François Mitterrand’s visit to Sarajevo, 28 June 1992.

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Abstract

At 10h30 on 28 June 1992, a Dauphin helicopter landed at Sarajevo airport carrying a precious cargo: the French President, François Mitterrand. Since the beginning of the Bosnian War, Bosnian Serb forces had controlled the airport and restricted the delivery of humanitarian aid to the city’s destitute population, which formed an important cornerstone of their siege strategy. In reaching the airport, the President secured its reopening and, with it, the commencement of the longest humanitarian airlift in history. However, Mitterrand’s visit also had implications and significance beyond the Bosnian capital. The visit secured humanitarian intervention through the United Nations as the international community’s modus operandi for conflict resolution in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Through its permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council and enthusiastic engagement with humanitarian intervention, France would shape the intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina and thus continue to justify its position amongst the world’s great powers.

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At 10h30 on 28 June 1992, a helicopter carrying the French President François Mitterrand touched down at Sarajevo airport, which had been held by the Bosnian Serbs since the outbreak of fighting in Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH) in early April. Controlling the airport formed a vital part of the Bosnian Serb war strategy of strangulating Sarajevo and ethnically dividing its population. In making this visit, the President helped to secure the re-opening of the airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid to the city’s destitute population. However, this gesture also had implications beyond the besieged Bosnian capital.
The visit was also imbued with a sense of historical symbolism, which Mitterrand used to highlight the precariousness of the European project. The French President was keenly aware that it was in the Bosnian capital on the very same date in 1914 that Gavrilo Princip had assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand providing the spark for World War One. Mitterrand used this potent symbol to reify the threat to the project of European union, if the European Community (EC) failed to mediate a crisis on its own continent. Indeed, the symbolism of the visit was stark: Europe could now allow itself to end the century as it had begun it, at war. However, the post-Cold War European security architecture was not sufficiently developed to deal with the disintegrative and destructive processes at work in Yugoslavia. Therefore, in lieu of a preferred European defence solution, Mitterrand turned instead to the United Nations (UN) because it could incorporate Russia into any solution, which would minimise American and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) influence in Europe.

France’s role in the international community’s diplomatic response to, and management of, the wars in Yugoslavia has often been treated as peripheral. However, France took significant initiatives in attempting to resolve the crises in the Western Balkans and played an active role in shaping the international community’s response to events in BiH. France’s engagement with BiH is best exemplified by the visit of François Mitterrand to besieged Sarajevo on 28 June 1992. By drawing on memoirs, interviews conducted by the author, and newspaper articles, this article will begin an important process of reassessing France’s contribution to the international response to the Yugoslav wars. To do so, it will focus on this intriguing case study and demonstrate that it was a bold act in support of a larger, coherent diplomatic vision for post-Cold War world order.

Since the beginning of Mitterrand’s second term in 1988, French diplomacy had taken the UN General Assembly’s stronger stance on humanitarian issues as one of its main guiding principles. Subsequently, the end of the Cold War had reinvigorated the importance of the UN as a global forum. The UN Security Council (UNSC), of which France is a permanent member, provided the most conducive international forum for France to remain an important global power
in the post-Cold War world. Mitterrand thus aimed to fix the doctrine of military-humanitarianism in place as the *modus operandi* for international intervention in the conflicts of the former Yugoslavia. France therefore pursued humanitarian intervention with great enthusiasm in the early 1990s, believing that it would not only justify its position amongst the world’s great powers but that it would also allow it to shape the international framework of post-Cold War security. As such, by the end of 1992, France was the largest troop contributor to UN missions around the globe, accounting for 10,000 of 60,000 deployed troops.\(^4\) Furthermore, France could often be found at the origins of diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving the conflicts in Yugoslavia through negotiation, particularly when European diplomacy was faltering.

European diplomacy had already suffered a chastening experience in Yugoslavia over the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in the latter half of 1991. At that time, Germany had been the most vocal proponent of international recognition of the two breakaway republics, whilst France was convinced of the necessity of maintaining a unified European approach at virtually all costs.\(^5\) Indeed, François Mitterrand wrote to Helmut Kohl on 14 December 1991 pleading that, “We must guard the unity of the Community at all costs and particularly Franco-German unity in this case.”\(^6\) Notwithstanding, the crisis over recognition placed strain on the Franco-German axis at the heart of European integration, although Kohl and Mitterrand agreed to disagree over Yugoslavia and chose to prioritise the Maastricht Treaty.\(^7\) Significantly, it also led to a serious European reluctance to engage with the issue of BiH’s future, which was looming large on the horizon. Nevertheless, Europe still led the international diplomatic efforts aimed at mediating the Yugoslav crises until the convocation of the International Conference for the Former Yugoslavia in August 1992.

In the meantime, Europe’s diplomacy was being led by the seasoned Portuguese diplomat José Cutileiro under the auspices of the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia (ECCY). Cutileiro had drafted a proposal for BiH that confederalised the republic into a tripartite state divided along ethnic lines, which, Josip Glaurdić has argued, induced the three Bosnian
communities “to create new ethnic realities on the ground.”

In anticipation of the European Community (EC)’s recognition of an independent and sovereign BiH on 6 April, fighting broke out in Yugoslavia’s most ethnically heterogeneous republic in early April. As the descent into violence began, the Community called for an immediate ceasefire and sent a strong warning that, “Violations of the principle of territorial integrity will not be tolerated and will not be without consequences for the future relations between the EC and those who will be held responsible.”

As had been the case in December 1991, over the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, the war in BiH quickly became marked by Franco-German discord.

German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher supported US calls to suspend Yugoslavia from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) unless the Federal Republic adopted a fundamentally different attitude towards the UN, the CSCE, and the ECCY. The French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas moved quickly to exclude France and the EC from this condemnation, as he thought that the EC had already given Serbia sufficient warning and he stressed that it was essential to “look towards dialogue, appeasement and a ceasefire.”

This Franco-German divergence reflected broader disagreements over how best to develop Europe’s new security architecture in the spring and summer of 1992 and how to define each international organisation’s competencies. On one hand, Germany was a key supporter of the CSCE and consistently sought to broaden and deepen its competencies. France, on the other hand, was invested in developing a European defence identity free from US pressure. The confused and contradictory message emerging from the different and, at times, competing institutions highlighted the ambiguity of Europe’s post-Cold War security.

In this context, France moved to act in support of its military-humanitarian doctrine. On 22 April, the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, announced that France would send aid and medicine to the civilian population of BiH and would implement a humanitarian airlift. He argued that, “the United Nations must hurry to intervene in order to avoid a greater evil and a new disaster caused by a conflict that increasingly resembles a civil war.” To lead these efforts, France had the
perfect figurehead in the young and energetic humanitarianist, Bernard Kouchner. A rising star in French politics and the French public’s most trusted politician, the Minister for Health had begun to occupy a central role within the Mitterrand administration. The young minister, who was a great proponent of the ‘right to intervene’, lobbied his colleagues in Cabinet to “do something” for Sarajevo. On 23 April, Kouchner accompanied a delivery of 25 tonnes of aid and medicines to Sarajevo and championed the idea of a humanitarian intervention under the auspices of the UN. Simultaneously, French Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) Équilibre and Pharmiciens sans frontières (PSF) were establishing a logistical base in the Bosnian capital in collaboration with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and EC observers. The infrastructure for a humanitarian intervention with a French imprint was slowly being established in BiH.

In support of these efforts, Dumas, alongside his German and Polish counterparts, issued a communiqué calling for an emergency meeting of the UNSC and the deployment of a peacekeeping force to re-establish peace. The weight of a joint Franco-German proposal forced UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali – who was initially opposed to UN involvement in BiH – to announce that the UN was ready to act in BiH. In support of France’s predisposition for European solutions to European problems, Dumas began to explore the possibility of the EC or Western European Union (WEU) dispatching observers to BiH under a UN mandate. Dumas proposed sending an observation mission to BiH under the leadership of Marrack Goulding, head of peacekeeping operations for the UN. Boutros-Ghali acquiesced and dispatched Goulding to the Bosnian capital to study the possibility of establishing a peacekeeping operation. However, following a fraught incident involving a UN exchange convoy that was transporting Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović, it became clear that the UN presence in Sarajevo was neither sufficiently equipped nor mandated to deal with the evolving crisis. By 15 May, UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Commander Satish Nambiar decided to withdraw the force from Sarajevo, leaving behind a small contingent of French peacekeepers. Equally, following the death of a
Belgian EC observer, the EC reduced its presence in Sarajevo and its personnel were withdrawn from Bihać, Banja Luka, Tuzla, and Mostar. In spite of French activism and enthusiasm, the EC-UN tandem was faltering and with it France’s vision.

As the Europeans withdrew their ambassadors from Belgrade and pushed for sanctions against the newly-created Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), France continued to insist on the necessity of sending a UN deployment to BiH. Daniel Bernard, Spokesman for the Quai d’Orsay, announced that, France was “thinking of a small contingent of a few hundred men, mandated by the UN and drawn from European forces… to perform basic and essential humanitarian tasks, such as the protection of humanitarian convoys, airport access and the protection of negotiators.”

In light of this French initiative, the UNSC called on the Secretary General to prepare a study on the feasibility of humanitarian intervention along France’s proposed lines. Although Boutros-Ghali remained reluctant to deepen the UN’s involvement in BiH, the Quai d’Orsay thought that the UNSC was “going in the right direction”. However, this progress was asynchronous to the acceleration of events on the ground and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) described the Bosnian War as “without doubt the worst refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War.” In light of this, and the lack of progress made in finding a political solution to the crisis, France was becoming increasingly dismayed with the efforts of the ECCY. The Quai d’Orsay thus called on the UN to convene a meeting between the warring parties at its headquarters in Geneva. However, the Secretary General’s reticence won out and he continued to champion the work of the ECCY.

Notwithstanding UN reluctance, France continued to enthusiastically engage with the Bosnian question and attempt to offer European leadership.

The Europeans’ failure to mediate the crisis led United States Secretary of State James Baker to declare that his country would not rule out military action against Serbia if political, economic, and diplomatic sanctions failed to bring Belgrade to heel. With the Europeans struggling to agree on a sanctions policy, France and Germany clashed over the speed and strength over the penalties against Belgrade. France was reluctant to pursue sanctions, believing that a
resolution of the crisis would have to be political and that Belgrade’s cooperation was therefore necessary. Pierre Morel, diplomatic adviser to the President, counselled Mitterand ahead of a tête-à-tête with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, writing in a note that, “we prefer to avoid entering into the system of sanctions which seems to offer little promise because it will not stop the fighting.” However France was out of step with is European partners as, at a meeting in Lisbon, ten countries were in favour of immediate sanctions against FRY whilst France expressed its reservations. The EC adopted a commercial embargo against FRY on 27 May and diplomatic sanctions on 2 June; the UN followed suit a day later. However, the EC sanctions did little to dissuade Bosnian Serb aggression and on 28 May the shelling of a breadline in Sarajevo killed 16 people, which led to the suspension of the ECCY.

The latest atrocity only highlighted that international condemnation and sanctions offered little deterrence to the Bosnian Serbs’ war project. Therefore, the Bosnian Foreign Minister, Haris Silajdžić, called for military intervention in light of the single bloodiest attack on the capital and complained that, “the UN sanctions against the Serb-Montenegrin Yugoslav republic have changed nothing.” However, military intervention seemed a distant prospect, as a Pentagon official reported that, ‘No one is pushing the military option very hard at this point… At the moment the emphasis is trying to get as much international and economic support to pressure the Serbs.’

By the end of May 1992, the Bosnian Serbs had largely established the principal elements of the siege: to physically separate the Bosnian capital from the outside world; to unpredictably and intermittently shell the city and its inhabitants; and to carry out the physical separation of the city’s population along ethnic lines. Controlling the airport and preventing the distribution of humanitarian aid was therefore a key aim of the Bosnian Serbs’ siege strategy. Acknowledging that the situation had continued to deteriorate, the UNSC deplored that conditions had “not yet been established for the effective and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance, including safe and secure access to and from Sarajevo and other airports in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The
humanitarian plight of the Sarajevan population fixed the world’s gaze on the besieged capital and strengthened calls for direct military intervention.

On 3 June, Haris Silajdžić appealed to the international community to provide military protection to humanitarian convoys and to protect Bosnian airspace.\textsuperscript{39} The following day, Silajdžić met with Dumas in Paris and appealed to his French counterpart to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Bosnian population. The Quai d’Orsay indicated that there were obstacles preventing the functioning of the airport and, thus, the delivery of humanitarian aid, which France was keen to see resolved. Therefore, the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, Serge Boidevaix, met with Slobodan Milošević to secure Belgrade’s agreement with UNSCR 752 and 757.\textsuperscript{40} Resolution 752 demanded that all parties respect the ceasefire agreed on 12 May, and ordered the cessation of military interference by forces from outside BiH, and the dissolution of all irregular units.\textsuperscript{41} With the UNSC’s appeal going unheard, they reiterated their demands and implemented sanctions against FRY with UNSCR 757.\textsuperscript{42} Of course, having established the principle elements of the Siege, the Bosnian Serbs could now accommodate the demands of the international community in the hope of forestalling any stronger intervention. Indeed, the UN confirmed that it would consider Belgrade’s cooperation in reopening the airport as a demonstration of its goodwill.\textsuperscript{43}

Nonetheless, it still remained incredibly difficult to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid. An unsuccessful attempt to deliver aid led Kouchner to declare that it was “necessary to break the encirclement of Sarajevo airport and to bring food and medicine there.”\textsuperscript{44} Increasingly, the public and political gaze became fixed upon Sarajevo airport as a panacea for BiH’s humanitarian woes and accordingly the credibility of European diplomacy and UN intervention became increasingly attached to this issue. However, at an international level, politicians remained divided on the best course of action for BiH. British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd told the House of Commons that, “While people see destruction and massacre night after night, they do not expect us to send in troops but to take sensible action to bring the suffering to an end.”\textsuperscript{45} The Portuguese Prime
Minister Aníbal Cavaco Silva argued that military intervention might be necessary if sanctions failed, whilst the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, suggested that military should not be ruled out as a last resort. Kinkel also relayed the American position following a conversation with Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger: “We [the German delegation] had the impression that the American side strongly supported sanctions, not excluding military actions, but practically that is hardly thinkable.” President Bush reinforced this stance in a news conference at the White House stating that, ‘I think prudence and caution prevents military actions. If I decide to change my mind on that, I’ll do it in an inclusive way, but at this juncture I want to stay with these sanctions.’

With Sarajevo quickly becoming “the most famous place in the world”, and international public opinion clamouring for greater activism, Boutros-Ghali reported back to the Security Council about the prospect of sending a peacekeeping presence to protect the airport. Accordingly, the UNSC passed resolution 758 on 8 June, which called on all parties to “create immediately the necessary conditions for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies… including the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport.” The resolution also noted that all parties had agreed to “the reopening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes, under the exclusive authority of the United Nations, and with the assistance of the United Nations Protection Force.” Analysts on the ground in Sarajevo reported that “reopening the airport would be a strategic disaster for the Serbian forces who now control it.” However, resolution 758 required “an effective and durable ceasefire” before it could be enacted. France quickly expressed its support for the resolution and its readiness to contribute to the peacekeeping force to be deployed in Sarajevo. A spokesman for the Quai d’Orsay noted that the “resolution corresponds to France’s wishes for a long time to see Sarajevo airport cleared to allow the delivery of humanitarian relief needed by the population.” UN resolutions related to BiH had enshrined the importance of humanitarian aid and airport access, and had thus begun to fix France’s military-humanitarianism as the international community’s approach.
The Bosnian government felt that the UN resolution was insufficient and instead preferred unilateral American intervention. On 8 June, President Alija Izetbegović appealed directly to the American government for “American bombing of the gun positions. Aerial bombing would be the right solution. Let them bomb those who are bombing us. That would probably be enough.” However, the United States remained reluctant to use force in BiH notwithstanding the Bosnian appeals. President Bush announced that “American troops will not be deployed in Bosnia because ‘we are not the world’s policemen’”. Furthermore, Secretary of State James Baker reinforced the President’s reluctance to militarily intervene in BiH stating that, “If you mean is the United States likely to resort to the unilateral use of force to shoot our way into Sarajevo, that is a nonstarter.” Indeed, State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler told reporters that, “she knows of no serious, responsible person in here [the State Department] who had even discussed military intervention” adding that “We have a totally clear conscience.” Rather, American policy was, as stated by former United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman, “to get Milosevic [sic] to change his mind or, if he doesn’t, to get the Serbian people to put the kind of pressure on him to cause him to change his mind.” Economic and political pressure remained the American modus operandi.

Keen to capitalise on resolution 758, the UN moved quickly to establish a peacekeeping force at the airport and dispatched UNPROFOR Commander General Lewis Mackenzie to Sarajevo. Shortly following the General’s arrival, an unknown group attacked the convoy that was escorting him through Sarajevo, leaving one French peacekeeper seriously injured. The Quai condemned the attack adding that, “It is up to all parties concerned to respect the decisions of the Security Council and in particular to ensure the proper conduct of the mission of UN observers at the airport in Sarajevo and in Sarajevo in general.” Undeterred, France dispatched 50 soldiers to Sarajevo on 11 June to assist in the first phase of securing the airport as Lewis Mackenzie began negotiations with the warring parties.
In spite of difficulties, Mackenzie was able to negotiate a ceasefire, which would come into effect at 06h00 on 15 June, and the dispatch of a thirty-man reconnaissance team to the airport. Once there, the reconnaissance team found the airport to be in a surprisingly serviceable condition, although much of the heavy plant was damaged or missing. Optimistically, Mackenzie asked to install a fifty-man mission in the airport on 17 June to “help satisfy the mounting pressure that we [UNPROFOR] be seen to be moving quickly to open the airport.” Indeed, public pressure continued to build on the UN and the need to ‘do something’ was becoming paramount. The sudden end of the ceasefire, which collapsed at 05h00 on 17 June, only added to these mounting calls.

An UNPROFOR contingent had been en route from Belgrade to take up residency at the airport when artillery fire once more lit up the skies over Sarajevo. Resolutely, Roland Dumas declared that, “the action should be continued in Sarajevo despite the difficulties on the ground to achieve the liberation of the airport and allow the delivery of humanitarian aid.” Similarly undeterred, Lord Carrington proposed talks with Slobodan Milošević, Franjo Tudman and Alija Izetbegović in Strasbourg on 25 June, whilst UNPROFOR secured an agreement that would allow peacekeepers to occupy the airport within days. But, as had become a familiar leitmotif in Yugoslavia’s dissolution, the Serbian party promised one thing, whilst pursuing something quite different on the ground. Thus UNPROFOR efforts to reopen the airport were once more suspended on 20 June as fighting intensified in the surrounding area.

In spite of difficulties, it appeared that the UN-EC combination was making some minor yet notable progress. Nonetheless, Europe, as one German official stated, “was still a long way from being willing or able to step in with peacekeeping forces, but it could be in a better position to tighten sanctions against Serbia”. Military intervention remained one option amongst many but Europe and the United States remained unprepared to commit troops. Indeed, Germany’s Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel believed that, “Military measures should not be excluded in Yugoslavia but I believe it is not a good thing for us Germans to stand in the foreground and
demand them, because German troops will not and should not take part.” France remained committed to its humanitarianism and continued to deliver aid by road. Indeed, France was the only nation that was still successfully delivering aid and one Sarajevan reflected that the French aid was “symbolic, given the enormous needs, but important because it shows we are not totally abandoned.” However, even France’s will was being tested as, following an attack against French volunteers, the French government decided to slow its aid programme until fighting abated.

The public intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy had recently returned from an extended trip to the Balkans accompanying an aid delivery by the Lyonnaise NGO Équilibre and immediately set about lobbying Mitterrand to strengthen his BiH policy. On 23 June, Lévy arranged a meeting with the President that very morning. Over the course of a long discussion, Lévy struggled to engage Mitterrand until he compared the fate of Izetbegović with that of the former Chilean President, Salvador Allende. The writer thought that he had found in “this well-read man [Izetbegović], this man of texts and law, something of Léon Blum or better, an air of Salvador Allende, on the eve of the assault on the palace of La Moncada, in the famous photo where he has his miner’s helmet and his big glasses.” Lévy noticed that this caught the President’s attention. Indeed, Mitterrand had previously entertained the idea that a similar fate could befall him as that of the Chilean President. Later, Mitterrand would reveal to Roland Dumas that it was Lévy’s personal intervention that persuaded him of the need to seize the initiative.

Mitterrand was aware that the international mood was building towards a crescendo as the fighting in BiH worsened. He was also coming under increasing domestic criticism following revelations about his wartime association with the Vichy regime. In this context, the President held a private conversation with Dumas and revealed that, “I want to strike a decisive blow. I feel that it is necessary to change the rhythm and to go off the usual paths of classic diplomacy. I am thinking of going to Yugoslavia.” Initially, Mitterrand toyed with the idea of going to either Belgrade or Sarajevo but Dumas quickly warned the former against such a move. Dumas later told Mitterrand that:
You cannot start in Belgrade… The critics will come from all sides. We will visit the red tyrant, the butcher of Sarajevo. We are continuing to privilege our alliance with the Serbs. I can hear certain comments already from the opposition and I read certain editorials before they’ve even been written.  

The visit was designed with one eye firmly on media perceptions. To this end, and because of his expertise, Mitterrand wanted Kouchner to accompany him but wanted the visit to remain absolutely secret until the last possible moment. The President and Foreign Minister would continue planning on 26 June in Lisbon at the meeting of the European Council. 

The Lisbon Summit opened as international condemnation of Serbia was reaching a crescendo and Sarajevo endured some of the heaviest bombardment it had experienced theretofore. The American Secretary of State called on European leaders to “kick Yugoslavia out of all international organisations.” The United States had, in the preceding days, become more willing to consider taking part in a multilateral relief effort. Baker stated that, “No one is talking about us trying to solve the Yugoslav civil war. The United States’ objective here is humanitarian relief.” Indeed, Bush administration officials revealed that, in making the statement, “one of Baker’s objectives was to begin conditioning the American public and Congress to the idea of American forces taking part in United Nations relief operations in Bosnia.” Furthermore, NATO commanders suggested that they “already had a mandate for intervention” and “it was better placed than any other organisation to put together an appropriate multinational force.” However, any plans they had were limited “safeguarding a humanitarian airlift.” Notwithstanding, Bush’s National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, cautioned that “no action is imminent”. France still had time to shape the international response to events in BiH. 

Boutros-Ghali issued an ultimatum to the Serbs calling for the end of hostilities and the relinquishing of heavy weapons by Monday 29 June. If they failed to do so, then the UNSC would
meet to determine the best means to ensure that the civilian population of Sarajevo received aid and relief. Over the course of the weekend, President Bush began consultations with European allies over “forming an international military coalition to break the blockade and deliver humanitarian aid to the Bosnian capital”.

Diplomats at the UN even went so far as to suggest that military action could be forthcoming. One option that was being considered was for the UN to authorise member countries to drop relief supplies in the Bosnian capital with support from the United States Air Force. However, one diplomat concluded that, “There will be no drafting of invasion notices over the weekend.”

Washington remained eager for the Europeans or the United Nations “to appear to be taking the lead, arguing that this is a strictly European matter.” Nonetheless, with the potential for a significant NATO involvement, it was important for France to shape any military action in support of its doctrine of military-humanitarianism.

In support of striking his “decisive blow”, Mitterrand designated the Serbs as the main aggressors for the first time in the conflict and stated that, “Serbia is the aggressor today, even if the origins of the conflict are far deeper.” With Denmark having rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum on 2 June, and with France due to hold its own in September, Mitterrand warned that the Bosnian crisis had brought the credibility of the European Council into question and that, if a solution was not found quickly, it could negatively impact on the ratification of Maastricht.

With the European project at stake, the French President sought to provide European leadership and called for his partners to put their military means at the disposal of the UN. The British Prime Minister, John Major, supported Mitterrand’s call and proposed that all member states should offer support for the humanitarian airlift. A European consensus had coalesced around securing the opening of the airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

As the European leaders continued discussing Yugoslavia in the afternoon, Mitterrand began to prepare the ground for his latest initiative. In the meeting, he passed Dumas a piece of paper outlining his plans for the trip to Sarajevo. He told his Foreign Minister to pay particular attention to media relations whilst preparing the operation. The President wanted Paris Match
photographer Claude Azoulay to document the trip alongside a journalist from *Agence France Presse*. In alerting international figures and organisations, Dumas continued to suggested that he would be making the trip to the besieged capital himself.

The following morning, Bernard Kouchner arrived in Lisbon and was briefed by Dumas:

> We are leaving for Sarajevo today, you and me. You know the terrain, you know the access: prepare our voyage. It will make a small noise. Our partners in the Twelve do not know but France cannot allow the situation to worsen.

In preparing for the trip, Dumas and Kouchner spoke to UNPROFOR members, ambassadors and politicians, all of whom were under the impression that it was the Foreign Minister, and not the President, who would be taking the trip. All warned that the visit was very dangerous and they sought to deter Dumas. Slobodan Milošević warned that:

> It’s dangerous. Therefore go through Belgrade. There, we one hundred per cent guarantee your safety… A helicopter will take and bring you back from Sarajevo without difficulty. You are not obliged to see us, or even greet us. I understand the idea of your mission.

Following the final session of the Lisbon Summit, Mitterrand held a short press conference where he was keen to outline that his forcefulness did not infer inevitable military intervention. Asked whether Europe was going to be able to assert itself in settling the Yugoslav crisis, the President responded that the Community “does not have the competence to order foreign policy actions that could have military actions.” Nonetheless, Mitterrand hinted that an initiative was forthcoming, stating that, “the impossibility of delivering humanitarian resources in Sarajevo
especially, creates a moral obligation, dare I say, beyond law (hors textes).”96 The President was determined to go beyond diplomatic norms to secure humanitarian aid for the Sarajevo population, but equally to secure European hegemony over European security.97 As such, and in the spirit of Franco-German leadership, in the corridor outside the conference room Mitterrand informed Kohl that the President himself was about to take an initiative.98

A European solution still seemed achievable as the European Council stated in its resultant declaration that it welcomed the study being carried out by the WEU of “possible means in support of actions undertaken in the framework of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.”99 In its Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers had already reaffirmed its commitment to strengthening the WEU’s operational role and stated that, “military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping.”100 In the summer of 1992, Europe’s post-Cold War security architecture was still in a state of flux and, in order to secure French international influence, Mitterrand needed to act. When Dumas informed Kouchner that it was in fact the President who would be taking the trip to Sarajevo, he revealed that the trip was intended to “Demonstrate that whilst Europe is powerless, France is taking the initiative.”101 The President was hoping to secure France’s international role in the post-Cold War world.

As the President’s party prepared to leave Lisbon, the initiative was, in a number of ways, still in the planning stage. The President’s entourage totalled eleven people.102 From the jet that would transport the group, Kouchner called Mackenzie in Sarajevo and informed him that the President was travelling to the besieged capital. A shocked General responded: “My God! Do you know the date? ... You French are mad!”103 Quickly the word spread amongst a thrilled French contingent that the President intended to land in Sarajevo that evening. However, the airport, and the city itself, were not prepared for the visit of a Head of State and Mackenzie tried to persuade the President and his entourage to delay their landing until the morning. However, Mitterrand
remained determined to land that evening and Mackenzie decided, rather than have the “President of France splattered over a mountainside beside the runway”, to negotiate a cessation of hostilities between the government forces and the Bosnian Serbs. However, fortunately for Mackenzie, the pilots aborted their landing in Sarajevo citing cloud cover, and diverted to Split, where the French Ambassador to Croatia, Georges-Marie Chénu had made alternative arrangements.

Given that the visit was formulated with one eye firmly fixed on media perceptions, and he still hoped to maintain an open channel to Belgrade, the President did not want to meet with the Croatian President Franjo Tuđman whilst he was in Croatia. So, rather than stay in Tito’s former residence in Split, which would have represented a compromise with the Tuđman state, the President stayed in the Hotel Bellevue. Nonetheless, Mitterrand spoke with his Croatian counterpart by telephone and in the evening he dined with Croatian Foreign Minister Zdenko Škrabalo and Hrvoje Šarinić, head of Tuđman’s personal office and a dual citizen of France and Croatia.

In Paris, Dumas continued to monitor the President’s progress as the Foreign Ministry publicly announced Mitterrand’s initiative. The Spokesman for the Élysée, Jean Musitelli, was surprised by the initiative and had to return to work that evening to deal with the flow of media information. Musitelli confirmed that Mitterrand “was not bearing a message” for his European partners, “but this approach is to be situated within the logic of the European Council.” Slowly a trickle of information, coming largely from the AFP journalist Véronique Decoudu, revealed that the President was travelling to Sarajevo to “make a symbolic gesture to draw international attention to this part of Europe, which is ravaged by war” and to “contribute to the end of the Siege of Sarajevo and the reopening of its airport.” The Foreign Minister sent a message to Helmut Kohl to inform the German Chancellor that, following the two Heads of State’s earlier conversation, Mitterrand had decided to go to Sarajevo. Dumas also spoke with the Yugoslav Minister of Defence, Života Panić, to ensure that the Bosnian Serbs would disengage their forces surrounding the airport.
The President’s party left Split aboard Dauphin and Super Puma helicopters at 09h30 and arrived in Sarajevo little over an hour later. The Super Puma was hit by a single round of machine gun fire. The Bosnian-Croat politician, Stjepan Ključ, who had remained loyal to the Izetbegović government, later revealed to Chénu that a number of Bosniaks had fired rounds at the time of the President’s landing to deter him from coming to Sarajevo; they were convinced that he had gone to Sarajevo to prevent military intervention.

At the airport, they were welcomed by Mackenzie and French peacekeepers from the 153rd Infantry Regiment. Surrounded by journalists, Kouchner helped the aging and ailing President down from the Dauphin and declared “Mission accomplished, the airport is reopened!” The President saluted the French troops and shared a few words with them before climbing into an official car to take him to the UNPROFOR Headquarters in the Postal, Telephone and Telegraph (PTT) building – north-east of the airport and south of Sarajevo’s Miljacka River. It was soon decided to transfer the President to an Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC), for safety. By reaching the PTT building, Mackenzie declared that the President had created the first humanitarian corridor between the airport and the city. Already the President’s visit was achieving notable successes in support of his BiH policy.

In his meeting with Mitterrand, Mackenzie relayed his personal assessment of the conflict, stressing that whilst the Serbs bore the majority of the responsibility, certain amounts of blame could also be attributed to the government side. He thought that it was in Izetbegović’s interests to keep fighting “in the hope that the world will come to his rescue–provided he can make it look as if the Serbs are solely responsible for perpetrating the chaos.” To this end, Mackenzie relayed the information that, “some really horrifying acts of cruelty attributed to the Serbs were actually orchestrated by the Muslims against their own people, for the benefit of an international audience.” The Canadian General asked Mitterrand to hold a meeting with the Bosnian Serbs and not only with Izetbegović, as had originally been intended. After deliberations with Kouchner, Mitterrand reluctantly agreed, notwithstanding the harm that the meeting may do to his already
diminishing popularity in France.\textsuperscript{118} The Canadian General had one further request for the President: to ask Izetbegović to “Stop the harassment of federal [JNA] forces at the airport” so that “the agreement [the reopening of the airport] can be applied.”\textsuperscript{119} However, this was a sensible strategy for the Bosnian government: allowing the airport to be reopened would resign BiH to accepting humanitarian intervention as the international community’s \textit{modus operandi}, and would preclude the more robust American intervention the Bosnian government hoped for.

At 11h30, the French President was escorted along Sarajevo’s devastated east-west highway to the Presidency building where he was greeted by his Bosnian counterpart, Alija Izetbegović, before the two went inside for a meeting that lasted just over an hour.\textsuperscript{120} The French President would later face fierce polemics – following the exposure of the concentration camps in BiH and the publication of Bernard-Henri Lévy’s \textit{Le lys et la cendre} – for a number of revelations that Izetbegović supposedly shared with his French counterpart during their \textit{tête-à-tête}. During the conversation, which was conducted through a translator, Mitterrand made no promises beyond offering humanitarian intervention and reaffirming his desire to see peace.\textsuperscript{121} The French President told Izetbegović:

\begin{quote}
We hope that you are going to help us reopen the airport. As soon as it is liberated and put under UN control, you must do all you can to avoid Bosniak soldiers occupying it. That would risk turning international opinion [against you] that supports you. This is a piece of advice that I am giving you… The UN is waiting for this opening to deliver humanitarian aid. Then it can return to diplomacy.\textsuperscript{122}
\end{quote}

In 1993, Izetbegović recalled two significant features of the meeting: that he had requested direct military intervention and that he had provided Mitterrand with proof of the existence of a network of concentration camps.\textsuperscript{123} However, whilst Izetbegović thought that the international community needed to go further than merely reopening the airport, he did not demand direct military
intervention but suggested that it was necessary. Mitterrand urged patience ahead of the end of the UN’s forty-eight hour ultimatum, and repeated that, after its expiration, the European Council was willing to consider military action under UN auspices. Similarly, Izetbegović recalled that he was sure that he “spoke to him [Mitterrand] about the concentration camps and… waited for his on-the-spot reaction when he returned to France.”

Although Izetbegović went to great lengths to explain the suffering of the Bosnian population, and the harrowing and systematic process of ethnic cleansing, he provided no proof of a network of concentration camps per se. Throughout Izetbegović’s moving account, Mitterrand remained straight-faced. The French President’s objectives were fixed – reopen the airport and secure the delivery of humanitarian aid – and he remained committed to achieving these alone.

The two presidents then began a brief tour of central Sarajevo by foot. Firstly, they walked to the nearby Koševo Hospital. En route, Izetbegović explained to Kouchner that, “Women are deported after having been raped, and they are directing innocent men, civilians, unarmed to extermination camps.” Although Kouchner rejected the idea that there were extermination camps in BiH, he “promised, with the approval of the President, to try to open the camps.” Nonetheless, the dilapidated conditions of the nearby municipal hospital would have reinforced the appalling conditions in Sarajevo and BiH. In these surroundings, the French President moved amongst the hospital’s patients and comforted them, holding their hands.

The presidents and their parties then left the hospital and walked towards the bakery on Vaso Miskin Street (present day Ferhadija), where, a month prior, the shelling of a breadline had left sixteen people dead and tens more injured. En route, the President was greeted with cheers of “Mitterrand, you are our last hope!”, “Mitterrand, Bosnia!” and “Thank you for your courage!” When he reached the bakery, Mitterrand laid a single red rose to the memory of the victims. For him, the red rose was a potent symbol and one that he had cultivated since the early 1970s.

The two Heads of State returned to the Presidency for their final engagements. Mitterrand met the Bosnian government before “a simple meal” of soup and some meat. As shells fell
around the Presidency, Mitterrand was then awarded honorary citizenship of Sarajevo before the two presidents held a joint press conference. In front of the assembled press, the French President underlined the symbolic and humanitarian character of his visit and stated that its purpose was “not to wage war with anyone but to protect the aid convoys for suffering peoples” and that the population “cannot wait for the deliberations of the great powers.” The French President was also keen to reinforce that, notwithstanding the EC designating the Serbs as the aggressors, “France is not the enemy of any of the republics of the region.” In fact, he stressed that the traditional relationship between France and Serbia made him “all the more free to say that this [the siege] is not acceptable.” As Mitterrand left the Presidency, he was handed a lily – the flower that adorned the Bosnian national flag, but which symbolically was also the flower of the historic French monarchy – by a Sarajevan woman. As he prepared to leave, the President clattered his head on the APC that was waiting to take him to the airport. In the back of the vehicle, alongside Kouchner, the President mindfully inhaled the scent of the lily to regain his composure ahead of his impending meeting with the Bosnian Serb leaders.

The French party was greeted at the airport by Nikola Koljević, Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić, who revealed that they were preparing to hand over control of the airport to the UN. As the group walked inside, fighting erupted in the surrounding area and the Bosnian Serb troops fired in the direction of Dobrinja. It became clear that the fighting would ensure the meeting would last as long as the Bosnian Serbs desired, which General Mackenzie had warned of earlier in the day. However, the exchange between the French delegation and their Bosnian Serb counterparts was rather curt. Karadžić and Mladić launched into their tired tropes about Islamic fundamentalism and the threat that it posed to Europe, which left Mitterrand unimpressed. The nearby fighting also made the President agitated and keen to bring the conversation to an end. Karadžić reasoned that the Bosnian Serbs had the right to establish their own independent territory in BiH. Mitterrand responded, “Perhaps, but you are going about it the wrong way.” A rattled Karadžić replied, “You pity yourselves, but for every Bosniak death, there are one hundred Serb deaths that you
Kouchner recalled that Mitterrand looked Karadžić directly in the eye and responded, “You are making fun of me and you are speaking nonsense. You are losing your cause. I do not believe you.” The Bosnian Serbs retorted, “You see, Monsieur le Président, they are shooting at us.” The French President argued that, “If you were not here, they would not shoot at you” before promptly leaving the meeting.

Before leaving, Mitterrand quickly spoke to Mackenzie to offer further French assistance. The Canadian requested that French humanitarian transporters land at the airport as soon as possible to secure its handover and also for a deployment of French marine commandos to fortify the UN’s presence at the airport. The President gently nodded and walked away. Surrounded by members of his security team, UNPROFOR members, and his party, the President walked out to the waiting Dauphin helicopter, which left Sarajevo at 16h45 and headed for Split.

Once airborne, Bernard Kouchner sought to convince the President of the necessity of more robust intervention, arguing that, “We warned that we would not go all the way! Intervention – the word causes fear – it’s prevention!” Mitterrand responded arguing that the “right to intervene does not exist” and Kouchner replied, “There must be a world leader, Mr President, a true standard bearer. Our country is designated by our humanist tradition.” With Kouchner pleading for intervention, the President responded, “Who? France alone? No. We will not add war to war. Only the naïve, liars and some fiery intellectuals can think of that.” The visit to Sarajevo appeared to strengthen Mitterrand’s belief that the crisis needed to be resolved through humanitarian aid in support of political negotiations.

In France, the President’s visit was greeted with near unanimous praise. The conservative newspaper Le Figaro thought that Mitterrand had recaptured French public opinion with panache comparing him to “Bonaparte at the bridge of Arcola, Clemenceau in the trenches, de Gaulle advancing under fire towards the nave of Notre Dame.” The socialist newspaper Libération argued that Mitterrand had retaken the initiative in solving the Bosnian crisis, having swam against the tide of public opinion in trying to negotiate with Serbia over the preceding months. Moreover,
it noted, the visit would have buoyed Sarajevans as not only was Mitterrand the French President, or a member of the Twelve of Europe, France was also one of the Permanent Five of the UNSC.\textsuperscript{150} Internationally, reaction was generally positive. German officials appeared to be irked as theretofore France had appeared the most reticent to act against Serbian aggression.\textsuperscript{151} However, on the Sunday evening, Mitterrand personally called Helmut Kohl, who did not share the negative reaction of his diplomats.\textsuperscript{152} The German press praised the personal courage of Mitterrand but, perhaps still offended over the acrimonious debates over Croatian and Slovenian recognition in December 1991, accused him of breaking from a unified European approach; a popular accusation of French diplomats of German policy in late 1991.\textsuperscript{153} In Great Britain, the press praised Mitterrand’s personal courage and Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Minister, saluted “the courageous act of an aging French President”, underlining that “nothing in Europe, nor in Maastricht, prevents a country from taking such an initiative.”\textsuperscript{154}

In the short-term, the President’s visit appeared to have brought about the reopening of the airport; the declared aim of his visit. Mitterrand called Milošević on 29 June, who told the Bosnian Serbs to relinquish control of the airport and accept a deployment of UNPROFOR peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{155} They duly did that afternoon, although as part of the agreement reached with the UN, the Bosnian Serbs were required to remove artillery from around the airport, which was a slow process.\textsuperscript{156} To secure the agreement, twenty UNPROFOR observers were placed in the area surrounding the airport and a French Transall transport craft landed that evening carrying aid. The following morning three more transporters, carrying aid, medicine and equipment to repair the airport, landed without incident.\textsuperscript{157} Military-humanitarianism had been established as the international community’s preferred method for conflict management in BiH.

In Sarajevo, initial Francophile enthusiasm quickly dissipated as it became clear that the President’s visit had fixed humanitarian intervention as the international community’s response. A week after the President’s visit, the Bosnian newspaper Oslobodenje bemoaned the humanitarian policy of the West, which it thought sought only to deal with the “symptom of the disease”, and
perceptively reflected that Mitterrand sought to use the symbolism of his visit to counter domestic criticism but also to demonstrate internationally that Europe could act without American interference. Izetbegović later recalled that, “Many regret the reopening of the airport and this ‘humanitarian’ policy of the West, which definitively relegated the struggle for rights, justice and laws. Instead, we had a policy of alms imposed on us, which, of course, did not meet our expectations.” Indeed, the International Committee of the Red Cross recognised that the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina fixed humanitarian issues at “the top of the political agenda,” with “one turning point being the visit of French President Mitterrand to Sarajevo at the end of June 1992.”

The President’s visit did indeed fix the political agenda as it precipitated a flurry of international activity. Lord Carrington once more renewed the ECCY, paying tribute to Mitterrand’s “spectacular gesture” and adding that the President’s visit would probably have “a very important effect for the population of Sarajevo.” In support of reopening the airport, the UNSC authorised the deployment of 1,000 more peacekeepers to protect it, and Britain declared that it was ready to participate in a humanitarian airlift. The President’s intervention had reinvigorated the EC-UN partnership. Thus the EC began its humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo on 2 July, with five French and one British transporter planes delivering over 600 tonnes of aid and material to the Bosnian capital. The UN airlift began in earnest the following day, with nine cargo planes landing at Sarajevo and being emptied of the cargo in less than seven minutes. It marked the beginning of the longest humanitarian airlift in history, which would consist of 21 nations flying over 13,000 sorties, delivering 160,000 tons of aid, and evacuating 1,300 Bosnians.

The visit of François Mitterrand to Sarajevo was a pivotal moment in the Bosnian War. In organising the sortie at such short notice, the President’s aims, and means for achieving them, were limited. Notwithstanding, where the EC-UN partnership had failed in reopening the airport for a humanitarian airlift, Mitterrand succeeded by sheer dint of will and the prestige attached to the highest office in France. The President fixed military-humanitarianism as the international community’s modus operandi and ensured that subsequent initiatives for BiH bore the hallmarks of
France’s post-Cold War security strategy. In doing so the President prevented a NATO-led initiative in Yugoslavia and ensured that France would ‘maintain its position’ (‘tenir son rang’) in the highest international forums during a dynamic period of history. But the implementation of France’s humanitarianism also prevented direct military intervention in BiH. The President repeatedly stated that he would not “add war to war” (“ajouter la guerre à la guerre”) and by fixing the praxis of military-humanitarianism in BiH, France was able to prevent the march towards war that the President thought would “create a widespread guerrilla war in the Balkans.”

1 François Mitterrand was deeply affected by European history and often looked to examples from the past for guidance. There are many excellent political biographies of the President. In particular see: Jean Lacouture, Mitterrand. Une histoire de Français, 2. Vol (Paris: Seuil, 1998); Pierre Favier and Michel-Martin Roland, La décennie Mitterrand, 4 Vol. (Paris: Seuil, 1990-9).


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69 Ibid.


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For Azoulay’s photographs from the trip, see: Claude Azoulay, *Francois Mitterrand: «Tenez-vous prêt, nous partons!»* (Paris: Éditions Filipachi, 2005).


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