Quantifying the deterrent effect of anticartel enforcement

Davies, Stephen, Mariuzzo, Franco and Ormosi, Peter L. (2018) Quantifying the deterrent effect of anticartel enforcement. Economic Inquiry, 56 (4). pp. 1933-1949. ISSN 0095-2583

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    Abstract

    This paper presents a rare attempt to quantify the deterrent effect of anti-cartel policy. It develops a conceptual framework, which establishes the sort of information necessary for such quantification. This is then illustrated and calibrated by drawing upon existing literatures and using evidence from legal cartels to approximate what would be observed absent policy. Measuring impact by the proportion of all potential harm that is deterred, our best estimate is two thirds and, even on conservative assumptions, at least half of all harms (or seven times the detected harm) is deterred.

    Item Type: Article
    Uncontrolled Keywords: anti-competitive harm,cartels,detection,deterrence,monte carlo stimulation,selection bias
    Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
    Faculty of Social Sciences > Norwich Business School
    Depositing User: Pure Connector
    Date Deposited: 13 Feb 2018 15:30
    Last Modified: 06 Nov 2018 15:47
    URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66290
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12574

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