LINGUISTIC IMPOLITENESS IN THE IRAQI AND BRITISH PARLIAMENTS

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Abstract

The current research is essentially a qualitative comparison of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliamentary discourse. It is intended to enhance our understanding of impoliteness, in particular parliamentary interactions. Hence, the study aims at developing an analytical framework to account for and compare the nature of parliamentary impoliteness in these two settings. The comparison includes three dimensions of impoliteness: (1) the factors that underlie the communication/ interpretation of impoliteness in these settings; (2) the linguistic set of strategies utilised by the Iraqi and British parliamentarians to convey impoliteness in initiation turns; (3) the counter-impoliteness patterns available to politicians in the Iraqi and British parliaments.

Following a theory- and data-driven approach, this study integrates different approaches to device an analytical framework that covers cross-cultural differences in impoliteness patterns. The framework draws on Bull et al.'s (1996); Spencer-Oatey's (2000, 2005, 2008); Culpeper's (2011); Harris' (2001); Bull & Wells' (2012); Culpeper's (1996); Culpeper et al.'s (2003); and Bousfield's (2007) theory contributions to address the aspects of impoliteness under discussion.

The study employs a binary set of naturally occurring data, which comprises pre-existing video recordings of parliamentary discourse from both cultural settings. The Iraqi parliamentary corpus comprises three interrogation sessions in which governmental figures, i.e. Ministers of Defence, Trade, and the Mayor of Baghdad, are being questioned on allegations of corruption. The British corpus comprises 19 Prime Minister's Question Time sessions, henceforth PMQs, featuring David Cameron as Prime Minster and both Ed Miliband and Jeremy Corbyn as the Leader of the Opposition. The length of the analysed corpus in each setting comprises nine and a half hours.

The analysis reveals a significant influence of the institutional context on shaping the three dimensions of impoliteness under examination in these two parliamentary practices.

The analysis also shows that face is fundamental in the interpretation/communication of impoliteness in these parliamentary interactions. However, particular sociality rights also contribute to sculpting impoliteness in these parliamentary corpora, such as autonomy and imposition expectancies. Additionally, the results reflect points of similarity with respect to the use of particular impoliteness strategies in initiation turns and counter-impoliteness strategies in response turns in both parliaments. The absence of some strategies in questioning and answering turns is also noticeable in both parliaments. Moreover, the results indicate differences between the two parliaments in the frequency and delivery of strategies both in questioning and answering turns

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Abbreviations

Symbol	Representation
((1FC))	FACE SENSITIVITIES
((1PPFC))	PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE
((1PFC))	PARTY FACE
((1SOFC))	SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE
((1FC-PI))	PERSONAL FACE/Personal Insults
((2RS))	SOCIALITY RIGHTS
((2EQRS))	EQUITY RIGHTS
((2EQRS-CB))	Cost Benefit Considerations
((2EQRS-FR))	Fairness and Reciprocity
((2EQRS-AI))	Autonomy and Imposition
((2ARS))	ASSOCIATION RIGHTS
((2ARS-IV))	Involvement
((2ARS-EM))	Empathy
((2ARS-RC))	Respect
((ISs-))	Impoliteness Strategies in Initiation Turns
((ISs-PRF))	PREFACE
((ISs-DQ))	DETAILED QUESTION
((ISs-CPS))	CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION
((ISs-CIM))	CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE
((ISs-CFQ))	CONFLICTUAL QUESTION
((ISs-PFTA))	INVITATION TO PERFORM FTA
((ISs-MQA))	METALANGUAGE of Q&A
((CISs-))	Counter-Impoliteness Strategies in Response Turns
((CISs-EXP))	OFFER AN EXPLANATION

((CISs-R/DC))	REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION
((CISs-AT))	ATTACK
((CISs-AT: 1PPFC))	ATTACK PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE
((CISs-AT: 1PFC))	ATTACK PARTY FACE
((CISs-AT : 1SOFC))	ATTACK SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE
((CISs-AT : 1FC-PI))	ATTACK PERSONAL FACE
((CISs-PPF))	PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE
((CISs-PPF: 1PPFC))	PROMOTE PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE
((CISs-PPF: 1PFC))	PROMOTE PARTY FACE
((CISs-PPF : 1SOFC))	PROMOTE SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE
((CISs-PPF: OTHERS))	OTHERS
((CISs-AB))	ABROGATION
((CISs-USI))	UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS
((CISs-OPR))	OPT OUT ON RECORD
((CISs-TPR))	THIRD PARTY RECOURSE
PMQs	Prime Minister's Question Time
Lab	Labour Party
Con	Conservative Party
LD	Liberal Democrat Party
PM	Prime Minister
LO	Leader of the Opposition

Transcription Conventions

Symbol	Function
(0.5)	The number in brackets indicates a time gap in tenths of a second.
(.)	A dot enclosed in a bracket indicates a pause in the talk of less than two-tenths of a second.
=	The 'equals' sign indicates latching between utterances.
//	Two parallel lines indicate the starting point at which the current utterance is overlapped with that transcribed below.
((coughs))	A description enclosed in a double bracket indicate a non-verbal action. For example ((banging sound)).
(( ))	Double brackets may indicate the transcriber's/researcher's comments on contextual or other features.
((CAPS))	Capitalised descriptions enclosed in double brackets indicate analytical labels.
CAPS	Words in capitals indicate a section of speech uttered with relatively high volume than that surrounding it.
!	Exclamation marks indicate an animated or emphatic tone.
( )	Empty parentheses indicate a stretch of talk that is unintelligible to the analyst.
(guess)	The words enclosed in single brackets indicate the transcriber's best guess at an unclear utterance.
.	A full stop indicates a stopping fall in tone. It does not indicate the end of a sentence.
?	A question mark indicates a rising inflection. It does not necessarily indicate a question.
(XXX)	Capitalised double Xs enclosed in single brackets indicate an unknown participant.
…	Ellipses

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1   Chapter One: Preview to the Research

1.1   Introduction

The last decade has witnessed a growing interest both in theorising impoliteness and in empirically testing these approaches in various discourse types. However, research on impoliteness in political discourse in general and parliamentary one in particular is still scarce. Moreover, most impoliteness studies have been conducted in Anglo-American cultures, i.e. Western cultures. Very few studies have focused on Eastern cultures. Since impoliteness is grounded in specific social and cultural systems, a comparative study may best demonstrate the institutionally and culturally available manifestations of impoliteness. By investigating the impolite language use among parliamentarians in the Iraqi and British parliaments, I attempt to address this gap.

1.2   The Rationale and Significance of the Research

Clarifying the motivation behind the present research helps to uncover the choice of context for investigating impoliteness. The researcher's interest in institutional impoliteness stems initially from direct and indirect experiences of impoliteness incidents in a work place context, namely an Iraqi academic setting. Direct experiences here refer to the researcher's personal involvement as a participant in such incidents, while indirect experiences encompass the researcher's observations of such events as being experienced by other individuals, namely co-workers. The exposure to impoliteness fostered a sense of social obligation to understand the nature of impoliteness in institutional contexts in the hope to capture its effects on the management of social relations.

However, these experiences have not been simply work-related, i.e. not arising due to work-related power imbalance only. There has been an element of political involvement. Namely, these experiences of impoliteness were initiated by an administrative academic with a political affiliation who was exercising his political power along with the institutional

authority. Such incidents are starting to rise in various non-political institutions in modern day Iraq. In today's Iraq even non-political state institutions are politicized, in the sense that new political norms have become operative in these originally non-political institutions. Such norms include, for example, the implementation of an ethno-sectarian and partisan quota system in the appointment of the leading administrative posts in non-political state institutions such as educational ones.

Moreover, Iraqi politicians employ impoliteness to de/legitimise their ideologies in less formal political contexts through highlighting ethno-sectarian identities, which has negatively affected the general public (Al-Tahmazi, 2016). This can be seen in social media, which has become an open arena for such practices among Iraqi users who show signs of intolerance to each other's ethnic, religious, and sectarian differences. These are the reasons behind the shift of interest from investigating impoliteness in an Iraqi academic setting to a political one.

These incentives were further followed by a literature survey of Linguistic impoliteness which asserted the need to launch an examination of linguistic impoliteness in the Iraqi political contexts, particularly the parliamentary one.

To the best of the researcher's knowledge, the current research is the first to account for the nature of impoliteness in the Iraqi parliamentary discourse. Moreover, research on the expression of impoliteness in an Iraqi discourse, in general, is scarce, if any. Hence, this study stands as an early attempt to address impoliteness in the Iraqi context. And since impoliteness is highly determined by the set of socio-cultural values prevailing in a given society, a comparative study will help to clarify the institutional and cultural similarities and differences regarding the nature of impoliteness in the specific parliamentary contexts. Hence, the decision to examine and compare the nature of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments. This study is expected to contribute to knowledge in the field of linguistic impoliteness, particularly in the Iraqi context in general, and the political one, in

particular. It is also intended to redress the balance with regard to impoliteness research in non-Western contexts.

1.3 Research Questions

The current research aims to conduct a comparative analysis of the nature of linguistic impoliteness in two national parliaments, namely in the Iraqi and British parliaments. It aims to do so by exploring three aspects of impoliteness in these settings. Each research question handles a particular aspect of impoliteness, as follows:

1) What is the nature of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliamentary discourse? In other words, what are the key concepts/factors which underlie/influence the communication/expression/interpretation of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments?

2) What kind of linguistic strategies do the Iraqi and British parliamentarians employ when behaving impolitely towards each other?

3) How do the Iraqi and British politicians react to impolite utterances addressed to them? Do they respond or not? When responding, do they counter the attack or accept it?

4) Given the results of the previous research questions:

a) Are there any consistent and deep-going similarities and differences in the nature of impoliteness and how it is expressed and used in both Iraqi and UK parliamentary discourse?

b) To what extent and in what ways does impoliteness reflect institution-specific and culture specific constraints?

In the next section, I briefly introduce the theoretical and methodological frames adopted to address the research questions posed in this study.

1.4 Research Methodology

The current study adopts the position that impoliteness exists in social reality and that its nature may be best understood from multiple resources, such as participants and/or analysts. Moreover, the research utilises a retroductive reasoning approach and essentially qualitative discourse analysis, using theory and data-driven analytical categories.

Reviewing the literature on im/politeness reveals two broad trends in theorising it, namely first-order and second-order approaches to im/politeness. First-order approaches stress the need to address im/politeness as communicated and perceived by participants themselves in situ. Whereas second-order approaches examine im/politeness through the lens of an analyst, i.e. by constructing theoretical concepts. Although first-order approaches highlight significant ideas in researching impoliteness, yet it does not provide an effective, workable framework to investigate impoliteness. Moreover, first-order approaches also do not invalidate the quest to produce a predictive theory of impoliteness by investigating it on a macro-level. Additionally, reviewing the literature also reveals the need to further explore particular under-examined aspects of impoliteness both in particular discourse types and cultures. Recognising this, the current study attempts to uncover the psycho-social factors that influence the communication/interpretation of impoliteness, the linguistic strategies used to convey it, and possible responses to it in the Iraqi and British parliaments.

Following a theory- and data-driven approach, this study develops an analytical framework that combines insights from both first-order and second-order trends. To unveil why Iraqi and British politicians may regard a particular utterance as impolite, I develop a framework that utilises Bull et al.'s (1996); Spencer-Oatey's (2000, 2005, 2008), and Culpeper's (2011a) theory contributions. In order to uncover the linguistic strategies of impoliteness utilised by Iraqi and British parliamentarians, I rely on Harris' (2001) and Bull & Wells' (2012) frameworks. Finally, to detect the range of counter-impoliteness strategies in these two political settings, I develop a response framework that draws on Bull & Wells'

(2012); Culpeper's (1996); Culpeper et al.'s (2003); and Bousfield's (2007) theoretical contributions.

This study relies on naturally occurring parliamentary data to examine and compare the nature of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliamentary settings. The two text corpora are obtained from pre-existing video recordings of specific parliamentary practices, particularly recordings of Iraqi parliamentary interrogations and British PMQs. The current study analyses nine and a half hours of parliamentary interactions from each setting. The Iraqi corpus is derived from parliamentary interrogations occurring in 2009, 2011, and 2016. Whereas the British corpus comprises PMQs that occurred between January 2015-June 2016.

This study espouses an eclectic view of impoliteness that encompasses both a theory-based (impoliteness 2) and participant-based (impoliteness 1) understanding of impoliteness. However, it leans more towards investigating impoliteness through the observer's (analyst) lens, due to the contextual constraints (i.e. the limited accessibility to the participants' perspective in the context under observation).

1.5   The Structure of the Research

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one gives an overview of the research. It firstly introduces the motivation behind the investigation of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments. The chapter then presents the relevant research questions, and briefly introduces the theoretical and methodological frames adopted to conduct a comparative examination of impoliteness in the two political settings.

Chapter two reviews relevant literature on impoliteness. Considering that the evolution of impoliteness is closely related to the development in theorising politeness, the chapter starts with a critical review of politeness theories. Since the current research views the literature on politeness as being divided into two generations: first and second waves of politeness theories, the chapter briefly introduces the first and second wave theories of

politeness concentrating on particular approaches. Namely, the chapter focuses on Brown & Levinson (1987) and Spencer-Oatey's (2000, 2008) models. Then, I review the early attempts at theorising impoliteness in Pragmatics. Namely, I summarise Austin's (1987) model, then elaborate on and compare Lachenicht's (1980), and Culpeper's (1996) frameworks. The latter framework is given particular attention, as it is the most elaborate, and developed, and empirically tested one. The chapter also sheds light on relevant studies of impoliteness on parliamentary discourse in both the Iraqi and British settings to highlight the gap in the literature. Then, I introduce my definition of impoliteness in the context of the current research and explain how I understand Grice's (1975) theory of conversational implicature, as it is relevant to my analytical framework.

Chapter three explores the context of the current investigation of impoliteness, namely the Iraqi and British parliaments. Before doing so, I delve into theories of political science to define parliament as a communicative context hosting the phenomenon at issue. I present the Iraqi setting by giving a concise account of the origins of the Iraqi parliament; then I provide a detailed explanation of the structure and functions of the current Iraqi parliament. The functional account stresses the relevant parliamentary practices implemented to scrutinise the government. Next, I introduce the British setting in a similar fashion. In view of the fact that impoliteness is part of parliamentarians' language, I also describe the rhetorical possibilities that are available for both the relevant Iraqi and British parliamentarians. Due to its significance in shaping parliamentarians' choice of linguistic resources, I account for a possible distribution of political power in the context of the parliamentary practices being examined in this study, namely Iraqi parliamentary interrogations and The British Prime Minister's Question Time.

Chapter four is the methodology chapter. It involves a detailed explanation of the theoretical and methodological frameworks adopted in the current research. The chapter begins with an outline of its structure followed by a reiteration of the research questions.

Then, I present in detail the methodological framework for the current research. The presentation is preceded with a clarification of the philosophical position and the logic of inquiry embraced in this thesis and how they have guided data collection methods and techniques of analysis in this research. Then, I explain the data selection criteria. Next, I report in detail how the current Iraqi and British corpora were collected, along with the challenges emerging in the course of data collection. I also briefly introduce the transcription system and the translation approach employed in the representation of the current binary corpora, and how frequencies were calculated. The following section provide a detailed description of the analytical procedures employed in the present research. Next, I introduce and exemplify the theoretical categories used in the analysis, clarifying how they were initially derived from theory and then adapted in response to the data. Although this research is essentially qualitative, particular quantitative methods are utilised to process the data.

Chapter five introduces the results and findings relevant to the aspects of impoliteness which are examined in the Iraqi and the British corpora. These findings are presented both in terms of word percentages and number of occurrences. The chapter includes three main sections. The first section, viz. 5.2, focuses on the findings relevant to impoliteness types in the Iraqi and British corpora. In the second section, I discuss the findings relating to the linguistic strategies employed by the relevant Iraqi and British parliamentarians. The third main section, viz. 5.4, expounds the findings relevant to the counter-impoliteness strategies detected in the current Iraqi and British corpora. Then, I provide a comparison of the relevant findings from the three-fold analysis of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments.

In Chapter six, I discuss and compare the findings relevant to the three dimensions of impoliteness being explored in the Iraqi and British parliamentary discourse.

Chapter seven presents the main conclusions arrived at with regard to the main types of impoliteness identified in the data, the linguistic strategies used to convey impoliteness,

and the counter impoliteness strategies employed in the Iraqi and the British parliaments. In this chapter, I also explain the limitations of the current study and propose areas for further research.

2 Chapter Two: Key Approaches to Im/politeness

2.1 Chapter Outline

This chapter reviews the literature on linguistic impoliteness. However, since impoliteness is parasitic on politeness (Culpeper, 1996:355), i.e. models and approaches designed to account for impoliteness are derived from models and approaches originally designated for politeness, one inevitably has to refer back to relevant politeness models. Hence, the researcher starts the chapter with a critical review of closely connected politeness theories which constitute the basis of the relevant theoretical approaches to impoliteness. In so doing, the current research follows Culpeper's (2011b) chronological and/or epistemological categorization of politeness theories into first and second wave approaches. Accordingly, I will first introduce the first wave approaches to politeness concentrating on Brown & Levinson's (1987) politeness theory. Next, I present the second wave theories of politeness focusing on Spencer-Oatey's (2000b, 2008) rapport management model. Then, I account for, through relevant literature, the need to theorise impoliteness. Next, the chapter focuses on the birth and the evolution of impoliteness theories. Namely, I review the first generation of impoliteness theories including Lachenicht's (1980), Austin 's (1987), and Culpeper 's (1996) frames, and their relevant later revisions, if any. Then, I review the relevant studies of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliamentary discourse. Next, I define my understanding of impoliteness in the context of parliamentary discourse. Later I introduce my understanding of Grice's (1975) conversational implicature. The chapter concludes with a summary.

2.2 First Wave Theories of Politeness

The first wave of politeness theories are usually known as the classic theories of politeness. In these theories, as claimed in Watts (2003; 2005: xx) and Watts et al. (2005:3), politeness is approached in a scientific manner, i.e. these frames construct abstract, theoretical concepts which are claimed to be abstractions of reality.

These pragmatic models of politeness (Watts, 2003; 2005:xxxv) utilise the classic pragmatic theories including the Speech Act Theory, namely Austin's (1962) and Searle's (1969) frames , Grice's (1975) Conversational Implicature, and Goffman's (1967) influential notion of face borrowed from Sociology.

The classical models view politeness as a set of pragmatic strategies or maxims that participants employ to maintain social harmony, which is, according to these theories, the essence of politeness (Culpeper, 2011b:395). Such theories have investigated politeness in terms of speakers' production (Watts, 2005:xv), consequently focusing on politeness at the utterance level (Kadar & Haugh, 2013:28). In terms of data collection, studies adopting the pragmatic view of politeness have employed either naturally occurring data or, more often, elicited data such as discourse completion tasks, questionnaires/surveys and interviews (Kadar & Haugh, 2013:29-30).

Classical politeness theories include maxim-based approaches to politeness, such as Lakoff 's (1973), Leech's (1983) models of politeness, and face-management models of politeness such as Brown & Levinson 's (1987) model. Watts (2003) refers to such theories as second order politeness models (politeness 2) as these approaches ignore participants' understanding of politeness and instead rely on analysts' interpretation of abstract concepts and frameworks claimed to approximate participants' understanding of politeness.

2.2.1   Brown and Levinson's (1987) Politeness Model

Brown & Levinson's (1987) politeness theory is considered the most influential among the early politeness theories, viz. the first generation of politeness theories. It gained, and still has, an unparalleled status in different branches of knowledge such as linguistics, psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Indeed, Brown & Levinson's (1987) model is usually considered as the defining work on linguistic politeness (Kadar & Haugh, 2013:16). In this section, I will limit myself to present a basic critical account of Brown & Levinson's

(1987) theory, covering its core concepts, and alluding to the main criticism which the theory received.

Brown & Levinson (1987) rest their politeness theory upon certain concepts and arguments. Their theory constructs the existence of a Model Person whom they define as "a wilful fluent speaker of a natural language, further endowed with rationality and face" (Brown & Levinson, 1987:58). The theory assumes that all Model Persons are rational agents in the sense of being beings who choose means that will accomplish their ends. Additionally, Brown & Levinson (1987) argue that all Model Persons possess a face. The concept of face is a basic pillar in Brown & Levinson's (1987) politeness theory. In this respect, they adopt Goffman (1967:5) notion of face which reads:

> the term face may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self-delineated in terms of approved social attributes- albeit an image that others may share, as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing of himself.

Brown & Levinson's (1987) conceptualisation of face also encompasses the English folk term *save/lose face* that associates face with notions of embarrassment and humiliation, i.e. face can be damaged, maintained, or enhanced. In constructing their theory of social interaction, Brown & Levinson (1987) have based their study on languages/cultures from the southern hemisphere. It is despite this, their conceptual apparatus better fits Western cultures. This may imply imposing the social values of those specific cultures onto other cultures which may conceptualise face differently such as the Japanese culture.

Brown & Levinson (1987:61) define face as "the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself". More significant is the fact that Brown and Levinson (1978) view face as having two dimensions: positive and negative face. These two aspects can be explained as follows bellow:

1) Positive face refers to those components of face that rather stress an individual's want to be accepted or approved of by others.

2) Negative face refers to those elements of face which indicate and/or imply an individual's desire of self-governance, independence, freedom from external influence or control.

Brown & Levinson (1987:61) also assume that it is in the best interest of all participants in an interaction to enhance each other's face. In other words, they assume that individuals cooperate and assume the cooperation of others to maintain face in an exchange. This cooperation results from the mutual vulnerability of face, i.e. an individual's face-maintenance is dependent on enhancing the face of all participants in that interaction. Moreover, Brown & Levinson's (1987) theory assume the universality of the face aspects, an argument that received a lot of criticism in the literature.

Another pillar of Brown & Levinson's (1987) politeness model is the notion of "face threatening acts". The theory is built on the linguistic unit of a speech act which they define as " what is intended to be done by a verbal or non-verbal communication, just as one or more 'speech acts' can be assigned to an utterance." (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 65). So, for example in uttering the words "I'm sorry, I forgot your birthday", a speaker performs an apology and in saying "Hey, I really like your tie!", he/she performs a compliment.

Many speech acts, Brown & Levinson (1987) argue, are intrinsically face-threatening. The theory introduces a neat classification of face threatening acts on the basis of (1) which face is being threatened, positive or negative face; (2) and whether the threat is addressed to the speaker or hearer. A request, for instance, threatens the hearer's desire not to be imposed on (negative face), while performing a refusal threatens a speaker's sense of acceptance and appreciation (positive face).

According to Brown & Levinson (1987), the seriousness of the face-threatening acts (inherent in the act) is influenced by three situational factors: the social distance between speaker and hearer, the relative power of the speaker compared to the hearer, and the intrinsic degree of imposition in an act. Thus, performing a criticism would be more face threatening if it was directed to a superior rather than a peer, or a stranger rather than a friend. Weighing these factors together would help to figure out the amount of face threat in a given speech act which in turn determines speakers' choice of five super-strategies presented in the theory. Each super-strategy is associated with an amount of politeness towards the others face. Brown & Levinson's (1987:68-70) five super-strategies include:

1. **Bald on record politeness**. Employing this super-strategy involves the performance of the face-threatening act " […] in the most direct, clear, unambiguous and concise way possible" (Brown & Levinson ,1987: 69). According to Brown & Levinson (1987), such an utterance is performed in accordance with the specifications of Grice's (1975) conversational maxims. The theory specifies the situations in which such a strategy is employed. For example, when the threat to face is very small as in offers such as "come in" and " do sit down" ; when the threat to face is temporarily deactivated as in an emergency situation; and when the speaker is much more powerful than the hearer as in " do your bed" said by a mother to a child.

2. **Positive politeness**. Utilizing this super-strategy implies performing the face threatening act with the assistance of redressive or mitigating strategies which address the hearer's sense of acceptability and appreciation from others. Such an orientation aims to counteract the potential threat inherent in acts. Brown & Levinson (1987) suggest three broad techniques that encompass positive politeness strategies: " Claim common ground", "Convey that the speaker and the hearer are co-operators'', and "Fulfil hearer's want for some x" (Brown &Levinson ,1987:102)(For

a detailed demonstration of the linguistic output strategies associated with this strategy see Brown & Levinson (1987:101-129)).

3. **Negative politeness**. In this super-strategy the face threatening act is performed with additions, modifications which stress the hearer's desire for freedom from imposition, and territory in an attempt to undermine the potential threat innate in the act. Five broad techniques are proposed to incorporate negative politeness strategies: "Be indirect", "Do not presume/assume", "Do not coerce hearer", "Communicate speaker's want to not impinge on hearer", and "Redress other wants of hearer" (Brown & Levinson ,1987: 131) (For a detailed demonstration of the linguistic output strategies see associated with negative politeness see Brown & Levinson (1987:129-211)).

4. **Off record politeness.** The face threatening act is performed using an indirect illocutionary act. In other words, there is more than a single definite illocutionary force applicable to the utterance in question. Hence, no single obvious communicative intention may be attributed to the utterance in question. Consequently, the utterer cannot be held responsible of a particular communicative intention including the face threatening interpretation. Two broad techniques are recognised here, namely "Invite conversational implicature", and "Be vague or ambiguous: violate the manner maxim" (Brown & Levinson ,1987:214) (For an elaborate view of the linguistic output strategies for this strategy see Brown & Levinson (1987:211-227)).

5. **Don't do the face-threatening act**. The speaker abandons performing the act due to a judgement that weighs the want to maintain hearer's face as greater than the want to communicate the content of the face threatening act.

The above simplified description of the theory does not cover all the detailed aspects of this particular face-based politeness theory. Moreover, Brown & Levinson (1987)

introduce extensive details regarding the types of the illocutionary acts which they categorise as face-threatening; the classification of these face-threatening acts into sub-groups according to whether they threaten the speaker's or hearer's positive and/or negative face; as well as a more encompassing view of the redressive strategies that can be employed within each of the above mentioned super-strategies. The present researcher's commitment to such a limited presentation of Brown and Levinson's (1987) model is due to relevance and necessity.

In this respect, I do agree with Bousfield (2008:67) that despite the criticism which Brown & Levinson's (1987) face-based model has received, it still has the potential to be "a predictive theory of im/politeness", if necessary corrections and clarifications are provided. Among such insightful modifications is Bousfield's (2008:60-67) corrections regarding Brown & Levinson's (1987) the "bald, on record" superstrategy and the viability of the positive and negative politeness dichotomy. Bousfield (2008) further applies his corrections to a model of impoliteness that is inspired by Brown & Levinson's (1987) model, namely Culpeper's (1996) framework of impoliteness and its later revisions , as we will see in 2.5.2.

Despite introducing a detailed theory of human interaction, Brown & Levinson's (1987) theory, along with the rest of the traditional politeness theories, were criticised. Some of the major criticisms include:

1) Failing to represent the layperson's conception of politeness, and instead constructing scientific concepts such as face and claiming that they represent lay people's understanding of politeness.

2) Their claim that these explicatory concepts, for example the concept of "face", are universal across diverse cultures.

3) Relying on pragmatic models, such as Speech Act theory and Grice's Cooperative Principle, which heavily stress a speaker's perspective and language production, i.e. ignoring the addressee's perception of politeness.

4) Failing to capture context adequately, despite its importance in the analysis of politeness.

5) Failing to account for non-cooperative, confrontational, and challenging discourse types, i.e. failing to conceptualise impoliteness.

Further elaborate criticism of the traditional theories of politeness can be found in Eelen (2001). Following this brief introduction to Brown & Levinson's (1987) framework, the researcher turns to introduce the second generation of politeness theories below.

2.3   Second Wave Theories of Politeness

Second wave theories of politeness are regarded as first order models of politeness as these theories claim their reliance on lay people's understanding of politeness (Watts et al., 2005:3), hence Eelen's (2001) term politeness1. Second wave politeness theories reflect a socio-cultural view of politeness as these emphasize the social context. Their focus on social context, states Culpeper (2011b), can be manifested in embracing either social norms or participants' interpretations of politeness in relevant situations.

These approaches have further claimed that politeness is judgmental in essence, and that there are multiple understandings of politeness not a single unified interpretation of it (Eelen, 2001; Mills, 2003; Locher, 2004; Locher & Watts, 2005). Second wave theories examine politeness as being co-constructed in immediate local interactions by participants. Methodologically, these theories have shown preference for certain types of data such as computer-mediated communication and institutional discourse alongside naturally occurring face-to-face interactions (Kadar & Haugh, 2013:54).

Within these second wave approaches, Culpeper (2011b) identifies three main directions, namely the discursive approach, for example Watts' (2003), Mills' (2003), Locher's (2004) approaches , the relational approach, for example Spencer-Oatey's (2002, 2008) rapport management model, and a frame-based model like Terkourafi's (2001) frame. Despite having some differences, these frames "all have in common a central focus on

interpersonal relations, rather than, as with traditional models of politeness, a central focus on the individual performing "politeness" (Culpeper et al., 2010:599).

However, Spencer-Oatey (2002, 2000a, 2005b , 2007, 2008) and Spencer-Oatey & Jiang (2003) rapport management framework is "more detailed" and " developed so that it could account for data pertaining to a variety of cultures" (Culpeper et al., 2010: 599). In the next section, I turn to review this particular version of relational approach to politeness as it is relevant to the current investigation.

2.3.1   Spencer-Oatey's (2008) Rapport Management Model

Spencer-Oatey's (2008a) rapport management theory proceeds from her interest in the interactional function of language. Her model is designed to address the maintenance of interpersonal relations among language users. In other words, Spencer-Oatey's (2008a) model concerns itself with how individuals use language to construct, maintain or attack harmonious social relations (Spencer-Oatey, 2008b:13).

In Linguistics, the management of interpersonal relations is tackled within the politeness theory, hence the relevance of Spencer-Oatey's (2008a) rapport management to this research. Culpeper (2011a) and Culpeper & Haugh (2014:219) position Spencer-Oatey's (2008) model among second wave theories of im/politeness as it stresses interpersonal relations. Nevertheless, her model is a modified face-based approach as it arose as a criticism to Brown & Levinson's (1987) politeness theory.

Spencer-Oatey (2008a) embraces a cross-cultural perspective in criticising Brown & Levinson's (1987) politeness theory. In particular, Spencer-Oatey (2000, 2002) invokes Japanese and Chinese cultures view of face presented by linguists such as (Matsumoto, 1988; Ide, 1989; Gu, 1990; Mao, 1994). Such criticism centres around the conceptualisation of face in Brown & Levinson (1987). For example, Matsumoto (1988:405) argues that the notion of individual freedom and autonomy is overemphasized while the interpersonal/social dimension on positive face is neglected in Brown & Levinson (1987). In other words, Brown

& Levinson (1987) neglect that an individual's desire of approval, viz. positive face, includes both positive evaluation of personal qualities and social identity, and that notions of individual freedom and autonomy, viz. negative face, may not be perceived as face concerns at all . In line with Matsumoto (1988), Gu (1998) indicates that autonomy and imposition, viz. Brown & Levinson's (1987) negative face, are not perceived as face sensitivities in Eastern cultures.

To remedy the issue of ignoring the interpersonal dimension in Brown & Levinson's (1987) positive face, Spencer-Oatey (2007) advocates an interdisciplinary approach for a deeper understanding of face. Spencer-Oatey (2007) turns to theories of social psychology for a diversified comprehension of face, namely Brewer & Gardner's (1996) views on levels of collective identity and Simon's (2004) Self-Respect Model of Identity.

Simon's (2004) model depicts one's self-concept/identity as being composed of a series of self-aspects or attributes (Simon, 2004:45). Building on Linville (1985), Simon (2004:45) understands a self-aspect as "a cognitive category or concept that serves to process and organize information and knowledge about oneself''.

According to Simon (2004:45), self-aspects can refer to, inter alia, to physiological features or traits (e.g. nervous), physical features (e.g. short), roles (e.g. grandmother), abilities (e.g. excellent dancer), tastes (e.g. preference for Chinese and hot beverage), attitudes (e.g. against believing in God), behaviour (e.g. I walk fast), language affiliation (e.g. Arabic, Turkman, English), group membership (e.g. member of the Conservative party). Moreover, certain attributes have the potential to be oriented within a particular type of face rather than the other, e.g. a person's sex, ethnicity, religion have more 'collective potential' than others (Spencer-Oatey, 2007:641).

Moreover, Simon (2004) argues that the salience of a particular self-aspect in an immediate situational context is what determines which type of self is activated. For example, a collective identity is constructed whenever self-interpretation is built primarily

on a single self-aspect that one shares with other people in the relevant social context. Inter-individual differences on other self-aspects becomes irrelevant and move to the psychological background. Consequently, similarity with other people sharing the same self-aspect moves into the psychological foreground activating the collective identity (Simon, 2004:49).

While Brewer & Gardner (1996) propose a further extension to the widely known levels of self-concept in social psychology which identify only two dimensions of self: individuated/personal self and the social/relational self. Personal self refers to "those aspects of the self-concept that differentiate the self from all others" (Brewer & Gardner, 1996:83) , whereas social self signifies "those aspects of the self-concept that reflect assimilation to others or significant social groups" (Brewer & Gardner, 1996:83).

A further differentiation of social self is introduced by Brewer & Gardner (1996) who distinguish between relational and collective selves/identities. Relational self reflects those aspects of self-concept that arise from "interpersonal relationships and interdependence with specific others" (Brewer & Gardner, 1996:83) whereas collective self indicates those self-characteristics that originate from "membership in larger, impersonal social groups" (Brewer & Gardner, 1996:83).

It is argued that the difference between relational and collective self lies in that the type of the social connectedness , namely for the former it is a personalized attachment while for the latter the social relation is established through "a common identification with some symbolic group or social category"(Brewer & Gardner, 1996:83). These three types of self, viz. personal, relational, and collective, coexist within an individual, and the shift from one self into another is activated in different context (Brewer & Gardner, 1996: 86).

Building on Simon (2004) and Brewer & Gardner (1996), Spencer-Oatey (2007) adopts a view of face as consisting of a varying number of attributes. Certain attributes are activated in certain contexts giving rise to either personal, collective, or relational face.

Consequently, Spencer-Oatey (2008a) proposes that face management includes the management of its components: personal/collective/relational. She defines face as "the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself [sic] by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact" (Goffman, 1972:5).

To address the issue of Brown & Levinson's (1987) mis-representation of individual's freedom of action and imposition as face concerns, Spencer-Oatey (2008a) adopts the view that autonomy and imposition are not face concerns. She re-introduces these as components of as Socio-pragmatic Interactional Principle (henceforth SIPs), namely as "A rights and obligations SIP" (Spencer-Oatey & Jiang, 2003:1645).

Then to empirically validate these proposals concerning face sensitivities and sociality rights and/or any other relevant factor that may influence language use, Spencer-Oatey & Jiang (2003) propose to abandon Leech's (1983) notion of politeness maxims due to the criticism raised in Brown & Levinson (1987), Fraser (1990), Thomas (1995), and Spencer-Oatey (2000). Alternatively, Spencer-Oatey & Jiang (2003:1635) propose their notion of Socio-pragmatic Interactional Principles SIPs which is defined as:

> socioculturally-based principles, scalar in nature, that guide or influence people's productive and interpretive use of language. The principles are typically value-linked, so that in a given culture and/or situational context, there are norms or preferences regarding the implementation of the principles, and any failure to implement the principles as expected may result in mild to strong evaluative judgements. Preferences for different points on the scale will develop through the socialization process and through exposure to (and involvement in) natural interactions, and these preferences will frequently vary from context to context and from culture to culture.

This means that, as argued in Spencer-Oatey (2000), with politeness maxims it is always one end of a maxim that is favoured than the other. Whereas with Spencer-Oatey & Jiang 's (2003) notion of SIPs, different points on the continuum could be favoured. It is argued that this scalar nature of SIPs accords with "the notion of dimensions of cultural differences suggested by House (2000) and with the cultural values proposed by Wierzbicka

(1985)" (Spencer-Oatey & Jiang, 2003:1635). Then by replicating Kim's (1994) study, Spencer-Oatey & Jiang (2003) introduce three fundamental SIPs that proved to be significant in their study. These three SIPs include: "A face SIP", "A rights and obligations SIP", and "A task SIP" (Spencer-Oatey & Jiang, 2003:1645).

Though in Spencer-Oatey & Jiang (2003) and in the latest publications, such as Spencer-Oatey (2005, 2008a), this category, viz. sociality rights and obligations, is termed as Interactional Principles, here I will refer to it simply as "sociality rights". Similarly, for the task SIP, I will use the terminology adopted in Spencer-Oatey (2008a), namely "interactional goals".

Bearing in mind such arguments, Spencer-Oatey (2008a) proposes a modified framework that adjusts the criticism directed at Brown & Levinson's (1987). According to Spencer-Oatey (2008a:13), rapport management, the management of harmony-disharmony among individuals, entails the management of three components: the management of face, the management of sociality rights and obligations, and the management of interactional goals.

The management of face entails the management of face sensitivities. Face relates to "personal/collective/relational value, and it is concerned with people's sense of worth, dignity, honour, reputation, competence, etc." (Spencer-Oatey, 2008a:13). Personal face is that aspect of Spencer-Oatey (2007, 2008:14) conceptualisation of face which relates to an individual's awareness of his/her value in terms of personal traits he/she possess. Consequently, an individual's desire that his/her personal traits such as competence, abilities, appearance are accepted, evaluated positively by others.

While collective face, according to Spencer-Oatey (2007, 2008:14), refers to an individual's awareness of his/her worth as a member of a social group and his/her desire that others would admit and preserve his/her social role or identity such group leader, valued customer, close friend. It is more relevant to an individual's awareness of public worth.

Finally, relational face is associated with an individual's want from others to value his interpersonal attachment with significant others.

This multi-layered view of face is instrumental in institutional settings, such as parliaments, where an individual has various roles. Hence, Spencer-Oatey's (2008) model has the potential to be applied in an investigation of im/politeness in a political setting.

Spencer-Oatey (2008a:13-14) perceives the management of sociality rights as the maintenance of social expectancies which she defines as the

> fundamental social *entitlements* [Spencer-Oatey's emphasis] that individual's effectively claim
> for him/herself in his/her interactions with others…social rights and obligations, on the other
> hand, are concerned with social expectancies, and reflects people's concerns over fairness,
> consideration and behavioural appropriateness.

Spencer-Oatey (2005:99) recognizes two types of sociality rights, equity rights and association rights. According to Spencer-Oatey (2008a:16), equity rights stems from an individual's fundamental belief that he/she has the right to be treated in a fair and considerate manner from others in the sense that he/she is not excessively being forced to behave in a specific way, immoderately ill-used, unjustly dominated by others.

Spencer-Oatey (2005:100) introduces three components relevant to the comprehension of equity rights management, namely cost-benefit considerations, fairness and reciprocity (Spencer-Oatey,2005:100), and autonomy-imposition (Spencer-Oatey, 2008a:16). Spencer-Oatey (2005;100) defines the three components of equity rights as

> cost-benefit considerations (the principle that people should not be exploited or disadvantaged),
> fairness and reciprocity (the belief that costs and benefits should be "fair" and kept roughly in
> balance), and autonomy-control (the belief that people should not be unduly controlled or
> imposed upon).

As for association rights, Spencer-Oatey (2008a:16) writes that association expectancies involve an individuals' basic belief that they are qualified to an engagement with others which accords with the type of the relationship they have together. Spencer-

Oatey (2005:100) recognises three constituents for association rights, namely involvement, empathy, and respect. In her account of these components, Spencer-Oatey (2005:100) writes "involvement (the principle that people should have appropriate amounts and types of "activity" involvement with others), empathy (the belief that people should share appropriate concerns, feelings and interests with others), and respect (the belief that people should show appropriate amounts of respectfulness for others)".

As for the management of interactional goals, Spencer-Oatey (2008a:17) reports that participants in an interaction, usually have specific goals when engaging in an interaction with others. These goals may be relational or transactional. Such aims influence participants' perceptions of rapport as failing to realise them can cause annoyance and frustration. However, the introduction of this detailed theoretical framework needs verification through empirical studies in various communicative interactions as stressed by Spencer-Oatey & Jiang (2003).

Spencer-Oatey's (2005, 2007, 2008a) Rapport Management Model is illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 2.1 Spencer-Oatey (2005, 2008) Rapport Management Components

(1) Face Management
- Personal face
- Relational face
- Collective face

(2) Sociality Rights Management
- Equity Rights
  - Cost-benefit considerations
  - Fairness & reciprocity
  - Autonomy-imposition
- Association Rights
  - Involvement
  - Empathy
  - Respect

(3) Interactional Goals Management
- Relational goals
- Transactional goals

In conclusion, Spencer-Oatey's (2008) framework seems promising as it manages to offer theoretical adjustments to some of the criticism pointed at Brown & Levinson 's (1987) model of impoliteness such as introducing autonomy and imposition as face concerns. Moreover, Spencer-Oatey's (2008) model introduces different levels of self-interpretation which may be applicable to political contexts, consequently parliamentary settings. Furthermore, the introduction of sociality rights and obligations is of significant value as it brings social expectancies into the light. In addition, Spencer-Oatey's (2008) framework has been developed empirically be applicable to cross-cultural comparisons which is also relevant to the context of the current thesis.

Despite the fact that second wave theories have highlighted significant issues and ideas into the research on im/politeness, it failed to introduce an alternative framework which enables researchers to investigate impoliteness on a macro level. This results from discursive approach's heavily reliance on participants' idiosyncratic understandings of im/politeness. Moreover, accepting the various proposals of the second wave approaches to im/politeness does not refute the attempt to explore the possibility of building a predictive theory of im/politeness (Kádár, 2017).

In the next section, I report on the early attempts to account for impoliteness in various discourse types which necessitated theorising impoliteness.

2.4   Why Theorise Impoliteness?

The publication of Brown & Levinson 's (1987) politeness theory have generated a huge bulk of politeness-related studies. Though numerous researchers from various branches of knowledge such as linguistic pragmatics, sociology, psychology, have adopted their propositions, Brown & Levinson 's (1987) model have received relatively equivalent amount of criticism. A line of criticism has focused on Brown & Levinson 's (1987) negligence of the fact that communication does not only include harmonious patterns. Instead individuals encounter situations/contexts where they act in a competitive, challenging, or even verbally

aggressive manner. Hence, such a model have been considered inefficient in terms of theorizing impoliteness within its structure.

Among these critical views, for example , is Tracy (1990) who argues that face work studies have virtually failed to account for specific situations where people may want to be seen as intimidating, competitive, needy, competent or dependent. In other words, Tracy (1990:215) justifiably has emphasized the need to include a greater range of identity claims. Likewise, Craig et al. (1986) indicate that a decent account of the dynamics of interpersonal communication should take into account aggressive as well as cooperative communication. As well as, Eelen (2001) who acknowledges that approaches to politeness are conceptually biased.

As a result, many researchers have attempted to extend the politeness theory to other types of discourse in which conflict is an intrinsic element. For instance, Lakoff (1989) have extended her politeness theory to include therapeutic and courtroom discourse. Liu (1986), for example, has explored impoliteness as an extension of Brown & Levinson's (1978) theory while investigating politeness in a Chinese novel . Along the same line of research, Harris (2001) conducts a study to extend Brown & Levinson 's (1987) politeness rules to political discourse, namely Prime Minister's Question Time, henceforth PMQs.

Even though the above mentioned studies have included the investigation of non-harmonious, confrontational communicative behaviour within the framework of politeness theory, none of these studies attempted to theorise impoliteness exclusively to enhance our understanding of the phenomena.

However, the extension of Brown & Levinson's (1978) politeness model to contexts in which identity concerns include components such as the need to compete, challenge, attack or threaten face proved to be insufficient to clarify and explicate, and capture the nature of such a diverse phenomenon as impoliteness, as indicated in (Bousfield, 2008:62). Thus the need to theorize impoliteness became more indispensable when we take into

consideration, as argued later on in Culpeper et al.(2003), that the conceptualization of impoliteness within Brown & Levinson's (1978) bald on record superstrategy fails to capture the complexity of impoliteness.

2.5   Early Models of Impoliteness

To the best of my knowledge, three studies stand as the early attempts to construct a theoretical understanding of impoliteness. These works include Lachenicht (1980), Austin (1987), and Culpeper (1996). All the three studies have in common the fact that their theoretical frameworks are derived from Brown & Levinson's (1978) politeness model.

Since the aim of the present chapter is to explore the evolution of impoliteness frameworks, these early impoliteness models must be reviewed. In this section, I will briefly review Austin's (1987) work. In the next sections, I will elaborate on Lachenicht (1980), and Culpeper (1996) since their framework seems more detailed and elaborate than Austin's (1987).

On the assumption that a model of face work should account for the non-cooperative patterns in communication, as well as the cooperatives ones, Austin (1987) extends Brown & Levinson's (1978) model with her face attack model. Most of the assumptions in her study are the same ones adopted in Brown & Levinson's (1978) model. However, Austin (1987) has introduced the FAAs meaning the Face Attack Acts. According to Austin (1987:14), FAAs refer to face threatening acts which are perceived as intentionally face attacking by the hearer, whereas face threatening acts are constructed as unintentional/unavoidable by hearers. In her Face Attack Model, Austin (1987:29-30) has suggested five main strategies:

1) On record without redress to positive face

2) On record without redress to hearers' negative face

3) On record with inappropriate redress to positive face

4) On record with inappropriate redress to negative face

5) Off record

For each one of these main strategies, Austin (1987:24-25) has proposed various substrategies. As Culpeper et al. (2003) remark, Austin (1987) ignores the role of the speaker. Moreover, Austin's (1987) model provides manufactured, not real life, data that was derived partly from her personal experience and observation, and some from the works of others. In addition to the flaws that her theory inherited from Brown & Levinson's (1978) model, her interpretations concerning impoliteness are untested, and the model itself was not revised nor developed. Hence, it does not stand as a strong rival to either Lachenicht's (1980) or Culpeper's (1996) frames.

2.5.1 Lachenicht's (1980) Model of Impoliteness

Indeed, Lachenicht's (1980), work is the first attempt to theorise impoliteness yet it is poorly known and cited in the literature on impoliteness. Unlike Austin (1987) and Culpeper (1996), Lachenicht (1980) uses the terms *aggravating, abusive, insulting, invective,* language, and, *rudeness* to denote the phenomenon under investigation here. Besides, Lachenicht (1980) employs these terms interchangeably without assigning a technical sense to any of them. Nevertheless, Lachenicht (1980:613) recognizes the existences of various types of aggravating language, at least, based on whether they are intentional or unintentional , and whether they are intended to hurt or amuse. Accordingly, Lachenicht (1980:613) restricts the scope of his study to investigating the type of aggravating language which is performed intentionally to hurt others, namely "deliberate rudeness" to use Lachenicht's (1980) words.

Lachenicht (1980) has emphasized and demonstrated the various social functions of aggravating language in human life, refuting others' description of aggravating language as an "impoverished system" and rejecting the feasibility of investigating this sort of language.

By adopting the same theoretical assumptions embraced by Brown & Levinson (1978), Lachenicht (1980) builds a theoretical structure to account for aggravating language as an extension to Brown & Levinson 's (1987) politeness model. According to Lachenicht (1980:616), aggravating language is a verbal output performed to hurt or damage the

addressee. Lachenicht (1980:619) reformulates four main aggravation strategies to perform face threatening acts, as indicated in table 2.1below, in order of degree of threat:

Table 2.1 Lachenicht's (1980:619) Aggravation Superstrategies

Lachenicht's (1980) Aggravation Superstrategies
i. **Off record**: ambiguous insults, insinuations, hints, and irony. This strategy is much of the same kind as the politeness strategy, and is designed to enable the insulter to meet an aggrieved challenge from the injured person with an assertion of innocence. ii. **Bald on record**: directly produced face threatening acts and impositions ('Shut the door', 'Do your work', 'Don't talk, etc.) of the same kind as in the politeness strategy. iii. **Positive aggravation**: an aggravation strategy that is designed to the show the addressee that he is not approved of, is not esteemed, does not belong, and will not receive cooperation. iv. **Negative aggravation**: An aggravation strategy that is designed to impose on the addressee, to interfere with his freedom of action, and to attack his social position and the basis of his social action.

As noted by Bousfield (2008:84), Lachenicht's (1980) first two strategies are not genuine constructs, instead these are taken from Brown & Levinson 's (1987) strategies as stated by Lachenicht (1980:619) himself. For this reason, Lachenicht (1980) has not elaborated on these two superstrategies with the similar depth and detail devoted to positive and negative aggravation superstrategies. Apparently, Lachenicht's (1980) positive and negative aggravation are distinguished from Brown & Levinson's (1987) positive and negative politeness in terms of orientation to face wants.

According to Lachenicht (1980:634-635), positive aggravation revolves around employing strategies that emphasize a contrast of face wants among participants. For Lachenicht (1980:634) positive aggravation can be achieved through two main strategies, namely "Deny common ground" and "Convey that H and S are not cooperators" (Lachenicht,1980:634) (For a detailed description of Lachenicht's (1980) positive aggravation substrategies and their linguistic realisations, see Lachenicht (1980:634-658).

As for negative aggravation, Lachenicht (1980:657) relates it to strategies that aim to impose on the addressee's freedom. Lachenicht (1980:658) proposes three main strategies to attack the negative face of an interactant, namely "Be indirect", "Communicate ability and want to coerce H", and "Coerce and impinge on H" (Lachenicht,1980:658)(For a detailed description of Lachenicht's (1980) negative aggravation substrategies and their linguistic realisations see Lachenicht (1980:658-679).

Lachenicht (1980) introduced an extensive account of communicative strategies that have the potential to aggravate face. And he also proposed that negative and positive impoliteness strategies coexist (Lachenicht, 1980:633). As noted by Bousfield (2008:84) as well, the latter merit is exclusive to Lachenicht's (1980) model when compared to, for instance, Culpeper's (1996)and even Brown & Levinson's (1987:17-20) who neglected the intermingling between positive and negative strategies.

Despite its strength, Lachenicht's (1980) model still has certain flaws. These weaknesses include: failing to recognize that the lack of politeness work when there's an expectation to do so can be a source of aggravation, an inconsistency in introducing certain basic concepts, and relying on constructed, written examples from dictionaries of insult and literary works (For an elaboration of these flaws see Bousfield (2008:89-90).

2.5.2   Culpeper's (1996, 2005, 2011a; Culpeper et al., 2003) Model of Impoliteness

Culpeper's (1996) article "Towards an Anatomy of Impoliteness" may be considered as the most influential as many studies have adopted, critiqued, modified his model in their investigations of impoliteness, in addition to the author's development of the original model.

Again both the demand and appeal to explore confrontational, non-cooperative interactions prepared the grounds for Culpeper (1996) to structure a framework that is parallel, yet opposite in its orientation towards face to, Brown & Levinson's (1987) politeness model. Culpeper (1996:350) defines impoliteness as the employment of various strategies that attack other individuals' face wants, positive and/or negative, and cause social disruption and disharmony. This conception of impoliteness is quite similar to Lachenicht (1980).

Though Culpeper (1996) draws on Brown & Levinson's (1987) politeness model and uses some of its assumptions and notions such as positive and negative face, he does not adopt all the set of assumptions claimed in the latter model, unlike Lachenicht (1980) and Austin (1987). Among these assumptions is the issue of whether impoliteness is inherent in speech acts or not. Culpeper (1996) maintains that im/politeness cannot be divorced from context, and that it is not speech acts that are inherently polite or impolite, but rather the context in which they are used which guides the judgement of im/politeness.

In pursuit to determine the type of impoliteness being addressed in his study, Culpeper (1996) distinguishes between impoliteness that is intended to attack the addressee, viz. genuine impoliteness, and impoliteness that is aimed to establish and enhance social harmony, viz. mock impoliteness or banter. As with Lachenicht (1980), it is genuine impoliteness that is the focus of investigation in Culpeper (1996). Unlike Lachenicht's (1980) model Culpeper's (1996:356) framework comprises five superstrategies:

1) **Bald on record impoliteness**. With this strategy the FTA is performed in a straightforward manner in contexts where face sensitivities matters. As demonstrated

in Culpeper (1996:356) this strategy differs from Brown & Levinson's (1987) *bald on record* politeness strategy in that the latter is originally intended to enhance face wants, and it occurs in very specific contexts. Whereas the former is oriented towards attacking face. Hence, Culpeper's (1996) *bald on record* is also distinct from Lachenicht's (1980) *bald on record* main strategy as it is identical to Brown & Levinson's (1987) *bald on record* politeness strategy.

2) **Positive impoliteness**. This strategy is designed to damage the addressee's positive face wants. It is similar to Lachenicht's (1980) positive aggravation strategy. The linguistic output strategies of Culpeper's (1996:357) positive impoliteness are listed in table 2.2 below.

Table 2.2 Culpeper's (1996:357) Positive Impoliteness Output Strategies

Culpeper's (1996) Positive Impoliteness Output Strategies
1.1 Ignore, snub the other - fail to acknowledge the other's presence.
1.2 Exclude the other from an activity
1.3 Disassociate from the other, deny association or common ground
1.4 Be disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic
1.5 Use inappropriate identity markers
1.6 Use obscure or secretive language
1.7 Seek disagreement, sensitive topics or just disagree outright
1.8 Avoid agreement, avoid agreeing with H's position (whether S actually does or not)
1.9 Make the other feel uncomfortable
1.10 Use taboo words, swear,be abusive, express strong views opposed to H's
1.11 Call H names, use derogatory nominations
1.12 Etc...

3) **Negative Impoliteness.** This strategy is designed to damage the addressee's negative face wants. This is also similar to Lachenicht's (1980) negative aggravation main strategy. The linguistic output strategies of Culpeper's (1996:358) negative impoliteness are listed in table 2.3 below.

Table 2.3 Culpeper's (1996:358) Negative Impoliteness Output Strategies

Culpeper's (1996) Negative Impoliteness Output Strategies
1.1 Frighten - instill a belief that action detrimental to the other will occur 1.2 Condescend, scorn or ridicule - emphasize your relative power. Be contemptuous, belittle, do not treat the other seriously, use diminutives to other(or other's position) 1.3 Invade the other's space - literally (e.g. position yourself closer to the other than the relationship permits) or metaphorically (e.g. ask for or speak about information which is too intimate given the relationship). 1.4 Explicitly associate the other with a negative aspect - personalize, use the pronouns 'I' and 'you' 1.5 Put the other's indebtedness on record. 1.6 Hinder-physically (block passage), conversationally (deny turn, interrupt). 1.7 etc'.

4) **Sarcasm or mock politeness.** This particular strategy entails performing the face threatening/damaging acts with surface politeness realisations yet it is obvious that the intention is to attack the addressee's face wants. In this respect, Culpeper (1996) identifies Leech's (1983) Irony principle (IP) as being similar to his view of sarcasm. Leech's (1983) Irony principle (IP) reads:

> If you must cause offence, at least do so in a way which doesn't overtly conflict with the PP [Politeness Principle], but allows the hearer to arrive at the offensive point of your remark indirectly, by way of an implicature (Leech, 1983: 82)

This view of sarcasm creates a confusion between the current strategy and Brown & Levinson's (1987) off record politeness superstrategy. Hence, Culpeper (1996:357) indicates that the difference among these is that sarcasm/mock politeness aims at social disharmony unlike Brown & Levinson's (1987) off record strategy which aims at social harmony.

In addition, sarcasm or mock politeness is apparently a superstrategy in Culpeper (1996) yet in Lachenicht's (1980) model it is a positioned within the scope of the positive aggravation strategy of "Deny common ground, convey that H is not liked'' (Bousfield, 2008:87). Likewise, using inappropriate positive politeness (one form of mock politeness) is for Lachenicht (1980), an aggravation substrategy falling within the boundary of the negative aggravation strategy of "communicate ability and want to coerce the addressee, minimize the addressee's power''. Hence, as argued by Bousfield (2008:87), this phenomenon is categorized into one impolite superstrategy in Culpeper (1996) but distributed in different positions within Lachenicht's (1980) framework.

5) **Withhold politeness.** This strategy involves intentionally or unintentionally failing to employ politeness strategies when expected.

Furthermore, Culpeper (1996) adopts Brown and Levinson's (1987) formula for assessing the weightiness of face threatening acts to weigh the seriousness of impoliteness. Brown and Levinson's (1987) formula is $Wx = D(S,H) + P(H,S) + Rx$. Accordingly, the more powerful and socially distant the other is, the greater the imposition of the act, the more the face threatening act is likely to be.

However, Lachenicht (1980) and Culpeper (1996) have made no mention to the role of prosodic aspects. Lachenicht (1980:622) does allude to the significance of various paralinguistic elements in communicating aggravation yet he fails to include such elements

in his model. Moreover, both models introduce little knowledge concerning sequencing in discourse, as they concentrate on single strategies out of context (Bousfield, 2008:145).

Among the merits of Culpeper (1996) is the fact that it has been tested, to a degree, using real life data, across various discourse types (Bousfield, 1999, 2004; Cashman, 2006; Culpeper, 1996, 2005; and Culpeper et al., 2003).

Culpeper (1996) has analysed the challenging, impolite utterances in US army training, Lauer (1996) applied Culpeper's (1996) model to explore impolite language in complaint letters, whereas Cashman (2006) investigated impoliteness within bilingual Spanish/English children's interaction.

In an attempt to fill in gaps in earlier models of impoliteness, Culpeper et al. (2003:1555) attempt to investigate impoliteness in an extended discourse rather than in a single strategy. Culpeper et al. (2003) also address the role of prosodic aspects in communicating impoliteness.

Regarding the investigation of how impoliteness is realized in extended discourse, two aspects have been addressed: "how individual impoliteness strategies co-occur in and across a particular participant's turns'', and "patterns of impoliteness and reactions to it across exchanges'' (Culpeper et al., 2003:1560). They identify two recurrent patterns, though not mutually exclusive, in which impoliteness strategies combine in a participant's turn. The first one is the repetition of a particular strategy (or a collection of strategies) to form a parallelism. The second pattern is that a particular strategy can be used in combination with other strategies. With regard to reactions to impoliteness, Culpeper et al. (2003:1563) have mapped out a complete theoretical set of response options, as shown in figure 2.2 below:

Figure 2.2 A Summary of Response Options (Culpeper et al., 2003:1563)

Culpeper et al.'s (2003) data have not featured all the options stated in their complete theoretical sketch, both the "Do not respond'' and "Accept'' were absent in their data. However, the strategy "Counter'', which includes impoliteness strategies identified in (Culpeper, 1996), has been frequent.

Furthermore, Culpeper et al. (2003) identify a set of counter impoliteness strategies occurring in his data such as "*abrogation*" viz. "the abrogation of personal responsibility for the action(s) or event that caused the interlocutor to issue a face damaging utterance in the first place (Culpeper et al., 2003:1565), "*opt out on record* " in which the speaker attempts to conclude the impolite act, and " *insincere agreement* " (Culpeper et al., 2003:1566).

With respect to reactions to impoliteness, Culpeper et al. (2003) adopts a scalar view in classifying such strategies in defensive and offensive. That is to say,

Offensive strategies have, to some degree, the secondary goal of defending the face of the responder; defensive strategies may have, to some degree, the secondary goal of offending the speaker of the original impoliteness act (Culpeper et al., 2003:1563)

Accordingly, Culpeper et al. (2003) propose two patterns for the option "Counter", namely OFFENSIVE–OFFENSIVE, and OFFENSIVE–DEFENSIVE. The vast majority of the interactions in their data follow the basic OFFENSIVE–DEFENSIVE pattern. However, Culpeper et al. (2003:1568) raise the possibility that other patterns may emerge in different types of discourse.

Indeed, I believe these findings raise the need to further examine impoliteness in extended discourses of other types in order to validate and identify the existence of similar, or perhaps other, impoliteness patterns in various discourse types, as well as responses to it, as indicated in Culpeper et al. (2003:1568). This proposal seems worthy of investigation in both institutional, such as parliamentary, and non-institutional discourse types.

In a later revision of the model, particularly in Culpeper (2005), the conceptualization of impoliteness is expanded to include the hearer's perspective, in addition to a speaker's intention to damage the face of the addressee. Accordingly, in Culpeper (2005:38) impoliteness is defined as:

> Impoliteness comes about when: (1) the speaker communicates face attack intentionally, or (2) the hearer perceives and/or constructs behaviour as intentionally face-attacking, or a combination of (1) and (2).

Furthermore, the concept of face is not abandoned here, as Culpeper (2005:39) still believe that Brown & Levinson's (1987) face-based frame represents the best way of understanding impoliteness, despite the criticism in the literature. Among the issues raised was the rejection of the universality of face proposed in Brown & Levinson (1987), and the need to adopt a more socio-culturally based, and contextually-sensitive view of face (cf. Matsumoto, 1988; Gu, 1998).

In response to such proposals, Culpeper (2005) adopts a more adequately conceptualized and contextually sensitive view of face, that is of Spencer-Oatey's (2000a, 2002). As explained earlier, Spencer-Oatey (2000a, 2002) proposes two aspects of face:

quality face and identity face. Indeed, Culpeper (2005) does not only claim to adopt Spencer-Oatey's (2000b, 2002) understanding of face, but her conceptualisation of rapport management as a whole. Hence, Culpeper (2005) integrates the management of sociality rights, as introduced in Spencer-Oatey (2000a, 2002), into his model. Since, I have already introduced Spencer-Oatey's model, no further elaboration is needed here.

Moreover, driven by data, Culpeper (2005) introduces the "off record" impoliteness superstrategy as a replacement for his earlier meta-strategic strategy, viz. sarcasm. In the light of the these modifications, Culpeper's (2005) impoliteness superstrategies can be re-explained below:

1) **Bald on record impoliteness.** According to Culpeper (2005:41), bald on record impoliteness takes place when the speaker employs direct, clear, and unambiguous linguistic choices to intentionally attack the addressee, or the addressee perceives and/or constructs the attacks to be as such. These intentional, or perceived to be so, straight forward attacks occur when there is much face at stake, they are in accordance with Grice's (1975).

2) **Positive impoliteness.** According to Culpeper (2005:41), positive impoliteness signifies deploying strategies in which the speaker intentionally attacks the addressee's quality face and elements of his identity face, and/or the addressee perceives and or constructs the speaker's linguistic behaviour as such. Such strategies, as stated in Culpeper (2005:41), include ignore the other, exclude the other from an activity, be disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic, use inappropriate identity markers, use obscure or secretive language, seek disagreement, use taboo words, call the other names.

3) **Negative impoliteness.** According to Culpeper (2005:41), negative impoliteness signifies deploying strategies in which the speaker intentionally infringes the addressee's equity rights as well as elements of his association rights, and/or the

addressee perceives and or constructs the speaker's linguistic behaviour as such. Examples of such strategies from Culpeper (2005:41), include frighten, condescend, scorn or ridicule, be contemptuous, do not treat the other seriously, belittle the other, invade the other's space (literally or metaphorically), explicitly associate the other with a negative aspect (personalize, use the pronouns "I" and "You"), put the other's indebtedness on record.

4) **Off record impoliteness.** This strategy is counterpart of the Brown & Levinson's (1987) off record politeness strategy. Employing the off record impoliteness means offending the addressee in an implied manner, via an implicature which cannot be cancelled.

5) **Withhold politeness.** Culpeper (1996:357) argues that impoliteness can be realised through the absence of politeness work where there is an expectation for it to occur. For instance, failing to thank someone for a gift they have received may be conceived as intentionally offence (Culpeper, 2005:42).

Even with these promising modifications, argues Bousfield (2008:91-92), the model fails to resolve the issue of "multi-face-directedness" of the linguistic impoliteness strategies, i.e. failing to identify a one-to-one relation between these impoliteness strategies and the face they affect or the sociality right they infringe. Another critique is that the list of the linguistic output strategies in Culpeper (2005) are not exhaustive, i.e. open-ended, which reflects a weakness as it does not offer a practical method to encompass these strategies (Bousfield,2008:91). However, this openness, simultaneously, provides sturdy foundation for their model as it becomes adjustable to the change in linguistic usage over time.

Indeed, in an insightful modification, Bousfield (2008:95) proposes to reduce the impoliteness superstrategies under two formal categories, namely on record and off record impoliteness since one may attack face or infringe a sociality right both explicitly and implicitly.

The introduction of Bousfield's (2008:95) refinements into Brown & Levinson's (1987) politeness model and further impoliteness models based on it, such as Culpeper (1996), enhances the fruitfulness of a strategy-based models of im/politeness in various types of discourse. Moreover, viewing impoliteness as a set of communicative strategies that attack interactants' face wants appears to be an effective approach in contexts which sanction and restrain both the ability to attack others and manage others' attacks, such as parliamentary contexts. In such contexts, participants are expected/required to possess the ability to both attack others and neutralize others' attacks. Thus, having knowledge about what type of impoliteness strategy is being employed, the possible defense and attack options facilitates participants' ability to manage confrontational interactions is worthy to investigate. Therefore, I think that impoliteness strategies comprise a promising part of bigger framework to investigate impoliteness in parliamentary discourse.

However, in Culpeper (2011a), the author has shifted focus from the classical conceptualization of impoliteness in terms of pragmatic strategies into a more culturally and contextually sensitive model of impoliteness, though this shift is not an abandonment of impoliteness strategies, as argued by Culpeper in Dynel (2013:164) . Indeed, many features of second generation of impoliteness can be traced in Culpeper's (2011a) definition of impoliteness below.

> impoliteness is a negative attitude towards specific behaviours occurring in specific contexts. It is sustained by expectations, desires and/or beliefs about social organisations, including, in particular, how one person's or a group's identities are mediated by others in interaction. Situated behaviours are viewed negatively-considered impolite-when they conflict with how one expects them to be. Such behaviours always have or are presumed to have emotional consequences for at least one participant, that is, they cause or are presumed to cause offence. Various factors can exacerbate how offensive an impolite behaviour is taken to be, including for example whether one understands a behaviour to be strongly intentional or not (Culpeper, 2011a:23)

As stated in the definition above, Culpeper (2011a) argues that impoliteness occurs when a participant's linguistic utterance is evaluated negatively by other participant(s), i.e. he relates impoliteness with how lay participants understand it. The negative evaluation stems from a disagreement on how one's (or a group's) identity is to be managed in interactions. This dissimilarity reflects that participants possess different ideological systems regarding how one's or a group's identity, for example, is expected to be tackled in communicative interactions. The negative evaluation may cause offence to at least one participant, the offence may be manifested through emotions as anger. The intention to cause offence or harm through the negative evaluation of others' language is not a prerequisite in the communication of impoliteness, though it may contribute, along with other factors, in exacerbating the degree of offence.

Culpeper (2011a) adopts Spencer-Oatey's (2002,2008) model, as face sensitivities and social norms represents part of participants' ideological systems that may trigger impoliteness judgements if it is managed in a way contrary to one's expectations.

With such a conceptualisation of impoliteness that centres around participants' understanding of impoliteness, Culpeper (2011a) employs various data collection techniques that rhyme with this conceptualisation. These techniques include: impoliteness perception questionnaires, corpus data, informants reports, video recordings and written texts containing naturally occurring impoliteness.

As for how Culpeper (2011a) decides whether the incident in question qualifies as impoliteness or not, some of his data sets, such as informants reports, included incidents that were reported by the informants themselves as impolite. As for other data sets, Culpeper (2011a:11) relies on the following sources of evidence:

1) Using explicit impoliteness meta-pragmatic comment and/or metalanguage (e.g. rude, abusive, insulting)

2) Retrospective comments are comments made after the event in question, these usually take the form of long discussions by participants and/or observers about whether the event in question is impolite.

3) Using conventionalized impoliteness formula.

4) Displaying certain non-verbal reactions viz. emotions like anger, disgust, embarrassment, and shame.

Influenced by Terkourafi's (2001,2002) frame-based approach to politeness, Culpeper (2010,2011a) argues that impoliteness can be more inherent in a linguistic expression or can be more determined by context, but neither the expression nor the context guarantee an interpretation of impoliteness. In this respect, Culpeper (2010,2011a) recognises two types of impoliteness: implicational impoliteness and conventionalised impoliteness formula. Accordingly, Culpeper (2010,2011a) examines both direct and indirect experiences of impoliteness and the linguistic structures utilised to express impoliteness. These methodologies include:

1) Examining the particular contexts in which participants display a perception of impoliteness, together with the expressions employed to convey impoliteness.

2) Examining the expressions utilised by participants when talking about behaviours understood to be impolite, i.e. impoliteness meta-discourse

Using the above methods, Culpeper (2011a:135-136) generated a list of conventionalised impoliteness formula in English, on the basis of frequency of occurrence. These include various types of *insults, condescensions, dismissals, message enforcers, unpalatable questions and/or presuppositions, silencers, threats, negative expressive.*

2.6 Previous Studies of Impoliteness in Parliamentary Discourse

Over the last few decades there has been a considerable amount of investigation of various political genres from a politeness perspective (Chilton, 1990; Zupnik, 1994; Agha, 1997; Pérez de Ayala, 2001; Ilie, 2001; Christie, 2002; Mullany, 2002; Blas Arroyo, 2003;

Bolívar, 2005; Garcia-Pastor, 2008; Ilie, 2004, 2013) ; Frumuşelu & Ilie, 2010). Despite the growing interest in investigating im/politeness in various political settings, studies of impoliteness in political discourse in general, and parliamentary discourse in particular, are still scarce (Ilie, 2004:45).

The Journal of Pragmatics (2010) has dedicated a special issue to studies of parliamentary discourse from pragmatic perspectives. The articles in that issue demonstrate a considerable diversity in the range of discourse aspects being explored ,the range of methodologies employed to highlight those discoursal aspects under investigation, the kind of political systems that house these discourses, and the countries in which these various political systems operate. However, most of the parliaments whose language was under investigation were, geographically, European except one non-European parliament (Chile). In addition, among the aspects of parliamentary language covered by those articles, only Ilie (2010b) is partially related to im/politeness. Namely, Ilie (2010b) investigates and compares the strategic use of parliamentary forms of address among politicians in the UK parliament and the Swedish Riksdag. Moreover, the introductory article in that issue, viz. Ilie (2010a:883), concludes with a recommendation for further empirical research into parliamentary discourses with an emphasis on cross-cultural context.

 Below I review the relevant studies of im/politeness in the Iraqi and British political and/or parliamentary discourse. In the British setting, these studies include Bull et al. (1996), Harris (2001), Bull & Wells (2012), Murphy (2014).

Bull et al. (1996) aim at investigating the correlation between the concept of face and equivocation in political interviews. Bull et al. (1996) argue that the concept of face can provide not only a theoretical framework for equivocation but it can also be employed to predict when and why politicians do reply to questions in interviews. The study builds a typology of face-threatening questions in the context of political interviews. Bull et al. (1996) employ their typology to analyse 18 interviews with the leaders of the three main

political parties in the 1992 British General Election, namely six with the then Prime Minister John Major, six with Neil Kinnock the then Leader of the Labour Party, 1983-1992, and six with Paddy Ashdown , then Leader of the Liberal Democrats since 1988).

The analysis identifies 19 subcategorises of face-threatening questions, grouped into three major types in accordance with the type of face these categories threaten. Bull et al. (1996:271) propose, building on (Goffman, 1972), that politicians have three faces to defend: personal political face, party face , and the face of significant others. Figure 2.3 below demonstrates these categories.

Figure 2.3 Bull et al. 's (1996: 274-279) Typology of Face-Threatening Questions in Political Interviews

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                          ┌────────────────────────────────────┐
                          │ Typology of Face-Threatening Questions │
                          └────────────────────────────────────┘
        ┌──────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────┐
        ▼                          ▼                          ▼
┌──────────────────┐    ┌──────────────────┐    ┌──────────────────┐
│ Personal-Political │    │ Party Face        │    │ Significant Others │
│ Face Threatening   │    │ Threatening       │    │ Face Threatening   │
│                    │    │ Questions         │    │                    │
│ Questions          │    │                   │    │ Questions          │
└──────────────────┘    └──────────────────┘    └──────────────────┘
        ▼                          ▼                          ▼
```

Personal-Political Face Threatening Questions

1. Creating/confirming a negative statement or impression about personal competence.
2. Failing to present a positive image of self if offered the opportunity.
3. Losing credibility.
4. Contrasting past statements, policies, etc.
5. Personal difficulties in the future.
6. Difficulty in producing/clarifying personal or party beliefs, statements, aims, principles, etc.
7. Contrasting/confirming a negative statement or impression about one's public persona.

Party Face Threatening Questions

1. Creating/confirming a negative statement or impression about the party or its policies, actions, aims, principles, etc.
2. Failing to present a positive image of the party if offered the opportunity.
3. Future difficulties for the party.
4. Contradictions between the party's policies, actions, aims, principles, etc.
5. Creating/confirming a negative assessment of the stat of the nation (for the party in power only).

Significant Others Face Threatening Questions

1. Not supporting the electorate.
2. Not supporting a significant body of opinion in the electorate (where there is a division of opinion).
3. Not supporting a colleague.
4. Not supporting a subgroup of one's own party.
5. Not supporting other positively valued people or institutions.
6. Not supporting a friendly country
7. Supporting a negatively valued other

Bull et al. (1996) argue that politicians, during political interviews, not only attempt to defend their personal face, but also the face of their political parties and colleagues to an extent that failing to do so is considered a political mistake. Given the fact that other political settings share the same adversarial nature, one can argue that politicians in other political contexts, such as parliamentary ones, also have three faces to defend and/or attack. One can also argue that failing to defend and/or attack these three manifestations of face, depending on the immediate context, may have political consequences.

One attempt to extend Brown & Levinson's (1987) politeness theory to institutional discourses is Harris (2001). In her study, Harris (2001) investigates both politeness and impoliteness in the British parliament, namely in PMQs. Harris (2001) argues that intentional and explicitly face threatening (or face enhancing) acts constitute the majority of PMQT's discourse, she further argues that systematic impoliteness is expected and rewarded within PMQT. Harris (2001) identifies a number of strategies for performing face threatening acts in the context of PMQs sessions. Figure 2.4 below illustrates these strategies.

Figure 2.4 Face-Threatening Acts in PMQs as proposed in Harris (2001)

Face Threatening Acts in PMQs

1. Questions that request very specific information.
2. Questions that reveal the PM inability to quote an exact figure.
3. Questions that construct implicatures or presuppositions.
4. Exchanges that focus on the metalanguage of asking and answering questions.

Harris (2001:470) signifies the value of investigating such strategies in the British parliament as it helps to uncover why parliamentarians choose to be politically impolite. Considering that the current research also examines parliamentary discourse, Harris' (2001) strategies seem worth investigating in the context of the Iraqi and British parliaments.

Although both Harris (2001), and Bull & Wells (2012) have attempted to extend Brown & Levinson's (1987) model to include confrontational, adversarial discourse, Bull & Wells' (2012) examination is more systematic and elaborate. Harris' (2001) study has utilised illustrative examples , whereas Bull & Wells (2012) have conducted a more systematic examination of strategies for performing face threatening questions in PMQs.

Bull & Wells (2012) aim to construct a theoretical framework for face threatening questions in PMQs by identifying strategies for both attacking and countering the attack, unlike Harris (2001) which identified strategies in questioning turns only. By analysing 18 sessions of PMQs, Bull & Wells (2012) have spotted six different strategies for posing face threatening questions and five strategies for responding to face threatening questions. These strategies are demonstrated in table 2.4 below.

Table 2.4 Bull & Well's (2012) Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Impoliteness in PMQs

Strategies for Face-Threatening Acts in Questioning Turns	Strategies for Face-threatening Acts in Response Turns
1. Preface. 2. Detailed question. 3. Contentious presupposition. 4. Conflictual question. 5. Invitation to perform a face-damaging response. 6. Aside.	1. Talk up positive face. 2. Rebut. 3. Attack. 4. Ignore. 5. Self-justify.

As Bull & Wells (2012) state by themselves, their theoretical framework needs further empirical analysis, more specifically they indicate that specific strategies, such as "invitation to perform a face threatening response"(Bull & Wells,2012:39) and "conflictual questions" (Bull & Wells,2012:38) , require further investigation. Moreover, Bull & Wells' (2012) study seems more promising to adopt in my study as it distinguish between strategies employed in initiation turns from those utilised in response turns.

Similarly, Murphy (2014) demonstrates that both politeness and impoliteness can exist in the discourse of PMQs. Building on Culpeper, (2010), Murphy (2014) outlines a set of frequent impoliteness strategies in his data set. However, Murphy (2014) focuses more on impoliteness strategies employed by the Leader of the Opposition and other Opposition members, i.e. strategies in questioning turns. Although, Murphy (2014) compares how two Prime Ministers, namely David Cameron and Gordon Brown, respond to face threatening questions addressed to them, his strategies, whether in questioning or answering turns are not as detailed as in Bull & Wells (2012).

As demonstrated above, most of im/politeness research into British political discourse have focused on identifying single strategies taken out of context. In other words, these investigations ignored to explore the dynamics of impoliteness within extended discourses, as well as ignoring to systematically account for how participants respond to face threatening attacks. In addition, most of the studies in the literature are devoted to examine impolite language in European national parliaments, as well as other political contexts in those cultures.

On the other hand, very few studies have been conducted to tackle impolite language use in the Iraqi political discourse. To the best of my knowledge, such studies include only Abdlali (2014) and Al-Tahmazi (2016). Abdlali (2014) attempts to analyse, on a very small scale, the correlation between political power and Iraqi politicians' impolite language in the context of political interviews. Moreover, Abdlali (2014) does not investigate the specific aspects of impoliteness that are examined in the current research. Whereas in Al-Tahmazi's (2016) study, impoliteness is viewed as one of the various discursive deligitimisation practices employed by (non-)political actors in quest for political power. Similarly, Al-Tahmazi's (2016) investigation involves corpus from political interviews, and social media in the Iraqi setting. In other words, both studies address impoliteness as a means to an end not as an end in itself. In addition, both Abdlali's (2014) and Al-Tahmazi's (2016) study do not involve a comparative element. Thus, no study have been conducted to tackle impolite language use in the Iraqi parliament.

Indeed, a search within the Iraqi Academic Scientific Journal (IASJ) database for im/politeness research in an Iraqi discourse yields to six results. These results include two investigations of politeness in classical non-Iraqi literary works, namely Flayih (2013) and Abdul Kadhem (2008), and three explorations of impoliteness in non-political (non-) Iraqi discourse, namely Abdual-Wahid & Omar (2010); Abbas & Ismail (2016); and Al-Musawy

& Al-Salman (2014). The only examination of impoliteness in Iraqi political discourse is Abdlali's (2014) mentioned above.

This review demonstrates the need to further investigate particular aspects of impoliteness in the Iraqi and the British parliamentary discourse to fill in the gap indicated in previous studies of impoliteness in these two settings.

2.7   Defining Impoliteness

Now that I have reviewed the different approaches and frameworks of impoliteness, I propose my understanding of impoliteness in the context of parliamentary interactions. Parliamentary impoliteness consists of linguistic strategies which are intended and/or perceived as attacking politicians' multiple face manifestations and/or infringing their sociality rights in specific communicative interactions. However, considering that impoliteness is the context of the present study is strategic (Kienpointner, 1997), i.e. impoliteness is sanctioned, accredited, preplanned, and calculated, the possibility of impoliteness being intentional is very high.

These linguistic strategies may also, whenever possible, be evaluated negatively in those communicative interactions by at least one politician. Politicians' negative evaluation regarding such linguistic strategies of impoliteness result from a difference in their expectations on how their multiple face manifestations, their sociality rights, and/or particular norms should be managed during parliamentary interactions.

 Such linguistic strategies may cause offence or harm to politicians which may cause emotional consequences, especially when performed with an intention to cause offence.

Taking into consideration that my study aims to investigate and compare the nature of impoliteness in two national parliaments where discourse is highly constrained, relying primarily on participants' conceptualisation of impoliteness seems methodologically challenging. Hence, I believe that in the context of investigating impoliteness across two

parliaments, including the present study, it may be more productive to adopt a model that integrates both participants and analysts' understanding of impoliteness. In other words, I think that an integrative approach of impoliteness that combines elements of both first order and second order theories of im/politeness is the most practical option to explore parliamentary impoliteness.

Thus, I mainly take impoliteness to consist of linguistic strategies that are attacking face or infringing some sociality rights, but also take into account participant's understanding of impoliteness, through their negative evaluations whenever produced.

With regard to strategies, I find the set of strategies introduced in Harris (2001),Bull & Wells (2012), and Culpeper et al. (2003) to convey impoliteness in initiation and response turns useful to explore in the Iraqi and British parliamentary discourse. I also argue that Spencer-Oatey's (2002,2005,2008) rapport management model is potentially promising in encompassing the cultural/institutional similarities and differences in the conceptualization of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British settings. Moreover, Spencer-Oatey's(2002, 2008) model combines both face wants and sociality rights. Furthermore, both Bull et al.'s (1996) and Spencer-Oatey's (2000b, 2008) conception of face being multifaceted is attractive for a political context such as the current parliamentary ones.

2.8 Grice's Cooperative Principle

In the course of an interaction users of language tend to express their illocutionary intent either explicitly or in an implied manner. Grice's (1975) model of conversational implicature postulates how speakers generate their propositions beyond what is said and how hearers grasp that intended meaning, viz. the distinction between saying and meaning. Prior to assigning a polite or impolite judgement to a specific linguistic behaviour occurring in a specific situation, interactants need first to parse the meaning encoded in that talk exchange. Hence, Grice's (1975) model of conversational implicature is essential for studies of

im/politeness. Hence, the need to outline and clarify my stance regarding the concept of conversational implicature.

Grice (1975) assumes a hidden/unspoken agreement among interlocutors to cooperate in the course of an interaction. This mutually expected cooperation, which Grice (1975:45) labels as the Cooperative Principle, is assumed to consist of four maxims: Quality, Quantity, Manner, and Relation. The category quantity involves two maxims: "Make your contribution as informative as is required" and "Do not make your contribution more informative than is required" (Grice, 1975:45). On the other hand, the category quality comprises two maxims: "Do not say what you believe to be false" and "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence" (Grice, 1975:46), whereas maxim of Relation includes a single maxim "Be relevant"(Grice, 1975:46). The last category, namely the category of Manner involves the following maxims: "Avoid obscurity of expression", "Avoid ambiguity", " Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)", and "Be orderly" (Grice, 1975:46).

Grice (1975) recognises that users of language do not always abide by these maxims, instead they diverge from using them for various interactional reasons. Interlocutors may violate a maxim, opt out a maxim , face a clash of maxims, or flout a maxim(Grice, 1975:49). According to Grice (1975:49), flouting a maxim refers to an intentional overt non-observance of a maxim. Grice (1975:49) argues that this overt deviation from adhering to a maxim is made purposefully in order for the addressee to grasp it and therefore to construct a conversational implicature.

Brown & Levinson's (1987) theory is built on the assumption that interactants flout Gricean maxims for their desire to safe face.

Nevertheless, among the issues that surround Grice's (1975)theory of conversational implicature is the notion of cooperation. Researchers have proposed different readings of Grice's(1975) Cooperative Principle, namely the social goal sharing view and the "linguistic goal sharing" (Thomas, 1986) view of the Cooperative Principle.

Adopting the extralinguistic/social conceptualisation of cooperation proves problematic when tackling some types of communication, such as conflictual or impolite discourse. Whereas the formal/ linguistic view of Gricean Cooperative Principle allows the processing of all types of discourses including confrontational and impolite interactions. Such a view , argues (Thomas, 1986:28-29), assumes that the only shared aim among interactants is the expression of their illocutionary intent clearly, explicitly or implicitly, and getting the addressee to comprehend it without committing themselves to producing polite or impolite propositions.

It is the linguistic reading of Grice's (1975) Cooperative Principle that I will be adopting in the analysis of my study as it proved to be relevant in a preliminary analysis of my data.

2.9   Summary

In this chapter I have reviewed the relevant literature on impoliteness. Namely, I have reviewed both the theoretical frameworks relevant to the investigation of im/politeness in general, and the studies that have examined impoliteness in relevant political and/or parliamentary settings. This procedure helps to (1) demonstrate the evolution of the concept of impoliteness in the literature; (2) highlight the relevant theoretical frameworks that has the potential to be part of an analytical framework to examine impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments; and (3) pinpoint possible underexplored dimensions of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliamentary discourse.

Accordingly, the review has included those theories of politeness that inspired the emergence of impoliteness frameworks in the literature, and/or helped the construction of an analytical framework for the current study. These theories include Brown & Levinson's (1987) and Spencer-Oatey's (2000b ,2008) models. I have also reviewed and compared the early attempts to theorise impoliteness, viz. Lachenicht (1980), Austin (1987) and Culpeper (1996)models. Previous relevant studies of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British

parliamentary discourse has also been reviewed. I have also introduced my understanding of parliamentary impoliteness in the context of the current research, and my position with regards to Grice's (1975) notion of conversational implicature.

In the next chapter, I will focus on introducing the institutional context which hosts the phenomenon under discussion the current study.

3 Chapter Three: Cultural Contextualisation

3.1 Chapter Outline

In this chapter, I will explore the cultural and the institutional context of the present study. The exploration starts with the identification of an adequate conceptualisation of 'parliament', as a political institution, that best parallels the conceptualisation of impoliteness as viewed in the current research. The rest of the chapter falls into two parts, i.e., the Iraqi and the British settings. For each setting, I introduce a brief account of the origins of that parliament. Then, I present the structure of that parliament focusing on the relevant practices, rules, and conventions that may contribute to the conceptualisation of linguistic impoliteness in the culture. Next, I shed light on particular contextual factors such as rhetorical choices available to parliamentarians in such institutions and attempt to sketch a possible power distribution in the particular parliamentary practices under discussion.

3.2 What is a Parliament? Parliament as a Communicative Context

Whether one adopts a first order (language user's understanding of impoliteness) or second order (analyst's understanding of impoliteness) approach to impoliteness, the role of context is crucial to the understanding/interpretation of impoliteness, given its pragmatic nature. For example, in the case of first order models, hearers' perception/construction of a given verbal behaviour as impolite may involve a judgmental evaluation of the utterance as face threatening and/or norm infringing in that specific situation. In other words, it is very likely that the same utterance may not be evaluated as impolite, by the same hearers, if uttered in a different situational context. Hence, context is vital in the interpretation of impoliteness. Indeed, the extent to which the role of context is regarded as either central or determinant to the interpretation of impoliteness, relates to the argument of whether impoliteness is inherent in a linguistic expression or not. Whatever one's stance is, the role of context remains undeniable in the conceptualization of impoliteness, as it is in the constructing the meaning of every/any single utterance in a given language.

Since context is at the heart of impoliteness research, it is a must for every impoliteness-related investigation, including the present one, to cast light on the context which houses the verbal performance. The current study aims to investigate impoliteness in the context of two national parliaments, namely the Iraqi and British parliaments. Hence, this chapter will be devoted to exploring the Iraqi and British parliaments. The importance of this part of the research lies in the fact that it links and integrates the extra-linguistic part of the work with the linguistic one.

In this particular section, the notion of parliament is reviewed first to clarify how the current research conceptualises parliament as a communicative context. This will determine how to display both the Iraqi and British parliament in the following sections. Existing relevant conceptualizations of parliament will be demonstrated through the following paragraphs.

Phrases such as *the Parliament, the Congress, the National Assembly, the Council of Representatives* are employed in different countries to designate the (highest) legislative body in the state (Norton, 2005). In its simplest, earliest forms, a legislature is the rule-making institution in the system of governance in any state, regardless of whether that system of governance is regarded as good, "democratic", or bad, "undemocratic" (Rothstein, 1996:134). So, the crucial point is that, regardless of whichever terminology is being utilized or whichever form of government is adopted, the story is always about political institutions. Since parliaments exist as part of the political system in many countries, it seems only logical to rely on political science theories to identify a convincing answer to my question: what is a parliament?

Political science adopts diverse approaches in examining systems of government and the analysis of political activity and political behaviour such as: positivism, rational choice theory, behaviourism, structuralism, post-structuralism, realism, institutionalism, and pluralism (Marsh & Stoker, 2010, Peters, 2012). The present research views parliaments from an institutional perspective. The institutional approach followed here focuses on

identifying formal and informal rules, procedures, and structures that constitute political bodies. Consequently, it helps to explicate certain elements that constitute parliamentary contexts. The identification of those elements is, in my opinion, vital in manifesting how this context shapes the nature of impoliteness within its boundaries.

Before proceeding to explore how institutionalism defines a parliament, it is important here to make clear that it is not the objective of this chapter to conduct a political analysis. Instead, the study will seek to provide a concise demonstration of the value of the selected approach and clarify its functionality and harmony with the stance on impoliteness taken in this thesis.

The interest in political institutions, or the institutional approach to politics dates back to Plato and Aristotle who discuss which types of political institutions may build a better society and individual. For example, in his *Republic*, Plato introduces and compares various forms of governments such as timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny. Likewise, Aristotle in his *Politics* asks questions such as "what is the ideal form of government?" (Rothstein, 1996:137). The interest in the institutional approach continued and in the late 19th and 20th century, the focus was more on the constitutional architecture which led to detailed studies of different national constitutions and other political institutions. Constitutions are introduced here as they represent the source of the fundamental set of laws that structure the legislative, executive, judicial powers and many other collective and individual rights in a state. In other words, constitutions are part of the political system and a political institution in itself.

Lawrence Lowell (1920) described the English political institutions through investigating their formal and official structure (Finer, 1932; Redlich, 1908; Bryce, 1921). The core element of old institutionalism was the extensive descriptions of constitutions, legal systems and government structures and their comparison over time (Lowndes, 2010:60). Simply speaking, institutionalist research was devoted to producing elaborate illustrations of the formal rules, structures and procedures of various political institutions, and to compare

these internationally. The fundamental motive behind this descriptive narrative was the belief that "seemingly insignificant details could have a pervasive impact on the behaviour of the institution and the individuals within it" (Peters, 1996:206).

Old institutionalism was criticised for its focus on formal rules and organizations rather than informal conventions (Lowndes, 2010:62). However, institutionalism came back in the late 1980s as a reaction to the internal limitations of the dominant behavioural approach, which was mainly concerned with applying empirical methods in investigating politics (Sandrers, 2010:25). March & Olsen (1984) are recognized as the first to coin the term "new institutionalism" (Lowndes, 2010:63).

New institutionalism emphasizes the proposition that the "organization of political life makes a difference" (March & Olsen, 1984:747). Despite having various forms and manifestations, new institutional thinking shared basic inclinations.

Below I illustrate the basic features of new institutionalism to justify the rationale behind taking a new institutionalist perspective in my explorations of the parliamentary contexts under observation. To phrase it in a more explicit manner, the common features of institutionalism underlie my conceptualization of parliament in this particular study.

Lowndes (2010:66) proposes that new institutionalism departs from and builds upon the insights of the best of old institutionalism and presents it within a theoretical framework. Below are the main characteristics of new institutionalism as outlined in Lowndes (2010:66-70):

1) "From a focus on organisations to a focus on rules" (Lowndes, 2010:67). New institutionalism does not conceptualize political institutions as one whole but rather as being composed of parts. Each one of these parts has their own set of rules that influence and constrain the behaviour of political actors within.

2) New institutionalists extend the range of an investigation to include informal as well as formal rules and the impact of these rules on the behaviour of individuals within political institutions (Lowndes, 2010:67).

3) "From a static to a dynamic conception of institutions" (Lowndes, 2010:68). Within the old institutionalist approach, institutions were defined as "stable, valued and recurring patterns of behaviour" (Huntington, 1968). Whereas new institutionalists probe into "how institutional stability is accomplished through human action" (Lowndes, 2010:68).

4) "From submerged values to a value-critical stance" (Lowndes, 2010:69). New institutionalism investigates ways in which institutions represent and sculpt societal values.

5) "From independence to embeddedness" (Lowndes, 2010:70). New institutionalists focus on political institutions as being situated within a specific time and space.

As mentioned before, new institutionalism has many variants. Hall & Taylor (1996) recognize three versions of it, whereas Peters (2012) identifies seven separate varieties. In my view, the variant which best explains and unravels the nature of impoliteness in parliamentary context is a fusion of normative institutionalism, and rational choice institutionalism. These two versions are reviewed below.

March & Olsen (1984) are regarded as the pioneers of normative institutionalism. For March & Olsen (1989:17) institutions "are collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs". Normative institutionalism argues that political institutions affect actors' behaviour by moulding "their values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs'' (March & Olsen, 1989:17). Normative institutionalists propose that apparently impartial rules and structures of an institution manifest values and power relationships, and determine appropriate behaviour within given settings. Rules may be "routines, procedures, conventions, organizational forms, roles, strategies, technologies around which political activity is constructed, and beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowledge that surround, support, contradict those roles and routines" (March & Olsen, 1989:22). These rules are vital since they enable actors to recognize what is normatively "appropriate behaviour" (March & Olsen, 1989:22).

Therefore, "what is appropriate for a particular person in a particular situation is defined by political and social institutions and transmitted through socialisation" (March & Olsen, 1989:23).

Normative institutionalism views institutions as being made up of formal rules, informal conventions, and organizational structures that embody values and power relationships. These elements guide and shape the behaviour of the actors within the institution. In other words, these elements determine what politically appropriate/expected behaviour is in a particular situation. So, it is political institutions and socialization that determine what is appropriateness in a particular situation for a particular individual. Thus, it is said that normative institutionalism posits a "logic of appropriateness" to account for the behaviour of both institutions and actors within it (Peters, 1996:208).

However, it is not certain that actors within an institution fully comply with the institutional rules and structures, nor it is always the case that individuals' interests and preferences are identical with and achievable through the very set of rules or values, norms promoted by the institution. One approach that fills the gap for such instances is the rational choice institutionalism.

Rational choice institutionalism rejects the proposition that institutional rules and structures produce and/or constrain the behaviour of political actors within it. Instead it argues that political actors' preferences and self-interests are internally determined and relatively stable (Lowndes, 2010:66). They argue that institutions provide the rules, procedures, and informal practices which restrain political actors' behaviour however they aim to maximize their utility (Peters, 2012:47-48). Indeed, it is the political actors' recognition that the institutional rules also constrain their competitors which provides the rationality to accept the limitations on individuals' choice incurred by institutional membership.

Building on this, it is possible to take a compromise position and argue that political actors' behaviour is neither utterly constrained by institutional rules and structures alone,

nor it is merely a result of an endogenous cause or origin. Rather, it is a combination of both, i.e. an individual follows institutional rules and structures in a way that best serves his/her interests and preferences. Indeed, political actors submit to institutional rules and structures in a manner that protects their interests. Both institutions and political actors affect and interact with each other.

These different conceptualizations of political institutions, normative and rational choice institutionalism, are originally designed to account for the political behaviour of such institutions and actors within them; i.e. these approaches attempt to account for the kind of behaviour which contributes to politics and has political consequences, such as decision making. In other words, normative and rational choice institutionalism are not specifically, exclusively designed to account for the verbal behaviour, i.e. linguistic performance, of politicians. However, language has always been in a close connection with politics and politicians since it is the means by which political actors communicate their interests, negotiate and arrive at decisions. Moreover, language or linguistic behaviour is a subtype of the overall behaviour of political actors. Hence these approaches relate to political actors' linguistic behaviour as well. In other words, they may, to a certain extent, explain the nature of different linguistic phenomena, such as impoliteness, occurring within the boundaries of parliaments. Accordingly, the current research adopts an intermediate perspective that combines normative and rational choice institutionalism to conceptualise parliaments.

With the introduction of the institutional dimension to the conceptualization of impoliteness in a parliamentary context, it seems that two sets of norms, values, rules are involved: institutional norms and values and, arguably, the socio-cultural values that underlie them. I propose that participants, in this case political actors, do not replace one category with the other one, i.e. they do not replace the norms, values of the broader social/cultural context with the less inclusive institutional/parliamentary context norms and values, and rules. Instead, both set of norms and rules coexist but one of them is operative on front stage and the other is latent in back stage. Within political settings, for instance

parliaments, institutional norms and rules become more salient. This may be represented as in figure 3.1 below.

Figure 3.1 Representation of the Types of Norms within a Parliamentary Context

Now that the conceptualisation of parliament taken in this thesis has been made explicit, the focus may be shifted to the exploration of the Iraqi and British parliaments respectively. The nature of the political system in any country is highly influenced by the series of events which that country faced. Hence, I will briefly review the critical and decisive events in the history of UK and Iraq that have contributed, directly and/or indirectly, in shaping their political systems, namely their parliaments, in their current status, before exploring both parliaments in more detail. A brief display of such events is also intended to highlight the longevity of the British parliament compared to Iraqi one.

3.3   Parliament in the Iraqi Political System: Origins and History

Since the 16th century, most of the territory of present-day Iraq was under the control of the Ottoman Empire. When the Ottomans joined forces with Germany and became part of the Central powers in World War I, the British Empire, as a representative of the Allies, initiated its invasion of Iraq in 1914.

By the end of 1918, they maintained control over Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, the three-main administrative provinces of Ottoman Iraq (Al-Hassani, 2008:64-68). Contrary to Iraqis' expectations, at the San Remo Conference in April 1920, under Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, Iraq was formally made a Class A mandate entrusted to Britain (Tripp, 2007:30).

Due to Iraqis' demands for self-governance, expressed so vividly in the 1920 revolt, and Britain's need to cut the financial expenses of ruling Iraq directly, Britain announced its commitment to establish a national Iraqi government. On the 23rd August 1921 Feisal bin Hussein was crowned as the Iraqi King and Iraq was declared as parliamentary hereditary monarchy. The first Iraqi constitution, known then as the Substantive Iraqi Law, was authorised by King Feisal I of Iraq on the 21st March 1925.

Article No.28 of the 1925 Constitution declared that the legislative authority is represented by the Majlis Al-Ummah (National Council) and the monarchy. The Article also states that that the National Council, viz. parliament, is a bicameral one, i.e. composed of two chambers: Majlis Al-Aiyan (Council of Elites) and Majilis Al-Nuwab (Council of Representatives) whose members were selected through public elections.

The Iraqi parliament, during the monarchy period, had a passive role in the Iraqi political life as huge and crucial jurisdictions bestowed on the King in the 1925 constitution. Many of those jurisdictions are nowadays normally fall within the functions of a parliament (Al-Hassani, 2008:272).

On July 14, 1958, the monarchy was overthrown in a coup executed under the leadership of Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassim. The 1958 coup d'état terminated the rule of the monarchy and initiated the republican reign in Iraq starting in 1958 till 2003. During the different periods of the republican era, the legislative authority in these periods was in practice conferred to some partisan and/or executive body in the state, whether an explicit mention of a legislative/representative was made in the constitution or not.

On 9[th] April, 2003, a coalition led by the United States invaded Iraq. Following the invasion, a transitional civil administration, known as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), was established by the coalition forces. By virtue of the United Nation's Security Council Resolution 1483 (22[nd] May, 2003) and the laws of war, the CPA bestowed on itself the executive, legislative, and judicial authority over Iraq from the period of the CPA's inception on 21[st] April,2003 until its dissolution on 28[th] June,2004 (Abbas, 2015: 142-143). Meanwhile a transitional governing body was formed, called Iraqi Governing Council, whose responsibility was to draft a temporary constitution that would establish the executive, legislative and judicial parameters for running Iraq during that period (Abbas, 2016: 53-57). Accordingly, a transitional government was established on 30[th] June, 2004 and a permanent constitution was drafted and approved in a referendum on 15[th] June, 2005 and announced as the permanent constitution of Iraq (Abbas, 2015: 157-159). According to this constitution, Iraq is a federal parliamentary republic.

Before elaborating on the current status of the Iraqi parliament, it is important to clarify the linguistic situation in the Iraqi parliament. Although Iraq is a multiligual society, as acknowledged in Article 3 of the current Iraqi Constitution, Arabic is the language used in the national Iraqi parliament. More specifically, it is a fusion of Modern Standard Arabic and Iraqi Arabic (a low variety known as Colloquial Arabic).

3.3.1   The Iraqi Parliament Today: Structure and Functions

Officially, the phrase that is used to designate the legislative power in Iraq is the Iraqi Council of Representatives (ICR) since the word *parliament* is foreign to Arabic. In the current, the 2005, Iraqi constitution, Article 48 states that the legislative power shall be granted to the Council of Representatives and the Federation Council, the latter has not been formed yet. In other words, the legislative body is theoretically a bicameral institution involving two houses, however only one of these is active. In the current research, however, I use the term parliament to refer the Iraqi Council of Representatives.

Regarding the composition of parliamentary political parties, the Iraqi parliament is not structured into a binary system of Government and Opposition as with the House of Commons in the British parliament. Instead, the governmental cabinet comprises members of all mainstream parties, whether these parties have scored majority in the general elections or not. Various social and/or political factors contribute to such a result. The multi-complex and interwoven fabric of the Iraqi society was not represented in the political body of the state during earlier stages, in particular Saddam Hussein's regime (Majeed, 2013:47-48). Therefore, the post-2003 political system aimed at filling this gap by implementing various measures in the process of building political institutions in Iraq. These measures include: adopting the propositional representation system in parliamentary elections, advocating and activating the principle of multiparty system instead of the previous one-party system, employing ethno/sectarian quota system and political consensus in the formation of the cabinet and the allocation of political posts almost in all governmental establishments. These distinguishing features colour the Iraqi political climate with a sense of consensus democracy or consociational (Ghanim (2011: 136) cited in Al-Tahmazi (2016:13) in contrast to the majoritarian democracy of Westminster (Lijphart, 1999).

Regarding key functions of the Iraqi parliament, the 2005 permanent constitution incorporates the following : the enactment and amendment of laws (the legislative power), the formal approval of the budget resolution (the financial power), the submission and ratification of changes to the permanent constitution (constitutional amendments), extra exceptional authorities, and the thorough examination and challenging of the executive authority in the state (the scrutiny of government) (Abbas, 2011:53-54; Abbas, 2016:80-93; Hadi, 2010: 57-60). The last function is particularly important in the context of the current research as it involves various parliamentary practices that have the potential to produce confrontational/adversarial language.

As for scrutiny, Hadi (2010) proposes two modes of conducting parliamentary scrutiny in the Iraqi parliament: explicit and implicit methods. Under implicit scrutiny, Hadi

(2010:69-87) includes two practices: parliamentary investigation and parliamentary debate, whereas explicit scrutiny comprises parliamentary question and parliamentary interrogation. To clarify the terminological use, it worth mentioning that for reasons of consistency, the current research denotes the above mentioned parliamentary practices using their translated forms as found in the English version of the rules of procedure for the Iraqi parliament. The figure below demonstrates the above practices.

Figure 3.2 Modes of Scrutiny in Iraqi Parliament (Based on Hadi, 2010)

```
                    ┌─────────────────────────┐
                    │  Parliamentary Scrutiny │
                    └─────────────────────────┘
        ┌───────────────────────┐      ┌───────────────────────┐
        │ Explicit Manifestations│      │ Implicit Manifestations│
        │  of Parliamentary      │      │  of Parliamentary      │
        │  Scrutiny              │      │  Scrutiny              │
        └───────────────────────┘      └───────────────────────┘
              ┌──────────────────┐         ┌──────────────────┐
              │ Parliamentary    │         │ Parliamentary    │
              │ Question         │         │ Debate           │
              └──────────────────┘         └──────────────────┘
         ┌──────────────────────┐    ┌──────────────────────┐
         │ Parliamentary        │    │ Parliamentary        │
         │ Interrogation        │    │ Investigation        │
         └──────────────────────┘    └──────────────────────┘
```

Parliamentary investigation is conducted under certain circumstances specified in the rules of the procedure. A parliamentary debate, on the other hand, is known as *parliamentary hosting* in the Iraqi parliament (Hadi, 2010:79). Perhaps, the reason behind this terminology lies in the fact that according to the Iraqi constitution, parliamentary debates do not result in a no-confidence motion. In the Iraqi parliament, debates are perceived as a process of negotiation between the parliament and the government to assess and provide recommendations to improve the performance of the latter (Hadi , 2010:79-80).

Access to interactions occurring in such practices are not made public, hence not included in the data set of the present research and no further elaboration is necessary.

As for parliamentary questions, Article 50 of the rules of procedure for Iraqi parliament states that questions are posed to obtain information unknown to the questioner, seek clarification on matters he/she came to know about, or to be informed about what the government intends to act regarding a particular issue. Moreover, questions are either written or oral. Articles 51, 52, 53, 54 state that members have the right to pose a single question for each session, only the member who tables a question has the right to follow it up with a comment, unless the Speaker grants the same privilege to another member. It is conventionally set that questions must not involve improper words or phrases. Both written and oral questions do not lead to a no-confidence vote. However, if the questioning member is not convinced with the answers, questions may lead to a parliamentary interrogation.

Parliamentary interrogations in the Iraqi parliament, are conceptualised as an enquiry that implies accusations raised by the questioning member against the governmental official being interrogated regarding an issue that lies under the latter's' jurisdiction. A parliamentary interrogation stands as the most effective scrutiny tool in the Iraqi parliament because it may lead to a no-confidence motion if members are not convinced with the answers of the official being interrogated (Article 61 of the rules of the procedure). A no-confidence vote in such a case must score an absolute majority to result in the auto-resignation of the official being interrogated.

Article 56 of the rules of procedure for the Iraqi parliament states that any member, with the assent of 25 other members, may interrogate the Prime Minister or one of his deputies or Ministers regarding any issue within their responsibilities. The questioning member submits a request in which he/she clarify the subjects, the questions, the nature of the violations attributed to the official being questioned, and all supporting evidence, as stated in Article 58 in the rules of the procedure for the Iraqi parliament.

Among the formal requirements of the language employed in parliamentary practices is that it should not contain improper words or phrases. Moreover, the set of rules that shape the institutional behaviour, including the linguistic one, of members are not packaged solely in the rules of the procedure. Another relevant document in this respect is the code of conduct for ICR. The code appears as a section in *The Instructional Guidebook for the Iraqi Parliamentarians.*

The code stresses general principles such as altruism, integrity, impartiality, liability, clarity and straightforwardness, honesty and leadership, equality in the eyes of law, enforcing good relations among members, and resolving conflict of interest and respect. Advocating such principles implies their relevance with the overall behaviour of members including their linguistic performance hence the inclusion here.

The code adds that the behavioural standards/constraints it advertises has the authority to filter the right of freedom of expression for Iraqi parliamentarians as outlined in Article 3 of The Rules of the Procedure. Moreover, the document explicitly states that, although the expression and the exchange of ideas and opinions may be executed using acute/intense/strong language, the language used should always remain within the frame of the sessions and should not include excessive, unreasonable personal attacks at members. More specifically, the code sets constraints regarding parliamentarians' conduct during the sittings. These constraints include:

1) Members should address the Speaker of the House when participating in sessions. Also, they should cease speaking when the Speaker issues an order to manage the flow of discussions.

2) Members should desist from using aggressive, improper/repulsive language that may be a source of an insult for other members. Generally, in the event of member being insulted due to an exposure to improper language, he/she may demand to withdraw such language. Another possible option here is for the Speaker of the Council to

command the insulting member to withdraw the insult and apologise for the insulted member.

3) Female members should be treated with respect.

Iraqi parliament has not specified what is meant by insult, aggressive, uncivil behaviour. Instead shaping the conceptualisation of such concepts is a matter of negotiation between the Speaker and members. Hence unveiling instances of communications that are considered as impolite will help to clarify what counts as impolite within the borders of the Iraqi parliament.

3.4 Parliament in the British Political System: Origins and History

The UK parliament is commonly viewed as the mother of all parliaments. Jones (2009:1) argues for the validity of such a claim only in the sense that it is "the oldest existing parliament on the mainland of Great Britain".

Today's UK parliament can be perceived as a continuation of the great national councils in the early 10th century Anglo-Saxon England, viz. witan or witenagemot. The witan encompassed mainly magnates, churchmen, and leading noblemen. Moreover, kingship was perceived as God-given quality in these political systems (Maddicott, 2009:3).These assemblies practiced legislation, political decision-making and the distribution of land grants. The political stability in the kingdom was associated with the consensus among the king and his witan

Even with the Norman invasion of the country in 1066, these assemblies continued to exist in the Anglo-Norman England though in a modified version. The main difference relates to the employment of the feudal law throughout the kingdom and its effect on these councils. In Anglo-Norman England, tenure became the basis of the meeting between the king and his great men (Maddicott, 2009:6).

Throughout the 12th century, these councils kept a similar structuring and functioning. Most importantly, the consensual tone coloured the relation between the king and his wise men as taxation was not part of the council agenda (Maddicott, 2009:6).

However this harmonious relation started to collapse as the application of fiscal pressure became part of the council's business. This disharmony developed to a conflict and rebel and reached its culmination with the drafting and issuing of the Great Charter of Liberties, commonly called Magna Carta, during the reign of King John of England at Runnymede, near Windsor, on 15 June 1215 (Brand, 2009).

It was during the 13th century that the term parliament was first used to denote the meetings of the king's council (Brand, 2009: 10). This age also marked the emergence of the House of Commons as a representative body in the realm (Norton, 2005:16) since the king's council included "both lay (barons and earls) and ecclesiastical (bishop, abbots and priors)"(Brand, 2009:10) and "knights and burgesses"(Norton, 2005:16). Hence the two parts, together with the Sovereign became known as parliament. However, both the attendance and the engagement in significant political decision-making of the common members was not regular and active in this era (Norton, 2005:16).

During the 14th and the 15th centuries, the Commons struggled to activate and enhance its role in the king's council. One attempt to establish its independence was the several separate meetings of the knights and burgesses without the churchmen and nobles (Norton, 2005:17). Moreover, the Commons succeeded in securing their rights in approving fiscal and legislative matters during this era (Pollard, 1964:127-131).

During the 16th century and under the rule of the Tudor dynasty, particularly Henry VIII, the parliament gained an omnicompetent status. In other words, parliament possessed full authority to legislate in all aspects of life in the kingdom. Henry VIII transferred the religious authority from the Catholic Church to the English Crown. With his Reformation Parliament (Lehmberg, 1970:vii), he stressed the supreme authority of the Crown in parliament, that is the royal authority embodied in law passed by the monarch, Lords and Commons (Pollard, 1964:214-215).

The 17th century witnessed a severe conflict among the ruling dynasty, the Stuart, and the parliament as the former believed in the divine right of kings. The armed conflict

resulted in the Civil War which abolished both the monarchy and House of Lords (Field, 2002:102-117). The parliament then was revived together with the restoration of the monarchy in the 17th century (Norton, 2005:18 and Rush, 2005:35). In 1688 the parliament of England passed the Bill of Rights 1688 (UK) which is a significant document that contributes in constructing the constitutional body in the United Kingdom. The Act establishes and demarcates the authoritative boundaries of the monarch, parliament and individuals. It was within this Act that the UK parliament claimed the requirement for regular parliaments, free elections, and freedom of speech in the parliament (Rush, 2005:37-38). With the death of the last Tudor monarch the English Crown was inherited by king James VI of Scotland (Seel & Smith, 2001:37). This event brought the Union of the Crowns in 1603 (McLean & McMillan, 2005:2). As the union was a dynastic one, both England and Scotland remained as sovereign states till the Acts of Union 1707(Rush, 2005:39). The Acts of Union 1707 gave birth to the parliament of Great Britain encompassing the parliaments of the two countries (Jones & Farrell, 2009:145). At the start of the 19th century, the parliament of Great Britain was joined by the Irish parliament through the Acts of Union 1800to create the parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (McLean & McMillan, 2005:2).

In addition, nineteenth century embraced the introduction of several parliamentary Acts that contributed in the structuring of the current political atmosphere in the United Kingdom. For instance, various reformative measures were adopted to give political voice to a larger scale of the electorate such as the Reform Act 1832, the major Reform Act 1867, the Representation Act1884 (Salmon, 2009: 262), and the secret Ballot Act 1872 (Rush, 2005:41).With these measures, most of working men officially became part of the electorate. Though these Acts affirmed the authority of the House of Commons over the Lords, they also transferred the elective function from the Commons to the electorate and the legislative function to the cabinet. Hence, the role of political parties became significant (Norton, 2005: 20). Mass parties were established due to the expansion in the electorate (Norton, 2005: 20)

which later on included the enfranchisement of women through the Representation of the People Act 1918, and the Equal Franchise Act 1928 (Norton, 2009: 271). Hence the 20th century witnessed the emergence of coherent political parties inside and outside the House of Commons namely the Liberal, Conservative, and Labour Party, and others.

3.4.1 The British Parliament Today: Structure and Functions

Currently, the parliament of the United Kingdom, commonly known as the British or the UK parliament, consists of the House of Lords, House of Commons and the Queen (Norton, 2005:15).The House of Lords stands as the Upper Chamber of the parliament whose members are either hereditary peers or life peers (Adonis, 1993:192-193).

The monarch is politically a neutral element of the parliament however its consent is essential for a measure to be recognised by the courts as an Act of parliament (Rogers & Walters, 2015:38-41). As the linguistic behaviour of both the Lords and the Queen is not part of the current enquiry, no further elaboration is needed. The House of Commons is the Lower Chamber of the parliament, and the representative body in the institution.

The relative majority system, namely first-past-the-post is the electoral system adopted for the allocation of seats in Westminster parliament (Adonis, 1993:26). Adopting this electoral system contributes in formulating the shape of the British parliament into a government, comprising members of the winning party, and an opposition, comprising members of the main opposition party, unlike Iraqi parliament which does not demarcate a stable opposition body in its structure. This may add an adversarial tone to the communications in the British parliament.

Rush (2005:59) lists the multi functions of parliament as a whole stressing functions that are performed by each house exclusively, collectively or individually. However, the role of the House of Commons is far more essential in implementing those functions (Rush, 2005:59). These functions include legitimising the government, representing constituents, authorising taxation and expenditure, the redressing of grievance, legislating bills, recruitment of ministers, scrutinising the executive (Rush, 2005:59-65).

As scrutiny of the government may involve face threatening/attacking communicative activities, hence the researcher shall elaborate only on how the British parliament manifests scrutiny. According to Rush (2005:64), scrutinising the government, through parliament, involves monitoring its policy and administration then publicise that knowledge to the nation. Scrutinising the executive is among the functions that both Houses exercise either on their own and/or collectively. However, the Commons is more engaged with scrutiny practices (see table 3.1 in Rush, 2005:59).In addition to a system of scrutiny exercised by Select Committees, namely inquiry, investigation and scrutiny of specific tasks, Opposition and Governments backbenchers exercise scrutiny through a variety of practice. These include questions, adjournment debates, early day motions, and debates on Opposition days and Estimates day. No further elaboration needed here as interactions in such practices are not within the corpus to be analysed in the current study.

Questioning the executive occupies a central part in the Common's agenda (Adonis, 1993:128). Questions in the Commons fall in to four categories: oral questions, written questions, urgent questions, and Prime Minister's questions (Rogers & Walters, 2015:278-292).

Backbenchers in the Commons have the privilege to table questions to be orally answered by the executive, namely ministers of the cabinet, or MPs speaking on behalf of other institutional entities (Rogers & Walters, 2015:272). All cabinet ministers are subject to questioning on a rota basis(Adonis, 1993), some of these questions are substantive ones while others are topicals. For the latter type of questions, ministers receive no prior notice unlike the former type of which ministers are given prior notice(Rogers & Walters, 2015:279). After a question being answered, the MP who tabled the oral has the right to pose an extra question, i.e. a supplementary, which may be followed by oral questions from other MPs (Adonis, 1993:133).

Another type of parliamentary questions are urgent questions. In cases of urgent issues, an MP may table his/her question at the end of question time, with the consent of the Speaker of the House (Adonis, 1993;135).

Majority of parliamentary questions are written. Questions tabled for written answers are of two types: ordinary and priority or written questions. The first type of written questions are tabled to be answered within two weeks whereas the second type are set to be answered on a certain day with a minimum of three working days (Adonis, 1993:135; Rogers & Walters, 2015:291).

The House has evolved certain rules for questions to ensure they conform to their principal purpose of requesting information or pressing for action as stated by Erskine May in his *Parliamentary Practice*. These rules require MPs to relate their question to issues within the authority of the executive being questioned. Questions should also be relevant to government's own policies and actions not opposition parties' policies. Parliamentary questions are not admissible if they inquire about issues that are sub judice, argumentative, speculative but rather these should have factual basis. Questions should not relate to devolved administrations, namely Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Moreover, questions should not be repetitive, controversial, ironic, vague or asking for confirmation of a rumour or press report (Rogers & Walters, 2015:273-274). Questions should also not be framed as a statement or speech in the interrogative. These specifications are applicable for all types of questions in the British parliament including questions in PMQs.

The last and the most thrilling context for parliamentary questions is PMQs. Every parliamentary week, the Prime Minister attends at the Despatch Box for half an hour to answer questions tabled for him/her by the Leader of the Opposition and backbenchers (Rogers & Walters, 2015:288). It is usually the dual between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition which attracts the attention of the public and the media(Adonis, 1993:133). Beyond the genuine request for information and/or urge for action, PMQs can also be used as a weapon in the party-political battle. Indeed, PMQs is even a sharper weapon

than the ministerial parliamentary questions as it is a contest between the chief executive and the Leader of the Opposition. PMQs can be employed to score party points and make one's self prominent, demonstrate and publicise the proficiency of one's policies to a multiple audience(Adonis, 1993:133;Rogers & Walters, 2015:289). The discourse of PMQs contains both supportive and critical communication. Both the Prime Minister and his/her backbenchers aim to demonstrate the effectiveness of government policies and administration whereas the Leader of the Opposition and his/her backbenchers criticise/challenge/doubt government measures (Rogers & Walters, 2015:289).

Opposition Leaders and backbenchers from both the government and the Opposition participate in PMQs. Members wishing to participate enter their names to the Order Paper, which lists the business of the House on daily basis. Then these names are sequenced randomly through a ballot. All selected members table the same question on the Order Paper, namely a question enquiring about the Prime Minister's engagements for that day. The Prime Minister responds to the engagement question only when asked for the first time. Members who are not selected, may ask a supplementary question about any topic he/she chooses, if they catch the eye of the Speaker. This means that the Prime Minister has no prior knowledge of what are next questions. The leader of the Opposition has the right to ask six questions (Rogers & Walters, 2015:289). These questions are also are not known to the Prime Minister. Hence, part of the preparation for PMQs, on the government side, are devoted to anticipating these questions, and developing possible arguments to respond to them (Reid, 2014:49).

3.5   Political Rhetoric in the Iraqi and British Parliament

Rhetoric defined as the art or science of effective, eloquent and persuasive language is crucial in various forms of communication or fields of knowledge such as oratory, literature, literary criticism, politics, and law (Martin, 2014).

Politics employs language to resolve clashes of interest, to make decisions, and decide policies. It does so through a variety of techniques such as persuasion, threats, and irrational strategies (Chilton, 2004:3). In other words, such political activities usually

involve controversial issues that are resolved using arguments that "…involve rudeness, disrespect, hostility, animosity, name calling, putdown, insults, ad hominem attacks…" (Govier, 1999).

Building on this, it is argued that parliamentary impoliteness is part of the wider rhetorical parliamentary practices. Hence, it only makes sense to briefly shed light on possible rhetorical strategies of persuasion/argumentation employed by parliamentarians in the Iraqi and the British settings.

Currently the study of Iraqi political rhetoric is scarce due to the huge amount of scepticism towards the Iraqi parliament, and Iraqi politicians in general. This scepticism relates to Iraqis' frustration with the incompetence, and failure of the current political system in providing even the basic public service, e.g. consistent power/electricity, and successful measures to improve the degeneration of security conditions in the country. The scarceness in the examination of Iraqi political rhetoric may explain why such studies, in the Iraqi academia, conventionally and primarily involve literary, and Quranic texts. No attempt has been specifically made to examine the rhetorical style in the Iraqi parliamentary discourse.

To the best of my knowledge, the only rhetorical investigations conducted to explore argumentation techniques in an Iraqi political discourse are Kashkoul's (2012) and Dakil's (2011) studies. Both investigations have identified a similar range rhetorical techniques in the discourse of election campaigns during general and local government elections in Iraq. This range includes a variety of argumentations techniques which encompass options such as "repetition", "provoking emotional reactions", "deforming/misrepresenting social reality", "promoting party manifesto", "introducing opinions as facts", "promoting relevant prominent political figures", "provoking religious issues", "provoking fear", "exaggeration", "justification", "mockery", and some other categories. The techniques identified in these studies, however, are investigated on a macro-level, i.e. no correlation was made among these techniques and the micro-linguistic structures realising these argumentation techniques.

76

On the other hand, Al-Tahmazi (2016), whose study is more anchored in Critical Political Discourse Analysis, vividly recognises impoliteness as micro-discursive strategies employed by Iraqi political actors to de/legitimise the quest for power. Within his theoretical framework, Al-Tahmazi (2016) identifies two macro-de/legitimisation patterns, namely "actor-oriented patterns" and "action-oriented patterns", which political actors employ in political interviews and social media platforms.

Moreover, the argumentation techniques identified in Dakil (2011), Kashkoul (2012) and Al-Tahmazi (2016) can be categorised within the Classical Aristotelian types/ modes of argument, namely ethos, pathos, and logos. Ethos are those argumentation styles that centre on the character or credibility of individuals involved. For example, Al-Tahmazi's (2016) actor-oriented patterns involve instances in which political actors' credibility is being attacked/misrepresented in order to delegitimise them. Pathos argumentation mode, on the other hand, entails provoking emotions in order to convince an audience. Kashkoul (2012) and Dakil (2011) have identified various persuasion techniques that employ emotions as a means of convincing the electorate such as "provoking fear", "mockery", and "provoking emotional reactions".

Although these argumentation techniques are specific to the context under scrutiny in those studies, they may occur in other highly formalised Iraqi political discourse such the parliamentary one. For example, in extract 1 (see the Methodology Chapter) the questioner Al-Waeli attacks the credibility of the Mayor of Baghdad by demonstrating the latter's incompetence in managing governmental projects, i.e. Al-Waeli is employing an ethos based argument to convince his audience. In addition, pathos based arguments in the Iraqi parliamentary discourse can be traced in examples such as extract 15 (see the Methodology Chapter). In that extract, the questionee, the Mayor of Baghdad Al-Isawi, reacts emotionally, viz. expressing feelings of being hurt, to attempt to persuade the audience of the unacceptability of the questioner's, Al-Waeli, question, and consequently his argument.

Aristotle's logos implies the use of logic or reasoning to persuade an audience of a particular argument. This mode can also be found in the Iraqi parliament. For instance, in extract 18 (see the Methodology Chapter), the questioner, Al-Waeli, provides official governmental documentary evidence to persuade the audience of the validity of his argument, namely claiming the corruption of the Mayor of Baghdad.

In this context, it is worth pointing out that the relatively short life of the current parliamentary system in Iraq may be a reason to assume a state of inexperience with regard to Iraqi politicians' rhetorical skills compared to the skilfulness of their British counterparts in the current study.

As for the rhetoric in the British PMQs, Reid (2014) also argues for the predominance of ethos-based argumentation styles in this parliamentary practice. Namely, he views PMQs as a "trial of character"(Reid, 2014:47). These thirty minutes every week at the Dispatch box are considered as a rhetorical competition among the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition to establish and prove leadership qualities through their rhetorical abilities (Reid, 2014:47-48). Among the Aristotelian rhetorical modes available to them, the ethos strategy is the best fit to confirm their leadership. Using this mode of argumentation, the Prime Minister and/or the Leader of the Opposition attempt to positively represent their own politically valid character traits and actions, while misrepresenting the character traits and actions of the political opponent. For example, in extract 25 (see the Methodology Chapter), the Leader of the Opposition Corbyn attempts to discredit the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, by implicitly exposing the latter's inadequate flood protection measures. Furthermore, in extract 33 (see the Methodology Chapter), the then Prime Minister Cameron attacks Ed Miliband's, the then Leader of the Opposition, leadership qualities by declaring the latter's inability to provide policies, plans to rule a country.

Aristotle's pathos, viz. the appeal to emotions in order to convince the audience, can be detected in the discourse of the PMQs. For instance, Karl McCartney, the then

Conservative member for Lincoln, ridicules Corbyn's unfeasible stance on the renewal of Trident, the United Kingdom's nuclear programme (see Appendix H). By ridiculing/mocking Corbyn's policy on Trident, McCartney is aiming to evoke laughter from the audience as a means of persuading them of his argument, namely Corbyn's inadequate defence policy.

British parliamentarians also employ Aristotle's logos to persuade an audience of a particular argument. In the extract below, Angus Robertson, the then Leader of the Scottish National Party in the British parliament, provides relevant figures of the United Kingdom's loss in terms of military casualties and expenditure in various overseas engagements to convince the audience of United Kingdom's futile foreign policy.

```
01  Robertson (SNP): more than 450 UK service personnel have died in Afghanistan
02              ( . ) but sadly the Taliban are back. the UK spent 13 times more bombing
03              Libya than on rebuilding the country ( . ) and there has been anarchy. the
04              US has just dropped a $500 million programme to support the Syrian
05              opposition (0.5) Russia is bombing Syria ( . ) and the UK has no plan to help
06              refugees from Syria who are now in
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3.6   Power in Parliament

Parliaments possess power (Norton, 2005:5). However, the dispersion of power among individuals is variable. Moreover, various forms of power co-exist within the different parliamentary contexts/practices. It is important to briefly demonstrate types of power that may operate in a parliament and how it may be temporarily distributed among individuals in the context of PMQs sessions and Iraqi parliamentary interrogations. This is significant as power plays a vital role in structuring of the context of any parliament. Hence, it affects impoliteness communication and/or interpretation.

Generally speaking, power is defined as the ability of an actor to influence the behaviour of others (Dahl, 1957). Within the broader political context, including the parliamentary one, there are different views of power, i.e. various forms of power which may coexist together. According to Lukes (2005), there are three dimensions of power, namely the decision-making power, non-decision making power, and normative power. In

the first approach, originally introduced by Dahl (1957), power is defined only in terms of the ability of decision making, i.e. a political actor exercises power through participating in the process of decision making that influences others. Representing the second approach, Bachrach & Baratz (1962) add an extra dimension, namely they define power in terms of having access to set the agenda in the first place. In other words, an actor A indirectly influences B's behaviour by establishing or determining the political values and practices that can emerge in the agenda. The third approach to power adds another form, namely the normative/institutional power. This view was proposed by Lukes (2005) who defines power in terms of the structures and processes constituting the system or the institution which shapes the outcomes.

In the context of parliamentary interrogations in the Iraqi parliament, a questioner exercises two forms of power over a questionee, namely the agenda setting and the decision-making power. The questioning parliamentarian, with the assent of 25 other members, can interrogate any governmental official, and he/she can determine the topics and what questions will be on the agenda to be asked. Moreover, the questioning parliamentarian, with other members of the Iraqi parliament, can decide the outcome of the interrogation based on their satisfaction of the questionee's answers (see the Cultural Contextualisation Chapter). However, the rules, conventions, and processes of the Iraqi parliament affect both the questioner and the questioned. Although the high ranking official has a certain executive power outside parliament, being interrogated weakens that power and paves the way for the questioning parliamentarian, along others members, to exercise their power.

In the context of PMQs, both the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and the backbenchers on both sides are also affected by the institutional power of the British parliament in general and the specifics of PMQs. The Prime Minister heads the government which constitutes the highest executive authority in the United Kingdom, i.e. the Prime Minister is the most powerful governmental figure. Moreover, the Prime Minster by virtue of his/her executive powers gets to indirectly set the agenda of possible topics to be raised

in PMQs sessions. However, it is the questioners, namely the Leaders of the Opposition and other Opposition members, who eventually decide what questions are to be asked without the Prime Minister having prior knowledge of. In other words, the most powerful political/governmental figure is effectively required to attend and be subjected to cross-questioning, not knowing what questions will be asked. In that sense PMQs weakens them and gives an opportunity for the Opposition to exercise power.

In both parliamentary interrogations and PMQs sessions, politicians involved display their power over words, and over the House. The audience, such as colleagues, the press, and the public, also has a judgemental power. Furthermore, power is seen as a dynamic, i.e. in a constant transition among individuals involved in the discourse of these practices.

3.7   Summary

In this chapter, I have first introduced my view of parliament as a communicative context, viz. an institutional context which both influences the behaviour of political actors through its structure, rules and conventions, and gets influenced by the interests and preferences of these same actors.

I have then introduced a brief account of the history of parliament in the Iraqi setting to demonstrate the short existence of the Iraqi parliament. Next, I have presented the available scrutiny practices in the Iraqi parliament focusing in particular on the rules and conventions relative to parliamentary interrogations. Then I have followed a similar pattern in introducing the British parliament and the PMQs.

Next, I have shed light on other influential contextual elements, namely the rhetorical choices available to the Iraqi and British politicians, and the type of political power at play in these institutional settings.

In the next chapter, I elaborate on the methodological framework adopted in the current research.

4   Chapter Four: Research Methodology

4.1   Chapter Outline

This chapter is devoted to demonstrating the methodological approach adopted in the current research. First, I reintroduce my research questions to show how these guided the design of the analytical framework in this research. Then, I present in detail the methodological framework adopted to investigate impoliteness in the current parliamentary settings. Namely, I demonstrate the philosophical position and the logic of inquiry embraced and how these have guided data collection methods and techniques of analysis in this research. Next, a detailed account of the sampling procedure is provided. Then, I reveal how the current Iraqi and British corpora is collected along with the challenges emerging in the course of the data collection. I also introduce the transcription system and the translation approach employed in representing the current binary corpora, and how frequencies are conducted here. Next sections introduce the analytical framework, analytical procedures employed in this study. Then, the theoretical categories emerging from the present framework are introduced and exemplified with extract from both corpora. The chapter is concluded with a summary of its contents.

4.2   Research Questions

As discussed in Chapter One, section 1.2, direct and indirect personal experiences of institutional impoliteness followed by a survey of the relevant literature have been the main motivation for the current researcher to conduct a comparative investigation of impoliteness in a parliamentary discourse.

In other words, the present research explores the nature of linguistic impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliamentary discourse. Four research questions are posed to uncover the nature of impoliteness in these settings. Being the first attempt to examine impoliteness in the Iraqi parliamentary discourse has contributed significantly in shaping various theoretical

and methodological decisions, as well as the formulation of research questions in the current research.

The reason behind the recapitulation of research questions here is for ease of reference. This reference is necessary for demonstrating how these questions guided the design of the analytical framework, i.e. how the latter addresses these questions. Below is a reiteration of questions posed in this research.

1) What are the key concepts/factors which underlie/influence the communication/interpretation of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments? This question is addressed by adopting Spencer-Oatey's (2008) rapport management theory, and Bull et al.'s (1996), and Culpeper's (2011a) frameworks.

2) What kind of linguistic strategies do the Iraqi and British parliamentarians employ to convey impoliteness? This question is addressed by adopting a framework of impoliteness strategies that combines elements from Harris' (2001), and Bull & Wells' (2012) frames.

3) What kind of counter-impoliteness strategies do the Iraqi and British politicians utilise when faced with impolite utterances? This question is tackled by adopting a set of communicative response options proposed in Bull& Wells (2012), Culpeper (1996), Culpeper et al. (2003), and Bousfield (2007).

4) Given the results of the previous research questions:

a) Are there any consistent and deep-going similarities and differences in the nature of impoliteness and how it is expressed and used in both Iraqi and UK parliamentary discourse?

b) To what extent and in what ways does impoliteness reflect institution-specific and culture specific constraints?

The next coming sections will be devoted to the introduction of the methodological, analytical frameworks adopted in the present research.

4.3 Methodological Framework

An essential element in the process of conducting social research is to establish the philosophical, viz. ontological and epistemological, basis of the research (Blaikie& Priest, 2017:23). A philosophical stance in this context refers to how a researcher views reality (Silverman, 2014:23).The philosophical underpinning of a research, together with its logic of inquiry, influence various aspects of its design such as "who or what will be the source of data; how selections will be made of these sources; what kinds of data will be required; how the data will be collected/generated and analysed; and how the findings will be communicated" (Blaikie & Priest, 2017:22). In other words, it is significant to clarify the ontological and epistemological assumption adopted in a research, to address a specific problem in the assumed social reality, so that the descriptions, explanations provided under that view are evaluated in terms of that view (Blaikie, & Priest, 2017:24).

The research at hand adopts a constructionist view to reality. Constructionism focuses on how reality is socially constructed in particular contexts (Silverman, 2014:26).The current research adopts the position that impoliteness exists in social reality, and that gaining knowledge of its nature can be derived from multiple sources such as participants themselves and/or the observer(s). Moreover, the logic of inquiry utilised here is retroductive in nature. Retroduction as a reasoning approach involves deductive and inductive logic (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003) in which theoretical structures are used to test the validity, and reshape those structures in a given context (Ragin, 1994:55). For a brief account of inductive, deductive reasoning see Blaikie & Priest (2017: 26).

The importance of identifying a philosophical position, together with the logic of inquiry adopted, lies in its contribution to colour one's research as adopting either qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methodologies. To be specific, such assumptions guide the selection of data collection methods and techniques of data analysis in a research. In this

study, research methodology is understood to refer to methods, techniques/tools operationalised to collect and process data.

To clarify the position of the current research on a methodological continuum, a brief account featuring the basic characteristics of qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methodologies is presented. This is annexed by a reminder of the objectives of the current study, translated into a form of research question, to justify the selection of a specific methodology, hence the methodological position adopted here.

Research in social sciences, including Linguistic ones such as the present one, opt for one the three above mentioned methodologies (Miles & Huberman, 1994). These research strategies are associated with certain methods of collecting and analysing data (see Silverman , 2014) part II).Qualitative research explores how a phenomenon is experienced in real life contexts (Silverman, 2014:4-5) aiming to identify patterns or structures of behaviour (Rasinger, 2010: 52). It induces these theoretical structures from data by examining case studies (Rasinger, 2010:52) .

While quantitative research aims to establish correlations among variables (Silverman, 2014: 4) by generating numerical data that allow statistical analysis. Quantitative investigation is deductive in nature, i.e. theoretical hypotheses are established in advance and validated or refuted through the empirical exploration (Rasinger, 2010:52). Eliciting data and processing it in quantitative research is accomplished using specific investigative techniques. Most of research in social sciences opt for one of these binary options. However, a large number of studies lie between these two ends of the continuum (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Such eclectic methodological approaches aim to mix methods of data collection and/or data analysis (Angouri, 2010). Mixed methods claim the production of comprehensive accounts of the phenomenon under examination (Greene et al. 1989), i.e. these methods aim to demonstrate different worldviews of it.

Moreover, it is the nature of research questions, focus of the study and context of the research (Blaikie & Priest, 2017: 24; Mason, 2002:19) what determines the choice of the methodological stance in any research. The study at hand attempts to investigate, and compare possible structures/sequences used to express impoliteness in the discourse of Iraqi and UK parliaments. These sequences include structures used by Iraqi and British parliamentarians to communicate impoliteness, react to it, and the grounds/rationale behind their evaluation of such structures as impolite. The comparative nature of the present study entails a comparison of these structures as communicated in situ, i.e. in the Iraqi and British parliaments.

Since the current research focuses on examining these structures in situ, then it is only sensible to get access to the actual discourse as it occurs in the local institutional context, namely parliamentary discourse in action. This contextual specification, viz. accessing the linguistic behaviour while being materialised, automatically excludes various possibilities of data collection due to the institutional character of the context under examination, i.e. it is difficult to replicate the institutional activity, namely parliamentary sessions. Moreover, the current study adopts a version of an interactional approach to impoliteness in which the researcher leans more towards investigating impoliteness through the observer's (analyst) lens.

However, the present study does not neglect participants' understanding of impoliteness as it attempts to gain knowledge from this source through participants' impoliteness metalanguage. Hence, the study's claim to adopt a multiple perspective in approaching impoliteness. Taking into consideration these two decisions, namely the focus on an institutionally naturalistic setting and relying heavily on analyst view to explore impoliteness, researcher-provoked methods of data collection, including social surveys, questionnaires, interviews, and focus groups, may not be helpful. In addition, the potential

challenges related to having access to Iraqi and British parliamentarians simultaneously problematise adopting such methods of data collection.

To obtain naturalistic parliamentary discourse, the current research therefore favours video data of relevant Iraqi and British parliamentary sessions. Namely, my research relies on pre-existing video recordings of Iraqi and British parliamentary sessions, which are available on the official YouTube website of the Iraqi parliament and the official website of UK parliament respectively, as its methodology for collecting data.

In terms of preparing the data sets for analysis, the pre-recorded data is transcribed following a system that comprises different conventions to render both data from the Iraqi parliament, conveyed in spoken Iraqi Arabic, and UK parliament accessible to the English readership. The present research employs a professional software, viz. ELAN, to help annotate the video recordings used in the current analysis.

As regards analytical tools, the current study adopts Discourse Analysis as an analytical tool to capture the meaningfulness of the transcribed data.

Table 4.1 outlines research questions posed in the present study together with research methods and techniques used to probe it. The table also introduces the studies that constitute the whole theoretical/analytical framework of the present work.

Table 4.1Research Questions, and their Corresponding Research Methods

	Research Questions	Data Collection	Data Analysis
1	What are the key factors underlying the expression of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments?	Naturally occurring Data (pre-existing videos)	Discourse Analysis + (Bull et al., 1996) (Spencer-Oatey, 2008) (Culpeper, 2011a)
2	What type of impoliteness strategies are employed in the Iraqi and British parliaments?	Naturally occurring Data (pre-existing videos)	Discourse Analysis + (Harris, 2001) (Bull & Wells, 2012)
3	How do Iraqi and British parliamentarians react to impolite utterances addressed to them?	Naturally occurring Data (pre-existing videos)	Discourse Analysis + (Culpeper, 1996) (Culpeper et al., 2003) (Bousfield, 2007) (Bull & Wells, 2012)
4a	Are there any consistent and deep-going similarities and differences impoliteness in both Iraqi and UK parliamentary discourse?	Naturally occurring Data (pre-existing videos)	Discourse Analysis
4b	To what extent and in what ways does impoliteness reflect institution-specific and culture specific constraints?	Naturally occurring Data (pre-existing videos)	Discourse Analysis

As the table above demonstrates, the present study resorts to naturally occurring data to address its research questions, a detailed account of the binary data set is introduced in section 4.4 below. The table also shows the analytical tools used to process the data, viz. discourse analysis. The analytical framework employed to tackle these questions will be elaborated on in section 4.7 below.

In summary, most of the methodological decisions adopted in the research at hand place the research at hand on the methodological continuum where research is described as qualitative, despite a descriptive quantification of the binary corpora. The following section describes in detail the specifics of the data employed in this study.

4.4 The Nature of the Corpus and its Challenges

It is argued that the strength of a research lies in the generalizability of its findings which is doubted in qualitative analysis (Gobo, 2007:193). Moreover, generalizability is widely synced with statistical probability sampling procedures. However, probability/random sampling frames which are commonly associated with quantitative research analysis may be inadequate for a qualitative research for reasons related to practicality (Silverman, 2014: 59), and the in-depth focus of qualitative analysis. Still Mason (1996:6) urges that a " …qualitative research should (therefore) produce explanations which are generalizable in some way, or which have a wider resonance''. In line with this proposition, Mason (2018: 53) reconceptualises sampling as "principles and procedures used to identify and gain access to relevant data sources that are *generative* in relation to a wider universe, and to select from them for the purpose of gaining meaningful insights into your intellectual puzzle''.

This proposition, I believe, sets the logic of sampling in qualitative research and redefines the notion of representativeness of samples and generalizability in qualitative analysis. In other words, the representativeness of samples doesn't necessarily require a statistical aspect to it, and generalizability relates to the findings of a research (Gobo, 2007:194) . Put otherwise, to be able to infer/generalise does not necessarily pre-require

probability/representative sample. Rather it is the generativeness of a data source that adds strength/credibility to qualitative sampling. Generative data sources ensure that a researcher's data does not only relate to/represent a population but to a wider universe. Here, generative data sources are understood to be sources that has the potential to provide a flow and continuity of the kind of knowledge a researcher examines and develops. Hence, the findings arrived at for a set of data, generated by the source, have a high potential to reoccur with a similar data generated from that source.

Therefore, alternative sampling procedures and principles are posited to conduct a credible qualitative research. These options include theoretical and purposive sampling (Silverman, 2014:60).

In strategic qualitative sampling, the logic of selection lies in the ability of a data set to generate samples showcasing a feature or a process provided that they produce an empirically, theoretically grounded argument (Mason, 2018:55). More clearly, purposive qualitative sampling "seeks out groups, settings and individuals where…the process being studied is most likely to occur'' (Denzin & Lincolin, 1994:202).

As the current research adopts a qualitative methodology, a strategic/purposive frame seems a prudent procedure for sampling its data sets. Taking into consideration the context and topic of the current research, the researcher attempts to select a parliamentary discourse that is most likely capable to generate linguistically impolite structures. Following Mason's (2018) perspective on sampling, parliamentary discourse can be seen as the wider universe for the current research. Hence, sampling involves identifying possible data sources to generate linguistically impolite patterns within parliamentary discourse. In other words, a stratification procedure is needed next.

The researcher relies on the notion of genre to stratify, and then select a source of data that is most likely to produce impolite language within a parliamentary discourse. Genre here is understood as "a class of communicative events in which language (and/or

paralanguage) plays both a significant and an indispensable role" and "the members of which share some set of communicative purposes" and "these purposes are recognized by the expert members of the parent discourse community, and thereby constitute the rationale for the genre" (Swales & Swales, 1998:58). It follows that various subgenres of parliamentary discourse are identified as shown in Ilie (2006:2) who recognises the following: *interpellation, ministerial statements, speeches, debates, oral/written questions* and *Question Time.* The genre of parliamentary discourse is fundamentally adversarial (Bayley, 2004:21), i.e. comprises face-threatening linguistic structures. However, some subgenres are more adversarial than others since parliamentary discourse is greatly influenced by the functions, conventions, and the formal rules constituting the practice under consideration. Consequently, such confrontational subgenres have more potential to generate impolite language than their sister subgenres. The decision as to which parliamentary subgenre to analyse here relates to identifying confrontational practices in both Iraqi and British parliaments that are similar in at least particular aspects.

Similarity is sought here as it helps to establish a solid ground for the comparability of the nature of impoliteness in the two national parliaments examined here. As with most national parliaments, Iraqi parliament comprises a range of practices that are potentially confrontational. As demonstrated in section 3.3.1 such practices include: parliamentary investigation, parliamentary debate (parliamentary hosting), parliamentary question (oral/written questions), and parliamentary interrogation. In the Iraqi setting, parliamentary interrogation is very consequential to the official being questioned as it determines his/her continuation in office, i.e. it could be highly confrontational.

Besides, parliamentary interrogation is very much anticipated by the public and media as it involves sensitive events/topics affecting the daily life of Iraqis. In addition, it is seen as manifestations of party battle both by parliamentarians and the electorate. Moreover, at the time of the start of the current research this was the only parliamentary practice that

was accessible to the current researcher (see section 4.4.1 below). Indeed, the potential to produce highly confrontational language and the accessibility to data determined what to analyse in the Iraqi context. This in turn has affected the selection of a possible data source from the British parliament.

The next step is to identify a parliamentary practice in the British Parliament that is similar in a way or another to the one selected in the Iraqi setting. The British parliament displays a range of confrontational activities such as parliamentary questions, adjournment debates, early day motions, and debates on Opposition days and Estimates day (see section 3.4.1). One category of parliamentary questions is PMQs. In the view of the current researcher, this practice manifests aspects similar to parliamentary interrogation in the Iraqi parliament, hence it was selected to be the source of data for analysis from the British parliament. PMQs is much anticipated by parliamentarians, media, the public, party battles, the questioner stays the same, a better chance for follow up questions which allow for an interaction to be developed further.

Availability is no issue with regards to data from the British parliament as the official cite of the British parliament provides audio/video-recordings of its practices in addition to their scripts. In the two following sections, I introduce in detail the Iraqi and British corpora collected and analysed in this research.

4.4.1 The Iraqi Parliament Corpus

As indicated in Chapter Three, the Iraqi parliament is a very recent establishment. As a result, its regulations, practices, rules and conventions are being institutionalised gradually. For example, keeping records of and displaying the various parliamentary practices are not managed consistently yet. The verbal interactions in parliamentary committee meetings, for example, are not broadcast live to the public and their minutes of proceedings are not being displayed afterwards. Whereas sessions tackling the daily parliamentary business such as reading legislations, debating policies, questioning the cabinet are dealt with differently.

Since the establishment of the modern Iraqi parliament, namely the 2006 council, it has been a regular procedure that some of its parliamentary sessions are broadcast live on specific state and private Iraqi TV channels (for instance, AL Iraqiya satellite channel, Beladi satellite channel, Hona Baghdad satellite channel). In other words, the official web site of the Iraqi Parliament (http://www.parliament.iq) provided neither a live broadcast nor archived video recordings of parliamentary debates back then.

At the time of the start of the current research, contact was made with the Iraqi parliament to gain access to the archived video recordings of parliamentary sessions. But their offer involved being able to only watch and observe the audio-visual recordings of particular sessions in a one-time visit to the Iraqi parliament. Due to the restrictiveness of the offer, the researcher excluded it as a reliable source of data collection for the current research.

However, since May 2017 an official YouTube channel was created for the Iraqi parliament. Currently particular parliamentary practices of the third Iraqi council, viz. from 2014-2018, are being video-recorded, and archived on its YouTube channel, <https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLDvbIRAwPEtaxFD__cn0fpNgyJsb0tm2s>, in addition to being broadcast on Iraqi TVs. Moreover, the minutes/reports of proceedings for all sessions, from the third parliamentary round, are electronically provided on the parliament's website. These reports of the parliamentary sessions can be traced by following this link < http://ar.parliament.iq/category/جلسات-المجلس/محاضر-الجلسات/>. Such procedures are applicable only for specific practices such as parliamentary debates and interrogations.

As for the first and second councils, some of their visual sessions are made available on YouTube by personal users' accounts and the official YouTube accounts of some Iraqi TV channels. Whereas their relevant minutes of proceedings are available on the Iraqi parliament site. The archived minuets for the first and second councils can be traced by following   this   link   <

http://parliamentiraq.com/Iraqi_Council_of_Representatives.php?name=listtopics_gdsgfstter8s4t86683c3487v53b6sr8e7sv7vse85s45h5vlwaw78wv54gy38y538723g872wrelwaaar687wa837&file=listoftitles&topicid=1&gid=1> .However, the availability of these sessions is not exhaustive, i.e. minutes of proceedings are not available for all sessions of the first and second councils. Moreover, the minutes of proceedings for some the available sessions are incomplete. As with Hansard, minutes of proceedings are supposed to be verbatim but again there are corrections, modifications from informal to a more formal version of Arabic, deletion of repetition.

In brief, the obstacles that researchers may face in the process of collecting data from the Iraqi parliament can be summarized as the absence of a regular live broadcast of all parliamentary practices on the official web site of the Iraqi parliament; failing to provide a publically accessible archive of audio-visual records of all parliamentary activities; as well as the lack of a complete compilation of scripts of such activities.

Bearing in mind such challenges, the researcher relies on pre-existing video recordings of parliamentary interrogation sessions provided on the official YouTube accounts of the Iraqi parliament, some Iraqi TV channels, and some Iraqi personal users. However, since these videos are incomplete, the researcher also made use of their respective minutes of proceedings, when available.

Building on the sampling principle indicated in section 4.5, the researcher has selected the following interrogation sessions:

1) Interrogating the Minister of Trade, Mr. Abdul-Fallah Al-Sudani in the first electoral round/the fourth legislative year/the first legislative term 2009/ First Council 2006-2010. In these sessions the then Minister of Trade Abdul-Fallah Al-Sudani was interrogated by Sabah Al-Saady who was then the head of the Integrity Committee in the Iraqi parliament. Al-Sudani is a member of the Islamic Dawa Party whereas Al-Saady affiliated with the Islamic Virtue Party at the time. Both parties are Shia

Islamist which were grouped under the United Iraqi Alliance which won a plurality of seats in the January 2005 Iraqi election. However, the Dawa Party stands among the most powerful party in the alliance. The interrogation followed a media frenzy over the Minister's armed intervention to hinder the arrest of his brothers, and six Trade Ministry officials, over corruption allegations. This increased the demands and protests of several political parties and governmental bodies to scrutinise Al-Sudani's conduct. The length of the relevant videos analysed from this interrogation is three hours and 10 minutes.

2) Interrogating the Mayor of Baghdad, Mr. Sabir Al-Isawi in the second electoral round /the second legislative year/the second legislative term 2011/ Second Council 2010-2014. The then Mayor of Baghdad, Sabir Al-Isawi, was interrogated by an Iraqi parliamentarian, namely Shirwan Al-Waeli. The interrogation followed a series of public demonstrations and protest marches in the capital Baghdad over/against governmental failure to provide necessary public services such as power supply, clean water, and sanitary drainage. This failure/negligence was linked to allegations of corruption in the Mayoralty of Baghdad which is responsible of providing such services to the Baghdadi people.   Moreover, the questioner and the questionee affiliate with political parties who compete with each other over power, despite being within the same political Shia coalition, namely the United Iraqi Alliance. The questioner, Al-Waeli, affiliates with the State of Law Coalition, which is an Iraqi political coalition formed by the then Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki of the Islamic Dawa Party, and the questionee is the candidate of the Iraqi Islamic Supreme Council which is also a Shia-Islamist party. The State of Law Coalition and the Iraqi Islamic Supreme Council have major disagreements with each other over political power. The length of the relevant videos analysed from this interrogation is three hours.

3) Interrogating the Minister of Defence, Mr. Khalid Al-Obaidi in the third electoral round/the third legislative year/the first legislative term 2016/ Third Council 2014-

2018. The then Minister of Defence Khalid Al-Obaidi was interrogated by Aliah Nassaif, a female member of the Iraqi parliament. The questioner and the questionee affiliate with opposing political parties. Nassaif is a member of the State of Law Coalition and Al-Obaidi is a member of Muttahidoon Coalition. Al-Obaidi claims that the interrogation is a fabricated scenario set by a group of corrupt politicians and their allies as he refused to participate in their corruption (deals). Moreover, Al-Obaidi openly states that he has filed legal charges against Nassaif because the latter has asked for favours which go against the standard regulations in the Ministry of Defence. The length of the relevant videos analysed from this interrogation is three and a half hours.

4.4.2   The British Parliament Corpus

The official site of the British parliament offers a flexible access to recent and older PMQs video sessions. The site also provides access to Hansard which is the official edited transcripts/reports of all parliamentary practices including PMQs sessions. Hansard can be traced by following this link https://hansard.parliament.uk/. The current study has retrieved its British parliamentary corpus through accessing the parliament TV which can be traced by following this link https://parliamentlive.tv/Guide. The present British PMQs corpus was collected/downloaded in 2017.

The sampling of the British data comprised two stages. In the first stage, the researcher has specified a timeline for the selection of PMQs sessions. The PMQs sessions analysed in the current research fall within the period 2015-2016. In the second stage, the researcher narrowed the selection process by redirecting it towards periods that witness politically significant events. Namely, the current PMQs corpus includes sessions which occurred before the 2015 General Elections and the 2016 EU Referendum. The rationale behind such a focus is to locate data sources that have more potential to generate impoliteness. Thus, even within these narrowed periods, the selection involved those

sessions that proved to be highly confrontational after a preliminary observations. In other words, many more sessions were piloted before the final selection of the current PMQs corpus.

The current British Corpus comprises 19 PMQs sessions in total. These sessions fall into two sets. The first set features David Cameron as Prime Minister and Ed Miliband as Leader of the Opposition. These sessions include 14th January; 25th February; and 4th, 11th 18th, 25th March 2015. The second set of the current British parliamentary corpus features David Cameron as Prime Minister and Jeremy Corbyn as Leader of the Opposition. This set includes the following PMQs sessions 16th September; 14th, 21st October; 25th November; 16th December 2015 and 6th ,20th January; 10th February; 23rd March; 20th April; 11th May; 15th, 29th June 2016. The length of the relevant PMQs videos analysed in this study is nine and a half hours.

4.5 Corpus Representation and Processing Issues

As indicated in the previous section, namely section 4.4, the current study utilises a binary set of data due to its comparative orientation. The binary set of data includes spoken exchanges in Iraqi Arabic and British English.

The procedure that follows the process of data collection involves the presentation of data in preparation for a detailed analysis. This includes the systematic representation of spoken language in a written form, viz. transcription (Crystal, 2002: 470). In the current research, the pre-existing videos were retrieved from the sources mentioned in sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 above. Then these videos were Elanized, i.e. inputted into ELAN software and transcribed. In other words, the current Iraqi and British political corpora is stored on ELAN (Appendix A and B showcase various screen shots of the current Iraqi and British corpora in ELAN windows). During the transcription process, the researcher has also relied on Hansard and the minutes of proceedings. Namely the official transcripts were used initially

then these were transcribed verbatim during the analysis. Next the transcribed material were analysed following the parameters adopted in the current study.

The present research favours conversation analysis system that uses the Jefferson Notation System provided in Hutchby & Wooffitt (1998). However, the transcript notations are not strictly based on Jefferson's symbols. The list includes some modification from Levinson (1973), Williamson (1995), and myself. A list of transcription conventions is available on page xiv.

In-text representation of spoken exchanges from both the British and the Iraqi parliament use the above mentioned transcription system.

Moreover, exchanges from the Iraqi corpus are rendered accessible to the English reader through translation. The existence of various approaches to translation, necessitates adopting a perspective that fits the nature of the current investigation. As the research at hand is interested in meaning-related aspects of parliamentary discourse, not in specific discourse markers, the emphasis on the formal, grammatical aspects is of minor importance. Hence, the researcher adopts a perspective in which there is a balance in translating the elements that contribute to meaning of the exchanges in the source language. This perspective may be positioned between free translation, in its basic sense, without committing to either of its subtypes, and direct literal translation (see Ghazala, 2008:4-16) . In other words, producing a translation that accounts for some and/or all the grammar, vocabulary, style of Arabic and English as needed in the exchange in question.

An extra level of in-text representation is used for the Iraqi exchanges, namely these exchanges are also introduced using the non-Romanised Arabic orthography. However, this form of in-text representation of Arabic exchanges is only used when quoting from the extracts. The original Arabic transcripts of all of these translated extracts are included in Appendix I.

To determine the word distribution for the analytical categories adopted in the present research, the relevant text was exported from ELAN into a word document and then the word percentage was measured through the Word Count feature. Nonetheless, the frequency of occurrence for these categories was conducted by using the Search function in ELAN which enables the user to obtain the number of occurrences of a given structure, along with the relevant linguistic structure, within the annotated text (see Appendix C). The word and occurrence percentage of these categories were calculated manually using the Relative Frequency Formula (see Appendix D).

4.6 The Interactional Structure of Parliamentary Discourse

Parliamentary discourse is goal-oriented as is any institutional discourse. To execute its functions, parliaments device various tools, practices, internalised rules. Scrutinising the work of the government is one of the main roles of national parliaments. It involves practices designed to examine, challenge, evaluate the governmental agenda and the effectiveness of measures placed to accomplish that agenda.

The interrogative character of such parliamentary practices presupposes a question-answer sequence to structure its interactions. Furthermore, such practices involve inspection which entails a further addition to the question-answer sequence, namely a follow-up to examine the answer. This three-part interactional structure is a common one in institutional discourse, known as the initiation-response-follow up, henceforth IRF, exchange system.

In the British parliament, the discourse of PMQs utilises IRF pattern. In this parliamentary practice, members of the parliament, namely backbenchers form the party in office and the Opposition, together with the Leader of the Opposition examine, challenge the work of the government through questioning the Prime Minister. Members are allowed a single turn to ask their questions, i.e. they cannot follow up the PM's response with a further question. However, the case is different with the Leader of the Opposition as he/she is permitted up to six turns. This allows the leader of the opposition to follow up on the

replies provided by the Prime Minister. Hence, the interactional structure of PMQs' discourse exhibits a mixed pattern composed of initiation-response and initiation-response-follow up.

Harris (2001:460) suggests that turns in PMQs typically consist of "a series of propositions followed by a question frame + a final information or action seeking summarizing proposition''. Whereas the predominant form of questions in these turns is a polar (yes/no) interrogative frame (Harris, 2001:457).

Parliamentary interrogation is among scrutiny practices in the Iraqi parliament which is designed to examine the performance of the government. The discourse of parliamentary interrogation in the Iraqi parliament accommodates the IRF structure. Moreover, parliamentary interrogations in the Iraqi parliament may take place over several sessions. These interrogations can be thought of as consisting of several episodes or what I prefer to call communicative events (see the figure 4.1 below).

Figure 4.1A Structural Representation of Discourse in Parliamentary Interrogation in the Iraqi Parliament

Structurally speaking, these communicative events comprise quite a considerable number of IRFs that focus on a shared common topic. In other words, these communicative events represent a chain of IRFs connected with structural and semantic ties. It is through IRFs, specifically in follow ups, that impoliteness gets triggered and escalated, and concluded. Since impoliteness is mainly expressed and communicated in follow ups, it is important to explicate the nature of follows ups in the Iraqi parliamentary discourse. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to explore the structure of Iraqi parliamentary discourse.

In the context of this research, follow ups are understood as communicative acts that evaluate, challenge, accept, or negotiate a prior communicative act by ratified participants (Fetzer & Weizman, 2015: XI). Structurally, follow ups in the Iraqi parliament may occur either at a second or third position responding to a previous answer. A single follow up may either contain only an introductory component that evaluates, challenges, or criticises a previous response or in addition it may conclude with a further initiative element. In both cases a further response is required to which a further follow up is produced. In the case where the first follow up comprises only an introductory element, the second follow up will occupy a second position in the sequence, as demonstrated in figure 4.2 below. Let's call this kind of structuring as type A

Figure 4.2 The Structure of an IRF in the Iraqi Parliament, Type A

_____Initiation

_____Response

_____1st Follow up

_____Response

_____2nd Follow up----2nd position

Whereas if the first follow up includes both an introductory element and a further concluding initiation, the second follow up will occupy a third position in the sequence, as demonstrated in figure 4.3 below. Let's call this kind of structuring as type B.

Figure 4.3 The Structure of an IRF in the Iraqi Parliament, Type B

_____Initiation

_____Response

_____1st Follow up

_____Initiation

_____Response

_____2nd Follow up----3rd position

Moreover, as turn-allocations and turn types in the Iraqi parliament are predetermined in the rules of procedure. Article 53 of rules of procedure in the Iraqi parliament, privileges the questioning member, the Speaker, and whoever the latter permits to comment or ask for further explanation. Hence, only non-initiative utterances produced by the above-mentioned parliamentarians are qualified for a follow up status.

The cohesive ties among the structural elements of the IRF are taken into consideration as well in defining follow ups. So, this broad definition of follow ups embraces non-initiation, pre-allocated participation, and cohesion as its core criteria.

The position of the impolite structure within the IRF in the discourse of Iraqi parliament, namely in parliamentary interrogation, is inconsistent. In the current data set, it seems that the placement of an impolite construction is dependent on the interactional style of the questioning member.

During the questioning of Minister of Defence, Mr. Khalid Al-Obeidy, the questioning member Aliya Nassaif places the impoliteness both in the initiation and the follow up. Her initiations usually consist of a preface followed by or preceded by a question through which she builds her threat and/or attack. Then she escalates, enhances, makes explicit, and supports her impolite propositions with further official documentary evidence in the follow up. This pattern of distributing/building of impoliteness is also employed in another parliamentary interrogation under investigation, namely interrogating the Minister of Trade, Abdul-Fallah Al-Sudani, which is conducted by Sabah Al-Saady.

Whereas during the questioning of Mayor of Baghdad, Sabir Al-Isawi, Shirwan Al-Waeli manifests a mixed pattern. One is similar to Nassif's mode in which the initiation is composed of a preface followed by a question, and the attack is disseminated both in the initiation and the follow up. In a less frequent pattern, Al-Waeli confines the initiation for the introduction of a question, then presents the impoliteness in the follow ups.

4.7   Analytical Framework

The purpose of this section is to introduce the overall analytical framework adopted in the present study. The introduction of the framework consists of two parts: first the presentation of the theoretical perspective underlying it, and then the construction of the analytical framework through the amalgamation of its constituting components.

The philosophical position indicated in section 4.3 lays the foundation for the theoretical perspective adopted to approach impoliteness here. The current study adopts a version of an interactional approach to impoliteness proposed in Chang & Haugh (2011). Their interactional approach espouses an eclectic view of impoliteness that encompasses both a theory-based (im/politeness 2) and a layman's (im/politeness 1) understanding of im/politeness. It adopts the view that obtaining a comprehensive knowledge of impoliteness necessitates the inclusion of both analyst's and language user's understanding in researching impoliteness (Kadar & Haugh, 2013). In other words, the interactional approach adopts a

multiple epistemological perspective to enrich the understanding of impoliteness. However, the interactional approach adopted in the current research represents a modified form of the interactional approach introduced in Chang & Haugh's (2011).

In the interactional approach described in Chang & Haugh (2011), the authors argue that "evaluations of impoliteness are closely tied to converging and diverging interpretations of actions and meanings that are interactionally achieved in situated discourse,…as well as empirical and moral norms relative to which such evaluations arise''. They propose that analyst's inferences of such evaluations, arrived at through a close examination of relevant situated discourse, can be validated and grounded through examining perceptions of im/politeness of the same meanings and actions by different informants of the same sociocultural group. Chang & Haugh (2011) verify their arguments through investigating the speech act of apology interculturally. To infer the im/politeness evaluation of the apology , Chang & Haugh (2011) draw from earlier works on apology in interactional discourse in the relevant contexts. Mainly they examine the illocutionary force indicating devices, viz. IFIDs, and other structures used to express apology in relevant cultures. Then such analyst-constructed evaluations are compared with those of the informant's from the same sociocultural groups via questionnaire and follow-up interviews.

The modification to the interactional approach intended in the current research relate to implementing different and/or obtainable methods of data collection and analysis which arise out of the limitations, and challenges related to the context of investigation, and the intended scope of investigation here. These modifications are explained below.

The modification related to limitations in data collection methods includes the technique of gaining access to language user's evaluation of impoliteness. The present study does not claim to do this through the traditional means of eliciting data in Pragmatics such as Discourse Completion Task, Role plays, Pragmatic Scales, Questionnaire, or interviews as in Chang & Haugh (2011) research. Instead in my research I rely on participants'

metalanguage to capture their understanding, and consequently their evaluation of impoliteness in the parliamentary context.

The other modification relates to an analytical procedure employed in Chang & Haugh's (2011) work which is inaccessible in the present research. Chang & Haugh (2011) construct and compare their evaluation of a given linguistic behaviour as impolite or polite to the evaluation of that specific linguistic behaviour in the related linguistic literature. This particular procedure is not feasible for certain reasons. First, the current study does not focus on a specific speech act to investigate how it is used to express impoliteness in the parliamentary discourse. Besides, there's no pragmatic study that examines a given speech act in an Iraqi parliamentary or political discourse up to the point of writing this research. Hence, there's no Linguistic/Pragmatic literature on Iraqi political/parliamentary discourse to relate to and compare with a British equivalent discourse in the analysis. Therefore, constructing analysts' inferences of parliamentary impoliteness through the relevant literature in both the Iraqi and the British discourse is not possible here. Consequently, the identification of impoliteness in the present research relies on analyst's inferences and participant's understanding expressed in their impoliteness meta-pragmatic comments. Figure 4.4 below demonstrates this.

Figure 4.4 Sources of Impoliteness Identification in the Current Research

106

As mentioned earlier, these alternations are due to the intended scope of the current research, the challenges/limitations relevant to nature of the context in question, viz. political/parliamentary context. It is not the aim of this work to focus on a certain speech act nor any discourse marker within the Iraqi and British parliamentary discourse. Moreover, since the context of research is political, this matter imposed certain methodological and theoretical limitations. Having access to Iraqi and British politicians and securing their consent to participate in the research is somewhat not practical whether in Iraq or United Kingdom. In other words, establishing access to parliamentarians' understanding of impoliteness in Iraqi and British setting through research methods, such as interviews, questionnaires, discourse completion tasks, is not feasible. Consequently, this limitation resulted in relying on naturally occurring data collection procedure to be adopted in the present research. This methodological decision has partially guided the adoption of the theoretical stance for the current work, namely an interactional approach.

With these restrictions and challenges, an analytical framework was designed to explore parliamentary impoliteness through addressing the research questions outlined in section 4.2 above. The overall analytical framework draws on impoliteness related works both in institutional and non-institutional contexts. These studies include Bull et al.'s , 1996; Harris', 2001; Culpeper's (1996); Culpeper et al.'s, 2003; Culpeper's (2011a); Bousfield's (2007); Spencer-Oatey's (2008) ; and Bull & Wells' (2012) frameworks. All of these studies except Spencer-Oatey's (2008) and Culpeper's (2011a) follow the classic theories of im/politeness that define im/politeness in terms of analyst-constructed notions such "face'', "maxims'' , known as second-order im/politeness.

Such models concentrate on investigating communicative strategies employed by participants to communicate im/politeness. These particular studies comprising the current study's framework adopt Brown & Levinson 's (1987) face-saving model of politeness (see section 2.2.1). Whereas Spencer-Oatey 's (2008) rapport management model belongs to the

trend that promotes the view that im/politeness theories should concern itself with how participants understand im/politeness, i.e. first order of im/politeness. Spencer-Oatey (2008) introduces a face-based model that is more culture sensitive (see section 2.3.1).

In the following paragraphs, I introduce the relevant frameworks which are adopted to address each research question posed in in this study, and why each is selected.

The first research question focuses on exploring the key motivating concepts/factors that affect the communication/interpretation of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments. The study at hand adopts the perspective that an adequate face-based model has the potential to provide a theoretical explanation for what constitutes the communication of impoliteness in a parliamentary setting. Unveiling these factors contributes into identifying the types of impoliteness that may occur in these two settings due to the influence of such factors.

Thus, to uncover what concepts/factors underlie Iraqi and British parliamentarians' impolite linguistic behaviour, the present research adopts Spencer-Oatey (2008) rapport management theory. As explained in section 2.3.1, Spencer-Oatey (2008) argues that the management of social relations is governed by three underlying causes: face sensitivities, sociality rights, and interactional goals. The rationale behind the choice of Spencer-Oatey's (2008) rapport model is that her model offers adjustments that remedy many of the criticism directed at Brown & Levinson 's (1987) model (see section 2.3.1).

One such adjustment is the recognition and incorporation of sociality rights in her model. The inclusion of this element enables research to , I believe, encompass instances of impoliteness that arise due to infringing formal/informal institutional rules.This will also be useful to pin point the cultural and/or institutional similarities and differences in the expression and communication of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British context.

In her model, Spencer-Oatey (2007) introduces a multiple conceptualisation of face: personal face, collective face, and relational face. The application of this multiple conceptualisation of face in the parliamentary context is problematic. The problem relates to the identification/differentiation among collective and relational face in the parliamentary context considering the methodological framework adopted in the current study.

According to Spencer-Oatey's (2008) conceptualisation of face, personal face represents those self traits, such as abilities, competence, and appearances, which distinguish an individual from all others whereas collective/group face relates to those self traits that arise due to an individual's membership in larger groups. Hence, in parliamentary settings, the personal/individual face represents the personal political face, the collective face represents party political face.

However, the identification of Spencer-Oatey's (2008) relational self within parliamentary contexts is confusing since relational face involves a personalised attachment with other group members. Given the data collection method adopted in this study, it is not plausible to recognise such personalised attachments/bonds that parliamentarians may have with each other inside the parliament and/or with specific others in the wider political sphere. Thus, it follows that a relationship between two members of the same political party may signify both a party and relational face. Therefore Spencer-Oatey's (2008) conceptualisation of face is not adopted in this study.

In this context, various studies have empirically validated the significance of the notion of face in political settings such as political interviews and parliamentary contexts such as Jucker (1986). Also, Harris (2001) uses a face model to examine both politeness and impoliteness in the context of PMQs. A further argument for the value of face in political interviews is proposed in Bull et al. (1996) which is based on Goffman's (1967) conceptualisation of face. Goffman (1967) points out that in addition to defending one's own self, there's an obligation to defend the face of others, as well as sharing the same face with others.

Bull et al. (1996) argue, and empirically validate that Goffman's (1967) three-layered envision maps with the types of face concerns politicians may seek to attain in political interviews. Bull et al. (1996) argue that politicians, in the context of political interviews, have concerns over their own personal traits, and abilities that may influence their political performance. Similarly, politicians may have concerns over the face of their political colleagues and allies, i.e. they seek to defend their colleagues' politically significant attributes and decisions. Bull et al. (1996) further argue that politicians may share a face, i.e. a politician may act as a representative of a given party. Consequently, they recognise three faces for politicians to maintain: personal political face, significant others' face, and party face.

Building on Bull et al. 's (1996) argument, the present research claims that parliamentarians share the same face concerns that politicians demonstrate in political interviews considering that both political interviews and parliamentary interactions are subgenre of political discourse. Political discourse here is defined as talk or text delivered by political actors in political communicative activities (van Dijk, 1997:12-15).

In addition, the use of conventionalised impoliteness formulae, such as personal insults, surfaced in the current Iraqi and the British corpora. The use of such forms have not been accounted for in earlier studies of impoliteness in political or parliamentary discourse as in Bull et al. 's (1996), Harris' (2001), and Murphy's (2014) frameworks. However, the set of conventionalised impoliteness formulae that have occurred in the current British corpus fits with the set of conventionalised impoliteness formulae introduced in Culpeper's (2011a: 135-136). Conventionalised impoliteness formulae in the current Iraqi setting are identified based on the researcher's intuition as a native speaker and then classified according to Culpeper's (2011a) list of conventionalised impoliteness formulae. Thus the current study recognises the following types of face: personal political, personal, significant others', and party face. Hence, in the current research, I understand personal face to denote those

character attributes which are conventionally attacked in non-institutional/non-political settings such as daily social interactions. However, the current study, does not embraces Brown & Levinson's (1987) face-oriented model to explore the bases of impoliteness categorisation.

To turn to Spencer-Oatey's (2008) model, as explained earlier the management of social relation involves the management of interactional goals as well. Hence, it could be argued that parliamentarians may have interactional goals, whether relational or transactional ones, and the accomplishment of these goals may affect the manner in which they evaluate the linguistic contribution of other politicians.

However, due to methodological limitations explained in 4.4, namely those relating to methods of data collection, having access or knowledge of such goals is not feasible in the current research. As a result, this line of investigation will not be pursued in the context of this study.

In section 4.9, I introduce and exemplify the relevant analytical categories proposed in the above mentioned frameworks to reveal the possible factors that may affect politicians' communication/interpretation of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments.

In the previous paragraphs, I have introduced the relevant frameworks adopted to address the first research question which focuses on identifying possible factors involved in the communication/interpretation of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments. In the following paragraphs, I continue introducing the frameworks adopted to tackle the remaining research questions.

The second research question aims to examine the range of the linguistic strategies employed by the Iraqi and British parliamentarians to convey impoliteness in questioning turns. In the current research, these strategies are viewed as a variety of communicative, a mixture of discoursal and pragmatic, resources that speakers use to convey impoliteness and

which relate to the explicitness and effectiveness of impoliteness.

To identify these impoliteness strategies, the study at hand draws on strategies introduced in Bull & Wells (2012) and Harris (2001). These two studies are favoured here since both have explored impoliteness stratrgies in a parliamentary settings. In addition, Bull & Wells' (2012) study is more systematic and distinguishes between strategies communicated in questiong and answering turns, unlike Harris (2001)who ignores this distinction. Besides, Bull & Wells' (2012) study comprises most of the questiong strategies introduced by Harris (2001) along with extra ones. However, Harris (2001) distingushes two strategies that proved to be recurrent in my data, hence the inclusion here. Moreover, in this research no attempt is made to establish a link between the factors underlying the communication/interpretation of impoliteness and the linguistic strategies utilised to convey impoliteness. The typology of these impoliteness strategies are exmplified in 4.9 below.

To address the third research question which attempts to explore the possible patterns of counter impoliteness strategies, the present study adopts a typology of responses introduced in Bull & Wells' (2012) framework. However, analysis revealed the occurrence of strategies that have been accounted for in frameworks investigating impoliteness in non-institutional/political settings such as Culpeper's (1996), Culpeper et al.'s (2003), Bousfield's (2007) frameworks. Bousfield's (2007) framework of participant's response patterns to impoliteness was revised in Dobs & Blitvich's (2013) model who incorporate face-threat witnesses' responses to impoliteness research. Dobs & Blitvich (2013) argue that face-threat witness's, whom they define as "any participant, ratified or un-ratified who witnesses the initial FTA.", have an active role in the co-construction of impoliteness in polylogalic interactions. In the context of the current research, participants', other than the face-threat initiator and/or recipient, responses to impoliteness have not been disregarded. In particular, such responses have been utilised as one source of evidence for the perception of impoliteness. However, it is not within the scope of the present research to highlight and/or

distinguish among response patterns adopted by face-threat initiators/recipients and face-threat witnesses. The response strategies employed in the current research are exemplified in 4.9 below.

The last research question is an overarching one, non operationalizable, consisting of two subordinates. To answer these research questions, i.e. 4a and 4b, the researcher compares how the analytical categories described in 4.9 function in both settings. It is noteworthy to emphasize that the framework adopted in this research is both theory- and data-driven as categories have been repeatedly adjusted to reflect the examples emerging from the data. The combination of these models constitute the overall analytical framework adopted in this study, which is shown in figure 4.5 below.

Figure 4.5 The Structure of the Framework Adopted in the Current Research

Key Concepts of Parliamentary Impoliteness

FACE SENSITIVITIES ((1FC))

SOCIALITY RIGHTS ((2RS))

- PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE ((1PPFC))
- PARTY FACE ((1PFC))
- SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE ((1SOFC))
- PERSONAL FACE ((1FC-PI))

EQUITY RIGHTS ((2EQRS))

- Cost Benefit Considerations
- ((2EQRS-CB))
- Fairness & Reciprocity ((2EQRS-FR))
- Autonomy & Imposition ((2EQRS-AI))

ASSOCIATION RIGHTS ((2ARS))

- Involvement ((2ARS-IV))
- Empathy ((2ARS-EM))
- Respect ((2ARS-RC))

What type of Communicative strategies are employed within each analytical category to realise the impolite event?

u

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Communicative Strategies within the theoretical │
│  Categories that actualise the impolite event    │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Impoliteness Strategies in Initiation Turns

1. PREFACE **((ISs-PRF))**
2. DETAILED QUESTION **((ISs-DQ))**
3. CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITIONS **((ISs-CPS))** & CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE **((ISs-CIM))**
4. CONFLICTUAL QUESTION **((ISs-CFQ))**
5. INVITATION TO PERFORM FTA **((ISs-PFTA))**
6. METALANGUAGE of Q&A **((ISs-MQA))**

Counter-Impoliteness Strategies in Response Turns

1. OFFER AN EXPLANATION **((CISs-EXP))**
2. REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION **((CISs-R/DC))**
3. ATTACK **((CISs-AT))**
4. PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE **((CISs-PPF))**
5. ABROGATION **((CISs-AB))**
6. UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS **((CISs-USI))**
7. OPT OUT ON RECORD **((CISs-OPR))**
8. THIRD PARTY RECOURSE **((CISs-TPR))**

4.8   Analytical Procedures

Along the lines set by the research questions and the current framework, the following procedures were adopted in analysing the binary data set in the present research.

1) Organise the data into its structural components as illustrated in section 4.7, namely into communicative events/episodes if possible, then structure these further into IRFs.

2) Then identifying instances of impoliteness exchanges within the initiation turns in both Iraqi and British corpora.

3) The identification of impoliteness in the present research is based on the adopted theoretical stance. This theoretical stance appropriates a form of interactional approach to investigate impoliteness (Chang & Haugh, 2011) (see section 4.7). The interactional approach favours a mixed perspective in exploring impoliteness. It proposes to integrate both observer (the analyst) and users' (participants) understanding in the examination of impoliteness. In the current research identifying impolite utterances with an analyst's perspective involves adopting a scientific-theoretic conceptualisation of impoliteness. In other words, the analyst relies on theoretical/analytical constructs/concepts to understand impoliteness. These constructs include Spencer-Oatey's (2008) SOCIALITY RIGHTS, and Bull et al.'s (1996) and Culpeper's (2011a) manifestations of FACE. These categories are listed in section 4.9 below. The identification of impoliteness occurrences from participants' stance is detected through different sources of evidence. One such source is what is termed impoliteness evaluators/metalanguage (Kadar & Haugh, 2013:94) or co-text /impoliteness meta-pragmatic comments (Culpeper, 2011a:11 & 74). Other sources of evidence used include retrospective comments. These are comments /discussions made by participants and/or observers after the impoliteness event arguing whether the event is impolite or not. The use of conventional impoliteness formulae is also employed here as evidence of participant

understanding. All of these sources are employed in (Culpeper, 2011a). Moreover, response to impoliteness helps to understand how the addressee perceives it. Hence, the response of the addressee is included in all of the extracts cited in the current research.

4) Then within the impoliteness exchanges categorised above, identify impoliteness linguistic strategies adopted and modified from Harris (2001) and Bull & Wells (2012) which will be clarified and exemplified in section 4.9. Linguistic strategies of impoliteness are identified in questioning/initiation turns only.

5) Then within the response turns, identify response strategies as introduced in figure 4.3. these counter impoliteness strategies are based on Culpeper's (1996), Culpeper et al.'s (2003) Bousfield's (2007) and Bull & Wells' (2012) frameworks.

6) The analytical categories identified in steps (2), (4), and (5) are quantified descriptively. The quantitative tests include the distribution of the relevant analytical categories both in terms of word percentages and frequency of occurrences. Such tests are utilised to compare and account for the nature of impoliteness with regard to the relevant analytical categories in the Iraqi and British parliamentary discourse. The tests carried out here are descriptive in nature, i.e. intended to summarise and present the findings in a more meaningful manner. In other words, the quantitative results in the current research are not statistically valid/significant.

7) The above-mentioned procedures are conducted on data sets from the Iraqi and British parliamentary discourse.

8) Then a comparison is made between Iraqi and British parliamentarian's behaviour in terms of the parameters identified above, namely the factors affecting the type of impoliteness employed, communicative strategies used to express impoliteness, the strategies adopted to respond to impoliteness.

In this research, it has to be stressed that the distinction between impoliteness arising from affecting the FACE SENSITIVITIES and infringing SOCIALITY RIGHTS is not

always a clear cut. For example, to restrict the future action of the Prime Minister by requesting him/her to commit to a future policy may be seen as both infringing the Prime Minister's freedom of action and/or threatening his personal political face when failing to do so. Similarly, it is difficult to draw a straightforward line between the various manifestations of FACE SENSITIVITIES in the current binary corpora.

4.9   Analytical Categories

The analytical categories investigated in this study include constructions adopted from Culpeper's (1996), Bull et al.'s (1996), Harris' (2001), Culpeper et al.'s (2003), Bousfield's (2007), Spencer-Oatey's (2008), Culpeper's (2011a) and Bull & Wells' (2012) frames. These categories are explained, exemplified in the following sections.

4.9.1   FACE SENSITIVITIES

Face sensitivities relate to politicians' desire to be approved within the political atmosphere. According to Bull et al. (1996), politicians have three face sensitivities: PERSONAL POLITICAL, PARTY, and SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE. Moreover, my corpus indicated the presence of a further type, namely PERSONAL FACE in which conventionalised impoliteness formulae, such as personal insults, were used to attack the face of a political rival. Attributes that constitute each of these aspects of face may influence parliamentarians' orientation to either construct, enhance or threaten interpersonal relations. Impoliteness arising from attacking these four face types are explained and exemplified below.

4.9.1.1   PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE

This category refers to politicians' fundamental desire that their politically significant individuated personal traits, abilities, ideologies, decisions, etc. are accepted and valued positively in the political sphere, viz. by relevant audience. This category is illustrated with examples from the Iraqi and the British parliaments.

[Extract 1, Al-Isawi's Interrogation, 3rd Session, Nov 2011]

[Context**:** *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (2) above. In this particular extract, Al-Waeli attempts to uncover Al-Isawi's alleged corruption by demonstrating the latter's failure/incompetence in monitoring projects which led to the loss of billions of public money and poor public service.*]

```
01  Al-Isawi: …the Rusafah project is handled with integrity professionalism and
02            work is progressing well (0.5) it is a great accomplishment ((CISs-
03            PPF))…but I know the motives behind attacking this project (0.5)
04            ((CISs-AT: 1PPFC)) but I don't want to affect the objectivity of the
05            interrogation
06  Al-Waeli: what mr Mayor is saying is not acceptable…. and this report mr
07            Speaker I have received it yesterday…and this is a statement from a
08            professional manager who says that work progress has reached only
09            (48%) and what mr mayor declares is misleading
10            ((1PPFC))((ISs-PRF))
11  Al-Isawi: I won't allow you to say misleading ( . ) ((CISs-AT:1PPFC)) my
12            information is all correct and (0.5) your information is incomplete
13            and selective ((CISs-AT:1PPFC))
14  Al-Waeli: I am your questioner and all my information is correct and yours is
15            a press release ((1PPFC))…I dare you if Baghdadis drank water by
16            the 1st of October ((1PPFC)) … the progress of the project is slow
17            and I insist it is (48%) ((1PPFC))((ISs-PRF))…
```

The above extract is part of a longer exchange in the interrogation in which Al-Waeli extensively demonstrates to his audience how Al-Isawi has failed to properly manage a vital project in Baghdad, namely Rusafah Water Project. In an earlier discourse, Al-Waeli shows how Al-Isawi has unprofessionally assigned the project to an unqualified and unregistered company which required even higher cost expenses, and has also highlighted many other aspects of violating the standard regulations in implementing governmental contracts. All of these claims have been challenged and rejected by Al-Isawi repeatedly. In the above extract, Al-Waeli continues demonstrating how Al-Isawi mismanages the regulations in executing such projects. In particular, Al-Waeli states that the work progress has reached only 48% after 28 months, which goes against what is agreed upon in the contract, and that Al-Isawi has not taken any disciplinary action to penalize the company. Moreover, Al-Isawi provides unauthentic figures regarding the work progress, claims Al-Waeli in line 15. By demonstrating these issues, Al-Waeli is challenging and accusing the Mayor of Baghdad of

119

negligence, incompetence. All of these accusations of not properly, skilfully, and ethically managing a project that is very vital for the public represent attacks against Al-Isawi's PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE. Al-Waeli targets the Mayor's credibility, integrity and efficiency. In line 11 above, Al-Isawi counter attacks and rejects Al-Waeli's accusations emphasizing that his work progress figures are authentic and those provided by the questioner are false.

The example below illustrates PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE being attacked in the current PMQs corpus.

[Extract 2, PMQs/25 Mar 2015- CE]

[Context: *This PMQs session is the last one before the 2015 United Kingdom general election. The election was held on the 7th of May to elect members to the House of Commons, the lower house of the parliament of the United Kingdom. At the time, Miliband was the Leader of the Labour Party which since 2010 is the Official Opposition in the United Kingdom parliament as it the party with the second-largest number of seats in the House of Commons. As a result, Miliband was also the Leader of the Opposition since 2010 till the announcement of his resignation on 8th May 2015 following Labour's defeat by the Conservative Party at the 2015 general election. Whereas Cameron was then the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Leader of the Conservative Party which is the governing party since 2010, although in coalition with the Liberal Democrats sine 2010 till May 2015. Cameron resigned from both posts after the unfavourable result of a national referendum on European Union membership introduced by the Conservative party as a manifesto commitment. Both Conservative and Labour constitute the two major parties in the United Kingdom. The PMQs that were held at times close to the election date were mainly employed for campaign purposes, i.e. employed to excessively attack the opponent and promote oneself. The current extract falls within such a context which may be termed as 'campaign discourse' within the overall PMQs discourse. In these sessions, both party*

leaders engage themselves in mutual attacks by stressing the disadvantageous policies and

decisions of the other.]

```
01   Miliband (LO, Lab) : mr Speaker there's only one person who is gonna raise taxes on
02           ordinary family and that's  him ((1PPFC)) and he is gonna cut the national
03           health service ((1PPFC)). and he didn't answer the question((1PPFC))
04           ((ISs-PRF)) and let's ask him a question about the NHS (0.5) five years ago
05           he promised no top-down reorganisation of the NHS. now (.) this is an easy
06           one (.) can he confirm that's a broken promise? yes or no? ((1PPFC))
07           ((ISs-CFQ))((ISs-PFTA))
08   Cameron (PM, Con): I'll tell him what's happening in the NHS (0.5) 9,000 more
09           doctors 7,000 more nurses and 20,000 more bureaucrats. but we've heard it
10           now. a clear promise on VAT from this side of the house ((CISs-PPF:
11           1PFC)) and no answer on national insurance from that side of the house (0.5)
12           ((CISs-AT: 1PPFC)) and it goes to a bigger point mr Speaker (.) he's had
13           five years to come up with an economic plan he's had five years to work out
14           some policies for the future of this country. he's had five years to demonstrate
15           some leadership(.) and he's failed on every count ((CISs-AT: 1PPFC))
```

In the above exchange, the then Leader of the Opposition Ed Miliband launches a series

of attacks at Cameron's PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE. Miliband attacks the Prime

Minister's PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE through highlighting the latter's decisions and

policies that are both unpopular with and vitally relevant to the electorate, e.g. policies

related to taxing and the NHS. In lines 1-2, Miliband states that Cameron is the one who will

increase taxation for the families, and cut their health services. Moreover, in line 3, Miliband

points out that Cameron has not replied to one of his previous questions which is in itself

face threatening. That question relates to whether Cameron can confirm that the spending

cuts he plans for the next three years will be even greater than those seen in the last five

years. In response to that question, Cameron equivocates, i.e. does not provide a direct, and

explicit reply but rather evades it, since it is a conflictual question (see section 4.9.3.4

below). In other words, both an affirmative and negative answer will be face damaging for

Cameron. Whether Cameron confirms or denies that the spending cuts he plans for the next

three years will be even greater than those seen in the last five years, the result is that still

there will be spending cuts with a Tory led government. Thus by pinpointing out Cameron's

past and future adverse policies, Miliband is attacking the former's trustworthiness, and dependability, i.e. attacking his PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE.

In another PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE attack in this interaction, lines 5-7, Miliband seeks another confirmation of Cameron, i.e. asks Cameron to assert that his promise concerning NHS-reorganisation has been broken. In the 2010 election, Cameron had pledged in his Conservative party manifesto that there would be no top-down reorganisation in the NHS. He even re-confirmed this commitment in his coalition government agreement with the Liberal Democrats in various occasions.

However, Cameron launched what is described as the biggest top-down reorganisation in the NHS through the Health and Social Care Act 2012. Again the question here is a conflictual one, i.e. regardless of whether Cameron agrees that it is a broken promise or not, he will lose his credibility. Hence, Miliband attacks the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of Cameron. Indeed, Cameron does equivocate on this question as well. Instead of answering it, Cameron promotes the face of the Conservative government in lines 8-11, then he attacks Miliband for not providing an answer to a previous question he posed on Labour's national insurance tax in line10 . Cameron continues attacking Miliband's PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE by stating that he lacks the leadership and competence to run the country, lines 12-14.

4.9.1.2 *PARTY FACE*

This category refers to a parliamentarians' desire that their politically valid attributes which are shared with members of their relevant party are accepted, valued in the political sphere, viz. by the relevant audience. Namely, PARTY FACE is construed when a member of a given party represents that party. This category is exemplified below with instances from the Iraqi and the British corpora respectively.

[Extract 3, Parliamentary Session, 10ᵗʰ Jan 2013]

[Context: *In this interaction Al-Mullah argues with the then Speaker of the Iraqi parliament, Al-Nujayfi, regarding the former's fruitless attempts to question the then Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research. The Minister is a member of the State of Law Coalition, a Shia-Islamist Iraqi political party, whereas Al-Mullah is a member of Al-Iraqiya List, a secular nationalist alliance. These two political bodies are in a continuous state of ideological and political conflict. State of Law Coalition was the Coalition in office back then and Al-Iraqiya was its strongest adversary*.]

```
01  Al-Mullah:… questioning government officials is stated under Articles 58 and
02              61 of the rules of procedure … we had only two questioning
03              sessions performed perfectly with all my due respect (.) by our
04              brothers in the State of Law Coalition. the question is (.) are political
05              parties allowed to question government officials?! ((ISs-CIM))
06              ((1PFC)) … mr Speaker are political parties other than the State of
07              Law Coalition allowed to question government officials or not?
08              ((ISs-CIM)) ((1PFC))
09  Mr. Speaker Al-Nujayfi: of course all parties are allowed
10  Al-Mullah: then table the questioning in the agenda (.) then why is the delay?
11              ((ISs-CPS))((1PFC)) no member other than the State of Law
12              Coalition representatives' can question government officials!
13              ((1PFC)) why?
```

The above exchange exemplifies an attack at PARTY FACE as it threatens (attacks) the social/political identity face of the State of Law coalition members, i.e. their social/political identity as members of party in question and members of the Iraqi parliament. Al-Mullah launches his attack in steps. He first preludes by posing what seems on the surface a genuine attempt to seek information, namely the interrogative structure in line 4-5 'the question is: are political parties allowed to question government officials?!'. This is a face attacking rhetorical question as it implies that there is a motive behind not being able to question the Minister of Higher Education since both the Constitution and the rules of the procedure grant such a right for parliamentarians. After clarifying that the application process to question the Minister was technically acceptable , Al-Mullah rephrases his earlier question as follows 'mr Speaker are political parties other than state of law coalition allowed to question government

officials or not?'. Al-Mullah's latest rhetorical question implies that no political parties other than the State of Law Coalition are allowed to question government officials and that State of Law Coalition members are, therefore, receiving preferential treatment. This is an accusation aimed the State of Law Coalition. In lines 11-12, Al-Mullah then repeats his accusation openly in a declarative form and with an emphatic tone 'no member other than the State of Law Coalition representatives can question government officials! why?'. Al-Mullah also tags his declarative proposition with a "Wh-'' question word, namely "why'', to re-inquire about the motivation behind his alleged claim/accusation that only State of Law Coalition can question officials.

These repetitions serve to enhance and affirm the accusation Al-Mullah initially implied to his audience. More directly, Al-Mullah's utterances ultimately imply that the State of Law Coalition holds the power to control which officials are to be questioned. Consequently, it also implies that the State of Law Coalition intentionally prevents its ministerial members from being questioned. This prevention raises suspicions such as that they are failing to properly run the ministerial affairs. Raising such a suspicion, that the party plans to cover the incompetence or even the corruption of its ministers, is an attack to their PARTY FACE.

The perception of impoliteness is confirmed in a subsequent discourse by the comments of two State of Law Coalition members, namely Al-Hilee and Ghadhban. Both challenge and deny the claims of Al-Mullah, and attack him back demanding his statements, in which he attacks/disrespects the party, to be removed.

A further instance of attacking the PARTY FACE can be illustrated with the following extract from the current British corpus.

[Extract 4, PMQs/25 Mar 2015- CE]

[Context: *The current interaction can be positioned within the 'campaign discourse', for a full contextualisation see extract 2 above. In this particular extract, the then Leader of the Opposition Miliband attacks the Conservative's taxation policy, namely the top rate of*

124

income tax. During their last government, 2005-2010, Labour has increased the top rate of income tax for those who earn more than £150,000 from 40p to 50 p on grounds of a fair taxation system. Whereas the Conservative party, in its 2012 budget, has cut the income tax to 45p in collaboration with the Liberal Democrats, their Coalition government partners. The economical effectiveness of such a measure is an issue of dispute among the two main parties as both claim the robustness of their arguments. Labour argues that raising the top rate of income tax creates extra tax revenues unlike the Conservative who believe the opposite. However, how the wider population digests such taxation approaches creates a political echo for the parties involved. Labour and many other public bodies view and advertise this budgetary move as benefiting the high-earning tax-payer and as unfair to the lowest paid workers.]

```
01   Miliband (LO, Lab): … now let's try him on one more (0.5) three years ago he
02          promised three years ago he cut the top rate of income tax. can he rule out
03          under a Tory government a further cut in the top rate of income tax?
04          ((1PFC))((ISs-CFQ))
05   Cameron (PM, Con): the richest in this country are paying more tax under this
06          government than they paid under the last government ((CISs-AT: 1PFC)).
07          we've set out our plans for tax cuts (0.5) if you are young and you work hard
08          (.) you'll get an apprenticeship (.) if you're a family we'll take you out of tax
09          until you earn £12,500. I do not want to see middle-income families drawn
10          into the top rate of tax…. ((CISs-EXP)). now let him make a promise (0.5)
11          will he increase national insurance? yes or no? ((CISs-AT: 1PPFC))
```

In the above interaction, the then Leader of the Opposition Miliband attacks the credibility of the Conservative cabinet headed by the then Prime Minister, Cameron. In this context, Cameron is treated as representing the collective face of the Conservative Government.

Miliband challenges the credibility of certain promises delivered by the head of the Tory government. In other words, Miliband implicitly accuses the Conservative government of acting hypocritically as it pledges itself into measures it cannot keep. Furthermore, Miliband attacks the unfairness of the Conservative cabinet's tax policies. The accusations are implied through the use of a conflictual question as explained below.

In lines 2-3, Miliband requests a confirmation from Cameron that there will be no such tax cuts in future. The request to confirm or deny the continuity of the tax cut is expressed through an interrogative structure, i.e. a question. This question is a conflictual one as all replies are equally face damaging for Cameron's cabinet.

On the one hand, if Cameron affirms ruling out such cuts, he will restrict the cabinet's future policies as it might not be desirable to some of his cabinet members. Indeed, it was only a few months later when reports emerged that Osborne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer then, namely in the subsequent Conservative government of 2015 election, is facing pressure from 160 Tories to cut the top rate of income tax from 45p to 40p. On the other hand, if Cameron denies ruling out such cuts, then he will be confirming that such unfavourable cuts will continue in the future. Cameron avoids answering the question. Hence the possibility of this disadvantageous cut to occur in the future is left open.

Considering Labour's position on this tax cuts, the continuity of these cuts may confirm that the Conservative government's policies, which are benefiting the rich at the expense of harming the poor, will continue to do so in the future. Miliband's question helps to reinforce the perception that the Conservative party is 'the party of the rich'. This is an attack at Cameron's PARTY FACE as it challenges the inclusiveness and fairness of its policies. Cameron's response, in lines 5-6, may indicate that the attack to PARTY FACE is perceived as such, namely he denies Miliband's proposition/view that the rich are paying less under the Conservative government. Rather, Cameron states the opposite, namely that the rich have paid less under the previous Labour government.

4.9.1.3   SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE

This category refers to parliamentarians' desire to defend the face of their political colleagues and allies. That is to say, the category signifies parliamentarians' desire that the politically significant attributes, policies, and decisions of their colleagues, and political

allies are accepted and valued by a political audience. This category is exemplified below with an extract from the Iraqi corpus.

[Extract 5, Al-Obaidi's Interrogation, Aug 2016]

[Context**:** *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (3) above*. In the extract below, Nassaif raises accusations against the Minister's son for abusing his father's authority.]

```
01 Nassaif: ... what is your son's relation ( . ) who threatens the Korean company
02          (0.5) and forces it to assign 50% of a its contract for developing Al-
03          Swayrah military air base to himself and his partner ((1SOFC)) otherwise
04          the contract will be assigned to another company (0.5) he also informed
05          the Korean company that expelling their general manager is only a
06          warning bell ((1SOFC)) this is a complaint submitted by the Korean
07          company ((ISs-PRF))
08 Al-Obaidi:... I DARE HER IF SHE COULD PROVIDE ANY EVIDENCE
09          THAT CONNECTS MY SON FANAR TO ANY OF THIS
10          ((CISs-AT: 1PPFC))
```

In the extract above, Nassaif attacks the Minister's son, Fanar, for abusing his father's authority to gain personal favours. Namely, she accuses him of directly interfering in concluding governmental contracts for personal interests. Nassaif further reports that Fanar has expelled the general manager of the Korean company which is supposed to execute the construction and development of an Iraqi airbase. By attacking Al-Obaidi's son Nassaif is attacking the fatherhood attribute in the Minister. Hence activating and attacking a relationship with a significant other, viz. his son. These direct accusations against the Minister's son also imply further indirect accusations against Al-Obaidi himself for intentionally and/or unintentionally allowing his son to intervene in managing ministerial duties and responsibilities. The attack is perceived by Al-Obaidi who denies it and challenges Nassaif to be provide proof of his son's alleged interference.

This category is further exemplified with an extract from the current British corpus.

[Extract 6, PMQs/15 June 2016-CC]

[Context: *The above exchange falls within the Brexit narrative. The word 'Brexit' itself came into being in an article by Peter Wilding in 15th May 2012 in reference to a possible United Kingdom departure from the European Union (EU). The Conservative Party pledged, in*

their manifesto for the 2015 general election, to hold an in/out referendum on United Kingdom's membership of the EU before the end of 2017. There was a lack of agreement among the Conservatives over Brexit as party members were mainly divided into those campaigning to remain within the EU and those supporting a leave-campaign. Cameron, together with many other Conservatives, has adopted a remain-campaign. So did the Leader of the Opposition and almost all Labour members. However, some high-profile Conservative cabinet ministers embraced the leave campaign, such as "the honourable member for Uxbridge", i.e Boris Johnson, the former Mayor of London for two terms and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs at the time, and "the honourable member for Surrey Heath", i.e. Michael Gove, then Secretary of State for Justice. The extract makes reference to a quote in a 2003 book authored by Boris Johnson, namely Lend me your ears, The essential Boris Johnson.]

```
01  Corbyn (LO, Lab):…a major funder mr Speaker of the leave campaign said and I
02          quote (0.5) if it were up to me I'd privatise the national health service (0.5)
03          the honourable member for Uxbridge said (.) if people have to pay for NHS
04          services they will value them more ((1SOFC)).both he and the honourable
05          member for Surrey Heath are members of the government who have put the
06          NHS into record deficit. these people are now masquerading as the saviours
07          of the NHS (0.5) wolves in sheep's clothing ((1SOFC))((ISs-PRF)). didn't
08          the honourable member for Totnes get it right when she rejected the duplicity
09          of this argument in the leave campaign (.) and decided to join the remain
10          campaign?
11  Cameron (PM, Con): I was delighted with what my honourable friend the member for
12          Totnes said about changing her mind ( . ) which is a brave thing for politicians
13          to do ( . ) and saying that she thought that the NHS would be safer if we
14          remained inside a reformed European Union ((CISs-PPF:1SOFC)). I believe
15          that very profoundly (0.5) because the key to a strong NHS is a strong
16          economy. an I think there cannot be any doubt ( . ) with nine out of 10
17          economists ( . ) the Governor of the Bank of England ( . ) the International
18          Monetary Fund the OECD and all these other organisations (. ) saying that
19          our economy will be stronger (. ) and it is a strong economy that delivers
20          a strong NHS.
```

Both Johnson and Gove are members in Cameron's cabinet and at the same time they are high-profile political colleagues, i.e. they are significant to Cameron. Having a different opinion on Brexit does not alter this relation. It is in this sense that attacking Johnson and Gove's political stance is viewed as an attack to SIGNIFICANT OTHER'S FACE.

In the above exchange, Corbyn criticises the deceitfulness of Johnson and Gove's leave-campaign strategy. In order to accomplish this, Corbyn reminds the audience of Johnson's most controversial arguments, namely the privatisation of NHS. In lines 1-4, Corbyn refers to Johnson's advocation of NHS privatisation. Advocating the privatisation of NHS may deprive a large proportion of the public the chance to access free health services. Accordingly, Johnson's stance is portrayed as destroying NHS services. Then, in lines 4-7, Corbyn hints to Johnson and Gove's stance on post-Brexit NHS funding. Boris Johnson had promised/claimed that leaving the EU would save £350 million a week to spend on the NHS. A position that is intended to be seen as supportive of NHS free health service continuity. Hence, Boris Johnson is acting as a saviour of the NHS, to use Corbyn's words.

By demonstrating Boris Johnson's contradictory/opposing positions on NHS, Corbyn is able to expose the duplicity of his argument. Moreover, Corbyn enhances his attack through the use of an idiom 'wolves in sheep's clothing' implying the deceitfulness of their argument. Cameron nonetheless ignores reacting with any sort of remark on the part of Corbyn's discourse where his colleagues' FACE, Johnson and Gove's, is being attacked. Instead, Cameron picks Corbyn's question in lines 7-10, which invokes a Conservative member's Anti-Brexit stance, viz. Sarah Wollaston's, to respond to. Namely, Cameron decides to eulogise Wollaston's, then a Conservative colleague, position on EU membership. By avoiding to join Corbyn in attacking Johnson and Gove's FACE, Cameron's is saving the FACE of SIGNIFICANT OTHERS, i.e. Cameron's political colleagues.

4.9.1.4 *PERSONAL FACE*

In the context of the current research, PERSONAL FACE is used to signify character attributes which are personal/non-political. Here I understand personal/non-political attributes as those which are conventionally attacked in non-political/social interactions such as cowardliness. In other words, PERSONAL FACE attacks as those involving the use of conventionalised impoliteness formulae which are commonly employed in non-institutional

contexts, i.e. everyday life social interactions. Hence, these are non-political/personal only in the sense that they include impoliteness structures which are conventional in social interactions such as insults, for example. Appendix F introduces an exhaustive list of the conventionalised impoliteness formulae in the current British parliamentary discourse. This list is developed and modified by drawing on Culpeper's (2011a) conventionalised impoliteness formulae.

This category is exemplified below with two exchanges from the current British corpus. Each exchange represents a subtype of insults recognised in the current PMQs corpus, namely Third Person Negative Indirect Reference and Third Person Negative Direct Reference respectively. Moreover, for an instance of employing insults in the present Iraqi corpus, see extract 32 below.

[Extract 7, PMQs/14 Jan 2015-CE]

[Context**:** *This extract, along with similar others, originated when four broadcasters, namely the BBC, Sky News, ITV and Channel 4, announced proposals for TV election debates ahead of the United Kingdom General Election on 7 May 2015. The broadcasters designed the debates to be as follows: a head-to-head debate between the then Prime Minister David Cameron and the then Leader of the Opposition Ed Miliband; a three-way debate among the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat leaders, namely Cameron, Miliband and Nick Clegg; a four-way debate among Cameron, Miliband and Nick Clegg, and the leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Nigel Farage. However, Cameron expressed concerns over the exclusion of some minor political parties such as the Green Party whereas parties of similar stature, i.e. UKIP, were included in the debates. Also other political parties such as the SNP, which is the third largest party in the United Kingdom in terms of membership, named their exclusion from these debates as unacceptable*.]

```
01  Miliband (LO, Lab): …now we all understand that as long ago (.) as last Thursday
02              his abiding passion was to give the Green party a platform (.) but it's frankly
03              a pathetic! excuse ((1FC-PI))(( jeering and cheering sounds)) … now is he
04              really telling is he really telling the people of Britain that he's gonna seek to
05              deny them the television debates (.) if he does not get to choose who is in
```

```
06          them?((1PPFC))
07  Cameron (PM, Con):  we had a set of European elections this year (0.5) and UKIP
08          and the Greens both beat the Liberal Democrats ((turns to Nick Clegg)) I'm
09          afraid to say (0.5) ((laughter sounds)) it is very simple (.) you either have
10          both of them (.) or you have none of them. so let me ask him again why is
11          he so chicken ((CISs-AT: 1FC-PI))  when it comes to the Greens?
```

This interaction, along with similar others, constitutes a discourse within PMQs and the British political media that can be termed as 'debates over TV debates'. These interactions appear in several PMQs, namely in 14 Jan 2015, 4 Mar 2015, and 11 Mar 2015, to name only those occurring within the data range of the current study. In the series of PMQs that hosted such interactions, the current session is the last one, to the researcher's best knowledge. In these interactions, both the then Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition exchange personal attacks at each other using the third person mode of address.

In the current extract, Miliband challenges and attacks Cameron for refusing to join the former in a two-way televised debate. Cameron declared that his refusal is due to the fact that the proposed series of televised debates excludes some minor political parties such as the Green party. However, Miliband condescendingly declares that such an excuse is a pitiful excuse, lines 2-3. Then he continues to further seek a confirmation of non-attendance from Cameron reflecting that such a rejection may mean favouring personal political interest over the national one. To such a proposal, Cameron repeats his previous argument of the necessity to include all minor political parties in such debates. Moreover, Cameron counter-attacks by presupposing that Miliband is avoiding to debate with the Green party because he is lacking the courage to do so. In other words, Cameron is insulting Miliband by presupposing that he is scared and behaving cowardly because he is afraid to debate with the Green party in fear of losing, lines 10-11.

Another form of personal insults in the context of PMQs, is using reference structures with negative meanings when addressing political opponents. Thus, the extract below exemplifies the usage of Third Person Negative Direct Reference type of personal insults.

131

[Extract 8, PMQs/14 Jan 2015-CE]

[Context: *See the contextualisation of extract 7 above*.]

```
01  Cameron (PM, Con):  … so I ask him again (.) when he looks at the Green party
02              (0.5) why is he so scared? ((CISs-AT: 1FC-PI))
03  Miliband (Lo, Lab): mr Speaker I'll debate anyone the broadcasters invite to
04              debate…he has run out of excuses (0.5) he is running scared of these debates
05              (.) and in the words of his heroine (.) lady Thatcher he's frit ((1FC-PI))
```

This extract is part of the same session from which the previous extract is quoted. In this excerpt, Cameron continues to attack, and insult Miliband by proposing that he is scared, and frightened to debate with the Green party, lines 1-2. Miliband responds by denying that he refuses a debate with any party suggested by the organising body, namely the broadcasters. Then he insults Cameron by referring to the latter using a negative reference forms of address, namely 'scared' and 'frit'. Miliband addresses Cameron, through the Speaker of the House of Commons, hence, this constitutes a third-person negative reference. Furthermore, Miliband revives an insult form, viz. 'frit', from the linguistic legacy of Margaret Thatcher, Cameron's predecessor as British Tory Prime Minister. Thatcher introduced the word 'frit', which is a regional form of insult mainly used in Lincolnshire dialect, into political discourse when attacking the then Leader of the Labour and the Opposition Denis Healey in early 1983.Hence, Miliband's attack is intensified as he is attacking Cameron using a weapon coined by a former fellow Conservative Prime Minister. The word became popular in such contexts since then. For example, it has recently been used by the veteran Labour member Dennis Skinner to attack the Conservative current Prime Minister Teresa May in December 2018.

4.9.2   SOCIALITY RIGHTS

This category relates to social and/or institutional expectancies that parliamentarians develop regarding what is prescribed, what is permitted, and what is proscribed in a parliamentary setting. Spencer-Oatey & Jiang (2003) propose that such behavioural expectations can be formulated as two superordinate interactional principles, namely EQUITY RIGHTS and

ASSOCIATION RIGHTS. These two superordinate categories together with their subclasses are explained and exemplified below.

4.9.2.1 *EQUITY RIGHTS*

In the current research, it is argued that parliamentarians "have a fundamental belief that they are entitled to personal consideration from others and to be treated fairly; in other words, that they are not unduly imposed upon, that they are not unfairly ordered about, and that they are not taken advantage of or exploited.''(Spencer-Oatey, 2005:100). This category can be manifested in three forms: Cost Benefit Considerations, Fairness and Reciprocity, and Autonomy and Imposition. Each of these subcategories are listed, exemplified below.

A. *Cost Benefit Considerations*

This category relates to parliamentarians' expectation that they should not be exploited or disadvantaged in any way or another. To exemplify this category, consider the extract cited below from the current Iraqi corpus.

[Extract 9, Al-Isawi's Interrogation, 1st Session, Nov 2011]

[Context: *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (2) above. In this particular extract, the Mayor of Baghdad, Al-Isawi, is reading from an official letter in response to an earlier question posed by the questioner Al-Sudani*.]

```
01  Al-Isawi: … authorizing mr Mayor of Baghdad ( . ) the accreditation to directly
02            negotiate with specialised foreign firms to execute the work listed
03            under the plan of supporting the mayoralty of Baghdad….these are
04            two plans conducted with non-competitive tender meaning no
05            competition among companies((CISs-EXP)) //
06  Al-Waeli:                              the answer is clear and
07            complete ((2EQRS-CB))
08  Al-Isawi : no this is an official letter ( . ) I am reading an official letter //
09  Al-Waeli:                                        yes this
10             an official letter
11  Al-Isawi: allow me to continue reading
12  Mr. Speaker Al-Nujayfi: continue continue
13  Al-Isawi: allow me to just complete reading the script of the decree ( . ) this
14            is a parliamentary interrogation not parliamentary hosting (0.5) you
15            must give me the right and time to proceed and complete this
```

The exchange above is intended to exemplify how language may be employed by politicians to attack others through infringing social expectations. In particular, it illustrates how cost-benefit expectations may affect Iraqi parliamentarians' judgement regarding the acceptability of a proposition. In line 6 above, the questioner Al-Waeli forces Al-Isawi to terminate his turn by stating that Al-Isawi's turn is completed. This can be viewed as an imposition on Al-Isawi's freedom of action and it can also be regarded as offensive by Al-Isawi as it infringes his EQUITY RIGHT, namely his right not to be exploited or disadvantaged. This right or behavioural expectation is explicitly appealed to by Al-Isawi, in lines 14-15. In other words, this interruption is viewed, at least by Isawi himself, as infringing his right to reply in a manner and duration that seems appropriate to him.

Moreover, Al-Isawi explains the consequences/cost of Al-Waeli's command in line 14, 'this is parliamentary interrogation not parliamentary hosting'. He states that terminating his response earlier than expected may result in producing incomplete answers which may reflect an inaccurate description of the incident under discussion, at least from Al-Isawi's perspective. Such an inaccurate description may have legal consequences for Al-Isawi as he is being interrogated. As pointed out in Chapter Three, parliamentary interrogations, unlike parliamentary hosting, may result in a vote of non-confidence if parliament deems the questionee's replies to be unconvincing. In other words, providing such a distorted picture may lead to Al-Isawi being judged as inefficient in his governmental post and hence withdrawing confidence from him, i.e. automatic resignation. It might also lead to affirming certain serious accusations. So, not being able to present clear, complete explanation of the incident is costly for Al-Isawi.

B. *Fairness and Reciprocity*

This category signifies parliamentarians' belief that costs and benefits should be fair and kept roughly in balance. This category is illustrated below with an example from the Iraqi corpus.

[Extract 10, Al-Obaidi's Interrogation, Aug 2016]

[Context: *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (3). In this particular extract, an Iraqi parliamentarian, namely Al-Alaq, is requesting to pause/end/stop the interrogation due to the questionee's proposal that the questioner, Nassaif, in collaboration with other parliamentarians, have ulterior motives to hold the interrogation.*]

```
01 Al-Alaq: as prescribed in the rules of the procedure relating to parliamentary
02          interrogation (0.5) there should be no personal interest/gain behind an
03          Interrogation (0.5) and since the questionee is claiming that the
04          questioner and other members have personal motives behind holding
05          the interrogation (0.5)  then an investigation should follow.
06          NOW THE QUESTIONER HAS NO RIGHT TO PROCEED WITH
07          THE INTERROGATION UNTILL UNTILL//
08 Nassaif:                              HARAM HARAM
09 Al-Alaq: LISTEN LISTEN //
10 Nassaif:              HARAM
11 Al-Alaq:                    //UNTILL ((he stands up facing Nassaif and
12          pointing at her))SHE REFUTES THE MINISTER'S
13          CLAIMS OF A CONFLICT OF INTEREST ((2EQRS-FR)) IT IS
14          OVER//
15 Nassaif:      HARAM BY THE AL-MIGHTY ALLAH HARAM
16
```

The extract above is intended to demonstrate how a given proposition may be evaluated as infringing one's EQUITY RIGHTS, namely the expectation to be treated fairly, in the current Iraqi political corpus.

In the course of the interrogation, the Minister of Defence openly accused several parliamentarians including the Speaker of the Iraqi parliament of blackmailing him to secure contracts for themselves. The scandal created an uproar and a disruption during the session and the Speaker of the Iraqi parliament no longer chaired the session. Being an unprecedented incident, the Deputy Speaker of the Iraqi parliament consulted members so as to decide if it is legally and institutionally acceptable to proceed with the interrogation or not.

In the above extract, lines 1-5, Al-Alaq states that it is against the rules of the procedure for the Iraqi parliament to further proceed with the interrogation as the questionee raised claims of a conflict of interest. In other words, Al-Alaq indirectly requests to cease the

interrogation because the questioner's institutional right to hold an interrogation is suspected/challenged now. The questioner, Nassaif, views Al-Alaq's request to cease the interrogation as unfair as it ignores consideration of its cost to Nassaif if complied with. In a later discourse, Nassaif's explains all the obstacles, and challenges she has faced and tolerated in order to prepare for this interrogation. She further claims that the Minister filed charges against her in order to hinder the interrogation. In other words, Al-Alaq's request to cease the interrogation renders all of Nassaif's efforts futile.

Moreover, the meta-pragmatic comment 'haram' (which literally means any behaviour that goes against the teachings of Islam) can be used pragmatically to indicate the unfairness of a given behaviour in the Iraqi culture.

C. Autonomy and Imposition

This category symbolises parliamentarians' expectation that they have the right not to be unduly controlled or imposed upon. This category is exemplified below with an extract from the current Iraqi corpus.

[Extract 11, Al-Sudani's Interrogation, 1ˢᵗ Session, May 2009]

[Context**:** *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (1) above. In this particular extract, Al-Saadi unveils one of Al-Sudani's alleged corruption files, namely the 'lumpy sugar' affair. Despite its lumpiness and being unfit for human consumption, sugar was distributed to citizens and sold at loss to the Ministry of Industry. Thus, Al-Saadi accuses Al-Sudani of wasting public money, and harming citizens.*]

```
01 Al-Saady: ... when the ministry has decayed lumpy food that does not comply with
02            the standard specification ( .  ) unfit for human consumption (0.5) the
03            ministry must return that to the exporter.( . ) the ministry must not distribute
04            it to governorates ((2EQRS-AI)) //
05 Al-Sudani:                              this is not acceptable (.) I answered his
06            question but if comments on it I can comment as well (0.5) THIS IS NOT
07            AN INTRROGATION (.) IT IS TURNING INTO SOMETHING ELSE (.)
08            THESE      ARE      ACCUSATIONS      AND      PROVOCATIONS
```

In the full version of this extract, Al-Sudani illustrates the measures, and procedures undertaken to manage the lumpy sugar cargo in response to an earlier question posed by Al-Saady. In this turn, Al-Saady rejects the validity and legitimacy of Al-Sudani's measures. Then Al-Saady continues his critique by providing an alternative line of action with regard to what the Minister should have done in the lumpy sugar situation. Hence, in lines 3-4, Al-Saady informs the Minister, Al-Sudani, that in such cases the Ministry is obliged/requested to return the goods to the exporter. Namely, Al-Saady indirectly commands/orders Al-Sudani to follow a specific course of action. By ordering Al-Sudani to perform in a certain way, Al-Saady is imposing on the Minister's freedom of action. This imposition is rejected by the Minister in line 5-7 above. Al-Saady's imposition causes the Minster to feel annoyed and maybe angry as the latter raises his voice as indicated in lines 6-8. Moreover, in a later discourse, the Minister informs Al-Saadi to consult the relevant ministerial/legal regulations and not to request him, the Minister, to follow a personal course of action.

Below is another example to illustrate the occurrence of this category in the current PMQs corpus.

[Extract 12, PMQs/25 Feb 2015-CE]

[Context: *The excerpt below is taken from a PMQs session which addressed the issue of MPs second jobs. The Labour party had planned a proposal to restrict the outside earnings of MPs, namely to ban them from having paid consultancies and directorships or trade union officials. Their proposal was motivated by the desire to ensure that MPs are not influenced by what they debt to the interests of others. The initiative came after an undercover investigation, conducted by the Telegraph and Dispatches, revealing a cash for access scandal involving two senior parliamentarians, namely Sir Malcolm Rifkind and Jack Straw. Eventually the Conservative government declined Labour's proposal on the grounds that such a ban would restrict parliamentarians' professional backgrounds hence limit the range of experiences within the parliament.*]

```
01  Miliband (LO, Lab) : if he wants to talk about party funding(.) let's talk about a
02          party (.) bought and sold by the hedge funds (0.5)((cheering from the
03          Opposition benches)) a man who appointed a self-declared tax avoider as
04          his treasurer(.) that is the Conservative party ((1PFC))((1SOFC)). now he's
05          got one more chance. he talked big in opposition about change(0.5) he's
06          gonna be judged on the way he votes tonight ((ISs-PRF)). he should vote
07          for one job not two ((2EQRS-AI)). last chance yes or no? ((1PPFC))
08          ((ISs-CFQ))
09  Cameron(PM, Con): the problem with a members of parliament being swayed by
10          outside interests is best seen in this one example. this parliament the first in
11          the history of Britain has passed an Act on lobbying. the Labour party has
12          been lobbied by the trade unions to get rid of that Act (0.5) what have they
13          agreed? they have agreed to scrap the lobbying Act. ((CISs-AT: 1PFC))
14          that's what they've done. they are owned lock stock and block vote by the
15          trade unions((CISs-AT: 1PFC))
```

In the preface to his question, lines 1-2 , the then Leader of the Opposition , Ed Miliband, attacks the Conservative party, by questioning its integrity as he criticises its funding source to imply that that their policies, decisions are influenced, controlled by the interests of the funders. Along the same lines, Miliband also attacks the Conservative party for appointing a tax avoider, as Miliband claims, as a treasurer, namely Lord Stanley Fink, lines 3-4. Then Miliband, concludes his preface by reminding the audience of Cameron's, the then Prime Minister, previous opposing stance on MP's second jobs and his intentions/declarations to change the status quo when the latter was in Opposition. Miliband does this to highlight the inconsistency in Cameron's words and actions, i.e. the latter cannot be trusted to keep his words. In other words, to attack the reliability, and truthfulness of Cameron. In the utterance 'he should vote for one job not two', Miliband requests Cameron to vote for MPs to have only a single job. Requests are by definition face threatening acts (Brown & Levinson 1987). By requesting Cameron to vote for one job, Miliband impinges on Cameron's claim of freedom of action and freedom from imposition.

The core request or the head act is realised as a suggestion formula here due to the use of the modal auxiliary 'should' and hence it is expressed as a conventionally indirect request. Moreover, the illocutionary force of the request is indirectly enhanced by a preceding adjunct, namely 'he talked big in opposition about change (0.5) he's gonna be judged on the way he votes tonight'. The supportive move or the adjunct acts as a cost maximiser here as

it suggests that non-compliance with the request will be costly for Cameron. In other words, not voting for one job, or rather voting for two jobs, will demonstrate how unreliable Cameron is as he does not commit to his earlier stance on MP's second jobs. The request then is followed by a face threatening conflictual question to which Cameron fails to answer. Instead, Cameron counter attacks Labour by claiming that they are attempting to discard the lobbying Act introduced by the Conservative government under the influence of Labour's major funder, the Trade Unions.

4.9.2.2 ASSOCIATION RIGHTS

In this research, it is argued that parliamentarians have a fundamental belief that they are entitled to an association with others that is in accordance with the type of relationship that they have with them. Spencer-Oatey (2005:100) identifies three possible components for this principle: involvement, empathy and respect. These subcategories are defined, and exemplified below.

A. Involvement

This category demonstrates parliamentarians' expectation that they should be treated with appropriate amounts and types of activity engagement by other politicians in the political space. This category is exemplified below by an extract from the Iraqi parliamentary corpus.

[Extract 13, Al-Sudani's Interrogation, 1st Session, May 2009]

[Context: *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (1) above.*]

```
01 Al-Saady: … the freight cannot be transported into state warehouses as long as it
02              lumpy ( . ) it cannot be transported as transportation squanders public funds
03              ( . ) it cannot be sold to another ministry with a lesser price ( . ) delay in
04              delivering ration food for citizens. When you import tremendous amounts
05              then you have corruption in this and that deal(0.5) and the citizens would
06              either get the ration late or they don't get it at all ((2ARS-IV))
07 Al-Sudani: honestly I demand the brother to be cautious in approaching the legal
08              aspects of these issues (0.5) he shouldn't overburden us ( . ) we are part of
09              the government too
```

In the above extract, Al-Saady launches an attack against Al-Sudani, the then Minister of Trade. Al-Saady states in detail some of the contraventions conducted in the Ministry of

Trade under Al-Sudani's administration. He specifically demonstrates the legitimate pathways of conducting certain Ministerial procedures to show the Minister's malpractice and negligence. Then he shows the impact of such non-observance on Iraqis livelihood. These accusations may be seen as attacking the Minister's PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE as they challenge his efficiency for his current post. Nevertheless, from Al-Sudani's perspective the attack is seen as infringing his ASSOCIATION RIGHT, namely his right/expectation to have Involvement from others. Al-Sudani's expectation of Involvement is based on an intragroup orientation he establishes in lines 7-9. Namely, the group being alluded here is the Iraqi government with its executive and legislative branches. Al-Sudani reminds the questioner that they are both part of the same political body in which Al-Sudani represents the executive branch and the Al-Saady belongs to the legislature. Al-Sudani uses intragroup markers such as the plural pronoun 'we', 'us'. Then in lines 8-9, the Minister politely requests the questioner to be tolerant and lenient with him.

B. Empathy

This category relates to parliamentarians' expectation that their concerns, feelings and interests are shared (empathised with) by other politicians in the political setting. The extract below demonstrates this category.

[Extract 15, Al-Isawi's Interrogation, 1st Session, Nov 2011]

[Context: *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (1) above. In this particular extract, the questioner is attempting to show how the Mayor of Baghdad has allegedly abused public resources for familial interests.*]

```
01 Al-Waeli: what is your brothers' job in the Mayoralty? ((2ARS-EM))((ISs-DQ))
02 Al-Isawi: indeed I am deeply hurt by this question (0.5)... I would say they are upright
03          people who have no connection with the mayoralty of Baghdad
```

In the above extract, Al-Waeli's DETAILED QUESTION, in line 1, is regarded as infringing Al-Isawi's ASSOCIATION RIGHTS, namely his right to receive Empathy from

the audience including the questioner Al-Waeli. That is to say, Al-Isawi's expectation that his feelings, interests are shared, preserved and appreciated by Al-Waeli. In his parliamentary question, Al-Waeli enquires about the position of Al-Isawi's brothers in the Mayoralty of Baghdad. The question is intended to attack the Mayor's brothers by showing how they abuse their familial connections for personal interests. It also aims to attack Al-Isawi's integrity by demonstrating how he misuses various Mayoralty resources for personal/familial benefits. These embedded accusations are clarified in subsequent discourse, namely in Al-Wael's follow ups to his parliamentary question. However, Al-Waeli's question is perceived as non-empathetic by Al-Isawi, i.e. infringing the latter's right to be empathised with. In line 2, Al-Isawi expresses an emotional reaction towards Al-Waeli's question, namely Al-Isawi states that he is 'hurt'. This signifies that Al-Isawi's concern/expectation for his familial privacy to be preserved is not adhered to. That is to say, Al-Isawi's desire to keep his family away from the interrogation is not shared/empathised with, hence his feelings are hurt. In later discourse, the Mayor of Baghdad explicitly states his disappointment and complains about getting his family member needlessly involved.

C. Respect

This principle relates to parliamentarians' belief that they should be shown appropriate amounts of respectfulness from their audience in the political context. No example could be detected in both corpora.

4.9.3 Linguistic Impoliteness Strategies in Initiation Turns

In the current research, impoliteness strategies are conceptualised as a variety of communicative resources, both discoursal and pragmatic, that parliamentarians use to convey impoliteness and which relate to the explicitness and effectiveness of the communicated impoliteness. The framework adopted in the current research, Harris' (2001) and Bull & Wells' (2012) frames, yields a set of impoliteness strategies, performed at

initiation turns, which are listed and exemplified below. Each strategy is provided with an example from each setting, namely the Iraqi and the British settings, respectively.

4.9.3.1 PREFACE

Building on Harris (2001) who states that questioning turns in PMQs predominantly consist of propositions followed by a polar (yes/no) questions, Bull & Wells (2012) argue that such preliminary explanations/propositions may be employed by parliamentarians to communicate impoliteness. The following extract from the Iraqi corpus exemplifies this strategy below. In the discourse of parliamentary interrogation, in the Iraqi setting, both initiations and follow ups may contain a series of propositions/explanations that communicate impoliteness. In the extract below, the initiation embraces a series of related propositions that serves to express accusations against the questionee.

[Extract 16, Al-Sudani's Interrogation, 2nd Session, May 2009]

[Context: *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (1) above. Moreover, in this particular extract, the questioner Al-Saady attacks the Minister by unveiling the various ways through which the latter fails to effectively and efficiently perform his ministerial duties.*]

```
01  Al-Saady: ... the ex-general inspector at the ministry was transferred to another post
02            when he discovered the corruption run by the minister's brother Sabah Hassan
03            ... the general inspector was astonished to find out that the minister's two
04            brothers are involved in concluding fraudulent contracts ... they receive
05            4 million dollars bribery for every single deal they conclude mentions the
06            ex-general inspector ... the general inspector reports that after confronting the
07            minister's brothers ( . ) he received a phone call from them threatening him to
08            accept the minister's offer otherwise he and his family will be killed ( . ) the
09            next day the minister Al-Sudani phoned me offering me
10            a post as a commercial consultant in Russia or China or Japan ((ISs- PRF))
11            ((1PPFC))((1SOFC))... we ask the minister (.) are you aware of these
12            things/information? or you aren't ((ISs-CFQ)) ((1PPFC))
13  Al-Sudani: this man contravened several institutional regulations since holding the
14            office ( . ) the first thing is that he transferred many employees form the
15            Ministry of  Electricity to the Ministry of Trade ( . ) without our knowledge
16            nor consent (0.5)((CISs-AT: 1SOFC)) moreover he blackmailed the State
17            Company for Grain Trade and built an extravagant house using public funds
18            ((CISs-AT: 1SOFC)). I have not been informed of any threat by mr Abdual
19            Hadi (0.5) he did not inform me neither orally nor in a written form
20            ((CISs-R/DC)) ... in 2006 and 2007 the security condition was very difficult
```

21	and dangerous (0.5) he informed me that he had faced several assassination
22	attempts (.) so I offered him a position in one of our commercial attaché
23	out of my good will **((CISs-R/DC))**...

In the excerpt above, Al-Saady deploys the PREFACE to his parliamentary question to attack the Minister of Trade Al-Sudani by demonstrating how the latter allegedly covered up the corruption of his two brothers who are employees at the Ministry of Trade. In particular, Al-Saady reports how an ex-general inspector at the Ministry was ignored, unfairly treated, transferred to an overseas post when the latter exposed the dishonest behaviour of the minister's brothers, namely their fraudulent deals. In lines 3-6, Al-Saady explicitly attacks the Minister's brothers, through reporting the ex-general inspector's alleged statements that they were receiving huge amounts of money as bribery. The ex-employee also reports having been threatened with death by the two brothers if he did not follow the Minister's offer of a post outside Iraq. Though explicitly attacking the two brothers, the ex-general inspector's impolite allegations also imply accusations of corruption for the Minister himself as the latter fails to investigate/validate the ex-inspector's allegations if he was aware/informed about these deals. Hence, the PREFACE introduces face attacking utterances explicitly targeting the Minister's brothers which in turn embed implied accusations for the Minister himself. Then Al-Saady concludes the PREFACE by posing his parliamentary question in lines 1-12.

The Minister, Al-Sudani, lounges a counter attack in which he questions and challenges the institutional conduct of the ex-general inspector. Al-Sudani claims that the ex-inspector has transgressed authorities higher than him at work by taking decisions without the minister's consent, lines 14-16. Al-Sudani also attacks the ex-inspector by claiming that he has blackmailed the State Company and abused the electorates' money to build a private luxurious property. Al-Sudani is attacking the ex-inspector's credibility, and integrity to weaken the bases of the impolite beliefs reported by ex-inspector and articulated by the questioner.

A further exemplification of this strategy is the following extract from the British corpus below.

[Extract 17, PMQs /25 Nov 2015-CC]

[Context: *In the present PMQs the Leader of the Opposition Jeremy Corbyn choses to question the Prime Minister regarding the Conservative government's record on renewable/green energy. The choice of the topic was in preparation for the forthcoming Paris Climate Change Conference in the following week*.]

```
01  Corbyn (LO, Lab): mr Speaker the problem with the Prime Minister's answer is that
02          the gap between Britain's 2020 target and our current share of renewable
03          energy (0.5) is the biggest in the European Union. some of his decisions he's
04          made recently such as cutting support for solar panels on home and industrial
05          projects(.) scrapping the green deal(.) cutting support for wind turbines(.)
06          putting a new tax on renewable energy (.) increasing subsidy for diesel
07          generators ((IPPFC))((ISs-PRF)). is it any wonder that the chief scientist of
08          the United Nations environment programme has criticised Britain for going
09          backwards on renewable energy? ((1PPFC))((ISs-CIM))
```

In the above extract, Corbyn employs the introduction to his parliamentary question to attack Cameron's vulnerable record on green energy. He states that Britain is failing to achieve its 2020 target to convert 15% of energy into green energy. The Leader of the Opposition also states that the gap between its intended target and the current share of renewable energy is the biggest compared to other European countries Britain's. Then Corbyn elaborates on specific measures introduced by Cameron that contributed to such a vulnerable record, such as 'cutting support for solar panels on home and industrial projects, scrapping the green deal, etc'. All of these elements in the PREFACE are face threatening to the PM as they question the efficiency of his policies. The PREFACE is followed by the parliamentary question which implicates, via flouting Grice's quality maxim, that it is not a surprise that an authoritative figure has criticised Britain falling behind on renewable energy. This implicature serves to confirm Corbyn's statements on Britain's vulnerable record on green energy which are the result of Cameron's policies, at least according to Corbyn.

4.9.3.2   DETAILED QUESTION

Harris (2001) and Bull & Wells (2012) point out that some questions in PMQs may require very specific details that the Prime Minister may not have at his disposal or may not wish to publicise. Moreover, with such questions the Leader of the Opposition, usually provides the answer for his/her own question in a follow up turn. In the context of this research, such interrogative structures are not employed to implicate a presupposition or an implicature nor do they create a communicative conflict. This strategy is illustrated with examples from the Iraqi and British parliaments respectively below.

[Extract 18, Al-Isawi's Interrogation, 1st Session, Nov 2011]

[*Context: For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (2) above. Below the questioner Al-Waeli shows how legal/institutional regulations relevant to contracting with companies were manipulated/mal-practiced and/or ignored*.]

```
01  Al-Waeli: ... first of all ( . ) which company signed the contract?((1PPFC))((ISs-DQ))
02  Al-Isawi: Arab Contractors and Al-Guri
03  Al-Waeli: Al-Guri is an unregistered fake company owned by an Iraqi called Haider
04            (0.5) these are the relevant documents indicating this. ( . ) the Mayor
05            himself gave them to me (0.5)  it was established in 2008 specialised in
06            Currency exchange stocks and estates. the report of the mayoralty indicates
07            that Arab Contractors signed the contract (0.5) Arab Contractors does not
08            exist and I will prove it with documents (.) the contract was signed by
09            Al-Guri only which is unregistered and unspecialised company (.) these are
10            all the official letters indicating that ((1PPFC))
11  Al-Isawi: the contract was assigned to Arab Contractors in partnership with Al-Guri
12            on the condition that Arab Contractors is the lead contractor.  Al-Waeli
13            requested authentication for the documents proposed by the company (0.5)
14            here are the authentication documents from the ministry of foreign affairs
15            (0.5) this document shows that Arab Contractors is an Egyptian company and
16            its partnership with Al-Guri is genuine and the Contractors is the lead
17            contractor ( . ) this copy from the General Inspector's office and this is from
18            the ministry of foreign affairs ((CISs-EXP))
```

In the above extract, Al-Waeli poses his parliamentary question, here a DETAILED QUESTION, requesting Al-Isawi to name the company with which the Mayoralty of Baghdad contracted to execute one of its projects. Al-Waeli's question can be considered face attacking since he already has two answers for his question yet still he attempts to get a

confirmation from Al-Isawi. In other words, Al-Waeli has two versions of an answer for his question, namely Al-Isawi's version of the answer and his own version of the answer. Al-Isawi's version of the answer is what Al-Waeli expects as an answer from the questionee which Al-Waeli claims not to be valid/authentic. Whereas Al-Waeli's version of the answer is what he believes is authentic and valid. This version is face attacking for Al-Isawi as it indicates that the question was posed for the sake of challenging the answer not to genuinely elicit information. Accordingly, after confirming Al-Isawi's answer, Al-Waeli begins to challenge it by demonstrating how the institutional regulations are ill-executed. In other words, Al-Waeli shows how the contract was assigned to a fake, local and unspecialised company where, according to regulations, it should have been assigned to a foreign, specialist company, lines 3-10. This in turn is face attacking for Al-Isawi as it depicts how he has intentionally or unintentionally contravened the relevant regulations which challenges his credibility and integrity. Therefore, Al-Isawi starts to defend himself by providing an explanation to clarify his position regarding the implemention of the relevant regulations. And by doing this, Al-Isawi is violating the parliamentary convention/rule that restricts his role to only providing answers to the proposed questions but not to further comment on the questioner's follow ups. Moreover, Al-Isawi's non-committal to parliamentary conventions and Al-Waeli's positively interacting with it on several occasions contributed in creating communicative loops during the interrogation.

The DETAILED QUESTION strategy is one way of demonstrating how parliamentarians/politicians both accommodate themselves to the institutional/parliamentary rules and/or conventions and accommodate these rules and conventions to serve their political agenda.

A further exemplification from the British corpus follows below.

[Context: *In the current PMQs, the Leader of the Opposition Jeremy Corbyn relates to the housing crisis in the United Kingdom. In this regard, Corbyn quotes the housing charity Shelter which estimates that 180,000 affordable homes will be lost over the next four years. He also criticises the Conservative government's record on social housing, and the overpriced houses to buy which forces people to resort to the private renting. He also criticises the Conservatives' rejection of a Bill introduced by Labour addressing prerequisite standards for homes to be fit for human habitation.*]

```
01  Corbyn (LO, Lab):… there are now 11 million people in this country who are
02          private renters. does the Prime Minister know how many of those homes
03          don't meet the decent home standard? ((ISs-DQ))
04  Cameron(PM, Con): to to listen to Labour where in the last five years (.) we built
05          more council houses than they built in 13 years ((CISs-AT:1PFC)). where
06          was he? where was he when that was going on? ((CISs-AT:1PPFC)) thirteen
07          years and an absolutely hopeless record on housing (0.5) ((CISs-AT:1PFC))
08          what we are doing is an £8 billion housing budget that will provide 400,000
09          new affordable homes (0.5) a target to build a million homes during this
10          parliament(.) getting housing benefit down so we can spend money on
11          housing(.) and having a strong economy that can support the housing we
12          need((CISs-PPF:1PFC))
13  Corbyn (LO, Lab): mr Speaker I was asking through you the Prime Minister how
14           many of the 11 million renters (.) are living in homes that do not meet the
15           decent homes standard and are therefore(.) substandard((1PPFC)) I'll help
16           him (.) one third of those in the private rented sector don't meet those decent
17           homes standard (.) Shelter has found that six out of 10 renters have issues such
18           as damp mould leaking rooves and windows. It is simply not good enough
19           ((1PPFC))
```

The current extract comprises a PREFACE, which is not quoted here, in which Corbyn explains the housing crisis in Britain and the government's contribution to it. The PREFACE is face threatening as it explicitly criticises and attacks the government's performance in this regard. In lines 2-3, Corbyn resorts to another strategy to attack the then Prime Minister Cameron, namely to ask a DETAILED QUESTION. Here, Corbyn asks about the number of private renters who live in homes unfit for human habitation. The Prime Minister is not able to answer the question either because the information is not at his disposal and he is unaware of it or he does not desire to publicise it. To admit that he is unware of a figure, would be face threatening for Cameron. Moreover, not publicising some

information, especially when requested, can also be face threatening. However, a response is still needed. So instead of providing an answer, Cameron embarks on a series of attacks on Labour's record on housing as indicated in lines , then he concludes his attack by promoting the face of the Conservative government and its record on housing. In order to complete the attack, Corbyn provides the answer to his question as indicated in line 13-18. Hence, Corbyn quotes that the number of private renters who live in indecent homes which represents one third out of the 11 million renters. By providing the answer, Corbyn doubles his attack on Cameron. On the one hand, he has shown to be able to quote a figure that Prime Minister could not do in case that the latter was genuinely unaware of it, which is face attacking to the Prime Minister. On the other hand, if the PM did not want to publicise the information as it embarrasses his government, then Corbyn successfully exposed the face threatening information which highlights the poor performance of the Conservative government. It is very unlikely that Cameron was not aware of that specific figure as it was issued by a public housing charity. Therefore, it can be said that the PM did not want to publicise the information in question as it embarrasses his government. Noticeably the type of response strategy chosen by Cameron, namely to counter attack, acts as an indication that Corbyn's question has been perceived as impoliteness or face attack by the former.

4.9.3.3 *CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION and CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE*

Harris (2001) and Bull & Wells (2012) maintain that parliamentary questions in PMQs may be constructed so as to communicate presuppositions or implicatures that are highly face-threatening. In the current research, a presupposition is defined as a type of pragmatic inference which seems closely related to the linguistic structure of an utterance, and sensitive to contextual factors (Levinson,1983:167). It involves a shared common background knowledge between interactional participants(Culpeper & Haugh, 2014: 74). Implicature, on the other hand, refers to propositions that are communicated implicitly. Implicatures, both conversational and conventional, are propositions deduced from the form of an utterance, on the basis of Grice's (1975) cooperative principles.

CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITIONs are illustrated with examples from the Iraqi and British parliaments respectively below. Then these are followed by examples demonstrating CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE from both Iraqi and British parliaments.

[Extract 20, Al-Isawi's Interrogation, 1ˢᵗ Session, Nov 2011]

[Context: *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (2) above. In this particular extract, Al-Waeli attempts to uncover Al-Isawi's alleged corruption by demonstrating the latter's failure/incompetence in monitoring projects which led to losses of billions of public money and poor public service.*]

```
01 Al-Waeli: ... the question is what are the legal grounds for assigning the project to the
02           Turkish company? ((1PPFC))((ISs-DQ)) have they provided insured skilful
03           labour?((1PPFC))((ISs-DQ))...why was work delayed despite the huge
04           facilitations with which rules and regulations were encroached upon?
05           ((1PPFC))((ISs-CPS)) mr mayor will reply with the same answer (.)
06           I don't think we need his reply because he will also say it is a
07           decree of council of ministers
```

In the above extract, Al-Waeli employs his turn to pose a series of face attacking questions to challenge the credibility of Al-Isawi. In lines 2-3, Al-Waeli poses two DETAILED QUESTIONs to enquire about very specific details regarding the eligibility of a Turkish firm to implement a given project for the Mayoralty of Baghdad. Al-Waeli's questions are face attacking as he later on, namely in subsequent follow ups, provides an answer for his question by demonstrating with evidence how the Turkish company is allegedly unregistered, unspecialised which quadruplicated the costs and produced a low standard work. Al-Waeli continues his attack by posing a question which triggers a face attacking or CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION in lines 3-4. The wh-question presupposes that there is a delay in work progress despite the contraventions of various standard regulations. The PRESUPPOSITION is face attacking for the then Mayor of Baghdad Al-Isawi as it presupposes that the delay in work is due to the Mayor's mismanaged decisions such as assigning the project to unprofessional firm and the lack of not monitoring instead covering up its mal-implementation. This face attacking assumption persists over

many follow ups in later subsequent discourse to which Al-Isawi responds by refuting Al-Wael's allegations, using official documents to demonstrate the falsity of the latter's information, and accusing him of initiating the current interrogation for personal motives.

Below is an example of a CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION from the British corpus.

[Extract 21, PMQs/20 Apr 2016-CC]

[Context: *To continue implementing its educational revolution, the Tory government announced, through a white paper published on 17 March 2016, plans to force all state schools to convert into academies, or have plans to do so, by 2022. The vision was expressed since early August 2015 by the then Prime Minister David Cameron as an expansion in the execution of the Academies Act 2010 introduced by their previous coalition government with the Liberal Democrat. In the English education system, both traditional state schools and academies are state-funded schools, i.e. fee-free schools. However, the former receive their funding through state taxes and local council tax revenue and are controlled by Local Education Authorities which comprise a number of parent representatives and governors, the head teacher and other serving teachers. Academies, on the other hand, are directly funded from the central government, namely via the Department of Education, and independent of local authority control. There has been a debate over the effectiveness of such a policy in raising education standards in the United Kingdom. Cameron positions himself within the front who believe that academies help to improve education standards, and provide more power access for head-teachers and teachers rather than bureaucrats. The controversy also relates to the compulsion element of the intended policy. In other words, the policy was originally intended for schools that are described as struggling/underperforming but the government's 2016 white paper forces even outstanding schools to convert into academies. The proposal received heavy criticism from Labour, the*

teacher's union, and even some backbench Conservatives, which eventually resulted in

dropping the legislation.]

```
01  Corbyn (LO, Lab): mr Speaker we appear to be heading into some kind of fantasy
02          land here ((laughter sounds)) ((1PPFC: MOCK)) ((ISs-CIM)). the Institute
03          for fiscal studies the Institute for fiscal studies (0.5) states that school spending
04          is expected to fall by at least 7% in real terms in the next four years (0.5) the
05          biggest cut since the 1970s. so why on earth is the Prime Minister proposing to
06          spend £1.3 billion on a top-down reorganisation that was not in his
07          manifesto? ((1PPFC))((ISs-CIM)) teachers don't want it parents don't want it
08          (.) governors don't want it (.) headteachers don't want it (.) and even his own
09          MPs and councillors don't want it ((ISs-PRF)). can't he just think again and
10          support schools and education not force this on them?
11          ((1PPFC))((ISs-CPS))
```

In this PMQs, the Leader of Opposition Jeremy Corbyn embarks on a series of attacks

against the then Prime Minister David Cameron over the latter's determination to force a

blanket scale in implementing the academisation of schools in the United Kingdom.

In the above extract, the Leader of Opposition employs various strategies to attack the

PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of the Prime Minister such as ridiculing the latter's

arguments, raising CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURES and PRESUPPOSITION in the

minds of the audience. These strategies may be seen as being grouped within a face attacking

PREFACE followed by a CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION structured as a yes/no

question. The current extract is intended to exemplify a CONTENTIOUS

PRESUPPOSITION; hence, other impoliteness strategies included in the above extract

won't be elaborated on here.

In an earlier discourse, Corbyn attacks Cameron by reporting multiple opposing

arguments from Conservative cabinet members, such as the former chair of the Education

Committee, head-teachers, parents, and parent governors. These arguments centre on the

uncertainty of the evidence that academies raise and/or enhance education, the amount of

time and resources required following such a top down reorganisation, the futility of

imposing a policy seen as unnecessary and unfitting by the people involved. To such

arguments Cameron responds with counter arguments. Hence, in the current extract, lines 1-

2, Corbyn mocks the Prime Minister by implicating, via flouting Grice's quality maxim, the

unfeasibility of the latter's arguments which, according to Corbyn, have no basis in reality. Corbyn continues his face attack by further implicating, via quality flouting rhetorical question, the nonsensicality/irrationality of Cameron's top down reorganisation of schools, lines 5-7. Then, the Leader of the Opposition explicitly reports the rejection of Cameron's academisation policy by the relevant people, lines 7-9. Corbyn concludes his turn by creating a face attacking or CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION comprising a lexical presupposition embedded in a yes/no structural presupposition.

The lexical presupposition is triggered by the iterative word 'again' which implies that the Prime Minister had thought of the academisation before and his thinking was not supportive of schools and education but rather coercive. This CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION is embedded within and enhanced by a further presupposition structured as a yes/no question. This interrogative structure creates a presupposition involving the disjunction of possible answers, namely either the Prime Minister can think again and support schools and education and not force this on them or he cannot think again and support schools and education and will force this on them. The latter disjunct is the face attacking possibility.

The question of deciding which of these possible disjuncts is the one highlighted by the speaker may be determined with the help of the immediate surrounding linguistic environment, namely the presupposition triggered by the iterative word 'again' explained above, and the all the face threatening preface in the present extract. All of these linguistic structures attack the Prime Minister's policy of academisation and contribute to boosting and highlighting the second face attacking disjunct presupposed by the interrogative structural presupposition. Hence, it could be said that the lexical and structural presupposition work in harmony to attack the prime Minister. Together with other devices, Corbyn employs presuppositions to attack the Prime Minister and to indicate the ineffectiveness of Prime Minister's decisions and the latter's tendency to force his own vision on the electorate.

To turn to CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE, the extract below exemplifies the use of this strategy in the current Iraqi corpus.

[Extract 22, Al-Obaidi's Interrogation, Aug 2016]

[Context: *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (3) above. In the extract below, Nassaif is aiming to show how the then Minister of Defence Al-Obaidi is misusing the budget for personal benefits.*]

```
01  Nassaif: ... spending 279$ million on refurbishing properties which are not owned by
02           the ministry of defence( . ) hence the expenditure violates the relevant legal
03           regulations as these properties belong to the council of ministers((1PPFC))...
04           the minister refurbished the guests' house in the ministry of defence for 60$
05           million then for a second time it was refurbished for 31$ million (0.5) setting
06           cameras 9$ million ( . ) air conditioning 5$ million ( . ) refurbishing mr
07           minister's house for 21$ million...in total the minister spent 74$million to
08           refurbish houses that are neither his nor the property of the ministry of defence
09           (0.5) these documents indicate this ( . )((1PPFC))((ISs-PRF)) this is a
10           dissipation of public funds? ((1PPFC))((ISs-CIM))( . ) isn't this a
11           contravention of  regulations or not ? ((1PPFC))((ISs-CIM))
12  Al-Obaidi: indeed these properties do belong to the council of ministers ( . ) but they
13           have been assigned to the ministry of defence with official decrees(0.5)
14           hence it is within legal regulations to use defence funds to refurbish these
15           properties... I have rented the guests' house from the council of ministers (.)
16           ((CISs-R/DC)) I dare anyone to say they have has spent a single dinar on
17           this! ((CISs-AT: 1PPFC)) ( . ) the refurbishment costs are all from my own
18           pocket ( . )((CISs-R/DC)) if there's anything proves otherwise it can be
19           investigated ((CISs-TPR))
```

Through the PREFACE to her question, lines 1-9, Nassaif states explicitly the various improper facets of spending Defence budget. Namely, using the budget to renovate public property that doesn't belong to the Ministry of Defence. This is face attacking for Al-Obaidi as it challenges his proficiency and integrity. Nassaif continues the attack by concluding the PREFACE with two rhetorical questions which trigger the CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE which implicates that Al-Obaidi's expenditure of Defence budget is squandering of public money for personal interests and a professional misconduct. To these accusations, Al-Obaidi rebuts Nassaif's claim that the properties in question do not belong to the Ministry, lines 13-15. Then he challenges Nassaif or anyone in the audience to prove that he has refurbished his house using public funds. Instead he indicates that the relevant

costs are from his personal pocket inviting the audience to refer to legal authority to prove this.

The example below illustrates the use of CONTERTIOUS IMPLICATURE to attack each other in the British parliament.

[**Extract 23, PMQs/ 20 Jan 2016-CC**]

[Context: *In July 2015, the Tory government announced through its Chancellor George Osborne its plans to axe maintenance grants and replace it with maintenance loans starting from September 2016. The maintenance grant was a non-repayable amount of money that the British government provided for full time students to help with the living costs before September 2016. It was estimated that such a change will hit low-income students. The Tory government passed its plans through a legislation committee without being scrutinised and voted on in the Commons and the Lords. Both the controversial cuts and the lack of parliamentary scrutiny were the focus of severe criticism as these grants help a half a million of the poorest students with the costs of living in a university. Moreover, criticisms of these cuts were intensified as the Conservatives, in their previous coalition government with the Liberal Democrats in 2010, had raised the cap on tuition fees to £9,0000 per year, following the Browne Review on Higher Education.*]

```
01  Corbyn (LO, Lab):… in 2010 his government in 2010 mr Speaker the
02            Prime Minister's government trebled tuition fees to £9,000 (.) defending it by
03            saying that they would be increasing maintenance grants for students from
04            less well-off backgrounds. they are now scrapping those very same grants (.)
05            they used to boast about being increased ((1PFC))((ISs-PRF)). where is the
06            sense in doing this?((ISs-CIM)) why are they abolishing those maintenance
07            grants? ((ISs-CIM))((1PFC))
```

The above extract is taken from a session in which the Leader of the Opposition Jeremy Corbyn raises the issue of axing maintenance grants to attack Conservative's educational policy. Earlier in this session, Corbyn reports questions from students protesting against Cameron's education cut, as it will create further financial turmoil for hundreds of thousands of them. Then, in what constitutes the PREFACE in the current extract, Corbyn moves on to

demonstrate that maintenance grants came as part of a Conservative government package that included trebling tuition fees, lines 1-5. In other words, the Conservative Government have trebled tuition fees in 2010 and in return they have pledged to increase maintenance grants to compensate the rise in tuition fees. Moreover, Corbyn indicates, in an earlier discourse, that no mention was ever made in the Conservative manifesto to end these grants. The PREFACE, lines 1-5, focuses on attacking the Conservative government's face for failing to implement its pledges, hence damaging their credibility, reliability and trustworthiness.

In lines 5-7, Corbyn introduces his questions which demonstrate the futility of the Conservative's educational decision or policy. The attack is conducted through CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATUREs structured as rhetorical questions that flout Grice's quality maxim. In the first question, viz. 'where is the sense in doing this?', Corbyn enquires about the rationality behind abolishing maintenance grants. The audience will realise that Corbyn's enquiry is insincere if only they consider the previous discourse in which the addresser, Corbyn , has already provided his opinion regarding the rationality of such a policy. Assuming that Corbyn is cooperative, the audience will look for another relevant interpretation. The most relevant interpretation here is a negative answer to Corbyn's question, i.e. there is no sense in doing that. Hence, Corbyn's question 'where is the sense in doing this?' implicates that there is no sense in abolishing maintenance grants or abolishing maintenance grants is nonsensical. The same process of inferring can be followed to generate Corbyn's intended meaning for the second rhetorical question in lines 6-7, namely 'why are they abolishing those maintenance grants?', which would implicate they shouldn't be abolishing those maintenance grants. Both of these IMPLICATUREs are CONTENTIOUS as they implicate the futility of the Conservative government's decision which goes hand in hand with the attack initiated in the PREFACE.

4.9.3.4   CONFLICTUAL QUESTION

Bull & Wells (2012:38) propose that questions in the discourse of PMQs may be constructed so as to create a communicative conflict where all possible replies have negative consequences for the addressee. Bull & Wells (2012:38) argue that such conflictual questions can be face-threatening. Moreover, the conflictual situation creates a pressure for the addressee to equivocate, which is self-damaging per se. In other words, the addressee does not provide a direct, and explicit reply to the conflictual question but rather evades it. Instead, he/she resorts to a self-promoting narrative, or attacking the questioner. That is how equivocation is understood in the current research. This strategy is illustrated with examples from the Iraqi and British parliaments respectively below.

The example below illustrates the use of a CONFLICTUAL QUESTION in the current Iraqi political discourse.

[Extract 24, Al-Sudani's Interrogation, 2nd Session, May 2009]

[Context: *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (1) above. In this particular extract, Al-Saady demonstrates how the Minister of Trade violates and abuses legal regulations to protect his family members who are facing accusations of corruption.*]

```
01 Al-Saady: ... is he aware of these incidents? or he isn't ((ISs-CFQ)) ((1PPFC))
02 Al-Sudani: this man contravened several institutional regulations since holding the
03           office ( . ) the first thing is that he transferred many employees form the
04           Ministry of Electricity to the Ministry of Trade ( . ) without our knowledge
05           nor consent (0.5) ((CISs-AT: 1SOFC)) moreover he blackmailed the State
06           Company for Grain Trade and built an extravagant house using public
07           funds ((CISs-AT: 1SOFC)). I have not been informed of any threat by
08           mr Abdual Hadi (0.5) he did not inform me neither orally nor in a written
09           form ((CISs-R/DC)) ... in 2006 and 2007 the security condition
10           was very difficult and dangerous (0.5) he informed me that he had faced
11           several assassination attempts ( . ) so I offered him a position in one of our
12           Commercial Attaché out of my good will ((CISs-R/DC))...
13 Al-Saady: ... mr minister says he blackmailed the State Company for Grain Trade and
14           built an extravagant house ... he says he blackmailed and he is corrupt ( . ) do
15           you reward such a person and make him a consultant  so that he initiates
16           corruption in another place? ((1PPFC)) ((ISs-CIM)) you reward him instead
17           of investigating his allegations  ... if the general inspector was corrupt the
18           minister covered it up and if he was honest in his claims the minister treated
19           him unfairly and did not cooperate with him to fight corruption((1PPFC))...
```

The above extract is a repetition and a continuation of extract 16 cited above to exemplify PREFACE in the Iraqi parliament. The repeated parts are included here for ease of access. After posing a series of alleged accusations for the Minister of Trade in the PREFACE, Al-Saady introduces his question in which he inquires whether the Minister is aware of the complaint/allegations expressed by the ex-inspector or not, line 1. At first, the Minister counter attacks the ex-inspector in line 13-18.Then in his response to Al-Saady's question, Al-Sudani denies having any knowledge of the ex-inspector's allegations of corruption, lines 7-9. Moreover, Al-Sudani adds that the reason behind the ex-inspector's transferral to an overseas post is due to a consideration to the latter's circumstances, namely escaping several assassination attempts.

Al-Saady's parliamentary question in the extract above is a CONFLICTUAL QUESTION. To paraphrase, Al-Saady's question above creates a communicative conflict for Al-Sudani in which all possible replies have negative consequences for the latter. Considering that Al-Saady's question is a polar question, two alternatives are possible here as an answer, namely a yes, viz. affirmative reply, or a no, viz. negative reply. An affirmative reply would mean that Al-Sudani was aware of the ex-inspector's complaint/allegations concerning the corruption of the former's brothers yet the Minister did take any institutional action. This would in turn raise further questions as to why hasn't the Minister Al-Sudani taken any action as the institutional regulations would require. These questions are face attacking for Al-Sudani as they imply that he is unwilling to reveal the truth about these allegations. In other words, not conducting an investigation would imply that the Minister Al-Sudani is covering up the corruption of his two brothers which is face attacking for him as it challenges his credibility, integrity, and neutrality.

The negative reply to Al-Saady's question would indicate that the Minister Al-Sudani was not aware of the ex-inspector's complaint/ allegations which is what Al-Sudani claims in lines 7-9. However, in a later discourse, Al-Saady illustrates an official letter written by

the ex-inspector addressed to the Minister in which the ex-inspector explains his complaint in full. Hence, it has been face attacking for the Minister to respond to the CONFLICTUAL QUESTION.

Moreover, Al-Sudani also explicitly states that the ex-inspector has violated several official regulations, has blackmailed other institutions and abused public funds for personal interest. In other words, Al-Sudani is implying that the ex-inspector himself is corrupt. Even though Al-Sudani is aware of the ex-inspector's alleged dishonest behaviour at the Ministry, he has not taken any action to discipline the ex-inspector. Instead, Al-Sudani claims that he has transferred the ex-inspector to an overseas post in one of Iraqi Attachés out of a consideration for the latter's circumstances. Working in an Attaché is regarded as a privilege in the Iraqi culture hence Al-Saady describes the job transferral as a reward in lines 11-12. Not taking any disciplinary action against the allegedly corrupt ex-inspector but instead rewarding him with a post in an Attaché is also face attacking for the Minister as it challenges Al-Sudani's credibility and integrity as well.

Another instance of using a CONFLICTUAL QUESTION is provided with an extract from the British Corpus below.

[Extract 25, PMQs /6 Jan 2016-CC]

[Context: *In Dec 2015 severe floods hit Yorkshire and Lancashire which affected thousands of people in the north of England. The then Prime Minister David Cameron was criticised for not learning the lessons from previous flooding crises. In other words, he was attacked for ignoring and rejecting calls from flood experts and consequently not being able to defend and protect people and their properties. For example, in winter 2014 a wave of floods hit the south of England causing disastrous damages, and the coalition government was ill-prepared due to cuts in capital spending on flood defences by 27% year by year starting from 2010. These cuts came despite the recommendations of the 2007 Pitt Review to increase flood defence funding.*]

```
01  Corbyn (LO, Lab): mr Speaker of course the rainfall was excessive (.)
02          of course the river levels were high (.) but! the Prime Minister still not
03          answered the question on the Leeds flood protection scheme(0.5)
04          ((ISs-MQA)) I give him an opportunity to do in a moment ((1PPFC)).
05          in 2014 Cumbria county council applied
06          for funding for new schemes in Keswick and Kendal (.) both were turned
07          down and both areas flooded again in the last few weeks((1PPFC))
08          ((ISs-PRF)). does the Prime Minister believe that turning down
09          those schemes was also a mistake? ((IPPFC)) ((ISs-CPS)) ((IS-PFTA))
10          ((ISs-CFQ))((2EQRS-AI))?
11  Cameron (PM, Con): we are spending more on flood defence schemes and stacking
12          up a whole series of schemes that we will spend more on (.) ((CISs-
13          PPF:1PFC)) but let  me make this point to him (.) if he is going to spend
14          £10 billions on renationalising our railways (.) where is he gonna find the
15          money for flood defences? ((CISs-AT: 1PPFC)) the idea  the idea that this
16          individual would be faster in responding to floods when it takes him three
17          days to carry out a reshuffle is frankly laughable (0.5) ((CISs-AT:MOCK))
18          mr Speaker  since I walked into the Chamber this morning(.) his shadow
19          foreign minister resigned (.) his shadow defence minister resigned (.) he
20          couldn't run anything ((CISs-AT: 1PPFC)).
```

The above extract is taken from a session during which the Leader of the Opposition raises the issue of government's failure to properly manage the flooding crisis that hit several parts in northern England. In the above extract, line 2-3, the Leader of the Opposition explicitly indicates Cameron's, the then Prime Minister , failure to answer a previous question regarding the government's intention to proceed with a flood protection scheme for Leeds. This strategy can be face attacking in the context of PMQs (see 4.9.3.5 below). Then Corbyn moves on to employ another face attacking strategy, i.e. posing CONFLICTUAL QUESTION. Corbyn asks Cameron whether he thinks/agrees that declining to provide flood defence funds for Cumbria county council was also a mistake, lines 8-9. Here the possible answer for the conflictual yes/no question would either be yes, i.e. turning down those schemes was also a mistake, or no, i.e. turning down those schemes was not also a mistake. If Cameron responds with an affirmative answer, then he would be admitting/confessing his own wrong doing. In other words, he would be admitting not only declining Cumbria flood schemes but also admitting that such a decline was a mistake.

Consequently, Cameron would be acknowledging his inability to make effective decisions, hence pinpointing a weakness in his management skills. This would be a damage to his PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE as it attacks/challenges his leadership qualifications

of effective management and future credibility. Moreover, by responding with an affirmative reply Cameron would not only condemn this particular decision to turn down Cumbria flood schemes but it would also confirm turning down the Leeds schemes, via the presupposition trigger 'also', and admitting that both were bad decisions.

Whereas if Cameron replies with a denial/negative answer, then he would be admitting having turned down these schemes, via presupposition, but rejecting that the decline of these schemes was a mistake. To deny that such a decline is not a mistake goes against reality which has shown that the current defences could not stand in the face of the flooding but rather failed to do so. Consequently, this option turns to be face threatening for Cameron as well, as it demonstrates inadequate management skills.

As both answers have negative consequences for Cameron, it could be said that Corbyn's question creates a communicative conflict which pressures the Cameron to evade answering the question, i.e. equivocate. As can be seen , in lines 11-20, Cameron does not answer Corbyn's question instead he promotes the positive face of his government, lines 11-12, attacks the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of Corbyn, lines 13-15, including mocking him, lines 15-17, and then attacks Corbyn's PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE again in lines 18-20.

4.9.3.5   INVITATION TO PERFORM AN FTA

Bull & Wells (2012:39) indicate that one strategy to express impoliteness in PMQs discourse is to request the addressee to perform a self-damaging act. Within the context of PMQs, Bull & Wells (2012:39) provide instances of such FTAs that include: apologising, criticising his/her own party, or admitting the failure of a policy adopted by one's own party when in office. This strategy is illustrated with an example from the British parliament below.

[Extract 26, PMQs/ 29 Jun 2016-CC]

[Context: *The current extract is taken from the first PMQs session that followed the EU referendum which took place in 23 June 2016. The LO raised various key issues to criticise*

the Conservative Government's record over the years. Among these issues was child poverty.

Corbyn quoted figures released the day before by the Department for Work and Pensions.

These figures show that child poverty has risen by 200,000 children over the past year. They

indicate that 29 per cent of children, approximately 3.9 million, are now categorised as in

poverty.]

```
01   Corbyn (LO, Lab):mr Speaker government figures government figures released
02            yesterday (.) show the number of children living in poverty has jumped by
03            200,000 in a year (.) to a total now a disgraceful total of 3.9 million children
04            in this country living in poverty ((1PPFC)) ((ISs-PRF)).does he not think he
05            should at the very least  apologise to them and the parents that have been failed
06            by his government (0.5) ((ISs-PFTA)) and do something about it so that we
07             do reduce the level of child poverty in this country? ((1PPFC))((ISs-CIM))
08   Cameron (PM, Con): If he wants to deal with the figures let me give them to him.
09            income and inequality has gone down. average incomes have grown at their
10            fastest rate since 2001 (.) ((CISs-PPF: 1 PPFC)) he asks about poverty (.)
11            there are 300,000 fewer people in relative poverty since 2010 (0.5) half
12            a million fewer people in absolute poverty since 2010 ((CISs-PPF:
13            1 PPFC)). look If he is looking for excuses about why he and I were on about
14            the referendum (.) frankly he should look somewhere else. and I have to say
15            to the honourable gentleman he talks about job insecurity and my two months
16            to go(.)it might be in my party's interests for him to sit there (.) it's not in the
17            national interest and I would say (.) for heaven's sake man go!
18            ((CISs-AT: 1FC-PI))
```

The extract starts with a PREFACE in which Corbyn quotes and criticises the rise in the

number of children in poverty under the Conservative government. In lines 4-6, Corbyn

requests an apology from the then Prime Minister David Cameron on behalf of children and

their parents for failing to provide a decent living standard for children in Britain. In the

political domain, an apology can be defined as a speech act that is employed to express

remorse or guilt either for performing a past offensive act by the speaker or for being directly

and/or indirectly responsible for its occurrence (Murphy, 2015). This definition implies a

recognition of the faultiness/offensiveness of the past act and the responsibility for it. Hence,

if Cameron decides to comply with Corbyn's request to apologise, then he would be

admitting his direct and/or indirect responsibility of the offensive act, which is face

damaging for him. Therefore, Cameron opts not to publically apology for the increase in the

number of children in poverty. Instead, Cameron provides statistics showing the reduction

in the number of children in poverty since he took office in 2010, lines 11-12. Cameron

concludes his turn by criticising Corbyn's performance with regard to EU referendum, and asks him to resign.

4.9.3.6   METALANGUAGE of QUESTIONS and ANSWERS

Harris (2001:460) notices that impoliteness may occur due to the non-compliance with the question/answer format governing the PMQs sessions. Members of the Oppositions, mostly the Leader of the Opposition, use this strategy to hold the Prime Minister accountable for not answering questions. As an impoliteness strategy the METALANGUAGE of Q&A consists of a direct, explicit declaration/reference by the questioner, namely the Leader of the Opposition, that the addressee, namely the Prime Minister, has not answered a question though being repeated for several times within the same or previous PMQs session. To such questions the Prime Minister usually equivocates the answer. This is how the current researcher codes this category.

[Extract 27, PMQs /6 Jan 2016-CC]

[Context: *See the context for extract 25 above.*]

```
01   Corbyn (LO, Lab): mr Speaker it is very strange that when I've asked a question about
02           Leeds flood defence (.) then on Cumbria flood defence(.) the Prime Minister
03           still seems unable to answer ((1PPFC))((IS-MQA)). can he NOW tell us if
04           there's going to be funding for those schemes? ((1PPFC)) ((ISs-CFQ))
05           ((ISs-CPS)) ((2EQRS-AI))
06   Cameron (PM, Con): we have increased and continued to increase the spending on
07           flood defences. we are spending more in this Parliament (.) and for the first
08           time it is a six-year spending perspective which is £2.3 billion extra on flood
09           defences((CISs-PPF:1PFC)) money that would not be available if we trashed
10           the economy in the way that he proposes ((CISs-AT: 1PPFC))
```

In the above extract, the Leader of the Opposition makes an explicit reference to the fact that the Prime Minister, Cameron, has not replied to two previous questions posed by Corbyn. These questions relate to whether or not Cameron will provide the essential funding to implement flood protection schemes for both Leeds and Cumbria which were cut by Cameron himself. However, Cameron did not answer Corbyn's question, i.e. he did not affirm neither deny issuing such cuts to flood defence spending. Instead, the Prime Minister has equivocated in his replies. The equivocation occurs as Corbyn's questions are creating a

communicative conflict for Cameron in which both alternative replies would be consequential for him, i.e. face attacking. Cameron cannot deny he issued cuts in flood defence schemes which caused huge damages to many people in those areas; neither can he affirm that he restores those flood spending cuts as this would confirm he had them cut previously and at the same time it would restrict his future freedom of action. Hence by explicitly stating Cameron's failure to provide an answer, Corbyn will be enhancing and enforcing the face attack expressed through the earlier CONFLICTUAL QUESTIONs.

At the same time, the explicit declaration of Prime Minister's failure to answer the question may be seen as a request to account for not providing the answer. This request is made with the expectation that the Prime Minister will not be able to comply with. To intensify the attack, Corbyn repeats the earlier CONFLICTUAL QUESTION in lines 3-4. As expected, Cameron does not provide an account on his failure to provide a reply to Corbyn's earlier questions. Neither does he answer the repetitive conflictual questions about flood defence in the current extract. Instead, Cameron engages the audience with a party promotion discourse followed by an attack of Labour's economic policy as indicated in lines 6-10.

4.9.4   Counter-Impoliteness Strategies in Response Turns

The framework adopted in this research to explore patterns of response to impoliteness employed in the current binary corpora includes strategies identified in Culpeper's (1996), Culpeper et al.'s (2003), Bousfield's (2007), and Bull & Wells' (2012) frameworks. The following introduces and exemplifies these counter-impoliteness strategies.

4.9.4.1   *OFFER AN EXPLANATION*

This strategy is identified by Bull & Wells (2012:42) in which the questionee/politician provides the audience with explanations, justifications to counteract the attack. This strategy can be illustrated with the examples from the Iraqi and the British parliaments respectively below.

[Extract 28, Al-Sudani's Interrogation, 1ˢᵗ Session, May 2009]

[Context: *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (1) above. In this extract, Al-Saady is accusing the Minister of covering up the corruption of certain employees by intentionally refusing to comply with arrest warrants for those employees.*]

```
01  Al-Saady: mr minister covers up corrupt employees ( . ) ((1PPFC)) this is mr
02            minister's confidential and urgent letter to Al Smawa court... we would like
03            to inform you of our dissent to surrender the following suspects Kayis Naseeb
04            Mohammed Hanoon ((1PPFC)) ((ISOFC))…
05  Al-Sudani:  indeed this issue is still under examination in the relevant court...as a
06            ministry we have received arrest warrants for some of our employees ( . ) then
07            the same court namely Al Samawa court have sent us a letter requesting  the
08            view of the ministry on this issue ...the standard legal position is to conduct
09            an investigation and decide accordingly whether to agree on surrendering
10            them to the court or not (0.5) and that is what we have done((CISs- EXP))
```

In the extract above, Al-Saady's turn consists of a lengthy PREFACE, 70 words, comprising a series of negative assessments of Al-Sudani's conduct regarding the covering up of five employees suspected of an alleged corruption.

Al-Saady's turn may be deemed impolite because it directly/explicitly accuses Al-Sudani of fostering/encouraging the corruption. These direct accusations implicitly question, challenge, and threaten the Minister's eligibility for the position as they implicitly show his inadequacy, incompetence in taking effective decisions. Moreover, these accusations may also imply the Minister's involvement in the alleged corruption.

The Minister responds to Al-Saady's accusations by providing a background information on the issue followed by an explanation of the standard procedures adopted in this case and similar ones. The Minister states that in this case, the relevant institution, viz. Al-Samawa court, issued a letter to the Ministry of Trade requesting its official/institutional stanceregarding the alleged corruption. The standard procedures require the Ministry to conduct an internal investigation to decide whether the alleged suspects to be sent to trial or not, claims the Minister. Then the Minister, viz. Al-Sudani, asserts that he has complied with the standard procedures regarding the corruption of five of his employees.

The extract below illustrates the use of this strategy in the British Parliamentary corpus.

[Extract 29, PMQs/14 Oct 2015-CC]

[Context: *In the extract below, Callum McCaig, then a member of parliament for Aberdeen, makes an off-record accusation against David Cameron, the then Prime Minister, and the Conservative government of acting unfairly towards Scotland in terms of the latter's allocation of a specific taxation program to support apprentice training in the UK, namely the apprenticeship Levy. This accusation among many others in the British political scene stems from a broader grievance narrative initiated by the National Scottish Party as part of their campaign for Scotland's independence from the United Kingdom*.]

```
01  McCaig (SNP): ... the Scottish government has estimated (.) that the apprenticeship
02              levy introduced er by the chancellor in the July budget will raise £391
03              million from Scotland (.) with £146 million of that coming from the public
04              sector (.) as yet there has been no confirmation that a single penny of that
05              will come to Scotland to fund our distinct modern apprenticeship
06              programme (0.5) will the Prime Minister confirm today that Scotland will
07              receive our fair share of this funding (.) ((1PPFC))((ISs-CPS)) or are we
08              seeing another pig in a poke ((1PFC)) ((ISs-CPS)) from this supposed one
09              nation government?
10  Cameron (PM, Con): I wanna  say to the honourable gentleman is that we haven't
11              yet set the rate of the apprenticeship levy or (.) indeed, set what level of
12              business size has to be before it starts paying it (0.5) but the guarantee I can
13              give him is that Scotland will be treated fairly (.) and will get its full and fair
14              share of any apprenticeship levy (.) ((CISs-EXP)) but as ever with SNP (.)
15              they invent a grievance before it even exists((cheering from Government
16              members)) ((CISs-AT: 1PFC))
```

In the above extract, McCaig is attacking Cameron's political competence, leadership, and integrity. The former's accusation, lines 6-9, is expressed through presuppositions. The presuppositional structure comprises two interrogative elements. In the first interrogative structure, viz. ' will the Prime Minister confirm today that Scotland will receive our fair share of this funding', the assertive part of the question, the noun phrase 'fair share', presupposes the existence of a fair share of the apprenticeship Levy. However, the interrogative structure introduces a further presupposition that signifies a guarantee or non-guarantee to receive the desired alternative, namely the fair share for Scotland. This presupposition is enhanced through the second interrogative structure, viz. 'or are we seeing another pig in a poke from this supposed one nation government?'.

The second interrogative structure presupposes that there have been previous instances in which the central government of Westminster treated Scotland unfairly, i.e. Scotland did not receive a fair share. This presupposition is triggered through the use of the iterative form 'another'. What is interesting is McCaig's idiomatic choice, i.e. 'pig in a poke', in reference to 'unfair share' which is more elaborative than a noun phrase as it adds further details, i.e. that Scotland pays its fair share of the deal but in return does not get what it should get. The first presupposition aims to attack Cameron as it directly addresses the Prime Minister whereas the second targets Cameron's government.

Cameron counteracts these accusations by offering an explanation, namely that the apprenticeship program is still under examination, and confirms that Scotland will receive its fair share. It could be said that OFFER AN EXPLANATION to counter an attack is a defence mechanism. However, Cameron further follows his explanatory account here with an attack against the Scottish National Party, lines 14-16, which may serve as an indication that McCaig's attack is perceived as offensive.

4.9.4.2 REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION

Bull & Wells (2012: 40) indicate that one strategy in replying to an attack is to refute the attack by proving or showing that it is false. Below is an example from the Iraqi Parliament.

[Extract 30, Al-Isawi's Interrogation, 2nd Session, Nov 2011]

[Context: *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (2) above. Here, Al-Waeli claims that Al-Isawi is not stern in executing administrative disciplinary measures issued against specific employees. These actions, as Al-Waeli claims, are part of a covering up process, a corruption, which influence and damage the service introduced by the Mayoralty of Baghdad to the general public.*]

```
01  Al-Waeli : mr Speaker the director of contracts department is also an employee at
02              the deputy manager's company((1PPFC)) …director of legal affairs
03              department the director of contracts department who are all employees at
04              Al-Sumood company… the director of contracts ((named Adil Ibrahim))
05               is disciplined in ten cases ((1SOFC))((1PPFC))((ISs-PRF)) …
06  Al-Isawi:  you mentioned that he is an employee at Al-Sumood give  me a single
```

07	evidence he is an employee at Al-Sumood (0.5)**((CISs-AT: 1PPFC))** this
08	information is inaccurate and imprecise 100% **((CISs-R/DC))**
09	**((CISs-AT))**... and he ((namely Al-Waeli)) mentioned that mr Adil Ibrahim
10	is an employee at Al-Sumood (.) and he is not an employee at Al-Sumood
11	**((CISs-R/DC))** and I wish he presents any official document that proves
12	that Adil Ibrahim is an employee at Al-Sumood **((CISs-AT))**. and he
13	((means Adil Ibrahim)) is not junior to the deputy manager as mr member
14	mentioned (.) never junior to the deputy manager (0.5) **((CISs-R/DC))**
15	departments of contracts control and inspection are directly under my
16	authority as they supervisory units

In the above extract, Al-Waeli attacks a group of corrupt employees affiliated to the Mayoralty of Baghdad through the PREFACE to his parliamentary question. In his account, Al-Waeli claims that those corrupt employees, including Adil Ibrahim, the director of contracts Department, are employees in a private firm named Al-Sumood. Al-Waeli claims that those employees abuse their authorities in the Mayoralty of Baghdad to benefit the private company.

Al-Waeli focuses on uncovering one of them, namely the director of Contracts, Adil Ibrahim. In addition to being an employees at Al-Sumood, Al-Waeli shows that Ibrahim has been disciplined in ten legal charges for which he has not received the recommended disciplinary action as it was ceased by the Mayor of Baghdad, Al-Isawi. Moreover, Al-Waeli, in a subsequent part of the current interaction, claims that the Mayor of Baghdad provides the necessary cover for those employees including Ibrahim. Hence, by accusing these corrupt employees Al-Waeli is also attacking the Mayor of Baghdad. In other words, Al-Waeli's is attacking Al-Isawi's PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE, namely attacking his credibility, integrity. To such accusations, the Mayor, Al-Isawi responds with a rebuttal. The rebuttal may be seen as occurring in two collaborative forms here: an implicit and explicit denial. Al-Isawi begins the denial by challenging Al-Waeli to prove the authenticity of his claims, lines 6-7, which is an attack against the latter but also an implicit emphatic denial of Al-Waeli's claims. Then Al-Isawi boosts his denial with an emphatic explicit denial in line 8 in which he asserts emphatically that Al-Waeli's information is incorrect. In line 10 and

14, Al-Isawi for the third time refutes Al-Waeli's claim that Ibrahim is an employee at Al-Sumood explicitly.

An example of rebutting in the British Parliament is demonstrated below.

[Extract 31, PMQs/15 June 2016-CC]

[Context: *The extract below recalls the 2011 notorious phone-hacking trial in the United Kingdom. In brief, Rupert Murdoch, the owner of a former national newspaper in the United Kingdom, namely the The News of the World, was forced to close down the newspaper after the conviction of some of the defunct newspaper's journalists, such as the editor Andy Coulson, of a conspiracy to illegally hack phones of politicians, celebrities and crime victims. In May 2010, Coulson was appointed by David Cameron as the director of communication in Downing Street. Later on, Cameron officially apologised and admitted that Coulson's appointment was a wrong decision. Cameron also, initiated a public inquiry to examine the practices, and ethics of the press headed by Lord Justice Leveson. Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act (2013), was written in response to the recommendation of Lord Leveson*.]

```
01  Corbyn (LO, Lab): three years ago mr Speaker there was a cross-party agreements for
02          the implementation of section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act (0.5) and to
03          proceed with Leveson 2 once criminal prosecutions were concluded (0.5) the
04          Prime Minister will be aware that today there is a lobby of parliament by the
05          victims of phone hacking (0.5) the prime minister said a few years ago that we
06          all did too much cosying up to Rupert Murdoch (.) ((1PPFC)) … but will the
07          Prime Minister give a commitment today that he will meet the victims of press
08          intrusion and assure them that he will keep his promise on this? ((1PPFC))
09  Cameron (PM, Con): ...in terms of the Leveson issue (.) we said that we'd make a
10          decision about the second stage of this inquiry once the criminal investigations
11          and prosecutions were out of the way (0.5) they are still continuing so that is
12          the situation there (.) ((CISs-EXP)) I have met with victims of press intrusion
13          and I am happy to do so again((CISs-EXP)) but I think right now people can
14          accuse me of many things(.) but I think cosying up to Rupert Murdoch
15          probably is not one of them ((CISs-R/DC))
```

In the PREFACE to his parliamentary question, the Leader of the Opposition Jeremy Corbyn attacks the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of the then Prime Minister, namely David Cameron. In the interaction above, Corbyn inquires about the destiny of executing

section 40 of the above mentioned Act, in attempt to activate the legislated Act in question, lines 1-5.

Bringing up a scandal that demonstrates Cameron's self-confession of wrong doing is an attack to Cameron's POLITICAL FACE, as it undermines the effectiveness of his decision making abilities. Corbyn further challenges Cameron by accusing him of flattering, pleasing Murdoch at the expense of justice which is an attack at Cameron's righteousness and moral conduct, lines 5-6. In response, Cameron provides an explanatory account, lines 9-12, on why the implementation of section 40 has not yet happened, and he welcomes the phone hacking lobby, line 13. He thus refutes Corbyn's claim that he was behaving towards the phone hacking affair with the mind-set of pleasing Murdoch.

4.9.4.3   ATTACK

Counter attack is another responding strategy in the discourse of PMQs as indicated in Bull & Wells (2012:41). In this strategy, the questionee/politician responds to the attack by attacking back. Below are examples from the Iraqi and British parliaments respectively.

[**Extract 32, Al-Obaidi's Interrogation, Aug 2016**]

[Context: *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (3) above. In a prelude to his answers, Al-Obaidi declared that the reason behind his interrogation is because he refused to join in corruption offers/deals. In other words, Al-Obaidi insinuated that some corrupt parliamentarians have unfairly arranged for him to be interrogated. Upon requests from many Iraqi parliamentarians, the Minister of Defence started to expose those members and their corruption.*]

```
01 Al-Obaidi: Al-Karbouli came to me saying that there are 1300 Hummers in Texas
02            which are cheap and could be useful for the Iraqi army... we checked
03            with the Americans who were laughing at our inquiry...then it turned out that
04            the lining level in those vehicles is not as required and they only cost 60$
05            thousand. it was supposed that we buy these Hummers from the
06            manufacturing company for 124$ thousand and claim it was sold to the
07            ministry of defence for 360$ thousand (0.5) that was the deal. by the
08            Al-Mighty Allah Al-Karbouli comes and informs me that this is
09            mr Speaker's deal ((CISs-AT:1PPFC)) and keeps asking me about it
```

```
10              on daily basis//
11 Al-Karbouli:           liar by the Al-Mighty Allah (he is) a liar ((1FC-PI))
12 Al-Obaidi: by the Al-Mighty Allah no one lies except your face ((CISs-AT:1FC-PI))
13              by the Al-Mighty Allah no one lies except your face ((CISs-AT:1FC-PI))
14         : (       )
15 Al-Obaidi: respect yourself ((CISs-AT:1FC-PI)) respect yourself ((CISs-AT:1FC-
16         PI))
17         : (       )
18 Al-Obaidi: by Allah there's no one immoral except your revolting face
19         ((CISs-AT:1FC-PI)) look no one by Allah no one has destroyed Iraq
20         except your dirty faces ((CISs-AT:1FC-PI)) (you)  depraved ones ((CISs-
21         AT:1FC-PI)) (you) vile/ immoral ones ((CISs-AT:1FC-PI))
22         : (       )
23 Al-Obaidi: it is not acceptable that he continues assaulting me and I keep quiet it is
24         not acceptable mr speaker 'if they don't respect themselves/stop what they
25         are saying, then by Al-Mighty Allah I will insult them back very
26         cruelly'((CISs-AT:1FC-PI))
27
```

In the above extract, the conventional pattern of interrogation in which the questioner performs the challenging, questioning, and attacking is reversed. In other words, the questionee, the Minister of Defence Al-Obaidi ceased the questioner from posing her questions for a period of time and started launching an attack on several Iraqi parliamentarians including the Speaker of the House. Politically speaking, this has been a significant incident as the questioner attacked not only members with opposite political affiliations but he mainly attacked members with the same political membership.

In this session, Al-Obaidi exposed several corruption and bribery deals that were offered to him by those corrupt politicians and their associate businessmen. In lines 1-9, Al-Obaidi attacks Al-Karbouli and the Speaker of the House by explicitly unveiling the specifics of a fraudulent deal planned by these politicians as claimed by Al-Obaidi. The alleged deal entails that Al-Obaidi being the Minister of Defence to initiate a contract with an American company to provide defective, and cheaper in price Hummers for the Iraqi Army. However, both the faultiness and real cheaper price of these vehicles has to be kept as a secret among the parties involved and the official contract to declare a different price, namely higher than the price actually paid for it. Consequently, the parties involved in the deal, i.e. allegedly Al-Karbouli, the Speaker and Al-Obaidi, to benefit from the discrepancy in price. These alleged accusations of corruption pose attack against the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of both

Al-Karbouli, and the Speaker of the House as it questions their integrity and credibility. Moreover, the face attack/impoliteness escalates into a different level when Al-Karbouli attacks back the Minister of Defence using personal insults, namely calling him 'a liar' as indicated in line 11. Then Al-Obaidi insults Al-Karbouli and the other politicians involved in this also using personal insults as shown in lines 12-13, 18-21, 24-26.

The extract below demonstrates the use of the counter strategy ATTACK in the current corpus of PMQs. The extract below exemplifies how the Prime Minister attacks various manifestations of FACE such PERSONAL, PERSONAL POLITICAL, and PARTY FACE.

[Extract 33, PMQs/11 Mar 2015-CE]

[Context: *See the contextualisation of extract 7 above.*]

```
01  Miliband (LO, Lab): mr Speaker these are pathetic feeble excuses. ((1FC-PI))
02          can we now take it (.) that there are no circumstances that he will debate me
03          head to head between now and the general election?((1PPFC))
04  Cameron (PM, Con): we have had four years of debates (.) and we have found out (.)
05          he's got no policies he's got no plan he's got no team and he's got no clue of
06          running the country ((CISs-AT: 1PPFC)). but the truth mr Speaker  is this
07          (0.5) Labour are now saying that they cannot win the election. here is the the
08          leaflet they put out in Scotland(.) ah I think the SNP might be interested in
09          this. at the general election we need to stop the Tories being the largest party.
10          they are not  trying to win (0.5) they are just trying to crawl through the gates
11          of Downing street on the coattails of the SNP (( cheering sounds from the
12          government members)) ((CISs-AT: 1PFC)). so what he's got to do is prove
13          he is not a chicken and rule that out ((CISs-AT:1PPFC))
```

 In relevant previous PMQs sessions, Miliband has launched several endeavours to tease, attack Cameron to participate in these debates. In the above interaction, Miliband is recycling the same accusations he made at previous relevant PMQs regarding Cameron's stance on the Broadcasters' TV debates. Namely, he describes Cameron's justifications as 'pathetic feeble excuses', implying that Cameron is avoiding these debates because he is scared, frightened of engaging in a TV debate with him in fear of losing the debate. Such accusations continue in subsequent discourse as Miliband attacks Cameron stating 'why is he chickening out of the debates with me?, and ' why does he not show a bit more backbone and turn up for the head-to-head debate with me—anytime, anywhere, any place?'.

In the current exchange, Cameron strikes back at Miliband and attacks the latter's POLITICAL FACE. In other words, Cameron states that the Leader of the Opposition lacks the political competence to run the country as 'he's got no policies he's got no plan he's got no team and he's got no clue of running the country', lines 4-6. Cameron then proceeds to attack the Labour party by attacking their election campaign strategy. In lines 9-11, Cameron implies that Labour's strategy is not to 'earn' an election victory properly, but to benefit from the growing popularity of the SNP. He claims that Labour is aiming for a deal with the SNP who supports and campaigns for Scotland's independence from the rest of the United Kingdom. Hence, accusing Labour of risking the unity of the United Kingdom. Cameron further attacks Miliband and by challenging him to deny, rebuff such a deal – otherwise he is a 'chicken', i.e. coward.

4.9.4.4   PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE

In this strategy, the questionee engages the audience in a self-promoting discourse. In other words, the politician provides an account, brief or lengthy, regarding his/her accomplishments, measures, and decisions in handling an issue or an aspect of an issue that is being questioned, and challenged. This strategy is also adopted from Bull & Wells (2012:40). This strategy is exemplified below with examples from the Iraqi and the British parliaments respectively.

[Extract 34, Al-Isawi's Interrogation, 2nd Session, Nov 2011]

[Context*: For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (2) above. In this extract, Al-Waeli continues to unveil the alleged corruption by manifesting how Al-Isawi mal-executes institutional regulations regarding the appointment of general managers which affects the quality of the public service.*]

```
01   Al-Waeli: I ask about the appointment of Mosa Dishar (.) under what legal decree was
02              he appointed ?(.) ((1PPFC))((1SOFC)) ((ISs-DQ)) and what are his
03              professional qualifications?
04   Al-Isawi: ... indeed there were suspicions that mr Mosa Dishar's degree certificate
05              is forged we sent an authentication request to the relevant university twice
06              and they replied that the degree is not forged ((CISs-EXP)).  a year ago I met
```

07	the assistant dean of the relevant university who is a relative of mine and
08	personally requested a further authentication (.) the assistant dean brought me
09	the authentication document personally (0.5) this time it was confirmed that
10	the degree is not original. accordingly I initiated a joint investigation
11	through the general inspector's office at the mayoralty of Baghdad and the
12	general inspector at the ministry of higher education (0.5) the forgery was
13	confirmed and mr Dishar was removed from his post ((CISs-PPF:1 PPFC))

In the above extract, Al-Waeli questions and challenges the Mayor of Baghdad with regard to how the latter appoints one of the general managers at the Mayoralty of the capital city, namely Mosa Dishar's appointment. In a subsequent discourse, Al-Waeli shows how the appointment of Dishar contravenes the official regulations and how his unfit modest professional and academic qualifications resulted in poor public service. In particular, Dishar's appointment was based on a forged academic certificate. Hence, Al-Waeli's question in lines 1-2 may be considered as attack to the Mayor of Baghdad, Al-Isawi, who is accountable of Dishar's appointment. The attack also implies an accusation of covering up a corruption. Al-Isaw responds to the attack by providing an explanation of the administrative procedures following the appointment of Dishar using official documents, lines 4-6. Then Al-Isawi shows his personal and institutional contribution in unveiling the forged academic background of Dishar, i.e. resorts to PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE. In lines 6-10, Al-Isawi states that although the first request of authentication confirmed the originality of Dishar's certificate, still he used his personal connections to reconfirm the originality of Dishar's certificate for a third time. In lines 10-13, Al-Isawi then demonstrates that all necessary institutional actions has been taken upon proving the forgery of Dishar's academic degree.

The example below demonstrates the use of PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE in the present PMQs corpus. The example includes structures that can be regarded as promoting PERSONAL POLITICAL and PARTY FACE.

[Extract 35, PMQs/16 Dec 2015-CC]

[Context: *The National Health Service, viz. NHS, is a classic and recurrent theme in the discourse of PMQs. Due to its indispensableness to the general public, the NHS is usually*

weaponised in political party battles. In this session, the Leader of the Opposition, Corbyn, criticises the Prime Minister, David Cameron, upon failing to manage the NHS, as relevant trusts at the time forecast a £2.2 million deficit by the end of 2015.]

```
01  Corbyn (LO, Lab):… if he's so happy mr Speaker about the national health service
02            (0.5) could he explain then (.) why  he's decided to cancel the publication of
03            NHS performance data this winter? ((jeering sounds from the Opposition
04            members)) ((1PPFC)) ((ISs-CPS))  and there was a time (0.5) when
05            the Prime Minister was er (.) all in favour of transparency (0.5) it's not
06            long ago (.) in fact it was 2011 when he said and I quote (.)  information
07            is power. it lets people hold the powerful to account giving them the tools
08            they need to take on politicians and Bureaucrats (.) is it because the
09            number of people being kept waiting on trolleys in A&E has gone up
10            more than fourfold that he does not want to publish those statistics?
11            ((1PPFC)) ((ISs-CPS))
12  Cameron (PM, Con): first of all the data that he quoted in his first question was not
13            published before this government came into office ((cheering sound from the
14            government members)) ((CISs-PPF: 1PFC)).that's right  and let me quote
15            him some data about the NHS (0.5) let me just take an average day to day
16            compared with five years ago when I became Prime Minister (.) on an average
17            day on the NHS today(0.5) there are 4,400 more operations (.) there are 21,000
18            more out patient appointments ((CISs-PPF: 1PPFC))
```

In the above extract, Corbyn attacks Cameron's inadequate policies and measures in running the NHS by alluding to their consequences, such the increase in the number of patients kept waiting in trolleys in Accidents and Emergency units. In lines 2-3, Corbyn presupposes that Cameron has cancelled the publication of NHS performance report for winter 2015. He then proceeds to provide a motive behind that cancellation through another presupposition in lines 8-10. He claims that Cameron has concealed NHS information because it proves the inefficiency of his economic decisions. Hence, both presuppositions are attacking the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of Cameron.

To these face attacks, Cameron responds by highlighting the results of implementing his government's measures in the NHS, namely by PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE. For example, in lines 12-13, he states that the figures Corbyn is quoting in his questions were not accessible before his government, i.e. the Conservatives, took office. Hence, he PROMOTEs POSITIVE FACE of the Conservative cabinet and/or party. Cameron further markets his own NHS achievements such as the increase in the number of surgeries, and out-patients

174

appointments since he took office in 2010, lines 16-18. Thus, Cameron PROMOTEs his POLITICAL FACE.

4.9.4.5 ABROGATION

To the best of the researcher's knowledge, this strategy is not listed in studies investigating impoliteness in political discourse. However, it is recognised in (Culpeper et al., 2003:1656) who define it as " the abrogation of personal responsibility for the actions or events that caused the interlocutor to issue a face damaging utterance in the first place''. In their research, the abrogation takes place through a shift in social or discoursal role. Switching in social role involves shifting from being a private citizen to public servant whereas shifting in discoursal roles involves acting a representative role. In other words, it involves a denial of personal responsibility by passing it on others. The following extract shows an example of abrogation in the Iraqi parliament.

[**Extract 36**, **Al-Sudani's Interrogation, 2ⁿᵈ Session, May 2009**]

[Context: *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (1) above. In this extract, the questioner Al-Saady challenges Al-Sudani's intentional disregard for De-Baathification procedures in relation with a specific employee at his office. De-Baathification is a post 2003 policy implemented to eliminate the existence and influence of the Iraqi Baath party in all political and public institutions in Iraq. The party is constitutionally and legally banned in Iraq at the time being. For politicians, not adhering to De-Baathification policy, which was later on enacted as a legislation known as Accountability and Justice Act 2008, has serious social and political implications. Indeed, confirming to have no ties with the Baath party, through an official letter from the Justice and Accountability Commission, is a prerequisite to have a high ranked governmental post and/or political career in Iraq. Hence, De-Baathification became a common and effective tool for political struggle in the country.*]

```
01  Al-Saady: mr minister mentioned that the National De-Baathification Committee
02            has issued  several contradictory letters in relation to Mahmood
03            Al-Shahmany (.) however I have at my disposal the principle and
04            the only letter (0.5) the letter clearly states that procedures of
05            De-Baathification applies to Mahmood Al-Shahmany (0.5) and no minister
```

06		should keep him in any post within the public sector (.) not
07		only that mr minister did not activate De-Baathificarion measures but
08		he transferred Al-Shahmany to ministry of Trade when he took office
09		there **((1PPFC))((ISs-PRF))…**
10	Al-Sudani:	regarding the De-Baathification issue <u>the letter mentioned</u> by the
11		<u>questioner was issued before being appointed in the ministerial office</u>
12		**((CISs-AB))**(.) <u>the letter of De-Bathification was issued in March 2005</u>
13		<u>when I was not a minister of trade in the first place</u> **((CISs-AB))** …

In this example, the questioner employs a set of propositions to express accusations against the then Minister of Trade for not activating De-Baathification measures. In lines 1-7, Al-Saady claims that Al-Sudani, as a Minister of Education at the time, received only a single official letter informing him that Al-Shahmany is eligible to De-Baathification policy. Hence, the Minister should have activated the relevant procedure and removed him from his post in the Ministry. Instead, the Minister kept Al-Shahmany in his post back then and transferred him to the Ministry of Trade when Al-Sudani held the Ministry's office. Hence, Al-Saady is accusing the Minister of not complying with the De-Baathification policy and protecting a former member of the Baath party.

In response to this accusation, Al-Sudani denies responsibility of having to adhere to the De-Baathification letter as he was not in office back at the time of issuing the official decree/letter. In other words, the Minister passes the responsibility to whomever was in office at the time of issuing the letter in question.

4.9.4.6   UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS

This strategy is not included within the studies that investigated impoliteness in the political and or parliamentary discourse such as Bull et al. (1996), Harris (2001), and Bull & Wells (2012). However it surfaced in my corpus, both in the Iraqi and the British parliaments. In this strategy the politician/questionee underrates/makes light of the face attack in an attempt to dismiss it. Culpeper et al. (2003:1567) include a similar strategy, namely "dismiss: make light of the face damage, joke". Culpeper et al. 's (2003:1567) strategy is an example of mock impoliteness/ritualistic banter or ritualistic insults (Labov, 1972). However, the samples included under the current strategy in my study do not involve an element of

humour/jockery. Indeed, the impoliteness is genuine, i.e. the questionee intends to belittle the impoliteness produced by the questioner. Hence, it can be regarded as an offensive strategy like the ones stated in Culpeper (1996: 358). This strategy is exemplified below with examples from the Iraqi and the British parliaments respectively.

[Extract 37, Al-Sudani's Interrogation, 1st Session, May 2009]

[Context: *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (1) above. In this extract, Al-Saady attempts to uncover the various dimensions of corruption in the Ministry such as its failing policy to deliver the many items of the ration to the Iraqi people, and its ill, suspicious management of the budget.*]

```
01  Al-Saady: …on page 33 it says that two amounts of money were transferred to
02            unknown destinations (0.5) the first amount is 18 million dollars in
03            31/10/2007 and the second 27 million dollars in 24/1/2008 (0.5) even till
04            today the ministry has not identified the destination to which the money was
05            transferred to nor the purpose of the transfer ((1PPFC)) ((ISs-PRF)) …
06  Al-Sudani: the Federal Board of Supreme Audit takes notes and sends these notes to
07            all ministries (0.5) the ministries responds to these notes with absolute
08            transparency (.) there are points which we recommend changing and there
09            are points that needs to reviewed and double checked (0.5) but to
10            assume/expect/say that the minister is responsible of knowing where did this
11            dollar go and where did that dollar come from ((CISs-USI))
12             (( loud noises from parliamentarians )) please let me continue this is indeed
13            a very detailed issue

14  Al-Saady: the issue is very serious (.) it is not as insignificant as he states it
```

In his attempt to uncover the alleged claims of corruption in the Ministry of Trade, Al-Saady resorts to inspectorial governmental reports to support/prove his claims. In the above extract, Al-Saady refers to an item in a report issued by the Federal Board of Supreme Audit which records two suspicious transfers of huge funds to unidentified source(s), lines 1-5. Al-Saady points out that neither the purpose nor the destination of the transfer has been resolved at the time of speaking. By illustrating these critical details, Al-Saady is attacking Al-Sudani by showing the latter's inefficiency in the management of governmental funds. Moreover, the disappearance of public funds in this manner may indicate a possible embezzlement issue. In other words, Al-Saady's attack may be considered as an implied accusations of

embezzlement of public funds by the Minister of Trade. To these accusations, Al-Sudani provides various different responses such as denying to receive the relevant document prior to the interrogation, lines 9-12, explaining relevant procedures in such situations, lines 13-16, and underrating the suspicious funds transfer as insignificant. In line 18, the Minister indirectly states that the amount of lost funds is too small to be worth considering, namely 'this dollar go and where did that dollar come from'. In other words, Al-Sudani is UNDERSTATing THE IMPOLITENESS to lessen Al-Saady's attack among the audience by misrepresenting the relevant situation. Al-Sudani also states that it isn't within his job description to be aware of such tiny details which he describes as too unimportant, and rejects being accountable for it. The Minister's condescending attitude created an uproar in the session which interrupted the continuity of Al-Sudani's response to the accusations.

To illustrate this counter strategy in the current PMQs, consider the extract below.

[Extract 38, PMQs/18 Mar 2015-CE]

[Context: *In this exchange, a Labour member of parliament, henceforth MP, namely Liz McInnes accuses the then Prime Minister David Cameron of favouritism, i.e. to intentionally disregard the execution of relevant parliamentary procedures to cover up the malpractice of Conservative members.*]

```
01  Mclnnes (Lab): mr Speaker (0.5) the Prime Minister has a record of looking the other
02              way (.) when it comes to allegations (.) of wrongdoing in his own team.
03              he did it with Andy Coulson and he is doing it now with the honourable
04              member for Welwyn and Hatfield (0.5) ((jeering from the Opposition
05              members)) ((ISs-PRF)) can the Prime Minister explain (.) why he's been
06              so quick to rule out an investigation into his own party's chairman?
07              ((1PPFC))((ISs-CPS))
08  Cameron (PM, Con): I would have thought really with all the things happening in the
09              part of the world that she represents she could have come up with a better
10              question ((laughter sounds))((CISs-USI)). my right honourable friend has
11              acknowledged that he made a mistake(0.5) but his entry in the register
12              of members' financial Interests was correct ((CISs-EXP)). so I really think
13              she is barking up at the wrong tree. but while I am here (.) I am sure she will
14              want to welcome that in her constituency the claimant count has FALLEN
15              BY 54% SINCE THE LAST ELECTION ((CISs-PPF: 1PFC))
```

In the PREFACE, Mclnnes accuses Cameron of attempting to cover up that a Conservative member, namely Grant Shapps, has had a second job for almost a year after being elected as an MP. Moreover, she uses the expression 'has a record' to imply a pattern of covering ups, i.e. to imply that Cameron's conduct of covering ups is systemised and indefinite. To exemplify this pattern, she recalls the Coulson affair in which Cameron turned a blind eye to Coulson's dubious history and appointed him as Downing Street communication director. As mentioned earlier, extract 31 above, Coulson was involved in illegal phone hacking allegations that were later found to be true. Then McInnes raises Shapps' case who has conceded working as a millionaire web marketer' while being an MP despite his previous repeated firm denials. Namely, Mclnnes accuses Cameron to cover up Shapps' violation through a presuppositional interrogative structure in lines 5-6. Hence, Mclnnes is attacking Cameron's POLITICAL FACE as she attacks his integrity. Cameron responds to these attacks by understating, trivialising it, lines 8-9. He tells the Labour MP that there are other more important issues within her constituency to inquire about. He then proceeds to OFFER AN EXPLANATION defending Shapps, and PROMOTE the Conservative PARTY's FACE by quoting Claimant Count figures in Mclnnes's constituency which had risen since Conservatives took office in 2010.

4.9.4.7   OPT OUT ON RECORD

This strategy is also not included within the studies that investigated impoliteness in the political and or parliamentary discourse such as Bull et al. (1996), Harris (2001), and Bull & Wells (2012). However, it manifested itself in the Iraqi corpus within the current study. In this strategy, which is identified in Culpeper et al. (2003:1566), the politician/questionee attempts to conclude the impoliteness by refusing to further contribute/respond to it. This strategy is exemplified below with an example from the Iraqi corpus.

[Extract 39, Al-Sudani's Interrogation, 1ˢᵗ Session, May 2009]

[Context: *See the context of extract 37above.*]

```
01  Al-Sudani: ... these issues need a detailed investigation into it (0.5) as the Minister of
02            Trade I request to have access to it to be able to respond (.) I have no detailed
03            answer now ((CISs-OPR)) I don't have an answer now because I can't
04            recognise these amounts of money mentioned earlier (0.5 ) I request to have
05            access to the report he holds
```

The above extract is a continuation of the interaction cited in extract 37. Following accusations of incompetence and possibly public funds embezzlement by Al-Saady, the Minister of Trade has employed various strategies to counter the impoliteness as mentioned above. Among these strategies is to OPT OUT ON RECORD, namely to declare that he will not contribute further in the interaction or in responding to that particular incident of funds disappearance, lines 2-3. Moreover, Al-Sudani provides a justification for using this strategy in lines 3-5. Al-Sudani's justification seems invalid as Al-Saady demonstrates, in a later discourse, that the report in question is circulated regularly to the Minister of Trade. Thus this strategy, namely OPT OUT ON RECORD, may be an attempt to avoid/escape the impoliteness by trying to conclude it.

4.9.4.8 THIRD PARTY RECOURSE

This strategy is also not part of the studies that explored impoliteness in the political and or parliamentary discourse such as Bull et al. (1996), Harris (2001), and Bull & Wells (2012). However, it manifested itself in the Iraqi corpus within the current study. In this strategy, the questionee/politicians requests resorting to a dominant third party, who has power over the participants, to resolve/conclude the impoliteness. This strategy seems similar to a strategy recognised in Bousfield (2007:2204) called "dominant third party intervention''. However, in Bousfield's strategy no mention is made of the third party being requested yet it actually intervenes and concludes the impolite situation. My version of this strategy is exemplified below with an example from the Iraqi corpus.

[Extract 40, Al-Sudani's Interrogation, 2nd Session, May 2009]

[Context: *For a full contextualisation of this extract see 4.4.1 (1) above. In this extract, the questioner Al-Saady attempts to unveil the alleged corruption in the Iraqi Ministry of Trade*

by showing how Al-Sudani is covering up corrupt employees and consequently, how he is

failing to perform his duties.]

```
01  Al-Saady: ...regarding the minister's two brothers whom he falsely informed the
02            courts that they are not affiliated with the ministry of trade (0.5) in yesterday's
03            session mr minister said that even if they possess official IDs (.) they are not
04            employees at the ministry of trade ... I don't know how does the ministry
05            provides official IDs for such a sensitive post as the secretary of the minister
06            to an individual who is not officially affiliated with the ministry? how would
07            he use this ID? where would he use this ID? ((1PPFC))((1SOFC))
08            ((ISs-CIM)) amid of all kinds of security breaches in the country nowadays...
09  Al-Sudani: ...this issue is now in the hand of the judicial authorities which will
10            investigate and reach a decision whether we are correct or not (.) whether
11            we are claiming things or not(0.5) law will prove all these things and we
12            leave it for the judicial authorities because this issue is under consideration
13            in relevant courts ((CISs-TPR))
```

In an earlier discourse, Al-Saady has demonstrated with evidence how the Minister of Trade Al-Sudani has misinformed the relevant judicial authorities, namely Al-Simawa court about his brothers' status within the Ministry. Namely, Al-Sudani informed Al-Simawa court, through an official letter, that two of his brothers are not employees at the Ministry of Trade, though both were carrying official IDs that indicate their affiliation with the Ministry when arrested. Al-Sudani denied that his two brothers are employees at the Ministry even if they are provided with official institutional IDs.

In the current extract, Al-Saady attacks the Minister for issuing, and providing institutional IDs for individuals who are not officially affiliated with the Ministry, as Al-Sudani claims. Al-Saady implies that such an irresponsible act may cause security breaches which can result in catastrophic consequences for the Iraqi people, i.e. opens a possibility for suicide bombings. Al-Sudani attempts to seal off the attack by proposing to resort to a dominant third party, i.e. THIRD PARTY RECOURSE, which has power over both the questioner and the questionee. In other words, Al-Sudani invites the questioner and the whole audience to resort to the relevant judicial authorities to determine whether he has taken the appropriate measures concerning his brothers' condition or not, lines 11-13.

4.10 Summary

In this chapter, I have first reiterated my research questions so as to show how these are addressed in terms of the theoretical and methodological frameworks adopted in the this research. Then I have elaborately justified the current research's methodological stance. Next, I introduced the sampling frame adopted in the selection of corpora for analysis in this study. What follows is a thorough account of the nature of the Iraqi and British corpora selected for analysis in this research. A moderate reference was also made to the challenges of collecting corpora in the Iraqi setting. I have also demonstrated the representation system, both transcription and translation, employed for the in-text inclusion of the Iraqi and British corpora. Moreover, I have explained how frequencies have been measured in this study. An explanative account of the interactional structure of Iraqi parliamentary interrogations and British PMQs discourse has been provided next. Afterwards, I have explicated the analytical framework, and the relevant analytical procedures adopted in the study at hand. Then I have introduced and exemplified the analytical categories adopted to address the questions posed in this research.

In the next chapter, I introduce the empirical findings of investigating the nature of impoliteness in the current Iraqi and British parliamentary discourse.

5 Chapter Five: Impoliteness in the Iraqi and British Parliaments

5.1 Chapter Outline

The present chapter introduces the results relevant to the three aspects of impoliteness being examined in the current research. Namely, (1) the types of impoliteness defined by the specific FACE SENSITIVITIES and SOCIALITY RIGHTS that are affected or infringed, as outlined in the Methodology Chapter, (2) the linguistic strategies, both discoursal and pragmatic, employed by relevant parliamentarians in invoking/expressing impoliteness, and (3) the relevant patterns of response to such impoliteness strategies which may, in turn, involve further types of impoliteness as in (1).

In this chapter, I will first introduce the various types of impoliteness occurring in the Iraqi and British parliaments respectively along with their distributions. I will then present the linguistic strategies employed by Iraqi and British parliamentarians to express these types of impoliteness and their frequencies. This part is followed by the presentation of the frequencies relevant to the use of counter-impoliteness strategies in Iraqi and British parliaments. Next, I introduce a comparison of the relevant aspects of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments at all three levels. The chapter is concluded by a summary of its content.

5.2 Impoliteness Types in the Iraqi and British Parliaments

This section showcases the findings from the analysis of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments with specific reference to the FACE SENSITIVITIES and SOCIALITY RIGHTS that are affected in the investigated parliamentary sessions. These parameters of impoliteness were initially derived from the framework introduced in Chapter Four, namely Spencer-Oatey's (2008), Bull et al.'s (1996) and Culpeper's (2011a) frames.

However, the overall framework was adapted to include elements from Bull et al.'s (1996), Harris' (2001), Culpeper's (1996), Culpeper et al.'s (2003), Bousfield's, (2007),

Spencer-Oatey's (2008), Culpeper's (2011a), and Bull & Wells' (2012) frameworks, and further categories were adjusted following preliminary analysis of the data, as explained in the Methodology Chapter.

It is worth noting that the results relevant to the types of impoliteness recognised in the current Iraqi and British parliamentary discourse include only those occurring in questioning turns. In other words, the types of impoliteness introduced here include only those impolite utterances produced by the relevant questioners in the Iraqi parliament and by the Leaders of Opposition and MPs in the British parliament.

As for the relevant impoliteness types in answering turns, i.e. produced by the relevant questionees in the Iraqi parliament and the Prime Minister in the British one, these will be introduced within one of the counter impoliteness strategies, namely the ATTACK strategy.

Moreover, for each of the parameters investigated in the current study, the findings are presented both in terms of word percentages and number of occurrences. However, these two measures of frequency are introduced separately, namely the word percentages are introduced first in tables and pie graphs whereas the number of occurrences are presented afterwards in bar charts. The findings for both the Iraqi and British settings respectively are presented in the following sections below.

5.2.1   Impoliteness Types in the Iraqi Parliament

This section demonstrates the types of impoliteness that surfaced in the Iraqi corpus based on the relevant parameters (FACE SENSITIVITIES and SOCIALITY RIGHTS). These impoliteness types are presented in table 5.1 below in terms of word percentages.

Table 5.1 The Distribution of Impoliteness Types in the Iraqi Parliament by Word Percentage

Impoliteness Types	Words	Word Percentage
FACE SENSITIVITIES ((1FC)) Total	12129	91.65 %
PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE ((1PPFC))	9908	74.79 %
PARTY FACE ((1PFC))	123	0.93 %
SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE ((1SOFC))	2094	15.81 %
PERSONAL FACE ((1FC-PI)) Total	4	0.03 %
Personalised Negative Assertions	4	0.03 %
SOCIALITY RIGHTS ((2RS)) Total	1118	8.44 %
EQUITY RIGHTS ((2EQRS)) Total	943	7.12 %
Cost Benefit Considerations ((2EQRS-CB))	126	0.95 %
Fairness and Reciprocity ((2EQRS-FR))	183	1.38 %
Autonomy and Imposition ((2EQRS-AI))	634	4.79 %
ASSOCIATION RIGHTS ((2ARS)) Total	175	1.32 %
Involvement ((2ARS-IV))	81	0.61 %
Empathy ((2ARS-EM))	94	0.71 %
Total Words =	13247	

Table 5.1 above shows the distribution of impoliteness types and subtypes in the Iraqi corpus. The size of the relevant linguistic realisations are introduced both in terms of a word count and a percentage. The table above shows that two superordinate concepts/factors, namely FACE SENSITIVITIES and SOCIALITY RIGHTS are involved in activating impoliteness in these parliamentary interrogations.

Table 5.1 above also displays the subordinate concepts/factors that diverge from the above mentioned superordinate ones. Overall, the table above indicates that the size of the linguistic realisations employed in communicating impoliteness that involves FACE SENSITIVITIES is much greater than that used in expressing SOCIALITY RIGHTS related impoliteness.

The table also illustrates that almost three quarters of the realisations involving FACE SENSITIVITIES are utilised to attack PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE in the Iraqi parliament. Whereas the slightest amount of language has been deployed in attacking PERSONAL FACE in these parliamentary interrogations. Furthermore, table 5.1 above demonstrates that impoliteness deriving from infringing EQUITY RIGHTS utilises a bigger range of language than impoliteness triggered by breaching ASSOCIATION RIGHTS in the Iraqi parliament.

As illustrated in table 5.1 above, impoliteness arising from attacking FACE SENSITIVITIES in total has deployed 12129 words, which accounts for approximately 92% of the total Iraqi corpus (see the pie graph in figure 5.1 below). By contrast, SOCIALITY RIGHTS related impoliteness in total uses only 1118 words which constitutes nearly 8% of the total corpus as indicated in the pie chart below.

Figure 5.1 The Distribution of Impoliteness by Main Type (Face Sensitivities and Sociality Rights) in the Iraqi Parliament

Word Percentage for the Superordinate Types of Impoliteness in the Iraqi Parliament

- FACE SENSITIVITIES — 92%
- SOCIALITY RIGHTS — 8%

According to table 5.1 above, it is clearly evident that impoliteness initiated by attacking PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE uses 9908 words compared to impoliteness arising from attacking PARTY FACE which required only 123 words. In addition, impoliteness activated by attacking SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE in the Iraqi parliament uses 2094 words, as shown in table 5.1 above, which accounts for nearly a sixth of the total corpus (see the pie chart in figure 5.2 below).

Figure 5.2 The Distribution of Impoliteness by Subtypes in the Iraqi Parliament

Word Percentage for Subordinate Types of Impoliteness (Face Sensititivities and Sociality Rights) in the Iraqi Parliament

- PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE — 74.79%
- PERSONAL FACE — 0.03%
- SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE — 15.81%
- Autonomy and Imposition — 4.79%
- Involvement — 0.61%

Interestingly, linguistic realisations of impoliteness ascribable to PERSONAL FACE attacks, in questioning turns, have used solely 4 words in total. Table 5.1 also demonstrates that realisations of SOCIALTY RIGHTS impoliteness in total comprises 1118 words which forms slightly above 8% of the total corpus (see also the pie chart in figure 5.1 above). According to table 5.1 above, the total realisations of SOCIALITY RIGHTS related impoliteness in the Iraqi parliament consist of those realisations arising from breaching EQUITY RIGHTS and ASSOCIATION RIGHTS. The former type of impoliteness comprises a range of realisations composed of 943 words compared to the realisations of the latter type which consists of 175 words.

The realisations of EQUITY RIGHTS related impoliteness comprise the linguistic realisations of its subordinate concepts, namely the realisations of breaching Cost Benefit Considerations (126 words), Fairness and Reciprocity (183 words), and Autonomy and Imposition (634 words).

As shown in table 5.1 above, realisations of impoliteness ascribable to violations of Autonomy and Imposition are greater (4.79%) than those ascribable to violations of Cost Benefit Considerations (0.95%) and Fairness and Reciprocity (1.38%). Moreover, realisations of impoliteness triggered by violations of ASSOCIATIONS RIGHTS in the Iraqi parliament comprise those triggered by breaches of Involvement (81 words) and Empathy (94 words).

The word distribution of impoliteness main types, whether triggered by FACE SENSITIVITIES or SOCIALITY RIGHTS, may be suggestive of the frequency of occurrence of these concepts in the current Iraqi parliamentary corpus. In other words, both the word distribution and the frequency rates for these categories increase and/or decrease simultaneously in the current Iraqi corpus.

Figure 5.3 below illustrates the frequency of occurrence, with its respective percentage, for impolite utterances that are provoked by the two superordinate key concepts/factors of impoliteness in the Iraqi parliament, namely FACE SENSITIVITIES and SOCIALITY RIGHTS.

Figure 5.3 The Occurrences of Impoliteness by Main Type (Face Sensitivities and Sociality Rights) in the Iraqi Parliament

Overall, impoliteness deriving from attacks to FACE SENSITIVITIES occur more frequently than impoliteness resulting from infringing SOCIALITY RIGHTS. According to the bar graph in figure 5.3 above, the frequency of FACE SENSITIVITIES related impoliteness in total makes of slightly under 90% of the total corpus (256 hits) compared to the occurrences of SOCIALITY RIGHTS related impoliteness in total which account for just over 10% of the total corpus (29 hits).

As for the frequency of the subtypes of FACE SENSITIVITIES impoliteness, the results of each individual type along with its percentage is indicated in figure 5.4 below.

The Frequency of Subordinate Types of Impoliteness (Face Sensitivities) in the Iraqi Parliament

In general, impoliteness utterances arising from attacking PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE have the largest proportion of occurrences among the other manifestations of face recognised in the current Iraqi corpus (see the bar chart in figure 5.4 above). Moreover, realisations of impoliteness activated by attacking PARTY FACE and PERSONAL FACE score the least in terms of their frequency rate.

According to the bar graph in figure 5.4 above, impoliteness involving attacks against PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE occurred as many as 210 times, representing precisely 73.68% of the total percentage.

Next in order of frequency, is SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE related impoliteness, which scores 43 hits, constituting slightly above 15% of the total corpus. The lowest number of occurrences is represented by the realisations of PARTY FACE and PERSONAL FACE, viz. a single occurrence vs. two occurrences respectively.

The various subtypes of SOCIALTY RIGHTS related impoliteness recognised in the current Iraqi corpus are indicated in figure 5.5 below.

Figure 5.5 The Occurrences of Subtypes of Impoliteness (Sociality Rights) in the Iraqi Parliament

It is clearly evident from the bar graph above that realisations of EQUITY RIGHTS related impoliteness score remarkably higher than the realisations of ASSOCIATION RIGHTS related impoliteness in the current Iraqi parliamentary corpus. The figure above also shows that among the subtypes of SOCIALITY RIGHTS related impoliteness, the greatest number of occurrences goes to realisations of impoliteness resulting from imposing on the freedom of other parliamentarians, viz. Autonomy and Impositions impoliteness.

In the current Iraqi corpus, realisations of EQUITY RIGHTS related impoliteness in total score as many as 25 hits representing exactly 8.77% of the total percentage. Realisations of Autonomy and Impositions related impoliteness score 21 hits among the total number of occurrences for EQUITY RIGHTS related impoliteness. Both realisations of impoliteness ascribable to infringements of Cost Benefit Considerations and Fairness and Reciprocity occur twice in this corpus (see the bar graph in figure 5.5 above).

In general, ASSOCIATION RIGHTS related impoliteness is very infrequent, with only four occurrences in the total Iraqi corpus (1.4%). Within the subtypes of ASSOCIATIONS RIGHTS, Involvement related impoliteness is represented once, whereas the realisations of Empathy related impoliteness is represented three times in the total corpus (see the graph in figure 5.5 above).

5.2.2 Impoliteness Types in the British Parliament

The previous section has illustrated the types of impoliteness in the Iraqi setting, whereas in this section I present the manifestation of impoliteness in the British parliament along the same parameters. The analysis of the British corpus, namely the 19 PMQs, is summarized in table 5.2 below.

Table 5.2 The Distribution of Impoliteness Types in PMQs by Word Percentage

Impoliteness Types	Words	Word Percentage
FACE SENSITIVITIES ((1FC)) Total	8137	87.84 %
PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE ((1PPFC))	5539	59.78 %
PARTY AFCE ((1PFC))	1404	15.16 %
SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE ((1SOFC))	1073	11.58 %
PERSONAL FACE ((1FC-PI)) Total	121	1.31 %
Third Person Negative Direct Reference	77	0.83 %
Third Person Negative Indirect Reference	29	0.31 %
Condescension	15	0.16 %
SOCIALITY RIGHTS ((2RS)) Total	1126	12.15 %
EQUITY RIGHTS ((2EQRS)) Total	1063	11.47 %
Autonomy and Imposition ((2EQRS-AI))	1063	11.47 %
ASSOCIATION RIGHTS ((2ARS)) Total	63	0.68 %
Involvement ((2ARS-IV))	63	0.68 %
Total Words =	9263	

Table 5.2 above displays the types of impoliteness employed in the present British Corpus, namely in the PMQs, along with the size of their relevant realisations both in terms of word count and its percentage. As indicated in the above table, British parliamentarians, in questioning turns, tend to use two main types of impoliteness when attacking each other, namely FACE SENSITIVITIES and SOCIALITY RIGHTS impoliteness. The above table also shows the subtypes of impoliteness in the current PMQs corpus.

In terms of size, FACE SENSITIVITIES related impoliteness in total appears to give rise to a greater amount of linguistic realisations than that of SOCIALITY RIGHTS. The results in the above table show that realisations of impoliteness defined by FACE SENSITIVITIES in total deploy a total of 8137 words compared to those provoked by breaches of SOCIALITY RIGHTS which in total account for 1126 words. Moreover, as demonstrated in table 5.2 above and the pie chart in figure 5.6 below, realisations of impoliteness arising from attacking FACE SENSITIVITIES constitute approximately 88% whereas those of SOCIALITY RIGHTS form only 12% of the total corpus of impolite utterance in the present PMQs corpus.

Figure 5.6 The Distribution of Impoliteness by Main Type (Face Sensitivities and Sociality Rights) in PMQs

Table 5.2 above shows that among the subtypes FACE SENSITIVITIES related impoliteness, realisations of impoliteness initiated by attacking PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE constitute the largest portion, viz. 59.78%, whereas realisations of impoliteness caused by attacking PERSONAL FACE comprise only 1.31 % of the total corpus size (see the pie graph in figure 5.7 below for a better visualisation).

Meanwhile impoliteness types initiated by attacking PARTY FACE accounts for 15.16 % compared to attacks at SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE which has scored merely 11.58 % of the total (see table 5.2 above).

As for subtypes of SOCIALITY RIGHTS related impoliteness, realisations of impoliteness defined by infringing Autonomy and Imposition, with 11.47 % of the total corpus, score higher than Involvement related impoliteness, which scores just 0.68% of the total corpus (see the pie chart in figure 5.7 below).

Figure 5.7 The Distribution of Impoliteness by Subtypes in PMQs

The size of samples realising FACE SENSITIVITIES and SOCIALITY RIGHTS impoliteness may be indicative of the frequency of occurrence for these concepts in the current PMQs corpus. To paraphrase, the word distribution and the frequency rates of these categories tend to be in a direct proportion, i.e. increase and/or decrease simultaneously.

Figure 5.8 below displays both the frequency of occurrence and its respective percentage for impolite utterances provoked by the two key concepts/factors that surfaced in the current research, namely FACE SENSITIVITIES and SOCIALITY RIGHTS.

Figure 5.8 The Occurrences of Impoliteness by Main Type (Face Sensitivities and Sociality Rights) in PMQs

The Frequency of the Superordinate Types of Impoliteness in PMQs

As the bar chart above shows, FACE SENSITIVITIES impoliteness is more frequent (222 occurrences, constituting 83.15% of the total frequency of impoliteness types) than SOCIALITY RIGHTS impoliteness (45 occurrences forming 16.85% of the total frequency). As for the frequency of the subtype of FACE SENSITIVITIES impoliteness, the results of each type along with its percentage is indicated in the bar graph below.

Figure 5.9 The Occurrences of Subtypes of Impoliteness (Face Sensitivities) in PMQs

The Frequency of the Subordinate Types of Impoliteness (Face Sensitivities) in PMQs

Figure 5.9 above demonstrates that impoliteness occurrences due to attacking PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE are the most frequent (scoring 152 hits with a 56.93% of the total percentage of overall types) compared to the other related types of FACE SENSITIVITIES impoliteness. For example, impoliteness occurrences that emerge from attacks targeting PARTY FACE in PMQs come second in order, scoring 32 hits with 11.98% of the total percentage of overall types whereas attacks against SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE account for 26 impoliteness hits (with 9.74%) in the overall PMQs corpus. However, impoliteness arising from attacking PERSONAL FACE is not as recurrent as other types of FACE SENSITIVITIES related impoliteness in this PMQs corpus. Namely, PERSONAL FACE impoliteness has manifested itself through only 12 occurrences in the PMQs corpus at issue. SOCIALITY RIGHTS related impoliteness also manifested itself in various subtypes as indicated in figure 5.10 below.

Figure 5.10 The Occurrences of Subtypes of Impoliteness (Sociality Rights) in PMQs

The bar graph in figure 5.10 above illustrates the frequency and the corresponding percentage for the subtypes of SOCIALITY RIGHTS impoliteness found in the current PMQs corpus.

Impoliteness utterances defined by breaches of SOCIALITY RIGHTS score 45 hits with 16.85% in the current PMQs corpus. SOCIALITY RIGHTS impoliteness manifests itself through two subordinate types in the current PMQs corpus, namely EQUITY RIGHTS and ASSOCIATION RIGHTS related impoliteness. Overall EQUITY RIGHTS in total accounts for a bigger proportion of occurrences than ASSOCIATION RIGHTS impoliteness, as indicated in the bar chart above. The former scored 42 hits, constituting 15.73% of total frequency of the overall occurrences of impoliteness types vs. only 3 occurrences of impolite utterances prompted by breaches of ASSOCIATION RIGHTS which account for 1.12 % of the total. Moreover, as indicated in figure 5.10 above, the category EQUITY RIGHTS manifests itself through impoliteness arising from Autonomy and Imposition breaches only.

Other subcategories of EQUITY RIGHTS impoliteness such as COST-BENEFIT CONSIDERATIONS and FAIRNESS and RECIPROCITY impoliteness have not surfaced in the British corpus. Hence, in the British corpus, the only impoliteness forms emerging for breaching EQUITY RIGHTS are those that impinge on the freedom of action of parliamentarians. These utterances occurred 42 times with 15.73% of the total percentage of all impoliteness types in the current PMQs corpus. ASSOCIATION RIGHTS impoliteness also manifested itself through a single subcategory in the current PMQs corpus, namely through Involvement, occurring three times, 1.12% of the total.

5.3   Linguistic Impoliteness Strategies in the Iraqi and British Parliaments

In this section, I will present the linguistic strategies employed by Iraqi and British parliamentarians respectively to convey impoliteness (FACE SENSITIVITES attacks and SOCIALITY RIGHTS breaches) in initiation turns. As explained in the Methodology Chapter, these linguistic strategies comprise a range of discoursal and pragmatic communicative features deployed to convey impoliteness.

These strategies are used to express any of the impoliteness types identified earlier, FACE SENSITIVITIES and/or SOCIALITY RIGHTS related impoliteness. No attempt is made to establish a link between the impoliteness types and the linguistic strategy. These strategies involves elements from Harris (2001), and Bull & Wells (2012). The relevant impoliteness strategies which were detected in both Iraqi and British settings will be introduced respectively in the following sections below.

5.3.1   Linguistic Strategies of Impoliteness in the Iraqi Parliament

This section presents the distribution of the linguistic strategies used to convey impoliteness in the Iraqi corpus. The main findings are summarized in table 5.3 below both in terms of word count and percentage.

Table 5.3The Distribution of Impoliteness Strategies in the Iraqi Parliament

Impoliteness Strategies	Words	Word Percentage
PREFACE ((ISs-PRF))	6412	71.1 %
DETAILED QUESTION ((ISs-DQ))	689	7.64 %
CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION ((ISs-CPS))	681	7.55 %
CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE ((ISs-CIM))	1036	11.48 %
CONFLICTUAL QUESTION ((ISs-CFQ))	204	2.26 %
Total Words =	9022	

In general, table 5.3 above demonstrates that realisations of the category PREFACE forms the greatest proportion compared to other impoliteness strategies in the current Iraqi corpus. In contrast, the lowest proportion of linguistic realisations belongs to the category CONFLICTUAL QUESTION in the same setting. Both DETAILED QUESTION and

CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION have approximately a similar size of linguistic realisations in the present Iraqi corpus.

We can see from table 5.3 above that the impoliteness strategy PREFACE deploys a range of realisations composed of 6412 words which stands for precisely 71.1% of the total corpus. As it is indicated in the Methodology Chapter, PREFACE mainly comprises explicit explanations/propositions communicating impoliteness. Therefore it is expected for this strategy to utilise large/big range of linguistic realisations compared to other strategies in both the Iraqi and the British corpora.

In the present Iraqi corpus, viz. parliamentary interrogations, the size of linguistic structures realising a PREFACE is exceedingly lengthy (see Appendix J) compared to its counterpart in PMQs corpus. Hence, the large size of its realisations in the current Iraqi corpus.

The next strategy in order is CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE, e.g. ' هل يستوجب عقد أسفلت بجلب شركة وحيدة؟ '(Is it necessary for an asphalt contract to have a monopolistic approach?). This strategy has been used over 1036 words, making up 11.48 % of the total realisations of impoliteness strategies in the Iraqi discourse (see table 5.3 above).

As indicated in table 5.3, realisations of DETAILED QUESTION and CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION have approximately a similar size. The strategy DETAILED QUESTION, e.g. ' أنا اسأل عن مدير العقود ومؤهلاته وكفائتة ونزاهته ' (What are the qualifications, background, integrity, and competence of the contracts manager?), employs 689 words. Whereas the strategy CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION, e.g. ' هاذي طائرات تستخدم لعمليات مواجهة داعش، موتخليها تكسي الك ولأحباب القائد ' (These aircrafts are used to fight ISIS, you are not supposed to use them as a taxi for yourself and your beloved ones) or ' انت غير تعزله ' (You are/were supposed to suspend him), utilises 681 words in total.

ويقول هو أبتز وهو بنى الفساد، هل تكافئ هذا الشخص وتجعله ' CONFLICTUAL QUESTION, e.g.
'إستشاري حتى يذهب ويفسد الناس؟ (He says that he blackmailed and established corruption, do you reward him by appointing him as a consultant to continue his corruption?), utilises the smallest amount of realisations, namely 204 words, compared to the other strategies in the Iraqi corpus.

The word distribution of these strategies may be suggestive of their respective occurrences in the current corpus. In the current Iraqi parliamentary corpus, both the word distribution and the frequency rates of these strategies increase and/or decrease simultaneously.

Figure 5.11 below provides the occurrences and the relevant percentage of the above mentioned impoliteness strategies.

Figure 5.11 The Occurrences of Impoliteness Strategies in the Iraqi Parliament

It is evident from the bar chart in figure 5.11 above, that the strategy PREFACE has the greatest number of occurrences, whereas CONFLICTUAL QUESTION scores the least frequency among the set of impoliteness strategies recognised in the current Iraqi corpus.

PREFACE has been used as many as 91 times which represents precisely 42.13% of the total percentage of strategies in the Iraqi corpus.

The next strategy in order of frequency is CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE which has occurred as frequently as 49 times, constituting exactly 22.68% of the total corpus in the current set of data (see the bar chart in figure 5.11 above). My analysis indicates that Iraqi parliamentarians violate Grice's (1975) maxims to construct face attacking implicatures.

The most frequent kind of implicature in the current Iraqi corpus is the one created by flouting the maxim of quality, for example 'هاي شلون اجراءات ادارية واجراءات تنفيذية؟' (What kind of administerial and executive procedures are these?) to implicate that these are not the correct administerial and executive procedures. Moreover, various grammatical structures, such rhetorical questions, are employed, that infringe the quality maxim as in ' هل معقول انه هو رئيس لجنة تدقيق الإحالات والي يوقع العقد الي هو المرحلة التي تتبعها هو مدير عام المشاريع؟' (Is it reasonable that he is the chairman of committee of contracts yet the one who signs the contract is the project manager?) to implicate that it is not reasonable that he is the chairman of the committee of contracts yet the one who signs the contract is the project manager or irony as in ' شوفوا السيد الوزير الي يكول هو حريص' (Look at the Minister who says he is prudent) to implicate that the Minister is not prudent. My analysis indicates that face attacking implicatures are mostly realised as rhetorical questions rather than irony under the overall category of CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE. Namely, face attacking implicatures structured as rhetorical questions occur as frequently as 38 times in the current Iraqi corpus.

The next strategy in order of frequency is DETAILED QUESTION which scores 37 hits constituting just 17.13% of the total percentage of linguistic strategies (see figure 5.11 above).

The next strategy is CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION that occurs as many as 34 times, thus forming 15.74% of the total percentage of strategies in the present Iraqi corpus as indicated in the bar graph in figure 5.11 above. As presupposition is closely associated

with specific linguistic structures, namely presupposition triggers, it is worth briefly mentioning the most frequent types of such triggers in the current Iraqi corpus.

My analysis reveals that Iraqi parliamentarians, in questioning turns, employ certain face threatening presupposition triggers more recurrently than others. Table 5.4 below demonstrates, with examples, the most common presupposition triggers used in the current Iraqi parliamentary interrogations.

Table 5.4 Presupposition Types in the Iraqi Parliament

Presupposition Type	Presupposition Trigger	Example
Structural Presupposition	Wh-questions	'ولماذا خالفت كتاب الأمانة؟' (why have you breached the regulations of the mayoralty?)
	Yes/no questions	'اليس من الواجب ان يشكل السيد الوزير لجنة تحقيقية للتحقق من حصة كلام المفتش العام؟' (Isn't it an obligation for the Minister to assign an investigative committee to verify the general inspector's statements?)
Lexical Presupposition	Implicative expressions	'يمتنع عن تطبيقات اجراءات الاجتثاث' (Desists from implementing de-Baathification procedures)
	Iterative expressions	'جاب شركة والشركة غير مسجلة نفس الشي كالعادة كما ذكرت' (He brought a firm and the firm is not registered again as usual)
Counter factual Presupposition	If clauses	'واذا كنا حريصين على المنصب التنفيذي الأول في العراق يجب ان نبعدهم عن هكذا مداخلات' (If we are prudent about the head executive post in Iraq, we have to keep them out of such interventions)

The last strategy which has the smallest frequency among impoliteness strategies is CONFLICTUAL QUESTION. This strategy occurs only five times in the Iraqi parliamentary corpus, which forms 2.31% of the total percentage (see the bar chart in figure 5.11 above). Furthermore, my analysis reveals that the conflictual statement involves creating two parallel face attacking/threatening situations for the questionee. These parallel situations include confirming or denying a course of a governmental action as in ' يذكر في نص الكتاب يقول ليسوا من منتسبي وزارة التجارة بينما هاي الهويات الرسمية لما القي القبض على السيد صباح حسن حمادي اخو الوزير يقول سكرتير الوزير وسكرتير الوزير الامانة العامة لمجلس الوزراء ووزارة التجارة' (He reports in the letter that they are not personnel in the Ministry of Trade whereas these are the official IDs when Mr. Sabah H. Hummadi was arrested it says[sic] the Minister's secretary and the Minister's secretary (.) the General Secretariat for the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Trade). Here, the questioner confronts the Minister both with a letter issued by the latter in which he affirms that his brothers are not employees in the Ministry of Trade and with official IDs of his brothers that prove their affiliation with the Ministry. So the Minister has to either confirm or deny issuing a letter in which he refutes the affiliation of his brothers with the Ministry. In both cases, the Minister will lose face because the questioner is displaying official IDs that prove the affiliation of the brothers with the Ministry.

Moreover, the combination or amalgamation of strategies discussed in Culpeperet al. (2003: 1561-1562) is the norm in my Iraqi parliamentary corpus as well. Both patterns of strategies amalgamation identified in Culpeperet al.'s (2003) data set are recurrently employed in the current Iraqi corpus. Culpeper et al.'s (2003) first pattern involves a participant using a particular strategy repeatedly, and the second involves the participant combining different strategies together.

In my data, the first pattern involves a politician repeatedly utilising a given strategy within a single turn or even in multiple turns. For example, in extract 20 (see the Methodology Chapter) the Iraqi politician employs the strategy DETAILED QUESTION

twice within the same turn, although not to enquire about the same specific information. On the other hand, the second pattern of strategies amalgamation identified in my corpus involves joining two or multiple strategies together in the same turn. For example, in extract 16 (see the Methodology Chapter) the Iraqi parliamentarian employs a combination of impoliteness strategies consisting of a PREFACE and a CONFLICTUAL QUESTION in the same questioning turn.

5.3.2 Linguistic Strategies of Impoliteness in the British Parliament

This section presents the range of impoliteness strategies used by British parliamentarians in questioning turns, namely by the Leaders of the Opposition and MPs during PMQs sessions. Table 5.5 below displays the range of impoliteness strategies and their distribution in the current British corpus both in terms of word count and percentage.

Table 5.5 The Distribution of Impoliteness Strategies in PMQs

Impoliteness Strategies	Words	Word Percentage
PREFACE ((ISs-PRF))	4817	59.29 %
DETAILED QUESTION ((ISs-DQ))	100	1.23 %
CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION ((ISs-CPS))	1046	12.87 %
CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE ((ISs-CIM))	720	8.86 %
CONFLICTUAL QUESTION ((ISs-CFQ))	624	7.68 %
INVITATION TO PERFORM FTA ((ISs-PFTA))	621	7.64 %
METALANGUAGE of Q&A ((ISs-MQA))	197	2.42 %
Total Words =	8125	

As indicated in the table above, both PREFACE and CONFLICTUAL PRESUPPOSITION, respectively, account for the greatest proportion of linguistic realisations among the linguistic strategies conveying impoliteness in the present PMQs discourse. At the opposite end of the pole, METALANGUAGE of Q&A occupies significantly a small range of realisations which amounts to 197 words only of the total corpus for this set of strategies.

According to table 5.5 above, PREFACE, which consists mainly of explanations/propositions communicating impoliteness, has utilised a range of realisations composed of 4817, words representing 59.29% of the total corpus for the current set of strategies. PREFACE is realised through linguistic structures of varying sizes, i.e. with utterances composed of varying numbers of words, from a single sentence, as in 'the Tory party has been and remains the party of the rich and the privileged' to a more detailed, lengthy, explicit, and more direct criticisms of the government, the ruling party, and/or the Prime Minister's policies, and decisions, as in

> 'mr Speaker I was asking through you the Prime Minister how many of the 11 million renters (.) are living in homes that don't meet the decent homes standard and are therefore, substandard. I'll help him (.) one third of those in the private rented sector don't meet the decent homes standard (.) Shelter has found that six out of 10 renters have to deal with issues such as damp mould and leaking rooves and windows. It is simply not good enough. millions are struggling to get the home that they deserve. more families are slipping into temporary accommodation (0.5) elderly are threatened with eviction. homelessness rising(0.5) too few homes are being built (.) social housing under pressure. families forced into low standard overpriced private rented sector. young people are unable to move out of the family home and start their own lives **((1PPFC)) ((ISs-PRF))**'

The strategy CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION, e.g. 'when did he lose his nerve?', comes second in terms of word count with 1046 words, namely 12.87 % of the total corpus. Next in order is CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE, e.g. 'why are they abolishing those maintenance grants?', which manifests itself through using a range of realisation composed of 720 words with 8.86 % of the total corpus.

Then comes CONFLICTUAL QUESTION, e.g. 'does the Prime Minister agree that cutting these crucial services is a false economy?, and INVITATION TO PERFORM AN FTA, e.g. 'will he take the opportunity to apologise for deliberately dividing communities in order to win cheap votes?', which deploys approximately similar size of relevant realisations, namely 624 and 621 words respectively.

Table 5.5 above also indicates that British parliamentarians, namely the Leader of the Opposition and MPs, have utilised the least amount of language, just 100 words, when using DETALIED QUESTION to attack the Prime Minister. Finally, METALANGUAGE of Q&A   is also realised through a small number of words, namely 197 words.

The size of the realisations of these impoliteness strategies may be suggestive of their respective frequencies in the current PMQs corpus. That is to say, the word distribution and the frequency rates of these strategies are in a direct proportion, i.e. increase and/or decrease simultaneously. Figure 5.12 below shows the frequency and the relevant percentage of the above mentioned impoliteness strategies that are employed in questioning turns for the current research.

Figure 5.12 The Occurrences of Impoliteness Strategies in PMQs

As shown in the bar chart above, the strategy PREFACE occurs most frequently in the corpus whilst DETAILED QUESTION is the least frequent. The bar graph also shows a descending pattern starting from CONTENSIOUS PRESUPPOSITION and ending with METALANGUAGE of Q&A.

The bar chart in figure 5.12 demonstrates that Opposition members employ PREFACE as many as 84 times to attack the Prime Minister, a frequency rate that represents 36.36 % of the total percentage of linguistic strategies.

Yet, DETAILED QUESTION features only five times among the total range of linguistic strategies in the current PMQs corpus. My analysis confirms Bull & Wells' (2012:37) observation that, in the context of PMQs ,such questions are mainly posed to enquire about an exact figure/statistic. For example 'can the Prime Minister tell us how much worse off Kelly will be next year?'. However, the current study has also found that such questions may also be used to inquire about a previous campaign promise which the Prime Minister does not want to shed light on at the time of speaking such as 'can the prime minister tell the house where in his election manifesto did he put his plan to abolish maintenance grants for all students?'.

The next strategy is CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION, which scores the second highest frequency in the current set of strategies, namely 52 occurrences with a 22.51% of the total percentage of strategies. In section 5.3.1, I illustrated the most frequent types of presupposition triggers in the Iraqi corpus. As for the British corpus, my analysis has revealed that British parliamentarians, namely the Leaders of the Opposition and MPs, tend to employ certain face threatening presupposition triggers more recurrently than others.

Table 5.6 below demonstrates, with examples, the most common presupposition triggers used in the current PMQs corpus.

Table 5.6 Presupposition Types in PMQs

Presupposition Type	Presupposition Trigger	Example
Structural Presupposition	Wh-questions	'why did he break that promise?' 'where will the tax rises take place as the £ 4.4 billion has to be found from somewhere?'
	Yes/no questions	'can the Prime Minister explain (.) why he's been so quick to rule out an investigation into his own party's chairman?' 'does the Prime Minister agree that cutting these crucial services is a false economy? '
Lexical Presupposition	Factive verbs	'does he realise that many people consider him to be a Prime Minister who simply does not understand the lives of millions of people of this country who try to live on modest incomes?'
	Iteratives	'will he today rule out increasing them again?' 'will the Prime Minister now listen and learn?'
Counter factual Presupposition	Temporal clauses	'when the Prime Minster leaves office in 70 days…'

Due to the institutional rule in the British parliament that constrains parliamentarians to structure their contributions as a question, the most frequent presupposition trigger in PMQs is the interrogative structure, whether a Wh-question or a yes-no question. Moreover, my analysis has revealed that the embedding of the presupposition trigger in a wide range of various grammatical structures is very frequent and prevailing with the use of presuppositions in the PMQs discourse. My analysis also demonstrates that, in some of the utterances, multiple presuppositions interact to intensify the face attack. It is not within the scope of the current study to specifically focus on the behaviour of presuppositions in PMQs discourse, e.g. how they interact with implicatures to enhance impoliteness, hence no further elaboration is necessary here.

The next following impoliteness strategy is CONTENIOUS IMPLICATRUE, which scored 35 occurrences, amounting to 15.15% of the total percentage of strategies, as indicated in figure 5.12 above. My analysis shows that British parliamentarians, namely the Leaders of the Opposition and MPs, tend to exploit Grice's (1975) cooperative maxims so as to create face attacking implicatures. The most frequent kind of implicature in the current PMQs corpus is the one created by flouting the maxim of quality, for example 'how is this fair?' to implicate that it is not fair. Moreover, infringing the quality maxim manifested itself through various structures such as rhetorical questions, for example 'why is he chickening out of the debates with me? ', or irony as in 'those such as the Leader of the Opposition who do not believe this have a defence policy inspired by the Beatles' Yellow Submarine' or as in 'let me invite the Prime Minister to leave the theatre and return to reality', and comparison as in 'his promise on immigration makes the Deputy Prime Minister's promise on tuition fees look like the model of integrity'. My analysis shows that creating face attacking implicatures through rhetorical questions is the most frequent of the CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE occurrences, in the current PMQs corpus with 23 occurrences. My analysis

shows that presupposition may coincide and cooperate, through existing in a single embedded structure, with implicature to aggravate the face attack.

The next strategy is CONFLICTUAL QUESTION, which has occurred 26 times, amounting to 11.25% of the total strategies in the current PMQs corpus, as shown in figure 5.12 above. As with the Iraqi corpus, the parliamentary question in the British corpus creates a communication conflict through constructing two parallel FACE threatening and/or RIGHTS infringing situations for the questionee, namely the Prime Minister. These parallel situations include one of the following:

1) Assenting or rejecting to commit to a future policy as in 'will the Prime Minister confirm that his government will protect workers and back these reforms to stop the undercutting and the grotesque exploitation of many workers across the continent?'

2) Providing or not providing a reply to a previously unanswered question as it was face threatening as in 'I wonder whether he will be able to help us with an answer today'

3) Agreeing or disagreeing that his/her government's decision of terminating certain public services, that is proven to cause negative consequences for part of the electorate, is a false economy as in 'does the Prime Minister agree that cutting these crucial services is a false economy?'

4) To either confirm or deny a proposition, e.g. a future deficit that is predicted by other governmental bodies, as in 'will the Prime Minister confirm that NHS trusts are forecasting a deficit of £2.2 billion this year?'

5) To either agree that breaking a promise, which is already broken, is an over denial or to admit that breaking a promise, which is already broken, is a straightforward broken promise as in 'would he describe this as an over denial or simply a straightforward broken promise?'

6) To admit that a colleague is wrong for condemning a party/government policy or to admit that a colleague is right for condemning a party/government policy as in 'isn't

the honourable member for Chingford right when he says that this was a political decision rather than one made in the interests of people in this country?'

7) To approve or disapprove of an action as in 'so can the Prime Minister now absolutely and categorically rule out any further cuts to welfare spending in the lifetime of this Parliament? Simply: yes or no?'

8) To admit and approve to listen and learn from previous mistakes or to reject to listen and learn from previous mistakes as in 'will the Prime Minister now listen and learn (0.5) and withdraw the £30 per week cut to disabled ESA employment and support allowance claimants that his Government is pursuing?'

9) To vote with a Yes on a matter the PM's previously advocated when in Opposition or to vote with a No on a matter the PM's previously advocated when in Opposition as in 'he should vote for one job not two (.) last chance: yes or no?'

10) To confirm or to deny a planned future government action as in 'can he confirm that the spending cuts (.) that he plans in the next three years will be even greater than anything seen in the last five?'

11) To affirm/admit or to deny that a campaign promise, that has been broken, is indeed broken as in 'five years ago the Prime Minister promised to cut net migration to tens of thousands (0.5) straight answer to a straight question is that a broken promise? yes or no?'

12) To admit the possibility of ruling out further action or to deny the possibility, i.e. admit the impossibility, of ruling out further action as in 'can he rule out under a Tory government a further cut in the top rate of income tax?'

13) To agree or to deny that a certain course of action, which was undertaken, was another governmental mistake as in 'does the Prime Minister believe that turning down those schemes was also a mistake?'

This list is significant as it helps to further identify other potential FACE affecting and/or RIGHTS infringing related impoliteness in this setting. What is more, it illustrates the kinds

of communicative conflicts that may arise in PMQs. Using a CONFLICTUAL QUESTION may also relate to a politician's rhetorical skills as formulating such questions may require more intellectual effort than, say a DETAILED QUESTION for example. And it also shows a greater expertise in accommodating to the parliamentary rules and conventions while achieving one's political goals. The above list covers all occurrences of CONFLICTUAL QUESTIONs in the current PMQs corpus. However, similar corpora may indicate other types of such communicative conflicts as well.

The next strategy is INVITATION TO PERFORM AN FTA. My analysis demonstrates that the Leaders of the Opposition and other MPs tend to employ this strategy as frequently as 21 occurrences with a 9.09 %. In the current PMQs corpus, it was found that such FTAs include the following:

1) To admit being frightened to lose in a political/campaign debate as in 'why does he not just cut out the feeble excuses (.) and admit the truth: he is worried he might lose again?'

2) To congratulate/compliment the election figures of an opposing party leader as in 'so I am sure he would acknowledge the success of Nicola Sturgeon and the SNP in being returned victoriously for a third time with 46% of the vote'

3) To apologise for a campaign policy that brings negative consequences for the overall society or country as in 'will he take the opportunity to apologise for deliberately dividing communities in order to win cheap votes?'

4) To admit the failure of a previous foreign or economic policy and provide commitment to avoid the failure in future decisions as in 'will the Prime Minister give an assurance that he has learned the lessons of Iraq of Afghanistan and of Libya (0.5) and that he will never repeat them?'

5) To criticise/condemn the political, and economic choices of a colleague as in 'so will the prime minister take this opportunity (.) to condemn the opportunism (.) of 57 of

his colleagues who are pro-leave (.) these are members who backed the bedroom tax backed cutting disability benefits (.) and slashing care for the elderly (0.5) who suddenly have now had a damascene conversion to the anti-austerity movement'.

6) To express regret for one's failure to meet the least expectation of the electorate as in 'is it not time that the Prime Minister showed some guts and apologised to the people of the north-east?'

7) To express regret for an economic decision that alarmed a large proportion of the electorate as in 'will he apologise to my constituents, who have been scared witless over the past week?'

8) To express regret for the misuse of national property as in 'so will the Prime Minister apologise not only to my constituent, but to the country for this gross misuse of national property and revenue?'

9) To admit the failure in delivering a manifesto pledge as in 'straight answer to a straight question (.) is that a broken promise? yes or no?'

10) To acknowledge/admit a predictable future failure of a government policy as in 'does he agree with the Energy Secretary that Britain is likely to miss its target of getting 15% of our energy from renewables by 2020?'

11) To acknowledge the failure of a government's policy as in 'does the Prime Minister believe that turning down those schemes was also a mistake?'

The above list counts for all acts that are considered as FACE damaging when performed by the addressee only in the current PMQs corpus. Hence, it is not exhaustive of such a category as different corpora may produce similar or different types.

The last impoliteness strategy in the current PMQs corpus is METALANGUAGE of Q&A. This strategy has featured eight times in the current corpus, amounting to 3.46% of the total corpus. My analysis reveals that this strategy is closely associated with another impoliteness strategy, namely CONFLICTUAL QUESTION. As explained in the

Methodology Chapter, as an impoliteness strategy the METALANGUAGE of Q&A consists of a direct, explicit declaration of by the Leader of the Opposition that the addressee, namely the Prime Minister, has not answered a question though being repeated for several times within the same PMQs session.

The association between these two strategies is that in such cases, the unanswered question was found to be a CONFLICTUAL QUESTION in all eight occasions. In other words, each occurrence of a METALANGUAGE of Q&A strategy was preceded by a CONFLICTUAL QUESTION in the current PMQs corpus. However, not every occurrence of a CONFLICTUAL QUESTION was followed by a METALANGUAGE of Q&A strategy. In other words, there were potential chances for METALANGUAGE of Q&A strategy to surface but it was not recognised by the relevant politicians.

In addition, my analysis illustrates that some impoliteness strategies introduced in table 5.4 above may be performed within a single speaking turn such as PREFACE, CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION and IMPLICATURE, INVITATION TO PERFORM FTA. That is to say, these strategies are performed, and identified without the need to follow/examine the kind of response to it in the next speaking turns. However, some of these require multiple speaking turns to be recognised such as DETALIED QUESTIONS, CONFLICTUAL QUESTION, and METALANGUAGE of Q&A.

Furthermore, both patterns of strategies amalgamation are also recurrent in my PMQs corpus as well. For example, in extract 23 (see the Methodology Chapter) the Leader of the Opposition Jeremy Corbyn utilises the same strategy, viz. CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE, twice in the same turn. And in extract 17 (see the Methodology Chapter) the Leader of the Opposition combines a PREFACE with a CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE.

5.4   Counter-Impoliteness Strategies in the Iraqi and British Parliaments

My analysis has shown that Iraqi and British parliamentarians resort to a range of response patterns when they face an impolite utterance. The framework developed to account for response patterns includes elements from Culpeper's (1996), Culpeper et al.'s (2003), Bousfield's (2007), and Bull & Wells' (2012) frameworks. The sections below illustrate the range of such counter-impoliteness strategies in the relevant settings respectively.

5.4.1   Counter-Impoliteness Strategies in the Iraqi Parliament

My analysis reveals that Iraqi parliamentarians employ a specific range of response patterns when faced with impolite utterances. Table 5.7 below illustrates these patterns that surfaced during the analysis of the Iraqi political corpus, along with their distribution both in terms of a word count and a percentage.

Table 5.7The Distribution of Counter Impoliteness Strategies in the Iraqi Parliament

Counter-Impoliteness Strategies	Words	Word Percentage
OFFER AN EXPLANATION ((CISs-EXP))	8153	46 %
REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION ((CISs-R/DC))	1572	8.87 %
ATTACK ((CISs-AT)) Total	5206	29.38 %
ATTACK PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE ((CISs-AT: 1PPFC))	2737	15.44 %
ATTACK PARTY FACE ((CISs-AT: 1PFC))	0	0 %
ATTACK SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE ((CISs-AT : 1SOFC))	2402	13.55 %
ATTACK PERSONAL FACE ((CISs-AT : 1FC-PI))	67	0.38 %
PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE ((CISs-PPF)) Total	1646	9.29 %
PROMOTE PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE ((CISs-PPF: 1PPFC))	1336	7.54 %
PROMOTE PARTY FACE ((CISs-PPF: 1PFC))	0	0 %
PROMOTE SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE ((CISs-PPF : 1SOFC))	69	0.39 %
OTHERS ((CISs-PPF: OTHERS))	241	1.36 %
ABROGATION ((CISs-AB))	742	4.19 %
UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS ((CISs-USI))	208	1.17 %
OPT OUT ON RECORD ((CISs-OPR))	52	0.29 %
THIRD PARTY RECOURSE ((CISs-TPR))	143	0.81 %
Total Words =	17722	

As shown in table 5.7, OFFER AN EXPLANATION is the most frequently used counter-impoliteness strategy in terms of word count whereas THIRD PARTY RECOURSE is the least used. In terms of their word count, the remaining categories can be listed in a descending order as follows: ATTACK, PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE, REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION, ABROGATION, UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS, and THIRD PARTY RECOURSE.

Table 5.7 above shows that when faced with impoliteness, questionees OFFER AN EXPLANATION using a range of linguistic realisations composed of 8153 words which constitute 46% of the total corpus (see also figure 5.13). The table also demonstrates that Iraqi governmental figures when questioned in the parliament tend to ATTACK employing a range of realisations consisting of 5206 words. This size of realisations makes up 29.38% of the total percentage of counter-impoliteness strategies in the Iraqi corpus (see table 5.7 above and the pie chart in figure 5.13 below).

The next strategy in order of word count is PROMOTE A POSITIVE FACE which uses 1646 words constituting 9.29% of the total corpus (see the pie chart in figure 5.13 below).

Questionees in the Iraqi parliament tend to REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION an impolite utterance using a range of realisations comprising 1572 words which forms 8.87% of the total corpus (see table 5.7 above and figure 5.13 below). Lastly, ABROGATION deploys a range of linguistic realisations consisting of 742 words (4.19%), UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS uses 208 words (1.17%), THIRD PARTY RECOURSE uses 143 words (0.81%), and THIRD PARTY RECOURSE employs 52 words (0.29%), as indicated in table 5.7 above and figure 5.13 below.

Figure 5.13 The Distribution of Counter Impoliteness Strategies in the Iraqi Parliament

Word Percentage for the Counter Impoliteness Strategies in the Iraqi Parliament

- OFFER AN EXPLANATION ((CISs-EXP))
- REBUT/DOIRECT CONTRADICTION ((CISs-R/DC))
- ATTACK ((CISs-AT))
- PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE ((CISs-PPF))
- UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS ((CISs-USI))
- ABROGATION ((CISs-AB))
- OPT OUT ON RECORD ((CISs-OPR))
- THIRD PARTY RECOURSE ((CISs-TPR))

4.19%
0.29%
0.81%
1.17%
9.29%
46%
29.38%
8.87%

The size of the realisations for the counter impoliteness strategies demonstrated above may be indicative of the frequency of occurrence for these strategies in this Iraqi corpus. In other words, both the word distribution and the frequency rates of these counter impoliteness strategies increase and/or decrease simultaneously.

The bar graph in figure 5.14 below demonstrates both the frequency and percentage of occurrence for counter impoliteness strategies as employed by high ranked Iraqi government officials when being questioned in the Iraqi parliament.

Figure 5.14 The Occurrences of Counter Impoliteness Strategies in the Iraqi Parliament

Overall, figure 4.14 indicates that ATTACK has the greatest frequency among the other counter impoliteness strategies in the Iraqi parliament whereas OPT OUT ON RECORD is the least used.

Figure 5.14 demonstrates that Iraqi government officials, when encountering impolite utterances, tend to OFFER AN EXPLANATION as many as 103 times which equals precisely 27.76% of the total percentage of counter impoliteness. At the same time, they tend to provide a REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION as many as 68 times, forming 18.33% of the total percentage in the current Iraqi corpus (see figure 5.14 above). However, these same Iraqi officials rely more on countering the attack, i.e. to ATTACK, which occurs 132 times constituting 35.58% of the total corpus. The counter impoliteness strategy PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE has scored 30 hits during parliamentary interrogations which comprises 8.09% of the total Iraqi corpus in the current research. Furthermore, UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS has occurred nine times (2.42%) in total whereas ABROGATION was used 22 times which makes of 5.93% of the total corpus (see the bar graph in figure 5.14 above).

Finally, OPT OUT ON RECORD appears twice only, and THIRD PARTY RECOURSE five times in the current Iraqi corpus.

As ATTACK includes occurrences in which questionees faced impoliteness with impolite utterances among the set of counter strategies, this point will be elaborated further below. Moreover, ATTACK scored the highest in terms of the frequency of occurrences in the current Iraqi corpus. The bar graph in figure 5.15 below demonstrates the frequency and percentage of occurrence for the types of face that has been targeted by Iraqi parliamentarians when attacking high ranked government officials.

Figure 5.15The Occurrences of Face Attack Types in Counter Impoliteness Strategies in the Iraqi Parliament

In general, ATTACK PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE scores the highest frequency whereas ATTACK PARTY FACE is non-existent in the current Iraqi corpus as indicated in the bar chart in figure 5.15 above. We can see that Iraqi government officials have attacked Iraqi parliamentarians' PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE 67 times which comprises 18.06% of the total percentage of counter impoliteness strategies (see figure 5.15 above) and 58% of the total percentage of face attacks (see the pie graph in figure 5.16 below).

Moreover, ATTACK SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE has occurred 31 times which stands for 8.35% of the total percentage for counter impoliteness strategies, as indicated in figure 5.15 above and 27% of the total percentage of face attacks (see the pie graph in figure 5.16 below). Interestingly, Iraqi officials when being questioned in parliamentary interrogations have made no attempts to ATTACK PARTY FACE of their questioners (see both figures 5.15 and 5.16). The bar chart in figure 5.15 above also illustrates that Iraqi parliamentarians' PERSONAL FACE has been attacked by government officials as many as 17 times constituting only 4.58% of the total percentage of counter impoliteness strategies and 15% of the total face attacks (see the pie chart in figure 5.16 below).

Figure 5.16The Distribution of Face Attack Types in Relation to the Total Face Attack in Counter Impoliteness Strategies

As indicated above, my analysis shows that government officials have attacked three manifestations of Iraqi parliamentarians' face, namely PERSONAL POLITICAL, SIGNIFICANT OTHERS', and PERSONAL FACE. Attacks against parliamentarians' PERSONAL FACE, e.g. ‘يا كلب’ (you dog) employed in answering turns in this Iraqi corpus fall into four types as displayed in table 5.8 below.

Table 5.8 Conventionalised Impoliteness Formulae Types in Counter Impoliteness Strategies in the Iraqi Parliament

Conventionalised Impoliteness Formulae Types	Frequency of Occurrence
Idiomatic Insults	2
Personalised Negative Reference	4
Personalised Negative Vocative	7
Threats	3
Message Enforcers	1
Total=	17

In addition to attacking the various manifestations of face, my analysis demonstrates that other key concepts/factors of impoliteness are involved in attacking the questioning parliamentarians in the Iraqi corpus. These key factors include EQUITY RIGHTS and ASSOCIATION RIGHTS. In other words, government officials attacked Iraqi parliamentarians through affecting their EQUITY RIGHTS and ASSOCIATIONS RIGHTS. For example, these officials imposed on the parliamentarians' freedom of action, i.e. obstructed their autonomy, giving rise to EQUITY RIGHTS related impoliteness. For instance ، وهو أن تستلم جداول الكميات التفصيلية بأرقامها وتدقق وتقيم من جهة أخرى ولتكن جهة حكومية مثل جامعة بغداد وليس الاستعانة بمقاول' (Lists of detailed quantities to be received, assessed by a third neutral party which must be governmental such as Baghdad University, not a private contractor). The present study reported 13 occurrences of Autonomy and Imposition related impoliteness in answering turns.

As for ASSOCIATION RIGHTS related impoliteness, these instances include situations in which impoliteness emerges due to questionee's perception/expression that their concerns, feelings, and interests are not (appropriately) shared. In other words, impoliteness arises as a result of the absence of an expected EMPATHY from the questioner.

أيضاً طلبت تأجيل استجوابي ليكون هناك متسع من الوقت لأجيب لكن أيضاً تمت الإجابة ، For example

ومع الأسف من مدير مكتب مجلس النواب' (Also asked to postpone the interrogation to have enough

time for preparation but it was unfortunately responded by the head of the parliamentary

office). In the current Iraqi corpus, four occurrences of EMPATHY related impoliteness, in

answering turns, has been detected.

Moreover, I believe that it is significant to shed some light on the types of FACE

being promoted positively here as it can serve to enhance/establish the various types of face

that manifest themselves in the Iraqi corpus. The bar graph in figure 5.17 below displays the

frequency, with its respective percentage, of the FACE types being promoted in the current

Iraqi corpus.

Figure 5.17 The Occurrences of Face Promotion Types in Counter Impoliteness
Strategies in the Iraqi Parliament

In general, PROMOTE PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE has the largest frequency

compared to PROMOTE PARTY FACE which has not scored a single hit among the various

manifestations of face recognised in the current Iraqi corpus.

Figure 5.17 above illustrates that questionees in answering turns promote PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE as many as 20 times which equals 5.39% of the total percentage of counter impoliteness strategies and 67% of the total FACE promotion, as demonstrated in the figure 5.18 below. PROMOTE SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE scores only three hits making of a very low proportion, namely 0.81%, of the total percentage of counter impoliteness strategies (see figure 5.17 above) whereas it comprises 10% of the total FACE promotion as indicated in the pie graph in figure 5.18 below.

My analysis shows that another category of FACE has been promoted in the Iraqi corpus, namely PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE of relevant governmental institutions, such as the Mayoralty of Baghdad, and commercial companies such as consultancy firms and distribution companies for importing goods.

These bodies were promoted positively because their professionalism and expertise were challenged as part of challenging the credibility/competence of the governmental official who assigned governmental projects to them. Hence, promoting the positive face of these bodies will indirectly PROMOTE the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of the official being interrogated. These bodies are grouped under the category OTHER which scored seven hits constituting almost 2% of the total percentage of the counter impoliteness strategies, as shown in figure 5.17 above and 23% of the total face promotion (see figure 5.18 below).

Moreover, the patterns of strategies amalgamation, identified in initiation turns above, are very recurrently utilised by the relevant Iraqi politicians in questioning turns as well. For example, in extract 22 (see the Methodology Chapter) the questionee, Al-Obaidi, employs multiple counter impoliteness strategies within a single turn, namely REBUT/DIRCT CONTRADICTION twice, ATTACK and THIRD PARTY RECOURSE.

5.4.2   Counter-Impoliteness Strategies in the British Parliament

In section 5.3.2, I introduced the impoliteness strategies employed by the Leaders of the Opposition and other MPs in questioning turns. In this section, I present the counter impoliteness strategies as deployed by the Prime Minister in answering turns.

My analysis reveals that the Prime Minister employs a specific range of response patterns when faced with impolite utterances. Table 5.9 below illustrates the counter-impoliteness patterns that surfaced during the analysis of the present British political corpus, along with the frequency of their relevant linguistic realisations both in terms of a word count and a percentage.

Table 5.9 The Distribution of Counter Impoliteness Strategies in PMQs

Counter-Impoliteness Strategies	Words	Word Percentage
OFFER AN EXPLANATION ((CISs-EXP))	3402	32.54 %
REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION ((CISs-R/DC))	574	5.49 %
ATTACK ((CISs-AT)) Total	4973	47.56 %
ATTACK PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE ((CISs-AT: 1PPFC))	1582	15.13 %
ATTACK PARTY FACE ((CISs-AT: 1PFC))	2729	26.10 %
ATTACK SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE ((CISs-AT : 1SOFC))	558	5.34 %
ATTACK PERSONAL FACE ((CISs-AT : 1FC-PI))	104	0.99 %
PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE ((CISs-PPF)) Total	1448	13.85 %
PROMOTE PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE ((CISs-PPF: 1PPFC))	155	1.48 %
PROMOTE PARTY FACE ((CISs-PPF: 1PFC))	1182	11.30 %
PROMOTE SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE ((CISs-PPF : 1SOFC))	74	0.71 %
OTHERS ((CISs-PPF: OTHRS))	37	0.35 %
UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS ((CISs-USI))	59	0.56 %
Total Words =	10456	

As indicated in table 5.9, the distribution of the strategies ATTACK and OFFER AN EXPLANATION are greater than those of the other strategies in the present PMQs corpus.

Whereas the strategy UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS accounts for a very small proportion of the total corpus of Counter impoliteness strategies in the current PMQs discourse. According to table 5.9 above, the Prime Minister employs exactly 47.56 % of his total language to attack the Leader of the Opposition and other MPs. Whereas he uses almost a third, which comprises 3402 words, of his/her language to provide explanations when responding to impolite parliamentary questions. Moreover, PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE accounts for 13.85% of the total corpus employed by the Prime Minister when faced with impoliteness.

In addition, the distribution of the linguistic realisations for the strategy REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION comprises only 574 words of the total corpus in this set of strategies. The Prime Minister utilises the lowest fraction of his language, namely 37 words, to promote the positive face of OTHERS. Furthermore, the strategies UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS and PROMOTE SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE also have low word distributions, namely 59 and 74 words respectively. For a better visualisation, the above details are also shown in the pie graph below in terms of word percentage.

Figure 5.19 The Distribution of Counter Impoliteness Strategies in PMQs

The distribution of the counter impoliteness strategies demonstrated above may be indicative of the frequency of occurrence for these strategies in the current study. In other words, both the word distribution and the frequency rates of these counter impoliteness strategies increase and/or decrease simultaneously in the current PMQs corpus.

The bar chart in figure 5.20 below demonstrates both the frequency and percentage of occurrence for counter impoliteness strategies as employed by the Prime Minister in the present PMQs corpus.

Figure 5.20 The Occurrences of Counter Impoliteness Strategies in PMQs

As indicated in the bar graph above, ATTACK has scored the highest number of occurrences compared to UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS which has scored the lowest hits among the set of counter impoliteness strategies in the current PMQs discourse.

The Prime Minister resorted to OFFER AN EXPLANATION 60 times when faced with impoliteness, which constitutes slightly more than a fifth of the total percentage of counter impoliteness strategies in the current research. REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION appears only 17 times with 5.41 per cent of the total (see figure 5.20 above).

In addition, the bar graph above demonstrates that the Prime Minister has attacked his opponents in 158 occasions, which equals 50.32 % of the total percentage of strategies in this set. Hence, it can be argued that half of the Prime Minister's techniques to react to impoliteness focuses on countering the impoliteness with a similar response, i.e. to counter attack.

Moreover, the bar chart in figure 5.20 also shows that PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE accounts for 24.52% of the total percentage of the counter impoliteness strategies employed by the Prime Minister. Finally, the Prime Minister has UNDERSTATED IMPOLITENESS only on two occasions in total.

In conclusion, it could be said that half of Prime Minister's counter impoliteness strategies tend to be attacking his opponents, and slightly above a quarter of his counter impoliteness strategies are devoted to promoting FACE. He provides relevant explanations at a ratio of 19 per cent of the total. In a descending order, the Prime Minister tends to ATTACK, PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE, and to OFFER AN EXPLANATION when faced with impoliteness.

As ATTACK includes instances in which the Prime Minister faced impoliteness with impolite utterances among the set of counter strategies, this point will be elaborated further below. Moreover, ATTACK scored the highest in terms of the frequency of occurrences in the current PMQs corpus. The bar graph in figure 5.21 below demonstrates the frequency and percentage of occurrence for the types of face that has been targeted by the Prime Minster when attacking Opposition including mostly their Leader.

The Frequency of Face Attack Types in Counter Impoliteness Strategies in PMQs

Overall, the bar graph above demonstrates the Prime Minister's tendency to attack PARTY FACE more frequently than attacking the other types of FACE recognised in this research. It also shows that attacks aimed at the PERSONAL FACE of a political opponent and the FACE of SIGNIFICANT OTHERS in PMQs discourse are approximately similar in terms of their frequency and respective percentage.

According to the bar chart above, ATTACK PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE makes up 14.33 per cent of the total percentage of counter impoliteness strategies and 32.37% of the total percentage of face attacks (see the pie graph in figure 5.22 below). In other words, the Prime Minister has attacked the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of Opposition members as many as 45 times among the total number of face attacks. He attacked the PARTY FACE of the Opposition at a ratio of about a quarter of the total percentage of counter impoliteness strategies and slightly above half of the total FACE attacks (see the pie graph in figure 5.22 below).

As stated in the bar graph above, attacking SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE comprises only 3.5% of the total percentage for counter impoliteness strategies, whereas attacking personal face scores only 3.18% of the total. The attack of both these types of face comprises 8%   and 7% respectively of the total FACE attack percentage.

Figure 5.22 The Distribution of Face Attack Types in Relation to the Total Face Attack in Counter Impoliteness Strategies

As indicated above, the current investigation shows that the Prime Minister attacks four types of FACE in PMQs. It demonstrates that, in addition to challenging the PERSONAL POLITICAL, PARTY, and SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE, the Prime Minister may attack the personal FACE of his/her opponents as in 'the truth is he is weak and despicable'. Personal insults employed by the Prime Minister in this research fall into four types as displayed in the table 5.10 below.

Table 5.10 Conventionalised Impoliteness Formulae Types in Counter Impoliteness Strategies in PMQs

Conventionalised Impoliteness Formulae Types	Frequency of Occurrence
Third Person Negative Direct Reference	3
Third Person Negative Indirect Reference	4
Condescension	2
Dismissal	1
Total=	10

My analysis also indicates that one recurrent way of counter attacking the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of the Opposition is to ridicule or mock certain attributes in the opponent. For instance, in the context of arming Trident, the utterance 'all I can say when it comes to Beatles' songs is I suspect that the Leader of the Opposition prefers *Back in the USSR'*, the then Prime Minister David Cameron mocks Corbyn's attitude toward Trident missiles and the latter's alleged sympathy for Russians (see Appendix H). Moreover, mocking is not confined to attacking only one type of face. Instead, it has been used to attack all four manifestations of face that have been recognised in the current PMQs discourse. Furthermore, in the present PMQs, mocking seems to be employed more frequently by the Prime Minister to attack Opposition members rather than the opposite. Still, mocking was used by Opposition Leaders (see the Methodology Chapter, extract 22).

In the context of countering impoliteness with impoliteness, i.e. to attack back, SOCIALITY RIGHTS are also implicated. As my analysis shows, two types of rights are relevant here, namely EQUITY RIGHTS and ASSOCIATION RIGHTS.

For example, the Prime Minister impinged on the EQUITY RIGHT of Opposition members by obstructing their autonomy, i.e. imposing on their freedom of action.

The current investigation recorded 16 occurrences of impoliteness in which the Prime Minister impinged on Opposition's freedom of action. In the current PMQs corpus, the Prime Minister obstructs the freedom of action of Opposition members by requesting the following:

1) To thank/compliment/support a policy introduced by the Government which was face threatening to the Opposition if complied with or not. For example, 'I really think he ought to get up and say he supports the national living wage and thanks the government for introducing it'.

2) To welcome/acknowledge the achievements of the Government by the Opposition which may be face threatening for the Opposition whether complied with or not. For instance 'I note that we are on question four and there is still no welcome for the unemployment figures'.

3) To commit oneself to rule out a certain tax in the future as in 'I HAVE RULED OUT VAT (.) WILL HE RULE OUT NATIONAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS? YES OR NO?'

4) Other miscellaneous requests such as 'and I say to its leader that it is his party and he should sort it out' and 'before we get a self-righteous lecture from Labour (.) I would say to them LOOK AT YOUR RECORDS!'

As for ASSOCIATION RIGHTS, my analysis reveals that impoliteness surfaced due to an absence of an expected INVOLVEMENT from the Opposition. In the present study, all the three occurrences of impoliteness that were evoked through triggering the concept of INVOLVEMENT were communicated by the Prime Minister. For instance 'is he gonna welcome that at Christmas time (.) or doesn't he care about the reduction in unemployment?'

It is also worth noticing the types of FACE being promoted positively, as this may help to establish the types of face recognised in PMQs discourse in general. Furthermore, the category PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE scores second in order of frequency among the set of counter impoliteness strategies introduced in figure 5.20 above. The bar graph in figure 5.23 below displays the frequency, with its respective percentage, of the FACE types being promoted in the current PMQs corpus.

Figure 5.23 The Occurrences of Face Promotion Types in Counter Impoliteness Strategies in PMQs

As shown in the bar graph above, PROMOTE PARTY FACE scores the highest frequency compared to OTHERS, which scores the lowest, one occurrence, among the total number of face promotion in the Prime Minister's counter impoliteness strategies. The Prime Minister shows a significant tendency to promote his own party face at a ratio of 21.97% of the total percentage of counter impoliteness strategies, as indicated in figure 5.23 above. At the same time, PROMOTE PARTY FACE constitutes 90% of the total FACE promotion, as demonstrated in the pie chart below.

On the other hand, PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE is promoted only six times by the Prime Minister to counter impoliteness and SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE only twice. According to the pie chart in figure 5.24 below, both PROMOTE PERSONAL FACE and PROMOTE SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE collectively constitute only a tenth of the total percentage of FACE promotion. Similarly, the category OTHER in the British corpus includes promoting the FACE of entities such country which accounts for only 0.32% of the total.

Figure 5.24 The Distribution of Face Promotion Types in Relation to the Total Face Promotion in Counter Impoliteness Strategies

In this PMQs corpus, strategies amalgamation is frequently used in questioning turns as well. For example, in extract 25 (see the Methodology Chapter) the then Prime Minister David Cameron employs various counter impoliteness strategies such as PROMOTE PARTY FACE, ATTACK PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE thrice in a single speaking turn.

5.5   Comparison: Impoliteness in the Iraqi and British Parliaments

In this section, I will compare the relevant aspects of impoliteness as utilised by the Iraqi and British parliamentarians. Namely, I will compare the frequency of occurrences for the main types of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments. This will be followed by comparing the frequency of the subtypes of impoliteness, namely the subtypes of FACE SENSITIVITIES and SOCIALITY RIGHTS related impoliteness. Then I present a comparison between the frequency of the relevant Linguistic strategies utilised to convey impoliteness in the Iraqi and the British parliaments. Finally, I compare frequency of occurrence of the counter impoliteness strategies in both parliaments.

No comparison is made in terms of word distribution for the relevant categories in the Iraqi and the British parliaments. The word distribution for the categories identified in the current study tends to be in a direct proportion with the frequency rates for these categories. In other words, both the word distribution and the frequency rates increase and/or decrease simultaneously, hence the comparison of frequency rates is sufficient in this context. Figure 5.25 below introduces the frequency rates of the main types of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments.

The Frequency of the Superordinate Types of Impoliteness in the Iraqi and British Corpus

Overall, FACE SENSITIVITIES related impoliteness secured a greater number of occurrences than SOCIALITY RIGHTS impoliteness in both parliaments. Figure 5.25 above shows that of FACE SENSITIVITIES related impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments scored 256 vs. 222 hits respectively whereas realisations of SOCIALITY RIGHTS impoliteness occur only 29 times in the Iraqi parliament vs. 45 times in the British one.

Moreover, realisations of FACE SENSITIVITIES impoliteness in the Iraqi corpus outnumbered their counterparts in the British corpus, namely 256 hits in the Iraqi parliament vs. 222 hits in the British one. In contrast, realisations of SOCIALITY RIGHTS related impoliteness in the British parliament outnumbered their counterparts in the Iraqi setting. As indicated in the bar graph in figure 5.25 above, SOCIALITY RIGHTS impoliteness in the British setting occur as many as 45 times compared to only 29 times for the Iraqi setting.

As for the subtypes of impoliteness, figure 5.26 below demonstrates the frequency of occurrence for the subtypes of FACE SENSITIVITIES related impoliteness in the Iraqi and the British parliaments.

Figure 5.26 The Occurrences of Subtypes of Impoliteness (Face Sensitivities) in the Iraqi and British Parliaments

The Frequency of the Subordinate Types of Impoliteness (Face Sensitivities) in Iraqi and British Corpus

As indicated in the bar chart in figure 5.26 above, impoliteness arising from attacking PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE in both parliaments are more frequent than those of the other manifestations of face recognised in the current research. It also demonstrates that PERSONAL FACE related impoliteness scores the least in both parliaments. Realisations of impoliteness defined by attacking PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE in the Iraqi parliament has occurred 210 times. Whereas in the British parliament realisations of impoliteness arising from attacking PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE occurs 152 times only.

Furthermore, impoliteness resulting from attacking SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE occurs more frequently in the Iraqi parliament, viz. 43 times, than those in the British parliament, viz. 26 times (see figure 5.26 above).

However, impoliteness ascribable to attacking PARTY FACE scores 32 hits in the British parliament compared to solely a single hit in the Iraqi parliament as shown in figure 5.26 above. Finally, PERSONAL FACE is attacked twice in the Iraqi parliament whereas impoliteness related to attacks of PERSONAL FACE scores 12 occurrence in the British parliament.

Moving to other subtypes of impoliteness, figure 5.27 below presents the frequency rates of the various manifestations of SOCIALITY RIGHTS related impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments.

Figure 5.27 The Occurrences of Subtypes of Impoliteness (Sociality Rights) in the Iraqi and British Parliaments

Overall, impoliteness arising from violating SOCIALITY RIGHTS scores higher in the British parliament than its counterpart in the Iraqi parliament. Namely, realisations of SOCIALITY RIGHTS related impoliteness occur 45 times in the British parliament compared to 29 times in the Iraqi parliament (see the bar graph in figure 5.27 above). In addition, SOCIALITY RIGHTS related impoliteness in both parliaments has two further manifestations, viz. EQUITY RIGHTS and ASSOCIATION RIGHTS impoliteness.

Besides, EQUITY RIGHTS related impoliteness is more frequent than ASSOCIATION RIGHTS related impoliteness in both parliaments.

In general, EQUITY RIGHTS impoliteness occurs more frequently in the British setting more than its occurrence in the Iraqi parliament. Namely, realisations of EQUITY RIGHTS related impoliteness score 42 hits in the British parliament compared to 25 hits for their counterparts in the Iraqi setting, as indicated in figure 5.27 above. However, the total occurrences of EQUITY RIGHTS impoliteness in the British parliament stems from a single subtype of EQUITY RIGHTS, namely Autonomy and Imposition. In other words, impoliteness arising from breaching EQUITY RIGHTS in the British parliament manifests itself only through breaches of Autonomy and Imposition but never through breaches of Cost and Benefit Considerations nor through infringements of Fairness and Reciprocity. In other words, instances of impoliteness arising from infringing Cost and Benefit Considerations and/or Fairness and Reciprocity have not surfaced in the current PMQs/British corpus. Whereas realisations of Cost and Benefit Considerations related impoliteness occur twice and Fairness and Reciprocity related impoliteness score two hits as well in the Iraqi parliament. In addition, realisations of impoliteness ascribable to breaching Autonomy and Imposition occur as many as 21 times in the Iraqi parliament and 42 times in the British parliament, i.e. higher in the British parliament.

Figure 5.27 also shows the frequency of impoliteness resulting from violating ASSOCIATION RIGHTS in both parliaments. ASSOCIATION RIGHTS related impoliteness in the British parliament represent those realisations of impoliteness that arise from infringing Involvement (three hits), as demonstrated in figure 5.27 above. That is to say, realisations of both Empathy and Respect impoliteness have not surfaced in the current PMQs/British corpus (see the bar graph in the figure 5.27 above).

As for the Iraqi corpus, ASSOCIATION RIGHTS related impoliteness diverges into those arising from breaches of both Involvement (one occurrence) and Empathy (three occurrences). Whereas impoliteness related to lack of Respect are non-existent in both parliaments (see figure 5.27 above).

Next is figure 5.28 in which I introduce the frequency of the linguistic strategies as employed to convey impoliteness in questioning turns during parliamentary interrogations, in the Iraqi parliament, and PMQs sessions in the British parliament.

Figure 5.28 The Occurrences of Impoliteness Strategies in the Iraqi and British Parliaments

In general, figure 5.28 above illustrates that the strategy PREFACE has the greatest proportion of occurrences amongst the remaining impoliteness strategies both in the Iraqi and British parliaments. Furthermore, figure 5.28 above shows that two linguistic strategies have zero occurrences in the Iraqi parliament, namely INVITATION TO PERFORM AN FTA and METALANGUAGE of Q&A.

The strategy PREFACE scores a higher number of occurrences in the Iraqi parliament, viz. 91 hits, compared to 84 occurrences in the British parliament. The bar chart in figure 5.28 above also indicates that Iraqi parliamentarians have used more DETAILED QUESTIONs, namely 37 times, than British parliamentarians who utilised it only five times. The strategy CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION is more frequent in the British parliament than the Iraqi one, i.e. the strategy occurs 52 times in the former parliament and 34 times in the latter one.

The next strategy is CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE which manifests a greater frequency rate in the Iraqi parliament than the British one. In other words, Iraqi parliamentarians in the current study have utilised CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE 49 times, whereas British parliamentarians have used it 35 times only (see figure 5.28 above).

The next strategy is CONFLICTUAL QUESTION, which has recorded only five occurrences in the Iraqi parliament in contrast to the British parliament where it has manifested a higher occurrence for this strategy, namely 26 hits.

The last remaining strategies, namely INVITATION TO PERFORM AN FTA and METALANGUAGE of Q&A, have occurred 21 times and eight times respectively in the British parliament. As mentioned earlier, both these strategies have not surfaced in the Iraqi parliament.

Now, I turn to compare the distribution of counter impoliteness strategies in both Iraqi and British parliaments. Figure 5.29 below illustrates the frequency of each counter impoliteness strategy in the Iraqi and British parliaments.

As indicated in the figure above, the category ATTACK scores the highest occurrence in both the Iraqi and British parliaments. In addition, three counter impoliteness strategies, namely ABROGATION, OPT OUT ON RECORD, and THIRD PARTY RECOURSE, are absent in the British setting unlike the Iraqi one. The bar chart in figure 5.29 above reveals that the relevant questionees in the Iraqi parliament have resorted to OFFER AN EXPLANATION when encountered impoliteness as many as 103 times compared to British parliamentarians who used it only 60 times.

The category REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION has a greater frequency in the Iraqi parliament, viz. 68 hits, than the British parliament in which it employed only 17 times. The strategy ATTACK has occurred more in the British parliament, viz. 158 times, than the Iraqi one viz. 132 times only. Figure 5.30 below shows the distribution of types of Face being attacked in the counter impoliteness strategies in the Iraqi and British corpora.

The Frequency of the Face Attack Types in Counter Impoliteness Strategies in the Iraqi and British Parlaiments

The figure above shows that the Prime Minister has attacked the PARTY FACE of his political rivals more than any other manifestations of face in the current PMQs corpus. Whereas in the Iraqi parliament, the questioner has never attacked the PARTY FACE. Other manifestations of FACE, namely PERSONAL POLITICAL, SIGNIFICANT OTHERS', and PERSONAL FACE, have occurred in both settings though with dissimilar distributions.

Attacking the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of the opponent, in answering turns, has the greatest occurrence in both the Iraqi and the British corpus, viz. 67 vs. 45 times respectively, among other manifestations of face except PARTY FACE in the British corpus. When replying, the questionees in the Iraqi parliament have attacked SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE 31 times compared to only 11 similar occurrences by Prime Minister in the current PMQs corpus.

Finally, PERSONAL FACE has been attacked 17 vs. 10 times in the Iraqi and British corpora respectively.

Moreover, mocking the four manifestations of FACE is very frequently employed by the Prime Minister to attack his rivals in the current PMQs corpus. Nevertheless, mocking have not surfaced the current Iraqi parliamentary corpus.

In addition to aggravating the FACE SENSITIVITIES of political opponents, both the Prime Minister, in the British parliament, and relevant questionees, in the Iraqi one, have employed other types of impoliteness in their replies. As indicated earlier, EQUITY RIGHTS and ASSOCIATIONS RIGHTS related impoliteness were detected in answering turns in the both parliaments. Namely, both relevant Iraqi and British politicians have attacked their rivals, in answering turns, through imposing on their freedom of action, i.e. Autonomy and imposition related impoliteness. This type of impoliteness occurred 9 times in the Iraqi corpus compared to 16 similar instances in the British corpus. However, ASSOCIATIONS RIGHTS related impoliteness has manifested itself differently in both settings. In the Iraqi corpus, it manifested itself through Empathy related impoliteness which scored four occurrences. Whereas in the British parliament, three instances of Involvement related impoliteness were detected.

To PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE occurs 77 times in the British parliament whereas it occurs 30 times only in the Iraqi one. In other words, to respond to impoliteness by promoting positive face has been used more frequently in the British parliament than in the Iraqi one. UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS has surfaced only nine times in the Iraqi parliament in contrast to the British parliament which manifested two occurrences of this counter impoliteness strategy. Furthermore, ABROGATION is employed 22 times in the Iraqi parliament compared to zero manifestations for this category in the British setting (see figure 5.29 above). OPT OUT ON RECORD has occurred only twice in the Iraqi parliament compared to five occurrences for the category THIRD PARTY RECOURSE in the same setting. Both last two counter impoliteness strategies have recorded zero frequency in the British parliament, as shown in figure 5.29 above.

5.6 Summary

In the previous sections of the current chapter, I have introduced the categories related to the aspects of impoliteness being investigated in the Iraqi and British parliaments respectively. Namely, I have first introduced the distribution of the main and subtypes of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British corpora both in terms of word count and occurrences. Identifying impoliteness types is significant as it may uncover the relevant concepts/factors that underlie the expression/interpretation of such impolite utterances in the Iraqi and British parliaments. This answers the first research question posed in the current research which investigates why language users in these settings may regard certain utterances as impolite.

Secondly, I have introduced the frequency of particular linguistic impoliteness strategies, discoursal and pragmatic, that has surfaced in the Iraqi and British corpora respectively both in terms of word count and occurrences. This reveals the kind of communicative strategies that are employed by politicians in the relevant parliaments. This line of investigation answers the second research question in the present study which aims to unveil the kind of linguistic strategies employed by politicians in initiation turns to convey impoliteness in the relevant parliaments.

Thirdly, I have introduced the set of counter impoliteness strategies recurring in the Iraqi and British parliaments, together with their word percentages and number of occurrences, respectively. This step in the investigation provides an answer for the third research question which investigates the set of response patterns to impoliteness available to Iraqi and British politicians in the relevant parliamentary practices/activities.

Then I have introduced a comparison between the relevant aspects of impoliteness mentioned above in the Iraqi and British parliaments. This comparison answers the last research question in this study which explores the similarities and differences in the nature of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments.

In the following Chapter, I discuss the significance of these findings in the light of the wider socio-cultural, religious, and linguistic context.

6   Chapter Six: Discussion and Comparison of Findings

6.1   Chapter Outline

In the present chapter, I discuss the relevant similarities and differences in the nature of impoliteness with regards the three parameters explored in this study. First, I will highlight and discuss the similarities and differences with respect to the emerging types of impoliteness in both the Iraqi and British corpora. This will also include clarifying the significance of the factors underlying the expression/interpretation of impoliteness in these settings and how the institutional parliamentary context may affect the occurrence/absence of such factors under its boundaries. Then I move to discuss the interaction between the relevant parliamentary settings and the use of particular linguistic strategies of impoliteness in initiation turns. Next, I examine and relate the similarities and differences regarding the use of counter impoliteness strategies in both parliaments to certain contextual factors. The chapter is concluded with a summary of its content.

6.2   Discussion of Findings

The purpose of this study is to explore the nature of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments by investigating three relevant aspects of the phenomenon in question. These investigations are designed to unveil: 1) the key concepts/factors which evoke an interpretation of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments (the specific FACE SENSITIVITIES and SOCIALITY RIGHTS involved) and, accordingly, the relevant types of impoliteness these factors give rise to, 2) the discoursal and pragmatic strategies employed by Iraqi and British parliamentarians to communicate impoliteness in initiation turns, and 3) the relevant counter impoliteness strategies utilised in these two settings. The results of investigating these aspects of impoliteness have been introduced in the previous chapter. In the following sections, I will compare and contrast the relevant impoliteness aspects in terms of how they are expressed and used in both Iraqi and UK parliamentary discourse.

6.2.1 Types of Impoliteness in the Iraqi and British Parliaments

In this section, I discuss the similarities and differences in terms of the use and expression of the FACE SENSITIVITIES and SOCIALITY RIGHTS that underlie and influence the interpretation of impoliteness in the current Iraqi and British parliamentary discourse.

My findings show that impoliteness types, which are defined by the FACE SENSITIVITIES they affect and the SOCIALITY RIGHTS they infringe, occur in both settings (see figure 5.3 and 5.8). In other words, both Iraqi and British parliamentarians tend to be impolite by attacking the FACE SENSITIVITIES of their rivals and/or breaching their SOCIALITY RIGHTS. This may indicate that, despite the differences in the wider socio-cultural, religious, and linguistic background of the two settings, the interpretation of impoliteness is affected by similar parameters in the corresponding political contexts. This similarity may be ascribable to the fact that both settings in question are institutions that are adversarial in nature, i.e. the Iraqi and the British parliaments are institutions structured along broadly similar rules and conventions of conduct. Hence, for example, ways of attacking the adversary may be similar. However, this does not exclude the possibility that the occurrence of impoliteness related to FACE SENSITIVITIES and SOCIALITY RIGHTS in the current parliamentary contexts may be a reflection of the occurrence of the same types of impoliteness in non-institutionalised settings in the Iraqi and British cultures. Namely, non-institutionalised impoliteness may have influenced the present institutionalised forms of impoliteness. However, it is not the within the scope of the present research to specifically compare and correlate non-institutional impoliteness with an institutional one.

Although both types of impoliteness, i.e. FACE SENSITIVITIES and SOCIALITY RIGHTS, do occur in both settings, their frequency of occurrence is different (see figure 5.25). My results show that Iraqi and British parliamentarians tend to attack their rivals through affecting their FACE SENSITIVITIES (256 times (89.82%) vs. 222 times (83.15%) respectively) more than infringing the SOCIALITY RIGHTS of these opponents (29 times

(10.17%) vs. 45 times (16.85%) respectively) (see also figures 5.3 and 5.8). This tendency to attack the FACE SENSITIVITIES of political adversaries falls within parliamentarians' choice of argumentation type they adopt to convince their audience of their stance on a specific issue. In particular, by attacking the FACE SENSITIVITIES of a political opponent, they attack the ethos of the rivals, i.e. their authority and/or credibility. On the one hand, this might achieve the objective of the parliamentary practice in question and on the other hand it may allow parliamentarians to exercise power over their opponents. That is to say, attacking the FACE SENSITIVITIES of a political opponent is more politically consequential/functional in this parliamentary practice. For example, in the Iraqi parliament, by attacking the FACE SENSITIVITIES of the questionee, the questioner is scrutinising the government's performance through highlighting its incompetence and failure in the hope of disciplinary/reformative procedures. At the same time, the questioner, who is usually affiliated with a political party different from that of the questionee, is unveiling the incompetence, and undermining the authority of the political rival as an end in itself. The same applies to PMQs in which the Leader of the Opposition scrutinises the policies and decisions of the government by challenging the credibility and the authority of the Prime Minister, i.e. by attacking the latter's FACE SENSITIVITIES, whilst, at the same time, exercising his political power over the Prime Minister and the ruling party.

The occurrence of FACE SENSITIVITIES related impoliteness in the current Iraqi and the British corpora conforms to the findings of other studies of impoliteness in parliamentary discourse, such as Harris' (2001), Bull, & Wells' (2012), and Murphy's (2014) , which also identify the significance of FACE in attacking political rivals in such contexts.

As mentioned earlier, both Iraqi and British parliamentarians tend to rely less on attacks via infringing the SOCIALITY RIGHTS of their political opponents compared to attacks via FACE SENSITIVITIES. As argued earlier, challenging the credibility and the authority, i.e. affecting the FACE SENSITIVITIES, of a political opponent has more

negative political consequences for the politician than infringing his/her SOCIALITY RIGHTS. For example, denying an opponent their turn to speak, which may be interpreted as being unfair, i.e. breaching EQUITY RIGHTS, may cause uncomfortableness for the addressee. However, it will not be as embarrassing/damaging as demonstrating a rival's failure to run official responsibilities due to ineffective decision-making abilities, for example. This may explain the low frequency rate for SOCIALITY RIGHTS impoliteness in both parliaments as the ultimate goal of politicians is win over a rival.

Unlike the present study, earlier studies of impoliteness in parliamentary discourse, namely Harris' (2001), Bull & Wells' (2012), and Murphy's (2014), have not included/recognised instances of impoliteness that arise from infringing SOCIALITY RIGHTS in their frameworks. Namely, these studies have not investigated EQUITY RIGHTS related impoliteness, such as impoliteness arising from infringing the Cost benefit and Fairness and Reciprocity expectations, or ASSOCIATION RIGHTS related impoliteness, i.e. Involvement and Empathy expectations not being met.

The distribution of main the impoliteness types in the Iraqi and British parliaments respectively by word percentage, namely those arising from affecting FACE SENSITIVITIES (12129 words (91.65%) vs. 8137 words (87.84%) respectively) and infringing SOCIALITY RIGHTS (1118 words (8.44%) vs. 1126 words (12.15%) respectively), is approximately similar (see tables 5.1 and 5.2). A possible explanation for the minor discrepancy in the word percentage might be that there are no parliamentary rules that could determine the type, and the length of the linguistic structures to be employed in the Iraqi or British parliaments. In the Iraqi parliament, it is the Speaker of the Council who determines the length of an intervention. However, no objection is made to the form the questions may take. Therefore, the questioner's interventions in my Iraqi corpus were very lengthy compared to those expressed in PMQs corpus which were more strictly managed.

Moreover, in Iraqi parliamentary interrogations, the participants are required to support their claims with documentary evidence. Hence, both questioners and questionees in the Iraqi parliament recite official letters, whose textual content is a communication of impoliteness, to support their arguments. Therefore, their interventions are relatively lengthy compared to those of the Prime Minister's and the Leader of the Opposition in the British parliament. Thus, the size of the linguistic material conveying impoliteness may be affected by the very nature of a given parliamentary practice and its relevant conventions and rules.

Unlike earlier studies of impoliteness in parliamentary discourse, namely Harris' (2001), Bull & Wells' (2012), and Murphy's (2014), which refer only to face threatening acts without specifying which type of face is being attacked or threatened, the current research follows Bull et al. (1996) in recognising different manifestations of FACE SENSITIVITIES. However, Bull et al.'s (1996) framework recognises only three FACES for politicians in political interviews, namely PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE, PARTY FACE, SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE. However, my research recognises an additional option, namely PERSONAL FACE (see the Methodology Chapter, section 4.4).

My analysis shows that impoliteness subtypes defined in terms of attacking the four manifestations of FACE occur with dissimilar frequency in the Iraqi and British parliaments (see figure 5.26). In practicing their parliamentary role, both the questioners in the Iraqi parliament and the Leaders of the Opposition in the British parliament tend to attack PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE more recurrently (210 times (73.68%) vs. 152 times (56.93%) respectively) than the other faces (see figures 5.4 and 5.9). This result is expected considering the adversarial nature of the discourse in general and the nature of the particular parliamentary practice in question. The ultimate objective behind parliamentary interrogations and PMQs is to scrutinise government's performance through assessing the proficiency of the official involved, i.e. to assess attributes such as decision-making ability, the ability to effectively implement a government policy and budget for example. It is these

political attributes which take centre stage and are challenged, giving rise to frequent examples of attacks to PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE.

A distinctive difference between the Iraqi and British corpora is the occurrence of impoliteness type defined by attacking the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of the Speaker of the House. No examples of such attacks have been detected in the current PMQs sessions. However, within the current Iraqi parliamentary corpus, attacking the Speaker's PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE, namely Salim Al-Joubori's, has surfaced in one of the interrogation sessions, i.e. interrogating the Minister of Defence. The whole extract is included in Appendix G in which the underlined sections represent attacks against the Speaker of the parliament. As contextualised earlier, in a relevant example introduced in the Methodology Chapter, viz. extract 32, the Minister of Defence claims that some parliamentarians headed by the Speaker were blackmailing him to exploit Defence-related resources for personal benefits at the expense of the public. Such accusations put the integrity and the credibility of the Speaker in question as they imply that he profits from his parliamentary position. What is interesting about this particular instance of attack to PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE is that it involved members of the same political Sunni alliance. Hence, impoliteness in the Iraqi parliament can arise from intraparty conflicts of interest. Indeed, attacking the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of the Speaker in the Iraqi parliament occurs outside interrogation sessions as well, for example in parliamentary debates. Consider for example the extract below.

[Extract 1, Parliamentary Session, 10th Jan 2013]

```
01  Mr. Speaker Al-Nujayfi:… this is a way to create troubles in the session(.) if there is
02              an entity in the Council that wants to suspend its proceedings (0.7) let
03              them announce that((1PFC)) … whoever tries to disobey we will
04              suspend his participation in the sessions  (. ) or expel from the hall (.) that
05              is enough  this is not an acceptable way to talk to someone
06  Khalid Ghadhban: we are very keen to have the Council carry out its censorial role
07              (.) therefore we want the sessions to be held in a neutral objective
08              atmosphere (0.6) honestly it is noticed that you don't devote the same
09              amount of attention to all representatives (.) you discriminate among
10              political parties (.) you don't give them full time to speak and express
11              their opinion (.) and this has become a practice ((1PPFC))…in addition
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12	your last statement included a reference to a specific bloc which aims to
13	suspend(0.5)confuse the Council this comment is also not acceptable not
14	acceptable at all (.) we hope to delete this from today's records.

The above extract is part of a lengthy exchange between the then Speaker of the Iraqi parliament, Al-Nujayfi, and members of the State of Law Coalition, in which both parties take turns to attack each other. In lines 8-11, Ghadhban accuses the Speaker of political partisanship in response to Al-Nujayfi's repeated attacks against several members of the State of Law Coalition on various occasions, as in lines 1-3 for example. It has to be pointed out here that the then Speaker of the parliament is the chairperson of a Sunni political Coalition, which is conflict with the State of Law Coalition, a Shia political Coalition. These extracts, and several others observed in my Iraqi corpus, are manifestations that the Speakership in the Iraqi parliament is prejudiced and politicised. This results from the lack of a parliamentary rule that compels the Speaker in the Iraqi parliament to terminate his/her political affiliation, i.e. become apolitical. Nevertheless, within the current PMQs corpus, no occurrence was detected of impoliteness arising from attacking the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of the Speaker nor that of politicians' of the same political affiliation. The absence of impoliteness defined by attacking the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of the Speaker may result from the fact that the Speaker's position is apolitical in the British parliament.

Another interesting instance of attacking the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of a politician in the Iraqi parliament can be illustrated in the following extract below:

[Extract 2, Al-Isawi's Interrogation, 1st Session, Nov 2011]

01	Al-Isawi: the invitation was issued by myself to Arab Contractors at the presence of
02	the Egyptian Chargé d'affaires and deputy chairman of the board...in the
03	implementation of contracts and the brother is a contractor and know how
04	things are // ((pointing to Al-Waeli with his hand))
05	Al-Waeli: who is the contractor? who is the contractor? //I am an engineer
06	Al-Isawi: I am sorry you
07	aren't a contractor
08	Al-Waeli: and a military man! (0.5) I have never knocked the door of the mayoralty
09	thanks to Allah

In the above extract, Al-Isawi's reference to Al-Waeli as a 'contractor' is taken as offensive by the latter. Here I can propose two possibilities for why this reference may have annoyed Al-Waeli in this context.

The first possibility for the offensive interpretation can be ascribed to social stratification in the Iraqi society. In principle, jobs/careers that require academic degrees are more prestigious than those that do not necessitate such requirements. In Iraq, being an engineer or a member of military institutions entails being a degree holder, while being a contractor does not require an academic degree. Hence, being an engineer, or a military man is more prestigious than being a contractor. That may be the reason why Al-Waeli has taken this as offensive, as he is already a member of the Iraqi parliament and a military engineer, i.e. he has a prestigious career. Therefore Al-Waeli may have felt offended for being associated with a less prestigious profession.

The second possibility for the offence is that by addressing Al-Waeli as 'contractor' Al-Isawi may be alluding that the reason behind this interrogation is a conflict of interest. In other words, Al-Isawi may allude that Al-Waeli, directly or indirectly, has been harmed by the policies of the Al-Isawi, the Mayor of Baghdad. Judging from Al-Wael's response in line 6, in which he denies attending the Mayoralty ever for personal business, the second possibility seems more plausible. In this case, the utterance in question is merely an instance of attacking the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of Al-Waeli as it questions his integrity.

However, the first possibility is still valid especially because Al-Waeli emphasizes what his actual professional role is, namely an engineer and a military man, which can be taken to be a rejection of or an objection to Al-Isawi's addressing him as a 'contractor'. In this case, the utterance attacks his PERSONAL FACE, i.e. it degrades Al-Waeli's personal/private profession. This denotes that non-institutional aspects are activated and challenged in an institutional setting, namely the Iraqi parliament. Moreover, this example helps to identify a further dimension of PERSONAL FACE attacks, i.e. degrading a

profession, in the parliamentary context along with personal insults identified in both parliaments.

My findings demonstrate that the Leaders of the Opposition during PMQs employ more PARTY FACE-related impoliteness than the questioners in the current Iraqi parliamentary interrogation corpus (see figure 5.26). That is to say, impoliteness arising from attacking attributes that are shared by members of the ruling party was significantly more recurrent in the British parliament, 32 instances 11.98%, than in the Iraqi one, 1 occurrence 0.35% (see figures 5.4 and 5.9). This may be because the political system in the United Kingdom adopts a plurality/majoritarian democracy in which the government is formed by the party with the largest number of seats after a general election and the next largest party becomes the Official Opposition, i.e. two-party system.

The term two-party is used in Britain to describe a system in which two major parties dominate the elections, and form the government and the Opposition. However, there are other effective political parties which do win seats in the parliament and join the Opposition. Hence, the party system is demarcated very clearly in the British parliament, which is also represented by the physical spatial distribution of members (see figure 6.1 below). In the figure below, government members are seated in the left hand benches and the Opposition occupies the right hand benches facing each other.

Figure 6.1 The Chamber of the House of Commons in Session

By contrast, the Iraqi system adopts a proportional representational/consensus democracy in which all the mainstream political parties form the government. After a nationwide parliamentary elections, the party or coalition of parties with the largest number of seats form the government.

Moreover, cabinet formation must include members of all the other mainstream political parties as well, to ensure that all political views are represented, at least theoretically. Hence, the political system is a multi-party one, therefore the parties are not demarcated clearly in the Iraqi parliament.

The spatial distribution of members in the Iraqi parliament demonstrates the consensus democracy (see figure 6.2 below). In the figure below, members of all Iraqi political parties are seated in random seats facing the Speaker of the parliament.

Figure 6.2 Sessions Hall in the Iraqi Parliament

Due to these structural differences among the Iraqi and the British parliaments, impoliteness forms affecting PARTY FACE are more frequent in the British parliament. Moreover, impoliteness arising from attacking PARTY FACE in the British parliament involved a direct explicit reference to the party such as 'the Conservatives' or 'the Labour party'. For example 'Tory bluster and condescension will not go down well in Scotland'. PARTY FACE in the British parliament is also attacked through reference to a group of party members as representatives of that party such as those forming the cabinet or a council borough. For example 'Conservative borough council has pocketed the additional money that would have been used to allow pensioners to have access to trains'. This was an essential criterion for coding this category.

However, within the current Iraqi parliamentary corpus the impoliteness occurrence which was coded as affecting PARTY FACE did not involve an explicit mention of the party in question, unlike in the British corpus. Impoliteness arising from attacks against PARTY FACE was made through attacking representatives of that party. In other words, it was coded as such because members of the same political party initiated attacks against the parliamentarian who attacked their fellow party member, as indicated in the extract below.

[Extract 3, Al-Isawi's Interrogation, 3rd Session, Dec 2011]

```
01  Al-Waeli: …and this report mr Speaker I have received it yesterday…and this is a
02              statement of a professional manager who says that work progress has
03              reached only (48%) and what mr mayor declares in the press is
04              misleading ((1PPFC)) ((1PFC))
05  Al-Isawi: I won't allow you to say misleading ( . ) ((CISs-AT:1PPFC)) my
06              information is all correct and (0.5) your information is incomplete
07              selective ((CISs-AT:1PPFC))
08  Al-Waeli: I am your questioner and all my information is correct and yours is a
09              press release ((1PPFC)) ((1PFC))…I dare you if Baghdadis drank water
10              by the 1st of October ((1PPFC)) ((1PFC))… the progress of the project
11              is slow and I insist it is (48%) ((1PPFC)) ((1PFC)) ((ISs-PRF))…
12  Al-Igayli: mr Speaker interrogations are blessed ( . ) through which corruption and
13              deficiency is spotted…we request brief questions and answers we possess
14              numerous files against the questioner ((1PPFC)) that shall be left for Iraq
15  Al-Waeli: mr Speaker exposing files requires bravery and confidence ( . ) and Al-
16              Igayli's  own files are well known ((1PPFC))…
17  Al-Isawi: … and I request a witness from the State of Law coalition namely from
18              Al-Dawa party who informed me that Al-Waeli insisted on interrogating
19              me he will swear by Allah why has Al-Waeli refused to have me in the
20              parliamentary committee on integrity ((CISs-AT:1PFC)) I insist on
21              bringing that witness in the next session
22  Al-Allaq:  Al-Waeli did this interrogation independently he wasn't pushed by Al-
23              Dawa party nor State of Law coalition he practiced his role as a
24              parliamentarian… Al-Dawa party pushed no one and there are no political
25              motives here when Al-Isawi mentioned Al-Dawa party he should either
26              state the name of the witness now or it should be deleted from the records
27
```

The above extract is part of an interrogation held to question the then Mayor of Baghdad, Al-Isawi. The questioner, Al-Waeli, challenges the incompetence of Al-Isawi in monitoring /supervising a project and accuses him of providing false information, lines 1-4 and 8-11. This may be considered as an instance of PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE impoliteness as the direct target of the attack is the Al-Isawi, as coded above. However, it is the intervention

of Al-Igayli , who affiliates with the same political party that Al-Isawi affiliates to, in the subsequent discourse that enables us to categorise the underlined utterances in lines 1-4 and 8-11 as attacking the PARTY FACE of both Al-Isawi and Al-Igayli, at least from Al-Igayli's perspective. The latter two politicians belong to Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, which is in conflict over power with the State of Law Coalition, to which Al-Waeli belongs. In the extract above, Al-Igayli accuses the questioner Al-Waeli of corruption and threatens to expose his corruption, line 13-14 above.

Another evidence that the exchanges among Al-Waeli, Al-Isawi, and Al-Igayli are turning into an instance of attacking a PARTY FACE is Al-Allaq's intervention in lines 22-26. Both Al-Waeli and Al-Allaq belong to the State of Law Coalition. So when Al-Isawi, in lines 17-21, requests to bring a witness from the State of Law Coalition to prove that Al-Waeli's motivation behind the interrogation is not for the public interest, Al-Allaq objects and requests that the name of his political affiliation be withdrawn from the records, lines 25-26. Al-Allaq further explicates that his political party has no role in initiating the current interrogation and that Al-Waeli is only practicing his parliamentary role to scrutinise the government, lines 22-25. The above is evidence from the local linguistic context to support the categorisation of the above exchange as impoliteness arising from attacks against PARTY FACE.

Moreover, the positioning of parliamentary interrogations within the wider Iraqi political sphere provides an extra evidence for my case. Within the wider political sphere in Iraq, parliamentary interrogation s are seen as one of the various manifestations of party battle. Iraqi mainstream parties compete amongst themselves to initiate interrogations for their rivals' candidates who occupy ministerial offices and/or high ranked officials so as to uncover their alleged corruptions. In this context, parliamentary interrogation is an exercise of political power and an indication of how powerful a political party is. A powerful and/or ruling party manages to question its rivals' ministerial candidates but will not allow for its

own candidates to be interrogated. These interrogations count as party achievements, which are made public and advertised afterwards in political campaigns. However, more direct and explicit instances of impoliteness arising from attacking PARTY FACE are more frequent in other parliamentary practices in the Iraqi parliament, such as debates, for example extract 3 in the Methodology Chapter.

My analysis indicates that both Iraqi and British parliamentarians tend to attack the FACE of their opponent's significant others. Though Iraqi parliamentarians seem to employ SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE related impoliteness, 43 instances 15.09%, more than the British ones, 26 times 9.74% (see figures 5.4 and 5.9). The higher frequency of this type of impoliteness may be a result of the widely-spread practice of familial, ethnic, and political favouritism in the Iraqi governmental institutions. To paraphrase, Iraqi governmental officials tend to utilise public resources for the advantage of their family members, members of their own ethnicity or political affiliation. Hence, inspecting such a practice became a common way to scrutinise and attack the integrity of politicians in the Iraqi society. In the current PMQs corpus, impoliteness arising from affecting SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE include the FACE of the following:

1) Colleague(s) of the rival politician, the latter being the Prime Minister, who may be a member(s) of his/her government such as a secretary of state.

2) Politician/political leader allying with the political rival.

3) A president of an allied country.

4) Cross-party politicians sharing a similar stance on an issue.

5) A group of politicians/colleagues within the rival politician's party.

6) A colleague of the rival politician, the latter being the Leader of the Opposition, who may be a member of the shadow government.

On the other hand, in the present Iraqi corpus, impoliteness arising from affecting SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE include the FACE of the following:

1) Politician's/Minister's family members.

2) Politician's/Minister's family members who are employees subordinate to the Minister/politician.

3) (Senior/ high ranked) employees who are subordinate to the Minister/politician.

4) Businessmen/contractor involved in governmental/ministerial projects.

Unlike in the current British corpus, SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE in the Iraqi parliament include the FACE of individuals outside the political sphere such as family members, i.e. the impoliteness arises from activating relational components which are non-institutional/non-political. This again could be ascribable to the common practice of favouritism by Iraqi politicians explained above.

Both Iraqi and British parliamentarians in the current study employ impoliteness that results from highlighting non-political attributes in their rivals, i.e. attributes that are conventionally attacked in everyday social interactions. In other words, non-institutional forms of impoliteness, for example personal insults, may coincide with institutional forms of impoliteness, perhaps, to enhance and escalate the former.

Personal insults in the Iraqi parliament revolve around themes such as accentuating the moral superiority, social status and power, and sincerity of the accuser in contrast to the lack of the these qualities in the addressee. For example, 'يا ساقط' (you immoral), 'كذاب والله العظيم (he is) a liar by the Al-Mighty God (he is) a liar), and 'تخسأ شاربك اذا اني ادمرها كذاب' (shame on you, how dare you say I destroy the military institution?), which implies the moral superiority of the speaker. These particular attributes are highly valued among male individuals in the Iraqi culture. The linguistic form of these insults are either expressed explicitly as in 'والله العظيم مايكذب إلا شكلك' (by the Al-Mighty God no one lies except your revolting, repulsive face) or implicitly as in 'اطيح حظهم والله العظيم' (by the Al-Mighty God I will insult them cruelly). Moreover, these personal insults abandon the institutionally restrictive forms of address to be used in the parliament, namely the third person form of

address. In articulating these insults, the Iraqi parliamentarians adopt a first person address strategy, e.g. ‘احترم نفسك احترم نفسك’ (respect yourself respect yourself). This deviation may be strategic, aiming to intensify the attack.

Another characteristic feature of personal insults in the Iraqi parliament is the intensification through the use of religious words such as using the name of God in the Islamic world, i.e. الله (Allah), or His attributes as ‘العظيم’ (Al-Mighty), or mostly a combination of both, i.e. ‘والله العظيم’ (Al-Mighty God). An exhaustive list of the all the types of impoliteness arising from attacking the PERSONAL FACE in the present Iraqi parliamentary corpus is provided in Appendix E.

Personal insults in the current PMQs corpus include references to character traits such as the worthlessness, weakness and the lack of courage/bravery in the addressee. For example, 'the truth is he is weak and despicable' and 'he's frit'. As with the personal insults in the Iraqi corpus, the relevant British parliamentarians employ both direct, e.g. 'scared', and indirect, e.g. 'when did he lose his nerve' forms in expressing these insults. The personal insults in the current PMQs discourse are mitigated through the use of the institutionally constrained third person address mode, unlike their counterparts in the Iraqi corpus, e.g. 'why is *he* so scared?'. An exhaustive, classificatory list of the all the types of impoliteness arising from attacking the PERSONAL FACE in the current British parliamentary corpus is introduced in Appendix F.

My findings indicate that both Iraqi and British parliamentarians employ impolite utterances defined by infringing some kind of SOCIALITY RIGHTS to attack their political rivals (see figure 5.27). Both the Iraqi and the British corpora include examples of two types of SOCIALITY RIGHTS that influence impoliteness interpretation/expression, namely EQUITY, 25 instances (8.77%) vs. 42 (15.79%) respectively and ASSOCIATION RIGHTS, 4 occurrences (1.4%) vs. 3 occurrences (1.12%) respectively, though with different frequencies (see figures 5.5 and 5.10).

Both Iraqi and British parliamentarians in the current corpora tend to attack their opponents more frequently by restricting their freedom of action rather than infringing opponents' other types of SOCIALITY RIGHTS (see figure 5.27). Hence impoliteness, arising from breaching the Autonomy of politicians outnumbers other types of impoliteness ascribed to infringing other types of SOCIALITY RIGHTS, 21 times (7.37%) vs. 42 times (15.73%) in the Iraqi and British parliaments respectively (see figures 5.5 and 5.10).

In this context, breaching the Autonomy of a politician occurs when requesting them to perform actions which may result in negative political consequences for them. Moreover, relevant British parliamentarians in the present corpus, namely Opposition members, have employed more Autonomy related impoliteness than the questioners in the Iraqi parliament (see figure 5.27). A possible explanation for this variation may relate to the nature and objective of the relevant parliamentary practice in question, namely parliamentary interrogations and PMQs. In the British parliament, the official Opposition forms an alternative/shadow cabinet which scrutinises the performance, and the policies of the cabinet led by the Prime Minister. In this shadow cabinet, the Leader of the Opposition is perceived as an alternative/shadow Prime Minister whose political role is to scrutinise the actions and policies of the Prime Minister, to hold him/her accountable and offer alternative pathways or policies. With such a perspective in mind, it is expected, if not inevitable, for Opposition members and mainly their Leader to propose other measures and policies, courses of actions. Hence, the current British corpus comprises instances of impoliteness, in which the Prime Minister's freedom of action is imposed on, e.g. being requested repeatedly to attend a TV debate despite the latter's explicit refusal to comply with the request.

In the Iraqi parliamentary interrogations, on the other hand, the questioner's institutional and political role lies in scrutinising the performance of the government official involved by identifying possible failure/negligence rather than introducing alternative pathways. Therefore such interrogations do include instances in which a questioner provides an alternative course of action being introduced as the legitimate one, after challenging and

proving the inadequacy of the questionee's measures and/or policies. However, such instances are overall uncommon. This may explain the low occurrence of impoliteness forms/types resulting from imposing on political rivals' freedom of action in the current Iraqi parliamentary corpus compared to its British counterpart.

Neither Cost-Benefit, nor Fairness and Reciprocity-related impoliteness are represented in the current British corpus. On the contrary, Iraqi parliamentarians are confronted with a few utterances that are judged as impolite because these are perceived as exploitive/disadvantageous and unfair to them.

It is has been noted that impoliteness types arising from infringing opponent's right to be treated fairly and without exploitation in the Iraqi parliament are identified as such based on impoliteness meta-pragmatic comments such as ' حرام , انا اريد الانصاف , هذا فيه غبن (this is عليك , حرام والله حرام' .The phrase 'الانصاف اريد انا' (I want fairness), 'غبن فيه هذا' unfair), ' حرام والله حرام ' (this is not acceptable/permissible according to Islamic teachings), and 'عليك حرام' (this is haram for you to do/say). The word 'حرام: haram' is an Arabic word which literally and pragmatically means that what is being said/done is proscribed/forbidden according to the Islamic teachings. The word 'حرام: haram' is the opposite of the Arabic 'حلال : halal' which means prescribed/ permissible according to Islamic teachings. In Iraqi Arabic a very frequent equivalent phrase to 'حرام'is to say ' الله ميقبل' which means 'God does not allow/permit what is being said/done'.

Other impoliteness meta-pragmatic comments which were spotted in the identification of other types of impoliteness in the current Iraqi parliamentary corpus include 'يجوز ما هذا' (this is not permitted/allowed), 'مومعقول هذا' (this is not reasonable/acceptable), 'هذا مو حجي هذا' (this is not something (accepted) to be said), and 'عيب هذا' (this is a disgrace/shame). However, pragmatically the phrase translates as 'this is not acceptable'). As an impoliteness meta-pragmatic comment, it explicitly denotes a negative evaluative judgement as regards what has been said/done. Moreover, the word 'eib / ayyb: عيب' is the folk term for an important concept in the Iraqi society, and many Middle Eastern Islamic

cultures as well. The concept designates behaviours which are unacceptable in a given interactional situation, no matter what the grounds are for their unacceptability. This concept is an umbrella category for anything that is socially prohibited/proscribed in such cultures. Hence, it is closely related to the conceptualisation and identification of impoliteness in these cultures. These impoliteness meta-pragmatic comments are seen as representations of those evaluative judgements which are based on beliefs regarding what counts as impolite, polite, etc. Thus the use of the word 'حرام: haram' indicates that religion is part of the belief system that underlies the conceptualisation of impoliteness in the Iraqi parliament.

Conversely, the current PMQs corpus has not recorded as many impoliteness meta-pragmatic comments, e.g. 'this is disgraceful', as in the Iraqi setting. Moreover, these meta-pragmatic comments have not included religious words or socio-cultural notions.

As for types of impoliteness arising from infringing opponents' ASSOCIATION RIGHTS, both Iraqi and British parliamentarians have employed utterances that display a lack of involvement, viz. not showing interest in the political rivals' concerns and interests , though their occurrences are very low (see figures 5.5, 5.10, and 5.27). In the Iraqi corpus, Involvement-related impoliteness occurs when a questionee does not encounter the expected amount of engagement in his/her interests and concerns from the questioner. Consequently, the former makes an emotional request for an appropriate amount of engagement from the questioner. The request is beneficial for the questionee as it aims to activate an in-group status with the questioner. In the Iraqi parliament, its function is to gain support and leniency from the questioner. Involvement-related impoliteness in the current PMQs corpus also involves a request by the Prime Minister for the Leader of the Opposition to show interest and acknowledgement in the former's governmental achievement. Thus, the use of this type of impoliteness may be seen as beneficial, i.e. achieving political aims, in both the Iraqi and the British parliaments.

Unlike the British parliamentarians, Iraqi politicians in the current parliamentary corpus deploy another type of impoliteness resulting from breaching another type of

ASSOCIATION RIGHTS of their rivals, namely their right to be empathised with. As exemplified in the Methodology Chapter (extract 15), the politician aims to invoke certain sentiments, such as anger or humour or pity, in the audience, including the rival politician, as part of his/her approach to persuasion. It could be argued that the use of this type of impoliteness falls within politicians' appeal to invoke the pathos, i.e. emotions, of the audience as an approach of argumentation in this context.

Throughout the examples analysed in my corpora, the types of impoliteness, which have been used by the relevant politicians, have been functional/strategic, i.e. served to accomplish a political goal for a given party. It could be argued that all of these different ways of attacking the political rival fall within the larger umbrella of politicians' approach to persuasion, namely their political rhetorical strategies. That is to say, the main factor for the choice/decision as to which factor/concept is evoked in the communication/interpretation of impoliteness is the efficiency of the resulting impoliteness type in achieving the political goal within the particular political activity type. This is also influenced by the particular politician's choice of argumentation style and his/her skill/expertise in manipulating it. In other words, the reoccurrence of certain types of impoliteness in both of the current political settings, such as impoliteness arising from affecting FACE SENSITIVITIES of relevant politicians, may relate to the fact that these recurring dimensions are institutionally valid for the functioning of such institutions. Conversely, the absence of certain types of impoliteness in one parliamentary corpus, such as the absence of Empathy- or Fairness and Reciprocity-related impoliteness in the British parliament, and/or the two corpora, such as the absence of Respect-related impoliteness in both the Iraqi and British setting, may indicate that these aspects of communication are marginally institutionalised/significant in such institutional interactions compared to other dimensions such as FACE SENSITIVITIES related impoliteness. Thus, the nature of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments is affected and shaped by the political/institutional character of these two settings.

Nevertheless, both the occurrence and the absence of any type of impoliteness, in the current parliamentary corpus, does not exclude the possibility that similar or different types of impoliteness may emerge in another political corpus.

Moreover, the absence of certain types of impoliteness in one and/or the two corpora may relate to theoretical and methodological issues. The framework adopted to identify the factors/concepts that underlie the expression/interpretation of impoliteness in the current parliamentary corpora, namely Spencer-Oatey's (2008) and Bull et al.'s (1996), proved to be helpful in this respect nonetheless it had its problems. Spencer-Oatey's (2008) theoretical framework lacks a precise coding system/scheme for some of its categories, namely those categories which manifest ASSOCIATION RIGHTS infringements, which results in having closely related interwoven categories. The theoretical conceptualizations of "Involvement" (as the principle that people should have appropriate amounts and type of activity involvement with others) and "Empathy" (as the belief that people should share appropriate concerns, feelings and interests with others) may seem distinguishable only on the surface. However, in practice it is not easy to differentiate instances of these two categories, considering the very broad coding criteria introduced for Involvement in Spencer-Oatey (2002:537-538) and the lack of a specific coding for Empathy in Spencer-Oatey (2005:100). Spencer-Oatey (2002:537), conceptualises Involvement as expressing a desire for involvement. Accordingly, Spencer-Oatey (2002:537-538) exemplifies Involvement with instances in which the addressee fails to show association with the speaker who was expecting such an involvement. Moreover, Spencer-Oatey (2002:538) reports instances of impoliteness resulting from the absence of an interpersonal, intergroup, and intragroup association from the addressee as separate categories by themselves, i.e. not as types of Involvement related impoliteness. However, the failure to show a sense of inclusion to a group may be considered an instance of not showing Involvement when it is expected. Hence, the lack of an interpersonal, intergroup, and intragroup association, when expected,

is a type of impoliteness arising from the lack of Involvement. This is how it was coded in my research.

As I have mentioned earlier, the category Empathy was only conceptually defined but not clearly illustrated in Spencer-Oatey (2005:100). Moreover, its theoretical conceptualization may be better seen as a type of Involvement, namely an affective Involvement. According to Spencer-Oatey (2005:100), to empathize means that people should share appropriate concerns, feelings and interests with others which may be seen as showing an association, an involvement with them, particularly an affective one. Hence, Empathy may be considered as one manifestation/type of Involvement. This approach to coding ASSOCIATION RIGHTS, namely to Involvement and Empathy, is based on observations from my data. However, this does not mean that Involvement-related impoliteness includes only the types mentioned above. Further research could identify other types as well.

The absence of some types of impoliteness in one and/or the two corpora may relate to methodological issues as well. More specifically, methodological choices may underlie the absence of Cost-Benefit- or Fairness and Reciprocity-related impoliteness in the British parliament. The coding scheme for these two categories as with most of the other categories in Spencer-Oatey (2002:536-536) is mainly dependent on participant's understanding and description of relevant incidents. Cost- Benefit and Fairness-related impoliteness are said to occur when interactants perceive incidents in which they are exploited, disadvantaged and unfairly dealt with respectively. In general, SOCIALITY RIGHTS, including Cost-Benefit and Fairness related impoliteness, are coded either when RIGHTS are referred to explicitly, i.e. explicit evaluative comments, or a reference is made to what should have been done or not done. This was manageable in the Iraqi corpus as the rules, conventions, and the type of the relevant parliamentary practice provided more space for more elaborate interventions. Sometimes, these interventions included evaluative judgements, i.e. meta-pragmatic comments on impoliteness, which provided insights into participants' understanding of these

incidents. However, PMQ rules, and conventions are more varied and inflexible, in terms of the time and speaking turns, than the parliamentary interrogations in the Iraqi parliament. And even the extent of compliance with parliamentary rules and conventions is greater in the context of PMQs than in the Iraqi parliament. Consequently, politicians' interventions are limited in PMQs compared to the interventions in the Iraqi parliamentary setting. Thus gaining participants' evaluation of the impoliteness associated with particular utterances was not possible very frequently.

To conclude, the nature of impoliteness in both the Iraqi and British parliaments may be affected by various political dimensions such as the objectives, rules, conventions of a given parliamentary practice, and the political agenda of relevant parties. These aspects may influence the argumentation strategies utilised by parliamentarians which may in turn affect and shape the nature of impoliteness in a parliament. The theoretical and methodological approach adopted in this research may have also had a bearing on the findings.

6.2.2   Linguistic Impoliteness Strategies in the Iraqi and British Parliaments

In this section, I compare and contrast another aspect of impoliteness investigated in the current research, namely the range of discoursal and pragmatic strategies employed to communicate impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliamentary corpora.

Both Iraqi and British parliamentarians in questioning turns have deployed a range of linguistic strategies to communicate impoliteness, viz. PREFACE, DETAILED QUESTION, CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION and IMPLICATURE, and CONFLICTUAL QUESTION, except for two strategies which were absent in the Iraqi corpora, namely INVITATION TO PERFORM FTA and METALANGUAGE of Q&A. Despite their occurrence in both parliaments, these impoliteness strategies are performed/delivered differently in the two parliaments. The dissimilarity in the performance of these impoliteness strategies includes their distribution both in terms of word percentage

(see tables 5.3 and 5.5) and frequency of occurrence (see figures 5.11 and 5.12) in the Iraqi and the British parliaments respectively. Further differences are discussed below.

In the context of both parliaments, the strategy PREFACE consists of direct, explicit contextualising propositions that attack the FACE SENSITIVITIES and/or infringe the SOCIALITY RIGHTS of political rivals. Hence, in this research these propositions constitute the PREFACE which may be followed by a DETAILED QUESTION, or CONFLICTUAL QUESTION or a question which pragmatically expresses a CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION or CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE.

In the Iraqi parliamentary interrogations, questioners have deployed this strategy slightly more often, namely 91 times (42.13%) (see figure 5.11), than it was used by the Leader of the Opposition in the PMQs corpus, namely 84 times (36.36%) (see figures 5.12 and 5.28).

In addition, within a single questioning turn, these propositions are more extended, elaborate, and repetitive in the Iraqi parliament than in the PMQs, in which they are consistently concise. In terms of word percentage, PREFACE showed a greater presence in the Iraqi context compared to the British one as indicated in tables 5.3 and 5.5. As explained in section 6.2.1 above, questioners in the Iraqi parliament recite the texts of official documents and letters to authenticate their accusations and attacks. This typically happens within their PREFACE, which may explain why PREFACEs are lengthier in the Iraqi parliament than in the British setting.

In terms of sequencing the questioning turn, the predominant form in the present PMQs corpus is a PREFACE/propositions followed by a polar question (yes/no). However, this structure has not been consistently adopted by the questioners in the Iraqi corpus. In Iraqi parliamentary interrogations, a questioning turn may consist of the following sequences:

1) Proposition/PREFACE + question.
2) Question + proposition/PREFACE.

3) Proposition/PREFACE+ question+ proposition/PREFACE.

This variation in the structuring of a questioning turn may be seen as a result of contextual factors such the lack of any parliamentary constraints on the duration of parliamentary interventions in the Iraqi setting or the nature of this particular parliamentary practice, which requires devoting extra time to both the questioner and the questionee during their speaking turns.

As explained above, the interrogative structure, viz. questions, are employed to function as a DETAILED QUESTION, CONFLICTUAL QUESTION or express a CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION or IMPLICATURE. Regardless of the pragmatic function of questions, both Iraqi and British parliamentarians in the study at hand employ Wh- and polar questions. This format may be more the result of conventional practice rather than actual prescription. However, in the Iraqi parliamentary interrogations, most often a PREFACE is not followed by a question, i.e. the question is not articulated as it is implied or suggested. In such cases, an implied question would be 'what do you have to say about this?' or 'do you have any/enough information/knowledge of about this?' or 'are/were you aware of this/that? '.

Thus, once more, the form and performance of an impoliteness strategy may reflect the different parliamentary rules and/or conventions that apply in either setting, whether these are similar or varied.

The strategy DETAILED QUESTION is employed significantly more often by Iraqi parliamentarians, namely 37 times (17.13%) (see figure 5.11), compared to its use by the Leader of the Opposition in the current PMQs corpus, namely 5 times (2.16%) (see figure 5.12). Despite its occurrence in both parliaments, as an impoliteness strategy, DETAILED QUESTION is carried out differently in the Iraqi and British contexts.

A DETAILED QUESTION in the PMQs context is used to elicit very specific information from the Prime Minister, e.g. a request for a specific figure whose disclosure is

Face attacking for the latter. The Prime Minister in turn may not have access to the answer at hand or does not want to bring it to public attention. Following the failure of the Prime Minister to answer the DETAILED QUESTION, the Leader of the Opposition provides the answer by him/herself, which intensifies the Face attack.

The same scenario is applicable in the Iraqi parliament with some modifications. In the Iraqi parliamentary interrogations, a DETAILED QUESTION may be used to elicit specific information regarding various aspects within the responsibilities of the questionee, e.g. how he/she appointed specific general directors, how he/she assigned a contract to a company, hence it is not used to inquire only about figures, as is the case with PMQs. Unlike the Prime Minister, the questionee does provide an answer for the DETAILED QUESTION in the Iraqi parliament. In the follow up turn, the questioner begins to challenge and refute the questionee's answer and provides a different reply, which is face-attacking for the former. This sequence of a DETAILED QUESTION, an answer, then a follow up in which the answer is refuted/challenged is repeated for the same question over many turns. This particular pattern is very frequent/repetitive in the questioning of the Mayor of Baghdad, Al-Isawi. Both the questioner Al-Sudani and Al-Isawi engage in a circular process in which a given question is posed, answered, and then the answer is challenged over and over.

To turn to other strategies, CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION occurs in both parliaments as well, though it is more frequent in the British setting than in the Iraqi one (52 times (22.51%) vs. 34 times (15.74%) respectively) (see figures 5.11, 5.12 and 5.28). My analysis has demonstrated that both Iraqi and British parliamentarians have employed a similar range of presupposition structures/types in expressing impoliteness against their political rivals (see tables 5.4 and 5.6). Moreover, both Iraqi and British parliamentarians favour structural presupposition in the expression of impoliteness, namely both tend to rely more frequently on using interrogative structures to trigger these CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITIONs. This tendency may be expected in the light of the nature of the two

parliamentary practices at hand, which are intrinsically designed to question government representatives.

Another impoliteness strategy which occurs in both corpora is CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE, although it is used more frequently in the Iraqi parliamentary corpus than in the British setting (49 times (22.68%) vs. 35 times (15.15%) respectively) (see figures 5.11 and 5.12). Both Iraqi and British parliamentarians rely more on rhetorical questions, which flout Grice's quality maxim, to express a CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE compared to other means of creating a conversational implicature such as irony. This tendency to create an implicature through a rhetorical question may result from the nature of the parliamentary practice that is designed to elicit information from the relevant governmental officials through an interrogative structure. Implicitly expressing impoliteness through CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION and IMPLICATURE is the result of the parliamentary constraints that prohibits the use of direct explicit offensive expressions within both parliaments.

A further impoliteness strategy which occurs in both parliaments is the use of a CONFLICTUAL QUESTION as in 'Does the Prime Minister agree that cutting these crucial services is a false economy?'. This particular strategy has been utilised remarkably more often by the relevant British parliamentarians compared to their counterparts in the Iraqi setting (26 times (11.25%) vs. 5 times (2.31%) respectively) (see figures 5.11, 5.12, and 5.28). I propose that the reason behind this discrepancy is the level of skill and experience of the relevant British politicians in parliamentary rhetoric in particular and in politics in general. In terms of exercising and practicing politics and parliamentary business, Iraqi politicians are less experienced because the modern parliamentary system was only established in 2005, compared to the longevity of the relevant British politicians, as indicated in the Cultural Contextualisation in Chapter Three. Unlike the questionees in the PMQs, the questionee in the Iraqi parliament does reply to the CONFLICTUAL QUESTION, i.e. he/she

does not equivocate. In other words, although faced with a communicative conflict created by the questioner's CONFLICTUAL QUESTION, the questionee selects an answer which is as face-damaging or action-constraining as any other possible reply. This is picked up by the questioner to launch an attack and confirm the alleged accusations. This deviation is contradictory to what is predicted in Bull et.al (1996), namely that politicians equivocate when faced with a CONFLICTUAL QUESTION. I propose that this deviation may result from the Iraqi politicians' inexperience in handling such situations or, in some cases, their overwhelming trust in their political influence/power to avoid the negative consequences of such replies. It may also be the case that Iraqi speakers do generally prefer a more direct communication style.

Two more strategies, namely INVITATION TO PERFORM AN FTA and METALANGUAGE of Q&A, were recurrent in the British parliament but absent in the Iraqi context (see figure 5.28). Both strategies entail awareness, and expertise in manipulating certain parliamentary resources, i.e. rules, conventions and procedures, to attack one's political rival. For example, to attack an opponent using the strategy METALANGUAGE of Q&A demonstrates a skill in pragmatically utilising the question/answer framework that constrains the structure of a PMQs sessions in the British parliament. In other words, employing such strategies is part of a politician's rhetorical abilities or expertise. In this regard, the relevant British parliamentarians may be more skilled compared to the Iraqi parliamentarians (see the Cultural Contextualisation Chapter). Hence, the absence of these two strategies in the Iraqi setting may be attributed to absence of such expertise.

In terms of the strategies used to convey impoliteness in the PMQs corpus , the above mentioned results agree with the findings of previous studies such as Harris' (2001) and Bull and Wells' (2012) which also report the occurrence of a similar range of impoliteness strategies in their PMQs corpus. My study extends previous research by illustrating the

occurrence of such strategies in a different political setting, namely the Iraqi setting, and shows how these are performed by Iraqi parliamentarians.

These findings indicate that relevant contextual factors, such as the parliamentary rules and conventions regarding the permissible/preferable types of linguistic structures to be employed in a given parliamentary practice, politicians' rhetorical experience affect/shape the way impoliteness is expressed. These may affect politicians' choice of the linguistic structures, pragmatic and discoursal strategies employed in expressing impoliteness. However, I am not disregarding the possibility that politicians' use of these linguistic strategies in conveying impoliteness may reflect the influence of the use of similar impoliteness strategies in non-institutional settings.

6.2.3 Counter-Impoliteness Strategies in the Iraqi and British Parliaments

In this section, I discuss the similarities and differences with regard to the use of response patterns to impoliteness in the current Iraqi and British discourse. In this research, I adopt Culpeper et al.'s (2003:1564-1568) and Bousfield's (2007:2199-2201) perspective that some of these counter strategies may be viewed as primarily defensive strategies, i.e. destined to mainly save one's or others' face. These defensive counter strategies include OFFER AN EXPLANATION, REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION, ABROGATION, and OPT OUT ON RECORD. Equally, both PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE, which is originally introduced in Bull & Wells (2012) and THIRD PARTY RECOURSE, which is a modification of a strategy originally introduced by Bousfield (2007:2204) can also be seen as defensive along the same lines. I also reject the dichotomization of response strategies into purely defensive or offensive. Rather, I follow Culpeper et al.'s (2003) scalar view of these counter strategies, namely that a defence strategy "has a secondary goal of attacking the face of the speaker'' (Culpeper et al. 2003:1563), and an attack strategy "has the secondary goal of defending the face of the responder'' (Culpeper et al. 2003:1563).

In responding to impoliteness, some counter strategies were utilised by both Iraqi and British politicians, namely OFFER AN EXPLANATION, REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION, ATTACK, PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE, and UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS though with different frequencies (see figure 5.29). Nonetheless, some counter impoliteness strategies were absent in the present PMQs discourse, viz. ABROGATION, OPT OUT ON RECORD, and THIRD PARTY RECOURSE (see figure 5.29). In other words, more variety of counter impoliteness strategies was displayed in the Iraqi corpus.

I propose that the objective behind the relevant parliamentary practices from the questionee's perspective and his/her relative political power affect the occurrence and/or absence of these counter strategies and how frequent they occur in each corpus.

In the Iraqi parliamentary interrogations, the goal of the questioned governmental figure is primarily to refute the alleged corruption issues claimed by the questioning parliamentarian. Besides, in this particular practice, the political/executive power of the Iraqi government official is weaker than that of the questioner who decides what issues to inquire about and what questions to raise about these aspects, although the questionee will be provided access to these question in advance. Moreover, the questioner participates in a final vote to determine whether or not the questionee's answers are satisfactory and convincing to refute the alleged corruption. A vote of no confidence is proposed if the questionee's replies prove unconvincing (see the Cultural Contextualisation Chapter, section 3.5).

In the British PMQs sessions, on the other hand, the Leader of the Opposition institutionally has the power to decide what questions to ask from the head of the government without the latter having a prior access to these questions. The Prime Minister, however, on account of his/her executive powers, gets to indirectly set the agenda of possible topics for such questions. Despite the Prime Minister being the most powerful figure in the British political context, his/her political/executive power is weakened dynamically within the

context of PMQs (see the Cultural Contextualisation Chapter, section 3.5). However, during PMQs, the Prime Minister attempts to restore his/her power by demonstrating the validity and efficiency of government policies and decisions, and disproving the arguments posed by the Opposition. Besides, PMQs is a platform for party political point scoring.

In responding to impoliteness, Iraqi government officials provide explanations more than the Prime Minister does , viz. 103 times (27.76%) vs. 60 times (19%) respectively (see figures 5. 14 and 5.20). Considering the position of the questioned officials in the Iraqi parliament explained above, resorting more frequently to such a defensive countermove is expected from the questioned official as it maximises their chances to disprove the allegation set against them. By contrast, adopting such a defensive strategy so frequently risks showing the Prime Minister in a weak position; thus, face loss risks are higher. Hence, the lower occurrence of this counter strategy in the British parliament.

Likewise, Iraqi government officials/politicians have denied/contradicted the impolite propositional content expressed through questions significantly more than the British Prime Minister has done in the current PMQs corpus, viz. 68 times (18.33%) vs. 17 times (5.41%) respectively (see figures 5. 14 and 5.20). Thus, again may be the defensive nature of REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION is what makes this strategy more favourable to Iraqi officials/politician than to the British Prime Minister who may regard it undermining his political power before an opponent.

Conversely, PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE has been employed indicatively more by the British Prime Minister in the current PMQs corpus than by Iraqi Ministers' of State, namely 77 times (24.52%) vs. 30 times (8.09%) respectively (see figures 5. 14 and 5. 20). The relatively low frequency of this defence strategy in the Iraqi parliamentary interrogations may be attributed to an institutional convention that restrains excessively boosting one' positive face. In the Iraqi corpus, questionees have been repeatedly and explicitly asked to not elaborate or extensively PROMOTE FACE, either by the Speaker or

the questioning member. Such requests/appeals may reflect an institutional attempt to conventionalise efficacy, and brevity in the Iraqi parliament. However, the low occurrence of the strategy under discussion may also be a reflection of a cultural tendency for humbleness/modesty, which is religiously rooted in the Iraqi society.

Despite its defensive nature, which may reflect negatively on the British Prime Minister, PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE scored the second highest frequency among the counter impoliteness strategies used by the Prime Minister (see figure 5.20). This relatively high frequency contradicts the previous argument that correlates the use of a defence strategy negatively with political power. It might be possible to argue that the Prime Minister here is activating the secondary function of this particular defence strategy, i.e. he is primarily attacking the Opposition by highlighting the achievements of the government, under his party's rule, to imply Opposition's failure/negligence to accomplish such achievements when the Opposition is in government. Hence, 90% of PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE occurrences has been devoted to PROMTE PARTY FACE (see figure 5.24). Additionally, many PROMOTE PARTY FACE occurrences in my PMQs corpus has been coupled by ATTACK PARTY FACE occurrences. Consider the extract below.

[Extract 4, PMQs/10 Feb 2016-CC]

```
01  Cameron (PM, Con): we inherited mass unemployment (.) economy that
02              completely collapsed and a banking crisis ((CISs-AT:1PFC))
03              and now we've got zero inflation wages growing unemployment at
04              5% an economy growing and people able(.) for the first time to look
05              to their future and see (0.5) they can buy and own a house in our
06              country ((CISs-PPF: 1PFC))
```

The occurrence of the above mentioned counter strategies in the Iraqi and British parliaments comes in accordance with the findings of other studies of impoliteness in parliamentary discourse, namely Harris (2001) and Bull & Wells (2012) which assert the occurrence of similar strategies in their data as well.

The well-known principle that the best defence is a good offence may explain why the countermove ATTACK has scored the highest frequencies in both the Iraqi and British corpus compared to other countermoves, namely 132 times (35.58%) vs. 158 times (50.32%) respectively (see figures 5. 14 and 5.20). Furthermore, both the relevant Iraqi and British parliamentarians have counter attacked their opponents by either affecting their FACE SENSITIVITIES and/or infringing their SOCIALITY RIGHTS.

The occurrence of FACE SENSITIVITIES- and/or SOCIALITY RIGHTS-related impoliteness in response turns, as well as in questioning turns, enhances the significance of these factors in the expression/interpretation of impoliteness in both the Iraqi and British parliaments. However, impoliteness types defined by affecting the questioners' FACE SENSITIVITIES is greater than those types of impoliteness defined by infringing the questioners' SOCIALITY RIGHTS in both the Iraqi and the British parliaments. Namely, FACE SENSITIVITIES related impoliteness in the Iraqi and the British corpora have occurred 115 times vs. 139 times respectively whereas SOCIALITY RIGHTS related impoliteness has occurred only 17 times vs. 19 times in the same settings respectively (see the Findings Chapter, sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2).

These results may confirm that FACE SENSITIVITIES is a more crucial factor than SOCIALITY RIGHTS in the expression/interpretation of impoliteness in the current parliamentary settings, whether in initiation or response turns.

My results also show that the British Prime Minister employs ATTACK as a counter move more than Iraqi parliamentarians do (see figure 5.29). Again, this may be attributed to the disparity in the respective power of politicians involved, which is at stake in such contexts. The greater a politician's power, the more FACE to lose. Hence, the incentive to ATTACK is greater with the British Prime Minister who is more powerful than the Ministers being questioned in the Iraqi parliament.

Despite the high frequency of ATTACK in both corpora, the distribution of ATTACK types with regard to FACE SENSITIVITIES is dissimilar in the two settings (see figure 5.30). In PMQs, the Prime Minister tends to ATTACK the PARTY FACE of his opponents more than any other manifestations of face, namely 73 times (23.25%) (see figure 5.21). On the other hand, Iraqi government officials and Ministers do not make such similar attacks at all in the Iraqi corpus (see figure 5.15). These results support my earlier argument regarding the effect of the form of the political system, whether majoritarian or consensus democracy, on the type of FACE SENSITIVITIES to be provoked (see section 6.2.1). To paraphrase, a two-party system may give rise to increased occurrences of ATTACK PARTY FACE-related impoliteness, as in the current PMQs corpus. This is different from a multi-party system in which chances of ATTACK PARTY FACE related impoliteness are low, if non-existent, as in the current Iraqi parliamentary corpus.

Both the interrogated Iraqi politicians and the Prime Minister in this study have employed PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE-related impoliteness, 67 (18.06%) times vs. 45 (14.33%) times respectively, moderately when attacking their rivals (see figures 5.15 and 5.21). This result underlines the role of this specific manifestation of FACE in the parliamentary corpus, regardless of the specific turn in which it may occur. Likewise, impoliteness defined by affecting SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE was present in response turns as well.

Conventionalised impoliteness formulae, such as personal insults, i.e. ATTACK PERSONAL FACE impoliteness, were the least used by both the relevant Iraqi and British politicians in response turns, viz. 17 times (4.58%) vs. 10 times (3.18%) respectively (see figures 5.15 and 5.21). This result is expected considering the parliamentary constraint on the use of such linguistic structures (see the Cultural Contextualization Chapter, sections 3.3.2 and 3.4.2). It has to be pointed out that the occurrence of such types of impoliteness in my corpora concurred with uncommon incidents such as political scandals, as in the present

Iraqi corpus, or significant political timings such as general elections, as in the current PMQs corpus. (Tables 5.8 and 5.10 respectively have introduced the types of conventionalised impoliteness formulae including personal insults which are employed by the interrogated Iraqi Ministers and the Prime Minister in the current binary corpora). A comparative account of the characteristics of personal insults in particular was given earlier, namely in section 6.2.1, hence no further elaboration is necessary here. Moreover, an exhaustive list of these conventionalised formulae, whether occurring in answering or response turns in both corpora, is provided in Appendix E and F).

Although relevant studies of impoliteness in parliamentary discourse, i.e. Bull & Wells (2012), include ATTACK within their framework of response patterns, they do not aim to specify which type of FACE is under attack. Unlike Bull & Wells (2012), my study has identified the type of impoliteness used in countermoves, and it shows whether such counter strategies involve FACE SENSITIVITIES or SOCIALITY RIGHTS related impoliteness. In addition, my research also identified the various manifestations of FACE being attacked in these offensive countermoves.

The British Prime Minister and the relevant Iraqi politicians have also employed another offensive countermove, namely UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS (see figure 5.29). In this counter strategy, the Prime Minister and the Iraqi Ministers attempt to render the impoliteness as trivial and unworthy to be mentioned. Furthermore, this strategy also belittles the political rival's effort in highlighting it.

Mocking or ridiculing the different FACE SENSITIVITIES was frequently used by the Prime Minister in the current PMQs corpus. It may be indicative of the relevant Prime Minister's rhetorical style, namely David Cameron's. Below is an example of mocking the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of the Leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn.

01 Corbyn (LO, Lab): … if the initial in the initial announcement he proposed cuts to
02   PIPs then changed his mind. Isn't the honourable member for Chingford right
03   when he says that this was a political decision rather than one made in the
04   interests of people in this country? **((1PPFC))((ISs-CPS)).**
05 Cameron (PM, Con): … I don't want to be part of a government that doesn't
06   have the courage to pay off our debts and leave them instead to our children
07   and grandchildren. and that is the truth(0.5) what is dressed up as compassion
08   from the party opposite just means putting off difficult decisions (.) and
09   asking our children to pay the debts that we weren't prepared to pay ourselves
10   **((CISs-AT: 1PFC))**. ((Jeering sounds from The Opposition members)). I
11   don't know why (.) I don't know why the shadow leader of the house is
12   shouting at me (0.5) <u>mr Speaker we've got a very interesting document today</u>
13   <u>(.) we've got the spreadsheet of which Labour MPs is on which side. The</u>
14   <u>honourable lady is shouting(.) but it says here no no no no it says she</u>
15   <u>is neutral but not hostile. that's right. now the chief whip on the other hand</u>
16   <u>is being a bit quiet. look there are five categories mr Speaker</u>(0.5) ((very
17   loud laughter sounds)) <u>mr Speaker there are five categories we have core</u>
18   <u>support</u> ((noise sounds)) <u>I've got all day mr Speaker. we have core support</u>(.)
19   <u>I think you can include me in that lot very strongly</u> ((loud laughter)). <u>we've</u>
20   <u>got core plus</u>(0.5) <u>the chief whip is being a bit quiet because she is in hostile</u>
21   ((loud laughter)). <u>mr Speaker I thought I had problems!</u> **((CISs-AT: 1PPFC:**
22   **MOCK))**.

The above extract focuses on a reverse of an announced cut to a welfare benefit in the budget of 2016 introduced by Cameron's cabinet. Cameron's government had announced plans for cuts in a disability benefit, namely cuts in personal independence payments (PIP). These controversial cuts were criticised by various political and non-political bodies and individuals such as Labour, a number of Conservatives, and disabled charities to name only few. Moreover, it is claimed that the cuts in PIP had caused a division within the Conservative cabinet as they resulted in the resignation of the then Secretary for Work and Pensions, Iain Duncan Smith. The latter claimed that these cuts were not in the national interest but namely for political reasons in reference to George Osborne, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer.

In the above exchange, the Leader of the Opposition, is attacking Cameron's PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE as he questions Cameron's competency as Prime Minister in managing the country's financial affairs. It may also count as an attack at Cameron's leadership in scoring consensus between his Conservative cabinet members. In lines 2-4,

Corbyn presupposes, through an interrogative structure, that the decision to include and then cancel disability cuts was purely political in nature. To such accusations, Cameron attacks the policies of Labour that leave national debts for future generations, lines 5-10. Cameron continues attacking Corbyn by mocking the latter's party leadership, i.e. Corbyn's skill in preserving the internal unity among his shadow cabinet. Cameron mocks the division in Labour shadow cabinet by employing a leaked document that categorises the shadow cabinet into five classes according to their loyalty to Corbyn. Raising such issues provokes irritation between the Shadow cabinet members, and demonstrates the divisiveness within Labour. Consequently, manifesting Corbyn's inefficiency to create, and maintain the internal unity within the party. By mocking Corbyn's weak leadership, Cameron aims to create an emotional response amongst his audience to persuade them of the validity of his argument. In the current PMQs corpus, mocking was also used by other members (see the extract in Appendix H).

Other studies of impoliteness in PMQs, such as Harris (2001) and Bull & Wells (2012), have not referenced mocking as a way of attacking the various types of FACE, whether in questioning or answering turns.

My findings indicate that three defensive counter impoliteness strategies, namely ABROGATION, OPT OUT ON RECORD, and THIRD PARTY RECOURSE, have not employed by the Prime Minister (see figures 5.20 and 5.29). I propose that the absence of these defensive strategies in the British corpus may relate to the extent of FACE loss/damage these can cause for the Prime Minister if opted for. To abrogate means to deny responsibility by passing it to others. Thus, if the Prime Minister, viz. the politician holding the most influential executive powers in the country and the head of the government who is accountable for his/her government policies, denies responsibilities, the FACE damage is immense.

Likewise, to OPT OUT ON RECORD and THIRD PARTY RECOURSE may jeopardise the Prime Minister's PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE to a great extent. It seems possible to argue that the Prime Minister's choice of specific counter impoliteness strategies better fits within a framework of how a politically powerful figure copes linguistically and pragmatically while temporarily being in a weak position.

On the other hand, the interrogated Iraqi Ministers possess less executive powers relative to that of the British Prime Minister. Hence, to abrogate, refuse to reply to a question, and to request a third party's resolution may not seem face damaging for them. On the contrary, these defensive countermoves may be the best choice to avoid face loss as these strategies provide a departure/conclusion from the offensive situation, whether temporal or permanent. With ABROGATION, Iraqi Ministers permanently escape the commitment/responsibility to a face attacking incident by passing it to others such as previous ex-Ministers, other government departments or to a higher executive authority such as the General Secretariat for the Council of Ministers. Whereas with OPT OUT ON RECORD and THIRD PARTY RECOURSE, the departure from the face attacking situation may be temporary. For instance, to use the counter strategy THIRD PARTY RECOURSE entails the questionees' requesting the intervention/resolution of a higher authority that has power over both the questioner and the questioned Minister, such as the judicial authority. But the resolution of the higher third party may not be in the interest of the questionee, i.e. the resolution may assert the Minister's responsibility of the offensive situation, hence the departure from the offensive situation is temporal.

However, other factors may have influenced the Iraqi Ministers' choices. The seriousness of the offence may be a crucial incentive. For example, OPT OUT ON RECORD, i.e. to decide/state not to reply to a face attacking question/proposition, was utilised in a context in which the seriousness of the offence was extreme, namely implicit

accusations of embezzling 45 million dollars by the then Minister of Trade Al-Sudani (see figure 5.14).

These findings support how the current research views parliament as a communicative context. As indicated in Chapter Three, I view parliament as an institution with rules, conventions, and routines that both shapes the behaviour, including linguistic behaviour, of political actors within its boundaries and gets affected by the interests, and preferences of those political actors. Namely that parliamentarians submit to the constraints posed by the institutional rules and structures in a way that best serves and protects their interests, viz. a fusion of normative and rational choice institutionalism.

6.3   Summary

In this chapter, I have illustrated how various contextual dimensions, political or otherwise, contribute to the nature of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments. The chapter shows how the parliamentary, and maybe the wider socio-cultural context, establishes and shapes similarities and differences with respect to certain aspects in the communication/interpretation of impoliteness in both settings.

First, I have discussed the impact of the parliamentary context on the emergence of specific type of impoliteness, namely FACE SENSITIVITIES- and SOCIALITY RIGHTS-related impoliteness, in the Iraqi and British parliaments. For example, the two party-system in the British parliament gave rise to the very frequent occurrence of PARTY FACE impoliteness in the current PMQs corpus, both in initiation and response turns. On the other hand, the multiple party-system resulted in almost non-existence of PARTY FACE impoliteness in the Iraqi parliament, whether in questioning and answering turn.

Secondly, I discussed the similarities and differences in the linguistic strategies employed in conveying impoliteness in both parliaments. The discussion makes reference to the impact of particular institutional and cultural factors on the choice of these strategies, such as parliamentary conventions regarding the form of questions.

Finally, I discussed the interplay between the use of the counter impoliteness strategies employed in both parliaments and particular contextual factors such as the relative power of parliamentarians involved

In the next chapter, I present the main conclusions and relevant recommendations for further research.

7 Chapter Seven: Conclusions, Limitations and Recommendations for further Research

7.1 Chapter Outline

In this chapter, I highlight the final methodological, empirical and theoretical contributions of this research with reference to the research questions, my analytical approach and the empirical findings of my investigation of linguistic impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliamentary discourse. In section 7.2, I summarise my research findings with reference to the main questions, and I highlight the theoretical contributions of the research with reference to the concept of impoliteness. In section 7.3, I clarify the methodological contributions of my research to the analysis of impoliteness in context, and acknowledge the limitations of the present study. In the final section, I introduce suggestions for further supplementary research.

7.2 Empirical and Theoretical Conclusions

The empirical contribution of this study lies in the application of the analytical framework in investigating the nature of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliamentary discourse. The main empirical and theoretical conclusions are summarised below in connection with the aspects of impoliteness investigated in the current research, as set out in the research questions. The empirical conclusions below demonstrate the similarities and differences in the relevant aspects of impoliteness between the Iraqi and the British parliaments and show how they reflect institution-specific and culture-specific influences on the relevant aspect of impoliteness under discussion.

7.2.1 Types of Impoliteness

The first research question enquires into the factors that influence the communication/interpretation of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments. Using the framework designed in this study, namely Bull et al's (1996), Spencer-Oatey's (2008) and

Culpeper's (2011a) frameworks, my findings have shown that both FACE SENSITIVITIES and SOCIALITY RIGHTS contribute to what is regarded as impolite in these two settings.

However, FACE SENSITIVITIES play a significantly more important role in shaping the nature of impoliteness in these two settings compared to SOCIALITY RIGHTS. Although SOCIALITY RIGHTS-related impoliteness does occur in both the current Iraqi and British parliamentary corpora, manifestations of impoliteness defined by the FACE type they attack are far more frequent in both the Iraqi and British parliaments. The current research has related this particular tendency to the objective behind the parliamentary practices under discussion which influences the type of argumentation to be employed, whether to invoke/attack rivals' political character or infringe their expectation to act freely, to be treated fairly, to be empathised with or be respected.

These results enhance the view that the concept of FACE is essential in the conceptualisation of impoliteness in the context of political institutions, particularly in parliamentary ones.

Moreover, impoliteness defined in terms of attacking FACE in both Iraqi and British corpora have been found to be orienting towards different manifestations of FACE. My findings have shown that both Iraqi and British politicians attack their rivals' FACE either through attacking the latters' PERSONAL POLITICAL, PARTY, SIGNIFICANT OTHERS', or PERSONAL FACE. These results signal the importance of adopting a multi-layered FACE model of impoliteness when dealing with parliamentary discourse. In this respect, my findings assert Bull et al.'s (1996) and Spencer-Oatey's (2008) proposals that at least in particular contexts FACE is a multi-layered phenomenon

Accordingly, impoliteness arising from attacks aiming at politicians' PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE was considerably more frequent in both Iraqi and British parliaments compared to the other manifestations of FACE. The current study has ascribed the high frequency of this type of impoliteness to the prevalence of ethos-based arguments in the Iraqi

parliamentary interrogations and the British PMQs sessions. The high frequency also indicates that PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE is more essential in the conceptualisation of impoliteness in parliamentary settings, particularly in parliamentary practices similar to the ones examined in the current research.

My findings have also highlighted a distinctive difference between the two parliamentary corpora, namely the attack of the Iraqi Speaker's PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE, which has been non-existent in the current British corpus. This shows the impact of the parliamentary context, viz. rules relating to the political affiliation of the Speaker, on sculpting the nature of impoliteness within its boundaries.

However, my findings have also shown that PARTY FACE-related impoliteness is more frequent in the British corpus compared to a marginal occurrence in the discourse of the Iraqi parliamentary interrogations. This variation reflects the influence of the institutional context on shaping impoliteness, namely the way a parliament and/or government is structured by the political parties involved whether two-party or multiparty system, and by the nature of specific parliamentary activities.

My findings have also shown that impoliteness defined by attacking SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' FACE occurs in both the Iraqi and the British corpora. This is further evidence of the multi-layeredness, and complexity of FACE in these contexts

My research has also shown that impoliteness forms which are conventionally employed in non-institutional social interactions, such as 'you dog: يا كلب'; '(he is) a liar by the Al-Mighty Allāh (he is) a liar: كذاب والله العظيم كذاب'; 'weak and despicable'; 'running scared'; 'chickening out', are employed infrequently within the Iraqi and British parliamentary contexts.

These conventional forms of impoliteness are used on rare occasions such as political scandals or politically significant events such as general elections. My findings have

indicated a variation in terms of the themes around which these conventional forms revolve. For example, Iraqi personal insults stress issues including moral superiority, social status/power, such as 'shame on you, how dare you تخسأ شاربك:' and sincerity, whereas the British insults invoke character traits such as worthlessness, weakness and lack of courage/bravery, such as 'so scared'. Unlike the British insults, Iraqi personal insults invoked religious words as a means of intensifying the insult. This reflects a culture-specific difference in the nature of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments. Moreover, personal insults in the Iraqi parliament are further intensified by employing the first person mode of address, unlike the British insults which are mitigated by the adhering to the institutional third person form of address.

These particular results indicate that culture-specific, e.g. religion, and institution-specific dimensions, namely the (non-) adherence to institutional rules of address, shape the expression of impoliteness in a given setting.

Examples of PERSONAL FACE-related impoliteness have not been detected in other studies of impoliteness in parliamentary discourse such as Harris (2001), Bull & Wells (2012) and Murphy (2014). These examples were identified in the current research due to its purposive methodological framework and the incorporation of Culpeper's (2011a) framework of conventionalised impolite formulae in English (see 7.3 below).

In addition, the occurrence of various manifestations of FACE-related impoliteness indicates that particular contextual factors, such as the choice of particular rhetorical strategies, the rules/conventions of particular parliamentary activities, and significant political events, determine/shape which type of FACE can surface, and, consequently, what constitutes the nature of impoliteness in these interactions.

Unlike Harris' (2001), Bull & Wells' (2012) and Murphy's (2014) research, the current investigation has been able to capture those instances of impoliteness defined by the type of FACE being attacked by incorporating Bull et al.'s (1996) and Spencer-Oatey's

(2008) multi-layered Face models into its theoretical and analytical framework (see 7.3 below).

Although examples of SOCIALITY RIGHTS related impoliteness are not as frequent as FACE-related impoliteness, still particular RIGHTS appear to be relatively significant in shaping the conceptualisation of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments. My study has revealed that infringing some type of EQUITY RIGHTS is more frequent and significant in the communication/interpretation of impoliteness in these two settings. Of particular importance here is the infringement of a rival's freedom of action, which results into a considerable frequency of examples of Autonomy and Imposition related impoliteness in both the Iraqi and the British parliaments.

Overall EQUITY RIGHTS seems to be a more significant variable in shaping the nature of parliamentary impoliteness than ASSOCIATION RIGHTS, both in the Iraqi and British parliaments. My analysis detected a greater occurrence of EQUITY RIGHTS-related impoliteness than impolite utterances arising from depriving political rivals of their expectations to be involved with, empathised with, and/or respected, viz. ASSOCIATION RIGHTS-related impoliteness.

I have suggested that the greater frequency of Autonomy and Imposition-related impoliteness, compared to other types of EQUITY RIGHTS-related impoliteness, in both settings may be associated with the function of the relevant parliamentary practice in question and the political significance of such attacks. This shows that Autonomy and Imposition, viz. Brown & Levinson's (1987) negative face, is significant in shaping the nature of impoliteness in parliamentary discourse.

The analysis also revealed a higher occurrence of impoliteness through meta-pragmatic comments in the Iraqi setting compared to the British PMQs context. The meta-pragmatic comments in the Iraqi corpus include references to culture-specific elements, such as religion and folk notions as "عيب", which contribute to the cultural conceptualisation of

impoliteness. However, no such references appear in impolite meta-pragmatic comments employed in the British setting. This indicates that parliamentary impoliteness in the Iraqi setting is more explicitly influenced by the wider socio-cultural context than its counterpart in the British context.

Due to the absence of particular types of ASSOCIATION RIGHTS-related impoliteness, such as Respect-related impoliteness, or the low frequency of some SOCIALITY RIGHTS-related impoliteness, namely Cost-Benefit- and Fairness and Reciprocity- or Involvement- and Empathy-related impoliteness, in both parliaments, the current research suggests that these factors are not particularly significant in shaping the nature of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments. However, further supplementary research, employing different and/or an integrated/mixed methodologies (for more detail, see 7.4 below), may conclude otherwise.

Overall, my findings have clearly demonstrated how specific aspects of the parliamentary institutional context affect the communication/interpretation of impoliteness in both settings. Such contextual elements include argumentative strategies employed by relevant parliamentarians, the function of the parliamentary practices at issue, the overall rules and conventions of parliamentary procedures, and the specific rules relating to a particular parliamentary practice, as well as the relative political power of parliamentarians involved and the system of government by political parties. The current research has thoroughly brought to light the effect of these institutional factors on defining impoliteness in parliamentary contexts, in contrast to previous studies such as Harris (2001), Bull & Wells (2012), and Murphy (2014), which marginally allude to such an effect, if any.

The influence of these institutional factors on defining parliamentary/political impoliteness also demonstrates the fluid-like nature of the concept of impoliteness, i.e. impoliteness takes the shape of its container.

7.2.2 Linguistic Impoliteness Strategies

The second research question probes the range of the linguistic impoliteness strategies employed by the Iraqi and British parliamentarians in questioning turns. To detect these strategies, this study has designed and operationalised a framework that draws on Harris' (2001) and Bull & Wells' (2012) frameworks.

My findings have indicated that both Iraqi and British parliamentarians make use of particular impoliteness strategies, namely PREFACE, DETAILED QUESTION, and CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION and CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE, CONFLICTUAL QUESTION. However, two strategies only occur in the British PMQs discourse, namely INVITATION TO PERFORM AN FTA and METALANGUAGE of Q&A.

Although recurrent in both parliaments, particular impoliteness strategies vary in their frequencies and/or their delivery, as clarified below.

The strategy PREFACE is used frequently in both parliaments but it is more elaborate and extended in the context of the Iraqi parliamentary interrogations. My results have also shown that the sequencing of a questioning turn in the PMQs corpus is more consistent than that in the Iraqi parliamentary interrogations. The predominant structure in the British PMQs is a PREFACE followed by a parliamentary question, whereas in the Iraqi context there may be more than one PREFACE which may follow or precede the parliamentary question. These variations result from the specific parliamentary rules/conventions of conducting the relevant parliamentary practice at issue, namely parliamentary interrogations and PMQs, in each setting.

Results from my analysis have shown that the relevant Iraqi parliamentarians have utilised the strategy DETAILED QUESTION more often than the Leader of the Opposition in the British PMQs. Moreover, the strategy itself functions differently in the Iraqi context. In the British context, this strategy is used as an attack when the Leader of the Opposition

enquires about a very specific figure, expecting that the Prime Minister may not answer it. This expectation is built on an assumption that the Prime Minister either does not have the specific figure at hand or does not wish to publicise it. The Prime Minister does avoid providing the information which is later on introduced by the Leader of the Opposition. In the Iraqi parliamentary interrogations, on the other hand, the questioner enquires about specific information with the expectation that the questionee will provide an answer that is unsatisfactory/inaccurate/untruthful from the questioner's perspective. And the questionee does provide an answer which is later on refuted/contradicted/falsified by the questioner. This difference in the performance of a DETAILED QUESTION also reflects the particular parliamentary conventions of conducting parliamentary interrogations and PMQs in the Iraqi and British parliaments respectively.

My findings have illustrated that the strategy CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION is more frequent in the British context. With regard to presupposition types, both Iraqi and British parliamentarians have employed structural, lexical, and counter factual presuppositions. However, the most frequent type in both parliaments is structural presupposition, in which yes/no or Wh-questions trigger the face attacking or a social expectation infringing presupposition.

My analysis has also revealed that CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE is more frequent in the Iraqi parliamentary corpus. However, both the Iraqi and the British parliamentarians make wider use of rhetorical questions, which flout Grice's quality maxim, to express a CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE, compared to other means of creating a conversational implicature such as irony.

The tendency to express the FACE attacking or SOCIALITY RIGHTS infringing PRESUPPOSITION or IMPLICATURE through an interrogative structure is a result of complying with a parliamentary convention that requires the parliamentarian to phrase their interventions as a question.

My results have also shown that CONFLICTUAL QUESTIONs are used more often in the British parliamentary corpus. Contrary to what is predicted in Bull & Wells (2012:38) with reference to the British parliament, it has been found that Iraqi questionees provide an answer, i.e. they do not equivocate, despite the communicative conflict. I suggested that both the variation in the occurrence and the performance of this strategy may stem from the discrepancy in the rhetorical skills between the relevant Iraqi and British politicians.

My findings also have shown that both INVITATION TO PERFORM AN FTA and METALANGUAGE of Q&A are non-existent in the Iraqi corpus. I suggested that this absence may also be due to the discrepancy in the argumentation experience between the relevant Iraqi and British parliamentarians.

Overall, it was argued that the variation in the frequency and/or the performance of the above mentioned impoliteness strategies may relate to particular contextual factors such as the institution-specific conventions of conducting a parliamentary practice in each setting or the rhetorical style/experience of the parliamentarians involved. Hence, contextual factors may be seen to shape not only the FACE SENSITIVITIES and SOCIAITY RIGHTS that are implicated in the relevant parliamentary discourse, but also the linguistic resources used to express them.

Other studies of impoliteness, Harris (2001), Bull & Wells (2012), and Murphy (2014), have not systematically demonstrated the effect of such contextual factors on shaping the linguistic resources that parliamentarians employ to convey impoliteness.

7.2.3 Counter-Impoliteness Strategies

The third research question enquires into Iraqi and British politicians' reaction to impoliteness. My findings have shown that particular counter-impoliteness strategies are prevalent in both the Iraqi and British parliamentary corpora, namely OFFER AN EXPLANATION, REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION, ATTACK, PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE, and UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS. Whereas the remaining

three, viz. ABROGATION, OPT OUT ON RECORD, and THIRD PARTY RECOURSE, are used with variable frequencies in the Iraqi corpus but are non-existent in the present PMQs corpus.

Moreover, the analysis revealed a variation in the occurrences of the counter-impoliteness strategies which are employed by the Iraqi and British politicians. The strategy ATTACK is the most frequent in both corpora, compared to other strategies in each data set. The remaining counter-impoliteness strategies occur in the following descending order in the Iraqi corpus: OFFER AN EXPLANATION, REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION, PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE, ABROGATION, UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS, THIRD PARTY RECOURSE, and OPT OUT ON RECORD. Whereas the descending order for the strategies in the British PMQs corpus is as follows: PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE, OFFER AN EXPLANATION, REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION, and UNDERSTATE THE IMPOLITENESS.

The current research has argued that the absence and/or the variation in the occurrence of particular counter-impoliteness strategies in each corpus relates to the effect of the defensive/offensive nature of these strategies on relevant politicians' political power. Building on Culpeper et al.'s (2003) perspective, this research assumes that particular counter impoliteness strategies are primarily defensive in nature while others are mainly defensive. Depending on a politicians' respective power and the objective of the parliamentary practice, defensive and/or offensive strategies may either weaken or restore/strengthen relevant politicians' political position/power. When a particular counter-impoliteness strategy weakens politicians' power, i.e. when face loss risks are high, then the strategy is either excluded or used cautiously and/or infrequently. Conversely, when a counter-impoliteness strategy has the potential to restore and/or strengthen politicians' political power, i.e. when face loss risks are low and face enhancement chances are high, then politicians opt for such a strategy.

Accordingly, my findings show that Iraqi Ministers employ OFFER AN EXPLANATION and REBUT/DIRECT CONTRADICTION more frequently than the British Prime Minister, as these defensive strategies maximise their chances to disprove the allegation set against them; hence, these strategies restore their face. On the other hand, the extensive use of these defensive strategies may weaken a British Prime Minister's relatively stronger political power, i.e. face loss risks are high; hence, the lower frequency of these counter-impoliteness strategies in the current PMQs corpus.

My results have also shown that the strategy PROMOTE POSITIVE FACE is more frequently used by British than Iraqi parliamentarians. The higher occurrence of this primarily defensive strategy in the current PMQs corpus is ascribed to its secondary function of attacking a rival's face, i.e. when the Prime Minister promotes his/her government's achievements, he/she is simultaneously attacking the Opposition's face for not accomplishing similar achievements. The relatively low frequency of this defence strategy in the Iraqi parliamentary interrogations may be attributed to institutional conventions of brevity and efficacy and/or to a cultural tendency for humbleness/modesty, which is religiously rooted in the Iraqi society.

As mentioned above, my findings have illustrated that the strategy ATTACK is the most frequently used in both the Iraqi and British corpora compared to other countermoves. In both parliaments, the strategy ATTACK was performed by affecting rivals' FACE SENSITIVITIES and/or infringing their SOCIALITY RIGHTS. Within the ATTACK strategy, impoliteness types defined by affecting the questioners' FACE SENSITIVITIES have been more frequent than SOCIALITY RIGHTS-related impoliteness in both the Iraqi and the British parliaments. The tendency to counter ATTACK by affecting the FACE SENSITIVITIES of political rivals rather than infringing their SOCIALITY RIGHTS relates to the effectiveness of an ethos-based argument in political contexts. This result also

confirms the centrality of the notion of FACE in the communication/interpretation of impoliteness in parliamentary contexts, whether in initiation or response turns.

My findings have also shown that, within the counter strategy ATTACK, targeting rivals' PARTY FACE is more common in the British PMQs corpus compared to other manifestations of FACE. Whereas ATTACK PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE related impoliteness is the most recurrent counter strategy in the Iraqi corpus, and no PARTY FACE related impoliteness is used by the Iraqi questionees. It was suggested that these particular results reflect the influence of the relevant government system, whether two-party or multi-party, on the type of FACE to be affected in communicating impoliteness.

Moreover, both the Iraqi and the British parliamentarians utilise PERSONAL FACE and SIGNIFICANT OTHERS' related impoliteness in response turns as well, as indicated in my findings. The recurrence of various manifestations of FACE SENSITIVITIES-related impoliteness in response turns also confirms my earlier argument of the need to adopt a multi-layered model of Face when tackling impoliteness in a political context. In contrast to my study, previous research of impoliteness in parliamentary discourse, such as Harris (2001), Bull & Wells (2012), and Murphy (2014), have not highlighted the complexity of Face in such contexts nor the importance of adopting a multi-layered model of Face to encompass it.

As stated earlier, my findings have demonstrated that Iraqi questionees/Ministers employ ABROGATION, OPT OUT ON RECORD, and THIRD PARTY RECOURSE, whereas the British Prime Minister does not utilise any of these counter-impoliteness strategies. I argued that these defensive strategies may jeopardise the Prime Minister's PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE to a great extent, hence their absence in the current PMQs corpus. On the other hand, Iraqi Ministers possess less executive power relative to that of the Prime Minister, therefore these defensive countermoves may not be very face damaging to them. Indeed, these counter strategies may be the best choice to avoid face loss, as these

strategies provide a departure/conclusion from the offensive situation, whether temporal or permanent.

Overall the analysis shows that the preference for specific counter-impoliteness strategies in each setting is also dependent on various contextual factors such as the relative political power of politicians' involved, the purpose of a given parliamentary practice, the effectiveness of particular argumentation styles and the system of structuring political parties in the Iraqi and British parliaments. As in the case of impoliteness strategies in initiating turns, the choice of counter-impoliteness strategies in responses reflects institution-specific aspects of the parliamentary context under discussion.

7.3 Methodological Conclusions and Limitations of the Research

The methodological contribution of this research has been the construction and modification of an analytical framework suited to the analysis of impoliteness in the discourse of the Iraqi parliamentary interrogations and the British PMQs sessions. The analytical framework was designed so as to unveil the nature of impoliteness in these two settings with respect to (1) the factors which underlie the communication/ interpretation of impoliteness, (2) the linguistic strategies employed by relevant parliamentarians to convey impoliteness, (3) the range of counter-impoliteness strategies in these two settings.

Following an approach that is both theory- and data-driven, the researcher designed a framework comprising elements from Bull et al.'s (1996), Spencer-Oatey's (2008), Culpeper's (2011a), Harris' (2001), Bull & Wells' (2012) , Culpeper's (1996), Culpeper et al.'s (2003), and Bousfield's (2007) theory contributions to conduct a comparative analysis of the three aspects of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliamentary corpus.

The integrated analytical framework falls into three main parts in accordance with the dimensions of impoliteness being investigated here. The first part of the framework comprises arguments/conceptualisations/structures from Bull et al.'s (1996), Spencer-Oatey's (2008), and Culpeper's (2011a). This part was designed and operationalised to unveil

the factors which underlie the interpretation of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments. Originally, Spencer-Oatey's (2008) rapport management model was intended to address this aspect of the investigation. Spencer-Oatey's (2008) was selected for its theoretical modifications, empirical validation, and the deployment of cross-cultural data. The theoretical modifications intended here include the adjustments Spencer-Oatey made on Brown & Levinson's (1987) aspects of face, viz. negative and positive face. Positive face modification signals the recognition of three levels of face concerns, i.e. an individual's desire of approval should extend to include three levels of self-representation: personal, collective, and relational. Negative face modification is manifested through re-categorising the notion of freedom of action and imposition as part of sociality rights and obligations.

However, Spencer-Oatey's (2008) Face levels were problematic in terms of its application in the parliamentary context. The difficulty lies in the confusion and intersection among Spencer-Oatey's (2008) collective and relational face when applied in the current parliamentary context. According to Spencer-Oatey (2008), collective face signifies "the membership to larger, impersonal groups" (Brewer & Gardner, 1996:83) whereas relational face refers to "interpersonal relationships and interdependence with specific others" (Brewer & Gardner, 1996:83). Considering the methodology adopted in the current research to collect data, viz. pre-existing videos of naturally occurring parliamentary discourse, it would have been difficult to differentiate whether a politician has a personalised attachment with members of his/her own party and/or other politicians or not.

To resolve this methodological challenge, the researcher adopted Bull et al.'s (1996) mulit-dimensional conceptualisation of face which is more relevant to the context of the current research as it was specifically designed for a political setting, i.e. political interviews. Namely, Bull et al.'s (1996) recognises three types of face within a political interview: personal political face which signifies the attributes that individuate the politicians from others; party face in which a member stands as representative of the party; significant others'

face which signifies a relation with members of the same party or with political allies or a friendly country or an electorate. However, in this research, I take significant others' face to signify a relation with significant (non-)political individuals only. Whereas the face of significant entities such a country, an institution, or a country have been categorised as OTHER (see Chapter Five, sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2).

Moreover, my binary data repoted an occurrence of impoliteness forms that are conventionally employed in non-institutional social interactions. These forms were not addressed in Bull et al.'s (1996), Spencer-Oatey's (2008) frameworks. These attacks to face have been accounted for by borrowing from Culpeper's (2011a) list of conventionalised impoliteness formulae.

In addition, the current research also has discarded examining the impact of Spencer-Oatey's (2008) interactional goals on defining impoliteness as having access/ knowledge to such goals is not feasible considering the current research's data collection methodology.

Overall, the integration of the analytical frameworks, namely Bull et al.'s (1996), Spencer-Oatey's (2008), Culpeper's (2011a) theories, was successfully applied to reveal the factors that influence the communication/interpretation of impoliteness in the Iraqi and British parliaments. Spencer-Oatey's (2008) rapport management model, in particular, has enabled the current research to differentiate between impoliteness arising from attacking the different manifestations of FACE and those ascribable to infringements of social and institutional expectations. However, some of Spencer-Oatey's (2008) categories posed a theoretical-methodological limitations for the current research.

These theoretical-methodological limitations mainly relate to categories Spencer-Oatey's (2008) designated to encompass social expectancies viz. SOCIALITY RIGHTS, except Autonomy and Imposition. The theoretical characterisation of EQUITY RIGHTS and ASSOCIATION RIGHTS categories is generic, unclear and impractical. This has created an overlap among particular categories, such as Involvement vs. Empathy and Cost Benefit

vs. Fairness and Reciprocity, in the categorisation process. The category Respect, for example, is so generic that it may include all instances of personal insults. In this case, what is regarded as infringing one's ASSOCIATION RIGHTS is also an attack at one's particular type of FACE SENSITIVITIES. To overcome this confusion, the researcher has resorted to participants' direct and indirect meta-pragmatic comments to identify and differentiate such categories. Despite this, further thought ought to be given to the categorisation of these notions in future studies.

Moreover, heavily relying on participants to specify and define the preconditions for such categories/notions may not be feasible in all contexts. The impoliteness meta-pragmatic comments has been very infrequent in the British parliament as indicated in my findings. The infrequency of impoliteness meta-pragmatic data in institutional settings, in particular parliamentary ones, highlights the inadequacy of such methodologies that rely on participants' understanding.

The second part of the integrated analytical framework has been constructed to explore the linguistic strategies employed in the Iraqi and the British parliaments. This framework comprises elements from Harris (2001),and Bull & Wells (2012). The strategies included in these studies successfully captured the linguistic resources employed in the current Iraqi and British parliamentary corpora. The third part of the analytical framework has been designed to determine the reaction of Iraqi and British politicians' reaction to impoliteness. This part of the framework, which incorporates counter-impoliteness strategies derived from Bull & Wells (2012), Culpeper et al. (2003), Culpeper (1996), and Bousfield (2007), has also been constructive to encompass the response patterns utilised in these two parliamentary practices.

One of the limitations of the present research relates to negligence of non-verbal language. In the current research, no systematic analysis has been conducted to examine politicians' non-verbal aspects and how it contributes to the communication/interpretation

of impoliteness in both settings. However, such forms of expression, such as body language, have not been completely ignored in the identification of impoliteness in the current research.

Further methodological limitations comprise various dimensions which mainly relate to securing and analysing the Iraqi parliamentary discourse. These methodological issues involve the difficulty of accessing parliamentary discourse in the Iraqi setting. From the start of the current research up to the time of writing, the official site of the Iraqi parliament did not provide means to download and save any of its parliamentary practices such as debates, interrogations or committee meetings. This predicament has forced the researcher to rely on the available parliamentary material uploaded on YouTube by personal users. This material was limited in range as it only included recordings of one type of parliamentary practices, namely parliamentary interrogations. Moreover, the sessions of these parliamentary interrogations are incomplete and interrupted at some points. Also, the official transcripts of such parliamentary practices are non-exhaustive and are often incomplete.

Another methodological challenge is the selection of an identical or similar parliamentary practice in both the Iraqi and British parliaments. Although the Iraqi parliamentary interrogations are similar to the British PMQs sessions in various significant aspects, yet these are not exactly identical. Perhaps, a more directly comparable practice in both parliaments would have been debates. However, these practices have only been made available very recently on the Iraqi parliament's official YouTube channel, but they are still not downloadable. As a result, the researcher opted for the best available possibility, which was to seek a high degree of similarity, rather than identicality, among the parliamentary practices to analyse in this research.

A further methodological restriction is the impossibility of accessing relevant Iraqi or British politicians for post analysis interviews or questionnaire. My findings would have been more grounded if this access was an option, as it would have allowed me to probe in

further detail the motivation behind the use of particular impoliteness and counter-impoliteness strategies in the Iraqi and British contexts.

An additional barrier is the lack of any relevant literature on Iraqi parliamentary discourse, whether rhetorical or linguistic. This has deprived me of a benchmark against which my findings could be compared or further explained for the sake of establishing a firmer theoretical and/or practical basis for the findings.

7.4   Recommendations for Further Research

The findings and the methodological limitations of the present study, provide the basis for conducting further research.

To redress the theoretical-methodological limitations related to the indefinite, indeterminate characterisation of Spencer-Oatey's (2008) SOCIALITY RIGHTS categories, impoliteness in a parliamentary context could be investigated by integrating the methodological framework with a further post-analysis interview or questionnaire. In these interviews and questionnaires, politicians may provide their understandings/ judgments on the findings, particularly on whether instances of FACE SENSITIVITIES- and SOCIALITY RIGHTS-related impoliteness constitute part of their understanding of what is parliamentary impoliteness. Although having access to parliamentarians through interviews or distributing questionnaires is realistically difficult, this may be facilitated by limiting the number of politicians to be involved. In these interviews and/or questionnaires, politicians may be asked to comment on the seriousness of the offence, the emotion it initiates, and how they would label the behaviour described in the interventions specified by the researcher. These dimensions are based on Culpeper (2011a:10).

Further possibilities for future research are to explore the interaction between presuppositions and conversational implicature in a parliamentary discourse with reference to impoliteness. My findings has revealed that presuppositions and implicatures may

corporate to enhance the gravity of the offence or vice versa. This could be either confirmed or refuted using further extensive, systematic empirical results.

Another aspect of impoliteness that is worthy of investigation in an Iraqi political/parliamentary and non-institutional discourse is impoliteness meta-discourse. It is believed, as shown through the findings, that these structures involve reference to folk and religious notions that shape the understanding of impoliteness in the Iraqi culture. One way to do so could be by collecting impoliteness material that involve the use of such meta-pragmatic comments using methodologies appropriate to the context under examination. Then this material may be used to uncover the bases of the impoliteness judgements by the participants'. In a society such as the Iraqi one, this may pin point which impoliteness judgements are religiously-based and which ones are socially-based. My findings has revealed that particular linguistic impoliteness incidents were judged as 'عيب'(meaning 'disgraceful') which is non-religious, while others have been judged as ' حرام ' (meaning 'not allowed by God'). Such a study may further identify what is impolite in the Iraqi culture, especially if conducted in various non-institutional contexts.

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Appendix A: Iraqi Corpus in an ELAN Window

Example 1: A Screen Shot of Al-Obaidi's Session in an ELAN Window

ELAN 5.2 — Elan Al-Obeidi.eaf

No	Type 1 : Arabic Text	Type 2 : English Translation	Type 3 : Linguistic Analysis
	Al-Karbouli Arabic	Al-Karbouli English	Al-Karbouli Analysis
39	كذابك(1FC-PI)) ((1FC-PI))والله العظيم كذاب. (1	liar by the Al-Mighty Allah (he is) a liar	
	Al-Obaidi Arabic	Al-Obaidi English	Al-Obaidi Analysis
40	احرم نفسك احترم نفسك. ((CISs-AT: 1FC-PI))((CISs-AT: 1FC-PI))	respect yourself respect yourself	this phrase may be regarded as a impoliteness metapragmatic comment in the Iraqi setting. In other words, this phrase/expression indicates that what was said or done is unacceptable and judged negatively. However, it is not only a descriptive judgement. The phrase is an imperative mood, it is a command/order. It is a conditional sentence that has the second part elipted. The full version would be: what you are saying/doing is irrespectful/unacceptable, respect yourself and stop it otherwise you will be insulted/disprespected. it is at the same time an insult as it implies you are not respectfull.
41	والله ماكو ساقط غيرشكلك((CISs-AT: 1FC-PI)) با كلب((CISs-AT: 1FC-PI))يافاسدين((CISs-AT: 1FC-PI))شوف ((CISs-AT: 1FC-PI))محد والله محد((CISs-AT: 1FC-PI)) مادمر العراق غير انتوهالاشكالات القذرة. ((CISs-AT: 1FC-PI))	wallah there is no saqit except your face you dog you corrupts no one look no one has destroyed Iraq but you disgusting faces	The recurrent use of the word " Allah" meaning God for swearing, to intensify and strengthen the truth value of his statements. In the Arab, and Islamic cultures, swearing with holy entities usually serves the function of enhancing the credibility of your words as it is believed that unlawfully swearing using Allah will bring punishment. Hence, it is risky to swear using Allah if you are not actually confident of the truth value of what your saying. Personal insults: saqit, dog, dirty faces. saqit means vile
42	ساقط((CISs-AT: 1FC-PI))كتاب((CISs-AT: 1FC-PI))سفلة((CISs-AT: 1FC-PI))ياساقطين((CISs-AT: 1FC-PI))ساقطين((CISs-AT: 1FC-PI))	depraved ones (you) vile/ immoral ones	ساقط= vile, immoral; سفلة=depraved
43	مبصص. يفلط وأنا أظل. كاعد مبصص. سيد رئيس . مجلس. النواب.	it is not acceptable that he continues assaulting	

Example 2: A Screen Shot of Al-Sudani's Session in an ELAN Window

ELAN 5.2 — Sudani 3:2.eaf

No	Type 1 : Arabic Text	Type 2 : Linguistic Analysis	Type 3 : English Translation
	Al-Sudani Arabic	Al-Sudani Analysis	Al-Sudani English
1	هذا الرجل حينما جاء إرتكب عدة أشياء خاطئة ومخالفة للقانون. ((CISs-AT:1SOFC)) ((CISs-EXP))	Reply to initiation 11 & question 1: The explanation is done through attacking the face of a significant other.	this man contravened several institutional regulations since helding the office
2	اول عمل قام به هو نقل مجموعة كبيرة من الموظفين من وزارة الكهرباء الى وزارة التجارة بدون علمنا ((CISs-EXP)). وموافقتنا والأرقام موجودة	Continuation of reply to initiation 11 & question 1: The explanation is done through attacking the face of a significant other.	the first thing is that he transferred many employees form the Ministry of Electricity to the Ministry of Trade without our knowledge nor consent
3	قام بإبتزاز الشركة العامة لتجارة الحبوب وبنى بيتا في العظيمة من ((CISs-EXP)). أموال الدولة وكلف بناء البيت مئة مليون دينار ((CISs-AT:1SOFC))	Continuation of reply to initiation 11 & question 1: The explanation is embedding an attack at a significant other.	moreover he balckmailed the State Company for Grain Trade and built an extravagant house using public funds
4	لدي وثائق عن هذا الرجل أنه كان يحاول إبرام العقود المباشرة. ((CISs-EXP)) ((CISs-AT:1SOFC))	Continuation of reply to initiation 11 & question 1: The explanation is embedding an attack at a significant other.	I have documents indicating his attempts to conclude direct contracts
5	إن أي تهديد صادر من أي جهة لم نبلغ به من قبل السيد عبد الهادي ولم يخبرني بشكل شفهي ولا بشكل مكتوب وكان يفترض به ان يعرف الأصول الحكومية ان يكتب أني تعرضت الى التهديد لكذا وكذا ولم يذكر هذه الأشياء إطلاقاً. ((CISs-EXP)) ((CISs-AT:1SOFC)) ((CISs-R/DC))	Continuation of reply to initiation 11 & question 1: rebut/ direct contradiction,	I have not been informed of any threat by mr Abdual Hadi (0.5) he did not inform me neither orally nor in ant written form ...
6	تذكرون عام2006 و2007 كان الوضع الأمني صعب وخطر جداً وهو حينما يأتي الي يقول تعرض لمحاولة إغتيال عدة مرات وأبني معوق. فأنا قلت له أعرض عليك عرض وبكل حسن نية فأ قلت ولا أقل هل تذهب الى الملحقيات التجارية التي ذكرها الأستاذ؟ وقال لي أنا مستعد للذهاب قلت له هذه أماكن بعيدة يجب ان تأخذ موافقة عائلتك لأن عائلتك سترافقك الى هذا المكان وأخذ موافقة عائلته وذهب الى الصين وهو مستشار تجاري.((CISs-R/DC))((CISs-EXP)) ((CISs-AT:1SOFC))	Continuation of reply to initiation 11 & question 1:	in 2006 and 2007 the security condition was very difficult and dangerous (0.5) he informed me that he had faced several assassination attempts (.) so I offered him a position in one of our commercial attache out of my good will ...
7	من صلاحية وزير التجارة ان يعين المستشارين والملحقين التجاريين وهذه صلاحية قانونية ثابتة ليس لوزير التجارة فقط وإنما لوزير الدفاع ولوزير التعليم العالي فامن. الصحة ان ينين المستشار التجاري أو الملحق	Continuation of reply to initiation 11 & question 1: rebuts/contradicts	

315

Example 3: A Screen Shot of Al-Isawi's Session in an ELAN Window

Appendix B: British Corpus in an ELAN Window

Example 1: A Screen Shot of Cameron & Miliband Session in an ELAN Window

Example 2: A Screen Shot of Cameron & Corbyn Session in an ELAN Window

Appendix C: Category Search in ELAN

Example 1: A Screen Shot of 1SOFC Frequency Search in the Iraqi Corpus Using ELAN

Example 2: A Screen Shot of CISs-EXP Frequency Search in the British Corpus Using ELAN

Appendix D: Frequency Measurements

Example 1: Calculating the Distribution of the Linguistic Impoliteness
Strategies in the Iraqi Corpus

<table>
<tr><td colspan="3">The Frequency of Occurrence for the Linguistic Impoliteness
Strategies in the Iraqi Corpus</td></tr>
<tr><td>Category</td><td>Frequency</td><td>Relative Frequency</td></tr>
<tr><td>**PREFACE ((ISs-PRF))**</td><td>91</td><td>(91/216*100)
=42.13%</td></tr>
<tr><td>**DETAILED QUESTION ((ISs-DQ))**</td><td>37</td><td>(37/216*100)
=17.13%</td></tr>
<tr><td>**CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION
((ISs-CPS))**</td><td>34</td><td>(34/216*100)
=15.74%</td></tr>
<tr><td>**CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE
((ISs-CIM))**</td><td>49</td><td>(49/216*100)
=22.68%</td></tr>
<tr><td>**CONFLICTUAL QUESTION
((ISs-CFQ))**</td><td>5</td><td>(5/216*100)
=2.31%</td></tr>
<tr><td>Total=</td><td>216</td><td></td></tr>
</table>

Example 2: Calculating the Distribution of the Linguistic Impoliteness Strategies in the British Corpus

Category	Words	Word Percentage
The Frequency of Word Percentage for the Linguistic Impoliteness Strategies in the British Corpus		
PREFACE ((ISs-PRF))	4817	(4817/8125*100) =59.29%
DETAILED QUESTION ((ISs-DQ))	100	(37/8125*100) =1.23%
CONTENTIOUS PRESUPPOSITION ((ISs-CPS))	1046	(34/8125*100) =12.87%
CONTENTIOUS IMPLICATURE ((ISs-CIM))	720	(49/8125*100) =8.86%
CONFLICTUAL QUESTION ((ISs-CFQ))	624	(624/8125*100) =7.68%
INVITATION TO PERFORM FTA ((ISs-PFTA))	621	(621/8125*100) =7.64%
METALANGUAGE OF Q&A ((ISs-MQA))	197	(197/8125*100) =2.42%
Total=	8125	

Appendix E: Conventionalised Impoliteness Formulae in the Iraqi Corpus

1) Personal Insults

A. Idiomatic Insults

1. [تخسأ شاربك اذا اني ادمرها والله]

The utterance 'تخسأ شاربك' is an idiomatic linguistic structure used as a powerful insult to accompany, and/or counter an offensive expression in Iraqi Arabic. The noun 'شارب' denotes 'moustache', and the verb 'تخسأ' here could mean 'shame on'. Thus, the utterance literally could mean 'shame on your moustache'.

Pragmatically, it signifies that what has been said, namely the offensive expression, is completely, utterly not true. In other words, the accuser, viz. the utterer of the offensive expression, is initially in a weak position in terms of launching the accusation in the offensive expression because he stands as a more likely suspect for it. Whereas whoever uses the phrase 'تخسأ شاربك' to counter the offensive attack has the upper hand. Moreover, the phrase 'تخسأ شاربك' also reflects a degrading, demeaning tone to the addressee since it involves the noun 'شارب' which denotes moustache that in turn symbolises manhood in the Arab culture. Hence, the phrase may mean something as 'how dare you utter such nonsense, you are not man enough to utter such lies'. It is mainly used in settings that preserve traditional Arab traditions and it is exclusively employed in male contexts. The accusation is further intensified with the accompaniment of the word 'Allāh: الله' meaning God. In the Arab and Islamic cultures, the name of God, 'Allāh: الله', and His attributes, such as 'Alʿaḏīm: العظيم' meaning Al-Mighty, stand as the most frequent swearing structure, among other religious expressions, as it involves the most sacred entity in these cultures. Swearing with holy entities usually serves the function of enhancing, intensifying the credibility of one's statements as it is believed that falsely invoking

Allah as a witness will bring punishment. At last, the whole utterance may mean 'shame on you, how dare you say I destroy the military institution'.

2. [اطيح حظهم والله العظيم]

The personal insult in this utterance, viz. 'اطيح حظهم', is an idiomatic expression in Iraqi Arabic. The verb 'اطيح' denotes 'to overthrow' and the noun phrase 'حظهم' means 'their luck'. In Iraqi Arabic, the utterance means 'I will insult them immensely'. The insult is intensified with a double swearing structure, namely ' والله العظيم' meaning by the Al-Mighty God. The whole utterance means 'by the Al-Mighty Allāh I will insult them cruelly'.

B. Personalised Negative Reference

1. [والله العظيم مايكذب إلا شكلك]

In Arabic, the noun phrase 'شكلك' literally means 'your shape'. However, pragmatically it signifies 'your face'. Here the part, i.e. face, is used to refer to the whole, viz. the individual. In the Iraqi culture, usually such usage of the noun 'شكل' indicates a negative judgement. In other words, it is employed in a derogatory tone. Again the insult is intensified by the use of a double swearing structure, namely ' والله العظيم' meaning by the Al-Mighty God. The whole utterance means 'by the Al-Mighty Allāh no one lies except your revolting, repulsive face'.

2. [والله ماكو ساقط غيرشكلك]

The personal insult in this utterance involves the use of the word 'ساقط' meaning vile, immoral. In addition, it also includes the use of the derogatory noun phrase 'شكلك' meaning your dirty face. The insult is again intensified with the swearing by Allāh structure. The utterance translates to 'by Allāh there's no one immoral except your revolting face'.

3. [شوف محد والله محد ما دمر العراق غير انتو هالاشكالات القذرة]

The personal insult in this utterance manifests the plural form of the noun 'شكل', viz. 'اشكال' which also connotes a derogatory tone. Moreover, the negative judgement

embedded in the noun 'شكل', meaning 'face', is made explicit through a post modification, namely by describing the face as ''dirty''. The utterance means 'look no one by Allāh no one has destroyed Iraq except your dirty faces'.

C. Personalised Negative Vocatives

1. ['يا كلب', meaning 'you dog'] , ['يا فاسدين', meaning 'you corrupts'] , ['سفلة', is the plural form of 'سافل' meaning '(you) depraved ones'] , ['ساقطين' is the plural form of 'ساقط', meaning '(you) vile/ immoral ones'], ['يا ساقطين' meaning 'you viles/immorals'].

D. Personalised Negative Assertions

1. [كذاب والله العظيم كذاب].

The personal insult here involves the noun 'كذاب' meaning 'liar'. The offence is intensified both through repetition of the noun 'كذاب' and the insertion of the double swearing structure, namely 'والله العظيم' meaning by the Al-Mighty God. The utterance translates as '(he is) a liar by the Al-Mighty Allāh (he is) a liar'.

2) Threats

1. [لو يحترمون نفسهم لو ارد عليهم رد اطيح حظهم والله العظيم] , [احترم نفسك احترم نفسك].

In Iraqi Arabic, the utterance 'احترم نفسك' meaning 'respect yourself' may be regarded as a threat when uttered as a counter-response to an offensive expression. In other words, the utterance in question is a clear-cut that impoliteness is actualised, i.e. it used to express a negative judgement. Grammatically speaking, the utterance consists of the verb 'احترم' which is in the imperative mood, an implied subject 'you', an object 'yourself'. Pragmatically, the utterance means 'what you are saying/doing is disrespectful/unacceptable, respect yourself and stop it'. Moreover, the repetition of the utterance adds more intensity to the offense.

The second utterance to instantiate threats in the Iraqi setting is a conditional structure that is common in Iraqi Arabic. The conditional structure is composed of two parts, viz. independent clauses, introduced by the particle 'لو' meaning 'if'. The

particle 'لو' is systematically used to express conditional propositions in standard Arabic however, it only introduces the first independent clause in such contexts. In contrast to standard Arabic usage of 'لو', the Iraqi Arabic conditional structure employs 'لو' in both of the independent clauses. In the present utterance, the first part comprises 'لو يحترمون نفسهم' which translates into 'if they don't respect themselves/stop what they are saying ,…' or 'either they respect themselves/ stop what they are saying ,…' and the second independent clause is 'I will insult them back very cruelly'. Hence, the whole offensive expression here may translate into 'if they don't respect themselves/stop what they are saying, then by Al-Mighty Allāh I will insult them back very cruelly' or 'either they respect themselves/ stop what they are saying, or by the Al-Mighty Allāh I will insult them back very cruelly'.

3) Message Enforcers

1. [شوف محد والله محد ما دمر العراق غير انتو هالاشكالات القذرة].

The message enforcer here is the verb 'شوف' meaning 'look'.

Appendix F: Conventionalised Impoliteness Formulae in the British Corpus

1) Personal Insults

A. Third-Person Negative Direct Reference

this useless Prime Minister

like all bullies when the heat is really on he runs for cover

the truth is he is weak and despicable

I am looking at Alex Salmond's poodle

Everyone knows that he's running scared

there is only one there is only one person running scared of these debates and that is this

Prime Minister

chose to refer to the prime minister as chicken

he is running scared of these debates

he's frit

is prove he is not a chicken and rule that out

B. Third-Person Negative Indirect Reference

so let me ask him again why is he so chicken when it comes to the Greens?

when did he lose his nerve?

why is he chickening out of the debates with me?

why doesn't he show a bit more backbone?

why is he so frightened of debating the Green party?

why is he so scared?

If he had an ounce of courage, he would rule it out

2) Condescension

these are pathetic feeble excuses

what a despicable and weak thing to do

but it's frankly a pathetic excuse

what a <u>depressing spectacle</u>

    4) **Dismissal** as in "<u>for heaven's sake man, go!</u>"

Appendix G: Attacking the PERSONAL POLITICAL FACE of the Speaker in the Iraqi Corpus

An Example

01 Al-Obaidi: I have submitted a request to the speakership and the general
02   secretariat of the parliament (.) to postpone the interrogation when I was
03   abroad but it was rejected...and again when I returned from Washington
04   I requested a postponement but it was rejected disappointedly (.) by the
05   director of the parliament office**((2ARS-EM))** this is not acceptable in
06   institutional communication for a minister to be responded by a director. I
07   requested a postponement for a third time as the interrogation itself is
08   under consideration at the federal court hence the case should be
09   concluded then commence with the interrogation**((2EQRS-AI))**.
10 Mr. Speaker Al-Joubori: mr. minister the request was proposed at the council(.) and
11   it voted against the postponement …here I read the letter ((reads a script))
12 Al-Obaidi: there wasn't a vote (.) your speakership demanded to conduct the
13   interrogation straight **((1PPFCS))** … and I'm inshallah certain and honest
14   with you all (.)if I have accepted plenty of offers I wouldn't have been
15   interrogated (0.5) among such offers is rejecting the corruption in the food
16   of Iraqi soldiers and that is why we have this interrogation today
17   **((1PPFCS))**... this is only the tip of the iceberg my brothers members of
18   the parliament
19 Al-Fatlawi:the minister's statement included accusations against the parliament ... I
20   demand a clarification in order not to accuse the whole council …
21 Al-Obaidi: brothers inshallah I will be honest in all what I am saying. during the time
22   mrs representative Al-Fatlawi was interrogating me(.) some groups started
23   to strengthen their relations with me including businessmen and
24   disappointedly some parliamentarians
25   : …
26 Al-Obaidi: then I must say it is Mohammed Al-Karbouli **((1PPFC))**
27   : ((loud voices and clapping from members of the house))
28 Al-Karbouli: mr speaker you know at the time of the interrogation(.) we as a bloc used
29   to frequent him [...] no they must know (0.5) Itihad Al-Qiwa as a bloc was
30   standing with the current minister (.)at mr. Al-Nujayfi's house we agreed
31   to vote for him. this is what happened **((CISs-EXP))** but the talk of
32   contracts! (.)let him state if he ever has given me a contract or I have
33   negotiated with him over a contract let him speak among everyone
34   here**((CISs-R/DC))**. I have not spoken to him for five months because he
35   yesterday has kicked out my nephew from the ministry as if the institution
36   is a private property of him this is ayab this is ayab mr speaker
37 Al-Obaidi: no never I haven't given you any contracts and I will not give you any if I
38   ever have given you I wouldn't have been interrogated **((1PPFCS))**
39   : …
40 Al-Obaidi: mr Speaker I want to finish the rest of the story I want to finish it(.)you have
41   allowed me to start the story (.) let me finish it
42 Mr. Speaker Al-Joubori: no you are not allowed to proceed
43 Al-Obaidi: feeding the Iraqi army the Hummers contract the 1300 Hummers (0.5) the
44   armoured vehicles contract **((1PPFCS))** each one of these is a story
45   brothers...each one is a whole play
46 Mr. Speaker Al-Jabouri: what is being claimed now will all be investigated (.)the
47   initial understanding of these obscure accusations is that you were aware
48   of it hence you are an accomplice **((1PPFC))**
49 Al-Obaidi: I have never kept quiet about it and reported it.
50   : …
51 Al-Obaidi: mr Speaker if I was an accomplice (.) you wouldn't have sent me an

52	interrogation order **((1PPFCS))** ... <u>you seated me and brought Muthana</u>
53	<u>Al-Samarai trying to compromise the army feeding contracts</u> **((1PPFCS))**
54	<u>...they want to take the army feeding contract that is worth a trillion and</u>
55	<u>three billion</u> (0.5) <u>for their companies and supply the Iraqi soliders with</u>
56	<u>whatever quality food to earn and accumulate money</u> **((1PPFCS))**
57	**((1SOFC))** Muthana Al-Samarai the businessman, mr speaker and I were
58	sitting together and <u>both trying to convince me to pursue a political career</u>
59	<u>together in future</u> ... <u>this needs money and you mr minister have all the</u>
60	<u>money needed. I asked how? they said you own the ministry of Iraqi</u>
61	<u>defence</u> (.) <u>and the budget of the Iraqi state lies within your reach. at last</u>
62	<u>they told me to announce the Iraqi army feeding contract as a legal tender</u>
63	<u>and they will do the rest</u> **((1PPFCS)) ((1SOFC))**
64	they stated that I don't need to care about any interrogation and to run the
65	ministry as I wish and mr speaker will back me up...I swear by Al-Mighty
66	Allah this is what happened (0.5) <u>this is the respected mr Speaker</u>
67	**((1PPFCS))** <u>this is why I didn't want to attend this interrogation that is</u>
68	<u>led by him.</u> is this a Speaker of the house? **((1PPFCS))** <u>will the session be</u>
69	<u>impartial?</u> **((1PPFCS))** <u>will the voting be impartial?</u> **((1PPFCS))** ... <u>they</u>
70	<u>destroyed the military institution by forcing me to appoint corrupt and</u>
71	<u>worthless unqualified leaders officers</u> (.) <u>they brought major general Al-</u>
72	<u>Maksusy who was expelled for political reasons</u> (0.5) <u>insisting to appoint</u>
73	<u>in a very sensitive position because he is their friend</u> **((1PPFC))**. <u>I feel</u>
74	<u>ashamed as a representative of the Iraqi military institution to be</u>
75	<u>interrogated by such a corrupt person</u> **((1PPFCS))** if you all accept for the
76	military institution to be interrogated insulted in such a way then I will
77	resign!
78	: …

Appendix H: An Example of Mock by an MP in the British Parliament

[PMQs/20 Jan 2016-CC]

[Context- *The current extract revolves around Jeremy Corbyn's position on the renewal of Trident, the United Kingdom's nuclear programme. The Leader of the Opposition adopts a disarmament policy on defence which constitutes an area of disagreement between the ruling Conservative Party. Moreover, half of the Labour's shadow cabinet and the Trade unions oppose their Leader's policy on Trident. To accommodate this, Corbyn proposed a compromise that both maintains his position and protects defence jobs represented by the Trade union. Corbyn's proposition was to have Trident submarines and nuclear capabilities without nuclear missiles. In other words, to build the new submarines to be operating without the nuclear warheads. The extract also make reference to the Beatle's, a 1960s English rock and roll band, song and/or animated fantasy comedy film entitled Yellow Submarine and Back in the USSR. The Yellow Submarine, whether the song and/or the film, talks about an imaginative colourful under-the-sea world who are saved from evil powers via a group of singers, the Beatles, in a yellow submarine. The yellow submarine Beatles win over the evil powers and restore peace in the imaginative world armed with only love, music, and witty remark.*]

> **McCartney (Con)**: does my right honourable friend agree with me that our nuclear deterrent (.) only works against our nation's enemies if our nuclear submarines (.) are actually equipped with nuclear missiles (0.5)((laughter sounds)) <u>and that those such as the Leader of the Opposition who do not believe this have a defence policy inspired</u> by the Beatles' <u>Yellow Submarine</u> (.) **((1PPFC: MOCK))((IS-CIM))** and shows that while members opposite may twist and shout (.) their current leader certainly needs help? **((1PPFC))((IS-CIM))**

> **Cameron (PM, Con)**: I congratulate my honourable friend on his ingenious question(.) there is a comic element to sending submarines to sea without missiles in (0.5) but in fact it is absolutely serious because the deterrent has been on a cross-party basis (.)an absolutely key part of our defence and making sure we've got the ultimate insurance policy (.) which we support on this side and we should vote on in this house. <u>and all I can say when it comes to Beatles' songs is I suspect that the Leader of the Opposition prefers "Back in the USSR</u> ((laughter sounds)) **((CISs-AT: 1PPFC:MOCK))((IS-CIM))**

In the above extract, the Conservative backbencher McCartney attacks the Labour Party's, the Official Opposition, position on arming the Trident, i.e. the British nuclear programme. And in specific, he mocks the Opposition Leader's stance on Trident by creating an analogy with one of the Beatle's song, namely *Yellow Submarine*. The analogy aims to demonstrate that Corbyn's stance on Trident is impractical and can only be applicable in an imaginative world such as fiction films or songs. McCartney's attack at Corbyn serves another function, merely to pave the way for his Conservative Prime Minister, viz. Cameron, to initiate, and continue the attack at the Leader of the Opposition. Cameron ceases the chance, and in turn creates another mocking analogy using another song by the Beatles, i.e. *Back in the USSR*. The analogy is intended to allude to Corbyn's alleged sympathy for the Russians since the song itself was criticised as expressing the Beatles' supposed pro-Soviet sentiments.

Appendix I: Scripts of Iraqi Examples in Arabic

1) Extracts cited in Chapter Four: Methodology

Extract 1

العيساوي: هناك لجان عملت والعمل محال بنزاهة وكفاءة والعمل ينفذ، من غير المعقول نحن إما أن ندعم المشاريع أو لا. السبب أنا أعرفه في مشروع الرصافة، مشروع ماء الرصافة منجز حقيقي ولكن مع الأسف هناك أسباب لا أريد أن أذكرها لكي لا أفشل مهنية الإستجواب

الوائلي: السيد الأمين في نهاية كلامه يعطي كلام لا يليق بالجلسة ... وهذا كلام مدير دائرة متخصص ويقول إن نسبة الإنجاز هي ٤٨٪ والشيء الذي قاله الأمين هو تضليل

العيساوي: أنا لا أسمح لك بقول التضليل، إن معلوماتي كلها صحيح وأنت معلوماتك مجتزئة

الوائلي: أنا مستَجوبَكَ ومعلوماتي كلها صحيحة وأنت معلوماتك عبارة عن تصريحات إعلامية وإذا شربت بغداد ماء يوم ١١\١٠ فليأتوا ويعاتبوني ... نسبة تقدم العمل بالمشروع متلكئ وأصر عليها إنها ٤٨٪

Extract 3

الملا: قضية الاستجواب مرسومة في المادة (٥٨و٦١) من النظام الداخلي ولا لبس فيها ولا شك فيها... لدينا استجوابين فقط مع جل احترامي وتقديري أدت على أفضل ما يكون من قبل إخواننا في دولة القانون... هل من المسموح للكتل السياسية ان تجري استجواب؟ أم لا؟... السيد رئيس المجلس هل يحق لكتلة سياسية غير دولة القانون ان تمارس إستجواب؟ أم لا؟

السيد رئيس مجلس النواب النجيفي: طبعاً يحق للجميع

الملا: اذا يحق ضعوا الاستجواب على جدول الأعمال، لماذا التأخير ولا يستجوب؟ لا يحق لنائب آخر خارج إطار دولة القانون ان يمارس الاستجواب، لماذا؟

Extract 5

نصيف: وما هي علاقة ابنكم فنر الذي يقوم بتهديد الشركة ويطلب ومقاول شريكه بتنفيذ ٥٠% من أعمال المشروع؟ وإلا سوف يسحب العمل وقال للكوريين أن عملية طرد مدير الشركة الكورية وعدم إدخال الشركات الثانوية هي قرصة أذن للكوريين وهذه هي الشكوى التي قدمت من قبل الشركة الكورية موجودة

العبيدي: اتحدى ان تجيب او تظهر مايثبت علاقة ابني فنر بأي موضوع من هذا القبيل

Extract 9

العيساوي: ... تخويل السيد أمين بغداد صلاحية التعاقد المباشر مع الشركات المختصة الأجنبية لتنفيذ الأعمال المدرجة ضمن خطة إسناد ودعم أمانة بغداد، هذه خطة، وخطة مؤتمر القمة العربية، هذه خطتين وبأسلوب العرض الواحد) يعني عرض واحد، لا يوجد تنافس بين الشركات

الوائلي: انتهى الجواب، هذا نص قرار

العيساوي: هذا نص قرار داقراه خل اكمل

الوائلي: نعم هذا نص قرار

العيساوي: خل اكمل خل اكمله

السيد رئيس مجلس النواب النجيفي: استمر استمر

العيساوي: خل اكمله نص القرار خل اكمله مو هذا استجواب هذا مو استضافة. لازم تنطوني الحق والوقت اكمل.علمود اكلكم شنو الصلاحية

Extract 10

العلاق: من أصول الإستجواب كما ورد في النظام الداخلي في المادة التي تتعلق بالإستجواب، يجب أن لا تكون هناك دوافع شخصية أو مصالح خاصة في عملية الإستجواب ولما أثار السيد المستجوَب أن هناك دوافع شخصية وذكر أسماء معينة وجب التحقيق، الآن سقط حق المستجوِب. لحين إثبات عدم وجود دوافع شخصية

نصيف: حرام حرام والله حرام

Extract 11

الساعدي: على الوزارة عندما تجد شيئأ تالفا متكتلا غير مطابق للمواصفات حسب تعبير الوزارة يسموه من المواد الموقوفة غير مطابقة للمواصفات او غير صالح للاستهلاك البشري فبالتالي يجب على الوزارة ان ترجعه الى المستورد الذي تم الاستيراد منه مو توزعه عالمحافظات وتجري عمليات نقل

السوداني: هذا مايجوز هذا انا حقيقة جاوبت على السوال الي طرحه اما يعلق عليه انه همينه اعلق عليه بس هذا مو استجواب صار قضية اخرى يعني

Extract 13

الساعدي: الاعتراضات التي على الوزارة هي كالتالي النقطة الاولى لايجوز تحميل الحمولة الى مخازن الدولة مادامت متكتلة ثانيا لايجوز نقلها وانفاق اموال للنقل تسبب خسارة على المال العام ثالثا لايجوز بيعها الى وزارة اخرى بسعر دون المشترى به ورابعا تأخر وصول مواد البطاقة التموينية الى المواطنين. لمن انت تستورد كميات بهل العدد بهل الحجم هذا يطلع بيها فساد وعقد ثاني يطلع بيه فساد وعقد ثالث يطلع بيه فساد.... وعقد رابع يطلع بيه فساد والمواطن شيحصل؟ لو توصله البطاقة التموينية متأخرة او لاتوصله

السوداني: لذلك حقيقة ما اطلبه من الاخ ان يلتزم الحذر في القضية القانونية ولايحملنا اكثر من اللازم (.) احنا همينه جزء من الحكومة وننفذ القوانين

Extract 15

الوائلي: شكرا سيادة الرئيس ماهو وظيفة اخوان السيد الامين في الامانة؟ دورهم في الامانة؟

العيساوي: هذا السؤال حقيقة سبب لي شرخ في داخلي. اني اتمنى اذا عندك معلومات اني اكول ناس نزيهين مالهم علاقة بامانة بغداد

Extract 16

الساعدي: تم نقل المفتش العام السابق للوزارة عندما إكتشف عمليات الفساد التي تجري من قبل السيد أخو الوزير صباح حسن الذي يجري الكلام حوله... السيد المفتش العام بعد ان باشر في عمله بمعلومات تثبت تورط أخ السيد الوزير وهو صباح حسن في عمليات فساد في العقود ... ويتقاضون مبلغ الرشوة الذي سيكون اربعة ملايين دولار في الصفقة الواحدة ... والسيد المفتش العام يقول ومن جانبي تم مقابلة السيد أخ الوزير صباح حسن وأبلغته بهذه المعلومات ولكن بعد يومين إتصل بي أخ الوزير وقال لي أنت تريد ان تبتزنا بهذا الكلام حياتك بسكوتك وإلا نصفيك انت وعائلتك من الأفضل لك ان تقبل بالشيء الذي سيقوله لك السيد الوزير... وفي اليوم التالي أتصل بي السيد الوزير عبد الفلاح السوداني وعرض علي منصب مستشار تجاري في إحدى الدول التالية إما روسيا أو الصين أو اليابان... نحن نسأل السيد وزير التجارة الآن سؤال هل تعلم بهذه المعلومات؟ او لا تعلم

السوداني: هذا الرجل حينما جاء إرتكب عدة أشياء خاطئة ومخالفة للقانون ... واول عمل قام به هو نقل مجموعة كبيرة من الموظفين من وزارة الكهرباء الى وزارة التجارة بدون علمنا وموافقتنا... قام بإبتزاز الشركة العامة لتجارة الحبوب وبنى بيتاً في العطيفية من أموال الدولة وكلف بناء البيت مئة مليون دينار... إن أي تهديد صادر من أي جهة لم نبلغ به

332

من قبل السيد عبد الهادي ولم يخبرني بشكل شفهي ولا بشكل مكتوب...ولم يذكر هذه الأشياء إطلاقاً... تذكرون عام ٢٠٠٦ و ٢٠٠٧ كان الوضع الأمني صعب وخطر جداً وهو يقول تعرضت لمحاولة إغتيال فأنا قلت له أعرض عليك عرض وبكل حسن نية لا أكثر ولا أقل هل تذهب الى الملحقيات التجارية التي ذكرها الأستاذ؟

Extract 18

الوائلي: أول مرة على أي شركة أحلت؟ العقد موقع من قبل من ؟

العيساوي: المقاولون العرب وشركة الغري

الوائلي: شركة الغري شركة وهمية غير مسجلة لعراقي اسمه عصام حيدر هذه الأوراق من الأمين إعطاني إياها. مؤسسة بـ ٢٠٠٨ وهي شركة صيرفة واسهم وبيع عقارات. هذه الشركة في تقرير الأمانة الإحالة على المقاولين العرب وشركة المقاولين العرب غير موجودة وسأثبت بالوثائق ووقع الغري فقط على هذا العقد لشركة غير متخصصة وغير مسجلة وهذه الكتب الرسمية

العيساوي: أحيلت إلى شركة المقاولون العرب شراكة مع شركة الغري على أن تكون في عقد المشاركة شركة المقاولون العرب هي قائد العمل يعني هذا مقاول ثانوي. والسيد شيروان الوائلي كتب إلى وزارة الخارجية وبالتنسيق مع المفتش العام لوزارة الخارجية لبيان صحة صدور هذه الوثائق والشراكة وجاءت صحة صدور هذه الوثائق والشراكة وهذه موجودة الوثيقة من وزارة الخارجية صحة صدور وثيقة بأن شركة المقاولين العرب شركة مصرية وشراكتها حقيقية مع شركة الغري والمقاولون هي قائد الشركة، هذه من وزارة الخارجية ومن مكتب المفتش العام

Extract 20

الوائلي: السؤال ما هو الأساس الذي إعتمدته الأمانة في الإحالة؟ وهل إعتمدت العمالة التركية الماهرة والمؤمن عليها لأن شروط العقد تقول ذلك؟ وما هي ملائمة الشركة وخبرتها؟ ولماذا تلكأ العمل رغم التسهيلات الواسعة التي تم التجاوز بها على القوانين والتعليمات السيد الأمين يجيب بنفس الطريقة لا أعتقد أحتاج الجواب لأنه سوف يقول أيضاً هذا قرار مجلس الوزراء

Extract 22

نصيف: السيد الوزير صرف ٢٧٩مليون دينار لتأهيل دور خارج الضوابط القانونية، لكون هذا الدور غير عائدة لوزارة الدفاع...السيد الوزير قام بتأهيل وصيانة دار ضيافة وزير الدفاع بـ٦٠ مليوناً .تأهيل دار ضيافة وزير الدفاع مرة أخرى بـ٣١ مليون دينار .تجهيز عمل كامرات ٩ ملايين، تبريد ٥ ملايين تأهيل منزل السيد الوزير ...صرف عليه ٢١ مليون دينار .تأهيل دارين لأمين السر العام بـ٧٠ مليوناً، تأثيث دار سكن ٧٤ مليوناً مجموع ما صرفه الوزير في تأهيل دور ليس ملكاً له، وليس ملكاً لوزارة الدفاع، صرف عليها ٢٧٩ مليوناً، وهذه أوامر الصرف لكل البيوت التي أهلها، هذا هدر بالمال العام، هذه مخالفة للضوابط أم لا؟

العبيدي: طبعاً الدور المخصصة هي فعلاً للأمانة العامة ولكنُ خصصت بكتب رسمية من الأمانةً العامة لمجلس الوزراء وعندما يخصص الدار فمن حق الوزارة .أن تصرف عليه دار ضيافتي وأنا إستأجرته من الأمانة العامة وأتحدى إن كان أحد قد صرف عليه ديناراً واحداً كلها من جيبي الشخصي أبداً وإذا يوجد ما يثبت فأرجو إحالة هذا الموضوع للتحقيق

Extract 24

الساعدي: ... نحن نسأل السيد وزير التجارة الآن سؤال هل تعلم بهذه المعلومات؟ او لا تعلم

السوداني: هذا الرجل حينما جاء إرتكب عدة أشياء خاطئة ومخالفة للقانون ... واول عمل قام به هو نقل مجموعة كبيرة من الموظفين من وزارة الكهرباء الى وزارة التجارة بدون علمنا وموافقتنا... قام بإبتزاز الشركة العامة لتجارة الحبوب وبنى بيتاً في العطيفية من أموال الدولة وكلف بناء البيت مئة مليون دينار... إن أي تهديد صادر من أي جهة لم نبلغ به من قبل السيد عبد الهادي ولم يخبرني بشكل شفهي ولا بشكل مكتوب...ولم يذكر هذه الأشياء إطلاقاً... تذكرون عام ٢٠٠٦ و ٢٠٠٧ كان الوضع الأمني صعب وخطر جداً وهو يقول تعرضت لمحاولة إغتيال فأنا قلت له أعرض عليك عرض وبكل حسن نية لا أكثر ولا أقل هل تذهب الى الملحقيات التجارية التي ذكرها الأستاذ

الساعدي:السيد الوزير يقول إبتز الشركة العامة لتجارة المواد وبنى بيت بـ ١٠٠ مليون دينار فأي بيت يبنى في بغداد بـ ١٠٠ مليون ... ويقول هو أبتز وهو بنى من الفساد، هل تكافئ هذا الشخص وتجعله إستشاري حتى يذهب ويفسد الناس؟ أنت تكافئه بدلاً من ان تأتي به وتحقق معه وتذهب به الى النزاهة تجعله مستشار تجاري ؟

Extract 28

الساعدي: ان السيد الوزيريتستر على الفاسدين هذا كتاب السيد الوزير وزير التجارة الى محكمة السماوة سري وشخصي وعاجل جدا ... نود اعلامكم عدم الموافقة على إحالة المتهمين المدرجة أسمائهم ادناه قيس نصيب محمد حنون الشحماني

السوداني: الحقيقة هاذي قضية الان امام القضاء والتدخل بيها بهذه الطريقة حقيقة يشوه مسألة القضاء احنا بالنسبة النا كوزارة عدنا موظفين اجت عليهم عمليات القاء قبض ... ثم بعدين بعثت النا نفس المحكمة محكمة السماوة بعثت النا طلب موقف مرجع... او يجري التحقيق الاداري اللازم قبل ان يشوف هذولي لازم يحيلهم للمحكمة او مايحيلهم وهذا ماني اتخذته

Extract 30

الوائلي: مدير عقود الامانة أيضاً موظف بنفس شركة السيد الوكيل المجموعة نفسها مدير القانونية ومدير العقود والذين هم موظفين في شركة الصمود ... مدير العقود السيد عادل إبراهيم عوقب من قبل الأمانة ١٠ مرات بقضايا تحقيقية

العيساوي: ذكرت أنت أنه كان موظف بالصمود، اعطني دليل انه موظف في الصمود، هذه المعلومة غير دقيقة وغير صحيحة ١٠٠ %...وذكر أنه موظف في الصمود وهو ليس موظف في الصمود ويباريت يعطينا أي أمر من الأوامر الإدارية التي تثبت إن الموظف عادل هو موظف في الصمود. توجد ملاحظة ثانية انه غير تابع للوكيل الإداري مثل ما ذكر السيد النائب، أبداً غير تابع للوكيل الإداري، قسم العقود وقسم الرقابة والتدقيق مرتبطة بي مباشرة لأنها جهات رقابية

Extract 32

العبيدي: أجاني النائب محمد الكربولي وقال لي توجد ١٣٠٠ همر في ولاية تكساس الأمريكية وهي رخيصة ومناسبة ويمكن أن تفيد الجيش العراقي وبصراحة قلت له نعم سعرها مناسب فعلاً لأنه الهمر لدينا بحدود ٣٦٠ ألف سعرها مع السلاح الموضوع يجب أن أتحرى عن هذه الهمرات ويجب أن اسأل طبعاً دققنا مع الأمريكان في مكتب التعاون الأمني عندما نسألهم كانوا يضحكون على هذه المعلومة ومن ثم من خلال العلاقات وملحقتينا الموجودة أرسلنا أشخاص وتبين أن العجلات مستوى التصفيح كان ليس بالمستوى المطلوب وسعرها لا يتجاوز ٦٠ألف دولار المفترض انه نحن نشتريها بسعر ١٢٤ ألف دولار من الشركة الأمريكية المصنعة نحسبها نحن بسعر ٣٦٠ألف دولار حقل وهذه الصفقة والله العظيم يأتيني محمد الكربولي ويقول لي أنها صفقة السيد الرئيس ويومياً يسألني

الكربولي: والله العظيم كذاب كذاب

( )

العبيدي: عليها والله العظيم مايكذب إلا شكلك والله العظيم مايكذب إلا شكلك

( )

العبيدي:احترم نفسك احترم نفسك

( )

العبيدي: شوف محد والله محد مادمر العراق غير انتو هالاشكالات القذرة يافاسدين يا كلب والله ماكو ساقط غيرشكلك

( )

العبيدي: كلاب ساقط سفلة ياساقطين ساقطين

( )

العبيدي: ميصير يغلط وأنا أظل كاعد ميصير, سيد رئيس مجلس النواب لو يحترمون نفسهم لو ارد عليهم رد اطيح حظهم والله العظيم ميصير هذا الكلام.

Extract 34

الوائلي: . أنا اسأل عن تعيين السيد (موسى دشر) ما هو سنده القانوني؟ وما هي كفائته؟

العيساوي: ... حقيقة كانت هناك شكوك بأن وثيقة السيد (موسى) مزورة مرتين إلى الجامعة نطلب صحة صدور وفي كل مرة يأتي الجواب بأن الشهادة صحيحة قبل السنة وستة أشهر بمعاون عميد الكلية المذكورة وأنا تابعت موضوعه شخصياً وأحضر لي السيد معاون عميد الكلية المذكورة باليد بأن شهادة السيد (موسى) مزورة وعلى أثر ذلك أنا كتبت هامش على ظهر الشهادة وطلبت تحقيق من قبل مكتب المفتش العام وصار هناك تنسيق بين مكتب المفتش العام في أمانة بغداد ومكتب المفتش العام في وزارة التعليم العالي وتم تثبيت التزوير وتم عزلة من الوظيفة وهو الآن ليس في المنصب وسحب كل الامتيازات وأحالته إلى القضاء وهذا أنجاز يحسب إلى أمانة بغداد

Extract 36

الساعدي: ذكر السيد الوزير فيما يتعلق بموضوع الإجتثاث أن هنالك كتب متعددة وردت إليه بخصوص إجتثاث محمد حنون الشحماني لكن الكتاب الرئيسي الموجود بين أيدينا والذي لا يوجد غيره هو الذي صدر من الهيأة الوطنية العليا لإجتثاث البعث. الكتاب واضح الدلالة بأن السيد محمد حنون الشحماني مشمول بإجراءات الإجتثاث ولا يمكن بأي حال من الأحوال لأي وزير كان ان يتجاوز إجراءات القانون ويبقي المشمول بإجراءات الإجتثاث في وزارته ونقله من وزارة التربية الى وزارة التجارة بعد ان تعين أو أصبح وزير التربية وزيراً للتجارة

السوداني: بالنسبة الى قضية الإجتثاث، الكتاب الذي ذكره المستجوب هو كتاب صدر قبل ان أتولى منصب وزير التجارة وقد قدر في الشهر الرابع لسنة ٢٠٠٥ وأنا لم أتعين وزير أصلاً

Extract 37

الساعدي: ... هو ما ورد في الصفحة ٣ ٣ يقول تم تحويل مبلغين ... احدهما ١٨ مليون دولار والاخر ٢٧ مليون دولار بتأريخ ٣١\١٠\٢٠٠٨ على التوالي ولم تتعرف الوزارة على الجهة التي تم تحويل المبلغ اليها والغاية من المبلغ

السوداني: ديوان الرقابة المالية يسوي ملاحظات وهاي الملاحظات تجي لكل الوزارات والوزارات تجاوب عليها بكل شفافية اكو امور احنا نطالب بتصحيحها اكو امور تحتاج تدقيق ومراجعة . اما الوزير مسئول عن هذا الدولار راح وين؟ وذاك الدولار وين اجه؟ هذه قضية تفصيلية حقيقة

الساعدي: القضية خطيرة وليست بهذا التبسيط

Extract 39

السوداني:... هذه الاشياء تحتاج الى دراسة تفصيلية انا اطلب ان نطلع عليها كوزارة تجارة ونجيب عليها انا ماعندي الان اجابة بالارقام لان ماعرف هذه الارقام المثارة امامي

Extract 40

الساعدي: الوزير قال بالنسبة الى إخوة الوزير الذين ذكر للقضاء بأنهم ليسوا من منتسبي الوزارة وقال ما نصه اذا رجعنا الى جلسة يوم أمس واذا كانوا حاصلين على هوية الوزارة هم غير منتسبين في الوزارة فلا أعرف وزارة التجارة تعطي هوية بمنصب سكرتير الوزير الى شخص هو غير منتسب، كيف يستخدم هذه الهوية؟ واين يستخدم هذه الهوية؟ بالتالي بدلاً من ان يجيب الوزير على السؤال زاد المشكلة إشكالاً والخرق القانوني خرقاً آخر

السوداني: ... المسألة الآن خاضعة الى القضاء والقضاء هو من يحقق في هذه الأشياء وهو الذي يتخذ القرار سواءً نحن صحيح أو غير صحيح وندعي أو لا ندعي فالقضاء سيثبت هذه الأشياء ونترك الأمر الى القضاء لأن القضية الآن لدى القضاء

335

2) Extract cited in Chapter Six: Discussion of Findings

Extract 1

السيد رئيس مجلس النواب النجيفي:...هذه طريقة لإثارة المشاكل داخل مجلس النواب، إذا كانت هناك جهة تريد تعطيل المجلس لتعلن عن هذا الموضوع ...أي أحد يحاول الخروج سنطبق عليه النظام أيضاً ونمنعه من الكلام أو نخرجه خارج القاعة، فيكفي هذا الموضوع، هذا ليس أسلوب

خالد غضبان: نحن حريصين جداً على أن يضطلع مجلس النواب بدوره الوطني والرقابي في تشريع القوانين، لذلك نريد للجلسات أن تستمر في أجواء موضوعية وبإدارة حيادية نزيهة لوحظ سيادة الرئيس وبصراحة أن حضرتك لا تعطي نفس الاهتمام للسادة الأعضاء النواب تُميز في إدارتك بين كتلة وكتلة أخرى ولا تعطيهم الحق الكامل في الحديث والتعبير عن آرائهم وهذه في الحقيقة ممارسة... وردَ في كلامك الأخير إشارة إلى كتلة معينة بأنها تستهدف تعطيل جلسات مجلس النواب وإرباك عمله وهذه أيضاً ملاحظة غير مقبولة على الإطلاق، هذه ملاحظة غير مقبولة نرجو شطبها من محضر جلسة هذا اليوم

Extract 2

العيساوي: الدعوة تمت من قبلي شخصياً الى شركة المقاولون بحضور القائم بالأعمال المصرية ونائب رئيس مجلس الإدارة وعضو مجلس الإدارة وممكن نسأل القائم بالأعمال المصري الحالي. هذه الدعوى التي صارت أما يختار شريك أو بقانون تنفيذ المقاولات والأخ مقاول يعرف العمل

الوائلي: منو المقاول؟منو المقاول؟ أنا مهندس وعسكري وضابط لم أطرق باب الأمانة في يوم من الأيام

العيساوي: انا اسف مو مقاول

Extract 3

العيساوي: ... هناك لجان عملت والعمل محال بنزاهة وكفاءة والعمل ينفذ، ،...، نحن إما أن ندعم المشاريع أو لا. السبب أنا أعرفه في مشروع الرصافة، مشروع ماء الرصافة منجز حقيقي ولكن مع الأسف هناك أسباب لا أريد أن أذكرها لكي لا أفشل مهنية الإستجواب.

الوائلي: ...السيد الأمين في نهاية كلامه يعطي كلام لا يليق بالجلسة فهو قال أن مشروع الرصافة مستهدف وأعلم لماذا؟ أنا لا أدري هذا الكلام لأني واعدت مجلس النواب والشعب العراقي بأن لا أتكلم إلا بوثائق وأرقام عرضت وسأعرض الباقي.

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الوائلي: ... وهذا تقرير سيادة الرئيس استلمته يوم أمس ...وهذا كلام مدير دائرة متخصص ويقول إنها (٤٨%) والشيء الذي قاله الأمين هو تضليلِ.

- العيساوي: أنا لا أسمح لك بقول التضليل، إن معلوماتي كلها صحيحة وأنت معلوماتك مجتزئة.

- الوائلي:أنا مستَجوبُكَ ومعلوماتي كلها صحيحة وأنت معلوماتك عبارة عن تصريحات إعلامية، وإذا شربت بغداد ماء يوم (١\١٠) فليأتوا ويعاتبوني... نسبة تقدم العمل بالمشروع متلكئ وأصر عليها إنها ٤٨%)...

العيساوي: أنا أؤكد أن مشروع الرصافة محال بنزاهة ومهنية والعمل يجري بشكل شفاف ووفق المواصفات العالمية المطلوبة ...، وكل المعلومات التي ذكرها غير دقيقة ومجتزئة. سيدي الرئيس أن هناك (١٦) نائباً من أعضاء مجلس النواب زاروا المشروع وكتبوا ملاحظاتهم وأنا أؤكد على شهادة أحدهم كونه ليس من حزبي وهو مهندس مدني مختص.....

- الوائلي:...هذه وثائق أن اللجنة الاقتصادية تخولك بـ(٦٣٣) وأنت تحيل (٩٦٥) أي بفرق (٣٠٠ مليون) دولار.. وأنا أعيد وأكرر أسلوب السيد الأمين هو تضليل وأنا أقدم أدلتي بوثائق.

336

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عزيزالعكيلي:سيدي الرئيس الاستجوابات مباركة وبها نستطيع أن نعرض أماكن الفساد والخلل ... نحن نطلب أن يكون السؤال والجواب مختصر ومركز ولدينا ملفات كثيرة على المُستَّجوب سوف نتركها للعراق.

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- الوائلي:سيدي الرئيس من يظهر الملفات يحتاج إلى الشجاعة والثقة بنفسه وإن (عزيز العكيلي) معروفه ملفاتَهُ.

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العيساوي: ... وأطلب شاهد من دولة القانون وبالتحديد من حزب الدعوة حمل لي رسالة من شخص يقول إن السيد شيروان الوائلي مصر على أستجوابك يقسم بالقرآن كشاهد أمامكم لماذا أصر النائب شيروان الوائلي ورفض أستضافة لجنة النزاهة النيابية وأنا مصر على هذا الشاهد في الجلسة القادمة.

الوائلي: ... ليس هناك بيننا خصومة شخصية وأنا أحترمك لكن نحن في موضوع أستجواب، أنت أجلب الشاهد وأنا لم أستهدفك شخصياً ولا توجد مصلحة ولا أريد أن أعتلي مكانك ....

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علي العلاق: ....السيد شيروان الوائلي قام بهذا الأستجواب بقرار شخصي ولم يكن مدفوعاً لا من حزب الدعوة ولا من دولة القانون مارس دوره كشخص عضو في مجلس ... وحزب الدعوة لم يدفع أحداً ولا قضية سياسية في هذا الأتجاه وعندما أثار أسم حزب الدعوة إما أن يطرح أسم الشخص الآخر الآن...أو يرفع الآن أسم حزب الدعوة أو دولة القانون ويقول شخص ما جاءني بمعلومة .

Appendix J: An Example of a PREFACE in the Iraqi Corpus

Interrogating the Minister of Defence Al-Obaidi [August, 2016)

نصيف : ... تلكؤ ومؤشرات فساد في المستشفى العام للقوات المسلحة والمتضمن الخروقات السابقة والحالية...مبلغ العقد ..
٢٩\٣\٢٠١٠ السيد الوزير مدد هذا العقد ووضع ملحقات له ومدده إلى ١٤٧مليون ونصف، مدة العقد ١٨ شهر تاريخ المباشرة
١٠٦٤ يوم أي ثلاث سنوات، الذي حصل في هذا العقد وسوف أوجهه بصيغة أسئلة، في شهر كانون الثاني ٢٠١٥ قمت بزيارة
المستشفى وقد شاهدت العمل متلكأ وشبه متوقف وأصدرت أمر بإستأخار الغرامات التأخيرية للشركة وعلى ضوء تأخيركم لهذه
الغرامات تم صرف مبلغ ما يقارب ٨ مليار ونصف وتأخير الغرامات ضمن صلاحية الوزير في حالة .وجود حسن النية من
المقاول في تنفيذ الأعمال إجراءاتكم عن عدم إلتزام الشركة في إنجاز الأعمال بناءً على تأخير الغرامات وصرف السلفة حيث
كانت نسبة الإنجاز من٥١\٦\١ أي من بداية إستلام السيد الوزير ولحد يوم الإستجواب هذا في فترة العشرة ٦٥% والـ١٤-
١٥نسبة الإنجاز ٢٪ السادة أعضاء مجلس النواب ٢٪ بالرغم من ان المقاول قد أعطى تعهد للوزارة بإكماله في٢٠١٥\٤\١٥ مما
يشير بإن قراركم بإستأخار الغرامات غير صحيح وغير دقيق ولم يكن مبني على أساس مصلحة الوزارة قمت بزيارة المستشفى
في٤\١٠\٢٠١٥ وأكيد رأيت العمل متوقف ولم تعمل أي إجراء قانوني تجاه المقاول فقط غيرت المهندس المقيم ومدير المستشفى
لأن المقاول وسوف أتكلم بالوثائق التي تخص المقاول بعد توقف الشركة وتلكؤها ولغاية هذا اليوم تم توجيهكم بتكليف المفتش
الفريق علي احسان برئاسة لجنة ضمت عدد من الأعضاء لغرض دراسة معوقات تنفيذ المشروع وتم عقد مجموعة من
الإجتماعات برئاسة هذا الفريق توصلت اللجنة إلى سحب العمل وتصفية الأعمال، ما هي أسباب تشكيل هذه اللجنة وكان الأجدر
المباشرة فوراً بتنفيذ الإجراءات القانونية الخاصة بسحب العمل وتصفية الأعمال وإتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية بعد مرور شهر من
إلغاء سحب العمل من اللجنة السابقة نفس اللجنة تشكلت برئاسة نفس الفريق وقررت هذه اللجنة بسحب قراراها الأول .بإيقاف
العمل وسحب خطاب الضمان وسحب وتصفية الأعمال .بعد زيارته للمستشفى في شهر حزيران ...