Subgroup deliberation and voting

Thordal-Le Quement, Mark and Yokeeswaran, Venuga (2015) Subgroup deliberation and voting. Social Choice and Welfare, 45 (1). 155–186. ISSN 0176-1714

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    We consider three mechanisms for the aggregation of information in heterogeneous committees voting by Unanimity rule: Private Voting and voting preceded by either Plenary or Subgroup Deliberation. While the first deliberation protocol imposes public communication, the second restricts communication to homogeneous subgroups. We find that both protocols allow to Pareto improve on outcomes achieved under private voting. Furthermore, we find that when focusing on simple equilibria under Plenary Deliberation, Subgroup Deliberation Pareto improves on outcomes achieved under Plenary Deliberation.

    Item Type: Article
    Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
    Depositing User: Pure Connector
    Date Deposited: 12 Apr 2017 06:10
    Last Modified: 12 Feb 2019 00:49
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0871-x

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