On the Shores of Anarchy: Jacques Rancière in International Relations

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Abstract

In this thesis I argue for the articulation of the work of Jacques Rancière to International Relations (IR) theory. In response to the fourth “debate” I show, using Rancière that ‘anarchy’ is the ordering principle (arkhè) of IR theory and that Rancière helps us to understanding how this ordering takes place and what ramifications it has for our understanding of politics in International Relations. The thesis thus seeks to make two contributions to the field of IR: firstly, a general demonstration of the applicability of Rancièrian thinking to IR via the concept of ‘anarchy’; secondly, a Rancièrian argument about what is to count as ‘politics’ for International Relations.

My thesis is a work of theory. I start from looking at the broader literature, then work through Rancièrian theory, and finally move to highlight the role of anarchy in ordering IR. From this basis I articulate Rancière to IR through the mobilisation of his concept of ‘the distribution of the sensible’. I then work through the application of these ideas to an exemplary case study, that of migration in IR.

I argue that a Rancièrian theory of international Relations enables a re-evaluation of the divisions caused by the fourth “debate”. It shows how anarchy acts as the field’s ordering principle (arkhè) and excavate how politics functions in IR theory. Overall, then, the thesis aims to develop a critical and post-positivist understanding of politics with the potential for overcoming the ordering of the field occasioned by the ‘fourth debate’
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**Introduction**

This thesis is a work of theory seeking to articulate the political theory of Jacques Rancière to International Relations (IR). Articulating Rancière with post-positivist IR theory can, I argue, help us to understand the fourth debate and to reconsider the way in which anarchy operates as the organising principle of IR. I begin, in this introduction, by charting the position of my argumentation within the field of IR, explaining where my research will develop and contribute to current theorising, and where I will challenge IR conventions. I then discuss my contribution and explain further why reading Rancière into IR is important. In Chapter One I set out the key findings of the relevant literature both in IR and with regard to Rancière. After assessing the movement of anarchy throughout the great debates in Chapter Two I undertake a close reading of Waltz. Then, in Chapters 3 and 4 I break down and explicate Rancièrian theory and, in applying it to IR, show that the concept of ‘anarchy’ is the ordering principle (arkhè) of IR theory. I argue here for my Rancièrian formulation of IR theory. In Chapters 5 and 6, I apply my theorisation to IR using migration as an exemplary case-study.

**Why Rancière?**

My contribution to IR is aimed at post-positivist IR Theory. Post-positivism broadly refers to a shift in the field to call to question the use of positivism, or “empiricist epistemology which grounds our knowledge of the world in justification by (ultimately brute) experience and thereby licensing methodology and ontology in so far as they are empirically warranted”. The second debate, or so-called behavioural revolution in IR, had pitted the traditional or classical methods of IR against scientific methods, which ultimately won out. Post-positivism in IR then emerged from critical attention to the consequent dominance of behaviourism, and a preoccupation with metatheory, which opened, as Fierke and Jorgenson describe, space for a “celebration of difference” in IR theory.

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While post-positivist scholarship in IR can be traced back to the 1980s, this space for difference has inspired IR scholars to challenge some of the core assumptions of IR theory and of how knowledge is produced in IR. During the 1990s post-positivist methods gained ground, although there was some preoccupation with defending such methods and ways of thinking about the world in IR, to the extent that metatheory still perhaps overshadowed the scholarship itself. As a result of this groundwork, in more recent years post-positivist methods, interpretivist epistemologies and critical theory have become more broadly accepted in the mainstream of IR theory. As my argument springs primarily out of the articulation between Rancière’s body of thought and my deployment of these ideas in an IR context I being with a justification of my selection of Rancière.

I use Rancière for a variety of reasons. The first is the way in which Rancière conceptualises politics which gives us a definition of a paradoxical mode of action. Having an understanding of politics as an active process, that necessarily transcends the available subjectivities in the world is useful for IR Theory. It is useful as it gives us a location for politics which exceeds the already existent order(ing). The focus on politics as an activity is useful given the state of the field during/after the fourth “debate”. As I show in Chapter One, in the context of the fragmentation of the field it is in post-positivist IR theory that the most effective and interesting theorisation of IR is taking place. Rancière’s distinct approach to politics can, I show, speak to this movement and provide a valuable way of understanding politics within. Of particular value and importance here, and this is a second reason for turning to Rancière, is his notion of the ‘distribution of the sensible’. I provide a comprehensive definition of this in Chapter Three but it is worth highlighting it’s important for my argumentation here. The distribution

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of the sensible grounds Rancière’s argumentation in the world of the sensory.\(^6\) While focusing on the realm of the apprehensible is not unique to Rancière, it is of particular relevance for IR helping us to see the apprehensible as the terrain of the arguments we make in IR. In this respect my argument runs alongside post-positivist IR while also offering to it potentially useful understandings of its own project. This is so because the distribution of the sensible is not just a way of understanding the aesthetic terrain of politics in IR post fourth debate. It is also about charting a way outside of thinking about ontology as the grounding assumptions of IR. Critique of ontology is not unique to my argument, but I hope to show that Rancière helps us to think about the way in which we understand ontology as grounding positionality in the fourth “debate” in IR, and to problematize that focus. In articulating Rancière to IR I show how might separate out ontology from its location as the grounding and organising force for politics in IR.

Rancière, and the key Rancièreian concepts are discussed in full in Chapters Three and Four. But it is worthwhile considering here how his work complements but also departs from that of his contemporaries and others who address related or similar issues, and so also what is distinct about his work when compared to other modes of theorisation more common in IR. In looking at the differences between these post-positivist theorists I want in particular to chart points of commonality around the notion of lack/surplus but also differences in how they organise their theoretical understanding.

I begin by looking at Rancière in contrast to the theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Laclau and Mouffe in their book *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* give a powerful account of the way in which the conditions of our realities condition the emergence of our shared social and politics identities.\(^7\) In particular they give us an understanding of a radical democracy,\(^8\) which they developed in later works.\(^9\)

\(^{8}\) Ibid. pp. 152-159
The way in which Laclau and Mouffe organise their conception of democracy is at once both agonistic and communicative. They are looking in their analysis of democracy to chart not only how it relates to a function of politics but how it acts as the foundation of that understanding of politics. In reading this understanding of politics and democracy as ‘post-foundational’ we can see distinctions between both Laclau and Mouffe. Mouffe’s focus on the delineation of the political itself, drawing heavily on the work of Schmitt, is particularly striking. Laclau’s work extends semiology into an understanding of discourse and political arrangement that has implications for thinking politics. Marchart elucidates this in the context of his own analysis of the Heideggerian categories of ontological and ontic understood as the political and politics, which he then directly contrasts to the Rancierian approach. Here the post-foundational notion of democracy is made possible through a combination of a linguistic turn and a distinction between the ontic and the ontological. As Marchart argues the distinction between the ontic and ontological and politics and the political connects theoretical organisation to political theorisation/theorisation of politics. This has been useful in producing a post-positivist IR that is critical of the state and state discourses but it also produces an understanding of IR that is grounded within an ontological/ontic frame. This is problematic and a location through which

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Agonitics (Verso, London, 2013) and For A Left Populism (Verso, London, 2018). This list is not exhaustive but is designed to give an insight into the works presented by these authors.

13 E. Laclau, Emancipation(s), (Verso, London, 2007) pp. 36-66
I begin to see value in adopting Rancière’s approach as it challenges and gets us out of this Heideggerian understanding and relationship between the ontological and the ontic.

While this reading is convincing and productive I argue for an approach that severs Marchart’s thread joining the ontic/ontological and the politics/political. The Rancierian (ac)count shifts the weight of politics away from this singular reliance on ontology and enables us open up a space for challenging the relationship between politics and ontology and for instead conceiving of politics grounded in aesthesis as opposed to ontology.\(^{17}\) This then enables a conception of politics that is separate from the idea of foundation but is instead related to the particularity of subjectivation as grounded by an aesthetic arrangement.\(^{18}\) I argue that this is substantially different from the account of democracy or politics presented by either Laclau, Mouffe or Marchart. As we will see, the former understands politics as (mis)counting and as the subjectivation of the part which has no part. In reading Rancière into IR, as opposed to Mouffe, Laclau or Marchart, I argue that we get a novel framework, freed from strictures of ontology, able to break with the vocabulary and structure of semiology and which is aligned with post-positivist IR but also potentially transformative of these relations.

With this in mind we can also compare Rancière’s approach to that of another theorist who has been widely read across a multitude of theoretical approaches into IR: Agamben.\(^{19}\) In works such as *Homo

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Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life\textsuperscript{20} Agamben has been a key source for some excellent post-positivist scholarship in IR. His springs partly from his spatial-temporal rendering of sovereignty and exclusion and partly from his focus on power, and the wide-ranging application of his work, especially the deployment of his understanding of bio-politics and of his central notion of bare life, has provided insightful scholarship. The findings of scholarship that draws on/from Agamben and my own argumentation are not dissimilar. Both look to break down and interrogate the core principles of IR and both open a new way of reading through these assumptions. The difference in my Rancièrian approach, and the reason for selecting it, comes from the distinctiveness of the concept of ‘distribution of the sensible’ as opposed to that of sovereign exceptionality. While Agamben’s theorisation rests upon and problematizes the spatial and temporal relationship between the state, sovereign and population the Rancièrian framework is organised in light of a fundamental equality linked with the distribution of the sensible. Thus the excessive element of the system is understood not as bio-political bare life, but as ‘the part which has no part’. Both approaches look that the way in which fundamental aspects of the international/political order are rendered superlative to it, but the Rancièreian characterisation grounds the always already mis-counted part which has no part as the location for political action and does not subsume it into the framework of bio-politics. This enables a certain flexibility in the reading I can present of political subjectivation in IR – one that isn’t always necessarily tied into a relationship to a particular temporal articulation of sovereignty.

This discussion of Agamben brings me around to my final theoretical comparison: that of Rancière to Foucault. Foucault has of course been read into and across a multitude of theoretical approaches in

IR although his primary contributions to the field of IR have been through his analyses of power and population as well as archaeology and genealogy. Of particular note is work which draws both Agamben’s conception of bare life and Foucault’s bio-politics through and around Achille Mbembe’s notion of Necro-Politics. Foucault, then, has been central to the way in which IR has thought critically about the circulation of power within the international system but also about its own discourses of knowledge and the ways in which the activities of knowledge production are conditioned. Foucault has been essential in reading through the reflexive move in critical IR theory.

To explain how and why I elect to use Rancière as opposed to Foucault a few distinctions that need to be drawn. While Foucault is heavily influential on not only Rancière’s conceptualisation of the Police,

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aesthetic order and subjectivation Rancière establishes a separation between power and politics. While accepting that, as Foucault showed, police order is not confined to specialised institutions, Rancière nevertheless insists that nothing is political in itself merely because power relationships are at work in it. For a thing to be political, it must give rise to a meeting of police logic and egalitarian logic that is never set up in advance. He goes on to explain that, for example, a strike may or may not give rise to politics. It doesn’t do so if it is only about reforms to wages or management style. It does so only when it reconfigures the relationships that determine the workplace in its relation to the community. My argument with regard to the potential of Rancière’s work for theorising the politics of IR is that it makes possible an approach not necessarily grounded in the analysis of the flow of power throughout IR but which, rather, looks to understand the aesthetic scene which constitutes the formation of IR. While this is a slight difference it is an important one. My selection of Rancière as a theoretical frame enables a reading of politics and subjectivation that, while aligned with the Foucauldian conception, enables an understanding of the political that isn’t orientated towards power, opening up a potential site for reading politics in IR as constituted through subjectivation that is not oriented towards that of power relations.

Across these brief engagements with different thinkers who have been utilised as frameworks for thinking IR within post-positivist IR we can see not only the modes of thought I am aiming to write with but also how my argument and approach offers a useful addition to post-positivist IR. In my movement away from ontology as the core organising factor in a politics of IR as well as my focus on subjectivation and (ac)counting as the source of politics I present an argument that highlights the use value of my articulation of Rancière to IR.

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Limitations of Rancière

It goes without saying that Rancière cannot provide everything a theory of IR requires and that use of his work in the field requires developing a novel articulation rather than simply applying his ideas without modification. This is particularly clear in relation to three main issues: firstly, and primarily, Rancière’s relationship to ontology; secondly, his understanding of what it means to be a speaking and thinking being and the specificity of the human; thirdly, his focus on the polis, the ‘nation-state’ rather than the international. In reflecting on these limitations I am in agreement with Chambers’ understanding of the utility of the application of Rancière. Chambers says of his own interpretation, that he has ‘started to push Rancière’s conception of politics past itself, to gesture in directions that frequently exceed Rancière’s concerns and sometimes work against his intentions.’

As I look show in more detail in Chapter Three, Rancière has actively tried to distance his theorisation from the deployment of ontology as the grounding principle or location for his critical work. Indeed, we can see ontology as one of the targets of Rancière’s critical work at multiple points and he is particularly critical of the way in which ontology is related to political theory. This is important as one of the contributions I hope to make is a consideration of how, in IR, this move away from ontology can help us to conceptualise politics. But there are tensions in Rancière’s own thought around ontology, and, as I will work through later, philosophy is a mode of constraint for the writing of this thesis but also my own voice, argument and understanding.

The crucial distinction Rancière introduces is that between aisthesis and ontology, a fracture we can trace back to his split from Althusser, and which shows Rancière pushing on the social-political

tension between the theorisation of politics/aesthetics and the actuality of politics. As we shall see, equality is a fundamental assumption of his theory but understood not as ontological but rather as a non-ontological aesthetic assumption.\textsuperscript{31} His alternative way of thinking about grounding is \textit{aesthesis} and part of what I want to show in the thesis is the benefit of this way of thinking, for IR. But there is a problem here in so far as this distances Rancièrian terminology from the language of IR in the fourth “debate”. That is a problem of translatability which I am trying to address by writing my own Rancièrian framework of IR into post-positivist IR. The latter is of course interested in looking at the ways in which ontology conditions and structures IR. In stepping away from this philosophical-theoretical schema Rancière presents an approach that I argue is interesting and useful, but requires reworking in order to be apprehensible to IR. This is a limitation for Rancière’s theory and one which is at tension with my articulation as it means there is often a break between the language and theoretical stakes of IR’s argument and that of Rancière. While I do touch on movements in post-positivist IR to think \textit{aisthesis} as both a location for politics, these approaches don’t necessitate \textit{aisthesis} in a similar position structurally to ontology but rather as a wellspring of political and social meaning. In making the articulation to IR I necessarily reform and reorganise Rancière’s work with my own thought.

As Chambers explains, Rancière argues that politics cannot be deduced from any ontological principle\textsuperscript{32} and the majority of his work is written polemically against a notion of ontology as grounded politics (although \textit{Disagreement} is the least congruent with this tone).\textsuperscript{33} Rancière’s break from ontology, as Chambers also argues, is characterised through the distinction between reality and the potential of politics to be inferred from this reality.\textsuperscript{34} Rancière objects to the movement between a

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The general theory of the subject and the conditions of being as a being, and politics and which he polemically characterises as a “superpower”. The way in which a general theory of the subject or a general theory of being becomes the ordaining force behind a politics is itself, for Rancière, a political action. It is a way in which the ontological becomes suffused with the weight, not only of particular assumptions but also of a conclusion. This is not to levy the accusation that ontologies already smuggle in the politics they suppose to predicate but, rather, that the position of drawing on ontology or any kind of general theory of the subject itself for a politics is inherently anti-political. This can be seen when we think the meta-political, and the relationship between Rancierian thought and philosophy, which I turn to later. However in terms of the specific limitation I am looking at here my concern is the success of divorcing Rancière’s own thought from a general theory of the subject or ontology.

There are times in his work when Rancière does seem to be relying on schema which provides general theories of the subject. His notion of aesthetic regimes provides a structure, albeit one that isn’t historically specific or monocausal, from which generalisations can be made. This notion gives us a structure, one pregnant with void and surplus, but a structure with which art can be historically cognised and categorised nonetheless. This is a good example of where the limitations of Rancière can be recognised. His structures while liminal in their structuring are still ordering. Their reflexivity with regard to their own contingency and separation from the generalisation or “super-powers” does not occlude their geometric relation to Rancière’s thought. That is to say, there is here a tension between the ways in which he critiques ordering as a historical process and his provision of his own categories of order. Rancière’s whole understanding of politics is predicated on subjectivation in relation to social wrong. This modality of wrong and subjectivation are themselves tied up into a historical theorisation of the subject that is both ongoing and articulated in the majority of theoretical literature.

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to ontology. While Rancière gives us an approach with a different flavour it is still congruent with that literature. This gives Rancière’s argumentation and theorisation an, as it were, atavistic character; the vestigial ontology he has sought to move beyond reappears and colours not only the concepts Rancière deploys but also his formal style and theoretical organisation. This inherent tension in, between his arguments or claims and the hangovers of their past with regard to ontology become a limiting factor. This is of particular interest to my argument in this thesis. As I seek to articulate Rancière’s theory to IR, and to speak to post-positivist IR, I necessarily have to smooth the transition between the different and competing tensions both within Rancière’s thought and that of IR. This tension is also the location for my own voice to be heard within the thesis. I have to perform the chiropractics of aligning Rancière’s understanding of, and objection to, ontology, with IR’s understanding without carrying over the fatal herniation of Rancière’s own internal tensions. This is where my own voice and understanding shape the way in which Rancière relates to my thesis. For me, these tensions, central to Rancière’s understanding of ontology, are not terminal for his arguments but, on the contrary, a location of what makes them interesting while also something to more on from in order to successfully articulation of my theoretical framework to IR.

In this respect, it is important to understand how Rancière’s critique of ontology is conceptualised within a break from the idea of philosophy. While Rancière is read in our universities as part of theory or philosophy courses he argues specifically against a notion of political-philosophy.\(^{39}\) This is put most clearly in Rancière’s indictment of Plato’s politics project as an ‘anti-maritime’ polemic.\(^ {40}\) This approach characterises philosophy as a means to order and constrain the excessive world of the subject and of politics.\(^ {41}\) There is a categorical distinction between the way in which philosophy relates to the political/politics and the theoretical orientation that Rancière gives through his theory. This

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critique is borne out in the distinction of metapolitics from archipolitics or parapolitics. Metapolitics is for Rancière the end point of political-philosophy and a particular means of eliminating politics.\footnote{S. Chambers, \textit{The Lessons of Rancière}, (Oxford Uni. Press, Oxford, 2013) pp. 136} This is clear throughout \textit{Disagreement} and \textit{The Philosopher and his Poor} where Rancière gives us a spicy polemical take that cuts against any relation between philosophy and politics. It sets these modes of activity as diametrically opposed to each other. Part of the previous limitation and tension around ontology I spoke about can be derived from this separation out of philosophy from politics. This is more than just a position Rancière takes but a tension as he himself often identifies and is identified as a philosopher.\footnote{J. Rancière, \textit{The Philosopher and His Poor}, (Duke Uni. Press, London, 2003) pp. 226} This is important for thinking the limitations of Rancière as it gives us a sense of the internal tension between the approach Rancière puts forwards and the role he ascribes to philosophy. This tension runs deeper than consanguinity as it is a relation that is drawn out explicitly by Rancière himself and the critique he is making. Rancière is then at once a critic of philosophy and a philosopher. The tension between these positions is worked through across many of his different works.

My thinking in relation to this tension is conditioned through my own reading and argumentation. For my articulation and my thesis the broader conceptions and critique between philosophy and Rancière’s own position are a board against which my own understanding and voice are sounded. While there is this tension between Rancière’s own status, both personal and disciplinary, and his work my thinking is an attempt to move beyond this through my own application of the theory to IR. There is a way in which the philosophical orientation of Rancière’s work shifts when I apply it to IR. My own argumentation and voice here then condition the mechanism for the theories application in IR. This helps to neutralise the tension in philosophy through bringing Rancière into IR. In drawing out the breaks between the disciplinary and philosophical my articulation explores this limitation and tension. Through the application of Rancière to IR I am also forwarding that same critique of philosophy as ordering however the resonance of the tension is diminished through my own subje-
position as author, as well as the argument I forward in my thesis. I don’t adopt the position of the philosopher. Instead I speak as a theorist of and to IR. In particular in speaking to post-positivist IR, I aim to dis-articulate myself from the heady draughts of philosophy and express thoughts that are reflexive in their relationship to their organisation and argumentation. In working through this limitation I am partly dealing with an issue of the feeling of my thesis. How it can and should be read and with what intonation. In charting this limitation here I hope to highlight my own dissatisfaction with the *aisthesis* of philosophy and ordering and open up the possibility of theory. My voice in this thesis is trying to sound with the timbre of, if not of the political edge of my thought, then at least in the direction of that edge. While, undoubtedly, I am chained in part to the vocabulary, convention and understanding of philosophical argumentation in post-positivist IR, I aim to speak with a critical, *catachrestic* tongue.

This matter of voice connects with another series of potential limitations, linked with Rancière’s conception of thinking/speaking beings. Despite this linkage with being, the limitation I am working through here is not one of ontology but, rather, of the way in which thinking/speaking are understood in Rancière’s work and how this sets a limit for a thinking of where politics can occur. I work through this limitation to set my own understanding in contrast to Rancière’s as a location not only for further work outside this thesis but a staging ground for it.

Rancière draws his understanding of thinking and speaking primarily out of the work of Aristotle and from the latter’s distinction between voice and speech; the discrepancy between indication and expression. This sense experience correlates with a dual mode of sensing. The sense of voice, pleasure/suffering, and the sense of speech - justice/injustice. While Rancière breaks down this assertion in detail it is the general underlying distinction which becomes the basis for (ac)counting people out of the sensible. The way in which the Police order renders people outside of social and

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45 Ibid. pp. 2-19
political relations is through the reduction of the fact that they always and already possess speech to the lowing of voice. This, for Rancière, is the key mechanism by which people are counted into and out of the distribution of the sensible. It is in fact what is constituted as within the sensory community as we see in his examples of the Scythians and Plebeians.\(^{46}\) This distinction is not the clear linguistic/biological one that Aristotle make but, instead, already a sensory one. There is already a distinction between feeling a blow and the “injury” caused by that blow as Rancière argues.\(^{47}\) As the stakes of the sublimation of our existence as subjects who always already possess the capacity for speech and act on that capacity for speech\(^{48}\) then it is essential that politics is actioned at the level of speech.

A problem here is that Rancière considers speech as particularly human and this anthropocentrism has been contested in the literature on him. Chambers opens up a space by which we can think Rancière as arguing for language as never being possessed by the subject,\(^{49}\) so that we can think of his work as a useful tool in breaking from an anthropocentric conception of language.\(^{50}\) Chambers, through his reading of ‘literarity’, gives us an (ac)count of Rancière that potentially can escape the linkage between political subjects and human subjects.\(^{51}\) While I agree with Chambers that there is fertile ground in this mode of thinking about Rancièrenian thought it is never purely within Rancière’s work itself. As Bennett highlights, Rancière is not interested in expanding the political beyond the human.\(^{52}\) There is a wealth of literature which reads Rancière not as providing us with a means of

\(^{46}\) Ibid. pp. 12-13 & 23-25

\(^{47}\) Ibid. pp. 2


\(^{50}\) Ibid. pp. 108

\(^{51}\) Ibid. pp. 98-122

escaping from the anthropocentric but as still bound up within it.\(^53\) This debate around the anthropocentric reading of thought/speech in Rancière is a limit for my thesis in two ways. The first is that it draws out a tension between the subject and its referent. This is of particular importance as IR considers what can be (ac)counted as a subject within the international but also where within post-positivist IR Rancière can be articulated. The second issue is that it establishes a horizon for the limits of my project and for what and to whom my thesis and argument can be made. My reading and position on the anthropocentrism of Rancière’s work, in which I side with Chambers, is a tension against which I write. This tension puts me directly in contrast to Rancière’s own reading of his theoretical and political project. While he may not intend for the reading of his work to escape the confines of humanity or the polis, my project inherently transgresses these intentions and boundaries.

Thirdly, and more briefly, it is important to note an initial tension between the terrain and orientation of Rancière’s own thought and the discipline of IR. Rancière’s framework has always been the site of the polis. The rhetorical scenes painted for us in *Disagreement* are always insular to the state: the Aventine succession from Rome\(^54\), the Scythian rebellion\(^55\) and the demonstrations of 1968.\(^56\) These scenes are always tied at the level of the subjectivation to a singular state or Police order. For Rancière politics is generally considered at the level by of, in the language of IR, the Nation-State. This is important. For an orthodox reading of Rancière the distribution of the sensible is related to a shared social world. This shared social world is apprehensible and produces/presumes the level of the Nation-State/Polis. Part of the work of this thesis is that of establishing how Rancière’s concepts, formed at the level of the Nation-State/Polis, can be taken to the level of the international.

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\(^55\) Ibid. pp. 12-13

\(^56\) Ibid. pp. 59
While it may seem odd to start this thesis by looking at the problems of my theoretical approach I have done so to highlight where and how I aim to move beyond them: to establish my own voice amongst the clamour of the theory I articulate. These limitations are the locations through and against which I am able to speak. They are not problems for my argument but rather places where I can move beyond and unfold my own reading and understanding of the key concepts. In thinking through these tensions and limitations I have not shown why an approach to using Rancière is hopeless but rather that is it hopeful. I have justified not only the use value of Rancière to my thesis but also highlighted the areas in which I am in disagreement with him and aim to go beyond him.

**Positionality in the Field**

Having articulated both the reasons for seeking to apply a Rancièrean theorisation to IR, and the limitations and challenges in doing so, I want now to look at how and where my work sits within the field of IR more generally – where I build on existing theory, and where I call to question some of the key ways of thinking in IR. As will become clear, I am writing in relation to the fourth debate and in particular addressing those post-structuralists most focused on radical contingency. This is not to be read as a criticism or bracketing out of the concerns of normative critical IR but rather to make clear the reach of my claims and argumentation in the thesis.

Thematically, research in post-positivist IR is conditioned by and considers the radical contingency of IR theory while working through and thinking different logics of inclusion/exclusion. Rancière, I argue, supplements such themes but also highlights absences in our thinking of them. For example, Ashley’s work has provided a site of much discussion and debate within post-positivist and in particular post-

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structuralist IR theory and has been read as essential to the development of post-positivist IR theory. I am writing along a similar line to that of Ashley. As I discuss later in the thesis his breakdown of anarchy in the field is influential on both my characterisation and understanding of anarchy in IR.

I want to dissent from and disrupt the hegemonic constellation outside of post-positivist IR. In this respect both the approach I forward and the argument I make across this thesis can be seen as writing towards to the work of Ashley. However, as Weber highlights, Ashley is often constructed as focused partially on the disruption of mainstream IR, although of course his work is always already constitutive as much as it is disruptive. My argument, although it directly references and seeks to break down mainstream IR, especially in both the literature review and chapter two, is more concerned with opening up a space for post-positivist IR than it is to further critique mainstream IR.

We can see a similar relationship that my argument has to Ashley in my relationship Walker. He too is a key source for post-structural IR and I work through his thinking in more detail later in the thesis and at multiple locations. I have been especially influenced by his theorisation of sovereignty and especially by his insight that IR is a location of political theory. Indeed, underlying my writing is the same thought that IR is both subject to and object of politics. I have also been influenced by the work of


of thinkers such as Sylvester, Dingli and Shepard. While different from each other they have each been critical in orienting my approach towards thinking and understanding the role of subjectivation in IR as well as the constitution of the field itself. Sylvester’s division of the field has been tremendously helpful in my thinking and writing however she is also positioned in part against the theoretical movement and blind spots of the kind of theory I am doing. Dingli likewise gives a clear and potent account of some the benefits of thinking and reading Rancière into IR. However the deployment of her reading of Rancière is something I come back to later in the thesis in order to show how my interpretation, argument and voice have a different frame and goals. This difference is about how out work is orientated and organised with regards to IR theory. Shepard’s reading of both the aesthetic and political character of IR has also grounded and organised my orientation towards the field although the Rancièrian approach is in some tension with this.

At this point I look at how my argument fits into the larger domain of post-positivist IR theory. While writing to post-positivist IR theory my orientation and contribution is most clearly articulated to three

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67 Ibid. pp. 612
sub-fields of post-positivist IR: Narrative, Critical Feminist, and Post-Structural IR theory (distinctions which are not absolute within the scholarship and which often move between these “boundaries” but which have value in orientating our thinking). My thesis’s literature review explores this in more detail, but it is helpful to outline some of the relevant work here.69

With regard to Narrative IR Theory, the *Journal of Narrative Politics* in particular is emblematic of a space of political potential in IR, whereby the unique take on how to *do* academic scholarship in IR can be considered political in the Rancièrian sense,70 in ways which might be illuminated by my arguments about the redistribution of the sensible. However, there are tensions here as evidenced by the journal and my own methodological orientation. These tensions are clear to see between how my own methodology in this thesis is theoretical whereas the journal has a much wider and critical basis in method. The second literature in IR towards which I am writing is Critical Feminist IR Theory. This body of work highlights the inability of the field to see the impact of IR in and on/ across the “international” and IR’s own construction, along aspects of particular gendered social power and political experience.

My argument offers a distinct conception of the kind of ordering of the sensory which enables us to explicate how the order(ing) of the field along the lines of anarchy has divided its approach into Police and political (ac)counts. I offer a contribution which highlights, without recourse to ontological assumption, the articulation between a Rancièrian understanding of politics and the critique offered by critical Feminist IR Theory.71 There is, of course a tension here, particularly with more liberal

69 It is important to note that these are not given as an exhaustive or complete list of potential politics in IR. As I will argue later in the thesis, such an understanding would be nonsensical. Rather I have selected these authors as examples given their centrality to the respective literatures.


oriented Feminist IR. The role of thinking modes of Feminist IR as Policing presents a tension in relation to which I have to not only carefully steer my argumentation but also am writing both away from and towards. If we read feminist approaches to IR as divided into Police and political accounts we can see a tension that a Rancierian approach can grapple with but not necessarily resolve. Liberal feminism seeks to reorder the policing of the field along particular female-oriented approaches but, without engaging in epistemological or methodological critique, cannot truly be considered political in the Rancierian sense (that is not to detract from the achievements of liberal feminism in IR, for further discussion of IR feminisms.) Critical feminists are interested in how IR produces and is influenced by gendered social power and in working to shift IR internally, produce a potential space for politics, such is the focus of Maria Stern, Peterson, and Sjoberg.

Finally, Post-Structural IR theory can be read as the central location in IR where my contribution fits most smoothly epistemologically and methodologically. These literatures, because they are all concerned to question critically the way the field is ordered and how this links to questions of ‘the political’, can all be enriched by Rancière’s work and by the ways in which it can help to remedy the distinctions drawn by the fourth “debate”. We can see this in more detail, the alliances I hope to form and also their tensions and limitations, by looking, briefly, at work of Shapiro and Bleiker.

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While there are several different threads that can be drawn across Bleiker’s work I am focusing here on his engagement with aesthetics and the aesthetic turn. I do so for two reasons. Firstly so that I can draw out the specifics of Bleiker’s engagement with Rancière and highlight the similarities and differences between our approaches; secondly to highlight the way in which I am writing with Bleiker in regards to IR theory and the points at which our work diverges. Beginning with Bleiker’s reading of aesthetics we can see he is concerned not just with fleshing out the realm of art in IR but also with the sensory (dis)position of international relations. For Bleiker, like Rancière, there is this articulation between our sensory and political world.

As Bleiker himself argues, ‘Rancière’s theory of political aesthetics and the political implications of recognition... Because these aesthetic practices frame what is thinkable and doable they are political at their very core.’ Bleiker’s theorisation of the aesthetic and the political has a clear Rancierian character and as such is both an anchor and target for my work. While aligned with his project there are also clear breaks with my argument and reading of Rancière. Bleiker’s reading is wholly consistent with the texts but while Bleiker conceptualises Rancière as presenting a theory of political aesthetics I present him as a theorist of an aesthetic politics. This is a

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central point of divergence between Bleiker’s and my own reading of Rancière: we are, as it were, singing from the same hymn sheet but placing different inflection on the notes. For me Rancière is focused on the political implications of the distribution of the sensible and the aesthetic construction of our social (dis)positions. Bleiker reads a Rancière concerned with how our social (dis)positions are constructed/related to the production of certain aisthesis. These different readings, while they are always inexorably intertwined, do represent the crux of the distinction I draw out and perform in my argumentation.

Shapiro, like Bleiker, has worked extensively on thinking aesthetics and its relationship to politics in IR. He deploys a similar political, ethical and aesthetic understanding of the field and places importance on the aesthetic relations that foregrounds our engagement with both the international and politics. Shapiro gives us a theorisation of IR that is able to glean insight into the political arrangement, powers and structures via thinking the sensory and artistic productions that mediate our engagement with the world. Like Bleiker and myself Shapiro is a post-positivist and post-structural theorist of IR. His reading of aesthetics as not simply delimited to art-objects but rather rounded out to the sensory is congruent with the argument I forward within the thesis and his reading of Rancière is more congruent with my own than that of Bleiker when it comes to configuring the relationship between Rancière, politics and aesthetics. In particular Shapiro’s position on the sublime in relation to Rancière’s political reading of aesthetics, aligns his reading of Rancière with that which I take later in the thesis. Shapiro’s integration and reading of Rancière is a clear beacon in the field in which I wright, write and right my thesis. However, my writing is focused specifically on what an explicitly

Rancièrian framework looks like in its application to IR. That is, while Shapiro applies some Rancièrian ideas to the analysis of aesthetic international politics my concern is with how those ideas, thought through fully, affect the way we think about what IR is. My contribution, as I have argued earlier, lies in my own interpretation and execution of a Rancierian articulation to and theorisation of IR and that entails a close and prolonged attention to Rancière’s work. This is something which is expanded on and brought through in my research questions.

**Research Questions**

As we have seen, my argument can be read as being centred around two key research questions both of which are articulated to post-positivist IR. They are the mechanism by which I articulate Rancièrian theory to the context of IR in order to make my contribution. These two research questions act as a guide rail by which I can navigate and examine the literatures I engage with and as a way of bringing together the political and aesthetic work of Jacques Rancière. While methodologically my thesis is theoretical and therefore takes Rancière as its method, these questions form a codex that enables the translation of political theory into IR theory. As such these questions are both spacing and bridging in their nature.

**Research Question One:**

My first research question can be stated thus: How does anarchy construct IR’s distribution of the sensible?

This question draws our attention to a junction between anarchy and the Rancièrian concept of the distribution of the sensible. The distribution of the sensible is a central concept within Rancière’s work and forms the basis of his argumentation and I argue in later chapters that to apply Rancière to IR this must be the starting point. This question is useful because in working it through I am able to open up the points of articulation between IR theory as it currently stands and Rancièrian theory. Furthermore,
the framing of the question is such as to link it to the centrality of anarchy in the organisation of IR as a discipline. As we will see, anarchy is one of the theoretical locations where Rancierian theory can be articulated with IR.

Research Question Two:

My second research question can be stated thus: What effect does a Rancierian theory of IR have on our understanding of International politics?

This question builds on the first. While the first enables the articulation of Rancière to IR, this question works through the implications of that articulation. I argue that the previous question’s articulation of Rancière to IR has implications for how politics can be understood in IR. This question explicitly raises this fact and opens up the opportunity for the evaluation of a Rancierian notion of politics for IR. As I have outlined in a previous section of this introduction, the Rancierian notion of politics is a useful tool with which to highlight those literatures that might find the articulation of Rancière to IR useful and therefore what the contribution of this thesis is in terms of the field at large.

Conclusion

This introduction has charted throughout the thesis the questions, limitations and contribution I am offering throughout. The first research questions is dealt with primarily in chapters one, two and then returned to in five and six. A detailed breakdown is given in the conclusion. The second research questions is dealt with primarily in chapters three and four and returned to in five and six a detailed breakdown is given in the conclusion. The limitations of the thesis are engaged with throughout and are returned to in the conclusion. Chapter one assess the literature, chapter two assess the role of anarchy, chapter three looks at Rancière, chapter four articulates my understanding of Rancière to IR theory chapters five and six apply work through my theorisation with regards to my case study.
Chapter One:  
Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter of my thesis charts the development of the field across its constitutive “debates”. While this narrative of the field has been contested, for example by Dunne et. al\(^1\) and Schmidt\(^2\) this narrative still holds a lot of power over the discipline.\(^3\) In my (re)reading of that narrative I focus on the continued centrality of a concept of anarchy. I structure my engagement with IR across the four major “debates” in the field. I have opted for the four-debate structure as it enables the maximal engagement with the literature while also taking us to the present state of the field after the fourth “debate” which, I argue, has resulted in a field that is fractured.

The chapter is divided into six sections. Across these six sections I lay the foregrounding for the argument of the thesis. Building on the introductions statement of the position in the field I organise the topology of IR via that “debates” to show who I am writing against in more detail. In charting the concept of anarchy I also foreground the notion of the ordering principle and its relation to IR. This links into my argument as a whole as it establishes the state of the field of IR and enables me to build on and develop the positon I have established in the introduction. This is significant for my argument as it gives a clear elocution of my positon to IR and understanding of the development and shape of the field.

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Before I move to the first section I must be clear that in looking at the history of IR through the “debates” narrative I don’t intend to imply that these manoeuvres direct or relate to the field in real time. Mine is a methodological move which enables us to understand the current shape of the field. I use the structure of the debates to gain an understanding of the story that IR tells itself in order to make itself intelligible to itself. I do not make claims as to the ultimate truth of this story. Rather, I am interested in the way in which this enables the field to congeal around the hegemonic Realist position in the first two debates and dissipate itself based on the field’s assumptions as set by the latter debates.

The First “Debate”: Realism - Idealism

This was the first and founding “debate” of IR, in part a response to the interwar period and the ascendance of Nazi Germany. The “debate” is usually constructed between the theoretical positions of Realism and Idealism but this is controversial not least because of challenges over the extent to which idealism can be seen as a coherent body of thought. Idealism’s core argument, that states objectives, understanding and philosophy can be translated from the domestic to the international, can be seen in the work of Angell, Woolf and Zimmerman. The idealist position is also made possible given Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points and the League of Nations. It is worth noting that this not only made the Idealist position possible but also acted as the backdrop for Realist argumentation. Within the debate Idealism was presented as occupying the liberal position of teleological historical progress. The occlusion of this position by Realism shouldn’t be read as a failure of the idealist

position\textsuperscript{9} as it is this understanding of history that resurfaces in the work of Fukuyama and the neo-conservative moment in the 90s.\textsuperscript{10}

The role of history as framework and methodology is, alongside anarchy, one of the core tenets of the first “debate”. Dismissal of the historical approach separates IR from the discipline of History. Through looking to uncover a-temporal rules of international politics, a move that is undertaken both by Idealism through its progressivism and Realism through its tragic understanding of IR, the field establishes the pre-conditions of the second “debates” move towards scientism. The Realist understanding of human nature as the grounding principle of the basis of IR has a clear effect on the ordering of the field. As Classical Realism relies on a human nature that is exempt from material or historical development, it enables the later transition to science as the dominant mode for understanding the field. This is a twofold move. Classical Realism relies on a Hobbesian\textsuperscript{11} notion of human nature and the resultant anarchy that underpins IR is treated as a natural/physical law. Then Realism undergoes its methodological shift towards understanding itself as a science seeking then to uncover and falsify potential natural laws about IR. This is achieved through appropriating the conditions laid down by the Classical Realists as laws to be tested and evaluated. In doing so the Neo-Realists methodologically carve away the Classical Realist argumentation that sustained the initial understanding of human nature as a-temporal. This understanding of human nature is essential in understanding how anarchy moves from being seen as a product of the human-condition to a set natural law of IR. Differences in the reading of history aren’t limited to just the first “debate”. The distinction between the Idealist understanding of history: as progressive, and the Realist understanding of history: as being constructed with regard to an unchanging human nature, form the preconditions of anarchy as the ordering principle of the field both in this “debate” and the second.

\textsuperscript{10} F. Fukuyama, \textit{The End of History and The Last Man}, (Penguin, London, 2012)
One thing that is worth noting is that the Idealist position was not solely an academic. It was propagated within the public sphere at large. I am not arguing that this is a strength for the Realist position, we can see this given Crossman\(^\text{12}\) and Hayek’s\(^\text{13}\) rebuttals of Carr that this “debate” was not a solely academic one. This is important as Wilson highlights the extent to which Idealism was manufactured as a coherent school of thought by Realism.\(^\text{14}\) Idealism, which in practice was a loosely formed coalition of publicists, writers and academics, becomes a cogent bloc in order to propagate the myth of a Realism tempered in debate and formed through the contestation of ideals, as opposed to ideals that crystallised autonomously and were subject to eclectic and disparate critique. The appearance of a cogent Realism enables Realists to craft the nature of the field and reify their assumptions via the myth of the ‘defeat’ of Idealism. This founding myth enables Realism to craft the idea that IR should be grounded in the material “real” as opposed to the ideational/theoretical. And within this constellation of concepts and arguments anarchy could become the core ordering principle, grasped as a material “reality” as opposed to the merely theoretical possibility of liberal progressivism.

This is important for the first “debate” as the Realist move to understand IR, as resting on a core immutable human nature, capable of explaining the actual “real” rhythms and patterns of world politics is crucial for understanding the development of anarchy as IR’s ordering principle. The two key theorists for the Realist position in the first “debate” are Morgenthau\(^\text{15}\) and Carr\(^\text{16}\). While the coherence of Realism might be questionable (both Morgenthau and Carr’s Realism has been called into question by Cox\(^\text{17}\) and Williams\(^\text{18}\), Howe blurs the lines between Idealist and Realist thought in

\(^\text{13}\) F. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, (Routledge, London, 2001)
\(^\text{16}\) E. Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*, (Macmillan, London, 1946)
Carr\textsuperscript{19} and Osiander looks at the broader similarities between the positions\textsuperscript{20} it is its mythology (of both coherence and importance) which is key. Part of the move in highlighting the inconsistencies within the Realist position of the first “debate” is to highlight the broader historical narrative of “power-politics”.\textsuperscript{21} Understanding the contribution of Carr and Morgenthau not only as Realism but as establishing a broader “power-politics” is convincing. Williams highlights that we can see in the first “debate” a complete blurring between the Idealist and Realist position and the emergence of a Realist Liberalism.\textsuperscript{22} This is something which, according to Williams,\textsuperscript{23} emerges not only out of the first “debate” but also fed through into the second. The broader historical narrative of “power-politics” is something that becomes crystallised into Realist IR throughout the latter debates.

While there is some contestation over “power-politics” within Realism\textsuperscript{24} it still forms one of its central tenets. The interpretation of Realism winning out over Idealism has shaped the fields understanding of itself.\textsuperscript{25} The way in which this has rhetorically shaped the discipline is explored by Quirk and Vigneswaran, who show how the “debate” can influence current methodology in the field.\textsuperscript{26} One key thing that becomes clear here is the way in which Realism not only relies on its assumption of anarchy,\textsuperscript{27} but through its mythologised victory sets this up as the dominant understanding of the field. If we factor William’s Realist Liberalism into this understanding we can see that in the blurring of the two positions anarchy remains a central point of assumption and agreement.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. pp. 659
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid. pp. 655
The narrative of the first “debate” establishes anarchy as one of the founding conditions for the existence of IR as a field. This is an important moment in the story of IR as it is where the discipline coheres around anarchy through the mythologised victory of Realism, which can then appear as a singular unbroken tradition with “ownership” of certain historical texts. Slomp, for example, has shown the confused way in which classical texts such as those by Thucydides, Machiavelli and Clausewitz are appropriated within this understanding of the field. Realism self-selects and imposes its own assumptions and understandings, such as the causal power of anarchy, back through history onto these classical authors (while ignoring, for instance, the Kantian underpinning of Clausewitz’s theorisation of war).

Here my reading of the first debate highlights how it should be read not as a “true” contestation or dialectic between Realism and Idealism. Instead I have shown how it acts as a narrativised (ac)count of the mechanism by which Realism coheres itself into a distinction theoretical reading of IR. This is significant for my argumentation as it foregrounds the role of the organising principle of anarchy. This also highlights my understanding of the aesthetic nature of politics and IR given that Realism, by telling its own story about the foundation of the field enables not only its own internal (in)coherence but, more importantly, the establishment of the terms of the field. This establishment includes the enshrinement of anarchy as the disciplines organising principle. Thus, the first debate provides the initial moment in which the field, under Realism, begins to highlight anarchy as its central organising principle. I now go on to chart the movements in this narrative that occur within the second “debate”.

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The Second “Debate”: Traditionalism - Scientism

The second “debate” continues in line with the first’s establishment of anarchy and Realism as the dominant assumptions and forces within IR. The core difference in the narrative of this “debate” is not between two (in)coherent schools of thought but rather over the appropriate methodology of the discipline. The “debate” can be characterised as Realism moving away from its appropriated classical heritage in favour of the epistemological mantle of science. As I hinted in the previous section we can see in the second “debate” the historical product of Classical Realism’s ahistorical rendering of human nature and thus also of anarchy. The irony of the “debate” is highlighted by Ashley’s quotation of Morgenthau’s statement ‘it is a dangerous thing to be a Machiavelli. It is a disastrous thing to be a Machiavelli without Virtū.’ Through the movement towards a scientific ontology and epistemology Realism organises IR against its own unfalsifiable Classical Realist tenets. Through Ashley’s use of Morgenthau, we can see that the “victory” of a scientific mode of IR leaves Neo-Realism grasping in the dark, with new scientific instruments, attempting to enthrone a Machiavelli without Virtū: which is a Machiavelli without Machiavelli. Interestingly we can see here progression from Realism attempting to re-appropriate its own historicity while serving its - and its assumptions - own temporality.

The second “debate” doesn’t have the same character as the first. It isn’t structured as a disagreement between competing schools within a new field but is instead reported as a disagreement between an understanding of IR as an excessive irreducibly complex international system (traditionalism) and IR as a materially and objectively reducible and understandable international system (scientism). The approach from science has its roots in the sub-field of strategic studies as well as the broader

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behaviourist turn in the social sciences.\textsuperscript{36} One of the precursors to the debate that took a similar approach is the Chicago school.\textsuperscript{37} The position that best encapsulates the move towards this approach is that of the Neo-Realist position as given by Waltz’s \textit{Theory of International Politics}\textsuperscript{38} and its precedent \textit{Man, The State & War}.\textsuperscript{39} Waltz takes the Classical Realist assumptions of human nature\textsuperscript{40} and submits them to an external a-temporal law: anarchy.\textsuperscript{41} This Neo-Realist approach is what the narrative of the second “debate” focuses on in and is seen as winning out. This movement towards IR understanding itself as a scientific approach not only shifts its methodology. It also changes the underlying way in which IR makes its assertions and assumptions intelligible to itself. The second “debate” changes the mainstream epistemology and ontology of IR. It is important to note that this phenomenon isn’t unique to IR but is indicative of some developments more broadly at the time.\textsuperscript{42}

The traditionalist understanding of IR was championed in part by the English School.\textsuperscript{43} They sought to resist the momentum towards the reduction of IR to simplistic formulae. But while the English School favoured a social understanding of IR they also maintained that anarchy was the central ordering principle of the field.\textsuperscript{44} The distrust of the reduction of the complexities of IR to scientific laws can be seen in the first “debate”. Carr\textsuperscript{45} and Morgenthau\textsuperscript{46} both highlight their distrust of understanding IR through scientism. Morgenthau, paraphrasing Pascal, states: ‘\textit{the history of the world would have been different had Cleopatra’s nose been a little bit shorter... how do you systemize that?}’\textsuperscript{47} It is important

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid. pp. 12-14
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid. pp. 78
to bear in mind that here Morgenthau is directly intervening into the debate calling for a movement away from the Neo-Realist obsession with scientism and a return to the Classical paradigm. This argument from Morgenthau highlights the extent to which Classical (or for Spegele Neo-Aristotelian\textsuperscript{48}) Realism is reliant on a particularly conservative impulse: not only established historical, and historicised sources, but also a commitment to the irreducibility of the human condition. This has repercussions for how anarchy can be understood in IR. It moves anarchy from an assumption that is held to be true based on an \textit{a priori} understanding of humans to an external law at work within the international system and in that sense quite separate from humans.

This movement is important because it is implicit in the relation between Classical Realism’s understanding of complexity and Waltz’s internalisation of this within his first\textsuperscript{49} and second image.\textsuperscript{50} Through this internalisation the complexities of the individual and state have their causal power removed. Instead the structure of the system, anarchy, becomes the ‘permissive cause’.\textsuperscript{51} Historical complexity and contingency are therefore subject to set external and a-historical maxims, the most prominent and effectual being anarchy.\textsuperscript{52} The second “debate” moves away from complexity and contingency as expressed through historicity and rationalism and towards elegant structural solutions.

The story that IR tells itself through the second “debate” is grounded in an understanding of the sciences and mathematics as extracting universally applicable laws. This is instantiated within a certain methodological and epistemological frame. By narrativizing the second “debate” as an expression and acceptance of broader trends in American political science this has an odd effect on Realist understanding. As the second “debate” narrativizes the movement from a Classical to Neo-Realist hegemony it preserves the assumptions which underpinned Classic Realist IR.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid. pp. 69
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid. pp. 233
By telling the story of the second “debate” as a methodological and epistemological conflict rather than a substantive one IR paves the way for the continuance of its core ordering principles, namely anarchy. This can be seen in the Neo-Realist movement from a theorisation of IR grounded in complexity, “human-nature” and an understanding of state-craft to one rooted in micro-economic analogy. What changes here isn’t the way in which IR is ordered in terms of conclusions. The assumptions which grounded Classical Realism are recast into the frame of scientific IR through the emergence of game theory. By focusing on anarchy as the structural constraint which makes possible IR, while desiring “scientific” credibility, the second “debate” sublates Classical Realist assumptions into laws to be tested and excavated by experimental practice. By turning to the deployment of modelling IR along the lines of Nash’s equilibrium, and games such as So Long Sucker, the political assumptions and lessons of Hobbes, Machiavelli and Thucydides are reconstituted as proven by zero-sum games. The narrative of the second “debate” tells a story that simultaneously rejects traditionalist understandings of IR and accepts the ordering principle that made possible this position: anarchy. By turning to the behaviourist game-theory logic of strategic studies the second “debate” propagates not only scientism directly within IR but also enables the “dispute” between Offensive Realists such as Mearsheimer and defensive Realists such as Waltz as well as the third “debate’s” understanding of absolute and relative gains.

The political dimension of story of the second “debate” is captured through Morgenthau’s title of and argumentation within Scientific Man Versus Power Politics. In the text Morgenthau is concerned about the way in which the narrative of scientific progress can lead to the detriment of state-craft.

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This is substantiated in part by the relegation of diplomatic and state organisation to second image concerns within the work of Neo-Realism. Through the reduction of IR’s ability to understand itself only via simplified systemic maxims this cements the role of those maxims in organising the understanding of IR produced. As Torsten highlights, behaviourism and scientism in IR set the tone for later “debates” around ontology and epistemology. Rathburn situates the movements within the second and later “debates” as the resultant of the (ir)resolution of the first. These two authors highlight the way in which the “debate” narrative tells a story of IR that is not necessarily fixed historically but rather as a narrative that continually steps over and talks to itself.

I argue that we should understand the “debates” then, not as providing a faithful historical account of the scholarship of IR but as a political expression of the dominant discourse within IR: Realism. This is significant as it highlights the way in which IR relates to itself and my engagement with it. The “debates” narrative is in part an ideological mechanism by which Realism maintains its hegemony. However, this also opens up sites of resistance (as we will see when we turn to the fourth “debate” and the advent of post-positivist IR). We can see the seeds of this in Mercer’s problematisation of the notion of IR as a social science as well as work in Post-Structural IR theory. The second “debate’s” (ir)resolution means that IR doesn’t develop a singular methodology but remains subject to a hegemonic constellation drawn together along the narratives of a scientism that never reached the point of falsification. This constellation also represents the retrenchment of anarchy as the ordering principle of IR. The second “debate” renders sensible the approbation of a “scientific” understanding of IR but also demarcates the distinction between appropriate methodology and epistemology. This “debate” then establishes the conditions which colour the later “debates” in their epistemological and

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64 K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, (Routledge, London, 1999)
methodological frame. While this appears as a move which offers a development in the field it is also deeply conservative in its preservation of anarchy. The narrative not only established and strengthened the position of Neo-Realism, but also set the terms of debate within IR. This facilitates the transition of anarchy from an assumption tied to classical understanding of human nature to an external trans-historical maxim. Again here I am arguing for anarchy as being read via Realist thought as the organising principle of IR. The narrative of the second “debate” tells the story of an anarchy that must exist a-temporally and a priori to IR otherwise it would be part of the social baggage produced by IR and therefore not an appropriate assumption on which to produce a scientific analysis of the field. This is something that recurs in the third and fourth “debates”.

The second debate is significant for the broader argument of my thesis in its configuration of the relationship between the scientific and traditionalist positions. This movement, which as I have argued, facilitates and is facilitated by the behavioural turn in political science grounds anarchy as the field’s central tenant. Through Realism’s re-interpretation of its own assumptions again we can see a story being told that enable the crystallisation of its own assumption. I argue that this story which maintains the methodological and epistemological promise of scientism shapes the way in which IR understands itself. This is a story within which anarchy maintains its central position as the guiding assumption. I have argued that the second “debate”, through its deployment of “scientific” understanding strengthens the organisation of IR around anarchy. This links through my thesis in it highlights not only who I am writing against both their organisation of the coherence of the field around anarchy.

**The Third “Debate”: Inter-Paradigm (But Really Neo-Neo Synthesis)**

The third “debate” is often understood as a response to the proliferation of the Kuhnian understanding of scientific research within IR.65 The “debate” is mainly focused on the parsing of the

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field into three separate research paradigms: Neo-Realism, Neo-Liberalism and Marxist IR, and narrated by mainstream IR as a way in which, through division different modalities of research each could continue to proffer their understanding of IR along the lines of different assumptions. But the “debate” also served to delimit the possibilities of what could be seen as effective research in IR. The “debates” division of the field into these separate but equal paradigms enables the fourth “debate” but also effectively includes and excludes different modalities of research in IR, restructuring the field, as Guzzini highlights, along the lines of ontological assumption which prohibit different paradigms from being “tested” against each other. Nevertheless, as Guzzini also argues, anarchy persists throughout the historical development of the field and into the third “debate”.

There are clear conceptual problems with the story being told by the third “debate” however. The proposed division into three paradigms of Neo-Realist, Neo-Liberal and Radical deliberately organises the field along the lines of its hegemonic, predominantly Realist organisation. Both of the “Neo”-paradigms share core assumptions: most prominently anarchy. The third “debate” in reality becomes about technical distinctions between relative vs. absolute gains and potential for the mitigation of anarchy. This runs counter to the understanding of a “grand debate” over the ontological positioning of differing paradigms. The “debate” also turns on its head the manner by which the “debates” have divided IR between Neo-Realist, Neo-Liberal and Radical. While the first two categories are empirically substantiated by the quantity of research aligned with these approaches the Radical paradigm starts the “debate” as a catch-all for Marxism which then later mutates into Post-Structuralism. For these reasons the “debate” can be dismissed as not really impactful on the broader narrative of IR. This

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67 Ibid. pp. 66-69


position recounts the story of the third “debate” as an in-house squabble between the “Neo”-paradigms. I contend that this “debate” has a larger function in the narrative of IR; through its constitution of the Radical paradigms the third “debate” works to conserve the position of anarchy as an ordering principle in IR and rather than offset the challenges or questioning of anarchy defers the impact of such questioning to the fourth “debate”.

Weaver characterises the narrative of the debate as the move towards a neo-neo synthesis. This understanding of the “debate” moves the Neo-Realist and Neo-Liberal understandings of IR much closer to each other and in doing so refines their conceptual toolkits. Weaver makes clear that the “debate” acted as a centripetal force, sharpening the paradigms into ‘leaner and meaner’ registers. Weaver thus highlights how the “debate” hardened of the paradigms’ commitment to their shared assumptions, such as anarchy, as well as to their differences. Jervis, Buzan et. al & Ruggie also substantiate this reading of the “debate”. Within this narrative anarchy becomes an even more central assumption within IR, enabling the construction of and communication between both Neo paradigms research schemes. In the Neo-Neo synthesis anarchy’s position as essential to meaningful and intelligible IR research becomes further ingrained as the ordering principle of the hegemonic constellation. This movement is a continuance of the second debate’s focus on the uncovering of external a priori maxims. The third “debate” is not only a continuation but an intensification of this movement in that now these maxims, such as anarchy, become ontological necessities for IR research to be sensible to the field (and, as we will see when we look at the radical paradigm) modes of

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71 Ibid. pp. 163
scholarship that do not take anarchy as their ordering principle or as a necessary ontological assumption become written out of the narrative. This highlights where my contribution to developing the field is foregrounded. Smith foreshadows the fourth “debate” in saying that synthesis is impossible for differentiated theoretical approaches. In reading Smith it becomes clear that by synthesis is becoming impossible for approaches with differing assumptions. I argue that this is the case with regard to the positions taken by the Neo paradigms in the third “debate”.

The “debate” cannot be characterised as a debate between multiple distinct paradigms. It should be constituted as the synthetic pursuit of technical clarification amongst the Neo paradigms. If we follow this narrative then the Radical paradigm becomes the point of actual paradigmatic dispute. Weaver complicates this by highlighting how there was little in the way of engagement across these lines. The end result of the third “debate” for the Neo paradigms becomes the synthetic arrangement following the trajectory of the first and second debates and ensuring anarchy’s position as the ordering principle of IR. Wendt’s Anarchy is what states make of it is a good example of the proliferation of anarchy as the ordering principle of the field. This is a proliferation that serves in part to write the Radical paradigm out of the story IR tells itself in the third “debate”. In order to show how this proliferation writes out the Radical paradigm from IRs narrative and thus understanding of itself I turn now to how the third “debate” understood the Radical paradigm as “Marxist” and later “Post-Structural”. In so doing the third “debate” constructs a narrative which serves to neuter the potential for critique of anarchy as an organising principle in IR and constructs the conditions for the fourth debate’s impact on the field.

Marxist argumentation within IR can be traced back at least as far as Lenin’s *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*\(^81\) and within Marx’s *Capital*.\(^82\) As Rosenberg shows\(^83\) the distinction between looking at the organisation of empire and colonial practices became subsumed into IR during its formation as a discipline.\(^84\) While the third “debate” sublated Marxist IR’s accounts of the field into scholarship specifically on empire, the Neo’s paradoxically embrace Gramsci’s notion of hegemony.\(^85\) The emergence of Marxism as (in)visible within the Radical paradigm is made possible through the second “debates” movement of the narrative towards scientism and behaviourism as I previously argued.

As Lamola\(^86\) and Burawoy\(^87\) demonstrate Marxist theory has within it an understanding of and a relation to science. In IR’s positioning of itself as a “scientific” pursuit it necessarily has to confront the challenge of the Marxist claim to science. In naming the paradigm as radical the narrative of the third “debate” draws together and sublimes Marxist theory and its understanding of science as a singular component among a group of fringe approaches to IR. This move weakens any claim Marxist theory might offer to science as it is already bracketed out of the “scientific” hegemonic constellation: the Neo paradigms. This sublimation has the effect of continually focusing the narrative on the Neo paradigms as the question of scientific credibility had been settled by the second “debate”. The third “debate” is made possible precisely because of the strength of the assumptions established within the second “debate”. The story of the third “debate” is also one which is constructed along political lines. The exclusion of Marxist theorisations of IR is a symptom of the adoption of fundamental Realist

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\(^87\) M. Burawoy, ‘Marxism as Science: Historical Challenges and Theoretical Growth’, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 55, No. 6 (December 1990) pp. 775-793
assumptions\textsuperscript{88} such as anarchy.\textsuperscript{89} The third” debate” highlights the inability of the field to process Marxism as either scientific or tangible given the political considerations of its hegemonic constellation.

Marxism presented a systemic challenge to IR in the form of world systems theory. By offering a substantive and different way of configuring the structural limitations on state behaviour Marxism gave a competing ontology of IR. This way of reading IR doesn’t necessitate the organising power of international anarchy.\textsuperscript{90} Theorists such as Wallerstein\textsuperscript{91} & Chase-Dunn\textsuperscript{92} give an account of IR in which it is ordered not by a lack of world governance but through its division of labour and the predominance of capital flows. In this reading of IR, the economic system of Capitalism structures and enforces the actions of states. The separation of the international system into a core and periphery undermines the notion of anarchy. Instead it places a necessary hierarchy between the central exploiting states and the periphery exploited states. This is an arrangement that is conditioned not by the lack of world governance but rather by the economic system which produces nation states.

As the third “debate” bleeds over into the fourth “debate” the Radical paradigm becomes associated not only with Marxists but also post-structuralisms. The narrative here seeks to bind together an increasingly structural and scientific Marxism with the more post-positivist Critical-Theorists. This is a move undertaken to reduce and unpick the potential rigour of this alignment. The story told by the third “debate” becomes a political move by the hegemonic, predominately Realist, constellation to defend the field’s organising principles. The political ramifications of this movement can be charted in

\textsuperscript{88} A. Davenport, ‘Marxism in IR: Condemned to a Realist Fate?’, \textit{European Journal of International Relations}, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2011) pp. 27-48


the work of Renegger & Thirkell-White93, Haacke94 and Kratochwil.95 Given the failure of the third “debate” to effectively enable contestation between the differing theoretical approaches this becomes the ground on which the field enters into the fourth “debate”. The preference for internal refinement practiced by the Neo paradigm then provides a narrative inclination in the field to preference internal critique over external engagement. This doesn’t doom IR to synthesis between theoretically aligned positions. Rather it lends kudos to the extant Realist hegemonic constellation and encourages debate along similar ontological lines as opposed to across them.

In terms of anarchy this means that it becomes enshrined as the principle that enables communication between differing paradigms within IR. This enables anarchy to organise IR not only around theoretical content but structurally across paradigms. My analysis of the third “debate” is useful as it draws out the distinction between the location in the field where I am making my contribution and what I am writing against. The third “debates” linkage to normative IR opens up a gap to which I am sympathetic but do not argue towards. As I have written in my introduction my major alliance in writing my thesis is towards post-structural IR theory and away from normative and mainstream IR. This is something I build on in looking at the fourth “debate”.

**The Fourth “Debate”: Positivist IR Theory**

The fourth “debate” is the most recent and ongoing “debate” in IR. The “debate” constructs a narrative around the differentiation between Positivist and Post-Positivist IR. I argue that this “debate” is both the result and continuation of the previous “debates” narrative. I forward that the fourth “debate” divides the field along the lines of ontology. By making this distinction the “debate” conditions and establishes the possibility of what can be understood within IR. Through this distinction

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then I contend that we see a divergence of approaches to IR in addition to a lack of communication between these approaches. Within the fourth “debate”, as in the other debates, anarchy structures the field as an ordering principle, although with the divergence between Positivist and Post-positivist IR critiques of anarchy become operationalised. As I have articulated in my introduction I offer a contribution to post-positivist and in particular post-structural IR. In breaking down the distinction between positivist and post-positivist IR I highlight that I am writing away from the “main-stream” and positivist conceptions of IR and contributing to post-positivist IR.

The 2013 special issue of the European Journal of IR is focused on the theme: *The End of International Relations Theory*. Characterised by Dunne, Hansen and Wight as ‘*the paradigm wars*’ the fourth “debate” sees the retrenchment of the positions drawn up within the third “debate”. The difference between the two “debates”, as Lake argues is that the fourth “debate” fractures the field definitively. In being structured around distinctions between positivist and post-positivist approaches the field becomes about the grounding assumptions and structure of the field. Keohane constructs the “debate” along the lines of rational versus reflectivist. In taking this line the ontological nature of the “debate” becomes explicit. There are two initially apparent contradictions in how the “debates” narrative is structured. The first contradiction is foregrounded in the second and third “debates” narrative with regards to scientism and the rejection of the Radical paradigm. The characterisation of the positivist position becomes in the fourth “debate” the position adopted by the IRs hegemonic constellation of approaches. This is the resultant of the previous “debates” marshalling and arrangement of these theoretical schools. Although the positivist position is not monolithic but ontologically and epistemologically fractious. The second contradiction mirrors the third “debates”

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97 Ibid. pp. 406  
attempt to construct a Radical paradigm. The myriad, shifting post-positivistic approaches to IR are too disparate to be effectively characterised as a singular orientation to the field in the way Keohane and the fourth “debate” attempt. In the narrative of the fourth “debate” the construction of the post-positivist position plays the political role of disempowering the critiques offered of mainstream IR by reducing them to the product of their requisite ontologies.

The positivist understanding of the field can be understood as emerging from the Neo paradigms of the third “debate”. There is the distinction between the Liberal and Realist takes on the field here. The Liberal position is one which grows out of the work of Keohane and Axelrod developing along the lines of institutionalism. This is coupled with approaches grounded in Doyle’s understanding of how to proliferate peace in IR. These key texts ground the development of later thinkers such as Ikenberry and Slaughter. This Liberal position coagulates in the forth “debate” under the banner of positivist ‘problem-solving’ IR. The Realist position grounded in the work of Waltz, as I have argued previously, also draws inspiration from Gilpin, Krasner and Walt. This Realist position is again one that is broadly positivist in nature. Although with work such as Williams, Lebow and Lobell et. al’s edited collection: Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy move away from the strict scientism of Neo-Realism and a return to Classical Realism. This movement is interesting as

105 A. Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, (2005)
it highlights how within the fourth “debate” the positions of positivist and post-positivist IR only serve to broadly structure the “debate” and field. In actuality within different “sides” of the narrative there is closer cohesion in the assumptions taken by schools than the large categories of positivism/post-positivism.

We can see this in the way in which schools cut across the narrative of a positivist/post-positivist divide in the English School and Constructivism. Both approaches cohere around their respective assumptions about IR but necessarily cut across the division of the debate. Within the English School we can see this from its starting assumptions, which have their heritage in Grotius, and are laid out by Bull, Vincent and Buzan, this crosses the boundary between positivist problem solving and post-positivist reflection. The English school’s working through hegemony and notions of order problematizes the fourth “debates” clean division of the field. The Constructivist tradition also skirts the distinction between positivist and post-positivist. Kratochwil, Onuf and Wendt provide some of the grounding texts for this understanding of IR. We can see in work by Kratochwil and Onuf a commitment that is less positivist than that provided by Wendt. With the move to securitisation within the work of writers such as Balzak, Salter & Bigo Constructivism engages in a more post-

positivist reflection on the assumptions that have structured IR. Within the Constructivist and English School approaches to the fourth “debate” we can see how it bleeds out of the third “debate” but also how the narrativized categories of positivist and post-positivist are not stable. This is a distinction that grounds much of my contribution to IR as outside of the positivist/post-positive frame of the constructivist and English schools understanding of IR. I am writing my argument and contribution away from and against this mode of thinking IR.

From taking the positivist approaches in IR we can see how the fourth “debate” appears most clearly as a series of small running battles. This isn’t due to the impossibility of sustained critique between the differing approaches but rather how the “debate” configures itself. The lack of coherent and stable categories caused the debate to collapse back into itself. The “debate” then cannot sustain a clear division between positivist IR and post-positivist IR. This is a breakdown of the narrative produced by the predominantly Realist hegemonic constellation; the categorisation of IR retreats away from the broad lines of positivism and post-positivism and becomes defined along the lines of school and their requisite assumptions. We can see this in the way in which the “debate” situates structural Marxism as a reflectivist/post-positivist approach to the field when it is more rationalist/positivist in its own understanding. The position of the differing schools in relation to each other and their assumptions then becomes increasingly important given the way in which the meta-narrative of the “debate” can no longer effectively bind the field together. This has effects on the status of anarchy which while it remains an ordering principle, is unmoored from a binding narrative leaving it both empowered as a concept and opened up to fresh contestation. It is in this area for contestation that my thesis moves to make its contribution to post-positivist IR theory. This gap and division sites the location for my critique of and contribution to IR.

In an approach critiqued by the Torsten & Suganami Jackson attempts to make sense of the way in which the ontological and epistemological ordering of the field lies in the debates aftershocks, opening up questions around the “correct” manner of ontology and epistemology in IR. By organising these assumptions Jackson and Nexon highlights how the foundation of positivist IR can occlude other modes of theorisation and questions if IR has to be considered a science. In opening up the assumptions which divide the field Jackson highlights the way in which there is a division between the positivist drive towards “scienceing” IR and the post-positivist drive towards critique of its fundamental assumptions. While some IR theorists defend the research programmes approach this methodological underpinning forms the basis for this drive. We can see the division along epistemological and methodological assumptions as a return to some of the questions raised by the second “debate”. The fourth “debate” again is not separate from the other debates but exists in the interregna cause by the previous debate’s (ir)resolution. With regard to providing a narrative to the field the fourth “debate” doesn’t construct a clear position but rather opens up a space in which the diversification of epistemological and ontological assumption becomes essential. In doing so this results in the field becoming more diverse but also more disparate. As I foregrounded in the introduction my contribution in this thesis is written in the spirit not only of this diversity but also in response to the disparate character of the field after and during the first debate. Here my contribution lies not only in my articulation of Rancière but the way in which my reading of Rancière challenges the functionality of ontology in IR.

The fragmentation of IR across epistemic and ontological lines is the core effect of the fourth “debate”. It has serious ramifications both immediately and meta-theoretically for how IR can be conducted. As I have argued the previous debates structured the field through ensuring the position of anarchy as IR’s ordering principle. The fourth “debate” cannot do this in the same way as its dispute takes place at the level of assumptions. Rather the “debate” serves to provide a mechanism around which the field can maintain its existence as a discipline while undergoing a loss of internal cohesion. The division caused within IR theory by the fourth “debate” has led to the project of theory\textsuperscript{133}, metatheory\textsuperscript{134} or the discipline as a whole\textsuperscript{135} being pronounced to be on its last legs and Jackson’s represents the mode of much of the engagement taking place in the fourth “debate”. For example, Rengger looks at how the divergence of schools into assumption-based camps is causing the field to list and be subsumed into broader political theory.\textsuperscript{136} This fracture is where my argument is able to be heard as it gives the handholds through which I can pull my Rancièreian articulation through onto the field.

Schmidt through looking at the work of Kuhn/Lakatos writes about how “scientific consensus” can be produced within IR.\textsuperscript{137} By parsing the story of IR into two narratives, one historical and another analytical, Schmidt highlights the potential location of cracks in the discipline.\textsuperscript{138} In his dissection of the field into these two stories we can see the potential power of counter-narratives to the central understanding of IR. Rather than the “debates” forming a key that unlocks the secret and true history of IR they should be viewed as a political narrative which conserves the predominantly Realist hegemonic constellation. Sørenson argues that the discipline should be less concerned with its

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid. pp. 351
fragmentation and more concerned with the material and ideational forces that are at work within it.\textsuperscript{139} This mode of argumentation seeks to look at the material and ideational forces that enable the field’s possibility. While this provides a solid foundation for progressing the field it requires an already extant and coherent set of assumptions that would make this possible. Such a set of ontological and epistemological assumptions are not a reality given the disparate nature of IR in the fourth “debate” and thus provide the location for my theoretical contribution to the field.

**The Fourth “Debate”: Post-Positivist IR Theory**

The other side of the narrative of the fourth “debate” is Post-positivist IR. I make my contribution to the field to this location. Although I recognise normative IR as being grounded in emancipation as having value here I am not writing towards them. Rather my contribution is aimed at Post-positivist IR theory which I delineated, building on my introduction here. This delineation in the field has been taken by the fourth “debate” to include the reflectivist position outlined by Keohane\textsuperscript{140} and characterised by Sylvester as part of the pushback against the positivist framing and understanding of IR as brought about by the end of the cold war.\textsuperscript{141} We can see in this the failure of the story of the “debates” to encompass and explain the material conditions of IR, the Post-positivist reading of IR being a response precisely to the prevalence of this narrative of IR as well as to the predominantly Realist hegemonic constellation’s increasing inability to explain contemporary experiences of IR both as a discipline and as something actually occurring in the world. Although there has been some pushback against the fourth “debate” as productive for IR\textsuperscript{142} I maintain and argue for its value in shaping the narrative of the field.


As I argued in the previous section the post-positivist understanding of IR can be seen as fragmented given the fourth “debate”. Kristensen has argued, telling the story of IR through “debates” has been a tool by which Realism and more broadly positivist IR has strengthened its hold within the field, a mode of “stocktaking” which organises the discipline along political lines. Understanding IR as not only proliferating but performing politics is something that has been central to the post-positivist understanding of the field. This approach, seeks to understand the central tenets that have informed the current formation of IR, unpicking the field’s ontology, epistemology, methodology or “self-evident” assumptions and in working through the assumptions that have grounded the field post-positivist IR actively challenges the narrative of the “debates”. In relation to the positivist understanding of IR post-positivist IR doesn’t build into the (in)coherent hegemonic narrative but rather seeks to highlight the incoherence of such a position and challenge this understanding of narrative. While this has interesting implications for anarchy as an organising principle my contribution to IR is aligned in highlighting specifically how anarchy is constructed as such.

143 Ibid. pp. 252-253
As we have seen, the traditional predominantly Realist, hegemonic constellation is entrenched in the assumptions of the field. Such a constellation cannot communicate with an approach which challenges or even simply questions the assumptions that render it sensible. In this thesis, in order to articulate my understanding of Rancière with IR I focus on writing my contribution and my argument in line with the Post-positivist questioning of political and axiomatic underpinnings. As I argued in the introduction I have identified three distinct literatures within the fourth “debate” that, I propose, my contribution to and reading of Rancière can be best articulated with.

The first of these is Narrative IR Theory which rose to prominence as part of the constructivist & post-positivist turn within the fourth “debate”. This work is often historicist in nature, as in the work of Suganami and not explicitly concerned with politics or the political. Similarly, Roberts while recognising overlap with post-positivist understandings of narratives but advocates a distinct phenomenological understanding of the concept which, he believes can (re)ground core assumptions and maintain the coherence of the field. But what interests me here is political nature of specifically post-positivist Narrative methodology. This approach to IR seeks to challenge the

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fundamental assumptions of IR offering a political (ac)count of the field and seeking reposition academic practice. As such my conception of politics fits nicely in thinking how Narrative politics both conforms to and challenges the methodology that can deployed in IR.

One example of this within the literature is the introduction of autoethnography. Löwenheim charts this initial movement\(^{161}\) and seeks to bring the method through. Brigg and Bleiker follow this thread looking at the way in which the academic in IR becomes a source of knowledge.\(^{162}\) We can see this movement carried through in the work of Doty\(^{163}\) and Auchter.\(^{164}\) In reading IR not only as an external world to be subject to examination but also as a set of practices lived and experienced by the researcher and their subject Narrative IR theory critiques of IR’s hegemonic understanding of itself and, by turning the understanding of IR onto the researcher themselves, politicises the study of IR. This is also interesting when thinking of my allies within the field such as Bleiker who, as mentioned in the introduction has considered and deployed this method which unsettles the way in which the field has been considered both as a site of academia and material reality forcing a rethink of what constitutes IR and the study of it. This necessarily cuts across and challenges the founding assumptions of the field both epistemologically and methodologically and gives my argument a location for articulation to the field.

Interestingly this leads to aesthetic experimentation which is another point of similarity between my own argumentation and the approach of Narrative IR. For example, Jackson not only looks at the way in which the self can be a mechanism through which to know IR but also experiments in the form of academic writing.\(^{165}\) We can see the subversion of traditional academic prose also in the work of

In challenging the mode by which IR can understand itself Narrative IR Theory offers a reading of the frameworks of IR in its (re)performance as well as scholarship. Work by Dauphinee and Muppidi follows this narrativized format. Much like the turn towards an autoethnographic methodology the move towards challenging academic form offers a cross cutting critique of the foundations of IR. By breaking down the structures in which IR scholarship is (re)performed Narrative IR Theory opens up a political space in which these assumptions can be challenged. By reading IR as a site for aesthetic contestation it becomes possible to forward a perspective that enables a differing understanding of IR. This again is fertile ground for my contribution to germinate.

Another place we can see the political contribution of Narrative IR theory is within the Journal of Narrative Politics. Publishing their first issue in 2014 the journal offered a reading of the field that was challenging in two ways. Firstly, it was founded on diverse ranges of scholarly form as well as style. This has ranged between shorts, poetry, film, photography, and interviews. In taking this approach to academic knowledge and prose the Journal of Narrative Politics offers and explicitly political re-rendering of IR. This is a movement we can see not only in the work published there but also in the mechanics of the journal. By using a double-open peer review system the journal

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challenges the dominant academic hegemonic constellation in IR. This mode of challenging the institution of academic IR is interesting and potentially political. My arguments reading of Rancière into IR gives a way to for me to read this literature and its impact on the field politically. It also explications the way in which Narrative IR theory can be seen as political through my reading of Rancière into the field. Here we can see again as foregrounded in the introduction how my contribution relates to the field of Narrative IR theory.

The second literature which I foregrounded as a site of interested to my argument and to which I am writing towards is Post-Positivist Feminist IR theory. Feminist IR theory is by its nature political, unpicking the hidden assumptions of the field and opening up space within which new subjectivities and voices can become apparent. Sjoberg in her research into the immunity principle argues for a gendered analysis of phenomena in IR theory.176 In her critique of Carpenter177, Sjoberg highlights the needs for a political understanding of these issues.178 Feminist IR becomes a point at which we can bring through the political dimensions of IR that are excluded through the mainstream discourse.

In response to this I focus on Feminist theory, which is avowedly political. In this sense I highlight how Feminist IR has looked to unpick both the ontological179 and methodological180 assumptions of the field. By understanding how gender and sex are (in)visible within IR Feminist theory gives the opportunity for the emergence of new understandings and subjectivities. This as I argue in the thesis at length is fertile ground for the understanding of political.181 The approach of Post-Positivist Feminist IR Theory has been to break down the assumptions which structure IR with particular focus on gender

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181 Ibid.
& sex.\textsuperscript{182} Tickner highlights the way in which IR has been resilient to respond to critique of its assumptions along these lines.\textsuperscript{183} Enloe\textsuperscript{184}, Harraway\textsuperscript{185} and Shepard\textsuperscript{186} give us different techniques by which the ground has been cleared to the emergence of a new subjectivity. Carver highlights the way in which this understanding of the world is not unique to IR although it can have unique benefits.\textsuperscript{187} A Post-Positivist Feminist mode of IR Theory offers the potential to both understand the decomposition\textsuperscript{188} and breathe new life\textsuperscript{189} into the field. Thinking of the ways in which IR is lived and embodied\textsuperscript{190} has opened up new horizons for thought.\textsuperscript{191} This has carried through challenges to the theoretical\textsuperscript{192} and practical understanding of IR.\textsuperscript{193} While there is a significant contribution and section of theorisation to which I am writing within post-positivist Feminist IR there are also moments in which Police action organises and foregrounds this reading. As highlighted in the introduction I write towards this field with an open and honest contribution but recognise the limitations and significance of my potential use value.

\textsuperscript{188} C. Sylvester, ‘Experiencing the End and Afterlives of International Relations/Theory’, \textit{European Journal of International Relations}, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2013) pp. 609-626
A third literature which is of special interest and important for my contribution is Post-Structural IR Theory. Given Post structural IR’s unpicking of the core values of the field it is a literature that is concerned with working through and deconstructing the way in which the field has congealed around its core assumptions, as I argue and have argued its arkhè of anarchy. Ashley, Walker, Hoffman and critical theorist Linklater all produced (ac)counts by which these assumptions can be challenged and to which I am writing towards. My mode of understanding the field focuses on response to the failure of positivism to produce a cohesive narrative to and from IR. In working through the assumptions of the field my contribution to Post-Positivist IR Theory opens up a space in which the grounding principles of the discipline are broken down and challenged. This ties in with the contribution I offer the field as my reading of Rancière gives us a way of understanding what is political, and through my deconstruction of IR, the field itself that avoids many of the pitfalls around ontology.

My argumentation offers a substantive critique of the underlying assumptions of the field but also gives a clear definition of politics which can be deployed by these modes of theorisation and is written in service of this mode of theorisation.

This literature, I am writing towards, focused initially on opening up a meta-theoretical critique of IR’s hegemonic constellation. Ashley and Walker brought together the seminal early works in this

approach to IR in their edition of International Studies Quarterly.\textsuperscript{202} The Post-Structural IR Literature used this meta-theoretical critique to unpack the assumptions around state identity as well as foreign policy.\textsuperscript{203} In breaking down the disciplinary assumptions, such as anarchy, that hold mainstream IR together, post-Structuralist IR offers a way of cutting across and breaking down this understanding of the field. Walkers \textit{Inside/Outside} is a key text which looks at the way in which the field can be conceived politically.\textsuperscript{204} I give a closer analysis of Walker’s text later in the thesis. But we can see in this mode of analysis, the breaking down of the field’s core assumptions in order to highlight areas that have but occluded. As I have signalled earlier we can see a similar vein in work by Bleiker\textsuperscript{205} but that of Der Derian.\textsuperscript{206} Der Derian’s reading of networks as well as unpicking the role of the quantum in IR offers and alternative reading of the fields understanding and underpinning within physics provides another ally to which I am writing this thesis. By unpacking the assumptions that enable a conception of IR and consciously exploring the way in which the field organises itself politically Post-structuralist IR aligns with the contribution of my thesis. This enables my contribution of a Rancièrian theory of IR to be read as a new way of configuring our understanding of the field. I offer a contribution to this literature as my thesis offers a modality of understanding IR and its relationship to practical material international relations that questions how such a rationality is projected.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This chapter has drawn out my argumentation through the historical trajectory of the great “debates” in IR. I have foregrounded my contribution and analysis of anarchy by charting its history. This, in light


of the introduction, can be read as me foregrounding my contribution, location and voice within the field. I have in this chapter given an (ac)count not only of my own position but where and to who that position could have value. This analysis, specifically of anarchy is then carried over into the next section which addresses the particulars of IR’s theorisation of anarchy. Broadly we can see this chapter as giving a literature review which highlights not only the location of my contribution to IR but where and to whom I am writing in IR.
Chapter Two:
Anarchy as an Organising Principle of IR

Introduction

In Chapter One I charted and organised my contribution to the field. I showed how anarchy developed across the field as an organising principle. In this chapter I build on the analysis developed in the literature review and argue that understanding Anarchy will also prefigure my Rancièrèian framework which shows how anarchy constructs IR’s distribution of the sensible. That is to say, I mark out my own understanding and build on my justification for moving Rancièrian thought into IR through understanding anarchy as providing a basis for the distribution of the sensible in IR.

I begin with an exploration and an immanent critique of anarchy in the field. The second section of this chapter cements this reading of anarchy within a close reading of Waltz. I argue that the concept of anarchy, by virtue of its function of ordering the field is also a point at which politics can be leveraged. This is important for thinking my contribution to the field. I discuss some extant critiques in the literature and argue that if we are to understand anarchy as an ordering principle than this will have an impact on what can be understood as politics in IR through my Rancièrian lens.

Anarchy in IR Theory

Anarchy is often understood taken as the organising principle of IR,¹ both a starting point for understanding it but also central to theories of it.² As I charted in the literature review, anarchy has been central to the Realist understanding of IR as well as the development of the field. It is not a theoretically neutral term but, rather, comes from a particular theoretical and thus political

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orientation. Within this section I will work through how anarchy can be understood to act as the organising principle in IR theory.

While anarchy is central to the Realist understanding of IR it has been challenged by a variety of approaches. Lake, for example, looks at thinking through hierarchy as an alternative organising principle for IR. This mode of analysis is similar to that employed by Donnelly in thinking through the structural and hierarchical nature of IR theory. By reading hierarchy as the organising principle of IR, as opposed to anarchy, these authors seek to problematize the field’s latent understanding of anarchy as a central, elective tenet. Lechner argues that such approaches don’t actually tackle the concept of anarchy itself but rather look to challenge theories of anarchy. She argues that the movement towards hierarchy as an organising principle fails to recognise the way in which hierarchy is extant within Waltz’s and Bull’s theorisations of anarchy. Following Lechner I contend that by working through how anarchy orders IR and IR theory, we can see that anarchy operationalises both a material and conceptual hierarchy. As such I don’t focus on hierarchy as the ordering principle since it is coterminous with anarchy. It is important for me to draw this distinction here not to dismiss the

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8 Ibid. 343
approach of hierarchy but to make clear my focus the reasons for which are given in more detail in this chapter.

We have to look at how anarchy is read in the field, at the distinct meaning the term has (contrasting with lay or popular understandings but also with political philosophy and theory.\(^\text{10}\) Pritchard and Havercroft argue that there are tensions in how anarchy is read in IR.\(^\text{11}\) They open up the way in which it has been read across the field as both order and alternative modes to theorisation outside of order.\(^\text{12}\) Pritchard\(^\text{13}\) and Pritchard and Cerny\(^\text{14}\) look at the way which anarchy changes over time within the field. Anarchy in IR theory doesn’t have the same connotation of disorder that it connotes in the public vernacular\(^\text{15}\) or the anarchist tradition.\(^\text{16}\) Rather within IR it is constructed both as the absence of a centralised authority but also as the material condition of IR. Sjoberg drawing on Pritchard states that the substantive existence of anarchy is separate from the approach taken by theorists.\(^\text{17}\) Sjoberg uses Pritchard’s four categories across anarchy as a virtue, an object to be tamed, a condition to be ascended and worthy of having its virtues reconsidered.\(^\text{18}\) I argue, like Sjoberg\(^\text{19}\), that rather than reconsidering the virtues of anarchy we need to move towards thinking about the rationale between anarchy and its ordering of IR. While Sjoberg looks to the formal and substantive distinctions within anarchy,\(^\text{20}\) I focus on its function as an ordering principle and the consequences this has for politics in IR.


\(^{12}\) Ibid. pp. 255


\(^{18}\) Ibid. pp. 328

\(^{19}\) Ibid. pp. 328

\(^{20}\) Ibid. pp. 328
To think further about how anarchy is understood in IR we have to start with its Hobbesian character. In *Leviathan* Hobbes presents anarchy as the human-condition before the social contract. He goes as far to describe nations as ‘*in the state and posture of Gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another*’. Anarchy in IR is conditioned by Hobbes along lines of fear. Thus anarchy is not just a material fact of the world for Hobbes but also part of a psychological condition in its subjects. We can see this line of understanding carried through in Foucault’s understanding of war in *Society Must Be Defended*. For Foucault Hobbes’ understanding of the anarchic condition of war is a way of bracketing out actually occurring material warfare via a mode of representation. This is not an easy transition and there is tension between Hobbes’s characterisation of anarchy and the way in which he is read into IR. However, as Bull and Donnelly elucidate in their readings of Hobbes it is possible to reading this mode of anarchy across the Classical Realist tradition and, as I explore in my close reading, the latter Neo-Realist turn. The understanding of Hobbesian anarchy is then foundational for the way in which anarchy is understood in the field. From this survival becomes understood as the predominant motivation for states within IR as well as the racialization of hierarchy. Hobbes’s construction of anarchy applies only in relation to the sovereign at the domestic

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23 Ibid. pp. 90
26 Ibid. pp. 50 & 97
level and the anarchic within IR.\textsuperscript{32} This distinction is important for how anarchy is read into the field as it forms a constitutive absence which organises state relations. Without the void of anarchy IR would be necessarily compressed into a singularity of sovereignty and the field would melt into that of domestic politics. Anarchy structures the field not through a surplus but rather through an absence. That is to say, in contrast to a constitutive presence or condition such as sovereignty anarchy operates is a constitutive absence. Let us look at this further.

Anarchy structures the field through setting the conditions for sensibility of IR. This means, especially in light of and for the Realist tradition, that it provides a background ontology against which states construct their own identities, capabilities and self-understanding. Anarchy delimits the possibility for state action as it organises the space in which states find themselves. While this may seem like a Constructivist claim it can be seen to operate within the Realist tradition.\textsuperscript{33} Indeed, anarchy operates as a constitutive absence throughout Realism. As I argued in Chapter One Carr, who established Realism via a self-orchestrated\textsuperscript{34} challenge to Idealism\textsuperscript{35}, arranged the Realist position as against a utopian or idealist understanding of IR.\textsuperscript{36} His Classical Realism is constructed on an understanding of IR backlit by Hobbesian anarchy. Through rejection of the utopic idealised understanding of Idealism Carr grounds his argumentation in a notion of reality.\textsuperscript{37} This is a reality structured along historical lines which internalise and subsume anarchy. Importantly here anarchy referred to the empirical fact of a lack of a visible world government or centralised authority. Carr, then, constructs anarchy not as a

\textsuperscript{32} J. Garner, ‘Limitations on National Sovereignty in International Relations’, \textit{American Political Science Review}, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1926) pp. 8
structural consideration but rather an internal factor, inherent within “human nature”. This fixation on “human nature” serves as a positivistic driver of an implicitly Hobbesian anarchy.

We can see this again in Morgenthau who reads “human nature” as threefold: biological, rational and spiritual.\textsuperscript{38} At the centre of this understanding is human embodiment. This gives IR an ontological basis in “human nature” as well as its driving force of \textit{animus dominandi} (the desire for power). This is for Morgenthau both a Hobbesian and ontological condition of human existence.\textsuperscript{39} Kostagiannis highlights for Classical Realism how the individual condition of anarchy becomes a collective condition for IR.\textsuperscript{40} Anarchy then, and the climate/feeling of fear that accompanies it, becomes central to the way in which statesmen and states understand their relations to each other. Here the way in which anarchy constructs IR becomes clear in that it establishes the condition by which IR becomes intelligible to those carrying it out and those interpreting it. For Classical Realism, and as I have argued in the literature review the rest of the field, anarchy is a facet of the international system which must be understood, operationalised and respected in order for IR to function. Anarchy is then constitutive of IR in the same way that a chess piece’s move-set is based on its ontology. While there are a vast array of strategies and tactics one can pursue with such pieces the framing of their movements is pre-ordained. Similarly, states must act within the reality that produce. Anarchy then becomes an ontological status linked to the human condition and delimits the possibilities of IR. Anarchy is not simply a structure within/of the system but that which actively structures the system itself. A structure that is not a presence but rather an absence.

The Classical Realist understanding of anarchy is particularly in the way it highlights and makes clear how anarchy acts not only as an ordering principle but also as an ontological grounding for the field. The Neo-Realist understanding of anarchy is particularly important for seeing how the concept

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. pp. 169
\textsuperscript{40} K. Kostagiannis, ‘Hans Morgenthau and the Tragedy of the Nation State’, \textit{The International History Review}, Vol. 34, No. 4, (2014) pp. 514
structures the field. As I show through a close reading of Waltz this approach separates anarchy from the individual condition of humanity and instead makes it a structural feature of the system. The negativity of anarchy as a constitutive absence becomes the permissive cause of state behaviour and thus assumes an active ontological reality. It begins to exert causal effects on states. Anarchy operates at a central position in relation to the other assumptions of Neo-Realism and while these do contribute to the creation and performance of Neo-Realist theory this rests upon the permission of anarchy. The assumption of a permissive cause necessitates a hierarchy between the body which permits and the agent who acts. Anarchy then, while always silent, is nonetheless permissive and adopts a preferential position, above other modes of causation, within this reading of IR.

I argue that Anarchy is a constitutive absence structuring the field through setting the conditions for the sensibility of IR. In thinking anarchy as an ordering principle, we can see how it is read in the Realist tradition as an ontological feature of IR theory this is significant for both my argument and contribution.

**Anarchy in Man the State and War**

I read through Kenneth Waltz’s *Man the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* in order to highlight exactly how anarchy can be seen within IR. I chart the movement of anarchy throughout the text and highlight how, rather than just being a third image phenomenon, it is immanent throughout animating the text as a constituent absence. Waltz contended that the book ‘did not present a theory of international politics’ but simply laid its foundations.⁴¹ I argue that this produces the foundation for theorisation the text rests upon a specific theorisation of anarchy as a constitutive absence. This line of thought forms a central station for my contribution and argument.

Before I move to the reading it is important to justify my selection of the text, its context and location within Waltz’s work. I have chosen to read *Man, The State and War*, as opposed to *Theory of

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International Politics\textsuperscript{42}, or Realism and International Politics\textsuperscript{43}, as this text is the one in which the notion of permissive causality is at its clearest. Man, The State and War, like The Origins of War in Neo-Realist Theory\textsuperscript{44} and Structural Realism after the Cold War\textsuperscript{45} looks at how anarchy acts as the permissive cause in IR. Within Waltz’s work Man, The State and War is an earlier text (based on his dissertation)\textsuperscript{46} and it directly articulates his theorisation of war. This is important as work such as Evaluating Theories\textsuperscript{47}, The Stability of a Bipolar World\textsuperscript{48} and Realist Thought and Neo-Realist Theory\textsuperscript{49} provide accounts of Waltz’s theory that don’t necessarily focus on the relationship between anarchy and IR. Man, The State and War gives this articulation clearly and with a focus on the way in which anarchy structures the field. The other text that is important to bear in mind is Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, an important and robust theorisation of Waltz position but one which, given its aims of articulating a thin holistic theory of IR, doesn’t have the detailed analysis of the way in which anarchy has causal power in IR that we find in Man, The State and War.

The text is structured by three different “images” of the international system. Each chapter on an “image” is followed by one discussing its implications. In this reading I focus on the articulation of the “images” themselves but will discuss some of the relevant implications. Waltz takes each “image” as providing the separate functions that become visible from that viewpoint.\textsuperscript{50} The notion of the “image” is interesting in itself - images are not bound by a necessarily strict hierarchy but rather can be viewed both separately and simultaneously.\textsuperscript{51} The use of “image” also highlights the way in which there is an overlap between these categories. These for Waltz a way of “seeing” IR that is eminently sensory.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[43]{K. Waltz, Realism and International Politics, (Routledge, London, 2008)}
\footnotetext[51]{Ibid pp. ix}
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While Waltz denies there is a strict or necessary hierarchy between these “images” it becomes clear that there is at least a latent one which privileges the third “image” and by extension anarchy within the text. Each of these “images” is meant to give a potential cause of war in IR. The first looks at human nature, the second the composition of the state and the third the structure of the international system (anarchy). In their presentation Waltz draws up the “images” as theoretical approaches which are substantiated by examples from history, economics and politics. The text has been read as targeted at liberal understandings of IR and it is part of the movement from Classical Realism to Neo-Realism as is clear from Waltz’s critique of Morgenthau as well as the move towards game theory.

Waltz begins the book with an allegory between war and natural disaster. He rejects the essentialisation of warfare as divine or natural and asserts that there are three possible cause of war. Each of these becomes one of the “images” that act as Waltz’s mode of analysis. Each is a ‘nexus of important causes’. Thus, Waltz reduces the complexities of empirical reality so as to make visible a distinct understanding of IR. Just as changing the focus on a camera can reveal and obscure details in the subjects of the photo so too can the differing “images” of international relations reveal and obscure causes of war.

Anarchy and the First Image

Waltz begins by looking at the claim that the causes of war are found in the nature and behaviour of individual humans. The first image, then, locates War within “human-nature”. Among those who see with this image ‘there are both optimists and pessimists’. Waltz reads philosophical pessimism as the

54 Ibid. pp. 198-210
55 Ibid. pp. 1
56 Ibid. pp. 3-7
57 Ibid. pp. 12
58 Ibid. pp. 16
59 Ibid. pp. 18
mode of understanding expressed within Morgenthau, Malthus and Milton. For the Waltzian pessimist ‘the forces of evil may be contrived but the expectation of a generally and permanently good results is prevented by constant awareness of the vitiating effects of an essential defect’. For the optimist reality is ‘good, [and] society basically harmonious’. Waltz draws out here an ontological distinction between two viewpoints on reality which each give an ethical colour to it. Waltz divides these two first “image” approaches into distinctly ethically charged categories and in doing so stakes out two separate ontological positions.

The optimist then becomes written into a universe that is inherently ethical at the ontological, the pessimist into one that is inherently defective. In establishing this distinction between optimistic and pessimistic readings of the first “image” Waltz begins to privilege the position of the pessimist. This move has an interesting character as it works through devaluing the notion of Spinozan anarchy. Anarchism here differs from its usual form as a lack of government. Within this deployment of anarchy in the first “image” there is already a simplification – one which obscures the fact that between the optimist cosmology and pessimist cosmology anarchy is contested. For the optimist, the moral orientation inherent in the world means that the absence of laws in a state of anarchy is not a lack of law qua law; natural moral law is inscribed in the universe. But this is not how the concept must function within Waltz’s thought. There, anarchy is implicitly inscribed with a lack of moral character. Through the division of the first “image” into the separate ontological categories Waltz sneaks in the assumptions he later relies on to disavow the optimist framing of the first “image”. More importantly he sets up the pessimist ontological framing as the a priori condition of the international system and anarchy then becomes a term loaded with “pessimistic” connotations. This is how the meaning of anarchy can shift from something harmonious, as in Spinoza, to something inherently discordant.

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60 Ibid. pp. 18
61 Ibid. pp. 19
62 Ibid. pp. 19
63 Ibid. pp. 23
64 Ibid. pp. 23
65 Ibid. pp. 183
This is really important for our understanding of anarchy in IR. This movement which enmeshes anarchy into the pessimist orientation shapes how the concept works in the field.

The first “image”, which is concerned with the nature and behaviour of “human nature” as the cause of war, builds on the established distinction between optimist and pessimist to set up a difference in the way in which causation works. In this distinction Waltz establishes a simple maxim which can be tested: war can be eliminated if humans can be changed.66 This becomes the stakes of the first “image”. Drawing on Spinoza, Augustine, Niebuhr and Morgenthau, Waltz establishes the condition of war, and anarchy as related to reason and passion.67 Following this distinction between rationality and passion Waltz links the causal explanation of war to “human nature” and therefore a panoply of human activities.68 Although for Waltz these activities and our “nature” are outside of our ability to change them69 it is possible to reduce the play of human’s passions.70 Rather than the first “image” serving as a cogent explanation of the cause of war, Waltz instead begins to argue for the transition to a different “image”. The first “image” then becomes inherently unable to explain the occurrences of war in the international system other than by claiming responsibility for the wars themselves. This logic Waltz highlights has been employed both by his optimists and pessimists through firstly, noticing conflict, secondly asking themselves why it occurs and, thirdly, pinning the blame on a small number of behaviour traits.71

Waltz smuggles in the conception of anarchy as the cause of war not only through ontological claims but also through shifting usage of the terminology. Initially he identifies the term as a positive condition, as in Spinoza.72 But quickly it gathers negative connotations of lawlessness and chaos.73 These are possible only because Waltz has already adopted his own pessimistic ontological structure.

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66 Ibid. pp. 25
67 Ibid. pp. 24
68 Ibid. pp. 28
69 Ibid. pp. 30
70 Ibid. pp. 30-34
71 Ibid. pp. 39
72 Ibid. pp. 23
73 See Ibid. pp. 26, 31, 32, 37, 38, 58, 62, 69 & 76
He does not make an argument for the pessimist condition he tacitly endorses. Instead it is always already assumed in order for the state to act as a buffer against the tide of war. The arguments he does give for the adoption of the pessimist condition are linked firstly to the denegation of the optimist position\textsuperscript{74} or adopted as a mechanism by which to argue against the adoption of a world state.\textsuperscript{75}

Waltz, then, is not simply analysing the role that human nature and activity have in the occurrence of war but instead setting up the preconditions for his theoretical structure. He smuggles anarchy into the first “image” through the conclusion that the immutability of human nature means it is subject to mutable institutions.\textsuperscript{76} “Human nature” is taken as natural and therefore outside of our agency whereas states and the international system are not natural and therefore subject to our agency. The fact that agential activity can be inscribed on the state means that as causes of war that can be influenced/explained by humans it is a more powerful cause. This is Waltz shifting the image already within the first “image” away from the individual and into institutions. This prefigures the structural move to anarchy. It is why he requires the chapter arguing and excluding the behavioural sciences from the field.\textsuperscript{77} The claims made there are precisely that the human form is mutable not just by contingency but through human technique.\textsuperscript{78} I won’t spend to the time to work through the argumentation of this chapter here as it doesn’t bear as closely on the role of anarchy as the chapters on the “images” do.

The arguments surrounding the first “image” do more than just highlight its unserviceability as an explanation for the cause of war. They are in fact concerned with establishing - through a series of assumptions and negations - the preconditions of Waltz theory. His division between pessimist and optimist enables his ontological framework which then orients the international system against progressive understandings of history and loads anarchy with an inherently amoral if not always

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid. pp. 38
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid. pp. 66
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid. pp. 41
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid. pp. 42-79
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid. pp. 47
immoral content. Importantly this sets the terms of anarchy for the rest of the text and more broadly for Waltz’s theoretical project. It is through this conclusion that Waltz manages to redirect the first “image” away from the site of human nature and onto the melding of human nature as by its institutions. The cause of war then already becomes enmeshed with international anarchy. 79 By raising the spectre of world-government, which is untenable given the pessimist ontological orientation, Waltz moves the question from “human nature” in relation to the human to the international system in relation to “human nature”. This highlights how Waltz is not concerned with the actual condition of “human nature” but instead with how humanity is shaped by its relation to the international system - which is anarchic. The first “image” wasn’t about the role of “human nature” but instead the role of the anarchical international system and its relation to that “human nature”. The third “image” is hidden behind the first and IR is ordered by a constitutive absence. Waltz represses and reformulates anarchy within the first “image” precisely so he may impregnate that “image” with anarchy. This is the theoretical condition for the later claim that that ‘those who, seeing the cause of war in men, seek to change them’ 80 and inevitably come to see ‘world government’ as the “psychological” foundation for peace. 81 Anarchy, the third image, is the condition of possibility for the first.

Anarchy and the Second Image

In developing his concept of the second “image” Waltz takes the relation between the state and the individual as metonymic. 82 A human being is like a liquid: ‘water running out of a faucet is chemically the same as water in a container, but once the water is in a container, it can be made to “behave” in different ways.’ 83 The state, then, is a metonymic container for “human nature” – one which has effects on behaviour. To develop this images Waltz asks two sets of initial questions about the causes of war. The first look at the nature of international politics, the second at the nature of the state. 84

79 Ibid. pp. 34
80 Ibid. pp. 42
81 Ibid. pp. 69
82 Ibid. pp. 80
83 Ibid. pp. 80
84 Ibid. pp. 81
Waltz raises this notion of international politics openly but diverts it to the third “image” and delineates the nature of the state as the level of analysis for the second “image”. The argument is that the internal nature of states will determine the likelihood of their engagement in war. The metonymy to the first “image” is increasingly apparent here as states act as like units to humans.

Waltz initially develops this as a positive claim through the work of Bodin. He considers the claim that a reformation of state “nature” could, just as if you could change “human nature”, lead to the reduction or elimination of war. Within both the first and second “image” warfare is a pathology. The defective humanity of the defective state act as the causal drivers for war. Thinking back to the initial division of war as separate from the natural and divine phenomena we can see how this barrier is already broken down. If war can be considered a pathological state of being, then it is in a sense already outside of the control of human agency. Waltz here makes war a phenomenon outside of the remit of human action and places it in the bounds of the state. Waltz draws out two examples of theories of potentially “good” states: Kant and Marx (although there remains much of Hobbes throughout). Waltz’s understanding of the “image”, then, is not of states as war-wagers but, rather, states as war-producers. This means that the condition of war emerges not from the actions of states but from their “nature”.

Waltz attacks this thesis but in doing so has already shifted the relationship by deferring the agency of states to the third “image”. Cycling this deferral back to the first “image’s” location of human nature as linked to international politics we can see a pattern by Waltz relies on anarchy to sustain his argumentation. By delineating the questions between state action and structure Waltz applies the pressure of the third “image” before he has defined. If there was no third image with which to credit the agential capacities of states, then the second image would cease to be about the nature of states.
but instead focus on their capabilities. This movement would then stop war being a pathology of states very being and become a method for state action. However, Waltz’s reliance on anarchy means that only in the third “image” can IR distinguish war-as-method-in from war-as-symptom.

While this is given as an explanation of the second “image” it is only understandable if viewed implicitly from the third “image”. The state here engages in warfare out of a desire to alleviate its own pathology as opposed to the pathology driving the state. The shifting between the agency of states and their relation to the system and war already shows how anarchy seeps into the constitution of the second “image”. To go back to the analogy given by Waltz, the second image isn’t truly about looking at the differing sizes and shapes of pots in which water boils. Rather it is about looking at the ways in which containers can be shaped to affect the boiling of water. By re-reading Waltz’s metaphor like this we can see that the second “image” is already doing more work than simply explore how states are internally constructed: it is foregrounding and reliant upon anarchy.

We can see this reliance traced throughout the commentary on the second “image” in that it is concerned with the projection/establishment of a political theory and in particular a theory that is grounded in an understanding of anarchy. Waltz draws on Hobbes for this foundation. As I have argued earlier in the chapter we can see how the Hobbesian understanding of anarchy is baked into the formulation of anarchy here. It is worth also thinking about the pessimistic understanding presented in the first “image” and how that relates to thinking IR. Waltz carries the inherently negative connotations of anarchy through his established pessimist ontology. It is against this backdrop - the state as the saving grace of the first image from the inherent negativity of anarchy - that the second “image” becomes clear. With the metonymic state as his unit Waltz paints the liberal position as making the argument that good states equal a good system. From this Waltz unfolds two core questions that all socio-economic systems need to answer. The first questions is about what states

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89 Ibid. pp. 85
90 Ibid. pp. 86
need to understand what makes them function. The second question is about what makes states function well. Returning to my initial reading we can see here how Waltz manages to pathologise the state. Waltz’s state then imbibes the liberal prescription but without the potential for the mitigation of anarchy.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 96} States become internally ordered but constituted within a pessimistic cosmology. Within the second image then, sovereignty of the state is an essential assumption by which the international location of the state is given to appear. State’s become the organiser of the international system ordering both themselves and their relationships to each other through their own healthy or pathological existence. Although this may seem to lend power to the states the capacity to organise and order is itself ordered through the pessimist ontology of anarchy. This constitutive absence shapes the way in which states can possibly relate to one another.

This is the form by which Waltz arranges the second image in which the right of states springs unendingly from themselves and the international is arranged by virtue of their salubriousness.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 97} It is important to note here that war, the object of the text’s analysis, becomes an arbiter of state dispute and the ordering methodology open to states. As mentioned previously this opens up two divergent and conflicting notions of warfare: war-as-method-in and war-as-symptom-of. This is part of Waltz’s critique of the Liberal argumentation that goes unspoken but assumed. War is operating in conflicting ways within the second “image” because it cannot take the appropriate distance from the third image. The second image serves then to establish through the liberal argumentation a mechanistic state. This means the state is formulated through an economic analogy\footnote{See Ibid. pp. 83-84, 86, 90-92, 94-5, 98, 108 & 119} and is a like-unit to all other states. This mechanistic state is useful for Waltz when zooming up to his third image informed by game-theory. By establishing through liberal argumentation, a state that is fundamentally a mechanical actor he can carry the metonymy from first to second; to second to third. The ground is laid for a state which can be taken as a monolith, essential for Waltz’s political understanding of the third image, and in doing
so the constitution of states is moved from their units, whose arrangement is the indicator of good health, to their environment.

The theoretical moves made by Waltz here establish the relationship between the internal composition of states and the rationality between states, as well as the assumption of anarchy. Waltz’s theoretical aim is to step away from the condition of states themselves and move to looking at how anarchy forces their arrangement. Before it is possible for Waltz to highlight how anarchy is the permissive cause behind war he first has to eliminate the notion that war springs from the sickness of the state. Thus, in critiquing the Liberal frame of IR the second “image” serves his argument in much the same way as the first: it establishes the preconditions for the third.

Within the second “image” the internal ordering of a state becomes detached already from the constitution of the state. If political (re)organisation isn’t sufficient to cause war then the cause of war must be constituted externally from outside the state i.e. anarchy. With the assumptions given in the first “image” and built on through the second it becomes clear that anarchy provides the cause for war. The relationships between states under anarchy cannot be coloured by the internal ordering of states rather it must be constituted by their outside.

**Anarchy and the Third Image**

The third “image” of the international system is where Waltz brings anarchy to the fore and it becomes clear that the cause for war is the structure of the system: anarchy. Conflict becomes not a pathological feature of the construction of states but rather a structural consideration. The text constructs the existence of sovereign states as an inherently lawless system. Waltz here carries through the metonymic understanding of the state as individual through to the international system. The difference with the third “image” is that the focus shifts to the conditions which shape the interrelation of states. There’s a distinction here between the first and second “image” in which the

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94 Ibid. pp. 99
95 Ibid. pp. 159
agent has access to differing mechanisms for resolution. In the third “image” agents (states) have no recourse to any resolutions outside of their own means. Waltz articulates anarchy to this understanding by his adherence to his own pessimist ontology. He states that ‘in anarchy there is no harmony’. 96 Waltz builds this assertion out of Machiavelli 97 and Rousseau 98 and it is worth spending a little bit of time working his relationship to Rousseau.

Waltz’s reading of Rousseau is focused solely on the latter’s example of the stag-hunt 99 and heavily shaped by the former’s pessimist ontology, making the third image into a game of balanced interests, rationalities and passions. This then makes anarchy tied to a numerical analysis. 100 Anarchy then becomes the rules by which IR can be ordered and “played”. Anarchy bridges the gap between the understanding of the second “image” state and the problem of action in IR. Waltz builds on this to understand that states and state behaviour are only recognisable as such in light of anarchy. 101 This movement grounds the third “image” in Waltz’s understanding of IR. Through this grounding, states become essentialised undifferentiated actors ordered by anarchy. By focusing on anarchy as the permissive cause of war in IR Waltz establishes the construction of states as understandable only as monolithic entities. We saw this in the second “image” of IR with the distinction being understood through a pathologisation. This movement means that the relationship between states and war moves from war-as-symptom to war-as-method – as part of the agency of states. States then have the choice to go to war based on and because of the condition of anarchy. In making this move Waltz empowers the anarchy as permissive condition of action in IR but can only do so as long as it is mute otherwise it would be effective. Anarchy by its nature is absence: the absence of harmony 102 or law. 103 Anarchy then is not an inscribed set of conditions or dictates but rather the assertion of its own permissibility.

96 Ibid. pp. 160
97 See Ibid. pp. 211-215
98 See Ibid. pp. 161, 165-170 & 172-175
99 Ibid. pp. 168-169
100 Ibid. pp. 201-203
101 Ibid. pp. 178
102 Ibid. pp. 160
103 Ibid. pp. 182
The “silence” of anarchy is important for how Waltz builds his theory of IR. Anarchy orders IR precisely as a silent partner. It is the environment within which the immediate causal mechanics of states operate. Waltz, in developing the distinction between the immediate cause of war and its true, permissive, cause – anarchy - gives the environment and thus anarchy itself a privileged position. The immediate causes are given in the first and second “image” and organise war-as-symptom-of the internal pathologies of human nature and state structure. These immediate causes are, however, secondary to the permissive cause of anarchy. There is an explicit causal here. The environment of anarchy shapes and renders sensible the immediate causes of warfare. Anarchy then has jurisdiction over the plausibility of war. This is always for Waltz a jurisdiction that is silent in and of itself. Anarchy, like Hobbesian liberty, is always permissive. Given the pessimist ontology Waltz establishes this makes the silence of that anarchy a-moral. Anarchy then must always be permissive in its jurisdiction and not restrictive for Waltz. This isn’t to say that anarchy isn’t restrictive in and of itself as it delimits the understanding of IR that is sensible to itself. Anarchy in the third “image” doesn’t positively produce the arrangement of IR directly but, rather, is a constitutive absence producing IR through its negativity.

This is an important distinction to draw for my larger argument. Anarchy is like the “dark energy” of IR, constantly shaping the system but undetectable and indecipherable. It is essential for the functioning of IR yet remains an unobservable and immeasurable quality. This isn’t to say that anarchy is a progressive or material force in IR - in actuality it is a silent void which permits state action. But in establishing such a void Waltz is free to then fill it with his own a priori. The lacunae of anarchy becomes the entry way for Waltz’s own understanding of the functionality of IR. This constitutive absence is then a byword for the structural ordering of IR through the permissive and silent causality of anarchy.

104 Ibid. pp. 162
105 Ibid. pp. 233
106 Ibid. pp. 233
This has an important consequence for sovereignty within IR. Waltz’s mode of (ac)counting IR isn’t concerned with the positivity of particular qualities but, rather, the space into which such qualities are allowed to unfold. The absence of boundaries and limits becomes constitutive of the system and gives licence for the actions of states. The permissive quality of anarchy is therefore doubly potent as it is also tied into the causality of the actions carried out by states. Anarchy doesn’t just allow actions to occur in IR but it also allows and enables that action to take place. This isn’t to say that because Waltz makes anarchy a void that it is neutral. Rather he maintains that it is devoid of harmony. Anarchy’s silent primordial character is constitutive for the system of IR that comes out of it. Anarchy is not a simply amorphous substrate but is committed to the pessimist orientation Waltz imbues it with. The third “image” gives us anarchy as an ordering principle that is a constitutive absence. Anarchy structures the sensibility of the field while being imperceptible to it. This is something I take forwards in the final section of this chapter. In looking at how anarchy acts as the ordering principle of IR I argue this has implications not only for the order(ing) of IR but also for how politics can be understood in IR.

**Anarchy as Opening up Space for Politics**

As I outline in the next chapter in Rancière’s political theory political action is linked to the ordering principle of a ‘distribution of the sensible’. As such my argument is that anarchy constructs the distribution of the sensible in IR. I begin to explore the consequences that the Anarchy has as an ordering principle for IR. This is important when thinking of my location within the field but also how my Rancièrian argumentation structures not only my argument in the thesis but my positionality and articulation to the field as a whole.

Havercroft and Pritchard argue that as a concept there has been little work in IR that has sought to understand how anarchy is defined within it. They seek to break down and understand the ways in

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107 Ibid. pp. 238
which it can be mapped within IR.\textsuperscript{109} In thinking anarchy in IR, they acknowledge how it is assumed automatically as the organising principle of the field but want to see a richer understanding of the concept flesheout.\textsuperscript{110} They offer us understandings grounded in Deleuzian assemblage theory or mediaeval heteronomy.\textsuperscript{111} The move to open up the theorisation of anarchy in IR is not unique to Havercroft & Pritchard.\textsuperscript{112} In thinking through anarchy as an ordering constituent absence it is interesting how Sjoberg states the concept is under-theorised.\textsuperscript{113} Anarchy for Sjoberg operates as an invisible structure that orders IR\textsuperscript{114} this is in line with some of the previous iterations I’ve given. What is interesting about Sjoberg’s argument is that the problem of anarchy isn’t just a theoretical one but a sensory one also.\textsuperscript{115} It isn’t just that anarchy structures the field but that it is invisible in this structuring.\textsuperscript{116}

As Sjoberg states, the problem isn’t that ‘Waltzian anarchy presumes that there is no structure within anarchy because no structure is visible in global politics.’\textsuperscript{117} This means that anarchy is not just an issue in terms of the theorisation of IR but an issue for sensing within IR. The theoretical and sensory apprehensibility of the field itself is determined by anarchy. As she states, her ‘goal is to understand the invisible ordering principles that populate anarchy, and then, in turn to, understand anarchy with order over a simplistic, empty, version of anarchy that is often the cornerstone of analysis of global politics.’\textsuperscript{118} Sjoberg’s argument is interesting and important for my argument in two ways. Firstly, she breaks with the conception of anarchy as empty but rather looks at the way in which it (re)produces overlapping modes of order(ing).\textsuperscript{119} This breaks down the anarchy-hierarchy distinction and looks at

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid. pp. 253-257
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid. pp. 262
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid. pp. 262
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid. pp. 325
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid. pp. 327
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid. pp. 326
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid. pp. 326
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid. pp. 326
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid. pp. 326
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid. pp. 330-335
how anarchy can be in and of itself hierarchical. As I demonstrate in the next chapter this has an interesting overlap with the concept of arkhē within Rancièrian thought. Secondly Sjoberg’s argument charts anarchy as a sensory problem. This, as I have mentioned previously, means that the structuring of the field is not solely about theoretical consistently or correlation to empirical reality. Rather Sjoberg recognises the way in which anarchy is effective at the level of apprehension. This is important for my argumentation as for my reading of Rancière all modes of order(ing) are carried out at the level of the sensory. By reading anarchy not only as a concept that enables the propagation of multiple modes of hierarchy but also as (re)produced at the level of apprehension my Rancièrian reading of IR aligns with Sjoberg’s own reading. This harks back to my introduction which highlights the alliances and contribution my thesis is drawing out here.

In order to articulate Sjoberg’s argumentation to my own it is worth considering the conception of hierarchy she deploys. For her, anarchy orders the field formally through its (non)presence but also substantively through invisible ordering principles that constrain and constitute the identities and behaviour of agents in IR.\textsuperscript{120} In particular she takes gender as an invisible ordering principle of IR. The problem in terms of anarchy and its relation to IR then is a sensory one but also a visual one. For Sjoberg politics in IR is linked into making the role of the invisible hierarchies visible. Following on from Dingli\textsuperscript{121} I argue that while Sjoberg is correct in unpicking the sensory nature of anarchy this issue is not a purely visible problem. Rather anarchy has a distinctly silent and silencing character. If for Sjoberg anarchy is a problem of visibility then for my argument it is not only a problem about what is visible but also what is hearable and more broadly sensible. This sensory distinction is worth playing out as it is important for the way in which I conceptualise not only the distribution of the sensible but for how I argue for the articulation of Rancière to IR. I have shown here how Sjoberg is both a clearly ally along with which I am writing but also a tension between our argumentation.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid. pp. 329
Another ally in the writing of my thesis is Dingli, whose thorough breakdown of the concept and literature surrounding silence in IR explicitly draws on Rancière to highlight the political dimension of silencing.\textsuperscript{122} In thinking through silence as a political sensory condition apprehensible only in relation to a distribution of the sensible Dingli paves the way for my thinking of Rancière in IR. She also draws attention to the way in which the sensory is a political issue in thinking not only IR but, more broadly, the international as a whole: ‘the exclusion of women’s experiences from established IR paradigms did not mean that women were invisible; rather it illustrated the establishment’s thoughts on their significance in international politics.’\textsuperscript{123} This linkage is important in that it highlights how issues surrounding the distribution of the sensible are not just matters of sensibility but are also always political. Apprehension structures the way in which IR can be considered a political discipline and the politics of IR understood and acted on. This distinction between the way in which (in)visibility is deployed in both Dingli and Sjoberg isn’t a distinction between their conceptions of the political but rather a distinction between how the political relates to the sensory. In Sjoberg visibility is a political reality constructed in relation to hierarchical structures. Anarchy delimits visibility along the lines of hierarchies it establishes. (In)Visibility is then a matter of (re)presentation and of the ability to see that which is (re)presented in IR. Sjoberg’s critique of anarchy in IR is political, on her terms, as it is a political act to render an “invisible” hierarchy visible. Dingli’s politics has a Rancièrian character, it isn’t about the (re)presentation of imperceptible yet extant hierarchies but about the ways in which the hierarchies are (re)producers of sensible categories. This is an important distinction to draw, not least as it highlights the distinctions between my own thought and that of Dingli and Sjoberg Dingli’s presentation of silence makes the political act not a question of (re)presentation within IR but rather a question of the sensory mechanisms that render subjects apprehensible to IR. This is important as when we should think IR both as silent and silencing in the way through which it constitutes the

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid. pp. 725-726
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid. pp. 725
apprehensibility of what subjects can be said to be seen, heard, touched and tasted in IR. The sensory nature of anarchy delimits what can be said to be apprehensible.

This is important to realise for politics in IR as if we don’t understand the way in which anarchy organises the field, not only at the formal or substantive level but at the sensory we cannot grasp the relations that a Rancièrian understanding of IR opens up for us. In order to think IR as political but also politics in IR we need to be attentive to the conditions of apprehensibility that exist in IR. This is where my argument about anarchy as essential for understanding how politics can occur in IR comes to the fore. I contend that anarchy as the ordering principle of IR constructs its distribution of the sensible. Anarchy as an ordering principle establishes the conditions of apprehensibility in IR as well as a series of self-evident facts about what can and can’t be taken as apprehensible within IR. Again, this isn’t about the material presence of objects within IR, nor is it about their (re)presentation. Rather this is about their apprehensibility, the level at which objects and subjects are sensible within IR.

Once we understand anarchy as the ordering principle within IR questions of the nature and manner of the order are important to raise. As Waltz demonstrates anarchy orders the field as a constitutive absence. Such an order isn’t a delineable positive quality. Rather anarchy structures IR as its organising principle. This isn’t only just a matter for the sensory and political but rather given this reading of anarchy it must also be the location for critique. This is something we see directly in the work of Feminist, Narrative and Post-Structural IR theory. The movement to unpick anarchy requires a reworking of the organisation of the field and the sensory possibilities that establish and propagate IR. These literatures each serve as an example of the way in which politics can be seen to occur within IR as they challenge the structure of the field. Part of this challenge must always be articulated in part towards the centrality of anarchy as an organising principle. This is important for my argument as by understanding the way in which these literatures challenge the centrality of anarchy but also foreground the sensory conditions of possibility under anarchy gives them new political possibilities.
Through a discussion and comparison of the work of Sjoberg and Dingli I have highlighted the way in which the ordering of IR is not simply a theoretical issue but also a sensory one. I also draw a linkage through to the introduction and my position in the field. I go on to look specifically at the way in which anarchy organises IR in terms of the sensory and the implications this has for thinking a politics in IR. This foregrounds my answers to both research questions in that it situates anarchy as the organising principle of IR and opens up a space into which I can articulate the work of Rancière into IR.

**Conclusion**

I highlight here how anarchy has been the organising principle of IR while also drawing through and explication my positionality with IR. My substantiation of my argument with regards to anarchy through my close reading of Waltz highlights the distance between my allies and contemporaries I am writing alongside and those against which I am writing. This also foregrounds my argument and reading of Rancière. This is something which I carry through in the next chapter where I begin to explicitly draw out my own position in relation to IR and cement the justification and use of my Rancierian framework in IR.
Chapter 3:
Jacques Rancière & the Distribution of the Sensible

Introduction

In this chapter I concentrate on my reading of Rancière. I explicate and critically discussing the key concepts that define my relationship to Rancière’s thinking. I begin by outlining the shape of Rancière’s thought, and some key themes to bear in mind when approaching it. This clears the way for a second section which is an extended consideration of the concept of the distribution of the sensible (le partage du sensible) while a third introduces and explores three other key Rancierian concepts of particular importance for our thinking about IR: arkhè, the Police and politics. The final section, prior to the conclusion, explores his notion of wrong. Across these sections I highlight the useful and influence of Rancière on my thought as well as the tensions that can be drawn out here. As I argue this connects closely to questions about the conditions within which politics takes place. Overall the chapter develop my reading of Rancière which I then go on to articulate to IR theory.

Approaching Rancière

In this section, I outline a general approach to his work, its relationship to aesthetics, to politics and to ontology. I do this through a brief consideration of some key debates about his work.

Rancière has been read within many fields but in particular Politics and Aesthetics. As we shall see, aesthetics and the question of the ‘apprehensible’ are central to my reading of Rancière’s political thinking – his text The Politics of Aesthetics acts as a skeleton key to his core ideas.\textsuperscript{1} His work which focuses on artistic forms includes Mute Speech which charts the emergence of literature,\textsuperscript{2} The

Emancipated Spectator, concerned with aesthetic and intellectual emancipation, and work on Cinema such as Chronicles of Consensual Times, The Intervals of Cinema, Film Fables, The Future of the Image and sections of Short Voyages to the Land of the People. These works have led to a broad and divergent secondary literature applying Rancière to such varied subject matter as dance, global aesthetics (and its inadequacy), music (including Bruce Springsteen), body art, voice, aesthetics and autonomy, the aesthetics of class struggle as well as its democratic character.

While this work is broadly relevant, my concern in this thesis is not with how art and politics are intertwined but, rather, with the aesthetic nature of politics (as opposed to the aesthetic as politics).

As both Davis and Panagia have shown Rancière’s conceptualisation of ‘sensibility’ can be translated as ‘sensory’. Aesthetics and the aesthetic for Rancière are not external to political phenomena which are always related to our sensory capacity for encountering the world. The concepts and practices of...

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6 J. Rancière, Film Fables, (Bloomsbury, London, 2016)
Art, Rancière argues, are structured by different ‘regimes’. These are not periods or set historical epochs but rather overlapping forms within a distribution of the sensible, structuring and structured by the way in which art is encountered and understood. He names these distinct regimes: the ethical regimes of images, the representative regime of art and the aesthetic regime of art. This way of understanding art and artwork is not wholly necessary for understanding the political implications of Rancière but is coterminous with his thinking on the distribution of the sensible and, as I argue later in the chapter, the aesthetic is linked inexorably to the sensory for Rancière. My argument and contribution highlight that it is important to bear in mind the relationship politics has to the sensible as well as to art.

Within political thought Rancière has been seized upon in a variety of ways. Todd May, is a prominent example, appropriating Rancière’s political framework for the anarchist political movement and tradition, using it to develop an argument about the ontological and epistemological conditions for political agency, a blueprint for planning political action and for ordering the common social world and as a way of undertaking the historical analysis of political equality. That is to say, May doesn’t delve into and explicate Rancière’s writing so much as use the theory to help his politics. But as Chambers argues, May’s reading rests on the assumptions of a “pure” politics which, cuts across

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20 Ibid. pp. 20-30  
Rancière’s own writing. It identifies a utopian threshold (be it an anarchist local co-op\textsuperscript{30} or the Zapistas in Mexico\textsuperscript{31}) against which contemporary political praxis and theorisation should understand itself. For May, then, this isn’t simply about the methodology or theorisation of political praxis but also its ethical orientation. By situating Rancière within the particular ethical, ontological and methodological orientation of Anarchism May offers a reading which, with its ‘purist’ conception of politics and Manichean division of politics from the Police, cannot be justified by Rancière’s own writings.

May’s work does, however, contain useful insights into the Rancièrian conception of equality. He draws out, effectively and in detail, the way in which equality is both particular and operationalised within Rancière’s work. He distinguishes between what he terms “passive”\textsuperscript{32} and “active”\textsuperscript{33} equality, developing a critique of the former. He highlights that equality when read in its “passive” form is always a product of governance - that is to say it is both governing and governed\textsuperscript{34} and thus distinguishes between the concept as employed by theorists such as Rawls, Nozick, Sen and Young\textsuperscript{35} and Rancière’s ‘active’ conception for which the affirmation of equality is foundational for politics. This is a helpful distinction, which we will return to, but overall May’s reading involves a trade-off, sacrificing Rancière’s the nuance of theoretical argumentation and rejection of political philosophy in order to enable the application of his thought to anarchist political discourse.

In contrast to May, Chambers’ reading and explication in \textit{The Lessons of Rancière} is lucid, forceful and attentive to both the detail and the application of the analysis.\textsuperscript{36} This is especially so in his reading of the concept of ‘subjectivation’\textsuperscript{37} which he reads as a potential challenge against anthropocentrism.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. pp. 38-77
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid. pp. 3
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid. pp. 6
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid. pp. 98-108
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. pp. 106
Through the demarcation of speech and disagreement Chambers elucidates the way in which Rancière unpacks the functionality of speech as the mode through which subjectivation occurs. Also important is how Chambers configures Rancière’s understanding of ontology, taking Rancière’s own hesitation to provide an ontological foundation for his theorisation seriously.39 I follow in this vein arguing that Rancière, in particular within Disagreement, does not set out a strict ontology for his theorisation40 and he actively distances himself from what he terms ‘ontologies of superpower’.41

By this he means that he is not engaging in a mode of charting rupture that is then reducible to the emergence of a truth.42 This distinction is important, especially in contrast to May’s reading: Rancière is emphatically not a philosopher and he argues very clearly in Disagreement43 and The Philosopher and His Poor44 that there is a difference between political theorisation/argumentation and philosophy & sociology. Within political philosophy/theory there is a focus on the ontological (super)power of rupture, in particular the rupturing power of the true over the false provides a point of anchor for our locale.45 To explain this further we can helpfully compare Rancière with his contemporary Alain Badiou. Badiou46 whose concept of ‘the state of the situation’ is sometimes likened to the distribution of the sensible.47 I draw this comparison not to test its validity but rather to highlight how I configure Rancière’s relationship to ontology. In reading this section it is worth thinking about the limitations I charted in the introduction with regards to Rancière’s project.

42 Ibid. 216
47 While the state of the situation can be read in a similar light to the partage of the distribution of the sensible the two are explicitly different. The state of the situation takes its philosophical efficacy from its foundation within set theory. It is grounded in a series of mathemes that are ontological propositions. Mathematics for Badiou is ontology and the state of the situation arises only out of a set of onto-mathematical conditions dictated by the logical relation between sets. The counting of Badiou is literal whereas the (ac)count for Rancière is not reducible to a matheme or logical set but rather stems from an arkhè, the logic which makes them apprehensible.
In *Being and Event*. Badiou sets out a philosophical framework grounded in a rigorous and logical account of mathematics as ontology⁴⁸, and orientated towards the unmasking of a true understanding of the world.⁴⁹ Badiou’s promise, at the end of *Being and Event*,⁵⁰ to expand this framework and work through its implication for politics is delivered on in *Metapolitics* and *The Rebirth of History and Ethics*⁵¹ and it is here that distinction between Rancière’s and Badiou’s theory of ontology becomes apparent. For Badiou ontology is a foundation upon which philosophy must necessarily be built on. For Rancière ontology is a form of organising principle fulfilling a Police function. Badiou characterises the Rancièrian understanding of ontology as anti-platonic⁵² and founded on a ‘negative ontology’.⁵³ This reading of Rancière is possible only if one has already accepted Badiou’s assertion that all philosophy and anti-philosophy is only possible given a firm grounding in ontology. Badiou, then, in giving primacy to the ontology and thus reducing thought in part to it, aligns his own definition of the state of the situation with Rancière’s distribution of the sensible.⁵⁴ In doing so he collapses the aesthetic “fullness” of the allocation of parts under Rancière’s distribution of the sensible into his own philosophical categorisations of void⁵⁵ and event.⁵⁶ Badiou in imposing a framework of “negative ontology” on Rancière reduces his theory into, at best, a spectral rendering of Badiou’s own ontological truth. This reduction renders Rancière a ‘conjuror of shadows’.⁵⁷

What is at work here is the subjection of Rancière’s thought to Badiou’s own ontological frame. In order for Badiou to make his critique of Rancière he draws a line of equivalence between the truth proposed by his ontological framework and the anti-ontological position of Rancière. Through this line of equivalence, it becomes possible to subsume Rancière into the wider philosophical truth of Badiou’s

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⁴⁸ A. Badiou, *Being and Event*, (Bloomsbury, London, 2016) pp.4-9
⁴⁹ Ibid. pp. 455-457
⁵⁰ Ibid. pp. 457-458
⁵¹ This can be seen in his texts *Metapolitics, The Rebirth of History and Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*.
⁵³ Ibid. pp. 115
⁵⁴ Ibid. pp. 119
⁵⁶ Ibid. pp. 181-201
narrative. Rancière himself dismisses this comparison separating himself from Badiou both historically and theoretically. He charts the emergence of Badiou’s argument as a function of reading Lacan that valorises ‘the all-powerfulness of the true’. My reading of Rancière is not limited to unpacking the epistemological relationships within Badiou, at least not directly, but rather an investigation into how truth becomes a function of ontology for Badiou. The latter isn’t attempting to draw out a distinction between truth(s) and falsehood(s) but rather to translate the terrain of their debate onto that of fidelity. Truth for Badiou is an ontological relation which forms the basis of his ethics\textsuperscript{59}, politics\textsuperscript{60} and philosophy\textsuperscript{61} and his claims in each of these realms are only potent given his ontological framework and argumentation. I have argued here that Badiou is, as it were, the archon of ontology providing an ethics, politics and philosophy that is an ontological body with an ontological heart.

Badiou understands Rancièrian thought as nothing other than the shadows cast by a philosophical tree\textsuperscript{62} because, he sees Rancière’s in his rejection of the (super)power of ontology as a break with philosophy’s understanding of itself. For my argument true politics is accident as opposed to a knightly quest for being.\textsuperscript{63} What he refers to as the “nights of labour”, which is the writing undertaken by working people - are important for both Rancière and myself; not because of their revelation of a hidden ontological truth - that workers possess aesthetic autonomy - but because they highlight what Rancière calls ‘disagreement’, a break within a sensory regime which specifies who can express what and how. Rather than offering a complete and totalising ontology, my argument and reading charts that which makes politics (im)possible and how philosophy has articulated itself to, in part to preclude, politics.

Understanding this separation from ontology is important for the present thesis as it opens onto a way of thinking which isn’t linked into the quagmire of ontological disputes in which the field is

\textsuperscript{58} J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 216
\textsuperscript{60} A. Badiou, Metapolitics, (Verso, London, 2005) pp. 141-152
\textsuperscript{61} A. Badiou, Being and Event, (Bloomsbury, London, 2016) pp. 345-358
\textsuperscript{62} A. Badiou, Metapolitics, (Verso, London, 2005) pp. 123
\textsuperscript{63} J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 218
currently stuck. As we saw in the introduction this conception of ontology is important for my contribution but also represents a threshold within Rancière that I am working through. In placing Rancière’s thought in conversation with the theorists from the introduction and now Badiou I move towards my arguments displacement of the centrality of ontology within IR. Through articulating my reading and conception of Rancière to IR (as we will see in the next chapters) I further this development while giving it a stronger theory of politics. Bearing this in mind, it is important to remember my reading of Rancière is concerned with the sensory, and with a politics that cannot be contained by philosophy or ontology. I now turn to develop my reading of Rancière’s key concepts starting with the ‘distribution of the sensible’.

The Distribution of the Sensible (*le partage du sensible*)

The distribution of the sensible is a central concept in both the aesthetic and the political works of Rancière. It is also central to my argument in this thesis.

The distribution of the sensible is given in French as *le partage du sensible*. In terms of understanding the concept the core is within both the French terms *partage* and *sensible*. *Partage* in the French can be taken to mean separation, disruption, distribution and even sharing. Each of these individual concepts are rolled up into the notion of *partage*. This is important as there is not a clear division between dividing and disrupting within the concept of the distribution of the sensible. A *partage* for Rancière is both dividing and connecting. This is a core conceptual point with regard to the distribution of the sensible. The distribution of the sensible is a *partage* that not only “cuts-up” the sensible it also makes legible the relationship between its parts. Partage is how things are spread out and allocated in including the creation of the spaces for and of allocation. The relationship between distribution both as the allocative and relational property with regard to the sensible is

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66 Ibid. pp. 70
important to understand as it configures how the distribution of the sensible works conceptually.

*Partage* describes not only the distribution of something but also its division into parts so that they can be distributed and their relation to each other. It is a “process” of sorts, not only in the way in which things are broken up in order to be distributed but also in how the distribution takes place. The breaking up and allocation are completely connected as it involves establishing categories for exclusion and inclusion not only in who receives the distributed parts but also in how the distributed body is broken apart.

*Sensible* also has a large amount of leeway in its translation. Chambers, Panagia and Davis read the term as meaning sensory/sensitive and sensible. This breadth in the translation of *sensible* to sensory/sensitive/sensible is well documented and important for how the concept has been received in English. Julie Rose in her translation of *sensible* opted for perceptible when she translated *le partage du sensible* into the configuration/partition of the perceptible. Rose gives preference to the visibility of sensibility over the other sensory effects of the *sensible*. My understanding of the term moves away from this restriction to perceptibility in order to highlight the ways in which it relates to a broader category of the sensory. In doing this I hope to flesh out my two core concepts that I draw from Rancière in relation to sensibility: *aisthesis* (feeling) and *aisthēton* (what is apprehensible to the senses). These two terms are essential for my understanding of how sensibility operates. *Aisthesis* (feeling) is important as it relates to the way in which the external world can be encountered and understood in relation to and by ourselves. In drawing out these two distinctions I mark a point of slight departure from Rancière’s own work and my reading. The preference I place on thinking these

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71 This can be seen throughout *Disagreement* and has been unpicked in great detail by the work of Chambers both in his article *Walter White is a Bad Teacher* and the broader problems with Rose’s translation in *Lessons of Rancière* (pp. 90-97).
concepts, while wholly consistent with Rancière’s own though, is an argument I make, partly to push beyond the tensions explored in the introduction but also to align my contribution to IR.

My deployment and reading of aisthesis is important as it sets up my understanding, which comes out of Rancière, of how apprehensibility as connected to how the total sensory ‘field’ is broken up and expressed through logos. We can see this in the Rancière when he argues: ‘The manner in which this organ exercises its function, in which language expresses a shared aisthesis is another’.74 This is an argument I take forwards in my own argumentation. Aisthēton (what is apprehensible to the senses) is important as it highlights what is viable to be felt by the subject in question. This distinction between feeling and that which is apprehensible to the subject is amalgamated within the distribution of the sensible as it conditions both aisthesis and the aisthēton of the subject – how both the feeling of the subject and what is available for being apprehended and thus felt by the subject are possible. It also the condition the possibility of subjectivity. These two terms essentially condition my understanding of sensibility that I forward in this thesis. In particular sensibility isn’t just perception or perceptibility but rather apprehensibility.

Apprehensibility in this sense prefigures perception. What is at stake isn’t just what can be perceived but what can be recorded both internally and externally as having been perceived. The aisthēton enables perception - if an object lies outside apprehension then it cannot be perceptible. Thus, the sensible is broader than just perception; it is all sensory objects and their capacity for and feeling of their apprehension. By understanding le partage du sensible as a synthesis of partage (the division and relation of parts) and sensible (the aisthēton: what is apprehensible to the senses & aisthesis the feeling of what is apprehensible to the senses) we can see that it is clear that the term describes both the division and the relation between what is apprehensible to the senses.

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I now develop along Rancierian lines this notion of sensibility into my reading of the distribution of the sensible. The first point of clarification is that the distribution of the sensible doesn’t mean “good sense” or appropriateness. Instead the distribution of the sensible describes a social implicit law that organises the places, apportionment, and relations of the shared experience of the world. This is done through establishing the mechanisms of sensory apprehension that are self-validated. From this validation the distribution produces assumed facts which delimit what can be seen, done, said, thought or made.\textsuperscript{75} As such the distribution of the sensible conditions the apprehensibility of our shared world and our engagement with it. The distribution of the sensible then isn’t concerned in the mechanics of sensibility as appropriateness. Rather it sets the very condition through which appropriateness can come to be understood as appropriate. We can see this relation between sensibility and appropriateness through an example. Imagine that we are going for a hike over a small hill. When you arrive, I ask you “did you bring sensible shoes for today’s hike?” Here sensible functions as a measure of appropriateness not apprehensibility. By formulating and asking you this question I am asking if the shoes you are wearing are capable of withstanding the hilly terrain and such that you will be comfortable walking across that terrain in them. Now imagine you have arrived for the hike in stiletto heels, this of course would not be sensible for the journey. This doesn’t mean that your heels are not apprehensible. They are still subject to my sense. I could see, feel, smell and taste them. This example traces out the way in appropriateness is contained within sensibility. Your heels are apprehensible as sensible not only in the fact they are presented to my senses but also by the way in which they relate to the context in which they can be rendered apprehensible to my senses. The way in which heels may or may not be sensible footwear isn’t contained wholly within their existence as objects apprehensible to my senses but also the context in which they are apprehensible.

The apprehensibility of things in the world is related to the notion of appropriateness. While stiletto heels are of course an inappropriate mode of footwear for a hike it is the distribution of the sensible

that establishes the criteria against which we can make that judgement. This is important to understand as the distribution of the sensible is the organising scaffolding which makes the sensory world apprehensible to us. This means that our apprehension of the world it isn’t purely a product of our physical senses of sight, touch, smell and taste but also of the “rightness” of the situation at hand.  

We can see this in *Disagreement* where Rancière discusses the feeling of a blow: ‘*The division of their aisthesis is not so obvious: where exactly do we draw the line between the unpleasant feeling of having received a blow and the feeling of having suffered an “injury” through this same blow?*’  

The personal quality of feeling the blow and the social quality of having been dealt an injury are linked. In order for this distinction to be recognised, understood and tuned it, there must be a third thing which maintains the apprehensibility of the blow, the personal quality and the social quality. Not only this but this third thing must also have established a series of relations between these differing qualities. It is the distribution of the sensible which establishes a series of “right” relations between these parts.

Following on from Rancière, I argue that the distribution of the sensible not only already contains the categories of *sumpheron* (useful) and *blaberon* (harmful) but also the relationships they have to each other and the world. Taking this forward, it becomes clear that the appropriateness implicated by the distribution of the sensible is to prior to thinking of the sensible as good judgement. The distribution of the sensible provides the deeper social apprehension or feeling (*aisthesis*) of the appropriateness that makes good judgement possible. The distribution of the sensible then establishes the conditions of “goodness” and “judgement”, via a series of self-evident facts. This is possible precisely because of the *partage* by which the distribution of the sensible divides up and organises the experience of a common world. The distribution of the sensible is what establishes the relations between the partitions of that common world. It creates both the singular qualities felt in

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76 “rightness” here is no ethically charged but instead is used to convey a feeling (*aisthesis*) of what is appropriate and natural.


78 Which are already false categories. They are not in some sense permanent or ontological categories but simply always designated through their naturalisation via the Police as “right” categories.

the apprehension of the world as well as the common qualities that are laid out, and apprehensible, to the subject as well as configuring the relations between them. Through the distribution of the sensible not only does the individual proportion become evident but also how such a proportionality relates to a broader shared community and communal share. This is because, as I have alluded to previously, the distribution is at the level of the community. Without the \textit{distribution} of the sensible there cannot be communal relations at the level of apprehension. A distribution of the sensible must be extant in order for commonly shared apprehensive links between sensory phenomena and our feeling of that phenomenology to be possible.

This is the foundation that enables me to show in more detail how the distribution of the sensible impacts on our understanding of the apprehensible world. The first thing that is of interest in this interpretation is the concept’s Kantian heritage. The distribution of the sensible is, for the individual, similar to a conceptual scheme. That is to say the distribution of the sensible is and “acts” \textit{a priori}. This is important for thinking about how the distribution of the sensible influences society and politics. This isn’t agential or intentional action but rather what limits and delimits society and politics through establishing limits to the objects of apprehension (\textit{aisthēton}) and our capacity to apprehend them (\textit{aisthesis}). This does not mean that the distribution of the sensible is contained or operates solely at the level of the individual subject. The distribution of the sensible operates and delimits the experience of the whole social formation. As it sets the possibilities for apprehension it is held communally as well as organising as world that is held in common. This isn’t to say that individuals don’t engage with or experience the distribution of the sensible but, rather, that their experience and apprehension is made possible and structured by it. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter Rancière’s work on art and aesthetics details the modes of engagement and encounter with art that depend on

\textsuperscript{80} It is important that I means something to which I return later in thesis: that this division is never perfect. Rather this division always a mis- or double count founded that is made possible precisely because of this mis- or double counting. I flesh this out in more detail in the sections on politics/the Police.


\textsuperscript{82} Ibid. pp.14-15
and transform the distribution of the sensible.\textsuperscript{83} This is also an important moment when the limitations of Rancière’s thought become apparent. It is both this Kantian and Aristotelian heritage that sets Rancière’s anthropocentric bias in place. As highlighted in the introduction this is a bias against which I am writing but it is important to draw on and at least note the way in which this notion becomes clear within Rancière’s own work.

Partly in response to this limitation I argue it is worth thinking of the distribution of the sensible as a form of communally held \textit{a priori}, self-evident facts\textsuperscript{84} which formulate the possibilities of apprehension within that shared world. Looking back to this Kantian heritage its distinction from conceptual schema becomes clear here as it is the \textit{partage} of the distribution of the sensible that enables the communal relations that enable and delimit the communal world. This is distinct from the physical and conceptual sensory mechanisms that enable apprehension as the \textit{partage} also conditions that apprehension via these \textit{a priori} facts, which are held in common. Despite this distinction the Kantian heritage of the concept is important in the fact that it is tied to Rancière’s reading of Kantian aesthetics, and aesthetic judgement which places feeling (\textit{aisthesis}) at its centre. It is clear that this is due in part to Rancière’s distain for ontological principles.\textsuperscript{85} Feeling (\textit{aisthesis}) is established and establishes the distribution of the sensible. To be precise it is the conditions of feeling (\textit{aisthesis}) as well as the feeling (\textit{aisthesis}) of that which is apprehensible to the senses (\textit{aisthēton}) that are established through the distribution of the sensible. I, following Rancière, argue that the distribution of the sensible organises and establishes the very notions of sensibility itself. However contra to Rancière, and as I charted in the introduction, I don’t place a necessary human limitation on this notion of sensing. The distribution of the sensible then, organises what can and cannot be apprehended and

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{83} An account of this mode of aesthetic engagement with art is given the best account in works such as \textit{Aisthesis}, \textit{Mute Speech}, \textit{The Emancipated Spectator} and the sections on the aesthetic in \textit{Dissensus}. It also worth thinking back to previously in the chapter where I mentioned the regimes which structure our reception of art.
\item \textsuperscript{84} The use of the term fact here is not to suggest it is an empirical one. Rather I use the term facts given their self-evidence in relation to the distribution of the sensible and out of fidelity to Rancière’s own terminology. The factuality of these self-evident facts is linked both to their position as given but also their relationality to the distribution as a whole.
\item \textsuperscript{85} J. Rancière, \textit{Dissensus}, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp.217
\end{itemize}
the means of the apprehension that is appropriate to both the individual and the community.\(^{86}\) To turn back to the Rancièrean terminology again I contend that it should be understood that the distribution of the sensible distributes (*nemein*) the “laws” (*nomoi*) of sensing.\(^{87}\) Turning back on my previously identified concepts this can be rewritten with an eye to my previously established understandings of feeling (*aisthesis*) to be read as: the distribution of the sensible having distributed (*nemein*) the objects of apprehension (*aisthēton*) into feeling (*aisthesis*). It is this relation between *aisthēton* and *aisthesis* that is essential in understanding how the distribution of the sensible organises the condition by and for apprehension of the community.

This organisation of sensing makes the *aisthēton* into an almost tautological basis for sensing.\(^{88}\) This is because sensing cannot be reliant on any form of justification outside of itself. The justification for apprehensibility comes from within the distribution of the sensible. *Aisthesis* and the *aisthēton* are self-evident facts produced in relation and by the distribution of the sensible. They become apparent due to their own apparition. A tendency here can be to combine the distribution of the sensible with the notions of the natural. This is not a recourse to an absolute or an essentialist base rather that the distribution of the sensible due to its establishment of facts about the apprehensible that are self-justifying is often taken as “natural”. This has ramifications when thinking about the commonality of the self-evident facts established by the distribution of the sensible.

As the distribution of the sensible distributes sensing in and of a common world it isn’t simply a matter of the individual modalities of sensing but also apprehension at the level of the social. The socio-political world is inexorably linked to the sensible as opposed to divorced from it. This isn’t an activity

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\(^{86}\) A point of clarification I need to draw is that this is not to imply that the distribution of the sensible organises a strict hierarchy of sensing. While it could be sufficient for a distribution of the sensible to institute of a hierarchy that privileges one mode of sensing over another it is not necessary for the distribution of the sensible to do so.

\(^{87}\) Another clarification I need to make is that when I talk about laws I do mean the term in the context of judicial writ or the *diktat* of a singular society but rather in the broader sense of the laws of nature. There is a disjunction here between the socio-political instantiation of juridical practice and the way in which our reality of things is understood to function. As I go on to highlight in the section on Police. One mode of Policing that is prevalent within archi-politics is to fold this disjunction into a singularity: the community as the expression of a singular ethical virtue.

that a society engages in but rather what makes a society possible. The distribution of the sensible grounds the objects of apprehension (aisthēton) and their distribution (nemien) through its partage of the “laws” (nomoi) of sensing (aisthēsis). This isn’t simply to do with physical sight or touch or smell or taste but also the apportioned social and political location - not only how these positions are apprehensible but also the “naturalness” of their appearance. Thus, the distribution of the sensible is also a distribution of bodies and positions specific to those bodies.⁸⁹ This is the establishment based upon the partage of the distribution of the sensible.

Rancière fleshes out the way in which we can see this in his article Then Theses on Politics. He explores the way the policeman’s mantra: ‘Move along! There is nothing to see here!’ operates. This mantra is not just a tool by which public order can be maintained but is also a (re)performance of the distribution of the sensible. When a policeman tells you to move along they are enacting an assertion of the politico-aesthetic laws (nomoi) that are established through and within the distribution of the sensible.

Taking Rancière’s understanding forwards into my own I draw out this example in more detail. Imagine there was to be a tragic and bloody murder on a bustling street. The Police arrive at the scene and the first thing they do is to cover the body and cordon of the scene. In this act of covering the body and erecting a cordon they (re)position and (re)purpose some of the space of the street from being a street into a crime-scene through their usage of police tape. They change the conditionality of the space. This delimitation of the purpose of the street and the crime scene is dictated and understood through conditions established by the distribution of the sensible. Due to the presence of the police tape onlookers already and immediately apprehend and recognise the difference in space between the street (a space for circulation) with that of the crime scene (a space for investigation). This division is achieved through (or as) the establishment of a different understanding of the objects of

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⁹⁰ Ibid. pp. 37
apprehension (*aisthēton*) that are available for sensing (*aisthesis*) within both the street and the crime scene. Each delineated space has a different set of self-evidencing facts which render them sensible to the people in and around them. While the police tape formulates a barrier and a relation between these spaces it is not a total or absolute one. It could be torn down, cut or leapt over. This doesn’t change the fact that there exists a delineation between these spaces made possible and rendered apprehensible by the distribution of the sensible. The very possibility of dividing up the space like this is made possible because of the distribution of the sensible’s instantiation of both the objects of apprehension (*aisthēton*) and feeling (*aisthesis*).

Continuing with this example, the simple act of dividing these spaces is not sufficient to stand on its own: it has to be maintained.91 Due to the graphic nature of our hypothetical murder bystanders flock to take in the grisly scene. At this point one of the police officer’s steps forwards and tells them ‘*Move along! There is nothing to see here!*’ Within my example of course this makes no sense. There is something to be seen behind the police tape, namely the body of the murder victim and the crime scene. The policeman doesn’t mean that there is nothing worth seeing behind the tape or that the object behind the tape are invisible: this would be lunacy. The statement also isn’t nonsense, it has a real meaning that the people rubbernecking understand and act upon. This is because the policeman isn’t invoking a literal claim to the invisibility of the scene beyond the tape but rather he is instantiating the division of the spaces. This is not the instantiation of a division that solely flows from the power of a policeman’s orders. Rather it is the designations of the scene as something that we cannot look at anymore. This division of spaces rests already upon our understanding of what is appropriate for the street. When the policeman orders bystanders to move along he is reasserting the distributions of the sensible division of spaces: namely the space of the street. The feeling (*aisthesis*) of the street is supported by a series of self-evident facts that preclude looking and sensing within it. The street is

91 This will be spoken about more in the section of the Police as how the distribution of the sensible can be understood and maintained.
a space of circulation, so the people must circulate. 92 Thus, the policeman’s statement that “there is nothing to see here!” is in actuality a statement about the role of sensing within the space of the street as delimited by the distribution of the sensible. It reads in effect: ‘The Street is a space of circulation and not seeing. Therefore, you must stop seeing and start circulating. Move along!’

This of course is already apparent to the bystanders in the example. They know instinctively that the street is a space of circulation and thus that they can be moved along by the policeman. In the example of the policeman’s locution it is clear how the distribution of the sensible creates the self-evident facts upon which space is delimited with regard to what can be seen, thought, made and done within it. Through this establishment there is erected a grid of apprehensibility which channels the always excessive reality into an apprehensible common world. As I go onto explore later in the chapter this is not a conscious act of power or a false consciousness. Rather it is an understanding of what it means for there to be an apprehensible common world and of the way in which this world is made possible in relation to the distribution of the sensible. It is not the power of the policeman’s locution that divides the space but rather in order for there to be a power it must be rendered apprehensible through relations proportioned by the distribution of the sensible. This isn’t a false reality that occludes a singular truth whose rupture would enable us to dismantle this false distribution. Instead it simply the statement of what must the case in order for a common world to be apprehensible.

In presenting my example I have argued for how my reading of the conception of the distribution of the sensible conditions what can be apprehended within a common world. The distribution of the sensible is what establishes the ways in which we can understand what is (in)visible, (un)thinkable and (im)possible93 within the community.94 This can be carried through and thought further in terms of the ways of doing and making that are possible within an apprehensible common world. As I argued

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93 I require the parentheticals here to highlight that the distribution of the sensible does not just establish what can be positively presence but also what is negative in terms of apprehension. The distribution of the sensible establishes the condition of apprehensibility and so establishes the relations between visibility and invisibility. Of what can be seen but also what cannot be seen. This is true for all aspects of the sensory.
earlier, the distribution of the sensible sets the condition of such an apprehensible common world but it also creates a series of positions and dispositions specific to those positions: a distribution of bodies and disposition specific to those bodies. The distribution of the sensible makes possible any/all social order through its establishment of the conditions of apprehensibility of a common world. As I have argued within this section the distribution then makes apprehensible and possible any/all social orders, as it makes possible a commonly shared apprehension of the world. This is a basis on and against which all social orders must rest. Without an apprehensible common world, social order would be impossible. The distribution of the sensible is therefore key to how Rancière understands the social and political orderings of existence.

**Arkhè, Politics and the Police**

In this section I explicate my reading of Rancière’s concept of arkhè, specifically in relation to the distribution of the sensible. This will be especially important when I move to look at and understand my framework in relation to IR. From arkhè I turn to argue how a differing (ac)count of the social order can be taken in both the counts of politics and the Police.

Arkhè comes from the Greek and can be literally translated as “the point/moment of commencement”. The term this has within it a sense or priority and prioritisation. Derrida gives a full and comprehensible etymology of the word in his article *Archive Fever*. He links the definition both to the moment of commencement and commandment. This definition is similar to the one given by Rancière. One difference between the two, however, is that Rancière focuses on commencement.

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96 While this concept might seem poorly worked through I highlight the specificity of the term and the relevance of the parenthetical later within the chapter. Broadly speaking the parenthetical represents the fact that every count (understanding of the total amount of parts within a system) is also an account of that system. Both in the sense of an accounting of as well as a justification for.
97 My choice of the –khè translation as opposed to arche is made here to highlight the Rancierian allusion back to arkhèin. While both choices are synonymous and equally valid the –khè translation avoids a reliance upon the connotations of the archons implicitly.
99 Ibid. pp. 9
over commandment, emphasising priority. Within the Rancièrian usage arkhè is divorced from its
direct etymological heritage with the archons and tied into the notion of arkhèin - to begin, to lead or
to rule). This linkage and reading is most prominent in Rancière’s *Ten Theses on Politics*.101 Arkhèin is
the form of action that enables commencement:102 it is the active referent of an arkhè. This
relationship is central to understanding how the concept of arkhè functions within my thesis. It is the
commencement that is also the foundation for and of any community, its starting point and basis, this
is central to both my argument and contribution to IR.103 While this might seem like a potential
contradiction given what I have said about the distribution of the sensible but, as I will go on to argue,
arkhè is not separate from the distribution of the sensible. Rather I read the two concepts as tied very
tightly together. Arkhè, for Rancière and myself, is linked to the distribution of the sensible as it
provides a singular logic around which an apprehensible common world can congeal.

Before I can flesh out my argument fully I need to first examine the way in which the term’s classical
heritage shapes and orientates Rancière’s and my own understanding of the term. Understanding this
heritage is essential for making apparent the way in which I develops Rancière’s concepts and
arguments. Rancière’s conception of political and the social is most apparent at the level of the city (-
state). 104 The delimitation of space here is useful in thinking about the referents that underlie
Rancière’s understanding of order (although this doesn’t mean that Rancière’s work cannot be
translated beyond an individual city). Here of course city should be read a polis, in which the social is
a bounded space both territoriality and metaphorically. For Rancière the city-state can be read
smoothly across into the nation-state. This isn’t to step over the historical differences between the
classical understanding of the city-state and the Westphalian nation-state but rather to emphasise
that both are territorially bounded and produced by and are productive of a distribution of the
sensible. This is clearly a limitation for how I can think and understand Rancière in IR. As I go on to

102 Ibid. pp. 28-29
later in this chapter and the next I move to develop Rancière’s thought through its application to IR and move beyond his framing of the level of politics at that of the polis.

In *The Philosopher and His Poor* Rancière begins with a critique of Plato’s *Kallipolis* (beautiful city\textsuperscript{105}).\textsuperscript{106} This critique consists of showing how the Platonic city primarily rests on the proposition that labour, and labourers must be singular in their duties and position and always be available for work.\textsuperscript{107} The positions held by the labourers are singular in the sense that a shoe-maker must only be a shoe-maker. The ordering of the city thus determines not only the occupation of the labourer but also the limitations of who the labourer can be. Being a shoe-maker within the order of the city isn’t only a position but also a disposition. As Rancière highlights, the artisan is conceived of as aspiring towards the virtue of *sōphrosunē* (moderation). For Aristotle gives *sōphrosunē* is the virtue\textsuperscript{108} of the labouring classes,\textsuperscript{109} but it isn’t just the virtue of moderation or temperance; it is also about knowing one’s place within the social order. The labourers within the city, by the singularity of the labour must be singular in their being and social position; the virtue of the labourers lies with their recognition of their own singularity. *Sōphrosunē* entails the understanding that the shoe-maker must only be a shoe-maker and not an artist or weekend roofer. We can see here to connection with the distribution of the sensible allocations which, we saw, not only positions but also dispositions. In thinking through the relationship between a shoe-maker as only ever a shoe-maker we can see how this is created in relation to a *partage* of time – a time spent only in making shoes. From this I argue that the virtue of *sōphrosunē* can be linked back to the distribution of the sensible precisely as a virtue that is the recognition and exemplification of that distribution of the sensible. In order for a labourer to possess that virtue of

\textsuperscript{105} This is also taken as the name for the Socrates utopic city of “gods and men” in *the Republic*. This is different to “real” mythical city of *Magnesia* in *The Laws*.


\textsuperscript{108} This is not to be confused with the division between the *Aristoi*, *Oligoi* & *Demos* and their requisite qualities as explored by Rancière in *Disagreement* and *On The Shores of Politics*. Rather here Rancière in reading Aristotle is delineating a virtue, as opposed to a quality of the labourers within the city. He is looking at what a good labourer should be as opposed to what quality delineates a labourer.

Sōphrosunē and thus be a “good” labourer they must recognise their existence as only a labourer, the partition allocated to the labourer within and by the distribution of the sensible.

How does this link to arkhè? The virtue of Sōphrosunē, of moderation, is a “double virtue” or “empty virtue” in the sense that it isn’t just for the labourers but for all parts of the polis. Every singular (dis)position partitioned by the distribution of the sensible must understand and embody their singular relation to the whole: they must recognise and internalise the distribution of the sensible as such as well as their part in it. The distribution of the sensible is the logic which allots the partition and apportionment of the common world. For the labourer to be a labourer the distribution of the sensible must be configured in which a way as to enable to the apprehensibility of labourers and their virtue (sōphrosunē). An arkhè is what enables that partition.

Rancière discusses this in the Ten Theses on Politics with reference to Plato’s Laws. Plato establishes seven different qualifications to rule and in doing so charts seven different scenes. In looking to six differing modes of rule Plato establishes conditions grounded in specific qualities. He sets out the rule of creators over the created, of the noble over the ignoble, the old over the young, masters over slaves, the strong over the weak and the wise over the ignorant. These six qualifications are established as conditions for rule based in singular logics. Each expresses a mode of rule based in a qualification – such as age, strength or wisdom. But Plato allows a qualification for rule which is an exception. This is a seventh qualification: God’s part or allotment (which I will discuss in more detail later). Each of these qualifications for rule, then, represents an arkhè by which the polis can be ordered. That is to say, arkhè in the Platonic sense serves as the logic within which rule can be seen to be exercised. In its active iteration as arkhēin it literally means who walks at the head. Now,

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111 This is done to make clear the relationship between and inherence of the aesthetic scene to the work of Plato. This can be viewed not only in his critique of poetry or writing but also in the very formation of Kallipolis: it is written on a painter’s slate.
114 Ibid. pp. 30
turning this understanding of arkhè back on the distribution of the sensible we can see that it is the logic which enables the partitioning of the *polis*. As I have argued previously the distribution of the sensible not only grounds the apprehensibility of a common shared world but also allots (dis)positions specific to that world. An arkhè is the shared logic of allotment and position as rendered apprehensible; it is the logic that enables the *partage* of (dis)positions through the distribution of the sensible.

We can see now, then why arkhè is such an essential concept for my argumentation. Each of Plato’s arkhè is a distinct account of a different distribution of the sensible. Of course, from these arkhè aren’t necessarily mutually exclusive; rather there is an eminent arkhè, at the moment of commencement, which gives the account of the distribution of the sensible. A good way to think about this is through the example of a polarising lens. If we are thinking of the distribution of the sensible as a polarised pane of glass, enabling only the correct orientation of light to remain visible, then arkhè is that which sets the glasses orientation: it polarises. It this through this action of orienting and polarising that arkhè establishes the apprehensibility of a common world: the distribution of the sensible. Each distribution of the sensible, then, contains arkhè which initiates its logic and which in turn establishes the self-evident facts and (dis)positions within our common world that make it (in)visible, (un)thinkable and (im)possible.

As I go on to argue my understanding of arkhè can be employed in answering my research question: ‘*how anarchy construct IR’s distribution of does the sensible?*’ as it makes clear that this is a question of the arkhè of IR. In the previous chapter I argued that anarchy acts as the organising principle of IR. I can now argue that being the organising principle of IR means to give the field a logic: anarchy is the arkhè of IR’s distribution of the sensible. In doing so I am responding to the tension I highlighted both in my introduction and above. I am not simply carrying forwards Rancière’s argument but rather developing it through my theorisation of IR. This is something I will go into in more detail in my next chapter.
This concept of arkhè as the moment of commencement which enables the formulation of a logic for the distribution of the sensible leads us onto the concept of Police (la Police). The first distinction that I need to draw is between the police in their everyday vernacular sense and the Police in my Rancièrian theorisation. Rancière terms the everyday agents of law enforcement the ‘petty police’. These are the plain-clothes and uniformed enforcers of the state. This definition encompasses more broadly the institutions of policing itself such as the courthouse or the prison. The petty police and their institutions are just a particular form of ordering which arises from the distribution of the sensible. The details of the organisation of overt and covert agents of state power have varied over time. From night-watchmen and men at arms to our modern day Peelite “Bobbies” the vestiges of particular organisations of policemen aren’t what Rancière or myself are concerned with when we talk about the Police. I am deploying the terms in in a more general, Foucauldian, sense which carries with it the nineteenth-century usage that stretched in its scope from humanity to the organisation of the common good. This is to say that the Police for my reading of Rancière is about maintaining order and coherence. It isn’t policing with reference to the organisations and institutions of state power but to the forces that enable consistency and coherence within a given field. This can include the delimiting and enforcement of these limits to a field. In this reading for Rancière and myself the Police first and foremost maintain an order. I argue that the Police aren’t agential or directed. Rather the Police is best thought of as an (ac)count of the social order. The Police are a specific mode of (ac)counting. Rancière describes the core feature of the Police as that they are devoid of void or supplement: they are total. The Police in this (ac)counting enact the distribution of the sensible. They are not a force separate from the distribution but rather are linked inexorably to it.

116 Ibid. pp. 28
117 Ibid. pp. 28
Before I can work through the linkage between the Police and the distribution of the sensible I have to touch on the notion of counting itself. Counting I argue following on from Rancière is the *modus operandi* of the distribution of the sensible. There is a linkage between an (ac)count and the *partage* of the distribution of the sensible. As I have argued previously the distribution of the sensible delimits the apprehensibility of the social order and creates (dis)position. The (dis)position or parts of the social order are delimited as both distinct and natural. I have argued earlier that the naturalness of these (dis)positions is given through the self-evident facts that underwrite and are produced by the distribution of the sensible. This naturalness in turn springs from the distribution’s arkhè (its “polarisation”) which is the logic that discerns and justifies the locales and relations between the requisite parts produced by the distribution of the sensible. In creating and justifying these parts the distribution of the sensible gives a count in an arithmetic sense. It formulates the number of parts that can be apprehended within its commonly apprehensible world. It also gives a count in a geometric sense. It formulates the relationships between the parts that can be apprehended within its commonly apprehensible world. It also gives an account of these parts: a justification for their number and relations, why they exist and how they are held in relation to each other. The distribution of the sensible then is an (ac)count of the social order: the commonly apprehensible world which it creates.

An (ac)count then is never just a count but an ordering. An (ac)count not only gives the number of parts but also their self-justified relation. The important thing is that this (ac)count isn’t value neutral, but rather as the distribution of the sensible is arranged through and by an arkhè has a singular logic infused within it. At this point the Police becomes understandable in full. As the distribution of the sensible appears total it is worth thinking about how such a totality is understood. Any total (ac)count

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119 This terminology is discussed in more detail in the section of the chapter on *wrong* and speech. To summarise briefly any count of something is also an account of it. By playing with this terminology Rancière highlights the way in which rendering the polis to its constitutive parts is always also an occluding gesture: it hides the uncounted.
of societies’ (dis)position should\textsuperscript{120} give all the parts within that society a part of that society. This is reinforced by the distribution of the sensible delimiting the conditions for apprehensibility. If a part of our commonly apprehensible world isn’t allocated a part, or (dis)position within its partition/portion, of the social order then it cannot be apprehended. A distribution of the sensible can be understood as a Police distribution when it is total in its (ac)count. This is synonymous with the Police being a totalising count. From this it is clear that the Police is not a social force in the manner of the petty police but rather a way of (ac)counting. It is a distribution of the sensible which is without void and supplement.

At first glance, then, it appears that Police is the name of all distributions of the sensible and that these are total in nature. The Police count is the most prevalent and standard (ac)count of the social order. This has deep seated and serious implications for how it is possible to understand the relationship of the Police to politics. Consider a total Police (ac)count. How can disputes can be raised and rectified within it? The totality of the Police (ac)count is total and any redistribution between these parts reinforces the relations between them. Even if there is a radical redistribution between the parts of a social order the Police count goes unopposed. The Police count may be replaced by a different but still Policing count. This could be radical or wide sweeping change. If the arkhè of the social order changes from the rule of the strong over the weak to the wise over the ignorant, then so does the actuality of the Police order. This may be preferable and an improvement for each of the parts of the social order, but the totality of the Police count remains unchanged. There are still the same (dis)positions or parts of the social order, organised in a totality between and with each other. All of this is still the Police – it is not Politics. Politics is more that the rearrangement of parts within a distribution of the sensible. It is a shift in the Police count itself, one which necessitates the emergence and subjectivation of a void or supplement always already present within the Police (ac)count.

\footnote{I use the term should here to foreground the claim that every (ac)count of the social order is always already a mic-counting of that order. The claim and capacity to award a total (ac)count relies upon the exclusion of a part that has no part. This is something I work through in more detail in the section on politics and wrong.}
To call something a Police count isn’t inherently pejorative. It may not be a negative practice. The Police are ethically *a priori* as they set the apprehensible basis for ethical argumentation within a social order. There could be a meta-ethical judgement between different Police counts. From this meta-ethical statement, it could be possible to conclude that there are better or worse Police counts. As Rancière highlights our existence in contemporary capitalist society is in every way preferable to the life of a blinded Scythian slave. But in making these meta-ethical comparisons between Police orders we do not overlook the fundamental character of the Police count: inequality.

It might seem initially disingenuous to talk about the Police count as being fundamentally grounded in inequality. At first glance it appears that the Police count is grounded in equality in the sense that it paints everything with the same brush. By ordering our commonly apprehensible world the Police establishes the relations between parts with regard to its own arkhè. As Rancière jokes, just as ‘*at night all cows are grey*’ so is the Police a levelling force. By delimiting the horizons of our apprehensibility and organising the social order in accordance to its arkhè the Police give everything its (dis)position and place by “turning down the lights”. In one sense the Police does provide an equality in terms of commonality. But the (ac)count distributes portions and so doing apportions a tangible inequality: it sets up bodies to be rulers and bodies to be ruled; it establishes and justifies the inequalities within any and all social orders.

Importantly here, it isn’t just the apportioning of power or material categories under the Police count that is established but also the apprehensibility of speech (*logos*) itself. As I argued above the Police count, as a distribution, establishes the conditions of apprehensibility. The Police count then enacts a specific distribution of the sensible which apportions what (dis)position or parts can be apprehended as speaking and thinking. The Police through their count of the distribution of the sensible constitute some as possessing speech (*logos*) but others have only voice (*phonē*). The valorisation of some and
the reduction of others forms the foundation of any Police count. By distributing the sensible the Police render the apportioned parts apprehensible and the unapportioned parts, which are still materially present within the world, inapprehensible. This is the inequality at the heart of all Police counts: they render thinking and speaking individuals mute.\textsuperscript{123}

This inherent inequality is important because it also reflects back on the totality of the Police count. If there are thinking and speaking beings which are written out of thinking and speaking, then the Police isn’t giving in fact a total (ac)count but instead a mis-count. This fundamental mis-counting is key to understanding both the Police and counting. Any totality in the distribution of the sensible is always false. This is not an omission on the part of the Police count but is in fact its very foundation. We can see this if we go back to Rancière’s treatment of Plato’s seventh arkhè as it is this which reveals and undermines the foundation of the Police count. Plato titles the seventh arkhè in \textit{The Laws}: the ‘choice of God’ or ‘the drawing of lots’.\textsuperscript{124} It isn’t a singular ordering logic like the other six. The other arkhè are organised on the basis of singular and particular qualification for rule whereas the seventh is the complete absence of any qualification. I argue, following from Rancière that this reveals the absence of qualification at the heart of any ordering. If it is as justifiable to have those randomly allocated to rule ruling as those who possess the qualities that orientate them for rule this means that the qualification is not important. This is the scandal of a superiority based on no qualification other than the absence of any superiority.\textsuperscript{125} The seventh arkhè, that of chance, makes the fundamental equality of all thinking and speaking beings its grounding principle. The very fact that \textit{anyone} could rule and the equation, of the seventh arkhè’s rule, to the other six forms of rule make it clear that these arkhè are grounded in a foundation of inequality.

\textsuperscript{123} This doesn’t mean that people once distributed lose their vocal cords or material capacity for speech. Rather it is about how speech and be understood and apprehended within the social order and the forms of speech and speaking that can be articulated. Speech (\textit{logos}) entails reason and the understanding of what is beneficial and harmful. Voice (\textit{phone}) only is capable of vocalising the pleasurable and the painful. While the Police count doesn’t physically stop the uncounted from talking it stops their communication as being apprehended as speech: their conversation is reduced to lowing.


The Police count is, therefore, only understandable, as ordering our commonly apprehensible world if it rests on a fundamental inequality. All Police counts are unequal as they divide speech (logos) and voice (phonē) within our commonly apprehensible world. There is no escape to be found from a pure totalised Police as the Police count is foundationally tied to its initial mis-counting. You could in part argue for a distribution of the sensible grounded in the seventh arkhè. On the surface such a grounding would appear to offer a foundation in equality. But for a total count to rest in this arkhè there would no longer be the divisibility of parts. There cannot be a total partage of all. This would be in effect reduce the social order to a singular natural oneness. This is nonsensical from the point of view of the distribution of the sensible in that it undoes its own singularity and thus the possibility of its own and any other distribution. The problem for the Police order lies in its apparent totality. In order for a count to be without void or supplement it must necessarily occult a portion of the commonly apprehensible world it orders: it must be a mis-count. But this is where Politics comes in.

Politics, for Rancière, is the re-counting of our commonly apprehensible world. Politics is both a peculiar and slippery thing for Rancière as, like the Police, it has a meaning separate from its common-sense understanding. Politics is a specific and technical term which explicitly refers to an (ac)count of our commonly apprehensible world which takes into account the Police (ac)counts uncounted remainder.126 This is a specific mode of counting grounded in the seventh arkhè. Politics does not aim for a total (ac)count of our commonly apprehensible world but rather is an intervention in what is (in)visible, (un)sayable and (im)possible within the distribution of the sensible.127 Politics operates as the revelation and effect of the Police’s mis-count. We can find evidence for this reading within Disagreement. There Rancière shows how Aristotle’s division of the polis into three parts - the rich (Oligoi), the noble (Aristoi) and the people (demos) - rests on an “empty qualification”. Each part of the social order is apportioned a share of the social order in accordance with their own quality. The rich have their wealth, the nobles have their excellence/virtue (aretē) and the people have freedom.
(eleutheria). The discrepancy is that these qualities are inherently unequal. As qualities (axiai) wealth and excellence/virtue are particular to their requisite parts but freedom is shared by every part. It is the fact that freedom is an “empty qualification” assigned to a singular portion but shared by all portions that it has a double purpose. Through its “emptiness” freedom provides the conditions for the erasure of the people from allotment and apportion in the social order. The “emptiness” of freedom is the mis-count within the Aristotelian Police (ac)count. It is a germ from which the invisibility of the people is enacted. The people can then be reduced to have no portion, or part, within the social order they exist in. Their status as uncounted and uncountable forges them into, as Rancière puts it, a part without a part.

The part without a part is an important concept within my theorisation of Rancière. A simple definition is that the part without a part is the indivisible and uncountable remainder of the Police count. They are necessitated by the fact that the Police (ac)count is always a mis-counting. The part without a part is a kind of transcendental political subject. It is transcendental in the sense that it exists prior to its own subjectivation into a particular immediate subject-position within our commonly apprehensible world. It is worth spending some time breaking down this concept here. Politics, as I have argued above, is necessarily a re-counting of the Police count to enable the recognition of the Police count’s fundamental mis-counting. Politics is in part a statement in speech (logos) by those who had been rendered the possessors of only voice (phonē). In other words, it is the part without a part speaking as if they were a part that had a part. This rests on the fundamental equality between thinking and speaking beings: the seventh arkhè.

In this act of seizing the capacity of speech (logos) to which the part which has no part has no proper claim they highlight the fact that they were always speaking and thinking on equal terms with those who were apportioned apprehensible speech and thought. It is this moment of the recognition of the speech of the part which has no part that is the subjectivation that I spoke of earlier. The political

instance and politics is when those who are uncounted become a subject i.e. a part that can be seen and counted as a part. This is the process by which the part which has no part becomes apprehensible as a part. Therefore, the political moment should be read as an instant in which the part which has no part articulates a social *wrong*\(^{129}\) (the Police’s fundamental mis-counting) and becomes understood and apprehended as a part. There is a difference in the way in which the subject is played out across these terms. Firstly, there is the transcendental subject of politics. This is the part which has no part. As I argued earlier this is transcendental in the sense that it is the *a priori* political subject that has yet to be subjectivated into a particular subjectivity within the distribution of the sensible. As such it is an atavistic subject, its only characteristic is its own incalculability and its being mis-counted. Thus, the transcendental political subject, the part which has no part, is no singular political subject i.e. workers or women but rather is the feeling (*aisthesis*) and relation to the distribution of being uncounted. Politics is the litigious process by which the Police count is recounted. This recounting transforms the part which has no part into a named and apprehensible part. Through politics the incalculable part which has no part becomes countable and thus gains a name such as ‘workers’ or ‘women’.

This is how I have read and developed Rancière’s understanding of politics. From this understanding it becomes immediately apparent that most of what we understand to be politics in our common or academic vernacular doesn’t fall under this definition. Any form of negotiation between visible parts cannot be considered as politics. This is because negotiation between apprehensible subjects is not about the emergence and subjectivation of a part which has no part. Rather such negotiation is about a redistribution of the apportioned portions under the Police count. This is a shift in Policing not in apprehensibility itself. Politics, in mine and Rancière’s terms, is a rare occurrence, one in which the distribution of the sensible’s conditions of what is apprehensible are changed.

\(^{129}\) This term has a particular meaning in the work of Rancière. I go into this in more detail in the section on disagreement, speech and wrong.
Thinking back to my previous argumentation about the comparison between Police counts we can see that the criteria for making meta-ethical judgements between differing Police is not necessarily about the distribution of resources between named parts. Rather one criteria for judging a Police count is the openness to politics: in the sense of the subjectivation of the part which has no part. A Police order can be seen to be judged as better than another in terms of its openness to the speech (logos) of the part which has not part. The rarefaction of politics this isn’t a move designed to temporalize politics. Politics is not about the singularity of a rupturing event or the efficaciousness of mutual relations of power. Rather politics and the Police are not distinct but muddily tied together. In contrast to the reading of Todd May (discussed above) my reading of politics charts it as impure, not only in the sense that it is not a singular category, or that it is something perfectly expressed in a political event, but also that in that it can only ever exist in relation to the Police. The impurity of politics draws back on my previously argued understanding of politics as a re-counting. Thinking politics in this way highlights how it is never separate from the distribution of the sensible. It can never be broken down or distilled to the point where it departs from the Police totality. This also means that the Police is not something to be overcome in the way in which May desires. There cannot be a form of politics, social organisation or common apprehensible world outside the distribution of the sensible. Such a phenomenon would be like “mana from heaven”: a gift from beyond the apprehensible itself.

The muddiness of politics’ enmeshment with the Police sets up the conditions for my understanding of the concept and the translation of the concept into IR. Politics is not external or separate from the

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132 Ibid. pp. 118
134 If we reflect back on the argumentation I have made earlier about the part without a part being the transcendental politics I can clarify that this is not an ontological claim. Rather than being a claim about an implicit hierarchy or understanding of being. The part which has no part is transcendental only through its status as a priori subjectivity. It is an unspecified, primordial and potentiate subjectivity yet to be rendered apprehensible through the fires of subjectivation’s kiln. In this sense the part which has no part does not offer us any particular map, method or class by which to understand and direct politics. It is simply the incalculable clay to be sculpted by politics into a subject. It is not an ontological position rather a mode of feeling (aisthesis) in relation to its preclusion from apprehensibility (aisthēton).
Police but rather is always begin articulated to the Police along the lines of the fundamental equality between thinking and speaking beings. The wrong of the Police mis-count is the site along which subjectivation can occur. It is within and through the crucible of this wrong that the part which has no part can be articulated into an apprehensible part. I am not making an argument that formulates Rancière as a theorist of the event or of a moment of politics drowned thereafter by apathy. Although this could be a tension against which to think my work I do not see this as an effective or convincing reading of what I have presented here. Instead politics is always germinal and, most importantly, a re-mapping of our commonly apprehensible world. Such a re-mapping can only take place with regard to the fundamental equality of thinking and speaking beings. There is the distinction between Rancière’s understanding of this reading and my own. Thinking and speaking for me is a potentially, although not always, broader category than that of the singularity of human beings. This is no the foundation or rupturing of a singular ontological principle such that Being can be better and more fully understood through politics. Rather fundamental equality is a crucial assumption, a quality (axiāi) that makes any and all social orderings and our common apprehensible world possible. Politics necessarily maps a common world through the assertion of a fundamental equality that makes the part which has no part into a part. The fundamental equality of politics and the fundamental inequality of the Police are thus tied together. These twinned forms, the Police and politics, are always both the head and tail of an ouroboric ordering. The distribution of the sensible is (re)distributed by the political (ac)count to allow foundational equality to be confirmed. Its litigation of the Police through the subjectivation of a new part to be recognised as having portion in the social order is, for my argument in this thesis and understanding of Rancière, politics.

This understanding of politics and the Police will become important for my answering my second research question: ‘What effect does a Rancièrian theory of IR have on our understanding of International politics?’ I need to set out the conditions that my argument and understanding sets for

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Politics. As I have foregrounded here but continue to argue in the next chapter: my Rancièrian understanding of politics forces us to rethinking our own categorisation of politics. Following on from the arguments I have made within the chapter it is clear my theorisation and articulation of a Rancièrian theory of IR needs to identify not only a part which has no part for and in IR’s distribution of the sensible but also its subjectivation. It is also an appropriate moment to reflect back on this limitations of my framework and argumentation at this point. In thinking through the notion of politics, the Police and arkhè I have also forwarded a reading that develops and progresses Rancière’s own position. It is not a simply homology or repetition of Rancière’s understanding I have given by my own reading, understanding and argumentation. I have at points flagged moments where my reading is in direct tension and I push through, following the introduction, to develop my theorisation of Rancière that will be useful for IR. This tension between my writing and Rancière as well as my articulation of my theory to IR is an argument I will develop in the next chapter and through my case study section which looks in more detail at the theorising of speech and wrong further explicating the specific notion of counting, its linkage to disagreement and subjectivation as well as how it forms the basis for politics. The next section carries my argument forwards and looks in more detail at the theorising of speech and wrong further explicating the specific notion of counting, its linkage to disagreement and subjectivation as well as how it forms the basis for politics.

**Disagreement: Wrong, Speech and Politics**

In this section I give an account of my understanding of wrong and the process of subjectivation in. In working through the notion of wrong and subjectivation through engagement with Disagreement I finesse the understanding of Rancière’s theory which I am applying and developing across my thesis. I highlight and develop an argument about how this understanding of wrong and subjectivation reflects back on the notion of counting/(ac)count highlighting that politics is necessarily contingent on the process of subjectivation and emerges in relation to wrong itself.
Wrong can be understood as a specific form of disagreement. This understanding of disagreement is separate from a misconception. A disagreement is not a conflict between parties that think something should be different. Disagreement is situated within the terrain of speech and is a problem that arises when two parties, with regard to a common object, cannot apprehend the object being presented as they cannot understand the other part as emitting sounds that can be experienced as speech. This is important in that it indicates the location around which a disagreement can take place. Given that a disagreement can only emerge as the product of an impasse within the objects of apprehension (aisthēton) it follows that it cannot take place wholly within the Police order. As a disagreement is a contestation over the apprehension of a form of speech that can only be heard as voice by the Police, rather than as speech, it cannot be within the Police (ac)count of our commonly apprehensible world. Rather a disagreement must be in part the germ around which politics takes place and can adhere itself to the distribution of the sensible. As I have previously argued politics is always enmeshed with the Police as opposed to being temporally and spatially distinct from it. As I alluded to earlier my reading is partially contentious. May looks to build his anarchist project precisely through the dividing of the Police from politics. For May politics then becomes an act of purity which is a countervailing force to the ignoble Police order. May’s reading of Rancière thus substitutes disagreement (a liminal dispute over the objects of apprehension as rendered by the Police distribution of the sensible) for a totalising dissensus. May, rather than looking at how the Police order shapes the objects of apprehension, sets up such shaping as Foucauldian power and for him disagreement isn’t about speech but rather a rejection of the Police that comes from the bedrock of anarchist politics. This is obviously a break from my reading of Rancière and that of May’s.

137 Ibid. pp. xii
139 Ibid. pp. 117
140 Ibid. pp. 122-23
For reasons I have laid out earlier May’s reading is not tenable. May misunderstands the sensory character of the distribution of the sensible. Against May’s reading Chambers gives a potent argument for avoiding this line of argument in his article *Jacques Rancière and the Problem of Pure Politics*.\(^{141}\) I agree with Chambers that rather than politics being separable from the Police it is always enmeshed with it. The nature of this enmeshment is both aesthetic, in that it is to do with the apprehensible, and foundational in that it affirms a fundamental equality. Taking Rancière and Chambers seriously on this point – and seeing the disagreement as fundamentally about both parties being capable of expression yet with one not apprehended as capable of expression is my starting point for politics and the quotidian activity of the Police.

I argue that this helps us to better understand the nature of a *wrong*. As I have argued, politics is first and foremost a re-mapping of our commonly apprehensible world and the Police distribution of the sensible allocation of parts. It is a remapping that emerges from a part that has no part and the fact that the Police distribution of the sensible is founded on a double mis-counting. In this mis-counting the part which has no part is denied access to speech (*logos*) and is reduced to possessing only voice (*phonē*). This mis-counting is what makes politics possible but is also that which makes disagreement possible. Through an initial *partage* that is irrevocably arranged to remove the speech from some in order to order our commonly apprehensible world so that some may rule it becomes possible for that apprehension to occur. Through the arkhè’s arrangement of the Police distribution a part of the order becomes unable to take part in the order. This, while in part a recap of my previous argument, is the miscount that makes the part which has no part an essential characteristic of the Police distribution of the sensible. This arrangement is the *wrong* that enables politics: the essential and initial mis-counting of the Police’s *partage* and distribution of the sensible.

Wrong, then, is an essential element within my Rancièrian definition, argument and understanding of politics. All orderings and distributions of the sensible are founded with regard to an arkhè which rests on a fundamental mis-counting. The fact that any and all Police distributions of the sensible rest on fundamental inequality via a miscount means that any distribution of the sensible has within it a mis-count and so a fundamental wrong of the existence of a part which has no part. This is not an ethical failing. The distribution of the sensible sets the pre-conditions that enable ethical judgement and arguments about the wrong of any partage occur prior to ethics. As such the wrong is a wrong not in the sense of an ethical dispute between parts of a social ordering. It is a wrong in the sense that the Police (ac)count rests upon fundamental inequality. As I have argued previously the only meta-ethical critique that can be brought to bear is about the openness of a distribution of the sensible to the potential visibility of the part which has no part: to politics. Wrong then is not an ethical problem. It is an aesthetic one.

In drawing this distinction - between wrong as an ethical approbation and as an aesthetic actuality - I open up a fruitful way of looking into its relationship to speech and therefore disagreement and politics. Politics is about the subjectivation of a part which has no part. In the transition from a portion of the polis which takes no portion of the polis (from a part that is present within the polis but inapprehensible to it) to a part that has a portion of the polis and can be apprehended as having such a portion. In this understanding wrong is the germ which is required for politics to ever be possible. I can flesh this out through the example of a common household science experiment by which a bottle of beer is placed into a freezer. In doing so the temperature of the beer is lowered below freezing point. Given the smoothness of the glass no ice crystals can take hold and the beer remains in its liquid form. However, if you take the beer out of the freezer and slam it on a table this forms a bubble. The bubble enables ice crystals to form spread throughout the glass. This freezes the beer instantaneously before your eyes. In this analogy Wrong is like the initial bubble which enables the beer to freeze. The Police distribution is too smooth a space for any kind of politics to occur because it is without void or supplement. Like the smooth glass inside the beer bottle there is no space in which
a reaction can occur. Our common world, like the beer, contains within it (always-already) the miscount of the bubble. It is a latent characteristic which enables politics to take place.

This idea is essential for understanding the relationship between wrong and politics, a contestation over apprehension. Wrong, just like the bubble enables the beer to freeze, is the catalyst which makes apprehensible the conditions of the Police distribution of the sensible and its mis-counting. If we understand wrong as the catalyst of an action, that action must be subjectivation. In order for a part to be apprehended as a subject there needs to be an axiom across which this equality can be articulated. I argue that there are two things that enable wrong to transform into subjectivation and thus for politics to occur. These two things are speech and equality. Speech is the quality of the part which has no part that is rendered inapprehensible by the Police distribution. Through the attribution of being unseen and unheard those which fall within the part which has no part become unable to be apprehended as possessing speech (logos) and as such they have only noise (phonē). As I have argued previously this reduction stages the ground for politics.

An example of such a disagreement drawn out by Rancière, and one which informs my argument is the succession of the plebeians from Rome.\(^{142}\) Within the Roman Police order the plebeians had been completely deprived of speech. They were not apprehended as possessing speech capable of being heard and as such became “nameless”.\(^{143}\) It is specifically this separation from speech which meant that the plebeian could not take a part in or of the polis. This sets the terrain of the wrong as grounded around speech. If the plebeians could not make their demands heard, then they could not redress their share: they could not take part in the polis or take a part of it. They could only gain recognition through being subjectivated by having their voice apprehended as speech. This was done through the creation of their own symbolic order.\(^{144}\) Like with my previous example of the bottle it is only at the moment of dissensus that the wrong and be addressed. Without the succession or immediacy of the

\(^{143}\) Ibid. pp. 24
\(^{144}\) Ibid. pp. 25
wrong politics cannot take place. Just like bubble of air which enables the bottle of beer to freeze, it is the dissensus that enables the wrong to be rendered apparent. The politics which takes place in Rancière’s example makes speech the methodology through which subjectivation can occur. This is because speech provides the tool, language, through which a symbolic order can be written. It is possible to do this because of the fact that language is founded on (mis)communication. Language and in its apprehensible form, speech, is able to apply terms catachrestically. The catachresis upon which communication is founded becomes not only the tool by which a partage can be applied but also the way in which politics and subjectivation are possible.

The second condition for subjectivation, and therefore politics, to be possible is the prevalence of a fundamental equality. Rancière assumes the primary equality of thinking and speaking beings as revealed by Plato’s seventh arkhè. This equality is radically egalitarian in that it affix’s chance to rule. The fact that anyone could rule through allotment it reveals the falsity of the other arkhès. I turn now to an example to illustrate this point. If we suppose that there isn’t an inherent equality present within the partage but in reality, there is an actual apprehensible difference between those who give orders and those who receive orders then our common world disappears. It becomes impossible for there to be communication between the giver and receiver of the order; that is to say, the transmission of orders would itself be impossible. Without the equality common to our shared world then our shared world itself breaks down. Thus, all sensible orderings of the common world don’t rest upon their arkhè but on the fundamental equality which underwrites all modes of ordering. Arkhè serves to marshal the sensory through its Police partage and into a distribution of the sensible. The arkhè is what is necessary for that marshalling of that ordering. The ordering is the mechanism through which arkhè appears as natural when in fact it is contingent. If there is to be an axiom which makes possible an order it is not the privileging or preference of any part of that order over another.

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Instead what makes that ordering possible, is the fundamental equality of those parts which makes them orderable. It is this axiom that is verified in politics. Verification is important here as it is the recognition of the axiom of equality as opposed to the implementation of an equality. The fact that the axiom is verified makes sense given the previous understanding and organisation of equality within my argument and is key for thinking through how equality and politics relate in my Rancierian theorisation.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explicated my Rancièrian theorisation. I have explicated my approach to Rancière’s theory and have defended my reading of it. In particular, while concentrating on the core concept of the distribution of the sensible I have emphasised my focus on the sensory and the organisation of what can be apprehended, the link to an initiating arkhè, the importance of the count and the miscount, and the relation of this to the wrong, subjectivation and speech. I also linked back to the tensions between my mode of analysis and how this is at times in tension. I highlighted, with reference to the introduction where I develop and move beyond Rancière’s initial argumentation. This is something I develop in the next chapter what I highlight my understanding of IR through my Rancièrian framework.
Chapter 4: 
International Relation’s Distribution of the Sensible and 
International Politics

Introduction

In this chapter I develop my reading of Rancière into IR with a particular focus on my understanding of the concepts of the distribution of the sensible, arkhè, politics and the Police. I show how I understand IR theory and forward my contribution to the field. I excavate and examine what constitutes the Police within IR and at what could be classified as politics. I develop my core argument that IR should understand politics as subjectivation against a wrong, which is a (mis)count grounded in Police order which stems from its arkhè – anarchy – it is the moment of subjectivation through which non-state actors become apprehensible as actors for and in IR.

“The International” and IR

Within this section I explicate my linkage between “the international” and IR. I argue that “the international” is an inaccessible set of material conditions which IR seeks to make apprehensible, in particular ways. My argument is developed through a reading of the specificity of IR which shows the distinction between “the international” as something outside of IR’s (ac)count and IR itself which is the apprehensible presentation of the “the international”.

148 By “the international” I don’t mean a singular or pure notion of any type or modality of what is the international. In my use of this term I only mean the object for/of IR. This could be any object that is looked at or situated as the object for/of IR.

149 The term material conditions has been selected here to avoid conflation with the literature surround “external worlds”. It has been used to mark a departure with Rancière from the “philosophising” of the Police order and to open up the approach to the radicality of politics and politically reading. The phrases material and condition have been selected to emphasise and recognise the historical linkage to Marxist thought within Rancière. They also stress the kind of raw materiality of being outside of sensibility and thus apprehension. The selection of condition(s) is important as even in their inapprehensible excessiveness they are conditional based on the distribution of the sensible.

150 This will be developed in more detail throughout the section but it is important to note now that “the international” is precisely not limited to the conditions of apprehension imposed on it by IR but in fact is always excessive. IR through counting up its object will place limitations on what can be apprehensively understood as IR given that this is always a relation that limits the inaccessible and excessive material conditions.
I start by looking at the relationship between IR and political theory. In looking at this relationship I concur with Walker\(^{151}\) that the two are interrelated. This provides the foundation on which I examine how its disciplinary construction is designed separate from political theory but also to make the two relate in particular ways. I argue that as IR becomes a separate mode of political theorisation it comes to have its own distinct object which it names “the international” and which is contrasted to “the domestic”. I highlight how my Rancièrian reading separates the inapprehensible object of study: “the international”, from its apprehensible form through a distribution of the sensible.

In making my argument with regard to understanding the relationship between IR and its object “the international” it’s important to look at the way IR considers itself. Most of the “core texts” within the field don’t focus explicitly on IR but rather on international politics. We can see this across works such as Morgenthau’s *Politics among Nations\(^{152}\)*, Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics\(^{153}\)*, Wendt’s *Social Theory of International Politics\(^{154}\)*, Mearsheimer’s *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics\(^{155}\)*, Bull’s *The Anarchic Society: A Study of Order in World-Politics\(^{156}\)* and Jervis’s *Perception and Misperception in International Politics\(^{157}\)*. Each of these texts orientates itself in relation to IR and politics in the manner that Walker conceives of as performing a mode of political theory in his *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*.\(^ {158}\) Walker situates his argument about IR with regard to the discipline’s positioning of and engagement with the state understood as a point of schism between ‘theories of political possibility within and theories of mere relations beyond the secure confines of the modern territorial state’.\(^ {159}\) In drawing this distinction between political possibility within the state, which is

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\(^{159}\) Ibid. pp. 6
nominally understood as politics, and the relations beyond the state, Walker clearly shows how the relationship between IR and politics is configured. Furthermore, through analysing the historicity of sovereignty\(^{160}\) and territory\(^{161}\) Walker shows how IR forms in relation to politics and understands its own thinking of itself. He thus highlights the way in which the field is the ‘celebration of a historically specific account of the nature, location and possibilities of political identity and community’.\(^{162}\)

For Walker, this celebration is, fundamentally, a product of a spatial and temporal reality that is (re)shaped through its own theorisation both in domestic political theory and IR. Of particular importance to my argument here are certain historical accounts of the emergence of modern nation-state for which it crystallised in early-modern Europe, constructed by and made coherent through a series of answers to binary questions:\(^{163}\) ‘Identity/difference, self/other, inside/outside, History/contingency and immanence/transcendence.’\(^{164}\) Walker argues that these binary distinctions ‘have permitted theories of international relations to be constructed as a discourse about the permanent tragedies of a world fated to remain fragmented while longing for reconciliation and integration.’\(^{165}\) He thus highlights how IR’s understanding of state relations is not divorced from political theory but is in fact an extension of it. This is to say that IR is not disconnected from politics but rather is itself a mode of thinking through political questions.

Walker’s argument that IR should be viewed as a produced via political theory is convincing. But it is also important to bear in mind that IR isn’t solely produced through political theory. It is also a site for its production. This is to say there isn’t a strict isomorphism between political theory and IR but rather a reciprocal relationship. Thus, thinking IR as political theory necessarily charts political theory as thinking IR. The historical juncture of the emergence of the modern nation-state instantiates a division

\(^{160}\) Ibid. pp. 164-169
\(^{161}\) Ibid. pp. 130-135
\(^{162}\) Ibid. pp. 15
\(^{163}\) Ibid. pp. 17
\(^{164}\) Ibid. pp. 17
\(^{165}\) Ibid. pp. 17
between political theory and IR, a separation that is, in and of itself, a de-politicisation of elements within political theory. In thinking IR as distinct from, although reciprocal to, political theory IR loses its own standing as politics. This movement, as Walker highlights, enshrines the state, and as I have argued, also anarchy as the core assumptions necessary for thinking IR. However, I want to argue that this distinction between political theory and IR also makes it possible for IR to develop a political life of its own, that the separation of IR from political theory makes it possible for IR to develop its own theoretical understanding of politics.

To elucidate this point further we will return to Waltz. In Chapter One I showed that that Waltz is an important figure for instantiating anarchy as the ordering principle of IR. In asking the question ‘how can we conceive of international politics as a distinct system?’ He delineates IR as a mode of theorisation. Waltz distinguishes between the third image of the international system, as permissive cause, and the second and first as effective. This distinction expresses the movement of causality from the state to the organisation of the international system. This shifting of causal power makes possible a political imaginary which necessarily includes a distinction between political theory and “political” IR theory, complementing IR as foreign policy, or the politics of state relations, with the view that it can be a distinct political theorisation in its own right.

We can see a similar movement within the work of Morgenthau. As Paipais highlights Morgenthau seeks to de-politicise elements of his object of study as well as politicise others, ‘recognising those forces at play in the political and refusing to gloss over the logic of antagonism that permeates international politics’. It is precisely this twofold action of IR, attempting to think its own political theory and itself as a mode of political theory that enables and delineates these two modes of understanding IR. Walker shows us how and why political theory constructs the delineation of IR from

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166 Ibid. pp. 182-183
169 Ibid. 362
politics at the level of the state. Waltz and Morgenthau evidence how this delineation can be taken forwards in order to produce a political theory specific to IR. The separation between the internal and external boundaries of the state becomes the starting point for IR’s own political theorisation. By separating the inside from the outside\textsuperscript{170} politics and political theory becomes divided between their domestic and international iterations.

As we saw in Chapters One and Two, from its inception this understanding is structured in relation to Anarchy. This separation then is not the death of a political reading of “the international” but, rather, its birth grounding IR as a discipline and giving it, for its own political theorisation, the object of the “international.”

It is worth spending some time developing this division more fully. Distinguishing between the political theorisation of the domestic (political theory) and the political theorisation of “the international” (IR theory) is only made possible through and by the historical and material existence of the sovereign territorial nation-state. By taking this division between the domestic understanding of politics and the international understanding of politics it becomes possible to analogise the two. In terms of the distinction between the subject and object of study, political theory takes the polis or society and IR takes “the international”: the extra/intra-relations between and of polises or societies. While this analogy is useful,\textsuperscript{171} in order for its strength to be felt fully, we first have to look at how “the international” can be conceived of as the object of/for IR and thus also how conceive of IR in relation to its object. To do this I want to look at and write against the work of Patrick Thaddaeus Jackson whose \textit{The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations} breaks down the philosophical underpinnings latent in IR’s approach to “the international”.

\textsuperscript{170}Not just as a simple distillation but rather a fractionation. Here the inside and outside are not immutable separate categories but always mixed together. By establishing the conditions for separation it becomes possible to understand the ratios and molarity between the inside and outside within and around the domestic.

\textsuperscript{171}I work through and apply this analogy in more detail later within the chapter.
Jackson makes his arguments partly through looking at the question of the role/applicability of “science” within and to IR. With reference to Lynch he breaks down the philosophical commitments within his own research to ‘ontology: how do researchers conceptualise what they study? Epistemology: how do researchers know what they know? [and] Methodology: how do researchers select their tools?’ “Science” can then be articulated with IR at the level of method giving Jackson space for the philosophical dimensions of ontology and epistemology. He then breaks IR down into four different mechanisms for knowing about the world: Neopositivism (mind-world dualism & phenomenalism), Critical Realism (mind-world dualism & transfactualism), Analyticism (mind-world monism & phenomenalism) and Reflexivity (mind-world monism & transfactualism). Jackson argues that each approach has, resulting from its philosophical commitments, a relation to the status of knowledge and procedure for the evaluation of claims. Jackson then establishes a grid through and against which research in IR can be categorised through the relationship of the theory to its object. Through this approach to the field and IR, Jackson produces an (ac)count of IR that is totalising.

There are two things I argue in response to this. The first is that the level at which Jackson’s claims operate is disciplinary. Jackson is not making an argument about the nature of IRs object, but only about how it is apprehended by the discipline. Secondly, and relatedly, Jackson’s arguments serve to categories the modes of research in IR not the objects of that research. Jackson assumes the homogeneity of the object across different approaches; Jackson orders in terms of different approaches the discipline takes to its object but assumes that the object remains the same: “the

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173 Ibid. pp. 26
174 Ibid. pp. 25
175 Ibid. pp. 198
176 Ibid. pp. 198
177 Ibid. pp. 198
178 Jackson sets up a totalising (ac)count of IR in that each and every philosophical approach can be broken down into his categories and gridded accordingly. Given his own framework Jackson’s project then is to articulate the specific modes of research in IR into bracketed social-scientific categories against which their contribution and potential can be measured. It is important to highlight already how in Rancièrian terms such a project cannot be political as its totalisation sets it up as a mode of Policing. I cover later in the chapter how Jackson’s intervention is that of policing via the deployment of a metapolitics.
international”. This is important for the argument I am forwarding in this thesis. As I highlighted in the introduction I am writing this thesis towards post-positivist IR. As such I am actively rejecting the framework put forwards by Jackson. This is not only because of my positioning within the field but also the weight that my critique of philosophy carries.

Buzan is useful in clearing up this distinction through his argument that ‘IR is NOT just world politics: that is the macro end of political science’.\textsuperscript{179} For Buzan IR is not simply the extrapolation of the political to the level of the state but rather is the end point of analysis of a multiplicity of disciplines.\textsuperscript{180} In charting out the historicity of the discipline Buzan contextualises it as a product of historical and politico-theoretical discourses\textsuperscript{181} and stresses that the movement to reduce the field to the focus of nations/nation-states is a misstep.\textsuperscript{182} Buzan touches on the way in which taking “the international” as the object of study does not force IR into the position of studying only the macro-element of politics. Instead I contend that it gives such a mode of inquiry a unique character.\textsuperscript{183} This can help clarify how Jackson’s assumptions structure his engagement with IR and “the international”. He divides the field into four separate philosophical approaches. But this is not a purely philosophical action. It is also a political one. Drawing on Weber, Jackson homes in on the role of science within the field and this leads him to construct his distinction between the ontologies of mind-world dualism and mind-world monism.\textsuperscript{184} These become, for Jackson, the core ontological dispute within IR: is there a world that is separate from our engagement with it. And this raises the question of whether or not there is an external “international” that can be accessed by theorists of IR. Jackson’s categories break down, at the level of ontology, the distinction between “the international” as an external object world (mind-world dualism) and as only subjective experience (mind-world monism). This distinction between

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid. pp. 156-157
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid. pp. 157
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid. pp. 157
\textsuperscript{183} This isn’t to say that IR isn’t political or analogous to politics in the Rancièrian sense. Rather it shows that it is distinct from political inquiry more radically than as continuance of domestic narrative and understanding.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid. pp. 31
objective and subjective is a firm line between the philosophical underpinnings of engagement with IR, he says, cementing this through readings of Descartes and Kant.\footnote{185}

To develop my argument, I want to briefly take a detour and consider the work of philosopher Quentin Meillassoux.\footnote{186} Whose work is at the forefront of thinking through the implications of the ways in which the subject-object distinction has unfolded within philosophy since Kant. He has written on topics as diverse as poetry\footnote{187} and temporality\footnote{188} but his major work is focused on what he terms ‘ancestrality’ meaning events anterior to the emergence of life on earth and thus separate from our species being, and the ‘arche-fossil’, material which indicates the existence of an ancestral existence. In his seminal work After Finitude\footnote{189} Meillassoux characterises post-Kantian philosophy, with its division of the subject and object as correlationism. This is the proposition that cannot access thinking or being in themselves or separately but only as two things in reciprocal relation, where that relation is not simply one of division but of a correlation.\footnote{190} Meillassoux argues that this correlationism, has been a staple in philosophy since Kant. And, indeed, we can see it in Jackson’s encounters with Kant himself.\footnote{191} Through engagement with ancestrality Meillassoux formulates a “speculative realism” which challenges the viability of correlationism. We can’t address all of this here. The key point is that post-Kantian thinking such as that on which Jackson draws is not so much about the division oft subject

\footnotetext[185]{This is clear within The Conduct of Inquiry into International Relations as Jackson works through his four understandings of IR they each rest on either a fundamentally Cartesian or Kantian reading of the subject-object distinctions. By charting the relationality between these foundations Jackson draws out the philosophical underpinnings in terms of ontology for each of the theories at hand.\footnote{186}{M. Wark, General Intellects: Twenty-One Thinkers for the Twenty First Century, (Verso, London, 2017) pp. 286-298} \footnote{187}{Q. Meillassoux, The Number and the Siren: A Decipherment of Mallarmé’s Coup De Dés, (Sequence Press, New York, 2012)} \footnote{188}{Q. Meillassoux, Time Without Becoming, (Mimesis International, London, 2014)} \footnote{189}{Q. Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, (Bloomsbury, London, 2015) pp. 3-5} \footnote{190}{Ibid. pp. 5} \footnote{191}{Jackson doesn’t propose the he has a singular philosophical engagement with Kant but rather takes Kant as read by differing sources and approaches. Thus Jackson doesn’t give us a singular account of Kant and his ideas but rather how Kant is appropriated and read by differing discourses. Again here it is clear that Jackson’s engagement at the disciplinary level highlights his engagement as Policing. As I develop later in the chapter Jackson, through his philosophical engagement with IR, serves to Police and manage the discipline. This is not a criticism of his important work but rather a statement of how it should be read under a Rancièrian understanding of IR.}
and object a separated as it is about their *correlation*. Badiou’s philosophy seeks to avoid this critique through a distinct *negative ontology*. By reading mathematics as the foundation for ontology and at a larger level philosophy, Badiou can effectively answer the charge of *ancestrality*.

Jackson however doesn’t have such a negative understanding of ontology. For him or Jackson “the international” is a series of differently weighted subject-object *correlations* that can be read differently depending on the ontology of the “beholder”. This disciplinary approach doesn’t take a position on “the international” but rather serves to give, in its strongest form, a taxonomy of approaches. Approaches for which the ‘actual’ object of IR is effectively unimportant or non-existent. There cannot be a consistent object for IR as there can be such a discrepancy between the ontological foundations of the object of IR itself. The common object for this mode of analysis in IR then, as I argued above, becomes the field itself as opposed to “the international”. This makes clear that Jackson is not giving us an argument about the nature of “the international” but rather marshalling the discipline itself. He gives us options as to what “the international” can be seen as but no definite answer as to its actuality.

My theorisation of IR changes how we can and should understand “the international”. As we have seen, our commonly apprehensible world is inaccessible without a distribution of the sensible to render its contents apprehensible. My proposition is that in the same way, “the international” is only apprehensible through a distribution of the sensible. I will develop this argument as on a twofold movement. Firstly, I shift the discussion away from competing ontologies and the debate around monism/dualism and subject/object; secondly I turn to look at the condition of politics within IR, something which is possible because I do not provide a philosophical (ac)count of our existence but rather an aesthetic and political one. This is important lest we mistake my Rancièrian politics in relation to the distribution as reading a self-other *correlation* liable to the same critique as Jackson.

Jackson is interested in taking the field at the level of discipline and as such wants to organise IR in its totality. In positioning my theory towards post-positivist IR I am breaking away from Jackson’s reading of the field. Because I am arguing for how politics functions in IR and an theorising it I am writing away from Jackson; who is giving us a philosophical account of divergent ontologies and methodologies in IR. My reading and forwarding of Rancière is producing for the field an account of politics for IR that is decisively set against political-philosophy and thus Jackson. My reading of Rancière and argument in this thesis is not concerned with the disruptive power of the emergence of the true but rather with understanding how politics must be understood based on the terms with which it is read. This brings my argument through to post-positivist and post-structural IR. The ontological truth of methodological intervention in the discipline or the truth of anscestrality don’t pose problems for Rancière as he has already delimited these critiques. As I argued in the previous chapter on Rancière and the distribution of the sensible, I move away from philosophy and the ‘ontologies of superpower’. This directs my argument and articulates this thesis clearly to post-structural IR. It also through this engagement with philosophy highlights my own voice as separate from that of Rancière. In making this claim forcefully and by looking at anscestrality I progress Rancièrian thought.

As I have shown Jackson attempts to produce a philosophical understanding of IR in the form of catalogue or taxonomy of the differing superpowers gifted to ontology within IR. This is a useful project for understanding both the discipline and the field but such an engagement cannot be political. It is a Police action. I have explicitly distanced myself and my approach from philosophy as I am not focused on engaging in the typical charting of rupture that becomes reducible to the emergence of a truth. By extracting my argument from philosophy my Rancièrian reading can’t be read as producing a total account of IR but rather an approach that has implications for politics in IR, one that is never complete or total. Jackson’s useful contribution to the field is his charting of the potential “ruptures of truth” through his reading of Post-Kantian philosophy. However, the ruptures Jackson is capable of

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195 Ibid. pp. 216
charting are already contained within the totality of the visible, hearable and possible allotted parts contained within IR. As such I am writing in this thesis a contribution to IR that goes against Jacksons reading and understanding of IR.

My account evasion of the Meillassoux’s critique of correlationism by eschewing philosophy as a basis for approaching IR, sets up the conditions of and for my understanding of “the international” forwarded within this thesis. “The international” like the material relations behind our commonly apprehensible world is inapprehensible in and of itself. What is required to make “the international” apprehensible is a distribution of the sensible. As the partage of a distribution of the sensible enables the apprehensibility of “the international” it is non-sensible to talk of “the international” as existing outside of its relation to the distribution of the sensible. This is not a statement about the existence of a material and physical world or conditions outside of our distribution of the sensible. This a question that rests in philosophy. The distribution of the sensible requires a material and physical existence to exist in order for there to be objects moulded into apprehensibility. In thinking “the international” as the material conditions that must be (ac)counted by the distribution of the sensible to become apprehensible it becomes clear that “the international” is only meaningful and apprehensible through its relationship to the distribution of the sensible. This means that IR can only encounter its object through a distribution that rests upon an arkhè and produces self-evident facts about that object. Thus, the object of IR is only knowable when thought through IR’s distribution of the sensible. This represents not only a contribution to my argument and thesis but also a contribution to thought around Rancière as I am writing against the tensions I have with the Rancièrian framework.

Rather I argue “the international” is conditioned by the discipline’s own formulation and arrangement of its distribution of the sensible. While this may seem like an odd claim I will work it through here. As I have argued previously the distribution of the sensible produces assumed facts, which delimit what can be seen, done, said, thought or made.\footnote{J. Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, (Continuum, London, 2004) pp. 85} The distribution of the sensible produces these same
facts out of “the international” into an apprehensible mode of thinking IR. The object of IR’s study then is not, a “pure” international. It is not the IR that we look at and apprehend in the world taken as true. Rather it is the IR that we look at and apprehend in the world that appears as true due to the fact it is structured through IR’s distribution of the sensible. But IR cannot set the conditions for the production of its own distribution of the sensible. Rather, as Walker hints at the distribution of the sensible for IR is always already produced in relation to the social, historical and political imaginaries that enable the formulation of IR as a specific mode of engagement with the world.

The next sections looks at how I read the distribution of the sensible into IR. Here we can see the argument I give which highlights the linkages between my work and work by Bleiker197, Callahan198 and Ciută199 which serves to bring the aesthetic and aesthetic texts into the workings of what we consider “the international”. As I highlighted in the introduction these texts are essential allies in rethinking IR however I forward a different reading and focus, partly through my reading of Rancière. My argument in this section defined my relationship between IR and political theory through my engagement with Walker. From this I argued that IR separates itself from political theory and arranges itself with regard to a separate object, “the international” as opposed to “the domestic”. Through an engagement with and critique Jackson I highlighted how my Rancièrian reading of IR requires the separation of the inapprehensible object of study from its apprehensible form through the distribution of the sensible. Finally, I concluded by proposing a distinction between “the international” as the material conditions and IR as the apprehensible (ac)count of “the international”.

**The Distribution of the Sensible in IR**

In order for me to apply the concept of the distribution of the sensible to IR I need to do a little bit of ground clearing first. There have been numerous attempts to think IR through the lens of political

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theory\textsuperscript{200}, with the most influential being Walker.\textsuperscript{201} I have argued in the previous section that Walker gives us an interesting account of the articulation between political theory and IR\textsuperscript{202} can and has been subsumed and utilised on behalf of political understanding. This helps to show how IR is understood as a method of realising and understanding “the international” but also as a political tool in shaping that understanding.\textsuperscript{203} The interlocking of political theory and IR is a useful point for the translation of Rancière into IR theory. I understand IR not just as a methodology or philosophy for theorising “the international” but as a way by which we can theorise politics within IR and how this can be conveyed. As Lake sets out, and I have alluded to in my literature review, the fourth debate constructs an eclectic basis of IR.\textsuperscript{204} This eclectic base has a double function. Firstly, it enables a field, or at least section of IR, that are conducive to the articulation of my Rancièreian understanding of IR theory. Secondly it operationalises a potential for moving IR away from understanding itself solely in relation to its own ontological foundations. This is important in thinking through the way in which my articulation and understanding of Rancière sits at a tension with ontology within Rancière’s own thought.

In order to render this argument and my contribution possible I have to look through how the distribution of the sensible and be articulated to IR. As I have argued in the previous chapter in order for this to be meaningful there first needs to be an argument which accounts for the distribution of the sensible in IR. As I outlined in the previous chapter the distribution of the sensible sets the conditions of an apprehensible common world and creates a series of positions and dispositions specific to those positions.\textsuperscript{205} It also makes possible any and all orderings through its establishment of

\textsuperscript{200} A good example of this debate and thought can be seen in the \textit{Journal of International Political Theory}. Especially Vol.13 No.1 Feb 2017 and Vol.12 No. 2 Jun 2016 as trying to look at the relationship between IR and political theory. These journal issues do work at trying to bridge divides and contestations between IR and political theory as being drawn together as distinct entities. Some other notable work in this vein is Moore’s ‘A Political Theory of Territory’ and Lenin’s ‘Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism’ both of which seek to work through IR and its relationship to the political although they aren’t necessarily texts within IR.


\textsuperscript{202} Ibid. pp. 21

\textsuperscript{203} Ibid. pp. 25


the conditions of apprehensibility linked to the arkhè which ensures the coherence of the differing (dis)positions allotted and apportioned by the distribution of the sensible. My proposition is that in IR apprehensible common world and the requisite apportioned (dis)positions are established around the arkhè of Anarchy.

Now, as we have seen Rancière’s frame of reference is the polis from which he extrapolates the situation of the nation state. In attempting to think “the international” as understood through its relation to the distribution of the sensible this could be problematic. Whereas Rancière makes clear and establishes the location of apportioned parts and their allotted portions within his political theory, their location within IR is not immediately clear. This is where I step outside of Rancière’s own argumentation and argue that with regard to the distribution of the sensible within IR we can see that it apportions its parts and their allotted portions with regard to “the international”. The location of these parts is given, as I showed in Chapter 3, at the level of relations between nation-states. In order for this location to be clear I have to first look at how the distribution of the sensible sets the conditions for its understanding of apprehensible actants within IR. This is only possible given the partage specific to IR by which the distribution of the sensible carries out its (ac)count. In order to highlight the distribution of the sensible within IR I turn back to the work of Waltz, with regard to Wendt, to give a clear account of how IR has been rendered apprehensible through the distribution of the sensible.

As I argued in Chapter 2 for Waltz, within the first image wars effective cause is the nature and behaviour of man. There is already a linkage here between the three images of the causes of war and the (dis)position of its subject: states. As I explicated within my close reading the first image isn’t the cause of war as it is not war’s permissive cause. Waltz shifts away from specific personalised understanding of War as human nature cannot be changed whereas socio-political institutions can

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210 Ibid. pp. 16
be. Humanity in and of itself is not a sufficient location for “the international” to be found and rendered apprehensible for Waltz. This argument for the understanding of IR, as I have hinted at in my close reading, requires that IR theorists ignore in part every feature of states except their capabilities. As Waltz argues IR theorists must ‘not ask whether states are revolutionary or legitimate, authoritarian or democratic, ideological or pragmatic. We abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities.’ As I have argued previously this is not a rejection of the aesthetic character of politics but is instead a political choice designed to construct IR in a particular way. In taking the state not only as an empty unit, devoid of its first and second image concerns, and also as a neutral unit Waltz makes a statement as to the (dis)position of parts within the distribution of the sensible. This approach to IR takes and apprehends “the international” at the level of states through the lens of anarchy. In effect Waltz, as conditioned by the political, social and historical imaginaries around him, produces an (ac)count of IR which renders apprehensible an understanding of “the international”. We can see this in his statement that ‘among men as among states, anarchy, or the absence of government, is associated with the occurrence of violence.’ As Waltz renders the state as the unit of IR it isn’t simply the state in isolation, nor is it the metonymic state of his second image. Rather it is the state as ordered by anarchy. This establishes for Waltz the apprehensibility of IR. This is a particular way of understanding and reading both Waltz and the distribution of the sensible. It is worth working through this in more detail so I can lift out a broader understanding of the distribution of the sensible within IR.

Waltz makes the transition from an understanding of domestic politics to IR through looking at a distinction in what he calls organising principles. Waltz argues, as I have highlighted earlier, that he ‘defined domestic political structures first by the principle according to which they are organized or ordered, second by the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions and third by the

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211 Ibid. pp. 41
213 Ibid. pp. 102
distribution of capabilities across units.\textsuperscript{215} It is obvious here that for Waltz the stakes of how “the international” can be rendered apprehensible are inexorably tied to the capability and relations of and between states. Waltz relies in part here on an analogy to the domestic. To be more precise “the international” in understood by Waltz as threefold. Primarily there is the ordering principle of IR: anarchy. Secondly there is the character of the units: states. Finally, there is the capabilities of these states: their militaries and economic arrangement. From this tripartite distinction Waltz goes on to argue that the organising principle of IR is anarchy. He gives an account that within IR ‘none is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralised and anarchic.’\textsuperscript{216} In making this distinction Waltz highlights that the core character of IR is its anarchic nature. However, this is not a difference in system. Waltz thinks through IR as peculiar and particular in that it is an anarchic system. The prevalence of this organising principle is what gives IR distinction and establishes the conditions for its order(ing). However IR is not unique in terms of it being an order(ing). Waltz shows us that IR is structured by an organising principle that is different from the domestic understanding of the political. This structuring is not in and of itself unique but rather is consistent with modes of structure and order(ing). To carry this over to its Rancièrian understanding, there is a distribution of the sensible that renders IR from “the international”. The arkhè of this distribution is different from that of the domestic.

For Wendt\textsuperscript{217}, and those who follow him, however, the state has an ontological existence in its own right.\textsuperscript{218} Wendt is in agreement with Waltz that “the international” can be taken as analogous to the domestic. He agrees in taking anarchy as the arkhè of the distribution of the sensible but gives the state a social character. Wendt’s constructivism, then, is not a counter to Waltz’s argument and does

\textsuperscript{215} K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Addison-Wesley, London, 1979) pp. 88
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid. pp. 88
\textsuperscript{218} As well as the literature around ontological security such as the work of Mitzen’s Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma, Steele’s Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State & Ringmar’s On The Ontological Status of the State demonstrate the way in which the state has become personified as a distinct ontological actant as opposed to simply an aggregate of its human components. Some of the particularities of this are touched on briefly when I work through my case-study.
not change the relationship of the distribution of the sensible, its arkhè and relationship to “the international”. The state as actant is still a (dis)position made apprehensible via the distribution of the sensible.

There is a problem here in that as a state and it subjects have already had the condition of their apprehensibility constituted through the distribution of the sensible, how can theory avoid positing at the level of the international a kind of “double jeopardy” in the distribution of the sensible ability takes place twice. How can we talk about the distribution of the sensible within IR without falling recourse to an infinite regression/multiplicity of distributions of the sensible?

I argue that there is a singular distribution of the sensible that formulates our relationship between differing (ac)count and (ac)counting of apprehensible parts. This singular distribution of the sensible cuts across all different manners of understanding. We can see this distribution in that as we change the object of our focus so too changes the specific details of the distribution of the sensible’s apportionment. This is to say that while domestic understanding and international understandings have different particulars they are both shaped by the distribution of the sensible. I am arguing here for IR to be considered an activity that differs to the regular attenuation of the domestic distribution of the sensible. This is not an argument for IR to be considered a completely distinct and abstract distribution onto itself. Rather I am arguing that when we shift the object of our focus to “the international” our common apprehensible world is apportioned by the distribution of the sensible differently. I am looking at the way in which our common apprehensible world within IR is apportioned and (ac)counted through the distribution of the sensible. This is a different task to looking at how our common apprehensible world is apportioned and (ac)counted through the distribution of the sensible.

In making this distinction I am highlighting the divide between the apprehensible spaces of IR from the apprehensible spaces of domestic politics. In doing so it follows that the system of self-evident facts that are produced by the distribution of the sensible in relation to IR and constitute the apprehensibility of IR are different from domestic politics.
The distribution of the sensible is not universal. We can see this given the differing readings of Police order found in *Disagreement*. Rancière distinguishes between the Scythian “slave war”\(^{219}\) as distinct from the Roman (ac)count which enabled the Aventine secession of the plebs.\(^{220}\) Both of these Police orders have different sets of parts (ac)counted by and for their distributions of the sensible. I have already argued for a meta-ethical comparison between police orders also.\(^{221}\) In order for my argument to be consistent and for this to make sense there must be a distinction between the distribution of the sensible present in Scythia and Rome. This distinction isn’t only temporal but also spatial. The differentiation between states understandings of themselves depends on the states own understanding of a commonly apprehensible world. This in turn means that as state understandings differ over space and time the distribution of the sensible must also differ over space and time. This is not only uncontrovertial but is also a necessary assumption for my arguments to have any weight.

If the distribution of the sensible was not contingent across time or space then it would be unchanging and a fixed universal substrate to be uncovered. This uncovering would reduce my Rancièrian approach to understanding and politics to a mode of philosophy privileging the rupture of the true: another account of the superpower of ontology. Rancière, then, explicitly sets the location of the distribution of the sensible at the level of the *polis*. This is a tension between Rancière’s own work and my argumentation. I move against Rancière in arguing that by the fact that the distribution of the sensible is not a universal substrate or some unequivocal mode of being then it is a concept grounded in contingency. Just as the distribution of the sensible varies and is still meaningful across states and societies. It must also be meaningful to (mis)communicate between states and societies. Just as the individual parts of the *polis* are distributed through the *partage* of the distribution of the sensible made to cohere via its arkhè the distribution of individual part of “the international” must be distributed through the *partage* of the distribution of the sensible made to cohere via its arkhè. This

\(^{220}\) Ibid. pp. 23-5
\(^{221}\) Ibid. pp. 30
is me giving an argument to differentiate my own work from Rancière as well as the possibility for my argumentation within IR.

My argument here for IR is the same as Rancière’s for the polis. As the ability for individual parts to be apprehensible to each other within the polis they must also be distributed between polis’. Rancière’s foregrounding of the distribution of the sensible as enabling the conditions for apprehensibility at the individual level, and thus the establishment of apprehensible order, means if “the international” is rendered apprehensible into IR it must also be ordered by a distribution of the sensible: as we are capable of apprehending IR. This distribution of the sensible can be thought of as like a patchwork quilt. Rather than it being a singular uniform distribution which allocates (dis)positions in a homogenous fashion it is operationalised heterogeneously. The distribution of the sensible with regard to “the international” organises the (dis)positions of the states themselves.

Each patch is like the distinct distribution of the sensible which grounds the conditions of apprehensibility within that particular state, both temporally and spatially. The patches are not separate from each other but constituted by a partage. While the contents of each patch might be different to another patch they are distributed in line with the broader quilt. This is the important point with regard to the distribution of the sensible in IR. While there exist states, which are internally ordered by a distribution of the sensible which sets the conditions of their apprehensibility, the conditions of those states own apprehensibility, by an observer, is set at an external level. The stakes of my argument rest not on the partage of relations within the state but rather on a distribution of the sensible making “the international” apprehensible and thus a partage of IR. In order for this to be reasonable there must be a distribution of the sensible that enables states themselves to be understood as states by other states. There must be an international order(ing) of states as it is possible for states to apprehend each other.

Following on from this example I argue it is worth thinking about the way in which the distribution of the sensible orders states. Because the distribution of the sensible sets the conditions of
apprehensibility both of itself and the subjects produced in relation to it, the notion of statehood itself is set by IR’s distribution of the sensible itself. This will be important when we look at the formation of the Police and politics within IR.

Having argued for the existence and applicability of the distribution of the sensible to IR I now go on to explore the character of this distribution. Namely how it is structured by an arkhè but also how it sets up the conditions of apprehensibility for and by states. I highlight how the distribution of the sensible for IR is coheres around the arkhè of anarchy. Anarchy is given as the ordering principle not only by Waltz\textsuperscript{222} and Wendt\textsuperscript{223} but, as I have argued in Chapter 2 throughout the field. It is the ordering principle across not only the great debates of IR\textsuperscript{224} but also its contemporary existence and understanding of itself where it makes apprehensible the subject positions of IR. Anarchy then isn’t a geo-political or territorial force that shapes state behaviour in relation to each other. Rather anarchy structures IR at the level of apprehensibility. It establishes the (dis)positions which make IR apprehensible as a practice and a field and constitutes what can be seen as a subject of IR. Here it is clear that territorial, sovereign, nation-state become the (ac)countable parts of the international. They are, given the Police, the constituents of IR without void or supplement.

Anarchy constructs IR’s distribution of the sensible as it is the arkhè which enables the distribution to cohere. In thinking anarchy’s relationship to the distribution of the sensible as an arkhè it follows that it produces a series of self-evident facts which enable the apportionment of (dis)positions, relations between these (dis)positions and a commonly apprehensible world. In short anarchy constructs IR’s distribution of the sensible by providing a logic which enables the coherence of IR. Without an arkhè the distribution of the sensible in IR would be unable to formulate its object into a common

apprehensible world. This also means that political action within IR must necessarily challenge anarchy’s apportionment. To explain this I want to turn to an example from Feminist IR.

As we saw in Chapter 1 the fourth debate structures IR in terms of ontology.\(^{225}\) I have argued that the fourth debate restructures the boundaries of IR and in doing so organises IR around these approaches’ epistemological and ontological foundations. A good example of this reflexive turn is the work of Ackerly & True.\(^{226}\) Feminist IR and specifically Ackerly & True\(^{227}\) deploy an epistemological approach by which they establish the ethical standard to which IR should adhere,\(^{228}\) arguing, in common with other Feminist engagements in IR is that attentiveness to feminist-informed research can produce an understanding of “the international” that is not only more effective/accurate but also sound ethical practice.\(^{229}\) As Ackerly & True state ‘we would also argue that the feminist research ethic is an ethical practice.’\(^{230}\) The sort of reflexive turn, brings through the normative implications of theorising IR while situating IR within the remit of ontology and epistemology. That is to say, it aims at a transformation of methodology so that we, as IR researchers, can be attentive to the ways in which the object of our research can be rendered sensible.\(^{231}\) As Ackerly & True argue ‘feminist attentiveness to disciplinary boundaries reveals how the political boundaries of the state system shape our knowledge about IR and continue to render women invisible as international subjects and actors.’\(^{232}\) This highlights the latent and potentially political character of the field as understood by Feminist IR. In being concerned with

\(^{227}\) Ibid. pp. 697
\(^{230}\) Ibid. pp. 694
\(^{231}\) Ibid. pp. 697
\(^{232}\) Ibid. pp. 697
how the way gender and women can be subjectivated into IR against the wrong perpetrated by IR we can read this potentially as a site for politics.

This, as I argue now, is related to but distinction from the Police distribution’s understanding of gender and women. We can see this in their argument that ‘Feminist perspectives redirect our attention from the kinds of questions that are being asked in International Relations to ask questions that have not fallen within the purview of IR as the discipline has traditionally defined knowledge.’ Here Ackerly & True move to open IR up to an excluded part that has been reduced to only having voice. The proposal of a research-ethic enables the articulation of their argument to the Police order of IR through becoming depoliticised by a focus on ethics/power. We can see this focus as they argue the ‘a feminist research ethic can give us limited confidence that our epistemological perspective, theoretical choices, research design, data collection, data analysis, exposition of findings, and venues for sharing findings are attentive to power.’ The feminist-research ethic proposed by Ackerly & True is useful in unpacking and understanding the ethical and power relations that exist within the state-system. This is an interesting understanding of how IR can and does relate to the Police order. Ackerly & True could be read here as organising a redistribution of the Police understanding of IR as opposed to a political move that re-distributes the sensible. Here there is both a linkage between my argumentation and also a tension between how I am writing.

As Feminist IR isn’t solely concerned with the conditions of subjectivation and apprehensibility but rather also unpacking power relations, I need to highlight how these two modes of engagement go together. As Rancière highlights for us politics requires more than just the explication of power relations: it must ‘give rise to a meeting of [the] Police logic and [an] egalitarian logic that is never set up in advance.’ With this in mind it is clear that Ackerly & True do represent a moment of politics in

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233 Ibid. pp. 704
234 Ibid. pp. 704
IR but one that is related to the specifics of IR’s distribution of the sensible. While they break down and challenge the notions of apprehensibility within IR they do not draw through these relations to the Police ordering of IR. This is a good example of how my reading of IR through Rancière is useful. We can see in Ackerly & True, as well as Feminist IR more broadly, not only the potential for politics but a mode of politics that is specific to IR. This understanding of IR produces a meta-ethical critique of the Police order in addition to its political understanding of subjectivation against a wrong. This becomes understandable through Rancièreian theory as the Feminist research-ethic providing a meta-ethical comparison between the current Police order and a potential Police order that is feminist-informed and therefore ethically preferable.

This is not a criticism given my previous argument for the muddying of the Police and politics previously within the thesis. Rather it highlights how Feminist IR can be considered as political but also how it relates to political possibility. The critique of IR given by Ackerly & True raises the spectre of political possibility as a clear example of the subjectivation that would be necessary for IR to take gender and women seriously as parts of IR that possess speech. This example highlights how IR has been constrained to Policing through the terms of the fourth debate and also foregrounds my next section which looks explicitly at the conditions of politics and Policing in IR. The contribution of applying a Rancièrean theory of politics to IR, with regard to Feminist IR, is the ability to translate and understand meta-ethical claims and critiques into political ones. By focusing on the wrong of IR’s distribution of the sensible Feminist IR gives us an account of the possibility in subjectivating women and gender within IR. As I have argued Ackerly & True do present a mode of potential political argumentation and in reading them with regard to a Rancierian theory of politics allows us to see how they pave the way for the process of political subjectivation. The specifics of this articulation are something I work through in the next section of this chapter which is concerned with the police and politics.
The Police & Politics in IR

I argue that if we are to accept the distribution of the sensible as an appropriate framework for rendering sensible IR then we must also accept its consequences for how we understand its Police as well as political (ac)counts. If IR is to be rendered apprehensible by the distribution of the sensible then it must always already be a (mis)counting of IR. Through the translation of Rancièreian political theory into IR I argue that politics in IR can only occur at the site of a *wrong*. Given this *wrong* politics then must be the subjectivation of a part of IR that has no part of IR. Policing for IR must be an (ac)count of IR that is without void or supplement.

As I argued in the previous chapter the Police are distinct from the “petty police” of everyday law enforcement agencies. Work that understands and charts the activities of the “petty police” in IR can be seen in that of Dunton & Kitchen, Gould & Greener where they look at the way in which the “petty police” enforce both laws within IR but also normative relations. Within IR this is the approach which dominates understandings around policing. Rather than looking at the way the “petty police” acts internationally, or the way in which shared norms between states can maintain their coherence, I look at the Police as a total (ac)count of IR without void or supplement. This understanding is consistent with what I argued in the previous chapter. The Police are a specific mode of (ac)counting the distribution of parts within a given distribution of the sensible. In particular the Police (ac)count is a total one without void or supplement. Politics cannot occur wherever the whole of “the international” is reduced to the sum of its parts with nothing left over. The Police, then, are the mechanisms by which the distribution of the sensible’s totality is maintained. I now go on to argue

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for how the Police (ac)count of IR is structured and give three examples of the way in which this silences potential politics.

The first mode by which the Police order (ac)counts for our commonly apprehensible world so as to preclude politics is what Rancière terms archipolitics. Archipolitics is by its very definition the inception of the complete realisation of the arkhè of the distribution of the sensible as enacted in the (ac)count of the distributed commonly apprehensible world. Archipolitics is then not really a mode of politics but is instead a mode of Policing. Policing here grounds itself through understanding arkhè as a way by which the part which has no part can be written out of our commonly apprehensible world. This links the arkhè precisely to the wrong which is the miscount inherent within every (ac)count. Specifically, archipolitics is a mechanism by which political-philosophy enables a Police (ac)count. The archipolitical Police (ac)count of IR is in (ac)counting for an understanding of IR that underlines and reinforces the distribution of the sensible as rendered apprehensible through its arkhè anarchy as natural. This can be understood as making the self-evident facts (nomos) produced by the distribution of the sensible the referent and basis for the Police (ac)count of IR. Rancière gives us an example of archipolitics as the translation of quality of the demos, as I have argued previously this is freedom (elutheria), into the virtue of moderation (sōphrosunē). I argue that this translation enables the conversion of the “empty quality” of freedom into the empty virtue of moderation. Through an archipolitical Police (ac)count politics and the wrong at the centre of any and all Police (ac)counts becomes written out of the common apprehensible world (ac)counted. This is achieved as the archipolitical Police (ac)count fuses together the naturality (phusis) of the Police count with the self-

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242 Ibis, pp. 65
243 Ibid. pp. 65
244 Ibid. 68
245 As I have argued previously Rancière distances his own approach from philosophy to focus on understanding politics. Given this distinction the political-philosopher is a category which is inherently paradoxical. Politics has the specific meaning I have laid out in the previous chapter whereas philosophy for Rancière is specifically a categorising and therefore totalising endeavour. Philosophy is always read by Rancière as a Police activity whereas politics is linked to the subjectivation against, a wrong, of a part which has no part.
evident facts (nomos) it produces. Through this fusion the archipolitical Police (ac)count renders politics impossible by transitioning any (ac)counting of the commonly apprehensible world into a “politics” of harmony. This harmony is a reaffirmation of the arkhè which enables to constitution of the Police (ac)count as total.

We can see an archipolitical Police (ac)count of IR within work that makes arguments along the lines of the affirmation of anarchy as the organising principle of IR. Looking back to my previous chapter on anarchy as the organising principle of IR we can see that the literature that understands anarchy as an organising principle is the basis for archipolitics. We can see it clearly within works that fall within the Realist school of thought. Work by Waltz both Man, the State and War and his Theory of International Politics as well as works by Mearsheimer, Wohlforth and Rose. Looking at Classical realists like Morgenthau and Carr, as well as Neo-Classical scholarship such as Rathburn and Taliaferro, we can see their understanding of IR is based in both a naturalised human nature and anarchic system. This literature reifies anarchy as the natural and total (ac)count of IR. Classical Realist scholarship paints a picture of a naturalised anarchic cosmos. The principles of this cosmos serves to establish an ordering of IR. As such Classical Realists give a Police archipolitical (ac)count of IR. Classical Realist argumentation is archipolitical in that they give a total (ac)count without void or supplement, that negates politics through the “natural harmony” of an anarchic order.

247 Ibid. pp. 68
248 Politics, as indicated by the speech marks, is meant to be taken in its lay understanding here as opposed to the Rancièrian notion which will be given without marks.
253 G. Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics, 51 (1998), pp. 144-172
255 E. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, (Macmillan, London, 1946)
of territorial sovereign nation-states. It is obvious here that harmony doesn’t necessitate actual peace or normative tranquillity. Rather the harmony referred to is in the relation between the (ac)count’s totality and the totality given by the arkhè of the distribution of the sensible.

With regard to the Realist literature, that I write against, it is not the case that these texts are wholly archipolitical. Rather they forward a Police (ac)count of IR that is grounded within an archipolitical understanding of the distribution of the sensible. This is one example of how archipolitics can be seen to take place within IR but of course this is not limited or specific to Realist thought. Wendt for example takes great pains to situate his constructivist reading of states within an anarchic world to which they are held accountable and also internalise. The normativity of the arkhè here doesn’t matter; what is important is how the arkhè becomes the central point of fusion between its appearance as nature (phusis) and the self-evident facts (nomos) of the distribution. Archipolitics becomes a way for the miscount that the Police (ac)count relies upon to become unrealisable: for IR to be Policed.

The second mode by which the Police (ac)count can order IR is that of parapolitics. This is a mode of Policing that is more complex than archipolitics. This is because parapolitics does not seek to use the complete totality of the Police (ac)count but rather precludes politics by redirecting the political impulse. While Rancière credits Plato with the formulation of the archipolitical syllogism he gives Aristotle as the source for the para-political. Parapolitics recognises the peculiarity of politics but redirects and reaffirms the Police count over this miscount. This is a mode of Policing that changes its basis for ordering from the arkhè of the distribution of the sensible to the arkhai (offices), or (dis)positions, within the distribution of the sensible. Within Parapolitics the site for “politics” becomes read as the relationship between already apprehensible (dis)positions and parts. Parapolitics does not look at the arkhè as necessarily natural but rather understands the arkhè of the distribution through the arkhai (offices) held by and in relation to apportioned parts of the distribution. “Politics”

then is read as the negotiations and conversations between these already apportioned and apprehensible parts.

This is a mode of Policing that is not about highlighting the cosmological unity of the arkhè of the Police (ac)count but instead is about the relative “power” (kurion)\(^{260}\) held by the relative (dis)positions of and between apportioned parts.\(^{261}\) Parapolitics, then, is a mode of Policing which looks to provide an “equality” between the already apprehensible parts of the distribution of the sensible through an arithmetic and geometric equality. This is not to be confused with the fundamental equality which is an axiom required for politics proper. Equality for parapolitics becomes the struggles around the apportion between the arkhai and over the “power” (kurion) within the system.\(^{262}\) This mode of Policing gives an (ac)count of IR without void or supplement not through a cosmic harmony engendered by subservience to our commonly apprehensible world, to the arkhè, but rather looks to establish the conditions of “politics” through its absence.\(^{263}\) As such any and all “political” movement within a para-political (ac)count must be by, for and between the already apprehensible (dis)position of parts.

An example of this mode of Policing within IR can be found within the work of Liberal Institutionalists such as Keohane.\(^{264}\) Within this mode of thinking IR, questions of “politics” are taken as questions of balance and distribution. We can see a similar impulse in some of the work of Neo-Realists which focuses on relative gains.\(^{265}\) Another example of parapolitical Policing in IR is the work of Hedley Bull

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260 The term power here is being used in a peculiar fashion. It means the dominant element of the system and also the way in which domination is being played out within the system. It is a mechanism used to centre the political system around questions of power and allocation. This is used to Police by rendering “politics” as oriented towards the equality of domination between already recognised parts as opposed to the recognition of that fundamental equality that enables the visibility of new parts and the Police (ac)count fundamental miscount.


262 Ibid. pp. 73

263 Ibid. pp. 74


both in *The Anarchical Society*²⁶⁶ and elsewhere.²⁶⁷ By turning anarchy into a socialised and countable understanding, Bull transforms the arkhè of IR into its requisite *arkhai*. This movement is focused not on anarchy itself but on the nature and relations between states within anarchy. This is a mode of Policing which is typical of parapolitics as it converts the appearance of the order(ing) of IR from its arkhè, anarchy, into a totalising count of the relations between states. This makes the miscount which enables the Police (ac)count inapprehensible.

The third and final mechanism of Policing in IR is that of metapolitics. The two previous articulations of political-philosophies that have enabled Policing, have been attempts to render “politics” inapprehensible. Both archipolitics and parapolitics are Policing as they enable a total (ac)count of IR that makes the miscount which enables the Police (ac)count to be rendered inapprehensible. Metapolitics differs in that it is not necessarily an amalgamation of philosophy and “politics” but rather is read as the “politics” of a philosophy.²⁶⁸ While archipolitics established arguments and the Police (ac)count in the form of a “politics” which is the reaffirmation of the arkhè of the Police (ac)count, Metapolitics is the assertion of a radical surplus of “wrongs”.²⁶⁹ This is different from the “wrongness” of a particular distribution that becomes the “politics” of parapolitics’ Police (ac)count. The metapolitical Police (ac)count is established on the assumption that our commonly apprehensible world is constructed on and by a falsity.²⁷⁰ Metapolitics constructs the falsity of our commonly apprehensible world as that conflation between the allocation of lots and the “political” process.²⁷¹ This conflation, for a metapolitical Police (ac)count, is designed to obscure a form of truth.²⁷² “Politics” then becomes the uncovering and rupture of this truth back against the commonly apprehensible world which assumes it is true. Metapolitics as a Police (ac)count gives a total (ac)count without void

²⁶⁹ Ibid. pp. 81
²⁷⁰ Ibid. pp. 82
²⁷¹ Ibid. pp. 83
²⁷² Ibid. pp. 83-4
or supplement by highlighting how the allocation of (dis)positions within the distribution of the sensible is inequitable and that this inequitable character is obscured by the system. “Politics” for the metapolitical Police (ac)count, then, is the way by which the “truth” of the inequality of the system is revealed through the understanding and argumentation of the philosopher. This mode of Police (ac)counting serves to write politics out of apprehensibility in a similar way to archipolitics. The difference is that archipolitics serves the truth and rightness of the distribution of the sensible whereas metapolitics serves through an exposition the falsity and wrongness of the distribution.

While it is tempting to read metapolitics as offering a coherent account of actual politics this is not the case. Metapolitics is Policing. In revealing the falsity/inequity of the system its “politics” is grounded through a referent and this is itself unequal. Metapolitics is not about opening up the fundamental exclusion of a part which has no part but, rather, the wrongness of the distribution of a specific special or true part. Metapolitics is the philosophical rupturing of the true, an account of the superpowers of ontology. Metapoltics is therefore the “politics” of those who ‘play the game of forms and those who direct the action designated to eradicate the play of forms’. It is a seizing of an aspect of the allotment of positions established by the distribution of the sensible and then focusing on the inequality that is articulated against this segment. This conceives of “politics”, not as the revelation and struggle for “power” as in parapolitics, but rather revealing the inequality of the allotment with regard to a specific position. Metapolitics then is Policing through a “politics” of the rejection of a specific distribution in favour of the revelation of a “truth” specific to an individual position. This account of metapolitics gets that the tension between my argumentation and the limitations of writing my Rancierian framework into IR.

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273 Ibid. pp. 86
274 Ibid. pp. 87
275 Ibid. pp. 87
276 Ibid. pp. 88
The metapolitical Police (ac)count of IR can be seen within some works of Marxist IR. Work like that produced by Davenport\(^{277}\), Cox\(^{278}\) & Teschke\(^{279}\) operates partially within a metapolitical frame in that it critiques the distribution of the sensible within IR in order to open up the way in which IR itself is a product of a “hidden” socio-political arrangement, namely capitalism. Davenport is an excellent case for this metapolitical reading as he sublates the Marxist reading of IR into the Realist understanding. This is a metapolitical Police move as it subverts any political reading of IR, to understand the potential impact of the argument only within the frames of the distribution of the sensible despite its “false” nature.\(^{280}\) In addition to this mode of metapolitical argumentation there is another clear example of this mode of Policing IR. This can be read in line with the “great debates narrative” if we look at the work of Schmidt\(^{281}\), Wæver\(^{282}\) and Jackson\(^{283}\). Where Marxist IR is metapolitical due to its reduction of the distribution of the sensible to a falsehood in favour of a singular allotment of that distribution in these examples metapolitics is different. This clearly highlights the positionality of my work and the organisation of my arguments articulation to IR.

The way in which the “great debates narrative” and the meta-theorisation of IR Polices IR not through looking at a single allotment as given by the distribution of the sensible but rather its conditions of apprehensibility. For example, Jackson conceives of conducting “politics” in IR along the lines of understanding the epistemology and ontologies which ground the field as a whole. This understanding of IR is metapolitical as it reduces any “politics” to engagement with the distribution of the sensible.

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purely at the level of philosophy. "Politics" under this mode of Policing becomes understanding and forwarding claims based on these set and realised true assumptions. This isn’t political as it isn’t about the emergence of a part without a part in relation to a wrong but rather is about understanding the way in which the current distribution of the sensible allocates lots according to the conditions of apprehensibility it establishes. When Jackson looks at the monist or dualist philosophical-ontological positions he is looking at the way in which the distribution of the sensible establishes the conditions of apprehensibility in IR. This isn’t done so as to facilitate the entry of a part which has no part into the field but rather to better categories and understand the already existing allotments.

I have argued so far for three different modes of Policing as examples of how the Police (ac)count within IR can propagate itself. These differing Police (ac)counts are given as mechanisms by which politics proper can be excised from emergence. These mechanisms are taken as modes by which politics and the political impulse can be rendered into the Police count. What, then, of politics? As we have seen, for Rancière politics is a process of subjectivation of a part which has no part in regard to a wrong. It is important to remember that this wrong is not reducible to a problem or distribution, the conditions of apprehensibility or the allotment and apportionment of the (dis)positions of parts under the distribution of the sensible. Rather, it is the assertion of the fact that the Police (ac)count is fundamentally a miscount. This fundamental miscounting always relies on the preclusion of a part of the count that has no part in the count. The task of politics is to enable this part that has no part to become apprehensible: for it to be (ac)counted. Within the context of IR this might seem an impossibility given the apparent totality of the Police count.

Given that the archè of IR’s distribution of the sensible is anarchy we can see the conditions for what is apprehensible within IR. This forces IR to be considered as the domain of sovereign territorial states. By establishing the conditions of apprehensibility along these lines the distribution of the sensible within precludes apprehension not only of the domestic but also any sub or supra state activity. This

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284 Ibid. pp. 946
preclusion is an example of a wrong. IR obviously relies and is founded upon and with regard to the activity of sub/para-state agents. As I have argued it doesn’t make sense to understand IR without looking at the reality of IR in practice or the political, social and historical imaginaries which engendered its emergence. In actuality “the international” is composed of non-, sub- and para- state actants but these are excluded from direct study in IR. This exclusion is formulated to enable the stability of the field through a distribution of the sensible. Following from this it is clear that the best way to understand the location of a potential part that has no part is within those bodies that exist in actuality in “the international” yet are not eligible for apprehensibility within IR. This division between the actuality of aesthetic, social and material relations contained within the world and those rendered apprehensible by the distribution of the sensible are at the core of the miscount which is the wrong. For IR then the wrong which enables the formation of politics is carried out at the level of its state centrism. In order for there to be politics in IR it must address this wrong through the subjectivation of an excluded subject.

My approach to politics renders the majority of work within IR Policing. This is not a surprise or criticism as Rancière acknowledges the rarity of politics proper and as I have highlighted Policing is not a normatively pejorative activity. So, given the relationship between the distribution of the sensible and IR it becomes clear that work within IR that is concerned with the actions and relations between states is Policing as opposed to political. This might seem counter-intuitive as work that has been done on state relations can be emancipatory. However, as I have argued this work cannot be political but is rather a renegotiation between the already apprehensible apportioned (dis)positional parts. This is the renegotiation of the arrangement within the Police (ac)count. As I have argued in the previous chapter there can be meta-ethical comparison between Police (ac)counts but this does not alter their character as Policing. The emancipatory potential of Alexander Wendt’s social theory of IR over Waltz’s neo-realist theory doesn’t change the fact that both of these are Police (ac)counts of IR.
Turning attention back to the previous examinations of archi-, para- and metapolitics it becomes clear how they fit into Policing even more deeply. These modes of Police (ac)counting manage to reintroduce political strands of argument that would turn disruption of the state system back into reaffirmations of that very system. The case of archipolitics is clear cut in that it writes off any attack against the virtuosity of an anarchic cosmos. Parapolitics reduces the political dimension of IR to a negotiation that crucially can only take place in IR at the level of the state. Metapolitics doesn’t just reduce the social, aesthetic and material relations of the real world to the state system but rather to a solely philosophical engagement with that world. The location of politics within IR then must be to do with a relation to anarchy and thus the primacy of sovereign territorial nation states. Given that the part of IR with no part in IR occurs below or above the state level then the potential subject for political action could be a variety of figures. I go on in my case-study to work through the potential political subject of the migrant/migration. This is by no means a comprehensive and total account of potential political subjects but rather an exemplar of how a Ranciérian theorisation of IR can play out. As I argued in the previous section and introduction we can see some literatures as already charting the emergence of a part which has no part into IR.

I have now given an answer to the effect of my Rancièrian theorisation of IR on politics for IR. Through the application of my understanding of Rancierian political theory to IR I have given an account of how such an understanding shapes politics. Namely I have shown that in order for there to be politics in IR this has to be the emergence of a part of IR which has no part in IR. This must be articulated against the wrong which is the exclusion of a part of IR that is a part of IR. In assertion of IR’s miscalculation and the fundamental equality of the part which has no part this is what is formulated as politics for a Rancierian understanding of IR. In terms of its effect this changes the focus of what international politics can be thought as. Given the constraints put on understanding IR by my Rancièreian framework it is only activity that enables the subjectivation of a part which has no part against a wrong that can be understood as politics.
Conclusion

In this chapter I have built on my previous explication of Rancièreian political theory articulating it to critical IR theory. I made arguments for the application of the distribution of the sensible to IR as well as for anarchy to be taken as its arkhê. This was done with reference to my relationship to Rancière, my position in the field as well as how I deal with the limitations of my approach.
Chapter 5:
Theorising the International Politics of Migration

Introduction

In this chapter I begin to further develop and demonstrate these claims through consideration of an exemplary case. That case is the politics of migration and migrants. My argument proceeds, in the first section, through a review of contemporary literature. Through close reading and a critical appraisal of this literature, I chart how migration and the figure of the migrant sit awkwardly within the field’s distribution of the sensible. I break this down into three areas in which migration and migrants become sublimated into IR through a Police count: territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship. In a second section I look at how migration is conceived within the work of Rancière, highlighting how the migrant is subject to a social wrong which, potentially, opens up a process of political subjectivation. As I explain in the conclusion this opens the way to the next chapter in which I propose a way of understanding migration and the figure of the migrant as a potential political subject within IR and shows how my approach to this recast the debate around politics in IR in particular through the collation of critical strands and a movement away from ontology. I also highlight where I sit in the field and to who I am writing with and against.

Policing Migration: Territoriality, Sovereignty & Citizenship

Within IR migration is often cast as a security issue, flows of people across and along borders written into the sub-field of security studies. In critically reviewing this work I focus primarily on research

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2 It is worth noting the major approaches to migration differ depending on theoretical alignment within this sub-field. A major contributing framework to the analysis presented by critical scholarship is the Copenhagen School, with work such as Balzacq’s Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (Routledge, London, 2010) and Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde’s Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998) providing a clear and solid introduction to the literature and theory around securitisation.
informed by critical theory given that there is no space to review all IR work on migration and also because this highlights most clearly and directly the ways in which migration and migrants provide a location for political subjectivation. The mainstream literature on migration has primarily failed to present a clear foundation for theorising migrants as subjects in and of IR while confining its theorising about the phenomenon within the framework provided by three intersecting and founding concepts: territory, the State (sovereignty) and citizenship. Within critical theory, as we will see, migrants and migration have been understood as a challenge to these mainstream assumptions.

The first of the conceptual foundations around migration I want to explore is territory. It is worth noting again the centrality of Walker in thinking territory in IR. As he informs us: ‘the spatiality of the state conceived as a territorial entity has always been fairly obvious and has consequently allowed for a strong geographical component within theories of international relations.’ Walker, as we have seen, allows us to understand how IR can be articulated in such a way as to perpetuate a political relation namely: sovereign territorial states. Walker makes clear in the quotation the assumption of the centrality of territory to IR, not only in the sense of spatially defined limitations to states but also geography itself. Indeed, the concept of the sovereign state has rested upon territory as one of its foundations from Weber onwards. Migration as a phenomenon is constituted against just this backdrop of territoriality. As Ypi argues, considering the difficulty of pinning down definitions here, the notion of territoriality refers to ‘the control of a geographical unit by an agent, be it an individual,

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3 This is in line with my argumentation as if migration and migrants by their nature as a part which has no part they cannot be incorporated cleanly into Police theories of IR. Mainstream attempts to pursue understanding migration prioritise the state. Brigden shows us this in her article ‘Improvised Transnationalism: Clandestine Migration at the Border of Anthropology and International Relations’, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 60 (2016) pp. 344. Further explication for both my focus on critical theory and the inability for mainstream IR to articulate migration and migrants as subjects coherently within IR comes off of the back of Sylvester’s ‘Experiencing the End and Afterlives of IR’, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2013) pp. 609-626. Sylvester, as shown on pp. 611-617, charts her critique of the field highlighting why the structural academic arrangements of critical theory are divergent from mainstream IR. In “camp IR” there isn’t necessarily communication between mainstream and critical IR and this, as I’ve previously argued, is central for my approach to the field and the argument forwarded by this thesis.


family, company or any other kind of artificial institution responsible for the use of land (terra) and its subsequent formation'. Migration is inherently spatial, involving as it does movement across space. A precondition for its recognition is, then, a certain conception of spatiality. We might conceive of human migration in a larger anthropological and biological context, comparing it with the patterns and motivations behind the mass movements of birds for example. This might be sufficient for a spatial understanding of migration but not one connected to concepts of territory. The concept of migration takes shape not only against the backdrop of a world that is spatial but one that is divided territorially – that is one that is not only spatial but also political. The spatial-political ordering of sovereign territorial states makes impossible any simple analogy to biological migration. Rather migration must be understood in reference to the territoriality of our contemporary global order.

This distinction between the spatial and political characteristics of territory is essential for understanding the contemporary literature around migration. Territory isn’t wholly particular to states but can also apply to supra-state entities. What is important for the territorial dimension to understanding the location of migration isn’t how territoriality is expressed within the particularity of a state or supra-state entity but in their establishment of fixed borders. The spatial delineation of fixed borders enables the integrity of both state and supra-state entities. This is what Walker has in mind when he explores the territoriality of states. The modern state system’s totalising framework

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6 Ibid. pp. 242
13 A totality that rests upon legal and political doctrine. For example, the notion of terra nullius, the doctrine which enabled western powers to legally seize the land of indigenous populations. Duffy gives this a good
constitutes one of the Policing assumptions of IR. Anarchy holds together this distribution of the sensible through its generation of territoriality within IR.

As the arkhè provides the polarising force which enables a common world to be rendered apprehensible, it establishes the conditions around which subjects can be understood within IR. These subjectivities, which are territorial sovereign states, rely primarily on anarchy for their establishment as the apprehensible subject of and for IR. Anarchy, then, establishes through its position as arkhè the self-evident facts of the international system. Here territoriality is one of the essential self-evident facts of the international system. Territoriality becomes akin to the Artisans “double virtue” of sôphrosunê - it is required for (ac)counting of the system of IR and its subjects (sovereign territorial nation states). I am arguing that territoriality is one of the self-evident facts produced by IR’s distribution of the sensible and is required for the subjects of IR to understand in order for them to be (ac)counted by IR. From this foundation it now becomes possible to look at how and why the migrant and migration are a locus for potential political subjectivation.

Migration rests upon the notion of territoriality within IR – one which it also challenges. Movement between and across these boundaries presents a problem for (ac)counting the reality of IR. The distribution of the sensible rests upon territoriality14 and thus IR can only apprehend subjects that are territorial in nature. Migration/migrants as phenomena and subject are not territorial in the sense of the state but are constructed in relation to territory.15 The migrant is both within IR’s distribution of the sensible but also a counter to it. In order to protect and produce the territorial integrity of states migration must be controlled and securitised – that is to say, it is sublimated into IR through the Policing count of security.

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14 As a self-evident fact produced in relation to the arkhè anarchy.
Within the literature there is a focus on a variety of economic justifications for migration.\textsuperscript{16} Massey builds on and situates this approach to migration around economics.\textsuperscript{17} Migration is contextualised and understood as an economic function operating at the behest of state power. Thus, problems with migration are situated with regard to its economic impact and security concerns. The focus on economics within mainstream political literature does not seek to integrate migration fully into IR but often refracts it into a domestic political issue. Security is the route through which migration has most clearly been brought into the discipline. This includes, for example, research into the ways in which conflict becomes a generative and steering mechanism for the flow of refugees\textsuperscript{18}, states desires for construction of fortified borders\textsuperscript{19} as well as migration as a direct cause of conflict\textsuperscript{20} and threat to national security.\textsuperscript{21} In reading migration in this way it is often reduced to domestic labour effect of globalisation\textsuperscript{22} which threatens the state’s economic security. The relationship between domestic security and migration is, then, often constituted both economically and militarily. Stivachtis highlights the way in which migration is seen to present a challenge to both national and international stability.\textsuperscript{23} Tirman contextualises this in the American policy environment post 9/11.\textsuperscript{24}

Domestic security for the mainstream literature is understood as threatened by the migrant who takes on the role of the criminal or internal-enemy a status reliant on a neo-liberal and governmental frame which construes them as a subject onto which the states territoriality must be reaffirmed through their criminalisation. Again, the migrant, and thus more broadly migration, is used to reinforce the territoriality of IR. Specifically in the constitution of migrants as criminal’s territory and thus the political legitimacy of the state has its apprehensibility reinforced through the performance and construction of the migrant as criminal or potential terrorist. This reading of territoriality highlights the way in which security is summoned to enable the Policing of IRs boundaries. It forces the sublation of the migrant into the category of criminal or always potential enemy, i.e. an “other” and this is never a legitimate subject of the state.

It is worth noting here that outside of the “mainstream” literature on migration, security has also been a framework within which migration is politically located within IR and securitisation has been a central theme in the critical migration literature. For example, McNevin, in a case-study of Bintan in Indonesia, charts the territorial and governmental location of borders drawing upon the existing securitisation and governance literatures to situate her claims. What is particularly interesting about McNevin’s argument is the way in which she finds migration both linked to and is critical of IR.

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31 Ibid. 296
As she states: ‘prevailing subject categories (citizen, alien and specific categories of migrant) deployed to investigate migration remain embedded in the spatial assumptions of the modern state system. Such categories are therefore unable to capture the complexity of the multidimensional yet contextually specific architecture of governance evident in Bintan, which does not necessarily operate according to territorial logic, despite deploying territorial norms to justify migration control’. This remark is indicative of how migration and migrants are often articulated to IR. Firstly is the level at which the subject categories are fundamentally apprehensible in relation to territoriality. Secondly is the way in which this articulation is not sufficient to encapsulate the “real” experiences and location of migration in IR. McNevin encapsulates the attempt by the field to sublate migration into the reaffirmation of its territorial foundation. Her experience of Bintan however shows how such a procedure is unsuccessful: ‘territoriality obscures the morphing space of border security and its implication in the reproduction of prevailing geopolitical norms.’ The political dimension, which is noted by McNevin, of the border is both an attempt to (re)produce the self-evident assumptions of territoriality in the locus of migration but also as is already evident a miscount. McNevin highlights the way in which critical security studies has understood territoriality and migration as both Police action but also the potential location for political action. This is an example, and I will give more in a later section, of how migration and migrants can become potentially subjectivated. McNevin argues for territoriality as essential for understanding the migrant in IR. This “self-evident” category also perpetuates a wrong against the migrant. It renders them only ever partially (in)visible and this, as we shall see, is why migrants have the capability to disrupt the Police order in IR; they are not fully factored into the totality of the police count given the way in which territoriality relates to it.

Anarchy, as the arkhè of the distribution of the sensible, produces the set of self-evident facts which enable the apprehensibility of IR and while territoriality is one of these it is not the only one. The

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32 Ibid. 296
33 Ibid. 306
34 Ibid. 306
35 Ibid. 306
state/sovereignty is another and it too us used to render migration apprehensible within the terms of IR while also opening up sovereignty as a category for political contestation. It is clear that the nation-state is presumed by the model of territorialisation but, the nation-state, is also a locus for migration/migrants in and of itself.

The state is a central assumption not just of the IR literature but of the field as a whole. For migration and migrants, the state, much like territory, is the location across which migration can be mapped. Just as territory is produced via IR’s distribution of the sensible so too is the state/sovereignty. The trajectory of the state/sovereignty in IR is evidently a long one but it is operationalised primarily in the migration literature as a governing body. The state is the purveyor of documentation, which enables the legal recognition, classification and regulation of migrants. It is worth briefly commenting on the relationship between the state and citizenship with regards to migration/migrants. Within IR the state functions as the body tasked with regulating and (ac)counting for migration. Citizenship is a mechanism by which the state can (ac)count for its obligations towards those within its borders and is often an individual and performative categorisation as well as a legal definition. The state operates through power, often violently, directly across bodies of migrants. Citizenship, while a referent to and from the state is open to contestation by migration/migrants through their own agency, performativity and understanding. There is then an interrelation between the state, as arbiter of citizenship and the individuals understanding and performance with regard their (non-)being as citizen

of the state. The state is one of the self-evident facts of IR against which migration and migrants must be (ac)counted. Citizenship, through its relation to the state, becomes both a mode of (ac)counting and the location whereby the wrong is manifest upon the individual.

This isn’t to say however that the state is a ‘cold monster imposing its rigid order on the life of society’\(^{44}\) but that the state is one of the core self-evident assumptions against which migration/migrants becomes apprehensible within IR. The state for IR is the (ac)counter of migrants both within the mainstream and critical literature. Within that literature I want to draw out and reflect on two themes. There is the mainstream liberal literature around International Political Economy and human rights and there is the critical security discourse which highlights the migrant/migration and problematizing IRs conception of security. I make clear how within these literatures, in particular critical security, there is a potential grafting site for my understanding of politics in IR.

I begin by looking at the mainstream economic and liberal literature around migration and the state. Part of the move taken, in particular around refugees, is the contrast between the state as a particular and humanity as a universal.\(^{45}\) Here already the state is subsumed into a broader domain. This liberalised discourse finds the migrant to be the embodiment of an ethical and legal rights regime that cuts across the power of the state. So, for example, Mosley and Singer explore the linkage between migrant workers, remittance and labour.\(^{46}\) Massey breaks down the distinction between world systems theory\(^{47}\) and institutional theory\(^{48}\) as defining migration in sociology and economics respectively.\(^{49}\) With regard to the state, migration is, then, both an economic and security concern. Massey highlights the way in which the state can be understood in relation to capital. Here migration


flows (both foreign and domestic) are understood as the product of market demands. The economic system which underwrites the international order is used to sublimate the emergence of workers and to (ac)count away the potential political subjectivisation of these migrants. This is enacted twofold within the literature’s recourse to human rights. States here are particulars that are subsumed into a broader discourse of humanitarianism that serves to write out their modes of agency and account for them as apprehensible only in relation to this understanding.

The critical security discourse around migration seeks to explain its relationship to the state through deconstructing its relationship to security studies. Salter for example breaks down the dramaturgy inherent within the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority,\(^50\) drawing on Balzacq\(^51\) and Strizel\(^52\) while looking at the way that security is performed.\(^53\) Here dramaturgy is drawn on to highlight the relationship between individuals and the state. This is interesting with regard to migration as it highlights the way in which this is neither solely aesthetic nor political but rather both. Sylvester’s contributions to Borderlands highlight the way in which, both in their form and content, the aesthetic relates to both migration\(^54\) and violence.\(^55\) Underwriting this movement to understanding performance is the aesthetic turn in IR.\(^56\) Here, Shepard, for example, draws out the ethical implications in moving towards ethics\(^57\) and politics\(^58\) and while there is a focus upon images\(^59\) the

move towards thinking sensibility\textsuperscript{60} does some work in bringing some of my argument into IR.\textsuperscript{61} This movement is key to understanding how the relationship between migration and the state is played out within IR. As Huysmans highlights, security can be constructed as an action between parties\textsuperscript{62} and in particular he highlights the centrality of speech and speech acts. If for the state and migration/migrants is not an issue of an actuarial (ac)count but rather ‘enacting refers to both expressing limits and bringing limits into being as an issue of contestation\textsuperscript{63}’ then this action could have a Rancièrian political implication.

The aesthetic turn in IR establishes the conditions by which speech acts can be read in terms of performativity. Within critical security studies this comes out of work by Wæver\textsuperscript{64} and the Copenhagen School (as we saw in chapter one and four). Understanding performativity around migration/migrants has implications for citizenship. With regards to the state it establishes differing performances between the migrant and the state. As Innes argues, criminalisation\textsuperscript{65} takes on a governmental mode between the migrant and the state. She opens up the performative aspect of the relation(s) between migrant and state and how this is given both in the individual experiences and accounts of migrants\textsuperscript{66} as well as the legal effects of the state.\textsuperscript{67} This approach has been carried forwards by Squire in looking at the agency possessed and exercised by migrants and its relation to Foucauldian subjectification.\textsuperscript{68}

Within aestheticized IR’s focus on performativity there is a clear entry point for thinking Rancierian

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid. pp. 373
politics. It is important to chart the differences between the two positions and to state clearly my argument with regard to it. As I have argued earlier and will develop later this is a literature to which I am writing this thesis.

Critical security studies, particularly Feminist security studies, situates ‘the practice of seeking security in lived experience [and] reveals security as a performative concept.’\(^{69}\) This highlights the individuated agency and experience of particular migrants against a backdrop of securitised discourse. For “aesthetic IR” this constitutes a *mise en scène* upon or within which terms of, and the relation between, the migrant and the state become understandable. There is here an ontological distinction to be drawn here between the distribution of the sensible and the discursive frame of aesthetic IR.

Following on from my arguments about the aesthetic, the ontological and the aesthetic turn in IR I am writing with this literature but also exploring the limitations of this frame, as such the literature around ontological security, while an ally is something I am not necessarily writing towards.\(^{70}\) By grounding security within a (re)performative aesthetic scene and assessing the performances, by migrants, in relation to such a scene, the ontological foundation of this approach, and thus my tension with it becomes clear. Here the temporality implicit within ontological security, having a secure future, is recognisable only within the aestheticized limits of the scene. It is ingrained within the literature that this security is constructed in relation to both the ontological status of the individual and the aesthetic nature of the discourse around them. This is what makes the migrant a possible figure for critical security studies but also what they are constructed against. My understanding of IR, as I have fleshed out earlier, cannot and will not ground migration/migrants within such an ontological framework.

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\(^{70}\) The concept of ontological security is drawn out of the work of Gidden’s *Modernity and Self Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. A good summation is the concept is giving by Steele in his book *Ontological Security in International Relations* and Zarakol in her article ‘Ontological (In)Security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan’ in *International Relations* 24 (3): pp 3-23. Innes uses the concept to unpack the experiences of her subjects in her work *Migration, Citizenship and The Challenge for Security*. 
Rather, it focuses on the ways in which migration/migrants are rendered (in)visible by the self-evident facts generated by IRs distribution of the sensible.

While this may seem like splitting hairs it does have serious theoretical ramifications for the way in which both Police and political action are understood to occur with regard to migration. Because it conceives of ontological security as primarily individuated and performed in relation to governmental structures, for critical security studies the subjectification of any migrant to the state is both possible and a way of thinking politics. My focus is also on political subjectivation but this begins with understanding the self-evident facts, that make migration (in)visible for IR, are produced by the distribution of the sensible. The analysis is not at the level of the individual who is grounded in mutable ontology but at the level of order(ings). This means the concern and stakes of my Rancièrian theoirisation of IR concern is not so much with the experiences of individual migrants themselves but rather with how migration/migrants are made apprehensible by and to IR. Thus, the claim that all migration is potentially ripe for political subjectivation is a harder one to prove.

This is because of the way in which the state relates to migration/migrants as a Police force. Through mechanisms such as Visas, Passports and Borders, the state can regulate its (ac)count of itself.

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72 Here I use the Rancièrian term for the stakes of my argument. As I have argued previously Chambers gives a breakdown of the distinction between the terms of pgs. 98-108 of The Lessons of Rancière. I do go on to use the term subjectification in reference to the work of Squire as she situates the response to Foucault but also given the ontological understanding that grounds the field it would be inapplicable to refer to it as subjectivation. In a simple sense part of the contribution of Rancierian IR is the move from subjectification which is grounded in ontological relations to discourse to subjectivation which is grounded in a relation to the distribution of the sensible.

73 As well as what is (un)thinkable and (im)possible.

74 This is not the same as breaking the question down along lines of structure/agency. To do so presupposes an ontological framework which would propagate these conditions. Rather in taking a Rancièrian approach to this structure/agency are structures produced in relation to the distribution of the sensible as opposed to an a priori ontological frame by which to understand the phenomena of IR.

75 Here the term carriers both an ordinary and a Rancièrian meaning. While the State does literally police the border and bring the mechanisms of police structure to hunt (as shown by Chamayou in Manhunts: A Philosophical History) and detain migrants deemed “irregular”. The state does deploy the judiciary to charge and deport those “irregular” migrants caught but also regulate the conditions and lives of “regular” migrants. They also are Policing in that the State is a mechanism by which a total count without void or supplement is undertaken. In this sense the state is both a policing state in its practice but also its “politics”.

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Potential political subjectivisation can effectively be “nipped in the bud” through the sublimation of individual migrants into its visible Police count. We can see this process at work through the courts in the delimitation of terms such as Asylum Seeker. Here the state is able to take the potentially political migrant and place them into a countable (dis)position and thus maintain the coherence of its own Police count. At the level of IR this same consistency is maintained not only in practice by the State’s sublation of potential political subjects into (ac)countable categories but also through citizenship. By the coherence of the distribution of the sensible, via its arkhè: anarchy, and along the categories of state, territory and citizenship, IR establishes the position of countable migration on the proviso, and because of this provision, it is rendered apprehensible by these facts. Of course, like any (ac)count this is always a (mis)count. Despite the appearance of totality in fact they are always too much or too little.

Following on from this it is clear that the political subjectivation of migration and migrants is possible. The possibility however of seeing politics within migration and the position of migrants cannot be upheld through a focus or recourse to migration or migrants’ ontological status. This is for several reasons I have discussed both within this chapter and chapter four. As the ontological status of migration/migrants has been territorialised by the state as a category for Policing it is already is in a sense (ac)counted. Through the states establishment of (dis)positions the ontological claim to a specificity of migration or migrants as potentially political does not function. Rather if I am to make a broader claim about the potentially political positioning of all migration/migrants I must do so with regard to a category that is not reliant on ontological positionality. This is because of the framework I have outlined but also in order to effectively give my contribution. I argue that this can be done with recourse to the concept of wrong. Rather than seeking to look at the way in which the differing ontologies of migration/migrants structure the potential political claims that can be made around migration or migrants I seek to understand how they are be seen as (mis)counted. In focusing on the wrong I am freed from the shackles of ontological positionality and rather can look at the underlying aisthesis which prohibits (ac)counting for migration and migrants within IR.
Once we shift the approach and understanding to my position which is grounded in the exploration of wrong it becomes clear that there are differing severities of wrong between different performances of migration. Two things become clear from making this shift to wrong as opposed to ontology. Both of which are central to my contribution to the field. The first is that it becomes easier to navigate and issue an argued with regard to the political potentiality of migration and migrants. The second thing revealed by the shift to wrong is how the focusing of critical IR onto ontology has led to the reoccupation of the ontological categories within established IR that it sets out to critique. This in turn has led to the replication of these categories, although in emancipatory fashion. Through the movement to wrong the possibility for the subjectivation of migration/migrants in IR becomes divorced from the ontological framings that are produced by the distribution of the sensible in IR. This potential politics then offers an opportunity to rethink and challenge these categories through the subjectivation of migration and migrants into IR that does not rest upon the ontological reabsorption and repetition of the same categories back into IR. This is essential for my argument and contribution to be meaningful to the field. It also highlights and draws upon the tension in my reading and approach to IR and Rancière’s own work. Here I have shown this difference in argument and how I differ from Rancière’s argumentation. We now go on to look at a third ‘self-evident’ fact that makes the migrant apprehensible to IR: citizenship

Citizenship sets up an apprehensible relationship between the migrant and the state, connecting it to a sense of belonging\(^{76}\) that is both legal and personal.\(^{77}\) It is a self-evident fact that enables the (ac)counting of people within the state who are “meant to belong” there. The contemporary literature follows Agamben in drawing out the meaning of the concept from its Greek roots and showing its

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relation to legal and political categories.\textsuperscript{78} Citizenship then has a delimiting function not only at the legal level of the state but also at the individual level.\textsuperscript{79} I have already clarified my position to Agamben in the introduction. This literature parses the social into those who can draw on the state’s services, those that can be “seen” by the state, and those who cannot.\textsuperscript{80} Joppke attempts to draw out a cohesive and organised understanding of citizenship,\textsuperscript{81} through its presentation as three dimensional, evolving alongside the human rights regime established after the end of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{82} Citizenship, then, isn’t taken as ahistorical but as changing significant shift as one of the political effects of the holocaust.\textsuperscript{83} This sits uneasily with the literature that has been developed on the basis of Agamben’s \textit{Homo Sacer}\textsuperscript{84} and which has hardly been free from criticism.\textsuperscript{85} Owens, for instance, highlights the need to draw distinctions between the natural and political world via Arendt.\textsuperscript{86} Citizenship, for Agamben, is at the borderline between \textit{zoē} and \textit{bios}.\textsuperscript{87} This distinction, taken at the level of life, serves a Policing function. Citizenship is often taken in the literature as parsing “regular” and “irregular” migrants by the State but whether inclusive or not it functions in part to sublate potentially political subjects into countable subjects. This is a literature which I am writing alongside although my work

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{78} G. Agamben, \textit{Means without End: Notes on Politics}, (Uni. of Minnesota press, Minneapolis, 2000), pp. 16
\item \textsuperscript{82} Ibid. pp. 46-47
\item \textsuperscript{83} Ibid. pp. 47
\end{itemize}

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\item \textsuperscript{85} P. Owens, ‘Reclaiming ‘Bare Life’?: Against Agamben on Refugees’, \textit{International Relations}, Vol. 23, No. 4, (2009) pp.567-582
\item \textsuperscript{86} Ibid. 578-579
\end{itemize}

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and understanding sits in tension with it. If citizenship is, as Lister argues\textsuperscript{88}, operative both at the global and individual level\textsuperscript{89}, then it is worth bearing in mind how the domestic and IR are articulated.

Citizenship can be understood as a tool by the state to organise internally but also to differentiate itself externally. Citizenship enables the state to understand who it can count and who it doesn’t need to count domestically. This means that the sublation isn’t just about “counting in” people through citizenship but also “counting out”. Thus “regular” migrants can be (ac)counted for within the state. In terms of the level of IR citizenship is useful for the same reasons as it enables states to be (ac)counted for in proportion to their populations and this is one of the ways in which migration is rendered apprehensible - without the category of (non-)citizen then differentiation between resident and migrant would be impossible.

Other research moves on to look at the way in which citizenship becomes constitutive of constructing security relations for the state. A prime example here is Innes’ \textit{Migration, Citizenship and the Challenge for Security}\textsuperscript{90} which does show some clear examples of how migration/migrants can be political for IR and can help us see how the figure of the migrant is subject to a social wrong and therefore open to political subjectivation. Innes locates migration as a particular problem for security studies as a sub-field of IR.\textsuperscript{91} She is concerned with the problem that migration/migrants pose, given migration/migrants ‘embodied and lived contestation of the boundaries of the sovereign state, which has conventionally been the primary unit of analysis for security studies.’\textsuperscript{92} Innes’ ethnography presents clear examples of migrants who are silenced in IR and here interviews clearly show how the categories of territory, sovereignty and citizenship are undone in the face of the migrant. She is conscious of the fact that her interviewees ‘\textit{already speak for themselves}’\textsuperscript{93} and highlights how the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{89} Ibid. pp. 57-58
\bibitem{91} Ibid. pp. 2-3 & 20-40
\bibitem{92} Ibid. pp. 3
\end{thebibliography}
‘security studies literature silences certain voices... Silenced voices are not silent but are speaking in a certain context that the limited realm of security studies often cannot or does not access.’⁹⁴ This inability to see or hear the experiences of migration/migrants is not just a failure in the as Dingli has argued drawing on The Politics of Aesthetics⁹⁵ within IR silence can be read as the wrong carried through by IRs distribution of the sensible⁹⁶ (and as we have seen, such silenced subjects are potentially also political subjects in Rancière’s sense - the (ac)counting of migration is a clear (mis)count).

As I charted in the introduction the similarities between my own understanding and work and the organisation of the literature. In this section am drawing an equation between the aims of my own work that that of Dingli/Innes as I foregrounded in the introduction. I am producing a linkage that draws my work and contribution in line with that of these authors. While the results of Innes’ and Dingli’s intervention into the field yield similar conclusions to my own there are methodological and philosophical distinctions. This is not to say in any way that my approach is contradictory or challenging but rather that it runs alongside and with these approaches. Part of the distinction, as I have given in the introduction, is the way in which my theory is organised with regards to Rancière’s work. My adoption, with alterations, of Rancière’s framework establishes a categorical distinction between my work and that of Dingli/Innes. This is clearly a point in which we differ as it inflects our ontological and methodological inquiries with subtly different intonations. There is also a difference in contribution and scope between the work of Dingli/Innes and my own inquiries into migration. While both Dingli and Innes are making a contribution to the field and its understanding, my argument and thesis are looking to use migration as a case study by which to draw out and emphasises what my theoretical

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⁹⁴ Ibid. 40
⁹⁶ Ibid. pp. 725
approach will look like and justify its use. In thinking of this position to the literature there are clear differences between my engagement and orientation between that of Dingli/Innes.

To explore this distinction more clearly, Innes, drawing on Donnelly, focuses on the fractured nature of the state in IR. She makes clear the inherent contradictions between how it is conceived of in both theory and practice and how these are problematized by her interviews with Ali a Sudanese migrant in Greece attempting to reach his family in France and caught up within a multitude of state processes. Ali’s case is complex and highlights the way in which state counting defines the (in)visibility of migration. Innes informs us of how Ali, due to having been made visible in to the state, through the Greek police classifying him as undocumented, cannot be understood as anything other than deportable. The example is striking because it highlights not only the mechanisms by which the Police count sublates a subject into its (dis)position but also that citizenship can be operationalised at the individual level. As Innes and Isin highlight, the claiming of rights is in itself an act of citizenship. This is interesting as it highlights how citizenship is both a category which establishes IR’s distribution of the sensible with regards to migration/migrants but also is problematized by it. The state doesn’t have a monopoly over the concept, it can and is re-deployed by migrants themselves litigiously against the state. In this re-deployment migrants are exercising their logos and in doing so are asserting themselves politically, disrupting the distribution of the sensible. This reading of migration and of the particular case can be read as a clear way in which my approach and framework can be understood. There is however always a slight tension in the application of my framework and theorisation here.

97 Ibid. 76
98 Ibid. 57
99 Ibid. 58
The way in which the exercise of logos is essential for subjectivation has been explored by Vandevooordt in a study of the experiences of Syrian refugees in Belgium. Focusing on practices around hosting and eating Vandevooordt, citing Rancière, argues that ‘the very moment he [a Syrian refugee] invites me to his house and serves me a Syrian breakfast, this man changes the subject-definition that was imposed from the outside’. Here the act of hosting reaffirms a fundamental equality, contrasting with the Police count. Again there is an ally for my thesis here in this approach however the orientation of their argument is towards migrations as opposed to IR theory. We can through my reading of Vandevooort see how the act of sitting down and sharing a meal opens up space in which the wrong of the Police (mis)count can be addressed. This is brought to the fore when the refugee Vandevooordt is dining with says: ‘You have mind I have mind, you have eyes I have eyes okay. We are the same, you are feeling I am feeling. You are professional in your job and your study and I have professional on my own.’ This moment and assertion of the equality of intelligences is mirrored in Innes’ interviews and arguments. She argues, following an interview with a Eleanor a UK Home Office Employee, ‘Migrants without documents problematize the picture of the world as divided up into territorial units, or countries: they are people who are not where they ‘should’ be, who do not hold a recognizable and verifiable state-based identity and who do not belong.’ Here Innes is, in my terms, showing how migration/migrants undermine IRs distribution of the sensible. They are always a surplus that is intolerable to the Police order not because they are ‘not where they ‘should’ be’ but also because they are not who they should be. Migration and migrants through seizing on citizenship as a mechanism to exercise their logos are not showing the sōphrosunē the Police count demands of

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104 Ibid. pp. 610
105 Ibid. pp. 609
107 Ibid. pp. 47
them. We can see here the linkages and differences between my own argumentation and that of Innes’, Dingli’s and Vandevoort’s arguments.

The final way in which migration/migrants undoes citizenship as a category is through interpretation of asylum seeking and citizenship as a category itself. Here I argue that Innes gives us an example of migration and migrants ‘writing a name in the sky’ to use a phrase employed by Aletta Norval. In her reading of migration/migrants can be seen to be writing themselves into the symbolic order of the community of speaking beings, giving themselves a name. This as Norval highlights for us is key to subjectivation. The way in which a name can be inscribed and therefore the wrong replied to through an act of logos is central to political activity. Innes gives us a clear example of the Migrants doing this through their identification of themselves under the name asylum seekers a (dis)position manifested by the state, and I would contend, a Policing tool: ‘Because the state hold the power of the definition and the power of the decision as to what is credible it forces the asylum seeker into a position of passivity.’ Here there is a clearly organised (dis)position into which migration/migrants are poured. Within the definition comes passivity that acts as its virtue (sōphrosunē). Thus, the migrant, who is always-already the equal of the homeland office official, is (mis)counted down and placed into a position of passivity. Innes gives us clear examples of the way in which migrants re-interpret the category applied to them by the distribution of the sensible (both domestically and in IR) and exercise

112 It is important to note here that this is not true only for asylum seekers but also the (dis)position of refugees. I focus in on asylum seekers here but, as I will say later, this is not the only possible political category. There is a certain level of synonymy between the asylum seeker and the refugee as both are (dis)positions that the migrant exceeds through the exercising of their logos. See: A. Innes. Migration Citizenship and the Challenge for Security, (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015) pp. 42-60
113 Ibid. 47
114 As Innes highlights on page 48. “asylum seeker” isn’t the only (dis)position that migrants can be placed into. There are other categories such as ‘undocumented migrant’, ‘illegal immigrant’, ‘bogus asylum seeker’ that serve a similar Policing function. My decision to focus on asylum seeker as opposed to these other categories is based on the coercive aspect implicitly within these. Whereas asylum seeker exists to ascribe a name to migrants that enables them to be (ac)counted, which is in and of itself Policing the other listed terms also seek to count-out its subjects more directly.
their **logos** with regard to it. She understands these narratives as demonstrating ‘the **disconnect between people who consider themselves to be asylum seekers and how the state defines asylum seekers. These self-identifications of asylum seekers are in particular obscured and denied by asylum law’.

It is precisely this disjunction between the always already equality of the subject and its (dis)position by the distribution of the sensible that enables the migrant to be politically subjectivated. By taking seriously their (dis)position as one capable of speech, by hosting guests as asserting their equality,

migrants turn asylum seeker from a site of passivity into one of agency.

While the next section focuses on the Rancièrian literature around migration and the figure of the migrant it is important to connect this to IR before we get there. This is important as it draws out the core claim and contribution of my thesis in looking at what effect does a Rancièrian theory of IR have on IR’s understanding of politics. As I have looked at in this section of the chapter it is clear that migration and the figure of the migrant are not properly and tightly (ac)counted by the field’s distribution of the sensible. I have given a critique of both the “mainstream” and critical IR literatures that look at migration and the figure of the migrant and highlighted how these approaches often either sublimate migration/migrants into the Police count or offer a critique which while emancipatory reoccupies the terrain of territory, state/sovereignty and/or citizenship. The next section foregrounds my argument in chapter six that articulates directly both Rancière and migration/migrants. This is important for the thesis as it enables the articulation of explanation of Rancière as given in chapter four to the literature I set out in the next section. In doing so I am able to level the critique raised in this section and provide and answer to my research questions.

Turning back to the research questions I laid out in the introduction we can see here how I am answering the second of them. Here I have argued for the implications of a Rancièrian theory through

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115 Ibid. 49
the example of migration and migrants within IR. I have argued that a Rancierian theory of IR’s focus on wrong as opposed to ontological (re)categorisation has implications for understanding the potential possibility of politics in IR as well as the manner and modality of claims that can be made about such an argument. In order to avoid the reoccupation of such spaces and the potential meta/para-politics of such a reoccupation we must see a move towards thinking through and understanding the role of both the distribution of the sensible and wrong within IR.

**Migration and the Figure of the Migrant in Rancière**

In this next section I critically assess Rancière’s own work on migration, some of the relevant secondary literature and the differentiation between them and my own approach. This will help in the development of a theory of the political nature of migration within IR. We will start with the idea of ‘movement’. Across Rancière’s work movement and displacement are a motif for political subjectivisation. For example, in *Short Voyages to the Land of the People* Rancière conceives of the voyage as a potentially aesthetically transformative endeavour.\(^{118}\) It is the movement to ‘lands that offer the visitor the image of another world. Just across the straits, away from the river, off the beaten path, at the end of the subway line, there lives another people (unless it is, quite simply, the people).\(^{119}\)

Here Rancière is exploring the way in which movement across aesthetic and political boundaries opens up new spaces for interpretation.\(^{120}\) The voyage is a moment of stepping out of one’s place, both geographically but potentially also aesthetically and politically. This exploration by Rancière is essential in foreground my own understanding of migration with regards to the framework I have laid out throughout the thesis.

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119 Ibid. pp. 1
120 Ibid. pp. 2-5
When looking at Rossellini’s *Europa 51*, Rancière compares the act of becoming “foreign” to Socrates’ *atopia* which in Rancière’s thought is grounded in both displacement and trust. Trust serves to highlight the way in which “foreignness” offers up the potential recognition of the equality of intelligences. The “foreign” as both a mirror and potential pathway is a recurring theme within Rancière and in the book he finds broadly melancholic but transformative accounts of travelling as subjects move across boundaries and are confronted in part by the people. This confrontation is not always complete and, much like politics, is often unsustainable. I align my argumentation and approach with Rancière’s reading here. Travel transforms the “homely” into the “foreign” which in turn enables the opening up of the “home” and the self, an opportunity to see beyond given allocations of (dis)positions and to experience what is in part a political transformation. However, in *Short Voyages to the Land of the People* the transformation is manifested aesthetically. It is not a text that is about politics and the concrete subjectivisation of a part which has no part. Rather it is about aesthetic attempts to chart the boundaries at which transformation from the familiar to “foreign” opens up the possibly of scratching below the surface of (dis)position and making visible the always already equality of intelligences. This builds into my argument for migration/migrants as a potential political subject for IR as it shows the aesthetico-political force behind travel. As my application highlights how migrants necessarily move across boundaries they bring with them the confrontation of both the “foreign” and the “self” opening up the possibility for dissensual revelation of the distribution of the sensible.

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121 This is not strictly a commentary of nationality or citizenship. Rather here Rancière uses the term to mean an exterior to society’s interiority. Thus it isn’t about a strictly judicial or legal relationship to the state but rather it is about being perceived as separate from society. The point being foreignness isn’t a relation set up by the State or people (i.e the Police count) but rather it is that which is alien to the state or people (i.e. the Police count). The assertion that underwrites *Short Voyages to the Land of the People* is that the people are of course always already alien. They are always already foreign as they are never fully (ac)counted by the Police.

122 Ibid. pp. 122

123 Ibid. pp. 123

This notion of the “foreign” as the representation of the social back to the social but also the presentation of an “other” is also developed in On the Shores of Politics where Rancière explores Aristotle’s treatment of the a-social individual,\textsuperscript{125} the city-less individual, ‘lover of war in that he is an azux, a non-co-operator, an isolated piece at draughts.’\textsuperscript{126} It is an odd proposition.\textsuperscript{127} The “hearthless” individual is already established, in Aristotle, as a character that is both more and less than human.\textsuperscript{128} Hearthless here isn’t just homeless. The idea carries with it a sense of ungrounding. Migration, as I argue, is only apprehensible within IR given the precondition of territoriality and by cutting across these boundaries migration/migrants undo IR’s distribution of the sensible but engender the possibility for subjectivisation with regards to their (dis)position within it. I draw out from the Rancière the conception of the city-less individual as important because it isn’t just that this figure is absent from a/their city but that they don’t belong to a city at all. This individual through their inability to be (ac)counted for in relation to the proper position in a world of city-states becomes both more and less than human.\textsuperscript{129} The city-less individuals are a superfluous unit that forms the basis for an unintelligible conflict founded not on envy or their own superfluous character but rather the socialisation of hatred itself.\textsuperscript{130} This example here is important for my argument as it carried with it some of the implications of my framework. There is also the tension between my contribution being orientated towards IR and Rancière’s orientation towards the polis. In working through Rancière’s work in this regard I draw out the tension between Rancière’s thinking of the polis and my account of IR’s distribution of the sensible. In thinking this relationship I develop from my theorisation Rancièrian basis and bring through my own voice.

This example is interesting for my argument as it draws through something external to the geographical material bound of the polis. The presentation of the individual as without specified

\textsuperscript{125} Aristotle, The Politics, 1253a, ( pp.5-6
\textsuperscript{126} J. Rancière, On the Shores of Politics, (Verso, London, 2007) pp. 27
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid. pp. 27
\textsuperscript{128} Aristotle, The Politics, 1253a, pp.5-6
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid. pp. 28
citizenship is presented within the Aristotle categorises this position as an isolated piece without recourse to the tapestry of meaning and positionality within the distribution of the sensible. This for Rancière becomes a question as to how Aristotle divides and closes off the mobilisation of hatred from a mass of people.\textsuperscript{131} Rancière’s dissection of the gaming analogy becomes the site of a critique of philosophical thoughts totalising character.\textsuperscript{132} This totality becomes the totality of the distribution of the sensible and of philosophies Police character. I develop this argument through my theoretical position to draw Rancière into IR as explicate my own Rancièreian argument for IR. For Aristotle what is important is the division and distribution of set apprehensible parts of the polis. This, para-politics, becomes the grounding for all consent and dissent. The a-social individual who is outside of this distribution, who lacks citizenship, is problematic for this arrangement as they cannot be rendered into the para-political negotiation between parts. They are always superfluous too the arrangement within Aristotle. This superfluous individual cannot be understood in the way proper portioned (dis)positions are. As such they cannot be seen or heard, their claims cannot be understood as anything but noise. This then located themselves as external to apprehensibility. In doing so they become a representation of the disorder of democracy and fundamental equality. This is both an indorsement of their political potentiality against Aristotelian para-politics but also an instantiation of philosophy’s distain for both democracy\textsuperscript{133} and void/supplement.\textsuperscript{134} This socialisation of hatred as referenced by Aristotle then is already and internalisation of his own para-political position contra democracy.

Rancière tracks how Aristotle renders unthinkable this socialisation of hatred through a recourse to the naturalness of humanity’s condition as the political animal.\textsuperscript{135} Rancière’s movement here is telling in that he locates a philosophical blind spot in a fundamentally sensory challenge: that of the city-less

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid. pp. 27
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid. pp. 30-31
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid. pp. 28
individual. This has repercussions for thinking through the status of migration/migrants with regard to politics. There is an analogy to be made between the migrant and the city-less individual that ties into the socialisation of hatred.\textsuperscript{136} Such an analogy stages the socialisation of hatred as a reaction by the city to the exposure of its fundamental truth: ‘the equality of [everyone’s] capabilities to occupy the positions of governors and of the governed.’\textsuperscript{137} Rancière’s excavation of the figure of the city-less individual is useful in showing how “stepping out” of, or across, territoriality removes a figure from apprehensibility. In Aristotle the lack of belonging to a city becomes grounds for the cessation of humanity (and with it speech), becoming an unchecked checker, the azux (an isolated piece in a game of draughts).\textsuperscript{138} For Aristotle the city-less person is inapprehensible as a person just as migration/migrants are inapprehensible for IR. This distinction read through Rancière’s reading of Aristotle is central to my own argument that I make in chapter six.

Rancière also argues that ‘the whole political project of Platonism can be conceived as an anti-maritime polemic.’\textsuperscript{139} This he characterises as ‘a matter of mise-en-scène, of shifting images around: cave and mountain instead of sea and land.’\textsuperscript{140} This movement from the metaphors of the boundaries of rivers and shorelines to ranges and grottos is designed to “ground” politics. Rather Plato takes the implicit democracy of the work and life of sailors and transposes it onto the regimentation of the shepherds. This is a double move. The shoreline of the sea is transmuted into the abstract division of the demes.\textsuperscript{141} Plato summons these images and metaphors because ‘Athens has disease that comes from its port, from the predominance of maritime enterprise governed entirely by profit and survival.’\textsuperscript{142} This is

\textsuperscript{136} Of course this hatred is not really about the conditions or being of migration/migrants rather it is grounded in migration/migrants as an expression of democracy. As Rancière looks to in Hatred of Democracy on pages 3-4 it is clear that the hatred of democracy is a thinly veiled hatred of fundamental equality. The expression of such an equality as outside people (dis)positions. In drawing these two together the discourses around the hatred of migration/migrants becomes a hatred of the assertion of fundamental equality. It is precisely because migration/migrants exercises capacity their (dis)position shouldn’t have that they are hated for having it.

\textsuperscript{137} J. Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, (Verso, London, 2014) pp. 49


\textsuperscript{139} Ibid. pp. 1

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid. pp. 2

\textsuperscript{141} J. Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, (Verso, London, 2014) pp. 44

\textsuperscript{142} J. Rancière, On the Shores of Politics, (Verso, London, 2007) pp. 1
because the sailors are not fit to carry out their politics. They are bawdy and drunk. Plato’s parable of
the ship carries this with it. If the sailors are left to their devices they will raid the stores, the journey
becomes a “pleasure-cruise”. Only the philosopher, who knows how to navigate by the stars, is
capable of bringing them back to land. There is a double move here. Plato privileges the stasis of the
land and the stars over the motion of the seas, and also the purpose of the journey over the voyaging
itself. Sailing is not proper, as it is not in its proper place. This is important not only for the rhetorical
comparison between the shore and the border but because it highlights the disruptive capacity of
movement. Sailors lack the virtue of the artisans (sôphrosunê) - their enterprise isn’t governed by their
capacity or availability for work and singularity of task but by profit and survival. They are a category
that isn’t present in the city and therefore is not fully (ac)countable to the city.

Rancière in his critique of Plato blurs the distinction between the *polis* and the distribution of the
sensible. In doing so he charts the limitations of his own thought, lyrically, as on the shore. The liminal
nature of the rhetorical scene of the shore is important here as it expresses the limitations with
Rancière’s approach to thinking migration. He is concerned with the oblique relationship between the
“land” of philosophy and the “sea” of politics. This distinction gets charted as possessing motility but
one across which Rancière treads lightly. Given his light-steps Rancière’s metaphor of the shore
doesn’t escape his own critique of Plato; that in ‘entering the cave we bid farewell to this fatal and
seductive seascape’143. This is the limitation I worked through in the introduction: Rancière’s inability
to fully distance himself from philosophy. Rancière is still, through his thinking of philosophy and the
grounding of his theory in the *polis* very much concerned with the schema and scene of the “land”.
My approach and development of Rancière’s thought is to think across the “sea” and to the “land” on
the other side. To think the “international” and IR through my Rancierian framework is to attempt to
see the shore not as a singular delineating boundary. Rather to think of the shores that surround and
connect us both metaphorically and literarily as the *partage* that constitutes IR. That movement

143 Ibid. pp. 2
across, over and around these shores and shorelines as a location which can be read as political is central both to the argument, contribution and theorisation I set out in this thesis. This highlights not only the Rancièrean heritage with which I am writing but also the ways in which I am developing and progressing that heritage.

Now when we look to the current migration crisis and see people traveling by boat across the Mediterranean to arrive in Europe, my arguments highlighting of the disruptive capacity of this movement is clear. The (mis)counting of migration/migrants is made harder as they are not still but rather have motility. Migration/migrants are not scalar quantities. They necessarily cut vectors across IR. Migration/migrants move physically/literally (in)between places and they do not have the singularity of labour demanded by the Police (ac)count. The comparison I have drawn here between Rancière’s reading of Plato as an anti-maritime polemic and migration/migrants as well as my own reading and relation to this reading is important as it constitutes a shift in the mise-en-scène of my argument. Such a rearrangement is important when I make claims as to the political potential of migration and migrants for IR. In doing so I highlight the inadequacy of Rancière’s (ac)counting for migration due to his own relationship to philosophy I explored in the introduction. My approach progresses this metaphor through the (un)grounding of philosophy, in order to constitute my argument as an opening up of and attention to the effluvious shorelines of IR.

Rancière’s addressing of migration directly in his article Politics, Identification and Subjectivisation. Is important to clarify his and my own positions. Here Rancière states: ‘twenty years ago the “immigrant had an other name; they were workers or proletarians. In the meantime this name has been lost as a political name. They retained their “own” name, and an other that has no other name becomes the object of fear and rejection.’ Rancière is writing of metapolitical Police (ac)count and of how this is played out. His argument is not directed at the political effects of migration/migrants but rather at

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145 Ibid. pp. 62-64
a collapse of emancipatory politics as the politics of the other.\textsuperscript{146} He argues that growing racism and xenophobia in France stem not from the material reality of migration/migrants but from a collapse of the capacity to deploy “wrong” names.\textsuperscript{147} From this it follows that, much like the socialisation of hate brought by the city-less individual\textsuperscript{148}, ‘the new outcomes of racism and xenophobia thus reveal the very collapse of politics, the reversion of the political handling of a wrong to primal hate.’ Just as the city-less individual is a superfluous character that cannot access their proper place and as such is (mis)counted out of humanity so the, barred by the metapolitical discourse from accessing a name which renders them sensible, is (mis)counted out of humanity. My argument, while concurrent with this position moves to think this relationship to the name migrant as constitutive and central to the way in which IR enables its own coherence.

When migration/migrants are (mis)counted out of humanity this isn’t just the Police count rounding down the surplus. It is a metapolitical Policing in the sense that it is situated within the frame of the discourse between humanity and citizenship\textsuperscript{150}. The discourse ‘that man and citizen are the same liberal individual enjoying the universal values of human rights embodied in the constitutions of our democracies’\textsuperscript{151} makes the categories of humanity and citizenship homogenous. The policy of liberalised human rights becomes the \textit{de facto} position of humanity, while erasing the interval or gap between names/identities\textsuperscript{152}. This is a totalising erasure that renders inapprehensible those who don’t fit into the count as human or citizen. Through this discourse the capacity of migration/migrants to be visible as anything \textit{other} than humans rendered simply as humans becomes impossible. This enables both the rendering of passivity that Innes has informed us of\textsuperscript{153} but also the capacity to count

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\textsuperscript{146} Ibid. pp. 63
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid. pp. 63
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid. 63
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid. 63
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid. 63
\end{flushleft}
migration/migrants out of humanity and socialise hate\textsuperscript{154}. This for Rancière takes place precisely because there hasn’t been the capacity for immigrants to access another name. They aren’t able to draw on their previous heterological identity as workers or proletarians\textsuperscript{155}. As Rancière argues this category has always been superfluous\textsuperscript{156} as opposed to denoting a particular (dis)position\textsuperscript{157} highlighting the wrong that is being carried out against migration/migrants; the migrant cannot access a recognised subject-position within the social constellation as they are written out by the distribution of the sensible. They can be reduced to their bare life and be assigned passivity, or they are seen in a similar manner to the city-less individual in Aristotle. The fact that wrong is evidenced here as being carried out against migrants is essential for my argument. Rancière demonstrates clearly how migrants are miscounted – a miscounting essential for politics to emerge. The wrong that blocks the access of migrants to names and consigns them to passivity is the same wrong that enables them to act politically and assert their fundamental equality. I side with this approach to reading and only differ in my application of this position to IR.

In \textit{Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?} Rancière looks to break down the relationship between human-rights and the conditions of bare life\textsuperscript{158} and develops an argument about how the ordering of these rights can be articulated as part of a Police (ac)count\textsuperscript{159}. The figure of the refugee is given, via Arendt, as the concrete conditionality that enables the abstractedness of human rights.\textsuperscript{160} Rancière shows how, in the Arendtian tradition,\textsuperscript{161} the condition for human rights are established through a

\textsuperscript{156} We can see this within the article itself on page 61 when he states that ‘proletarian was not the name of any social ground that could be sociologically identified. It is the name of an outcast. An outcast is not a poor wretch of humanity; outcast is the name of those who are denied and identity in a given order of policy.’ This similar understanding is given in \textit{The Philosopher and His Poor} as well as \textit{Disagreement}.
\textsuperscript{157} Linking back to the previous chapter, this is a good example of how politics doesn’t have a singular subject but rather a transcendental subject. That is a subject waiting for its subjectivation into the (ac)count.
\textsuperscript{158} J. Rancière, ‘Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’, \textit{The South Atlantic Quarterly}, Vol. 103, No. 2/3, (Spring/Summer 2004) pp. 297-310
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid. 308-309
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid. 298-299
\textsuperscript{161} Which is drawn on by Innes as a way of thinking through the potential security implications of migration see: \textit{Migration, Citizenship and the Challenge for Security} pp. 106-9
reduction of humans to their humanity. Arendt characterises the plight of refugees not as a lack of equality before the law but rather ‘that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed but that no one wants to oppress them.’ For Rancière this is the ‘statement of a situation and status that would be “beyond oppression”, beyond any account in terms of conflict and repression or law and violence.’ The condition then is not the reduction to bare life that Agamben discusses, that of exceptionality from the law but a broader reduction beyond the law. It isn’t that the subject is rendered apprehensible only as someone who can be killed with impunity but may not be sacrificed. Rather the subject becomes inapprehensible as a subject: the migrant does not have recourse to any names in society. They are completely isolated from social identification as they are in total exteriority to territoriality. For Arendt this makes sense: her archipolitical Police (ac) count requires the division between the proper “political” community, resembling Athenian-Spartans, and the realm of private endeavour. The point for my argument here is that this condition that is established by Arendt is not solvable through dissolving itself into the totalising community. Rather it is a condition of wrong. I carry forwards this reading and articulate that precisely it is the condition of a wrong that is required for subjectivisation to occur.

Rancière’s thinking here has been developed by, for example, Salvanou in *Migrants Nights*. Salvanou explores the way in which parallels can be drawn between Rancière’s depiction, in *Proletarian Nights*, of the experiences of 19th century workers and the situation of contemporary

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163 Ibid. pp. 299
164 Ibid. pp. 299
Pakistani migrants in Athens.\(^{170}\) She explores both the working conditions\(^ {171}\) and leisure time\(^ {172}\) of these migrants arguing that we can see a parallel with Rancière’s shoemaker poets\(^ {173}\) and dreaming floor-layers.\(^ {174}\) The migrants in Athens are able to ‘develop subjectivities that challenge the discourse that devalues them collectively by defining them as culturally inferior.’\(^ {175}\) It is in this capacity, through their leisure time and communal existence that they are able to challenge the excessive social-cultural predetermination of their lives. Much like the workers of the 19\(^{th}\) century, migrants face an excessive predetermination (as shown by Innes\(^ {176}\), Genova\(^ {177}\) and Lane).\(^ {178}\) The speech (logos) of migrants is reduced to their voice (phonē) (something also explored within the work of Lane\(^ {179}\), Schaap\(^ {180}\) and Gunneflo & Selberg).\(^ {181}\) This reduction of the apprehensibility of their speech is a key component of wrong. What Salvanou shows in her study of the aesthetic practices of Pakistani migrants in Athens, that which allows them to ‘develop subjectivities that challenge the discourse that devalues them’\(^ {182}\) is what could be construed as political action. My articulation can be read as doing something similar to the work of Salvanou. In looking to draw through my Rancièrian argument to IR I am making that similar kind of reading and movement Salvanou does but with IR as my target not Athens.

\(^{170}\) Ibid. pp. 1
\(^{171}\) Ibid. pp. 4-6
\(^{172}\) Ibid. pp. 7-9
\(^{174}\) Ibid. pp. 84-85
\(^{175}\) Ibid. pp. 18
\(^{179}\) Ibid. pp. 28
Another way in which the political activity of migrants is constructed is with regards to protest. Rigby & Schlembach explore the way in which protests at the Anglo-French border become political arguing that ‘the politics of the noborder camp did not begin in some pre-established domain of the political, but in the struggle over whether or not migration could be a site of politics at all.’ Rigby & Schlembach articulate the struggle here directly to Rancière’s arguments from Ten Theses for Politics. The act undertaken by the migrants in contesting the Anglo-French border is political precisely because it enables their subjectivisation. This is made clear as they describe the protest of one of their interviewees as having ‘made manifest this dissensus between having a part and having no part. It staged the ‘dissensual’ or ‘impossible’ presence of ‘two worlds in one’ (Rancière 2010, p. 36–37). We are all human, we are all brothers, or we are not.’ This mode of protest opens up the wrong through a dissensual identification and enables the possibility of subjectivisation. Similar arguments are made by Panagia and Nyers and by Millner who takes things in an ethical direction and is explicit about the ways in which migration confronts a wrong grounded in ‘the shift from the figure of refugee to migrant in the politicisation of asylum at Calais.’ Millner forwards an argument for the ethics of solidarity grounded in the political subjectivation based in the Police (ac)count of migrants and refugees. This ethical orientation in relation to thinking through politics here lines up in part with the critical account given in IR. In focusing in on the particular practices of Migrants this approach does open up a potential space for politics through the focus on the fundamental equality and relationality between the practices of migrants and the Police. This has interesting results when compared back to the approach given in critical IR theory. The focus within the Rancierian literature is not the

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184 Ibid. pp. 162
185 Ibid. pp. 162
186 Ibid. pp. 164
190 Ibid. pp. 327
constitution of migration/migrants by (un)stable categories, or ontology rather on the relationality between the practices and communities and the Police ordering of these (dis)positions. In making this shift it I forward and write in and towards this tradition of explicating how it becomes possible to apprehend not only a space for dissensus and by extension subjectivation but also politics.

A different take is offered by Dornhof who looks at the way in which violence against women, in particular migrant/post-migrant women, is rendered (in)visible in the French Banlieue.191 The concept of dissensus is central here enabling Dornhof to think the way in which the women exercise their politics and fundamental equality.192 This rendition is interesting given not only the way in which the distribution of the sensible assigns a (dis)position that is challenged not only on as migrants but also as women.193 In a similar vein to Salvanou’s comparison to Proletarian Nights, Dornhof looks at the aesthetic practices of letter writing and how through this dissensus begins to be made possible.194 Dornhof argues that the letters of migrant women in the Banlieue produce ‘an interruption that is not equal to critique, but that introduces a surplus of words in the mode of the ‘as-if’. Speaking in the mode of the as-if means ‘the staging of a dissensus’... (Rancière, 2009:11).195 The migrant women of the banlieue through an act of dissensus are able to, undergo subjectivisation and therefore to act politically. This application of dissensus is a point of convergence between Dornhof196, Gunneflo &

192 Ibid. pp. 113
193 Ibid. pp. 114-116
194 Ibid. pp. 113
196 Ibid. pp. 110-127
Selberg\textsuperscript{197}, Rigby & Schlembach\textsuperscript{198}, Engles-Schwarzpaul\textsuperscript{199}, Millner\textsuperscript{200} and Puggioni.\textsuperscript{201} Converging on ‘dissensus’ as a mechanism for thinking politics these all locate migration/migrants as potential political subjects who are subject to \textit{wrong} and thus open to political subjectivation. This is key for thinking through how a Rancièrian theory of IR effects the notion of politics. In looking at how political subjectivation is related to \textit{wrong} it becomes possible to move forwards IR’s critique from the literatures I explored in the first section of this chapter and produce a reading of migration and migrants, that is attentive to the nature of \textit{wrong} and the implications dissensus has for politics in IR.

Dornhof isn’t alone in looking at the way in which aesthetic practices provides the impetus for protest and politics. Johnson gives an interesting account of how migrant narrative making opens up spaces for political subjectivisation.\textsuperscript{202} Drawing on the securitisat\textsuperscript{ion literature Johnson highlights the performativity of borders in migrant’s relation to them and puts Rancière in conversation with Agamben to show that the \textit{‘fleeting interruptions and flashes of resistance that occur in the everyday lives of migrants create politics itself within this state of exception’}.\textsuperscript{203} Johnsons argument aligns with the analysis I gave of Innes’ account of how migrants regain their agency. This gives a clear moment of articulation between the Rancierian understanding and the IR literature on migrations and migrants. Migrants in Spain pushing their demand and claims for recognition against the state\textsuperscript{204} and the performative identity of asylum seekers,\textsuperscript{205} both highlight the possibility for the political

\textsuperscript{199} A. Engles-Schwarzpaul, ‘The Offerings of Fringe Figure and Migrants’, \textit{Educational Philosophy and Theory}, Vol. 47, No. 11, (2015) pp. 1211-1226
\textsuperscript{202} H. Johnson, ‘The Other Side Of The Fence: Reconceptualising the “Camp” and Migration Zones at the Borders of Spain’, \textit{International Political Sociology}, Vol. 7 (2013) pp. 75-91
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid. pp. 88
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid. pp. 88
subjectivation of migration and migrants. Interestingly, both Johnson and Millner contest the notion of ‘the camp’. Johnson articulates her critique directly to show how exceptionality can become the location for political activity\(^{206}\) (a claim mirrored in Rancière’s, that ‘an outcast is not a poor wretch of humanity; outcast is the name of those who are denied an identity in a given order of policy’\(^{207}\)). Millner, rather than focus on the locus of the camp highlights how the camps are not necessarily sites of exceptionality or “bare life”\(^{208}\), but rather offer up a mediated experience of authority\(^{209}\) and a location for dissensus to take hold\(^{210}\). This offers us an example of potential politics that differs from IR’s current understanding of migration/migrants. Rather than offering a reinforcement of the categories of territoriality/sovereignty/citizenship we can see how through dissensus a political subjectivation is possible that necessarily subverts these categories. By focusing on the way in which migration/migrants are a cite of dissensus it becomes possible to forward a critique in IR that moves to bring through potential political subjectivation.

Johnson gives us a series of arguments that are useful for thinking migration/migrants in IR\(^{211}\). Her work present a clear and critical take on the issues of reading migration through and into IR. Her approach is a clear ally with which I am writing. As I have explored in the paragraph above her work


\(^{209}\) Ibid. pp. 87-105

\(^{210}\) Ibid. pp. 89-92

places Rancière in discussion with Agamben\textsuperscript{212}. I referenced a similar mode of discussion in the introduction and such the conversation between Johnson, Rancière and Agamben is useful to delineate my own understanding of Rancière as well as my argument and the differences that spring from my argument. Johnson’s work then becomes central to my argument in articulating Rancière to IR. Her work gives a clear crampon against which I can leverage my argumentation to and through IR. This is not say mine and Johnson’s work are identical in nature. We have slightly different readings and inflections when it comes to reading the Rancière. We also have a different target in our articulation and aim of our arguments. These differences then are very minor when it comes to thinking this in contrast to the points of similarity in our approach.

Here, then, I have explored the literature surrounding Rancière and migration. I began looking at the primarily material. I broke down Short Voyages to the Land of the People, Politics Identification and Subjectivisation as well as On The Shores of Politics and argued that we can see within these texts the potential of movement and migration/migrants as setting the stage of political action. I then examined the secondary literature that directly articulates Rancière to migration. Here I have seen how migration/migrants can be conceived of as a locus for political subjectivisation.

**Conclusion**

This chapter’s appraisal has shown how IR and the literature around migration and migrants is constructed via the distribution of the sensible in IR. In looking at the three self-evident facts produced by this distribution I have shown how migration is constituted based on territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship. In looking through the mainstream and critical literatures on migration I have drawn out how they are constituted. I have worked through how while Critical IR Theory presents an interesting and emancipatory critique of IR. I have highlighted how there lies a potential political subject for IR

\textsuperscript{212} H. Johnson, ‘The Other Side Of The Fence: Reconceptualising the “Camp” and Migration Zones at the Borders of Spain’, *International Political Sociology*, Vol. 7 (2013) pp. 88
within migration and the figure of migrants. However, I have also argued that in order for this to be fully drawn out I have given an account of my argument and how it relates to Rancière’s reading. This has included the similarities and points of difference.

My Ranciérian (ac)count of migration and migrants for IR is foregrounded in this chapter through my exploration of the current Rancièreian literature around migration and migrants. The key things to be drawn out of this literature on migration and migrants, as well as my reading of Innes and Johnson is the prominence of dissensus as essential for politics. It is essential for subjectivation for a dissensual articulation against the wrong of the Police (mis)count. Through understanding and drawing across the primary and secondary Ranciérian literature on migration and migrant to IR I showcase how migration/migrants are subject to a wrong in IR. From this I highlight their potential political subjectivation through application of Rancière to IR.
Chapter 6:

Migration and Political Subjectivation

Introduction

I begin this chapter by outlining my overall argument - that migration as such creates the potential of the formation of a political subject for IR – developing it by building on what has been argued in earlier chapters. I then show that this involves a more general move away from ontology which, as I noted in the introduction is part of my working through the limitations of Rancière. This is part of the contribution I am offering to IR through both my development of a Rancièreian framework. This also aims my contribution towards the fourth “debate” in IR, in particular Post-positivist IR theory, as established by my introduction. That is to say, the chapter gives my case-study of migrants as political subjects which is a central claim of my thesis to show my contribution to IR. I then conclude the chapter by linking the argument and case study back to the previous chapters and show it provides an answer to the research questions formulated within the introduction.

Migration, Migrants and Political Subjectivation in IR

The following argument recapitulates and presents back to us what we have seen in the previous five chapters, focusing my findings about IR, anarchy and the distribution of the sensible onto the situation of migrants. The argument is constructed out of six clear moments. I work through each of these moments in turn and give a statement of how this is not only drawn together in the terms of the argument at hand but also how it links back across my thesis as a whole. This is done to draw together and collate not only my contribution to the field but also to provide answers to the research questions that provide the remit and contribution for and of my thesis.

1: A wrong is where a subject is reduced to a part which has no part through a (mis)count.’
As I have argued in chapter four of the thesis I read a *wrong* is a specific form of disagreement within and against a distribution of the sensible. The latter as I have argued, is what creates the condition of and for an apprehensible common world. It does so by specifying a series of positions and disposition specific to them. This is both a distribution of bodies and disposition specific to those bodies.\(^2\) This order(ing) takes place with a reference to the arkhè which structures the distribution of the sensible. As I have argued in chapters two, three and four the arkhè of IR’s distribution of the sensible is anarchy. This arkhè, by definition, order as (mis)count because it rests on the reduction of one of its constitutive (dis)positions as inapprehensible. This is to say that it produces a *wrong* through the creation of a part which has no part. That *wrong* is the void/supplement that makes possible dissensus and the assertion of the part which has no parts fundamental equality. If such a movement was impossible then politics itself becomes and impossibility. Without this movement then we would be completely trapped within the Police and unable to exercise any modes of political change with regard to the distribution of the sensible and thus the order(ing) of our lives.

Here I make clear the assumptions and arguments I have made in the thesis. This moment within the argument I am forwarding in this chapter is not a controversial one with regard to the account of Rancière I have presented in the earlier chapters, most notably chapters three and five. The definition of *wrong* itself is important given its relationship to politics within my theorisation. This moment is also important as it brings in the arkhè of IR: anarchy.

The first moment of this argument tells us something about the migration and the figure of the migrant within IR as it gives us the terms around which *wrong* can be understood for IR. In doing so it establishes the conditions of my argument and politics. My contribution to post-positivist IR differs in that it establishes the site of politics not around a specific ontological framework but rather about the conditions of apprehensibility itself. This is also in line with many other thinks who I have outlined throughout the thesis until this point. My emphasis on that *wrong* provides the locus for politics is

part of the contribution I am forwarding through my framework. This step of the argument in one in which I unpick and foreground what the political in IR must be, in the very least partially, at the level of apprehensibility.

2. ‘A potential political subject is one which has a wrong enacted upon it’.

In the second moment of my argument I look at the way in which a potential political subject relates to wrong. I draw out the stakes and relationship between politics and wrong. As the first moment of the argument defined and drew wrong back to the distribution of the sensible and the fundamental (mis)counting of the Police order, this moment draws out a defined political relationship to wrong. Notably we can see this in chapters three and four.

The term ‘potential political subject’ is important for the stakes of my argument. With regards to the argument I am forwarding subjects are not preconditions for politics but rather part of what it is for politics to take place. The act of subjectivation is necessary for politics but is not a guarantee the occurrence of politics. Neither does, the fact that there is a wrong being carried out by the Police (ac)count. Rather wrong is the necessary but is not on its own a wholly sufficient precondition for politics. This is an important is fine point. Politics is not to be confused with the wrong itself. It is also not the reaction to that wrong. Rather it is only the assertion of a fundamental equality against the wrong of the distribution of the sensible. Looking back at the terms of this moment in the argument this means that the subject is only potentially political as there is no guarantee they will undergo subjectivation into an apprehensible subject and thus no guarantee of politics occurring. It is perfectly possible for a Police (ac)count to never have the wrong of its foundation addressed.

There is also the fact that, strictly speaking, as subject isn’t an apprehensible subject until it has undergone subjectivisation. Rather the part which as no part, precisely by virtue of being the part which has not part, is inapprehensible to the Police (ac)count. As I have argued previously in chapter three, the Police (ac)count is a distribution of the sensible without void or supplement. Thus, the part
which has no part cannot be meaningfully understood as a subject within that distribution of the sensible. The ‘potential political subject’ within this moment of the argument is not only potentially political but also only potentially a subject until it undergoes the process of subjectivation. Therefore, until the potential political subject undergoes a process of subjectivation it is in a superposition with regard to the Police (ac)count.

This is important for the stakes of my argument in that it draws a direct linkage between the wrong outlined in the first moment and the conditionality of both subjectivity and politics. The second moment then tell us two things about the conditionality of migration and the figure of the migrant within IR. It tells us initially that migration and the migrant can only be potentially political if they are subject to a wrong by the distribution of the sensible. This links back to the first moment of my argument that has established the conditions for wrong. This is also important as it highlights the conditions and stakes of politics with regard for migration and the figure of the migrant within IR. This is important for my contribution to post-positivist IR as it establishes the conditions of my engagement with the field.

3. ‘Politics is a process/moment of subjectivisation by which a potential political subject asserts its fundamental equality against a wrong.’

The next moment in my argument builds on the previous ones by distinguishing between the potential political subject and the act of subjectivation itself. In order for politics to take place there needs to be subjectivation. Subjectivation involves the invocation of the miscounted part which has no parts fundamental equality. I argued for the previous in chapters three and four. This is to say the part which has no part is subjectivated through the assertion of its fundamental equality against the wrong of the Police orders (mis)count.

In the context of IR politics then must be the process of subjectivation with regard to the wrong carried out the Police (mis)count of IR. This means that the potential political subject for IR must be being
miscounted by IR. As we saw in the first moment of my argument and in chapter three the (mis)counting of the Police order must leave the part which has no part inapprehensible to IR. The Police (ac)count cannot have a gap or surplus within it. What is important is the characteristics of the Police (ac)count in IR as this will determine the conditions of apprehensibility and thus the character of the wrong. The arkhè of IR is clearly important for the character with which migration and migrants within IR as subject to a wrong and thus be a potential political subject. As we saw in chapters two and four the arkhè of IR is anarchy and thus its Police (ac)count is founded on this ordering principle. As I have argued previously anarchy delimits and (re)produces the tools by which IR can be and is rendered apprehensible. This is to say that key vectors along which apprehensibility runs in IR; territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship are produced only through their relationship to anarchy. These categories of apprehensibility, as I argued in chapter five, have been a means through which migration and migrants have been sublimated out of IR.

From this then I am showing in this moment of my argument how politics in IR must necessarily be a distribution of the distribution of the sensible and the Police (ac)count of IR. This disruption must occur through a subjectivation that destabilises anarchy and the constituent self-evident facts produced by the distribution of the sensible. In the case of IR this is its arkhè: anarchy as well as territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship. Following the previous moments of my argument it is also apparent that this disruption is only possible given the assertion of a part which has no parts fundamental equality against a wrong. This moment sets out the conditions for politics in IR. This is essential for the functioning of my case study as it organises clearly the conditions for politics within IR and also for the articulation of this case study to post-positivist IR theory, given the accounts of this mode of theory I have made throughout the introduction and thesis.

4. ‘Migrants and the phenomena of migration are (mis)counted in IR’; that is, they are (mis)counted in IR and thus have a wrong enacted upon them.’
If it is not the case that migrants and the phenomena of migration are miscounted in IR, then they cannot be understood as a potential political subject for IR as they will not have a wrong enacted against them. But, as we have seen in chapter five, in order to maintain a coherent totality for IR the claims, experience and existence of migration/migrants is sublated into the category of security. This renders invisible migration and migrants inapprehensible as phenomena. Rather than being read as discrete and important (dis)positions within IR they are written out as the objects of economic and security concerns. Territoriality is, as I have argued, one of the ways that migration/migrants are clearly a part which has no part in IR but so too are sovereignty and the state. As we saw, the State relates to migrants as the Police and this rationality precludes the possibility for migration or migrants to be understood as-if they were an equal subject for IR and restricts their apprehensibility through the denial of access to common names. This means that the state counts migration/migrants out of IR not only through sublation into an economic/security issues but also through limiting the claims they can make. IR constitutes migration/migrants as only capable of voice (phonē) within IR. This means that they cannot be seen as a subject and therefore are reduced through the state and sovereignty to a part which has no part. We can see this (mis)counting through the ways in which citizenship functions in IR. Citizenship renders migrants (in)apprehensible firstly by assigning the (dis)position of the citizen as tied to a state. This automatically makes migrants superfluous to the category. I argued that following this there is also a way in which citizenship makes migration/migrants inapprehensible to IR through reducing them to the domestic sphere of individual-state relations. I highlighted here how this category serves to sublate migration/migrants through their possession only of voice (phonē) as opposed to speech. This is a crucial point. If the distribution of the sensible of IR can effectively (ac)count for migration/migrants then they will not be miscounted and therefore are always already able to be taken as an equal within the field. However, within chapter five I have argued that this is not the case and we have seen how IR’s distribution of the sensible constructs migration/migrants as inapprehensible. The self-evident facts of territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship are produced by anarchy and render migrants an inapprehensible subject within IR, subject to a miscount.
A slight caveat is required here. There are potential Police mechanisms that render some migration/migrants apprehensible to IR. These rely on the distinction between regular migration/migrants and that which is irregular. This distinction between regular and irregular migration is drawn with regards to the conception of deportability. Huysmans, De Genova and Nyers each define and build on the concept of irregularity with regards to migration. This distinction between regular and irregular cuts across the boundaries of legality and the state.  

While legal and illegal migration is defined from the perspective of the state, irregular migration seeks to break from this definitional assumption. In this way it is a distinction that seeks to recapture the categories of sovereignty and citizenship. An important caveat to add is that this analytic category is not ‘a generic, singular, universal and thereby a transhistorical and essentialised object of study’. There is no specific categorisation, in terms of material factors, that can be ascertained through this terminology. This means that the distinct between regular and irregular are general categories that account for a swathe of individuated identities and experiences that are not necessarily aligned or consanguineous.

We can see how the distinction between regular and irregular migration undermines the self-evident facts of sovereignty and citizenship within IR as irregular migrations is defined as migrants/migration that is not authorised by the state in/across which they exist. Within the mainstream and critical literature there is often an economic implication tied to irregularity. This categorisation between regular and irregular migrants as tied into the correct possession of state approved paperwork is a mechanism by which migration/migrants can be sublimated into the Police (ac)count of IR. Through

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219 Ibid. pp. 93  
220 Ibid. pp. 91-116
the reduction of migration/migrants into an issue of security lensed through sovereignty and citizenship as articulated in state paperwork they are rendered inapprehensible.

I have argued earlier in chapter five that regular and irregular migration can be seen as a mechanism that divides critical and ‘mainstream’ literatures in IR. What becomes apparent at this moment in my argument is that both literatures already have the conditions of apprehensibility, as delineated by the Police (ac)count, baked into their understanding of migration/migrants. Through understanding that the conditionality of the difference between regular and irregular migration is the authorisation of the state, critical IR reoccupies the ground of territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship. Through the invocation and exploration of these self-evident facts we can see here how the conditions of apprehensibility are granted to regular migration. This division takes migration and migrants as a category at large and though a para-political reduction, along the lines of IR’s self-evident facts, enables regular migrants to become apprehensible. This enables the distribution of the sensible as a whole to remain coherent through boiling out the surplus matter of irregularity.

Regular migration is made apprehensible to IR through its locution via territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship. Irregular migration and irregular migrants by contrast are not subject to recognition by the state in the same way. They do not adhere to the implementation of territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship but rather flaunt it. As such they are inapprehensible to IR. This is where in part the (mis)count occurs through the exercising of deportability.221 The irregular migrant is rendered apprehensible only as a surplus to the Police (ac)count of IR and given that the Police (ac)count cannot tolerate void or surplus, they become sublated into the Police (ac)count through deportation i.e. the reassertion of territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship. This is then a mode of wrong. Through the distinction between regular and irregular migration/migrants it is clear how wrong plays out even with

Police action rendering regular migration apprehensible. Even as there are differing levels of apprehensibility between different modalities of migration or migrants there is still the central wrong of irregular migration. Migration/migrants that do not fit into the frame of IR are then rendered into a security problem. This wrong serves the function of retrenching the core self-evident facts of IR produced by anarchy: territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship: it is a Police action.

Critical IR generally focuses on irregularity as a site which undermines the core self-evident facts of IR produced by anarchy. The critical literature rather than looking to reaffirm the foundations of the (ac)count seeks up problematize the relationship between these core self-evident facts and IR. This is often done by looking at cases which naturally fall outside the remit of states own established conditions of apprehensibility i.e. regular migration/migrants. This is why Critical IR both focuses on irregular migration but also eschews the terminology of illegal migration. This is example of both wrong and potentially a political subject. Although here the self-evident facts are not always taken as dissensual but rather can be reproduced and reoccupied by Critical IR. This is the core contribution of my Rancièrian framework that I am deploying here. In reading migration and migrants through the lens of (in)apprehensibility and wrong it becomes possible to step out of the self-evident facts themselves and look to the function of politics in IR.

At this moment within my argument it is clear that there are differing modalities of apprehensibility with regards to migration and migrants within IR. Following from the delineation between regular and irregular migration/migrants it is clear that there is a wrong perpetrated against irregular migration/migrants and thus that they can be potentially political subject for IR. A quick summary of this moment in my argument reads that irregular migration is inapprehensible to IR as it cannot be seen, heard or thought by IR. This is why it becomes criminalised. My earlier arguments have also highlighted that this (in)apprehensibility opens up the potential for the politicisation of irregular migration. The second movement within this moment of my argument shows how the condition of
irregular migration/migrants’ inapprehensibility is established by the apprehensibility of regular migration. This linkage highlights the central wrong of IR’s Police (ac)count.

As migration/migrants themselves are an inherently excessive/empty phenomenon for IR they are sublimated into the distribution through the para-political rendering of regular and irregular migration. As we saw in chapter five with my discussion of Short Voyages to the Land of the People and On the Shores of Politics, movement itself has the potentiality for aesthetic-political disruption; the very act of being outside of one’s place creates potential for the realisation of a wrong and an awareness of a potential political subject (the part which has no part). This should be read within the limitations I established in that chapter. If we transpose this analysis of movement to IR it becomes clear that even regular migration can be seen to cut across the boundaries of territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship. I have drawn on the literature above which makes precisely this claim at the domestic level. The Police (ac)count which renders apprehensible some migration/migrants in IR does not complete eliminate or reduce the miscount against migration/migrants as a whole. Rather it reduces the capacity through which a sub-set of migration/migrants can enact their fundamental equality. Here the potentiality of the political subject rears its head again. The Police (ac)count reduction of the capacity of migration/migrants to carry out politics is a reduction not an elimination. And because they are still (mis)counted they have a wrong enacted upon them. And we saw in my discussion of Innes and Johnson, for example, exactly the mechanisms by which this wrong is carried out.

5. As migrants and the phenomena of migration has a wrong enacted upon them they must be a potential political subject and capable of enacting politics.

This moment in my argument follow on from the previous ones. My claim is that as migrants are subject to a wrong in IR then they must be a potential political subject for IR. I have provided evidence for this claim in detail in the previous moment. We have seen in chapter five my discussion of the secondary literature in both IR and Rancière which brought forwards numerous examples of how
migration/migrants should be taken as a potentially political subject in IR. In particular Salvanou\textsuperscript{222} and Gunneflo & Selberg\textsuperscript{223} give clear accounts of how migration/migrants can be taken as a potential political subject.

This is a point in the thesis where my framework for IR can be clearly seen and established. As I have charted throughout the thesis and in the introduction there is now a clear argument that can be read through into post-positivist IR. I have made clear not only how my framework and understanding of IR has been configured but also the point at which we can see the implications for this framework for IR and thus my contribution and articulation to post-positivist IR theory.

6. Politics in IR is the process/moment of subjectivisation by which migrants and the phenomena of migration assert their fundamental equality against a wrong.

This is the concluding claim of my argument. It is both the logical amalgamation of the preceding moments and the core claim of my thesis as it represents my proposition about my conception of politics in and for IR. This moment in the argument is where I articulate the claims about migration and migrants in IR to the implications of my Rancièrian understanding of politics for IR.

Looking back to my introduction we can see here how my argument related to post-positivist IR theory as well as my two research questions. The argument I have laid out above and my parsing of the relevant literatures in chapter five, addressed these questions directly and made clear how I am making a contribution to post-positivist IR theory. Through looking at the distribution of the sensible and the self-evident facts produced by the arkhè of the distribution I have drawn out the position of anarchy in IR. Throughout my argument I have given an account of what a potential political subject might look like for my theorisation of IR. This provides an answer to my second research question.


short I have shown that my Rancièrian theory of IR forces us to look at migration and migrants as a potential site for politics.

The Rancièrian Contribution to IR

One thing that we can draw out of the argument I have given the preceding section is that it is not reliant on or grounded in claims of ontology. This is central to the contribution to post-positivist IR as I set out in the introduction. It is organised as such partly, to recognised and progress the limitations between my own work and that of Rancière’s. Secondly given the research questions I am attempting to answer but also how I am articulating my contribution to post-positivist IR this is essential to understand. The fact that my argument is grounded with recourse to Rancière’s understanding and politics and his notion of the distribution of the sensible means that it offers the opportunity for re-evaluation of the trajectory of politics in IR after the fourth “debate”. This is essential for reading in light of my contribution to the field as laid out in my introduction.

With this in mind it is clear that my Rancièrian understanding can help IR in breaking free from its own fixation on ontology. This is in part the contribution and articulation to post-positivist IR I have argued for throughout but in particular in chapters two and four. As discuss in the introduction this ontological fixation comes out of the arkhè of IR: anarchy but also is a location of tension between my own writing and that of Rancière. As anarchy structures and organises both critical and mainstream IR we can see how this commonality in organising principle engenders contestation over ontology as opposed to politics/the Police. My articulation to post-positivist IR recognises the locations which often reoccupy and reproduce the self-evident facts of IR and thus the Police distribution of IR. It also seeks to produce a cohesive framework that offers the potential to escape this reproduction and reoccupation. In outlining this (re)production and given the stakes of my argument I have given a way in which we can discuss migration and migrants in IR potentially politically without recourse to ontology, which is essential to my contribution and articulation to post-positivist IR. My Rancièrian framework, when looking at IR, shows the capacity for IR to look outside of its own assumptions and to acts of
subjectivation that could be political. In particular I am writing towards and attempting to organise myself within post-positivist IR theory. This move breaks away from both the encamped meta-politics of ontology that reproduces IR’s arkhè: anarchy; and its supporting self-evident facts: territory, sovereignty and citizenship.

My argument as I have given above in this chapter focuses on how IR creates the condition of (in)apprehensibility is bound up within IR’s own (ac)count of itself. Anarchy becomes the central point which collates the field around ontology without void or supplement. My gives an account which does not rely on a recourse to ontology but rather is centred around politics. The advancement of my Rancièrian understanding of politics should be read through not only my own tension with Rancière but also with my articulation towards post-positivist IR. I have given who the allies I am writing towards and against the conceptions of IR and politics I am writing against. Thus I have shown how both the political and ontological are distinct categories in IR. It is clear that the ontological has a depoliticising character in IR as it is designed to reinforce a Police distribution of the sensible organised through its principle anarchy. Ontology is manifested then as a mechanism by which the political can be counted out of IR. This is part of my core contribution and the grease which enables me to write into post-positivist IR both as an ally and contributor.

Turning back to the literatures of Post-positivist IR I identified as benefiting from a Rancièrian theory of IR in my introduction and literature review we can see my contribution thrown into relief clearly given my argument about migration and migrants. For example, as I traced in the introduction and literature review Narrative IR theory is a ripe site for politics in IR given its unique methodological perspective and arrangement. My argument, as outlined in this chapter, has implications for Narrative IR theory. My movement away from a mainstream reading and deployment of ontology lines up with the work I have highlighted as political within Narrative IR theory, for example: Aijazi’s piece on
Kashmir\textsuperscript{224} and Alexander’s on nuclear evacuation.\textsuperscript{225} Both of these articles work through subjectivity as experienced by individuals. The argument I forward in both my argument here and across this thesis gives the opportunity to articulate this directly and politically as well as at the level of individual affect. This is a clear moment of articulation between my thesis and post-positivist IR theory. As such I have highlighted how the complex individual weaving and experiences of subjectivation become then the ground of and for politics. This is argued in solidarity with the important methodological concerns and contributions Narrative IR theory makes but also in thinking through the implications of my argument as given here. We can see this articulation in a similar vein to both Post-structural and Post-Positivist Feminist theory. As I made clear in the introduction as well as my literature review I am actively seeking to write my argument towards these literatures. I have highlighted how they are oriented post fourth “debate” and have an interest in setting out the ontological claims in addition to unpicking how these claims ground and structure the field. My argument can be a useful tool for stepping outside of the fourth “debates” quagmire of ontology. This is important for thinking how I can be read into post-positivist IR as well as bearing in mind the limitations and framing of my own theoretical perspective. Looking back to my argument we can see this mode of engagement with IR as useful to post-positivist IR as it gives us a way of understanding politics in IR that isn’t liable to reoccupy the ground established via the Police distribution of the sensible but rather offers up a new mechanism with which to augment the arguments and projects already underway in these literatures.

Secondly through my argument I have given here we can see how it directly brings out an answer to my first and second research question. The example of migration and migrants in IR as a potential site for politics gives us a clear answer to my second research question. If we take my reading of Rancière and my Rancièrian theory of IR that emerges from that reading seriously then politics must be


considered as subjectivation. The ramifications this has for the field in line with ontology have been given at length previously within this section.

The second claim (and partial contribution of my argument to IR theory) is that my theorisation orientates IR to be open to new subjectivities. As I have shown in my argument as well as Chapters Two, Three and Four of my thesis, IR’s distribution of the sensible is made possible through its arkhê of anarchy. The position of anarchy produces the self-evident facts which structure and provide for the Police (ac)count and distribution of the sensible for IR. This is shown within the argument I have given in this chapter, but it also provides a direct answer to my first research question. This again helps draw through and cement my contribution as located directly within post-positivist IR theory.

My argument shows that IR is incapable of understanding itself or what is political for it without a direct reflection upon the self-evident facts that make it possible. This argument shows that we should be opening IR up to new subjectivities as it is only through the subjectivation of a part which has no part that politics can occur in IR. Without a sensitivity and focus on the way in which the current distribution of the sensible occasions wrongs on different potentially political subject’s politics becomes impossible. If, however, like my argument above, we are attentive to the way IR’s distribution of the sensible in constructed then it becomes possible for us to apprehend the way in which IR has (mis)counted out its potential political subjects. My argument above and exploration of the literatures in chapter five provides a case study that shows this with regard to migration and migrants in IR. This argument is directly explicitly towards post-positivist IR theory. In breaking down this aesthetic-political order(ing) it becomes clear that IR has delimited its own access to its subjects and this has been don’t to maintain the coherent of its Police (ac)count of and to itself. We have seen this in the case of migrant and migration in IR and this analysis gives the opportunity not only the focus on the subjects the Police order rendered apprehensible but also the potential political subjects that are part of IR but have not part in IR.
Turning back to the specific literatures within post-positivist IR that I outlined as potentially situated to benefit from my reading and theorisation of IR theory we can see how my arguments possibility for opening up sections of the field to new subjectivities, which have been excluded from not only IR but apprehensibility within IR as useful. This is developed within the introduction and written towards and in the spirit of alliance with these particular literatures. Through the application of subjectivation we can see how such a notion and argument could be of use to post-positivist IR theory clearly. As I explored in chapter one this literature seeks to unpick the ontology and methodology of IR with regard to the functionality of multiple terms of reference. My theorisation of IR offers a way to unpick the structural organisation and ordering of the field that is inattentive and at times incapable of apprehending its own constitution. The opportunity presented through reading my argument into post-positivist IR theory so as to open up the field to new and diverse subjectivities that it currently occludes is an important contribution of my approach.

In fleshing out subjectivity and subjectivation and their relationship to politics I offer a potential augmentation to post-positivist IR theory but in particular post-structural IR theory. We can see how my mode of reading IR is particularly useful through moving away from ontology but also through highlighting the way in which subjectivation provides the ground and action of politics in IR. My argument about the potential politics of migrant and migration gives a clear case for how subjectivation in IR is the meter-stick for politics, but it also highlights the darker spaces of subjectivity that the current distribution of the sensible occludes. This is of particular interest to how post-structural IR reads its own understanding and thinking around politics in IR as I evidenced in the introduction. Not only have I shown this this but I also service answering both my first and second research questions. I answer the first through my account of subjectivation and looking at how archè constitutes the foundation for the self-evident facts that enable the apprehensibility of subjectivities in IR. Anarchy as the archè of the field not only organises the field along the lines of ontology but also sets the conditionality of which subjectivities can be understood as visible, hearable etc. within IR. I have offered an approach here which not only gives an account of how these subjectivities via anarchy
(as it is the arkhè which orders the field distribution of the sensible) but also how we should be attentive to the potential subjects excluded from that ordering.

Following on from my arguments implications for subjectivity and ontology I turn to how my argument means we need to rethink politics in and for IR. Through my exemplary case of migration and migrant we have seen that for a Rancierian theory of IR the political is not the reassertion or occupation of a Police distribution but rather a recounting of that Police count. This is clear articulated and of interest to how post-positivist IR must necessarily relate against the arkhè of anarchy and the self-evident facts it produces if it is to be considered political in a meaningful way. This changes the frame of reference for what politics means in IR. Rather than understanding IR as being about the already hearable, seeable and thinkable orientation of sovereign territorial nation states we are forced to focus on and consider what is written out by this categorisation. The stakes of my argument mean that in order for IR to be political it needs to confront its own inherent (mis)count and open itself up to the contingency of its own foundation.

Thus, as my argument above has shown to understand politics in my reading of Rancière and the tensions that persist around this reading place emphasis on the fact that IR must be able to begin to hear, see and think the subjectivisation of its own parts that have no part in its current distribution of the sensible. I have already highlighted how this means a movement away from the fields own grounding in ontology and the emergence of occluded subjectivities. This movement necessitates a rethinking of the way in which IR’s arkhè: anarchy and its self-evident facts: territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship shape the conditions of apprehensibility for the field. This has implications for and clearly draws my thesis into post-positivist IR theory. In particular given the heritage, organisation and implications of the arguments I draw out throughout the thesis my work it is closely tied to post-structural IR theory. As I have highlighted anarchy as an arkhè is often shared by both the “mainstream” and critical readings of the field. However my argument, while an immanent and explicit critique of “mainstream” IR is explicitly written towards critical post-positivist IR. The fact that the
archè is congruent across both readings of IR has ramifications for IR in that it displaces the focus of the political wings of the field. My argument within the thesis places the concerns of post-positivist IR with regard to politics, as orientated around subjectivation and the status of the Police while calling into discussion the field’s perceptions of ontology. Again, here we can see a clear answer to the first research question. Anarchy as archè has a twofold effect on the distribution of the sensible for IR.

My argument has given and sustained a Rancièreian understanding throughout the thesis. This is not to say it is solely constituted in this vein as I have explicated the limitations and tensions that this framework brings to light. Not only this however but through my exploring of the fact that anarchy is the archè of IR’s distribution of the sensible also has an effect on how the field is able to constitute itself. I have given this argument in more detail in my literature review and introduction through charting how anarchy effected and steered the formation of the great “debates. This steering and its relationship to critical and “mainstream” IR, I explored in chapter two when I looked at how anarchy has direct consequences for how IR can possibly organise and order itself. My argument throughout this thesis then has shown not only the consequences of anarchy as archè but also a way that challenges this ordering. This challenge is intelligible to, directed towards and written in solidarity with post-positivist IR theory. If we adopt my line of argumentation rather than reproducing or reoccupying the territory of anarchy as archè it becomes possible through dissensus to open up this distribution of the sensible to direct critique that is clearly tied into post-positivist IR. The mode of politics shown by my argument here is also a direct answer to my second research question as it gives an account of not only what my argument would look like but also the implications of that theory for politics in IR. My argument in this chapter as well as arguments given in chapters four and five show clearly what politics looks like for my theory and its articulation to post-positivist IR theory.

My understanding of politics as given throughout the thesis but through my argument in this chapter and the previous two both has implications for the literatures I have outlined earlier but also a contribution towards post-positivist IR theory. Through thinking politics in the manner I have given in
my argument above, we can see directly the contribution such a claim has for post-positivist IR theory. It is evident that such a manner of argumentation is useful to Post-structural, Narrative and Post-positivist IR literatures for the reasons I have outlined in my introduction and within this section. This mode of politics, as evidenced in my argument above, is useful as it gives a way of doing politics in IR that forces us to rethink not only the founding assumptions of the field but how the field is rendered apprehensibility to us. Through the distribution of the sensible and understanding politics as the subjectivation of a part which has not part it is possible to make arguments that not only look at the constitution of the self-evident facts that structure IR but how these themselves are products of the fields distribution.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have given an argument which acts as an exemplary case of an argument grounded in Rancièrian theory. This chapter has built on Chapter Five’s exploration of the literatures around migration and migrants in IR. From this basis my argument has been gives to show what a Rancièrian theory of IR would mean to politics. This has been done through an exemplary case study. This chapter has drawn out in depth the relationship between migration/migrants and political subjectivation. The case-study has taken the form of an argument which shows how migration and migrants are potential political subjects for IR. In doing so I have shown that Rancièrian theory is applicable to IR. I have building on this looked in depth at the relationship between not only migration and political subjectivation but also how the Rancièrian conceptual framework connects into IR as a whole. My six-point argument has served as both evidence for the claims throughout the thesis but also as an example of the resultant of these claims.
Conclusion

This thesis has been a work of theory that has applied and articulated the work of Jacques Rancière to IR Theory. It has clearly articulated my argumentation to post-positivist IR theory. I have carried out this work in order to help understand how thinking within IR is ordered and the implications that this ordering has for politics in IR.

Contribution of the Thesis

As I have argued throughout the thesis my contribution has been aimed at post-positivist IR theory. This is evident not only from my approach but also from how my argument has progressed across this thesis. In this section I provide an answer to the central question of any PhD: What do we know now that we did not when we started reading? I aim to do this but looking at what I have argued throughout the thesis as a whole. I focus on not only the how of the thesis but the whys of my argument to clearly show the original contribution to knowledge I have delivered to post-positivist IR theory.

Looking back to the introduction and my justification of why my reading of Rancière is interesting and useful for IR theory we can see the stakes of my argumentation throughout the thesis. I have argued consistently that explicitly in that section of the introduction that my reading of Rancière offers something of value to post-positivist IR. This use value can be seen in how Rancière conceptualises politics and his broader approach to thinking political theory. The reading of Rancière given by this thesis is not simply a statement of his thought but, as explored across many different sections of the thesis, and theorisation of my position having read Rancière. Here then are two things we know given my exploration of Rancière’s thought that we didn’t at the start of the thesis.

The first is my position and understanding of Rancière that I have developed across and throughout the thesis. This is useful as, I will set out in the next section, as it deals with the tensions and limitations that come with articulating Rancière’s though to post-positivist IR theory. I have throughout this thesis
explicated and developed on Rancière’s position to formulate my own Rancièrian framework. There is then a contribution here which is my development of my position on Rancière into an individual and clearly given Rancierian framework for and of IR. In the previous chapter I have spoken about how and why this would be useful for post-positivist IR theory. It is worth highlighting briefly here that this is useful not because it is my understanding of Rancière but in articulating an understanding of Rancière there that makes sense within the field of IR I have provided a reading that can be used as a stepping stone towards future and potentially more systematic research in IR.

It is important that we do not just know my thoughts on Rancière in IR but rather that we know the implications of my theorisation of Rancière in post-positivist IR. These implications, as I have shown, are both interesting and useful for post-positivist IR. While I have, throughout the thesis, briefly charted different specific literatures that might benefit from my theorisation of IR, there is clearly a broader contribution to post-positivist IR in my theorisation. By working through my theories implications to IR we now know what my Rancièrian theorisation has to say about politics and the political in IR. I hope, although I cannot guarantee that these are not only of interest to but use to the literatures I have outlined throughout the thesis.

The second thing that we know now that we did not when we started reading the thesis is how anarchy can be understood to function in my Rancièreian theorisation. This point follows on from the previous ones I just outlined. In making this articulation and reading I have produced a theorisation that breaks down and analyses how anarchy orders IR. As I have shown this is not some kind of particularly special or unique contribution. I have given evidence of many different scholars understanding of anarchy in IR. What is particularly useful here is not simply the fact that my reading is my own or that it is Rancièrian. Rather what is important for this contribution to be read as distinct from the myriad other criticisms or “mainstream” that exist within post-positivist IR. I argue that there is a particularly interesting contribution from my theorisation and approach to IR that lies within its understanding of and relation to ontology. While I have given a detailed account of this both in the introduction and
throughout the thesis it is worth mentioning again here. My theorisations thinking of ontology is something which has been developed throughout the thesis and placed in relation to post-positivist IR theory directly. As I have argued this is something that has a potential use value for post-positivist IR. I should add here, as I will explore in when I revisit the limitations of Rancière and in my gestures towards future research that this is not complete. Rather my thesis has kicked off a process of thinking and critiquing the role of ontology in post-positivist IR, which while it is not an astonishingly unique one, is one that constitutes a contribution to the field.

From these two brief summaries of my contribution to knowledge we can see how this thesis has offered up a contribution to post-positivist IR theory. Bearing this in mind I go on now to look at the limitations I set out for my approach in the introduction and see how the stand given the work I have carried out across my thesis.

**Limitations of Rancière Revisited**

As I argued in the introduction of this thesis my theorisation of IR can never be totalising or complete. Rather I have written throughout my thesis both with Rancière but also against and in tension with his ideas. In the introduction I separated out three clear areas where I am writing against the limitations of Rancière’s own thought. It is appropriate now to reflect back across these three distinct limitations and to analyse how I have wrestled with them across the thesis.

The first limitation I touch on now is how Rancière’s work has focused on the *polis* or the nation-state as the location for his political thought. This is an area that I explicitly broke down through my chapters that focused on migration and migrants. Chapters five and six have worked through this limitation in detail and I have shown that while Rancière does focus on the *polis* there is certainly room to read his thought and core concepts beyond this frame. I have highlighted, amputated and translated Rancière’s own understanding to produce my own theorisation of IR along the tracks that Rancière laid. I argue that this has been broadly successful in charting and that this limitation and tension has been a
formative one for the arguments I have given and made throughout this thesis. While this limitation will always provide and produce a tension between my own writing and that of Rancière it is and has been throughout this thesis a productive one. It is this tension which has enabled and arranged my contribution to post-positivist IR theory.

The second limitation I come to is Rancière’s understanding of thinking and speaking beings. As I highlighted in the introduction there is a central tension between how Rancière reads thinking and speaking and how I conceptualise and theorisation this distinction. This limitation can be simplified into thinking about Rancière is an anthropocentric thinker or not. While my thesis doesn’t directly engage with breaking down and resolving this tension directly it is one that has informed my own thinking and reading of Rancière throughout. As I return to in my section on the gestures to future research this is a location where my reading of Rancière can be developed out and articulated to current debates in IR around anthropocentrism. This limitation has been constitutive to my organisation of both Rancière and my argument. It is not a tension that is resolved throughout the thesis although I have made repeated movements in my argument to characterise and shift my argument away from an anthropocentric reading of Rancière and to a different position constituted against a reading of IR as centred on humanity.

The third limitation I have written both with and against is Rancière’s relationship to philosophy and in particular ontology. Throughout the thesis I have been explicit and implicit in stating the importance of Rancière’s understanding of and use of ontology. My reading of this limitation is what has informed many of the central claims and contributions of my thesis. As such it has been a site not only of internal production and tension but also of reflection and contribution. The core limitation of Rancière against which my own interpretation and voice has been drawn out is in regard to thinking ontology within and around Rancière. The role of the aesthetic and his critique of general theories is something I have taken up throughout my thesis. I have been writing in mind with the “better-half” of Rancière which is a theorist concerned with and actively opposing the “super-powers” of ontology. Throughout the
thesis this where much of the meat of my criticism and contribution has been drawn out from. It is not a tension or limitation that can be resolved, not least because of the ideological and material organisation of both academia and IR. Thus this limitation has been both deeply productive and a constant challenge for both articulating and thinking my theorisation of IR into post-positivist IR.

As is evident from my brief reflections back on the limitations I have wrangled with across my engagement and theorisation both with Rancière and IR these are not easy sites for resolution. Rather each one presents a tension that is both constitutive of my thought but also a challenge to it. They represent the shorelines against an across which I have tried to explicate and organise the argumentation in this thesis.

**Research Questions Revisited**

Having explored the limitation and contributions of my thesis I now look back to the research questions I sought to answer in within it. These research questions have been the guiding light towards which I have driven my articulation of Rancierian theory to IR. My two research questions have thus structured my thesis and set the conditions for navigating the literatures and producing my argumentation within the aforementioned chapters. These questions have been not only a bridging tool, in that they are conditioned by and respond to the state of the field but also a critical lens as they have enabled the application to the post-positivist IR theory throughout my thesis

**Research Question One:**

My first research question was: **How does anarchy construct IR’s distribution of the sensible?**

This question drew our attention towards the juncture between anarchy and the Rancierian concept of the distribution of the sensible. This question was useful because it enabled me in answering it to work through the boundaries between IR theory and Rancierian theory as they currently stand.
As I have already stated anarchy constructs IR’s distribution of the sensible through it being its arkhè. In being the arkhè of IR’s distribution of the sensible anarchy enables the production of the self-evident facts that engender the apprehensibility of IR. In addition, as the arkhè of IR’s distribution of the sensible anarchy enables the (dis)positions that are produced by the distribution. I have also shown that the arkhè of a distribution is central to the creation of that distribution’s Police (ac)count and the inevitable miscounting of that Police (ac)count. As such, given that anarchy is the arkhè of IR’s distribution of the sensible, it also contracts the miscount which enacts the wrong that enables politics.

Research Question Two:

My second research question was: What effect does a Rancierian theory of IR have on our understanding of International politics?

This question built on the implications of the first question. While my first research question looked specifically at anarchy and the distribution of the sensible in IR the second worked through the implications of such an articulation. In answering the first question I necessarily gave an account of IR that have implications for how politics could be understood in IR. My second question explicitly raised this fact and looked to work through the differing implications of my answering of my first research question. As such I argued that my Rancierian theory of IR is a useful tool that has beneficial implications for our understanding of International Politics.

I have already answered this question previously within the thesis, but it is worth recapping my answer here at my thesis’s conclusion. The effect that a Rancierian theory of IR has on our understanding of International Politics is manifold. My reading of politics in IR means that international politics is the subjectivation of a part which has no part that has been subject to a wrong. In terms of implications this means that politics will inevitable cut across the Police distribution of the sensible in IR and for the reasons I have argued anarchy. My theorisation also means that politics for IR must always
maintain an attentiveness and openness to occluded potentiate subjectivities. IR’s politics is necessarily focused towards understanding and seeking subjectivities that cannot be apprehended by IR and look at their subjectivation into IR. This understanding of politics also necessitates that what we consider politics to be in IR is not true given the Rancièreian reading.

Here it is worth thinking briefly about both of these research questions. As I have already echoed these both have provided a mechanism by which I can not only think IR and Rancière as in relation but actively articulate my own Rancièreian theory of IR to post-positivist IR theory. In thinking about the limitations and framing of this thesis the questions have provided the structure by which my research project has been guided. As such they have been crucial in setting the intellectual timbre and topography through and against which my thought has been directed. This in conjunction with the inherent tensions and limitations between my own and Rancière’s thought I just previously reflected on have provided the ley-lines through which the power of the contribution can flow. As such my capacity to answer and respond to these research questions has given my thesis its own organisation but also mechanics for my original contributions.

**Gestures to Future Research: What Comes Next?**

Having worked through my research questions I now look back to reading the thesis as a whole and thinking critically about where and what can be taken forwards as a result from it. In doing so I begin to think where and how my contribution can go now that I have articulated my Rancièrian theorisation of IR to post-positivist IR theory. I have identified two broad strands for future research along which I could take forwards and develop the contributions and argument I have forwarded across the thesis. The first is a focus back on the limitations and tensions between IR and Rancière. The second is thinking about taking forwards my reading of IR theory deeper in and through post-positivist IR along the lines of my case study.
I start then by looking at the potential for carrying forwards and excavating the limitations and tensions that have enabled the coherence of my own thought. As I have set out in the introduction, the body of the thesis and revisiting section above these tensions and limitations condition all of the work I have carried out here. In terms of going forwards with the project there is more work to be done in thinking my own understanding of ontology, Rancière’s understanding of ontology and the way in which IR deploys and uses ontology. There is definitely a site here for research dedicated to breaking down and working through the history and development of ontology in IR, how Rancière relates to this and my own reading of this limitation and tension as constitutive of politics. Obviously such a project is beyond the scope of this thesis but it is winked at here and at other occasions. The second gossamer that can be developed into a research strand here is thinking about IR’s relationship to philosophy given my own and Rancière’s opposition to this as a mode of critique.

There is also room to work through the two other limitations I have written with and against into gossamers of research. The primary project that springs out of this thesis would be thinking the relation between thinking and speaking beings and my theorisation as given here. One way in which my theorisation could be deployed against the limitations explicated here would be to join other academics in thinking an IR that is inherently non-human a way in which we can begin to think of a theory of IR that is radically against anthropocentrism. My theorisation given in this thesis can potentially begin to trace the first footfalls of thinking a non-human theory of IR that still holds the potentiality for politics. This is not wholly separate from the rethinking of ontology given in the first section.

Another way future research can be approached having read through the thesis is in rolling out my theorisation and applying it to other cases. While I have given the exemplary case found in chapters five and six this is by no means exhaustive or singular as an example. It is a reasonable mechanism, to take the work I have done in this thesis and apply it to other potentially political subjects/phenomena within IR. This mode of research does rub up against the previous limitations and understandings I
have given out across the previous sections and readings of Rancière across the thesis. This is because it moves in tension with both my own and Rancière’s scepticism of general theorisation of the discipline.

Here I have begun to trace out the potential future avenues for research that this thesis opens up. I have attempted to begin to show not only the questions that I have answered in this thesis, the contribution I have provided but also the questions to which my framework can begin to think outside of the confinement of its research questions.
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