“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

Chowdhury, Subhasish M. and Kim, Sang-Hyun (2017) “Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests. Games and Economic Behavior, 104. 486–493. ISSN 0899-8256

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    We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.

    Item Type: Article
    Uncontrolled Keywords: contest design,multiple winner,group-size,selection mechanism
    Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
    Related URLs:
    Depositing User: Pure Connector
    Date Deposited: 08 Jun 2017 06:08
    Last Modified: 09 Apr 2019 12:16
    URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/63705
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012

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