Public Goods, Social Norms and Naive Beliefs

Cartwright, Edward and Patel, Amrish (2010) Public Goods, Social Norms and Naive Beliefs. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 12 (2). pp. 199-223. ISSN 1097-3923

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Abstract

An individual's contribution to a public good may be seen by others as a signal of attributes such as generosity or wealth. An individual may, therefore, choose their contribution so as to send an appropriate signal to others. In this paper, we question how the inferences made by others will influence the amount contributed to the public good. Evidence suggests that individuals are naïve and biased toward taking things at “face value.” We contrast, therefore, contributions made to a public good if others are expected to make rational inferences versus contributions if others are expected to make naïve inferences.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 24 Sep 2016 01:13
Last Modified: 06 Nov 2018 15:44
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/59918
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01457.x

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