Financing Policy for Higher Education

and

the Role of the Private Sector in Libya

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Abstract.

Prior to 1999, higher education in Libya was monopolized by the public sector and there was considerable public resistance to the establishment of private universities. The impetus for the private higher education policy was created by a number of pressures on public policy for higher education, which had been adopted by Gaddafi’s government for two decades. This study explores the efforts of Gaddafi’s regime to cope with this issue. It reviews the financing policy for higher education and the phenomenon of the growth of private higher education in Libya and describes the strategy of the Gaddafi government for reforming the higher education system with a view to encouraging privatization. The thesis also analyses the case of a particular private university with the aim of providing insights into the managing and financing of a private higher education institution from which to make informed appraisals and assessments of the practice of private higher education in the country. In addition, it analyses the effects of the new financing policy for higher education in the Gaddafi period for the main stakeholders, namely students, academics and institutions themselves. The research contends that the policy shift had had a significant effect on quality just as it has introduced universities to risks through engagement with academic capitalism with its emphasis on marketization of university programmes and services. The thesis concludes with suggestions for some policy options that could help to mitigate the negative consequences of Gaddafi’s policy, taking in to account some developments since the February 2011 revolution which overthrew the Gaddafi regime.

The 1999 Private Higher Educational Institutions Act opened the possibility of private universities being founded to increase the supply of quality graduates to increase the advantage of competitiveness. As with many countries, Libya is a very recent arrival to the world scene of rapidly growing private higher education. Reform in higher education
financing in Libya has been occasioned by both endogenous and exogenous variables. Internal pressures of a declining economy, rapid demographic growth and increased inter- and intra-sectoral competition for scarce financial resources, coupled with external neoliberal doctrines championed by global donors like the World Bank, resulted in a new market-competitive policy of financing higher education.

In Libya the policy was to facilitate educational reform to produce quality graduates that could help transform Libya from a development economy to an industrialized and knowledge-based economy for the primary purpose of enhancing the competitiveness of the Libyan economy. However, the policy of Gaddafi’s government to privatize higher education was ad hoc; it was carried out in a deteriorating environment and in response to the political desires of dictatorship rule. The thesis demonstrates how important the particular circumstances of any single country like Libya are in helping us to understand the development of private higher education. It shows how the previous government policy to reform financing higher education cannot relieve fiscal stress. Attention is drawn to the expansion in the number of private higher education institutions, the dramatic increase of enrolments in social science fields, and the many difficulties institutions had in coping with the circumstances in Libya during the phase of Gaddafi’s rule. Comprehensive reform of the role of the state in the financing and governance of higher education was proposed. The government's reform strategy involved accreditation bodies that were established later. These centres were questionable in terms of skills of staff members, administrative structure and their attestation and accreditation procedures. The implementation of the new policy was poor.

Private universities offer a limited number of courses and the fees from students continue to be their major source of income. They are profit makers in a country that had been wedded to a culture of socialism for more than forty years. A number of college and
university students in Libya attend private institutions, for several reasons, one of which is that private universities are seen as easier than public universities. The number of students in private universities does not account for a significant proportion of university enrolments for there are more students in public than in private universities. Even so, private higher education plays an important role in the higher education sector. Private institutions do not provide professional training in fields relevant to employment opportunities but instead offer an education with its emphasis on the human sciences, qualification in which are unlikely to enable a graduate to obtain employment. Private higher education is expensive and costly to attend. Many private institutions are caught in a dilemma. They cannot achieve significant efficiency by reducing instructional costs without damage to the quality of their programmes, and they are reluctant to raise tuition fees and other charges because of the damaging effects on student recruitment. As long as public higher education is provided at low or no cost to the student and private higher education continues to be entirely self-supporting, the private sector will have a peripheral role to play in higher education in Libya. This research was undertaken during the period when the Gaddafi regime was overthrown in a bloody revolution in 2011. The thesis concentrates on the policy developments and problems during the Gaddafi years, but brief reference is made to relevant subsequent developments.
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List of Acronyms

- **ACE**  American Council of Education.
- **CCP**  The Communist Party of China
- **CEP**  Comprehensive Exam Policy.
- **CIES**  The Council on International Exchange of Scholars.
- **CSHE**  Centre for Studies in Higher Education.
- **DE**  Diversified Economics.
- **ERF**  The Economic Research Forum.
- **FAO**  Food and Agriculture Organization.
- **GCC**  The Gulf Cooperation Council.
- **GHRF**  Global Human Resources Forum.
- **GNP**  Gross National Production.
- **GPC**  The “General People Congress”.
- **GPCHE**  General People’s Committee for Higher Education of Libya.
- **GSE**  General Secondary Education GSE.
- **GSEC**  The General Secondary Education Certificate.
- **HCPHE**  High Committee for Private Higher Education.
- **ICAO**  The International Civil Aviation Organization.
- **ICHI**  International Conference of Higher Education
- **ICTs**  Information and Communication Technologies.
- **IIE**  Institute of International Education.
- **ILO**  International Labour Organization.
- **ITU**  The International Telecommunication Union.
- **LLC**  Limited Liability Company.
- **LNAID**  The Libyan National Authority for Information and Documentation.
• MOP Mixed Oil Producers.
• NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
• NCPE National Committee of Private Education.
• NCPU National Committee for Private Universities.
• NOC National Oil Corporation.
• OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
• PHEA Private Higher Education Administration.
• PP Primary Producers.
• QAA Quality Assurance and Accreditation.
• SAP Systems, Applications and Products in Data Processing.
• SSE Secondary School Enrolment.
• TNC The Transitional National Council.
• TSE Technical Secondary Education.
• UCCs University Competence Centres.
• UNESCO The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.
• WB The World Bank.
• WHO World Health Organization.
• WMO The World Meteorological Organization.
Definition of terms

There are some terms that will need to be defined as they all appear in this study. They are as follows:

1. **El-Fatah Revolution**: this was the revolution led by a group of young officers in 1969. Its leader was 27 years old and he was called Colonel “Muammar Al-Gaddafi and he was overthrown in the 17th of February Revolution. The Al-Fatah Revolution aimed to overthrow the monarchy in Libya and establish a republican system.

2. **The General People’s Committee (GPC)**: is a concept which was propounded by Gaddafi. The concept was presented in his theory which was called “the Third Universal Theory” in his “Green Book”. The GPC was defined by him as a council to include secretaries for economic activities. Although it appears to be similar to the cabinet, the way in which it elects its members is different. In the former the prime minister is chosen by the people through the election while the members of the GPC are chosen through what Gaddafi called the Basic People’s Congress (BPC) and General People’s Congress (GPC).

3. **Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)**: it was established after officers seized power on September 1, 1969. The RCC includes the free officers who were involved in Al-Fatah Revolution, headed by Muammar Al-Gaddafi. It aimed to implement a socioeconomic and political revolution in Libya.

4. **The Green Book: al-Kitāb al-Aḥdar** is a short book setting out the political philosophy of the former Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. The book was first published in 1975. It was “intended to be required reading for all Libyans”. It is a book which has three volumes: the first chapter is concerned with political problems, second chapter with economic problems and the third chapter with social problems. These were presented by Gaddafi who thought that they provide the best solutions for all the problems of the world.
5. **Al-Refak University**: it is a university was established in 2003 in Tripoli and it was run privately.

6. **The ‘Third Universal Theory’**: it is a concept used by Al-Gaddafi to refer to a theory that is neither capitalism nor communism. It is the socialism as explained by him in his “Green Book”.

7. **The ‘System of Masses’**: it is a concept that was introduced by Gaddafi in his `*Green Book*` and was a system that contained many of ideas (e.g. the people’s power). It was the political system in Libya during the Gaddafi regime.

8. **The General People’s Committee for Higher Education of Libya (GPCHE)**. This was the title of the Ministry of Higher Education.

9. **People’s Power**: The idea and the establishment of Popular Congresses (municipalities / popular ‘*Shbiat*’).

10. **People’s Congress**: There were two kinds of People’s Congress, Basic People’s Congress and General People’s Congress. The former was a place where Libyan people met to discuss matters concerning their society and where they made appropriate decisions and the latter was a place in which decisions were made and implemented according to the country’s needs and circumstances.

11. **Al-Taleem Al-Tasharoky or Al-Ahli Education**: this was a theory introduced by Gaddafi that meant that educational institutions should be regulated by people.
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Chapter one: Aims and objectives of the thesis and its methodology.

1. Aims and objectives:

1.1 Introduction:

Financing higher education policy has come into sharp focus in both developed and developing countries since the 1980s and 1990s because of several factors, and in particular the phenomenon of the dramatic increase in student numbers. The main focus has been on reforming financing policy for higher education in order to make it suitable to meet new challenges, such as larger numbers of students and demographic changes, the reappraisal of the social and economic role of higher education and the internationalization of higher education. A number of conferences have been held (e.g. New Perspectives on Global Higher Education Challenges in Washington in 1998 organised by the Institute of International Education [IIE] and the Council on International Exchange of Scholars [CIES], Financing Mechanism of Higher Education and Lifelong Learning organised by Global Human Resources Forum [GHRF] in Seoul in 2006, 2007 and 2008, Global Higher Education: Current Trends, Future Perspectives in 2009 in Malaysia at the Global Higher Education Forum, Higher Education Internationalization and Globalization in 2007 at the Centre for Studies in Higher Education [CSHE] on the Berkeley Campus at the University of California and Towards an Arab Space for Higher Education: International Challenges and Societal Responsibilities in 2009 in Cairo).

All these conferences and studies have dealt with the reform of the financing policies for higher education which has been under considerable pressure since the 1980s. The fundamental financial problems faced by institutions of higher education are worldwide and stem from common concerns. The first of these is the high and increasing unit cost
per-student of higher education. The second force greatly exacerbating the financial problems of tertiary educational institutions and ministries in many countries is the need for increasing enrolments, particularly where high birth rates are coupled with rapidly increasing numbers of young people finishing secondary school with legitimate aspirations for someertiary education. The third component is the effect of globalization. Higher education is increasingly being viewed as a private commodity that is commercial and saleable. With the emergence of cross-border education and the prevalence of open and distance learning, higher education is now an export commodity and a tradable service in the global economy. This burgeoning situation has become prevalent in many countries including that of Libya.

However, there has been an absence of academic study of the development of higher education in Libya. Local conferences, where scholars, professors, educators and policymakers have mostly focused on issues relating to the role of higher education in the country and the relationship between higher education outputs and the labour market, show that this has become a lively source of debate within Libya. Libya is classified as one of the developing countries. Since independence, economic and social policies have concentrated on developing human resources. It is felt that these resources play a leading and important role in the effort to raise national productive capacity. In addition, the development of human resources is seen as a means of promoting and maintaining a peaceful and stable society. Libyan leaders, then, stress the important of investment in education. One way to accomplish this is by expanding higher education to increase educational attainment levels within Libyan society. Moreover, in the period of Gaddafi’s rule, those people, the decision makers, on many official occasions especially, referred to the importance of financing higher education and the urgent need to undertake the necessary research associated with it.
1.2 The two historical phases:

Before the recent revolution, Libyan higher education and its financing policy passed through two different phases. First, let us examine the phase of monarchy (1952-1969) or the period before Gaddafi’s regime. Although this thesis will be looking primarily at the issues of private higher education in the Gaddafi period, it is also necessary to analyse the pre-Gaddafi period (1955-1969), considering that the beginning of higher education was in 1955 when the first university was founded in Benghazi and completely funded by the state. It is, in fact, considered to be the roots of Libya’s financing policy for higher education.

The second phase was that of “the Masses System” (1969-2011) or the ‘Gaddafi Period’. This phase of extreme authoritarian rule witnessed very considerable economic progress and the growth of wealth based upon the discovery of oil in Libya in 1961 and its subsequent exploitation. This initially helped the Libyan government finance and expand higher education without concern about the availability of funds. This was accompanied by an ideology, based upon the Green Book, which stressed a form of popular socialist ideology and which inspired a political system that completely opposed the private sector and privatization.

This second phase saw Libya become isolated from the international community for a ten year period, particularly in terms of its relations with western countries like the USA and the UK (over e.g. the Lockerbie issue). In reaction then Libyan political leaders adopted a policy that arrested any dealings with most western countries including the USA. At that time, the Secretary of General People's Committee for Education ‘Ahmed Ibrahim’
(Education Minister) imposed during the second half of 1980s, a policy to stop teaching the English language and which called for the Arabization of the curriculum in all institutions including universities\(^1\). The state also decided that no more students would be sent to study abroad\(^2\).

Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, in contrast to the earlier period of Gaddafi’s rule, Libya experienced a period of political and social instability and a drastic economic decline which affected its policy for financing higher education. In the mid 1980s the price of oil fell from $27 to $10 per barrel which led to reduced funding allocated to higher education. As a result, Libya faced severe financial constraints which resulted in a serious decline in the quality of higher education whilst, at the same time, its population grew and demand for higher education increased. Following this Gaddafi himself was responsible for a major shift in policy towards privatisation (discussed below) which brought about a considerable state of upheaval in higher education.

1.3 The background of the moves towards a policy shift involving the private sector in higher education:

The Libyan state achieved great expansion in terms of the number of students and institutions (universities and colleges) for a period of half a century. By 2011 there were thirteen universities and ten higher learning institutes, including the Academy of Graduate

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1 He was appointed by Gaddafi to be the Minister of Education. He was seen by Gaddafi as the right person to support him in his aggressive policy towards foreign countries especially the UK and the USA. This policy was used by the Gaddafi regime as a weapon against these countries as a consequence of the UK and USA attack on Libya in April 1984.

2 One reason was that Gaddafi’s Libyan government was scared of its European adversaries and fearful that they would influence Libyans studying abroad to be anti the Gaddafi regime.
Studies, which specialized in post-graduate studies (private institutions and the Open University are not included in the above). Nearly a quarter of a million students are enrolled in higher education.

The origin of this expansion dates back to 1955, the year of the first establishment of the Libyan university in Bengasi, with its funding coming entirely from the public sector. At that time Libya had a lack of financial resources, but the discovery of oil in 1961 and its burgeoning revenues helped the Libyan government to establish and expand higher education institutions without any financial constraints. In the 1970s all Libyan students who completed their secondary education were allowed to enrol in state universities. Fees were not charged and generous allowances and living expenses as well as accommodation were provided for all students. In the 1980s, however, the government withdrew this provision.

Although Libya has sufficient oil resources to make it a significantly rich country with a comparatively small population (6,733,620 July 2012 est.), its policy for financing higher education began to founder in the 1980s. A sudden relative decline in oil revenues was accompanied by other difficulties such as a rapid growth in population, a significant increase in tertiary student numbers, an absence of the right proportion of enrolments in the different fields of study required to meet the priorities of national development the problem of providing adequate equipment for higher education institutions and the spread of administrative corruption in the public sector. Moreover, in the case of Libya the financing of its higher education policy was affected by particular elements related to the political ideology of the Gaddafi regime which had published the three volumes of his ‘Green Book’ that stressed its socialist ideology adapted to Libya.
Notwithstanding this, in the period 1995-2005, Gaddafi, through a number of his meetings with the Secretaries of the General People's Committees (Ministers), determined to reform higher education policy. As a result, many Libyan leaders, policymakers and scholars felt that there was a need to restructure the higher education policy. There was no introduction of the idea of cost sharing or privatization until the beginning of the 21st century when a series of state committees were held by Libyan leaders and Colonel Mummer Al-Gaddafi, “the leader of El-Fatah revolution”, to reform the higher education policy and the other sectors as well. This call for change had come about due to the negative consequences of the previous policy adopted by the state over almost forty years: overcrowding in the universities, deterioration in the conditions of study, poor distribution of students between the disciplines and fields of study, the lack of a relationship between the higher education system and economic activities, the emergence of the educated unemployed, and the low internal efficiency of many of the colleges. These outcomes suggested that financing higher education through the public sector was no longer feasible and it was felt that challenges and difficulties, both locally and internationally, needed urgent consideration. The new trend re-considered the idea of privatization and private sector beliefs which had been overturned according to the ideology of the ‘Third Universal Theory’ of the ‘Green Book’. As Libya resolved the Lockerbie dispute and then renounced unconventional weapons, and as the United Nations suspended its sanctions in April 1999, Libya began to introduce socioeconomic reforms aimed at liberalization. Eight months later Gaddafi declared the public sector a failure and in Jan 2000 made this statement:

“….the system is finished. I have to step in today to stop this wheel from spinning in a rut and wasting fuel.”, accusing Members of the GPC of deliberately wasting the country’s

As a result, in June 2003, the Secretary-General of the People's Committee, the Prime Minister, Dr. Shokri Ghanem, announced a comprehensive plan for the privatisation of state-owned institutions and listed a number of state-owned enterprises targeted for either privatisation or liquidation. These included companies in the minerals, oil, chemicals and banking sectors, truck and bus manufacturers, makers of textiles and shoes, aviation companies, and state-owned farms. (Otman, W and Karlberg, E, 2007, p218).

The higher education sector was not excluded and here policy had three main aims: the distribution of oil wealth between Libyan citizens; the reduction of state intervention; and the lessening of dependence by universities and other institutions on the public sector. These institutions should be transformed and owned by individuals who would regulate them themselves. This reform was viewed as an “urgent issue” and the Libyan authorities paid particular attention to it, despite opposition from some officials as well as from many other Libyans. This trend towards change was a result of accumulations and failures after over forty years of experiment. Gaddafi and his regime were under tremendous pressure from inside and outside as could be seen by his speeches. (Speeches to public and General People Committee “Cabinet” on state TV, 2006 & 2007). Before he was overthrown, he referred on many occasions specifically to matters relating to higher education, but these efforts of Gaddafi’s government to reform the financing policy for higher education have been to some extent curtailed or frozen for some reason since the February 2011 Revolution. Programmes and projects initiated and implemented before the revolution were now seen as questionable, misused by the state authorities, and a source of
corruption that and had not served the nation’s interests. Therefore, the trend in general was to abolish, if possible, any policy set by Gaddafi’s government.

1.4. The motivation for this research:
The focus on the state policies on human resources of Libya, especially education policies, first arose from my interest in the broader issues associated with development. Such policies have a link with political economy which is very interesting. The idea for this research was inspired when Gaddafi’s government started to reform its overall economy at the beginning of the twenty first century as a result of many pressures which also involved the reform of higher education (as discussed above).

Many countries have struggled to improve their higher education sectors to reinforce their economies locally and internationally. One way to achieve this has been through the encouragement of the private sector to play a significant role in higher education and consequently private higher education has grown rapidly since 1999. However, it has raised many challenges and critical issues that need to be analysed. So Libya is not unique, although the implementation of privatisation presents many unusual features. There is, though, a lack of research, resources and related materials that deal with this aspect in the country. My interest in this began in 2000, a year after its implementation. At that time I was teaching in one of the private higher education institutions called "Al-Afak Institution for Financial and Administrative Sciences". For the six years I have spent as a lecturer at Al-Fatah University I observed the importance of this topic, and my interest was confirmed when I came here to the UK and read books and consulted research about private higher education. It was therefore instructive to see how Libya sought to implement its policy to
privatize its higher education sector and at the same time to identify the main pressures that have led to its existence.

The lack of data about Libya has been the most challenging aspect of this research and there was a time when I considered it an impossible aspiration. But subsequent to many fruitful discussions with my colleagues at the university, I was encouraged to start the project in 2005. It was difficult in the Gaddafi period to answer very important questions: Why did Libya need to privatize higher education? Had Gaddafi’s regime a real intention to improve higher education? If so, why was Libya facing financial difficulties in this area when the regime had acquired massive wealth from oil? The new, more open political climate prevailing in Libya after 2011 meant that that was easier to address these issues, although the instability of the general political situation soon presented other serious problems.

Given the above motivations, this study attempts to contribute to the literature on the state policies and political economy in Libya as one of a number of developing economies. In particular it seeks to contribute directly to the debate on its higher education policies and on ways to improve the elements of its state policy in higher education.

1.5. The broad aims of the study:
This study aims to examine the policies towards higher education, especially its financing, during the period of Gaddafi’s rule in Libya. There is some evaluation and discussion of the previous policies that have occurred before the fifty years of Gaddafi period, since the historical context is clearly important. The changes under Gaddafi took place in a context of very rapid social, economic and political change. The policy of privatization was a new
and sudden one, but there were trends in the earlier period that were important. Also, the study aims to show the disadvantages of the government policy to privatise higher education in Libya where there had been a dictatorship regime for more than forty years. The international context is also important in that it shows pressures to meet demand that were not unique to Libya and the general recognition internationally that purely public funding of higher education was difficult. But it should be borne in mind that these international developments are not the real focus of the study.

So, my aims are: to evaluate the Libyan experimentation in financing the policy for higher education, to examine past policy changes as a result of rapid economic, social and political developments in the country, to answer some important questions about the idea of privatization in higher education and how this idea has been introduced in to the Libyan tertiary system. Many specific questions will be considered, What kind of universities are these private universities? Are they profit-makers or non profit-makers? How was this idea defined in the ideology based on the ‘Third Universal Theory’ of the Green Book by Colonel Gaddafi which was completely against individual property ownership and the idea of privatization? Are these universities targeting only those students who can afford to pay fees? Does the government support them? Who runs these universities and who owns them?

In summary, this study has four interlinking objectives: first, to look at the historical context that formed the foundation for the financing policy for the higher education process; second, to examine the different pressures that led to the policy of privatization and private higher education; third, to consider the implementation process of the policy of private higher education and the response of Libyan society (private sector) through an
analysis of data collected from its reality; fourth, to consider the consequences of the policy in order to answer the primary question: ‘What was the reality of private higher education in Libya under the Gaddafi regime? The latter part of the study will consider briefly the developments after the February revolution of 2011 which overthrew Gaddafi and aim to establish the attitude of the post-Gaddafi government towards private higher education. Finally, the study will seek ways of improving higher education policy by suggesting alternatives for its financing that are commensurate with the reality of Libya today.

1.6. The importance of the study:

The study, which is the first serious academic study of these developments during periods of considerable political upheaval, is important for the following reasons:

1. Higher education is of tremendous importance in the development of the country and its financing policy is considered to be a significant aspect worthy of further research and study.

2. Despite national efforts, Libya has had problems retaining the investment and increase of financing resources provided by the state for education, to cope with its current conditions amid fears for the future.

3. The interest of educational experts, university professors, and policymakers, particularly, Libyans, indicate a need for such a study not only to show the problems facing Libyan higher education and their possible solutions, but also to evaluate the Libyan experiment in its financing policy for higher education and by explaining new trends towards its implementation.
There is a lack of extensive, informed study of the higher education financing policy in Libya and the few studies that have been undertaken are incompetent and lacking in academic rigour.

This thesis will contribute to literature and knowledge in Libya and will help its policy makers, but it will also be of interest to scholars and academics both inside and outside the country, who are interested more generally in the development of higher education.

Although the main focus of the study is on improving Libyan higher education, it will also touch on the broader concerns of political scientists, especially those interested in policy implementation and those concerned with policy making during regime-change. It raises issues of public policy and the interaction of ideas in policy practice (for example, how the authoritarian Gaddafi regime had changed the policy despite its ideology). The direction taken during the latter period of Gaddafi’s regime was towards the encouragement of the private sector to play its role in higher education; but the policy implementation was problematical. These issues make this thesis important.

1.7. Research methodology:

This study is an assessment and evaluation of private higher education in Libya, specifically on private universities and one that it is largely exploratory in nature. Data from other countries are used to facilitate and develop the explanation of the ideas. Studies on private higher education generally refer to internal and external pressures, but this study is concerned almost exclusively with the internal forces that led to the privatization of higher education. External forces have played an important role in many countries where there is not only a process of interaction with foreign colleges but also networking and a process of reshaping their internal higher education structure through the integration of internationalization into the development of higher education. In a more general sense,
internationalization supports the integration of many countries into the global economic community. However, in the case of Libya there was no strong political support for the internationalization of the higher education sector in the country. Gaddafi was always unwelcoming to western policies and his regime inclined to nationalization rather than to internationalization. The latter was seen as a western strategy of invasion and on the credit side of insisting that students remained in Libya to study, the savings to the economy were its justification. This study of both external and internal forces has found that over a long period of time, the internal pressures were clearly more important than the external ones in the reform of the financing policy for higher education in Libya. Hence the research emphasis is on official decisions, resolutions, and interviews within Libya, as a means of improving our understanding of the phenomenon of privatisation and its development in higher education. In the light of this context, this section will discuss and explain the research methodology employed. The section explains the types of data sources and the challenges of undertaking the research. It outlines the problems of the fieldwork and the problems and the advantages associated with the interviews. It also explains the interview guide and the management of ethical issues.

1.8. Qualitative Research

In studying the financing policy for higher education it is difficult to apply the quantitative method to understand the phenomenon of private higher education in Libya, especially in the light of the limited data available. But this does not negate the importance of quantitative research in obtaining concrete information on the phenomenon. Although this study is based mainly on qualitative data, quantitative data are utilized on some occasions, such as the pressures that led to private higher education and its growth in Libya. Data sets are used to compare the situation at different times of Libyan higher education with that of
other countries and also to illustrate the nature of the economic and social changes which meant that policy change was seen as necessary.

As has already been mentioned, there is a lack of research about the private higher education in Libya; however it was possible to gain numerical data and information (e.g. the number of private universities, students and staff members and there are other related numbers like tuition fees). They were taken from different sources and different places. Some of the data was collected directly from the institutions (private universities and other public establishments) that I visited during my field study. Books, magazines, articles and statistical books that were issued by the government were also good sources of providing information. They cover the targeted period from 1999-2011. Some of the resources were published by authors who work at big universities, such as Tripoli (previously Al-Fatah) and Benghazi (previously Garyounes). Other important materials were sets by government institutions and state authorities. They are reports, booklets, work papers, conference and workshop papers and bulletins. All these sources related to the private universities and they have reliable data and information for the research subject. These numbers have been calculated to give a clear picture about some important issues. It was not easy to collect data for the research subject I have to visit many places to get the information and collect related materials. Below is a list of places I visited:

1. The General People Committee for Higher Education GPCHE.
2. Private Higher Education Administration (PHEA).
3. Quality Assurance and Accreditation QAA.
4. Al-Refak University.
5. Afriqeya University.
6. Al-Hadera University.
Since the thesis will primarily be concerned with asking the questions ‘How?’ and ‘Why?’ developments in Libya took place in the context of the reform and implementation of the financing policy and its progress, the research method will be predominantly qualitative. Qualitative research is defined as “…a research strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data.” (Bryman, A, 2004, p266). It involves obtaining information through analysis of documentary material, open-ended interviews, participation, observation, and focus groups and then producing an overarching judgement of an analytical kind. In-depth case studies may also be employed to illustrate broader issues through the study of the particular. Qualitative approaches engage research questions through inductive reasoning and grounded theory. Creswell, J (1994) refers to qualitative research as a process of understanding based on a distinct methodological tradition that explores social problems in a natural setting. This thesis is concerned first with describing and analysing in an historical context the evolution of higher education in Libya since the Second World War and then analysing the policy making, policy objectives and policy implementation in the latter years of the Gaddafi regime. Qualitative methods
are appropriate for this thesis because they are suited for investigating a process that involves power relations in the policy process. In this context the attitudes, perceptions and views of participants in the policy process regarding the policy of privatization and in private higher education and its implementation are also important in understanding how policy developed the way it did.

A process of primary and secondary data collection was employed. The secondary data collection considered the literature on privatization and private higher education in other countries and also literature on higher education and economic development in Libya. As the nature of this study is about process, the primary data was collected predominantly through the critical analysis of texts, including policy documents, internal memos. In addition to the study of documentary evidence, a number of in-depth interviews with key people, including influential people, owners of private universities and a number of people who are seen as important contributors to the subject were undertaken. The aim has been to examine in detail their views on the idea of cost sharing in higher education and private higher education, the challenges and obstacles identified in the implementation of the policy, and their attitudes and perceptions towards other issues related to private higher education.

An important part of qualitative research is the use of triangulation of data. Triangulation “… entails using more than one method or source of data in the study.” (Bryman, A, 2004, p275). It is defined as “…a validity procedure where researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or categories in a study.” (Creswell, J and Miller, D. 2000.126). These authors also view triangulation as protocols used to ensure accuracy and alternative explanations. Yin (1994) suggested using
multiple sources of evidence as the way to ensure validity. Triangulation approaches generally involve the use of sources of data from different sources. By using multiple sources of evidence: survey instruments, interviews and documents, this study gains insight into the analysis of a phenomenon as complex a topic as the state policy to privatize higher education in Libya and adds robustness to it. Triangulation is used so that conclusions can only be drawn if a variety of sources agree on a point of view. This is particularly important in the cases of qualitative interviews where one individual’s perceptions may be distorting reality and at best will offer only a partial view.

1.9. Documentary sources

Documentary sources may be divided into three categories:

1. Secondary sources published by Libyan scholars who are interested in higher education matters. These include research, articles and books but are not specialist sources dealing with private higher education

2. Official sources are issued by the government to administrate and to organize private higher education. These include official documents and decisions outlined in newspapers, recorded speeches, archives and the media. The official decisions are found in the state magazine named “Higher Education Magazine” issued by the General People’s Committee for Higher education.

To provide information for research the thesis relies on different documentary sources. They include newspapers, government reports, magazines and records of speeches. Newspapers were published by government to cover general issues including issues related to the research topic. Magazines were issued by government (Ministry of Higher Education) and they were specialized in higher education. Newspapers, government
reports and magazines were very critical of evaluating private universities, but meanwhile they were very cautious in criticizing the government policy. These materials to some extent distort reality and suppress opposing views and they have therefore to be treated with caution. The problem was that the available materials provided by government were not organized well and they were not put at where should be. It was very hard to collect all these sources (Newspapers, state reports, official decisions and magazines) and I have to go to many places costing me more time and efforts.

3. The writer’s observations at meetings, which utilised his research skills and experience acquired at MSc level, provide records and photos as independent sources: these can be very important as people’s demeanor can often provide more information than the spoken word.

1.10. Photographic material

The photos, such as those of Afriqya University taken in October 2010 and which show the poor standards within that institution, are seen as important data for the research and provide visual documents and descriptions of facilities, equipment and teaching conditions that describe in general terms, the poor circumstances under which the majority of private universities operate. The table 1 gives details of the photographs and of the recordings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of photos</th>
<th>The place</th>
<th>Notices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Afriqya University</td>
<td>Afriqya University in Tripoli</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.11. Interviews:

Interviews with key policy actors and private universities’ owners have sought to reveal the evolving power relations, the perceptions of actors, and to what extent their views are consistent and compatible with the desire of the Libyan government to privatize its higher education, all of which form components of the policy implementation and its process.

Richards describes interviews as “one of the major tools in qualitative research.” (Richard, D, 1996, p199). The interviews were based on ‘elite interviewing’ as advocated by Burnham, P. *et al* (2008, p231): ".....elite interviewing is a key research technique which is often the most effective way to obtain information about decision makers and decision-making processes." Also, Leech (in Burnham, P *et al*, 2008, p231) said that "Elite interviewing can be used whenever it is appropriate to treat a respondent as an expert about the topic in hand".

Interviews have many uses and purposes. Obviously they are used to gain information about events and procedures based upon the knowledge and recollections of the interviewees. There are a number of advantages and problems of using interviews for the collection of data. In Libya where there is a considerable lack of data related to privatization and private higher education, interviews are important sources of supplementary information. According to Richard, D (1996, p200 & p201) the interview technique helps the researcher, first, by interpreting documents or reports identified by the personalities involved in the relevant decisions and by assessing the outcome of events. In Libya under the dictatorship of Gaddafi interviews in some cases helped balance any problems due to the distortion of official documents. Second, it provides the researcher with materials, documents and other sources of data that may not yet be available, and
third, it helps to establish a network with both people and institutions that are relevant to
the subject.

However, interviews are more than getting answers to questions: they involve studying the
physical demeanour of interviewees which can offer unexpected information about the
subject being discussed. Sometimes an interview-based field study explores unforeseen
aspects and circumstances that provide more research data and aid the analysis of the
phenomenon. Choosing the right time to ask a question is very important in order to elicit
relevant answers from the interviewees. Sometimes it is useful if the interviewer introduces
humour to encourage an interviewee to talk more freely and to make him or her feel
comfortable during the interview.

However, despite the above advantages, there are a number of well-known problems with
relying on interviews. Some key interviewees may refuse to participate in interviews and
thus render the technique useless and not be truly representative of a sample. Another
problem could be related to reliability which may affect the interpretation of an event. Can
the interview actually be remembering clearly? This is especially the case when relying on
research interviews as sources of data. Yet another problem is related to the interviewee
who sometimes gives contradictory observations and opinions in different interviews,
although this can sometimes be the fault of an interviewer trying to force his interviewee
down a certain avenue. It is also worth noting that some interviewees do not have a
profound knowledge of the subject, or that it is very limited. What the writer would like to
add here is that from his experience of the interviews conducted, there are some key
interviewees when asked to evaluate the privatization of higher education in Libya, refer to
the UK as an example by stating that it has many private universities. In fact, the UK has
only two. The vast majority of United Kingdom universities are government financed, with only two private universities, the University of Buckingham and the BPP, where the government does not subsidize the tuition fees. Other interviewees when asked to justify the privatization of higher education gave answers that were affected by the cultural, social and political background in Libya rather than from what was happening in the world. Some interviewees, even those in high positions, have no knowledge of the arguments for and against the privatization of higher education and this is true of the Libyan population as a whole.

In this particular research in a Libya under the rule of a dictatorship (during the first phase of interviews) and where free information was severely limited, there were many additional problems. Interviewees could not always be relied upon to answer frankly. A sufficient number of interviews was undertaken, however, and involved high status Libyan figures for whom questions were formulated in such a way as to avoid any possible repercussions with Gaddafi’s government.

So, interviews are not always perfect and are certainly not always very reliable for facts or figures. However, interviews are very useful for giving an insight into interviewees’ thoughts and attitudes and their subjective perceptions and recollections of events and the policy process.

Nevertheless the interviews have played an important role in researching the thesis. As was mentioned earlier, this is a first time to conduct PhD research about this aspect in Libya where there is a lack of information and data about the phenomena of private higher education. Therefore, the role of interviews is combination of a number of elements:
they are intended to provide background information,
2. to explore issues where no other sources were available,
3. to enable researchers to be closer to the events and issues, while those looking ‘from the outside in' may fail to gain the important particular information,
4. to probe for the story behind published material,
5. interviews can offer unexpected information about the subject being discussed.

In each interviewee, the interviewer has been told that the use of his/her words is confidential and impartial and that the given information is for an objective academic purpose based on real facts and will not be used to cause any inconvenience. They were also told that their statements will contribute significantly to the topic. They were happy to conduct interviews and they were happy to be recorded and used their names.

It should be mentioned that because the recorded interviews were long and contained much detail, only the truly salient points and observations were transcribed. In order to preserve confidence and impartiality the interviewers were informed that I am going to record the interview and to use their names for quotation marks in the thesis.

The selection of respondents is a particularly difficult and challenging aspect of fieldwork. The process raises questions such as ‘Who is the right interviewee?’ and ‘Why is the person right’? These questions are necessary to prevent bias and improve the reliability of obtained information. A major challenge was identifying key interviewees and gaining access to those of high standing, such as the Prime Minister and the Minister of Education.

Regarding interviews, four key points have to be covered according to Burnham, P et al (2008, p231): decide who you want to see, get access and arrange the interview, conduct
the interview and analyse the results. Below is an outline of the steps taken to implement this:-

(1) Permission was granted by the Libyan authorities to allow access and to arrange the interviews as well as permission to record them. The recordings have been saved on the writer’s computer.

(2) Four categories of persons were interviewed:

- Those who have an effect on private higher education policy.
- The owners of the private universities.
- People who work at the lower level of the administrative structure.
- Employees who have graduated from private universities.

Interviews covered a wide diversity of people from those who worked at high level (e.g. the Minister) to ordinary people who worked at the bottom. Interviewees included politicians, officials, leading academics, teachers, students, private universities owners, employees and ordinary junior academics (see appendix 1). It was easier to meet ‘normal’ people (e.g. employees and administrators) than those people at the high position. I was able to conduct more than an interview with employees often with no arrangements, whereas I had to make appointments to meet a director, manager and minister. Employees and administrators at low positions offer data and tend to be more helpful than those at the top. However, they all provide the thesis useful data, information and giving me a diversity of points of views from those who support the private higher education and those who against the policy.

About one hundred and twenty five recordings were made and most interviewees were willing to cooperate. The two tables below give details of the recordings:
Table (2): The recordings in the first field study. (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>The place</th>
<th>Notices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Afriqya University</td>
<td>Afriqya University/ Tripoli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Al-Refak University</td>
<td>20 of them were with the owner, 4 with students, the rest with the employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>QAA</td>
<td>Director of QAA, Director of QAA of Higher Education and a Doctor who works in the quality department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Government institutions.</td>
<td>Private university graduates who work in government institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Syndicate of Faculty Members.</td>
<td>The Secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Director of Private Higher Education Administration.</td>
<td>Dr. Abdullatif M. Latif</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Deputy to the Dean of Naser University.</td>
<td>Dr. Al-Hadi Swieyh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tripoli Planning Council</td>
<td>Mr. Nader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>General Authority for Information.</td>
<td>Mr. Fergany Eyad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The Administration of Tax/ Tripoli</td>
<td>The Director, responsible for affairs of law and some employees who have degrees from private universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Tripoli University</td>
<td>The owner, the General Registrar and a faculty member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>The place</th>
<th>Notices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Al-Refak University</td>
<td>Mrs. Basma Almadani, The Director of Administrative and Financial Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Al-Refak University</td>
<td>Student in accredited and un-accredited department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>QAA.</td>
<td>The Director, the Director of QAA of Higher Education, the Director of QAA of pre-Higher Education and the Director of Administrative and Financial Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tripoli University</td>
<td>Director of Administrative and Financial Affairs in the Faculty of Engineering and Director of Financial Affairs in the Faculty of Pharmacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Administration of Higher Education.</td>
<td>The Director, some employees and others who come to discuss problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Ministry of Higher Education.</td>
<td>The Minister and the Deputy of Higher Education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Ministry of Education.</td>
<td>The Minister, the Deputy and his secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>National Corporation for Oil</td>
<td>The Director of Administrative and Financial Affairs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The interviews I used followed the format of being semi-structured questions. The characteristics of the interview questions were as follows:

(1) They were open-ended questions to give the interviewee the chance to answer his or her question in more detail and to respond to further probing. Questions differed slightly depending on the type of response.

(2) They contained a variety of subjects:

• They included questions which were specifically related to state policy of higher education as a whole.

• Questions related to matters in private higher education.

• Questions concerning the political ideology of the Gaddafi regime.

• The answers of the interviewees were used to explain the matters and issues of private higher education in Libya and to highlight some of the contradictions between the policy and its application (e.g. the idea of private higher education and its reality).

(3) They were short and simple to understand.

As I have mentioned, the data and information are not published in an organized way and when I was in Libya doing my field study in 2010 I visited more than fifteen institutions. The answers of the interview questions in a despotic regime like Gaddafi’s do not seem to give the entire story, however I was able to get much useful answers and details for some reasons:

1. Interview questions were open.

2. Prior to each of my interview I introduce myself to the interviewee and showed him/her my official permeation to conduct the interview.

3. I have relationships with some of the interviewees, so they felt free and relax to talk.
4. Interviewees were happy to criticize private universities but not to criticize the political system.

5. An important point here that Gaddafi’s regime became less powerful than before as it had been in the power for forty years. His eight sons and a daughter became powerful figures and they played an important role effecting Gaddafi’s regime policy. There was in some way a free space to talk frankly about the government policy.

It should be mentioned that the problem was that the distance between places that I visited was very long and I have to take more than two transportations to get there and sometimes I have to walk because there is no transport between some of them. For example, the Higher Education Office was located in the city centre while the Ministry of Higher Education was located outside of Tripoli and the distance between the National Committee of Private Universities and the Ministry was very far. It means that I had to spend all day to get some information and sometimes in traffic jam circumstances the task became very hard.

1.12. Two Phases of Fieldwork including Interviews:

There were two distinct phases in my field work which need to be discussed because of the very different political circumstances of the two periods. These differences particular affected the interviews.

A. The first period of Fieldwork in 2010:

Field work started in October 2010 when I went to Libya and spent three months there. I visited some of the state institutions and a number of the private universities in the capital.

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3 Libya lacks buses, trains and the internet considerably. In addition the institutions are distributed randomly that makes the trip for everyone to get there very difficult.
city, Tripoli. The field study is limited to this city as it has the largest number of such institutions and would be likely to have at least one of the best of the private higher education institutions. I was able to meet the two key actors – one in charge of private education and one who is responsible for private higher education⁴. In addition, I conducted interviews with the owners of some private universities in order to obtain their views on the policy process. There were also several interviews with other important people in the city of Tripoli that provided me with a supplementary perspective on the subject.

For this period twenty one leading questions as listed in appendix 3 were prepared and were accepted by the supervisors. They were set up in a way that help the writer: to develop the notions and the ideas about the phenomenon of private higher education in Libya, to understand the perceptions of the interviewees about the subject and to identify the similarities or the differences of the phenomenon between Libya and the other countries.

The following were interviewed during this first phase of fieldwork:

- My MSc supervisor, Professor Farhat Shernana. He was a rector of Garyounis University (the second largest university in Libya) from 1980-1985 and then an economic minister from 1968-1990. At present he is retired.
- Dr. Suleiman Ghoja who was in charge of private higher education in Libya. Then he worked at the National Centre for Education Planning (NCEP).
- Eng. Mohammed Shafter the General Secretary for the Syndicate of Faculty Members of Alfatah University.

⁴ Private education is a level of pre higher education which includes primary and secondary education. While the second one refers to undergraduate level.
- Mr. Mohammed Al-Tomy the General Director of Tax Administration in Tripoli.
- Dr. Elhadi Al-Swayh the General Secretary of Naser University.
- Dr. Mohammed Al-Kaber the General Secretary of QAA.
- Dr. Hussin Margen the Director of QAA of Higher Education institutes.
- Dr. Abd-Al Majid Hussain who specialized on matters of quality in education at all levels. Ten employees.
- Dr. Abdullatif M. Latife the Director of the Administration of Private Higher Education.
- Al-Ferjani Eyad the Head of Administration Matters in the General Authority Information department.
- The head of the Planning Council in Tripoli.
- Mrs. Mohiba Franka who is the owner of Al-Refak University.
- Dr. Al-Mabrouk Abo Shena the owner of Afriqya University.
- Dr. Al-Mehdi Mohammed the owner of Tripoli University.
- Fortunately when I was in Al-Refak University doing my field study, I met Prof. Robert Schofield who is a British academic specializing in the area of quality matters and accreditation in higher education. He came with a delegation from QAA to have a meeting with the president of the university and the chiefs of the scientific departments and others responsible for university matters. I conducted and recorded an interview with him.
- Mr. Nader who work at Tripoli Planning Council, Mr. Fergany Eyad in General Authority for Information, Sabah Algdeery at Tax Administration and Mrs. Fateme Al-Abani who work at People’s Solicitor Administration.
Private university graduates. They all provided useful information about some issues relating to private higher education and its relationship with the government.

These interviews took place in the last three months of 2010, and were carefully designed and carried out. Most were quickly transcribed and stored. Three planned interviews, unfortunately, failed to take place. The Dean of Al-Fateh University, Tripoli, Dr. Abd.Alkarem Al-Akremi, refused to participate on the grounds that he was not interested in the research subject. I clarified the main points and the importance of the interview but he again refused and said, "...I am busy....it is better to go to the National Committee for Private Universities..." Dr. Shokri Ghanem, who has been Prime Minister for three years, was unfortunately abroad for a week attending a conference. The third was the Minister of Education (Dr. Abd-Alkaber Al-Fakhri) who was ‘very busy’, although he did pass a message via his secretary advising me to go to the National Committee for Private Universities which would represent his view on the subject.

B. The post revolutionary fieldwork after fall of Gaddafi.

After the February Revolution of 2011 I again went to Libya to do a further field study in January 2012. It was short and Libya had just entered a new era after 42 years of dictatorship. There was no doubt that such a tremendous change would have influenced the previous government’s policy to privatise higher education and it was important to cover issues raised by the revolution. I prepared a list of twelve interview questions (as listed in Appendix 4) that would shed light on these issues in an attempt to analyse the views of the
temporary government on the idea of privatization and private higher education and to establish to what extent private higher education has been influenced by the revolution. Twelve more questions were formulated to cover the issues raised by recent events in Libya since the 17th of February 2011 (e.g. the role of private higher education in the future, and aspects of unaccredited private universities and their graduates). More details of these are shown in the epilogue at the appendix.1.

The big challenge was how to arrange interviews under such difficult circumstances. The government had just taken control of the country but there were still pockets of resistance. It is also worth mentioning that in Libya, at least in most of the twenty five places that I visited, the Internet is rarely used and this is due to the fact that many employees lack computer skills. In the offices of the Administration of Private Higher Education, for instance, the majority of the staff do not utilise emails or have the ability to use the Internet.

In this second phase of the fieldwork I interviewed the following people:

- The Deputy Minister of Higher education, Prof. Fathi R. Akkari. Initially I tried to meet the Minister of Higher education, but his Secretary Dr. Abd-Almageed Husseen, prevented this by stating that: “....it is not necessary...it is not important and there is no need for such this work these days. The current government is temporary and the country is still in chaos...” But I persevered and attempted to convince him that the research was essential, especially at this stage of chaos and instability, and that it would provide an important link with the development of privatization and private higher education in Libya. The present policy has entered a
new stage and there is no doubt it will be open to as yet unexamined influences. At last I was allowed to meet the Minister and he answered the interview questions.

- The Minister of Education Mr. Suleiman Al-Sweahli and the Deputy Minister of Education Dr. Suleiman M. Khoja.

- Dr. Abdullatif M. Latif who in charge of private higher education. He is a Director of the Private Higher Education Administration.

- Dr. Mohammed Alkaber the General Director of the QAA.

- Dr. Hussin Margen the Director of QAA of Higher Education Institutes.

- Mr. Mustafa Al-Kheshr the Director of Administration for the Quality and Accreditation of the Pre-University Education Institution. He was involved in a committee of accreditation.

- Mr. Aref Al-Alawe the Director of the Management of Administrational and Financial Affairs at QQA.

- Mrs. Basma Al-Madani who is the Director of the Managerial and Financial Affairs in Al-Refak University. She is also the daughter of the owner of the university. Mrs. Saeda who in charge for the QAA department of Al-Refak University.

- I left a request asking to meet the Prime Minister Dr. Abd-Alrahim Alkeap but his secretary called me by phone and told me to go to the Minister of Higher Education.

All these contributors provide very important information and significant research data.
C. Comparing the two phases of interviews:

Table (4): A comparison between two field studies in Libya (pre- and post- 17\textsuperscript{th} of February 2011 Revolution).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title/ Subject</th>
<th>Pre 17\textsuperscript{th} of February Revolution</th>
<th>Post 17\textsuperscript{th} of February Revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to minister or vice minister</td>
<td>Difficult.</td>
<td>Easy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking politically on the issues of private higher education.</td>
<td>People very cautious to involve themselves in such issues or to refer directly to the role of the political system.</td>
<td>People frankly criticise the role of the political system on the policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The comments of some interviewees.</td>
<td>Some interviewees gave comments supporting the previous Gaddafi political regime.</td>
<td>These comments are reversed and the interviewees show in their reappraisals support for the current change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability.</td>
<td>Stable. The system of higher Education never experienced any disputes since 1955.</td>
<td>Unstable: There have been a large number of strikes and disputes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.13. The guidelines employed regarding the interviews and ethical issues:

Interviews were mostly face to face. All interviews were recorded and notes were taken where necessary. Some of the interviews and some of the written sources are in Arabic, the official language of Libya, and these have been translated in to English. All the interviews were conducted by the researcher with local assistance that helped in identifying and locating the right people and places in Tripoli. An official letter of permission was
carried by the researcher and showed to the interviewees before each interview; some of them were interested in examining it and some asked for a copy, due, no doubt, to their apprehension about the rules associated with security and political matters. Others displayed no fear whatsoever and readily agreed to be interviewed and those who initially refused to be recorded eventually gave their consent when convinced that the study was to be one with its main focus on the improvement of the higher education sector which would possibly constitute a service to the public. Most of the interviewees whose comments were used as quotes or narratives gave their full consent and were happy to have their names mentioned.

Post revolution the field study proved to be much easier than before, though full security and stability had not been achieved at the time. The country was still witnessing strikes and protests: on the occasion I went to meet the Minister of Higher Education on the 3rd January, 2012, for instance, I found a group of protestors assembled in front of the building and another protest I observed comprised workers from the Company for Engineering Industries that was controlled by the General Secretary for the Work Force. On 9th January 2011 the Cabinet establishment was blocked all day by employees demanding wages that had not been paid for seven months. Despite such obstructions, progress was made. Official letters of permission were always carried but were largely unused and even the minister and vice-minister were readily accessible and cooperative as long as appointments had been made. Such accessibility is attributable to the fact that those who have accepted responsibility in the new government try to avoid confrontation with citizens who have had negative experiences over a period of some 42 years under Gaddafi’s dictatorship.

Below are some critical points I would like to add with regard to some interviews:
1. To conduct some interviews I had to make more than one appointment and on occasions I had to wait all day before being able to conduct an interview.

2. Some high status interviewees displayed an unwelcoming attitude although not overtly: their responses indicated perhaps apprehension, even jealousy, and the information they gave was limited or evasive.

3. There were problems with some employees who were in occupations for which they were not qualified or competent.

It should be borne in mind that the writer has used only the important and relevant points from the recordings, some of which are used as references and allow conclusions to be made. Such observations are important components in developing an analysis of the Libyan higher education financing policy by providing extensive data that beforehand had not been available. As it has been mentioned earlier that the interviews are good sources of data, the researcher has chosen different types of people (e.g. seniors, important political figures, employees and students). This has helped provide a comprehensive section of people concerned with higher education who were able to speak from a range of different viewpoints. The material of interview was based on a Sony record with ability of recording more than 150 hours. The latter was an important element to save all information from the interviewees with no worries.

1.14. The case study of Al-Refak University

This thesis is concerned to analyse the developments of higher education in Libya policy with respect to the role of the privatisation. However, it has been considered beneficial as part of this research to undertake some in-depth study of one university in the form of a case study.
Stake (in Bryman, A, 2004, p48) writes that “…a case study is concerned with the complexity and particular nature of the case in question”. It is a method of empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, R, 1994). Stake, R, (1995) identifies some types of case study applications: descriptive, explanatory and exploratory; and these will be used in this study.

Al-Refak University has been chosen as a case study for the following reasons:

1. It is located in the capital city of Libya (Tripoli) where I live.
2. It is the only university during the Gaddafi period that gained accreditation from QAA in Tripoli.
3. It has been established since 1999 the year of the introduction of private higher education.
4. I have a good relationship with the owner of the university and its staff.
5. It has a good archive that helps the writer to get adequate data.
6. It has more number of students than other private universities.

It should be noted that the writer uses one university as a case study because:

1. There are only four private universities in Libya that are accredited by QAA. The others have not been accredited yet.
2. It seems to me it is the perfect example to give a standard of measurement in private higher education.
3. The other private universities have similar trends and features comparable with Al-Refak University and any analysis and evaluation of this university as a model would apply to others.

It should be mentioned that Al-Refak University as a case study was useful to me. There is a lack of data related to the research topic in Libya, but the university has provided me reasonable data and information. Dealing with the university as a case study and doing a practical research was very helpful in improving my research skills. In my point of view, there is a difference between theories or literature in private higher education policies and practical process. The detailed knowledge on the grass roots supplemented some general factors and helped explain how things really were developing. It was good to get a level of detail.

I have been to the university many times. It was a good experience to me. Such a special experience has -to some extent- provided some lessons I have learnt. It is clear that the university has made a good progress gaining accreditation certificate and being at a good position in the capital city (Tripoli) and is therefore supposedly towards the better end of the scale. However I discovered that there were still some important matters that needed to be addressed: quality, relevance, financing, efficiency, and governance. Despite the fact that its graduates have difficulty in finding interesting and well-paid jobs and its quality is believed to be poor, people are still sending their children to study there as well as to other private universities. People who do that seem to be looking for a means of buying degrees only which do not correspond to any real qualification or knowledge.
1.15. Conclusions

As Burnham, P et al. (2008, p232) state: “…the key guideline [in research methods] must be not to base any piece of work entirely on elite interviewing.” This is consistent with the principle of triangulation, which Bryman (in Burnham, P et al. (2008, p232)), “…entails using more than one method or source of data in the study of social phenomena.” Accordingly, the writer has primarily based the research upon various written materials, such as publications, official documents, working papers, official decisions, magazines, archives, observations at meetings, recorded speeches, photos, newspapers, catalogues and the media as described above. The elite interviews have been used to support the data collected and to gain some additional insights both regarding information and regarding the subjective perceptions of various actors in policy. All this research develops and goes on from my MSc research centred on the Economics of Education in Libya over the period 1965-1995. After this, I have worked for six years as a lecturer at Tripoli University (previously Al-Fatah), the largest university in Libya, and have contributed to more than 12 local conferences, forums and symposiums dealing with human resources and higher education. I believe that this experience and knowledge applied to the present thesis will result in a conscientious and worthwhile body of research.

Utilising all the research findings, the writer hopes:

- to build a proper study of private higher education in Libya;
- to make a new contribution in this field locally and internationally;
- to provide an accurate, comprehensive, and integrated picture of the higher education financing policy in Libya and to offer a base for future extensive studies in the field of financing higher education in the country.
Chapter two: The funding of higher education (review of literature).

2.1 Introduction:
High education is becoming increasingly important in modern societies as an active component in shaping public policy, developing the intellectual talent of the world, improving economic opportunity and leading pioneering research in fields such as health care, biotechnology, computer and information systems, manufacturing technology, the physical sciences and in the social sciences. Higher education today is becoming integrated into society as a leader in education and innovation. Education in general, and higher education in particular, are becoming one of the world’s largest economic activities. It is assumed to be the way to social esteem, higher paid and better jobs, wider life options, intellectual stimulation and a rewarding and vocational career structure.

Despite the clear importance of higher education for both economic and social development, the sector has raised several issues, such as the cost of higher education and its financing policy. Much has been said and discussed about the cost and financing of higher education and many questions have been asked: for instance, how will higher education be financed? How much of a nation’s total resources, whether physical or human, ought to be, or can be, devoted to higher education? Who will pay for higher education? What ought higher education to cost per student or per degree? How ought the costs of higher education to be shared between the public and private sectors? What quality of education will be supplied and in which disciplines and institutions? All these issues have been presented in depth in several authoritative reports, by, for instance, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Bank (WB), the
International Conference of Higher Education (ICHI), and the American Council of Education.

Some of the questions often raised are whether post-secondary education should be publicly funded or should its cost be divided between a government, a student, a parent, and other primary beneficiaries. There are many policies which have been introduced and adopted by governments and planners to control resources that are devoted to education in general and tertiary education in particular. These policies, which are designed to achieve and obtain various goals, appear to differ considerably according to circumstances and conditions in each country.

The size of tertiary education was limited in most parts of the globe until the 1960s after which there was a change towards a reassessment of financing policies for higher education and many governments across the world became increasingly focused on establishing strategies for the financing of their higher education. The 1990s saw the emergence of mass and universal access to higher education (Altbach, P, (a), 1999), and according to Johnstone, B (2003, p403) and (Barnett, R, 1992) its expansion has continued into the twenty first century. Now many higher education matters are debated by policy makers, different academic faculties and official authorities such as economists and politicians. One such area for consideration is, of course, the financing of higher education and this has become an important issue around the globe. Higher education is both necessary and desirable, but it is expensive and faces competition for funding from other public and social sectors with equally justifiable claims.
There is evidence that in many countries, especially in developing regions, governments can no longer continue to finance and increase spending on tertiary education. Consequently the worldwide attitude towards higher education finance has changed and governments have been forced to reform and reconsider their policies. Internal pressures of declining economies, rapid demographic growth and increased competition for scarce financial resources from different sectors, coupled with external neo-liberal doctrines championed by global donors like the World Bank, have resulted in a new market-competitive policy in financing higher education. As a result higher education has faced many changes in its methods, management, and its financing. Altbatch, P, (a) (1999, p110) explains that various countries have undergone substantial changes in relation to public spending. The role of the state in financing both public services in general and tertiary education in particular began to change after the Second World War, and an associated policy of high taxes to pay for these public services started to break down in the 1980s. During that period, attitudes around post-secondary education changed and it became “private is good”. The reason was not only that public expenditure in many countries, if not all, had not been able to meet the increasing social demands for tertiary education, but also as Walford (in Lee, M, 2008, p188) observes: “For countries to be competitive in the global market, neo-liberal ideology posits that there should be a shrinking of the welfare state and cutbacks in social expenditure. This view implies drastic cutbacks in public spending and the privatization of public services such as health, education, housing, and transportation. The underlying ideology of privatization is based on the argument that the public sector is wasteful, inefficient, and unproductive, while the private sector is deemed to be more efficient, effective, and responsive to rapid changes in the global economy.”
Moreover, according to Ziderman, A and Albreach, D (1995): “Pressure to reform the financing of higher education has mounted in virtually every part of the world. The problems compelling changes have been developing for decades, but the economic stringency of the 1980s has exacerbated the need for reform, bringing many institutions to the brink of collapse. The crisis confronting higher education systems is not simply financial. There are justified concerns about quality, relevance, equity and specific mission of institutions, in many countries, developing and developed, and all these issues need to be addressed. However, it is clear that putting the financial structure of higher education on to a more solid footing is essential before many of these other problems can be resolved.”

This chapter will attempt to outline three different approaches related to a financing policy for higher education, private division and its role in higher education. Firstly it will introduce, briefly, when and how the studies of higher education have developed. Secondly, it will highlight the definition of privatization and determine the difference between the concept of privatization of higher education and the concept of private higher education. Thirdly, it will introduce various points of view and the arguments that have been adopted by scholars and those who are interested in this aspect of privatizing higher education.

2.2 The development of the world attitude towards financing policies for higher education:
Higher education is a very important sector in developed and developing societies. It has four dominant purposes and roles. First, is that it provides the means and tools which are used by individuals or governments to solve a large number of problems. Second, is that
higher education provides training for a research career. Third, is that higher education creates an efficient management structure for the provision of teachers. And finally, higher education is a catalyst or agent in enabling life changes to be made. (Spitzberg, J, 1980), (Barnett, R 1992) and (Teichler in Burgen, A, 1996, p. 96).

Notwithstanding the importance of higher education, it was largely neglected as a subject of academic study until the mid-twentieth century. (Altbach, P and Engberg, D, 2001, p2). The feeling of many people from the end of the Second World War till the 1980s, even of those who were educated, had been that higher education in both the developed and in the developing countries could only be a public responsibility and that it should be provided and subsidized by the state. Before 1980, the dominant view was that higher education provided a service for the `public good’ and that it had a considerable role to fulfil in society by equipping individuals with the advanced knowledge and skills required for economic and social development. The consensus was that a society should meet its own costs and is thus defined as a public benefit that would serve a society as a whole and not just its individuals. This is the dominant concept with obvious interconnections. Firstly as Enders, J and Jongbloed, B (2007, p10) point out, the dominant role of the state in elementary and secondary education has been a well-established tradition and has led the state to expand its role in higher education as well. The second explanation, which seems to confirm the previous point, is that education in general and higher education in particular, has played a significant role in building nation-states and their economies. The third explanation has an economical foundation related to capital market imperfections. The latter implies that investments in higher education involve risks for the private sector because it is uncertain about its ability to bear the cost of higher education and achieve its gains. Higher education remains a public asset in many countries but there is a move
towards implementing tertiary education as a private concept with the benefits accruing largely to individuals. It seems that higher education for the public good can no longer to be a feasible policy in the light of current challenges (e.g. a growing demand for higher education and an unwillingness of the state to fund the increased costs of tertiary education. (Altbach, P, (a) (c), 1999, p111 & Altbach, P & Levy, D, 2005). This has led to a variety of responses in many countries. Some of them have encouraged the private sector to play its role in the higher education system (e.g. in Latin American and East Asia countries where private higher education institutions have grown rapidly). Other countries have not established private higher education but instead have introduces market mechanisms in financing higher education, by the introduction of tuition fees and by adopting the idea of cost sharing and increasing autonomy in financing and instituting policies.

2.3 The definition of privatization in higher education.

The term privatization is often used in economic literature meaning, in general, the deliberate movement of the state’s role in the economy towards private ownership and a free market economy. Le Grand and Robinson (in Mok, K and Wat, K 1998, p256) refers that privatization is closely associated with a reduction in state activities, especially a reduction in state provision, and in state subsidy and regulation.

A common element in privatization is a movement away from dependence on the state for funding towards private funding. Regarding higher education, this had been the major trend throughout the world in the 1980s and 1990s as is described by contributors (in Altbach. P (b), 1999, p113) who point out that higher education systems have been transferred from public control to private control, from democratization in higher education
to other varied concepts, such as ‘marketization’, ‘commercialization’, ‘and ‘privatization’. This movement has also been a significant feature of the World Bank’s agenda and its economic reform policies that are seen as important elements and an effective measure for every economic sector including that of higher education in order to improve efficiency and to ease financial crises.

Psacharopoulos, G (N.D, p1) and Mok, K & Wat, K (1998) point out, there are broad views regarding such a concept because of overlapping and interlocking in terms of privatized tertiary education with the private and public higher education institutions being neither purely private nor purely public. In spite of this, the literature on the financing of higher education provides us with several definitions for the concept of the privatization of tertiary education.

Johnston, B (2003) has defined it as a process or tendency of colleges and universities (both private and public) to take on characteristics of, or operational norms associated with, private enterprises. Kwiek, M (2003) and Sanyal, B (1998, p30) define it as “transformation of ownership and control from the state sector to the private sector be it individual, organization, enterprise or community.” Molly N. Lee (in Altbach, P (b) 1999, p144) defines privatization as one of the alternative means of financing higher education which “means a reduction in the level of state provision, and a corresponding encouragement of the expansion of private provision.” These definitions seem to share two main features: the move away from dependence on the state for funding higher education and the involvement of the private sector in higher education.
It should be noted that the privatization of higher education means and refers not only to the private sector, to individuals, to non-government or public agencies and other private forms, and not only has meaning in the private sector, but has also emerged in public institutions. The latter can also have a private programme or a privately run activity. This phenomenon, called ‘privatization’ by Altbach, P (d), (1999, p1) of public institutions makes public and private institutions appear more and more similar. The size of the private sector and the level of reduction in the state in higher education vary between countries. Public and private sectors coexist in most societies to different extents and in varying forms. In some Latin American countries, for example, private higher education is a growing phenomenon leading to what has been called the ‘mass private sector’. In contrast, the private sector in some societies in Asia has been limited and is known as the ‘peripheral private sector’. The table (5) below may be give some differences between privatisation of public universities and private universities.
Table (5) differences between privatisation of public universities and private universities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Privatisation of public university</th>
<th>Private universities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It founded by government, however the market forces play important roles</td>
<td>Founded by people and individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It still serves a clear public mission as determined by the faculty or the state.</td>
<td>It serves private interests of students, clients and owners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is publicly owned and it can be altered or even closed by government.</td>
<td>The owner/s is/are a person or people who found the university.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Still Free</td>
<td>charge tuition fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries of employees and staff members are paid by government</td>
<td>Salaries of employees and staff members are paid by owners of universities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High degree of autonomy, however universities are still under high state control.</td>
<td>Controls limited to those over any other businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatised public universities and they are non-profit: clear public</td>
<td>Private for-profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The source of Revenue comes from state and government allocations.</td>
<td>All private revenue mainly from tuition fees.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quasi-privatized public higher education has taken various forms that are found in different countries as a package of policies:

1. greater cost recovery through the introduction of cost sharing and student fees or the raising of student fees from the nominal levels charged at present in most countries;
2. privatization of services in public institutions;
3. delayed cost recovery through a system of student loans;
4. a broader diversification of revenue sources, particularly that of selling services to industry;
5. public-financed privatization;
6. corporatization of universities and the public–private partnership that refers to cooperative ventures between the state and private businesses;
7. The encouragement of public higher education institutions to lessen their dependence on state funds, to be more ‘entrepreneurial’ and competitive, and to demonstrate efficient professional management.

Privatization programmes of various sorts have a number of different goals:
1. to enhance higher education institutions process;
2. to increase competition between providers of higher education;
3. to raise revenue for the government;
4. to improve economic efficiency;
5. to decrease state influence in universities.

Privatisation in higher education seems to have different meaning, in some countries (e.g. USA) it is more about market orientation and push students and their parents for cost sharing and to pay tuition fees. Governments seem to alter their public universities deliberately to be private universities or alike. Although privatization leads to increased private participation and strengthened markets, it does not necessarily shrink the overall size of the public sector. In Libya privatization of public universities means self-steering administration where there were no tuition fees and cost sharing ideas. Public universities are free of charge. The government during Gaddafi’s period had implemented a policy for
privatising some faculties in Al-Fatah University. The government estimated the cost of each student in a year and then the university get its allocations according to the number of students. The university according to this policy was given autonomy and it operated like a business. However, the focus of the thesis is the private higher education rather than privatization of public universities.

Privatization in higher education has been seen a proper policy that is designed by policymakers trying to push for self-steering and accountable entities. In some countries the policy is proposed to improve higher education institutions. African countries, for example have been recommended by the World Bank to liberalize their higher education systems and to privatize their institutions. The World found that these institutions are highly subsidized by the state, overstaffed, offer outmoded curricula, and produce large numbers of graduates with minimal relevance to the prevailing labour market needs. (Munene, I & Otieno, W. 2007, p464). The World Bank indeed produced emphatic policy prescriptions which recommended a move towards a free market and privatization in economic activities including that of higher education.

In central and eastern European countries the rise in the role of private tertiary education has been mainly the result of widespread and explicit commitment to the virtues of the free market after a long period of dominance by centralised state planning. This commitment has frequently been strengthened by the difficulties experienced in various sectors of these societies by public institutions trying to adapt to the new situation during the early stages of their transition from communism. (Crnković, B Požega, Ž. (N.D), G.Sivalingam, 2006, p12 &p13, Quddus, M and Rashid, S. (2000) & Altbach, P (a), 1999).
Nowadays private institutions of higher education have spread widely in many Asian and Latin American countries where the number of students who attend private universities and colleges amount to more than those in the USA or in European countries. In Asian states, such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia upwards of 80 per cent of students attend private institutions. And in Latin America at least 50 per cent of all students are enrolled in such institutions whereas in Western countries it is only five per cent, the exception being the United States with 20 per cent. (Altbach, P (c), 1999).

Researchers have pointed to some general reasons for interest in market solutions to the problems of higher education:

1. The public sector has not been able to meet the increasing demand for higher education. There are many universities, especially in developing countries that are able to absorb only a small fraction of the students seeking admission. (Varghese,N, (a) 2004, p12, Kapur, D and Crowley, M, 2008, p16 and Altbach, P (a), 1999, p311).

2. As state institutions of higher education have required more funds, so a government has no longer been able to finance the cost and at the same time the public sector has had to diversify its funding sources from non-governmental revenues. Instead, public funding has declined in most countries and governments today have been curbing government spending in higher education and in their welfare provision with cutbacks in social expenditure as a whole. The more dominant reason for the decline in higher education support has been the multiple pressures on government itself, consisting of a much broader demand for social services, law enforcement, infrastructure improvements, public amenities and the exigencies of national emergencies. (Lee, M, 2008, Altbach, P (a), 1999, p314, Ali, H, N.D, p266, and Teferra, D & Altbach, P, 2004, p32.)
3. The public sector has been criticized by analysts and authors saying that it is wasteful, inefficient, and unproductive. Public trust in government has declined in recent years. The result is declining confidence in the non-profit sector and rising confidence in the for-profit sector. (Varghese, N, (b)2004, p12, Mok, K, 2003, p203, p213).

4. It is acknowledged that public institutions of higher education are not able to be more effective in responding to the rapid changes in the global economy. Globalization contributes both to the increasing demand for tertiary education and to the inadequate government revenue to support it. In light of globalization, governments today feel the effects (e.g. the revolution in technological communication and the development in the globalization of higher education) as theories of ‘new governance’ and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have proposed a need to change their roles from centralization to self governance and from nationalization to marketization which can take four models. These are the market model, the participatory state model, the flexible government model and the deregulated government model. (Nguyen, H, N.D, p73; Mok, K, 2000, Ali, H N.D, p265; Pierre and Peters in Mok, K, 2005, p358 and p359 and Mok, J, 2002)

A significant change is in the way that higher education has increasingly become perceived as a benefit for the individual rather than for the society as a whole and this has encouraged policymakers to consider the privatisation of higher education.

As already noted when discussed privatization in general, we can find competing and different objectives in these various policies. In some cases the goal is to shift costs from
government to students by the introduction of fees, for example. Here the issue can be portrayed as one of equity: those who will get the later economic benefits of a higher education should pay for it rather than be subsidised by the general public. On the other hand the desire to see universities operate along business lines to maximise profit is an issue of efficiency. As a result, varieties of models for privatization at this level of education have existed and reflect its meaning in different rhetorical constructions and ideological concepts.

In Western European countries, such as the UK, the state is the main resource provider and the existence of private institutions remains minimal in most higher education systems. Privatization, though, is seen as a means of increasing competition between universities which would lead to value for money, but it does not mean that the institutions are owned by companies or individuals. Instead, privatization seeks to diversify the financial resources by selling services and increasing tuition fees, by earning funds from consultations, by selling intellectual property of various kinds, by licensing, by renting out university property, by university and industry collaborations that produce income, and by encouraging competition between higher education institutions as a way of improving efficiency. In contrast, privatization in other countries (e.g. USA, Latin American countries and in some countries in Eastern Europe) where private institutions of higher education are well established, means that higher education institutions are owned by non-public organizations, individuals or families who fund these institutions through personal wealth. These establishments rely mostly on tuition fees and the contribution of students and families to the cost of higher education. (Teixeira, P and Amaral, A 2001, p364 & p365).
It should be noted that despite this diversity of such a concept of higher education privatization its definitions are slightly different in different systems, but they all share the common ideas that:

1. Autonomy, according to state regulation of ‘privatization’ in the literature is one of the most far-reaching trends in higher education today. It means that both public and private higher education institutions have been given self-government and self-determination by a state, relatively, to regulate themselves as a way to seek a more efficient use of available resources. In public universities in many countries, governments have shifted certain financial responsibilities to more local control and their policies have been moved from centralization to decentralization of authority. This means that individuals and citizens have become more involved in the regulation of higher education as in the case of private universities where governments allow them to be self-administrating institutions.

2. Cost reduction which means a decrease in the cost per student. It has a package of policies including an increase in class sizes and teaching loads, deferring maintenance costs and dropping low-priority programmes. It also includes other strategies such as substituting lower-cost part-time faculties for higher-cost full-time faculties and a concentration on low-cost popular fields, such as law, economics and business studies that would appear to exist more in private universities than in public higher education institutions.

3. Revenue generation where public and private higher education institutions have been asked to reduce their dependence on government funds and instead to generate revenue from alternative sources, such as tuition fees and auxiliary charges so that a proportion of the cost is shared by students, through an income from consulting, by university and industry collaboration to produce income and through other forms that transform
institutions’ teaching, research and service activities and thereby compete with private enterprises in the larger economic marketplace.

2.4 Higher education: the debate between the private and the public sectors.
Globally, higher education has varying forms in regard to the division in tertiary education between the public and private sectors. While some countries could have their higher education controlled, managed and financed publicly as the dominant sector, the private sector in other regions could be the dominant one. Geiger (in Geiger, R, 1988, p.700) classified higher education as having three basic structural patterns of public-private differentiation: mass private and restricted public sectors, parallel public and private sectors, and comprehensive public and peripheral private sectors. According to the relationship between a state and its higher education institutions, the provision of tertiary education could be divided between two main models of higher education. The first model is the public-control model. It means that the government or the state is essentially responsible for the regulation of its higher education institutions.

Second is the state-supervising model which means that academic professors have considerable powers, the institutional administrators have modest powers and the state accepts a modest role. The institutions in this model regulate themselves through their staff and their senior professors who control the institutions and design their policies. (Arnove, R and Torres, C, 2007, ps. 185 & 186). Below are two points of view that argue for and against the privatization of higher education.
A. Arguments against privatization.

Higher education is the subject of controversial debate with very different points of view and arguments on how higher education should be managed and financed: “In the past, the belief system surrounding the public interest has been that public entities (and actors) must be kept separate from the private domain, and that the public interest is best served by preventing conflict of interest” (Varghese, N, (b) 2004, p5 and Rhoades, G and Slaughter, S, 1997). However, following the Second World War, the financing policies of tertiary education have been at the centre of debate as to whether the public or the private sector should be the preferred system. Although the global trend has been more and more in favour of privatization of higher education there is still a strong feeling for public higher education.

The notion of state responsibility and public finance revolves around these arguments:

Firstly, Cemmell (in Lee, M, 2008, p. 193) argues that “The idea that higher education is a public good has strong support among educators and the academy. The non-rivals nature of public good implies that one person’s use of the good does not limit that of another, and its non-excludable character holds that a person cannot be prevented from using the good. According to this definition higher education is a public good because it is freely available (if there is no scarcity) and consumption by one person does not impair the interest of others”.

Secondly, it is argued that the private sector in its cost-sharing forms may make students, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds, unable to enrol in higher education and that higher education provision should be managed and financed publicly because of its social gains that benefit a society as a whole. A cost-benefit analysis on higher
education includes data that gives a broad overview about the costs and benefits of tertiary education for both the individual student and for society as a whole. Table 5 shows that post-secondary education imparts positive advantages that influence a society as a whole more than its individual students. The social rates of return for higher education can be calculated on the monetary external effects, such as economic growth and increased tax payments from graduates. (Vossensteyn, H, 2004, ps 40 & 41). These findings have been found by recent studies in developed countries. They ranged between 6 per cent and 15 per cent: Blonbal et al (in Vossensteyn, H, 2004, p42). Table 6 also shows that higher education imparts non-monetary benefits which justify full public subsidies for tertiary education.

Table (6). The Public Costs and Monetary and Non-monetary Benefits of Higher Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Operating costs of programmes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Student support</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forgone national production related to students</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monetary and Economic Benefits</td>
<td>Higher national productivity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher tax revenues</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Greater flexibility in labour force</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Higher consumption</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduce reliance on government financial support</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National and regional development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-monetary and Social Benefits</td>
<td>Increased consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased potential for transformation from low-skill industrial to knowledge-based economy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greater social cohesion, appreciation of social diversity and cultural heritage</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher social mobility</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower crime rates</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More donations and charity work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased capacity to adapt to new technologies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic participation; increased consensus; perception that the society is based on fairness and opportunities for all citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nation-building and development of leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved elementary and secondary education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tertiary education not only makes an overall contribution to economic growth, but also has broad economic, fiscal, and labour market effects. Both these influences have been explained and listed by Steier, F (2003, p76):

1. He points out that higher education enables and furthers the development and diffusion of technological innovations that increase the economic productivity.

2. Productivity is also improved by higher skills and qualitative enhancements which are gained by a labour force which is a product of tertiary education and which has acquired the necessary skills in utilising new technologies.

3. The development and diffusion of technological innovations contribute substantially to the progress within economic sectors, such as agriculture, industry, health, and in environmental concerns.

4. The higher education sector also contributes to an increase in workforce flexibility that is increasingly seen as a crucial factor in economic development in the context of ‘knowledge’ economies.

5. The contributions made by an innovative higher education system are essential for transformation and growth throughout an economy.

6. Several studies from OECD states, the United States and Canada reveal that there is a positive correlation between developed participation in higher education and reduced reliance on government financial support for medical and welfare services, such as housing, food stamps and unemployment. (Steier, F, 2003, p76).

An imperfect capital market has led to uncertainty about future roles likely to be faced by students eligible to enter higher education institutions, such as universities, and it is argued that they may face risks caused by the imperfections of the capital market and such students are doubtful as to whether they will be able to graduate with a guaranteed job in
the future. As a result, some students hesitate about making a decision and are apprehensive about applying for education loans through private banks. There is, therefore, a need for government intervention either by guaranteeing bank loans or by offering loans themselves, in order to compensate for the imperfections in the capital market. By so doing, they may help to prevent an underinvestment in education. (Oosterbeek. Barr in Vossensteyn, H, 2004, p42). For example: “Most industrial countries subsidise, to a greater or lesser extent, non-compulsory education and in particular higher education. One of the justifications for this policy is capital market imperfections which prevent agents from borrowing against future human capital income. Subsidies to higher education are therefore intended to provide equality of chances to all agents, no matter what their family wealth is.” (Peñalosa, C and K Wälde, 2000, p702).

Also, equality of achievement among various classes in society is an important aim in the government agenda and its economic and social development plans. This would appear to be more evidence to support the idea that tertiary education should be publicly managed and financed rather than through the private sector. It has been suggested by some educationalists that equity concerns, for instance, redistributions between rich and poor, justify full public or government subsidies. They state that: “From a lifetime equity position, public subsidies to students seem unfair because they will probably belong to the future group of above-average earners. However, at the moment of attendance it may be argued that public subsidies are needed to equalize entrance opportunities for potential students from different socioeconomic backgrounds. Otherwise, students from disadvantaged backgrounds may not enter higher education.” (Barr [in Vossensteyn, H] and Vossensteyn, H, 2004, p. 42). In addition, others believe that “…charging higher fees can create ‘irreparable socioeconomic inequities between the poor and rich’ because the
poor cannot afford such high fees. Furthermore, even in situations where public subsidies are provided to promote equity, these can be ‘perverse’ because they simply transfer income from poor to rich, as children from the middle and high income groups are heavily over-represented in higher education. To overcome this inequity, the shift is towards a cost-recovery policy accompanied by scholarships or loans for the needy.” (Woodhall and Tilak (in Lee, M, 2008, p. 192). Moreover, UNESCO (in Lee, M, 2008, p. 193) argues that higher education opportunity and access should not be an ‘affordable’ activity but should be based on ability and merit in order to conform to human rights. Another study reveals that in some instances public higher education is better than the private provision. For example, James and Benjamin (in Wilkinson, R and Yussof, I, 2005, p. 362) illustrate that the student-teacher ratio and the student-staff ratio in the public higher education institutions in four Asian countries (Japan, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand) were lower than in the private ones. In Japan the ratio was only eight-to-one in public tertiary education and twenty-six-to-one in the private sector. In the other three countries the ratios were found to be three times those of public institutions in Indonesia and the Philippines, and more than double in Thailand, indicating that the quality of education in public higher education is higher than in the private universities and colleges.

B. Arguments in favour of private higher education:

The provision of private higher education is becoming a major economic and political trend in the world today and transcends political ideologies. It appears that there is a major consensus about the role of the market and its function in improving efficiency in higher education institutions and it has been agreed that commercial involvement is more effective in promoting different institutional types of programmes and activities. Autonomy, de-regulation and market forces are considered the best way to promote
diversity through privatisation and are the main reasons for introducing market mechanisms into this provision. Geiger (in Teixeira, P and Amaral, A, 2001, p365) hypothesizes that:

“When resources are tight, the market is a much more powerful force for the differentiation of higher education institutions and functions than centralized policy and control.”

Advocates of private higher education strongly believe that post-secondary education should be deregulated and financed by the private sector as one of the cost-sharing forms. Their advocacy is supported by several major reasons: their economic analysis and economic theory present an explanation in terms of both efficiency and quality. There is a strong belief that private provision is able to improve quality and efficiency in higher education institutions better than that of the public sector and that it creates greater competition and increases differentiation in the tertiary education system, all of which lead to a reduction in cost. It has been argued by some authors that “It is commonly argued that private higher education institutions are inherently more efficient than public ones because of strong incentives to minimize costs and to use resources efficiently. The private sector is held to be more responsive to the changing demands of customers and markets. Competition brings down costs and improves the quality of service.” (Lee, M, 2008, p192). In addition, Vossensteyn, H, (2004, p. 40) argues that public finance resources, in most countries, are not only scarce, but also limited and that they rely on restricted sources which make their ability to generate income from other activities extremely difficult. Also, Lee, M (2008, p190), Woodhall (in Lee, M, 2008, p192), Patrinos, World Bank, Sanyal, and Balan (in Wilkinson, R and Yussof, I, 2005) discuss the point that the public sector
may not be able to create differentiation in distributing funding. As a result, it seems difficult to meet the challenges, particularly apropos growth demand for higher education. In contrast, deregulation and providing higher education institutions with greater autonomy will lead to increased differentiation and create greater competition that is more likely to improve both quality and efficiency. And a focus on efficiency may lead to a decrease in costs, achieve useful progress, and provide well-considered academic opportunities for both institutions and students. Some believe that when higher education students pay a part of their educational costs they will make more informed choices and some studies indicate that tertiary education imparts monetary and non-monetary benefits not only for society but for students, known as ‘private returners’ or ‘benefits’ (See table 7).

For example, a recent OECD study revealed that graduates of universities or colleges earn more than those individuals who have had only secondary schooling. (Vossensteyn, H, 2004, p.40). Similarly, it has been found by Psacharopoulos (in Atuahene, 2008, p. 408) that individuals who have received a higher level of schooling earn more than those who have not. So, if students benefit from higher education it is only fair that they should contribute to the costs of tertiary education. This also justifies a shift towards the private sector in academic education. (Vossensteyn, H, 2004, p.40).
Table (7). The Private Costs and Monetary and Non-monetary Benefits of Higher Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Monetary and economic Benefits</th>
<th>Non-monetary and social Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tuition, fees and study Materials</td>
<td>Higher productivity and thus higher net earnings</td>
<td>Increased educational opportunities and education enrichment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgone earnings</td>
<td>Better employment opportunities</td>
<td>Improved working conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher savings</td>
<td>Higher personal status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal and professional mobility</td>
<td>Greater job satisfaction</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Healthier lifestyle; longer life expectancy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Improved decision-making in spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More hobbies and rewarding leisure activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Improvement in personal status or in personal development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Improved quality of life for self and family</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.5 Actual Policy Options:

The debate between the two sides, state versus markets, has intensified in recent years. So, how valid are the arguments and the counter arguments? It should be noted that all arguments against the role of the state cannot necessarily be considered as being in favour of markets in higher education and that some of those arguments assume the level of efficiency of the state sector is high.

While it may be possible to marshal enough evidence to argue for either side, there are some aspects that stand out very clearly in favour of a dominant role by the state in higher education, and these are rarely questioned. For example, even those who oppose public subsidization of higher education recognise that it produces a number of external economic effects and although all the social benefits cannot be identified and measured accurately, there is still a consensus that they are substantial. The other aspects widely shared are: public good (and quasi-public good in the case of higher education) the nature of the education provided, merit good nature, social investment nature of education, market imperfections, and economies of scale. Further, many arguments made against public subsidization do not receive unqualified support either from theoretical or empirical evidence. The case against public subsidies in education in recent years is based on the premise that governments in developing countries do not have adequate resources at their disposal, and that the scope for restructuring public budgets with an increase in substantial subsidies for education is rather limited. Some research also exists that shows that education expenditure is affected by military expenditure, indicating a clear trade-off between public expenditure on defence and education. Patterns of public expenditure in developing countries also show that governments are not starved of resources but that they
lack a political will and a sense of priorities, especially in the case of sectors like education.

It has to be recognized that many of those who argue for increased cost recovery in higher education do not oppose public subsidization *per se*; on the other hand, since there is limited scope for increased public spending, it may be argued that additional resources can be mobilised through a variety of other measures. They also recognise that public subsidies can increase efficiency. Hence the real need is to raise resources by the state through tax or non-tax revenues.

As it is explained market failures consumer ignorance, technical economies of scale, externalities in production and in consumption, public good and inherent imperfections in capital and insurance markets, they all justify for the government intervention. In the case of higher education, it seems that externalities and imperfections in capital and insurance markets are relevant. Hence governments have to subsidise education. Governments subsidise education, not just for efficiency, but also for reasons of equity, and various other social and political objectives.

There is no doubt that the role of the private sector in higher education is important. In many countries private universities are a good option and often situations and facilities are provided that make private universities better than public ones. However, some countries, Libya is an example, lack the necessary conditions to privatize higher education because it would be premature to encourage the private sector to play its role in higher education under the particular prevailing circumstances. There has, though, been significant developments in private higher education institutions as will be explained in the following chapters.
2.6 Conclusion:

Higher education was limited until the 1960s and 1970s. The diversification of post-secondary mass education has brought with it significant changes not only in how its institutions should be financed and managed by governments and policymakers, but also in how policies should be designed appropriately taking into account both the scarcity of available resources and the high cost of higher education. The latter is now expensive, both in terms of the government budget and the increasingly direct cost to individual students and their families. As a result, financing higher education has become problematic since the 1980s and is an important issue that should be addressed. As higher education moved from the periphery to the centre of government affairs, the concept of the state role in higher education has changed and possible alternatives are being examined.

Problems and challenges, especially in developing countries, become acute if the pressure for academic and institutional expansion comes into conflict with scarce and limited resources. Higher education systems in many countries are under considerable financial pressure and face serious financial problems. The declining capacity of public higher education institutions with an attendant burgeoning demand from students for access to them, and the retrenchment of public services combined with other factors, has forced governments to seek new ways to solve their difficulties. Many, but not all, hold the view that students, parents, and the other main beneficiaries should contribute to the costs of higher education and there are diverse arguments for and against.

Although, there is a clear trend towards privatisation and private higher education, the nation state and the public sector are still powerful actors in shaping the higher education
policies in terms of both management and financing. Financing higher education is an issue that will result in prolonged debate in most countries concerned with centralized and decentralized frameworks, concerned with the relative importance of the public and the private and concerned with the role of government and the autonomy of the university. Whatever the arguments, both public and private sectors are important. If there is no way to avoid the existence of the private sector alongside the public sector in higher education then it is necessary, therefore, that some form of coordination should be found between them.
Chapter three: Private higher education in Libya compared with other countries in the Arab world.

3.1 Introduction:
One of the important features of the 1990s was the move away from dependence on the state for funding higher education. The reliance on market forces for development, the decline of centrally-planned economies, and the fiscal incapacity of the state to finance education adequately have persuasively encouraged the privatization of higher education. “Private higher education is one of the most dynamic and fastest growing segments of post-secondary education at the turn of the 21st century”. (Altbach, P (b), 1999, p1). It has appeared almost everywhere and the reasons that have led to the phenomenon of private higher education and the types of private universities are numerous. This section seeks to put Libya in the context of the rest of the world in general and of the Arab states in particular.

3.2 Higher education and its financing policy in the global context and the relative position of Libya:
The World Bank (in Vossenteyn, H, 2004) reported that investment in the knowledge economy is considered an important issue by leading world economists who suggest that expanding tertiary education would appear to be the only way to improve educational attainment levels within societies. However, higher education is universally recognized as a considerable investment in human capital, which contributes to socioeconomic development by developing both individuals and societies as a whole. The expansion of
higher education is costly, and would require increased investment and more efficient use of generally limited and scarce existing resources. In Libya, up to 1999, the higher education sector was completely financed by the state. In European countries, public expenditure on higher education is estimated to be 80% of the cost and the allocation of financial resources is even larger in developing countries. In contrast, higher education institutes in the USA, for instance, are financed by private resources where the private sector seems to be a dominant division in the tertiary education system (Barr, N, 1993) & (Varghese, N (b), 2004, p30).

Higher education in the modern world has developed dramatically in terms of the number of students, curricula, management of the systems, pedagogical practices, cultural and political influences on higher education, and knowledge production and dissemination research and teaching. There are four reasons that could be attributed to this expansion: The first is the necessity of a degree from tertiary educational institutes for personal economic success. Secondly, as universities and other institutions of tertiary education have expanded they have acquired the main responsibility for equipping individuals with the advanced knowledge and skills required for economic progress in the increasingly complex and technological-based economies of the twenty first century, known as the “information age”. Thirdly, university education is increasingly seen as a necessity in the overall advancement of a modern society. Finally, universities are instrumental in enabling social mobility which can be associated with demographic change. (Altbach, P, (a), 1999, p107-p108; Barr, N, 2004, p265). In most countries, the growth of universities and other higher education institutes has attained and acquired large and intricate governmental and administrative structures. They require major expenditures of both public and, often, private finance. It is a global market with commercial investments of more than $2 trillion,
including public and private spending on all forms of education; it enrolls more than 80 million students worldwide and employs 3.5 million people. It has been stated that “….mass higher education becomes the international norm at the end of the 20th century. Most countries have large academic systems that educate a growing number of young people and which require substantial resources.” (Kapur, D and Crowley, M, 2008, P16). (Altbach, P, (a)1999, p.107).

In Libya with 69,849 of the age cohort in 1995, the higher education system is not as large as in some Arab countries, such as Egypt where about 1,015,220 students were enrolled in higher education institutions in 1996. But it is clear that financing policies for higher education are being reformed in a number of countries. From 1990 to 1999, the global agenda had placed an emphasis on the reform policies of financing and the management of higher education systems (Cheung, B, 2004, p.1), and an important reason was that the decade of the 1990s has seen the emergence of mass and universal access in many parts of the world. (Altbach, P (b), 1999). In Libya, free higher education has made the institutions overcrowded particularly in the main cities, Tripoli and Benghazi. The real challenge for the Libyan government under Gaddafi was maintaining public finance for higher education. Harman (in Cheung, B, 2004, p1) points out that many governments have faced the problem of maintaining public funding levels for higher education, and that governments (Libya being no exception) seek financing alternatives for many reasons as are illustrated by Figure (1) below. (Cheung, B, 2004, pp 2-4) and (Johnston in Cheung, B, 2004).

Figure (1). Reasons why governments seek alternative resources to fund tertiary education.
Cheung, B (2004, p 5-6) provides several alternatives for governments to finance the institutions of post secondary education as shown by figure (2). Unfortunately, the available alternative resources to finance higher education institutions in Libya have been extremely limited and state finance has been the only funding for approximately five decades. The absence of other resources has prevented Libyan higher education from benefiting from a more flexible financial mechanism and has created considerable pressure on the government funds.
The reform of the financing policy for higher education has faced two universal dilemmas. The first was the high and still rising, unit cost per-student in higher education; the second was the increasing demand for places in educational institutions, particularly where high birth rates were coupled with both rapidly increasing numbers of young people finishing secondary school with legitimate aspirations for some higher education, and the growing number in the population of those aged 15-24. (Johnstone, D, 2003). These dilemmas, as we can see from the experience of other countries, are accompanied by other elements and it is important to undertake an analysis of all relevant factors and put them into a global context when examining the case of Libya.

3.3 Factors affecting higher education finance policies and a comparison between Libya and other selected Arab countries:

There are several factors which could influence the higher education financing policy:

- **Economic situation:**

  The prevalent economic situation of the country is one of the factors affecting a higher education finance policy. A considerable amount of the allocated funding will, of course, depend on the available fiscal resources which themselves reflect the income of the nation and differences in a nation’s GDP will result in disparities in the size of its budget set aside for higher education. Available data shows that the expenditure per student in universities in advanced countries (e.g. Harvard and Yale) is much higher than the expenditure in universities in developing countries (e.g. the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzani). (See Haddad, W et al, 1990 and Kapur, D and Crowley, M, 2008). In Libya, despite the scarcity of related data, the situation is similar. Data presented in table (8) shows that the public expenditure on education as a percentage of the GDP in Libya is 2.7% which is less than the percentage in developed countries where the GDP is higher.
Table (8). The public expenditure on education in Libya.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current GDP billion US$</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public expenditure on education as % of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>2002-2005</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another related element here is inflation. Especially high or unpredictable rates are regarded as having an adverse effect on financial resources devoted to higher education institutions. Inflation makes it difficult for a government to fund or plan long-term because of inefficiencies in the market and can be forced to reduce its resources and seek finance for higher education institutions elsewhere. An example is Uganda. Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, the Ugandan government faced serious economic difficulties that had affected considerably its financing higher education policy. The university had deep financial problems and the government was not able to provide adequate financial support. The staff salaries were very low and they were forced to find another source of income. The situation was on the verge of collapse. The government was advised to reform its higher education financing policy by charging students and by the introduction of the

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5In China for example, it has been said by some authors that because of inflation that aggravated public financing of higher education in China in 1988, the government was unable to cover all the expenses of its universities. Only two-thirds of higher education institutions’ costs were covered through state allocations. At most universities, 50 per cent of the total budget was collected and came from alternative sources. From 1988, students in most Chinese universities and colleges started to share the cost of higher education and tuition fees with the government. They paid 43 US$ per academic year to newly enrolled students, which accounted for about 8.6% of the unit recurrent cost. (Johnson, (in Wang, X, 2001, p. 208)).

In the case of Libya, an oil producing country, the financing policy for higher education has faced difficulties caused by economic factors. These difficulties could be attributed to several reasons, for instance, the policy of free higher education and the inefficiency of the administration in the education sector (details in Chapter Five). A high dependence upon oil revenues precipitated a critical situation once the price of oil fell.

- **Human population growth (Demographic factors):**

Population growth is, of course, a critical factor in determining a financing policy for higher education. As the number of students at basic and secondary education level increases so is a long-term potential demand for higher education created. UNESCO (in Kapur, D and Crowley, M, 2008) reported that “In 1991, the global higher education student population was 68 million. By 2004 it had nearly doubled to 132 million and is projected to reach 150 million by 2025.” In the Arab world over three million students were in higher education in 1996, 81% of them at undergraduate level (Bashshur, M, 2004, p16). The increasing numbers of eligible students has led to a corresponding demand for higher education and this is reflected in the sustained deployment of substantial public funds in this sector, making it increasingly difficult to compete for additional public resources. At the same time, poor macroeconomic conditions have constrained the growth of the public budget putting huge pressures on the institutions of higher education and the financial resources for these establishments. This has led to uncertainty and uneasiness in a number of areas of society: in the higher education system, among prospective students and their parents, in the political arena, in industry and the business world (the main
financial supporters of universities as well as being the beneficiaries of higher education). These factors helped pave the way to structural reforms and the establishment of new institutions, for instance, private institutions, distance universities, open universities, weekend universities, and evening courses …etc.

Clearly the size of a population influences the number of students who enter higher education and therefore the fiscal resources and funding devoted to these institutions becomes a problem as tertiary education enrolments increase. Many universities have been unable to meet the demand for places because of the large number of students applying for a finite number of places. In Malaysia, Mexico, India, Bangladesh and Kenya (see Wilkinson, R and Yussof, I, 2005, p.364 and Kapur, D and Crowley, M, 2008, p.16), the governments have tried to modify their higher education policies by allowing the introduction of private institutions. Libya, too, followed this pattern as the population and the number of university students increased in the years 1984-2006. See table (9).

Table (9). Population and enrolment profile for Libya.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>University Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>3,231,059</td>
<td>36,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4,389,739</td>
<td>144,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5,298,152</td>
<td>300,966*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- **Political factors:**

The relationship between politics and the policy for financing higher education is important, especially the political factor that influences that policy. In fact, “...each society produces its own system of education with its own structures, system of financing, and
administrative rules of operation.” (Mialaret in Sayegh, R, 1994, p22). For example, the political ideology in the USA focuses on the idea that central government action should be reduced, as does the very strong federal system in that country. In contrast, although some socialist or communist countries have moved toward decentralized higher education, they still rely on the state. In China, at the time of its leader Mao Zedong (1949-1976), education provision was strictly controlled by the government under the leadership of the Ministry of Education of the State Council. The CCP regarded education as a means of indoctrinating people with socialist ideas and it implemented a nationalization policy which included education. This policy gave the central government relatively tight control over education funding and the state provided free education for all Chinese citizens. (China National Institute of Educational Research and Yao in Mok, K & Wat, K, 1998, p. 258).

In times of political conflict and in the absence of stability, an essential requirement for a nation’s development, there might be negative consequences not only for higher education provision, but also for entire economic sectors. Many countries, particularly developing ones, have had their tertiary education institutions and systems lost or even destroyed because of political and military coups and the consequential instability. From 1975 to 1997 a number of African countries lost university-level institutions as a result of political turmoil which has made it extremely difficult to re-establish, especially in the poorer countries. (Tefferra, D & Altbach, P, 2004, p22; and Addison, T et al, n.d). The recurrent crises faced by Argentina as a result of the continuing interruptions to its democratic government led to the collapse of the Argentine university model between 1966 and 1983, with the loss of many talented people and a serious decline in the quality of higher education. (Wit, H et al, 2005, p72)
In Libya, the political system has changed three times in fifty years. After Libya gained its independence in December 1950, King Idris became king. The established monarchy was replaced in 1969 by the Republican system with young military commanders guided by Colonel Al-Gaddafi. And in 2011, the time of this study, the Al-Gaddafi regime came to an end and a new political system installed which, unfortunately, has yet to achieve stability. During the Al-Fatah Revolution era where socialism was the dominant political ideology and in the earlier period during monarchical rule, 1952-1969, the state and its public sector units had the responsibility for leading the country. However, state monopoly declined from 1999 because the public sector had been criticized for its inefficiency and inability to satisfy the growing social demand for higher education and this led to a major re-thinking of policy concerning higher education. But this was brought about by authoritarian decree, reflecting the political dominance of Gaddafi and his family.

**Cultural factors:**

Culture is another important factor that influences the financing policy for higher education. In contrast to economic and political factors, cultural ones are rather elastic and hard to assess. Dominant cultural values can change a good deal, but generally at a slower pace than political or economic ones. Cultural factors both act as a brake upon privatisation forces or else equally they can encourage them. In some countries private institutions have high prestige, but elsewhere can be seen as an easy option. This in some extent will lead the governments to rely more on private sector to play its role in higher education or in other instances to decrease the government’s favour in private higher education sector and keep the role of state is dominant. There is no doubt that private universities have become important for many countries, however, culture is more likely to be a serious obstacle in
the face of the efforts towards the policy. In countries like USA or Japan, where people have high level of awareness, private universities are strong and successful. While in other countries (e.g. Libya) where the social relationship and politics form the culture of society, private universities are weak and questionable.

- **Internationalisation**: 

According to Knight and De Wit (in De Wit, H, 1999, p.14) the globalization that could be seen as most relevant and appropriate in the discussion on the international dimension of the higher education sector, is as follows:

1. Globalization as the flow of technology, economy, knowledge, people, values, ideas…across borders. Globalization affects each country in a different way due to that nation’s individual history, tradition, culture, and priorities.

2. Internationalisation of higher education is one of the ways a country responds to the impact of globalization, yet respects the individuality of the nation.

How the internationalisation of higher education affects the policy of higher education within countries throughout the world has become a central issue in the growth of higher education in the twenty-first century. The new realities facing the higher education sector, both domestically and globally, are presenting changes, introducing new trends and posing different challenges for internationalisation. Governments, to enhance their global competitiveness, have tried very hard to internationalise their higher education institutions. In the quest for internationalisation, those institutions, their academics and their students are under tremendous pressure to compete with the global research-led universities. At the same time the internationalisation of curricula and the promotion of international academic

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6The concept of internationalisation has been described in different ways by some authors: as “..one of the important features of contemporary universities”; as “…a pressure no-one who teaches can be unaware of”; as “…a major theme for the next decade”; as “…one of the most important trends of the last decade if not of the past half century.” ( Smith et al, Halliday, Davies, Teichler, and Altbach (in de Wit, 2002, n.p).
exchanges have become an increasingly important trend in many countries. Since higher
education reforms were started in the mid-1980s, higher education in many countries has
undergone significant changes, not only by an increase in the numbers of students and the
founding of higher education institutions, but by a rapid increase in the number of students
who have studied outside their own countries. Since the late 1990s the number of students
studying abroad has risen dramatically. It rose from 1, 75 million in 1999, to roughly 2
million in 2000, and then to about 2.5 million in 2006 and it is projected to reach 8 million
(2009) reported that “…more than 2.8 million students were enrolled in higher education
institutions outside their countries of citizenship in 2007”. It seems to be that the general
trend has been from south to the north, from developing (poor) world to developed (rich)
countries. The large majority of them are from developing nations and newly developed
countries, with 55 per cent from Asia, and in particular from India, China, South Korea,
Japan, and Taiwan. The large host countries (global receiver of foreign students) are the
USA, the UK, Germany, France, Australia, and Japan. (Altbach, P, 2004, p. 2 and Kapur,

The important questions in relation to internalisation are:

(i) What factors forced or encouraged students to study abroad?

(ii) Why have governments sent or allowed their students to study in higher education
institutions in foreign countries, rather than in their own institutions?

(iii) How are the higher education policies designed by the policy makers taking into
account the influence of internationalization and globalization?

(iv) How do students returning to their home countries have an influence upon their native
institutions and ideas?
Students, whether sent by governments or by their families, prefer to study outside their own countries for many reasons, as Altbach, P points out (2004, p3):

1. In many developing countries, local higher education institutions are unable to enroll all domestic students because of the limited capacity of its universities. However, Libya is not among these countries. The government has not sent students to study abroad for more than a decade. During the 1980s and the 1990s Libya experienced extremely difficult political and social circumstances including the sanctions imposed by the United Nations. And then when the sanctions were lifted the country found itself with a serious shortage of skilled and highly qualified people. This resulted in a decision being made to send students to study at foreign universities especially in advanced countries, and in 2008 there were 8,160 Libyan students studying abroad, about half of them at PhD level. (General People Committee for Higher Education, Bulletin of Higher Education, the first issue, 2008).

2. Many students require highly specialized teaching and research facilities which do not exist in their own countries. In Libya this has been particularly marked, e.g. astronomical physics, genetic engineering, zoology, and this lack is particularly evident at postgraduate and professional levels.

3. The quality of education required at master’s degree level and PhD research level is unavailable in some developing countries. And even in those countries that offer these levels in their higher education institutions, an inferior academic standard is provided when compared with that of advanced countries and they find themselves unable to compete internationally. In Libya, although the government has offered courses at all levels of

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7 For example, in Malaysia, “…it is estimated that each year, more than 20,000 students have to pursue their university education overseas. In 1995, about 50,600 students were enrolled at degree level overseas, of which 39.5% were government-sponsored students.” (Malaysia in Wilkinson, R & Yussof, I, 2005, p.364).

8 Intervention in Uganda (1979) and in Chad (1979-87). (Allan, J, 1982, p378). After the murder of a British policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, outside the Libyan Embassy in London in 1984, the United Kingdom severed all diplomatic relations with Libya. In 1986 economic sanctions were imposed on Libya by the United States after the Gaddafi regime was implicated in the terrorist bombing of a West Berlin discotheque frequented by American military personnel. The UN imposed sanctions on Libya in 1992–93 after it was implicated in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988.
higher education in different fields, many students prefer to study in advanced countries. They feel that the prestige of a degree from a foreign university, especially a degree from an American institution, is greater than one from a local institution. In the UK there were 3000 Libyan students registered at different levels in 2010 and in the academic year 2008-09 the government had sent 7,516 students to study abroad at postgraduate level and 644 students to study at undergraduate level. (Libyan Embassy in the UK, 2011)& (General People Committee for Higher Education, Bulletin of higher education, 2008. The first issue, p8).

4. “Social and political forces also push students out of their home countries....., students study abroad to escape political or other repression at home or to experience academic freedom...” Altbach, P (2004, p4). Libya is categorized thus although it is difficult to obtain evidence. But it is widely acknowledged that many Libyans had chosen to study and work abroad to escape the dictatorship of the Gaddafi regime.9

Highly developed countries and the willingness of their employers to offer excellent opportunities with high salaries for well qualified foreigners in many fields, is a great incentive for Libyan students to study abroad.

The movement of students and the sale of higher education services have contributed significantly to the economies of many countries, especially in developed states. OECD (in Kritz, M, 2006, p. 15). This is not true in Libya, though, when it was deemed necessary for the good health of the hard currency of the Libyan economy, to withdraw opportunities for students to study abroad. Consequently, Libya has suffered a shortage of highly qualified

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9 Anecdotal evidence is provided by my friend who is resident in the UK and works in the NHS. He narrated his experience when he was in Libya in the 1980s. He said “I studied at the medicine faculty in 1985. In the faculty there was a “Revolutionary Committee Office” and its function was to report anything said against Gaddafi or his ideology....it had an effective power over the institution, its professors and the dean of the faculty......we studied in an atmosphere of fear and instability......we were not confident with each other.....it was very sad...”. (A conversation in 2008).
labour and experienced people. The writer, in attendance at his university’s graduation ceremony in 2000 remembers clearly the Director of Academy of Graduate Studies stating publicly that:

“….there is no need to study abroad...Libya has the ability to do so....”

His justifications were to save the hard currency for the nation’s economy and to stop providing data and information about Libya for foreign countries.

- **The Brain Drain:**

Increasing the supply of ‘human capital’ for the benefit of the state is considered an important goal of a higher education policy, but this goal can be rendered pointless if the human capital emigrates. Carrington et al (1999) point out that “…among the countries in Asia and the Pacific, the biggest source is the Philippines, with 730,000 migrants. Of these, the great majority have a tertiary education. The second largest stock of migrants is from China (400,000), which is split almost equally between the secondary and tertiary educational groups. Both India and Korea have seen more than 300,000 people migrate to the United States. It is striking that more than 75 percent of Indian immigrants have a tertiary education, compared with only 53 percent of Korean immigrants. The biggest migratory flows from Africa to the United States are from Egypt, Ghana, and South Africa, with more than 60 per cent of immigrants from those three countries having a tertiary education”. It was very difficult to obtain related data for Libya, but most Libyans recognise that significant numbers of highly qualified migrants leave Libya for many reasons. As a consequence, scarce public expenditure on higher education may be lost

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10 Some reasons relate to financial matters, others belong to political factors and some are attributed to the working conditions and the intrusive administrative situation. Anecdotal evidence from a Libyan doctor who works at the Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital spoke of his experience: “I migrated to the UK because the Libyan government did not deal with us equally and fairly... I worked there for three years and my salary was very low..., the work conditions were very bad...and the administrators and the managers did not respect us.....”
and the increasing number of those leaving has seriously affected financial resources in undeveloped states, including that of Libya. The developed countries have been the beneficiaries.

3.4 The types of private higher education with reference to the case of Libya:

Most countries have established private institutions of higher education. There are different types which may be divided into three main categories as follows: according to the size and importance of the private sector, according to the ultimate purpose of the institution or according to the role of the state in higher education. The question is: into which category or categories do the private universities in Libya fall? In the analysis below the various types of private universities are reviewed by authors and scholars and then an attempt is made to classify and categorise private universities accordingly.

Geiger (in Altbach, P 1999 (d), p154 and Tilak, J, 2008, p116 & p117) has identified three categories of private institutions of higher education according to size: first, ‘mass private and restricted public sectors’ which he defines as ‘…one in which public higher education is restricted in size and selective in intake, with the result that the majority of the students in higher education are enrolled in the private sector.’ This pattern is exemplified best by Japan and South Korea. This private sector model can be expanded to accommodate a rapid increase in the demand for higher education. The second category is when the public and private sectors are running parallel with each other. This pattern results from the need to guarantee a significant degree of cultural pluralism within a non-hierarchical system. The existence of national degrees requires that each university provides education of equivalent value but in order to achieve meaningful equality and to satisfy different cultural groups, private institutions have to possess resources comparable to public ones. In
Belgium and the Netherlands, this has resulted in full state funding for private universities. And although geographically and culturally far removed, Chile and Hong Kong have both evolved along quite similar lines. The third category comprises a comprehensive or dominant public sector with a peripheral private sector mostly supported by state funds. The latter, according to Geiger, R (1988) are left to take up the tasks that are neglected by the state especially non-university post-secondary education such as vocational education and training for commerce and private industry.

None of the above three types is found in Libyan private higher education. The number of private higher education institutions that has largely exceeded the number of public higher education absorbs only a small fraction of the students because such establishments are small. The majority of students are enrolled in the few public higher education institutions and universities which have a large number of places available and the Libyan government does not support private higher education which offers courses similar to those of public universities. These courses are specialised in low cost studies and they do not offer vocational and training programmes.

3.4.1 Based on the purpose of private institutions of higher education there are three categories:

(a). Not-for-profit private institutions: -

Along with institutions that are public or controlled by a state, there are private colleges and universities that are not allowed to earn a profit. These institutions are owned and sponsored by trusts and non-profit agencies which have a high level of autonomy (e.g. religious organizations or groups, scientific societies, visionary public leaders, and others
that have legal authority to own and manage them). They depend heavily on endowments and fees collected from the students and their families.\footnote{In the USA (which has an historically well-established private higher education system) the vast majority of its 3,600 colleges and universities are non-profit making. Examples include the private Ivy League universities such as, Harvard, Princeton, Yale and Berkley, some of which are considered the best in the world and feature at the top of the global academic hierarchy. These prestigious private universities are highly selective and all have large endowment funds. Harvard itself has endowments measured in billions of dollars (Altbach, P (a), 1999, p312 and, Levine, A, N.D.).}

This practice and tradition suits a donor culture in a highly established and successful economic system such as that of the USA with its critical mass of private sector philanthropy coupled with an accommodating and favourable tax system that makes the availability of a non-profit making system of higher education possible.

In some countries, the idea of profit-making by such institutions is anathema to their ideologies (e.g. in Egypt and Argentina: Fielden, J and Cheng, K, 2009, p35). In Libya, although the idea of making a profit in higher education institutions is unacceptable to most citizens, there is no non-profit higher education institution in the country.

\textbf{(b). For-profit higher education institutions:}

This phenomenon has emerged as a result of the idea that the privatization of higher education was possible: ‘The legitimacy of private for-profit institutions was attained in the 1990s due to the involvement of publicly traded corporations that own and run multi-campus universities, and these corporations traded the stocks and shares of educational institutions.’ (Ruch in Varghese, N [a], 2004, p8).

Earning a profit from education generally is without question a major phenomenon worldwide, but higher education for profit is not yet accepted culturally or legally in some countries, even though such institutions are a burgeoning commodity in most developing countries according to Altbach (in Al-Lamki, S, 2006). The growing student demand for
higher education and the inability of the government to accommodate this demand and provide the necessary overall support and funding has resulted in the creation of ‘for-profits’ higher educational institutions.\textsuperscript{12} However, in other countries, such as Malaysia, for-profit and non-profit higher education institutions legally look more and more similar and there is no clear differentiation between them. (Enders, J & Jongbloed, B, 2007, p444).

Higher education for profit enterprises can operate locally and across national boundaries. Because local institutions, particularly in developing countries, cannot meet the high demand for tertiary education, an opportunity is created for industrialized nations to sponsor academic institutions that are imaginative and often profitable. They often specialize in areas that might be in high demand, such as computing science, administration and management and finance. The majority of these are small vocationally-oriented institutions which mostly offer limited majors and short term programmes and courses of two years or less leading to certificates. They tend to focus on programmes linked directly to the job market, because they are driven more by the markets than by academic aspiration. In the United States, there are six large companies that make a profit from activities within the higher education sector.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} In the Philippines the government has allowed ‘for-profit’ universities for a long time in its higher education system.

\textsuperscript{13} They are: the Apollo Group (Phoenix), Career Education Corporation, Corinthian Colleges, DeVry, Education Management Corporation and Laureate Universities international. The University of Phoenix and Career Education Corporation in the United States constitute good examples of companies that make considerable profits and receive the highest revenues from their activities in higher education. Their profits reached US$1,340 million in the University of Phoenix and US$1,189 million in the Career Education Corporation. The University of Phoenix is the largest private university owned by Whitney International and the Apollo Group. It has a big share of the revenue within the country compared with the others, such as Kaplan and Corinthian Colleges and it has joined the ranks of for-profit higher education. This institution, which is listed on the New York Stock Exchange, offers academic programs in high demand areas that do not require much investment in facilities. It has got 126 campuses in the United States and its activities are run by 34 offices situated in a number of cities across the country. (Fielden, J and Cheng, K, 2009, p35), (Levine, A, N.D) and (Altbach (b), 1999).
In some countries private higher education institutions that make profits have become a major source of problems for their public authorities. In some African countries (e.g. South Africa) ‘...the private for-profit sector has come under scrutiny because of perceived problems of low quality offerings.’ (Teferra, D & Altbach, P 2004, p23) This effectively identifies the lack of full-time qualified teachers as an important contributor to poor quality. Political expectations had been quite different and this has provoked severe criticism and tension within the system. Significantly, these institutions did not respond to economic needs because their study programmes tended to concentrate on areas with low running costs and low investment, such as the social sciences, commerce and law, in contrast areas such as architecture and engineering, despite the government's political decision to give them priority, play only a minor role.

Higher education enterprises without support from the public sector and based essentially on a business model, make profits by charging their clients and students high tuition fees, by specializing in short term courses, by using low cost facilities and by hiring part-time teaching staff.

For-profit higher education has a specific mission and role in higher education. It has identified and secured a strategic niche and developed a distinctive character very different from the traditional state colleges and universities, (Altbach, P and Levy, D, 2005).

(c) Religious higher education institutions:

This type of institution has long been under private initiative and control; the first wave of privatization of higher education was religious, such as at the University of Santo Tomaso in the Philippines, the Universidad Javeriana in Colombia, the Universidad Católica
Pontifícia of Chile and the Al-Azhar University in Egypt. In other countries these kinds of institutions have been established only after the establishment of so-called secular universities.¹⁴ (Levy In Munene, I & Otieno, W, 2008), (Teixeira, P and Amaral, A, 2001, p366 and p367) and (Levy, D, 2007, p205).

The religious higher education institutions, in general, have long been involved in establishing and supporting academic institutions to produce locally the educated manpower necessary for state governance and the Catholic Church. The Roman Catholic Church founded many of the earliest tertiary education institutions (known as European medieval universities) in Europe, Latin America and Asia. Most modern universities today seem to be designed according to the Western model, even in places where there are powerful indigenous traditions of advanced learning (e.g. Chile and India), either imposed by a colonial master or adopted freely after careful study as in Japan and Libya.

The oldest religious higher education institution is the Al-Azhar University established as an Islamic institution in Egypt in 988 A.D. Protestant religious organizations have also been involved in higher education and established the first academic institution in the United States. Christian organizations founded many of the early universities in Asian countries, Korea, China and Japan, and were usually associated with the Catholic Church, for instance, the University of Santo Tomaso was established in the Philippines in 1611 during Spanish rule (1565 to 1898). A major motivation was to establish Christianity among local elites and ultimately to convert people to Christianity.

¹⁴ In Kenya the first private university was non-religious, then two religious universities were founded later. In this country and in some other African countries religious institutions outnumber the secular academic institutions. Fourteen of the eighteen Kenyan private universities are religious. Fifteen of Nigeria’s twenty-four are religious. Levy (In Munene, I & Otieno, W, 2008), (Teixeira, P and Amaral, A, 2001, p366 and p367) and (Levy, D, 2007, p205).
Another goal was also to educate church personnel: Hindu organizations in India, Shinto and Buddhist groups in Japan, Buddhists in Thailand, and Muslims in Malaysia, Indonesia, and elsewhere, and all have been active in establishing higher education institutions. (Za'rour, G, 1988, p1), (Varghese, N,(a) 2004, p8), (Levy, D, 2007, p205) and (Teixeira, P and Amaral, A, 2001, p366 and p367)

Religious higher education institutions in general are characterised as establishments that do not charge students for their study, do not intend to make a profit and are concerned with exerting a great sense of social responsibility. The demonstrable religious faith in these universities is a vital factor if they are to ensure their continuous financial support. The Ugandan Islamic University is an example which had its budget financed by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). This was fixed at a particular amount and has been unchanged for a decade, despite rapid expansion. (Banya, K. 2001).

The question is: in which of the above types are the private higher education institutions in Libya classified? In fact, there are no religious institutions in the country. The institutions which are legally permitted to earn a profit could be in those institutions that are ‘for-profit’ makers and that are self-financing. The former has been the main reason for expanding the number of private universities on a large scale and now the number exceeds the number of state universities, producing, as later chapters will show, problems of quality. . However, private higher education has created a number of major problems for the Libyan government because of its poor quality.
3.4.2 Differences relating to the extent of the State’s involvement in higher education.

Private higher education institutions are of two types: the private institutions which are supported by the state or are dependent private institutions and those that are self–funded or independent private institutions.

In some countries, private higher education institutions depend on the same state funds as public universities and colleges. They receive government support for various purposes, such as a government’s desire to encourage the private sector to be more active in post-secondary education or when substantial government funding is allocated to support students from poor families or from disadvantaged backgrounds and thereby provide ‘equality of opportunity’.

On the other hand, private higher education institutions in other countries operate with considerable autonomy, largely because private institutions typically receive little, if any, public funds. India has both kinds of institutions and its government has financed more than 2000 private institutions of higher education and a large number of their students have received grant aid from the state. These institutions are called “private aided”, whereas those private universities and colleges that do not rely upon state support are described as “self-financing” institutions.\(^{15}\) (Altbach, P (b), 1999). In Libya there is only one kind of institution. The private universities are self-financed and they do not get any support from the state. The owners of these universities usually argue that, although the government wants to set up private higher education, it does not give any support to their universities.

\(^{15}\) In addition to India there are other countries, such as the United States, Japan, The Philippines, which make support available to private post-secondary institutions. (Altbach, P (a), 1999).
The dependent universities and colleges are non-profit making and are under strict government control in contrast to the independent private profit-making institutions which are allowed to be almost completely free from government control.

3.5 Private higher education in Libya and the Arab world with a special reference to Egypt:

Over the last two decades there has been a significant change in the financing of higher education in many countries. This is evident in the withdrawal of student and institutional support in real terms by, for instance, considerable increases in tuition fees in all types of institutions. This emphasizes the view that it is the students who are the primary beneficiaries of higher education and this has resulted in policies that reduce the proportion of higher education costs borne by governments. Universities in most countries were dependent on public funding for their growth and expansion. The economic crisis and the resulting financial squeeze, as well as the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s, generally reduced the efficacy of the public sector to provide continued and adequate financing support for an expanding higher education sector. Countries adopted varying strategies to cope with the situation, one of which has been the encouragement and promotion of private universities. In a number of countries, where no legal provision for the operation of private higher education institutions existed, laws were introduced in favour of establishing private universities and this strategy is being mirrored in Libya and in other Arab countries.

Many Arab governments have given the private sector greater opportunities to play a role in higher education. The number of private universities in the Arab World reached 115 in 2008. (The Twenty-Fourth Report of the Investment Climate in Arab Countries, in Sabry, M, 2009, p11). One important difference between the shift that had occurred in Arab
countries and that of Libya is that in the latter, the speed of the change had increased because the Libyan government had been in a hurry to privatize the higher education sector. A comparison between other Arab countries and Libya reveals some important features and shows the rapid growth in the number of private universities established in Libya.

In trying to put Libya into the context of the rest of the Arab world it is essential to recognize contrasting features such as size of population, wealth, culture and tradition, and form of government. The private higher education policy is certainly one of the areas in which such contrasts are evident. In the following analysis a comparison will be made between Libya and other Arab countries, referring in particular, to three Arab states displaying different conditions and with differing experiences:

Dwindling public resources and changes in demographics comprise two of the six basic forces spurring the spread of private higher education. (Crnković, B. & Požega, Ž. N.D, p127). They are the most important factors that have enabled the rapid growth of private higher education in many Arab countries. Variations below reveal examples of sharp contrasts between Libya and other Arab States. Libya is a rich country with a small population and has a large number of private universities whereas some Arab countries with large populations and limited financial resources understandably have only a small number of private universities. In this analysis the selected countries vary greatly in circumstance and status: Egypt and Tunisia are classified under ‘Diversified Economics’ (DE) and Libya and Saudi Arabia under ‘Mixed Oil Producers’ (MOP) and ‘Gulf
Cooperation Council’ (GCC) because they are basically oil producing countries. These three countries have enormous populations compared with Libya, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The table below shows the wide variations in the populations in the sample. Libya, as can be seen, is a thinly populated, oil-rich country of six million inhabitants which gives it an advantage over Tunisia and Egypt, countries which do not have such financial resources, and possibly even an advantage over Saudi Arabia. But even so, Libya is no more effective than these countries in its financing policy for higher education. The Libyan government made a decision to reform higher education policy and in 1999 issued an official resolution to set up private higher education. In Egypt, the government had formulated a law in 1992 which allowed private universities to be established and Saudi Arabia followed by granting permission in 1999. Ironically, the growth of the private universities in Libya has been more rapid than in these countries and even more rapid than in a number of other Arab countries. Libya, with its allocated wealth, has the largest number of private universities in the Arab world even though some countries, such as Egypt, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia have larger populations. Table 10 below compares the populations in a selection of Arab states with the number of private universities in each of the countries. (Bashshur, M, 2004).

16 Arab countries have been classified in four broad categories: Mixed Oil Producers (MOP) includes Algeria, Libya, Iraq; the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; Diversified Economics (DE) includes Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia; and Primary Producers (PP) includes Comoros, Mauritania, Sudan, Djibouti and Yemen. (The Economic Research Forum [ERF] in Ali, A, 2002, p4)
Table (10). A selection of Arab countries, their populations and the number of private universities established in each of the countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of private universities</th>
<th>Population (,000)</th>
<th>Population / number of private universities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>79,537</td>
<td>13,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6,453</td>
<td>645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4,227</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,051</td>
<td>1,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,767</td>
<td>2,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.A.E</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,732</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32,381</td>
<td>32,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10,664</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6,530</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41,230</td>
<td>41,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24,475</td>
<td>3,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table has been compiled using the research data from (Bashshur, M. 2004, p92) and from data from the last update of the United Nations Statistics Division.

Libya has by far the greatest number of private universities. The number of people in one private university is about 131 in Libya, 13,256 in Egypt 645 in Jordan and 946 in U.A.E. It must be realized that the statistics which show Libya to be well endowed with private universities considering its comparatively small population, does not necessarily mean that the level of the higher education provided is of a high standard. Indeed, the educational status of Libyan private universities is highly questionable and an analysis of these institutions is given in Chapter Six. It should be noted that the expansion of private universities in Libya has been horizontal while in the rest of the Arab states, it has been vertical. This means that the number of faculties is greater and that they specialise in different disciplines. To illustrate this: in Egypt, six private universities include 39
faculties of which 29 are in practical fields and science, and in Jordan there are 54 faculties in ten private universities. In contrast each private university in Libya embraces a maximum of eight faculties most of which favour the humanities.

So does Libya really need this number of universities in the private higher education sector? Or more importantly, does Libya actually need a private sector in higher education at all in the light of its many advantages associated with the availability of its financial resources? Chapters Seven and Eight explore these questions and give an answer to the related question of why Gaddafi’s government allowed the establishment of private universities in the first place. The attitude of the present government is also examined.

Table 11 below provides a comparison between Libya and Egypt to illustrate the significant disparities within the provision of their higher education.

Source: this table has been compiled using the research data on Egypt from Bashshur, M. 2004. (*Until 2003. Data from (Bashshur, M. 2004, p92). and on Libya from different materials.
Table (11). Libya and Egypt: a comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The type of procedure/government action.</td>
<td>Resolution which could be cancelled easier than if it were a law. It is issued by the General People Committee (Cabinet).</td>
<td>Law which is more difficult to change or cancel. It is issued by Parliament and it is a part of the constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The date of the Law or Resolution.</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of private universities.*</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The type of private university.</td>
<td>Profit makers: they are completely independent of foreign institutions.</td>
<td>Profit makers: many of them are in association with European or American institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student profile.</td>
<td>The majority of students are Libyan.</td>
<td>They enrol a large number from abroad but mainly from Arab countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University profile</td>
<td>Only four are recognised by the government</td>
<td>All of them are recognised by the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The category of private university.</td>
<td>They specialize in humanitarian sciences and are essentially copies of the state universities.</td>
<td>Some of the private universities specialise in science and technology, for example Misr for Science and Technology, 1st October for Modern Sciences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The campus or physical area of university</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unlike Egypt, where market forces were left to play guided by a quasi-liberal policy that was based on total *laissez faire*, the emergence of private higher education in Libya has been fuelled more by political forces than other pressures (e.g. population growth and the inefficiency of the public sector). Most likely for political reasons the Libyan government was behind the large number of universities that were opened without adequate preparation or sufficient resources to ensure their success. The 1980s and 1990s were a very critical time for Gaddafi's regime: there was the decline in oil revenues, the political crises that arose between Gaddafi and European countries and with the USA and the internal social problems associated with unemployment and the deterioration of living standards in Libya. All this made Gaddafi and his government adopt inappropriate policies with the intention of reducing the heavy social and political pressures by encouraging the private sector to play its role in higher education. It was an attempt to hide the failures of his system and his ideology that were based on what he called the “Third Universal Theory” or "Green Book". Unlike Egypt where the privatization of public universities meant charging students fees, in Libya, it meant that the government paid the cost for every student to attend university.

Even so, it must be emphasised that there were other factors that resulted in higher education in Libya being privatized and these are discussed in Chapter Six.

3.6 Conclusion:

This chapter has focused on addressing and examining the development of private higher education and its related issues in the Arab world by comparing higher education in Libya with that of other Arab nations. The rapid and dynamic expansion of general education has produced an ever-increasing demand for higher education unmatched by supply. This discrepancy has yielded a growing number of secondary school graduates with no
opportunity for higher education in the Arab world. In response to this situation, seen by many as a national dilemma, many Arab governments, including that of Libya, have solicited the active participation of the private sector in higher education. But the pattern in the Arab world has not been uniform since each state has been affected by a range of Demographic, economic, political and international factors. In some Arab countries the emergence of private institutions has been referred to as the ‘Age of Openness’ although in the case of Libya private higher education probably emerged for political reasons because the Gaddafi regime was inundated with dilemmas and problems. So severe were these problems that Gaddafi found it necessary to relinquish one of the main pillars of his theory within the ‘Green Book’, the ‘Third Universal Theory’, in which the idea of privatisation was absolutely rejected. However, after a late start Libya developed the largest number of private educational institutions established specifically to satisfy the public’s demand for greater provision of higher education, but it has to be realised that they were opened without adequate preparation or sufficient resources to ensure their success.

The comparison between Libya and some other Arab countries, in particular, Egypt, reveals some significant differences: the thinly populated, wealthy Libya has a large number of private universities whereas Egypt, with its much larger population but limited financial resources, has few such institutions.

The following chapter will examine the financing policy for higher education in Libya by tracing its development during the years of the pre-revolution monarchy and throughout the subsequent years of the Gaddafi regime.
Chapter four: The historical legacy: the early development of Libyan higher education and its financing policy.

4.1 Introduction:

Libya is located on the North African continent and stretches along the north-east coast of the continent between Tunisia and Algeria in the west, Egypt in the east, and Niger, Chad and the Sudan in the south. Its population of approximately 6.5 million people lives mainly in the north of the country. It has a Mediterranean Sea coastline of about 1900 kilometres. Libya is a large country with an area of about 1.8 million square kilometres (1,775,500 km²), seven times the size of the United Kingdom, making it the fourth largest country on the Africa continent. It was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire from 1551 to 1911 when it was occupied by Italian colonists. Then, from 1942 to independence on December, 24 1951, it was under the administration of the French and British. Since its independence Libya has been given different names. Under the monarchy, it was initially known as the United Libyan Kingdom, and later as the Kingdom of Libya. When the Monarchy was abolished in 1969 the state was named the Libyan Arab Republic and then the name was again changed to the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya after the ‘Declaration of the Establishment of the People’s Authority’ in 1976-1977. The term ‘Great’ was added after 1986 when the USA and the UK bombed Tripoli and Benghazi. (Otman, W and Kalberg, E, 2007) and (Metz, H, 1989), and then the name has no longer been used since the collapse of Gaddafi’s rule.

Libya, as have many countries, has suffered from problems and difficulties. During the Ottoman Empire, there was no provision of higher education. However, Libyans went abroad to study in Asitana in Istanbul, at the al-Azhar Institute in Egypt and at the al-Zaituna Mosque in Tunisia, but it was for the elite and only for those whose families were
able to support them financially. (Obeidi, A, 2001, p37) Libya suffered in two world wars (the First and Second World Wars) which destroyed its infrastructure. Before the discovery of its oil Libya was an extremely poor country. The population numbered just over two-and-half million people. Most people lived on the threshold of poverty, untouched by education: “…more than 90 per cent of the population were illiterate and only a handful of Libyans had been given an opportunity to study at a university or to qualify for a recognized profession.” (‘The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development’ in El- Fathaly et al, 1977, p13). Until the commercial production of oil in 1959, Libya was ranked very near the bottom of the international development scale, regardless of the indicators employed. Indeed, in the words of Benjamin Higgins, it was the:

“…prototype of a poor country… the bulk of people live at a subsistence level… no sources of power and no mineral resources, where agricultural expansion is severely limited by climate conditions, where capital formation is zero, where there is no supply of skilled labour and no indigenous entrepreneurship … Libya is at the bottom of the range in income and resources.” (El- Fathaly et al, 1977, p1).

During colonial rule by Italy there were no possibilities of establishing higher education institutions. The sector was neglected and the colonial aim was to convert Libya to virtually an Italian province and about 110,000 settlers entered the country in 1940 during the Second World War. The education policies adopted by the government were designed to benefit the settlers and not the Libyan population. Another factor in preventing the establishment of universities was the conflict between Libyan fighters and Italian troops which destroyed even the basic institutions, such as houses and schools and there was little effort to rebuild them. Religious education was the only type of education available to
Libyans and this was financed by private effort and local charity. There were no institutions of higher education and Libyans who wanted to continue their study had to travel to Egypt, Italy or a limited number of other countries. As has been said, the infrastructure of Libya had been damaged significantly during the Second World War. (Lulat, Y, 2005, p150).

On December 24, 1951, Libya became independent but the situation remained in turmoil: severe economic problems, poor management of the available resources, and regional conflict of interests that hampered the establishment of higher education institutions. Education in Libya was in a very serious condition. There were no colleges and approximately fourteen Libyans university students from the whole country had graduated and these from foreign universities, such as, Egypt and other European countries. (El-Fathaly et al, 1977, p13). Consequently, education was declared to be the most important of the country’s social needs and development in education was seen as an essential element in improving the economic conditions of the country.

Since independence Libyan higher education has experienced much change and development. Earlier, during the phase of the monarchy, 1950-1969, the first university had been founded under difficult economic, social, and political circumstances. Between the years 1961-1969, the period that witnessed the discovery of oil, Libya was transformed into one of the richest nations on earth. In 1969 the monarchy had been abolished by a small group of military officers led by a then 27 year-old army officer, Muammar Al-Gaddafi, who immediately became commander-in-chief of the armed forces and chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. And then, in 2011, after another revolution, Libya entered a new phase abolishing the 42 years of Gaddafi’s rule. Although, there is a lack of
data available, particularly for the period 1952-1969, this chapter will try to explain the development of higher education and its financing policy from 1955 to 2011 by examining the phase of the monarchy, and then the ‘System of the Masses’, (Gaddafi period). It is an attempt to review the initial features for this sector and its historical development; to clarify some of the economic and political conditions that shaped its policy with reference to some of the difficulties faced during two different periods


After protracted political and diplomatic efforts that began in 1945, Libya achieved its independence in 1951 (Otman, W and Karlberg, E, 2007, p3). The Libyan government faced considerable difficulties that hampered its attempts to establish a higher education system because of the situation it had inherited and which made a shift in policy direction problematical. In addition to administrative and financial difficulties, there were other internal challenges, such as the high rate of illiteracy (81.1 %) and the large number of people engaged in the agriculture sector (70%). (Kubbah (in Otman, W and Karlberg, E, 2007, p98 and El-Fathaly et al, 1977, p21). Basically, higher education had not been the first priority on the government agenda because it had to develop primary and secondary education as well as other essential social services.

The establishment of a university, therefore, became an elusive goal. International missions\(^\text{17}\) reported that there were no financial or social possibilities that would allow the state to build its own university and that Libya would need a long time (ten years at least) to be able to establish a university. But it would be possible to devote financial resources to the financing of study abroad. (Elfiki, A, 1982).

\(^{17}\text{During the period 1952-1954 international missions that included experts and specialists, such as Roger Tournneau, Higgins, and the UNESCO mission were sent by the UN to study economic and social problems in Libya.}\)
Despite all the observations exposing such significant obstacles, the government determined to press ahead. It felt that there was a serious lack of trained manpower with the skills needed for economic and social development, so the government started to consider seriously the establishment of a university. According to Elfiki, A (1982), two possible patterns for establishing a university were studied in 1952. The first pattern was presented by a team of professors from the University of Nevada who suggested Libya should adopt the American pattern. The second plan, which was accepted by the Libyan government, came from Egypt which has a system similar to the British. It was seen to be more suitable to the circumstances in Libyan society. Four years later the efforts finally bore fruit and the project materialized. On October the 11th, 1955, when the plan for the Libyan university was completed the Libyan Prime Minister made the following statement:

“The government directed its great concern to education originally because education is considered to be fundamental to national advancement. The country cannot realize its great educational and cultural hopes unless it completes its efforts to establish a university. This university will be the light to spread the sciences, arts, and literature. It will be an effective power in spreading education and social and economic reconstruction”. Accordingly, the government issued its decision to establish the Faculty of Arts and Education in the Manar Palace in Benghazi, to be the first nucleus of the university..... (El. Fiki, A, 1982, p181).

About two months later, the king of Libya, Muhammad Idris al-Senussi, released his royal decree to create a university to be known as the Libyan University. The first article of law
was issued on December 15th, 1955 and had been prepared by a team of Libyan and Egyptian experts. In the official gazette of the Ministry of Justice it declared that:

“A university is to be established under the name of the ‘Libyan University’ and it begins by the establishment of the ‘Faculty of Arts and Education’ in Benghazi. The Cabinet of Ministers will decide which other faculties will be established, and their locations. Institutions, under the Faculty of Arts and Education, or other faculties, which will be established in the future, may be connected with these faculty departments or may be considered to be departments within it.” (the Official Gazette of Ministry of Justice in El. Fiki, A, 1982, pp 182 & 183).

After this, higher education in Libya expanded gradually. From 1957 to 1967 seven faculties were established, two of them being more ‘practical’ than the others. However, the university’s objectives were training teachers for intermediate and secondary education and for training employees for various government jobs. It is noted that the science faculties (practical studies) were located in Tripoli, whereas, the arts faculties (theoretical studies) were located in Benghazi, which meant that the Libyan government decided to make scientific disciplines (e.g. science and engineering) studied close to Tripoli, the ‘industrial centre of the country’, and those specializing in the humanities and social disciplines close to Benghazi, 'the spiritual focus' of the country. (Qubain, F, 1979, p 416 and Sayigh, Y, 1978, p 463). The number of higher education students increased from 34 students in 1956 to 2,522 in the academic year 1967/1968, just a year before the Al-Fatah Revolution. See Table 12.
The growth in the number of higher education students has several explanations:

1) Since independence Libya had experienced some sort of stability. This had facilitated the building of its system of higher education and led to serious consideration of the establishment of a university and other institutions.

2) After independence, the Libyan government realized there was a severe shortage of an educated labour force with the skills needed by the new phase of post-
independence and made every effort to establish institutions that would fulfil this vital role in the society.

3) The government allowed all Libyan students who had completed twelve years of elementary and secondary schooling, and who had received the secondary school certificate, to enter the university. This was considered a basic right for all Libyans.

4) The state was concerned about the pre-university stage of education in which there were two main levels: primary and secondary and in which the number of pupils had risen from 402 in 1951/1952 to 12,320 in 1960/1961. (Sayigh, Y, 1978, p 428).

5) The achievement of a unitary state in 1963 and the development of a strong sense of national unity had helped the Libyan government to widen the scope of education. (Sayigh, Y, 1978, pp 432 and 433).

6) The discovery of oil at the end of the 1950s had achieved substantial financial resources for the Libyan economy and the wealth brought about through oil eliminated the obstacle to education: educational facilities greatly expanded in rural and remote areas, students at all levels increased to a very impressive number, more colleges were founded in the University of Libya and more vocational school and training centres were established. (El- Fathaly et al, 1977,p13) and (Allan, J, 1981, p159).

During the period 1961-1969 18 the first five year plan was prepared by the Ministry of Planning. It covered the years from 1963-1968. The total yearly allocations amounted to about £L324.9 million devoted to eleven sectors. However the percentage of allocations to the education sector was 13.2 per cent, although the actual figure was only 8.7 per cent. In

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18 Libya changed dramatically and became a rich country and was freed from its dependence on alien capital with its attendant and military responsibilities.
fact, the education sector as well as the other sectors in the social infrastructure, e.g. health and social affairs, was in second place after the physical infrastructure, e.g. public works, transport, municipalities, housing. While in the former the percentage of allocations was 25.6 per cent, in the latter it was 42.8 per cent. Even in the second plan (1969-1971) the social infrastructure came second in percentile terms (17%) compared with that of the physical infrastructure (49%).

Through its budget the Libyan government strongly concentrated on investing in the social and physical infrastructure. Although, the education sector was in second place the government had shown its concern toward the sector. One of the seven major objectives in the plan that aimed to secure the optimum utilisation of the country’s resources and its security was the continuation of the public sector investment in education as well as in health, communications and housing in order to consolidate the basic elements for rapid economic growth. (Allan, J, 1981, pps79, 80 and 81 and Sayigh, Y, 1978, p 445).

4.2.1 Governance, Administration, and Finance.

During the phase of the monarchy there were two main powers responsible for the university system: the Minister of Education and the Rector, who was appointed by royal decree at the nomination of the board of governors and the recommendation of the Minister of Education. The Libyan University was managed by the government which was responsible for setting down its general policies and the administration of its affairs. It decided that from the beginning the Libyan University would be a publicly regulated institution and state funds were transferred from the governmental budget to the
university’s budget which was considered a part of the Ministry of Education budget. Table 13 (below) shows that the public expenditure on education as a percentage of total public expenditure increased from 9.6 per cent in 1952-53, to 21 per cent in 1960-61, and then to 24 per cent in 1968-69 (Qubain, F, 1979, p417). There is no doubt that oil revenues were a significant factor for such an increase.
Table (13). Total public expenditure, expenditure on education, and public expenditure on education as a percentage of total public expenditure. 1952-53 to 1968-69.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total public expenditure (£1000)</th>
<th>Expenditure on education (£1000)</th>
<th>(1) as % of (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952-53</td>
<td>6,229</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-54</td>
<td>7,870</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>8,797</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>9,816</td>
<td>1,216</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-57</td>
<td>9,174</td>
<td>1,441</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-58</td>
<td>10,123</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-59</td>
<td>12,373</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>13,381</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>12,140</td>
<td>2,549</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>19,561</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>43,437</td>
<td>9,113</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>53,251</td>
<td>11,130</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>79,035</td>
<td>17,890</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>85,965</td>
<td>19,996</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>101,000</td>
<td>20,812</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>41,245</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The monarchy did not last long and had only 17 years of life during which the policy for higher education had been controlled for 14 years from 1955 to 1969. It seems to have been too short a period of time for the higher education sector to examine its policy and it
is possible to highlight information to confirm this. The monarchical era experienced two different phases: the period from 1952 to 1961, prior to the oil boom when the financial resources were very limited, and the period from 1962 to 1969 after the discovery of oil when financial resources became available. It has to be realized that during the period of the monarchy Libya had no indigenous government structure or experience in self-government, that there was no training at any level, that only limited information was available, that there was insufficient and qualitatively inadequate staffing and that there was a lack of experience and weakness in management in the Libyan government. Given the lack of scientific experts and of university personnel, the financing policy for higher education at these times seems unclear with many of its decisions having been made under foreign institutions’ guidance and influence. It had been influenced by the UN and its agencies, particularly by UNESCO and by professors who were working at Egyptian universities. Higher education institutions in Libya were under the supervision of the Minister of Education who became directly responsible for directing higher education policy as well as for the overall education policy for all other sectors of education in the country. Three laws were founded during the monarchy regime: the ‘Law for Establishing the University’, issued in 1955; the ‘Educational Law’ of 1965; and the ‘University Law, No. 20/1968’. (Elfiki, A, 1982, pp128 & 133).

The structure and management of higher education in light of the three laws:

With the implementation of the first university law, the Libyan government established the first University Council. This was given the legal authority to own or dispose of property, as well as to accept financial contributions and assistance unless these violated the original objectives of the university. Both the university and faculty councils were controlled by the Minister of Education. The minister considered the first step towards the appointment of
the Director of the University and his suggestion was passed to the Cabinet of Ministers for approval, after which the king issued a decree for the director’s appointment. It seems to be that there had been a sort of centralization in the administration of higher education and its relationship with the education ministry and the other ministries in the Libyan government. All university decisions, actions, and appointments of administrators (e.g. General Secretary, Dean of Faculties, and Vice-Dean) had to be approved by the Minister of Education, who was in charge of the Cabinet and without whose verification such decisions would be ineffective. The main aim of this hierarchy was to avoid subjecting the university to any political activity. The financial functions for which the University Council was accountable were in administering its investment and expenditure, preparing budgetary projects and financial accounts, supervising and administering the accounts and stores, collecting monies due to the university and for maintaining the building and furniture. (Elfiki, A, 1982, pp184 and 187).

After the discovery of oil in 1959, the Libyan economy witnessed a radical change. Oil resources improved the economic conditions in the state and eased the funding difficulties in the education sector which had expanded at all levels. This led the Libyan government to enact a law in 1965 that dealt with new trends and redefined the objectives of public education. With the introduction of this new law the Director of the University and the Deans of Faculties had more of a contribution to make in decisions not only at the higher education level but also at pre-university levels as well. The Supreme Council of Education, which included the Director of the University and the Deans of Faculties, was established at the Ministry of Education. One of its duties was to get advice about the annual funding provided by the government for the University. (Elfiki, A, 1982, p131).

19 The government wanted the university to away from any political crises and make it under control of the government.
After frequent meetings with the Vice-president and Deans of Faculties, a new University Law, No.20, was established in April 1968. The introduction of this law had improved the administration of higher education by creating more flexibility and less centralization. It was stated by El-Mahdawy (in Elfiki, A, 1982, p 237) that:

“….. the new law was a considerable improvement over the old one.”

The ‘President’ of the University was used as a title according to this law instead of the ‘Director’. He was given a wider legal authority to regulate the University and its faculties and his decisions and actions did not need to be approved by the Minister of Education. El_Mahdawy (in Elfiki, A, 1982, p 237) stated that:

“….. the new law made the Minister of Education only an honorary authority; therefore, the decisions of the University Council are to be applied without additional approval.”

In addition, the Minister of Education, under the supervision of the Cabinet, had the right to regulate this higher education institution without being subject to approval by royal decree as it was before. Both the university and faculty councils were controlled by the Minister of Education. Through this change the Libyan government aimed to keep the University autonomous and to achieve its objectives easily without interference.

Since the establishment of the Libyan University, higher education institutions had been financed through two main sources: local resources and foreign resources.
4.2.2 Local Libyan finance.

During the period from 1955 to 1961 before the advent of oil wealth, domestic financial resources were limited. Mainly, these resources, according to J.A.Allan (1981, p22), came from an inevitable dependence on Western interests, whether in minor contributions collected from rents from the United States of America and British bases or through amounts paid by foreign oil companies to the Libyan government for contracts and agreements made for the development of the petroleum industry.

Basically, the general financing policy for education before oil had been characterised by an uncertainty and instability about the availability of funds and financial resources: “It was determined on a year-by-year basis, and often firm commitments came too late for the year in question to benefit from them. These lags in commitment seriously affected the execution of projects owing to shortages in planning and execution personnel and institutional and bureaucratic factors.” (Sayigh, Y, 1978, p 431).

Despite the financial difficulties and the limitation of available funds, Libyan higher education was free. It was heavily regulated by the government. In fact, the idea of privatization had emerged at the pre-university level and in other sectors (e.g. commerce and construction) but not yet at the tertiary education level. It seems to have been too early to think of privatization during the period between 1955 and 1969 because higher education was very limited and even elsewhere in the world this sector had only been seen as ‘a private good’ rather than ‘a public good’ until 1980 (Altbach, P (b), 1999, p110). In Libya, the private sector had been legalized to play its role in higher education since the early years of the 21st century as a result of the previous policy and this will be explained later. The higher education sector was regulated by the government and it had, as Qubain,
F (1979, ps 418, 422 and 425) points out, two ways of being financed: firstly, on some occasions the Libyan government had sent some students to study abroad at their own expense or on scholarships, including those who were awarded scholarships from the UN and its agencies, and were sent abroad under the terms of a legal pre-condition. Those opting to study abroad had two options: they either had to work for the state for a period equal to at least twice the length of their studies abroad after completion, or they had to refund the costs of their study.

Secondly, the Libyan government admitted students to study at its local university for free as a basic right, provided there was space and provided the student had completed twelve years of elementary and secondary education and had received the secondary certificate of achievement. However, the International Bank Mission commented that free higher education was wasteful and could not be justified by considerations either of economy or equity. Not only did the government not charge tuition fees or any other fees, but students were also given generous maintenance allowances of about twenty Libyan pounds a month, a substantial sum, as well as being given books and educational materials free of cost.

The prevailing conditions during the decade of the 1950s had been really hard. On the one hand, the financial resources in Libya were very limited and most of its income was generated from foreign aid (e.g. the UN and its agencies, and military bases) and these were uncertain and unstable. On the other hand, the Libyan government was burdened with extra cost by providing free study at Libyan University and by offering its students monthly stipends plus free books and free other educational materials, all of which had
increased continually. Table 14 summarises some of the government’s financial commitments on higher education institutions.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yearly payment (students* £L20 * 12 months) £L</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955/56</td>
<td>8,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56/57</td>
<td>16,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57/58</td>
<td>37,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58/59</td>
<td>82,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59/60</td>
<td>131,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60/61</td>
<td>174,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61/62</td>
<td>232,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62/63</td>
<td>258,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63/64</td>
<td>297,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64/65</td>
<td>307,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65/66</td>
<td>453,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67/68</td>
<td>605,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,604,240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It seems that the main purpose of this policy was to encourage as many students as possible to enter the university. The economic situation changed after independence and new education institutions appeared as a result of radical changes in the economic and social
structure of the state especially after the discovery of oil. This situation made it imperative to recruit trained scientific personnel.

With regard to the faculty staff, they were drawn from foreign countries because there were no qualified university lecturers in Libya when the Libyan University was founded in 1955. The Minister of Education appointed foreign faculty members who were able to meet two conditions: good qualifications and with at least ten years of experience. Those who were accepted by the Ministry of Education were contracted to avoid any engagement in political or commercial activities, any participation in the management of any commercial, financial, or industrial institutions and any job that could be at variance with their duties and performance. The foreign faculty members had to sign a one or two-year renewable contract with the Ministry of Education which paid them high salaries. The scale of salaries of faculty members ranged from £L 720 to £L 4000 see Table 15.
Table (15). Staff salaries in the years 1955 and 1968. (£L)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Professor</th>
<th>Associate Professor</th>
<th>Assistant Professor</th>
<th>Lecturer</th>
<th>Assistant Lecturer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,200 – 1,800</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,000-1,300</td>
<td>720-1,080</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3,200 – 4,000</td>
<td>2,700-3,500</td>
<td>2,100-2,800</td>
<td>1,600-2,200</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The economic difficulties and the limited financial resources did not continue for long. From the beginning, revenue from petroleum exports increased rapidly, growing more than fifteen-fold from $40 million in 1962 to $625 million in 1967. Within eight years of its first shipment, Libya was the world’s fourth largest exporter of crude oil, a rate of expansion previously unknown anywhere in the industry’s history. In the process Libya moved from a stagnant to an exploding economy, from a capital-deficit state to a capital-surplus state, from an aid recipient to an aid extender. The oil royalties supported other financial resources, such as taxes, customs duties and income from other national sources and became the main source for financing the education sector and other state services. (Ghanem, S, 1988, pps11-22). This wealth provided the government with enormous financial power. Since then, the Libyan economy has become heavily dependent on oil revenues and this has freed the Libyan economy from its former dependence on foreign based aid. This has been illustrated by El- Fathaly et al (1977, p35) showing that oil revenue contributions towards total revenues jumped rapidly and enormously from 7.8 per cent in 1962 to 76.5 per cent in 1968. This increase in wealth provided the Libyan government with the ability to go ahead with expanding the higher education sector. It was noted by Otman, W and Karlberg, E (2007, p99) that in the Libyan budget of 1967/1968 the allocation for education reached 20.6 per cent of the annual expenditure of 101,000,000
Libyan pounds. There was little constraint or uncertainty concerning the availability of funds and finance. “The increase in oil revenue and its ratio to total revenue, accompanied by an unfortunate decrease in other sectors of the economy… …promoted over the first few years of this development the idea that oil is the key to the dynamic character of the Libyan economy and its vitality for the development of the region.” (El-Fathaly et al, 1977, p16).

The monarchical era immediately after the discovery of oil prepared the first economic and social development plan to cover the period from 1963 to 1968 with a budget which amounted to 298.2 million Libyan pounds. One of its aims was expansion in education. This was followed by the second plan from 1969 to 1974 with an allocation of 1,149 million Libyan pounds. There was great concern within the state about education in general and higher education in particular. The Libyan government’s budget was strongly orientated towards investment in the education sector. During those two periods, the actual outlay on education rose from 8.7 per cent in the first plan to 10.10 per cent in the second plan. Unfortunately, the latter only had five months of life, instead of five years. It was cancelled and ignored by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) which took over after September 1969. (Allan, J, 1981, p92 and Sayigh, Y, 1978, p445).

4.2.3 Foreign finance.

Early independence prior to oil wealth, 1951 to 1961, brought an increase in external funding for higher education. Before that its institutions depended on foreign finance to a large extent and such support was handled by a number of agencies for overseas aid, such as the United Nations (UN), the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and even from other Arab countries like Egypt, Sudan, and Tunisia. About 68.7 million Libyan
pounds came to Libya as capital flows, which permitted the government to expand its public finance not only for higher education but also for other sectors. The UN and its executive agency, UNESCO, provided the Libyan government special assistance to finance two projects: the first was the establishment of the College of Advanced Technology in Tripoli, the capital city of Libya. The total cost amounted to $3,110,961 over six years. The UN paid $1,054,000 which was to be used for the provision of equipment, appointment of teaching staff and of fellowships. The second project was the establishment of the Radio and Telecommunications Institute at a total cost of $1,206,960. The UN paid $523,600 over a five-year period which was to be used to provide technical equipment and teaching staff. In addition to UNESCO, there were other agencies that contributed directly or indirectly to the training of manpower in Libya: ILO, FAO, ICAO, WHO, WMO, and ITU. All of them had a technical assistance programme of one kind or another and they received contributions of £5,499,200 from 1952/53 through to 1959/60. From 1952 to 1958 the USA had contributed about $11,600,000 as assistance to almost every facet of education in Libya (see Table 16). The staff members at the faculties in the Libyan University were from different nationalities. A few professors were from the USA and the UK, the rest were from Arab states, particularly Egypt, and all received their salaries from their respective governments. (Qubain, F, 1979, pp 418, 420, 423, 425, 427 and 428 and Sayigh, Y, 1978, pp 425 and 426).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of finance</th>
<th>Local finance</th>
<th>Foreign finance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No fees charged to students</td>
<td>Borne by the</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A stipend payment of £L20 a month</td>
<td>£2,604,240*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution for the College of Advance Technology.</td>
<td>$2,056,961</td>
<td>$1,054,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution for the Radio and Telecommunications Institute.</td>
<td>$683,360</td>
<td>$523,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical assistance from the UN and its agencies</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$5,499,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA assistance for education sector</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$11,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA aids (building campus)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital expenditure allocations for building and equipment from the Inter.Bank Mission</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>£500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: research, adapted from (Qubain, F, 1979, pp 420, 423, 425, 427 and 428), from Table 12.

A number of Libyan students studied in foreign countries because local universities were unable to offer certain specializations. Between 1951-1961 over 100 fellowships and scholarships were granted by the UN to Libyan students for study abroad. This meant two things: firstly, the Libyan higher education financing policy was being supported by foreign resources, and secondly, that the policy had introduced the internationalization of higher education in Libya since its beginning. During the period 1951-1958 there were about 108 students who studied at undergraduate level and graduated from foreign universities. Most of them graduated in the humanities. Only six students graduated in engineering, medicine, and pharmacy. Approximately 60% of Libyan students studied in
Egypt, particularly at the University of Alexandria. There were several reasons attributed to this: geographical proximity; similarity of language and culture, the low cost of living in Egypt and a fairly large number of scholarships in the form of free tuition and a monthly stipend available to Libyan students at Egyptian universities. The Egyptian authorities provided the Libyan University continuous aid over several years until it was able to support itself. The USA, the UK, and Italy were also destinations for Libyan higher education students. In 1959 there were 44, 20, and 20 students respectively who studied at universities in those three countries. (Qubain, F, 1979, pp 418, 426, 427 and 428).

4.3 Higher education policy in the republican phase and ‘The System of the Masses.’

On the first of September 1969, the monarchy was overthrown by a group of army officers, the ‘Free Officers’ headed by Colonel Mummar Al-Gaddafi. The previous regime disappeared but had left behind a reasonable foundation and the main pillars for further development of higher education institutions. At the end of the monarchy there was just one university with seven faculties and 3001 students and a simple design structure for higher education. But the new regime faced early challenges. Firstly, there were a large number of Italians who still remained in the country so the government decided to expel them. Secondly, the return to their own countries of most of the European and American professionals, technicians and teachers led to a shortage of skilled labour and of a skilled work force. Thirdly, university education in Libya suffered from shortcomings, such as a lack of adequate facilities, and its management and national faculty members, to a large degree, moved on to the national universities in the Mashreq and the necessary replacements for Libya were slow, inadequate and undertaken in an inappropriate setting. Finally, the drop-out rate in adult education in the year 1970/1971 was high as was the rate
of unemployment among the labour force as well as the rate of illiteracy in society. (Sayigh, Y, 1978, p434, p463 and p464).

After the 1969 Revolution higher education witnessed many changes because the sector was seen as an important factor towards improving economic and social conditions. Gaddafi had drawn his ideas from the three volumes of the ‘The Green Book’ on this sector and he introduced his philosophy to restructure the state institutions in a way that fitted in with these ideas. His unique approach to the traditional concept of the ruling system led him to establish the idea of the ‘State of the Masses’ which he believed had been the result of political and historical development in Libya over the two stages of monarchy and republic. According to him this development had led at the end to the establishment of the ‘System of the Masses’ which is the political system whereby Libyan people regulate themselves by themselves through the establishment of a people’s congress and committee as well as through unions and professional syndicates.

The institutions of higher education are considered to be the first to have practised his philosophy. This chapter will try to highlight the development of higher education after 1969 and the role of the Al-Fatah Revolution in this sector.

4.3.1 The importance of higher education in the national agenda.

Given the importance of higher education for economic and social development, Libya has attempted to improve its human resources through investment in the education sector at all levels. Gaddafi, who was the head of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), insisted that education at all levels is a right as well as a duty for all Libyans and no one has the
right to prevent any citizen from receiving education.\textsuperscript{20} This concept added a new pressure to promote higher education. So, free education has been offered by the state and more schools and higher education institutions have been founded. Basically the oil revenue helped the revolutionary government to achieve this. Libyan higher education then witnessed rapid development although issues of quality were neglected. The RCC made important changes in an attempt to improve human resources in Libya. It stressed vocational and technical training in order to equip these areas with the necessary skills and competencies needed by economic and social development projects. The Council also worked to create a balanced distribution of higher education institutions as well as schools in various areas of the country in order to provide education for as many people as possible. There was a particular focus on the scientific disciplines because of their significance to the economy. There was also an increase in the provision of girls’ education and girls were encouraged to continue their education at the higher education level. This contributed towards reducing the general level of illiteracy amongst people of all social and economic levels.

The population in Libya has grown rapidly for almost four and half decades. According to World Bank (2007) the number rose from 1.994 million in 1970 to 6.420 million in 2009. The percentage of the population aged 15-24 was between 21.1 per cent and 24.3 per cent during the period from 1990 to 2005. This means that a large number of the Libyan population was in the higher education age group. In 1969 when Gaddafi came to power, the rate of literacy was 28 per cent and almost 3,000 students were enrolled at the only university, the Libyan University, and in one or two other higher education institutions. By the end of the twentieth century these figures had improved considerably to reach a literacy

\textsuperscript{20} He released this declaration on the 11\textsuperscript{th} December, 1969, in article 14 of the Constitutional Proclamation of the El-Fatah Revolution which emphasises the improvement of the physical, mental, and moral welfare of youth. (Secretariat of Information in Allan, J, 1981, p230; and Elfiki, 1982, p137).
rate of 97.0 per cent. In the period 1995-2005 the percentage of literacy among Libya’s youth reached 98 per cent and in adults (aged 15 and above) about 84.2 per cent. Believing in the importance of higher education, the Al-Fatah regime had determined to expand the Libyan higher education system to absorb the increasing number of students. The state had not only adopted an open-door policy, but it also guaranteed employment for graduates. This policy, though, became a problem for the government by placing significant pressure on the system of higher education. Expansion could not be halted because public demand was immense and in Libya, as in many countries, access was guaranteed to those who had passed the secondary school examinations. Higher education institutions had to accommodate more students without the necessary financial resources. Expansion continued or even accelerated because government policy remained committed to increased access. The number of students in universities was, in fact, more than the places available and most of them were enrolled in the human sciences. The result was an overcrowding in the universities and deterioration in the conditions of study. In 2008/09 about 340,156 higher education students were enrolled in twenty three institutions, thirteen universities and ten higher learning institutes including the Academy of Graduate Studies which specialized in post-graduate studies. Private institutions and the Open University are not included in the above. Table 17 shows these institutions and the dates of their founding. (Ham, A, 2002, p 31 and Metz, H, 1987, p114; UN, 2007/08, p 270; & General People’s Committee for Higher Education, Bulletin of Higher Education, the first issue, 2008, p 8).

4.3.2 **The size of public expenditure on Libyan higher education.**

In the case of Libya, during the expansionary period after 1950s its financing policy for higher education remained heavily reliant upon local Libyan resources and essentially from
oil revenues, although there was some financial support represented by the technical and technological assistance from foreign organisations. At national level, Libyan higher education has been mainly sponsored by the state. Since 1969, the budget was divided into an annual administrative expenses budget, an annual development expenditures budget, and a special expenditures budget. The financing of higher education consisted largely of public funding based on budget allocations and a distribution formula loosely arranged according to many considerations (e.g. the size of finance resources and the number of faculty members and number of higher education institutions). The state adopted an open-door policy and students paid no fees with the exception of those enrolled in The Open University and the Academy of Graduate Studies. These were the only institutions within the public sector that relied to some extent on tuition fees paid by students. Other public institutions of higher education relied entirely on the national budget. Higher education’s rank in the priorities of economic and social development plans had fluctuated up and down from time to time. It seems to be that higher education in Libyan society has generally been seen as a 'public good' rather than a ‘private good’ and the impact of higher education on Libyan society and its role in fostering economic development are seen to justify the state’s expenditure.

Table (17). The higher education institutions in Libya, their establishment date, and the number of their faculties after 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Its establishment date</th>
<th>Number of faculties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Fatah University</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Of Al-Fatah</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Medical Science</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Arab Medical</td>
<td>Benghazi</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bright Star University Of Technology</td>
<td>Ajdabiya</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>5 departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sebha University</td>
<td>Sabha</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahaddi University</td>
<td>Sirt</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th of April University</td>
<td>Zawihyah</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar Elmukhtar University</td>
<td>Al-Bayda</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasser University</td>
<td>Alkhums</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Of Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi</td>
<td>Gharyan</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Of Darnah</td>
<td>Darnah</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Asmariya University</td>
<td>Zlitin</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th of October University/ Academy of Graduate Studies</td>
<td>Musrata</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academy of Graduate Studies</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Institute of Civil Aviation</td>
<td>Sabah</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Institute of Administration</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Posts And Telecommunications Institute</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Institute of Financial and Management sciences</td>
<td>Gergaresh</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Institute of Electronics</td>
<td>Bani walid</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Institute for General Vocations/</td>
<td>Musrata</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Higher Mechanical Occupations</td>
<td>Janzore</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Higher Industrial Technology</td>
<td>Engila</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Institute of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering</td>
<td>Hun</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Institute of Technology</td>
<td>Brack</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: research, adapted from Lulat, Y, 2005, p152; & Libyan University Directory, Libyan Universities and Colleges. (-) Not available.

Historically, the University of Al-Fatah, Tripoli, and the Garyounise University have received their allocation from the government. In the period from 1974 to 1979 the

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21 It is a public university. It is located in Benghazi, the second largest city in the country. It was founded on 1955 as the University of Libya.
expenditure in terms of both administration and development on the University of Al-Fatah rose from more than DL 6.5 million (more than US$19.7 million) to DL 16.5 million (US$49 million) and from more than DL10 million (more than US$ 30.3) to more than DL 29 million (almost US$ 88 million) for the Garyounise University. Between 1976 and 1980 the development and administrative allocations for both universities were much higher than at the pre-university levels of elementary and secondary education. This high financial allotment could be attributed to several reasons: special equipment and apparatus required by the faculties, such as laboratories, especially for the faculties of medicine, engineering, and pharmacy; monthly allowances for Libyan students; the large number of non-Libyan faculty members whose salaries were higher than those of the Libyans and who were provided with other advantages, such as a two-month vacation annually with free travel allowances and two months’ salary as a furniture allowance on arrival at the institution, as well as free transport to and from the institution and free medical services. Libyan higher education has depended considerably on foreign faculty members for a long time. From the first university in 1955 until at least the end of the 1960s there were no Libyan university lecturers; all were from abroad, especially from Egypt. In the 1990s the state started to practise what it called a ‘policy of Libyanization’. (Muftah, A, 1982, pp 38 and 39 and Qubain, F, 1979, pp 418), However, according to the General Authority for Information (in its Statistics Book, 2007, p136) a large number of foreign teaching staff remained at Libyan universities in 2007-2008. With a total of 5,983 teaching staff, 1,700 (28.4 %) of them were from outside the country.

During the period 1999-2001 public expenditure on the tertiary level of education as a percentage of all levels was much higher than on primary and secondary education. Expenditure on the former was 68%, whereas on pre-university levels it was 17.8% and
14.2% respectively. Similarly, in the period 2002-2005 public expenditure on higher education as a percentage of total public expenditure on education was much higher than that at primary and secondary levels. In higher education it was 69% and at other levels 12% and 19% respectively. (UN, Annex 4, 2004, p239 and UN, Human Development Report, 2007/08, p 266).

In the last years of the Gaddafi regime, higher education in Libya benefited from foreign institutions. Since its positive re-engagement with the international community following renunciation of weapons of mass destruction, the General People’s Committee for Higher Education of Libya (GPCHE) signed agreements with many foreign higher education institutions and international organisations to get educational, technical and technological assistance. After 2007, the GPCHE sent a delegation\(^\text{22}\) to University College London (UCL) to discuss quality assurance issues and the potential for collaboration.

On August 24th, 2008, the GPCHE announced its partnership with SAP Middle East and North Africa LLC to develop eleven University Competence Centres (UCCs) across the country. Dr. Abdolkhabir Alfaikry, Secretary-General of the GPCHE and Higher Education Minister, stated that:

“The Libyan General People’s Committee for Higher Education is proud to be in partnership with technology partners such as SAP and UNESCO to introduce a nationwide

\(^{22}\) The delegation included six people who held a meeting in March 2007 with Julia Abbott, Senior Executive Officer (Academic and International), Professor Vince Emery (Pro-Provost for South Asia and the Middle East), Jason Clarke, Deputy Director of Academic Services and Everard Whitehouse of the British Council. The Libyan delegation included Dr Suleiman Mahmoud Khoja (Director of the Higher Education Private Sector); Dr Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Ahmeda (President of the 7th October University); Dr Attia E A Elfeituri (President of Garyounis University); Dr Idris H Mabruk Elahedi (Manager of the Libyan Centre for Quality Assurance in Higher Education); and Adel Ali Sennosi and Hamad Ahmed Abdelwahed Saleh, both of the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (University College London, 1999-2009).
ICT-based educational program that will empower our students with essential ICT skills. Education is what will ultimately fuel the Libyan economy and ensure opportunities for all. The development of key ICT skills through programs such as UCC not only enhances Libya’s competitiveness, but lays the groundwork for long-term economic success.” (SAP AG, 2007).

Such projects and collaboration with foreign universities and related international organizations had led to an increase in the expenditure on Libyan higher education. Gibril Eljrushi, Dean of the Engineering Faculty at the 7th October University in Musrata, stated in 2009 that the General People’s Committee had set aside a budget of $72 million to finance a project to use information and communications technologies to reform the higher education and scientific research system, to establish local area networks in 149 faculties on various university campuses and institutes, and to include a wide area network forming the Libyan Higher Education and Research Network. (Sawahel, W, 2009).

4.3.3 The Libyan education system.

Until 1982 The Libyan education model, known as the 9-3 system, comprised nine years of primary education for children aged from six to fifteen years and three years of secondary schooling for students aged 15 to 18 years. In 1969 there was a lack of Libyan teachers who were qualified to teach in the primary and secondary schools and a lack of qualified accountants and managers to work in the state institutions. Most of these jobs were covered by expatriate personnel from Arab countries and in particular, from Egypt. Therefore, the RCC established commercial, agricultural, and teaching institutions in the Libyan education system as an attempt to cover this shortage.
At the beginning of the 1980s the General People’s Congress (GPC) called for the re-structuring and reform of the educational system under what became known as the New Educational Structure Plan. According to this plan, the state replaced the secondary schools by specialized training institutes whose curricula would be integrated with those of the universities and technical institutions. (Metz, 1989, pp 110 & 113 and Otman, W and Karlberg, E, 2007, p 380).

In the 1990s the education system was restructured to comprise four levels: pre-school children from four to six years of age; primary education for pupils from six to fifteen years of age; intermediate education for students from fifteen to eighteen years of age; and higher education which covered all post-secondary education leading to the award of certificates, diplomas and degrees. These included universities, institutes of higher education and technical centres. Study at these institutions would take between three years at institutes and technical centres and up to six academic years for some university degree courses. While technical centres, for example, the Petroleum Training and Qualifying institute, Tripoli, award professional diplomas, universities and higher institutes award a Baccalaureate, a Master’s degree, or a Doctorate depending on the level of study at the particular university or institute of higher education. (Elzatini, S, 2008, pp 132 & 133).

4.3.4 The philosophy of the Al-Fatah Revolution with reference to the development of higher education in Libya.

In September 1969 a communiqué read on Radio Benghazi announced the end, without bloodshed, of the Libyan monarchy and the birth of a republic. The message of "…victory of the Al Fatah Revolution, in the name of freedom, social justice and unity" was read by a young army officer, Gaddafi. The Free Officers Movement claimed credit for carrying out
the coup and designated itself the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). In its initial proclamations, it declared that:

“...the country is to be a free and sovereign state called the Libyan Arab Republic, which will proceed, with the help of God, in the path of freedom, unity, and social justice, guaranteeing the right of equality to its citizens, and opening before them the doors of honourable work. (Metz, H, 1989, p 42).

Metz, H, (1989, p 42) further commented that the rule of the Turks and Italians and the ‘reactionary’ regime just overthrown were to be condemned as the ‘dark ages’. The Libyan people were called upon to move forward as ‘free brothers’ without fear to a new age of prosperity, equality, and honour. For an oppressed people, a ray of true hope flickered at the end of what must have been for many a long tunnel of despair and frustration. Several important points made in the RCC’s constitutional declaration in December 1969 were that public ownership was to be the foundation of social development and sufficiency of production, that non-exploitive private ownership was to be safeguarded and not expropriated except according to law, that inheritance was to be a right governed by the Islamic Sharia, that freedom of opinion was guaranteed, and that education at all levels and medical care were the right of all Libyans to be free of charge and to be provided by the State. (Metz, H, 1989, p176).

Al-Fatah Revolution led to a radical change in Libya politically, economically, and socially. As mentioned previously, Gaddafi introduced his new political system starting with the RCC’s declaration on September 1st, 1969, that Libya is now a free country and sovereign state called the ‘Libyan Arab Republic’ instead of the ‘Kingdom of Libya’. In
1969 the RCC moved vigorously to institute domestic reforms and affirmed that the country’s identity was a part of the ‘Arab Nation’ and its state religion was Islam. It abolished parliamentary institutions, all legislative functions being assumed by the RCC, and continued the prohibition of political parties which had been in effect since 1952. The new regime categorically rejected both communism and capitalism in both domestic and international matters.23

Following the Revolution, Libya embarked on a policy of implementing rapid socio-economic development plans. These development plans embodied a conscious policy for the expansion of higher education opportunities in the country. The Al-Fatah Revolution stressed the need to make education services available to villages and remote areas by providing mobile classrooms and continued the expansion of university education as well as allowing study missions abroad.

In 1972 all university faculties in Libya in the three zones Tripoli, Benghazi, and El-Bayda were under the administration of the Libyan University and the University Council. At that time and due to various reasons, the University Council, which was the body responsible for regulating these faculties, began to think about the possibility of establishing another university. These reasons emerged in a memorandum. They were:

1. The rapid increase in the student and faculty numbers. Between 1968/69 and 1971/72 enrolment in the Libyan University increased from 2,804 to 5,069

23 Capitalism is representative of the western regime and communism is representative of the eastern regime. According to Gaddafi both systems had failed: the focus of Communism was on the collective whole and forgot the individual, while Capitalism elevated the individual without consideration of the collective whole. He composed a ‘third universal theory’ to correct the short-comings of both ideologies. In a series of essays in his ‘Green Book’, Qaddafi spells out a vision for what he termed the ‘Third Way’, or the alternative to Capitalism and Communism.
students. The number of faculty members rose from 277 in 1968/69 to 344 in 1970/71. See figures 3 and 4.

2. Some difficulties were related to the centralization issue compounded by the great distance between Benghazi and Tripoli.

A memorandum which was presented at the University Council meeting held in November, 1972, suggested that the establishment of two universities should be considered; one in Benghazi, and the other in Tripoli. According to the memorandum this idea was suggested as a result of several reasons: the long distance between Benghazi, Tripoli and El-Bayda, which made it difficult to manage the properties and their faculties from one administrative centre; the cost of communication and transportation; the increasing number of higher education students; and the economic development which required the establishment of another university. (Elfiki, A, 1982, pp 273 and 274).
In 1973, a decision was taken to establish two campuses: the first in Benghazi which was to include the faculties of Arts, Commerce and Education, Law and Medicine, and the
second in Tripoli, which was to include the faculties of Science, Agriculture, Engineering, and Education. It was also agreed to add two more faculties, a faculty of Medicine in Tripoli and a faculty of Education in El-Bayda. The two universities had witnessed even further expansion in terms of the number of both students and faculties. In 1974 three more faculties were established at Benghazi University. They were the faculties of Science, Engineering, and Dentistry. In 1975 the Faculty of Agriculture was founded in El-Bayda. In Tripoli University, in addition to the faculties of Science, Agriculture, Engineering, Education, Minerals and Petroleum Engineering, five more faculties were added during the period from 1973 to 1979. These were the faculties of Medicine (1973), Pharmacology (1975), Veterinary Medicine (1976), Education (1976, located in Sebha, south Tripoli), and the Faculty of Nuclear Engineering (1979). After the expansion, the number of Libyan and non-Libyan students increased on both campuses. In Benghazi University (Garyounise University) the number rose from 1,848 in 1968-69 to 11,721 in 1980-1981. In Tripoli University (Al-Fatah University), it increased from 1,154 to 9,656 in the same period. (Elfiki, A, 1982, pp 366-369).

It should be noted that during the 1970s Libya witnessed a marked expansion in the number of faculties and that during the 1980s it witnessed not only an increasing number of faculties, but also an increasing number of universities. As the figure 5 illustrates some nine universities have been established in different areas as can be seen in figure 6. This development can be attributed to several fundamental reasons: the discovery of oil resulted in the establishment of the Faculty of Petroleum and Mining Engineering; the wealth generated by the revenue from oil; the re-structuring and reform of the educational system in 1980 under what has been known as the ‘New Educational Structure Plan’; and the implementation of the ‘People’s Power’ idea and the establishment of Popular Congresses.
(municipalities / popular ‘Shbiat’) which gave Libyan people in each district the opportunity to establish a university.

Consequently, with the growth of the universities the number of enrolled students increased rapidly from 1990 onwards. It increased from 20,445 in 1980/81 to 54,391 in 1989/1990, and then to 269,302 in 1999/2000. See figure 7. The fundamental reasons for this growth were:

1. The high demographic growth over the past few decades;
2. The increase in the secondary education students who passed the GSEC examinations and qualified for a university education;
3. The democratic policy of education in Libya that offered free access to higher education institutions;
4. The discovery of oil and its important role in accelerating the process of economic development calling for a more expert and qualified workforce and an increased need for an educated and trained population to carry out the demanding socio-economic development programmes;
5. Attractive employment opportunities provided by the international oil companies and multinational companies which provided strong incentives for students to complete higher education.
Figure (5). Compare the number of universities established in 1970s & 1980s.


Figure (6). The distribution of universities in Libyan map.

Source: It has been done by the researcher.
6. The improvement in Libyan society’s attitude towards women and freedom for women to study at universities. Libyan law stresses that women must be regarded as equal to men, and that they are expected to play a constructive and profoundly important role in shaping the life of the country. Government officials emphasize not only the equality of the sexes but also the desirability that women should participate in the social and political world of men, areas from which they have been traditionally excluded. Through the period from 1970 to the early 1980s the female enrolment as a percentage of total student enrolment increased dramatically from 9% to 20%, and then in the next few years to 24% (Metz, 1989, p114). UNESCO (in UN, 2006) reported that Libya was among those Arab countries which had the highest enrolment rate of women in higher education with more than 50% of all women had enrolled in its institutions of higher education.

7. The dominance of the idea in Libyan families that universities are the only way to secure their children’s future. (Al-Nouri, Q, 1995)

8. The establishment of universities in the remote areas (e.g. Musrata, Sirt, Al-Zawya, and Sabha).

It is worth mentioning that the higher education system had been controlled by the new political system, the Masses System, for four decades. For forty years, higher education had been regulated under an administration which was strikingly different from that of the previous regime. Its ideas came mainly from the philosophy of the ‘Third Universal Theory’ of the Green Book by Gaddafi, which combined socialist and Islamic theories and rejected parliamentary democracy and political parties. Through its intervention the system had not only shaped the size of Libyan higher education, but had influenced its structure, administration, financing policy, trends and shape of the internationalization of higher
education, and even the name of its institutions regardless of whether they were public or private. The following section will highlight the influence of Al-Gaddafi’s philosophy on the higher education financing policy.

4.3.5 The impact of the political system on financing the higher education policy, management issues in Libyan universities.

Since 1969, the impact of politics on the financing of the higher education policy in Libya has been obvious. It is not in terms of how much has been allocated to higher education institutions, but in its management structure and the deployment of authority among people who work in the system. The process over the last forty years has been to transfer authority and power from the Ministry, which was the highest power in the state, over and above both the Ministry of Education and the University Council, to the People’s Committee that represents the people. The new regime had shifted the previous policy of the monarchy.
phase because Al-Gaddafi believed that it did not serve the Libyan people and it did not meet their ambitions and aspirations.

In the monarchical era, the Libyan government, when it became responsible for running its education affairs, stressed that the education system should reflect Muslim and Arab character and that its philosophy should be conceived in the light of the main outlines adopted by most Arab states. In Libya as a kingdom the higher education policy was influenced by the legislation enacted by the Government and approved by the King's royal decree. In its management structure, the power and authority come from the top down or from the King to the Cabinet and then to the Ministry of Education. Although, the University Council was given more authority and legal autonomy to regulate the university and its faculties, there were some issues and affairs that had to be approved by the Ministry of Education and the Cabinet and then confirmed by Royal decree.

After 1969, Libya became the Libyan Arabic Republic and the RCC took several actions, such as nationalizing foreign companies and establishing public-owned enterprises to restructure the economy. “In the spring of 1972, a new political, administrative and legislative system was introduced as part of the People’s Revolution, which established a socialist state, to be governed only by the people. After the Declaration of the People’s Authority in 1977, Libya became a ‘State of the Mass’ or a Jamahiriya”. (Ahmad, N and Gao, S, 2004, p.366). The RCC determines higher education and its financing policy and has imposed a set of procedures and changes. These procedures and changes have been merged to accommodate the institutions of higher education and their functions with the purposes and ambitions of the philosophy of the El-Fatah Revolution.
There had been a major national debate to determine the best political and constitutional arrangements for the realisation of popular power. In 1973 Gaddafi, in his five points speech in Zuwarah, West Tripoli, proclaimed the ‘Cultural Revolution’. He called for a popular uprising to set up People's Committees in all government departments, industries, schools and universities. His calls for administrative revolution resulted in mass marches on all government establishments. (Metz, H, 1989, p 211)

In December 1976, Gaddafi called on the People's Committees to go further by initiating action to articulate the popular will, instead of merely approving and supervising plans by the various ministries. In fact the executive system comprising the RCC and the Council of Ministers continued to operate into 1977. On March 2nd, 1977, Gaddafi proclaimed the ‘Declaration of the Establishment of the People's Authority’ and he renamed the Libyan Arab Republic ‘The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ or as it has been translated by American scholar Lisa Anderson ‘peopledom’ or the ‘state of the masses’. By this proclamation Gaddafi wanted to establish the concept of democracy and practise it directly through the people who could govern themselves free of any constraints, especially from those of the modern bureaucratic state. The main element in the practice of direct democracy was the ‘People’s Congress’, the first nucleus and the centrepiece of the new political system, which in the end comprised the ‘General People Congress’ (GPC). The GPC replaced the RCC as the supreme instrument of government. One of its roles was to appoint the ‘General People’s Committee’ to replace the Council of Ministers and its members now called Secretaries rather than Ministers, e.g., the ‘Secretary of Higher Education’ instead of the ‘Minister of Higher Education’. (Metz, H, 1989, p 47).
The idea of democracy through the establishment of popular congresses and popular committees was explained by Gaddafi. He made the point, “*Democracy has but one method and one theory*” (in Efiki, A, 1982, pp 284 & 185), meaning that real democracy and real people's power could only be achieved through elements contained in the theories in his ‘Green Book’. These were the People's Congresses and People's Committees. Political systems that act on behalf of their people in decision-making through parliaments were, in this view, non-democratic. The idea of the people's congresses meant that everybody had the right to participate in decision-making and in order to achieve that, Libya was divided into districts. Each area would have its own congress called the ‘basic people's congress’. The individuals in the basic people's congresses would choose their people's committees to replace the government. These committees were to be responsible for the administration of the public utilities in its district and responsible to the basic popular congress. In these conferences, individuals would make different decisions concerning their area. And then the popular committees would consider the resolutions and supervise and implement them. In this way a 'true democracy', a 'direct democracy' where all individuals participate in these decisions would be achieved. The ‘Green Book’ defines ‘democracy’ as ‘*the supervision of the government by the people*’ but this would come to an end and be replaced by the right definition: ‘*Democracy is the supervision of the people by the people*’. (Gaddafi, M (a), 1975).

The basic People's Congress included different socioeconomic classes, such as, doctors, engineers, farmers, workers and lawyers. These different sections would have their own syndicates and unions. Finally all decisions of the basic people's congresses, syndicates, and unions were to be considered in the General People's Congress which would meet in an annual ordinary session, usually for about two weeks in November or December. However, not everyone was satisfied with these changes. They criticised the government
because it did not use the correct criteria when appointing people to be responsible for universities and their departments.

After the division of the Libyan University in August 1973 into two campuses, the University of Benghazi and the University of Tripoli, their faculties were the first to put into practice Gaddafi’s ideas. The General People’s Committee had been established on each campus to confirm the real division of the university into two separate universities. All higher education institutions operating in Tripoli became part of Al-Fatah University, and all higher education institutions operating in Benghazi became part of Garyounise University. After that, a series of meetings were held in some of the faculties at both universities to explain the concept of the General People’s Committee and its responsibilities. On April 28th, 1973, a meeting was held at the Faculty of Law in Benghazi, which is considered to have been the first institution in Libya to establish a popular committee. On May 3rd, 1973, another meeting was held at the Faculty of Engineering in Tripoli which had followed suit and then on May 7th, 1973, Gaddafi met faculty members, students and administrators from the Faculty of Arts and from the Faculty of Medicine. This was followed by many other meetings in other faculties. (Elfiki, A, 1982, pp 298, 290 and 291). As a result of these meetings the concept of a popular committee became clearly understood and these committees were established in all faculties at the two universities. Members were chosen from faculty members, students, administrators and employees.

Since then the General People’s Committee (GPC) became dominant, it replaced the University Council in each university and the title of President of the University changed to the title of Secretary of the General People’s Committee and each faculty was represented by the Secretary of General People Committee instead of the Dean of Faculty.
Figure 8 shows the new university structure. These committees were established by Law no.78, 1973, giving extensive local government powers. On January 1, 1975, Law no.1, 1975, transferred the authority and functions of the university and the faculties’ councils to the People’s Committees at the same levels. It stated that:

“The popular committees in the universities take the duties and responsibilities given to the university council in the laws and regulations. The chairman of the committee takes the responsibilities given to the President of the University. The Secretary of the Committee takes the responsibilities of the vice-president. The popular committees in the faculties take the responsibilities of the faculty councils. The chairmen of the popular committees in the faculty take the responsibilities of the deans of the faculties. The secretaries of the popular committees of the faculties take the responsibilities of vice-deans”. (Elfiki, A, 1982, p295).

By this structure the committee of universities and faculties became responsible for regulating the institutions, laying down the broad lines of their financing policy of which the following are representative:

1. Administer investments and expenditures of university capital.
2. Approve the budget project and the final account to the university.
3. Supervise the maintenance of university buildings and the establishment of new buildings.
4. Decide on systems concerning different allowances and financial aid.
In April, 1976, the name of the university in both campuses was changed to reflect the political nature of the new system. Benghazi University was renamed the Garyounise University, which refers to the military garrison from which Colonel Gaddafi first led vanguard forces to start the revolution. Tripoli University changed to Al-Fatah University to refer to ‘Al-Fatah Revolution’. Naming the universities by using names having political significance and reflecting the support of the policy by the prevailing system, the ‘System of the Masses’, was obvious not only in the state universities, but also in the private ones. There were a number of universities which were named in way that referred to a political meaning or a political event. For example, the Seventh of April University in Musrata (West Tripoli) referred to a ‘Students’ Revolution’ that emerged in 1976 against the ideas of capitalism and communism. Also, Tahaddi University in Sirt (West Tripoli) referred to the decade during the 1980s when the relationship between Libya, the USA and the UK was at its worst. At that time Libya was blocked economically and politically. However, the Libyan leader wanted to show that by changing the names, Libya was not affected.

On January 15th, 2008, the General People’s Committee’s (Council of Ministers) decision No.22, 2008, was issued, giving the universities’ popular committees extensive local government powers. They were to assume responsibility for policies in all institutions and in all sections of local government, both initiating plans and putting them into action. The decision included sixty three articles that covered the universities, their faculties and the institutes of higher education. Twenty-nine of them were to deal with the administrative responsibilities of the universities of the popular committees. The latter, as has been mentioned earlier, were to be headed by the named Secretary of the General People’s Committee, but that named secretary and his or her assistants would have to meet four
conditions, according to articles 8 and 11. The first are scientific and the fourth is political, as follows:

1. To be the holder of a degree this should be of a higher level than that associated with the status of an Associate Professor.
2. To have had working experience in the field of university teaching.
3. To be deployed in scientific activities at university level.
4. He or she has to be a believer in the philosophy of Al-Fatah Revolution.

Articles 2 and 10 of the GPC’s decision dealt with financial affairs. According to the former the universities would have to become more autonomous:

“For each university, there should be a designated person and an independent, separate budget. The latter should be from public charity and from the university fixed and mobile income to comprise the overall budget (general budget). It will also include the generation of income from the services it provides, from Non-Government Organizations’ (NGO) subsidies and from the raised funding which come to a university from non-conditional gifts or recommendations with the only condition that these should not be contradictory to the main purpose of the establishment.” (GPC, Article 2, 2008, p2).

Article 10 of the GPC’s decision has two points, the first point and the fourth point, that give a university the right to manage and regulate its own affairs. They are as follows:

“…and by the university administrative body and its governance of its affairs, especially the following:
1. Management of university funds invested and disposed of in accordance with the legislation.

2. Approval of the budget and final accounts to be forwarded to the concerned authorities.” (GPC, Article 10, 2008, p 6).

Figure 8. The Structure of the Al-Fatah University. (Garyounise University has the same structure).

4.4 Conclusion:

To conclude, the above discussion has explained the development of higher education and its financing policy in Libya since 1955 when the first university was founded. For almost a decade since 1950, Libya experienced a period of tremendous economic, financial and social difficulties as has been noted by experts, such as Roger Tourneau, Higgins, and the UNESCO Mission that was sent by the UN to study economic and social problems in Libya during the period 1952-1954, i.e. before the establishment of the Libyan University.
Despite difficulties the Libyan authorities were determined to found a national university. It was felt by the government that there was a need to establish a local institution of higher education to provide an educated and qualified workforce and trained manpower. This growth has been accelerated by a number of economic and social factors, e.g. an increase in the number of students and faculty members, the discovery of oil, as well as other elements.

Prior to the advent of revenue from oil over the period 1951 to 1961, the financing of Libyan higher education had been heavily dependent on foreign aid. This overseas aid had come from various sources, such as the United Nations (UN) and its agencies like UNESCO ILO, FAO, ICAO, WHO, WMO, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and even from Arab countries like Egypt, the Sudan, and Tunisia. But after the discovery of oil Libya became independent of foreign assistance. From being a stagnant economy it became a burgeoning economy, a capital-surplus state rather than a capital-deficient state, and an aid extender rather than an aid recipient.

Politically, the funding of higher education in Libya has been through two different phases. The first was under the rule of the monarchy from 1952-1969. The second was under Al-Fatah Revolution, the ‘System of the Masses’ from 1969 to the fall of Gaddafi. In the former, the higher education system was regulated by the Ministry of Education. All its decisions and actions had to be passed to the Cabinet of Ministers for discussion, and then the King would issue a royal decree of approval. After 1969, when the monarchy ended, Libyan higher education entered a new stage called the ‘System of the Masses’. The new political system appeared to be completely opposite to that of the previous government and
made changes in the management structure of higher education in a way that fitted with the philosophy of the new regime. Gaddafi had introduced his ideas to restructure the higher education system. He transferred authority from the government to the people. Libyan higher education institutions were now regulated by ‘People’s Committees’. The President of the University became the ‘Secretary of the General People’s Committee’ and each faculty would be represented by the Secretary of the General People’s Committee instead of by the Dean of Faculty. Their members would consist of people who worked at these institutions, e.g. faculty members, students, and employees. These members would be elected through a direct election where the people sit together in a popular congress to choose the members according to specific requirements and conditions. The committees were given extensive legal authority and local state powers to regulate the institutions of higher education. However, this system was abolished subsequent to the February Revolution and has raised a number of issues related to private higher education. So, whether private institutions will survive or not is a matter to be determined in the future. These issues will be covered in epilogue at the end of the thesis.
Chapter five: The financial crisis and social pressures for change.

5.1 Higher education in economic and social development plans: policies for improving access and equity.

This chapter will examine more analytically the pressures leading to the expansion of higher education during the period briefly outlined in the previous chapter. When, in 1965, oil was discovered in Libya it became a rich country. This wealth provided the Libyan government and the policy makers in the education sectors with the ability to go ahead with expanding higher education. “The increase in oil revenue and its ratio to total revenue, accompanied by an unfortunate decrease in other sectors of the economy, promoted over the first few years of this development the idea that oil is the key to the dynamic character of the Libyan economy and its vitality for the development of the region.” (El-Fathaly et al, 1977; p16).

This discovery and exploitation of oil was to have a major effect upon the funding of Libyan higher education. There had been six plans for social and economic development. Two of them were formulated during the Monarchy phase and the others were founded after the Al-Fatah Revolution in 1969. The first ever five-year plan in Libya existed between 1963 and 1968. Its allocation reached 169 million dinars and then it was increased to about M.D.480 with the growth of the oil revenues. As the situation in Libya was difficult, a large percentage of these allocations were spent on the main services and the establishment of an infrastructure for the national economy including the construction of municipal facilities such as lighting, water networks, roads, houses, schools and hospitals. It was felt that it was important to give priority to the pre-tertiary level of education rather than to the higher level because at that time one of the major weaknesses was the high rate of illiteracy. (Central Bank of Libya, N.D).
The second plan covered the years from 1968 to 1974 with an increased allocation of M.D.1149. Despite its ambitious goals to develop the Libyan economy, it lasted only for five months instead of five years. It was ignored and then cancelled by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) which took over after September 1969. (Central Bank of Libya, N.D).

All development plans that were founded after 1969 were aimed at achieving a set of strategic goals, including reducing the reliance on oil and the diversification of income resources through more consideration of the main productive economic sectors, such as, agriculture, industry and energy, and thereby achieving self-sufficiency. To meet the ambitious development plans the government felt that it was important to increase the number of higher education students to provide qualified labour. The state listed a number of strategic objectives that should be achieved through these social and economic plans. These objectives were:

1. Expansion of higher education to absorb the increasing number of students.
2. Improvement in the quality of higher education graduates to fulfil the needs of social and economic development plans.
3. Ensuring that higher education institutions are distributed fairly between urban and rural areas.

Of course there could sometimes be tension between these objectives with different motives leading to them.
With regard to the first objective the Gaddafi government declared that education at all levels is a basic right for all Libyan citizens. Gaddafi in his “Green Book” says that “the acknowledgment [of this] is a nature right for everybody”. In the light of this concept education became not only a basic right but also the government guaranteed to make education, including higher education, free. Accordingly, higher education was characterized as being free of charge and public responsibility. As a result enrolment in the public universities grew dramatically from 8,220 students in 1972/1973 to 165,561 students in 2007/2008.

The quality of education has also been a concern in the plans. Emphasis was to be given to vocational training at the higher education level and more concern given to developing a long term plan for the educational sector that could achieve the goals of the social and economic development plans. About 109 higher education institutes and centres were founded during the period from 1985 to 1990. These specialized in different areas, such as mechanics, electrics, electronics, computing and building and construction. In 1982 the state enacted what is called the “New Educational Structure”. School curricula were restructured in favour of technical subjects in a way that students at these schools could choose the undergraduate major from an early stage. It meant that graduates were prepared vocationally and academically so they could continue their studies in universities or enter the market work force. In 1986, as result of the lack of qualified teachers, of technical equipment and of suitable buildings, this structure was abandoned and all types of secondary education schools were closed except for those teaching the basic sciences. In 1995 Gaddafi held a meeting with the General People’s Committee for Education and Scientific Research in Sirt to emphasize his desire for the structure. Secondary education was reorganized and special technical committees were founded under the supervision of
the National Centre for Training and Educational Research to avoid the earlier problems.\footnote{The previous problems included the lack of qualified teachers, technical equipment, etc., as mentioned earlier.} (Otman, W. & Karlberg, E, 2007 and Alhawat, A., et al, 2004).\footnote{After the February Revolution the post-Gaddafi government had intended to abandon this policy because the Higher Education Minister stated that this type of education was not suitable and would not serve the Libyan economy effectively.\footnote{(Interview The Deputy Minister of Higher education, Prof. Fathi R. Akkari, January 2012)}.}

The other concern in the plans was to ensure there was a balance in the establishment of higher education institutions across the country. Until 1973 there were two universities, one in Tripoli and one in Benghazi. As the number of students increased, the government established seven more universities in the rural areas to avoid the overcrowding in the universities in those two main cities. Moreover, some of these universities developed faculties outside their cities or towns. The Al-Fatah University in Tripoli, for example, opened branches in Al-Azizya in the south west, in Al-Zawya in the west and in Musrata in the east.

The economic and social transformation plans starting with the three-year plan 1973-1975 and then the 1981-1985 plan, were designed to implement a suitable strategy for the Libyan economy as planned by the coup in 1969 for the public sector to dominate and regulate economic activities. The private sector in higher education was not involved in those plans. All financial allocations for the education sector were distributed entirely to the state universities. The political system of Gaddafi’s regime initially completely rejected the idea of the private sector (see Chapter Six).

During the 1970s higher education in Libya was very limited and had just the two universities, Al-Fatah University in Tripoli and the other, Garyounise University in
Benghazi, with a combined total of 4,100 students. (General Authority for Information, Statistical Book, 2002, p77). Policy planners in the three year plan and in the plan of 1976-1980 had obviously given priority to the completion of these higher education institutions and by 1974 six faculties had been established in both universities. The 1976-1980 plan aimed to complete the establishment of these faculties: Education, Engineering, Science and Agriculture. Two lecture theatres were planned as were laboratories, facilities for public administration and the provision of a library housing academic materials. In Garyounise University the plan aimed to achieve the following:

1. Complete the Faculty of Arabic Language and Islamic Studies.
2. Establish more buildings for the faculties of Science, Engineering, Medicine and Agriculture able to accommodate 5,400 students and to be completed by the end of the designated period of the plan. Accommodation for 5,330 students to be made available in both cities.
3. Build other facilities to serve students.

At that time the state’s targets through this plan were to expand the capacity of the universities to increase the complement of students from 13,517 to 25,470 and to increase the numbers in practical studies more than in theoretical studies. Therefore, more faculties were added in both universities, whilst at the same time the current capacity of some colleges had been expanded to absorb greater numbers of students. To achieve the strategic goals of the 1976-1980 plan, the government devoted M.D.470, 430,000 to the education sector, 49% of which has been allocated to the universities of Al-Fatah and Garyounise. Four years later, three industrial institutes of higher education were opened. And in 1980 the number of university students and those in practical - i.e. scientific departments - had
risen to a figure of 19,315, about 5,798 short of the target proposed by the policy makers in 1976. (Planning Ministry. (N.D) and General People’s Committee for Planning, (N.D)).

By 1980 the 1981-1985 plan had been formed and this aimed to complete some of the enterprises that had not been achieved in the previous plan. These projects were divided into three types: under performance, non-realization of the committee of tenders, and faults in study and design. The government had planned to reach a group of strategic objectives that included higher education opportunities for all Libyan citizens through Open University programmes and to increase admissions in technical and scientific studies at the universities in order to meet the requirements of the ambitious development plan. To achieve this aim, the government spent M.D. 697,000 of the allocated sum of M.D. 825,300. It was the first time since 1957 that such an effort had been made to establish three more universities and to complete three vocational higher education institutions. All these establishments, with exception of one university, were located away from the two main cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. These institutions were designed to specialize in three different areas: electronic, electrical and technical. It was felt that its main concerns were: first, to avoid overcrowded cities such as Tripoli and Benghazi; second, to offer higher education opportunities for all Libyan citizens especially those who lived in rural and remote areas; and third, to create industrial and vocational training institutions within higher education that would help train the manpower urgently needed by the enterprises in social and economic development. It is ironical that, on the one hand, emphasis in the higher education policy had to be given to vocational education but, on the other hand, the entry requirement (i.e. level of attainment) for students to study at these institutions was a mark of less than 65%. It meant that students who achieved high grades enrolled in universities and others who scored low grades were directed towards vocational education.
The anomaly here is that although the policy makers emphasized the essential nature of vocational education and placed importance on the recruitment of high-quality applicants, it was students who held low qualifications from secondary education that were admitted to study at these institutions. (Al-Swyah et al, 1995). In fact, vocational education is not respected by Libyan society because it perceives this type of education as being of low class. This is compounded by the fact that even highly qualified university graduates were, and are, uncertain about their abilities and jobs for the future.

No plans like the three previous ones have been produced since 1985. In the following years the allocations from the development budget to the education sector had been devoted incrementally year by year instead of in an overall prescribed allocation. This was because the achievements of the previous plans were below the government’s expectations. In 2004 the new Prime Minster, Dr. Shokri Ghanem, had intended to implement a five-year plan as before, instead of an annual allocation, by claiming that the financial resources should be distributed according to the size of the enterprises because this would serve economical growth and that it should not be based on population figures. (Embark, S, Al-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 8th of December 2004, p13). However, subsequent plans continue to be designed on a yearly period. Previous plans had failed to achieve their goals and Gaddafi’s government was disappointed because of these failures. In available references and sources most development plan allocations are devoted to the education sector as a whole see table 18. It is to be noted that the dip in financial expenditure 1995-97 was partly because of the reduction of oil revenues.

Table (18). Yearly allocations to the education sector in Libya (1986-2003).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allocations</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>125.5</td>
<td>129.0</td>
<td>148.0</td>
<td>135.0</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>130.4</td>
<td>324.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is very difficult to get precise information of how much higher education cost the Libyan government, but the sources show the efforts of the planners in all development plans aspiring towards further development of the system. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed rapid expansion in the number of universities and of other higher education institutions. Seven more universities and 19 higher education centres for industrial and vocational studies were founded in different places. And then the number increased from 22 in 1995 to 62 in 2002 which included a variety of vocational fields. Again, the government was more concerned with developing a long term plan for the educational sector that would achieve the goals of the development plans and meet the manpower requirements of the economy for a specific technical work force. In the 1990s the General People’s Committee for Education (GPCE, Ministry of Education) adopted a series of procedures and decisions to increase the number of enrolments in these institutions. This sought to increase the percentage of young people who were projected to go to the higher vocational education centres from 15% to 60% by 2000 and had a future target of 70% for 2010. Unfortunately, two obstacles damaged the policy targets: the negative attitude of Libyan society toward this type of education and the fact that institutions enrolled students who had graduated from secondary schools with low standards of achievement. (Aljaly, A, 2006).

Indeed statistics show that the goal to raise the numbers more in practical studies than in theoretical ones was unsuccessful, as was the other aim to improve the percentage of enrolments in vocational institutions. In universities the majority of students still preferred

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allocations</td>
<td>216.1</td>
<td>738.8</td>
<td>381.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

human studies. And this led to a surfeit of graduates from the latter compared with the number of science graduates. As can be seen from table 19 this imbalance caused the problem of ‘educated unemployment’ (as it will be explained later). A report in 2002 submitted by a team of Libyan experts on vocational education after a wide evaluation concluded that most of these establishments needed to reconsider their curricula, their structure, their finance and their departments.

Table (19). The number of graduates from arts/humanities departments compared with those from science departments. (2001-2004).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>19,254</td>
<td>21,728</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>25,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>12,640</td>
<td>13,942</td>
<td>15,238</td>
<td>16,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The difference</td>
<td>6,614</td>
<td>7,786</td>
<td>8,162</td>
<td>8,934</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 2004 the public chancellor, Dr. Abd-Alsalame Al-gelalee, who was in charge of education at all levels described the education situation in Libya after about four decades as a disaster and painful. He stated disappointedly:

“........Its development plans and public policy were faulty in that graduates cannot find jobs, not with this education system......yes, it is true that the market labour in Libya was not able to offer jobs for many graduates, and the question here is why the results of education were not accepted by the labour market? ..... during the last three decades, the total costs and expenses in the education sector were more than three billion Libyan dinars. In the previous four years alone the costs exceeded one and half billion, however,

---

26 Human studies include all literature and theoretical sciences such as sociology, education, business management, historical studies and languages. Others like engineering, computing, medicine and pharmacy are called practical sciences. Libyan students prefer to go for the former rather than the latter as they consider these disciplines to be easier options.
the standards were very low and were not achieved as were proposed by policy makers.....” (Jawhar, A, Al-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 22nd of June 2009, p11).

5.2 The main forces of change towards the privatization of higher education

As has been explained earlier, the major trend in most countries, whether developing or developed, has been the privatization of higher education and Libya is not excluded. It seems there is consensus among authors and scholars that the first and foremost reason why governments favour the privatization of their higher education systems is that their financial constraints prevent the funding of post-secondary educational institutions. But the question is: did Libya face the same challenges and take the same direction?

In Libya at the end of the 1990s economic, demographic, inter- and intra-sectoral competition, as well as a shift in ideological thinking, all account for the policy shift in higher education financing. Previous policy failure to achieve some of, if not most of its goals, as proposed by the policy makers, is undoubtedly the most rational explanation for the reconsideration of the financing policy. Up until 1985, Libya’s economy performed remarkably well with a Gross Domestic Production (GDP) sufficient to cover development and recurrent expenditures. Economic decline began in earnest after 1985, catapulted by the oil price shocks that considerably slowed down economic production leading to capital destruction and the stagnation of joint productivity in both labour and capital. This dismal economic performance resulted in insufficient resource-based revenues being available to finance social services including education. Along with the decline in macro-economic performance came rapid population growth. Libya is among countries world-wide that have had a very high growth rate in population. For many decades after independence the
population growth rate was around 2% (Planning Ministry, (N.D) p55). These changes in demographic numbers translated into increased demand for higher education.

The country’s nine public universities and seven accredited private ones had by the first decade of the twenty first century an enrolment capacity of 326,453 students, 92% of whom are enrolled in public institutions (Alseny, N. 2004, in Al-Aowar, M 2006 and General Authority for Information, Statistics Book, 2008, p43). So the pressure to expand higher education, coupled with economic decline, has had a powerful impetus in policy reform. Increased inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral competition for diminishing national resources has also catalyzed policy reform. Education is just one of the sectors that call for continuous state funding in the last few decades and it has claimed a large share of the national budget to the detriment of other vital sectors. The Libyan government allocated 381.3 million LD of the development expenditure to education in 2003, representing over 14% of the entire national budget (Central Bank of Libya, 2004, Economic Bulletin, p27). In 2001, university education received 108,097 million LD from the development budget. These stark economic realities were accompanied by a general shift in ideological thinking about the role of government in financing higher education, as well as new conceptions of the role of university in national development. Neo-liberal ideology—the de-emphasis or rejection of government intervention in economy and the belief in progress through free-market approaches—during this period steadily gained currency within Libya’s national development thinking, courtesy of the World Bank proposals for higher education in many developing countries, especially regarding its criticisms of the perceived ‘failure’ of state universities in Africa and the growing unrest about the desirability of the public provision model which we examined in earlier introductory chapters. A combination of internal and external factors has, therefore, provided the drive for policy reform in higher education.
financing in order to sustain and develop the system for an ever increasing population. Critical questions remain, though, as to what kind of policy has been adopted and with what consequences to the values inherent in higher education aspirations in Libya.

The following section will highlight the main forces that led to the policy makers reconsidering their financing policy for higher education. These forces indicate the difficulties that faced the Libyan government during the Gaddafi regime. So, the section below covers the period from 1969 till 2010.

(i) The impact of economic crises on the higher education financing policy.

The dependence of the Libyan economy on one commodity - i.e. crude oil - represented a great problem once the price suddenly fell. The crude oil exports represent more than 90% of total exports. The oil and natural gas extraction sector contributed about 27% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which means that it ranked first in terms of importance for creating Libya’s GDP. The Libyan government distributed the oil revenues according to three different types of expenditure: steering (called the steering budget), development (called the development budget) and security and defence.

The steering budget included the expenses of universities and other higher education institutions, salaries and wages and other general expenses. The development budget includes the expenditure on the infrastructure for higher education, such as buildings, laboratoritories, libraries, communications and roads. The following analysis will focus on the latter because it reflects the government strategy on the importance of the higher education system. The development of higher education depends largely on this type of expenditure and the state policy was to direct a large proportion of the oil revenues to the development
enterprises. The law in Libya allowed the government to allocate 70% of oil revenues to social and economic development and this resulted in a strong relationship between development costs and oil revenues. In Libya there have been two important periods that could explain how much the education sector has been affected by oil revenues through the development allocations. The first period was during the 1970s when the Gross Domestic Product for oil was rising. The development expenditure grew from 6.6 million LD in 1970 to 216.7 in 1980, more than twenty-eight times in just eleven years. Starting in 1970, when an amount of 6.6 million LD was spent, this rose more than four times to 26.1 million LD in 1971 and increased even further to 31.6 million LD in 1972. Thereafter it increased steadily throughout the 1970s, with the exception of ‘76, ‘77, ‘78, and reached a peak of 182 million LD in 1982 when the oil price soared to US$ 40 per barrel occasioned by the Iranian revolution and the Iraqi-Iranian War. The figures (9), (10), (11) and (12) provide a comprehensive picture of the relationship between the GDP for oil and the Actual Development Expenditure on Education. (Ben-Saeed, B, 2005; Behear, J. 1999; and Otman, W. & Karlberg, E., 2007, p97).

The second period comprises the years from 1980 to the middle 1990s when the GDP for oil was decreasing. These years were very difficult for the Libyan government. Firstly, Libya had sanctions imposed by the USA and in 1992 the UN also imposed sanctions, causing increased privation and mounting discontent in Libya because it had failed to cooperate in the investigation of the two terrorist bombing attacks, the 1988 Pan Am flight 103 which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, and the UTA flight 772 which exploded over Niger. These sanctions isolated Libya economically and politically until 1999 when the UN suspended its sanctions. (Central Bank of Libya, Human Development Report in Libya, 1999) and (John, B. 2008). Secondly, the reduction in the state income from oil in
the mid-1980s was a factor for two reasons; the price was less than US $9 per barrel (the lowest level ever) and the significantly reduced production from Libyan oilfields due to the departure of the US oil companies. As a result of that the GDP declined from M.D. 6564 in 1980 to M.D 3380 in 1995 which led to a sharp decrease in actual development expenditure on education from M.D. 227.76 to M.D. 52.5 in the same period. The figures below show that the trend line of the two variables is generally downwards. However, this did not affect the number of higher education students who qualified during these years. It meant that in spite of the decline in revenue, the government continued to increase the number of higher education students from 19,315 in 1980/81, 32,770 in 1984/85, 50,471 in 1989/90 and then to 70,525 in 1991/92. (Alhawat, A. 1993). The simple reason for this was that higher education remained free, so those students were not required to pay tuition fees.
Figure (10). The expenditure on education 1970-1982. (Thousands of Libyan Dinars).

Figure (11). The Oil Revenues 1983-1994.
(ii) Demographic pressures

In chapters two and three I discussed how demographic pressures had been a force generally to reform the financing of higher education. Thus, the size of population can influence not only the number of students who enter higher institutions, like universities, but also by the allocations which are devoted to these institutions. And, of course, burgeoning tertiary education enrolments puts pressure on fiscal resources.

The question raised in this respect is: has the demographic growth been an effective factor in establishing private higher education in Libya as well as in the other countries? In Libya, the annual rate of growth has been almost the highest in the world. In the 1970s and 1980s the annual rate reached 5%. Although it declined from 4.21% in 1984 to 2.86% in 1995 and to 1.83 in 2006, the major trend in the population of Libya according to the censuses taken increased significantly, as is shown in Table 20 below. The reasons for this
growth could be attributed to the improvement in the quality of life with higher incomes and the existence of a government that guarantees to provide continual education, constant health care and other social services. By the first decade of the twenty-first century almost 50% of the population in Libya was below fifteen years of age and this classified Libyan society as a young society. (Al-Gaddafi, S. 2002, and Almagory, A, 2005).

Table (20). The Libyan population in 1984, 1995 and 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of population</td>
<td>3,231,059</td>
<td>4,389,739</td>
<td>5,323,919</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The growth in population led to an increase in the number of pupils in primary and secondary education and of students in higher education. Since the 1969 coup the number of students in secondary education at both general secondary education (GSE) and technical secondary education (TSE) had expanded rapidly. In the former, which is considered the main source of candidates for university education, the number increased from 8,304 in 1969-1970 to 234,023 in 2007-2008 (see Table 21), with, of course, a corresponding increase in the numbers of students leaving secondary schools with qualifications. The National Centre for Education Planning and Training refers to this in some of its studies by stating that the number of such students increased sixteen times in less than three decades. It grew from 2,898 in 1973 to 31,411 in 1995 (in Ben-Saeed, B, 2005, p85). The case of Libya differs from that of Bangladesh, Kenya or Malaysia where large numbers of students, although well qualified, fail to enter public sector institutions because their current university systems are unable to meet the increasing demand for tertiary education locally. Whereas in Libya the simplest response to the demand has been an increase in the number of enrolments in public universities, leading to the creation of
‘mega-universities’ comparable to the National University of Mexico and the University of Buenos Aires (see Kapur, D and Crowley, M. 2008, p16). As pupils pour out of elementary schools, they become the potential clientele for secondary schools and a similar process repeats itself at the higher educational level. In Libya this took place after 1969, with tertiary enrolments rising from 5,198 students in 1970-1971 to 300,966 in 2008-2009. Those students are distributed throughout 14 public universities. (The National Centre for Education and Training Planning, 2005, p43 and General Authority for Information, Statistics Book, 2009.).

Table (21). Secondary School Enrolment (SSE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Secondary School Enrolment (SSE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969-1970</td>
<td>8,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1991</td>
<td>113,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>278,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>211,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>257,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>234,023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 22 demonstrates that the distribution of students between these universities is very uneven and mostly concentrated in the two wealthiest and most populated regions, with a very heavy concentration in the two principal cities of Tripoli, where the Al-Fatah University is situated and in Benghazi, where Garyounise University is located.
Table (22). Distribution of students between the public universities in Libya, 2002-2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Students number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Fatah</td>
<td>71,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garyounise</td>
<td>34,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Tahadi</td>
<td>16,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar Al-Muktar</td>
<td>14,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Mergeb</td>
<td>13,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Seventh of April</td>
<td>10,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sebha</td>
<td>8,703</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This uneven distribution made the faculties in these institutions overcrowded. Indeed, by 2007 Al-Fatah University, the top university in the national rankings, had risen to 102,046 students enrolled, with most of them studying in inconvenient class rooms and lecture theatres (General People’s Committee for Higher Education, Bulletin of Higher Education; the first issue, 2008). In the Faculty of Medicine, because of the limited capacity of the lecture theatre, students had to either sit on the floor or bring their own chairs. This situation was revealed in a Newspaper in 2003 and 2004 when it was reported that:

“...the number that can be absorbed by theatres is 600 students but there are 1,979 students in year two and 1,300 students in year three....” A student in this faculty disappointedly complained: “Can you believe that students have been forced to bring chairs from outside or even from their homes to sit on during lectures? Is this logical? Where have the budgets that are allocated to universities gone? In the summer time medical students do their final examinations in a tent built in a car park. The weather is hot and the surroundings bad. And in the Faculty of Economics there aren’t any computing
laboratories and there’s an inadequate library....”. (Embark, S, Al-Jamahiriya Newspapers, 7th and 8th of March 2003, p6, 11th and 12th of June 2004, p10 and 25th and 26th of June 2004, p9).

Similarly, Al-Tear made a criticism of the Libyan government (in Ben-Saeed, B, 2005, p47) by pointing out that although many public universities had been established most had very poor facilities and suffered from serious overcrowding: in 2001-2002, for instance, the Faculty of Medicine at Al-Fatah University had 7,375 students who had to share a very small autopsy room with just two dead bodies for study. And at the same university in the Faculty of Dentistry there were about 5,000 students sharing just 35 examination chairs.

Many began to question how a relatively wealthy country like Libya which had the means to solve some, if not all of these difficulties, found itself in this situation, especially insofar as it has a vast income from its export of oil and gas. However, the total expenditure on higher education per capita was less than not only all other oil producing countries but also other countries classified as diversified economies, such as Jordan and Lebanon. (see Table 23). And the country has a population of only 5,323,991. (General Authority for information, Statistical Book, 2009). The author’s experience during this period was that many Libyans were disappointed and critical of the state’s failure to achieve its social and economic goals or to build better infrastructure.

Table (23). Total expenditure on higher education per head of the population 1996.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>The expenditure. (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>26.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>44.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>29.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>39.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>89.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>68.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>122.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Typical of these comments was a short statement by Professor Salah Al-Myhob, A staff member in the Academy of Higher Studies and Economic Research, who declared that: “Libya is a special case”. In comparison with some Arab countries, such as Jordan and Tunisia, Libya seems to be better. Despite the fact that Jordan, for instance, is not as rich as Libya and has a larger population, its higher education provision seems to be more effective and efficient. The larger population in Jordan has led to a corresponding pressure in the demand for post-secondary education. Its response was to establish a private sector in Jordan’s higher education which was founded in just eight years before the establishment of private higher education in Libya. In 1991 the first private university in Jordan was established.

(iii) Graduate Unemployment

According to the Human Development Report of 1999, the Libyan government had adopted an ‘open-door’ policy for work opportunities and a guarantee of jobs since the 1970s. The percentage of the workers in both services and manufacturing sectors reached 84.6% in 1984 and then receded to 66.19% by 1995. But the problem of unemployment had become more obvious by the beginning of the 21st century. It is very difficult to obtain data about unemployment in Libya in the previous three decades of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s because there is very little published research related to unemployment. As Otman,
W. & Karlbeg (2007, p95) point out: “It is difficult to get precise unemployment figures for Libya.” In the 1970s circumstances in Libya were still ambiguous. Gaddafi had come into power, had started to practise the ideology of socialism and at this time had produced his three volumes of the ‘Green Book.’ In the light of this ideology outlined in the ‘Green Book’, Libyans had supposedly become a power controlling themselves by themselves. So, it became very controversial to say that there was unemployment in Libya. The reason, I think, is that since the Al-Fatah revolution the state had adopted an ‘open-door’ policy for work opportunities and had guaranteed jobs since the 1970s. It was an automatic guarantee of a public sector job for not only university graduates but also for all Libyan citizens. (Al-Ghazal, M, 2006). It was seen as a national goal and one of the vital achievements of the 1969 Revolution. The following anecdote provides an insight into evidence associated with this sensitive issue: “A student in the 1990s prepared his proposal about unemployment in Libya and at a seminar two doctors from the Department of Economics showed a sense of caution about further discussion of the proposal.... At the end one of them asked him: ‘Suppose there is unemployment in Libya can you say that there is?’ He answered: ‘Not I, but the thesis will say that.’ The potential supervisor finished the discussion by saying that they could not be supervisors of such a topic....”. (Incident event happened with Author in Jun 2005).

The Economic Research Forum (ERF), in Ali, A. 2002, p24 reported that unemployment had reached between 25 and 30 per cent. However, the leader of the Al-Fatah Revolution, ‘Mummer Al-Gaddafi’ himself, had emphasised in his speeches at several events that there was no unemployment in Libya. For example, at a meeting on the 25th of December in 2004, with members of the Bab Al-Aziziya Popular Congress he emphasized that:
'We cannot say that Libyan adults are not employed.....because there is no unemployment in Libya and the evidence for that, as I told you, is that there are about two million foreign people working in Libya. If we wanted to swap them with Libyans we wouldn’t be able to find enough Libyan citizens to cover.....so, it is impossible that Libya has unemployment if it has a two million foreign work force.’. (Al-Hemali, J, Al-Jamahurya Newspaper, 24th and 25th of December 2004, p5).

This was what the leader said in his speech at that time. However, our sources have revealed that unemployment actually rose to at a high rate in the Libyan economy, and this becomes clear when some of the references, published in 2001 and subsequently, include data about the phenomenon since 1995, just a year after Mummer Al-Gaddafi’s speech. Our first source is Dr. Shokri Ghanem, appointed Prime Minister by Al-Gaddafi in 2003, a year before Al-Gaddafi’s speech. Ghanem stated that:

“The first of my priorities is to tackle the question of unemployment. Strange as it may seem in a country with a viable economy, and a population of less than six million, we have over 250,000 Libyans looking for jobs.” (Shell Exploration and Production, An exclusive Interview with Dr. Shokri Ghanem was conducted by ‘Shell Exploration and Production, September 2003).

Also, the Libyan National Authority for Information and Documentation shows that the percentage of unemployment increased from 1.4% in 1995 to 7.7% in 2001. In 2004 a survey was made by a national newspaper (Belal, A, Al-Shames Newspaper, 2004, p10), to find out whether there was unemployment in the country or not and concluded that unemployment in Libya was a considerable phenomenon which had caused tragic social
problems for many people. Part of the problem was evidently that graduates from universities were still looking for jobs. Most had qualifications that did not suite the jobs available and this was why the Gaddafi Libyan government became more inclined towards vocational education.

A number of Libyan researchers, authors and experts undertook studies about unemployment in the state and criticized the higher education system as being wasteful, inefficient, and unproductive. They claimed that it was unable to respond to the changing demands of customers and markets. This led university graduates, as Aljaly, A (2006) reports, to find themselves unemployed. On the one hand, there was an enormous need to raise the level of education in response to the country's development requirements, while, on the other hand, graduate unemployment was on the increase and the type of training provided failed to make graduates sufficiently capable of creating self-employment opportunities for themselves. In Almagory (2005), in his study about the relationship between the output of the higher education system and the labour market in Libya, argued that there were a large number of university graduates available but that the labour market had absorbed only a small fraction of those seeking jobs. He revealed that the presence of such unemployment could be attributed to the distribution of the students at universities where students had opted for departments in the humanities rather than in those of the practical sciences. See Table 24. He concluded that the public higher education system is responsible for the number of unemployed graduates. Not everyone, however, shares this

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27 The problem has not only been the concern of local studies and in addition to the ERF data mentioned earlier about unemployment in Libya there are other findings which investigated the phenomenon of unemployment in the Arab world. These references point out that in many Arab countries, and Libya is not excluded, the collapse of growth resulted in a serious unemployment crisis which reached dangerous levels, exceeding 25 per cent of the labour force, and only partially addressed by an expanding informal market which, because of its low productivity, and therefore, low income-generating capacity, is a symptom of a distorted economy rather than a window of opportunity for addressing poverty and unemployment in the region. Ali and Elbadawi in Elbadawi, I. (2005) and The Arab World Competitiveness Report 2002 2003 in Al-Hamad, A, (2003) p27.
view. An inspector general, Dr. Abd-Alsalame Al-gelalee, argued that this kind of unemployment was caused by faulty development plans and public policies not the education system (Al-Hemali, J, Al-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 22th of January, No, 4333, 2003, p9). The policy makers in Libya had not planned social and economic enterprises properly and this led to a misallocation of resources. Whatever the reasons unemployment in Libya, especially among graduates, had been a serious dilemma that seems to be perceived by leaders, policy makers and even by Libyan society generally since 2000, as a threat to internal stability. The focus of different media, such as newspaper articles, journals and local TV programmes has exposed the situation to the public. It has been the subject of a number of research studies and investigations which reflect the growing concern of policymakers by providing different analyses and explanations.

Table (24): The University graduates for the years 2001-2004.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Humanities and Social Sciences</th>
<th>Practical Sciences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>19,254</td>
<td>12,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>21,728</td>
<td>13,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>15,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>25,472</td>
<td>16,538</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another, more recent study, in 2008, scrutinized data back to 1973 and illustrated the fact that unemployment in Libya had increased from 3.61% in 1973, to 3.68% in 1984, to 11.66% in 1995 and then to 16.8% in 2002. According to this study the rate of unemployment had reached no less than 10%. One of the reasons given as to why there is unemployment is that the output of the Libyan higher education institutions had not fulfilled the needs of the labour market or the requirements of the economic and social development plans. (General Planning Council Institution, 2008, p7).
(iv) The failure of public higher education.

As was discussed earlier in this thesis, for 45 years after independence the higher education sector had traditionally been under the supervision of the government. From 1955, the year of the establishment of the first university, to 1999, the beginning of private higher education, all Libyan institutions of higher education had been public. After independence universities were seen by the Libyan government as a means of achieving national goals and an excellent tool with which to improve Libyan society economically, socially and politically. But despite the large sums invested, public higher education has failed to play its role in the Libyan economy and has faced many difficulties as shown in a report prepared by the Higher Education Committee (National Committee for Private Universities, A Report about Higher Education in Libya, 2009, PHEA). The Report included 18 points of criticism which provided a comprehensive view and which evaluated state universities and colleges. Some of these points are as follows:

1- Lack of balance in the number of students studying disciplines in specialized high schools. Most had enrolled in social sciences and the consequence was a lack of available places in universities to absorb them.
2- Lack of appropriate curriculums and a lack of development of these curriculums in line with scientific and technical development.
3- The instability of universities and their structure.
4- No match between the output of higher education and the needs of the labour market.
5- Absence of alternative other financial resources to fund the higher education institutions.

5.3 Other Challenges of isolation and corruption.

Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) has been a real challenge facing higher education in Libya since the early part of the twenty first century when the country’s relationship with foreign countries was re-established. Online registration by
students, online access to course outlines and materials and online examinations are all examples of the application of ICTs which could be used by administrators for better planning, for the setting of standards, for effecting change and for the monitoring of results of the essential functions of universities. ICTs is a crucial tool for increasing access to higher education and for ensuring high quality and standards in higher education but there are obstacles in the way. The period from 1985 to 1990 was an extremely difficult period for Libya when it was isolated politically and economically from most other countries in the world. As a result the Libyan economy deteriorated including higher education programmes, policies and strategies. To compound this, in the 1980s the Minister of Education, Ahmed Ibrahim, took an official decision that the English Language was to be excluded from education at all levels and the emphasis was to be given to the Arabic language and Koranic education. For Libya this has proved to be a fundamental and disastrous mistake which set Libya back in terms of educational quality by two generations. (Otman, W & Karlberg, E. 2007, p110). It is a tragedy because this decision has been the reason for illiteracy in English in the vast majority of Libyans and many of those who have recently been funded for study in the U.K have experienced really serious difficulties with the English Language. This problem affects both those who study at home universities in Libya and in other foreign countries.

Corruption was another problem. Huge financial allocations were spent on the education sector in Libya over more than three decades, but the achievements were far lower than had been expected by policy makers and even by Libyan society as a whole. Many people have criticised state policy for failing to invest enough in the education sector, but the government has spent more than three billion on the development of education for the last three decades, and the amount in the four years between 2000 and 2004 exceeded a billion
and a half. In the 2003 report in *Al-Jamahiriya*, a publication widely viewed as the mouthpiece of the Basic People’s Congress, the shortages in universities is strongly criticised:

“….in the Department of Dentistry of the Medical Technician Faculty there are no laboratory materials and lecturers ask students to buy the materials themselves…..the Medical Sciences Faculty in the Seventh April University is located in west Tripoli, and there, specifically in Dentistry and Pharmacy, there hasn’t been a laboratory for four years ……..” (Embark, S, *Al-Jamahiriya* Newspapers, 14th January, p12, and 20th April, p11, 2003).

It is tragic that, although the state devoted a large amount of its financial resources to fund a development enterprise inside a province, these public funds were wasted because of administrative corruption. Corruption in Libya had reached dangerous levels. This concern was expressed by a man during a public meeting held with Al-Gaddafi and the secretaries of the General People’s Committee (Ministers). He pointed at the secretaries and told Gaddafi that those were the people responsible for corruption in the country and that they had wasted the country’s resources and stolen its oil wealth. He stated that:

“…oh, the revolution leader those people who set in front of you have never told you the truth about how many Libyans are suffering in their lives….some people are poor…..some people are homeless…. we need your urgent intervention to step the ministers down…….” (Belal, A, *Al-Shames* Newspaper, 16th of February 2009, p3).
Several years before that, Gaddafi himself had emphasized that the current policy was no longer to continue. At the General People’s Congress in Sirte, in January, 2000, he accused members of the GPC of deliberately wasting the country’s oil wealth, saying “You are holding onto obsolete methods in order to justify wasting oil.” (Otman, W & Karlberg, E, 2007, p218). In a study published by Gaddafi’s son in 2000 he stated that, according to the ‘People’s Board for Follow-up’, corruption in Libya may be categorized under two phenomena: the phenomenon of forgery, mediation, favouritism, bribery and exploitation of jobs for private interests and the phenomenon of carelessness, lack of seriousness and negligence whilst performing duties. The failure of the officials responsible for applying the laws is the first and foremost reason that contributed to wide-spread corruption and this was coupled with the failure of those officials to supervise their subordinates in order to keep order and discipline. He also provided a number of examples of administrative corruption as cited in the Board’s reports, and these included a large number of cases of administrative incompetence displayed in several administrative decisions that were issued in violation of state laws. He further cited examples of the misdistribution of work and the deployment of unsuitable employees for certain posts.

5.4 New ideas and the ‘big change’:
By the early twenty first century, i.e. during the final decade of Gaddafi’s rule, it had become generally clear that the nationalized and centralized system of government in Libya could no longer survive. The collapse of centrally planned and bureaucratically managed economic systems which had informed the policies of Libya for decades had resulted in a lack of direction for a number of years. Because of the absence of a clear vision, of increasing population pressure and of rising social demands, the country failed to adopt appropriate adjustment policies for growth and institutional reforms. Its strategies
continued to rely upon physical capital accumulation, while neglecting the need for human and institutional development with greater access to the rest of the world. Hence soon after the beginning of the new century we find that the social and economic pressures we have been discussing are filtered by policy shifts of some considerable extent. The nation’s then political leadership had abruptly come to the conclusion that the current drift could not be allowed to continue. A public statement from Gaddafi himself at the General People’s Congress in Sirte in 2000, is witness to this: “...the system is finished. I have to step in today to stop this wheel from spinning in a rut and wasting fuel.” He blamed the members of the GPC (Ministers) of deliberately wasting the country’s resources. (Otman, W & Karberg, E, 2008, 217).

In fact, this was not his only speech sharply criticizing the public sector of the country and he attended many meetings to express his evaluation of previous stages. On 1st May, 2003, in a scientific conference held on the ‘Libyan Economy and the Avoidance of Oil Revenues; future perspective’, he said that “.... the Libyan economy has failed to achieve its goals as were designed in the last social and development plans. The country still depends heavily on its oil. The latter has not made any improvement in the economy in terms of diversifying resources and in reducing its reliance on oil revenues. Consequently most production enterprises and industries have collapsed as a result of shortages in financial resources and mismanagement and the situation in general has become worse...”

His attention focused more on the role of higher education institutions in the Libyan economy and he showed that the universities controlled by the public sector were inefficient. He continued his argument by saying that the government had spent its money for nothing and that the country’s oil revenues and human resources had been wasted. Referring to higher education he stated that “.....even in education it is a problem. In
Garyounise University, for example, it was found that the largest number of students was to be found in literature and the smallest number in engineering which means that even students in Libya favour useless studies....” (Al-Dahesh, A, Al-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 1st of May 2003, p4 & p5). He advised a reform of the financing policy for higher education and proposed an immediate move to the private sector and thereby to privatise higher education.

In June 2003 he gave a speech at the General People Congress (GPC) and again he seems disappointed and unsatisfied by the situation in Libya as he stated that:

“I have nothing to add to my speeches of the last forty years...I have spoken to you many times.... I would like to say something: I am not satisfied with the present situation in Libya ....and I’m not responsible for all of it..... don’t believe those28 who tell you that this is according to the guidance of the Leader of the Revolution....you consider that everything was false from the first day of the 1969 Revolution - it means that even those people who believe that they were revolutionaries were not genuine, including the Members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)29 who were free officers and who became treacherous as did the Members of the Revolutionary Committees who cheated us and who were never revolutionaries....” (Al-Dahesh, A, Al-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 13th and 14th of June 2003, p4-p7).

He continued:

“Today ideologically we have to end the public sector ....the latter needs highly educated people who have a high sense of nationhood, good manners and who are greatly

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28 He meant those who came later and established political units that were called “Revolutionary Committees”. They were founded in all state institutions, organizations and companies. These units were used by supporters of Al-Gaddafi to achieve personal interest at the expense of the public’s interest.

29 He meant his colleagues who were with him in the coup in 1969 but who later became his opponents.
concerned about poor people... in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe countries collapsed because they relied on the public sector...” (Al-Dahesh, A, Al-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 13th and 14th of June 2003, p4-p7).

It should be noted here that the Members of the RCC had vanished as a social group since the 1980s. Some were imprisoned; others left the country, while revolutionary committees seemed to have a much reduced influence during the 1990s. On the 24th of December, 2010, the office of the Revolutionary Committees announced on the local channel, ‘Al-Jamahiriya’, that these committees were going to be re-established in higher education institutions.

Through his speeches Gaddafi had shown a genuine desire to end the current policy at the time and to introduce an alternative policy to be adopted in the country. He sometimes referred to it as ‘the people’s socialism’ and sometimes as ‘the people’s capitalism’. To consolidate his decisions he appointed Dr. Shokri Ghanem in June, 2003, to practise the new policy.30 It should be noticed here that it was unusual in Libya to appoint an outsider like Dr. Shokri Ghanem to such a position because governmental high places had been devoted to those who were familiar with Gaddafi’s theories, philosophy, ideas and outlooks as portrayed in his three volumes of the ‘Green Book’. But this time it was different because it seems that Dr. Ghanem had never supported Al-Gaddafi’s regime nor Gaddafi himself. In June, 2003, at the meeting with the Members of the General People’s Congress criticising the public sector, Gaddafi’s said:

30 At that time he was the Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Economy and Trade (Minister) and then, almost five months later he became the Secretary of the General People’s Committee (Prime Minister) in November, 2003.
“…you get used to being led by somebody from the Revolutionary Committee Office…. but this time this person (he means Dr. Ghanem) came from outside… I called him to Libya to guide us in a new direction and to practise the new policy…..” (Al-Dahesh, Al-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 6th of June 2003, p4).

The reason why Gaddafi had chosen him was because the current members had been responsible for failures in the public sector, so Gaddafi felt disappointed and stated that “…we have tried all of you and none of you has been successful, Ghanem has massive experience which could be useful for the next stage..” Ghanem was an experienced petroleum economist credited with liberalizing the Libyan economy and accelerating the opening of the country to international petroleum investment. When he became a Prime Minister he stated that:

“For a number of decades the Libyan economy has been completely controlled by the State. What we are trying to do today, after belatedly discovering that the State cannot give everything to everyone and that the performance of the public administration is not up to the level of our expectations, is to invite more people to participate in the economic process. As a result, we have decided to open Libya’s doors to the private sector and we are offering incentives to people to participate in this economic programme…..” (Shell Exploration and Production, An exclusive Interview with Dr. Shokri Ghanem was conducted by ‘Shell Exploration and Production, September 2003).

The period 2003 to 2006 brought a trend of sorts in privatisation although some private higher education institutions had been established in the late 1990s. In fact, Gaddafi had

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31 Another important factor that helped Dr. Shokri Ghanem achieve such a position was that he helped Gaddafi’s son, Saife Al-Islam, when he was studying for his MSc in Master of Business Administration (MBA) in IMADEC University in Vienna.
now called for the privatisation of the economic sectors in his speeches and favoured
privatization justifying it by his philosophy in the ‘Third Universal Theory’ of the Green
Book’. His new ideology, ‘Neo-liberalism’, was posited by him and recommended that
there should be a shrinking of the welfare state and cutbacks in social expenditure. This
view implies drastic cutbacks in public spending and countenanced the privatization of
public services such as health, education, housing, and transport. The underlying ideology
of privatization was based on the argument that the public sector is wasteful, inefficient,
and unproductive, while the private sector is deemed to be more efficient, effective, and
responsive to rapid changes locally and globally. However, this argument was imposed not
to justify the importance of the private sector in higher education but to expose the failure
of higher education under state control. This policy stemmed entirely from his theory in the
‘Green Book’. Gaddafi since he came to the power had declared public control policy. His
strategy was meant to stem the private sector development. He was very interested to
socialism and opponent in capitalism and communism. After some forty years of his
regime, Gaddafi was disappointed with the previous policy but he never criticised himself.
He blamed those people in charge of the higher education sector. Policy change of this
extent could only come about if approved by Gaddafi,

5.5 Changing the role of the state. What was it and how is it handled now?

Until the late 1970s Libya’s economy operated in both the public and private sector. The
latter fulfilled a significant role in the economy before the appearance of the ‘Green Book’.
In volume two of Gaddafi’s ‘Green Book’ dealing with the private sector, rent was a form
of ‘exploitation’ that should be abolished. All laws were passed to expand the role of the
state at the expense of the private sector role which was seen as part of the ‘Capitalist’
system. Libyan workers took control of a large number of companies, turning them into
state-run enterprises. Retail and wholesale trading operations could, in theory, purchase whatever they needed at low prices. The government established about 230 centralized state-run supermarkets in various parts of the country. These stores were controlled by what were called the ‘local people’s committees’. In his thinking Gaddafi aimed to promote equity which he equated with socialism. Because of his unique conception of the character of the state, his distrust of the private sector, and his abhorrence of the profit motive, he maintained that it is only through massive state intervention that economic independence and equity can be attained. Thus, the state had taken control of virtually all economic domains since Gaddafi came to power.

The period from 1976 to the beginning of the 1990s was longest period of time that the idea of the ‘Third Universal Theory’ was in practice. It became very difficult for the political system in Libya to continue practising Gaddafi’s principles and ideas and the 1990s exposed the imperfection of the Gaddafi theory. It had failed to achieve many of its objectives. It failed, for example, to abolish the role of the private sector when the state-run supermarkets had closed down and private commercial transaction had again started to flourish throughout the country. It thus became evident through its many failures that the then current state policy based on the ideas of the ‘Green Book’ could not continue in the future. Realizing that the socio-political context had changed after the democratization project had started four decades previously. Gaddafi openly declared that the ‘democratization’ of higher education should go hand in hand with Libya’s political development. Announcing that the government was prepared to adopt a decentralization policy in the higher-education sector, he promised that the state would gradually devolve powers to higher education in four major aspects: personnel management, academic freedom, finance, and curriculum. On many occasions Gaddafi made public speeches and
held several meeting with the policy makers and others from different classes to confirm his desire for the change. His call to privatise higher education was not, he said, contrary to his thinking. According to him universities should be established on the base of profit-participation partnerships and should not be allowed to be owned by individuals.

The policy since the Revolution of 1969 had been in trouble. It had been hoped to develop Libyan society from its underdeveloped stage to an advanced stage of development and to improve the quality and standard of living of its people. The previous policy had failed to achieve its goals and its efforts had not borne fruit owing to many administrative and internal problems. Gaddafi had stated that:

“...education and health care have been controlled by the public sector for decades... do you feel satisfied with both sectors?...every year you criticize education and health by saying that they are unsuccessful and useless.....it means that when the state regulates, these sectors fail...... this is the result given in the proclamation of the People’s Authority in 1977 and shows that up to now, the state, the public sector and public administrative have failed to control the education and health sectors, so they have to be controlled by people ...”. (Belal, A, Al-Shmes Newspaper, 16th of February 2009, p2-p4).

In spite of this some argued that the public sector should retain its role in the economic sectors. The secretary of General Planning Council (Minister of Planning) stated that:

“I am not among those who are asking the state to forsake its role ....the state has to have a main role in economic activities........”. (Al-Hemali, J, A-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 6th of April, 2004, p11).
The newspaper did not go into further details of this speech but it exposed the difficulties facing the Libyan government and motivated Gaddafi to make many speeches publicly emphasizing the need for change. He proclaimed a new policy for the future that had three main elements:

1. A decision to cease public control over certain sectors in the country;
2. That oil revenues should be distributed between Libyan families;
3. That social services, especially education and health care, were to be regulated by people (the public sector and the state would no longer finance and be responsible for these sectors).

By making these decisions Gaddafi had aimed to achieve several goals. Firstly, equity, because he felt that the country’s oil belonged to all Libyans without any exceptions and that everyone had a basic right to have his or her share from its revenues and that these had to be shared equally between all the people. It is unfair, he said, that some people are rich and others are poor. By saying this he hoped to relieve the pressure exerted on the government by Libyan society. He suggested that if people receive their money and curtail the role of the public sector and the government, they would make better spending and investment decisions on all social services, including higher education based on their abilities, interests, and aims. However, the current government had made a massive investment in the sector of higher education by establishing new buildings on all campuses across the country. This meant that the role of the state was still dominant and to stem public sector spending in the country would be difficult.
In higher education specifically, which is the main concern of this thesis, there have been two long-standing major arguments supporting the Libyan government’s subsidization of higher education: social returns and positive results from higher education and considerations of equity. In the former, as is evident, higher education imparts substantial monetary and non-monetary benefits for both society and students. The major difficulty, though, is in measuring precisely the extent of the benefits. Not all can be measured according to a single scale, if, indeed, they can be measured at all. Nevertheless, analyses of rates of return based on only the monetary costs and benefits of education provide a baseline estimate of the pure economic value of education. But these studies seem to be extremely lacking in an evaluation of private rates of returns. Therefore, it seems to be difficult to decide whether the cost of higher education should be paid by Libyan students and their families or whether to justify the continued use of full public subsidies. And this is the reason why some of these justifications (e.g. personal benefits from higher education and capital market weaknesses) have not been presented widely in the arguments associated with the financing of higher education in the country. In spite of this inconclusive debate, if all previous studies in Libya are examined it will be found that they have appraised the important role that higher education exerts in the Libyan economy. Effectively it has given society more benefits than it has its individuals and thus justifies its 100% funding from the government. Since 1969, the financing of public higher education has been guided by equity considerations, namely that all Libyans, poor and rich alike should have the same equal opportunity to pursue higher education and accordingly university education is free for all with the full cost borne by the state. It is also argued that public subsidies are needed to equalize entrance opportunities for potential students from different socioeconomic backgrounds otherwise students from disadvantaged backgrounds might be prevented from entering higher education.
From the middle of the 1990s the trend changed. It became clear that Gaddafi’s suggestion was to introduce not the idea of cost-sharing as in many countries, but to distribute oil revenues among Libyans so that the entire financial costs of higher education would be borne by the students and their families. He had never before referred to the experience of other countries regarding the introduction of cost-sharing. And this might explain the lack of studies and research on the financing of higher education in Libya.

The policy makers’ arguments were based upon efficiency, consideration and choice. The first is defined as ways in which higher education institutions become responsive to the demands of their customers without state intervention. The notion of cost transformation from state to students and their families revolves around the argument that public funds are wasted, that state control is inefficient and that when students have to pay their own educational costs, they make more informed choices. There is a general consensus in Libya today that privatization is seen to be more efficient than public control because of strong incentives to minimize costs and use resources efficiently. It is argued that private higher education is more responsive to the changing demands of customers and markets. Privatization leads to competition which brings down costs and improves the quality of service. The private higher education sector is commonly looked upon as being flexible and responsive to the rapidly changing demands of students and the labour market and can offer a diversity of educational programmes in which to create a broadening of social participation in higher education.

5.6 Conclusion
Since the establishment of the first university in Libya, the government had been the sole provider of higher education at university level. It had established one university in 1955
and then the number grew to about 14 universities over a period of 55 years. As indicated above, student enrolment increased rapidly, so that by the end of the Gaddafi period public universities, on average, had an annual student enrolment of about a quarter of a million. There were several factors that could be attributed to this development of higher education. The majority of them were internal factors and these include the need to achieve a body of trained human resources to enable the country to meet its requirements in social and economic development plans, the population growth combined with the strong social demand for higher education (as people recognised its high economic and social returns) and the need for equitable access to higher education. Regarding the latter, the government was not only concerned with giving equal opportunities to men and women, but it was equally concerned with the need to balance the opportunities between the people who live in urban and those who live in rural areas.

All of these objectives were the concern of the Al-Fatah Revolution since the beginning and according to Gaddafi, were in line with the aims of his ‘Green Book’. Initially he considered the policy of state control as explained in the ‘Green Book’, to be the best way to achieve the objectives not only for the higher education sector but also for the other economic sectors.

Even so, despite the advances made during this period, Libya faced several challenges and difficulties. Although there was a rapid increase in enrolment in higher education, the benefits to economic development were not as substantial as hoped because the increase occurred mainly in the disciplines of arts and humanities, which are not widely believed to be as critical to economic development as the disciplines of science and technology. This trend led to the problem of graduate unemployment. Overcrowding in public universities
had a damaging effect on the quality of their students. The government spent a huge amount of money on higher education with results far below those expected and this, of course, raised the question of whether the public sector was competent enough to regulate institutions of tertiary education.

It has to be said that forty years of unattained objectives were enough to justify the claim that the policy for higher education was by the end of the century in trouble. In this respect the changed policy towards education was part of a more general reassessment by Gaddafi and other policy makers of the merits of state-run enterprise. By the start of the present century universities and other higher education institutions were being criticized by many Libyans. And the policy makers and Gaddafi himself felt unsatisfied about the previous policy. They had spoken in disillusioned terms about the failures of the state to control the higher education sector and that it had clearly failed to meet the requirements of its developmental aspirations. These difficulties had forced policy makers to reform the policy for higher education and the government had thereby taken an important step to encourage the private sector to play its role in higher education. These changes came about quite suddenly and had to be justified by a reinterpretation of the precepts laid down in the ‘Green Book’. A further characteristic of Libyan higher education during this period was its relative isolation from many international developments.

In the next chapter the landscape of private higher education in Libya will be presented and will highlight issues of establishment and growth, enrolment, courses, teaching staff and of financing.
Chapter six: The implementation of the changes: role sharing in public and private higher education with its problems.

6.1 Introduction.

The previous chapter examined the factors driving the shift away from public sector dominance. This chapter attempts to analyze the phenomenon of the growth of the private sector and its expansion in the state.

The argument around the emergence of the private sector in playing its role in higher education in Libya is different from the way it has been presented by many authors and scholars, so this is a good opportunity to examine the argument. This chapter will attempt to provide information and insight into the operation of the private sector in Libyan higher education. The first section discusses the transition from a state sponsored system of higher education to private higher education institutions. Section two makes a distinction between privatization and private higher education. The third section deals with the growth and expansion of private higher education in Libya and section four highlights the ownership patterns and orientation of private higher education institutions. Section five is devoted to a discussion on the programmes of study and courses offered by the private institutions and section six discusses teacher and student profiles followed by an examination of the quality of education provided within these institutions. The role of private higher education related to the matter of unemployment will also be analysed in this chapter. The final section will analyse the sources of the financing of private institutions and come to a conclusion.


The original Green Book of Gaddafi, as we have seen was deeply hostile to capitalism and the concept of the private economy. However, there are some sections or nuances of his
thought that contained ideas that could be seen as not entirely opposed to the later emphasis on privatization. Basically privatization in education was explained by Gaddafi through a concept called the ‘Al-Taleem Al-Tasharoky’ or ‘Free Education’ which was to be practised first at the pre-university level and then at the pre-secondary level. In his Green Book Gaddafi explains ‘Al-Taleem Al-Tasharoky’ when he writes that:

“...compulsory education and organized and systematic education in reality is compulsory ignorance of the masses...”

“.....all the prevailing methods of education in the world must be destroyed by the international culture revolution because this will liberalize the human mentality from intolerance and stagnation and resurrect classical humanity and understanding...”

“.....the countries that determine educational paths through their official curriculums, force people to follow those paths and officially determine the knowledge and subjects that are gained and studied; these countries are among those that practice arbitrariness against their citizens...”. (Gaddafi, M (b), 1975, p52).

According to him participation in ‘Al-Taleem Al-Tsharoky’ education means “...the participation of members of a community in providing educational services for those who wish to obtain an investigation of the principle of freedom of education and to ease the burden born by the public treasury. Provided that these individuals are qualified educationally and practically and that the institutions are subjected to the laws and regulations in the Great Jamahriya...” (Gaddafi, M (b), 1975, p51)
Such education according to him would achieve seven aims:

1. Disseminate education and broaden its base for participation.
2. Provide an opportunity for students to complete their studies according to their wishes and to break the monopoly of science and knowledge.
3. Involve scientifically and educationally qualified personnel to contribute to the development of the educational process and to open new job opportunities for newly qualified graduates in this area.
4. Raise the level of educational attainment by encouraging a spirit of competition among institutions to provide the best educational services commensurate with the requirements of the times.
5. Search for new methods, means and more sophisticated methods than those prevalent in the pattern of public education at this time.
6. Improve the standard of entry-level teachers and staff in these institutions.
7. Link the educational institutions with their social surroundings.

These generalities could be used in Gaddafi’s later years as the basis of an attack upon a top-down public sector which helped him to justify the very sudden reversal of policy. In the case of Libya the idea of establishing private higher education institutions revolved around the argument that public higher education had become an inefficient and bureaucratic system. The centralized system that had been adopted over the past three decades had created a system characterized by its inefficiency and lack of initiative. Bureaucratic reliance on central authority had not enabled higher education institutions to respond to external changes or receive timely support. In addition, a public university as part of public bureaucracy had no direct accountability to the public as it was accountable to its direct superior, i.e. a central government authority. The lack of institutional
autonomy had led to irrelevant course provision and slow institutional response to the needs of society. In contrast it began to be argued that private higher education could be seen as being more efficient and more responsive to the needs of society and its development plans. Privatization was also seen as a flexible model that offered freedom in diverse study disciplines. There was seen to be less bureaucracy in private higher education than in public higher education. Gaddafi then turned to the view that the establishment of private higher education would provide unlimited freedom for students to finish their studies. He was able to justify this by reference to the following remark in his earlier book:

“...society should provide the young with all kinds of educational activities and allow them to choose freely the discipline they wish to study....” (Gaddafi, M (b), 1975, p44).

In a meeting with the secretaries of the People’s Congresses, with co-ordinators of people’s and social leadership groups and with others who supported him, Gaddafi stated in April 2009 that:

“.....it is not right at all to force a student to study anything in which he isn’t interested.....it is not a good idea to force him or her to spend years in study to the age of fifteen....and the state funds him or her and then he or she fails...it is a waste of hundreds of thousands....and look at the loss in education... public education and forced learning is a failed programme and a failed theory...all countries, especially the developing ones that have such a model were unsuccessful whereas countries with free education were successful....” (Belal, A, Al-Shames Newspaper, Monday, 16th of April 2009, P2).
Some authors explain that privatization and quasi-marketing when introduced into the running of the public services and when concerned with the transfer of responsibility originally shouldered by the state to the non-state sector or a change in the nature of government involvement, significantly alters the *status quo*. (Walsh & Mok Johnson & Foster in MOK1 and WAT, 1998, p 256). In Libya, privatization, specifically in higher education had not been presented in the ‘Third Universal Theory’ of the ‘Green Book’. In the three last decades of the past century entire state control as a policy was dominant. The Libyan government preferred to adopt ‘socialism’ as it was seen to be the best way to achieve happiness for citizens and the ultimate solution to world problems. From 1977 to 1995 the Libyan economy started to practise this philosophy which included many socialist principles. However, there remained a place for private sector in the economy.

6.3 From state dominance to the privatization of higher education.

Gaddafi’s shift in theoretical approach was in reality reflecting developments at the grassroots level. As has been mentioned, the Libyan government had already started to reform its policy for higher education as a result of the unsuccessful centralized state-run model. Many economic sectors had been transferred from the government to the Libyan people who had accepted the responsibility for these enterprises, including that of higher education. In reality the fundamental changes in Libyan’s higher education sector since the late 1990s can be conceptualized through the processes of denationalization, decentralization and autonomization and marketization.32 Universities adopted a variety of

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32 By ‘denationalization’, I mean that the state had begun to some extent to forsake its monopoly on higher education, hence allowing the non-state sector and even the market to engage in higher education provision. By ‘decentralization’, I refer to the shift from the ‘state control model’ to the ‘state supervision model’, whereby educational governance is decentralized from educational bureaucracies to create in their place devolved systems of schooling or universities, entailing significant degrees of institutional autonomy and a variety of forms of school-based/university-based management and administration. As for ‘autonomization’, I mean that university academics now have more academic autonomy and they are empowered to undertake research projects of any kind and have far more discretion to manage and operate their institutions. As for marketization, private universities in Libya now have to search for additional financing resources.
revenue-generation activities, such as offering courses that could appeal to emerging market needs, strengthening alumni associations to raise funds and renting out facilities or amenities for profit-making purposes. Not surprisingly, academic departments able to offer market-oriented programmes and courses had been allocated additional resources while less market-competitive units had to face cuts in financial resources. Private university presidents were thus increasingly concerned about whether their programmes and courses were ‘marketable’. Similar to global practices, Libyan’s higher education has experienced transformations along the line of decentralization and marketization and under a far more socio-politically liberated climate; the Libyan Government allowed higher education institutions more autonomy to run their institutions. In order to reduce the state’s increasing burden, different market-related strategies have been adopted such as privatizing the public universities under what is called ‘self-control management’ and the establishment of private higher education institutions.

Three different types of institutions arose during the latter years of the Gaddafi regime: those that are purely private, those that were state run but have become privatized and those that are a mixture of public and private education institutions (see figure 13). The main focus of this thesis is an examination of private universities and below is a brief explanation about the privatization models that have been practised in Libya.

Figure (13). Methods of privatizing higher education institutions in Libya.

Private and public education institutions.

Source: the researcher.
In the first one, the institutions are run by individuals and the government’s role is supervision with limited control. These are fully dependent on the tuition fees to cover the cost of the education provided and their aim is to make a profit. The idea of privatization had started in the late 1980s under several different names, ‘Free Education’, ‘Al-Tasharoky Education’ and ‘Al-Ahli Education’. It was practised first in primary education and eleven official resolutions and a law were formulated to organize this type of education (see Appendix 6). In 1999 the Libyan government allowed the private sector to play its role at the higher education level.

The second method of practising private education was to privatize the public education establishments which covered primary education. It was called ‘Al-Tasharoki Education’. The third system is a mix of both the public and private sectors. The best example of this is the Higher Studies and Economic Research Academy which offers study programmes at post-graduate level in both MSc and PhD. Its manager Dr. Salah Ebrahim described it as a third sector by which he meant neither public nor private and that the infrastructure is owned by the government while its budget is financed independently. (An interview in Al-

33 In 2007, Law No. 79 was issued to establish schools that were to be managed by a new system. This system has two elements (GPCESR, 2009):
1. The State has the responsibility for paying tuition fees and for supervision. The amount of money payable is according to the number of students in each school. Through the General People’s Committee for Education (GPCE), the State monitors the schools’ facilities by providing books, equipment and other supplies as well as supervising examinations.
2. Teachers who work in these institutions receive their salaries from the government and are entirely responsible for managing these schools.

shwary, A, Al-Fajer Al-Jadid Newspaper, 5th of April 2010, p11). In addition, it has other financial resources such as unconditional donations, contributions from charities and revenues that come from publications and consultations. (Academy for Higher Studies and Economic Research, 1999, p10). The table 25 summarise the differences between these three types of institutions.

Table (25). The differences between methods of privatising higher education:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Private education institutions.</th>
<th>Privatised public education institutions.</th>
<th>Private and public education institutions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Tuition fees</td>
<td>By the State</td>
<td>Tuition fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The owner</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>The government</td>
<td>The government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State support</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>Pre- university and undergraduate level</td>
<td>Pre- university (primary and secondary education)</td>
<td>Post-graduate level only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Unsuccessful</td>
<td>Successful</td>
<td>Successful to some extent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the researcher.

The Libyan government has established the Academy to achieve several goals:

1. To provide the national universities with highly qualified people in different areas to teach at these universities and thereby reduce the reliance on foreign academic staff. This would also achieve the important goal of saving foreign currency in the Libyan economy.

2. To decrease the size of the expenditure on post-graduate studies from the state budget.

3. To encourage post graduate students to study in their home instead of sending them abroad. So, this helps to save the foreign currencies.

### 6.4 Policy solutions on privatization of public higher education.

As discussed in an earlier chapter, privatization encompasses both partial privatization within public universities and the growth of separate private higher education institutions.
Many countries, Libya included, experience both forms of privatization. The privatization of public higher education in Libya, though, seems to be different from that of other countries. Many countries privatize higher education by charging students for their study at public universities. However, in Libya the government has implemented two different policies. The first is called ‘Self Management’ or ‘The Self Control Administration Policy’. \(^{35}\) It is a type of privatization which was seen by Al-Gaddafi as a unique model for Libya. The secretary of the GPCE (Minister of Education) himself stated that: “…the idea is exclusive to the leader, Mummer Al-Gaddafi… it is his idea and it comes from the ‘Theory of the Masses’ which means that the power, the wealth and the weapons are in the people’s hand...”. (Al-Ahwel, M, Al-Fajer Al-Jadeed Newspaper, Friday 29\(^{th}\) of February 2008, p2). According to him the idea was different from private or public universities. Through this policy the government devoted financial allocations directly to some faculties according to the number of enrolled students and given more autonomy to manage these resources. It was seen by the government as more effective and would allow faculties to employ resources economically and thereby achieve ‘efficiency’ and ‘productivity’.

In January 2010 a resolution from the GPC was issued to give permission to the GPCESR \(^{36}\) to implement the idea of the policy in certain faculties in seven public universities as shown in Table 26 below:

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\(^{35}\) Called in Libya ‘Al-Taleem Al-Tasharoke’.

\(^{36}\) In 2010 the title of the GPCE changed to the General People’s Committee for Education and Scientific Research (GPCESR).
Table (26). A number of faculties in public universities that are privatized by the Government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>The faculty</th>
<th>The yearly allocations per student</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Seventh of October University, Musrata</td>
<td>The Pharmacy</td>
<td>2,300 D.L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Seventh of April University, Alzawia</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1,500 D.L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jabal Al-Gharby University, Gharian</td>
<td>The Sciences</td>
<td>3,000 D.L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Fatah University, Tripoli</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>2,300 D.L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabha University</td>
<td>The Sciences</td>
<td>2,300 D.L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar Al-Muktar University, Al-Bayda</td>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>2,000 D.L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qaruonis University, Benghazi</td>
<td>The Sciences</td>
<td>2,000 D.L</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Unlike in many other countries, in Libya it seemed very difficult to introduce the idea of tuition fees for the public universities because the notion of free public higher education had been prevalent for a long time. After four decades of a state controlled policy, people were accustomed to depend on the government and the public sector for almost everything such as free education, health care, jobs and other social services. It is considered as a vital right which is guaranteed by law. In 2009, Resolution No. 45 was issued by the GPCE to ensure that those students who failed their examinations repeat their studies and achieve examination success. The aims of this resolution are:

1. to put pressure on students to study hard and to be more responsible,
2. to push students to study in private higher education,
3. to make those students who have repeat a year because they had failed their final year examinations to cover the cost of their places in the universities so that new students may still admitted and overcrowding can be avoided,

4. to start to practise austerity

5. and to generate financial revenues for the benefit of the state.

Under this resolution students who failed in their studies were required to pay tuition fees ranging between 2,500 and 4,500 Libyan Dinars for subsequent study. However, the policy made many students angry and interviews with a number of them revealed that the decision made many unhappy and dissatisfied. The students criticised not only the decision but also the GPCE policies (Dango, E, Al-Shames Newspaper, 08th of July 2009, p10). This forced the GPCE to change its mind by cancelling the decision.

Another element in the cost aspect of the policy is the student-teacher ratio. The number of students per faculty member increased which reduced the unit cost of higher education. This, though, resulted in a lowering of the quality of the provision.

6.5 Policy solutions on the revenue side (cost covering).

In Libya the notion of cost-sharing revolves around two arguments. First, public funds are limited. As a result, higher education increasingly must compete for scarce public resources with other important public services, such as health care and primary and secondary education. Second, some believe that if students pay part of their educational costs they will make better-informed choices when deciding which discipline to study.

It should be noted that the policy solutions on the revenue side could be for public and/or private higher education. In many countries (e.g. Australia, Russia, Mexico, Portugal and
the United States) their policies mean that tuition fees in public universities are paid by students in different ways. (Vossensteyn, H. 2004). They are charged according to the different criteria of each government. In the case of Libya the idea of cost covering has only emerged in the private universities related to tuition fees which are completely paid for by students and their families.

When the Libyan government allowed the private sector to play its role in higher education as from 1999, its policy was not well organized. It suffered from several inconsistencies and imperfections, one of which is the role of the policy in the matter of students and their ability to pay their tuition fees. In many countries cost-sharing can be accomplished by means of student loans in place of grants and scholarships. However, in Libya, neither grants nor scholarships were available to support Libyan students in private higher education. For example, the government did not determine the level of fees that should be paid by students in the private universities which were left without any intervention from state authorities. This is why the fees varied from one university to another. Students at the Al-Takdom University pointed out that there was a wide range of different tuition fees between private universities. It reached 420 L.D in Al-Takdom University whereas in other universities it ranged from 150 to 200 D.L. (Embark, S, Al-Jamahiriya Newspapers, 2nd of July 2003, p8). Such a situation proved to be an excellent opportunity for private universities to charge high fees and make profits.

Generally in the international literature the phenomenon of profit in the education sector has been seen as a disfigurement of the education sector. Commercialisation in higher education is seen to have led to erosion in quality, the loss of important academic disciplines (in favour of marketable disciplines), a change in attitudes and erosion in
national, social and educational values. In Libya in the past, the concept of profit itself under the umbrella of socialist transformation had been entirely rejected in all sectors and services. However, today, in Libya as in many countries, the very concept of profit which had not been respectable for a long time has become acceptable and even fashionable. Though there are ethical and, more importantly, legal barriers in many countries to formally recognising profit as acceptable, the classification of private higher education institutions as ‘for-profit’ and ‘not-for-profit’ institutions has become common. The presence of private investors seeking profits in education has become normal. As a result, all kinds of businessmen – small to large, with little knowledge of the nature of higher education – entered the education markets and began setting up institutions. For many of them there is no difference between setting up an institution of higher education and establishing a manufacturing firm, a poultry farm or a shopping mall. They are ready to offer any programme or conduct any activity, academic or not, in their institutions that is likely to yield quick profits.

The commercialisation of higher education is nothing new. Today, it is taking place at a rapid pace. However, although public policy in many countries favours the contribution of the private sector in higher education, it does not favour commercialisation of higher education. Privatisation of education is acceptable for many governments, but not commercialisation. But it is seems to be difficult to distinguish between private higher education involvement and commercialisation in education, either theoretically or in practice. Both are characterised by profit. The definition of ‘commercialisation’ is given as a method designed to “manage or exploit in a way designed to make a profit, with ‘profit’ as ‘a financial gain, recognizing especially the difference between an initial outlay and the subsequent amount earned.” (Bok, D. 2003). These are exactly the same features of private
higher education, which also involves management of resources so as to make a profit. Thus, it could be said, that it seems there is little difference between privatising and commercialisation. Both are based on the same principles and considerations, the most important of which being profit maximisation.

The profitability of these institutions depends on the savings they make on expenditure. They save on salaries by employing teaching staff on a part-time basis or by relying on teachers from nearby public universities. The reduction in the hours of teaching and lectures is another policy used in private universities to increase their profits. In addition, in certain universities there are some subjects on the timetable which lack faculty members to teach them. Such universities gain more revenue with fewer, if any, costs. The profits of private universities depend on two important variables: the costs and the revenues. The former includes several elements, such as the number of faculty members and their qualifications, the number of teaching hours, non-teaching employees and the costs of electricity, telephone and other service expenses. The revenues are generated from tuition fees, the number of students on roll and according to the number of humanities and science departments.

6.6 Strategic responses of private higher education across regions.

6.6.1 Emergence of the private sector in higher education: universities, polytechnics and post-graduate courses.

The privatization movement started in the 1990s although the programme was limited to nursery education, primary education and other related services. Higher education sector
was not included. Universities and higher education institutions were controlled by the state.

One academic study refers to the fact that privatization in Libya emerged during the third stage of the political, economic and social development movement (Al-Teer, A, etl, 1998, p115). Since 1969 all laws and legislation which come from the ‘Green Book’ confirmed the role of the state at the expense of the private sector. As a result, the vast majority of the investments according to this strategy have been toward public sector rather than private sector as follows:

1. The public’s share in the total investment during the period of 1973-1990 was 85% while the private sector’s was less than 10%.
2. The public agriculture sector received 93.7%, and the private sector had 3.6%. The public industrial and transport sectors got 98% and 95% and the private sector just, 2% and 5% respectively
3. In other sectors such as finance, insurance and constructions, the public sector received a large share of the investments.

The Libyan government adopted the strategy of developing private higher education since 1999 in responding to the challenges and the difficulties of higher education. A number of other privatization strategies were not addressed or considered, such as tuition fees in public higher education institutions.

Private higher education in Libya is a relatively recent movement but expanding quite rapidly. Public sector failures have forced the policy makers in Libya to reconsider the

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37 It is entitled ‘The Political, Economic and Social Movements, 1969-1994’ and has been edited by a group of Libyan scholars and specialists.
previous policy. In the period from 1969 (the year of the Al-Fatah Revolution) to 1985 the private sector was very limited. Then, the Libyan government decided to practise a new policy called ‘the movement stage to production’. In this stage a number of decrees were issued which confirmed the role of the private sector in economic activities. In 1985 and 1988 Laws No. 9 and No. 8 were issued to establish institutions named ‘Tashrokiat’ where Libyan individuals in groups were allowed to practise their economic activities.

In 1988 the GPC issued Decision No. 427 concerning the practice of ‘collectivism property’. According to the second article of the decision, the properties of the economic units or institutions were transformed to the Libyan people with the total contribution as a share in these units to be no more than 10,000 Libyan Dinars. In 1992, Law No. 9 was issued regarding the practice of economic activities. The Law gave the private sector more opportunities to be more active in economic activities. In the context of programmes to privatize national economies, higher education was no exception.

During this period of renaissance (1970 to 2010), investment in basic education (pre-tertiary) took precedence. Consequently, free basic education was made available to all Libyan nationals under a programme of continuous and rapid expansion across the whole country. However, the Libyan government recognised the current predicament in higher education and the need to meet the demands of the public for post-secondary education. This was made clear by the Secretary of Higher Education in noting that:

“The greatest challenge faced by the government in human resource development in the past decade has been the widening gap between the increasing number of graduates from the secondary school system and the limited number of places available at institutions of
higher education in Libya.”. (Interview with Abd-Alkbeer Alfakhery, the Secretary of Higher Education, November 2010)

This rapid expansion was fuelled by a strong social demand for higher education. One of the reasons for this was that universities were seen as the main avenue for social mobility and promotion, and this was facilitated by generous government policies of open admission, free admission and, to some extent, grants for students and guaranteed employment for all graduates. As has been said earlier, the Libyan government kept higher education essentially free but government funding did not increase to match enrolment growth. The result was overcrowding in the universities and deterioration in the conditions of study, a crucial matter not only in the government’s agenda but also in Libyan society as a whole. At a meeting with members of both the General People’s Committee and the General People’s Congress, Gaddafi required them to abolish the role of the state in higher education and in other economic sectors and to distribute the oil revenues among Libyans who would then be free to spend their money according to their interests and their benefits. In his meeting he stated that:

“....this is yours n.b. he meant the oil revenues... now it is up to you... parents have their share from the oil and are free to teach their children or not....the current policy means that it’s the government’s responsibility to provide everything for the education institutions: desks, blackboards, rubbers, chairs and chalks and when the state does not bring the rubbers for example, then the education operation would not happen at all, and maybe the state one day didn’t bring the rubbers and people would start to complain saying that schools are without equipment.....without chalks....without books....and this has happened many times...in universities the lecture theatres were broken and students stand
on the walls and sit on the floor...this is a huge administrative system...it’s an octopus... it’s a very huge expense...today people will receive the money and will be free to spend it however they like....people, they complain because their money is with the Libyan government which takes the responsibility...so, take your money and manage yourself by yourself.. and in this situation the people can’t argue about any failure of the state..” And then he added: “...at present the education operation has failed....if you examined any student in Libya he or she would fail.....one day a number of people sent a complaint to me saying that the Army Institution a faculty had refused them to enrol them in the institution because they failed to meet entry requirements....when I investigated the problem I found that those students didn’t know how to write, they were illiterate ...it is a disappointing situation... ". (Speech on local TV, Al-Jamahiriya Channel, 2005)

Responding to this predicament, which included a disparity between basic and post-secondary education, coupled with financial austerity in the wake of competing demands from other public needs, Gaddafi called for control of higher education institutions by individuals instead of by the public sector. The watershed in the development of private higher education in Libya can be traced to the Private Higher Educational Institutions Act, 1999, which further liberalized the educational sector and provided the legal framework for the establishment of private higher education institutions and, later, the beginning of the privatization of some colleges in the public universities. It also provided for the upgrading to university status of existing private institutions of higher education. This liberalization was considered necessary to satisfy the increasing demand for higher education and to respond to the call for more accountability of the public universities, but, most importantly, to compensate for the public sector’s failure to achieve the development plan’s goals in higher education.
In practice, the start of the establishment of private higher education came in 1999 when Private Education Law No. 6 (Al-Taleem Al-Tasharoki Law) was passed by the General People’s Committee (GPC). But before that, two other related resolutions were also enacted by the GPC; these were No. 540 1992 and No. 624 1993 for free education. The 1999 law was the green light to establish private higher education in Libya. The idea of privatization has been defined in two different ways: the concept of private higher education itself and the privatization of higher education. It occurred on two fronts, with the first being the actual establishment of private institutions of higher education run by individuals and independent groups. Second, was the privatization of academic activities within public institutions. Both were significant in that they indicated the growing ascendancy of an ethos in academe which hitherto had been regarded as a totally public domain. Basically, the first wave of privatization in Libyan higher education had emerged by the establishment of private institutions and only later, through the GPCE, did the government introduce private practice – known as ‘self-management’ or ‘self-steering’ - within public universities.

Before this emergence the system could be classed as a single sector with the large public higher education institutions dependent entirely on the state. After 1999, though, it developed into a dual sector with a small private sector funded privately and a larger, public sector receiving subsidies from the state. Private enrolments were usually around ten to twenty per cent of the total with funds coming entirely from tuition fees paid by students. There were three types of institutions of higher education: the large public universities depending entirely on the state; small, public universities aspiring to introduce the idea of privatization but still reliant on government funding; and small private higher
education institutions which included accredited private universities and non-accredited private universities (See figure 14).

Figure (14). The Higher Education System in Libya.

The Higher Education System.

Large Public Higher Education Establishments.

Normal public universities.

Public universities start to introduce privatization.

Private Higher Education Establishments.

Non-accredited private universities.

Accredited private universities.

Source: the writer.
The table 27 highlights the main differences between public and private universities.

Table (27). The differences between public universities and private ones:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Public universities</th>
<th>Private universities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Profit making</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government intervention</td>
<td>plays a direct role</td>
<td>plays indirect role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation of academic Conditions, curriculums, and university rules</td>
<td>Strict</td>
<td>Absolutely flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuition fees</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Not free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State support(^{38})</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>No support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The quality of graduates</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size (e.g. the budget, administration, the number of students)</td>
<td>Big</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The owner.</td>
<td>The government</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries of the staff members</td>
<td>Paid by the government</td>
<td>Paid by the owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of universities</td>
<td>Small (12)</td>
<td>Big (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See figure (15) below.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of students</td>
<td>Big (300,000)</td>
<td>Small (40,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See figure (16) below.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition to that, the administrative structure in public universities is not similar to the private university. While the public universities are instructed according to Articles No.5 and No.7 in the Resolution No. 22, 2008 to be as following:

\(^{38}\)For example, the state would allocate some of its financial resources yearly to public universities whereas private universities would have to generate their own financial resources.
1. The University Council to consist of:

- Representative(s) from the Social People’s Leadership in the province where the university is located.
- Representative(s) from the Planning Council in the province where the university is located.
- The Secretary of Ascendancy of University’s Faculty Members.
- Representative from the Student’s Union in the university.
- Representative from the administrative employees in the university.
- 5 scientific and theoretic people who are interested in higher education issues. Those people are chosen by the GPCHE, and the Secretary of People’s Committee of the University must be among them. (GPC, 2008, Article 5, Resolution No. 22, p3)

2. The Administrative Structure includes seventeen offices and administrations as following:

- The Committee Matters Office.
- The Legal Matters Office.
- The Documentation and Information Office.
- The Following Up and Planning Office.
- The Office of the Development of the Dependence Resources.
- The Technical Consultations Office.
- The Cultural Assistance Office.
- The Internal Revision Office.
- The Evaluation and Quality Office.
- The Security Lodge.
• The Libraries Administrations.
• The Training and Higher Studies Administration.
• The Faculty Members Matters Administration.
• The Technical and Projects Administration.
• The Student Activities Administration.
• The Management and Financial Matters Administration.
• The Registration. (GPC, Article 5, Resolution No. 22, 2008, p4 & p5)

The majority of the private universities, if any, were not endowed with such administrative structures and it meant that private higher education in Libya could not be compared with public higher education.

All these private universities were of low quality. Many Libyan scholars, lecturers at public universities and academic writers criticised the quality of these universities in terms of facilities, faculty members, students, academic reputation and curricula. This led the Libyan government to establish what is called the ‘Quality Assurance and Accreditation Centre’ (QAA) which was founded in 2006, eight years after the establishment of private higher education. In the early days (from 1999 to 2006) private higher education was controlled by ‘higher education offices’. There was a sort of decentralization where these offices were founded in provinces and had been given authority to manage private universities. It was hoped by the Libyan policy makers through this policy to achieve some goals, such as the reduction of bureaucracy in state universities, the reduction of the dependence of higher education institutions on the government and to strengthen the role of the higher education sector in the country economically, socially and politically. Unfortunately none of these goals were achieved and the government had to intervene. So
the QAA was established to control the mass growth of private universities and to supervise very strictly each university to ensure that it had ample resources and observed the same minimum admission requirements as the public universities. According to the science section in the magazine, Al-Elem (Media Office, November 2009 No.15 and November 2010, No.16) only four private universities were accredited by QAA.\(^{39}\)

Private universities are small in size but not in number and, in fact, outnumber the public universities by 50 to 12. In terms of enrolled students, however, private higher education has absorbed only a small fraction, 40,000 students, whereas there are 300,000 students at the public universities, the figures 15 and 16 illustrate the difference between public and private higher education in terms of the number of students and universities. (GPCHE (a), 2007, p1 and General Authority for Information, Statistics Book, 2009, The general consensus for many Libyans that a number of students are registered at private universities to *buy* their degrees and not to *study*; these students are seen by the universities to be ‘good clients’ that generate income without any costs to themselves. Private colleges and universities typically operate on the basis of fee-for-service with no donations or grants. Competing with each other in their appeal to a mass clientele, they offer only those courses and subjects whose price will cover their costs because they must keep their costs low in order to survive.

In this pattern we may see the wide differences that exist between private institutions with some better than others and attracting good students. But even so, they are not able to compete successfully with public institutions. Well-to-do families are willing to pay whatever tuition fees are necessary in order to help their children finish their university

\(^{39}\) However, it is interesting that the manager of the QAA, in interview (October.2010), said that the number was six private universities.
courses, especially those who failed in public sector institutions and those with special circumstances.

Figure 15. The number of private and public universities in Libya, 2006.

6.6.2 The story of the development of private higher education in Libya.

Globally, private universities have grown rapidly and Levy, D (2007, p200) has characterized this development as “unanticipated and surprising.” And so it has been for Libya which had no private university between independence in 1952 and 1999, the year private higher education was introduced. In 2006 the number of private universities stands at around 50, in contrast to only 12 public universities. Even so, enrolment in private universities stands at about 40,000 students which pale in comparison with over 300,000 students in public universities. In the case of Latin America and in other regions of the developing world, the ‘first wave’ of private higher education comprised religious institutions (Teixeira, P. and Amaral, A. 2001, p366 and p367; and Levy, D. 2007, p205). In Libya, however, the first private higher education institutions were not religion-affiliated. An important characteristic feature of Libyan private universities is that they
tend to mirror public universities in curricula even with the hard sciences, though the facilities in these universities are very poor.

Altbach, P (b) (1999, p1) states that private higher education was one of the most dynamic and fastest growing areas of post–secondary education at the turn of the 21st century. And this is what happened in Libya where there has been an upsurge in the number of these institutions in recent years. This has been caused largely by an increasing demand for tertiary education as a result of high population growth and consequent expanded enrolment at the basic and secondary levels, and this far exceeds the capacity of the public institutions.

The reasons behind the growth of the number of private institutions of higher education could be categorized as follows:

First, the establishment of Quality Assurance and Accreditation (QAA) was founded in 2006, eight years after the establishment of private higher education. Since then, private higher education has grown enormously. Second, private universities have been established in un-congenial environments. Neither Law No. 6, 1999, nor Law No. 21, 2001, has outlined specific rules and clear instructions for their control. Third, there were many regions that had given licences to people who were eager to establish private universities, such as the Basic People’s Congress, the Education People’s Committee of the province and the Higher Education Offices. Fourth, to establish private universities was not difficult:

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I refer here to rapid growth but the Manager of the Assurance Centre (Dr. Mohammed Al-Kabir) stated that it was not true. In the interview with him (October, 2010) he said that the number was not 50 universities and indicated that the number was quite small. It could be argued that Dr. Al-Kabir was not objective in his statement because in his speech he appeared satisfied with private universities and did not criticise the privatization policy in Libya. One could make the observation that some officials in the Gaddafi regime only showed ‘good’ things. Indeed as is clear in statistics, in just the five years from 1999 to 2005, the number of these universities reached about fifty and in other source figures, even more than fifty. According to the General People’s Committee for Higher Education (GPCHE, 2007) report, the number reached 56 with 255 university-level institutions ‘deemed to be universities’.
during the period from 1999 to 2006. The circumstances were very attractive and this encouraged people to invest their money in such establishments and make a profit.

The courses available in private higher education in Libya range from two-year College diploma courses to four-year College and university courses offering Bachelor’s Degrees. The courses in the non-university sector institutions are mostly in the humanities and are of shorter duration. In the early days these institutions were perceived as ‘colleges offering diplomas’. At the time it was difficult to know how many such institutions had been established and the number continued to increase rapidly for a couple of years. Three years later most of these institutions were upgraded to university status. Although they were small in size they offered an alternative solution for access to higher education without adding significantly to government costs.

The Libyan government allowed adult students to use primary and secondary education public schools which in the mornings were used for primary and secondary education and in the evenings would be transformed into higher education institutions. At the beginning there were no places for the private higher education institutions to run their activities. In addition to that the Libyan government itself had not planned properly for this change. It had not provided suitable buildings for private higher education nor adequate facilities. People who had established higher education institutions rented primary and secondary education buildings from the state. However, these schools were not in a good enough condition for teaching at the higher education level or even at pre-university levels. The general inspector of education Dr. Al-Ghlaly himself described it disappointedly:

“...it was hoped by the Libyan government that the higher education sectors, both public and private, would be parallel, ...... unfortunately, some people used private higher
education incorrectly, some private universities were more concerned with financial profit than scientific matters....some schools are used to teach primary education in the morning. In the evening it is used for university education. These schools do not have academic standards suitable for a university.... there is no library... there are not well qualified faculty members and it does not have a time schedule..... they are called universities but in fact they are not, they have no administration, facilities or curriculums and unfortunately some parents register their children in these universities without any evaluation ........in the absence of a good system of follow-up and control many illegal actions are created in registration, timetabling, academic planning, facilities, examinations and then degrees...we have heard that there are many deceitful operations when awarding qualifications….and the majority of them have been in private education........” (Jwhar, A, Al-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 22nd of June 2009, p7).

It is very interesting that, on the one hand, the Libyan government had a genuine desire to encourage the private sector to be more active in higher education sector, but equally, on the other hand, the government’s attitude seemed to remain sceptical about the merits of private higher education. There were many people from different classes (teachers, employees, university staff members, and those who work at high positions....ets) who disagreed with Gaddafi’s ideas and principles.

One aspect of this is that the Libyan government, through the GPC had issued resolution No. 22, 2008, for the organisation of the universities and higher education institutions. It included 63 articles concerned only with the organisation of the structure of universities and higher education institutions in the public sector and thereby private higher education had been neglected by the government. As far as can be seen, a proper related resolution or
The decision to recognize private higher education had not been formulated within the public higher education resolution and consequently there was no control over private higher education. As a result it had developed in unsatisfactory circumstances in terms of the establishment of the private universities and their facilities.

Another aspect is that the Libyan government included in its privatization policy, opportunities for owners to get financial grants and other assistance to cover the costs and the expenses related to their universities, although the owners, in fact, found it very hard to benefit from these advantages. All the presidents of the private universities when interviewed in November, 2011, commented that the Libyan government had not provided any assistance, grants or donations: no private higher educational institutions had received any funding at all. Private educational institutions were supposed to generate their own money to fund their own programmes and the owners of private universities had to pay rent for using the state’s properties when they started their activities. It was quite expensive according to the presidents of the two Universities Al-Refak and Trables (Tripoli). The Libyan government seemed to have had a desire to commercialize these institutions to achieve two objectives: to offer locations for private universities which is very important for the introduction of the idea of privatization of higher education in Libya especially at its beginning; and to gain income from the rent of state buildings. However, when Dr. Shokri Ghanem was prime minister he issued a resolution warning these universities to

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41 In fact, the phenomenon of rent of state facilities, like public schools, has not been known since independence especially in the light of the Al-Fatah Revolution of 1969. The philosophy of the revolution which comes from the ‘Third Universal Theory’ does not accept such a concept. It was even against the law for somebody to rent a property, specifically between the period from 1977 to 1993 when the Libyan economy was designed to promote a large social, redistributive and economic role for the state under the flag of socialism or nationalism. It was the first time for Libya since the publication of the ‘Green Book’ to rent out public education institutions.
move out of the state schools and required them to find their own buildings. According to interviews with the owners of some private universities they complained that the state did not support us. Dr. Almehdy, the President of Trables (Tripoli) University said that:

“...in the first instance and at the start of private universities in 1999, the Libyan government offered its buildings to Libyans to establish universities, but then five years later the Libyan government required the universities to leave state properties and to find their own buildings.....at the same time the Libyan government did not provide enough time to allow these universities to move, and as a result, only ten survive from 36 universities.......”. (Interview with Dr. Almehdy, the President of Trables (Tripoli) University, November 2011)

Another aspect of this is that these universities were required to pay a tax. It is interesting to note that the government of Libya solicited the participation of the private sector to assume an active role in the development of higher education in the country and had encouraged the private sector to play its role in higher education which was seen as a way of supplementing public universities. However, private universities are classified according to the Libyan Tax Law as Musahima companies. In the legislative law issued by the General People’s Congress, unlike the public universities, the private universities were charged an amount of money every year according to that law. (General People’s Congress, 2010, Legislative Law.No.4). This situation made it difficult for private higher education to compete with public higher education. The costs of private universities are covered by individuals who invest in the projects, while the public universities are financed

42 I could not find the number of the resolution; however, I was a lecturer at the Afriqya University in Tripoli that rented a state school. It was closed by the local authorities to prevent workers, staff members and students using the facilities and this resulted in unrest associated with the school.
43 It means that it is a company that makes a profit and is similar to any commercial enterprise.
from the government budget. This implies that investments in higher education involve risks for the private sector because there is uncertainty about its abilities and future circumstances. However, there has been a significant investment of private sector in higher education which it is seen a good project for making profits. The result had been to a fast growth of private universities for few years.

There are several factors that helped private universities to spread in large numbers in an unplanned manner without regard to geographic dispersion policy:

1. The private universities had been established in a hit-or-miss or poorly organized environment. Neither Law No. 6. 1999, nor Law No. 21. 2001, formulated specific rules or clear instructions for their control.

2. There were many places and organizations which had given licences to people who aspired to establish private universities, such as the Basic People’s Congress, the Education People’s Committee in the province and Higher Education Offices. This led to a rapid increase in the number of universities. It also created chaos because it negatively affected the institutions’ procedures and the government’s ability to control them.

3. A private university was seen as an excellent, profit making business that could attracted many people from different social classes to invest their money. What is worse is that, although one of the pre-requisites for running a university is that its founder has to hold at least an MSc. Some did not hold this qualification, and indeed, in the Al-Jamahiriya Newspaper it was reported that the president of Kortoba University is a wealthy taxi driver with enough money to establish a university. (Embark, S, Al-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 9th of March, 2003. p10).
Since private higher educational institutions started to emerge in late 1990s, there have been a number of problems in the sector. The incomplete legal system in Libya has led to confusion in policy, practice, and capital distribution. Although teaching programmes are more flexible than that in the state-run universities, they are still not consistent with the practical needs of the society. No private higher educational institutions receive any funding from the government. Private educational institutions are supposed to develop their own programmes, but in reality, compulsory curriculums that have excessive theory are still imposed by the government. And the teaching methods currently used in Libya are exactly the same as before the reform, and these are traditionally teacher-centred. Students are required to sit through a class listening to the lecturers and do not have an opportunity to do their own research because research is often teacher directed. Moreover, there is a crucial shortage of teaching staff; private universities still have to hire lecturers from the state-run universities and many experienced lecturers are at retiring age and come from foreign countries, especially Iraq and the Sudan, two unstable countries. There are also problems with student evaluation, and the acceptance of educational credentials of students from private universities on graduation. Furthermore, private universities are relatively small in size and more importantly, less peaceful, so that the general assumption is that the quality of education given is of a very low standard. It is assumed that the students have limited use of facilities such as libraries, laboratories and information and communication technologies that are vital for academic excellence and research. But even some of the private universities like Afriqya University and Tripoli University do not have any such facilities. These universities, in the first instance, rented primary and secondary schools. Then, when these universities were required by the Libyan government to find their own buildings they rented houses from Libyan people.
The Afriqya University rented a house in Tripoli that was situated on a site that covered an area of 500 m² and the building itself had a floor area of only 200 m². This building contains eight faculties. These are Engineering, Law, Languages, Economics, Political Sciences, Management, Accounting and Computing Sciences. All these departments are deteriorating and lack facilities and decent conditions for study. The photos in the appendix were taken during the period of field study in November, 2010, and show the worsening situation in Libya. (see appendix 5). This university opened a medical study programme in spite of the fact that the Libyan government had specifically banned such programmes from being introduced in the private sector. There are many stories that show the extent to which the private universities operate illegally. First and foremost, they work without any legal justification or permission. Second, they open scientific departments, for instance Medical and Engineering sciences, which are impossible to implement in such conditions.

The following is narrated by a student:

“I studied at Al-Fatah University in the Faculty of Dentistry. Because I failed in the second year...I lost two years in this university because of poorly organized administration and the corruption. Some faculty members were put in prison. Therefore, I went to Afriqia University and I asked the president, Dr. Mabrouk Abo Shiba, about the accreditation. He said: yes it is accredited even from Satesborg University in Austria. I started my course in the third year. During that time I investigated to see if Satesborg University had any relationship with Afriqya University - I found nothing. So, I went back to Dr. Abo Shipa to ask him again. He sent me a fax which said: How are you? I hope we will be friends and know more about each other.......I paid 1,250 L.D in year three and the same amount in year four. In year four I went to the Higher Education Ministry and I asked Dr. Soliman
Khoga, who is in charge of higher education, about the university and he told me it is not accredited....then I collected my receipt and other documents and went back to Dr. Khoga to complain about this issue. Dr. Khoga reported this matter to the People’s Board for Control and Follow-up. Unfortunately the latter was useless. It did not take any action against the President of the university because, as I knew, the President had a good relationship with some powerful people who work at the institution....” (Interview with a student Mohammed Haman, October 2010) (see appendix 3).

Many members of the public were very eager to use the new universities to improve employment prospect; but soon the reputation of the private higher education sector began to fall especially among many parents of students. They considered the sector as commercial enterprise whose proprietors used their clientele primarily as a means of earning income rather than as institutions making a contribution to education and training. Private universities have poorly developed internal quality control mechanisms. This is evident on three fronts: they do not have a system for internal self-evaluation on a yearly basis; there is no internal evaluation of teaching staff by teachers or students (and an absence of this measure makes teachers underperform because there is a total lack of accountability and therefore no censure), and none of these private universities is a research or teaching institution. They simply sell degrees. Al-Teer (2005) criticized those private universities and compared them to shops, established to only to sell degrees and to make a profit. He concluded that the increasing number of higher education institutions does not mean that Libyan higher education is in a healthy state because higher education institutions, both public and private, do not achieve the necessary standards to be at the

44 It is a state institution and its function is to pursue the various public bodies and record any contravention of rules and regulations notified to its administrative body.
level of a university and have very poor facilities, especially in practical departments and laboratories.

The Libyan government, through the QAA, sought to compel the private higher education institutions to achieve minimum standards nationwide. The reality, though, was very different. Private universities were not concerned about the rules and constructions. I went to a number of these universities and I found that all of them, whether they were accredited or not, lacked adequate staffing standards, physical facilities, financing of programmes, enough books, journals or other resource materials for programmes. And it has to be added that, compared with public institutions, these establishments do not offer the social services of accommodation, cafeteria facilities or medical cover.

Despite these weaknesses in private higher education in the country, many sources (e.g. Shernana, F and Al-Falani, M both are professors at Tripoli University (Al-Fatah University before February Revolution)) point out that private higher education has provided access to higher education for 40,000 students without any expenditure from the government budget. It has also opened up opportunities for more students to access higher education especially for those who do not have opportunities to study in the state-run educational institutions. Not everyone, however, shares this view. The argument does not have a strong foundation, because, in reality, most students from the urban areas with more resources often get the top studentships in the public higher educational institutions. They receive more financial support from their families which helps them to access better educational resources even before entering higher education, while children from rural areas and poor families do not have these opportunities. This leaves poor students no choice but to choose the private universities if they would like to pursue higher education,
although the cost can be prohibitive. Students graduating from state-run universities are more highly regarded in the job market, which means the loss of social and economic equity and indicates that the gap between rich and poor in Libyan society is getting wider.

Because all of these private institutions were active in the evenings from almost 15:00 to 20:00, they attract many students to study, some of whom are employees who work in banks, in health care, public telecommunication companies and in other social services. Other students have special circumstances that force them to study at these institutions. This was illustrated by in interviews with some employees who work at state institutions the Libyan Al-Gehad Centre, Tax Administration and People’s Solicitor Administration:

“.....I studied at a public higher education institution, the Al-Shomokh Institute for Computing Science for four semesters but because I had problems with them, I went to a Two March private institute to complete my study ....”. (Interview with an employee, Hager Al-Fergani, the Libyan Al-Gehad Centre, October 2010)

“I studied at the Al-Fatah University in its Law Faculty. I could not attend final exams at the Faculty for two years because of personal circumstances. So I decided to study in a private university which is called the Al-Taqadom University. I registered in a ‘100 system’, which meant that I did not have to attend lectures.....and in 2004 I graduated from the university...” (Interview with an employee, Sabah Algdeery, Tax Administration, October/2010)

“...I spent three years in the Faculty of Law in Al-Fatah University. I failed in the third year and repeated it. The study was so very difficult that I decided to go to a private
university. It is called the Dar Al-Ealem University and I completed the fourth year.....”.

(Interview with an employee, Fateme Al-Abani, People’s Solicitor Administration, January 2011).

As these quotations illustrate, some students who have studied in private higher education have come from public universities and other state higher education institutions. Many have, in fact, failed to pass their exams in a public institution and private ones are seen by such students not only as an excellent opportunity to finish their studies but as an easy option because academic expectations in the private sector are much lower. The most important thing in these universities is that tuition fees are charged according to the conditions. As an example, a student is called Al-Arbi, Ali in Janzor (west Tripoli) had studied in a public university, the National Institution for Management, but had failed in his exams. Then he decided to go to a private university. He applied to Africa University; he met the rector and told him that he would like to study in his university. He saw this private university as a good chance to guarantee his graduation and to rescue himself (Author’s private information). In Libya a degree is seen as the most important achievement for a student, basically because it serves them socially and economically. Many Libyan students do not care about the quality of private universities and prefer to study at such institutions because they are academically undemanding.

6.6.3 The state intervention in the control of private higher education:

The HCPHE and QAA from the end of the 1990s, Gaddafi’s Libyan government, in line with its desire to reform the policy of higher education, embarked on programme of privatization of higher education but soon became aware of the fact that the new private universities were in trouble. Reporters started to talk about the real problems of private
universities such as the deterioration in quality, illegal activities and corruption within. Accordingly, the Libyan government decided to take steps to strengthen the sector:

1. The GPC issued a resolution, No.9 in 2006, to establish the High Committee for Private Higher Education (HCPHE). The Committee, in its first meeting in May 2006 agreed on the necessity to implement a set of procedures and decisions to regulate private education laws.

2. The Secretary of GPCHE announced resolutions No.4 and No.5, in 2006, the first to prevent the current institutions of private higher education registering new students or those who wished to transfer from other institutions according to Article 76 of the Private Higher Education Law. The second to prevent study in these institutions during the summer term 2005/2006 to give a chance for the private higher education committees in the areas to collect documents, data and results about the institutions.

In 2006 the GPC issued resolution No. 164 to establish the QAA. The Libyan government considered it important to follow a national strategy to strengthen the education sector and to improve the quality of its educational institutions. It is not certain why the QAA was founded so late but the problems within private higher education required the government to act. Its functions may be listed as follows:

1. Advising and making recommendations to the government on matters relating to higher education research;

2. Receiving and considering applications from institutions or organizations seeking to establish private higher education in Libya, and making recommendations thereon to the government;

3. Promotion of co-operation among the institutions of higher education in Libya;
4. Co-ordinating long-term planning;

5. Examination and approval of proposals for courses of study and course regulations submitted by institutions of higher education;

6. Accreditation of higher education institutions;

7. Advising the government on the establishment of higher education institutions;

8. Ensuring the maintenance of the standards of programmes and examinations in higher education institutions;

9. Making regulations appropriate to enrolment in state institutions of higher education and to provide a central admission service for higher education institutions;

10. Visiting and inspecting higher education institutions;

11. Making regulations on the standardization, recognition and the equality of degrees, diplomas and certificates conferred or awarded by foreign institutions and local institutions.

The QAA formulated rules regarding the operation of private universities:

1. A university may not be established and operated without the relevant provisional licence, charter or certificate granted by QAA.

2. Teaching should include practical solutions to social and economic problems in the community and therefore should be problem-solving based.

3. The language of instruction shall be Arabic, although other languages may be used as a medium of instruction under certain conditions.

4. Universities should recruit academic and administrative staff that meets the standards and qualifications stipulated by the QAA.

5. The finances of universities irrespective of their sources should be soundly managed.

6. Any university that wishes to change its name or part of it must apply in writing to the QAA.
7. Universities shall submit annual reports to the QAA and the GPCE in a prescribed form setting out their activities and achievements towards their objectives and shall set institutional standards for each year.

8. Private universities shall be free to become constituent colleges of other institutions as long as they meet with the approval of the QAA according to its set rules and conditions.

9. Admission, training and assessment of students in universities shall be based on merit.

10. Private universities shall be required to conform to the legal and relevant regulations required of them by the QAA and the GPCE.

The QAA was a Libyan state authority which acted according to the guidelines of the General People’s Committee for Education (GPCE, Education Ministry). It was responsible for accreditation and quality assurance and both private and public higher education institutions had to have their programmes accredited by the QAA; so before private higher education institutions were considered for registration, the Department of Education required that their programmes be accredited by the QAA. In fact, in terms of the Regulations for the Registration of Private Higher Education Institutions, over and above accreditation of learning programmes, an applicant applying to operate as a higher education institution had to provide a written declaration that it would maintain the necessary academic and support staff, with appropriate academic or professional qualifications and experience to achieve the objectives of each programme; would maintain a quality management system including assessment policies and procedures appropriate to each programme; would maintain sufficient space, equipment and instructional material to provide education and training of a sufficient standard to achieve the objectives of each programme; would not exceed the enrolment numbers that the facilities and equipment can reasonably accommodate and would maintain full records of
each student’s admission, academic progress and assessment of learning in respect of each programme.

To this extent, the Ministry of Education concurred with the QAA that the sector was inadequately regulated. The QAA statements infer that private higher education institutions were not regulated in such a way as to fulfil the role of being complementary to public higher education institutions, as well as of contributing to social development. Indeed, whilst private institutions on a limited scale provide access to higher education, the establishment of the new body indicated that the existing policy of Gaddafi regime was inadequate in terms of improving this aspect of their functioning.

The QAA promulgated a set of regulations for the registration of private higher education institutions in 2006. These regulations outlined the eligibility criteria used for applicants who want to operate private higher education institutions; guidelines for compliance with registration requirements; and responsibility criteria for the maintenance of registration, among others. They required private institutions to offer only programmes leading to qualifications that were registered on the QAA, to maintain the necessary academic and support staff with appropriate academic or professional qualifications and experience to achieve the objectives of each programme, to maintain quality management systems, sufficient space, equipment and instructional material, to not exceed the enrolments that the facilities and equipment can reasonably accommodate, and to maintain full records of each programme.
However, despite the above-stated requirements, Private Higher Education Administration (GPCHE, 2003, Private Higher Education Report, Scientific Committee⁴⁶) in its report painted a bleak picture of the quality of private higher education provision. The general consensus is that the majority of private universities are set up as small for-profit businesses, a trend also to be found internationally (Levy, D, 2003, p5). As such, they survive by investing little and can simply pull out if they do not yield the required returns. Thus, the PHEA provision in Libya found that many universities do not have the structure and strategies to deal with quality assurance and that: “…students articulated complaints about access, very poor libraries, and totally inadequate facilities that made assignments and other tasks very difficult to accomplish.” (Interview with Dr. Abdullatif M. Latife, the Director of PHEA, November 2010).

This negative picture is compounded by reports that the sector largely depended on inexperienced, under-qualified and mainly part-time employed staff, much against the requirements for the registration of private higher education institutions. It has been observed that “…some institutions consisted entirely of part-time staff while in others there is a lack of adequately qualified and experienced staff and some faculty members do not have even post-graduate qualifications.” The report implied that these discrepancies led to poor quality of teaching and learning at private universities. Even worse, there seemed to be no effort to improve these conditions. To this end, the report concluded that “…poor quality programmes, despite being financially accessible to low-income families, do a disservice to their students and the country in general because they inject poorly prepared graduates into the labour market. (GPCHE, 2003). In the following example the effects on higher education are revealed. It occurred at Afriqiya University, where the faculty of

⁴⁶ PHEA was required by the HCPHE to form a committee to evaluate the private higher education process, it is consist of five professors and they were asked to provide a report to be submit to the Secretary of GPCHE.
engineering faced with an upcoming evaluation of its facilities by the national regulatory authority and well aware that its level of engineering infrastructure was inadequate, adopted a strategy designed to circumvent the problem. Unwilling to accept the consequences of a poor rating, the faculty approached local engineering firms to borrow numerous items of major equipment. The day after the successful inspection, which ultimately yielded a satisfactory rate, all equipment was returned to local industry, leaving students just as bereft of necessary equipment as they were before. Such stories are not uncommon: Many private universities without sufficient equipment to support the practical curriculum end up compromising the quality of their students. The need for a more effective regulatory regime is now widely accepted although this is against a backdrop of corruption that has the capacity to undermine the effectiveness of quality assurance procedures.

In 2010, there were more than 50 private universities registered with the National Committee for Private Universities (NCPU). Only four of them fulfilled some of the requirements for registration. They also met some academic conditions that have been listed by the QAA, so were given an accreditation certificate which covered some of the departments of science as can be seen from Table 28. The remainder of the private universities were issued with letters of intent to cancel their registration because of their continued failure to comply with the requirements for registration. Despite this there were some universities that continued to operate illegally. In October 2010, the Director of Private Higher Education Administration issued a letter giving these universities a maximum of three months to comply with the legal and technical regulations if they aspired to accreditation from the QAA. It should be noted that the emergence of the QAA
has reduced to some extent the number of private universities alongside with other reasons, they are:

1. The private universities were required by the GPC (the Cabinet) in Dr. Ghanem’s time at the beginning of the 21st century to vacate public properties and to find other buildings and facilities to run their educational activities.

2. Some of the private universities were closed down because of illegal activities.

3. The General People’s Committee’s decision that insisted that the private universities to resolve their legal situation. This Act came into effect in 2010 and required that all private higher education institutions be registered with the QAA. This became a serious threat for those who have not already met the requirements of the regulatory framework.

4. The public became aware of the issue and approached unregistered institutions with great caution.

Table (28). The accredited programmes and the year of accreditation in private universities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Accredited departments</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afriqya (Benghazi)</td>
<td>Law, English Language &amp; Business Management</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International and Libyan University for Medical Sciences (Benghazi)</td>
<td>Medical Sciences</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Afriqya University (Al-Zawia)</td>
<td>Law, English Language &amp; History</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yet there remained a number of them working without any permission and, in addition, there was also the rapidly growing menace of unrecognised institutions of higher education which did not qualify to be recognised by the government as educational institutions. Moreover, the institutions themselves did not seek recognition because recognition by the QAA restricted the freedom of such institutions to adopt undesirable and questionable methods of management, relating to admission, student fees, teacher recruitment, etc. These ‘fake’ institutions can be regarded as ‘black’ or ‘illegal’ in the education market. They varied widely in nature and include ‘teaching shops’ or shop-like institutions, coaching centres, cramming schools, etc. Consequently, the QAA warned these ‘universities’ that it was an infringement of the University Act and University Rules to advertise and/or mount university level programmes without obtaining a letter of interim authority from the QAA and that if established, according to an Act of the GPC they are committing an offence punishable by law. They were required to submit their documents to the QAA for accreditation. To date, there have been many cases of prospective universities having been found to have infringed the Universities Act or the Universities Rules by either advertising or mounting university-level programmes. A deadline of three months was given, according to a letter dated in 3rd of October, 2010, for these universities to conform to the legal requirements otherwise they would suffer the consequences.\(^{47}\)

The situation that arose caused a serious problem: this was the number of students graduating from the private universities during the previous years 1999 to 2006. So the QAA made a decision to accredit the degrees given to those students during those years through what was labelled the ‘Comprehensive Exam Policy’.

\(^{47}\) After this date I have no idea if the private universities considered this deadline because Libya became almost immediately involved in the uprising of the 17th of February, 2011.
Actually, before the establishment of the QAA the policy of accreditation in Libya was the responsibility of the local authorities. Each city had its own committee called the General Committee of Education which had the right to accredit universities located in its area. At that time the number of accredited private higher education institutions in Tripoli itself reached 32. (General Committee for Higher Education, 2007). It seems to be believed, though, that the majority of these institutions did not meet the minimum requirements in academic standards. Sen Sad Higher Education Institute, at which I was teaching, is an excellent example: this institution was given accreditation in 2001. It was in very bad condition with very poor classes, no library and with a lack of other facilities. At the end of the term I handed the final results of the course to the president who was extremely upset because most of students had failed. She asked me to change the results but I refused and resigned from my post. The spread of corruption enabled the owners of these institutions to avoid the legal requirements and obtain their certificates of accreditation. Corruption was widespread and very clear in the case of the Al-Ahleya Tripoli University which had been established in 2000 through resolution No. 621 issued by the Private Education Office in Tripoli. After some six years the university was closed because its degree certificates were pronounced deceptive. Large numbers of students went to the Higher Education Committee (Ministry) and to court to complain but with no success whatsoever. When graduates approached the president, Muhsen Ramadan Ahmed, for help in solving their problem he did not show any interest or concern at all. (Al.Gharyani, E, 2011, p10).

6.6.4 Comprehensive Exam Policy (CEP):

The CEP had been adopted by the state since 2006 to solve the problem of non-accredited qualifications that were given by private universities. It was seen by the government as a good policy towards achieving: first, the political stability that it might stimulate and,
secondly, to rescue the reputation of the government because of the questionable degrees
given by the private universities. The Libyan policy makers did not want the idea of the
privatization of higher education to fail, especially when it was proposed essentially by
Gaddafi himself.

On the 20th of June 2010, a meeting was held by a supervisory committee to discuss the
first comprehensive examination for students at private higher education institutions. The
committee aimed to organize and discuss the procedures of the comprehensive examination,
such as places and timetables. At this meeting the secretary of the National Committee of
Private Education (NCPE) stated that steps were to be taken to solve the problem of non-
accredited degrees through comprehensive examination by evaluating the level of
understanding of the graduates of private universities and then to accredit their
qualifications if satisfactory. 5,000 students sat the first examination. (Media Office, Al-
Elm Magazine, 24th of June, 2010, No.11, p6). Some private universities and their
graduates did not welcome this move and complained that the QAA compelled them to
meet the QAA conditions if they wanted to have their degrees accredited.

Resolution No. 82, 2010 was issued by the General People’s Committee through its cabinet
regarding the comprehensive examination. In this, students were to be charged 100 D.L to
cover part of the cost of the examination. (Media Office, Al-Elm Magazine, 31th of May
2010, No.10, p9). On the 15th of May, 2010, the NCPE advertised the introduction of the
comprehensive examination on the 26th of June 2010. It called for all graduates from
private higher education (universities and institutions) who hold qualifications in the areas
of business management, accountancy, law, computing, the English Language, dentistry,
chemistry and other diploma holders. The examination was administered by the following five committees:

1. Tripoli Committee located in private higher education administration.
2. Benghazi Committee located in Garyounise University.
3. Sabha Committee located in Sabha University.
4. Musrata Committee located in the Industrial Technical Faculty.
5. Al-Jabal Al-Akhdar Committee located in the Higher Institute for Vocational Education in Derna. (Media Office, Al-Elm Magazine, 15th of May, 2010, No.9, p5).

The NCPE required students to fill in an application form with six documents attached: a certificate, a transcript, a secondary education certificate, the receipt for the examination fees, identification, and four recent photos. Students were allowed only two chances to sit the examination otherwise they would lose their opportunity to accredit their qualifications.

To get accreditation a student’s qualifications have to have been awarded from one of the seven universities or from one of the 31 institutions that were accredited. The administration announced four conditions that have to be met by those who wanted to accredit their degrees. They were:

1. fill in a new form that has been prepared by the administration;
2. submit an original and a copy of the degree and the transcript that were issued by the private institution;
3. produce and submit an original certificate of secondary education;
4. each applicant has to submit two photographs of himself/herself.

This announcement did not cover graduates after the year 2008 except for institutions that had gained permeations.
6.6.5 Programmes of study and courses offered by the private institutions of higher education.

The public universities are large organizations offering courses in a variety of subject areas. The academic interest and advances in frontiers of knowledge decide programmes of study and courses offered in public universities in general. The purpose of the operation of private universities is different from that of public universities since many of them are self-financing and concerned with profit making. They have to offer courses that have a premium both in the education market and in the labour market. The demand for particular courses and the fees levied in the education market are decided by the employability of the graduates. In this sense, the education market and the labour market give out signals to the private institutions, and their ultimate success depends upon their ability to respond quickly to such stimuli.

It should be recognised that all private providers were required to register their institutions and apply for accreditation for their programmes with the QAA. Private universities were required to teach only programmes and study subjects that were accredited by the Centre. In the only four accredited private universities eight study subjects were accredited, but private universities whether they were accredited or not, did not always follow the QAA’s rules and recommendations, and some operated programmes and subjects that were not accredited. Although resolutions were formulated by the government in 2001 and in 2010 cautioning these universities for using public media (e.g. magazines, newspapers and TV) the owners of private universities continued to use them, ignoring the state directive. Private universities also distributed leaflets inviting students to study at their universities saying that their programmes were accredited as an attempt to attract those students and their families who were unconvinced of their validity. It is interesting, too, to note that the
leaflets have misleading photos and pictures of very nice buildings and modern facilities that were not of their own shabby universities. Even more interesting is that these same pictures were used in a magazine issued by the Al-Fateh University. Evidence supporting this observation consists of comparing photos taken on site with a leaflet from the Afriqya University illustrating the difference between the pictures in the leaflet and the photos of the actual buildings. (See Appendix 5).

There were also instances where a good number of institutions were not registered and recognized, yet still operated and attracted students. Many of the private universities were not authorized to do so, as they did not meet the requirements regarding infrastructure, equipment, and staffing stipulated by the government; many of them were therefore operating illegally. A number of the recent private institutions established in response to the market-driven forces were unplanned in many ways. Often, for-profit institutions operate in legally ambiguous settings. They admitted students and taught courses without the right to offer degrees or certificates recognized by the government or the accreditation agencies.

Two factors contributed significantly to this state of affairs first, inadequacies in the legal provisions for the establishment of private higher education institutions. This led to a lack of clearly defined operational principles and regulatory mechanisms for opening and operating private universities, and such situations provided fertile ground for the mushrooming of private higher education institutions. Second, the employment market recognizes the training provided and the certificates issued by private higher education institutions, even when they are not formally recognized by the public authorities. This happens especially when employment is generated increasingly in the private sector.
The courses offered in private universities in Libya reflect commercial needs. It seems the primary objective of establishing a university were reflected in the curriculum offered. The for-profit institutions cater for private enterprises and the private institutions of higher education within the for-profit category offered courses that are market-friendly. Courses in business administration, computer sciences, accounting and marketing, economics, communication, etc., were very common in these for-profit universities. Their profitability depended on the savings they made on expenditure. Salaries (especially staff salaries) form a dominant part of the expenditure of educational institutions in the public domain and many private universities made savings by employing teaching staff on a part-time basis. These universities operated as commercial enterprises and their tuition fees formed their financial backbone. The total income of private institutions was determined, therefore, by the number of students and the rate of tuition levied. These institutions attempted to attract a larger number of students in order to maximize profitability by setting an appropriate level of fees.

Unlike many countries of the world, such as in some African countries where the non-university sector is one of the characteristics of private higher education, in Libya professional and vocational education were completely absent. The private universities did not offer the professional and vocational courses which were very popular in the private institutions of higher education in other countries in the world. In its development plans and in its policy for education, the Libyan government concerned itself more with this type of education than with classical university education with the aim of fulfilling the needs of the social and economic development plans. Fundamentally, vocational education was seen by the Libyan policy makers as an important sector that would serve the Libyan economy
well and they argued that professional and vocational courses were important for the economic development plan. It became apparent that classical university education presents problems. First and foremost, of course, was academic unemployment which has been outlined in the previous chapter and in 1985, the GPC called for a “…further expansion of vocational and professional training centres and for measures to compel technically trained students to work in their fields of specialization”. (Metz, H, 1989, p113).

The Libyan government had hoped that private higher education would conform to the public policy and its wish to offer vocational courses. Unfortunately, private higher education has been a copy of the public higher education system where most studies concentrate on the humanities and social sciences and the private universities have been similarly concentrated with its provision slanted towards low-cost disciplines that require little investment in equipment. Consequently, private universities mostly offer courses in subject areas which require low levels of investment in infrastructure facilities. This is in contrast with some of the private initiatives in other countries, such as India, where colleges of engineering and colleges of medicine, which require a high level of investment in infrastructure and other facilities, are common in the private sector. As a result, private higher education in Libya has produced more graduates from fields and areas that are not needed by the labour market and have contributed significantly to the number of the educated unemployed.

6.6.6 Admission policy and level of tuition fees in the private sector.

The private sector is the fastest-growing segment in higher education in many countries like Asia and Africa, and this includes Libya, where private universities outnumber public universities. But in Libya, private universities continue to be small and account for a
relatively low share of the total enrolment in higher education. The private tertiary institutions, understandably, tend to have far smaller numbers than the public institutions. The number enrolled in the public universities during the period 2000 – 2004 was 222,976. (National Committee for Private Universities, A Report about Higher Education in Libya. N.D. PHEA, pps 4&5). In 2006 the number of private university students grew to 40,000 and in public universities to 300,000 students. (GPCHE (b), 2007, p1 and General Authority for Information, Statistics Book, 2009).)

The admission policy in most private universities, especially non-accredited ones, is farcical and academic standards and conditions are simply not provided. There is no specific time for the registration of students and they can come and go as they please and choose to study at any time before the final exam. Procedures of enrolment are lax and mathematical statistics are not used for the evaluation of whether a student has been studying at the university or not.

High public demand and limited supply have led to the growth of many for-profit private universities with their focus on the supply of student places and on absorbing student applications, but not on the quality of education provided. It is odd that although the private universities are not accredited, students still apply to study at these establishments. There are several reasons that might explain this situation:

1. Many students are worried about their future especially those who lost an opportunity to study at public universities. Private higher education provides an opportunity for them to guarantee their future.

2. The failure of the Libyan government to monitor and control the development of private universities.
3. The presidents of private universities and their assistants do not follow the legal rules that are issued by the QAA. Most of them are not accredited but still function. When students come to register and ask staff about accreditation they are told that, yes, the university is accredited and approved by the QAA. On one occasion during my field study, a student came to Afriqya University to register and asked the president if the university was accredited. He was told that it was.

It is very important that students pay tuition fees before the start of a course, although institutions may be divided into two categories. Some universities are very strict in terms of the payment of tuition fees and students are compelled to pay in advance otherwise they would be barred from lectures. Other universities are more flexible and under certain circumstances allow their clients to delay payment, the aim being to help the poorer students but also to increase the number of students as an attempt to maximize the revenues.

Tuition fees from the financial backbone of many private institutions. For-profit private universities operate, as has been said, as commercial enterprises. The total income of private institutions is determined, therefore, by the number of students and the rate of tuition fees charged. But employment oriented and market-friendly courses are not the only factors that attract a large number of students to these institutions: private universities are very easy places in which to obtain higher degrees and many students are confident that they will graduate simply because they have registered and paid their fees.

Generally, fees in the majority of private universities term are higher than in public universities. In India, China, and Pakistan and in many other developing countries, the fees
in private institutions cover 100% of the costs of the education provided. In many
developed countries fees are less than 100%. In the USA, for example, the corresponding
proportion was only 25% and in Japan 59%. Accordingly, Libya would be placed in the
former where the fees in private institutions cover 100%, if not more. However, it is not as
high as in India, for example, where students seem to prefer going abroad to countries like
China for medical and even engineering education rather than study within their own
country. (Futao & Hata in Tilak J, 2008, p129). The largest proportion of the financial
resources in private higher education establishments comes from the tuition fees paid by
enrolled students and, despite the lack of available data on tuition fees paid per term, these
can be estimated at 250 L.D for subjects in the humanities and 500 D.L for scientific
subjects. There are, of course, variations and differences among establishments and
demand for places will vary: some are more expensive and it is to these establishments that
students from wealthy homes will apply. (Al-Refak University, Indicators and Numbers,
2010)

The management of financial resources is far worse in the private sector than in public
institutions because these universities operate in an unstable environment. There are no
clear policy guidelines or state procedures to regulate and control the level of tuition fees
in private higher education and tuition fees vary considerably between institutions, but all
are concerned principally with making a profit and levy fees accordingly.

In March 2010 the PHEA made a decision insisting that private universities organize the
rate of their tuition fees according to the circumstances of students, but again, because of
the corruption that seems to be the main feature of private higher education in Libya, there
was little response, as fees, of course, are vital to the survival of these establishments.
6.6.7 Employment prospects of graduates from private institutions:

So far, there has been no study of the employability of graduates from private higher education institutions in Libya. Studies that have been done have been related to their development and their evaluation. One of the major concerns of the government since 1999 has been on how to ensure that the increasing numbers of private establishments were offering quality programmes and that their graduates were adequately prepared for the existing job market.

The employment prospect of graduates of private institutions can be said to be currently considerably lower than that of public institutions because, for the first time, employers prefer to employ graduates from public higher education institutions because they feel that graduates from private universities are not well prepared and are of a low academic standard. The governmental institutions and Libyan society as a whole have complained that private higher education students tend to finish courses earlier than those from public institutions and that many do not attend lectures or lessons. They are held in low esteem. Every private higher educational institution is expected to inculcate other skills apart from their study skills, to help the graduates to be job creators rather than just job seekers.

Private universities, then, have not helped to solve the problem of the educated unemployed, as was hoped by Gaddafi’s government. They have produced graduates inappropriately qualified for the job market due to their focus and emphasis on offering courses in the humanities. A cursory glance at the course structure of these institutions reveals that all private universities offer accounting, business studies, management, and law, which are already well covered by public universities. Before the establishment of the
QAA the number of private higher education institutions had increased rapidly, producing a large number of graduates from different areas especially in the social sciences. Those graduates had not been examined adequately and their degrees were seen by state institutions, market employers and the Libyan society as a whole as of little worth. Private universities had a bad reputation and, as the data from my field study shows, the Libyan government was dissatisfied with the graduates from private higher education because the quality of these universities in terms of their staff, students, programmes and facilities were well below an acceptable standard. Notwithstanding, many of privately educated graduates have been employed by the state, many of whom studied in unlicensed universities. In Libya, it was impossible to obtain such data. There are no published statistics that provide such information about how many of state institution employees who holding private universities qualifications. However visits to a number of state institutions (as displayed in the table 29) during the field study helped me to gain related data. They are not comprehensive, but they are adequate for explaining the related purposes. The numbers given represent just a small fraction of the total and do not give a complete picture of the total numbers employed in the Libyan government, but are significant in their own right. Some employees, having worked in state jobs for nine years were told by the QAA to justify their qualifications. This led to a conflict on three fronts: graduates and their families, the private universities, and between employers and the government.
Table (29). The number of private university graduates who work in some of the state institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of institution</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Administration of Tax (Tripoli).</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Council of Planning in Tripoli Province</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Libyan Al-Jehad Centre</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Institution of Oil</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The General Authority of Telecommunication</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The People’s Court</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The General Authority of Press</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jomhorya Bank (South Tripoli)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Health Care Authority</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Authority of Al-Aoukaf</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Food Follow-up Centre</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researcher’s data collected during the field study from the Workforce Administration, Employees Affairs Department in each institution above.

Graduates and their families argued that it was not fair if they were prevented from working or from continuing with their studies because they held or were studying for private university degrees. The situation is complex. It seems unfair that students having studied at these universities for three or four years and having paid their fees should find their qualifications unacceptable to the government. In August, 2002, a decision was taken by the General People’s Committee to stop any further appointments of graduates from private universities unless their degrees were accredited. Again, though, there was no cooperation and the policy makers were placed in a difficult position; and it was hard to implement the decision in the public institutes because this would mean a further
emergence of the educated unemployed and such a result would have a serious destabilising effect on the country as a whole. This is why, I think, the decision was not implemented and policy makers were very cautious in dealing with the decision. Many graduates, however, in some way, have been employed, but others have faced problems in finding a job in the public sector. In Libya many people in public or private institutions, schools, universities and other social services establishments are having doubt about private universities to provide quality education because they are not of an acceptable academic standard. Interviews with managers and directors of some state institutions have said that they do not trust or accept private higher education qualifications (e.g. the Manager of the Tax administration, Mohammed Al-Tomi, Tripoli, October, 2010, the Head Master of the Secondary School, Farj Al-Hmadi, Tripoli, November, 2010 and the Departmental Chief of Administrative Affairs in the National Authority of Information, Moftah Othman, Tripoli, November, 2010). Yet neither the state employers nor the policy makers in Libya have the ability to ensure that private university graduates are barred from working in state institutions.

Most private universities were judged to be illegal but still operated. Interviews with presidents of three of the private universities have given an indication as to why these universities survive (Mrs. Mohiba Franka the president of Al-Refak University, Tripoli, December, 2010, Dr. Al-Mabrouk Abo Shena the president of Afriqya University, Tripoli, November, 2010 and Dr. Al-Mehdi Mohammed the president of Tripoli University, Tripoli, November, 2010). The private universities have students from powerful families, some of whom were close to Gaddafi’s family. In three private universities (Al-Refak, Afriqya and Tripoli) there were students related to Gaddafi’s wife (Safeia) and to some
senior leaders in political and military positions. The students and their parents found private universities easy places to guarantee the graduation. Private universities for them were less complicated than public ones. Those people have everything and they go to private universities because they found them suitable for their purposes and to get qualifications just for social satisfactions. Those in charge of higher education including the Secretary (the Minister) would be in trouble if they had closed a private university that enrolled such students. The rich owners of these universities had strong relationships with powerful Libyan leaders. These universities operated in a corrupt system which helped owners avoid any official action or punishment.

After the establishment of the QAA in 2006 and as the situation has deteriorated dramatically where most private universities have solely become business enterprises, a decision, No. 82, 2010, was taken as an attempt to strengthen the operation of private higher education. One of its aims is to re-accredit the qualifications. The QAA adopted a comprehensive examination policy which was announced in the Al-Elm Magazine and its first examination took place in June 2010.

A large number of graduates from private universities could not find jobs or were unable to continue with their post graduate studies because of the accreditation problem. They said that their degrees were not accredited. The situation has created a serious challenge for the decision makers because the government sometimes accredits illegal private university qualifications but at the same time has not controlled these universities from the beginning.

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48 1) In Tripoli University, for example, there was a student who was Ebrahim Ali’s son. The latter was Gaddafi’s cousin. Ebrahim is the Secretary (Minister) of Planning. 2) It also had Abdoullah Al-Sanossi’s daughter who is brother-in-law of Gaddafi. He was the most important person for Gaddafi. 3) The daughter of Safeya’s brother studied at this university. Safeya is Gaddafi’s wife. 4) The son of Gaddafi’s sister had a daughter who studied in the university. All these, although they studied in a non-accredited university, would have made it not only very difficult but also very dangerous to close the university. At the same time the university would be in a safe position from any action taken against it.
In the first examination of the 26th of June, 2010, 5,052 students were examined from different areas (see Table 30) and only 1,425 passed. 3,627 failed and will have to sit the examination again as a last chance. Failure has had a negative psychological effect on students.

Table (30). The number of students, who attended the comprehensive examination in June, 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
<th>Pass</th>
<th>Fail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business Management</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountancy</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computing</td>
<td>1,534</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English. Language</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemistry</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance &amp; Networks</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks Management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance &amp; Banks</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Mechanical Engineering</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electrical Engineering</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Number</td>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>Accredited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
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<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Physiotherapy</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arabic Language</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It should be noted that not all graduates attended the examination and these are as follows:

1. Some of the more fortunate graduates have already got a job.
2. Some of them are working but have to pass the examination if they want to accredit their degrees.
3. Others are still seeking jobs.

Interviews were held with some employees who work at state institutions. They narrated stories that described the complexity of the situation:
“...we applied for a job in many places since we graduated from the Private Higher Education Institution..... then we got jobs in a public institution .....we have worked for three years but unfortunately the employers do not accept our private university certificates as valid....we are paid salaries based on secondary education qualifications and these are lower than the salaries based at graduate level.....it is not fair ....”.

(Interview with employee, Nisreen Ashor, The Libyan Al-Jehad Centre, November, 2010).

Because of this those employees have lost at least three years’ salaries. According to the law salaries are divided according to the level of education: secondary education qualification gets 130 L.D. and graduate level gets 200 L.D. It means that 70 L.D is the loss every month for each of those workers. Those who have worked for three years have lost about 840 L.D per year. They had hoped to achieve a secure future and to improve their lifestyle by studying at these universities - unfortunately, they invested their money (tuition fees) of about 2,000 D.L that covered their courses but they also experienced other non-monetary anxieties, time and uncertainty.

The Al-Shames Newspaper published a very critical article in 2004 in which many private university graduates in public jobs state that their state employers accredit their secondary education certificates but not their university qualifications:

“..it is not a simple problem that is seen surfacing from time to time. The problem has seriously affected many students who go to private education institutions to get university certificates but they obtain useless qualifications and now are very worried about it......because there is no right state policy to guide secondary education students onto the
right path and there are no special institutions to advise the students where to go and study; the students have been trapped by these institutions by their advertisements distributed everywhere. These advertisements confirmed the legitimacy of their degrees... suddenly the graduates, whether they are working or not, find themselves in painful situations where their degrees are not accepted by the employers....” (Bellagti, K, Al-Shames Newspaper, 8th of May 2004, p6).

6.6.8 Distribution of private higher education providers across regions.

The inability of the Gaddafi government to organize private higher education properly is further revealed by the failure of the regional policy. Libyan policy makers’ plans were very concerned to achieve the balanced distribution of public universities since the 1980s. The notion of this distribution revolved around the argument that higher education opportunities should be available for all Libyans whether they lived in rural areas or in urban zones. This was seen as an important goal in the current political system agenda. After 1969 the Al-Fatah Revolution had aimed to achieve equality in Libyan society and to achieve this balance in the distribution of social services across the regions, public universities had been established by the government in urban and rural areas. Figure 5 shows the distribution of public universities on the map of Libya. As can be seen from the map there are 12 public universities, the two largest being located in the two main cities, Tripoli and Benghazi. In the former there is Al-Fatah University in west Libya and in the east, in Benghazi, there is Garyounise University.

So how has the distribution of private universities fitted into this aspiration for wider dispersion? Basically and according to the above analysis, the distribution of private

49 Before that time from 1955, the year of the establishment of the first university, to 1979, higher education was very limited and comprised only two public universities both in the main cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. 12 universities were added later and were distributed between urban and rural areas.
universities has to be in line with the government goal of achieving a balanced
distribution of public universities. Unfortunately, private universities have been spread
randomly without considering the equity aim.

Table 31 demonstrates that provision of higher education study places by the private sector
is very unevenly distributed. These places are mostly concentrated in the wealthiest and
most populated region, with a very heavy concentration of 75% in the principal city of
Tripoli. They are based in the capital city where the student pool is large and where the
infrastructure is relatively good. The private institutions’ profit-oriented strategy overlooks
most of the central area of the country, despite the existence there of several centres of
dynamic economic growth. This uneven distribution is also reflected by the private sub-
sector’s low provision of higher education study places in the most peripheral regions of
the country, and none at all in one region, Gharian, where it is completely absent.
((National Committee for Private Universities, A Report about Higher Education in Libya.
N.D. PHEA, p6-7).

Table (31). The geographical distribution of public and private institutions of higher

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tripoli</th>
<th>Benghazi</th>
<th>Gharian</th>
<th>Almerghep</th>
<th>Musrata</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The geographical dispersion problems thus provided another problem for the authorities.
The geographical and disciplinary distribution, the balance between teaching and research
and the quality of the degrees provided, have been quite different from political expectations; and this has provoked severe tensions within the system. Furthermore, private institutions did not prove to be more responsive to economic needs than the public sector, because their provision of study programmes tended to be concentrated in areas with low employment expectations and which did not always correspond to priorities defined by the Government or to the demands of the economy.

6.6.9 The ownership of institutions of private higher education.

Generally the ownership of private universities in the world may be categorized as follows: those owned by foreign bodies and operating like multinationals; private universities operating in collaboration with foreign institutions; those collaborating with institutions within the same country; and those that are religiously-supported institutions. Unlike in many countries where the above patterns of ownership exist, in Libya they do not. Private tertiary education in Libya is divided and encompasses many tutorial colleges that offer two year degrees running alongside the other institutions that offer bachelor degrees.

The actual owners of private higher education institutions in Libya are difficult to recognize and to identify because the ownership patterns in private higher education include private corporate bodies, groups of individuals and family-owned businesses. The religious organizational bodies are absolutely absent, while nearly 100 per cent of private universities are run individually, by families and by corporations.

Individuals who manage private universities are divided into two different types. First, a person with an MSc or PhD qualification who can afford to establish a university, examples of which are the Afriqya University in Tripoli and the United Afriqya University in Al-Zawia where the owners have got doctorates. While the former is not accredited by the QAA, the latter has been accredited since 2006. Secondly, those who do not have post-
graduate certificates but have a desire to found a business. These individuals link with academically qualified people to open a university and some of these owners are often rich people with strong connections with powerful members of society. These private universities can be said to have been established entirely for profit-making purposes and not for academic excellence although none would openly declare such an intention. Kortoba University is a good example.

In the family-ownership pattern there are a number of universities that are run by a family cohort. Some are accredited by QAA, such as the Al-Refak University whereas others are not accredited, for instance, the Trables (Tripoli) University and the Al-Shomokh University.

In the third pattern is a group of people who have MSc and PhD qualifications and join each other to establish a university. Most of them are already faculty members at public universities and they make a type of corporation which amounts to between two to five people to run their new university. Their aim is not to stop teaching at their public universities but to create an extra income to improve their life style. This is the case at the Al-Taqadom University. Interestingly, although the owners of these private universities are members of public universities, they work at the first university, Al-Fatah University, and these private universities had not been among the four accredited private universities as has been mentioned.

One of the negative features of the Libyan private higher education system is that the owners see the universities only as a business activity. Since 1999, the beginning of Libyan private higher education, a university has presented a good opportunity for many people to invest their money, especially the rich. All these private universities can be said to have been established for profit-making purposes, but none of these institutions openly declare
such an intention. They have always claimed to have been established for the professional
development of their clientele.

6.6.10 Academic faculties in private higher education.

The Gaddafi government, through the QAA, in theory compelled the private higher
education institutions to achieve minimum standards with regard to the faculty members
and professors. The reality was very different. As far as the human resources base of these
institutions is concerned, only a few satisfied the requirements of the stipulated regulations
regarding the teaching and management of such establishments.

In each institution, the conditions and procedures undertaken for the employment of
lecturers varied according to the owner (the Director) of the institution, who had ultimate
power when appointing staff. Certainly, there were qualified staff members amongst these
teachers, but there were also teachers who had yet to complete their own courses at the
university.

In the majority of cases, the teachers who took up headships and deanships in the private
institutions had retired from the public universities and some of them were from foreign
countries. One unusual aspect that deserves to be recognized is that some universities
appointed members of staff who lacked developed leadership qualities but came from
‘disadvantaged backgrounds’ which, according to the owners equipped them with the skills
to control the university. In fact, as they often worked in illegal circumstances, private
universities preferred to employ such people to avoid disruption and to maintain order and
control.

In terms of staff-student ratios, although the number of students in private universities is
smaller than in the public universities, it is impossible to determine whether the standards
have been better in the private than in the public because in the private universities there had been no clear policy for their control. The administration in these universities is weak and inefficient: there were a number of students who register in the university but did not attend classes, the university does not keep a record of registered students and there was no deadline for registration anyway. Most private universities even allow students to enrol in examination time. It is, therefore, impossible to calculate the staff-student ratio.

It is not easy to obtain data on staff in these universities. The institutions are averse to giving the names of their staff, most of whom are part-time employed in public universities. During my investigations during the field study I found that staff members at the private universities varied considerably; some employ professors with PhD or MSc qualifications with or without experience. Some, though, appoint lecturers with only a first degree, the purpose being to minimize operating costs and thus gain more profits.

In terms of pay structures, private institutions offer additional salaries and incentives. A major concern is that many of the lecturers in the public tertiary institutions have been the same people offering part-time service in the private sector and this can have serious implications for the quality of education given. A similar pattern may be observed with regard to the non-academic staff. One of the features of private tertiary institutions is the large number of non-academic staff. Generally the number of non-academic staff employed in private institutions has been high but few have degrees or professional qualifications.

In fact private institutions very often operate with a limited number of staff members and one of the unique features is that they have few permanent regular staff; they have a large number of part-time teachers, on which they rely heavily, and only a limited number of
full-time teachers. Often, the private universities in Libya have principals who are also the owners.

6.7 Conclusion:

During the period following a country’s independence, the establishment of a public university was often seen as a sign of national pride and a symbol of self-reliance. In Libya, however, the monopoly of the public sector institutions in higher education came to an end during the 2000s. Gaddafi’s government did not want this change but local and global pressures had forced it to accede and the privatization of higher education was seen as a viable alternative. It can be argued that the de-regulation policies under the structural adjustment programs, the fiscal incapacity of the state to expand higher education through public universities and the inability of public universities to respond immediately to the popular demand for employment-oriented courses created an environment conducive to the emergence and expansion of private higher education in Libya.

It was not expected in a political system like Libya’s that a policy of privatisation would emerge. Indeed, idea of the privatization as a concept had been criticized by Gaddafi in the volumes of his ‘Green Book’ because he perceived it as an aspect of capitalism. However, the private sector became a fast-expanding segment of higher education and the shift in policy was justified by some elements in Gaddafi’s earlier teaching of self-determination.

In Libya, for-profit private universities rely on fees. They are small in size and offer courses in subject areas that are similar to those offered by public universities. This gave the policy makers a dilemma because they had hoped, through this policy, to offer alternative subject areas that would realize the goals of their economic and social development plans and thereby reduce the rate of unemployment. In the end, private higher
education created many problems and became a constant headache to the Libyan government.

Private higher education in Libya has been practised inefficiently with the only aim that of making a profit for the owners and with no regard for the quality of education provided. Their operational survival depends on increasing the gap between the fees collected and the actual operational costs of the institution. Staffing costs being the major item of expenditure, they try to minimize their spending on this with an obvious effect on academic standards. Several reasons may be identified to explain the failure of private universities to play their role in the Libyan economy and for the failure of state mechanisms and regulations to assert control more effectively: the lack of institutional or administrative structures; the confused and different objectives of the policy; the complexities of different bureaucratic structures and the popular pressures and political interference or corruption.

The private higher education sector does exist in Libya. Its growth and expansion indicate absorption of both excessive social demand and the differentiated demand for higher education. So, in one sense, they do not really compete with public higher education. The growth of private higher education institutions has not had the intended effect on public universities because they have not created competition for students and lecturers nor have they succeeded in producing graduates with market-oriented and in-demand skills. Private universities levy a high rate of fees, making it difficult for students from the lower socio-economic backgrounds to participate.

Although the total undergraduate enrolment of Libyan private universities, both chartered and non-chartered, was about 40,000 compared to 300,000 in public universities for the 2006/2007 academic year, the institutions have provided alternative access to higher education.
education for those who would otherwise have missed the opportunity. However, it should be noted that many Libyans have yet to access private university education, mainly due to the high cost of the education it provides. This is compounded by the fact that students in private universities are expected to pay 100% of the fees, whereas those in public universities study without cost to themselves. And normally, students in private establishments are prevented from attending lectures until they have paid their fees in full although in unusual circumstances students are sometimes allowed to delay their payments. It can therefore be said that there is no parity for students in financial terms and that there should be a recommendation that some form of grant be awarded to assist students in private universities so that the equity gap can be reduced to a minimum.

It might appear rather too early to conduct an in-depth assessment of the operation of Libyan private higher education institutions, particularly universities, in view of their relatively short history, but it is becoming very clear that the unusual rush of parents to the many private higher education institutions is a demonstration that private institutions are perceived as much less organized than public ones and therefore unlikely to be so stringent in the application of rules and regulations. And the fact that, since 1999, when the first set of private higher education institutions was established, and until the present, there have been many cases of closure within these institutions as it happened in Afriqya University in 2005\(^50\), this indicates that they are generally less stable establishments. My visits to some of these institutions during my field study research revealed that many of them lacked a well-designed structure and existed in poor physical surroundings and lacked any clear philosophies. This serves to convince observers that, over a period of time, private universities in Libya will not compare favourably with older public higher

\(^50\) The university was obliged in 2005 when Shokri Ghanem was the prime minister of Libya 2003-2006, by authorities to leave public school and find its own place.
education institutions. So it could be said that the Libyan government has allowed the private sector to play its role in higher education, but it is also true that the government does obstruct to some extent anyway, many illegal private universities from operating. It is contradictory to come across a private university which is not accredited and illegal but which is advertised in an official booklet. For example, the General Ascendancy of Faculty Members has published a ‘Higher Education Leaflet for 2005’ which includes some private universities (e.g. Al-Hadera University and Afriqya University) that are not accredited and that are illegal and which are portrayed in the leaflet with attractive pictures of different institutions.

The issued legislation on private higher education was not designed to ensure that the sector makes a positive contribution to the higher education system nor to the social developmental needs of the country. It neglected many aspects that could contribute positively, such as making access to higher education easier and improving the quality and breadth of programs so that they would include relevant and useful fields of study. And, significantly, private higher education does not provide even a partial solution to the problem of unemployment.

The quality of learning at private higher education institutions has been reported as being of a very low standard indeed. All aspects that contribute to a high quality learning environment, such as the condition of classrooms and training centres, the quality of the teaching provided, the qualifications of teaching staff, ill equipped libraries and teaching materials and equipment are generally said to be in a seriously poor state. Of course, it has to be said that the standard is not the same for all private institutions. The desire to close many private universities that do not meet with the requirements of the QAA seems unlikely to be realised because of the spread of corruption on a massive scale in the
country and, even more importantly, because these universities have enrolled students from the country’s powerful leaders and families.

As public universities in Libya had nearly collapsed due to a myriad of problems (corruption, politics and lack of purpose) private universities was seen by the Gaddafi’s government an alternative solution to improve higher education policy. However, the government did not produce a sound policy to establish private universities. The policy lacked several things. For example, the policy makers did not find all bodies to regulate private universities (e.g. QAA was founded 6 years after the establishment of private higher education in 1999). The policy was confused. Its objectives were not clear and the private universities founders, students, lecturers and people were unable to understand what it is happening in the ground. The policy lacked effective mechanisms to control private universities. The QAA itself had a lot of problems (e.g. lack of skills, facilities and government support).
Chapter seven: A Case Study of Al-Refak University:

7.1 The Purpose of this field Study:

Despite the immense growth in private sector enrolments in Libya, the private sector is poorly understood and equally poorly analyzed: reliable data are very scarce and the public policy for private higher education has been subjected to very little research. In order to remedy this absence as part of the study, an in-depth analysis of a private university was made. This case study analyzed details pertaining to ownership, admission, teacher profiles, sources of financing and the management of a private university. It was difficult to obtain research information on private sector institutions in Libya, but the field study on private higher education has provided the research with worthwhile information and data.

There are several reasons that have led me to undertake a field study that examines a functioning private university. In my view it was not adequate to make just a generalized study of private higher education in Libya. I decided that it would be essential to analyse the privatization of higher education by dealing with a private university as a case study. The previous chapter discussed several issues which need to have more light shed upon them. The figure 17 (below shows private higher education and its relationship with related state institutions:

```
The Ministry of Higher Education.
  ↓
The Quality Assurance and Accreditation Centre (QAA).
  ↓
The Administration of Private Higher Education (APHE).
  ↓
Private Universities (e.g. Al-Refak)
```
The figure illustrates the apparent simplicity of private higher education. Private universities are controlled by the QAA and the APHE, but for some reason they are not well organised and have become a headache to the government. It is essentially a question of monitoring and checking the quality of these private institutions. This case study will provide an opportunity to look in more detail at the relationship between the administrative bodies and the reality of the situation and will highlight some of the important issues that face private higher education in Libya.

This thesis, then, will also focus on the behaviour of individual higher education institutions because its aim is not restricted to an analysis of the overall system but will also encompass an examination of the operation of individual providers. The empirical work focuses on a private university and the type of programmes it offers, on the fees charged, and the characteristics of its student population, and by so doing provides a wealth of informative and relevant material on the Libyan higher education system.

7.2 The Choice of Al-Refak university:
I had a chance to undertake two field studies in Gaddafi’s stage and after the February Revolution visiting Al-Refak University. There are several reasons for the selection of this university. Firstly, this university started functioning immediately after the enactment of the Private University Law of 1999; secondly, it is located in Tripoli, the capital city, which means that this university will reflect the nature of the majority of private universities in Libya; thirdly, it is the first and the only university that has gained accreditation from QAA in Tripoli; the fourth reason is that, because privatization in Libya is a very recent phenomenon with therefore limited data, it has been possible to get data and useful research information from this university; and the fifth reason is that this
university has proven to be financially viable: by 2010 it had completed almost a decade of its existence and there were visible signs showing that this institution was expanding. Its degrees and its graduates were being accredited at home but not abroad. Hence, I am examining what purported to be of the best of the private universities. It may not be entirely typical of all the private universities, most of which were markedly inferior. However, by examining one of the better ones we can analyse the private sector in the most favourable circumstances. Data for the case study was collected from interviews with the president of the university and the official records of the institution. A number of important administrative personnel of this institution were also consulted on different matters related to management, financing, and so on.

7.3 Al-Refak University in an historical context:
This institution first appeared in 1990 as a small institution with a computing laboratory and it trained a few students who paid for the cost of their training. In 1999 when the private law was issued the institution was upgraded to an institution of higher education and became known first as ‘Emad Al-Mustakbil’ and then after discussion, to the ‘Al-Refak Institute for Middle and Higher Education’. The name ‘Al-Refak’ was used to describe the friendship between the owner “Mohiba Franka” and her friends. At first the institution had two levels: secondary education and higher education, the latter of which included departments of Engineering and Languages. It depended on tuition fees from its students. The number of students in this institution, in both levels, grew to 800 students in 2000 and then to 2000 in 2004/2005. From 1999 to 2004 the institution offered a three-year diploma. From then on the Libyan government forbade the institution to continue with its engineering and language courses because these subjects require four years of study. It was determined by the government that these fields should be considered at Al-Refak
University degree level. In the early days, higher education level teaching started with many departments, in both vocational and theoretical areas and had five laboratories in different settings. However, only two of them were open: Business Management and Computing Sciences, the former with three male students and the latter with four female students. Other departments, such as Fashion Design, Banks and Accountancy, Tourism and Hotels and Mechanical Engineering were closed because of a complete lack of students. All departments were located in a building of five floors of 250 m². The institution was licensed to operate in 1999 with available teachers from the province of Tripoli.

As the number of students grew, the original building became seriously overcrowded and no longer able to cope. Therefore, the owner of the institution, Mrs. Mohiba, commissioned a new building in 2004. Three years later, in 2007, Al-Refak University was opened. Before the establishment of the university, Resolution No. 1330, 2003, had been issued by the General People’s Committee for the Province of Tripoli and this permitted the establishment of the Al-Refak Company for free education. And a year later, in 2004, Resolution No. 1 was issued to establish the university. It is officially named the ‘Al-Refak University for Humanitarian and Empirical Sciences’. The old building continued to operate and provides courses at pre-university and diploma levels in information technology, management studies and computer studies.

The university by 2011 had nine departments as follows:

First: Human Sciences:

- Business Management.
- Accountancy.
• English Language.
• Law.

Second: Empirical Sciences:
• Computing Science.
• Petrol Engineering.
• Architecture and Construction Planning.
• Civil Engineering.
• Electronic-Electrical Engineering.

The university profile:

The university occupied seven floors with the following facilities:

1. Twenty eight classrooms of various sizes.
2. Lecture theatre with a capacity for approximately 300 students.
3. Two libraries, one for hard copy resources, such as books, journals and scientific magazines. It occupied an area of 130 m². The second one housed 40 computers and covers an area of about 90 m².
4. The university had ten laboratories: four for computing sciences, two for civil engineering, one for electronic engineering, one for chemical sciences, one for geology, one for English Language studies and one is for Physics.
5. In addition the university had other service facilities, e.g. photocopying, and a cafeteria.

7.4 Conditions of acceptance for study at the university:

Four conditions had to be met by students before entering the university. These were:

1. He/she had to hold a certificate of secondary education or an equivalent qualification.
2. He/she had to be interested in the theoretical and practical principles of the Al-Fatah Revolution.

3. The registration of students was divided according to the number of full-time students and part-time students.

4. The student had to pass a test to determine whether or not he/she was capable of studying at university level.

These conditions were not always taken seriously by the university administrators since the aim of the university was to enrol as many students as possible.

The university also had two bills: the Bill of Registration, Study and Examination and the Bill of Faculty Members of Al-Refak University. The latter had eight sections each with a number of articles. The former had twenty articles that regulate the faculty members at the university. Table 32 (below) shows details of both bills:

Table (32). The legal bills in Al-Refak University and their articles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Bill of Registration, Study and Examination</th>
<th>The Bill of Faculty Members of Al-Refak University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The first chapter (general decisions).</td>
<td>Twenty nine articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The second chapter (the study system).</td>
<td>Two articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The third chapter (the acceptance system).</td>
<td>Three articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fourth chapter (the registration system).</td>
<td>Seven articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fifth chapter (the absence policy).</td>
<td>Four articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The sixth chapter (the evaluation and the examination).</td>
<td>Ten articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The seventh chapter (disciplinary regulations).</td>
<td>Nineteen articles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: taken by the researcher from the university catalogue/prospectus.
7.5 The objectives of the university:
The objectives of establishing the university include:

1. To contribute in the development of Libyan society;
2. To provide adequate resources for quality university education, training and research based on Islamic concepts and values reflecting the heritage of Arab culture;
3. To guide students towards an understanding and an acceptance of themselves, their individual needs and talents, and to develop their potential for a productive life and service to society;
4. To provide students with a balanced educational programme that helps them to develop and broaden their perception of the inherent relationship between physical and spiritual needs, and to develop a holistic approach to life;
5. To supply Libyan society with a suitable educational environment and to provide an excellent educational service.
6. To create a suitable climate for faculty teachers and administrators, according to their responsibilities, to participate in the developmental aims and objectives of the university.

7.6 Management and governance:
The management of the university was vested in four bodies:

Founder: the owner ‘Mrs. Mohiba Franka’, is considered the founder and sponsor. She had four basic functions, namely:

1. Overseeing the mission of the university;
2. Appointing the Chancellor;
3. Electing members to serve on the council of the university;
4. Receiving reports on the functioning and progress of the university.
The Chancellor: the Chancellor was appointed by the founder and was Chairman of the Council. There was no specific period of time for a person to hold this position. He/she held office for a period according to university circumstances and the desire of the sponsor. Other than chairing the Council, he/she was the head of the university and officially confers university degrees and grants diplomas, certificates and awards.

The Council: this was the governing body with full responsibility over the university. It comprised the Chancellor (Chairperson), the Vice-Chairman and members elected by founder.

Senate: The Senate comprised the Vice-Chancellor, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, principals, directors, deans of faculties, chairpersons of departments, a librarian, a registrar, two academic staff representatives, two other representatives and other members as may be provided for in the statutes co-opted by the Senate.

It had the following functions:

1. Proposing short and long-term academic plans and their modifications for approval by the council;

2. Developing evaluation structures and proposing modifications in programs of instruction, research and field services consistent with its objectives.

3. Developing criteria and policies for student admission, retention, progression and the awarding of degrees, diplomas and certificates;

4. Approving the academic calendar and programs of studies;
5. Discussing and approving annual academic reports presented by the deans and principals;
6. Receiving and approving examination results.

Day-to-day management of the university was the responsibility of the University Management Board. The latter was composed of the Vice-Chancellor, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, principals, directors and deans of faculties.

the management board had the following functions:
1. Ensuring efficient and effective management of the personnel, facilities and finances of the university;
2. Implementing plans for the development and needs of the university;
3. In consultation with the Senate, preparing annual plans and budgets for submission to the council for approval;
4. Developing strategies for revenue generation and fundraising;
5. Implementing rules and regulations for the conduct and behaviour of students and staff;
6. Recommending policies and strategies to achieve the objectives of the university;
7. Undertaking any other functions and duties as may be provided for in the statutes.

All these functions were carried out under the authority of the Vice-Chancellor, who was the Chief Executive Officer of the university. However, in reality all decisions and the university matters we at this period controlled by the founder, Mrs. Mohiba Franka, who has the ultimate responsibility for the university.
7.6 The financing policy of the university:
Al-Refak University depends largely on tuition fees. All its income has been self generated and it has not received any external financial assistance (e.g. government assistance, endowments, gifts, grants, charities and donations). The fees policies vary between universities. Fees were kept comparatively high at Al-Refak University. Table 33 shows the variations in tuition fees between selected private universities in Libya in 2010.

Table 33. the level of tuition fees in selected private universities in Libya 2010:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The university</th>
<th>Tuition fees per course (Libyan Dinars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Refak</td>
<td>400-640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afriqya University</td>
<td>300-500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli University</td>
<td>250-450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hannibal University</td>
<td>350-400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: analysis based on the writer’s data resulting from the field study.

In some universities students pay tuition fees for the course as a whole, whereas in Al-Refak University students had to pay the cost of their courses according to the number of disciplines undertaken, with some subjects being more expensive than others. For example, medicine or engineering studies cost much more than management or law subjects. But in general, each of the disciplines would cost a student 80 D.L. A student would be required to study a minimum of five subjects and allowed a maximum of eight subjects in any given term. So the cost of a course could be between 400 D.L and 640 D.L. According to data about the number of students enrolled, the university had raised revenues ranging from a million-and-a-quarter to a million-and-a-half D.L. Over the period 2008 to 2010 its revenue ranged from 1,250,000 D.L to 1,500,000 D.L. see the Table 3 below.
Despite this income the ownership claimed that sometimes the university could sometimes
not cover the costs of providing educational facilities which meant that the university
expenditure as shown in the Table 34 below, was more than its income (Accounting
Department, 2011, The Financial Report). But, the expenditure incurred by the university
seems to be less than had been declared on the university accounts. In some instances bills
and demands were not met. For example, the university did not pay its taxes for two
reasons: the first was because the university’s financial administration did not declare its
true financial situation to the Tax Authority and, second, because the Libyan government
did not have an efficient or proper Tax system, taxes were more expensive to collect and
easier to evade.

Table (34). An estimated of the total income for Al-Refak University from tuition fees in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The year (includes 3 terms)</th>
<th>The number of students</th>
<th>Total revenue for the year*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>1,250,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2700</td>
<td>1,350,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>1,500,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: It has been compiled by the author Data from Al-Refak University, 2010, documents and accounts

*the numbers were founded: the number of students× 500 D.L. the later is an average of how much do
students pay each term.

The academic year in the university was divided into three terms: the Autumn term which
started at the beginning of October, the Spring term which started at the beginning of
February and the Summer term which started at the beginning of June.

In addition to the tuition fees the university has other self-generated resources as follows:
• Income gained from university auxiliary enterprises and investments. The university has several projects that help to generate income for the university (e.g. photocopying facilities, the cafeteria and other services).

• Other charges are made for services, such as a fee for campus cards and the fees that are paid by students for their graduation.

• Recurrent costs, such as annual operating expenditure and staff salaries were mainly financed by income from tuition fees. In terms of sustainability, this was the only regular source of income, unlike the other resources that have varied over the years and reflect an absence of donations and government assistance. This, of course, made it extremely difficult for the university to cover the cost of its educational commitments. So students’ fees represented a large portion of the cost and, as a result, those students from disadvantaged backgrounds could suffer. In an interview with the president and owner of the university, she made the following observation “.....the university has not received any donations and the Libyan government has not supported us...there is no way to cover the costs of the university but from tuition fees...” She continued: “....sometimes we cover the costs from our financial resources and could not make any profits....”. (Interview with Mrs. Franka, M, the owner of Al-Refak University. December 2010). Table 35 below shows the details of the approximate variable costs that were paid by the university over a year. In fairness, though, the university had a policy that allows some, but not all, students who are very poor or disabled to study with half cost and, at the time of my research interview in October, 2010, there were about ten poor students and five disabled in the university who were studying with half cost to themselves.
Table (35). An estimated variable costs for Al-Refak University, 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable costs</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries for employees</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty members</td>
<td>210,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairpersons of departments</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stationery</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Updating of computing programmes</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Committees</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examination</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet and websites costs</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The designer of the Websites</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific activities</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduation ceremony</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External and cultural corporation visitors from outside Libya.</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media and advertisements.</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe system</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we take 2010 as a simple comparison between table 34 and table 35 we will see the profits equivalent to 889,400 thousands Libyan Dinars a year for the university \((1,500,000 - 610,600^{51} = 889,400\) Libyan Dinars). The university as well as others are able to return their capital and to make money in a very short time period. It should bear in mind that these calculations are estimated and they are not precise. However profits in private universities are significant and this supports an argument being made about the commercial attractiveness of private universities as an excellent business in Libya.

7.7 Courses offered and trends in enrolment:

The university offered courses that were similar to the courses in the public university. There were nine departments which offered only first degrees, at bachelor’s level, because the GPCHE did not allow private universities to offer postgraduate studies. The faculties in Al-Refak University included Architecture, Accountancy, Law, Business Management, Computer Sciences, Communication Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Civil Engineering, Petrol Engineering, and Languages, of which the first five were not accredited and although the English Department had been accredited by the QAA, the university had opened other languages which were not.

This university had yet to gain general recognition for the education it had been providing, even though it had been in operation for a long time in the private sector and it was also offering undergraduate courses in the natural sciences such as physics, chemistry and biology, and in most of the other social sciences.

\(^{51}\) 1,500,000 is an estimated of the total income for Al-Refak University in 2010. 610,600 is an estimated variable costs for the university in 2010.
It should be noted that the major trend for many private universities in the world has been to offer courses that require little investment in terms of infrastructure facilities and equipment as is the case in some African and Asian countries and even in the other private universities in Libya, such as Afriqya and the Tripoli universities. This was not the case in Al-Refak University, though, where there were relatively good facilities compared with other private establishments in Libya, although this could be attributed to the advantaged background of the owner.

An analysis of trends in the administration of the university revealed some clear patterns in enrolment as well as in other aspects, with the number of enrolled students up since its establishment in 2003. The available statistics show that the number had increased from 2500 students in 2008 to 3000 students at the time of this study in 2010-2011. The number accounted for about 1.2% of the total number of students in public higher education and 7.5% of the total number of students in the private higher education in the country in 2010 and indicated the favourable position of Al-Refak University compared with the other private universities in Tripoli specifically and in Libya generally. For example, in Tripoli University the percentages were 0.38% and 2.35%, in Afriqya University 34.0% and 2.1%, in Hannibal University 0.16% and 1.0% and in Al-Hadera University 0.19% and 1.17%.

The reasons for this may be attributed to the fact that:

1. The university was considered to be the oldest private university in the private university sector.
2. It was located in the capital city of Libya where the greatest number of Libyan people lives and this more easily provides a supporting infrastructure and, of course, a large pool of potential students.
3. It was, significantly, the only private university in the capital that had gained accreditation from the QAA.

Consequently, the university, compared with the other accredited private universities, had the largest number of enrolments in its accredited departments. As can be seen from Table 36 below, the number of students in Al-Refak University was more than the number in the other three private universities, Union Afriqya, Afriqya and the International Libyan University for Medical Sciences. In Al-Refak the number was 3,000 students for the year 2009/2010 while in the others the numbers were 668, 360 and 499 students respectively. However, the numbers were considerably lower compared with a public university, such as the Al-Fatah University which had 43,258 students. The figure (37) (below illustrates the wide gap in the number of students enrolled at Al-Refak University compared with that of Al-Fatah University.

Table (36). The number of students in the accredited private universities in Libya. 2009/2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The university</th>
<th>The number of students</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Refak University</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Afriqya University</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afriqya University</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Libyan University for Medical Sciences</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,527</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the National Committee for Private Universities; The Administration of Private Higher Education documents, 2010.
Table (37). Comparison in the number of students between Al-Refak University and Al-Fatah university 2009/2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Fatah University</td>
<td>43,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Refak University</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: researcher’s statistics based on:
- General Authority for Information, Statistics book, 2009,

This number of students was distributed between nine departments. It was difficult to obtain information on the number of students in different years. However, Table 38 shows the distribution of students amongst the departments both accredited and non-accredited.

Table (38). The distribution of students between the departments at Al-Refak University, 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teaching department</th>
<th>The number of students</th>
<th>The percent of the total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounting</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Management</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computing Science</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunication Engineering</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Engineering</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Engineering</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrol Engineering</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: through the researcher’s personal consultations with the Administrative Office, Al-Refak University, on October 2010, Tripoli.
Table 38 clearly shows that there were 3,000 students in the year 2010. Of this total, 29% (875 students), studied Business Management, after which came the Department of Accounting with 13% of the total. Whereas other departments, such as, Civil Engineering, Telecommunication Engineering, and Electrical Engineering had 5%, 2% and 1% respectively. The table shows that the distribution of students was more in human sciences than in practical sciences and this was similar to that of the public universities - Al-Fatah University, for example. Despite the Libyan Gaddafi Government’s policy and its efforts to increase the number of students in certain fields, for instance electrical engineering, for which there were a number of opportunities for employment, the number of students studying the humanities was still far more than in the practical sciences, and this is true of both the public and private sectors. This is substantiated by the case study research undertaken at Al-Refak University. The figures 18 and 19 below show that in the public university (Al-Fatah) the number of enrolments in the humanity areas was more than the number in the science departments. Similarly, in Al-Refak University (as a private university) the number of students enrolled in the humanities was higher than were enrolled in the practical sciences: in the former the number was 1730 students and in the latter 1270 students.
Figure (18). A comparison in the distribution of the students between human and empirical in the public universities.

Source: researcher’s analysis based on Al-Magory, 2005.

Figure (19). A comparison in the distribution of the students between human and empirical in Al-Refak university.

Source: researcher’s analysis based on Al-Refak University, official document, 2010.
In the accredited departments in the academic year 2010, the number reached 2,212 students, while in non-accredited departments the number was 651 students. This means that although these departments were not accredited by the QAA, students still applied to study in these departments and the likely reasons for this are:

1. The university did not tell students at the outset that certain departments were not accredited. In fact, private universities, in the absence of tight control from the government gave untruthful profiles of their establishments in an attempt to recruit as many students as possible. One of their methods was to use the media whose agencies were well paid by the universities’ founders to advertise their courses whether these were accredited or not, thus making it very difficult for students to acquire the facts about particular departments. For example, in both official newspapers, Al-Daleel and Al-Ealan, Al-Refak University had announced that the university had opened more accredited departments. In Al-Daleel Newspaper in 2009, the university announced that:

“...... Al-Refak University for Human and Scientific Sciences announces for students and their parents that there are new academic departments opening and that these have already been accredited by the QAA. The university has already opened the door for applications and registration for the academic year 2009-2010 in the following disciplines: English Language, Accountancy, Business Management, Computing Sciences, Architecture, Civil Engineering, Petroleum Engineering and Electronic Engineering ......”

The University announces its need for highly qualified academics to sign teaching contracts and to take up lecturing positions in the departments and disciplines mentioned
2. Some students had failed to gain places to study at public universities.

3. The QAA had not openly and clearly published relevant information for the benefit of potential students and their parents and many students were totally unaware of the need for accreditation to validate their degrees later. *Al-Elm* Magazine, issued by the Media Office in the Ministry for Higher Education was the only journal to publish truthful information for the benefit of potential applicants.

In the university the number of graduates reached 895 in 2009 and 2010, and these were distributed over nine fields of study as shown Table 39. Again, Business Management represents the most popular department with 169 graduates, and then Architecture with 107 graduates; the law department had 104 graduates. The departments with less than 100 graduates can be identified from the table below. The average graduation index included in this survey is 90 per cent; and the table clearly shows that there were more graduates from the humanities with 470, than from the sciences with 425 graduates.
There is a generally held belief that many of the private universities attract more male students than female students. In Al-Refak University male students made up more than 50 per cent of the total students in the university. The increasing number of males attending the university arguably reflected the small number attaining the minimum cut-off points for admission into a public university. More males than females fail to qualify so they turned to private universities generally and to Al-Refak University in particular. At the same time the students preferred to follow courses with low tuition fees such as accounting, business management and law. The reasons that could be attributed to this are:

1. Some students came from disadvantaged family backgrounds. Therefore, it was sensible, indeed necessary, for them to study on courses with low tuition fees.  

Source: data from Al-Refak University, the Statistical Book, 2011.

Table (39). The number of graduates from Al-Refak University, 2009/2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>The number of graduates.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business Management</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounting</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computing Science</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Engineering</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Engineering</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrol Engineering</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52 On the one hand the university enrolled disadvantaged family backgrounds students. Although the cost of study was high in the university, students from this class had no option but to study at private universities. They wanted to secure their future by joining private university after they had failed in their study at public university. Those were struggling for the study cost and life expenses. On the other hand, there were students
2. Students believed that the academic expectations in these departments were much less demanding than those of the science courses.

3. Many students expected to be employed soon after graduation from these ‘easier’ courses and that therefore, investment in a degree course in a private institution of higher education improved the chances of avoiding unemployment.

4. The accreditation of these departments could be one of the reasons that have encouraged students to study these subject disciplines.

The university had a small number of foreign students from other Arab countries, particularly from Egypt and the Sudan, although this amounted to only about 2% of the entire student body.

Another feature of Al-Refak University was that the students were from high class and rich families in society and others came from powerful families who were close to Al-Gaddafi. This, clearly, had been an important advantage for the university and placed it in a very strong position with no fear of it being closed down. Such students studied at private universities to get qualifications for social reasons and social satisfactions. They had everything and they went to private universities because they found these universities easy and suitable for their desires. Private universities were less complicated than public ones. For example, it was easy for the student parents to guarantee the graduation for their children who often do not like to go to study.
7.8 The quality of education provided by Al-Refak University:

It is very difficult to generalize on the quality of education provided by private institutions of higher education. It varies widely and depends upon the agency responsible for establishing the university and the legislative requirements for its infrastructure. An assessment of a particular educational institution could be based on various factors, such as the standard of its facilities, the quality of programs offered, the qualification levels of its teachers, an evaluation of the performance of its students while at the university and their success once on the labour market.

To improve their quality of education, private universities were required by the Libyan QAA to provide the necessary facilities and conditions for accreditation. Among the fifty private universities the Al-Refak University had relatively good facilities, such as decent lecture theatres, laboratories and offices. What it lacked, however, was efficient administrative skills, and the quality of its programs and the qualification levels of its teachers were below the standards required at university level. My observations during visits to the university were:

1. The university had administrative staff, some of whom hold only pre-undergraduate qualifications. These represented about 10% of the 30 members of the administrative staff. Some 50% had worked in this area for the first time and had only very limited experience and some employees had two jobs; they worked in a public institution in the mornings and in the university in the afternoons and this made it difficult for them to fulfil their responsibilities.

2. The quality of the courses offered by the university was not as high as was expected by the policy makers for higher education in Libya. The course programs
in Al-Refak University, as in all private universities in Libya, had been copied from the curricula of the public universities but were no better and quite often inferior.

3. The academic qualification of teachers is an important area affecting the quality of education offered. The qualification levels of a number of teachers in Al-Refak University were below those stipulated by the QAA. There were three reasons for this: firstly, the university depended heavily on teachers holding MSc degrees and these comprised about 80% of the total number of faculty members; only 20% of faculty members hold doctoral qualifications. In addition to that the university relied on a number of teachers who had not completed their post-graduate studies. Secondly, the university depended on a small number of part-time staff drawn mainly from public universities. Thirdly, the university lacked any academic connection with other institutions locally or internationally, the only recorded collaboration being in 2010 with the Al-Fatah University. This collaboration had several aspects, one of which was to allow the business management, civil engineering and petrol engineering departments in Al-Fatah University to supervise the same departments at Al-Refak University. Another was to allow Al-Fatah University to benefit from the other university’s facilities (e.g. classrooms and laboratories) and then to grant access to its petrol laboratories for use by students from Al-Refak. Thirdly, an agreement had been made to provide faculty members from the Al-Fatah University to teach at Al-Refak University.

It is interesting to note that although many of the students in Al-Refak University had a lower academic profile than those in the public universities, their academic performance, in general, was better. The dropout rates were low and the graduation rates are high. This may be partly due to the fact that having accepted students’ fees, the university has found it
difficult to fail its clients and this applies to other universities as well. The university administrators also believed that it was a good idea to allow students to pass their examinations as a way to help the university attract more students and consequently make a greater profit. The feeling in Libyan society at this time was that the quality of education provided by the private universities, including that of Al-Refak, was questionable and that not many students openly demand quality; they felt that many just wanted to get a degree or a diploma as a ticket to enter the job market. This was resulting in the emergence of ‘diploma mills’ where students could get degrees and diplomas over a short period of time without attending classes or taking examinations.

7.9 Academic faculties in Al-Refak University in comparison with other private universities:

The academic faculties govern the proper and efficient functioning of higher education provision. The number of academic faculties and their structures and the qualification levels achieved by their students are the most important aspects in the long term development of higher education. At the beginning of the transformation process, newly-established private higher education providers suffered from a lack of academic staff. In particular, there was a scarcity of highly ranked academics, such as professors and those holding doctorates. As the analysis of the number of academic staff has already been provided in this study, it will be useful to focus on the development of academic staff employed in Al-Refak University. Table 40 below gives a comprehensive view of the development of staff in a private and a public university, specifically Al-Fatah University. The increase in student numbers was not reflected in a comparable increase in the number of academic staff, which remained stable until the late 2000s, and then increased slightly

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53 I was a lecturer at a private university and I experienced this situation at first hand.
between 2007 and 2010. In total, the number of academic faculty members at Al-Refak University increased from 220 in 2008 to 228 in 2010, while at Al-Fatah University the number decreased from 1658 to 1349 and then increased to 1400. So, the student / staff ratio in the private sector, as can be seen, is better in Al-Refak University than in Al-Fatah University. In the former the ratio is about 0.11% while in the latter it is 0.03%.

Many faculty members in Al-Refak University came from the public sector. A small number of them had already taught at public universities and others had jobs in public institutions. Most, if not all, academics in the university were involved mainly in teaching, and their engagement in research and related academic activities appeared minimal. Because of the dearth of available and qualified faculty members even at state universities, private universities faced a major hurdle in this area. Al-Refak University as well as other private universities was finding it extremely difficult to compete with each other as well as with public ones due to generally poor facilities, weak support from the government and the state’s decision to prevent professors from having two jobs - it was illegal to work in both public and private universities. This decision did not help private university to attract the best qualified academics.

Table (40): Academic staff in a private and in a public higher education institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Al-Fatah</th>
<th>Al-Refak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>1658</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>1349</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since none of the private providers during the 1990s had the right to confer PhD degrees, and only a few offered master’s degrees, an important way to develop their own faculties was to offer academics better working conditions and financial incentives. In general, the salaries in the private sector were higher than in the public universities. In addition, professors’ contracts were usually negotiated individually and allowed private institutions to offer higher salaries in the most successful departments.

It is not possible to provide a detailed analysis of the level of salaries in the university. For instance, in the academic year 2007/2008, the salaries offered were in general higher than those in the public sector. The contracts for professors varied from 1500 L.D to 2000 L.D per month, while in public universities professors’ earnings were about 1200 L.D. Assistant lecturers with exclusivity contracts received 1000 L.D.\(^{54}\)

In addition, Al-Refak University has solved the problem of the scarcity of academics by employing foreign professors and lecturers especially in its languages department. However, the university administrators have preferred to appoint Libyan nationals as teachers in an attempt to achieve Libyan national identity.

Based on theoretical considerations we may assume that, during the development of the private higher education sector, the focus of many private higher education providers in many countries would be on the appointment of high ranking academics to be employed full-time. This would mean that private providers would first of all concentrate their efforts

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\(^{54}\) In Summer holiday months July, August and September when there are no lessons the lecturers get salary for about 450 L.D. because lecturers do not give lessons and lectures, so the government reduce salaries.
on attracting a group of academics that would fulfil the Ministry’s requirement for adequate staffing when offering degree courses. In addition, it is worth emphasizing the influence the QAA had on the number of full-time academics appointed in the private sector since the Committee looked carefully to see whether the institutions were meeting the minimum staff requirements. At Al-Refak University as in the other private universities in Libya, the academic staff had failed to meet these requirements.

Table (41). The distribution of faculty members between departments according to their degree status, 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>The number of faculty members</th>
<th>BSc</th>
<th>MSc</th>
<th>PhD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business Management</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountancy</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architecture &amp; Construction Planning</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computing Science</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrol Engineering</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: researcher’s findings based on Al-Refak University, Official Document. (2010).

Table (41) above summarizes the distribution of academic staff in the departments at the university according to their degrees. From the table we can identify several points:
1. About 80% of the total numbers of faculty members in the university had MSc degrees, and this amounted to 147 teachers. The establishment of the Postgraduate Academy in 1990, and later the beginning of the postgraduate programmes in the public universities, had provided professors for both the public and private sectors. A large number have graduated from the Academy since its establishment and have found the private universities a good source of employment.

2. The percentage of faculty members who held PhD degrees is estimated to be around 20% of the total number. Most of them were already lecturers at public universities and worked in the private universities to supplement their incomes.

3. It is worth mentioning that according to Article No.6 of the Higher Education Resolution No.120, 2004, issued by the GPC (Cabinet) and according to Article No.5 of the Faculty Members’ Regulation for Al-Refak University, faculty members must hold at least an MSc to teach at a higher education institution whether public or private. There are six members of the teaching staff at Al-Refak University who hold only BSc degrees.

4. In addition to that there were a number of teaching staff who held MSc and PhD degrees but did not teach in relevant departments and according to this researcher’s findings, there were five departments deploying lecturers who hold qualifications in inappropriate areas. In the Department of Business Management there were ten lecturers who held MSc qualifications, six in Economics, one in Industrial Planning, one in Mathematics, one in Civil Engineering and one in Languages. Also in the department there are four lecturers with PhD qualifications: one in economics, one in Library Sciences, one in Information Technology and one in Literature. Table 42 below summarizes the number of teachers who hold degrees in disciplines outside the specialist requirements of a department.
5. Business Management had the largest number of faculty members with a total of 45 professors and lecturers. In contrast, the Department of Political Sciences had the lowest number with only five. This was clearly because the number of students enrolling on Business Management courses was far greater than that of any of the other degree courses offered.

Table (42). The number of departments that had teaching staff from different disciplines, 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>MSc</th>
<th>PhD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business Management</td>
<td>Economics, Industrial Planning, Mathematics, Civil Engineering, Languages Studies</td>
<td>Economics, Library Sciences, Information Technology, Literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountancy</td>
<td>2 in Financial Planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architecture &amp; Construction Planning</td>
<td>2 Project Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computing Science</td>
<td>1 Mechanic Engineering</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>5 Arabic Language &amp; Islamic Studies</td>
<td>1 International Studies, 1 Islamic Faith</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: researcher’s data based on Al-Refak University Document. (2010).

The favourable developments in the academic staff employed in the university private sector were diminished by the fact that for many of these people working in Al-Refak University it was a second job. This additional source of income meant that the teachers often worked at several higher education institutions simultaneously. It is therefore difficult to evaluate the real number of faculty members. At the beginning of the 2000s,
about 60% of academics in the private sector held multiple teaching posts both in public and private universities but stated that their first commitment was to public providers. Those academic teachers who were employed permanently in public higher education institutions often had additional hours in more than one private institution. This situation had implications for the quality of education provided at Al-Refak University. Members of the academic staff who took multiple teaching posts were less likely to devote much time to the needs of students in the university, despite the fact that the courses were paid for. Usually, the non-paying students on full-time courses in public institutions received priority as they were the best students, selected through competitive admission procedures (World Bank, 2004).

In the academic year 2008/09 the academics in the university numbered nearly 228 people, constituting about 3% of total academic staff in the entire country, while student numbers amounted to 1.2% of all students. Therefore, despite the relative growth in the number of academics appointed to the university, the student/staff ratio was considerable less than in the public sector and in the academic year 2008/09 amounted to nearly 30 students per single faculty member in Al-Refak University55. In the public sector it was about 50. However, this relatively low ratio contributed to the notion that rapid expansion of public higher education providers with a sufficient number of academic staff had some favourable outcomes in terms of quality. The preceding growth in student numbers accompanied by the increase in the number of academic staff had resulted in drastic workload decreases. Despite this there was a negative aspect to the academic staff in Al-Refak University where many did not have ongoing scientific or research activities and, to some extent, their experience in the teaching field appeared limited.

55 There is a low staff student ratio in Al-Refak University, however this it does not always mean a good thing. For example, in the case of Libya private universities do not have good facilities and they work in confused policy that make the staff student ratio mean nothing .....
As mentioned, the common features were the limited number of teaching courses at undergraduate level, usually in low cost/high-demand study programmes, such as economics, management and pedagogy. Clearly, those institutions followed the so-called low cost strategy, and reduced costs in all aspects of their activities, such as academic appointments, equipment, and infrastructure.

The overall picture of academic staff in Al-Refak University improved during the period analyzed, but it was still unsatisfactory, with an inadequate number of academics and the development was in the quantity rather than in the quality. Yet there was a discernible possibility of a positive trend in the structure of academic employment in the university with the growing number of high ranked academics appointed on full-time contracts.

7.10 The relationship between Al-Refak University and Quality Assurance and Accreditation (QAA):

An important element in private higher education in Libya is the role of the QAA in controlling the private universities. It was hoped by the government through this institution to strengthen the function of the private higher education sector and create excellent private universities. However, the QAA had been unable to enforce its regulations because of several factors as was observed during the field study in the last three months of 2010. These factors could be summarized as:

1. The University's founder, Al-Refak, was simply too powerful and sought to enrol a number of students who were politically powerful as will be explained later. Those students were ‘used’ by the founder as a way of ignoring the QAA’s regulations and rules. In fact the strength of the university was not in its management structure

321
or in the professors and scholars it employed, but in the power and extreme wealth of its owner and founder and her corresponding relationships with important people in high status positions in government. Consequently the university was able to create a wide net of relationships with many important people that added to its reputation. Departments at the university did not have decision-making powers and departmental autonomy was very low; they were simply operational units that performed the tasks assigned by higher levels.

2. The QAA lacked the resources, specialist skills and experience that would have enabled it to undertake its role efficiently. And, it has to be said, such a role was beyond the experience of any educational organization in Libya.

3. The government faced corruption in trying to achieve its aims through the QAA, although no evidence was available to substantiate this observation. But it became clear during the field work that the social relationships and the shared interests between people working in the institution found the role of the QAA and its objectives a serious obstacle. For example, the important offices at the university were held by people from the same family and all letters and reports had to be shown to the owner before being sent to QAA or anywhere else for that matter. So, it was almost impossible for the QAA to know the truth. Even those who were not related to the founder did not submit information to the QAA or to the Administration of Private Higher Education (APHE) because they were well paid by the university. As an example I would like to refer to an interview with the owner of the university in December 2011 when I did my field work at the university. During the interview in her office her son came in and gave her some papers and said: “These letters should not be sent to the QAA...be careful ....if they were sent we would be in trouble and it might cause the university considerable
harm...why did you do that...?” She replied: “Oh...thank you my son so much....well done ....”. I was very curious to know the content of the letters. She took the letters and threw them in the bin under her table. Later I retrieved them and found that these letters included some important information criticizing the university. It was very difficult for the government to control private universities, at least the ones I had visited in 2010 and 2012. The staff members of Al-Refak University included five people from the same family. the owner (the family) of the university preferred to appoint people who have relationships (e.g. cousin, in-laws and friends) with the family.

It is worth noting that even the APHE was not able to control the private higher education for the same reasons. The APHE has several offices and employers where files, statistics and documents are archived. In fact, its role was administrative and consisted of storing the files of private universities, collecting the students’ results from the universities and in making simple decisions limited to straightforward matters such as organizing the work in the offices and meeting students and parents who might visit the administrative section to discuss a problem. The expected role of APHE in controlling private universities had not been fulfilled and had become absolutely absent since the Revolution of the 17th February, 201156.

A more detailed examination of the relationship between the QAA and Al-Refak University is of use. As mentioned before, the establishment of the QAA in 2006 came seven years after the birth of the Al-Refak University. Before that the institution, during

56 The epilogue at the end of thesis has covered the February Revolution issues.
the period from 1999 to 2006, had been controlled by the Education Office in Tripoli\textsuperscript{57} where the university is located. The first connection between the university and the QAA was through Resolution No. 28, 2007, issued by the GPCHE (Ministry of Higher Education). The resolution had included three articles. In the first article the university had been afforded two important accreditations: first and foremost was the institutional accreditation which was considered a great achievement for the institution and constituted the first accreditation in the capital city of Tripoli, and secondly, the university had been given accreditation only for its Department of Business Management, although the university taught other subjects, such as Accountancy, Computing Sciences and Law. In the second article the resolution had put the university under the technical supervision of the GPCHE. In the third article the resolution had required the QAA to monitor the university to make sure that it had met the academic conditions and the required standards. However, it was not easy for the QAA to accept this responsibility for two reasons. Firstly, since the QAA had been established only recently it did not have enough experience to run an organization in order to control private higher education. Secondly, the organization lacked the skills and specialists to deal effectively with the accreditation of private higher education institutions. Although it included professors from different subject areas and study fields, most of them, if not all, were involved in the job for first time. An interview with Dr. Adb-Almaged Hussen\textsuperscript{58} who was in charge of the department dealing with the quality of education, including the private sector stated that:

“I have only been doing this job at the QAA for a short time....I have not done this work before and my experience in this regard is limited.... we have been to several conferences

\textsuperscript{57} From the administrative aspect, the country was divided into 20 areas with each area responsible for its own private higher education administration. This division, though, had caused many problems as has already been noted. This accounted for the establishment of the QAA by the GPCHE.

\textsuperscript{58} He has a PhD in Software Engineering and had graduated two years previously.
and workshops locally and outside Libya related to this issue.... however, we still need more knowledge and experience to be able to achieve the QAA aims .....” (Interview with Dr. Adb-Almaged Hussen, Director at Assurance Administration. October, 2010).

Even the director of QAA himself had been in his position for less than a year. He was appointed by the General People’s Committee (GPC) according to Resolution No. 84, 2010.

The third point hampering the QAA control is that the establishment of Al-Refak University had taken place seven years before the emergence of QAA. The former had been founded in 1999 while the latter was not established until 2006. It meant that the QAA found it hard to evaluate and assess the previous effectiveness of the university in terms of its departments and graduates. The university had run six departments since 1999. When the QAA was founded in 2006 only one department achieved accreditation and this made the university dissatisfied and unhappy and gave rise to a form of instability. The relationship became affected because the university, as with other private universities, did not follow QAA instructions and its recommendations as had been hoped. This is noticeable from the official letters and other communications between the university and the QAA that display some conflict. The QAA had required the university to close any department that had not been accredited, but the university continued to operate all departments whether or not they had been accredited. It was seen by the university’s owner that these departments provided essential sources of income and decisions were taken to ignore the QAA rules because the QAA was administratively and politically weak and lacked political support from Gaddafi. Another factor was the establishment of a large number of unaccredited private universities which helped Al-Refak University to continue
to run all its departments ignoring the QAA’s regulations. In addition the university had significant relationships with some important state institutions, such as advertisement centres, that helped the founder to develop the institution rapidly.

In 2008 the QAA through the instructions of the Department of Administrative and Financial Matters had required the university to have its academic departments accredited. The accreditation procedure cost the university 27,000 L.D which was paid by cheque to the QAA. This amount was divided between the institutional accreditation and nine departments as is shown in the Table 43 below.

Table (43). The distribution of the accreditation costs in Al-Refak University, 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>The amount. (L.D)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The institutional accreditation procedure</td>
<td>11,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The accreditation for the Department of Business Management.</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The accreditation for Department of Architecture.</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The accreditation for the Department of Petrol Engineering.</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The accreditation for the Department of Engineering.</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The accreditation for the Department of Computing.</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The accreditation for the Department of Civil Engineering.</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The accreditation for the Department of Law.</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The accreditation for the Department English Language.</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In July 2009 the Secretary of the Administrative Committee for the QAA issued Resolution No. 33, 2009, to give the university accreditation for four departments: Accounting, Computing Science, Architecture and Law. With the Department of Business Management, this gave the university a total of five accredited departments. The university by achieving this goal had become the first and only private institution with such a status in Tripoli and only the third university in Libya after Afriqya University and the Union Afriqya University as table 44 below illustrates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The private university and its location</th>
<th>The departments</th>
<th>The date of accreditation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afriqya University/ Benghazi.</td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>4th of Dec., 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>English Language</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Afriqya University/ Al-Zawia.</td>
<td>English Language</td>
<td>4th of Dec., 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (44). The date of accredited departments in private universities in Libya.

In addition to the above five departments Al-Refak University has three other departments, although they have not been accredited by QAA. They are Civil Engineering, Electronic Engineering and Petrol Engineering.

Source: QAA document consulted during the field study. (N.D).
The university, in the newspapers both *Al-Daleel* and *Al-Ealan*, has advertised these departments as being accredited by the QAA in order to attract students to study at the university. However, the QAA, through the Director of the Administration of Private Higher Education has cautioned the university to stop the registration of students in these departments. In a letter issued by the director in April 2010, it states that:

“...... to draw your attention to the advertisements which were publicized in the Declaration Newspaper on open admissions and registration for departments...that these are not accredited is a clear violation of all rules and regulations and instructions that were issued by QAA........ these are English Language, Civil Engineering, Electronic Engineering and Petroleum Engineering ......... It's very important that the recruitment and involvement of students in these unaccredited departments has to cease because this will undoubtedly cause serious problems of accountability and incur the anger of the public, especially of the parents of the enrolled students......Therefore we hold you fully responsible for the need to address the students admitted to these departments quickly and to pledge in writing not to repeat such violations .......” (Al-Refak University, Official letter, University archives, April, 2010)\(^59\).

Despite this strong stricture, the university continued to enrol new students in the departments. Visits to the university during the field study revealed that it was difficult for the QAA to force not only Al-Refak University, but the other universities to follow the QAA’s rules and instructions. The weaknesses of the QAA already discussed were undoubtedly factor here. Even so, it became clear through visits to other private

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\(^{59}\) It an official letter was sent by the director of APHE to warn Al-Refak University for opening unaccredited departments. The letter asked the university to close these departments as soon as possible.
universities and from several interviews with the director of Al-Refak University, that the most important factor was that the private sector had gained strong political support from the Libyan regime, and in particular from Gaddafi himself, to play its role in the higher education sector. This, in fact, was enough to make Al-Refak University, as well as some other private universities, more powerful, especially in the case where there were a number of students who were members of Gaddafi’s family and who were politically very valuable for the university. These students were enrolled in the university and in these unaccredited departments as a way of protecting the university from any decisions made against it. The university had about five students who were related to Gaddafi and there would have been serious consequences for the university had the administrators of QAA closed down a department which included any those students. The QAA had to find a diplomatic way to satisfy them but which at the same time would not break the QAA’s rules.

Many senior people with high positions in Libyan society were not happy with this situation and Dr. Suleiman Al-Khoja was one of them. He had been the director of the office of private higher education since the beginning of the 21st century and decided to resign from the post in 2004. Another example was the Inspector General for the education sector in Libya, Dr. Al-Gelaly, and he, too, decided to give up his responsibilities. This gave a clear message that the task given to the QAA to control private higher education, including that of Al-Refak University is a complicated and difficult one.

An important aspect of this situation was the attitude of government institutions towards graduates from the unaccredited departments of Al-Refak University. According to QAA requirements the government work agencies and state institutions were not allowed to employ graduates who hold degrees from unaccredited departments. However, an
important official document from the National Oil Corporation NOC provides data show that there were a number of students who had graduated from the Department of Petroleum Engineering at Al-Refak University and had already obtained employment at the NOC. The director of NOC, Dr. Shokri Ghanem, issued Resolution No. 37, in August, 2010, allowing seventeen graduates to take up employment, all of whom held degrees in Drilling Engineering awarded by the Department of Petroleum Engineering, which had not been accredited by the QAA, at Al-Refak University. These engineers were distributed amongst the eight petroleum companies as shown in Table 45 below.

Table 45. The distribution of the Al-Refak University graduates between petroleum institutions in Libya. (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The name of the institution</th>
<th>The number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Arabian Gulf Oil Company</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Waha for Oil</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Zweteena</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melita for Gas and Oil</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occidental Libya of Oil</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jof for Petroleum Operations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya Mobile Exxon Limited</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Company for Digging and Maintaining the Petroleum Well</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These examples clearly show the absence of co-operation and co-ordination between the corporation, the QAA, the private universities and the other institutions in the government

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60 The National Oil Corporation NOC is the main institution responsible for all the petroleum companies in Libya.

61 Dr. Shokri Ghanem is the general director of the NOC. Before that he was the Secretary of the General People’s Committee (GPC, Prime Minister) in Libya during the early years of the 21st century.
sector. This did not help the government’s policy for private higher education in general and made the role of the QAA inefficient and ineffective. This has led Al-Refak University to ignore to some extent the QAA instructions and requirements.

7.11 Graduates from Al-Refak University and the world of work:

In 2009 and 2010 the number of graduates from the university reached a total of 895 from its nine fields of study, the largest number of whom graduated from the Department of Business Studies.

A major performance indicator of any private university was the marketability of its graduates, i.e. how far are those graduates being absorbed productively in the job market or in the ranks of the self-employed. Libyan state agencies and government institutions do not publish any comprehensive or regular data on the deployment of graduates from the private universities. From Al-Refak University the following pattern emerged:

1. In recent years (2008-2009), about 20 per cent of the graduates were appointed to salaried jobs. Another 15 per cent were involved in self-employed activities (Interview with Mr. Sheleeg, M, Administrative staff, Al-Refak University, 2010). Those graduates tried very hard to get jobs in both public and private sector and, of course, the social relationships played an important role to help job seekers. There was no further information whether or not they show good or poor relative employment prospects for Al-Refak University graduates. However, according to my field work in 2010 I revealed that the graduates have to do mostly an interview exam in state institution before they were employed. As it has been mentioned that there is a consensus that in the Libyan society that private universities are in very poor quality and they do not have academic standards.
2. The majority of its graduates who entered the job market found employment in the private sector, that is, the private firms that had merged with public sectors, financing institutions and other service sectors (e.g. educational institutions, software, multinational/multilateral agencies).

3. According to data obtained in the field study a number of graduates from the university had found work in some of the state institutions.

7.12 Lessons learned from the restructuring process:

The lessons learned from Al-Refak University are as follows:

First lessons learned come from courses offered and trends in enrolment: there were more academic departments than the capacity of the university to properly provide for them. So it is very important to reduce the number of these departments and keep running only the ones that were accredited by QAA. This policy would help the university reduce the cost and improve the quality of education in the university. Also, the university did not include in its staff members proper experts that would be able to give advices helping the owner to invest in fields that responded effectively to the market demands of skilled manpower. Al-Refak had failed to grasp the opportunity of properly assessing the needs of the employment market and economy with a view to providing high-class education to meet the needs of the government in vocational and technical subjects. There was no real attempt to relate the teaching to the employment requirements of students who were hoping to use higher education as a means of securing advancement.

The second lesson learned was the unsatisfactory the quality of education provided by Al-Refak University. The university management and its academic departments needed to have employed efficient administrative skills and qualified teachers. The management and
the departments needed to have worked together to coordinate policy on the university success. Heads of departments’ rights should have reflected their responsibilities and duties and they should have been able to recruit staff, evaluate students, and manage their own budgets within their units. Meetings should have been held with staff at various stages of development to set up several task forces and to study the management of academic matters, university personnel and financial matters that involved large groups of staff. Participation in working groups can make staff thoroughly understand the concept of university autonomy. The staff should be informed of subsidiary regulations and guidelines on academic matters and personnel management together with access to the draft of the University Act. Al-Refak during the period of this study notably failed to establish such sustainable participation that would have strengthened the workings and academic quality of the university.

The third lesson that should be learned by the government from this case study concerns the issue of autonomy given to private universities including Al-Refak University. Private universities in Libya did not follow the rules and instructions issued by the QAA and APHE. They often attempted to operate unaccredited courses and departments. In addition, they engaged in illegal activities and all this happened in the absence of government control. The government should have provided more regular intervention through its regulatory bodies. It is interesting to note that even when people criticize public intervention, no one prefers a situation with a total absence of state intervention and support.

The fourth lesson is related to academic faculties in Al-Refak University in comparison with other private universities. The current system needs to learn from the case study in
that compared with standards in other universities in the region, there is still a great diversity within teaching staffs of Libyan higher education institutions in terms of quality, quantity, and qualifications. In Al-Refak University most of the teaching staff had master’s degrees or only first degrees.

The fifth lesson was from the study programmes offered by the university. There is a risk that allowed people to open universities and who do not meet the academic conditions and requirements. Universities could be used by people especially from a rich family to make money in the expense of academic proposes. As it was noted from the field studies and a number of visits to some private universities, the owners were dominant and they had the power to make any decision whenever they liked. This would lead to centralized institutions affecting the quality of education weakening the whole system.

7.13 Conclusion:

Since its establishment Al-Refak university had, over a period of time, outlined several aims and objectives. But it has not been easy for the university to meet these goals and this field study has defined some of the problems encountered by the university that has prevented it from achieving complete success.

The study case exposes several issues and problems related to the privatization of higher education in Libya during the Gaddafi period, and indeed, beyond. Although the private sector is a fast-expanding segment of higher education, it represents only a fragment of the higher education sector. Even though Al-Refak University is the best private university in Libya in terms of the number of students, the number of departments and its good facilities, it is still an inferior university compared with state funded institutions. The
faculty members in Al-Fatah University, for instance, are more highly qualified than those in Al-Refak University. In the former most of them hold PhD degrees while in the latter, as in the other private universities, the majority have MSc qualifications only. This, to some extent has affected the quality of the education provided for its students even though, as has been pointed out, the teaching departments in Al-Refak University provide similar courses to those offered by the public universities. But these departments concentrate on the arts and humanities and do not follow the strategies advocated on the government’s agenda to reduce the rate of unemployment in the Libyan economy.

Al-Refak University illustrated the downward pressures on quality associated with the cost of providing high quality education. From the experience gained in private educational institutions around the world, operational efficiency for the for-profit private university is the crucial issue and, of course, Al-Refak University is no exception. This university ensured its operational efficiency primarily by increasing the gap between the fees collected and the operational cost of the institution. Staffing costs being the major item of expenditure, it tried to minimize its spending on this major component and this was done by relying heavily on part-time teachers and by employing faculty members who hold only MSc degrees. This was at the expense of the quality of education given.

It is worth noting that some of the problems encountered during the Gaddafi phase were due to the paradoxical situation in Libya in which the government had the power and the instruments to regulate the system, but frequently abstained from using them. Indeed, Libyan society at this period can be considered rather soft, gentle and permissive and any conflicts seldom lead to violent action until the 2011 revolution and harsh measures were very rarely enforced and a lot of sympathy was frequently directed towards the weak and
the fallen. Although it is also true that there were many laws of a strong regulatory character at the time, they were not always taken very seriously. There was a major problem of implementation stemming from a combination of institutional and organisational weakness and the extreme authoritarianism of the Gaddafi regime, where the relatives and friends of those in high places enjoyed a privileged position.

As noted earlier, the quality of the teaching courses offered at Al-Refak University was inferior to that offered at Al-Fatah University. Students successfully graduated but this can easily be explained by recognising that the university’s prime concern was to attract as many students as possible and a demonstrable high success rate would certainly help to achieve this objective. This meant that students having paid their tuition fees would be guaranteed to graduate simply by attending lectures at the university. This accounts for the fact that many students simply attended courses in the knowledge that they would be awarded a degree at the end of a specified period of study, rather than to develop their academic and intellectual abilities. Students at this university may be divided into three categories:

1. Those who had failed to complete their studies at public universities. Interviews with some students revealed that they had studied at Al-Fateh University. Khowther Ali, For example, said “I was in Al-Fatah University. I failed in my study. The study conditions are difficult, I came to Afriqya University to complete my study.....”. (interview with Khowther Ali, a student at Faculty of Engineering, Al-Fatah University. November, 2010)

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62 As I had been a lecturer at some of the private universities (e.g. Trables and Afriqya) I was able to get some important evidences to support the claim is mentioned above. I know a number of private university students (some of them are my relatives) who had not been to the class but they obtained degrees from the university.
2. those who came from high class families and did not really need to study to improve themselves but sought to obtain degrees to satisfy a social need,

3. Those who were already employees in state institutions but had enrolled to obtain higher education qualifications and thus increase their earning powers.

Finally, it is necessary to examine the role of the QAA in the functioning of Al-Refak University. The setting up of the QAA had been a real challenge to the institution because it knew that it was bound to comply with its requirements, rules and regulations but at the same time it was practising a contradictory policy with a disregard for the principles laid down by the QAA.: the university had allowed holders of BSc degrees to teach on its courses in spite of the QAA’s directive that all members of the teaching staff were required to hold higher degrees. It seems that the task given to the QAA of controlling private universities is an impossible one to fulfil because it does not have enough professional experience and therefore lacks the essential skills and the specialists to discharge its responsibilities effectively. Nor in the past has it enjoyed sufficient political support to enable it to make headway. The implementation of the policy to privatise higher education in Libya had several imperfections. Gaddafi’s government had not built a proper or practicable infrastructure and had not provided adequate facilities for founders of standard private universities to build and establish their institutions. From my experience as a lecturer at the first private higher education institution established in 2000 and from the two field studies I undertook, one pre-revolution and the other post-revolution, it is my considered opinion that the procedural steps for what was an absolutely essential private higher education policy were not put in any useful sequence for its effective implementation. The lesson is that both resources and political will are needed to ensure proper regulation by the government of the day.
Chapter eight: summary, conclusions and recommendations.

8.1 Introduction:

The growth of private higher education worldwide has been one of the most remarkable developments of the past several decades. This thesis contributes to an explanation and a discussion on its growth and its characteristics. The anatomy of private higher education displays a great variety in terms of its size and functions. While it has existed in many countries - and has traditionally been the dominant force in some countries, such as Japan, Colombia, and the Philippines - it has formed only a small proportion of higher education in most countries. It is interesting to note that policies to privatize higher education have come into existence in socialist and communist countries as a result of the failure of socialism and communism. This appears to be the case for Libya where private higher education emergence would have to break what was generally public monopoly. In Libya, the subject of this thesis, before 1999 the financing of higher education was completely dependent on public sector. However, the population growth, increasing secondary school graduates and graduate unemployment were pressures that forced Gaddafi’s government to allow the private sector to establish private universities. These pressures were accompanied by recognition in the political leadership of the poor performance of the existing large public universities. Private expansion began at the end of the 1990s, when new regulations allowed private higher education institutions to enter the market and this represented a sudden shift in policy. In 2010, the private higher education sector enrolment figures accounted for about 15 percent of total enrolment, with more than 50 private higher education institutions having been established. Such a rapid growth in Libya raised questions about the role and functions of the private providers and about government policies on the private higher education sector. Questions also arose about the behaviour of private higher education institutions in terms of the types of programmes they offered, the
level of tuition fees levied, their admission policies, the actual quality of the programmes on offer and their importance to the economy and culture of the nation.

Private higher education is an important topic within higher education policy. It has been widely studied and much research exists on the subject generally, especially after the 1980s (Levy, D, 1980, Geiger, R, 1986, and Altbach, P, 1999). However, very little research has taken place and there are no recent related studies that explore the situation in Libya. This study, then, has sought to contribute to the existing literature by tracing the development of the study of that country’s financing policy for higher education and the phenomenon of the privatization of higher education and the attempts to reform it. This chapter reflects on the usefulness of an examination charting the developments of the private and public sectors in the Libyan higher education system from 1969 to 2011. The thesis demonstrates how important the particular circumstances of any given country are in helping us to understand the development of private education. The example of Libya shows how unique political, economic and social circumstances have interacted to produce a significant private higher educational sector in a country that had previously provided as a matter of principle only state-run tertiary education.

8.2 Summary of research findings:

The study has showed that the financing policy for higher education has been shaped as a result of several pressures and Gaddafi in many times in his public speeches was very disappointed that his regime policy over three decades did not produce success in this sphere. The political situation had become very sensitive since the 1990s and the adoption of the private higher education policy was considered to be one of the possible

63 Libya had not seen any improvement at any level, in education, health care, and in other social services for four decades, so people were dissatisfied.
solutions in reducing pressure on the Gaddafi government and avoiding any risk of turmoil and political instability. The financing policy for higher education in Libya was reformed after 1999 and the private sector became a significant player in the higher education arena. One remarkable development, not widely recognized outside specialized academic circles, is the rapid emergence of institutions of higher education in the private sector in a country like Libya that had been wedded to a culture of ‘socialism’ for decades. During the Gaddafi regime, it was clear that his government was initially not interested in the idea of the private sector playing a role in the Libyan economy. However, his regime found it impossible to ban privatization so the higher education policy was reformed to allow the establishment of private institutions. After Private Education Law No. 6 (the Al-Taleem Al-Tasharoki Law), issued in 1999, a rapid expansion of private higher education began and the institutions steadily became more autonomous with the right to create fields of study, to set their own admission procedures, to determine the number of student places, to decide on curricula and study plans, obtain funds from outside the state budget and to appoint new faculty members and elect their rectors. And, significantly, private higher education institutions were permitted to charge tuition fees to students. This shift of responsibilities represented an increased autonomy of higher education providers and reflected the main characteristics of a new market-oriented legislation concerning higher education in Libya by the end of 1990s.

But according to the experience I have gained since the beginning of my research and during my field study, caution is required in making an evaluation of its development as to whether it has been positive or negative, an assessment made all the more difficult on account of the turmoil following the fall of the Gaddafi regime. The question is: are private universities the solution to the higher education crisis in Libya? It is difficult to give a
specific answer, but some facts may help to provide an insight and clarify the situation. It is necessary, therefore, to point out that private higher education institutions were founded in a damaged political environment where corruption was rife. A decision to establish a private higher education sector was made by the Gaddafi government on an *ad hoc* basis. The policy since 1999 (the year of the establishment of private higher education), revealed a lack of the mechanisms needed to implement its objectives. Clearly there was a gap between the implementing of the policy to privatize and the defined operational principles and regulatory mechanisms required to open and operate private higher education institutions.

By the early part of the twenty first century, the number of private universities had reached 50 with about 40,000 students. For the first few years under the 1999 Higher Education Act, due to the limited number of adequately qualified teaching academics available, private institutions offered mostly bachelor’s degree courses and did not have the right or the staffing facilities to offer courses at postgraduate level. Being deprived of any substantial state support, they developed mainly high demand, ‘low-cost’ study programmes (as was the case in most of the Central and Eastern European regions and in a number of other countries), and appealed to as many potential students as possible, especially part-time students. The expansion of private higher education brought with it, of course, a need for an increase in teaching staff and academics were recruited from public institutions, although a resolution had been issued to prevent public staff members from taking employment in the private sector. For many of these, their work in a private higher education institution was a second job but the effect it had was to improve the student/staff ratio in the private sector. Despite this, though, the actual quality of the education provided showed few signs of improvement. It was found, too, that the demanding workload of a
large staff resulted in a decline in research activity for most academics in the private establishments.

The implementation of the policy reflects three different views. From the government’s point of view it was important to follow this policy even at the expense of Gaddafi’s beliefs, because this was a means, as seen by Gaddafi’s regime, to help reduce pressure on the government. The founders of private universities for their part were delighted with the opportunity to invest in private universities and to generate a great deal of money over a short period of time. And for the students and their parents the private universities guaranteed the awarding of a degree and offered a secure future.

The empirical study confirmed that the implementation process had so far followed the market-oriented approach creating profit-making institutions. They act as for-profit organizations and they are non-vocationally and commercially oriented colleges. What it was observed from field study that private universities try to succeed primarily in the marketplace rather than trying to enhance the wider public good. These institutions face a problem that if they seek to supply services that contain public goods, such as basic research, or high-cost study programmes in low demand areas that are socially important in the absence of state or any provider of financial assistance, they will not be able to cover the cost of these services. Otherwise, if they provided such services they would decrease their profits. Therefore the subjects they offer are oriented towards low-cost study programmes in high-demand disciplines.

The quality assurance and other regulatory bodies had (and still have) a lack of experience in terms of knowledge of the theories of education, ideas and information on private higher
education as presented by world specialists and educational philosophers. Such a weak background provided fertile ground for the mushrooming of fallible and questionable private universities. The prompt massification of higher education and the emergence of 50 private universities confronting 12 public universities naturally gave rise to concerns about the quality of Libya’s higher education system, leading to a considerable criticism of private higher education. Has the system created healthy competition or was it bedevilled by many ethical and quality problems? Some observers of the process (e.g. Al-Teer64, M. 2005) emphasized that most of the private universities were not established according to proper educational and managerial concepts, but emerged mostly for financial reasons. Al-Teer argued that most of the academic faculty in the private sector is employed part-time, and does not have formal employee status but teaches on commission, and that the great majority was simultaneously employed permanently in public higher education as the first job. Moreover, they do not recognize the diversification of study offered in the private sector, both in terms of disciplines and types of study programmes. To simplify their arguments, all private institutions were single discipline, profit oriented, with courses leading only to the bachelor degree in the most popular study departments, such as management, finance, Law and accountancy, etc.

A feature of the Libyan experience was that the private universities were established before any regulatory bodies (e.g. QAA and PHEA) were established. This was, of course, a crucial factor and a big mistake because no thought initially seemed to have been given to the issue of auditing or controlling the new private universities before they were sanctioned. In retrospect this seems extraordinary and was surely a great error.

64 Ali Al-Teer is a professor in business management. He is a lecturer at Al-Fatah University.
The field study has revealed that the QAA was not founded with reference to the establishment of private higher education. Indeed an assessment by the QAA on private universities exposes many critical points against these institutions and their processes but the body was unable to force private universities to conform to the regulations set out or to follow rules, instructions and obligations. This is another key finding, that the policy for private higher education has limited scope in its legal framework and in the QAA’s administrative and procedural strength. For example, the director of the PHEA stated that letters of criticism had been sent to a number of private universities that were breaking the rules. These formal letters of authority, he said, were being totally disregarded as if such a legal body as the QAA did not exist. (Interview with Dr. Abdullatif M. Latife, the Director of PHEA, November 2010).

All these difficulties were made worse by the self-imposed isolation of the Gaddafi regime. Here a serious aspect was the lack of access to the English Language and the very poor English linguistic skills amongst not only staff members and students of private universities but also most Libyans. This was a direct result of the policy adopted during Gaddafi regime that had abolished the teaching of foreign languages, including English, since the 1980s when the secretary of the General People’s Committee for Education, Ahmed Ibrahim, Minister of Education, was in charge of the education sector. For Libya this has been a complete disaster and has set back Libya by at least a generation in terms of educational quality. It is one of the consequences of that misguided decision that many

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65 Ahmed Ibrahim was arrested after the revolution and has been charged by the court in Misrata. The judge has issued the death penalty for his crimes including his decision about the English Language. (National Libya channel, 2013).

66 It is difficult to be know how quickly the system can take to recover; however, the government had started to implement policies and programmes helping to improve the quality of education and reduce the negative consequences of Ahmed Ibrahim policy. In the late 20th century when Gaddafi’s son Saif Al-Esalam was a significant player in Libyan political system the country became open to outside influences. Many centres had been opened to teach English language since 1990s.
Libyans have been unable to use modern technological facilities such as computers and access to the Internet, especially with the English Language having been accepted as the main international language. The result has been that many Libyans had very limited knowledge of the outside world and the country found itself isolated from the world and from international communities. Moreover, the private universities themselves did very little to redress this situation: they did not provide rich and vibrating intellectual surroundings nor did they provide adequate academic infrastructures.

Private higher education institutions were allowed to enter the education market, and they were asked to meet some state requirements set by the Libyan government through the QAA, addressing issues such as academic standards, curricula design and their implementation and the necessary infrastructures to support and operate an educational institution.

In terms of institutional arrangements, it may be argued that, despite Libya having a huge number of private higher education institutions, it can claim only four as being accredited and the country is still far removed from creating a truly competitive higher education system. Although recognized private higher education institutions were eligible for state subsidies, they did not, in fact, receive any support. Students in these institutions were excluded from state scholarships, and the laws and regulations affecting the transparency of the system made in order to ensure high quality provision and the dissemination of information, were largely absent. Towards the end of the 1990s, the priority of policymakers was to allow the private universities more autonomy and to increase the number of higher education institutions to meet the rapidly growing demand without committing the state to their funding.
Most of the private universities were established in the large cities particularly in Tripoli and Benghazi. In general, the regional distribution of private higher education institutions across Libya was in accordance with the distribution of economic prosperity and these institutions were established in areas with large, concentrated populations and not in the rural areas. These were the ‘demand absorbing’ institutions and offered low-cost study courses in popular subjects, especially economics and management. Most were non-selective and imposed no entry requirements.

An analysis of the interviews conducted with graduates in the case study university reveal that those graduates failed to obtain employment because their qualifications, which were predominantly in law, science and business management were not in great demand in the market. Those who did get job opportunities in state institutions such as banks, state companies, hospitals and other social services were successful not because of their degrees and qualifications but because they had good relationships with employers. In fact, students who enroll and graduate from this university are not of the highest quality and the consensus is that the best students mainly enroll in the public universities. My impression is that the state institutions, the public companies and the banks are dismissive of graduates from the private sector because of the low standards of training, the poorly designed courses and low student motivation, all of which do not compare favorably with that of the public universities. The parents and potential students are not fully clear in their minds about the relative strengths and the efficiency of private universities when compared with

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67 My evidence to this is that, I have relationships with some of those people (e.g. Ala Al-Alrbi, Ahmed Al-Tomy who are my cousin’s sons and Akrem Amar who is my friend’s brother). They all got jobs because they know the employer. In addition to that I would say that this is well known in Libyan society that most private university graduates who get jobs in state institutions had relationships with the employers.
public universities and this is due to the lack of transparency and the money-making motivation of private university managers and organizers.

Slowly the attention of the policymakers shifted towards creating a more open and therefore accessible system and to issues of quality. The QAA had been established in 2006 with the purpose of evaluating the quality of education in all higher education institutions and it was charged with the responsibility for disseminating information about the outcomes of the evaluations to students and academics so that students could make better-informed choices about which public or private university to attend.

It became obvious during the field study that for the Libyan government to intervene in the private higher education to restrict its process would be problematical. There were several factors that made the control of private higher education extremely difficult or even impossible:

1. the spread of corruption in the state institutions;

2. the lack of expertise and experience in administrative staff;

3. The government had shown its desire to organize the private higher education sector by establishing the QAA and by introducing resolutions but there seemed to be little sustained enthusiasm on the part of political leaders to restrict private higher education. The influence of a number of students from powerful political families study at private universities and they benefit from a system that does not exercise control and refuses to be accountable situation. Even after the toppling of Gaddafi’s regime, it became more difficult for the QAA and for the other regulatory bodies, to assert control over these universities and force them to abide by the academic and scientific regulations as laid down.
As in some countries, in Libya the state treats private higher education differently from public higher education. The problem faced by the private universities was that the absence of a marketing policy which would have made state subsidies available to recognized and accredited private higher education institutions. The policy did not explicitly advocate the development of a private sector and did not establish an equal treatment bases for both sectors, because accredited and recognized private universities are deprived of state subsidies for their basic operations. They are not allowed to compete for many sources of state funding, so a true market for higher education still does not exist. This gave public institutions a clear advantage in terms of tuition-free, full-time study courses whereas private institutions had to charge their students full fees and the table (46) below outlines aspects of the problems that still confront them.

Table (46). Areas of concern in private universities in Libya.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access</strong></td>
<td>Access is limited in private universities compared with that of public ones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equity</strong></td>
<td>Higher education participation in private universities is low. High tuition fees might prevent poor people from studying at private universities. However, equity in the Libyan society is not a big issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quality</strong></td>
<td>Private institutions in general are of low quality and this is because the quality assurance and accreditation system has found it difficult to assert itself and its impact has been limited.</td>
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</table>
Overall enrolment and its expansion in private institutions, mainly in the liberal arts and humanities had produced graduates with unemployable skills; there are weak links between higher education and industry and a lack of information on graduate employment.

There is no public funding or financial support for private universities. Their income comes largely from tuition fees.

Overall weak administrative structure with a lack of accountability in higher education institutions. Inefficient internal management with poor quality administrative staff and ineffectual external accountability.

Poor ICT infrastructure with very limited access to global text books and knowledge resources.

Given the fact that the Libyan higher education sector is going to face some important future challenges, there is a need to rethink the policy stance to – in particular – the private higher education sector. If this private sector is to keep playing its important role in the system, the government will have to adjust its current policy stance to the sector. Only in this way can the Libyan higher education miracle really come true.

We will end our reflections on the outcomes of this study by giving a few recommendations for policy improvement:
A. Better Regulation:

If the Libyan government is determined to continue with the policy of having private universities, it must introduce as a matter of urgency, strong measures and regulations to close down those universities that do not conform to the required standards and allow only those which can demonstrate that they are able to function efficiently to remain open. And there must be stringent and transparent procedures adopted that reinforce such decisions and that ensure that they are implemented effectively. The use of the public media to broadcast and disseminate information is one way of publicizing the institutions that meet the required criteria and, of course, to identify those that do not. The fact remains, though, that, in spite of the government founding it, the QAA clearly has lacked the authority and expertise to control private universities. More effort has to be made by the QAA and by the government if worthwhile improvements are to be realized:

1. Employ people who have specific and specialized skills.
2. Give more practicable power to the QAA that would make it able to coerce the universities to follow its obligations, rules and instructions.

B. Ensure international influences and standards are brought to bear

The QAA should be required to expand its engagement internationally and to create relationships with other centres outside Libya in order to benefit from their experiences. The chance of getting Libya back to the international community to expand its communication and engagement with the rest of the world, to examine the experiences of other governments, to create liaisons with internationally well known and reputable universities would enable Libyan educationalists and administrators to gain an insight into the philosophies and the logistics of successful private institutions elsewhere.
Moreover, another important aspect should be considered: colleges and universities are becoming global players in a globalized world, the movement of an educated and skilled labour force is becoming increasingly common, and internationally certified and valid qualifications are a great advantage for individuals who wish to find employment abroad. There is no private university in Libya that has been founded by international organizations nor are there any branches of foreign educational establishments, which mean that Libyan private universities are lagging far behind the academic standards displayed by the many successful private universities in the world. This state of affairs has to be addressed by the new government if such a disadvantage is to be rectified. It is of great importance that the country’s private universities are open to global trends in private higher education and that they establish a wide network of international academic partners, invite experts from abroad in all disciplines as visiting lecturers at Libyan universities, cooperate in research projects and conferences with foreign university faculties and above all very carefully analyse the reasons behind the success of private higher education in other countries.

C. Encouragement of Proper Competition:

It has been argued by Vossensteyn that “Providing higher education institutions with greater autonomy give them an incentive to make choices and compete for students………private institutions create more competition and increase differentiation ……” (Vossensteyn, H, 2004, p43) Private universities do not actually constitute competition and there is no real threat between private universities themselves or with state higher education institutions. This is a good reason for rethinking and changing the general approach to the system and a number of steps should be taken to adapt to the new market conditions. There is weak competition between higher education institutions, so policy makers and education planners should be made aware of the severe competition from the
new tertiary education providers, such as virtual universities, corporate universities and franchise universities. In the light of these innovations and advances in education, a reform of higher education in Libya would encourage both public and private higher education institutions to strive for higher overall standards. Alongside that as the coordination is absent, it is absolutely essential to build effective links and to coordinate the strategies between private higher education and the regulatory bodies.

D. Intersectoral Approaches

Gaddafi’s political system had not built a sound infrastructure in adult training and the policy makers had not make decisions to deal with this weakness. The system of higher education in Libya should be adapted to the new social and economic realities of an emergent democracy and an intersectional approach seems to be the most effective one if social disorder is to be avoided. Interaction and cooperation between higher education institutions and the labour market should be re-established and this would be more easily accomplished if a demonstrable, higher quality of education were to be aspired to in both state and private higher education institutions. The generally low quality of private higher education institutions has resulted in a negative perception of their worth and even the best private universities that I visited in the capital city, Tripoli, were not enough to change this general picture. Subsequent to my experience of studying the private higher education debate and in particular the argument that the private sector needs to be encouraged but with a strong regulatory mechanism, I find the notion untenable, particularly in Libya with its weak government working in unstable circumstances. Countries with strong governments, like China, Thailand and South Africa would be more able to instigate such fundamental improvements.
A reform of higher education in Libya has to follow the general pattern of development accepted worldwide: there is no doubt that it is difficult to decrease public funding and to increase private finance but it is possible and important to consider this trend. Despite the disadvantages and weaknesses of private higher education in Libya already identified, a policy that encourages the privatization of the sector in the general higher education system has to take place as long as it participates in and conforms to, the standardized academic requirements and fulfils a scientific assessment of its efficiency. In order to create an environment of genuine competition state and private higher education institutions should be brought to the same starting position, regardless of ownership. It has to be borne in mind that present day attitudes and previous education resolutions and laws discriminate against private higher education institutions and hinder their development. In the context of Libya, if the government has a desire to go ahead in this direction it should work with private universities together. The state should try to put in place a ‘healthy degree of competition’ between private and public providers, allowing them to co-exist, interact and compete. With help of the Libyan government it may be possible for private universities to introduce targeted subsidization schemes for low-income qualified students through loan subsidy, grants and various kinds of scholarships. Also, it may be possible for the government to encourage donation/gifts, grants, direct financial assistance, and private scholarships awards.

An important factor in the modernization of the universities, whether public or private is the encouragement of a regular exchange of students and teaching staff between universities and firms and public institutions. Running parallel with this should be a more direct involvement of the representatives from the economic environment and public institutions in various university activities. The public institutions can facilitate this
happening by developing a forum with the participation of the representatives of universities and their partner institutions that produces useful mechanisms by defining uniform criteria to measure the quality of the university/business interaction and the performance of the universities.

E. Better Geographical Balance:
The geographic location of institutions that was based on ideological and political considerations rather than rational and coherent planning has resulted in the fragmentation of the system and unnecessary duplication of programmes. This study has shown that the geographic distribution of the private universities throughout the country is unbalanced and that most are concentrated in the wealthiest and most populated cities, with a very heavy concentration in the two principal cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. If private higher education improves and meets required conditions it will become important to distribute private universities more evenly and thereby achieve a more acceptable geographical balance. There is no doubt that the balanced distribution will help to achieve nation goals, for example, access to higher education would be available to all aspiring academics according to their needs and motivation.

F. Better Subject Mix:
The demand for sciences and technological programmes at tertiary level is high in Libya. It ranges from medicine to pharmacy, and engineering to architecture. The drawback is, of course, that these are capital-intensive courses demanding heavy investment. As they are time-demanding, expensive to set up and require qualified personnel who are often in short supply and who can demand high salaries, private universities have shied away from mounting those programmes. What they have done is to provide a middle ground between
programmes in very high demand and those that are just about viable taking into account the cost considerations. This explains the proliferation of market courses such as accounting, marketing, business and law. For the new government it is a big challenge. Under current conditions and in an unstable society, private universities are not able to run courses in disciplines that require substantial funding. Yet courses on communications skills, ICT and entrepreneurship are important to ensure excellent teaching and learning. The question is how should the government encourage private higher education to fund capital intensive courses while these universities do not have adequate facilities even for studies in the arts and humanities? Any shift here is likely to be difficult since it would require considerable attitudinal change on the part of participants.

G. The Importance of Political Leadership:

Any elaboration of a general strategy of development for the Libyan higher education system should address the challenges that were outlined earlier, clarify the sequential and practicable procedures to advance the policy and determine the mechanisms of its financing. The role of Libyan leaders, especially in the current uneasy political situation, is hard to overestimate. There is a clear need for the help and support of the Libyan government in establishing a team of policy makers and education planners, together with international experts, to work on the fundamental issues related to the future development of the country’s higher education system. It is crucial that Libya develops an educational policy that would build a structured, balanced system of higher education and ensure the availability of the programmes in high demand. But society generally should take advantage of the opportunities offered by higher education institutions and so consideration should be given to maintaining institutional and programme diversity.
Below is a proposal for the Libyan Government for a reappraisal of Libyan higher education in which the following objectives were put forward:

1. Regulate the structure of levels and systems of higher education institutions so that it is appropriate to the socio-economic development of the country and current global trends.

2. Set up a flexible and inter-related training process that stipulates effective learning objectives, content, and teaching methods.

3. Develop programmes for teaching staff so that they become politically responsible with high morals, so that they demonstrate a professional conscience and high professional standards, and so that they encompass advanced, modern styles of teaching.

4. Strengthen pure research and applied research activities that aim to improve the quality of training, that directly solve problems raised by the realities of socioeconomic development and that improve the financial rewards for employees of its institutions.

5. Deploy effective financial mechanisms in higher education in order to diversify resources and enhance the effectiveness of investments.

6. Re-orientate higher education management by enhancing their autonomy and by ensuring the accountability of higher education institutions and their competitiveness.

7. Enhance the competitive capacity of Libyan higher education through international communication and through integration with foreign academic and commercial institutions.

8. The notion of public-private partnership means that the public and private sectors work as a corporate body with no financial competition. It contains different types that exist in many countries. Lee (Lee, M. 2008, p9 - p11) refers to a number of models of public-private partnership, and gives as examples state/provincial governments and private companies, public universities and private companies, public universities and private colleges and non-profit making private universities. In Libya, the private universities work
independently from the public ones and Libyan higher education has never experienced any kind of private-public partnership. I think it is more likely to improve the financing policy of the post-Gaddafi government if it were to seek out corporations nationally and/or internationally that are willing to fund public higher education and private higher education as is the case in a number of countries, such as Indonesia, South Africa, Vietnam, and Malaysia. But this it will be a challenge and a difficult task for the Libyan government and decision makers.

H. Improvement for Public Higher Education:
The current higher education situation in Libya is, then, in disarray. Libya is a rich country with a small population but the problems confronting the government are immense. The immediate problems like rising graduate unemployment, the declining quality of graduates (in relation to the current needs of industry) and the rising unit cost of higher education in a society where there is a scarcity of financial resources and where universities have to compete for public resources are components in the overall list of governmental concerns. Clearly, if public funds continue to support higher education, higher education institutions should be more accountable and able to demonstrate their impact to the tax payers. Universities should improve their facilities and should be able to prove that they are of benefit to the wider population, ensuring the effective use of public resources to enhance the nation’s competitiveness. It is towards these ends that Libyan university reform is directed. Increasingly, Libyan public universities are being assessed in terms of the employability of their undergraduates because it has been argued that public universities are responsible for the current number of unemployed graduates. The real challenge is for the government to design and adopt a strong strategy for higher education with the aim that its graduates should be employable in the context of the global job market and not just that
of Libya. It is inevitable that the rapidly changing employment situation for graduates and for society at large will have major implications for Libyan universities and how they conduct their business in the future. The government, post-revolution, has to establish Libya in a regional and international centre of excellence in certain educational fields, especially that of technology.

To conclude, all of the above aspirations require policy makers in Libya to consider equipping its administrators with the necessary facilities to provide prior training for students and faculty members so that they could accommodate the extensive adoption of technologies that require special abilities adaptive to change. It is going to be a very difficult and long term goal if it is to be achieved. The period from 1985 to 1990 was an extremely hard time for Libya when it was isolated politically and economically from most of the rest of the world with the result that the entire Libyan economy deteriorated and this included higher education programmes, policies and strategies.

If private participation in higher education is the trend, greater coordination at the policy and implementation levels is needed to ensure that the outcome is not just wide access to higher education, but also better higher education. Only then would Libya take its rightful place amongst the emerging countries of the world.

8.3. Recommendations for future research:

The thesis has triangulated various sources of data to explain the interaction between economic and political elements that shape the financing policy for higher education. There have been some insuperable problems in assembling statistical data, though, because there is no databank dealing with the phenomenon of private higher education in Libya.
The task was also obviously made much more difficult by the recent political turmoil in the country.

The information provided by some institutions through their annual reports, records and documents sometimes appears unreliable as some gave contradictory figures. Methodologically, this study triangulated some qualitative methods and, while each has its own advantages, such as giving detailed insights, overall the results were limited due to the lack of representative models that could have given a general overview of the financing policy process in higher education in Libya.

More available data would help to further empirical research that could determine the reforming of the financing policy for higher education and the phenomenon of privatization in Libyan higher education. Generally there has been very little data made available from state institutions and from private sector participants and this has reduced the scope for triangulating claims and, in certain instances, limited authoritative analyses. The fact that so little data is publicly available is in itself significant because it reveals that there is a deliberate effort to avoid giving truthful information and displays a complete lack of transparency. At the same time, however, this research may have a useful outcome insofar as it may make Libyan society more aware of the serious problems facing higher education in the country.

The literature on higher education is increasing but is overly focused on the impact of higher education on the economy, or on an analysis of issues and matters related to its social and cultural aspects. This study has introduced another dimension to the debate by
shifting attention to the importance of the financing policy for higher education by analyzing its development in order to find mechanisms that could improve it.

Another important debate that deserves to be researched in the future may be termed ‘the higher education returns’. Higher education imparts substantial monetary and non-monetary benefits for both society and students. The major difficulty, however, is measuring precisely the extent of these benefits. Not all can be measured according to a single scale, that is, if they can be measured at all. Nevertheless, an analysis of the rates of return can provide a baseline estimate of the pure economic value of education, although in Libya the studies in this respect seem to be extremely limited especially those related to private returns. It is difficult, therefore, to decide whether the cost of higher education should be paid by Libyan students and their families or whether to justify the continued use of full public subsidies and this issue needs to be very carefully considered because it will have immense relevance to the design of any future policy. This study set out to determine how the financing policy for higher education has been shaped in Libya by different forces and to what extent the higher education sector has responded. Given the problems of availability and non-existence of data noted above, it is not possible yet to offer a definitive answer to the question. It can be strongly affirmed, though, that the evaluation of the financing policy, the case study findings and the educational practice examined provide us with the information and therefore the ability to determine a reforming policy for higher education and for its implementation.

Internationalization and globalization have been important subject matter both in higher education policy debates and in research on higher education, and many countries have expressed their related concerns. But in Libya, the previous government under Gaddafi and
the political authorities post-Gaddafi did not and have not constructed clear strategies and
the appropriate means to create a favourable environment for internationalization nor have
universities been encouraged to be more innovative and responsive.

Unfortunately the institutions themselves are not fully aware of the new challenges
presented by globalization and its market forces, nor are they aware of the greater role of
internationalization. This is true not only of the private universities but also of the largest
national universities in Libya which have not developed plans of action for
internationalization and have not allocated sufficient time and resources to accommodate
its demands. This compounded by the fact that the universities lack the fundamental
applicable knowledge, the ability and the skills to pursue a relevant policy. There is clearly
a need for a comprehensive study on the liberalization of trading links by the government,
this to be in line with the country’s socio-economic policy and its impact on future higher
education development. The feasibility of achieving international recognition and the
aspiration of achieving full integration into global scientific and academic communities,
together with the competitiveness of national higher education institutions must be
conscientiously examined. The framework of such a feasibility study should be set around
main state universities and within representative private institutions.

Finally, the experience and information I have gained during this research has made it clear
that, in the modern, scientific and technological world a country such as Libya will find it
progressively more difficult to achieve parity of esteem with other developing countries
and eventually with already developed countries, unless it takes the decision to invest in an
educational programme that addresses the urgent need for the acquisition of the
rudimentary and ultimately, the sophisticated skills essential for a technologically equipped
nation. Immediate research and action are required.

9.1 A quick view of the 17th February Revolution:

After 42 years of a dictatorship, Libya became free since the 17th February Revolution 2011. Gaddafi was no longer in control of the country. The revolution started in the west, in Benghazi, the second city in Libya, on 17th of February 2011 and Gaddafi quickly lost all cities in east Libya in just four days of the revolution. The forces opposing Gaddafi established a government based in Benghazi on the 20th of February named the National Transitional Council (NTC), whose stated goal was to overthrow the Gaddafi government and hold democratic elections. Libya had been in a very difficult political situation for eight months. NATO forces had played a very important role in protecting civilians and helped Libyans to destroy Gaddafi’s dictatorship. Gaddafi was captured and killed by rebels on the 20th of October, 2011, in his home town of Sirt. During the subsequent three years both the political and security situation in Libya has remained unstable.

9.2 The thesis and the revolution:

At the beginning, the research was targeted to cover the subject “Financing Policy for Higher Education and the Role of the Private Sector in Libya” in Gaddafi’s stage. It was not expected that a revolution would occur in the middle of this research. This event has created new circumstances that doubtless will have very significant effects on the nature of the previous financing policy for higher education.

All this raises a number of questions: to what extent will the revolutionary changes affect private higher education? Is the new political system going to allow the private sector to play its role in higher education, and if so, how will private higher education be improved
in terms of its quality and its role in research? And how will the new political system address the problems associated with unaccredited private universities, their tuition fees and their graduates? Also, it is an important to ask about those private universities students who are relative to Gaddafi’s family.

To highlight the issues related to private higher education after the 17th of February, 2011, the writer had an opportunity to undertake another field study in January, 2012, and conducted interviews from which important information was gained from a number of significant people. The field study was conducted under difficult circumstances because the country was still in a state of chaos and very unstable.

The difficult circumstances were:

1. The bureaucratic system was still in existence.

2. The length of the field study was limited to one month only. Another field study had not been planned, but the advent of the revolution made it important to do so. It was started on the 27 December 2011 but it became necessary for the writer to return to the UK before his visa expired on the 30th of January, 2012.

3. The situation in the country was still to some extent chaotic and indeed during the field study the country witnessed several protests from different groups.

4. Some interviewees did not understand the aim and the purpose of the interview and it proved difficult to explain the importance of the research. This was understandable because people still retained a fear of freely expressing an opinion or of giving information that might be used against them, a legacy from the Gaddafi regime.
9.3 The reopening of the whole debate about privatization.

A decision had been taken in 1999, when Gaddafi was in power, to allow people to open private universities. The policy had been put in practice by the regime just for twelve years. The new political system has not made a significant change on the previous policy of Gaddafi’s government, at least in the short term. Previously it was difficult to criticize the policy of Gaddafi in inaugurating the private higher education policy but afterwards people felt free to do so. It should be noted that some people who were interviewed in Gaddafi’s time were no longer in their positions. Those people have been accused of supporting Gaddafi. They are the secretaries of General People Committee for Higher Education, National Committee for public universities and National committee for Private Universities. In the post revolution period interviews were conducted with significant people who were appointed by the new political system.

The consensus among the members of the Libyan government, that was appointed by the NTC, was against the idea of privatization and private higher education in Libya. In an interview with the Deputy Minister of Higher Education and with others who share the same notion with him, it was said that:

“....it is not our fault.....students and the owners of the private universities are responsible for that...the students, they knew from the beginning that it was the wrong decision to study at these universities.....” (Interview, January 2012).

The unaccredited universities were still open at the time this research was conducted, and even universities which had already gained accreditation (e.g. Alrefak University) from QAA still have unaccredited academic departments which continue to accept students.
These universities do not declare or publish any information about their students. Evidence of this comes from my second field study in January, 2012, when Alrefak University refused to provide me with details of the numbers of students in the civil engineering department with the excuse that this was confidential information belonging to the University and could not be given because the department had not yet been awarded accreditation from QAA.

The deputy was not satisfied with private universities describing them thus: “..they are not universities....they are shops to sell degrees....” According to his view the financing policy for higher education in Libya was to be heavily dependent on the state and the Libyan government had a desire to reform the financing policy for higher education. In a speech on Libyan radio the deputy minister described the future policy:

“....the government will play a major role in financing higher education institutions and the role of the private sector in higher education will be tightened by the government. The latter will establish a sort of partnership and collaborate with excellent foreign universities if a private university is to open in the country....”

Some argue that the problems of private higher education in Libya did not stem from Gaddafi’s ideas but rather from how people had put them in to operation and that the policy had been implemented incompetently. Universities had been founded that did not conform to the required conditions and stipulations, such as qualifications and experience, and parents sent their children to study at these universities without establishing whether or not they had been accredited.
Not everyone, however, shares this view. Some argue that this was the responsibility of the government. They claim that if the government had not wanted to accredit private university degrees then why had it allowed these universities to open their doors and enroll students in the first place? They asked, too, why the government had not played its role earlier by publishing information on those universities that had been accredited and on those that had not.

It has also been argued that the government should not be so restrictive on matters of accreditation and that private higher education whatever its disadvantages is a reality in Libya. Many countries have private universities, but the establishment of private higher education in Libya was random and disorganized. It is surprising that the Gaddafi government acknowledged the deficiencies of the private establishments but did not take serious steps to strengthen them. In fact, it had no intention whatsoever to improve the private universities which had operated, and still do so, in a random and haphazard way. A Director of Financial Affairs who works for the National Committee for Private Education stated in interview that the people responsible for private higher education did not and do not want private universities to be successful. He said that when Dr. Abd-Alkabeer Al-Fakhri was appointed a Minister of Education he did not provide any support for this committee. The Committee has poor facilities and its staff members lack essential skills. Its building compared with that of the QAA which has modern facilities and employs highly qualified people, has poor equipment, no Internet or email access and its employees lack computing skills.
In spite of these serious drawbacks, and although private universities have a poor reputation students are able to make successful careers by acquiring a qualification from a private establishment. The Deputy Minister of Higher Education points out that:

“...it does not matter whether students study at private or public universities...the important thing is how to make a good career even if a student has attended a private university.......” (Interview, January 2012)

Those responsible for the higher education sector argue that it is the responsibility of students to decide where to study and if they decide to attend a private university with the knowledge that many of these institutions have unaccredited status, then that is their choice. An employee who works in the Administration of Private higher Education said that the Director, Dr. Abdlatife, told some graduates from a private university who had come to him with their problem of unaccredited certificates:

“....this is not our problem...I did not tell you to go to study at these universities...this was your choice and your decision....” (Interview, January 2012).

I asked the Deputy Minister of Higher Education, Professor Fathi, in January, 2012, in an arranged interview with him: “How will your government address the problem of graduates from unaccredited universities?” He replied: “I am not responsible for what those students have already decided and this is their choice and the decision of their families ....the Minister of Higher Education will not accredit their degrees...and it isn’t responsible for these illegal universities.....” (Interview, January 2012).
9.4 A brief look at the situation of the post-revolution with reference to the difficulties facing the QAA and the new administration.

The debate on private higher education in the post-Gaddafi stage has raised issues within this new context. Here I will present some observations on the long term character of Libyan higher education and concerning the difficulties facing the QAA.

The authorities continued to implement the previous policy and procedures until the country could established a credible government, a situation that had been absent since 1969. This situation after the revolution makes difficult for the researcher to analysis in depth the subject for some reasons: the situation in Libya was chaotic and unstable, most important people had been replaced by people with little or no experience of the previous educational policy, particularly of the private higher education policy.

The previous system had left private higher education in a state of total chaos, one of which was widespread corruption that also, at times, permeated through to higher education. While most university staff, both academic and administrative (sometimes the same individuals) throughout the region had worked hard under challenging conditions, including the aforementioned poor remuneration rates and very limited resources, there were some who performed less honorably. Data from the People’s Board for Follow-up cite reports showing that a significant percentage of Libya’s public investment expenditure in 1998 was lost to fraud and corruption, and the situation “…hasn’t improved since then.” (Al-Gaddafi, S. 2002, p.150).

There were more important matters, such as security that had to be addressed immediately. The first task of decision makers after the revolution was to identify political leaders able
to guide the country in the early and very difficult post-revolution phase because Libya found itself totally lacking in civil organization. No reliable state institutions existed that were able to guide the country’s citizens who had never experienced a democratic election system before and there were no feasible political parties. During the revolution most of the ammunition and weapon stores had been opened and guns and weapons had been taken by the people. There was no improvement on the country’s infrastructure since Gaddafi’s fall from power. In these circumstances higher education policy could not be a priority.

In November 2011 the NTC decided to appoint a temporary government which includes twenty ministries. In June, 2012, Libya held its first election in which a number of political parties participated and Libyans voted at the polling centres that had been set up in all cities and towns in the country. The aim of the election was to establish the National Conference (NC) so that all Libyan cities and towns could be represented and each of them allocated a number of seats according to the size of its population. The NC comprised independent members and parties that had been elected by the people. The nominated president of the NC was Dr Mohammed Al-Mgharyif.

However, the situation in Libya remained unstable even after the establishment of the NC. An example of this is illustrated by a serious incident that took place in a city called Bani Waleed in east Tripoli in September, 2012 when there were, according to the Libyan government, a number of people who supported Gaddafi and who had been involved in the killing of protesters during the revolution. The city wanted to hand them over to the government. A person called ‘Omran’ from Misurata arrested Gaddafi. Omran was kidnapped and killed in Bani Waleed by Gaddafi’s supporters. This forced the temporary government to make the decision to enter the city using force. It should be realized that at
this time there was no organized army in Libya and the government depended on independent forces that had been fighting during the revolution to enter the city. Several people were killed, a large number were injured and thousands of families in the city left their homes in a serious clash. The fighting ended in October, 2012, when government forces have freed the city. However, this event demonstrated that the temporary government was still unable to control the country and achieve security and stability. In October the NC chose Mr. Ali Zidan to become the Prime Minister of the Libyan government and he appointed new ministers to the ministries who would be responsible for overall control of the country. At this stage the political body in Libya consisted of two significant bodies: the NC headed by Dr. Al-Mgharyif and the Cabinet headed by Mr. Zidan. Several meetings were held with the ministers and a number of speeches were given by Mr. Zidan. The new government took a number of decisions mostly concerned with security matter and stability. Under these circumstances it was difficult to project how private higher education would develop post-Gaddafi because the main priorities of the Libyan government at this stage were to achieve stability, set up the constitution and establish a democratic system.

In private higher education accreditation is obviously of fundamental importance. There was a large number of unaccredited private higher education institutions and for several reasons, as already noted, the QAA is powerless to close them down. The private institutions include universities and higher education institutions that offer two year degrees. It is estimated that there are more than thirty of the former. The Director of QAA, in interview in January, 2012, estimated that there are two hundred private institutions all told and that they have become a real headache because so many students graduate from them. At the time of writing no decisions have been taken to solve the problem and further
delay will make the situation even worse in the future. The QAA, the APHE along with the Ministry of Higher Education are responsible for implementing and monitoring the private higher education policy but are too weak to control private higher education institutions, especially after the revolution. The new Ministry of Higher Education’s first priority was to achieve stability in order to address the problems it had inherited. The APHE had experienced difficulties when dealing with private higher education institutions during Gaddafi’s era. Its director said: “...I sent official letters to ten private universities that are not accredited, to stop their activities until they produce their documents to QAA for accreditation. ....none of them have responded to us and they are still open...'” He was very disappointed and he continued “....we cannot do more than that....” It is not the responsibility of the QAA to force these universities to close down. The role of the QAA is only to assess the quality of the private universities and to award them the accreditation certificate if they are successfully assessed.

In the Gaddafi era it had been difficult for the APHE to curtail unaccredited private institutions of higher education since they had gained strong political support from Gaddafi himself and some private universities such as Tripoli, Afriqyia and Al-Refak had enrolled a number of students from politically powerful families. Those clients have no longer to be enrolled in these universities since the revolution. However, the specific difficulties in private higher education post-revolution may be categorized as follows:

1. The administration of private higher education has been faced with instability and inconvenience. An example of this is that during the field study in January, 2012, the main building of the National Committee for Private Higher Education which had been used by the administration in the previous regime was occupied by a battalion, meaning that members of the administration, including the director, were
unable to use the facilities. All files and records of private education remained still inside the building and no access was allowed.

2. The administration has no official representative since the toppling of Gaddafi. This means that it is not able to fulfill its role until it gets recognition from the Ministry of Higher Education. In interview, the director stated that “....we cannot do our work as before....the administration has no legal framework or official representative... an official letter has been sent to the Ministry of Higher Education to address the matter but there has been no response for over a week...” (Interview, January 2012).

3. There is a lack of regularity and compatibility in the related state policies. It seems that there is no coordination between private universities, the Ministry of Higher Education and other relevant institutions (e.g. QAA and the APHE).

4. Facilities are very poor.

At the time this field study was being conducted there appeared to be no intention by the government to address the matter of unaccredited universities and this situation may continue for the foreseeable future because the current government has real problems in drawing up a policy of higher education that could be put into practice quickly. The current higher education sector is damaged and this damage will have to be repaired by the policy makers. The Minister of Higher Education stated that:

".....the previous policy of higher education had been designed in a way that served the political system for the Gaddafi regime.....that government did not pay enough attention to universities and higher education institutions......" (Interview, January 2012).

After the first election the Minister of Higher Education moved from Alnaser Street in the centre of Tripoli to Qasser Ben Ghesheer. It is about 20 k.m south of Tripoli. The Ministry
has established an administration specializing only in private higher education institutions: universities and two-to-three-year diploma institutes. The organization is concerned with the issues, matters and problems of private higher education such as the unaccredited private higher education institutions and their graduates.

A significant change in Zidan’s government was that the QAA relinquished its control over higher education and a new administration was founded in the body of the Ministry of Higher Education, the Administration of Private Higher Education (APHE). The previous manager Dr. Abd Alateef Kheshlaf was replaced by Dr. Ali Kheer Allah. The latter handed in his resignation because of the incompatibility between him and the inspector responsible for monitoring the activities of the ministry, which included inspecting the administration and operation of the private higher education sector. The Ministry has appointed Mr. Naser Al-Khelany\textsuperscript{68} to replace him. APHE’s responsibility was to accredit the degrees of private higher education institutions and universities and to control and monitor private higher education institutions. The APHE established a new system and all private higher education institutions are now compelled to register in that system. They are required to bring their documents and files including students’ results and their transcripts, and these are used by the APHE’s members to ensure the efficiency of the administration. Seven private universities have been partly accredited and thirty one private higher education institutions awarding diplomas have been given temporary permission to continue. Ten institutions have been closed down as is illustrated on the poster by APHE.

I have visited the Ministry of Higher Education many times and I have had the chance to arrange a number of interviews with responsible administrators and with graduates from

\textsuperscript{68} He has MSc degree in tourism and he is doing PhD in the same subject. He has not enough experience in the area of higher education and his knowledge is limited.
private higher education institutions. A number of students who had graduated from unaccredited private higher education establishments have visited the APHE to have their degrees accredited, some of whom could not provide the necessary details and information required by the APHE because their institutions had been closed down. It was difficult to obtain information on how many private higher education institutions have vanished and five of the students I interviewed claimed that their institution had closed down and that they could not find the founders. In fact, after the February Revolution some of the institutions disappeared because owners supported the Gaddafi regime and some of them were members of what were called the ‘Revolution Committees’ and ‘The Communication Office to the Revolution Committees’ \(^{69}\). This has made the situation for those who had graduated from such institutions extremely problematical if they wish to validate their degrees, although the Ministry of Higher Education may decide to accredit all qualifications to avoid any serious repercussions.

It is a considerable challenge for the government to be confronted by those who had graduated from these universities. There are reasons that could be factors in this situation: first, some of those graduates were revolutionaries who fought to overthrow Gaddafi’s forces and the government would not want to be embarrassed by them; second, the present political situation remains unstable - it is sensitive and the government has to be very cautious with any decision making related to these matters. In January, 2012, a group of graduates from private universities organized a protest in front of the cabinet asking the government to recognize their degrees. A large number of them had visited the APHE to get their certificates validated. A reliable source who works at APHE told me that he

\(^{69}\) I spoke to a student who had come to have her degree accredited at the APHE and she told me that the institution at which she had studied was closed. The owner had been a supporter of Gaddafi and all student files, profiles and documents were stored at her home so that all ex-students would have to go to her house for the information they needed.
estimated the number of visitors to be 30 per week. Some of them had come from cities and towns far from the capital city, Tripoli, and their problems were more complicated than for those from Tripoli itself.

In January, 2012, these graduate students organized their protest in front of the Cabinet in Tripoli asking the government to recognize their degrees and the government, under the circumstances related to the revolution realized that it would be diplomatic and sensible to accept their requests and thereby avoid any clash with those who had supported the revolution. The comprehensive examination\textsuperscript{70} has been the only way to sort out this problem since 2010. But the question that remains is to what extent is this policy going to continue?

In October 2011 when Gaddafi was killed, most economic activities in the capital were closed down including the higher education institutions. At the beginning of 2012 Tripoli University was very slowly coming back into operation. One of the issues that it has faced since then is the decision that had been taken previously to privatize the faculties of Engineering and Pharmacy.

\textbf{9.5 Al-Refak University after the Revolution:}

This section sets out to analyze the role of Al-Refak University at the time of the February Revolution, how it responded to the event and then tries to shed some light on issues related to the university raised as a result of the revolution. It is effectively an extension of Chapter Seven that analyzed the university through the methodology of a case study. It is necessary to define the university’s attitudes toward the revolution and to what extent it has

\textsuperscript{70} An examination is operated by QAA for students who graduate from unaccredited private universities.
been affected as a result. It has to be emphasized that the availability of hard evidence in the form of documents and substantive data has been seriously limited and the writer has depended on personal observations and interpretations essentially through interviews to form the analyses.

During the revolution the university was under pressure from those who supported Gaddafi and from his opponents. The owner of the university and some staff members provided assistance to the protesters secretly inside the capital. The daughter of the owner in an interview in January, 2012, said:

“...it was a very difficult time ....we were very worried about Gaddafi’s security forces - if they knew what we were doing ....unfortunately the security forces identified us therefore we decided that it was important to leave the country...me and the rest of my family made a plan of how we can take our wealth with us and which country is the best for us... My mother, the owner, went to Tunisia but unfortunately she was arrested by Gaddafi’s security forces who detained her and then investigated her....fortunately one of the security guards was a student at the university who helped her to escape...this was just ten days before the killing of Gaddafi....

........the university was not closed for very long... in November we opened again but there were still problems that we had to face. In December a group of students organized a protest against the university’s policy towards tuition fees. They complained about the high level of the fees and they asked the university to lower them........but the protest failed to achieve the aim...and she, my mother, said that our fees are not high.......a second problem was from a battalion in Tripoli that came to seize the university as they thought that the university belonged to the previous government....we had been arrested many times by the
members of the battalion who investigated us to see whether we were with Gaddafi in suppression of the protesters or not .. " (Interview, January 2012).

Like most private universities, Al-Refaq University is still as it was. Only five departments have been accredited by the QAA: Business Management, Architecture, Accounting, Computer and Law. The other departments that have not yet been accredited, for instance, Civil Engineering, Petroleum Engineering and English Language continue to enroll students. It was thought that private higher education in Libya after the revolution was going to be more organized and have greater integrity but this has not happened. The example from the second field study in January, 2012, when, during a visit to the university, the writer asked for data on the number of students in the Department of Civil Engineering, illustrates the lack of change. The request was refused because, said Miss Saeeda, who is in charge of the quality assurance of the department, such information was confidential to the university: “I cannot provide you with this information because the department has not been accredited yet and I am worried that you might use the data to harm the university.....". (Chatting through Yahoo Messenger, January, 2012).

9.6 Conclusion:

An attempt has been made in this section to describe some of the important trends in private higher education in Libya in the immediate period after the revolution. In fact, the government seems to be confused about the role of the private sector and about the dangers involved in choosing between state and private education, especially as far as the job market is concerned. Attitudes generally towards private education are confused. There is strong support for the public sector and there are attitudes that are anti-private as well as
those that are pro-private; and there are some that intend to regulate the growth of the private sector.

If the government is determined to give the private sector an opportunity to play its role in higher education then the government needs to reconsider the current policy and to be more restrictive with the private universities. It is clear that the QAA has little or no idea of what happens in some private universities. In an interview with the director of QAA and with a member of a delegation for the evaluation of private universities it was stated that the institutions visited were transparent and open but in reality they contradict themselves because they continue to operate illegal activities.

The situation now displays a lack of vision on the part of the government that makes the public policy ineffective for private higher education in Libya. This very lack of vision has created the situation of a policy vacuum relating to the private sector and not only is there is no clear policy on private education but the overall policy for higher education throughout the country suffers from governmental neglect. The result is the growth in private higher education which may be attributed to changing domestic conditions, a lack of government resources, weak government mechanisms and the absence of effective regulatory bodies.

An analysis of the development of privatization in higher education post-revolution indicates that the policy for privatizing higher education is going to need reforming if it is to operate effectively. A field study of just a month, even in an unstable country like Libya shortly after its revolution has provided reasonable coverage on some really important educational issues associated with the privatization of public higher education,
unaccredited private universities and the problems their graduates face as well as the attitude of the new government towards private higher education.

It is clear that the transitional government is confronted with a difficult problem if it is to form a financing policy for higher education in the current circumstances and this has been made more difficult by the protests made by different sectors in society, including the graduates from unaccredited private universities.

After the revolution private higher education is now coming under sustained criticism but not as heavy as during Gaddafi’s rule because since then an uncontrollable situation has been created and private universities have become free to do whatever they want. Libya now, after the first three years of the new regime is a country where the authorities, state powers and other government bodies seem to be absolutely absent. Take a very simple example: there is a complete absence of traffic wardens on the roads in Tripoli. Education planners and decision makers are dealing with the alarming situation of uncontrolled private higher education which will undoubtedly lead to an even greater decline in the quality of education and add to the rising problem of graduate unemployment.

There is a general feeling that the deterioration in quality is a result of inadequate staffing, rapidly deteriorating physical facilities, poor library resources and insufficient scientific equipment. In many cases, internal efficiency is very low and a significant proportion of a number of universities’ budgets is wasted. The second field study undertaken in January 2012, a year after the revolution revealed that the authorities and the policy planners had put higher education in jeopardy by their lack of planning and by their ineffectual organization.
A similar line of reasoning applies to the emergence of graduate unemployment. The lack of relevance of many university programmes contributes to the mismatch between graduates and the occupations for which they apply or, in some cases, to which they are appointed. It is obvious that graduate unemployment in the country has become a structural problem reflecting a fundamental arithmetical imbalance between the number of university graduates and the number of new jobs available in many sectors of the economy.

Equally worrying is the lack of access to global knowledge and the international academic environment; this is a growing issue. In Libya poor command of foreign languages among staff and students is a serious obstacle that complicates access to the Internet and to essential textbooks. Gaddafi’s government, since the 1980s, had opted for the use of the national language at the expense of foreign languages, including the English Language. Now, post-Gaddafi, officials, authorities and decision makers are seriously challenged by a situation that exposes their disturbingly high rate of illiteracy in English.

The collapse of Gaddafi’s system has created a very delicate situation where decision makers find themselves caught between conflicting objectives. From a social and political point of view, policy makers are committed to allowing any secondary school graduate to enter higher education. As a consequence, higher education has become increasingly supply-driven without trying to improve existing institutions or creating new institutions and by disregarding the standard and quality of the education provided as well as the needs of the labour market. If this trend were to continue, it is very likely that the unchecked expansion of higher education in response to demographic and social pressures would exacerbate the problems of poor quality and difficult access to employment.
The recurrent questions confronting educational planners intent on reforms are: How is it possible to learn from the previous experience in privatizing higher education which has taken place over the last ten years and which has resulted in a deteriorating situation characterized by a pattern of unmanageable and poorly planned private higher education practices? What kinds of reform are feasible and likely to prove effective in overcoming the present challenges? And how will the presently available higher education institutions be able to absorb the rising number of students?

In the ultimate analysis, the private sector alone should not be entrusted with the responsibility of deciding on their participation in higher education with aim of creating a system designed for the good of society. It is the responsibility of the public authorities to clearly define the public-private role in the sector so the state must intervene to provide regulation and to develop a framework for the operation of private universities.
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Appendixes:

Appendix (1). A list of questions for the interviewees in the pre-revolutionary Gaddafi’s stage:

Q1: Higher education in Libya has experienced huge expansion in the last few decades, and there have been many changes: what are your thoughts on this?

Q2: What do you think are the main forces that led to the introduction and practice of the privatisation of higher education in Libya?

Q3: To what extent do you think the privatisation has worked?

Q4: As you have been the Director General of the Academy of Post-graduate Studies and Economic Research for twenty years, how do you evaluate such this experience?

Q5: As the Academy of Post-graduate Studies and Economic Research has developed rapidly for two decades, what do you think are the factors that have led the institution to be a successful model?

Q6: The Academy has been the first institution to depend largely on students’ contributions (tuition fees), How has this idea been addressed in Libya which is a socialist country?

Q7: What has the Academy gained and achieved?

Q8: What difficulties and challenges have arisen through the Academy experience?
Q9:- What do you think public universities will look like in the future, in light of the current trend towards privatisation? What role do you think they will play in the Libyan higher education sector?”

Q10:-What will the decision makers in Libya expect from higher education institutions (public and private) after the reform of the financing policy for higher education?

Q11:- As you know there are 14 state universities, seven public institutions of higher education and 50 private universities in Libya. Two of the seven public institutions have not yet been given a preliminary licence by QAA and just four out of the 50 private universities have been awarded a preliminary licence in some of their departments. So, in the light of this, can you explain why this should be? And how will the QAA address these problems?

Q12:- Ten years from the beginning of private higher education in Libya in 1990, the government founded the Centre to assess the private universities. Why did the establishment of the Libyan Centre for Quality Assurance in Higher Education come so late?

Q13:- Why do you think why there is such a rapid growth in private higher education in Libya?

Q14:- To what extent do you think this policy will fit with socioeconomic classes in Libya society? Could this possibly lead to inequality in terms of access to education between the poor and the rich?
Q15:- On the one hand, the higher education policy in Libya has been geared towards the encouragement of the private sector to be more active in the tertiary education and on the other hand, the Libyan government has passed a law to prevent faculty members from engaging with private institutions of higher education. Do you think that there is a sort of contradiction and disorder in the state policy?

Q16:- Can you say something about the thinking behind the move to privatisation: how, theoretically, does it fit with the traditional principles of the government?

Q17:- How much private higher education should be supported by external funding?

Q18:- To what extent do you think the private sector will contribute in solving some of the problems, such as unemployment and overcrowded state universities?

Q19:- To what extent is the private sector making a significant contribution in plugging the gap between the demand for and the supply of higher education by the state?

Q20:- Do you think that public finance for higher education as a policy, as has been the case in Libya for a long time, is to be withdrawn?

Q21:- To what extent do these changes fit with the ideology of the third universal theory of the “Green Book” by Colonel Mummer Gaddafi? And do you think that the privatization of higher education in Libya differs when compared with other countries?
Appendix (2). A list of questions for the interviewees in post Gaddafi’s stage, after 17th of February 2011 revolution:

Q1:- Higher education in Libya has experienced huge expansion in the last few decades, and there have been many changes: what are your thoughts on this?”

Q2:- What do you think are the main forces that led to the introduction and practice the privatisation of higher education in Libya?

Q3:- What are the differences between public and private universities?

Q4:- how does Libya differ from other countries in terms of its policy to privatise higher education institutions?

Q5:- What do universities (public and private) in Libya need to learn from the experience of privatisation of higher education?

Q6:- To what extent do you think the privatisation has worked?

Q7:- What are your thoughts on the previous financing policy for higher education? Do you think the current changes were necessary, or could we have continued with the old system?

Q8:- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the reforming of the higher education policy?
Q9:- There are number of unaccepted universities and they have not been given a permit to engage in activities according to the Centre for Quality Assurance’s Assessment. However they are still open. So, how will the Centre has dealt with their graduates who are not able to decide whether to continue their study or to find a job in the public sector?

Q10:- Why was the decision (to operate private universities) taken?

Q11:- What difficulties and challenges has the Centre faced?

Q12:- It has been noted that degrees from some private universities have been rejected by state institutions which claim that these universities are of doubtful quality because of the expansion in teaching alongside the detriment and almost complete neglect of research activities. What does this mean do you think?
Appendix (3). The list of interviewees in Gaddafi’s stage (the first field study):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>The position</th>
<th>Place of work</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Notices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professor Farhat Shernana.</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>Academy for Higher Studies.</td>
<td>November, 2010</td>
<td>My MSc supervisor. He was a rector of Garyounis University (the second largest university in Libya) from 1980-1985 and then an economic minister from 1968-1990.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Suleiman Ghoja.</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>The National Centre for Researches.</td>
<td>December, 2010</td>
<td>He was in charge of private higher education in Libya. Then he worked at the National Centre for Education Planning (NCEP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eng. Mohammed Shafter.</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td>the Syndicate of Faculty Members of Al-Fatah University (today is Tripoli)</td>
<td>November, 2010</td>
<td>He was arrested because he supported Gaddafi during the revolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Elhadi Al-Swayh.</td>
<td>the General Secretary</td>
<td>Naser University.</td>
<td>October, 2010</td>
<td>He was a lecturer at Al-fatah University (today is Tripoli)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Mohammed Al-Kaber.</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td>QAA.</td>
<td>January, 2011</td>
<td>He has been in this position for four years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Hussin</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>QAA of Higher</td>
<td>December, 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Abd-Al Majid Hussain</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Assurance Administration.</td>
<td>December, 2010</td>
<td>He worked in this place just a year. Recently, he has moved to work in the cabinet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Abdullatif M. Latife</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>The Administration of Private Higher Education (PHEA).</td>
<td>November, 2010</td>
<td>He has moved to work at the Ministry of Education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ferjani Eyad.</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Administration Matters in the General Authority Information department</td>
<td>January, 2011</td>
<td>He studied management at Tripoli university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abd-Alkbeer Alfakhery.</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td>GPCHE</td>
<td>November 2010</td>
<td>He studied at Al-Feker Al-Jamahiry Academy. it is an institution specialised in teaching the Green Book ideas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah Salem</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Planning Council in Tripoli.</td>
<td>December, 2010</td>
<td>He has been in this job for 7 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nisreen Ashor.</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>The Libyan Al-</td>
<td>November, 2010</td>
<td>She studied Law at Al-Shomokin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Student X, Mohammed Haman</td>
<td>Dentist (he was a student)</td>
<td>Dentistry Clinic (private)</td>
<td>October, 2010</td>
<td>His age 25 and he lives in Gasser Ben Ghesheer, he studied at the Faculty of Dentistry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hager Al-Fergani</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>The Libyan Al-Gehad Centre</td>
<td>October, 2010</td>
<td>She studied accounting at Two March Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabah Algdeery</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>Tax Administration</td>
<td>October, 2010</td>
<td>She studied Management at Al-Taqadom University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatema Al-Abani</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>People’s Solicitor Administration</td>
<td>January 2011</td>
<td>She studied Law at Dar Al-Ealem University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Al-Tomi</td>
<td>General Director</td>
<td>Tax administration</td>
<td>October, 2010</td>
<td>He has been as manager for 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraj Al-Hmadi</td>
<td>Head Master.</td>
<td>Secondary School, Tripoli</td>
<td>November, 2010</td>
<td>He has worked as a headmaster for more than 14 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moftah Othman</td>
<td>Departmental Chief.</td>
<td>Administrative Affairs in the National Authority of Information, Tripoli.</td>
<td>November, 2010</td>
<td>He has a Bachelor Degree in Management from Benghazi University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Mohiba Franka</td>
<td>The president</td>
<td>Al-Refak University</td>
<td>December, 2010</td>
<td>She has a diploma in Arabic Language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Al-</td>
<td>The president</td>
<td>Afriqya</td>
<td>November, 2010</td>
<td>PhD in Law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Degree/ Position</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabrouk Abo Shena</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>University</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Al-Mehdi Mohammed</td>
<td>The president</td>
<td>Tripoli University (Trables University)</td>
<td>November, 2010.</td>
<td>PhD in Management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Mohammed Sheleeg</td>
<td>Administrative staff, 2010)</td>
<td>Al-Refak University</td>
<td>December, 2010</td>
<td>BSc/ Accounting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khwother Ali</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Al-Fatah University</td>
<td>November, 2010</td>
<td>She had studied at Faculty of Engineering for two years.</td>
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</table>
Appendix (4). A list of the interviewees in the post Gaddafi’s phase in 2012 (the second field study):

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>The position</th>
<th>Place of work</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Fathi R. Akkari</td>
<td>The Deputy Minister of Higher Education</td>
<td>Ministry of Higher Education</td>
<td>January 2012</td>
<td>PH. d in Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Naeem Al-Ghariani.</td>
<td>The Minister of Higher Education.</td>
<td>Ministry of Higher Education</td>
<td>January 2012</td>
<td>PH. D in Education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Suleiman Al-Sweahli.</td>
<td>The Minister of Education.</td>
<td>The Ministry of Education.</td>
<td>January 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Suleiman M. Khoja.</td>
<td>the Deputy Minister of Education</td>
<td>The Ministry of Education.</td>
<td>January 2012</td>
<td>PH. D in Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Mohammed Alkaber.</td>
<td>The General Director of the QAA.</td>
<td>QAA</td>
<td>January 2012</td>
<td>N.A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Mustafa Al-Kheshr</td>
<td>The Director of QAA of Higher</td>
<td>QAA</td>
<td>January 2012</td>
<td>BCs in Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Degree</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Aref Al-Alawe</td>
<td>The Director of the Management of Administrational and Financial Affairs at QAA.</td>
<td>QAA</td>
<td>January 2012</td>
<td>N.A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Basma Al-Madani</td>
<td>the Director of the Managerial and Financial Affairs in Al-Rfak University.</td>
<td>Al-Rfak University</td>
<td>January 2012</td>
<td>N.A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Saeda</td>
<td>The QAA department of Al-Refak University</td>
<td>Al-Refak University</td>
<td>January 2012</td>
<td>MS. c in Law.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.A: Not available