even, even the deputy governor, who will help you? It is only God (Borno).

The positions here are Glavda positions which serve to construct the self in opposition to a Kanuri Other that is considered hegemonic. David does not differentiate between Boko Haram and CT based on state and non-state violence but rather, based on ethnicity identity. When Major Johnson says 'our enemy' he does not refer to the enemies of the state but enemies of the Glavda. To construct the self, David first emphasises his ethnic identity and then goes ahead to position his self against another ethnic group that he considers to dominate his ethnic group through their political and economic control of the Borno State. As David points out, the officer draws from an already existing ethnic frame to highlight the fear of domination by a larger group, the Kanuri (also mostly Muslim). This psychological dimension of Glavda identity is constituted through social discourses intersubjectively shared with other members who identify as being Glavda (Wetherell and Potter, 1993).

These constructions have material consequences. For example, the officer's interpretation of Boko Haram threat through the ethnic frame had direct consequences for the other, i.e., those who were suspected of 'supporting' Boko Haram or could not explain the necessity to keep certain dual-use farm implements. Within an ethnic frame, Boko Haram's threat is first and foremost against ethnic minorities in the Northeast which then necessitates the demand for 'showing' the enemy. While the primary 'enemy' may be understood as Boko Haram militants and community members who were suspected of supporting Boko Haram through the possession of dual-use implements such as machetes, and guns among others,

‘terrorist’ people could be anyone not considered to be within the ‘us’ constructed. Jubril makes a similar argument but extends the argument to include governmental control and thus discriminatory resource allocation and distribution which results in the preferential treatment of IDPs who are *Kanuri*, at the expense of others in what he regards to be a form of tribalism.

From an anthropological perspective, Glavda community consists of ‘*Ngoshe Kasa, Agapalawa, Attagara, Jubrili, Zambga, Arboko, and Boko Satu and Boko Kalka*’ whom all trace their ancestry to Aga (Muller-Kosack, 1994; Müller-Kosack, 1996). *Amuda* and *Chinene* are a distinct ethnic group who trace their ancestry to Turu. This collectivisation of identity has a double implication as the ‘we-ness’ vs the ‘them-ness’ are both constructed as historically distinct, although with boundaries that can absorb other compliant ethnic identities as with the *Amuda* and *Chinene*, or cohere with religious, and national identities, that may not have existed for as long as these ethnic identities. Both individual (psychological) and collective subjectivities of Glavda are historically and socially constituted and discursively practiced in everyday situations.

Rather than a biological or consanguineous ancestry or kinship ties which much of earlier studies depict, ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’, which are both constructed around the ethnic frame, may be interpreted as not necessarily based on any particular direct genetic or biological basis for the construction of the Self but rather a shared experience of perceived persecution (Müller-Kosack, 1996) from ‘terrorist’ people. The construction of ‘brotherhood’ cannot be dismissed as ‘false consciousness’, as some may argue from a (neo-)Marxist perspective, or as

inconsistent but rather a purposive way of associating or dissociating the Self from an Other.

It should be added that this was one of the few occasions where the label 'terrorist' was used by interviewees (David), to describe Boko Haram's support base, i.e. militants and their sympathisers. The situation of this statement immediately after polarising two ethnic identities: Glavda and Kanuri with the former viewed as subjugated by the latter, is also important. While there are no evident accusations in this instance, there is a suggestion that Glavda and Boko Haram are incompatible identities; you cannot be Glavda and be Boko Haram, which means being Glavda is not to be one of the 'terrorist people'. Within this context, as with the popular politics of the label, it is used as a pejorative term to demonise and distance the speaker and the group he belongs to, Glavda, from Boko Haram, with a subtle emphasis on the complicity of the main ethnic group in the state, i.e. being 'under' them and Boko Haram being indulged. This politics of labelling is discussed extensively by authors within Critical Terrorism Studies, thus showing that citizens may likely reproduce or resist such labelling (Jackson et al., 2011).

Ethnicity was also adopted widely to construct support for particular army officers or to construct a value system based on acceptable standards and behaviour for officers in the Northeast. In a way, it served as a repertoire through which actions and inactions of individual officers, the army institution, the government and the identity of state more broadly were interpreted and constructed.

Bilikisu: The time that armies were in the village they were trying... there is one army, colonel army, colonel, he is our, our, he is living in our place. Because he was fighting Boko Haram seriously, he didn't wat that there is

one thing that is disturbing us, if he see, if he hear that Boko Haram is there, he will take armies to control that place and kill these Boko Haram militants. The time that he was alive, he will not let Boko Haram to enter to our village. The name of the army [officer] was Godwin Sule. If he was alive these Boko Haram can't do anything. He was fighting for our rights that is why they gathered and killed him (Borno).

Yahaya: So, the person was from our place, he was Godwin Sule by name... So when he came to us to fight for us, because he himself was from my village it hurt him to see that his people were suffering while he was in the force, the government force. So when he discovered everything, he now came and started searching house by house so if he found a weapon in your house then automatically Boko Haram. Most especially if you had a gun, or a lot of cutlass. Cutlass is mainly for farm, it is a farm implement but if it is too much then you have to be questioned and if you cannot answer very well then they will now comment on you that you are Boko Haram and they will kill you. So that's how he was doing (Borno).

Joel: I like this colonel, *Major Johnson*, I like that person, he was a gentle soldier, he was a powerful soldier and he was supporting us to fight with *these people*. As we lost this person, we were very very angry with it. So I didn't see a soldier like that person (Borno).

Within these various accounts, it is possible to piece the identity of Major and/or Colonel Johnson/ Godwin Sule together as a Glavda, with incorruptible personality, dedicated, altruistic and had just returned from a foreign peace-keeping mission at the time; he chose to participate in the counterinsurgency – to fight for the rights of his people (Bilikisu) – despite not officially required to. He had singlehandedly combated Boko Haram and the Kanuri and Muslim leadership in the Northeast and killed several 'Muslims' who were considered genuine Boko Haram members or sympathisers by these interviewees.

Building on the identity of this individual officer, interviewees further construct an image of an ethno-religious conspiracy by Northern elites to use Boko Haram as a weapon of control over minorities thus working to undermine individual and institutional efforts that sort to threaten Boko Haram's continued existence. The death of Major Johnson/Godwin Sule is interpreted as a result of the elite conspiracy and as the fulfilment of the fear of domination that was perceived. With the economic exclusion of 'community' members from the army, the death of the local hero is viewed as damaging to the counterterrorism project.

David: So Emir, urm... Col Hassan, and one Sergeant Abdul who is the best shooter and the person who killed Major Johnson. He is the best shooter of the soldiers, so he is the one who killed Major Johnson. So, the Emir and Colonel Rabi'u and the governor they met and discussed about how they were going to kill Major Johnson because he was disturbing Muslims (Borno).

Yahaya: As I said earlier, when our brother had been killed, that soldier that I said, *Godwin Sule*, we had no security anymore and I see no reason why the Nigerian army cannot maybe go and arrange Christians in the name of [fighting] Boko Haram' (Borno).

Brotherhood is a trope that recurs primarily within the ethnic frame but is often applied flexibly within the ethno-religious repertoire. Security here is constructed first, around an ethnic identity which is a form of fear of ethnic domination by a larger ethnic group. The flexibility of both identities is captured with the suggestion that Boko Haram represents an 'Islamic' problem which can only be solved with the recruitment of Christian soldiers. The interviewee uses ethnicity and religion interchangeably to achieve a rhetorical task, regarding polarising Muslims vs Christians and Kanuri vs non-Kanuri (primarily Glavda). Ethnic and religious

identities are given priorities while overlooking how a person could be Glavda and a Muslim or a Kanuri and a Christian which are not mutually exclusive identities. Ethnicity provides a strong resource for locals to interpret Boko Haram as a form of ethnic persecution (locally) while it is interchangeable with religious identity when necessary to conceptualise terrorism as both a form of religious and ethnic persecution and discrimination or extend the appeal or argument to a more national level of Christianity being under threat.

The navigation between ethnic and religious frames is quite fluid, and interviewees often use them interchangeably. Similar framings are present in Boko Haram's legitimacy claims such as the 'global jihad', Sokoto Caliphate, and the Kanem-Bornu Empire among others, which are either combined or used interchangeably. Within Borno State, a Kanuri ethnic identity retains its cultural purchase from the Kanem-Bornu Empire; recreating such an empire has both local and transnational appeals not only in Borno State but also across former Kanem-Bornu territory and client states in the Chad Basin – forming parts of Northern Cameroon, Chad and Niger – thus transcending national boundaries (Loimeier, 2011).

The discourse of recreating the Kanem-Bornu Empire will be less useful (perhaps useless) in much of Northern Nigeria outside the Northeast corridor (mainly Borno State) where recreating the Sokoto Caliphate which was established through the Fulani Jihad of 1804 could have better appeal. The final 'global jihad' discourse is an attempt to appeal to the global *Ummah* through exploiting an already existent animosity, which has changed over the years but represents an Islam vs West in contemporary politics 'clash of civilisations?' as argued by Huntington (1993). From a discursive psychological perspective, these individuals are simultaneously ethnic

subjects and active producers of this identity using the ethnic frame as a flexible resource to accomplish social action (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 110).

Contrary to these causal arguments, discursive psychology suggests that, 'in-group' and 'out-group' identities are not stable or universal but rather 'culturally relative', meaning that people adopt 'cultural frameworks' to make sense of the world including constructing identities of the self and the other (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 101). Similarly, group identification does not inevitably result in "in-group favouritism" and "out-group discrimination" [as] social identity [theorists suggest] (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 102). The frontiers of ethnic identities are not as stark and billiard-ball-like as they also suggest but rather are often malleable and continuously modified 'according to circumstances and the interests of individuals and communities' (Igbara, 2001: 92).

As shown in the various subject positions 'Such circumstances may be externally or internally provoked, and objectively or subjectively defined and redefined by the affected individuals, sub-groups and groups at any given time' (Igbara, 2001: 92). These boundaries shift, and since there are multiple identities to choose from at various times and in conversations from a discursive psychology position, identity repertoires serve this function of providing various cultural resources to achieve ideological goals in interaction.

From the way in which ethnic frames have been adopted to construct versions of reality, especially in making arguments about counterterrorism and Boko Haram, it appears to agree with what Igbara (2001: 96) refers to as ethnic identity as both hegemonic, i.e. 'ethnicity as dominance' and counterhegemonic 'ethnicity as

resistance to dominance'. While much of these constructions of people's 'fears may be real or imagined; they may be reasonable or petty' (Igwarra, 2001: 96), the main concern of discursive psychology is not the genuineness or authenticity of these fears or identities but how they are discursively constructed as valid and real (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Igwarra (2001: 96) makes a similar point by arguing that they have real life implications and should 'be taken account of because they influence to a considerable degree, the actions of the groups towards one another and, more important perhaps, the daily actions of the individuals from other groups' (Igwarra, 2001). This is not to suggest a form of determinism; they do not cause behaviour. Rather, they serve to influence the way people interpret the world and respond in particular situations (Wetherell and Potter, 1993).

It is important to note that despite these recurrent accounts about a certain Major Johnson or Godwin Sule (by others) in these accounts, especially in terms of challenging the traditional authority and military hierarchy and speaking truth to power in the Northeast, he is almost entirely absent from accounts by interviewees from the same community who identified as neither Glavda nor Muslim; he just did not exist. This selective process is important as it shows how cases or events that may appear unspectacular to particular sections of the population may appear so concerning how people collectively associate themselves with such events based on the meanings that they make of it.

The interpretations and attitudes that people express are based on cultural repertoires that are products of historical identities. Prior to the 1970s for example, religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria were mostly intra-religious where Wahhabi adherents constantly challenged Sufi Orders proponents – primarily belonging to

Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya – for the *shirk* and innovation rather than Christians who were considered inconsequential until the rise of Pentecostalism which then presented a new challenge to different Muslim sects and Islam in general through aggressive proselytization and conversion (Loimeier, 2011). Asking ‘what sect of Islam do you belong?’ may have been more pertinent than asking ‘what religion do you practice [Christianity or Islam]?’ as in these current constructions. These prevailing structures do not determine behaviour, but rather provide resources which people actively adopt in social interaction.

Furthermore, while the views expressed by these interviewees favour those that they construct as belonging to their group, this is not consistent. The construction of the Christian Self is historically and culturally specific to Northern Nigeria so is the Muslim ‘Other’. This does not mean that there may not be commonalities in ways which these experiences are shared. The point is that an a priori conceptualisation of a universally stable and homogenous Islamic or Christian self may be analytically dubious and essentially misleading. This is evident in the fluid and disparate constructions of Boko Haram identity under Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau and the ‘Other’ they targeted; the latter targeted Christians while the former did not. Being a Christian or a Muslim under the two leaders of Boko Haram resulted in two divergent experiences; one fatal, the other inconsequential. Likewise, there are occasions where Christians were asked to fight a ‘jihad’ like everyone else and kill not only other Christians but anyone (including Muslims) who refused to join their jihad, thus, blurring the Islam-Christianity divide and making it unstable and transient.

5.2.2 Identity Discourses on Counterterrorism: Christian and Muslim Positions

The most recurrent discursive positions that people occupy are Christian and Muslim positions, which serve as a framework through which people make sense of the world and position themselves within a cluster of various identity constellations. A common manifestation of this discursive construction is the polarisation of Nigeria into Northern Muslim and Christian Southern halves, thus taking sides and offering support or distancing the Self from religiously and geographically polarised positions. A significant number of interviewees interpreted CT measures through a religious frame and in its broadest sense, it represented a battle for supremacy between two main religions associated with geographical divisions of the country. While it is possible to contest the validity of the 'imaginary' religious partitioning of Nigeria into two equal (or almost) halves (geographical), North and South, it is important to examine the discursive practices at play when people advance religion-based arguments and reference these religio-geographical divides in talk.

In this section, within the Christian and Muslim positions that people occupy, it is possible to identify at least four possible constellations that interviewees identified: the Northern Muslim, Southern Muslim, Southern Christian, and Northern Christian, among others. The most prominent of these positions is the 'Northern Christian' position which was used very extensively to make sense of (counter-)terrorism, i.e., what leader's intentions were, what military officers did or did not do, which can both be considered as vertical positioning of the self or a more horizontal positioning about the actions of other community members' intentions and (in)actions.

Yusuf: That was how it was under Goodluck Jonathan. So, there were massive killings [by Boko Haram] for which people were thinking it was a *northern*

conspiracy against Goodluck, but on the other hand it was Goodluck [Jonathan] trying to use it [military atrocities and neglect] to destroy the northern youths, the northern economy and so on. Different points of view (Borno).

David: Because Goodluck Jonathan what he was doing... he was doing well and he was doing right, that's how some of the soldiers, Muslims they are destroying everything. If Goodluck Jonathan post soldiers to our place, even to Borno State even from here to Jos they will still take them back to the Federal again (Borno).

Success or failure of counterterrorism is constructed in vernacular discourse as a Northern 'sabotage' of the efforts of a Southern-Christian leader thus exonerating the government or Southern 'Christian' leadership of blame or responsibility in the (counter-)terrorism crisis.

David: It is not from Goodluck Jonathan. He will put the soldiers to our place and they will come back [to Abuja] again. That's why everything is not from Goodluck Jonathan. The problem and the Boko Haram is not... how can I say this, I mean, how can Jonathan do more than send soldiers? He was trying that time, everything, I mean... and know that what is happening right now, Goodluck Jonathan will not accept it (Borno).

These accounts tap into longstanding social, political, ethnic and religious debates in Nigeria and reproduce some of the main public discourses (Olaniyan and Asuelime, 2014; Onapajo and Usman, 2015). While it can be argued that much of the displacements occurred under Goodluck Jonathan's administration and there were widespread criticisms about his reluctance to act at the peak of the insurgency; these would amount to counterclaims against the interviewee's claim and challenging one truth with another truth to expose its falsity, inaccuracy or inconsistency. This will be based on the assumption that there is truth out there and that the interviewee only has a 'false consciousness' about this 'truth'.

Further accounts by interviewees polarise their support for political elites who are constructed as representing collective religious communities in their roles as presidents of the country and thus creating two conflicting versions of CT success across time.

David Buhari, I know that Buhari is a Boko Haram [supporter] what I have seen with my eyes and all what is happening in this Nigeria I know that Buhari is supporting [Boko Haram], he is supporting soldiers [that committed atrocities]. Goodluck did not support Senator D²⁸ (Borno).

Yusuf: So I am thanking God that Buhari has been able to achieve so much within a short period. If in 6 years we couldn't contain Boko Haram such a notorious group that believes in exterminating mankind. Not for any philosophy or reason then Buhari is welcome [...] Buhari is not foolish to set bomb everywhere, the girls²⁹ may be there and he could kill them they would say he is a Muslim and he hates Christians whereas he is not anti-Christ he is not against Christians, negative elements will use it. If not, we would have bombed the whole mountains, whoever dies, he dies ... that's the whole truth (Borno).

Abigail: Even ... like senators, senators were supporting Boko Haram. It was only a former house representative member that pitied us because he is a Christian, he fought for Christians. That is because he is a Christian, because he will not like something to touch his religion it will affect you that is the reason that he will defend the religion. He tried his best but the problem was beyond his power. That is the reason that the thing happened in our place (Borno).

These extracts evidence the main narratives that typify the polarisation of elite identity, (in)actions, intentions and (counter-)terrorism outcomes based on religious identities, especially regarding their affinity or otherwise with the interviewees. All

²⁸ Senator D is a Nigerian politician and legislator who represents or has represented Borno State in the Nigerian National Assembly.

²⁹ Chibok Girls who were abducted in 2014 from their school in Chibok, Maiduguri, Borno State in Northeast Nigeria.

three interviewees position themselves as religious, i.e., David and Abigail as Christians and Yusuf as a Muslim to show support for or objection to the activities of particular elites, specific CT measures or the government more broadly. In the accounts advanced by these interviewees, political elites are embodiments of religious identity nationally, thus making them representative of Christianity and Islam. David rebukes Buhari for being 'anti-Christian' and asserts with empirical certainty (with my eyes) that President Buhari is sympathetic to Boko Haram's cause based on the president's religious identity of being a northern Muslim. A corollary to this 'preferential' religious treatment is the failure to take action against soldiers that were alleged to have committed atrocities or shirked their responsibilities to Northern Christian populations; in short, they had been denied justice because of who they were. The final version by Yusuf adopts a hypothetical scenario to construct a religiously charged country where all (in)actions are 'hyper-religiousised'.

Yusuf adopts the rhetoric of the Chibok abductions as a bargaining chip to emphasise the restrictions that such public frames impose on the government thus construing religious repertoires as a form of 'im-potency' (Primera Villamizar, 2014). The abduction of 276 girls from their secondary school in Chibok in April 2014 is used to capture the dilemma that the current administration is faced with. Yusuf rhetorically dismisses those who interpret (in)security outcomes and (in)actions through the lens of religion as 'negative elements' with ideological intentions rather than 'facts', thus manipulating 'reality'. It follows that adopting extreme force against Boko Haram may put the abducted girls in danger which could be interpreted by 'negative elements' – advocates of the religious repertoire – as counterterrorism being anti-Christian and a form of religious persecution.

The ultimate objective of counterterrorism according to this account is to bring the girls home alive which vernacular religious repertoires contravene through 'religiousising' every (in)security incident. Otherwise, counterterrorism effectiveness posited by much of mainstream research such as the leadership decapitation (Johnston, 2012; Jordan, 2009; Price, 2012), targeting (Freeman, 2014; Johnston, 2012; Long, 2010) and deterrence (Wilner, 2007; Wilner, 2010; Wilner, 2011) literatures can be viewed as 'unsuccessful' in as much as they compromise the security of the kidnapped girls or by extension, civilians who are not involved in the hostilities. How counterterrorism measures and actions are interpreted by citizens is considered as important. He acknowledges the widespread interpretation of counterterrorism actions through the religious frame which he then re-articulates and implicates as the cause of the government's reluctance to achieve security militarily. In short, a military solution is undesirable with a high probability of inevitable collateral damages which may be (mis)interpreted as religious persecution and discrimination which are all attempts to construct the religious repertoire as unreasonable, paranoid, negative, and above all, a hindrance to countering Boko Haram. What this suggests is that identity discourses serve to create an 'imagined' ethno-religious battlespace where various publics contest to impose meaning on events through discursive practices, achieved in everyday interaction.

In a bid to further convince the listener, Yusuf emphasises the superiority of his own version of reality over alternative versions – which he had earlier laid ground for with his criticism of the religious repertoire as 'false consciousness' – and thus regards it as the 'whole' (or absolute) truth, thus constructing every other version as unconvincing (Eyerman, 1981). This is common in discursive psychology, where

much emphasis is paid on how these views are constructed as stable and real rather than their veracity thus paying little attention to their truth value (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). The religious divide is constructed here as incapacitating and detrimental to counterterrorism in that various policies and measures that could be effective are avoided because of the various interpretations that they will attract from hyper-religious 'zealots'. The argument advanced by this interviewee is that every action in Nigeria tends to be interpreted through a religious lens which leads to sections of the populations perceiving it as a form of religious persecution or discrimination, which may then be interpreted as a pursuit of religious domination by the Other; an *Islamisation* of the North or Nigeria so to speak (Adibe, 2014).

These views are quite prevalent within the Nigerian context where public interpretations of phenomena are based on religious lenses thus serving to polarise events and thus heightening their affective aspect and emotional intensity (Oduyela, 2014; Olojo, 2013; Onapajo and Usman, 2015; Waldek and Jayasekara, 2011; Appadurai, 1996). These constructions of the religious Self express support for or disagreement with particular projects – the president serves as a synecdoche for the government. As with the previous interviewee, by constructing Goodluck Jonathan as a Christian, the interviewee expresses support for the past administration through highlighting the actions that were considered beneficial to 'Christians' in the North, while simultaneously distancing himself from the current administration and Muslims more broadly. In this sense, Christians and Muslims in Northern Nigeria both view 'social reality' from the respective perspectives of the groups which they share with other members who intersubjectively construct themselves as belonging to the same group, thus, sharing a similar fate.

This 'government conspiracy' argument in 'lay' discourse on terrorism and counterterrorism is not new as shown in findings by Jackson and Hall (2016) in their research on lay terrorism discourse in the UK. The frame was adopted by citizens to make sense of British counterterrorism policy (Jackson and Hall, 2016). While these views may have certain divergences, what they have in common is that interviewees have the opinion that government officials and terrorists may sometimes exploit the each other to achieve their ulterior motives; those in government manipulate terrorism threat to achieve their objectives.

Blessing: The commander is a Muslim, urrm... Armies, ehn, more than 85 something, 25 are Muslims and Christians are fifty. He took the Muslims and put them inside car. There is one room that they put ammunitions in a room and the commander locked it. He said: 'Stay here, I am coming back'. In the evening, all the Boko Haram came and attacked the soldiers. They attacked these [Christian] armies. And these armies urrm, the only ammunition that they had was the one in the gun. Even with key ma, it is not easy because Boko Haram rushed them. Everybody was running, the soldiers and us... we all ran for our lives. The commander wanted Boko Haram to kill the Christian soldiers. In my mind, the commander is Boko Haram, wallahi³⁰ (Borno).

Chris: The commander is a Muslim. The time that the armies were there, there were more than one hundred and seventy-six armies, both Christians and Muslims. They now took all the Muslims... like thirty-eight Muslims from the total one hundred and seventy something armies. All of the Muslims were removed by the commander... All the ammunition that these [Christian] armies had were removed and taken to Maiduguri. Boko Haram came – more than four hundred people – they came with bikes and cars, but these armies only had limited ammunition, only the cartridge in their guns. They didn't have any extra ammunition and Boko Haram came and attacked all these armies (Borno).

³⁰ 'Wallahi' is a swear word in Arabic which comes from 'W-allah' meaning 'I swear to Allah/God'.

These excerpts show the collective images and narratives that are intersubjectively constructed by publics and reproduced in lay talk to construct a sense of persecution and domination. There are inconsistencies in the narratives in terms of the exact number of soldiers involved, which could imply the possibility of a 'genuine' version of events, but this would suggest that there is indeed a version that is independent of interpretation and representation, i.e., a 'real' version of the event (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). This is further expatiated building on the initial constructions of identities of the Self (in alignment with the Christian soldiers), the Other (Muslim commander and soldiers), and a version of the event itself.

Chris: As I am now, if my ammunition finished I would leave the gun and start going so that I will run; that is how they ran, one after the other. All their cars, they [Boko Haram] carried their cars, took them out and now what I can say is that if not that they have bought you? All the Muslims, they [army commanders] took them out and let the Christians die. That is their people, I can say that all these things can happen now because our [Muslim] soldiers are selling us (Borno).

Alimo: Chei, ehee [Haha]... the police said that time that they protected everybody, now they started to go and everybody left, even soldiers and police, okay, that time there was no police but only soldiers... Eehh [laughs] if you as a civilian saw the soldiers running what would you do? Are you not going to follow soldiers? You are saying: 'Help me, help me' and the soldier was saying: 'Help me help me, where is your dress, give me and let me wear it'. Because if Boko Haram sees the soldier's uniform they will kill them (Borno).

As these excerpts show, religious frames influence how different meanings are imposed on similar events with varying normative judgements and emotions. There is a Boko Haram attack that soldiers fail to repel and flee, leaving villagers behind or informing them to flee. The soldiers may have fled from their various positions in

response to being overwhelmed by militants, but these interpretations make it; a sign of cowardice or as a form of betrayal by the Muslim commander. In the second instance, empathy becomes possible – Chris claims he would have done the same – despite the soldiers being unable to fulfil their responsibility of protecting communities, thus allowing Boko Haram to overrun communities and engage in widespread atrocities. Religious identity provides a frame through which similar actions are intersubjectively interpreted and reproduced in everyday settings.

This religious conspiracy against Christian soldiers, which these interviewees associate with the Self means that their constructions serve to be empathetic with the soldiers' cause. Through a religious interpretation of the event, empathy for fleeing soldiers, and sympathy for the deceased 'Christian' soldiers; they ceased to be Nigerian soldiers but become transfigured to religious martyrs. They are not merely members of the Nigerian Army which is considered complicit in Boko Haram activities but defenders of the Christian faith and its adherents in the North.

What is also evident through much of the accounts of the military is that the agency of junior soldiers is mostly denied, thus they are exonerated from responsibility in the 'governmental conspiracy' thesis. Both the Muslim soldiers who survived and the Christian soldiers who were killed are considered subservient to the authority of their superiors. Hence, while they have 'bought' the Muslim commanders, the juniors were perhaps under duress, or they were unaware of the conspiracy; they were 'taken out' by their superiors within a strict command structure where orders are sacrosanct, while the Christian soldiers are also victims of the same command structure. Whether these interviewees are certain about the religious affiliation of these soldiers or if the anecdote is true will assume an external reality which the

participants have misconstrued or misrepresented. What is important here is how they intersubjectively construct their accounts as true and genuine, while they simultaneously discredit others as false. These are the versions of the world that people act upon, which are not necessarily first or second hand accounts but usually accounts of accounts (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

CT as Fostering Religious (In)tolerance

Building on the criticism of CT serving as a political tool by elites (both Christian and Muslim) to achieve political domination, some accounts construct alternative versions of security and what implications these have for the lived-experiences of publics from the Northeast.

Yahaya: That is how I see the fall short of my state government. Because he [the governor] couldn't listen to both the parties of the state. He was in support of one and not in support of the other. So, it is when the old ... most of the Christians of my local government now, most of them are in Abuja, some are in Taraba, some are in many places, but most are in Cameroon so the Muslim ones now we don't know where they are. They, maybe most of them are still in the local government headquarter and some of them are in the state capital, which is Maiduguri because Maiduguri, most of Maiduguri people are Christians so that is how it is. So truly the state government has not supported us the way we want (Borno).

This is an evaluation of the state government based on its handling of the (in)security crisis in the Northeast. The state government is constructed as partial, rather than maintaining the level of impartiality which is required for engendering peaceful coexistence among conflicting individuals and religious communities in the Northeast. From this perspective, Boko Haram is an instrument devised to serve the

interests of an 'imagined' Muslim community in their competition with an imagined Christian community.

An alternative version of governance is constructed around community cohesion, tolerance, impartiality and justice. Proceeding from this meso construction of terrorism and counterterrorism as serving the interest of groups in the Northeast in particular and Nigeria more broadly, solutions are proposed. From this perspective, if Boko Haram represents inter-group conflict, counterterrorism solutions should consider inter-group conflict resolution strategies.

Yahaya: What the government could have done first was to listen to the Christians, both the Christians and the Muslims of the local government. So, after listening to them we expected the government of the state to get us to be one, as in to come and maybe if they can promote peace between us so that we can stay together and provide us with security that is with soldiers. If the government can provide enough security and the security should not do any discrimination and the security should not belong to anybody and let them be for everybody (Borno).

Through religious identity, Yahaya constructs a version of counterterrorism that pays attention to the various identity constellations in the Northeast. In a way, this account calls for identity curiosity in CT where the government pays attention to both religious and social concerns through engagement with local communities to foster peaceful co-existence. Military security is important but only meant to preserve the social aspect of 'acceptance' and 'tolerance', which could only be achieved through impartiality by public officials.

As discussed, there is an emphasis on the significance of religious and ethnic identity groupings to understand their distinct (in)security experiences.

Bilikisu: And all the Boko Haram the time that he [Godwin Sule] was alive they were calm but one army now came and shot this colonel/Major because he is a Christian. They had already bought this man that shot him. The name of the army was Godwin Sule. If he was alive Boko Haram can't do anything. He was fighting for our rights that is why they gathered and killed him (Borno).

Yahaya: They now reported that he was killing Muslims, both innocent and those that were guilty because they were of different religion. So, as they reported ... So, the senator, house of assembly, the chairman and even the monarch of the state, they are all Muslims so for that reason they planned against him. After planning, against him, they now tried to kill him... When our brother had been killed, that soldier that I said, Godwin Sule, we had no security anymore and I see no reason why the Nigerian army cannot maybe go and maybe go and arrange Christians in the name of Boko Haram, after Boko Haram, is, the full meaning of Boko Haram is western education is forbidden, but the real meaning is '*Christians are forbidden*' (Borno).

From a DP position, discourses are situated sequentially in that the previous construction of Boko Haram as Islamic 'permits' its construction as 'anti-Christian' which makes it possible – but does not *cause* – the possibility of a 'Christian' counterterrorism force to combat an Islamist terrorist group. Both accounts both express and assume 'in-group' favouritism constructed around religious identity; thus 'Muslim' soldiers cannot be entrusted with the responsibility of safeguarding 'Christian' citizens from 'Muslim' insurgents.

From these accounts, religion is the preponderant identity and citizenship is only secondary which also establishes a religious vs secular binary; allegiance to the former is superior to the latter. It rearticulates this 'us' vs 'them' identity script, which runs through much of the identity constructions in the interviews, with the boundaries of both discursive formations constantly changing and overlapping with other

identities. Boko Haram is not out there as Yahaya's account shows but rather interpreted within this frame as 'Christians Haram', meaning that its current name is a front to cover up its 'real' agenda of ridding the Northeast of Christians.

Terrorism and counterterrorism become entangled such that the conceptual separation of both phenomena based on legitimacy (state) and illegitimacy (non-state) becomes unsustainable. The conflict here is no longer between Boko Haram and the state but between religious communities and representatives of these identities who have a responsibility to defend these 'imagined communities' against persecution, marginalisation and domination. As evident in the various identity constructions in this sub-section, the construction of Self and the Other are oppositional (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002), i.e., by constructing the Other as corrupt, there is a simultaneous and oppositional construction of the Self as incorruptible and upright; the Christian identity is constructed as being in conflict with the Muslim identity in a mutually exclusive imagination of community. In this sense, the self must be whatever the other is not; the leaders, commander and Boko Haram are Muslims, and they are corrupt, the soldier that fought for 'our' right and is our 'brother', a Christian, and is not only 'uncorrupted' but 'incorruptible'.

With religion being at the heart of (in)security in these constructions, there is a view that the government is incapable of being impartial because of the various interests of political elites.

Yahaya: The non-governmental organisations are trying... because as I said, the government can provide food but they can't provide enough. So those NGOs can add their own to make it enough for the people. So, they'll make sure that the Nigerian forces are around us to support us because BH are still conscious of us, they're still around us, because if they allow them,

this is a camp for IDPs, they'll attack it. So, the NGOs, because the government has somehow turned the thing to be political and other things. So, when things happen in Nigeria, they will now convert it to a political issue, after converting it to political issues, it will now turn to religious issue, so from there now, the NGOs, can maybe do something and now say 'No', they do provide security for us, they are trying (Borno).

What this excerpt captures is the limited capacity or intention of the government to fulfil the complex roles required to achieve security governance in the current crisis. This account shares much of the sentiments of other interviewees that the government cannot be entrusted with securing its citizens but it goes further to emphasise the need for continuous oversight and 'monitoring' of its activities by the civil society who may serve as an 'umpire' or a 'neutral' arbitrator in terms of not having immediate interests and not taking sides in the 'religious' politics that Nigerian CT has been entrapped.

People act on their interpretations of the world, the self and the Other, rather than any essence in an external reality per se but that the individual constructs their self and mind through internalizing 'social dialogues', which shows how the various repertoires that people drew from to actively construct their experiences of counterterrorism were shared with others who made similar argument (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). That counterterrorism was a tool by elites to destroy Christian communities in the Northeast is not an individual opinion but rather a position that recurred in the accounts of various interviewees who position themselves as Christians.

Religious arguments were largely absent from the accounts of those who did not share this repertoire, for example, people who either did not position themselves

religiously at all or who thought it was not important in constructing their experiences of counterterrorism. The religious resources that they draw from are shared with those that they consider to belong to an *imagined* Christian community. It is through this repertoire that individuals give meaning to the world and position themselves which has implications for the way they engage with security projects, individual soldiers, state institutions, the government and the state more broadly.

5.2.3 Religious Discourse on Boko Haram

An important account by interviewees was about what Boko Haram was regarding its nature, appeal, and objectives which were all couched in the religious frame. While there were a few exceptions, there is a broad consensus that Boko Haram is a form of religious violence and that it is driven by Islamic ideology. A further extrapolation from this argument is that the group's primary target was the Christian 'community' in Northern Nigeria. When this religious repertoire was evoked, the aggressor is associated with 'Islam' while the victim is 'Christianity' which is evident in these accounts.

Yahaya: What made my community a special target was eh when they initially, you know we are headed by Muslims there so when they initially separated us, they had nothing to do with Gwoza, other than to stay peacefully with them. All they were doing was just to attack the Christians' villages, any part that is of Christians, they will now be targeting it. To fight and kill anybody that is not a Muslim [Christians] should be persecuted, killed and it is allowed to do everything to [...them], except only if the person can accept Islam' (Borno).

Ajifa: The time that we were in the village, Boko Haram attacked us, I couldn't run and I couldn't trek and I was living in my house. My husband was a Muslim and I am a Christian. My husband was supporting Boko Haram

seriously and I had already separated from him because he said that: 'You are a Christian I am a Muslim, we can't live in the same place' (Borno).

Elizabeth: If you are in your market, Boko Haram will come and meet you and cut your head. If you are moving around, strolling, if you reach like four to three you are walking around like that. If they know that you are a Christian, armies they will say that: 'Boko Haram!!!'... Armies will kill you and say that you are a Boko Haram member. Even Boko Haram if they see you they will kill you, Boko Haram too they will kill you (Borno).

There is an image of mutual exclusivity and incompatibility between Cristian and Muslim identities. The various identity positions that Ajifa occupies are intersectional in that being a woman, disabled and a Christian in a Muslim dominated Northeast in a crisis when people had to flee without support (Crenshaw, 1991). The overarching construction by Ajifa is that of virulent religious intolerance, but she also expresses her identity as having physical challenges, i.e. she could neither run nor trek when Boko Haram attacked which made her more vulnerable to a Boko Haram attack in contrast to people who were not physically challenged and may have fled. The other main positions she takes here are that of a woman (wife and ex-wife) and Christian which all serve to position the interviewee in a variety of ways about Boko Haram, Islam, the state, society, and social relations, among others. Her marital experience serves as an anecdote to construct this experience within broader religious fault lines in the Northeast.

Being a woman, she brings her marital life to the fore to highlight the role of religious affiliation in its failure. She adopts metonymy in substituting attributes, i.e. a person's religion for the person thus making it possible to view the husband as representing Boko Haram (a jihadist group) and herself as being 'haram' i.e. a Christian – everything that Boko Haram abhors – thus polarising their identities and making their

marriage untenable: ‘... we can’t live in the same place’. In this sense, the husband, Nigerian, man (and father of her children) and several other identities cease to be anything else than a Muslim while similar constructions are evident with her husband seeing her as nothing else (woman, wife and mother of his children, and Nigerian) but a Christian. The ‘Christian’ (interviewee) represents everything that is forbidden by ‘Islam’ (Boko Haram), and the ‘Muslim’ (husband) represents everything that is dangerous and should be distanced from (she tried to run away from); Boko Haram’s discourse of representing Islam as targeting ‘Christians’ and other ‘*kafirs*’ is thus reproduced.

5.2.4 Security Means Defending One’s Community

The way security is constructed within the religious repertoire suggests a responsibility to speak for one’s community and if necessary, defend that community. This construction is totalising by polarising Christians vs Muslims; there are no by-standers. Evaluation of the state, state’s officials, CT and all other identities are based on this dichotomy and polarising framework.

David Because, Major Johnson he was killing Muslims, because all the Muslims from our people, from our villages are Boko Haram, because they are still from our places right now, they are supporting Boko Haram. All our people, all our Muslim people they are Boko Haram. All the Christians have escaped, and right now we are here because we are a Christian, all the Muslims they are Boko Haram. That is how Major Johnson was killing them (Borno).

Yusuf: The insurgency was limited to the Northeast but it is wrong to limit it to the northeast. Kano supported it, Kaduna supported it, Taraba supported it, coming down to Plateau and so on, there has been religious crisis prior to that and up to that moment (Borno).

Yahaya: So, [Shekau³¹] now, maybe he is the current leader now or he has been killed, so he is the one who started persecuting Christians. He said if you are fighting government you are not working for Allah. You can fight anybody that is not in support of Boko Haram, and the Christians, that is they are working for God and even if they are killed, they will make the kingdom of Allah... So, jihad is a Quranic word that I cannot explain but my friend, a Muslim friend explained to me that is it to fight for your right as Muslim, so I don't know why they are fighting Christians for their rights (Borno).

From this extract, Boko Haram is constructed as having a strong appeal in the Northeast (David), and even outside the Northeast geopolitical zone with supporters among a broader Islamic 'community' – with sympathisers and 'supporters' in Northcentral Nigeria and much of the North (Yusuf). There is also a historical argument where Boko Haram is constructed as a continuation of an enduring trend of attempts to establish an Islamic community in the North, through violence. Linking the point here with Yusuf's other construction of BH and CT existing in a symbiotic relationship driven by interests of elites, he makes class differentiation among members, the top elites and grassroots support; elites are in it for the money, ordinary Muslims are in it for their religious beliefs. Building on Yahaya's construction, terrorism and counterterrorism always involve a combination of both religious and interest elements rather than one or the other; they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Another line of questioning here is the 'Othering' of Christians, by Boko Haram, as the enemy to be targeted. Much of this questioning centres on exegesis, regarding interrogating Boko Haram's claims of being Islamic and the genuineness of *jihad*

³¹ Abubakar Shekau is believed to be the current leader of Boko Haram or at least the most active faction.

against Christian ‘civilians’ – who are victims of the government themselves. While jihad is a controversial concept and difficult to define, it may be understood as a struggle for one’s rights (Yahaya). The question that Yahaya then asks is how Christians have become constructed as the enemy, rather than the state. In a way, targeting the state and its institutions may be viewed as permissible within this scriptural interpretation, but unconditionally unacceptable when civilians and especially minority communities such as Christians are targeted.

These normative evaluations of Boko Haram’s actions and adherence to their claims and scriptural commitments recur as interviewees attempt to construct their versions of the insurgency in the Northeast. The religious repertoire is a flexible resource that can both be applied to terrorism and counter terrorism where the Christian ‘Self’ is the referent of lay security discourse. This Self has been subjected to persecution, discrimination and violence. The argument of *jihad* against Christians is so commonplace that it is continuously evoked to convince the listener about the veracity of this ‘religious’ version of terrorism in Nigeria.

There is a historical dimension to these constructions of a bi-polar religious antagonism in Nigeria more broadly and in the North and Northeast in particular. Thus, accounts couched within this repertoire emphasise longstanding religious intolerance in the Northeast and the North more broadly.

Joel They way that we would like to deal with these people. We will like the government itself, those that are fearing God to call those big big ones among those people to settle what is wrong among those people. As I am a Christian now, those people, when you tell them that you are a Christian, they will kill you. They are not tolerant to other religions. They will force you to back them or backing them when they order you to say what do you

like you like to enter Christian or to follow us. When you say, no I don't want to follow you, they will kill you at that time (Borno).

From Yahaya's account, Boko Haram actions alienated Muslim communities in the Northeast which resulted a rejection of their methods, campaign and ideology. This account suggest that this alienation was met with increased aggression and violence by the group which sought to coerce people where religious affiliation had become inadequate. There are various positions that can be discerned from these views; the minority position in Gwoza (religious) which emphasises vulnerability through its juxtaposition with the 'Other', the Muslim part. This view highlights antagonism over coexistence and the collective over the individual. The 'victim' position which is a product of intolerance inherent to Islamic religion which Yahaya and Joel both discuss. There is the trope of Islamic absolutism and hence intolerance to other religions which is displayed through forceful conversion and possible death for those who refuse their proselytising overtures. In other words, Islam is coercive and is a religion that permits killing people, primarily non-Muslims but may include Muslims through the need to express power or when they do not support Boko Haram's cause which may make them guilty of *takfiri*.

Although the terrorism label is seldom used by interviewees, there are various normative assessments and arguments made about Boko Haram which served to portray the group as 'oppressive', 'untrustworthy', and 'tyrannical'. One of the most common of these was the assessment of Boko Haram's actions and constructing how this diverged from various societal norms of acceptable behaviour which served to alienate 'Muslims' in the Northeast.

Elizabeth: As they sent many messages that they will start their work, they started to attack people and burn churches. And they were fighting only Christians, they didn't fight with government and forces again. After they finished killing poor people and burning churches they now faced the army and other security (Borno).

Yahaya: Muslim people in the village understood that what [Boko Haram] was doing was not the right thing. So they now started departing or diverting from them. That is they were no longer in their support. So, when that started then now said, okay we shall see. It is either all of Gwoza supported them or else they will displace everybody so that is how they were doing. So they now started doing it, that Gwoza, no longer supported them so they had to show them that they had power, because they were fighting for God. It is from the Quran that every good Muslim should fight for Jihad, and fighting for Jihad is to persecute non-Muslims (Borno).

These extracts construct BH's action of diverging from 'acceptable' behaviour regarding contradicting their claims and also the tenets of Islam. This made other Muslims question their claims of defending Islam against an oppressive secular government, which is the core narrative that Boko Haram advances through the 'infidel' discourse. For example, other Muslims believed that it was wrong to target 'Christians' (civilians) rather than the army (Yahaya). Boko Haram itself encourages religious (and sometimes ethnic) frames through its virulent religious outbursts and depiction of itself as the 'saviour' of Islam (Adesoji, 2010). This is believed to enhance the group's cause through validating its claims to the two most prominent epochs, i.e. the Sokoto Caliphate and the Kanem-Bornu Empire, especially the former. Losing the trust of the same community, its claims to defend them (Kanem Bornu) can be viewed then as deleterious to its political and religious objectives in Northern Nigeria, more broadly where much of the region was part of the Sokoto Caliphate.

What is evident here is that while the event of ‘killing’ of ‘people’ occurred, it is through the various interpretative repertoires that such actions get their meaning, and the various subjects and objects become constituted (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). For example, it is within the religious repertoire that this killing is assessed with ‘lying’ is a bad thing, which makes Boko Haram untrustworthy, and within such interpretation, persecution is constructed, i.e. targeting Christians, burning churches and empathy by other ‘moderate’ Muslims who stand up to Boko Haram in what can be understood as alienation.

Despite the preponderance of the religious frame in the vernacular discourse on Boko Haram, it is not unchallenged. Some interviewees problematize its influence or the claims that Boko Haram and other actors make about being ‘religious’ and also the importance attached to such constructions in public discourse. This excerpt suggests a scepticism towards viewing Boko Haram as a religious phenomenon.

Yusuf: But my belief is that it was a cult group. I don’t want to attribute so much religion to it either Mohammad or Christ, or Quran or Bible, no no no no, they would have covered with it to inflict havoc but they were not for God, for Christ or for Mohammad. The members, the team or people that benefitted from Boko Haram, may be called Alhaji, Mr, Chief, they are anti-Christ, they chase the same women in Nigeria and overseas, they own the same houses overseas, they go to the same holidays overseas, it is only in Nigeria that they are different and PDP has highest of these people, highest number PDP³² (Borno).

This excerpt challenges the main label of Boko Haram as a terrorist group and rather constructs it as a ‘cult’ of like-minded interest-seeking politicians. Religion from

³² People’s Democratic Party is one of the two main political parties in contemporary Nigeria and won 4 presidential elections between 1999 and 2015 where the party was defeated by All Progressives Congress (APC).

Yusuf's perspective is ideological in that it distorts reality from what it is to what the perpetrators want the public to know. Religion is a 'cover' for more cynical activities and interests by elites who do not necessarily subscribe to that ideology. Understanding Boko Haram and counterterrorism then should involve stepping outside the binary of legitimate/state/good vs illegitimate/non-state/evil but rather pay attention to the collective interests of agents who are the beneficiaries of the ongoing crisis. Terrorism from this perspective is the continuation of politics by other means; an instrument for political control of citizens and personal enrichment. The overarching argument here is that religion is a façade that many elites and militants exploit for their own benefits. It could then be further argued that these instrumentalisation of religion impacts on community cohesion and unity.

The moral distinction between terrorism and counterterrorism are blurred through the suggestion that both phenomena are driven by elite interests; terrorism and counterterrorism serve the same purpose for the same people, so to speak. To be sure, economic interest trumps other forms of motivation such as identity as the Bible and Quran metaphor express; religion is a mere façade for the pursuance of more cynical economic interests. This is a rhetorical move that does not only construct a version of reality but attempts to discredit other versions as unstable, 'uncritical' and too simplistic. The interviewee then advances a different rationalist argument driven by the economic interests of elites. The validity of this critique is further buttressed through the speaker emphasising its 'value-freeness' and 'unbiasedness'.

Yusuf: I'm a Muslim but look, I'm a different type of Muslim because I believe in ... diversity. Last week I attended a Church, I have a Bible and I don't discriminate against traditional worshippers too. I am open-minded ... Whoever looks at it from Maiduguri and Borno [perspective] and

laughs at it is stupid and foolish... [It is] a National affair, [...] an African affair, [as well as] a humanity affair... So I'm thanking God that Buhari has been able to achieve so much within a short period. If in 6 years we couldn't contain Boko Haram such a notorious group that believes in exterminating mankind. Not for any philosophy or reason then Buhari is welcome (Borno).

Veronica: By the time that my junior brother was killed I ran to Wada village in Cameroon. There are many Muslims in Wada. If you run to Wada, they will give you something to eat, food, room to sleep and everything they can do to help you. I spent up to two months in Wada (Borno).

To varying degrees and to serve divergent purposes, Yusuf and Veronica deconstruct the Muslim identity that has been constructed so far by other interviewees. For Yusuf, being 'open-minded', attending churches, being in possession of a Bible, and not holding a grudge against 'traditional' worshippers all point towards the 'moderate' or 'tolerant' Muslim position which contradicts the image of intolerance and extremism that Boko Haram may represent. Wada is a village across the Nigerian border in Cameroon, but this account constructs an imagined Muslim community that transcends borders which then provides a frame for Veronica, to assess her experience of Muslims in Nigeria. For her, these were nice Muslims, that were 'welcoming', tolerant and 'hospitable', thus contrasting an earlier 'dangerous' and 'intolerant' Muslim identity which may then be viewed as an 'extremist' version of Islam. However, it must be added that this view of 'tolerance', is not very popular among the other interviewees which makes it fairly unusual.

Yusuf advances an alternative explanation for Boko Haram which he considered more sophisticated and informed than superficial 'religious' explanations. Maiduguri and Borno are used as metonyms for locality which could be interpreted as Northern,

religious/ethnic, both implying some form of 'identity repertoire' within the context of its use. Boko Haram is 'everybody's cause' and 'everybody's problem', so to speak. If this is linked to the 'moral bankruptcy' or decadence that the same interviewee mentioned earlier, it shows how terrorism is constructed within this repertoire as a product of 'immorality' of 'humans' to seek their interests at the expense of others. From this perspective, arguments that construct Boko Haram as religious violence, a product of corruption or as resulting from particular ethnic animosities are too simplistic. This challenges 'monocausal' arguments, thus resonating with much of critical research where there is caution towards singular causes or even causes at all (Jackson et al., 2011).

In academia, the religious frame is much more prominent than the ethnic frame both in political and academic discourses on terrorism. For example, in academia, there are arguments about a 'new form' of terrorism that is inspired by religion. The most detailed of these works is that of Rapoport (2004) who proposes four 'waves' of rebel terrorism namely anarchist, anticolonial, new left and religious waves of terrorism. According to this argument, the world is currently experiencing a religious wave of terrorism which began in the 1980s (Rapoport, 2004). However, it is important to note that these typologies have been mostly challenged by academics within the critical studies school, for example critical authors such as Gunning and Jackson (2011: 369) have problematized this taken-for-granted dichotomisation of terrorism into 'religious and secular terrorism' and argue that this distinction 'is misleading in its typical assumptions about the motives, causes and behaviour of groups classified as "religious terrorist"' is generally unconvincing.

5.2.5 The Ethno-Religious Repertoire Spectrum

Acknowledging a few exceptions, both religious and ethnic discourses adopted by interviewees served to emphasise sameness and difference which served to construct the 'other' on a spectrum between amity on one end and enmity on the other end, with 'indifference' being intermediate between the two extremes. The various 'Others' that were constructed seemed to be positioned somewhere along this spectrum.

Other 'civilians' were usually situated in the middle of the spectrum of being indifferent (at least initially) to the experiences of ethnic and religious minorities rather than engaging in hostilities or openly supporting the 'domination' agenda that was unfolding. Excerpts show that those in the middle tended to be alienated by 'extreme' BH activities, thus becoming less supportive of the methods adopted to fulfil an Islamic community. Several 'Muslim' locals deserted the centre and moved further left to openly distance themselves from Boko Haram's activities, thus leading to the declaration of *takfiri* by Shekau. '*Takfir* [...] is an Islamic concept translating as excommunication, or the declaring of a nominal Muslim as an apostate' (Zenn and Pieri, 2017: 281. Italics added by author). On the spectrum, these Muslims moved left towards amity, thus having solidarity with Christians after rebuking Shekau's attacks against them as being 'too much' (Yahaya).

Those who are constructed as having direct involvement as 'sympathisers', 'financiers' or 'fighters' are on the extreme right of the spectrum regarding the ethno-religious spectrum are considered dangerous by almost everyone spoken to in the interviews. The bottom line of the ethno-religious frames and repertoire is that when

they are invoked, most interviewees use ethno-religious arguments to situate themselves as victims of social and political discrimination, ethnic and religious persecution and physical violence from a major religious, ethnic or ethno-religious group in the Northeast or North more broadly. In this sense, terrorism is constructed as an ethnoreligious project which has broader appeal to sections of the population who share similar characteristics with the insurgents such as Islam and Kanuri which for some could also apply to counterterrorism where the former and the latter (influenced by political and religious elites) may seek the same objective of achieving ethnic and religious dominance.

5.3 Familiarity and Strangeness: ‘...Boko Haram are people that we know’.

While the terrorism label is often pejorative and often serves to dehumanise those labelled as such, much of the discussions of some interviewees regarding Boko Haram has achieved the reverse, i.e. to ‘re-humanise’ militants by talking directly about members, rather than the abstract concept of terrorism. With accounts about direct encounters with militants and the relationships that interviewees had with them, the label of terrorism was almost absent from constructions of Boko Haram.

Yusuf: I had direct encounters with the insurgents at different levels. On one to one, I had friends, I had acquaintances that I didn't know were Boko Haram. Because they themselves will not show themselves as Boko Haram until when they go to the areas where they would meet... So, at a close range, social level, I had actions with them but I knew that we trusted each other or we believed in each other until the things got out of hand. At the battle level, I saw them killing, I escaped; God permitted me to escape. So, it is something I saw before it happened, I saw it happening and I escaped it (Borno).

Elizabeth: More than ten people that came with the woman and there are many small small boys [almajiri] that are in Boko Haram. They were nice before they joined Boko Haram and I used to feed them but since Boko Haram started attacking us, the woman [a business competitor] had slapped me and called Boko Haram to come and kill me. Boko Haram came and they knew that if they shot me, civilian JTF will hear them. They planned to use cutlass and as three of them almost killed me, they saw my face and said: 'Ah, this woman, we can't kill her, she has already helped us the time that we were hungry she gave us money that we wanted. We can't kill this woman' (Borno).

Adamu: In our place, if there was security, because before, *these people* used to come to our place, they'd be coming to our place like visitors, *these Boko Haram people*, they'd be coming like visitors. They will come, and they will move out [of the village] and nobody cared, and nobody asked why these people were here and what is the essence of them being here? Nobody asked these questions and they continued to come and they have multiplied all over the place. Nobody was asking them (Northeast).

Solomon: Some Arabs have run, Arab Boko Haram people. They have run to *their people* and some of them they have died (Borno).

These excerpts from different interviews construct the various ways of knowing Boko Haram or what can be construed as what people know about Boko Haram and how they position themselves against this identity. Two main positions are evident, which are constructed around 'familiarity' and 'strangeness' with both positions serving to integrate or exclude those constructed as either in particular ways. In academic literature on Boko Haram, there is significant literature that associates Almajiri children with not just Boko Haram but with various Islamist movements in Northern Nigeria, including Yan Tatsine (Adesoji, 2011; Hickey, 1984; Hiskett, 1987; Isichei, 1987; Kastfelt, 1989). From the 'familiarity' position, militants are constructed as 'insiders' in the Northeast, as Boko friends who had previously been trusted in the

community rather than strangers. From the 'stranger' position, they are outsiders who do not belong to the Northeast and are viewed as problematic and dangerous, thus needing to be controlled or kept out. Both accounts serve to position the interviewees in relation to militants in particular ways.

This does not suggest that people believe that militants are totally 'normal' people as is evident in accounts where they are viewed as 'werewolves', living parallel lives between being 'good' and 'dangerous' (Yusuf), or where they had apparently been transformed into 'monsters', from the 'small boys' that they used to be; only to not actually be the 'monsters' they were feared to have become (Elizabeth). In a way, there is an agreement that 'terrorism' changes or transforms people in significant ways but what they become after being initiated is up for debate. Similar arguments have been made in academic literature concerning how people become *radicalised* after being exposed to religious fundamentalism which somehow changes their attitudes, values and behaviour (Schmid, 2014; Schmid, 2013).

What is evident in these views is the lack of reproduction of elite discourse on Boko Haram as terrorists which as a label is performative and allows particular actions to be permissible (Jackson et al., 2011; Jackson and Hall, 2016). An integral part of counterterrorism and other state programmes is the construction of non-state actors and actions that challenge the authority of the state and 'survival' as illegitimate, thus serving to legitimise actions that are developed to counter such threats. In Nigerian political discourse, a prominent narrative about Boko Haram was that it was a fundamentalist group without a 'face' as was conveyed in a live media chat by the president at the time Goodluck Jonathan (Matfess, 2016), or in various studies that have been carried out on the group (Onuoha, 2012; Aghedo and Osumah, 2012;

Okoli and Iortyer, 2014; Shuaibu et al., 2015). The president further discursively positioned the group's objectives alongside other groups, 'Boko Haram's main agenda is to destabilise government like all other terrorists' (Sahara Reporters, 2013), thus aligning with other global discourses on terrorism, making the War On Terror a template for action in Nigeria.

The basis of this construction of Boko Haram's identity as 'unknown' was that it was a group lacking any recognised identity and legitimacy to enter into negotiations with or dialogue with, which aligned with the prevailing stance of the US at the time about not talking to terrorists (Toros, 2008). As Bush (2003) emphasised in a presidential speech in 2003, '[y]ou've got to be strong, not weak. The only way to deal with these people is to bring them to justice. You can't talk to them. You can't negotiate with them.' This made violence almost inevitable since non-violent means were constructed as useless against groups that have 'irrational' beliefs and goals.

Elite political discourses were not reproduced in vernacular views of Boko Haram, and much of the conversation explored in this thesis centred on personal experiences of militants with the 'terrorist' label seldom adopted. In cases where Boko Haram was constructed as 'strange', the *terrorist* label was usually absent from such constructions, with other identity markers such as ethnicity (Arab) preferred (see Yahaya, above). Labelling a group as 'terrorist' is not descriptive but performative in that it makes various actions possible (Jackson and Hall, 2016).

5.4 (Counter-)Terrorism and Trust

Outside the prominent repertoires discussed already, another common repertoire that emerged from the various constructions of (counter-)terrorism is related to

(dis)trust. What interviewees attempted to do with this repertoire was to problematize various taken for granted concepts in Nigerian public (counter-)terrorism discourse such as notions related to trust, distrust, fear, citizenship and ambivalence. The central plank of this repertoire was that in Nigeria, it is difficult to know 'which is which'; the realm of security (usually but not necessarily spatial, as in the Northeast) is the realm of 'indistinguishability', so to speak (Agamben, 2005).

The friend/enemy conundrum is evident in many of these discussions regarding being unable to distinguish between a 'friend' and an 'enemy'. The first of these accounts served to question the blanket suspicion of citizens in the Northeast as being potentially militants if they were not in the military. Accounts by interviewees show that there was an ongoing fear not only about terrorism but (counter-)terrorism regarding how citizens were positioned within the complex dynamics of (in)security in the Northeast.

Lawal: And if you say anything about Boko Haram, army will beat you or even kill you and say that you are a Boko Haram [member] or how did you know about Boko Haram? They will say: '*You are a Boko Haram [militant], where are your people, show me your people*', and they will tell you to do frog jump or kill you (Borno).

Tenimu: I would see the army and I will be afraid because it's impossible to be certain if it was the army or if it was Boko Haram militants dressed in military uniforms. Even if it was the army, they might be mad at you and just shoot and kill you and you will be dead either way (Yobe).

As these extracts show, the problem was not primarily about knowing which was which regarding differentiating the 'bad' guys (Boko Haram) from the 'good' guys (Army). Rather, that it was impossible to distinguish which encounter could be dangerous and potentially fatal with both state and non-state actors not only

mimicking each other but also adopting a brazen approach with civilians based on suspicion. The 'You can't trust anybody' repertoire is further re-enacted by interviewees to show how civilians were caught in between two actors that competed for supremacy.

Matthew: The soldiers, most of them they were doing like, if you are not an army, you are [a] Boko Haram [member]. You see, there was a time that Boko Haram wanted to attack the community. We had one strong man in my village who organised people, local people to go and fight Boko Haram. We now planned and started arresting Boko Haram, many of them that day. He said nobody should pass so we were catching and catching them. We are following him, we are following him he now grabbed one man like this, he said, everybody, you should catch them and we did. After we called soldiers that we had arrested Boko Haram, they came and surrounded us. I don't know why they did this. They collected all the guns that we collected from Boko Haram and they started firing everybody anyhow. That is why we began to run and I fled to Cameroon (Borno).

Yahaya: Boko Haram planned against everywhere, the Boko Haram people planned against everywhere, so they will surround a particular village, killing and destroying people's property, so there was even a village that they came in soldier's uniform they now said they were soldiers and they had come to protect us, they would do anything to protect us so when they came now, we didn't know that they were Boko haram, because everything they had was for soldiers. You can't differentiate between them and Nigerian forces. So, that's how we, when gathered around to listen to their instructions and what they had for us, we didn't know that they were Boko Haram, they now started shooting us. They shot more than 200 people on that same day (Borno).

Although there are accounts of blatant abuse of civilians and alleged complicity by the army, a very important thread that runs through these accounts is the ambivalence that surrounds some key concepts such as citizenship ('Nigerian-ness'), army officers/soldiers, and Boko Haram militants, among others. The

heterogeneity of Nigerian citizenship and the diversity of the various peoples that constitute the Nigerian community meant that there was no distinct physical (for example brown skin, beards, and passport) or ideological markers (religious views and identity) that could sufficiently define the 'Other'. If at all there was any, it would fit the physical profile of several millions of people from across Nigeria.

Citizenship is of paramount importance as it offers status and of political status to those who are considered to have them, whilst its absence is a spectre of *bare life* as Agamben (1998: 183) suggests, over those constructed as being outside of society; distinguishing between *zoê* – mere existence as biological beings – and *bios* – having full political rights as citizens or 'a qualified form of life'. It is a terrain for security governance where the political production of the 'us' takes shape against those constructed as 'them'. The relationship between citizenship and terrorist threats has evolved in the last two decades, especially with the 9/11 attacks all being foreign nationals from the Middle East³³ which meant the threat could be constructed as emerging from outside the state, in terms of the perpetrator's political status (McDermott, 2006; Akram and Johnson, 2001).

³³ Fifteen of the 19 hijackers were Saudi Arabia nationals, two were from the United Arab Emirates, one from Lebanon and one from Egypt.

From a more global perspective, the contradictions inherent in defining the enemy in Nigeria had significant implications for engaging with that idealised enemy in concrete terms. Defining the enemy is at the core of counterterrorism and while Nigerian CT has 'mimicked' Western approaches regarding policy and practice, local cultural and historical dynamics have made it difficult to implement foreign ways of 'alterity' and CT implementation. In response to 9/11, the US president, George W. Bush constructed the enemy as emerging from 'outside' society – the 'axis of evil'³⁴ – which served to polarise 'US' vs 'Them' by constructing two broad collective identities that were technically at 'war' (Heradstveit and Bonham, 2007). The 19 hijackers³⁵ were all citizens of 'Muslim' countries in the Middle East so it was expedient to tap into longstanding 'class of civilisation' arguments of the East invading the West or a clash between a backward civilisation and an advanced civilisation such as the claim of an imagined Other who hates 'our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other', seemed to accomplish (Bush, 2001a: xvi; Huntington, 1993).

A similar approach was initially adopted in Europe where the enemy was constructed as emerging outside society, thus making protecting borders and entry points the priority for achieving security (Heath-Kelly, 2016). Two main attacks, the 'lone-wolf' assassination of Theodoor van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004 and the July 7 bombings in London made this narrative of an 'external' threat that needed to be kept out

³⁴ The axis of evil metaphor was adopted by President George W. Bush in his State of the Union Address in 2002 to represent Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the new threat to the West.

³⁵ The nineteen hijackers that carried the September 11 attacks on the United States were all citizens of countries from the Middle East and had affiliations with al-Qaeda. Of the nineteen hijackers, fifteen were citizens of Saudi Arabia, two were from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), whilst the remaining two Mohamed Atta (the kingpin) and Ziad Jarrah were from Egypt, and Lebanon respectively.

inadequate, in dealing with incipient realities (Hajer and Uitermark, 2008; Rai, 2006). The attackers were Dutch and British citizens respectively, which meant that new frameworks were required to make sense of the new threats. The concept of radicalisation served to capture this ideological 'brainwashing' which means that people did not necessarily have to be citizens of non-Western or Middle Eastern countries but rather share some identity traits primarily through descent (although not exclusively); 'home-grown' threats and 'radicalisation' captures this framework (Heath-Kelly, 2016).

This ambivalence was particularly beneficial to militants, and their tactics have been built around being 'indistinguishable'; a camouflage so to speak. It was also beneficial to soldiers who committed mass atrocities, for example during the first Baga Massacre in 2013 where the army allegedly attacked communities killing over 200 civilians before burning down entire villages. The attack was denied by the military, blaming Boko Haram militants for disguising as soldiers (Nossiter, 2013). This created mutual suspicion between the people and the army as these accounts have shown which may have created some form of resistance by the people some security measures adopted by the state. What these accounts show is the public engagement with Nigerian elite discourse on Boko Haram, i.e., how the 'uncritical' mimicry of Western discourses anchored in an idealised notion of the Other, which re-enacted the historical rivalry between Islam and the West, has failed to be reproduced in these vernacular discourses (Bhabha, 1984).

5.5 (Counter-)Terrorism and Citizenship

The concept of citizenship takes another dimension where it is adopted to make demands upon the state in its duties of 'securing' its citizens and also to emphasise the importance of civic responsibilities. When the former is evoked, it is usually used to express discontentment about the treatment of IDPs or neglect of their wellbeing, whereas the latter is used to (self-) 'responsibilise' citizens by highlighting their collective role and duties in contributing to security from the ground up (Jarvis and Lister, 2010), or what Vaughan-Williams (2008: 64) refers to as 'citizen-detectives', i.e., publics who are required 'to (re)produce the central dynamics of [counterterrorism...] in everyday life'.

Sani: I am not feeling secure here because the concern now here is I don't have right to do anything as a citizen even though this is still Nigeria but we are not having right to do anything and then some of the things that I didn't experience before during my entire life in the years back here now it is very very new for me because I used to live inside batcha as you can see all these batchas now here so the thing now it is very new for me because in our place we were living in a good comfortable place and here now, there is a difference if I compare it to my place (Borno).

Marcus: Urrm, What do I mean by, "I am the best security of myself" is that, at least as a citizen in any country, you have to be very close to securities, you understand? In terms of giving them data on the wrong things that are happening in the environment. If we citizens we can cooperate with the security I think that terrorism will not be taking place too much as it normally do? (Borno)

Both extracts adopt the concept of citizenship but to achieve different tasks. Sani's account decries the lack of rights for IDPs, despite being within their own countries which does not make them refugees which he serves to accomplish to distinguish

why still being within Nigeria is not actually 'home', as the concept of 'internal' displacement will suggest; the absence or denial of citizenship rights is the central point he tries to make. For Marcus, the emphasis is on the duties that citizens have to contribute to security through being 'stakeholders' and being 'connected' to the government, especially the security apparatus (Jarvis and Lister, 2010; Jarvis and Lister, 2013a).

In the first instance, lack of citizenship rights creates a sense of insecurity. IDPs are not quite refugees, and they are not quite citizens with political rights. IDP status here is constructed as 'bare life'; citizens but not citizens (Agamben, 1998). The lack of basic amenities and perceived 'abandonment' are used as further indicators of lacking political rights. The second instance can be viewed as a form of governmentality from a Foucauldian perspective where the state conducts the conduct of others such that citizens aspire to become 'good' or 'best' citizens that they can be, through engaging with state's projects and contributing to the success of such endeavours (Foucault, 1982; Foucault, 2012).

To summarise, these political discourses have implications for the everyday experiences of (in)security of citizens who may get caught up in the realm of indistinguishability, where the Other and the Self cannot be differentiated through specific physical characteristics. Nigerian bodies are as well Boko Haram bodies which serves to give meaning to the concept of 'facelessness' that has been deployed in elite public discourses in Nigeria where Boko Haram militants are viewed not as lacking a 'face' per se (in a literal sense) but as unwilling to engage with the state or engage in normal dialogue that may provide options to the physical violence that has ensued since the founder of the group was allegedly 'extra-judicially'

executed by officers of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) in 2009 (Comolli, 2015; Matfess, 2016). The problem of this approach is that there is further difficulty in 'destroying' a concept, whose adherents are just like everyone else (Andréani, 2004); by having a face like any Nigerian, they are 'faceless'.

All these views could impact on communities in a variety of ways. A feeling of discrimination, for example, could affect trust regarding between the people and the government or between the people and other members of the society that they believe is favoured by the state. State limitations affect the confidence of the people in the state as sovereignty must be continuously reproduced through various practices, security being the most important. This is so because sovereignty in a performative sense is not a property that countries have, such as in a Westphalian traditional understanding but rather what they must discursively produce and sustain (Mercier, 2016). Failure or inability to practice these roles may affect legitimacy in the eyes of citizens (Weber, 1998). Corruption affects the trustworthiness of government officials and politicians which may lead to problems that transcend security but governance more broadly and also state legitimacy. Views about being treated as a 'suspect community' create a sense of victimisation where local communities may refuse to cooperate with the state which could open avenues for terrorists to promote an alternative agenda.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter addressed the vernacular discourse of counterterrorism in Nigeria through examining how people understand and discuss counterterrorism in everyday talk. The chapter sought to examine the various rhetorical tasks that people sought

to achieve through text and talk regarding the ideological purpose of utterances which aimed to achieve the aims of the talking subject.

The various attitudes and dispositions that interviewees express show their intersubjective nature since the various things that people know are 'constructed through social interaction between people in everyday life' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 100). In this way, their views of BH, CT, the Self, the Other, the army, the state and elites are shared with their 'fellows', depending on which identity they foreground in discursive practice. Understanding how various communities understand and construct their experiences of (in)security, (counter-)terrorism, the state, elites, BH militants, other members of the community could enrich various aspects of security governance, from offering policy less mechanistic insights with deep cultural, historical and political hues. If the diplomatic endeavour of winning the 'battle of hearts and minds' has any merit within contemporary political circles, the first step is an in-depth understanding of how publics construct their lived experiences in everyday life.

As already discussed in Chapter 3.8.3 the accounts of reality and identities that people construct are neither true nor false but from a discursive psychological perspective, the objective of this research to examine how people construct these experiences through text and talk as true and how they simultaneously discredit alternative views as false. It is this ideological work of language that is important, especially regarding the rhetorical organisation of talk to achieve particular objectives.

Chapter Six: '(Counter-)terrorism as Economic Interest' Repertoire

6.1 Introduction

In Chapter 6, I addressed identity discourses on (counter-)terrorism in Nigeria. While the ethno-religious discourse is the most prominent argument that publics advance in the accounts of Boko Haram and CT, there are significant views that construct (counter-)terrorism as driven by economic interests. Building on the various ethnic and religious discourses, repertoires and frames discussed in Chapter 6, the overarching question which this chapter answers is: How do people discuss Boko Haram and counterterrorism in their everyday lives?

This chapter argues that publics construct their experiences of (counter-)terrorism around various themes, repertoires and metaphors related to economic interests. Publics advance interest/economics or rational choice arguments to make sense and construct images of Boko Haram and CT which they do by suggesting that much of the (in)actions surrounding CT are based on the interests of elites, while Boko Haram is also implicated in these dynamics of cost-benefit analysis.

CT first and foremost is constructed as a form of economic exclusion of minority communities in the Northeast through excluding them from jobs, that they are most suited for such as the army and other security services that have been engaging Boko Haram. Within the interest discourse interviewees construct the security project in the Northeast within the: 'They have sold us' repertoire which serves to construct CT as a business transaction whereby citizens are sold by their own leaders for monetary rewards, thus granting terrorists considerable latitude. Finally, publics advance a 'root cause' argument for terrorism to emphasise the relative

deprivation of citizens in the Northeast which then serves to allow some form of empathy towards insurgents whom they share everyday experiences with.

6.2 Counterterrorism as Economic Exclusion Repertoire

An interesting perspective that emerged in the discussions on counterterrorism is the view that there was a need for greater involvement of local people in Nigeria's counter-terrorism thus constructing CT as excluding youths from affected communities. This based on the need to have those they consider to be from their community or their people to at the helm of affairs which relates to trust and concerns about the fear of domination expressed to varying degrees by interviewees across the board. The view of the current security project is that while there has been much effort to engage with pressing security needs in the Northeast, primarily Boko Haram, much of the current approach is inadequate because of its detachment from those communities.

Joyce: Though there were security [operatives] there, we still need more community [people] urm... and [members in] security. Especially these our youths, they are the ones that know our location, at least government should employ them into the force work so when people are going there in order to go and secure our environment or our community there they are the ones to direct them. They should ask them: "Where do you think we can be able to find these people." They will say, if you follow this side you will find them. That place there are bushes there, we are the ones to direct you or they will tell them, don't move to this side, this side, there is danger, or there is a hill there. They are the ones that know the places. To me than for them to be calling "outside people" that they should go there is like they will not know the actual places that things are happening (Adamawa).

The current security governance is constructed as being mostly top-down. Likewise, when there is engagement with citizens, it is usually in an informal and ad hoc basis

where citizens are only expected to act as informants or partners with the state which is similar to the concept of 'stakeholder security' coined by Jarvis and Lister (2010). Within this largely top-down elite level approach, Boko Haram has advantages of being 'local' and understanding the terrain better than federal forces. The government is aloof and lacks direction in the pursuit of security through marginalising the input of 'local' citizens. The two prominent positions here are those of the insider and outsider, Nigerian security operatives are constructed as the latter while citizens from the Northeast are constructed as insiders, just as Boko Haram.

Yusuf; I emphasise that government should interact with the IDPs, let them hear them talk, let them hear their view, they will understand this insurgency, they will get to understand it better (Borno).

From this extract, understanding is considered a prerequisite for countering Boko Haram. Hence, the government has struggled to combat the group because of the lack of engagement with deeper concerns and experiences of people from communities affected by the insurgency. In other words, Boko Haram needs to be understood within its social, cultural and geographical context rather than a simplistic approach that only focuses on the violence that the group perpetuates. The focus here is more on engagement or having a forum that allows information exchange, rather than formal employment or recruitment into the army as discussed by other interviewees.

Yusuf: Personally, if I had what it takes, the wherewithal, by now, they would have traced these [Chibok] girls because I discuss with people here every day, I eavesdrop people making calls. I read a lot in the bush, some people enter the bush to make calls and they don't know that I am in the bush and I understand the language that they use. That is why I put it in my prayer last week on Sunday that if not this week, let me liaise with the National

Security Adviser to see how we can put things together because of this development. I am not happy to hear soldiers kidnaped. And I want to assure them that we would trace these girls. Because tracing these Chibok girls will solve the problem (Borno).

Yusuf emphasises how this exclusion is detrimental to CT success in terms of missing out on a rich and in-depth knowledge of the social, cultural and historical dimensions of (in)security in the Northeast, which is invariably 'local'. IDP agency is emphasised through these accounts and rather than wanting to be saved, there is a view that they can 'save' the state through helping to 'put things right' (Yusuf), and supporting the NSA to achieve its security objectives, including providing information that will save soldiers and the Chibok girls³⁶. This account expresses sympathy towards a sort of 'helplessness' on the part of the government to solve the intractable problem. There is this altruism about the security of others rather than their own immediate concerns and wellbeing or their own ongoing experiences of insecurity.

The superior local 'knowhow' that runs through these accounts contrasts with important findings by Jarvis and Lister (2015) in their study on citizenship and antiterrorism policy in the UK, where participants mostly considered themselves as incapable or unqualified to make significant contributions to antiterrorism policy. A similar view was expressed by participants in a study by Jackson and Hall (2016) where interviewees expressed lack of knowledge or wherewithal to offer concrete or helpful knowledge about terrorism or any idea about how best to combat it. However, interviewees from Northeast Nigeria showed a keener interest, concentrating more on the identities of Boko Haram rather than on terrorism as a label which is often

³⁶ This was the abduction of 276 female students from a Government Secondary School in the town of Chibok in Borno State, Nigeria, in 2014. While some of the girls have been released, 112 are still unaccounted for.

contested. As shown in the viewed expressed here, locals did not only believe in their capacity to offer support but suggested that community members had superior knowledge of the terrain and also could identify those who were Boko Haram members better than non-community members.

There are further constructions related to the economic exclusion of citizens from the Northeast from the ranks of the Nigerian army. While the previous view emphasised local knowhow as key to the success of security, thus emphasizing the need for community-based engagement and recruitment, this view takes it further by expressing displeasure about the decimation of the current crop of officers from the Northeast currently within the Nigerian Army.

David: Major Johnson and Major Danladi and Staff Sergeant Hamidu Lawal and Manu, and ten of the recruit soldiers were killed but it was not the same day and not from one place. One Major Sarayi was killed when he was coming from Jos... [I meant] from Maiduguri to Jos, at Benisheik, so all urm... the recruits were killed. What government really promised was to take many of our people, because of Major Johnson's death [fighting Boko Haram], they said some us will be recruited to the NDA³⁷. That is how ... everything was disrupted because of Senator A, he destroyed everything. He is a very wicked man. If this Senator A, if he is killed or if he dies, everything will be fine, we will go back to our place and right now he is a current senator (Borno).

This interviewee is doing various things and occupying various subject positions. Senator A is a Muslim, Fulani and is a member of the political class. The actions attributed to Senator A are interpreted through economic, religious, ethnic frames, thus highlighting how these frames intersect to marginalise minorities in the

³⁷ National Defence Academy in Kaduna is the only military university in Nigeria.

Northeast. By replacing deceased community members in the army with 'outsiders' (ethnic and religious others), this action served to perpetuate economic exclusion of thus favouring one community (the Senator's) at the expense of another (the interviewee's). There is also a critique of the recruitment policy of the Nigerian Defence Academy which depicted here as a weapon wielded by powerful political actors at the expense of minorities.

Most interviewees do not lack knowledge about Boko Haram, meaning that there is no ambivalence about who Boko Haram members are. Perhaps the gaps in the knowledge about terrorism as a phenomenon highlighted by Jackson and Hall (2016), and Jarvis and Lister (2015) can be associated with the abstraction occasioned by the 'terrorist' label. These are mostly absent in accounts on Boko Haram, while circumspection towards media coverage of terrorist identity and incidents, which participants seemed to have a 'deep distrust' about (Jackson and Hall, 2016: 299). Publics from the Northeast believe that they know through their direct encounters with people whom they believe are members of their community, whose experiences they sometimes share, if to a lesser degree. They do not watch or read about Boko Haram in the media; they have them as friends, husbands, colleagues, customers and neighbours, among others.

While ethnic and religious identities are not totally absent in these constructions they are secondary to the primary constructions of CT as perpetuating the exclusion of locals thus engendering economic inequalities and worsening unemployment which is constructed through the image of jobless male youths at the IDP camps with nothing to do but with a lot to offer CT in the fight against BH. In summary, while articulated in a variety of ways, it can be argued that CT is viewed as a form of career

– as soldiers, aid staff and other government positions – thus, the exclusion of a section of the Northeast is constructed as further perpetuating longstanding economic divides. In a way, since terrorism directly affects the Northeast, they believe that they should benefit from any measure or project devised to combat it, especially when this usually involved significant budgetary outlay by the government. This is an argument that has never been made in academic literature (that I know of) which shows how communities may view their involvement beyond mere support but to be directly involved and economically benefit. IDPs express their desire to be more involved in the definition of threat and practice of their own security, citing their superior understanding and knowledge of the terrain.

Conceptually, the construction of CT as a form of economic exclusion is a novel contribution to debates on (in)security, which underscores the exploratory value of vernacular studies through its genuine inductiveness and potentials to generate new ideas and concepts that can be further elaborated upon. While citizens may construe terrorism as affecting their lives and communities, a sense of entitlement thus, emerges where they do not only expect to be involved in fighting terrorism as an expression of their citizenship but more importantly, as a means of livelihood and source of income – and pride – to their local communities.

6.2.1 Insecurity and Corruption

The first view within the corruption frame is directed at political elites and religious leaders as manipulating the politics of security to serve their own economic (and political) purposes. Corruption is a salient theme within Nigerian public discourse, and it was quite common in the interpretations and assessments of the (in)actions

of political leaders, traditional rulers, Northern elites, the army and other security agencies and operatives (Dike, 2005; Ikita, 2014). In its broadest sense, (counter-)terrorism represented a domain for contestation for control over populations in the North, especially in relation to the South, thus emphasising a North-South divide in the country.

Security is discussed as a terrain of competition for the political control of the country. The more popular framing of this competition is the polarisation of the Northern vs Southern political elites, where these elites battle for political supremacy through exploiting the salience of security and particular identities that they share with specific constituents, to advance their interests. Political elites benefit from (in)security as it provides a *carte blanche* of powers that they could wield to achieve their political ends. These accounts can be viewed as various forms of critique of the army and political elites or an expression of support for these same elites in their varied roles in security governance in Nigeria, in relation to Boko Haram, politics and (in)security more broadly. Critique of the military and other public officers in terms of their role in (counter-)terrorism seem to fall along two lines of arguments, i.e. they are constructed around 'capacity' and 'compromise', both embedded in the 'they have sold us repertoire' within interest discourses on (counter-)terrorism that lay citizens advance.

Corruption is a quite common topic in public debates and has become increasingly salient in Nigerian public discourse (Uslaner, 2010). Corruption is narrowly defined in Nigeria in terms of understanding it as bribery, embezzlement and the diversion of public funds rather than the broader definition of political corruption, which includes cronyism and nepotism, which have become very salient. This was

evidently so when the incumbent president, President Muhammadu Buhari adopted an 'anti-corruption' mantra to unseat the incumbent president at the time, Dr Goodluck Jonathan, which marked the first time that an incumbent president had been defeated in a democratic election. There are no claims about the 'change' campaign which promised anti-corruption as its foremost political agenda which is best captured in the quote of President Muhammadu Buhari during his campaign, '[if] we do not kill corruption in this country, corruption will kill Nigerians' (Abubakre, 2018: 179), transforming it into an existential threat.

On the international stage, former UK prime minister, David Cameron caused a stir when he was recorded describing Nigeria and Afghanistan as 'fantastically corrupt' countries in a conversation with the Queen and the Archbishop of Canterbury (Okoye, 2016: 11; Adetula and Amupitan, 2018). In his words, '[w]e've got some leaders of some fantastically corrupt countries coming to Britain... Nigeria and Afghanistan, possibly the two most corrupt countries in the world' (Okoye, 2016: 11). This further brought international attention to the enduring stereotype that Nigeria is a corrupt country.

Globally, it has become increasingly common to associate corruption with Nigerian citizens even when some of these indexes fail to capture more cynical activities which do not excuse the activities of so-called Nigerian fraudsters but rather calls into question a ranking system that may serve the purpose of particular powerful actors. The Transparency International's yearly Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which both track and rank public corruption perception across the globe, ranks Nigeria very poorly on both metrics which measure public's direct experiences of corruption in their daily lives and their

perception of 'corruptibility' of public officials respectively (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2017; Transparency International, 2017). While there are several reasons to be circumspect about these rankings – especially in terms of their methodology and also the underlying need to rank disparate countries based on the perceptions of citizens of their governments, which ignores the role of culture – what this shows is that corruption is an important topic in Nigerian public discourse (Abdulmalik and Ayinla, 2017; Abubakre, 2018).

In a more (counter-)terrorism related sense, one of the most high profile anti-corruption cases in Nigeria in recent times relates to the alleged diversion of public funds to achieve electioneering ends which have been eponymously labelled as the 'Dasukigate' (Niworu, 2017; Agbese, 2016). These diversions were a series of electoral monetary appeasements that occurred between 2012 and 2015, involving the diversion of \$2.1billion (N10 billion) of public funds earmarked for procurement of arms for CT for electioneering purposes and prebendalism (Niworu, 2017). The National Security Adviser (NSA) at the time, Colonel Sambo Dasuki was arrested and is currently standing trial for these accusations which has garnered massive media coverage (Abdulmalik and Ayinla, 2017).

Its relevance to this study transcends the implications of the alleged diversion of CT funds – which could be viewed as giving some credence to some of the accounts by interviewees that citizens had been 'sold' to BH – or even the culture and politics of corruption in Nigeria more broadly, but rather how these publicised media-themed 'gates' e.g. 'Dasukigate', 'Diezanigate', 'Ikoyigate' and 'Mainagate' (Abubakre, 2018: 182) and other high profile corruption scandals have brought corruption and anti-corruption to the centre-stage, thus making them a constant feature of Nigerian

public discourse. This has become so prevalent that it has become culturally taken-for-granted which makes corruption (and related concepts) a commonplace in everyday conversations and discussions. What this study shows is the grammatical regularity of these themes in lay discourse as people adopt them to construct versions of reality.

There was a widespread consensus among some interviewees that counterterrorism has been bedevilled by widespread corruption on the part of the army. The overarching argument is that the army has sold citizens from the Northeast to Boko Haram, which then serves as an interpretative repertoire to make sense of various government measures, the security project more broadly and the state. In adopting the corruption frame, interviewees construct the army (especially the commanders) as corrupt, self-serving and partial, thus advancing arguments of a complicit security institution as well as individual officers.

Abigail: They [the army] didn't do anything because whenever Boko Haram were coming – maybe they were buying over the army or not I am not sure – they were always free to do whatever they wanted and go back to where they came from. The army never woke up from where they were [sleeping] to come and say: 'What is happening here'? They would have been hearing the voices of people shouting and crying as they were being killed by Boko Haram (Borno).

Nojeem: The problem with them [military] was that they had been bribed, especially the commanders. So, when we saw the army, I mean when Boko Haram were coming to face the army, the commander never gave the soldiers permission to fight. The commander usually told the army not to shoot; Boko Haram would then kill the soldiers... Boko Haram, they kill the army and the commander will not allow the army to kill Boko Haram, that time if you kill the commander of the Boko Haram, the leader of the army will be sacked. In my mind, how can the army start on their own and fire, without

permission by the commander? They kill our regulars and then I was thinking that this ... how can the army secure the innocent? (Borno).

Chris: I can say that they have bought the armies over. They can come and talk to the armies and say that they [Boko Haram] will come and give armies bribe and they can come and do anything that they want. This is Nigeria and you can say that it is only pray that we can pray. If not because of that, they have already sold us, in our village (Borno).

Marcus: We are having problems in Nigeria, the security personnel are not doing their right job. They will, how do I put it, they always like to collect bribes, you understand? They collect bribes and they don't do their right job, which is why we are lacking in security in our country... We have young boys, young young youths in this Nigeria that they do not have a job and that's why we are lacking security you understand...? So, at times you will see, if Nigeria will try to fight this bribery and corruption, in this country, I think it will be better (Borno).

As these excerpts show, people adopt mainly anecdotes to express their opinions of the Nigerian army and of soldiers that were deployed to the Northeast. What is evident in the interviews was that the bribery frame unites interviewees across various ethnic and religious divides that they construct. The bribery frame can be viewed as a consensus position where the Northeast irrespective of the various identities that they position themselves, suggest that counterterrorism is undermined by corruption at the command level of the army and that this has impacted on the way in which soldiers have conducted counterterrorism. Advancing a bribery frame is a persuasive argument within the Northeast context which helps to give meaning and motive to various forms of army behaviour which could have also been interpreted as delayed orders, negligence, cowardice, incompetence, and sabotage on the part of individual soldiers or senior army officers.

The bribery frame is also used as a tool for showing solidarity or having empathy with citizens from the Northeast. Marcus links bribery to youth unemployment, and youth unemployment to the possibility of joining terrorism which creates a cycle of violence that becomes self-sustaining. This view deviates from a proper anecdote or a direct reference to CT in the Northeast but rather a view of Nigerian security personnel more broadly including the police, civil defence and the military. A similar move is made through the argument of betrayal of so-called junior officers or soldiers through empathising and sympathising with 'regulars' (Nojeem), who are exposed to dangers because they had been sold by their commanders. This constructs an image of layers of compromise and economic interest which conspire to perpetuate terrorism through sabotaging the efforts of 'dedicated' soldiers.

Yusuf: You cannot divorce politics from human affairs but people use and abuse the word, politics. More than politics, there was economic interest. The political interest was minor. Why did I say so? Even those that wanted it to continue so that they could use it to win elections, their aim was to steal money so it is beyond politics, ordinary people say it is politics but if you say it is politics, I disagree, I beg to disagree, that is moral bankruptcy (Borno).

David: So, Major Johnson refused to collect the money [bribe that was offered by political and religious elites]. He abused them in front of the Emir³⁸ that: "You are very useless, if you are supporting this, I went to Liberia three times, I went to Afghanistan two times, I went to ... I went there for peacekeeping. How many millions that government gave me when I went there? How many millions did I receive from the government?" (Borno).

In the first instance, elites are constructed as aiding militants to achieve their economic ends. What this suggests is that, while the immediate goal is to destabilise

³⁸ The title Emir is an Arabic word that means "commander", "general", or "King". In this context, it is used to designate religious and traditional rulers in Northern Nigeria.

communities and win political offices, the main objective is economic interest (Yusuf). However, the second view constructs an almost infallible identity solidarity where economic interests fail to sway or convince the officer to betray his 'own people' for personal gains (David). As these accounts suggest, despite various arguments the bribery frame is not only used to demonise particular army officers or criticise the army institution collectively but can be used as a rhetorical device to highlight positive attributes or virtues of particular army officers. This is most evident with David's retention of the bribery frame but then subjugating economic interest to identity, thus granting identity repertoires a more important status for understanding (in)security than interest frames.

There are further accounts that construct the army as untrustworthy, thus treating all security-related information as doubtful, unreliable and perhaps dubious.

Moses: Ah, definitely, I have no idea about those people [army and police] because every day they would say they have gone to Gwoza and Bayan Dutse which is our second community but there is no evidence that they have actually gone there. If they want to provide evidence, they should get some of our people to accompany them to ascertain if they have actually patrolled these communities or even visited there. But no. How will be sure that they went there or actually took action by battling the insurgents. We don't know (Borno).

From this extract, the relationship between the army and publics from the Northeast appear strained and also it shows some level of distrust in the army about their claims, which could affect the way in which citizens engage with them or follow instructions provided by the government. People do not believe what the government says any longer and need community members whom they trust to verify.

The involvement of locals in CT, i.e. as a career takes a new dimension where although there is the unwillingness of the state to employ 'locals' into the army to conduct CT, they insist on playing supervisory roles, to be certain about claims made by the army, which can be viewed as a 'vote of no confidence' in the army and in extension, the state to perform the duty of securing citizens from threats. These critiques of counterterrorism, the army, soldiers and the security apparatus more broadly are directed not at the state's incapacity, authority or legitimacy but rather concerns about the 'interests' of various actors in government – from elites to army commanders on the field.

In a way, insecurity in the Northeast is viewed more as a conspiracy and 'sell-out' rather than incompetency or incapacity. Thus, the ineffectiveness of counterterrorism at combating Boko Haram violence is a product of corruption with strong reiterations about faith in the Nigerian army and their prowess and reputation in providing security abroad through various peacekeeping missions. In short, the politics of (in)security in Nigeria rather than incapacity which is an attempt to reconcile the prowess of the Nigerian army with the reality of 'soldiers fleeing from Boko Haram'.

Nojeem: Even the Biafra crisis, all the army in Nigeria [performed admirably]. There was no army to go and attack these people [Boko Haram]. All over the world, the army of Nigeria, all the army are very intelligent. They have different expertise and experiences which are more advanced than vigilantes. You don't go outside for peacekeeping and then be unable to solve our own problems. Tell me, how is that possible? They don't give them the relevant guns to fight too. It is a useless situation (Borno).

Yusuf: So, if a non-discrete group emerges with a name Taliban and starts to wreak havoc, start to do what they did, it is unfortunate. The Nigerian

security apparatus needs to be 'rejiggered', the orientation and what have you and whatever it is to do, they need to ginger them. Either they were not doing their work or the powers that be refused to listen to them. If the powers that be refused to listen to them then the government should know who are the powers that be? Corruption, or who are the powers that be that refused to listen to them? Because it means they are the same people now supporting the air force to finish the work? (Borno).

As these extracts show, there is a reiteration of the capability of the Nigerian Army, and to an extent, their reputation (Nojeem). Yusuf makes points about military morale and leadership which are further emphases on the elite interests as undermining CT.

The belief that people have in soldiers is further expressed through concerns about the welfare of military personnel and in particular soldiers killed by Boko Haram which they reference more than the death of civilians. Soldiers are held in fairly high esteem as with the accounts of interviewees in these extracts.

Yusuf: I'm not ... I want to tell you that a lot needs to be done about security in Nigeria because, as committed as Buhari is and as buoyant that Buhari is, as experienced as Buhari is still we are having cases of abduction of soldiers, attacked by Boko Haram, and soldiers killed and all sorts of this in the 21st century and I am disappointed. We have had a lot of promises from the developed world to assist Buhari in this fight against insurgency and are they committed to the fight and our soldiers are being kidnapped and are being killed. I want to believe that much still needs to be done about security (Borno).

Support for the army is an outward expression of patriotism and support for the state despite criticisms of its agents and representatives. What is also evident is Yusuf's positioning of Nigeria in the world. He constructs Nigeria as lagging behind 21st century developments across the world, which he later contrasts with the so-called 'developed' world (markers of 21st century advancement). The binary opposition is

implied in that Nigeria, not being quite advanced into the 21st century warfare – where soldiers are ill-equipped to combat insurgents – thus, Nigeria is constructed as belonging to the ‘underdeveloped’ world (Yusuf). This is a reproduction of Eurocentric discourses of a backward ‘Third World’ or ‘Global South’ and reproducing the ‘saviour’ mentality of the West ‘saving’ Nigeria. This casting of aspersions outwards, towards the so-called ‘developed world’ can be viewed as a form of ‘extraversion’, which describes an unequal power relationship between African actors and their non-African counterparts, where these arrangements are exploited by African elites to suppress insurrections (Boko Haram) within (Bayart and Ellis, 2000). In a way, African elites [Buhari] can obtain international support to re-establish dominance over their local populations.

What is also important is that various vernacular discourses reproduce some prevalent public narratives through adopting these frames to construct events, such as with divergent interpretations of the army engagements in the Northeast. There is a tendency, as in Chapter 5, Section 4.1 for individuals to give alternative arguments of the same act by soldiers as ‘ethnic’ or religiously’ driven, or to still support soldiers who flee or are killed by Boko Haram as ‘Christian martyrs’ rather than as ‘gallant’ Nigerian soldiers. Commanders still get blamed for endangering the lives of regular soldiers, but the interpretations are interpreted through a different frame, such as religion and ethnicity. This shows the complex discursive cartographies that inhere in the vernacular as people adopt various narrative frames which they share with particular social collectives.

From a DP perspective, the various versions of events that have been constructed by interviewees are purposive, in that they are directed towards achieving a goal,

whether these are consciously intended or not (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Therefore, from the preceding accounts of constructions of CT, the army, political elites and various aspects of the state's security project as corrupt, compromised and involving largescale improprieties can be interpreted as achieving a discursive effect of blaming those constructed as 'commanders', 'elites' or 'the army' who have 'sold' citizens to BH, but also exonerative for some 'regulars' and 'subalterns' who, although are involved in these corrupt accounts, are nominalised without much agency; they were following orders, so to speak.

6.2.2 'Rational Choice' Constructions/ Relative Deprivation Repertoire: Economic Exclusion and (In)Security?

The preceding section addressed the corruption frame to situate how various publics in Nigeria adopted the bribery and other commonplaces associated with corruption to interpret their accounts of counterterrorism which they constructed around the: *'They have sold us repertoire'*. This section takes the discussions further to address how their accounts about the 'interest' dimension of Boko Haram or the rational choice explanations that they make advance their arguments about what they know about the group and how these impact on their lived experiences of (in)security.

'Idle Hands are the Devil's Workshop' Repertoire

Interviewees adopt the unemployment and poverty repertoire to make sense of the appeal that Boko Haram may have within local communities in the Northeast.

Joyce: To be frank, what caused this thing [Boko Haram] in our area is the lack of what to do. They deceived them, someone who never held five hundred Naira on his own somebody will say you need money and he says yes, I

need money. See one hundred thousand. If you are not fearing God, what do you think that you will do? You will go and join it but if you have something that you are doing on your own you will not bother to go and enter that thing you will say “rubbish what kind of thing is this? Me that I have something to survive, I have something to do. Why will I go and kill somebody because of one hundred thousand”. It is lack of what to do that causes this thing [Boko Haram] to me (Adamawa).

From this extract, poverty and unemployment in the Northeast are constructed as causal and terrorism is the effect of people’s relative deprivation within the broader Nigerian context. What this view suggests is an unfavourable opportunity cost for people who almost have nothing to lose. For many, joining Boko Haram becomes the only viable means of sustenance. This is a deterministic argument which falls within the ‘relative deprivation’ thesis which emphasises the predisposition of people to terrorism through structural or environmental factors such as poverty, exploitation, and oppression, among others. After making these causal explanations, the interviewee positions herself politically as someone versed enough and qualified to proffer solutions to terrorism thus suggesting what she believes is an effective strategy to countering terrorism in the Northeast.

Joyce: If there is justice everything will be all right and everything will be okay because some of these things it is injustice that caused them. If you are moving around now, you will see people moving around no work to do and the government will go and hide the money. They didn’t ask the citizens, ‘what do you need?’ What do you suppose to do?’ (Adamawa).

Jubril: So the thing that I like from these people, our government, let him call them to sit and to ask them the thing they need, if they like to pay them salary, most of them they are not working, this is a major problem. So, I like the government to call them and to ask them what they need. If they settle them then this thing will stop (Borno).

As these extracts show, Boko Haram is associated with poor governance, highlighting the lack of social and economic justice regarding equitable distribution of resources. From Jubril's account, the current CT is ineffective and alternative palliative measures have to be adopted; a dialogue is preferable to coercion which suggests a form of an amnesty programme for insurgents citing cases of unemployed youths. The government should reach out and find alternative ways to combat boko Haram besides the ongoing 'ineffective' means.

Rather than making a causal link between poverty and terrorism, it is possible to view these accounts as discourses of economic deprivation and causation which then captures how various narratives about poverty and perceived government injustice in Northeast Nigeria are constructed as influencing people's choices of joining Boko Haram insurgency because of unfavourable opportunity costs. This does not mean that people will join or not, rather, that citizens construct these narratives as real, consistent and stable.

Joyce: Government should do justice and give what it is supposed to give to that person, employ who is supposed to be employed. If you move around now, you will see graduates sitting, nothing to do; no one to go and operate their own business. They are supposed to issue electricity, no, water, no, all over. You see, we are all humans now. So, this is what I urm... the only thing I can say about it (Adamawa).

Sani: Urrm... if there is a way that the government can maybe empower us or find job to do for us and then anything common to this one if government can take necessary action so that our standard of living will be maybe not less or not poor you know the thing now will be really okay for us (Borno).

Matthew Let them provide job for us. Having a job will make us feel more secure. It is important to return to our community but it is gradually urm... not one

day you see, it is gradually, gradually. But the thing that is worrying us here now, let them provide job for us (Borno).

Interviewees use the opportunity presented to redefine security by distancing it from the narrow negative conception of the concept – protecting a specific referent object from harm – to a more positive view of security – making things happen or enhancing life's experiences.

Yahaya: Security as I said earlier, is not based on forces to be around you it is if you have a good health it is one of your security, you have financial support, it is your security, like me now I am student, I am fatherless, I don't have a father but I can support myself if I have a vocation as this... My security concern here is to have comfortability, to stay well, that is if you have accommodation you have to dress it very well to have your health, so after that, your feeding is there, you have to feed yourself very well, As far as I am a man and I am of good health as I am now, I have to do something to get money for me to sponsor myself ahead of my school (Borno).

Tenimu: See I don't know where to start. A man like me and I don't have a kobo like this in my pocket. My *pikin* will eat, wife will eat, and me? The last time I saw 1 hundred naira fa, it is almost one week. I'm not lazy, but what do you do when there is no job? Boko Haram stole my car, a Nissan. I was a taxi driver and you know that even if there is no business, at least two thousand Naira will follow me enter my house every day. This thing is painning me, *wallahi*... Everything is hard for everybody in this country now but it is very bad for us. How many people will give you a job as an IDP? They don't know you and you don't have a guarantor so they will say, 'what if he steals my good and runs away'? I wanted to work as an *okada* man but the owner said 'who will I arrest if you run away with my *okada*'? I could not answer the question so he said, 'I can't give you my *okada*'. There is no money and life is hard. (Yobe).

In this broadening of the security concept, security is reconceptualised as 'comfortability', i.e., the overall wellbeing of the individual including but mental and

physical wellbeing such as good health, employment and financial stability, accommodation, education, and food which all enhance the 'security' experience of the individual. These attributes of security are invoked as an ideal rather than a description of a state which IDPs currently experience. In this sense, this conception of security is evoked to emphasise its desirability and sadly, absence at the camps. Insecurity is associated with injustice and political and economic neglect by the government.

Despite these accounts emerging from lay understandings and talk on (counter-)terrorism in Northeast Nigeria, they speak to particular strands of academic research. Arguments about 'poverty amidst plenty' – the haves and have nots – speak to the 'relative deprivation' argument which was popularised by Ted Gurr (2015) in his 'frustration-aggression' thesis, which although was originally put forward by Ted Gurr (2015). He hypothesises that '[t]he potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity' (Gurr, 2015: 24).

From this perspective, rebellion will rarely ensue without a common discontent among the people about their current unfavourable circumstances, i.e. collective unemployment and poverty highlighted by '[unemployed] graduates sitting down', with a shared sense of disgruntlement; this common discontentment is, in turn, a product of individual experiences of exploitation – from their personal stories of failure to secure jobs and a means of livelihood with basic amenities (electricity and water, among others) lacking which is then experienced as a collective, 'all over'. These individual dissatisfactions are occasioned by a sense of injustice about governance, especially the allocation and distribution of state's resources – where

leaders 'will go and hide the money'. She concludes the account with an attenuative statement which is empathetic to the recruits' cause, 'we are all humans now³⁹', thus suggesting that anyone in their situation may be acquiescent. The justice argument here proposes the redistribution of wealth more equitably in Nigeria.

From a DP position, the main objective is not to ascertain the veracity of these claims, whether poverty or relative deprivation causes terrorism or not; DP distances itself from causal arguments (Weatherall et al., 2007). However, DP is concerned with how people construct these experiences and accounts of poverty and relative deprivation as influencing people's decision to join Boko Haram, which they believe to be true. DP does not attempt to counter one truth with another, i.e., the non-expert's perspective with an expert view, rather it seeks to capture the various worlds, identities and truths that people construct as real, valid and true (Wetherell and Potter, 1993).

What can be further deduced from these accounts is a form of nominalisation where the agency of BH militants is extirpated (Jackson and Hall, 2016). Constructions of militants as being pushed towards joining terrorism by unemployment, poverty, being 'deceived' or 'having no choice', serves to achieve the discursive effect of lessening their responsibility. This nominalisation serves to make arguments about non-coercive and non-violent measures such as 'asking them what they need' (Jubril & Joyce), achieving 'justice' possible and desirable. Killing militants then could amount to further injustice.

³⁹ 'Now' at the end of statements in much of Nigerian vernacular usually emphasises the self-evidence of a statement. In a nutshell, it is saying 'you should know' or 'I assume you know this'.

6.3 CT and Boko Haram as a Mimesis

The second prominent theme that emerged from the interviews was a surprisingly common construction of similarities between Boko Haram and the state. In discussing anecdotes and accounts of their experiences of the group, locals recall similar tactics adopted by both parties and emphasise similarities between terrorism and counterterrorism. These views differ from legitimacy-centred definitions of terrorism where there is a 'foundational sovereignty' assumption, attributing a pre-given identity to the state as having a monopoly over the use of force (Weber, 1946; Pisiu and Hain, 2017). In this sense, state violence is normalised; thus the state can engage in many acts that may mirror acts of non-state actors – such as abductions, assassinations and bombing – but these may be perceived as legitimate and sometimes, 'permissible', given the 'existential' challenges that terrorism poses (Buzan et al., 1998).

In the first instance, views by locals express an 'action' or 'victim-centred' account where 'violence is violence', irrespective of the perpetrator.

Tenimu: How many people in the village disappeared? Boko Haram killed some and army too arrested plenty and we have not seen them till today. They have killed many of them because they believe they are Boko Haram. That time, one chief called army and Boko Haram killed him that he was supporting soldiers. They killed many people in the village too that they are supporting Boko Haram. So, if Boko Haram comes, we will run, and if army comes we will run (Yobe).

Mabel: As we return [to the mountain], the army will go back again, and Boko Haram will come back and attack people as they are trying to retrieve their property and kill them. The army will run away. It is a game... The army will not follow Boko Haram into the hills, they will just leave them. Old

people cannot run because their age is big⁴⁰. They will hide inside the houses, so the armies will come inside our houses and kill them. They will say 'why are you here if you are not Boko Haram'. They will shoot them and say that they have killed Boko Haram ... From the hill, you can see everything (Borno).

These views all show an assessment of terrorism and counterterrorism by civilians in the Northeast based on their experiences of both phenomena. For Tenimu, similarities in the *modus operandi* of Boko Haram and the state meant that neither actor could be trusted. In this 'tactic'-oriented definition of threat, both parties were considered dangerous to the wellbeing of the publics from the Northeast. For example, some villagers had 'disappeared' because they were suspected of being BH members, supporters, or accomplices, while others had suffered consequences of cooperating with the government or acting as informants in a community-state arrangement that serves to partner with communities to achieve security.

This mimetic relationship of adopting similar tactics had made both terrorism and counterterrorism appear increasingly similar. As Jarvis and Lister (2014) argue, if states adopt the same tactics as terrorists then such violence can be construed as state terrorism. Thus, while devoid of labels such as terrorism and counterterrorism, what Tenimu describes may be viewed as a form of state terrorism which targets civilians to create fear and attach severe consequences to particular types of behaviours. What is also evident is the lack of deference to state authority or acceptance of state violence as necessary or essential in comparison to Boko Haram violence. Both state and non-state actions are viewed as 'dangerous' and

⁴⁰ Old people that are unable to run or escape to the mountains when Boko Haram attacks villages in Borno State.

‘threatening’ to the wellbeing of locals which is emphasised in their fleeing from both soldiers and militants.

The absence of labels such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘counterterrorism’, which serve to (de)legitimise actions/actors attest to this focus on the act rather than the actor (Jackson et al., 2011). By avoiding these labels, the moral superiority of counterterrorism over terrorism is deconstructed, people compare the actions of these actors rather than their identities or their claims to legitimacy. While this does not necessarily question the legitimacy of the actors, the legitimacy of their actions becomes problematized (Pisoiu and Hain, 2017). For example, from the first interviewee, rather than unavoidable ‘collateral damages’, killings and enforced disappearances occasioned by the army were juxtaposed with those orchestrated by Boko Haram; hence, locals fled from Boko Haram just as they did from the army without judgements about which action/actor was ‘evil’ or ‘good’; who was the state killer or the non-state killer.

Publics take this ‘game’ metaphor further to construct the (in)security project, as well as the identities of Boko Haram and the state and to make a normative evaluation of both phenomena.

Elizabeth: Before [Boko Haram] entered, they sent some messages that they will start their work. Nothing concerned them with poor people, only forces and government. They will attack the forces and government only and had no business with poor people; they will spare the poor people ... As they sent many messages to them as they started their work they started to attack people and burn the churches. And they were fighting only Christians, they didn’t fight with government and forces again. After they finished killing poor people and burning churches they now faced the army and other security (Borno).

Helen: You see, the guns they had, even armies didn't have it. They had many cars, they were not touching civilian people it was just the army that they were facing because they wanted to pursue all the armies before they started to kill the civilians (Adamawa).

Ajifa: All my clothes, food, Boko Haram burnt everything. I was living in the hill for four months. The time that Boko Haram had pursued all the army from there, they started doing what they liked. Even only one army was not left. The armies ran to Maiduguri (Borno).

These extracts show how the game metaphor is further extended to construct an ongoing competition where Boko Haram has increasingly been victorious and successful against the state. These normative evaluations of Boko Haram, regarding its failure to adhere to its promises of sparing poor people, by fighting the government alone, thus constructing it as biased and untrustworthy, especially with its exclusive targeting of Christians as well. CT is also evaluated through its portrayal as 'inferior' to terrorism regarding capability and its inability to prevent Boko Haram from achieving its aims and objectives in the Northeast.

6.4 Conclusion

In the first section, it was argued that Boko Haram could have enjoyed considerable support both in the northeast and in other adjoining states because of the anti-state and anti-oppression appeal that it enjoyed. In the second section, it was argued that people view Boko Haram differently under different leadership which meant that the strategy adopted by groups could determine how locals view threats to their security. In the third section, it was argued that some people from the northeast believe that Boko Haram adopted displacement as a strategy to reduce the population of minority religious and ethnic groups. Thus, many participants who belong to ethnic and

religious minority groups believe that Boko Haram particularly targeted them rather than the government.

As this chapter has shown, the various selves constructed by individuals played a crucial part in their construction of reality and also their support or rejection of particular policies, projects, persons and leaders. For example, within the religious repertoire, the various positions made it possible to exercise empathy, ridicule, criticise, support, discredit or suggest solutions to terrorism better ways to counter terrorism. When people positioned themselves as Christians, it was possible to construct Boko Haram as a form of religious persecution and discrimination which disproportionately targeted Christians in the Northeast. In short, it was an Islamisation project. When people positioned themselves as Muslims, Boko Haram was mostly a different form of political violence which was perpetuated with the influence and support of particular 'corrupt' politicians and had very little religious influence. These were not consistent as expected in discursive psychology as there were variations within and between accounts and anecdotes that were used to achieve the 'business of talk' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002).

Some lay discourses on terrorism resonate with contemporary academic research such as with views on religious terrorism and causal explanations related to the relative deprivation arguments. This does not necessarily validate or invalidate these studies but rather, reveals the rich discursive impetus contained in lay understandings of terrorism. Vernacular discourse on terrorism in Nigeria may also serve as a source of public opinion about various security projects, governance and democracy more broadly. In this sense, it provides vital public disposition towards state's performance from the perspective of non-elites in informal settings as with

unstructured conversations in bedrooms, football fields, beer parlours, football viewing centres, farms, schools, hospitals and roadside represent.

Chapter Seven: Implications for Security and Thesis Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

As Chapters 6 and 7 have shown, there are two prominent discourses that lay publics in Nigeria advance to construct their experiences of (counter-)terrorism and also to position themselves in the world. These two prominent discourses are interest and ethnoreligious discourses which can be further unpacked into various frames, interpretative repertoires, scripts and themes which publics intersubjectively draw from to make meaning of and construct versions of the world, events, and identities of the Self/Other.

This chapter addresses accounts that do not fall into these two main discourses, exploring how broader themes, narratives, metaphors and repertoires are adopted to advance arguments about BH and CT which can be structured around three overarching themes. First, interviewees adopt a 'game' metaphor to make sense of and construct state and BH identity and activities. In this sense, the ongoing conflict is viewed as a game between the state and BH which has implications for the normative evaluations that citizens in Nigeria make about both phenomena. Second, publics contrast between familiarity and strangeness regarding the identity of BH members. Third, publics advance a 'you can't trust anybody' argument, which serves to construct their distrust of both CT and BH.

The Chapter advances by discussing CT and Terrorism as a game, then progresses to discuss how elite constructions of Boko Haram militants as strange has been challenged with versions that portray the group as 'familiar' and usual members of society; it finally addresses the concept of trust, where publics emphasise the

widespread distrust of the army in the Northeast, not only because it was difficult to be sure they were actually soldiers but more importantly, because the 'game' that they were engaged in meant that they might want to outdo BH.

Finally, the Chapter addresses various implications that this study has for security through discussing its relevance to policy, academic research, and to theory; the original contribution to knowledge. It proceeds to address how the Self is positioned in the world and then provides a summary and reiteration of the main points made so far. Research questions and breakdown are followed by recommendations for future research and the value that the interpretative repertoires add to academic conceptions of interest and identity in relation to conflict more broadly and (counter-)terrorism more specifically.

7.2 Implications of Findings for Security

This section addresses the implications of the findings of this research for security policy and research through engaging contextualising and situating my findings within broader vernacular security discourses and contributing to ongoing debates on vernacular studies in security research. The section will progress through first identifying the similarities and differences in these studies and then proceeding to examine what the implications are in terms of the ongoing study of vernacular security. Second, the section will address the implications of these findings for security policy and practice in Nigeria, more specifically and in Africa and the world more broadly.

This study has so far addressed the various ways in which non-elites have understand, imagine, conceptualise and construct their own identities, the identities of others, the state, the government, and their knowledge of terrorism and counterterrorism in non-institutional setting or everyday life. What this section does, is link these repertoires and claims made about them with broader arguments and findings of similar studies in the West such as those of Jarvis and Lister (2014; 2017; 2016; 2015; 2013), Jackson and Hall (2016), Stevens and Vaughan-Williams (2016), Vaughan-Williams (2008), Vaughan-Williams and Stevens (2015), many parallels and divergences are evident which offer possibilities for further critique. The question here is what are these similarities and differences and what do they tell us about wider studies of vernacular security?

First, despite the widespread claims about failed and failing aspects of governance in terms of legitimacy and authority which significantly impacts on the views of citizens towards their governments in terms of deference or rejection, the findings in this study find parallels between how ordinary citizens in non-institutional settings in the Global North and those in the Global South conceptualise, imagine and discuss their experiences of (in)security and (counter-)terrorism. Non-elites in this finding and those in studies by Jarvis and Lister (2010; 2013a) Jackson and Hall (2016) and Steven and Vaughan-Williams (Stevens and Vaughan-Williams, 2016), Vaughan-Williams (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2015) express considerable cynicism about the government in terms of questioning the intentions and underlying objectives of the government and how security projects may be a thing of concern. Adopting a tool from the composite multiperspectival approach that this study expatiated in Chapter 3.10, the concept of 'worlding' is useful in terms of how it

implores us to restore the 'normalness' of African experiences from the exceptional character they have acquired not only in the West but in other non-Western societies (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Mbembé and Nuttall, 2004).

It must be acknowledged that the reasons for cynicism do differ but this thesis argues that they can be viewed as different versions of cynicism towards the state's security project which may impact on how citizens engage with the government and the various projects that are deployed to counter terrorism and other threats. For example the increasing panopticism of everyday life in terms of surveillance has drawn concerns in Europe and has been extensively investigated in terms of how these could actually lead to more insecurity or erode individual liberties. Within the Nigerian context, much cynicism is expressed towards the military and local and national politicians and community leaders in what citizens construct as a symbiotic relationship forged by identities and corruption. In this sense, the dichotomisation of state versus non-state violence does not hold but rather identities such as religious and ethnic identities which influences cooperation across state and non-state frontiers. Religious and ethnic identities are more paramount in much of the discussions within the Nigerian context in terms of providing repertoires for people to make sense of the world and construct their various allegiances and concerns.

In terms of the relevance of this study for non-academic audiences such policy and those in the Third Sector, these themes, repertoires, common places and tropes can enrich how security is understood by stakeholders in Nigeria to properly understand how the counterterrorism project and Boko Haram are constructed and people's dispositions and attitudes towards both phenomena. People's suspicious views towards Northern elites and senior level officers in the army may be a suggestion

that there needs to be more community engagement to build trust and also engage with concrete fears that people have in their everyday lives. Empathy and sympathy with the rank and file of the army may be an indication that publics share in their common experiences of subjugation and exploitation by political leaders.

Ethno-religious repertoires build on current debates about Boko Haram regarding enriching them with the voices of those living with insecurity, rather than studies that have attempted to speak for these people, regarding widespread assumptions about how both identities interact to cause discrimination. Vernacular discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism show that the current statist approach to security may be too narrow and inadequate in understanding and responding to the needs of citizens who define and understand security in more nuanced and changing, rather than static. Better engagement with public understandings of (in)security may help the various actors involved in security governance to better manage the problem of insecurity which cannot only be limited to the state, both in a narrow and broad sense.

Previous studies on (in)security within the Nigerian context have been less cognisant of the politics of terrorism and counterterrorism, i.e. mainly adopting the dominant Western positivist epistemology where culture, and economics, among others are considered independent of people and could be objectively known. Another corollary is the determinism inherent in these approaches where these variables are imbued with a causal logic, i.e. specific factors are viewed as causing unwanted vices in society. Language only serves the purpose of describing these inner states related to their religious or ethnic affiliations rather than constituting them and this has been very evident in studies surrounding tribalism, ethnocentric and religious bigotry

where various states of mind and perceptions of the *Other* is construed as conveyed through language. This thesis argues that the various construction of (in)security and (counter-)terrorism experiences are forms of social action. The critique of the Nigerian governments, both state and federal, traditional institutions and their leaders, the Nigerian military and other citizens may be viewed in this sense are not dispositions or mere description of those entities but rather a form of social action.

These findings show that people understand and discuss (in)security in a variety of ways which makes public security views heterogeneous (Jarvis and Lister, 2013b; Bubandt, 2005). This affirms arguments that security does not have a stable ontology as some advocates of an objectivist ontology may want us to believe (Jarvis and Holland, 2014). The various versions of security attest to the fact that security is continuously contested in everyday discourses where various actors contest to impose their own version of the world on others (Jackson and Hall, 2016; Weatherall et al., 2007; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). As Bubandt (2005: 291) rightly argues, 's]ecurity is conceptualised and politically practised differently in different places and at different times', which makes the uncritical imposition of a version of security as is currently the case not only problematic but counterproductive.

The inextricable links between knowledge and power cannot be overstated (Foucault, 1980). Elitist security projects such as those that have been adopted by the state to counter Boko Haram may overlook much of these insights citing their inferiority to so-called expert knowledge. In a way, lay versions of the world may be viewed as naïve and inadequate in a Foucauldian (1980: 81) sense. Through the privileged position that versions of security in Nigeria such as the national security project, other non-statist and non-national views and understandings of security

have been 'subjugated' (Foucault, 1980). In a way, 'previously established erudite knowledge and of local, popular, indigenous knowledge located at the margins of society [...] have been exiled from the "legitimate domains of formal knowledge"' (White et al., 1990: 26). I argue that these views are very important and offer insights that contribute immensely to our understanding of security as a concept and may enhance rather than undermine other forms of important security projects.

Both policy and academic research are implicated in overlooking the rich tapestry of everyday narratives and lived experiences of (in)security. In the first instance, lay understandings of (counter-)terrorism do not meet the criteria of expert military intelligence required to achieve national security, through militarily defeating Boko Haram, which is more policy-oriented. In the second instance, it can refer to the exclusion of lived experiences of publics from the Northeast by academics in Nigeria, based on the assumption that these articulations are neither 'scientific' nor sound enough to merit proper investigation (Foucault, 1980). Both instances are linked through the problem-solving character of Nigerian academic research which seeks to solve challenges to the status quo, rather than stepping outside that system (Cox, 1981).

This study contributes to the de-subjugation of these 'knowledges' through promoting the resurgence of lay understandings of (counter-)terrorism (Jackson, 2012). These views provide an important assessment or public opinion about counterterrorism in Nigeria and how various communities understand and communicate their experiences of (in)security. The various understandings and constructions of security by lay publics in Nigeria 'can re-centre the "ordinary", "everyday" discourses of lay people, and simultaneously de-centre the state and

political elites, within the field of international relations' (Jackson and Hall, 2016: 293; Jarvis and Lister, 2016; Stevens and Vaughan-Williams, 2016). What this means is that voices that are otherwise ignored and marginalised within academia are brought back into reckoning and given importance.

By problematizing the current statist CT project, which has an underlying assumption that displacement and insecurity are merely products of Boko Haram insurgency, but rather viewing insecurity in the Northeast as contingent upon the complex relationship between multiple actors (mainly Boko Haram and the Nigerian state), it becomes possible to think about (in)security in less 'statist' ways. This can open up avenues to start thinking about the complex ways in which the practice of sovereignty itself, as evidenced by the constant reference to 'national security and territorial integrity' as the basis of the fight against Boko Haram, can produce various forms of (in)security experiences, either intentionally or unintentionally.

7.3 Relevance of Research Findings

The findings of this study are relevant to thoughts about security both within the Nigerian context and globally. What is most apparent in the various constructions of experience of (counter-)terrorism is the seldom reproduction of the terrorism label by interviewees, which shows that the political objective of delegitimising insurgents through labelling them as 'terrorist', has not been reproduced by publics from the Northeast (Jackson and Hall, 2016). People view Boko Haram largely, not as distant enemies but people whom they know and whose experiences are not significantly different from theirs. Some of these were expressed regarding empathy for militants and comparisons with the current experiences of IDPs regarding poverty and

unemployment. These were made through the 'interest repertoire' which suggested that many people found Boko Haram attractive because of the unfavourable opportunity costs involved in the Northeast. While monocausal arguments are not very popular in contemporary critical security studies, these are accounts that are constructed as real and as valid, which makes them important for interviewees.

The current definition of security within policy circles in Nigeria is too narrow. The concepts of national security and territorial integrity within the Nigerian context are inadequate for the complex nature of security governance that is required in an increasingly globalised world where there is a proliferation of actors and also where there are cultures that transcend national boundaries and may retain strong cultural ties from historical associations with those communities. This has been evident in the ease with which Boko Haram has operated across so-called national boundaries, whereas, this has only been territories that formerly united under the Kanem-Bornu Empire. Paying attention to these complex cultural and historical dynamics will help to properly situate the various security challenges within their proper contexts, which will enhance security governance and provision. The final point is that citizens have to be engaged more as their accounts reveal an interest in taking part in their own security, but they feel largely excluded by the current framework where their views, fears and 'expertise' are ignored.

These findings are relevant to other studies on terrorism and counterterrorism more specifically and (in)security more broadly. It contributes primary work to terrorism studies which have just started gaining attention and serves to contribute towards ameliorating what Sageman refers to as stagnation of terrorism research because of the overreliance of experts on secondary data. This is even more important

because the few studies that have engaged with lived experiences of citizens have been in the West, primarily in Europe. This study contributes empirical material from the Global South, which enriches current international debates on (in)security.

The findings in this research also have implications for established theory. Should individuals be understood as rational actors who are primarily driven by self-interests or are these self-interests influenced by identity? Another question is how identity should be understood which in the context of this study, is performative, meaning that identity is what people practice rather than what people have. Using the identity and interest repertoires that emerged from this study, identity is given higher priority and while people may act in self-interested ways, the definition of what is considered 'rational' or 'irrational' is socially constructed and emergent from various norms and conventions that are shared within particular communities. Identity is not absent throughout this process of interpretation constructions of versions of the world.

7.4 Original Contribution

My research into vernacular discourses on Boko Haram and counterterrorism is important for three main reasons. First, it offers an original, in-depth discursive analysis of public conceptions and constructions of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Nigeria. Security from a vernacular perspective tends to provide a strong medium for social action through which people can support, reformulate or oppose Nigeria's political and security programme (Jarvis and Lister, 2013b; Bubandt, 2005). Second, linking these constructions/conceptions to underpinning assumptions about socio-political life, it shows that self-interest and religious beliefs are an influence if not determiners of behaviour. Third, following from these, this thesis also helps to

broaden contemporary research on counter-terrorism – traditional and critical – by moving beyond a Western-centric focus and delving into rich cultural and historical conceptions of security and constructions of the state and terrorism, which advances research in both IR and security studies.

This study also has the potential to contribute to policy through providing a detailed analysis of public understandings of this ongoing conflict regarding how they construct their experiences of (counter-)terrorism. It informs the government and other stakeholders about how publics from the Northeast interpret and construct their experiences of the state, its institutions, officials, and its ongoing security project. It provides an in-depth analysis of various actors – especially public and policy officials, NGOs and advocacy groups – about how various CT policies are perceived, received, reformulated or resisted by citizens in different arenas, and how they see the performance of the state in not only their delivery of security but also the prospects of success, within intersubjective knowledge and local interpretative repertoires. It also reveals what people know about BH, regarding its nature, goals, membership, and how they interpret its campaign against the state. This provides a better theoretically grounded, historically situated and culturally nuanced variety of public opinion.

7.5 Research Questions and the Contribution to Knowledge.

Returning to the research questions from Chapter 1.2, this thesis sought out to answer these questions and sub-questions:

1. How do people understand and discuss (counter)terrorism in their everyday lives?
 - a. What do publics from the Northeast do with their talk?

- b. How are various versions of reality and identities constructed through talk?
2. What implications do lay discourses on (counter-)terrorism have for security?

As demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, publics in Nigeria understand and discuss (counter-)terrorism in at least two main ways. The first prominent discourse that they advance is the identity discourse which they adopt in making meaning and constructing versions of reality through talk. In this sense, (counter-)terrorism is interpreted, understood and constructed as an identity problem, suggesting that political elites and Boko Haram seek to achieve ethno-religious domination over minority populations in the Northeast. The second prominent discourse is the 'interest discourse' which interviewees use to construct (counter-)terrorism as interest or economically driven. In this sense, elites, militants and the army are all rational actors making cost-benefit decisions that serve their own self interests.

In this study, interviewees constructed various versions of reality through their talk. Thus, the experiences and knowledge that they constructed about the Self, Other, BH and CT were not a product of a reality that was 'out there', or of stable, unchanging mental entities, but rather situated and contingent. What this means was that their notions of ethnicity, interests, their knowledge of the state, of the army, militants and political elites among others were co-constructed with the researcher in the research context as these were all contingent upon the prompts (research questions), cultural norms and their interpretative repertoires, from which they drew to create versions of the world. It is the case that a different context could elicit a different response which is why from a discursive psychology position, people are

not expected to be consistent, making variability an important part of naturally occurring talk.

Lay discourses on (counter-)terrorism have at least, three implications for security in Nigeria. First, public views on security have been largely left out of both academic research and policy circles where elite views of security have been preferred. The protracted insurgency shows that alternative ways are required to gain better insights into how various communities intersubjectively understand the conflict and how they view the state and its project. The findings show that publics challenge aspects of authority and legitimacy, regarding viewing counterterrorism as legitimate or terrorism as illegitimate, but rather, view both phenomena based on their experiences of victimisation or perceived violence.

Second, interviewees generally have concerns about political and traditional elites whom they believe have compromised their duties by 'selling' them to insurgents. However, they have solidarity with regular soldiers, and some militants whom they believe are victims of the same power and exploitative structures that subjugate them. In a way, they share empathy with the sufferings and experiences of these people which shows that the people believe that political leaders are detached from the experiences of ordinary Nigerians. They also feel that they are economically excluded from participating in CT through being excluded from the military. This shows very low popularity and approval of political and traditional elites among publics from the Northeast, except those that are considered to be 'defending' particular minority communities.

Third, these findings show that there is an urgent need for community cohesion and dialogue with IDPs who believe that they have a lot to offer regarding their knowledge of their communities and also being privy to knowledge that can, in fact, help save the state itself. In this sense, they do not necessarily view themselves as victims to be saved but rather feel empowered to contribute to security which they believe the state is currently unable to achieve. This is positive and more community engagement is required to speak with these people and get them involved in various stages of the security project which bodes well for democratic governance.

7.6 Recommendations and implications for Future Research

From the arguments that this thesis has made, and the rich experiences that publics in Nigeria have constructed, the overlapping nature of national boundaries and divergent security projects within the axis of influence of Boko Haram suggest there is real scope for comparative research examining how different publics of the various countries that have engaged Boko Haram to understand and discuss security in their everyday lives. In this regard, it may be possible to circumvent the restrictions occasioned by national boundaries and the labels that they have enforced on citizens such as 'internally' displaced or 'refugee'. It would also be possible to investigate if publics in, for example, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon understand and construct their experiences of Boko Haram and counterterrorism using similar scripts, themes, frames and interpretative repertoires. This could be extended to other groups such as the Islamic State and al Qaeda to see convergences or divergences in vernacular discourses on (counter-)terrorism globally.

Extending these findings may help to shed light on various taken-for-granted assumptions about terrorism, which influences counterterrorism. For example, do publics in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, Kenya, Somalia, Afghanistan or even France adopt similar interpretative repertoires in their understanding and constructions of (counter-)terrorism? This will be interesting because it will further populate academic research with the voices of a diverse set of actors that, traditionally will not be able to speak security. Besides this normative value, it may also provide insight into what various communities know about terrorism and counterterrorism, especially in revealing how various elite discourses are produced or resisted in everyday discourse.

Geographical constraints may have affected the findings regarding addressing other citizens that are currently living in the core (in)security zones such as Maiduguri and Damaturu to see if their experiences fit broadly into these repertoires and if they understand and discuss security in similar ways to the findings of this thesis. Challenges that may be faced in this endeavour may be the security concerns and dangers that accompany such work in dangerous situations with ongoing and unpredictable conflict and violence. This could be in the form of threat to the researcher and participants or both, and it could emerge from insurgents, their sympathisers and the state through the military and police who may have an objection to some of these findings being revealed. However, future research should incorporate these concerns of security censorship into its questions, which may become more feasible in particular areas where everyday activities have been resumed, and there are hopes that people may become more willing to discuss without fear of repercussions.

While I have attempted to counterbalance many challenges that emerged during the research process, some limitations can be identified. The first limitation is with the case selection and participants. This can be further linked to the earlier point on expanding the research participants to include people from the current epicentre of Boko Haram activities and counterterrorism. For example, could there be similarities in the ways that non-IDPs – people who have not been displaced – understand and discuss (in)security in Nigeria? Access was the main problem, especially regarding my ethical responsibility to not endanger my participants or expose them to possible reprisals – from Boko haram and state agents – during the research process. By talking to IDPs outside the Northeast, it was possible to negotiate data about experiences of terrorism and counterterrorism in the Northeast (and Cameroon for some) with a significantly reduced level of danger to participants and myself. Besides non-IDPs in the Northeast, the general population or Nigerians in the diaspora could be asked similar questions to identify how they construct their experiences of (in)security.

The second weakness that this thesis has is that of time. Because of time restrictions and very strict timeframe to design, carry out and present a PhD thesis, there are restrictions about the amount of time available to carry out field work. This restricted the length of the ethnographic work carried out in this research. A longitudinal study of around 5 to 10 years may capture more long-term patterns of discourse that may provide valuable insights that a shorter timeframe such as 3 or 4 months may offer. That said, much effort was put into making the most of the limited time that was available to the researcher including contacting the camps beforehand and using my

own familiarity with the field and culture to my advantage, which significantly shortened the required time for acclimatisation and familiarisation.

Methodologically, since this research adopted discursive psychology and elements of both discourse and conversational analysis on a small sample of semi-structured interviews from Nigeria, it is possible to advance these findings by pursuing some of the key points that this study has unearthed, such as with the repertoires and other themes that emerged during the discussions. This may be achieved in two main ways. First, other forms of discourse analysis techniques may be adopted to see if similar findings are made while, second, a quantitative methodology or a mixed methods research may help engage with the broader population to identify how these concepts and themes may apply to other contexts outside that which this study was carried out.

Interviews, field notes and participant observation were the primary methods used in this research. Since the interviews were semi-structured in that they used prompts to give participants more control of the direction in which they preferred to take the conversation, it is possible to adopt a different and less-individualistic method such as focus groups. Similar studies such as Jarvis and Lister (2013b) and Jackson and Hall (2016) have adopted focus groups to answer similar questions in the UK which generated some similar findings. It may be interesting to adopt focus group methods in Nigeria to examine how the group dynamics could play a part in how people understand and construct their experiences of (in)security. Certain dynamics such as religion and ethnicity have to be taken into consideration, especially when discussions could become charged and emotional in some cases.

7.6.1 Access to Remote Conflict Areas

Gaining access to remote areas when hostilities are ongoing presents various dangers for participants and the researcher which affected the choice of locations for this research. This was mitigated through speaking with IDPs from the most affected areas of the Northeast such as Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. However, it may be possible when there is a return to normalcy for more efforts to be put into following up on some of the experiences that people have in their own communities and villages rather than at camps which may have impacted in one way or the other on their experiences of insecurity since discursive psychology assumed that knowledge is impacted by context, i.e., it is co-created within the research environment which suggests that other dynamics may contribute to slightly different outcomes.

7.7 Conclusion

This thesis has examined the impact of (counter-)terrorism on the security of publics in Nigeria through examining the various vernacular discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism that citizens advance in everyday life. To be clear, this is not a linguistic endeavour that sought to examine the pragmatics of lay discourses in Nigeria, but rather a social psychological undertaking which has sought to achieve a more nuanced and greater understanding of (counter-)terrorism and other aspects of cultural and social life within the Nigerian context through the extensive study of lay discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

Ethno-religious discourses on (counter-)terrorism were adopted by interviewees to perform various tasks and position themselves in various ways in talk. Through

advancing ethno-religious arguments, counterterrorism was constructed as discriminatory, oppressive, biased and also a form of domination by ethnic and religious elites in the Northeast. In this sense, it is adopted to show disapproval and resistance to particular security measures, other community members, the army and the government more broadly. However, it was also adopted to show support for various actors such as junior army officers, political elites and other community members among others.

The second prominent discourse that individuals adopt in understanding and constructing their experiences of terrorism and counterterrorism is the interest discourse. Through the interest discourse, interviewees made rational choice arguments about terrorism and counterterrorism. In this sense, Boko Haram was viewed as driven by economic ends, while recruits were similarly considered to be influenced by narrow financial self-interest. For counterterrorism, this discourse constructed various interests by elites, traditional leaders and army commanders such as financial benefits. The interest discourse was also adopted to express displeasure about various forms of economic exclusion occasioned by CT. It is important to add that these two discourses are interwoven in everyday discussions which call for greater attention to the unproblematic ways in which current research attempt to treat them separately. The boundaries are not as clear-cut as we are usually made to believe.

This thesis concluded with recommendations for future studies through making geographical and methodological suggestions that can enrich further research. Regarding methodology, it is possible to adopt mixed-methods research that will combine quantitative and quantitative approaches to further investigate some of the

initial findings from the qualitative study. It is also recommended that other methods such as focus groups can be adopted to help examine how group dynamics could influence the outcomes, especially since this has been the main approach adopted by similar studies in the UK. Geographically, a significant percentage of the interviewees that participated in this study were from Borno, which is the epicentre of Boko Haram insurgency and counterterrorism but future studies may seek to balance this through seeking to investigate if similar dynamics exist in other states and across other parts of the sub-region such as in Cameroon, Niger and Chad, since Boko Haram is a transnational threat.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: The Support Booth and Health Clinic



Appendix B: Everyday Activities at the Camp. IDPs playing cards.



Appendix C: Solar Powered Water Tank at the Camp



Appendix D: IDP Dwellings.



Appendix E: IDP Rooms



Appendix F: IDP Soaked Beds from Rain



Appendix F: IDP Football Viewing Centre



Appendix G: Correspondence with Potential Gatekeepers 1

University of East Anglia
School of PPL
Department of Politics
Norwich
United Kingdom
NR4 7TJ
22 February, 2016

The Director General
Alhaji Muhammad Sani Sidi
National Emergency Management Agency,
No. 8, Adetokunbo Ademola Crescent, Maitama,
Abuja.

Dear Director General,

Request for Permission to Carry Out PhD Thesis Field Work on Internally Displaced Citizens in Nigeria

I am Akinyemi Oyawale, a second year PhD student in Politics, at the University of East Anglia, Norwich United Kingdom. I am currently investigating the 'impact of counterterrorism on the (in)security of publics in Nigeria', and my thesis requires a fieldwork that will enable me gather first hand data from Nigerian citizens, mainly those that have experienced the conflict in northern Nigeria, first hand. I am currently looking at Abuja and Lagos, however, I am open to suggestions concerning the logistical bottlenecks or sites that will be best for the research.

I hope to embark on this exercise between May and October 2016. All ethical considerations concerning research participants will be handled with utmost honesty, transparency, and fairness as the ethics of the University of East Anglia are uncompromising in terms of securing informed consent and maintaining the dignity and safety of participants.

I am Nigerian and I was awarded a Presidential NYSC Honours Award for outstanding community service during my NYSC service in Port Harcourt in 2010.

I can be reached on this email, the alternative email provided, or on the mobile number provided below. I can also be contacted through the department.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Kind regards,



Akinyemi Oyawale

Appendix H: Correspondence with Gatekeeper 2

PhD Research Assistance for IDP Access



Akinyemi Oyawale (PPL) <A.Oyawale@uea.ac.uk>

Sun 06/12/2015, 00:08

info@nema.gov.ng; nemapress@yahoo.com



Reply | v

Sent Items

Dear Sir/Ma,

I am Akinyemi Oyawale, a Nigerian and a PhD student at the University of East Anglia. I am currently examining the 'impact of counterterrorism on the security of publics in Nigeria'.

Part of my research involves a critical ethnographic fieldwork that will require an interview of Internally Displaced Persons in a bid to unravel their understandings of security and how the Nigerian response has affected them.

I am currently in the process of applying for ethical clearance and other approval from my uni but I will like to know what steps I will need to take to gain access and other requirements I may need. For example, does NEMA run the IDP camps or perhaps a specific policy that researchers must be aware of?

I look forward to your reply and assistance.

Kind regards,

Akinyemi Oyawale
PhD Student in Politics and International Security
School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies
University of East Anglia
Norwich

Appendix I: Correspondence with Gatekeeper 3

----- Original message -----

From: "Akinyemi Oyawale (PPL)" <A.Oyawale@uea.ac.uk>
Date: 16/02/2016 05:57 (GMT+03:00)
To: alhassannuhu@yahoo.com
Subject: PhD Research on Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria

Dear Mr. Nuhu,

Greetings to you. I am a PhD student at the University of East Anglia, Norwich, United Kingdom and I am investigating the 'impact of counterterrorism on the security of publics in Nigeria'. My research will require a fieldwork in Nigeria where I will interview citizens who have experienced counterterrorism to request for their views and experiences (with their permission and explicit consent). I came across your address on a report with the IOM which is valuable to my ongoing research.

I hope to embark on this between May and October, and would like to solicit your support. I will also hope to speak with you (if permitted), being the Director of Disaster and Risk Reduction, due to your vast knowledge and expertise in this area.

Thanks for your foreseen assistance and I look forward to hearing from you.

Kind regards,

Akinyemi Oyawale || Associate Tutor and PhD Candidate

Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, U.K. | [+44\(0\)7459242483](tel:+4407459242483) | Arts
3.82 | a.oyawale@uea.ac.uk | @akinoyawale

Appendix J: Correspondence with Gatekeeper 4

From: alhassannuhu <alhassannuhu@yahoo.com>
Sent: 16 February 2016 09:29
To: Akinyemi Oyawale (PPL)
Cc: sidisani@yahoo.com
Subject: Re: PhD Research on Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria

Dear Akinyemi,

Thanks for yours on the above and you are most welcome. Please write formally to the DG and you will be obliged.

Sent from my Samsung device

Appendix K: Transcripts

	Timespan	Content
1	0:00.0 - 0:39.1	A4 I am in school in the University of Maiduguri, I am in 100 level. I am Christian by religion and I am 22 years by age.
2	0:48.2 - 0:55.8	AO can I ask for your consent
3	0:55.8 - 0:57.3	A4 Yes
4	0:57.3 - 1:14.6	AO my first question is, what are your understanding of security?
5	1:14.6 - 1:55.2	A4 security is first of all for me, security is based on comfortability of an individual. So when someone is comfortable with everything beside him, for the survival of a human being it is the best security for me, then followed by the body guards, that is the security pertaining soldiers and policemen around us to secure us from the armed robbers and others things. For me the best security is for someone to be comfortable, very healthy and maybe financially stable. That is how I understand security
6	1:55.2 - 2:10.9	AO From your experience in the northeast, what is your experience with insecurity?
7	2:10.9 - 4:23.6	A4 Em, I experience a difficult condition, it was so harsh then. You know how it feels to displace someone from his own fatherland or native land to go somewhere where everything will be new for him. I myself, I had never been to anywhere apart from my locality, that is my local government. When I finished my secondary school there, I planned to join a polytechnic. So when I plan to join the polytechnic, I wrote Jamb and passed my exam, so from there I tried to go for screening in the school I applied so unfortunately Boko Haram had blocked everywhere so I couldn't gain admission that time. But before then when the insurgency was not as active as it is now, we can do everything easily because we can farm and get money to sponsor ourselves in school and we can anything that can help our lives. SO when the insurgency has started, the Boko haram people flew everywhere in the state, so most especially my LGA, we started experiencing it. In my side there in my particular village. We even battled with Boko haram that no one can displace us from our place. So unfortunately, they were using weapons like guns and other things. You know that you with bow and arrow cannot fight someone with guns. So we experienced a harsh condition whereby they burnt our houses they, everything we had has been destroyed. All we had now is our lives and we thank God that our lives have

		been safe and God showed us a way to run from our place, so very fortunately, we found ourselves at Mararaba here in Abuja. We really thank God. We faced a very harsh condition.
8	4:23.6 - 4:36.1	AO So what was your experience travelling from your community to Abuja?
9	4:36.1 - 5:36.7	A4 I escaped from my community, my people were still there. I first ran to Cameroon, when I got to Cameroon, I did a small business there so I got a transport to Maiduguri which is N1,500 then. It was N800 but because of the insurgency, you hardly see motor to carry you the price now raise to N1,500. From there when I got to Maiduguri, I still made a phone call because there was no service since when I had been displaced, even in Cameroon too, there was no network, so I had to come to Maiduguri and made a call to my uncle. He received my call and I now told him that I was in Maiduguri and I wanted to come to Mararaba. He now said okay, he asked me the transport, the transport was N3,500 then, so he sent me the transport then I transported myself here. That is how I got to Abuja.
10	5:36.7 - 6:10.0	AO Because you mentioned that you tried to tackle the insurgents yourself. Does that mean you perceive security is something not only the government should provide?
11	6:10.0 - 7:50.3	A4 Actually, we did that because some of the Boko Haram are the people from our place and the people from the community that we know. It was because of the religious differences so most of them were Muslims and we are Christians so they said their aim is for us to convert back to Muslim for us to be of the same religion with them then to join them so we can go and fight Jihad, they call it Jihad to fight and kill, that is anybody that is not a Muslim, should be persecuted, killed and do everything to him, except only if the person can accept Islam. then they will stay peacefully with them. So for us as a people in the village, we really don't wait for government alone to protect us. rather to wait for the support of the government or when the government's security are there we join together with them to support each other because that is how we can get safety, so we used our native things to defend ourselves as that is how we have been doing before. If we were battling maybe communal conflict or anything like that. So that's how we've been doing before so we took it just as a communal conflict whereby one tribe and the other will be fighting against maybe land and some other things so that is how we took it initially to fight with them battling with them using our bow and arrow, so we afterwards discovered that we could not fight them because it is modern weapons that were with them.
12	7:50.3 - 8:11.5	AO So what was your experience with the military, JTF, police and civilian JTF?

13	8:11.5 - 11:26.6	A4 Actually, what they did is erm, first of all, the problem is not from the security themselves. The problem is from the political leaders. Because when the thing initially started, we had a colonel. He was not promoted to a colonel, but he himself said, after this if he got to Abuja, he would be promoted to the rank of colonel. So the person was from our place, he was Joshua Musa by name. So when he came to us to fight for us, because he himself was from my village it hurt him to see that his people were suffering while he was in the force, the government force. So when he discovered everything, he now came and started searching house by house so if he found a weapon in your house then automatically Boko Haram. Most especially if you had a gun, or a lot of cutlass. Cutlass is mainly for farm, it is a farm implement but if it is too much then you have to be questioned and if you cannot answer very well then they will now comment on you that you are Boko Haram and they will kill you. So that's how he was doing. SO far he was a Christian so they Muslims now went o, because we are headed by Muslims in that state, it is a Muslim state, so when the Muslims ones discovered what he was doing and they knew that he was the one doing it they now reported that he was killing Muslims both innocent and those that were guilty because they were of different religion so as they reported, we have the senator of the southern side, because we are from the southern part of Borno state. so the senator, house of assembly, the chairman and even the monarch of the state, they are all Muslims so for that reason they planned against him, when they planned against they now tried to kill him. After killing that man, that is where the changes had started. Because before they killed him, you know where Boko Haram had camped themselves, where they camp themselves, it is in a mountain. That mountain, if you climb there, you will see a flat land inside, a lot of buildings inside. In that place, they had displaced all the innocent ones there, it was only Boko Harams that remained there. SO when that same colonel planned to go there he now said, anyone who is ready to go and fight with Boko Haram should follow him. So a lot of them were ready to follow him, so some refused. Those that refused went back to that person who is the ahead of that Musa. So when they went to him, he was also one of the people that planned against him. So when they planned against him, maybe they collected money or something like that. Those that refused to follow now said they would now follow him. They changed their mind that they would follow him. so when they go there, they battled boko Haram, when they battled Boko Haram they killed bastard, they killed many because all of them were with guns so his own was to shoot anybody that was with a gun because he is not a Nigerian force. so when he killed many those that planned against him now said it was too much, one of them now climbed a tree and looked for how to shoot that Musa, so when he tried, he shot Musa and Musa escaped it so Musa now asked him why he was trying to shoot him. The man now said no, we are not trying to shoot, you it is a mistake and we are only targeting to shoot Boko Haram. so they now said, he started showing them directions on how to

		follow, because he grew up there he knew how to climb the mountain and fight in the mountain as a village person there. So now they tried and killed him, so when they shot him, there was one communication something that soldiers use to communicate with themselves, so he now removed it and threw it back for them, that they should either fight or run back, because he has been shot so because he knew that it was a soldier that shot it, and I myself personally was not there, where I got the information was from one of my uncles. He stays in the village so when the soldiers came to the village to fight, they gave him a uniform to use to go with them and come to the mountain he was the one that broke the information and from there now, he that brought the information and four other Christians. They were five totally in number. Now the same Muslims of the local government planned against him again and take a civilian JTF from state capital Maiduguri came to the village and now said they were here to fight and arrest anybody that is Boko Haram, so when they came, instead of them to investigate and find out how someone is reacting to them or the signs to show, or the evidence to show if the person is Boko Haram member or not they couldn't find out that, so they had finished everything from Maiduguri that so and so people should be captured and be arrested, and the people that they mentioned were those same five Christians that were fighting for our rights then because they were our eyes in the village there. So they now arrested them with the soldiers because soldiers trust Civilian JTF very well, so when they arrested them, we have been trying to find out where they are we went to the this thing, all the this thing, the women fellowship of our churches, the pastor, everybody, ran to the oga patapata of the soldiers that these people are Christians, they don't know anything about Boko Haram, rather they fought Boko Haram, they now said, No, you are not the one to tell us our game, these Boko Harm people are your people so they are the ones that said that they were Boko haram. We now said that we know that they are our people but we are of different religion, you know something is coming up like religious differences. The soldiers now said No, they were not listening. Since when they took them away till today as I am talking to you, we have not seen them, getting to three years now or more than three years, since two thousand, and , yes three years, it was from 2013. SO that is when they took them till today we have not seen them. So that is how the thing started.so after all when we lost that man, when they killed that Musa Joshua, is from our state that they killed him that is where the challenges became much even when soldiers came you can show someone that he is a Boko Haram, they will not kill him, they will just warn the person not to do so again. so when they started doing that, they now planned against everywhere, the Boko haram people planned against everywhere, so they will surround a particular village, killing and destroying people's property, so there was even a village that they came in soldier's uniform they now said they were soldiers and they had come to protect us, they would do anything to protect us so when they came now, we didn't know that they were Boko haram, because everything they had was for soldiers. You can't differentiate between them and Nigerian

		forces. so that's how we, when gathered around to listen to their instructions and what they had for us, we didn't know that they were Boko Harm, they now started shooting us. They shot more than 200 people on that same day. From then we started witnessing harshness. So we decided to run away from my village. That is how, it was so bad then, So now there is nobody now. Any innocent person from my place is no longer there, they have run away, all you can find there now is Boko Haram. And we still know those people that are there.
14	17:17.0 - 17:41.4	AO You have been talking about the religious divide, especially Muslim and Christians. What in particular made your community a special target?
15	17:41.4 - 20:12.2	A4 What made my community a special target was eh when they initially, you know we are headed by Muslims there so when they initially separated us, they had nothing to do with Gwoza, other than to stay peacefully with them. All they were doing was just to attack the Christians villages, any part that is of Christians, they will now be targeting it. So the Muslims ones still understand that what they were doing was not the right thing. So they now started departing or diverting from then. That is they were no longer in their support. So when that started then now said, okay we shall see. It is either all of Gwoza supported them or else they will displace everybody so that is how they were doing. So they now started doing it, that Gwoza, no longer supported them so they had to show them that they had power, because they were fighting for God. It is from the Quran that every good Muslim should fight for Jihad, and fighting for Jihad is to persecute non-Muslims. So that is how they started, so most of, if you can divide Gwoza into two, one part is for Christians and the other part is for Muslims. But the Christian part has been displaced since, we were the first people to be displaced. We ran away so the remaining Moslem side is the people that remain with them. So when they remain with them, they said they have nothing to do with them, only for them to get a weapon and follow them to go and kill people that is how Jihad is. SO they now said they cannot do that. So if they say they cannot do that they will say if you are ready to join us go to this side, if you are not ready, they now separated them into them, those that were ready were giving a gun, those that were not ready, some escaped and some were killed. In that same Muslims. That is how the thing started and they said let it be a Boko Haram community. That's how they planned it, they now displaced everybody and they now made it as a camp for them, they camped themselves there and it has become a Boko Haram local government. It is coming to last year or this year when Buhari entered that the town of that local government you know local government has it's headquarter. So the headquarter of the local government was now retaken by soldiers but for my side, till today, that is where Boko Haram is now. Let them go and fight them, they cannot go. They are now insisting that we should go there. so they killed all the monarchs of the place, the current monarch now said, his father was killed by Boko Haram his brother was killed by Boko Haram, his

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		brother was a soldier and was killed him when battling with Boko Haram, he now said if the Christians of the local government cannot go back to Gwoza then there is something wrong somewhere there is no way that he himself can go back to Gwoza except if the Christians will go back with him. The Christians now said, only if the soldiers will provided will be available for their security and will assure that yes, the mountains where Boko Haram usually camped themselves and other places are destroyed and made it open and plain that yes there is nothing more in that village so that is how the thing is going on now.
16	21:27.1 - 21:45.8	AO From your perspective, what do you think the state could have done differently to maintain your security?
17	21:45.8 - 24:30.5	A4 What they could have done is first of all they were to listen to the Christians, both the Christians and the Muslims of the local government first. So after listening to them we expect the government of the state to get us to be one, as in to come and maybe if they can set peace between us so that we can stay together and provide us with security that is with soldiers so if they can provide soldiers for us and now set civilian JTF from that very local government once you have so many people that just don't know how to do, if not, the thing is paining them. If to say a government can provide enough security and they security should not do any selfish ness and the security should not belong to anybody and let them be for everybody. if they can do that I think that we can have safety but if they cannot do that, the main thing, their function to me is, the government, initially they were not listening to us, as I said earlier, when our brother had been killed, that soldier that I said, Musa Joshua, we had no security anymore and I see no reason why the Nigerian army cannot maybe go and maybe go and arrange Christians in the name of Boko Haram, after Boko Haram, is, the full meaning of Boko Haram is western education is forbidden, but the real meaning is 'Christians are forbidden'. That is how I see the fall short of my state government. Because he couldn't listen to both the parties of the state. He was in support of one and not in support of the other. so it is when, the old, most of the Christians of my local government now, most of them are in Abuja, some are in Taraba, some are in many places, but most are in Cameroon so the Muslim ones now we don't know where they are. They, maybe most of them are still in the local government headquarter and some of them are in the state capital, which is Maiduguri, because Maiduguri, most of Maiduguri people are Christians so that is how it is. So truly the state government has not supported us the way we want.
18	24:30.5 - 25:02.5	AO About the name of Boko Haram that you mentioned that is Christianity is forbidden, can you expand on that?

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19	25:02.5 - 27:29.7	A4 So Boko Haram, is a Hausa sentence, Boko is education and Haram is forbidden, so now the translation of Boko Haram in English now is 'western education is forbidden', so what makes us realise that is not western education but rather it is Christians themselves is because that they have started persecuting Christians, as I mentioned earlier that only if you can convert back to Muslim and join them or else they will kill us and keep on persecuting us. That is what, because when they started, they looked for churches to be burnt, they first of all burnt our churches, anybody that they could find, and they would kill in the name of Jihad. So Jihad is a Quranic word that I cannot explain but my friend, a Muslim friend explained to me that is it to fight for your right as Muslim, so I don't know why they are fighting Christians for their rights. When Boko Haram started initially, when they started fighting, their leader was not Shekau as people are saying, their first leader was Yusuf Mohammed, so what that started initially was fighting the government that is why their name was Boko Haram. So fighting the government in the sense that they will maybe they will be going everywhere, anywhere they see schools, they will attack schools, attack barracks, police headquarters, and anywhere they see is for government they will be destroying. So when that leader was killed by the Nigerian Army, they had another leader to head them that is this Shekau, So the Shekau now, maybe he is the current leader now or he has been killed, so he is the one who started persecuting Christians so he said fi you are fighting government you are not working for Allah, they call God Allah, that is you can fight anybody that is not in support of Boko Haram, and the Christians, that is they are working for God and even if they are killed, they will make the kingdom of Allah according to them so that is how the thing started. As for my own. The final name for it is 'Christianity is forbidden'. Because they can only attack Muslims if only you did not support them.
20	27:52.9 - 28:05.4	AO What concerns do you have of your security here and in Mararaba?
21	28:05.4 - 29:56.0	A4 Security as I said earlier, is not based on forces to be around you it is if you have a good health it is one of your security, you have financial support, it is your security, like me now I am student, I am fatherless, I don't have a father but I can support myself if I have a vocation as this. I have finished my part 1, I am to 2 so it is a long vacation of 3 months so if I am to return back to school now without doing anything to find money I think I cannot make up my school again because I cannot see money to register myself again let alone to feed myself. So what brought me to Mararaba is to look for a job. I came here particularly to find maybe, I am here to see my brother to find maybe some money to find a bike, so that is what brought me here in Kuchingoro so my security concern here is to have comfortability, to stay well, that is if you have accommodation you have to dress it very well to have your health, so after that, your feeding is there, you have to feed yourself very well, As far as I am a man and I am of good health as I am now, I have to do something to get money for me to sponsor myself ahead of my school.

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22	29:56.0 - 30:12.8	AO Has the government offered any support concerning your education, and maybe jobs?
23	30:12.8 - 31:04.9	A4 No, government has nothing to do with my education, what government does is maybe the displaced persons, you know this is a camp for displaced persons, sometimes government can provide support for them by getting them food so if they can get food for them, that is all, and then they make primary health care in case someone may have a bad condition, they now take them to the primary healthcare to take care of them that is what the government are concerned about. But for the internally displaced persons to be in school, it has nothing to do about that. If you join school, you are on your own. But if you stay in the camp, staying in the camp, they can provide food for you but not that enough, but you can manage, it is manageable.
24	31:04.9 - 31:21.6	AO I have seen NGOs around coming around, what roles do they play to your security?
25	31:21.6 - 32:33.5	A4 The non-governmental organisations are trying, they are trying, because as I said, the government can provide food but they cannot provide enough. So those non-governmental organisations can add their own to make it enough for the people. SO they will make sure that the Nigerian forces are around us to support us because Boko haram are still conscious of us, they are still around us, because if they allow them this is a camp of internally displaced persons, they will attack it. So the non-governmental organisations, because governments have somehow turned the thing to be political and other things, so when things happen in Nigeria, they will now convert it to political issue after converting it to political issues, it will now turn to religious issue, so from there now, the nongovernmental organisation, can maybe do something and now say No, they do provide security for us, they are trying.
26	32:33.5 - 32:48.1	AO What else do you have to add that I have not asked?
27	32:48.1 - 33:08.0	A4 Nothing else to say.

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Appendix L: Interview Questions

1. What concerns do you have about security?
 - a. What do you understand by security?
2. What are your experiences in the Northeast?
 - a. Can you tell me about your experiences in the Northeast?
3. What are your experiences with the military and police?
 - a. Can you tell me about your experiences with the military and police?
4. How do you think security can be achieved?
 - a. What do you think can be done about security?
5. What are your current experiences?
 - a. Can you tell us about your current experiences?
6. What else do you want to add that has not been asked?