
T.G. Otte

'πόλεμος βίαιος διδάσκαλος'
Thucydides.¹

August 1914 turned the natural order in the historical profession upside down. Before then historians had sometimes taken an interest in war; now war took an interest in their scholarship. Until August 1914, most historians went about their business scarcely more aware of the British state than the average Edwardian citizen. They had been raised on a diet of constitutional history and churchmanship; and although there was an obvious political dimension to such matters, the state, especially also in its external aspects, was a distant entity, just as Britain was 'top nation' as if divinely so ordained.² After the lights went out all over Europe, historians found themselves in much closer proximity to the state than they might have thought possible, or indeed desirable, before 1914. A number of them, if not actually fighting at the front, were drafted into government propaganda departments or the various intelligence agencies that mushroomed as the war progressed. In 1923, after the glad confident Paris morning of liberal internationalism had given way to a gloomier, colder day, two of them commented on their and their colleagues' war-time endeavours with becoming self-deprecation. Their memoranda and other planning documents, they concluded, had made little impact except, perhaps, on ministerial wastepaper baskets: 'For M. Clemenceau history began in 1871, Mr. Lloyd George knew little history, and President Wilson ... expressed a hope that no reference would be made to the designs of the statesmen of Vienna [in 1815].³

That they were too modest about their achievements to be strictly accurate has been shown by recent scholarship. Whilst the role of historians prior to and during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the degree to which they succeeded - or failed - to shape decision-making have been examined in considerable depth and detail, the reverse of the coin has been given but the most cursory of glances. And yet the effect of the war on historical scholarship was profound. Not the least, it stimulated the final emergence of diplomatic history as a distinct field of academic research, led by scholars who had served in wartime intelligence. This interplay between academia and officialdom, the complex and reciprocal relationship between dons working for government and the effect of that experience on their scholarly pursuit after the war is the subject of what follows. Given the nature of this collection of essays, the focus will be largely on international historians and scholars of the nascent international relations discipline.  

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Britain went to war unprepared for what lay ahead. For British academia, especially scholars in the humanities, the war was a profound shock. For a generation or two, Germany – the Germany of Jena and Göttingen, of Heidelberg and Tübingen rather than the Potsdam parade ground – had been a beacon of excellence for the liberal intelligentsia. Many of them had made the obligatory pilgrimage to seats of learning in Germany, had taken a deep draught of Wagner’s heady brew, and followed German scholarship ever after. Now notions of Prussian militarism and German war-guilt seeped into historical and political consciousness. Historians, too, rallied to the flag. Drilled in close textual exegesis in *Select Charters and Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic*, and committed to 'scientific' methods and the idea of strict impartiality, they might not have been predestined for such a role. Few of them had any real


grasp of recent, let alone contemporary, history. It was, the President of the Royal Historical Society had noted ten years earlier, 'as if we regarded the year 1815 as bringing a great historical epoch to a close, but not as being the commencement of a new and equally important period.\textsuperscript{6}

The summer of 1914 shattered any such illusions of the nirvana of a never-ending present. Whatever their scholarly scruples or their remoteness from current affairs, historians took to writing about the conflict now unfolding on the continent. Indeed, the war reinforced a conviction that history somehow mattered, that insights derived from its study had vital practical significance. A.F. Pollard, Professor of Constitutional History at University College London and editor of \textit{History}, articulated this rediscovered sense of mission in the inaugural issue of that journal. It was to bring 'the light of history to bear on the study of politics', and to help to judge 'modern experiment by historical experience'.\textsuperscript{7}

Between 1914 and 1919 that light was shone through 'war histories', mostly in the shape of propaganda pamphlets, and through employment in Whitehall. These two branches of activity were entwined, and some historians contributed to both. As for propaganda, one prolific pamphleteer, F.J.C. Hearnshaw of King's College London, reflected after the war with a degree of contrition that it had been misguided and largely unsuccessful, and that '[t]o treat of it would be a painful and almost indecent task.'\textsuperscript{8} More recent generations of historians, unencumbered by such delicacy and gifted with a higher toleration of pain, have found in these literary productions a rich seam of material that helps to elucidate the shifting attitudes towards the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{6} G.W. Prothero, 'Presidential Address', \textit{Transactions of the Royal Historical Society} XVIII (1904), 12. Prothero had taken the trouble to discover whether recent history was taught in continental universities. It was!, see replies by Pflug-Hartung, 27 Jan., Boutmy, 29 Jan., and Fournier, 5 Feb. 1904, Prothero MSS, Royal Historical Society, PP2/III/4.
\bibitem{7} [A.F. Pollard], 'Editorial', \textit{History} I, 1 (1916), 3. His \textit{Thomas Cranmer and the English Reformation, 1489-1556} (London, 1905) and \textit{The Evolution of Parliament} (London, 1920) reflected the Whiggish constitutional and ecclesiastical predilections of the day.
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enemy powers and Britain's role in Europe. The most effective general statement of Britain's case, the case of liberal Edwardian England, against Germany and the Central Powers was made in *Why We Are at War*. Written by half-a-dozen Oxford historians and rushed into print by Clarendon Press in mid-September 1914, it went through seven imprints and two revisions before the middle of the following month and received wider dissemination still following its translation into several foreign languages. Some 120 pages long but with an even longer appendix, consisting of official documents published by the belligerent powers, the book inaugurated a series of further *Oxford Pamphlets*, and it set the tone of this type of literature.² It was the intention of the Oxford Six 'to set forth the causes of the present war, and the principles which we believe to be at stake.' For this task they had 'some experience in the handling of historic [sic] evidence, and we have endeavoured to treat the subject historically.' Indeed, weaned on the set texts of the *literae humaniores* or reared on Stubb's *Charters* if they were history graduates, the work was remarkable for its heavy reliance on the so-called 'colour books', collections of official documents published by the belligerent governments to justify their positions. Britain's commitment to France was accepted as axiomatic. In taking up arms to defend Belgium, meanwhile, 'we fight for the law of nations; that is, ultimately, for the peace of all nations and for the right of the weaker to exist.' More difficult to treat was the role of Russia, the war-time alliance with whom sat uneasily with pre-war sensibilities. Since 1890, the six Oxford historians averred, Russia had acted 'in close accord with the desires of national [Balkan] Slav sentiment.' They thus insinuated the essentially progressive character of Russian policy, a circumstance further underlined by the Tsar's apparent promise to re-establish an autonomous Poland after the war. Indeed, the post-1905 'new constitutional Russia of the Duma is Anglophil' and 'the beginnings of Russian constitutionalism not only coincided ... with the

Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, but owed much to the inspiration of England.' And although Russia was the first great power to mobilise in 1914, 'she took the step in consequence of German threats.'

There was considerable variation amongst the 'war histories' that followed where *Why We Are at War* had led. Not all of them strove to strike the same judicious tone. The book nevertheless established the broad parameters of public discourse on the war. Britain had to defend France and the smaller nations of Europe, whose rights had to be safeguarded. Russia was acknowledged, albeit often warily, as a civilised, quasi-Western power, whereas Germany had sloughed off the veneer of civilisation, and her innate militarism was identified as one of the root causes of the war. German belligerence, indeed, was treated as the outward manifestation of German philosophy. To that extent, observed one of its authors, H.W.C. Davis11, 'German political theory [was] a deeper cause of the European war.'12 The notion had taken hold of 'Harry' Davis, one of the foremost mediaevalists of the day. He interrupted his work editing Anglo-Norman charters and by the end of 1914 had produced a study on the political views of Heinrich von Treitschke, the principal exponent of ultra-nationalism amongst the German historical profession. Before the war, Treitschke, who had died in 1896, was respected for his scholarship. But his British colleagues had viewed his writings on political matters with the bemused aloofness of an amateur botanist observing the antics of some exotic beetle. '[A]n historian, however great, is not always a safe guide in politics', one of them had concluded in 1904.13 The war changed that; and, together with Friedrich Nietzsche and

10. *Why We Are at War*, 5, 14-5, 52, 56, and 79.

11. Henry William Carless Davis (1879-1928), ed. Weymouth, Balliol College; Fellow, All Souls, 1897-1902; Fellow, Balliol, 1902-21; vice-chairman War Trade Intelligence Department, 1915-19; acting Director, Department of Overseas Trade, 1919; Professor of History, Manchester, 1921-4; Regius Professor, Oxford, 1924-8; Fellow, Oriel, 1924-8.


Friedrich von Bernhardi, Treitschke became part of an unholy trinity, much referenced by British war-time pamphlets. The 'political philosophy which is now in vogue in Germany', wrote Davis, had been fertilised by his ideas. His study of Treitschke's *Politik* was an exercise in careful textual exegesis, and it was remarkable for eschewing any polemical asides against this super-Prussian from Saxony. In almost Rankean tones Davis explained that he had sought not to criticise but merely 'to explain how the thought of Treitschke was influenced by events of his own life time', and how and why his polemics 'referred directly or indirectly to current questions of German politics.'

While Davis had refrained from polemics, younger scholars were less inhibited. One of them was his fellow-Balliol historian Arnold J. Toynbee, whose *Nationality and the War* was avowedly political. A trained classicist, already as an undergraduate Toynbee had developed an interest in international politics, and more especially the affairs of the Near East and the Balkans. To his mind the war was the outcome of 'national questions'. Indeed, 'the riddle of Nationality [had] become an affair of life and death.' The book showed traces of Toynbee's later penchant for the epigrammatic: '[t]he living generation of Germans is suffering for a thousand years of history.' But in content and diction it was very much the product of Liberal, upper-class Edwardian England, combining concern for the principle of nationality, albeit not unadulterated, with a sublime confidence in the beneficent, for enlightened, force of the British Empire. Its five hundred-odd pages were an early indication of Toynbee's ability rapidly to

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15. Arnold Joseph Toynbee (1889-1975), ed, Balliol, 1907-11; Fellow of Balliol, 1912-15; Propaganda Bureau, 1915-18; Political Intelligence Department, 1918-9; Koraes Professor of Modern Greek and Byzantine history, King’s College, London, 1919-24; Literary Director, Chatham House, and Stevenson Research Professor, London School of Economics, 1924-54.

absorb vast amounts of material to produce a substantive piece of analysis. Three central strands of Toynbee's argument are worth noting. Berlin's decision to plunge Europe into war had been 'an immense mistake', but the 'only way to convince Germany [that peace was preferable] is to beat her badly and then to treat her well.' This meant allowing her 'to retain all openings for peaceable ... expansion afforded her by her [pre-war] oversea dominions.' The future of Alsace-Lorraine and Schleswig-Holstein had to be settled on basis of nationality and by means of plebiscites, while Germany herself ought to be reconstituted as 'a truly federal Empire' to break Prussia's hegemony over the country: 'Spare Germany by all means, but humiliate Prussia without restraint.'

As for Germany's ally, Toynbee stressed the 'extraordinary vitality' of the Habsburg Empire in defiance of nationality, but it could no longer be preserved. Territory would have to be ceded to Italy and Romania in deference to the nationality principle. But it was the 'secession of the Southern Slavs [that would] dislocate the structure of the Danubian Monarchy.' To achieve longer-term stability in the region Toynbee suggested a 'Balkan Zollverein', including Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Romania and the Southern Slavs. The Balkans had been 'a no-man's land', a power vacuum that had tempted the great powers 'to tear each other to pieces for the proprietorship of a wilderness.' In such a wilderness no peace could be made. An economic federation, however, 'will almost automatically develop into a defensive alliance.'

The corollary to the dissolution of Austria-Hungary was some form of Anschluss with a reconstituted, federal Germany. 1866 and 1814 would be wiped out. It also meant that the German population of Bohemia and Moravia 'cannot be abandoned to Tchech [sic] nationalism, enjoying power for the first time, and schooled, as a victim, in Austrian methods of using it.' Toynbee's analysis of the Czech problem was driven by the twin-insight that '[o]n the old political scale, Geography decreed that the Tchechs should be a nation; on the new economic


18. Ibid., 102, 137, 216, 242, 243-4. Toynbee also discussed at length the dismantling of Turkey, ibid., 379-448.
scale it has brigaded them inexorably with the German group.' The answer, then, was for all of rump-Austria to join Germany 'as a single unit, on condition that she grants Home Rule within this district [Bohemia and Moravia] to the whole Tchech nationality.' A new Germany, reconstituted along federal lines, and with the nationality principle used fairly as much to her advantage as to her detriment, was an indispensable part of any lasting post-war settlement. It was this that a future peace conference had to attempt, rather 'like the Vienna Congress a century ago.'

Toynbee's suggestions regarding an eventual peace settlement were by no means free from contradictions. While he wished for Germany to join the Allies in 'organising some international authority', he was vague on the nature of such a body. He stressed that 'we cannot simply deposit our document in some international "Ark of Covenant" and go our ways'; and that treaties were 'lifeless', unless administered by 'a living organ with executive power, ... with sovereign authority.' And yet he did not envisage this international body to have such powers; it had 'scrupulously [to] confine itself to the adjustment of the equilibrium between individual units, and to the apportionment among them of untenanted areas.'

Toynbee's idea of a post-war international organisation thus hovered somewhat uneasily between the old Concert of Europe and some League of Nations-type body. He was adamant, however, that Europe was at a crossroads. If the nations now at war succeeded in using the current crisis 'to liberate their energies for higher ends', then Europe might yet thrive. If they failed, 'the Sovereign Nations of Europe are doomed to the same destruction as the Sovereign Cities of Greece.' Like so often in contemporary commentary, Toynbee's war-time opus was a mixture of prophecy and fallacy. At the distance of over a hundred years his prognosis of China's rise is remarkable: 'The fundamental factor of world-politics will be the competition between China and the new

20.Ibid., 38, 489 and 494.
21.Ibid., 500.
commonwealths' that would emerge 'to preserve the Pacific from Chinese domination.' The suggestion that Russia would be 'the chief promoter' of this combination, by contrast, seems less surefooted.22

Toynbee's concluding reference to ancient Greece is instructive, for as an historian of antiquity and as a student of current affairs Toynbee was influenced by the classicist A.E. Zimmern.23 A tutor at New College, then the fountain-head of Greek studies, Zimmern had taught the undergraduate Toynbee, who found his lectures 'immensely stimulating; and I had a warm affection and regard for him as a friend.'24 Zimmern was a Hellenist, who believed in the benefits of a historical education. Those trained in the discipline were not 'ready with quick remedies for present difficulties: for history supplies no rules for the solution of her problems. But she has in store ... a more precious gift - eyes to see and understand and unshaken courage to face and master them.'25 What made Zimmern's lectures remarkable was his ability to connect the Graeco-Roman world with the present, without resorting to crude over-simplifications.26 The work for which he is best known, The Greek Commonwealth, was 'an attempt to make clear to myself what fifth-century Athens was really like.27 Indeed, it was infused with contemporary

22.Ibid. 333-4.

23.Alfred Eckhart Zimmern (1879-1957); ed. Winchester, New College, Oxford, Berlin; lecturer in ancient history, New College, 1903-4; fellow, New College, 1904-9; inspector with Board of Education, 1911-15; Political Intelligence Department, 1918-19; Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Relations, Aberystwyth University, 1919-21; Acting Professor of Political Science, Cornell University, 1922-1923; Director, Geneva School of International Studies, 1925-1939; Deputy Director, League of Nations Institute for Intellectual Co-operation, Paris, 1926-1930; Montague Burton Professor of International Relations, Oxford, 1930-1944; Deputy Director, Foreign Office Research Department, 1943-1945; Adviser, Information and External Affairs, Ministry of Education, 1945; Secretary-General, Constituent Conference, UNESCO, 1945.


26.The Study of Greek History, Solon and Croesus, 75: 'Greek civilization differs fundamentally from our own, both in its material environment and in its thoughts and feelings'.

liberal assumptions, clad in Hellenic garb. The *polis* of Periclean, pre-plague Athens was the ideal political community, 'the most successful example of social organisation known to history.' A liberal empire before it became the 'Robber Empire' of Cleon and Alcibiades the parallels with the British empire were obvious. Hellas enjoyed an 'era of material prosperity and spiritual advance, promoted by the armed peace of the Athenian Empire', whose central mission rested on two indispensable prerequisites: 'absolute security and adequate wealth.' For a 'wonderful half-century', Zimmern enthused, 'the richest and happiest period in the recorded history of any single community ..., the perfect citizen in the perfect state.' This was the genius of the *polis*: 'it drew forth a deep patriotism from its citizens while at the same time ensuring that individuals continued to use their reason independently.'

Although born and educated in Britain, Zimmern was doubly cosmopolitan. His family background was Anglo-continental - German-Jewish and Huguenot. A gifted linguist, he spoke several European languages fluently, and already during his time at New College he was deeply immersed in the affairs of South Eastern Europe. Zimmern 'could ... draw subtle distinctions, for he was sensitive and perceptive to an unusual degree.' The planned sequel on the *Modern Commonwealth* never materialised. Two world wars and his tendency to dissipate his energies conspired against it. An inspector with the Board of Education since 1912, he was involved in the workers' education movement and briefly taught at the London School of Economics. On the outbreak of the war, Zimmern joined with R.W. Seton-Watson and two others to produce

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28.Ibid., 362, 362 n.1 and 426. Classicists were wont to draw parallels between the Peleponnesian War and that of 194, e.g. G. Murray, 'Introduction', id. (ed.), *Select Speeches from Thucydides: Selections from Jowett's Translation* (Oxford, 1919), 6. For Murray's ordeal during the war, see F. West, *Gilbert Murrany: A Life* (London and Canberra, 1984), 143-75.


'a guide to the study of the underlying causes and issues of the war.' The present was 'a testing time for Democracy', and the task before Europe was a double one - the practical one of restoring peace, and the intellectual one of creating 'true internationalism'. Zimmern, too, drew a sharp distinction between Prussia and 'real Germany', which was an 'integral part of the civilisation of Western Europe' and whose people were 'very similar to their neighbours of kindred stock'. But they had 'been indoctrinated and Prussianised not only into acquiescence, but into sympathy with the policy of its rulers.' The outlook of Prussia's ruling caste was alien to 'Western habits of thought', but its 'domineering spirit' now shaped German foreign policy.

The war was thus 'a war of ideas.' Germany had to be defeated, but Zimmern was wary of the nationality principle. Establishing a 'civil society' was more important than creating nation states, which always bore within them the seeds of oppression of minorities. This was Britain's historic task, for she was 'at once the freest, the largest, and the most vigorous' of the powers. There had never been 'a political organism like the British Empire. [...] Great Britain has thrown a girdle of law around the globe'; and the challenge now was 'to extend the sphere of Law.' Yet here, too, Zimmern was cautious. One road to a stable post-war order was the 'revival, on a firmer and broader foundation, of the Concert of Europe conceived by the Congress of Vienna'. But this did not necessarily mean an international organisation with executive authority. Advocates of such schemes presupposed 'a world map definitely settled on lines satisfactory to the national aspirations of the peoples.' A parallel route of advance was through international education to foster amongst the nations now at war 'a sense of common duty and a common life.' This was 'the old slow high road of civilisation, not the short cut across the field.'


34. *War and Democracy*, 348, 350-1, 370-1, 374 and 379. Before the war Zimmern had a more positive attitude to Nietzsche, choosing one of his fellow-Hellenist's epigrams to open the first section of the Athenian study, id., *Greek
Zimmern was much in demand as a public speaker as well as a frequent contributor to periodicals, such as Seton-Watson's *The New Europe*, or *The Round Table*, the empire-themed journal edited by Philip Kerr and Lionel Curtis. He was a public intellectual, part of an emerging 'Labour intelligentsia', and he became a civil servant, spending part of the war in the Ministry of Reconstruction and then, in 1918-19, in the Foreign Office's Political Intelligence Department (PID). His *quondam* tutee Toynbee had likewise found his way into temporary officialdom, initially in the 'Mendacity Bureau', the government’s propaganda department.

Already in early 1915, one of the Oxford Six, H.W.C. Davis, had joined the War Trade Intelligence Department (WTID). The organisation had gone through various iterations before emerging as the WTID by the summer of 1915, with its headquarters at Broadway House, Tothill Street, and superintended by T.H. (later Sir Henry) Penson and with Davis as its vice-chairman. After the war Davis wrote an unofficial history of the department which, as part of the Ministry of Blockade, was linked to the Foreign Office. Its purpose was to sift trade-related reports with which Whitehall was inundated from all directions, gauge their value, collate and then disseminate the information thus gleaned. At the outbreak of war, it had been difficult 'to find any group of investigators with the leisure and the necessary qualifications for winnowing the mountains of chaff mixed with grain which passed under the name of trade intelligence.'


This group formed 'a curious and interesting community', made up mostly of Oxford dons, barristers, stockbrokers and London literary types.38

The large number of intelligence officials with a historical education is striking but not surprising. For one thing, 'Greats' and the Modern History course still dominated the scene at Oxford, and at Cambridge the Historical Tripos was not far behind in influence, even its prestige did not match that of the Natural Sciences there. Graduates with some background in history were thus more common than pearls in oysters. For another, it was still generally accepted that a historical education equipped future civil servants and political leaders with the habits of mind necessary for dealing with the problems of imperial administration and strategic policy-making.39 That professional historians were drafted into war-time intelligence agencies was only to be expected then. Given their shared educational backgrounds, many of them were known, either by reputation or in person, to Whitehall mandarins. Trained, moreover, to contextualise and scrutinise documents, used to dealing with the often doubtful and fragmentary nature of extant evidence, and often possessing extensive linguistic skills and knowledge of foreign countries, they had the necessary attributes for intelligence work and policy advice. Since German was still the *lingua franca* of academia in the long nineteenth century, most of them spoke and read the language fluently; and not a few had spent some time studying at German universities. This applied, incidentally, more especially to Graecists, Latinists and papyrologists, many of whom found a niche in code-breaking, most notably Frank Adcock, F.M. Cornford and Dillwyn Knox.40 They came to Whitehall by different routes. Some, like Davis, Toynbee and Zimmern, volunteered for posts in government, once it became clear that


the belligerents had settled down to a war of attrition. Others had enlisted early in the war, to be redeployed in intelligence roles later, often on being deemed unfit for active service.

As the war ground on, these scholars-turned-civil servants proved their worth in cryptanalysis, trade intelligence and propaganda. But it also became clear that their expertise and skills could be used more effectively still. At some point the war was going to end; and, though no-one could yet know when and how it would be terminated, Britain had to be prepared for that eventuality. With this in mind Toynbee and Zimmern suggested, in January 1917, a scheme for a new intelligence section. Its specific remit was to 'to collect, organise, and present all the relevant facts' in a systematic manner, so as to create a sound basis of economic, ethnographic and political information regarding the territories likely to be affected by one or both groups of belligerents. It was an exercise in evidence-based decision-making: 'Whichever party is in possession of the most detailed knowledge regarding economic and political facts, the plans of the enemy, and the bearing of these facts upon their own, will have a formidable advantage over its opponents in making peace.'

At the same time, a historian in military intelligence, H.W.V. Temperley, pushed a similar scheme on a sympathetic Leo Amery, then a parliamentary private secretary in the Lloyd George coalition: 'Temperley came in with a suggestion that we should have a small historical staff to look into the past history of some of the debatable questions, more particularly the Balkans and Poland, which will come up at the Peace Conference.' There is no evidence that the three historians had coordinated their moves. Temperley had, at any rate, come to the view that a more strategic approach to war-time foreign


42.Harold William Vazeille Temperley (1879-1939), ed. Sherborne, King's College, Cambridge; lecturer, Leeds, 1903-5; Fellow, Peterhouse, 1905-39; active service, 1914-6; Intelligence Officer, General Staff, 1916-8; special mission to Balkans, 1918-9; attended Paris Peace Conference, 1919; Professor of Modern History, 1931-9; Master, Peterhouse, 1938-9.

policy was needed: ‘The political side of strategy requires a knowledge which cannot be improvised and is based on the study of history and a considerable acquaintance with contemporary politics, economics, and diplomacy.’

In the course of 1917, separate developments converged to make the establishment of a political intelligence section possible. One was the incontrovertible need for more systemic evidence gathering and analysis. In Whitehall this might not have counted for much, had it not been for the fact that the Permanent Under-secretary of the Foreign Office, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, fastened on such proposals in an effort to reverse his department's declining influence under David Lloyd George's imperial premiership. To restore the Foreign Office's pre-war predominance over the policy-making process once hostilities had ended, Hardinge initiated a series of internal reforms. A consummate Whitehall warrior, he 'methodically acquired control of the planning machinery' that came into existence somewhat haphazardly in early 1917. Thus, the WTID was placed under the blockade ministry, an off-shoot of the Foreign Office and staffed by it, and a number of personnel, including Toynbee and Zimmern, were seconded from the Cabinet Office to the Foreign Office.

A key element of Hardinge's campaign of bureaucratic empire-building was the transfer of the Historical Section to his department. The section, also known as ID 27, was the brainchild of Admiral Reginald Hall, who had approached G.W. (later Sir George) Prothero to supervise the new outfit and its ‘production of some manuals relating to subjects that are likely to come before the Peace Congress’. Prothero was an inspired choice. A former Cambridge

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46 George William Prothero (1848-1922), ed. Eton, King's College Cambridge, Bonn; fellow, King's College, 1876-94; Professor of Modern History, Edinburgh, 1894-9; editor, Quarterly Review, 1899-1922; Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office, 1918-20.

47 The approach was made indirectly through the Hon. Algernon (Gascoyne-)Cecil, one of the Hatfield crowd, who was employed in the Historical Section, see id. to Prothero (private and confidential), 20 May 1917, Prothero MSS,
fellow, who had taken a hand in reforming the historical tripos in the 1880s, he had occupied a chair at Edinburgh before succeeding his brother as editor of the Quarterly Review, that organ of the mildly conservative, educated classes of late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain, ‘its principles ... [being] roughly those of Church and State’. Prothero was thus well connected in political and opinion-forming circles. He was an historians' historian whose earlier work reflected the growing professionalisation and specialisation of British historiography in this period. His first opus, a somewhat youthful a study of Simon de Montfort, was rooted in the Stubbsian tradition. Indeed, he followed in the bishop's footsteps with a collection of Elizabethan and Jacobean statutes, originally conceived as an aid for his Cambridge special subject and typical of the Victorians' commitment to the systematic gathering and categorising of knowledge. The outbreak of the war turned Prothero's career in a new direction. He became involved in propaganda activities, coordinating the literary efforts of the Central Committee of National Patriotic Organisations with the aim was of rebutting the intellectual merits of the German case: 'German apologists often maintain that that they are politically as free as we any people on earth, and that we are in no way superior to them in that respect. On the other hand it has been said ... by Englishmen, when asked to join the army, that they would be no worse off under the Kaiser than under King George. The war also brought him belated public

Royal Historical Society, bundle I/9.


recognition. He, too, cast off a number of war histories, the most significant of which was a study of pre-war German policy, an expanded lecture given to the Royal Historical Society in January 1915. In it he took the reader across now familiar terrain via the unholy trinity to a detailed consideration of Germany's precarious position in the centre of the continent. It was Germany's *Drang nach Osten* with the aim of '[t]he conquest of the Orient' that 'supplie[d] the master key to German foreign policy.' Domination of the Near East was, however, only one ambition. Once Germany had defeated France and Russia and established her mastery in Europe and the Near East, 'the final challenge might safely be issued to Great Britain for the empire of the world.' Prothero's writings were a typical case of scholarship in the service of propaganda. Indeed, using his many familial and professional connections he also advised on British press campaigns in the United States.

As a Whitehall operator Prothero lacked the necessary guile and cunning to defend his own corner. There was continuous friction with his immediate superior, and there were run-ins with the India Office over demarcation disputes between its peace preparations and those undertaken by the Historical Section. Ultimately, Prothero's innate stubbornness and Hardinge's support helped him prevail. In early 1918, the transfer of his section to the Foreign Office as part of its Library establishment was complete, and the section's head was now free to concentrate on the production of his 'manuals'.

Prothero acted as a kind of literary impresario, a role for which his nearly two decades at the helm of the *Quarterly* had predestined him. He drafted in a wide range of talent and experts,


52. Thomas Spring Rice to Prothero, 30 Mar. 1916, Prothero MSS, PP IV/1. Spring Rice's mother was the sister of Prothero's wife; they were the daughters of Samuel Butcher, Bishop of Meath.

53. Parker to Hardinge, 14 Feb. 1918, FO 370/84/30550. For the strained relations with Cozens-Hardy, see Algernon Cecil to Prothero, 3 Sept. 1917, Prothero MSS, PP 3/V/2; see also E. Goldstein, 'Historians Outside the Academy: G.W. Prothero and the Experience of the Foreign Office Historical Section, 1917-20', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* LXII, 151 (1990), esp. 196-201.
drawing on his network of academic and other contacts.\textsuperscript{54} There was a genial, common room atmosphere in the offices in 3 Great College Street and later in the army hut in the middle of the now drained lake in St. James's Park, though at least one of Prothero's authors had to remind his fellow-toilers 'that they were not composing scholarly monographs at their leisure, but were compiling handbooks against time and for an \textit{ad hoc} purpose.'\textsuperscript{55} They had, in fact, been instructed to aim for '[c]ompression and clearness ...; and the books must be severely practical.' Prothero encouraged his authors to 'draw such conclusions regarding the past as may seem ... fairly deducible from the facts referred to ..., and to make suggestions or recommendations concerning the future.'\textsuperscript{56} Between them, some eighty experts wrote 174 handbooks, generally known as peace books, or 'P. books', in the period between late 1917 and early 1919. All of them followed the same standard lay-out: geography, economy, ‘political history and present conditions’.

The historians employed on the 'P. books', who are of particular interest for the purposes of this article, were recruited from two Whitehall sources, the newly created PID and MI2(e), the Historical Section of the Directorate of Military Intelligence. Both, in fact, were headed by historians, the former by J.W. Headlam (since 1918 Headlam-Morley)\textsuperscript{58} and the latter by Temperley. Toynbee's apt comment about the PID as a sort of 'Ministry of All the Talents' applied equally to MI2(e). Both organisations were youthful, assertive and, most of all,

\textsuperscript{54}See his request for a paper on Heligoland, Prothero to Dawson, 30 Aug. 1918, Dawson MSS, WHD 287.
\textsuperscript{55}Woodward, \textit{Short Journey}, 101; for an impression of Prothero as head of the Historical Section see A. Cecil, 'Sir George Prothero, KBE, LittD', \textit{Quarterly Review} CCXXXVIII, 2-3 (1922), 215-6.
\textsuperscript{56}Memo. Prothero, 'Instructions for Historical Writers', n.d., FO 370/84/f305050/50425; for details see Goldstein, \textit{Winning the Peace}, 41-2.
\textsuperscript{57}Memo., ‘General Plan’ (confidential), n.d., Webster MSS, LSE Archives, 3/9/57.
\textsuperscript{58}James Wycliffe Headlam-Morley (né Headlam) (1863-1929), ed. Eton, King's College, Cambridge; fellow, King's College, 1890-4; Professor of Greek and Ancient History, Queen's College, London, 1894-1900; schools inspector, Board of Education, 1902-15; attached to Department of Information (Wellington House), 1915-7; assistant director, Department of Information Intelligence Bureau, 1917-8; assistant director, PID, 1918-20; Historical Adviser, Foreign Office, 1920-8.
exceedingly well informed about far-away countries of which, as a rule, their political masters knew little. Among the writers obtained from Temperley's section were C.K. (later Sir Charles) Webster and E.L. (later Sir Llewellen) Woodward. Webster had been a protégé of Temperley's at Cambridge, and both were close friends. They had begun to carve out a niche for themselves as specialists in diplomatic history in the last few years before 1914, Webster more especially as the leading expert on Castlereagh's foreign policy. A clutch of learned papers on it earned him a chair at Liverpool at the ridiculously young age of twenty-eight. In June 1915 he was gazetted as a 2nd Lieutenant, but his poor eyesight kept him confined to the Army Service Corps before being transferred to the War Office intelligence department in August 1917 by a 'feat of wizardry ... performed by his friend and former teacher Harold Temperley.' Given his research specialism he was the natural choice as author of a manual on the Congress of Vienna. In its outline, it differed from the usual 'P. books', though its main emphasis was always on practicalities. Webster laid particular stress on the international circumstances during the two

59. Toynbee, Acquaintances, 161.

60. Charles Kingsley Webster (1886-1961), ed. Merchant Taylor's, King's College Cambridge; Fellow King's College Cambridge, 1910-4; Professor of History at Liverpool, 1914-22; commissioned into Army Service Corps, 1915-7; in General Staff intelligence section, 1917-9; seconded to Foreign Office, 1918; Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Relations at Aberystwyth, 1922-32; Stevenson Professor of International History at London School of Economics, 1932-53; head of American section, Foreign Office Research Department, 1942-45; attended inaugural meeting of the United Nations and final session of League of Nations, 1946.


years prior to the congress, before discussing in considerable detail the organisation of the congress and its proceedings. Although the 1815 settlement had shortcomings, its architects were focused on the 'possibilities of safeguarding the new Europe from aggression.' Crucially, in 'inventing the "Concert" they undoubtedly contributed in a very mark degree to the security of Europe.' It was a sotto voce demand for a new form of concert.\textsuperscript{64}

Woodward's account of the 1878 Berlin Congress was a compendium of sorts to Webster's handbook, but his choice as author was more unusual. Four years Webster's junior, he had obtained a senior scholarship at St. John's College, Oxford, in 1913, though he had serious doubts about a career as a don. A student of the classics - he also had attended Zimmern's lectures in 1908-9 - he abandoned classical antiquity for more modern topics, and at the outbreak of the war he had begun a planned four-year project on the rise of Christianity in the later Roman Empire. He was something of a Francophile, who viewed German scholarship with distaste because of 'the political bias that has distorted nearly every word written by Germans about the first six centuries of the Christian era.'\textsuperscript{65} Having enlisted at the beginning of the war, he commanded an artillery battery at Loos, and was then employed in a minor intelligence role at Salonika before being invalided home in the summer of 1918. Thereafter he spent four months in Prothero's Historical Section. For his account of the Berlin Congress he was given access to the Foreign Office archives, but found that material insufficient, all the key papers having been squirreled away by Disraeli and Lord Salisbury. His effort was nevertheless given 'a good mark' by the Foreign Secretary, a pleasing acknowledgment 'since Balfour had attended the Congress as Salisbury's secretary.'\textsuperscript{66}  

\begin{footnotes}
\item[C.K. Webster, \textit{The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815} (London, 3rd repr. 1920) (= \textit{Peace Handbook} No. 153), 147-8.]
\item[E.L. Woodward, \textit{Christianity and Nationalism in the Late Roman Empire} (London, 1916), v. Following his 1913-14 Parisian sojourn, Woodward had meant to spend the second year of his fellowship in Germany and the following year in Russia, id., \textit{Short Journey}, 55 and 73.]
\item[Woodward, \textit{Short Journey}, 101. Woodward’s judgment on the congress was balanced. The gathering ‘was the alternative to a war in which at least three Great Powers would have been involved’. Although a success for Austria-Hungary in 1878, in the longer term ‘it [is] difficult to see anything but ultimate disaster in these Austro-Hungarian victories’, id., \textit{The Congress of Berlin 1878} (London, 2nd repr. 1920), 37 and 41.]\end{footnotes}
The impact of the 'P. books' on decision-making is difficult to gauge. Hardinge complimented Prothero on the handbooks, which had 'proved extremely valuable' and were 'a glowing testimony' to the work of the Historical Section. But their real value lay in establishing the nature of the problems likely to be settled at the peace conference rather than in producing blue prints for their solution. Indubitably, at Paris, they were used mostly by junior diplomats. Yet as one of them noted 'no more authoritative, comprehensive or lucid basis of information could possibly have been compiled'. The influence of Prothero's 'manuals', then, was more subtle and is to be found in the details of the 1919 peace settlements than in their grand design. Somewhat naively, Prothero himself had entertained hopes in that direction. A few days before the armistice, Balfour had invited him to attend the peace conference as Historical Adviser on account of his 'admirable work' so far. Yet he soon found that he had been ‘left out of all the Committees on which I might have served’; and on complaining of this, he found himself at the receiving end of a magisterial rebuke by Hardinge, who left him in no doubt that ‘there never was any intention that you should serve on any of the Commissions of the Conference. The designation of Historical Adviser in no way implies such duties.’ Even if it had been, the 'Spanish influenza' left the septuagenarian Prothero hors de combat, and his spat with Hardinge was symptomatic of the decline of the Historical Section. Its work, as Prothero noted, was 'really done alr[ead]y, w[ith] v[er]y few except[ion]s, in the P. books.' During his brief sojourn at Paris, he himself had 'felt merely a fifth wheel to the coach', and the whole

67. Hardinge to Prothero, 14 and 22 Mar. 1919, Prothero MSS, bundle IV/5. Hardinge later wrote to all contributors to the 'P. books' to thank them for their efforts, see Hardinge to authors, 6 June 1919, ibid.

68. H. Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (London, 1933), 27; for the likely readership of the handbooks, see Goldstein, Winning the Peace, 47.

69. Hardinge to Prothero, 8 Nov. 1918, Prothero MSS, bundle VI/5.


experience had been very interesting in various ways, but on the whole a waste of time, 
& a disappointment, giving one a sub-sense of failure.  

Less prominent but no less significant than Prothero's series were the 'Peace Papers' 
produced by MI2(e); and here, too, historians played a prominent role. If Woodward was a 
late-comer to military intelligence, his route there was typical - active service followed by 
reassignment on being invalided. Temperley, a fellow at Peterhouse since 1905, enlisted in 
September 1914 and, having escaped the maws of the Dardanelles, was redeployed in military 
intelligence when the War Office eventually realised his expertise - historical, geographical and 
linguistic - in matters Balkan. Indeed, he found time to write a history of Serbia during this 
time, a remarkably sympathetic account of the country and its people. Between October 1918 
and February 1919 he was on a mission to Serbia and the Southern Slav territories of the now 
imploded Habsburg Empire to assess conditions on the ground. He briefly joined the British 
delegation at Paris in April 1919 to assist in settling the protracted Italo-Serbian dispute over 
Fiume. Later still, he played an important part in establishing Albania's frontiers. Given his 
knowledge of South Eastern Europe, Temperley wrote several of the MI2(e) 'Peace Papers' on 
Albania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

Temperley was a Serbophile, and so was another historian in MI2(e), the Rev. 'Robin' 
Laffan. A Balliol-man with a first-class degree in modern history, he had served as an army 

73. Anon., 'Peace Papers. List', n.d., Webster MSS, 3/7, with authors’ names added in Webster’s hand.  
Eighteenth century diplomacy & diplomats’ Temperley to Webster, 1 Apr. 1915, Webster MSS, Webster 1/2/113, 
appeared in the same year, Frederic the Great and Kaiser Joseph: An Episode of War and Diplomacy in the 
75. Mema. (all secret and confidential) Temperley, ‘Proposed Settlement of Albania’ (D. 7), 17 Sept. 1918, ‘The 
Czecho-Slovak Problem – Political’ (I. 2a), Apr. 1918, ‘The Jugo-Slav Problem – Political’ (L. 6), Dec. 1918, 
Webster MSS, 3/7/3, /15 and /21; for Temperley’s Balkan missions see 75. J.D. Fair, 'The Peacemaking Exploits of 
76. Rev. Robert George Dalrymple Laffan (1887-1972), ed. Eton and Balliol; ordained, 1911; curate St Olave's, 
York, 1911-12; fellow and chaplain, Queen's College, Cambridge, 1912-33 (conversion to Catholicism); chaplain to 
the Forces, 4th class, 1914-18; attached to Serbian Army, 1916-18; MI2(e), 1918-9; legation chaplain, Belgrade,
chaplain from the beginning of the war and between 1916 and 1918 had been with the British Salonika Force attached to the Serbian army. During the early months of 1917, he delivered a series of lectures on Serbian history, presumably for the edification of Tommy Atkins during a lull in the fighting. It was a wide-ranging, but essentially modern, post-1878 history of Serbia, a country he called 'one of the gateways of civilized Europe' that had never 'ceased to struggle against the barbarisms of Turkestan and Berlin.' The war had been brought about by 'the gamblers of the Central Empires'. Laffan was sympathetic to Serbia's 'Yugoslav' aspirations: 'The mere restoration of Serbia at the close of the war ... would constitute a failure on the part of the Allies.' Since the war had been thrust upon them, their object had to be to redraw the map of the region 'to remove from Europe that most prolific source of trouble, divided nationalities.' Such views inspired Laffan's intelligence memoranda on the frontiers of a future Yugoslav state.

The section's Russian and Baltic specialist was Humphrey Sumner. His family background was a curious mixture of Barchester and Bloomsbury. Already at school he had learnt Russian, but war had interrupted his undergraduate studies and he spent three years in the King's Royal Rifle Corps, before being transferred to the military intelligence directorate at the War Office. He was the most prolific writer in MI2(e) with nearly half of the 'Peace Papers' to his name, invariably on subjects related to Russia and the peripheral parts of the Russian Empire that were now breaking away, areas such as Armenia, Finland and the Ukraine but also

1919; university lecturer, Cambridge, 1927-53; Foreign Research and Press Service, 1939-43; Foreign Office Research Department, 1943-6; member of Italo-Yugoslav boundary commission, 1946.


79.Benedict Humphrey Sumner (1893-1951), ed. Winchester, Balliol; active service, 1914-17; MI2(e), 1917-9; International Labour Office, 1920-2; Fellow, All Souls, 1919; Fellow and Tutor, Balliol, 1922-44; Professor of History, Edinburgh, 1944-5; Warden of All Souls, 1945-51.
on the Trentino and that curious relic of the Crimean war, the demilitarised status of the Åland Islands. As for the largest of the breakaway territories, he was certain ‘that eventually some form of tie with Great Russia will be recreated. The sooner this takes place the better, since the Great Russians will inevitably be impelled ... southwards to the Black Sea.’

The focus of the reports by C.R. Cruttwell, by contrast, was on Western Europe. A tutor at Hertford College, Oxford, with a background in the classics and modern history, he had enlisted in August 1914. Gazetted as - at the age of twenty seven - rather elderly 2nd Lieutenant in a Territorial Force battalion, 1/4 Berkshire Regiment, he been sent to Flanders and France. By 1916 declared unfit for general service and intermittently deployed as an instructor, he was eventually assigned to assist Temperley at the War Office in April 1918. In that role he produced reports on Alsace-Lorraine and Belgium.

Charles Webster had been in the intelligence directorate since 1917, and eventually became Temperley's right-hand man. His earlier intelligence studies focused on Germany and Central Europe, including a neo-Bismarckian critique of some of the Mitteleuropa ideas then current in Germany. When at the turn of 1917/18 various peace-feelers suggested a possible end to the war, Webster examined the possibility of an armistice, and also produced a detailed examination of the peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. His contribution to the

80. Memo. Sumner, ‘Russia and the Ukraine’ (secret and confidential, R. 2), 29 Oct. 1918, Webster MSS, 3/7/30. Copies of his other memoranda are to be found in that same file.

81. Charles Robert Mowbray Fraser Cruttwell (1887-1941), ed. Rugby, Queen's College, Oxford; fellow, All Souls, 1911-12; tutor, Hertford College, Oxford, 1912-14; served on Western front, 1915-16; instructor Oxford Officer Cadet Corps, 1916-7; MI2(e), 1918-9; fellow, Hertford College, 1919-30; principal, Hertford College, 1930-9; contested (Cons.), Oxford University, 1935 general election.


85. Memo. Webster, ‘Possibilities of an Armistice, 21 Jan. 1918, and 'Some Notes on German Eastern Treaties', 15
'Peace Papers' was more limited. In fact, he produced only one such paper, on Zionism, in which he stressed ‘the connection of this ideal with the general aims of the Entente.’ His pro-Zionist sympathies, indeed, involved Webster in a row with the Foreign Office over its 'P. book' on the subject, which he condemned for its hostile bias and its many factual inaccuracies. Webster was MI2(e)'s liaison officer with the PID. That he took up the matter testified as much to the strength of his sympathies for the cause of a Jewish state as to the strength of his relations with the Foreign Office.

In an interesting parallel with Prothero's Historical Section, MI2(e), now renamed MI6(b) began to decline once its 'Peace Papers' had been completed in early 1919. Webster, whose account of the Vienna Congress appeared in January 1919, was determined to leave the War Office once the peace conference had concluded its business. Sumner and Laffan wished to return to civilian life even sooner, and so did Cruttwell who had been offered a fellowship at his old college. Both of them, indeed, left in the second half of March 1919, with only a Captain Kennedy left as a 'general hack ... though he should not be consulted on any political questions'. Under the circumstances ‘the unit cannot continue its duties as heretofore’, Webster concluded, and recommended that it be wound down. He himself remained, serving as Assistant Secretary of the Military Section of the British delegation at the Paris conference, before requesting demobilisation on 14 July.

Mar. 1918, ibid., 3/5/11 and /78.

86. Memo. Webster, 'Notes on Zionism' (secret and confidential, S. 1), 1 Feb. 1918, ibid. 3/7/32. Webster remained sympathetic to the cause of a Jewish state.


At the peace conference, as Webster later reflected, historians were 'as thick as bees'. But he and Temperley apart, they were mostly from the PID. Its creation was an early exercise in the central coordination of political intelligence in Whitehall but, just as importantly, it was an essential part of Hardinge's bureaucratic power-grab, though its precise status and, more especially, the question of its permanency, remained unresolved at the moment of creation. With one exception, the historians in it were Oxford-men, invariably from Balliol or New College, and usually with a strong background in the classics or mediaeval history. The exception was Headlam-Morley, the PID's assistant director and its 'doyen'. A Cambridge classicist - his first book, on Athenian politics, had won the Prince Consort Prize in 1890 - he eventually turned his attention to more contemporary themes with a biography of Bismarck. A fluent German-speaker - and with a German wife to boot - he also penned some twenty one articles on German and Austro-Hungarian topics for the tenth and eleventh editions of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Following the outbreak of the war, he was attached to the propaganda department in Wellington House, during which time he produced an account of Europe's final crisis. Although reliant on official documents and eschewing any overt anti-German bias, Headlam’s account was all the more effective for its restrained tone.

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92. C.K. Webster, *The Study of International Politics: An Inaugural Lecture, delivered before the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, on Friday, 23 February 1923* (Cardiff and London, 1923), 11.


95. J.W. Headlam, *Election by Lot at Athens* (Cambridge, 1891). The dissertation, which won the Prince Consort Prize in 1890, stood in the tradition of constitutional history and Hellenism. Headlam suggested that modern states ought to emulate the Athenian habit of allowing citizens 'to devote a portion of their ample leisure ... to the discussion of politics ... [and] the management of public business', ibid. 181.

96. Id., *Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire* (London, 1899), remained the standard English-language biography of the German chancellor until C. Grant Robertson’s work in 1918. Some of the *EB* entries appeared separately as *A Short History of Germany and Her Colonies* (London, 1914).

the *Westminster Gazette* and then, in 1917, a study of Germany policy on the eve of war followed, in effect a supplement to his earlier book, in which he sought to demonstrate that ‘those who defeated the efforts in favour of peace that ... [the German chancellor] began at the eleventh hour’ were to be found ‘in Berlin’.  

98 Headlam-Morley's writings were strongly marked by his classical education and his pre-war civil service experience: 'He was considerate, enlightened, rational and commonsensical, averse from every extreme, from every fanaticism, from any emotional indulgence. Everything he wrote has the same high-minded and rather aloof quality.'  

Under Headlam-Morley's enlightened leadership, Toynbee and Zimmern found their niche in war-time intelligence. Amongst the other historians were Edwyn Bevan and Lewis Namier. Bevan, a New College classicist, hailed from a banking family and had spent the years before 1914 pursuing his scholarly interests in Hellenism and, more especially, the intermingling of Greek ideas and ancient Judaism. An exact and meticulous scholar, rooted in firm Christian beliefs, he subscribed to the notion that the modern spirit of the Western world was 'really Hellenism reincarnate.' After a short time with the Artists' Rifles in 1914-15, he


100 Edwyn Robert Bevan (1870-1943), ed. Monkton Combe and New College, Oxford; private scholar; served in Artists' Rifles, 1914-5; attached to Department of Information, 1915-8; PID, 1918-20; lecturer in Hellenistic history and literature, King's College, London, 1922-33.  

101 Lewis Bernstein Namier (né Ludwik Bernsztajn vel Niemirowski) (1888-1960), ed. Lemberg, Lausanne, London School of Economics, Balliol College, Oxford; served with Royal Fusiliers (Public Schools Battalion), 1914-5; attached to Department of Information, 1915-8; PID, 1918-20; tutor, Balliol, 1920-1; Political Secretary, Jewish Agency, 1929-31; Professor of History, Manchester, 1931-53.  

102 The failure of his investments in 1921, an 'unforeseen predicament', forced him to seek salaried employment, Bevan to Prothero, 19 Feb. 1922, Prothero MSS, bundle 14/1.  

joined Wellington House before being drafted into the PID. Amongst his war-time publications was a sketch of early civilisation in Mesopotamia. Inspired by the 1916 military campaign there, its purpose was nevertheless historical, to show '[w]hat ... has Mesopotamia stood for in the past.'

His other two books fell into the category of 'war histories'. The first of them was a study of German policy, provocatively called The Madness in the Method. It opened with an incisive examination of the German 'mind' before the war and then offered an account of the war aims discussion in Germany on the basis of newspapers and other publications. The origin of the war, Bevan concluded, was 'the temper of the German people in AD 1914 - the craving for vague splendid things, the unquestioning credulity with which they were ready to follow their rulers into a prodigious adventure.' On Germany's eventual defeat, there had to be a 'reasonable settlement' that would rest on the principle of 'justice and security'. The nationality principle, however, could not be 'applied rigidly' - Bevan was agnostic about an independent Czechoslovakia - but it 'could be applied to a much larger extent in the new settlement ... than ... in the past.' Bevan supported the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine to France and of Germany losing her colonial possessions. But he warned that in seeking to annihilate German power, 'we may inflict upon Germany real injustice, and thus perpetuate Germany's evil will at an intensity which would constitute a permanent danger to us.' This was more especially a question of economics.

Bevan followed this book up, in mid-1918, with a careful and diligent study of the German Social Democratic Party during the war, from its initial support for the imperial government in August 1914 to the growing rift within the movement and its eventual split into

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104. E. Bevan, The Land of the Two Rivers (London, 1917), v. The book is a sketch of Near Eastern history, broadly defined in cultural terms, from c. 1000 BC to the time of the Arab conquest.

two rival parties. Based on whatever materials could be procured from Germany, he sought to
demonstrate that the chasm between the two was fundamental and ideological at the leadership
level, and that it was difficult to see how unity could be restored. He also warned that the break-
away faction grew 'not because the German masses cared for "self-determination of
nationalities" or "no annexations" ... , but because bereavements and material discomforts of the
war made them want peace above everything else.' The same masses had acquiesced in
Germany's control of the East after Brest-Litovsk and they would do so again, '[i]f the German
military machine were to secure a similar peace on [sic] the West.'

Bevan's *Madness in the Method* owed a good deal to his friend Namier, the most
unusual member of the PID and, perhaps, also the most complex personality. A Jew and not a
Jew, a Pole and yet often virulently Polonophobe, the son of a Galician landowner who craved
the security of landed wealth and yet was powerfully attracted to socialism and sympathetic to
the Ruthenian peasantry, Namier was a square peg in too many holes. The LSE had given him a
taste for social problems, Balliol had turned his mind towards history. He was naturalised a
British subject in 1913, and on the outbreak of war he enlisted, somewhat quixotically, in the
Public Schools battalion, but was discharged owing to his poor eyesight in 1915, to be rescued
by an Oxford contemporary, Lord Eustace Percy, and despatched to Wellington House where he
was employed to compile précis of the Austrian press. In the same year he also published
Germany and Eastern Europe, in which he argued that the root cause of the war was the
struggle between Germany and Russia for domination of Eastern Europe. Germany's leaders
had 'inherited [Bismarck's] brutality without any of his shrewdness', and so embarked on a
preventive war before Russia '[i]n five years' time, if ... left to complete her armaments ...
[became] superior to the joint forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary.' The Habsburg lands

106.Id., *German Social Democracy during the War* (London, 1918), v and 273 (quote from the former).

Zionism* (Oxford, 1980), 12-25; A. Ng, 'A Portrait of Sir Lewis Namier as a Young Socialist', *Journal of
Contemporary History* XL, 4 (2005), 621-36.
were a forward base for Germany to facilitate her expansion into the Balkans and Turkey, and this made a clash with Russia inevitable. Britain had entered the war 'over West-European questions and we want to see them settled in a ... just and reasonable [way].' But the true origins of the conflict lay in the suppression of nationalities and imperial rivalries in the East. Austria-Hungary was a failed state, Namier averred. The Dual Monarchy's very existence whetted German imperialist designs. It was 'a channel for German influence and a support of German dominion in Eastern Europe' and it 'must therefore cease to exist.' Europe had to be reordered 'in accordance with nationality', which left open to possibility of some form of Austro-German Anschluss: 'But German influence has to be limited to German land.' However, unless Austria-Hungary was 'dismembered "root and branch" many wars will still have to be fought before we arrive at a stable settlement in that part of the world.'

An historian, whose services could not be procured for the PID was Seton-Watson, even though many of its members had connections to his journal. He remained on the fringes of official policy, but was to prove useful during the hiatus between the collapse of the central powers and the peace conference. PID activities during 1918 consisted chiefly in collating and analysing political intelligence and drawing up background memoranda to assist in the preparations for an eventual peace conference. The analytical depth and qualitative breadth of the material produced by PID swiftly won it the plaudits of senior diplomats: 'It was not long before their influence permeated to the executive departments on the floors below.' That influence, however, was by no means all-pervasive. Given their support for the idea of a Europe reordered along national lines, most PID members took a relaxed view of a union between the German-Austrian Republic and Germany: 'We cannot exterminate the Austrian Germans; we cannot make them cease to feel German. They are bound to be somewhere. ... [E]nforced


separation would merely stimulate German nationalism, but would not prevent cooperation between the two branches nor their final reunion.\footnote{Memo. ‘South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans’, 13 Dec. 1918, FO 371/4355/f23/PC68. The section on Austria was written by Namier.} Bevan, too, urged to recognise ‘that the people now dominant in the country [Germany] have quite different ideals of political life and international action from those of the old régime. ... [I]f we fail to realize this ... we shall miss the opportunities of the hour.’\footnote{Bevan to Headlam-Morley, 5 Feb. 1919, Headlam-Morley MSS, HDLM Acc. 688/2.} At the Paris conference such pragmatism failed to overcome French recalcitrance and American lack of interest.

That same mixture of principle and pragmatism characterised the recommendations of the PID elsewhere in Eastern and Central Europe. Given the strong links with T.G. Masaryk and other Czech leaders, support for a Czechoslovak aspirations was well nigh universal. Seton-Watson stated an obvious truth when he noted that 'Austria-Hungary has ceased to exist'. The corollary to this, the 'only logical principle' on which the Allies could now deal 'with the former Dual Monarchy', was the formal recognition of the now emerging successor states.\footnote{Memo. Seton-Watson, ‘Austria-Hungary: The Legal Factors Replacing the Dual Monarchy’, Nov. 1918, FO 371/4354/f52/PC52.} Strategic considerations dictated that support for the nationality principle be tempered in the case of the German-Bohemian majority in the Czech lands. Several PID members emphasised the geopolitical significance of the Bohemian basin, though Namier acknowledged that 'the inclusion of a large German minority in districts contiguous on German territory is extremely inconvenient, if not downright dangerous, to the Czechs.'\footnote{Memo., ‘South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans’, 13 Dec. 1918, FO 371/4355/f23/PC68. The Czech section was written by Namier.} Whether or not minority rights were laid down ‘on broad & general lines’, the position of ethnic Germans and Magyars in the new state was likely to be a source of postwar instability.\footnote{Seton-Watson to Headlam-Morley (confidential), 11 May 1919, FO 608/7/10628.} No-one harboured any doubts about the tensions inherent in the Central European settlement which imposed ethnically defined
borders on the vanquished Habsburg successor states but conferred strategic frontiers on those who wound up on the side of the Entente. ‘[T]here is really no defence possible’ of the Bohemian borders, Headlam-Morley reflected afterwards.\footnote{Headlam-Morley to Forbes-Adams, 6 Apr. 1920, Headlam-Morley MSS, Acc. 727/37.} Nevertheless, in geopolitical terms, as Zimmern stressed, ‘Czecho-Slovakia is the natural pivot’.\footnote{Zimmern to Headlam-Morley, 23 Apr. 1921, ibid.}

The post-Napoleonic period remained a frequent point of reference in PID thinking. On reviewing the internal situation in Russia, for instance, Headlam-Morley warned of the ‘very serious danger that at any rate in appearance a permanent union of civilised states might appear to become a Holy Alliance against Socialism.’ However ‘perverted' Bolshevism might be, it was rooted in Marxist ideas; and '[h]owever pernicious the doctrines of Marxism may be, it is a disastrous thing to have an international alliance against an idea.'\footnote{Min. Headlam-Morley, 16 Jan. 1919, on General Staff memo., 'Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia', 12 Jan. 1919, FO 608/196.} The warning went unheeded, though it was acute. Headlam-Morley was more successful in brokering a compromise over Danzig. It was a matter ‘not ... merely of German sentiment but of principle’ that that port city not be handed ‘to an alien Power’. Instead he suggested the creation of a 'semi-independent city-state', which proved the decisive break-through in the search for a settlement of the Polish question.\footnote{Min. Headlam-Morley, 3 Mar. 1919, A. Headlam-Morley, R. Brant and A. Cienciala (eds.), \textit{Sir James Headlam-Morley: A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919} (London, 1972), 40.} Although the PID and its experts had demonstrated their worth, the department did not survive the peace conference for long. With its status left open in 1918, it proved the exception to the otherwise sage French proverb about \textit{le provisoire qui dure}. Most of its members drifted back into civilian life soon after the proceedings at Paris were wound down. Postwar fiscal retrenchment, moreover, left it exposed to the 'Geddes Axe'. It housed, as E.H. Carr, then a career diplomat briefly affiliated with the PID, reflected later, 'too...
many eccentrics. And with Hardinge relinquishing Whitehall for the Paris embassy their fate was sealed.

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The PID and MI2(e) nevertheless left an imprint both on Whitehall and on the historical profession. In 1923 Webster noted that during the war 'the Historian was associated increasingly with the practical conduct of affairs, as the area of conflict broadened, and the men of action were confronted with new and startling emergencies.' The war emergency had forced the British government to compensate for its lack of analytical power by recruiting scholars into the war machinery. In that sense, the various intelligence outfits, staffed by historians, were a first attempt at a more holistic approach to policy-making that drew on, and sought to integrate, a wider range of sources of information. Headlam-Morley's services were retained. He succeeded Prothero as Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office. In that role he continued to write background memoranda from an historical perspective. Dispassionate and first-rate, they were, in essence, departmental minutes rather than works of history. Headlam-Morley's role is, perhaps, best understood as that of a 'knowledge manager', whose wide network of academic and official contacts placed him at the heart of various scholarly and public policy projects in the 1920s, not least that of publishing the British documents on the origins of the war.

Although the wartime intelligence departments were dismantled, the experiment was deemed to have made a significant contribution to the war effort so that it was revived on the

120.Carr, 'Headlam-Morley', 166.

121.Webster, Study of International Politics, 14.

122.J. Headlam-Morley, Studies in Diplomatic History, ed. K. and A. Headlam-Morley (London, 1930). He was also involved in a public dispute with the German historian Hans Delbrück about the origins of the war; the exchanges can be followed in Headlam-Morley MSS, HDLM Acc. 727/3.

outbreak of the next world war, albeit within certain confines, as Woodward noted wistfully:

   It is a queer thing that, in the last war when we were young, we saw the ablest
and best of our contemporaries killed as junior officers when they should have
been singled out for high military responsibilities, and, in this war, when we
have behind us years of experience, and of the exercise of judgment and
authority, we cannot get into the key positions controlling policy and executive
action within the sphere of our special competence.\textsuperscript{124}

Perhaps, like Prothero in 1919, Woodward had succumbed to the delusions of grandeur.

Even so, the experience of war-time governmental employment clearly sharpened historians'
sense of the realities of international politics and it affected the manner in which they studied
and wrote about the past. Both these developments were visible in the creation, on the fringes of
the peace conference in May 1919, of the British (later Royal) Institute of International Affairs.
From the beginning it was intended to devote some of its resources to promoting the study of
contemporary history with a policy-related purpose. At that inaugural meeting it was also
decided to produce a multi-volume compendium on the peace conference, the editorship of
which was entrusted to Temperley, who had earned his first editorial spurs as A.W. Ward's
\textit{amansensis} on the \textit{Cambridge Modern History}.\textsuperscript{125} It was a pioneering project, for no
comparable work on a contemporary subject had ever been undertaken before. It was instructive
also in another respect. For in inventing contemporary history, it merely poured the old Whig
wine into new skins, painted in League colours. Temperley left the contributors in no doubt that

\textsuperscript{124} Woodward to Webster, 8 Aug. 1942, Webster MSS 1/23/1; for Webster’s later role see also P.A. Reynolds and
E.J. Hughes (eds.), \textit{The Historian as Diplomat: Charles Kingsley Webster and the United Nations, 1939-1946}

\textsuperscript{125} 'Report of the Provisional Committee appointed to prepare a Constitution, and select the original members
of the British Branch of the Institute of International Affairs’, n.d. [1919], Headlam-Morley MSS, HDLM/Acc.
727/43; Temperley to Webster, 24 Sept. 1919, Webster MSS, Webster 1/3/49; for further thoughts on the early
years of Chatham House see R. Morgan, ''To Advance the Sciences of International Politics ...'': Chatham House's
Early Research', \textit{International Affairs} LV, 2 (1979), 240-51; J. Cotton, 'On the Chatham House Project: Interwar
Actors, Networks, Knowledge', \textit{International Politics} LV, 6 (2018), 820-35.
the time for Actonian neutrality had passed: 'Such impartiality, if possible in the past, is impossible in the present. But contributors should aim at the international point of view and regard the Conference not from Washington or London but from Geneva - where for the first time in world history a permanent world organization will be established.' This was the old Whig history of the ever more perfect unfolding of the British constitution transposed into the international sphere. 1919 and the League carried on the work of the Congress of Vienna. Webster certainly thought so: '[T]he experience of 1815-22 demonstrates clearly ... that an association which depends merely on personal connections of one or two men is doomed from the outset. The inevitable reaction against their personalities would be in itself sufficient to destroy any chances of success. And now it is possible to go further.' Temperley struck the same chord. The old ‘balance of power’ politics had played out. The ‘weak point of the idea’ was always its ad hoc nature: ‘Each power is the judge in its own cause, and no one knows how & when it will decide. Hence no concerted plan.’ The League was the logical answer to this, ‘[f]or the League implies definite texts - limitation of armaments, territorial guarantees, prohibition of war.’ Temperley was by no means blind to the failings of the post-war settlement, but remained convinced that the League provided the only viable international mechanism: ‘One thing is certain, … there is no remedy for the ills of the world if the League does not succeed.’ In that event, ‘war will come again & a more terrible & devastating war than we can imagine. It can only be averted by a resolute resort to the ways of peace, and for that the only


instrument is the League.'

For many of the 1919 generation Paris confirmed their conversion to the creed of Geneva. Temperley and Webster, the latter very active in the League of Nations Union during the 1920s and 1930s, were only two of them. Zimmern turned from ancient history to the nascent discipline of international relations as the inaugural Woodrow Wilson professor at Aberystwyth before taking the Montague Burton chair at Oxford. 'International Organisation' was one of the great forces borne out of war, he expounded, and it was 'a material force' that derived its motive power 'from conditions in the external world.' Invariably, the spirit of Geneva weakened as the 1930s hove into view, and Zimmern's idealism was tempered now with weariness: 'Our choice is between attempting to civilize the barbarian [economic forces and nationalism] and abandoning our city: between internationalism or monasticism: between an effort at Hellenization ... or acquiescence in catastrophe and a return to the Dark Ages.' Still committed to the ideals of collective security, he thought that the Manchurian crisis had left the League 'revealed as a free masonry of the Great Powers'. His wartime work had also


132 Zimmern to Duggan, 16 Feb. 1932, Zimmern MSS, Bod., MS Zimmern 27.
sharpened Zimmern's appreciation of the public responsibility of experts, though he remained true to his Hellenist roots in conceiving of the expert as a quasi-Platonic philosopher—consigliere to the new kings of democracy.133 Such ideas were at the root of his pioneering initiatives in the field of international education and intellectual cooperation, which contributed to the creation of UNESCO, whose first director Zimmern became in 1946.134

Toynbee's intellectual development, after a brief and unhappy interlude as the first Koraes professor at King's College London, went in a similar direction. As research director at Chatham House, a position to which Headlam-Morley had helped when he sought escape from feuding Greeks in London, he fostered the study of contemporary affairs with his Annual Surveys; and here his wartime experience alerted him to the pitfalls of the enterprise: 'To give people the benefit of any doubt is particularly advisable for historian when the history with which he is dealing is very recent, because the nature of his evidence makes it impossible for conclusions to be more than tentative.'135 In later years, he dismissed his wartime writings as 'juvenalia'; and yet in Nationality and the War there are buried the seeds of some of his later arguments about the cyclical rise and fall of cultures in his monumental Study of History: 'Change is a harmonisation of two rhythms - Growth and Decay'.136

As for those who returned from Whitehall and Paris to history proper, it has sometimes


135A. Toynbee, 'The Writing of Contemporary History for Chatham House', International Affairs XXIX, 2 (1953), 137.

136Toynbee, Nationality, 491. For his self-criticism, see McNeill, Toynbee, 71; and for his role at Chatham House, ibid., 121-48.
been suggested that the war created diplomatic history. Such blanket judgment requires some refinement and qualification. Temperley and Webster had embarked upon research in diplomatic history before 1914, and indeed had developed ambitious plans for a multi-volume study of British foreign policy. After 1919 Temperley and Webster returned to the fields they had left five years earlier, but they did not simply continue ploughing the furrows they had left in 1914. War had impressed upon them the importance of decision-making processes as well as external forces, especially also now geography. In his inaugural lecture, Temperley suggested that 'by limiting aims, by increasing objectivity, and by abandoning vain speculation' historians could advance knowledge and understanding of the past. This was a kind of 'technical history', later half-praised and half-derided by his pupil Herbert Butterfield, that favoured specialisation and the detailed study of diplomatic documents. Temperley's study of Canning's foreign policy, a far cry from his youthful earlier monograph, was testament to this new approach. It also testified to the formative experience of war: 'Practical experience of war and diplomacy during the years 1914-21 has taught much that no historian could acquire by mere diligence. ... [I]ncreased knowledge of the practice of diplomacy makes one recognise the great difficulties which always beset the practical man, and the much greater difficulties which always beset the historian who has to pass judgment upon him.' Webster, who produced two major tomes on Castlereagh in the decade after the war as well as several important papers on


138. Temperley to Webster, 28 Feb., 6 Mar. and 5 May 1912, Webster MSS, 1/2/20, /25 and /39.


nineteenth-century diplomacy, followed similar precepts. 'The Foreign Office papers are one whole'; and the study of British foreign policy required immersion in a wide range of country files and personal papers. This was a matter of technique. Equally important was an appreciation of the wider systemic context of international politics. In sharp contrast to his two papers on Castlereagh before 1914, which focused entirely on the deeds of the man, the first 120 pages of Webster's monograph were devoted to the domestic context and institutional apparatus within which his subject operated, followed by a detailed sketch of international setting.  

Seton-Watson, who became the inaugural T.G. Masaryk chair at the newly created School of Slavonic and East European Studies, remained involved in the affairs of Eastern Central and South East European affairs. But he also turned his attention to nineteenth-century diplomatic history, for which he utilised the Imperial Russian embassy archives, held in London until their return to the Soviet authorities in 1925. His monograph on the 'Great Eastern Crisis' was a 'technical' history in the Temperley sense, but it was more than that. It contained an ideological core, presenting Disraeli as an exponent of that muddling and misguided 'old diplomacy' that ran aground in 1914 and Gladstone as a forerunner of Geneva-style internationalism.  

Seton-Watson attempt at a survey of British policy towards the continent during the long nineteenth century was perhaps strong on analysis and ideological drive than


technical competence, a defect he himself admitted. He accepted Britain's 'hybrid position', half-in and half-out of Europe, but swept aside as impractical the facile distinction between 'intervention' and 'non-intervention' that for so long bedevilled discussions of foreign policy. The interests of post-war Britain, he concluded, were 'more worldwide than ever before, and her need for peace is correspondingly greater.' The lesson of the past, then, was that Britain ought to be ready to collaborate with any country, 'but not at the expense of her own free institutions, and only on the basis of international peace and cooperation.' If this left the door open to 'appeasement', he took a forceful anti-Chamberlain position in two further books on current affairs.

In the cases of some wartime intelligence officials, the war really did turn them into diplomatic historians. Davis, who returned to Oxford in 1919, abandoned the Middle Ages for the nineteenth century. With his 1926 Raleigh lecture before the British Academy he ventured into historiographical terra incognita, Anglo-Russian competition for control of Central Asia in the first half of the century. Sumner, the most prolific of writers in MI2(e), proved to be a slow writer once ensconced again in the cloisters of academe. He contributed to Temperley's history of the peace conference and was closely involved with Chatham House, but it took him until 1937 before he published his first major work, a study of Russian policy in the Balkans in the 1870s. Based on a mass of mostly published sources in many languages, it was a masterly exercise in that kind of 'technical' history that Temperley had stipulated, mindful of external and internal contexts and of the constraints on decision-makers that arose out of the actions of


144 Id., Britain and the Dictators (Cambridge, 1938) and Munich and the Dictators (London, 1939).

145 'The Great Game in Asia (1800-1844)', repr. in Weaver and Poole, H.W.C. Davis, 164-202.
others as much as out of geopolitical factors.\textsuperscript{146} These were central to his survey of Russian history and his two slim studies of Peter the Great.\textsuperscript{147} E.L. Woodward's turn towards international history was similarly slow, though he, too, was involved in Chatham House. His earlier interest in religious matter had not faded altogether, but it was the rise of Hitler's Germany that made him turn his attention to the pre-1914 Anglo-German naval race, the resulting monograph, 'no politician has ever read', he noted wryly in his memoirs.\textsuperscript{148} It was a major \textit{tour de force} of 'technical' history, meticulous and comprehensive, but largely confined to official sources. From 1944 onwards, Woodward was editor of the British diplomatic document series for the interwar years, and also wrote a five-volume history of British foreign policy during the Second World War. Originally written between 1942 and 1950 for official use only, it was a work of detail but without much hindsight.\textsuperscript{149}

In his study of the First World War, Woodward praised C.R. Cruttwell's monograph on the subject as 'the most profound study of any war in modern times'.\textsuperscript{150} Its author is now remembered mostly because of Evelyn Waugh's juvenile vendetta against him which may have contributed to his mental decline - and perhaps because of his uncanny resemblance to Oliver

\textsuperscript{146}B.H. Sumner, \textit{Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880} (Oxford, 1937), 1-34, deal with the internal situation in Russia, followed, 35-55, by a discussion of the situation in Central Asia; see also id., \textit{Tsardom and Imperialism in the Far East and Middle East, 1880-1914} (London, 1940). His contribution to Temperley’s volumes was ‘The Bolshevik Attitude at Brest-Litovsk and Its Effects’, Temperley (ed.), \textit{Peace Conference I}, 221-35.

\textsuperscript{147}Id., \textit{Survey of Russian History} (London, 1945), which opens with a kind of 'frontier' thesis of Russian history (9-56), \textit{Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire} (Oxford, 1949), and \textit{Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia} (London, 1950).


\textsuperscript{149}Woodward dismissed the importance of 'after-knowledge', id., \textit{British Foreign Policy during the Second World War} (5 vols., London, 1970-6) I, vi.

\textsuperscript{150}E.L. Woodward, \textit{Great Britain and the War of 1914-1918} (London, repr. 1972 (pb) [1\textsuperscript{st} 1935]), xi.
Hardy. To some degree Cruttwell's study was of its time, monumental and painstaking, its vivid literary style often laced with sometimes crude national stereotypes. Yet it was also analytical in its attention to structural and procedural aspects of decision-making as well as calculations of grand strategy. Above all, it raised fundamental questions about the escalating nature of war: ‘The events of 1914-1918 have proved that war between great states ... cannot now be regarded as “an instrument of policy”. It becomes inevitably a struggle for existence.’\(^{151}\) Considerations of geographical factors and political relevance of the studying the past were central to Cruttwell's thinking. His last major work, initiated by Toynbee as literary director at Chatham House and published in 1937, indeed, was a study of the mechanisms of post-war international politics within the broader sweep of the rise of international organisation since the nineteenth century. As the sun was setting on the Geneva experiment, it was a late plea for the importance of an organisation 'which contains the promise of being converted into an instrument of international conciliation and revision more permanent, more impartial, and more universal than the old Concert of Europe.'\(^{152}\)

The last of the historians examined here had no such illusions. Lewis Namier was a realist, and took a grim pleasure in his withering contempt for the League and even more so for Anglo-saxon delusions about it. Although he lent his name to a style of history that was detailed and static, he was - rather like Karl Marx - 'ne ... pas_namieriste'.\(^{153}\) His tragedy - one of many -

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was, perhaps, that he was a far better analyst of international politics than of the Westminster manoeuvres of eighteenth-century backwoodsmen.

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The historians examined here would be horrified to discover that they had anything in common, that they had a uniform outlook on account of joint experiences, or - worse of all - that were part of some 'school'. And yet, just as they brought their scholarly skills and abilities to bear on their wartime work, so the experience of war and government affected the trajectory of their scholarly pursuits after 1919. The war did not create diplomatic history. But the war gave it a deeper meaning and firmer and more rigorous contours. The light of history shone in both directions.