The Political Survival of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan: From Participation to Boycott

Wisam Hazimeh

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University of East Anglia

School of Political Science and International Studies

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Abstract

This thesis explores the development of relations between the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and Jordanian regime from 1945 to 2010, in which a distinction is made between the pre- and post-1989 eras that demarked a significant shift from partnership to crisis. Utilising an historical approach, the first era is defined by both parties’ mutual pragmatism, establishing a unified understanding of the Palestinian issue, and what the nature of politics in Jordan would be. However, the post-1989 era is analysed within the context of the regime’s shift in interests from internal to external issues, subsequently changing its pragmatic discourse towards the Brotherhood and Islamic movements. This study suggests that the shift in the regime’s focus, teamed with the implementation of policies such as the ‘one vote system’ and the peace treaty with Israel, left a space for radical voices to rise within the Brotherhood. To understand if the Brotherhood is compatible to Jordan’s parliamentarian system, the research identifies circles of division within the Brotherhood between Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb’s ideologies in the wake of regional conflict and poor regime-Islamist relations. This bifurcation is exacerbated in Jordan, as seen with the opposing fronts of the Jordanian Brotherhood’s Shoura Council: Hawks of Palestinian origin vs. Doves of Jordanian origin, claiming a new division: the ‘new’ Hawks, or, the ‘Salafist Brotherhood’. Supported by exclusive personal interviews with Brotherhood leaders, this thesis argues that allowing Islamist movements’ limited political participation in Jordan is essential for the country’s stability and religious modernity as since the 2007 boycott, increasing numbers of al-Bannaist Doves have converted into Qutbist Hawks. This has empowered the Hawks to demand fundamental reforms regarding the monarchy’s existence, initiating the Brotherhood’s final 2010 political boycott, and positioning the once-allied movement outside the political process and indefinitely removed from accountability.
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Introduction
The Muslim Brotherhood [al-Ikhwān al-Mustālimān] was the first Islamic movement to enter Jordanian politics, working with King ʿAbdallah I in the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946. The alliances that were built between the regime and the Brotherhood maintained the stability and continuation of Jordan as a kingdom that is both Hashemite and Islamic. Throughout the years these two parties have maintained a bittersweet relationship with dialogue at its core, however, since King ʿAbdallah II’s coronation in 1999, the path of this relationship has entered into a crisis, with the new King ceasing all communication with the Brotherhood, resulting in the movement rejecting participation within the political process.

Jordan emerged in the aftermath of the Arab Spring as the only remaining stable Arab country in the Levant. Wedged between conflict, its location means that regional strife often passes through the country in the form of various aftershocks, rendering it both a beacon of stability externally and ideologically conflicted internally. To the east of Jordan is Iraq, and in the north is Syria, both of which are involved in conflict, and to the west of the Jordan river lies the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Over time these conflicts, among others, have found their way into Jordan, making it a magnet for economic troubles, refugees, and ideologies that overspill, affecting other states. Therefore, Jordan became a platform from which ideologies grow and are exported into neighbouring countries but do not take root within Jordan itself.

In that sense, Jordan does run the risk of descending into similar disturbances as its neighbours, however, the internal relationship between political and monarchic figures within the country has to some extent stabilised it, as seen with the alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime. This study presents a close analysis of Jordan’s internal dynamics in order to demonstrate the larger context of Islamic movements’ participation in modern state systems. Therefore, Jordan will be used as a model of how regime-Islamic movement relations can be both effective and destructive in different scenarios, and ultimately how political Islam has grown to the point of taking part in a regional uprising.
Figure 1 Map of Jordan

The map has been sourced from Mapsofworld.com with due permission¹

The Arab Spring not only changed regimes, but also marked the emerging opportunity to change ideologies that rule the Arab world’s states’ systems, allowing a new wave of democracy to take place in the Middle East, as well as proposing Islamic movements as alternatives to regimes.

The case of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood represents the long-lasting relationship of the Muslim Brotherhood in politics within a legitimate environment, in

contrast to other Arab Spring countries. By looking to the Jordanian Brotherhood case, its interaction with the regime and use of democracy within the democratic environment, we can understand how the Muslim Brotherhood works in a modern state domain. Furthermore, the Brotherhood’s political choices – whether in participation or boycotting the system and turning against democracy – will be clarified.

This study presents a comprehensive analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, its political participation, and the dynamics of its activities and relationships within Jordan. Whilst this study presents one of the few comprehensive studies conducted in English, looking to the Brotherhood’s internal divisions regarding the application of political Islam in Jordan, in light of the Arab Spring, it also features translated interviews with Brotherhood leaders.

As testament to the politically volatile environment of the Middle East today, one of these leaders has since been imprisoned, and another expelled from the movement due to their respective understandings of the regime. These interviews demark key points in history, at which point the future of the Brotherhood experienced a notable shift towards a new understanding of political Islam. Furthermore, they were conducted on the cusp of great changes within the Brotherhood, and thus the study presents a unique understanding of clashes internally with the Muslim Brotherhood and externally with the regime. Therefore, this study attempts to fill a gap in understanding the Brotherhood’s participation in politics, which will contribute to a wider understanding of the Arab Spring’s consequences for political Islam.

The Brotherhood in Jordan has based its ideology on Islamic reform, as indicated by Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, previous leader of the ‘Doves’ wing of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, defining the Muslim Brotherhood as:

A social movement, which emerges inside communities, aiming to serve them. Therefore, the movement’s priority is firstly to society, and secondly to political work […] They are revitalisers of the society, and aim to mobilise people to make them able to lead themselves and gain their own rights. Therefore, serving the society is not for the interest of the Muslim Brotherhood – in contrast, the Brotherhood will overlook their interests for the interests of the community.²

This notion that the Brotherhood is composing social reform derives from the

ideology of Hassan al-Banna, the Egyptian Brotherhood’s founder. He advocated that Islamic values be slowly introduced into society, creating manageable changes in citizens’ attitudes toward Islam before these values reach the state level. The leader of the ‘Hawks’ wing, Zakī bin Arshīd, adds that, “The Islamic movement is ideological, political, and idealistic due to its Islamic ruling. Its aims are the improvement and peaceful change of society through social work”. The model of change begins with small communities in order to create success stories before they flourish into larger communities, cities, and eventually the whole country. Al-Gharāybah furthers this with:

We would like to change systematic values in the community, because values are the borders of culture and [the Brotherhood] participates in raising the level of awareness to make society a coherent fabric. This goes together with the economic change in which the Brotherhood can support the situation of poverty, unemployment, and production.

The understanding between the Muslim Brotherhood and King ʿAbdallah I and King Hussein regarding how the state should be ruled, how Islamic values should be implemented, and how the Palestinian issue should be addressed, was reason for this relationship to flourish, ensuring unified goals in the midst of regional turmoil.

However, when King ʿAbdallah II came to power, the Brotherhood had to compromise with its gradual change as the new regime typically expressed different goals. Therefore, this is a study of alliances and crises between the Jordanian regime and the Brotherhood, demonstrating that the two rely on one another for legitimacy and their own stability.

The concept of the ‘regime’ in this study is an umbrella term for the monarchy, its rules, and those who fervently follow it. This latter group consists of officials appointed by the King such as the prime minister, government, parliament, security departments, and royalist civilians who support the monarchy’s existence, as they believe this will ensure their own survival. Furthermore, businessmen also link themselves to the monarchy to protect their capital under the King’s rule. This group, consisting mostly of Jordanian and tribal descendants, work as the King’s camarilla,

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3 Interview with Zakī bin Arshīd, August 31, 2012, Amman, Jordan.
and are rewarded for their loyalty with a larger presence in high governmental positions. Indeed, the monarchy can be separated from the regime, but the regime is inseparable from the monarchy. And so, when the Muslim Brotherhood deals with the regime, they are dealing with this royal cabal throughout parliament, government, and in the Jordanian streets.

Currently, however, the Brotherhood has declared its permanent boycott of elections, which makes Jordan risk disturbance due to the loss of the Brotherhood’s compatibility with Jordan’s democratic and parliamentarian system, ending the era of alliances with the regime since the establishment of the country and the Muslim Brotherhood in 1945/6.

These alliances during Jordan’s history enabled them to move past challenging situations and to eliminate any emerging opposition to the regime from different ideological sources, such as the Leftists, Nationalists, and the Fedayeen that also opposed the Brotherhood. This meant that their threats united them, and they pragmatically allied to fight others.

However, King ʿAbdallah II’s mission to eliminate the Brotherhood, shutting down any avenue for communication, in contrast with the previous King’s policies of dialogue and alliance, caused the Brotherhood to push for the latest boycott in 2010. This clash is due to the absence of mutual opposition, the growing power of the Jordanian Brotherhood, and lack of communication, which left no space for both parties to work independently without opposing the other. In this situation a new wing has formed within the movement, turning against the regime, and external from the accountability of the political system. If sustained, this may eventually cause a growing revolutionary rhetoric, causing similar confrontations between the Brotherhood and regime as seen in neighbouring countries during the Arab Spring.

This poses the main question of this study: ‘Is the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood compatible with Jordan’s modern political system?’

The study contextualises this question by looking to the Brotherhood’s historical experience as an association before 1989, and its participation as a political party in the parliamentary elections post-1989. In doing so, it traces the stances and transformations within the movement from participation to boycott, from modernity to radicalism, and from a positive to a negative actor towards Jordan’s parliamentarian system.

In order to answer this question and understand the unique relationship with
the regime, the study comprises five chapters in its main body, tracing the Brotherhood’s timeline from early participation in politics to their final boycott.

Chapter One, ‘The Establishment’, poses the sub-question ‘How did the regime and Brotherhood’s relationship evolve?’, highlighting the Brotherhood’s national role after Jordan’s 1946 independence, and the merger between the Brotherhood’s Jordanian and Palestinian branches to present the vital role of the Palestinian issue in the movement since its establishment.

In the second chapter, ‘A Group not a Party: the Marriage of Convenience’, the study asks ‘How did the Brotherhood enter politics, and what were the conditions of their early participation?’ This chapter looks to the nature of the Brotherhood’s alliances with the Leftists and Nationalists, and sudden change of direction, favouring the regime. It will also trace the Brotherhood’s role in Jordan’s wars with Israel, the Civil War of 1970-1971, and the Brotherhood’s use of violence during this period.

The third chapter, ‘The Fusion of the Muslim Brotherhood: The Crisis from Within’, proposes the question of ‘What were the reasons for the crisis with the regime, and how did the Brotherhood decide on its first boycott?’ To do this, the re-establishment of political life in 1989 is analysed, specifically in regards to the Muslim Brotherhood’s role in the government. This will help us understand the Brotherhood’s usage of boycotting as a strategy to pressurise the government for political changes.

Chapter Four, ‘From Boycott to Participation,’ asks ‘What were the reasons for the Muslim Brotherhood returning to political participation?’, tackling the Brotherhood’s internal divisions and changes of leadership between 1998 and 2003, and the influence on the pragmatism of the movement therein.

In contrast, Chapter Five, ‘Participation to Boycott: Radicalisation’ deals with the question ‘How did the rise of other Islamic movements, such as the Salafists, impact the Brotherhood?’, within the context of growing jihadism and Hamas’ success in 2006. This chapter also looks to the Brotherhood’s participation in a supposedly defrauded election, and its impact on their decision to boycott the political process in 2010 indefinitely.

Answering these five sub-questions provides reasoning for the Brotherhood’s participation and boycott. Through these questions the study identifies the compatibility of the Brotherhood with the democratic Jordanian system, and further predicting how the movement would manage power in Jordan if it were to obtain it.

Tracing the history of the movement and its guiding ideologies, juxtaposed
with personal interviews of current and ex-members, a multi-criteria perspective is gained, in which the overall findings imply an emerging direction for the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, with unprecedented fundamental internal divisions.

Literature Review: Political Islam and the Modern State

The emergence of the modern state system can be traced back to the early 17th and 18th century European experiences. The English revolution of 1688 and the French revolution of 1799 both pushed for state reformation, in which the state would become an entity representative of the people, rather than the traditional system of a king supported by God. This system would emphasise the role of the parliaments in the state as legislature, citizenship, and equality, accountable by law. Therefore, these events marked the beginning of the establishment of a national modern state built on man-made laws, separating the church and state. Max Weber says that the modern state:

Possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organised activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulation, are orientated. This system of orders claims binding authority not only over members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over all actions taking place in the area of its jurisdiction.5

Therefore, the modern state retains sole legitimacy of the use of violence, and equally applies its laws on all citizens. These revolutions were a tool for reformatting the state beliefs and ideologies of the population. In the same strain, the Arab Spring revolutions brought back the controversial question of political Islam’s adaptability with the modern state era, since political Islam proposed itself as an alternative to failing regimes. Therefore two arguments arise, whether political Islam is compatible or incompatible with the modern state system.

Incompatibility

Samuel P. Huntington’s *Clash of Civilisations*,\(^6\) states that political Islam is incompatible with the modern state era. He divides the world into eight civilisations under the premise that culture is the only determinant of civilisational divide, warning that the most probable struggle in this era would be between Western and Islamic civilisation. Bernard Lewis furthered this argument in *What went wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East*,\(^7\) where he compares political Islam’s confrontation with the West in the 21st century to their confrontation in the Dark Ages. Here he suggests that contrarily during Europe’s Dark Ages, Islam was a religion that supported the development of modernity and the concept of a civil state in contrast to the West, which, as led by Christianity, descended into obscurity. Lewis then emphasises the idea that with the failure of the Ottoman Empire, and without a central government for Islam to organise a political system, political Islam failed to create peace with the West, or with the new countries that were established upon the collapsed empire, thus making political Islam a reason for the failure.

Ultimately, both Huntington and Lewis understand the cultural and religious differences of Islam and the West as naturally positioning Islam as an adversary, making the chance of conflict higher, particularly based on religious disparities. Furthermore, both authors consider political Islam as incompatible with a modern state because it does not separate between ‘church and state’, and democracy does not exist within Islamic scripture. Thus they argue that Islam is unable to build the modern democratic state that is required for survival in the new world era; rather political Islam’s aim to build a theocratic state would be the reason for a continuation of aggression with the West, and the failure in development of Islamic countries that would use political Islam in power.

Huntington and Lewis reach their conclusions because the essence of political Islam is in the establishment of the caliphate and the application of *Shari'ah* law, which would then be the foundation of the Islamic state. In this sense, political Islam is theocratic at its core, as its goals are to make God the only ruler of the state, with his rules enforced by interpretations of scripture and subsequent teachings of Islam.

Alternatively, the civil state calls for the application of a democratic system, and the equality between citizens, and legislature passed through parliament

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accordingly. As US President Abraham Lincoln argued, democracy is a “government of people by the people for the people”;

8 which fundamentally contradicts political Islam, as God and his Sharī'ah – not the people – rule the Islamic state.

The interpretation that the Islamic state is theocratic is found in the concept of al-Hākimīyah [The Principle of Divine Governance], which was elaborated by the Bengali Islamist philosopher Abu-'l-A‘lā Mawdūdī. Al-Hākimīyah posits that God can be the only ruler and source of legislation and governance in the Islamic state, as an: “Whoever does not judge by what God has revealed-then it is those who are disbelievers,”

9 which indicates that deviating from God’s path is un-Islamic. Therefore, Mawdūdī suggests that by giving power to the people, and allowing them the ability to legislate laws, is to allow man to sit on God’s thrown.

Similarly, the famous Egyptian Islamist philosopher and Muslim Brother Sayyid Qutb emphasises that following God’s rules is the only way to rule Islamically. He says, “God, not humans, must rule. God is the source of all powers, including politics. Virtue, not freedom, is the best human value, therefore it must be the law of God [Sharī'ah], not human-made laws that rules any society”.

Therefore, according to al-Hākimīyah, political Islam is incompatible with democracy, something that is explained by the Egyptian intellectual Rifā‘ah al-Ṭahāwī in this manner: “this is because the rule of freedom and democracy consists of imparting justice and right to the people and the nation’s participation in determining its destiny.”

The argument that Islam is incompatible with democracy essentially comes from the contradiction between God’s rules and people’s rules – i.e., between manmade legislation and God’s legislation. Ultimately, however, this is to say that those who interpret God’s rules are the ones who make the Islamic state theocratic. However, it is debated as to what extent applying Sharī'ah makes the state theocratic,
and how applicable political Islam is to democracy.

Compatibility

Conversely, John Esposito’s collective work\(^\text{13}\) emphasises the compatibility of political Islam to the modern state system as Islam is continuously in transition. He argues that any future development in understanding democracy and the parliamentary system will be due to the reformist ‘Ulamāʾ in Islam who continuously propose new understandings and readings of scripture and teachings.

Esposito highlights the experience of the 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century reformists, namely Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ‘Abduh, and Rashīd Riḍā, who helped renew the religion by reactivating the concept of Ḥiṭḥād [diligence/independent reasoning]. This asserts the right for individuals to analyse the Qurṭān and the Sunnah independently from scholars’ understandings, opening the door for all kinds of reinterpretations of Islam in the face of modern politics. The introduction of individual adaptability has made political Islam pragmatic, and applicable to every situation as the texts are no longer fixed, but transient.

Furthermore, Olivier Roy claims in *The Failure of Political Islam*\(^\text{14}\) that political Islam is not the problem; rather it is the crises that the Islamic states already experience. He argues that since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the modern Islamic state has fallen into a cultural, political, and economic crisis under military, monarchic, and authoritarian regimes. In response to the failure to build economic and cultural stability, which further divided Muslims, the revival of political Islam was used as a tool for reforming and rebuilding the modern state by looking to previous experiences of Muslims’ unity and modernity, which happened to be within the Islamic caliphate, since secular and authoritarian states did not present viable alternatives.

However, these authoritarian regimes would not allow a space to apply political Islam, therefore we do not have a modern example for the political establishment of Islam; conversely, these regimes utilise political Islam to empower their ruling, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the failure of political Islam can be thought of in regards to the regimes, not political Islam.


The argument that the Islamic state is modern and civil is based on the assertion that Islam has organised and allowed legal systems through treaties to organise civilians, rather than just relying on Shari‘ah. The Islamic lawyer and scholar, Muḥammad Salīm ‘Awwā, argues in his book *Fī al-Nizām al-Siyāsī lil-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah* [In the Political System of the Islamic State] that Islam is a fully civil state, and that it has been constitutional since its establishment before the West had even established the concept of the modern state system. Here he refers to the first treaty in Islam, the ‘al-Madina treaty’ of 623 BC, as the first constitution of Islam, which organised the relationship between all groups in al-Madina, whether Muslims themselves, or Muslims and non-Muslims, granting equality and justice, and equal rights to practice religion. This united all religions and tribes together against any threat al-Madina faced.

‘Awwā furthers this claim by arguing that during the Prophet’s time the rulers of the Islamic state were not chosen based on *al-Hākimīyah* or religious qualifications, but rather their vocational experience in leadership positions. ‘Awwā uses the example of the appointment of Khālid bin al-Walīd and ‘Amr bin al-‘Āṣ as leaders for the Islamic armies despite being newly converted to Islam, which demonstrates the priority of success over religiosity. This claim of Islam as a civil state, constitutional and competent, over religiosity, found legal ground with Sāmir Māzin Qubbaj, who argues that the laws within the caliphate were Islamic despite being man-made. This is seen with the 1877 Ottoman *Majallat al-ʿĀḥkām al-ʿAdliyah* [Meccelles/Civil code], which was the first document of laws applicable to all Islamic states and territories that fell under Ottoman power. This document was enacted to unite the Islamic judiciary since judges around the Islamic state, from different sects and backgrounds, were making different judgements. Therefore, this constitution united Islam under a civil code that engendered equality and justice according to Shari‘ah law.

Therein, ‘Awwā and Qubbaj are against the argument that Islam is a theocratic state, rejecting any man-made laws, stating that it was built under civil laws that use Shari‘ah as a source – but not the sole reference – for the state. This interpretation for

the format of Islamic legislation is built on a former generation of Islamic scholars, such as Rashīd Riḍā, who said, “all issues in the Islamic state must be derived from a constitution that relies on the Qurʾān, Sunnah, and the al-Khulafāʾ al-Rāshidūn [the first four ‘rightly guided’ caliphs after the Prophet]”. This means that the Islamic state relies on Islam as a source for the constitution but not a full constitution alone. This therefore permits human laws, and the introduction of other experiences from the world’s constitutions and laws, and allows Islam to work within a modern state system.

However, the modern, independent states, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, began to create their own laws, constitutions, and parliamentary systems copying the European model when creating a modern state, as often Europeans drew these mandates. The theocrats saw this as a replacement for Shariʿah, leading some, such as Issam al-Barqawi, a Jordanian Salafist scholar, to call democracy a religion of its own, and its followers and those who apply the parliamentary system, Kuffār. Others, such as the Egyptian theologian Yūsuf al-Qarḍāwī, and the intellectual leader of the Tunisian Ennahda Movement, Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, look to the parliament as synonymous with Islam’s Shoura concept of mutual consultation, asserting the right to engage in politics by entering the parliament through elections. They see a greater value for Islam and Muslims in participating and adapting the democratic system, rather than rejecting it. Using scriptural texts, such as verses from the Qurʾān, they demonstrate the justifications and compatibility of Islam to the Shoura, as seen with: “And those who have responded to their Lord and established prayer and whose affair is [determined by] consultation among themselves…” and “…so pardon them and ask for forgiveness for them and consult them in the matter…” Thus, they draw their interpretation of Islam as a comprehensive system for all aspects of life including politics, which they believe cannot be separated from Islam, as well as Shariʿah, which is vital for the application of Islam.

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22 The Qurʾān, 42:38.
23 Ibid., 3:159.
Within their encouragement of the adaptability to democracy, they thought that a Muslim lawmaker, elected by the people, would not issue a law to restrict or harm Islam. Rather, they would use their background of Islamic teaching to protect Islam, and issue laws more compatible with it. Al-Qaraḍāwī went further by administering a Fatwa [obligation] to Muslims to protect Islam and to prove its civility. Those who argue Islam’s compatibility with democracy balance the goals of political Islam in creating the caliphate and the application of Sharīʿah with modern states, by accepting parliamentary systems and the man-made laws of the parliament. This insinuates that democracy might be a tool for Islamic movements to gain power, whilst still recognising that they could revert to theocracy once established.

In contrast to others, such as Syrian Brotherhood scholar, Saʿīd Hawwá, the Shoura is not seen as identical to democracy, but in fact a total antithesis, as Hawwá denotes in his book Jund Allāḥ [Soldiers of God]:

Democracy is a Greek term which signifies sovereignty of the people, the people being the source of legitimacy; it is the people who legislate and rule. As for the Shura, it denotes consultation [by the ruler] with a person or persons with regard to the interpretation of a certain point of Islamic law. In Islam, the people do not govern themselves by laws they make on their own, as in democracy; rather the people are governed by a regime and a set of laws imposed by God, which they cannot change or modify in any case.

Like most Islamic movements today, the Muslim Brotherhood maintains its goal of applying Sharīʿah law and building a caliphate. However, Brotherhood members fall into internal disagreements regarding what the state should look like, and whether democracy is the best route to achieving this goal.

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24 Fatwa: Scholarly opinion on a matter of Islamic law. See Appendix 1: Glossary.
The Muslim Brotherhood

The Brotherhood accepts democracy as a tool in creating Islamic change, following the example of the movement’s founder, al-Banna, who entered politics to demonstrate its importance in implementing Shari’ah. When preaching this political participation to the movement, al-Banna said:

We took the step to enter this field [parliament election] sincerely and innocently. We have nothing motivating us but love, goodness, our concern for the public’s interests, vigilance in protecting our holy Da’wah, and our desire to declare the message of Islamic reform from this official platform [parliament] as soon as possible.27

With these words he embodied political participation within the movement and made parliament the only platform on which the Muslim Brotherhood could initiate gradual change, making democracy an essential tool for the movement. This was applied within the movement in the form of its internal structure, the Shoura Council, and the internal elections that choose its leadership and representatives, making the Brotherhood a model for Islamic movements embodying models of democracy internally, and participating within a modern state system.

However, the movement still engenders reasons to push for a theocratic state. Al-Banna declared in an article:

We [the Muslim Brotherhood] are at war against every leader (president) or a leader of a political party, or entity, which does not work for the solidarity of Islam, and does not march in the way to bring Islamic rule and Islamic glory. We will declare it as a fight. No peace in it, and no negotiations with it, until God opens between us and between our people with righteousness and he is the best opener.28

It could be argued based on this statement that the Muslim Brotherhood is in a continuous struggle to bring Islam back to society, and is prepared to use violence to meet that goal. Furthermore, Sayyid Qutb’s assertion of the al-Hākimīyah concept left

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a portion of the Brotherhood with the belief that democracy and parliament are not replacements for God’s rule. These contradictions give rise to the question: What would the Brotherhood do if they came to power? Would they continue to accept the civil state system and democracy, or are democracy and parliament stepping-stones to the conquest of power, at which point they would revert to the theocratic system?

This study brings forth an understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political participation using the Jordanian branch as a model for the application of the movement’s ideologies, and the division the Brotherhood experiences regarding the issue of participation within the Jordanian political system. This study builds on political Islam studies with the example of the Jordanian Brotherhood’s interaction within the parliamentary system, which helped to understand how other Brotherhood branches and other Islamic movements would act if they came to power democratically.

Methodology

This research presents the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood as a case study to understand their process of participation in, and compatibility with, the Jordanian parliamentary system. With close attention to the movement, its driving beliefs and internal structures, its practical application of political Islam will be highlighted with deep analysis of the Brotherhood’s ideology behind establishing an Islamic society.

By delineating organisational changes such as the Brotherhood’s transformation from a modern to a politically estranged movement, and its core ideology, strategies, and structure, the study presents detailed observations of how these factors affected the movement’s adaptation into the Jordanian political environment. With close analysis, the study will also look to how these factors allowed the Brotherhood to develop a dynamic relationship with the regime.

This study does not follow a particular model of analysis, however, it standardises a chronological timeline with which it is possible to locate the exact points of change in the Brotherhood and regime’s relationship. Therein, an analysis of pre-and post-1989 events will be used as an historical approach to contextualise and investigate the Brotherhood in Jordan and its decline in regime-relations.

This approach also allows an illumination of how political struggles in Jordan have emerged, developed, and changed relationships between different political actors.
The main purpose of this is to define the actors’ interests, and the structure of power within the Brotherhood, and with the regime. Furthermore, by looking past the Brotherhood and regime’s differences, and critically analysing them as part of the same system, it is possible to demonstrate their co-dependence, which is crucial to understanding their relationship.

Therefore, this study uses primary sources split into four distinct categories. Firstly, historical documents and memoirs of key political players during Jordan’s creation, secondly ideological literature that founded the Brotherhood, followed by contemporary Brotherhood literature, and finally personal interviews with Brotherhood members conducted by the researcher. These fundamental sources are then contrasted against contemporary secondary sources that map Jordan’s history and the development of political Islam, presenting a comprehensive and thorough analysis of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood as it stands today.

**Primary Sources**

- **Historical Texts**

Utilising an historical approach to assemble a new perspective of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s key events during its early history, the study uses two key memoirs spanning the 1930s to 1960s. Sir John Bagot Glubb, also known as Glubb Pasha, who led the Arab legion between 1939 and 1959, documented his experiences in *Soldier with the Arabs*.\(^{29}\) This memoir provides a detailed account of key developments, such as Jordan’s independence from the British mandate in 1946.

Furthermore, Charles Hepburn Johnson, a British ambassador to Jordan from 1956 to 1959, assumed Glubb Pasha’s role in chronicling Jordan in the memoir, *The Brink of Jordan*.\(^{30}\) This text minutely documents events as they unfurled, such as the coup attempt in 1957, and the Leftist-Brotherhood clash, which remains undocumented elsewhere. Johnson recorded the daily developments of these events with exclusive insight and almost literary description.

- **Ideological Histories**

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In a similar strain, the respective literature of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb are presented as the primary sources and historical foundations for the Brotherhood’s ideology as it stands today. By founding the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hassan al-Banna is a key figure in the introduction of Islam as a political force. His efforts to reform the religion and society appear particularly in Majmūʻat Rasā’il al-Imām al-Shahīd Hasan al-Bannā [The Collection of the Messages of the Martyr Imam Hassan al-Banna], a collection of letters responding to the main issues facing Islam in the 1960s as he saw them. These messages and letters are a clarification of the Brotherhood’s commitment to the Da‘wah [proselytisation] as a path for the movement to create Islamic change societally, and the pragmatism the movement must foster therein, primarily by participating in politics. It also outlines the Muslim Brotherhood’s efforts in creating an Islamic Ummah [Nation].

Al-Banna includes letters intending to shape society with his understanding of Islam, referencing elections, education, and jihad [struggle] as ways for the il will be revisited at every stage of this study as al-Banna’s main methodology reflects how the Brotherhood system works today.

Furthermore, the ideological development of the Muslim Brotherhood can also be seen in the literature of Sayyid Qutb. As an ʻālim [Islamic Scholar] who facilitated a violent understanding of political Islam, his two books, al-Tašwīr al-Fannī fī al-Qur`ān [The Artistic Articulation in the Quran], and Maʻālim fī al-Tariq [Milestones] present the Brotherhood’s ideological divergence from al-Banna’s teachings.

- The General Muslim Brotherhood

Presenting recent analyses and accounts of al-Banna and Qutb’s texts, the literature of Muslim Brotherhood members is used. Whilst these texts serve clear agendas for (and sometimes against) the Brotherhood, this study draws from these biases and disparate understandings of the movement’s purposes to reveal the emerging divisions within the

movement. Furthermore, these texts are useful as they delve into the Brotherhood’s founding histories and ideologies, presenting compelling contrasts with secondary sources that have the same objectives, but employ different angles.

In regards to al-Banna, the founding father of the movement, Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī,34 ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Naqīb, Sayyid Daṣūqī Ḥasan, and ‘Adnān abū ‘Āmīr,35 present interpretations of al-Banna’s letters and messages to fit current events that effect the Brotherhood’s political struggle, highlighting his leading concepts such as democracy, and electoral participation. Through their analyses, these authors determine how the Brotherhood must function according to al-Banna, and the end-goal of the Islamic state.

Further, the study looks to interpretations of Sayyid Qutb’s methodology and its impact on violence and radicalism, as seen with the work of John Calvert’s Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism,36 which shows the influence of Qutb in contemporary Islamist terrorism. This secondary source is pitted against Brotherhood members’ literatures that present Qutb as having a peaceful manner, arguing that his tendency towards violent speech was related to personal strife. This is demonstrated in Muhammad Ghaḍbān’s Sayyid Qutb Didda al-‘Unf [Sayyid Qutb Against Violence], which defends Qutb by suggesting that his Fatwas were reactions to the growing nationalism and materialism resultant of the Soviet and US conflict.37

The study also builds a comparison between the two founders of the movement’s ideology with the aid of Minhaj al-Tagḥīr ‘inda al-Shahīdān Ḥasan al-Banna” wa Sayyid Qutb [The Approach to Change according to the Two Martyrs Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb]. In this text, ‘Abd al-Qādir abū Fāris discusses the origins of Qutb and al-Banna’s thinking, and their impact on the application of political Islam in the modern state system.38

To present the Egyptian Brotherhood’s history and context, further memoirs

Abbās Ḥasan Sīrī,39 Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm,40 and Ṣalāh Shādī,41 whose documentation of events the Brotherhood experienced reveal the internal dialogues and actions of the movement. For instance, these texts disclose previously unknown accounts of the Brotherhood’s use of violence against Nasser, its participation in the wars against Israel, and the application of al-Banna and Qutb’s ideologies within the movement both when they were active, and posthumously.

- The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood

Honing in on the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members themselves, their differing ideologies and beliefs regarding the application of political Islam in Jordan through the parliamentary system, further primary sources comprise discussions of Jordanian Brothers through memoirs and records such as Bassām Amūsh’s, Maḥṭattat fī Tārīkh Jamāʿat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdunn [Stations in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan].42 This text is of great importance as the author is an ex-member and offers criticism to the movement’s stances and actions from an insider’s perspective. Compounded with leaving the Brotherhood on bad terms, Amūsh is also of Jordanian origin, meaning he tends to side with the regime. This dynamic presents a unique perspective into the Brotherhood’s inner workings, with the text presenting a collection of interviews Amūsh conducted with Jordanian members and the political leadership, specific observations, letters, speeches, and other vital information that has not previously been recorded. For instance, he provides description and insight into the Shuyākh bases,43 and includes his correspondence with the Brotherhood in the aftermath of Jordan’s Wadi Arabah peace treaty with Israel.

Similarly, current Brotherhood member, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir abū Fāris, wrote Manhaj al-Harakah al-Islāmīyah fī al-Taghyīr [The Methodology of the

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41 Ṣalāh Shādī, Ṣafahat min al-Tārīkh: Ḥasād al-ʿumr [Pages of Bitter Harvest], (Kuwait: Sharikat al-Shuʿāʾ, 2006).
43 Shuyākh: singular of Shuyākh, which in the Jordanian accent refers to leadership of religious background. Al-Shuyākh resistance bases were formed in Jordan during the 1967 war.
Islamic Movement in Making Change], which presents a general history of the purposes of the Brotherhood’s call. The Brotherhood recommends this text to all new members, signifying its relevance to internal structures.\textsuperscript{44} Abū Fāris’ literature, including \textit{Ṣafāḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyyāsī lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdunn} [Pages from the Political History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], outlines the Brotherhood’s framework. Here he demarks the main principles of the Brotherhood, and denotes its goals. Furthermore, in these texts he states that Jordan is part of the \textit{ah}. This means that he wants Jordan to be a theocratic state. However, he does suggest that Jordan is not the best-suited place to build the Islamic state, but rather it should be thought of as an Islamic base to begin the Brotherhood’s gradual changes that will allow the creation of the Islamic state, thus making Jordan part of the Islamic \textit{Ummah}. Therefore, despite the Jordanian movement holding from within aspects of theocratic understandings for the state, it does mean that the movement wishes to apply these understandings in Jordan. In \textit{Ṣafāḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyyāsī} [Pages from the Political History], abū Fāris affirms that Jordan is part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s global organisation, and their main focus is the Palestinian case, for which they must prepare and provide all the financial and spiritual elements necessary to liberate Palestine.\textsuperscript{45} Therefore, the framework that abū Fāris sets out resists the argument of whether Jordan is a theocratic or civil state, since it is a platform for the movement and not the centre of its goals and makes the main purpose of the movement in Jordan to make the country a stage for supporting Palestine. This means that their understanding of the movement is as a regional tool rather than a national, Jordanian movement.

His text, which focuses on gradual Islamic change, favours al-Banna’s example of political participation, and al-Qaraḍāwī’s \textit{fatwas} in upholding politics as a means for social change rather than to just obtain power. However, in accordance with his understanding of a theocratic state, he still acknowledges Qutb’s teachings, which indicates the movement is trying to balance both ideologies, even if al-Banna’s founding principles are still momentous. This means that there may be a dilemma of which scholar to follow if they came to power – the theocratic or the civil state leader.

Beside abū Fāris’ writings, the Jordanian Brotherhood’s literature is very


much concerned with Islamic history, *Fiqh* [Jurisprudence], and interpretations of Qutb and al-Banna, rather than the Jordanian movement itself or its politics. However, due to their political positions, some members, such as Ishāq Ḩamad Farḥān, have felt the need to express the movement’s stances on political matters, as seen in the two volumes of *Mawāqif wa-Ārā’ Siyāsīyyah fī Qaḍāyā ‘Arabīyyah wa-Islāmīyyah* [Political Positions and Opinions on Arabic and Islamic Issues].

Similarly, the Brotherhood’s former parliamentarian, Hamzah Mansūr, recorded all of his speeches and letters to the government in a study entitled *Kalimāt wa-Mawāqif* [Words and Stands], to document the period of his leadership in the Muslim Brotherhood parliamentary block between 1993 and 1997.

As is the case with primary sources, the texts are unreliable. This can be seen particularly with Bassūm Amūsh’s *Maḥattāt*, which is fragmented, lacking chronological order, complete interviews, and strays from any possible sub-headed theme. It is therefore the reader’s job to fill in the gaps and complete the work, which is only possible through accurate comparisons with secondary sources. It is also important to remember that some authors-cum-activists, such as Amūsh, are acting independently of the Brotherhood, or even against it, while others, such as Mansour, try to justify key decisions from the Brotherhood’s perspective solely. Comparing these literatures with secondary sources presents a fuller picture and the reasons beyond how or why the Brotherhood has taken its particular stances towards the regime. Therefore, in the essence of reaching clarity and accuracy, the researcher has checked the Brotherhood’s statements and communiqués at the Ummah Centre for Strategic Studies in Jordan, where original documents are archived.

**Secondary Sources**

The secondary sources of this study look to historical works such as Philip Robins’ *The

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48 The Ummah Centre for Strategic Studies, which is run by the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Jordan, conducts studies related to election results. The official website is: http://www.alummacenter.net/.
History of Jordan,\textsuperscript{49} which presents an insight into the foundations of the country, highlighting King Hussein’s experiences and stances. The study also uses Shmuel Bar’s, The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, which provides a retrospective historical account of the movement’s establishment from the creation of Transjordan in 1921 focusing primarily on the Brotherhood’s political participation.\textsuperscript{50} Bar follows political events that the Brotherhood experienced during its establishment with little attention to later events such as the Civil War of 1970, and the 1989 riots. Therefore, despite the importance of Bar’s analysis of the early stages of the movement, his book does not provide an overall picture of the Brotherhood’s role in internal events that had a valuable influence on the democratisation of Jordan, such as the participation of the Brotherhood within politics. Ultimately, however, the book is limited to pre-1997 events, which obviously precede the Brotherhood’s boycott of elections. Since this is a pivotal point for the Brotherhood’s development of stances and alliances, further reading is required to gain understanding of the Brotherhood as it stands today. Therefore the work of Bar and Robins will be compared to the work of Glubb Pasha and Charles Johnson whose memoirs require secondary readings to provide wider understanding of the creation of the country and birth of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood.

Building on the works of Robins and Bar, Muḥammad Sulaymān abū Rummān provides additional analysis in his book, al-Ḥall al-Islāmī fī al-Urdunn [The Islamic Solution in Jordan].\textsuperscript{51} This text uses 1989 as a focal point of the democratisation of Jordan, and the involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood in parliament. This therefore brings analyses of more contemporary practices of the Brotherhood, in contrast to Bar and Robins.

In his books, abū Rummān argues that the Brotherhood is not a central Islamic movement in Jordan, and it is in the process of changing regarding its popularity, which was combined with the loss of seats in the last parliamentary elections that the Brotherhood joined. He attributes this diminishing popularity to the continuous clash with the government and the increasing division between members of

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{49 Philip J. Robins, \textit{A History of Jordan}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).}
\footnote{50 Shmuel Bar, \textit{The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan}, (Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1998).}
\end{footnotesize}
the movement that led to the loss of credibility in the streets. The importance of abū Rummān’s work comes from placing the Muslim Brotherhood on the map of Jordanian Islamic political movements, and distinguishing them from the Salafist movement in Jordan.\textsuperscript{52}

However, due to this limited exploration into the Brotherhood’s political development in Jordan, Beverley Milton-Edward’s \textit{Jordan and the Hashemite Legacy},\textsuperscript{53} is used to gleam further understanding of the relationship between the Brotherhood and the Jordanian regime, and Jordan’s application of the parliamentarian system. Milton-Edwards has written extensively on political Islam and contemporary world politics, paying particular attention to the Brotherhood’s adaptation to different environments, particularly in Jordan. Milton-Edwards and abū Rummān are compared to the work of the Muslim Brotherhood to draw opposing arguments for the reasons of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political actions.

Furthermore, this study looks to the work of Quintan Wiktorowicz, who uses a social theory approach to understand the movement. In \textit{The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafism, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan},\textsuperscript{54} Wiktorowicz analyses the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists in Jordan from a social and organisational perspective, whilst trying to compare the two. He delineates the organisational growth of the movement by analysing the application of the Brotherhood’s ideology in Jordan, as seen with its voluntary work and charity system. He also discusses the state’s regulations placed upon mosques and \textit{fatwas} to limit its movements directly prohibiting the Brotherhood’s and other Islamists movements’ activities.

Wiktorowicz argues that the state encouraged the organisational growth of the Muslim Brotherhood as a ‘formal’ social movement complying with, and operating under, the rules of the regime. Therefore, arguing that the state forbids strong movements from challenging the regime by keeping those such as the Brotherhood

\textsuperscript{52} Muḥammad Sulaymān abū Rummān, \textit{Jordanian Salafism: A Strategies for the “Islamization of Society” and an Ambiguous Relationship with the State}, (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010); Muḥammad Sulaymān abū Rummān, \textit{Anā Salaft [I am Salafist]}, (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2014).


active within what he calls the “management of the collective action”.

Wiktorowicz’s analysis, in contrast with abū Rummān and Bar, reliably accounts for the social and charitable wing of the movement, providing data of the Brotherhood’s social affects, such as the numbers of government/Brotherhood imams and preachers, and the amount of zakat [obligatory charity] distributed annually. However, he does not analyse the relationships that may affect this data, such as the Brotherhood and government’s, making his research dependent on further socio-political studies. Yet, despite avoiding the issue of the Brotherhood’s political involvement, Wiktorowicz’s study is important in understanding the growth of Islamism in Jordan, and the rise of the Brotherhood’s social power.

Ultimately, by using an historical approach of pre- and post-1989 events, and mixing interviews with analysis of primary and key secondary sources, the study objectively considers the work of the Muslim Brotherhood itself and historical memoirs written in Jordan’s early period, in light of contemporary works. Therefore, this research contributes to political Islam studies, providing the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood as a case study for the application of political Islam within the modern state, through the parliamentary system.

The study explores the relationship between the Jordanian regime and the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood from 1946 to 2010. This era witnessed world-changing events such as the Cold War, with the Middle East being an arena of extensive regional conflicts, and Jordan living under the reign of four Hashemite kings. Both the regime and the Brotherhood survived these often tumultuous times while other countries in the region, and other parties in Jordan itself, did not fare as well. Without reaping benefits from a mutually legitimising relationship, the two may not have survived independently.

This suggestion is tested and authenticated throughout this research by analysing ideological or radical disagreements between the two that have had significant effects on both the country’s and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s stability. It is the dynamics of this unique relationship that this thesis explores with discussion of the Brotherhood’s history, its various reasons for transformation, and finally the role it plays in contemporary politics.

Interviews

In order to analyse both the primary and secondary sources, and in order to create a complete understanding of the historical construction of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and its dynamic relationship with the regime, the researcher has used both quantitative and qualitative data in his research. However, the study is routed in qualitative epistemological research due to the Brotherhood’s nature, and the necessity of meeting them in person to obtain information pertaining to their decisions, who makes them, and how the movement is run. Therefore, in addition to office-based analysis of the aforementioned literatures, the study required field-based research in Jordan.

After obtaining ethical clearance from the University of East Anglia, the researcher visited the Higher Education Ministry in Jordan and obtained clearance to conduct field work in Jordan. Following this, the researcher visited a number of key Brotherhood sites in Amman, Jordan’s capital city, including the Jordanian Brotherhood’s headquarters in Abdali, and Jabhat al-‘Amal al-Islāmīl [The Islamic Action Front / IAF] in Shmasani, in addition to visits to the Islamic Hospital, the Social Centre, and to the Ummah Centre for Research in al-Weibdeh, which is an institution linked to the Brotherhood.

Although the researcher has met many Brotherhood members and leaders during this study, particularly at the Brotherhood’s headquarter and the branch in Madaba city, three personal interviews became pivotal to the study’s research, eliminating the need for other superfluous Brotherhood interviews. These three high-quality interviews were conducted with Zakī bin Arshīd, Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, and Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, and bring the study from the historical and history texts of al-Banna and Qutb, into the present, demonstrating the importance of the Brotherhood’s interactions with the regime and political Islam today.

Arshīd, who was head of the Brotherhood’s political wing when the interview was conducted, and was later made Deputy Supervisor of the movement, leads the Hawks wing of the movement, and plays an essential role in both the Brotherhood and this study. His statements present insight into the hows and why’s of the movement’s decisions and stances, whether in political participation, or boycott, particularly regarding issues such as the peace treaty with Israel. A further dimension was later added to this interview as soon after the interview was conducted, Arshīd was
arrested and imprisoned due to statements regarding Jordan and neighbouring countries. The interview’s value increased significantly following these events, and provides an indisputable relevancy to the Brotherhood and Jordan’s internal politics in the present day.

The second interview is with al-Gharāyahbāh, a member of the Brotherhood’s Maktab al-Tanfīdhī [Executive Bureau], former head of the Ummah Centre of Research, and who is considered a leader of the Doves branch, thus opposing Arshād’s Hawks. This interview is vital as it gives insight to the Doves and their reasons for prioritising participation over boycott and keeping the Muslim Brotherhood on the path of a national agenda, in contrast to the Hawks. The al-Gharāyahbāh interview reflects the dilemmas within the Brotherhood regarding national and political identity, and is therefore key in understanding the internal discourse of the Brotherhood. Furthermore, his insights into the social wing of the movement clarify the social structure of the movement, and how individuals become members or even leaders. With this inside information, the researcher was able to detail the movement’s growth structurally and politically, feeding the research objective in understanding the Brotherhood and its relations with the regime in a national and regional context.

The final interview is with al-Mashūkhī, a former Muslim Brotherhood parliamentarian who plays an important role in historical events within the movement regarding the Syrian Brotherhood, and Jordan’s 1970 Civil War. Over the past decade, al-Mashūkhī has gained a larger role within the movement due to the conflicting ideology between the Hawks and Doves, presenting a third way for the movement. The al-Mashūkhī interview is vital to support these claims, with his statements used to build a picture of the development of this internal division and the actions that caused a new wing to form. Al-Mashūkhī’s interview is vital for the fabric and detailing of this study, as it reveals previously undisclosed information pertaining to his imprisonment and altercations with the regime. This interview not only clarifies the development of a new wing, but it also gives a detailed account of the specific reasons for the divergence politically and ideologically within the Brotherhood, which inform the findings of this research and empower its argument.

As mentioned, the researcher interviewed other Brotherhood personalities, such as Jamīl Abū Bakr, the speaker of the movement, and Nabīl Kūfahī, a former Brotherhood parliamentarian. However, due to the events that the Brotherhood experienced in the period of this study, from 2010 – 2015, the Brotherhood were
cautious, and conservative in their statements. Therefore, Jamīl Abū Bakr withdrew from the interviews after rearranging them several times, whilst others apologised and cancelled on the day of the interview, such as Kūfahī. However, the focus on the three key interviews derives from them being leaders of the three wings the study sought to identify, and due to the importance of these personalities politically, socially, and historically. The quality and specificity of these interviews eclipsed the others, and were used extensively for this reason.

The interview questions were uniform in structure and idea across all three interviews, however the researcher allowed flexibility for the interviewee to open the doors for other questions, or to suggest different issues related to the study. Some interviewees used this as a chance to impose themselves and forward questions to themselves in order to make propagandist statements, however the researcher was prepared for this and decided what was compatible or not to the study, and would return the interviewee to the original question if necessary.

Furthermore, despite the uniformity of these questions, the researcher altered the theme of the questions according to each leader’s position and experience. For example, Arshīd was asked more specific questions regarding the peace treaty with Israel, whilst it was more appropriate to ask al-Gharāybah questions regarding division and leadership within the Brotherhood, and questions regarding specific historical events and the Brotherhood’s relations with other Islamic movements were more suited to al-Mashūkhī.

Because the Brotherhood is highly organised and beaurocratically structured, consent for the interviews had to come from the movement first, before contacting individual members. Therefore, the interviewees’ agreement to participate in the research was on the condition of firstly making an appointment with the Brotherhood’s headquarters and providing a paper from the university and an explanation of the research. Once granted permission to interview the members of the movement, the researcher was provided with contact details for the leaders’ offices so the researcher could directly contact them and arrange phone calls, meetings, and finally the interviews, based on the interviewees’ availability. Naturally, all interviews were conducted on a voluntary basis without obligation.

Before all interviews, the researcher presented a letter from the university to prove his credentials, in addition to the consent letter stating the purpose of the interview and a statement that the research was being conducted for a Ph.D. program in
the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of East Anglia, and was purely academic in nature. The statement also included that the interviewee was free to participate in the interview, or leave it at any time.

All interviews took place in the offices of the interviewees, except al-Mashūkhī, who requested the interview to take place in his house. Following Jordan’s culture, the researcher was treated as a guest and therefore accepted offerings of hot and cold beverages during the interviews, however no gifts were offered or received.

As the researcher comes from the same culture, he understands the details of how to behave and treat his interviewees, such as not crossing legs whilst speaking, and how to politely frame questions. The researcher also met representatives from the Sisterhood branches of the Brotherhood, and therefore followed Islamic customs of not initiating handshakes, and ensuring all venues were in public places and the interviews remained professional. The researcher was also required to consider dress code for religious and cultural purposes, and ensured appropriate attire during all interviews.

Although the researcher agreed with most interviewees that they would be recorded, some members, such as Arshīd, preferred the researcher to take notes, whilst al-Mashūkhī only permitted a recording once he had gained trust with the researcher. All interviews were conducted in Arabic, and were translated into English prior to their use within the study.

These three actors are key to determining the internal divisions within the Brotherhood, and present different driving ideologies that have split the movement. It is through these interviews that exclusive insight is gained into the movement, as personal interviews with Brotherhood members in English and academic writing are rare. Along with their contribution to the study of the Brotherhood, these interviews have allowed the researcher to determine the emerging three-way divide, which is elemental to the research’s findings.

In handling contentious questions and subjects, such as those of religion or politics, the researcher did not mention his personal views, but rather posed the questions in attribution to authors of relevant books or journals, journalists, and even the researcher’s own writing, in order to deflect the possibility of personal disagreements. Throughout the field work, the researcher was in contact with his supervisor and course director, who were made aware of the difficulties the researcher faced in securing the interviews, and the actual interview processes.

In regards to the regime, the researcher was satisfied with the books and
literature written Jordan’s present and previous royalty. However, there is also a recognised difficulty in reaching the royal family for academic research, who clearly present their perspective via comprehensive websites that are used extensively throughout this study. Therefore, the researcher used all information available to him, and used his primary sources to present the opinion of the movement in relation to pre-existing royal literature, presenting a perspective and statements that are entirely unique and original.

Obtaining information directly from the decision-makers of the Brotherhood is, in itself, far more valuable than from a filtered and peer-reviewed book. The interviews allowed the researcher to focus on the question of his study and obtain direct answers to specific questions that books cannot fulfil. Furthermore, implicit understandings were garnered from the locations of various Brotherhood sites, and inflections of tone during the interviews, providing the researcher with a comprehensive insight into many previously undisclosed attitudes of the Brotherhood leadership.

**Ending the Study in 2010**

In 2010 the Jordanian regime and the Jordanian Brotherhood experienced a milestone in their relationship and individual politics’. It was the year that the Brotherhood declared the end of its political participation, and the Jordanian regime was thrown into the Arab Spring phenomena. It was the year that the Brotherhood took its grievances to the streets, rallying citizens against the Jordanian regime, and therefore, to understand its participation in the Arab Spring, the study must end before the event actually occurred, and more importantly, this keystone year of 2010 must be fully understood.

As this study deals with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s political survival, it is only natural that the study leads up to the 2010 boycott as a climax to this study. The 2010 election is a vital turning point, representing the last participation of the Brotherhood in Jordanian politics. This thesis argues that this election was the reason for the Brotherhood’s final boycott. Therefore, the study looks to the Brotherhood’s last experience as an active participant in Jordanian politics, uncovers its reasons for the final boycott, and analyses its internal dilemmas regarding relations with the regime, thus providing understanding for why the movement continues to maintain this stance, and the effects it can/does have on Jordanian society. In
understanding these key issues, we can understand the conditions in which the Brotherhood could return to politics, the effect if it does not, and how the regime should respond to this development.

Furthermore, the 2010 election created a platform for a further division within the Jordanian Brotherhood, which lays the foundations for the argument of this thesis that the Brotherhood has furthered its division within the Hawks to create a new Hawks group that does not recognise political participation at all. This makes 2010 an essential year for predicting the Brotherhood’s next steps in and after the Arab Spring.

Using 2010 as a natural end point before Jordan and the Muslim Brotherhood entered a new and unpredictable Arab Spring age, the researcher is able to historically analyse each step of the Brotherhood’s political participation in Jordan, and how it resulted in a crisis with the regime in 2010. Ultimately, it is only through historical context that it is possible to make informed analyses and predictions of the Brotherhood’s current and future actions, and as 2010 marks the peak of a crisis between the Brotherhood and regime, it is most representative of this study, which is based on Jordanian Brotherhood and regime relations.
Chapter One  

The Establishment of the 

Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan
This chapter deals with the historical background of the Muslim Brotherhood from its emergence in Egypt, to its subsequent expansion throughout other Middle Eastern countries, resulting in its establishment in Jordan. The formation of the Jordanian Brotherhood is discussed in light of the transformation of the Emirate of Transjordan into the sovereign State of Jordan.

The timeline of this chapter follows the establishment of the Emirate of Jordan, and then observes the ideology of the Brotherhood by exploring the experiences of al-Banna and Qutb. Finally, it presents an insight to the early involvement of the Brotherhood in Jordan, its engagement in the 1948 war, and the merger with the Palestinian branch. These milestones internally define the position of the Brotherhood within the country and its relationship with the regime, and regionally in terms of the divergence from Egyptian patterns and the issue of Palestine.

1.0 Transjordan and King cAbdallah I

Transjordan was politically established in the event of the Syrian Kingdom’s downfall in 1918.1 By April 25, 1920, the San Remo Conference was held to distribute French control over Syria and Lebanon,2 and British rule over Jordan and Iraq, in application of the secret Sykes-Picot agreement of May 16, 1916.3 During this time there was a lack of unified political power in Transjordan, and in the absence of a central government, individual governments were established in different locations such as Ajloun, as led by Rāshid Khuzā’ī, Jerash, led by Muḥammad Maghribī, Dayr Yūsuf, by Kulayb al-Sharīdah, and Karak, led by Ṣāliḥ Rafīfān al-Majāli.4 On October 21, 1920, Husayn bin cAli, the Sharif [Protector] of sacred sites in Mecca sent his son, Emir cAbdallah, to Transjordan to use the territory as a base from which to fight the French.

Once there, however, the Emir made it his mission to use Jordan as a platform

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1 Zeine N., The Struggle for Arab Independence; Western Diplomacy & the Rise and Fall of Faisal’s kingdom in Syria, (Beirut: Khayat’s, 1960).
that could extend into territories already under British and French control, thus liberating the Levant from foreign control. He also planned to unite the disparate Transjordan with one government. This objective was met when Emir ʿAbdallah entered into negotiations with Winston Churchill on March 27, 1921, resulting in the establishment of the Transjordanian government under the Emir’s jurisdiction. Therefore, Transjordan’s first government, led by Rashīd Ṭalīʿ, was established on April 11, 1921, with the right to full administrative independence and support by British aid.

Furthermore, on May 25, 1923, Britain recognised the sovereignty of the Emirate of Transjordan, and by February 20, 1928, a constitution was enacted stating that Britain would relinquish its legislative and executive powers to Emir ʿAbdallah, but retained the right to keep military troops in the Transjordan territory. Transjordan remained under British control until 1946, when a treaty enabling self-determination was signed, delineating the borders of Transjordan with its neighbouring countries of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria.

The newly established Transjordan faced economic difficulties due to the lack of natural resources and infrastructure. The country was completely reliant on foreign aid from Britain, and then after its independence, from the US and Gulf states. Besides economic problems, the country faced the problem of defining its own identity. From the very beginning, Transjordan was not a nation-state, which meant that it needed to construct an identity. Emir ʿAbdallah’s desire to create a unified country was challenged by its ethnically diverse population, among which representatives of Bedouin tribes, Circassians, Turks, Kurds, Armenians, Chechens, Bedouin tribes, Circassians, Turks, Kurds, Armenians, Chechens,

and Palestinians could be distinguished. In order to mould these diverse groups together, ʿAbdallah had to construct a national identity embodying all the differences to unite them in national patriotism.\textsuperscript{12}

However, not all ethnic groups in Jordan accepted the authority of Emir ʿAbdallah, particularly those in the north, who saw the downfall of Syria correspond with Syrians’ obtaining power in Jordan, thus creating a fear of a central government run by Syrians at the expense of the individual governments. This was demonstrated in the riots of Irbid city in 1921, followed by the Adwan Rebellion in 1923, which violently rejected the exaggerated role of foreign actors in government, and the new leader’s application of the British mandate.\textsuperscript{13}

Notwithstanding these complications, Emir ʿAbdallah managed to create a semblance of a territorial identity by 1946 when Transjordan received full independence and was recognised as a sovereign Kingdom with a central government. However, it should be stated that ʿAbdallah, who became King upon independence, could not create a homogeneous Jordanian society with territorial identity alone; he also used Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood to achieve his objectives.

King ʿAbdallah I created the image of an Islamic leader by appearing at prayers, performing the pilgrimage, and introducing verses and notions of the Qurʾān in his speeches. In addition, being an outsider from Mecca gave him the advantage of not having any attachment to tribal or ethnic affiliations in Jordan. However, there were three main elements that helped realise ʿAbdallah’s nation-building plan. Firstly, the King belonged to the Hashemite family, who traced their origin from the Prophet Muhammad, thus presenting a clear religious communality between himself and the predominantly Sunni population. Secondly, King ʿAbdallah I succeeded in creating the cultural image of a pure pastoral Arab as the basis of Jordanian identity. Thirdly, the King received popular support due to his role in the Arab Revolt of 1916, which was defined in Islamic terms due to its initiation in Mecca by his father. However, it was


\textsuperscript{13} Mary C. Wilson, \textit{King Abdullah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 77-78.
also considered by Arab nationalists to have been the moment of liberation from the Ottomans, thus enriching the King’s legitimacy to lead a nascent Kingdom.\footnote{Yoav Alon, \textit{State, Tribe, and Mandate in Transjordan, 1918-1946}, (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2000).}

These elements used by the first King of Jordan to create a nation-state constructed the Jordanian identity in both religious and political terms. The religious orientation encouraged Islamic political groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to voice strong support for the King and his nation-building plan, honouring the Hashemite family. The Brotherhood found fertile soil in Jordan to distribute the ideology of Hasan al-Banna (the Egyptian founder of the Brotherhood). The Jordanian regime consisted of elements that would encourage the evolution and expansion of political Islam, and was considered by the Brotherhood to be a place where the Islamic state could be established. Against this backdrop, the Muslim Brotherhood’s branch in Jordan was established. Furthermore, the Brotherhood played an important role in the public acceptance of King ʿAbdallah’s Islamic identity, legitimising his authority and power over the country. Therefore, political Islam became the essence of Jordanian political history since the establishment of Jordan as we know it today, and was represented in two dimensions; both as King ʿAbdallah I’s use of his religious background, and as the activity of the Brotherhood to gain wider acceptance and legitimacy. In order to understand the further development of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, which would soon shape regional politics, it is first necessary to examine the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its ideological foundations.

\subsection*{1.1 Hassan al-Banna}

Dear brothers, you are not a welfare organisation, nor a political party, nor a local association with strictly limited aims. Rather you are a new spirit making its way into the heart of this nation – reviving it with the Qur’an; a new light dawning, dispelling the darkness of materialism through the knowledge of God; a resounding voice rising high, echoing the message of the Apostle (PBUH). In truth and without being excessive, you should feel that you are the bearers of a burden the rest of mankind has shrugged off. If someone asks you: "To what are you calling?" Say: "We are calling you to Islam, which was brought by Muhammad (PBUH): Government is part of it,
freedom is a religious obligation.” If someone should say to you: “This is politics!” Say: This is Islam, and we do not recognise such divisions.  

In this speech al-Banna introduced the Brotherhood and the nature of its work, demarking a fundamental understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ethos that is still debated today. Born in a rural town near Cairo, al-Banna received a predominantly religious education, for which he attended a Hafasi Sufi school, guided by Sheikh ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Hasaft, and Sheikh al-Taʾriqah al-Hasafiyya al-Shādhiliyyah. During this time, he met Rashīd Riḍā, and Muḥibb al-Dīn Khaṭṭāb, the owners of the Dar al-Salafiyah publishing house and its al-Fateh [The Opening] journal, where al-Banna published his first article, al-Daʾwah ilā Allāh [The Call for God].

The social transformation of Islam in Egypt during the 1920s was caused by the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which had been a religious reference for the Islamic world, giving rise to increasingly secularist theology. Thus ensued an intensified process by Islamic scholars, such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muhammad ʿAbduh, and Muhammad Rashīd Riḍā, to restore Islamic society in Egypt before new expeditions

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16 See Appendix 1: Glossary.


18 See Appendix 1: Glossary.


22 See Appendix 1: Glossary.
of colonisation could further harm the region. These scholars mixed their religious education with political events, making them ‘Ulamā’ – a specific kind of reformist – as seen with aforementioned scholars, who emerged as leaders of this movement.\textsuperscript{23} These reformists advocated Islam as the tool with which to fight colonisation and unite the Ummah [Islamic Nation],\textsuperscript{24} offering a theoretical framework to restore Islam after the caliphate had begun to disintegrate, asserting Islam’s adaptability to modernity, and its importance in uniting the Arab world against British colonialists.\textsuperscript{25}

The reformists’ call was immediately mirrored in a gathering of Muslim youth, who adopted the charitable, cultural, and sporting activities of the Jam’īyat al-Shubbān al-Masīḥīyīn [The Young Christian Assembly], in response to what was considered a European threat to Muslim identity. This gathering was formalised in 1927 as the Jam’īyat al-Shubbān al-Muslimīn [Assembly of Muslim Youth], by Muhībba dīn Khaṭīfī, who soon invited al-Banna to join.\textsuperscript{26}

After graduating in 1928, al-Banna became a primary school teacher in the city of Ismā‘īlīa, the main residence of the British military in Egypt operating in the Suez Canal, leading him into the heart of British rule, which enforced Westernised lifestyle, secularism, and the decline of traditional Islamic norms.\textsuperscript{27} This direct confrontation, combined with his religious education and with the Assembly of Muslim Youth, caused al-Banna to found the Jamā‘at al-İkhwān al-Muslimīn [The Muslim Brotherhood Association] in Ismā‘īlīa in 1928, which began as a school teaching the Qur’ān.\textsuperscript{28}

Al-Banna was influenced heavily by the collapse of the caliphate, and believed in the need to re-introduce Islam into modern politics in demonstration of its

\begin{itemize}
  \item See *Appendix 1: Glossary* for the three ‘Reformists’.
  \item Jam’īyat al-Shubbān al-Muslimīn [Assembly of Muslim Youth] was located in Ramsūs Street, Cairo, in the same building in which al-Banna was assassinated; Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir, and ‘Ādil Sulaymān Jamāl, *Jamhurat Maqālāt al-Ustādī Muḥammad Muḥammad Shākir* [Collection of Articles of Muḥammad Muhammad Shākir], (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānīj bi-al-Qāhirah, 2003), 773-774; Johannes J. G. Jansen, “Hasan al-Banna’s Earliest Pamphlet”, *Die Welt des Islam*, New Series, Bd. 32, Nr. 2 (1992), 254-258.
  \item Krämer, *Hasan al-Banna: Makers of the Muslim World*, 1-17.
\end{itemize}
adaptability. To illustrate the necessity of leadership and politics in Islam, he used the image of the meeting of the Prophet’s Companions to choose the first caliph [successor] of the Prophet before he was even buried. For al-Banna, the Islamic state’s constitution is Sharīʿah and its legislations only derive from the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and the political legacy of the caliphate [Islamic ruling system] state of the Prophet’s Companions. He further believed that the Islamic state should be built on three main principles: justice, freedom and jihad.29

This new association gained rapid success due to its societal approach, which differed from previous reformists who only addressed elites in their writings. Instead, al-Banna and his followers were keen to establish direct communications with the general public,30 and applied the traditional Islamic social structure upon the movement’s activities, building networks through mosques, Islamic social organisations, charitable associations, and local unions. The Brotherhood’s success was due to its affinity with the everyman, presented in simple language that appealed to the masses with its religious and traditional values.

Therefore, in 1933, within five years of the Brotherhood’s establishment, a journal entitled Jarīdat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [The Muslim Brotherhood Journal] was launched, publishing weekly.31 This was part of al-Banna’s first step towards Daʾwah [Proselytisation], as he outlined in “Risālat al-Muʿtammar al-Khāmis” [The Fifth Conference Letter on ‘Gradual Change’]:

The gradual change depends on education with clear steps in the Muslim Brotherhood path. Therefore, they believe that every Daʾwah has three steps. The step of induction, publicity, and preaching the idea to reach people from all levels; then, the configuration stage, recruiting and mobilising members; after all this, the executive stage, which includes work and production. Most of the time these steps happen simultaneously due to the strong connection between them. Therefore the al-Dāʿī [preacher] calls for the message of Islam, and at the same time, educates people on

This indicates the Brotherhood was following a clearly outlined methodology in its formation and path of Da‘wah. Accordingly, the number of supporters for the Brotherhood’s ideology continued to grow, both in membership and in geographical coverage. This can be illustrated by the number of journals the group was publishing: in 1933-34, 44 weekly editions of Jarīdat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn were published;33 followed by 16 editions of al-Nadīhr [The Warner] in 1934;34 12 volumes of the al-Khulād [The Immortality] journal in 1938;35 and again in 1938, a small student journal called al-Mujīma‘a [The Society].36

In response to the Brotherhood’s unprecedented popularity, al-Banna moved to the configuration stage of his plan, transferring the movement’s headquarters to Cairo in 1932. On August 19, 1993, he established the first Shoura Council for the Muslim Brotherhood, which adopted the first regulations and internal system.37 By the end of the 1930s the Muslim Brotherhood had transformed from a small Islamic association into a movement with three hundred branches across Egypt.38 The Brotherhood’s shift into politics came shortly after in the wake of King Farouk’s ascension to the throne on May 6, 1936, which coincided with the beginning of the Arab Revolt in Palestine. In proclamation of his support of Palestine, and in keeping with his second stage, al-

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Banna wrote in *al-Nadhīr* in 1937:

> It is not enough to listen to the demands of the Palestinians for self-determination and the courage to achieve ... promises, but [we] must convene a meeting of leaders to recognise the rights of the Majahideen ... This conference is heading towards unity and progress ... O Muslims, do not waste a minute without preparation for liberation, and then you will be able to choose the battle field instead of being sheep... O Muslims, you need strength and unity, which is the first step to achieve power.39

Al-Banna therefore linked the Brotherhood’s entrance into politics with the Palestinian issue, using political speeches, initiating special prayers, collecting funds, and protesting in solidarity with the Intifada, all of which extended the Brotherhood’s popularity past Egypt’s borders and across the entire region. In 1936, King Farouk appointed ṢAli Mahir Pasha as Prime Minister, and following the remarkable popularity of the Brotherhood during the Intifada, Mahir contacted the Brotherhood, as well as the *Wafîd* Party,40 requesting that they demonstrate their loyalty to the new king by participating in the coming elections.41 Al-Banna, however, refused the Prime Minister’s request, citing the Brotherhood’s organisational infancy as reason to not participate.42 Unofficially, however, the Brotherhood’s decision was also due to the belief that it was not the Brotherhood’s purpose to reinforce the monarchy.

Yet fourteen years after the Brotherhood’s establishment, in 1942, al-Banna decided that he had established a level of organisational structure and public mobilisation sufficient to enter public politics.43 Some Brotherhood members have

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40 See *Appendix 1: Glossary*.  
estimated that in 1944 the Brotherhood had a total of half a million active members, with a far larger sum of sympathisers.\(^{44}\) Although this may be exaggerated, it does reflect the fast growth of the movement in Egypt during this time. Therefore, the Brotherhood entered the third step in al-Banna’s plan of reform, the ‘activities stage’, which he substantiated as actively engaging in politics as a means to implement the gradual Islamic reform.

However, formal applications for Brotherhood membership were not implemented until the fifth Brotherhood conference, when the movement established the \textit{Nizam Asasi} [Basic Regulation] of 1945. Accordingly, the Brotherhood began developing internal regulations, including special requirements for membership, and specific duties and responsibilities for members, allowing members to participate in politics.\(^{45}\) Al-Banna then issued a “\textit{Risālat al-Intikhābāt}” [Election Letter],\(^{46}\) declaring that he would personally participate in politics to be a model of political participation for the Brotherhood thereafter. By 1950, the Egyptian Brotherhood had a new statute, a strong internal system, leadership, as well as the \textit{Firqat al-Jawwālah} [the Traveller Troop (unit for education and training)], \textit{al-Jihāz al-Khāṣṣ} [Private Militia], and \textit{al-Akhawāt al-Muslimāt} [The Muslim Sisterhood].\(^{47}\)

The real ideological achievement of al-Banna was, however, not just his political opposition to colonialism, and his participation in parliamentarian elections, but also the theoretical background he provided the Muslim Brotherhood with through his letters, which elaborated upon his activities and opinions, becoming historical

\begin{flushright}
\textbf{The Society of the Muslim Brothers,} 12-13.
\end{flushright}


\(^{47}\) Salāh Shāḍī, \textit{Ṣafahāt min al-Tārīkh: Ḥašād al-‘Umr} [Pages of Bitter Harvest], (Kuwait: Sharikat al-Shu’ā‘, 2006), 15.
references and guidance for the Brotherhood. Unlike preceding reformists, al-Banna attempted to generalise the meaning of Islam, making it available for a wider array of applications. While the reformists were searching for ways to update basic theories of Islam, al-Banna created a link between Shari'ah and politics in order to transform the Brotherhood into an Islamic political movement once he had fully achieved stage two in his plan. Therefore, al-Banna’s educational and organisational vision transformed Islam from a religion into an active political ideology, producing the basic elements for the political engagement of the Muslim Brotherhood thereafter.

The historical, political, and social transformation witnessed in Egypt and other Arab and Islamic countries during this time, such as the fall of the caliphate, colonisation in the region, and the issue of Palestine, played an important part in the formation of al-Banna’s political ideology. These events caused him to consider new problematic concepts such as democracy, rule of law, social and political reforms, and the concept of political plurality within the context of the Islamic state. In writings, such as “Risālat Nizam al-Hikam” [The Rolling System Letter], he considered the division of powers, the right to vote, and parliamentarian elections, in a methodology more flexible than the ‘Ulamā’ of the period who considered these concepts ‘Western’. This dispute of Islam’s adaptability still presents a mode of disagreement among Islamists today, however, al-Banna succinctly placed Islam as a political ideology fit for his method of reform. His supporting slogan declared that Islam is both a religion and a state: “Islam for Muslims is incomplete until it carries a political vision to its Ummah first ... Each Islamic movement and assembly should put the interest of Ummah politics as the first priority in its agenda, otherwise it cannot call itself Islamic and needs to re-understand Islam.”

Therefore, al-Banna claimed politics to be an essential part of Islam and that

48 Jansen, Hasan al-Banna’s Earliest Pamphlet, 8.
every Muslim should have an opinion on political Islamic affairs. According to al-Banna, the legacy of the Islamic state should be based on a well-developed political system. This system is essential for the executive stage in al-Banna’s previous three point plan for the Brotherhood, and can be summarised in a further four points, beginning with the assurance of a unified authority, as al-Banna refused any kind of separation between civil authority and religious authority. This was followed by the acceptance of the parliamentarian system to uphold and guarantee the responsibility of the ruler towards the people, in addition to the unity of the Ummah and the respect of human rights. Thirdly, the existence of political opposition, as long as this opposition does not have any aim of assuming authority or power, and finally, building a caliphate system gradually, making it the final political goal for the Islamic movements.

Al-Banna’s concept for the Islamic state was different from former ‘Ulama, who used Islam for their reasoning either as motivation for jihad against colonisation, or for the renewal of Islam. The emphasis was shifted from Islam as religion only, to the embodiment of an economic, educational, political, and social system, which should be protected within the framework of the state. He suggested that when these conditions of participation merged within in the Islamic world, the caliphate would be possible on an international scale by firstly creating fully independent Islamic governments in all Islamic countries; establishing full cooperation and unity through treaties and alliances; founding a League of the Islamic Nations; and finally choosing a caliph for all Muslims.

1.1.1 From Diplomacy to Arms (1941 - 1949)

After the Second World War, Egyptian political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Hizb al-Shuyū‘ī al-Miṣrī [The Egyptian Communist Party], the Wafd

Party, and *Misr al-Fatah* [The Young Egypt Party], began using violence to assert themselves as political powers.\(^{57}\) However, the Brotherhood formalised this resistance further by establishing *al-Jihāz al-Khāṣṣ* [Private Militia].\(^ {58}\)

In February 1948, two members of the Brotherhood’s *al-Jihāz al-Khāṣṣ* were arrested in connection with the assassination of Judge Ahmad al-Khazindār,\(^ {59}\) who had sentenced some Brotherhood members guilty of throwing bombs at British soldiers October 17, 1947,\(^ {60}\) and had also been involved in a case in which the Brotherhood was connected to the bombing of Cinema Metro in 1947. The majority of Brotherhood members condemned the assassination of the judge, and al-Banna considered the act to be against Islam and the Brotherhood’s values.\(^ {61}\) However, no expulsion or punishment for the militia leaders followed.

In fact, following the al-Khazindār assassination, the Brotherhood increased its activities, taking an active part in resistance movements, especially in Palestine, which had experienced a sudden growth of Jewish settlements during Egypt’s Martial Law, exerting further pressure on the recently militarised movement. The United Nations (UN) made a decision to partition Palestine on November 29, 1947,\(^ {62}\) and on December 15, 1947 the Brotherhood initiated protests in Cairo against the British protectorate.\(^ {63}\) However, when Israel declared its independence as a state on May 14, 1948, following its success in the war and the withdrawal of the British military from Egypt, *al-Jihāz al-Khāṣṣ* launched a series of attacks on private residences and businesses in Cairo’s Jewish blocks, between June 20, and September 28, 1948.\(^ {64}\)

On December 28, 1948, the call for voluntary fighters in Palestine was announced, resulting in Brotherhood members organising a base for a voluntary army led by Ahmad ʿAbd al-ʿAziz under the umbrella of the Arab League, in the war against the nascent state of Israel. The Egyptian Brotherhood established two bases in February 1948, in al-ʿArīsh (north Sinai), and Bureij (Gaza). Each base was estimated

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\(^{59}\) Ibid, *Fi Qāṭilat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* [In the Convoy of the Muslim Brotherhood], 202.

\(^{60}\) Ibid, 133-134.

\(^{61}\) Shādī, *Ṣafāḥāt min al-Tārīkh: Ḥaḍād al-ʿUmūr* [Pages of Bitter Harvest], 57-60; 69-104.


\(^{63}\) Ibid, *Fi Qāṭilat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* [In the Convoy of the Muslim Brotherhood], 202.

\(^{64}\) Jāmiʿ, *Waʾaraftu al-Ikhwān* [And I knew the Brotherhood], 63-64.
to accommodate two hundred members under the leadership of Yousef Tal'at. Another unit of the Brotherhood, led by Mahmood ‘Abduh, went to the Syrian base with the intention of meeting other volunteers from all around the Arab World.\textsuperscript{65}

Furthermore, the Brotherhood’s militia was accused of blowing up the appeal court on January 13, 1949.\textsuperscript{66} Due to these actions, and the sum of weapons in their possession, Prime Minster Mahmūd Fāhmi al-Nuqrāshī declared the ban of the Brotherhood on December 8, 1948, prohibiting it from practicing any more societal or political work in Egypt.\textsuperscript{67} Twenty days later, ‘Abduh al-Majid Ahmad, a Brotherhood member, shot al-Nuqrāshī in front of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.\textsuperscript{68} Al-Banna denounced the assassins in a famous speech, describing them as being ‘neither Muslims nor Brothers’,\textsuperscript{69} and pointing out that terror is not accepted in Islam.\textsuperscript{70} The statement publically demonstrated that al-Banna had lost control over the movement and the activity of \textit{al-Jihād al-Khāṣṣ}, compromising his plans for reform. However, it could also be understood that this message may have been issued to protect the rest of the movement. Either way, on February 12, 1949, al-Banna was scheduled to begin negotiations with a government representative who did not arrive, and whilst waiting, three people attacked and killed the Brotherhood leader.\textsuperscript{71}

In the last stage of the movement’s organisational establishment, from 1942 to 1952, the Brotherhood committed numerous mistakes due to the failure of al-Banna’s third executive step. This failure may have been due to the Brotherhood fighting with


\textsuperscript{66} This attack was meant to destroy evidence in the court regarding papers and weapons that had been seized earlier on November 15, 1948.


\textsuperscript{70} Stst, \textit{Fi Qafilat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn} [In the Convoy of the Muslim Brotherhood], 202.

the regime, and in their war in Palestine, working against itself and its plan of gradual reform, prioritising violence over social engagement, and assassinating important public figures.

1.2 Sayyid Qutb and the Division of the Brotherhood (1950-1966)

With the death of al-Banna just passed, the 1950s realised a new era for the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, in which chaos was ensuing without a leader. Sayyid Qutb soon became thought of as an Islamic mentor to the Brotherhood members, respected due to his literature, and providing direction for the floundering movement.

After graduating from the same college as al-Banna in 1933, Qutb began his career as a teacher in the Ministry of Public Instruction, and after 1939 was appointed in the Ministry of Education where he worked for 18 years. During this period Qutb was known for his literary contributions, and in 1939, wrote a series of articles in the journal *al-Muqtaṭaf* [The Extract], called *al-Taṣwīr al-Fannī fī al-Qurān* [The Artistic Articulation of the Verses of the Qur'an]. These articles were published in the following year as a book. While his articles were written in an objective style, his book demonstrates more passion for the Qur'anic verses and their meaning. This was the first sign of a shift in Qutb’s comprehension of Islamic theology, presenting him with an immediate following. He was mainly influenced by the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, and the Suez, where they resisted British forces in the 1940s.

Qutb was influenced by a wide array of ideologies, borrowing concepts from each and re-shaping them into an Islamic context, as seen with his adaptation of socialism’s social justice and equality. Furthermore, Qutb built his Islam on brand new concepts of a state and society. For example, in *Ma‘rakat al-Islām wa-r-Rā‘smālīya* [The Battle of Islam and Capitalism], he said:

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Islam must rule to provide mankind with a complete society based on its values. Humanity might find its dream in socialism, but socialism blurs humanity when it is limited to aliments. Socialism tries but its materialistic nature has forbidden humanity from soul and freedom … Islam must rule because it is the only positive doctrine that is formed from the complete mix of Christianity and socialism together, achieving all their goals, and adding balance, symmetry, and moderation.75

Al-Banna’s main pillar of belief for the transformation of the Brotherhood into a political association was embodied in his slogan that Islam is “religion and state, Qu’ran and sword”.76 Qutb demonstrated his compatibility with al-Banna’s school of thinking, declaring in his book al-‘Adalah al-Ijtima‘iyah fi al-Islām [Social Justice in Islam] that Islam is not a faith only, but also a social system combining religion and state, calling for the liberation of Muslims.77 Based on this understanding, and his compatibility with the Muslim Brotherhood and its understanding of Islam, he joined the movement as the editor-in-chief of the Brotherhood’s weekly Jarīdat al-‘Ikhwān al-Muslimīn.

The popularity of Social Justice in Islam impacted the Free Army Officer, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and other officers,78 who requested Qutb’s participation in a coup against King Farouk.79 The Brotherhood became involved in Nasser’s revolution on July 23, 1952,80 and as a result, the Egyptian army was successful in executing a ‘white coup’, wherein it took control and forced the King to step down. Following this success, Qutb was appointed Counsellor of the Revolution Council,81 and when the

78 See Appendix 1: Glossary.
79 Jāmī, Warārafūt al-‘Ikhwān [And I knew the Brotherhood], 83.
81 Sulaymān Ḥakīm ‘Abd al-Nāṣir wa-l-‘Ikhwān: min al-Wiṣāq ilā al-Shiqāq, [Nasser and the Brotherhood: From Discord to Concord], (Cairo: Maktabat Jāzīrat al-Ward, 2010). This can also be found in al-Masry alyoum Newspaper, October 10, 2010, accessed December 2, 2014,
Revolution Council dissolved all political parties in Egypt, the Brotherhood remained operational based on the idea that it was a movement, not a party, in recompense for its support of Nasser.82

Later, a disagreement between the Muslim Brotherhood and the revolutionary regime ensued, and the Brotherhood was accused of attempting to assassinate Nasser in Alexandria.83 Qutb and the Brotherhood’s leadership were imprisoned in 1953 although the perpetrators of this assassination attempt remain unclear. Despite the accusation, the Egyptian Brotherhood still rejects claims that they were behind this attempt. One explanation could be that the event was framed to present Nasser as a hero, and denounce the Brotherhood, as Nasser wanted to eradicate the remaining political actor that could compete with his regime. On the other hand, during al-Banna’s leadership the movement had shown examples of vigilante violence, and therefore this may have been a repetition of such events. Ultimately, however, the movement was banned for the second time in its short history.84

However, the Brotherhood continued to exist in a form of gatherings at Zainab al-Ghazali’s house.85 The gatherings formed a cell consisting of former intellectual members, and some members of al-Jihāz al-Khāṣṣ, all of who were inspired by Qutb’s literature, which he sent from prison. Due to this intellectual guidance, Qutb was proclaimed the Brotherhood’s leader and mentor from within the prison. In 1964, due to the mediation of the President of Iraq, Ābd al-Salam Āref, Sayyid Qutb was released from prison. The same year his famous text Māṣalim al-Tariq [Milestones on http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/190527; Jāmi‘, War‘croft al-Ikhwān, [And I knew the Brotherhood], 75-95.


83 On 26 October 1954, Nasser delivered his most famous public speech about the treaty of independence from the UK. During the speech, eight bullets were shot at him.


85 Zainab al-Ghazali was one of most important Islamic figures in the history of Islamists. She was the first Islamic woman to establish Jām‘ṭyāt al-Sayyīdāt al-Muslimāt [Islamic Association for Women] in 1937, when she was 20 years old. Later, she joined the Brotherhood after meeting al-Banna, and hosted Qutb’s group, which was accused in attempting the assassination of Nasser; Zaynab Ghažālī, Ayyām min Hayāt [Days from My Life], (Beirut: Dār al-Shurūq, 1987).
the Road] was published.\textsuperscript{86}

In Qutb’s \textit{Milestones}, his three essential messages constituted \textit{al-Hākimīyah} [The Principle of Divine Governance],\textsuperscript{87} \textit{al-Jāhītyah}, [Era of ignorance before Islam],\textsuperscript{88} and \textit{al-ʻUshbah al-Mu'mīnab} [The True Band of Believers].\textsuperscript{89} In \textit{Milestones}, Qutb argues that that Muslims were living under a secular system, in which Islam is not fully implemented, nor is God’s \textit{Sharī'ah (al-Hākimīyah)},\textsuperscript{90} to the extent that Muslims are not living by God’s rules, but in a state of \textit{al-Jāhītyah} due to non-Islamic regimes ruling Muslims.\textsuperscript{91} Therefore, he argues that there is a need to restore the society, building upon Islamic rules through \textit{al-ʻUshbah al-Mu'mīnab} – a gathering of true Muslims whose main duty is to deliver the message of Islam again to the people, returning them to their faith. In \textit{Milestones}, Qutb created this image of \textit{al-ʻUshbah} vanguard Muslims, raised from the beginning within Islam, who would become the starting point for a true Islamic state.\textsuperscript{92}

Qutb’s \textit{al-Jāhītyah} concept drove some to understand that he was promoting \textit{Takfīr} [infidel ideology] by suggesting that \textit{al-ʻUshbah} was the only true Muslim group while the rest of society was \textit{Kāfīr} [infidel],\textsuperscript{93} or living in \textit{al-Jāhītyah} status.\textsuperscript{94} Not all of Qutb’s followers believed so strongly in \textit{Takfīr}, as some understood his notion of \textit{al-Jāhītyah} as an exaggerated example of modern society, and hyperbolic of the lack of applied Islamic rules. However, Qutb believed that once a strong network of ‘new’ Muslims had been established, they would apply authority through Islamic \textit{Sharī'ah}.

\textsuperscript{86} Sayyid Qutb, \textit{Ma'alīm ft al-Tarţq} [Milestones in the Road], (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1991).
\textsuperscript{87} See Appendix 1: Glossary.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{89} Both ideas of \textit{al-Hākimīyah} and \textit{al-Jāhītyah} were studied in depth especially after the events of 9/11; however, the third main idea of \textit{al-ʻUshbah al-Mu'mīnab} was to some extent ignored; Ghadban, Sayyid, \textit{Qutb Dīdana al-ʻunf} [Sayyid Qutb: Against Violence], 135; \textit{Al-ʻUshbah al-Mu'mīnab} [The Band of True Believers] is an Islamic group that brings Islam back to the people. Qutb saw the Muslim Brotherhood in their reflection.
\textsuperscript{90} Qutb, \textit{Ma'alīm ft al-Tarţq} [Milestones], 5, 14.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid, 5, 10-13.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid, 14, 22-27.
\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Takfīr}: Commonly the word is translated as infidel, and derives from \textit{Kāfīr}. To proclaim someone a \textit{Kāfīr} is to say he/she is an infidel, an unbeliever. The act of \textit{Takfīr}, therefore, is to charge someone with \textit{Kāfīr}, which traditional Islam rejects. See Appendix 1: Glossary.
\textsuperscript{94} Such as Sālih Sarīyā in his “Risāl al-Ayman” [The Message of Belief], where he used Qutb to argue that the leaders of the Muslim world were \textit{Kāfīr} and the first step to create the Islamic state is by obliging them to step aside. Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salām Faraj in \textit{Al-Faridah al-Ga'a'ībah} [The Absence of Obligation] presents the domination of the West over Islamic lands a result of the current Islamic leaders. Therefore, he issued a \textit{fatwa} stating that jihad is \textit{Fard Ayn} [obligation] for all Muslims against their leaders; Jamāl Bānā, and Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Salām Faraj, \textit{al-Farīdah al-Ga'a'ībah} (Cairo: Dār Thābī,1984).
rules. The extreme understanding to this theory was that Qutb’s *al-Uṣbah* would introduce a virgin Islam, giving rise to a new sect within Islam.95

In 1965, eight months after being released, Qutb was imprisoned again, along with Zainab al-Ghazali’s group, and members close to him who had been influenced by his preaching. The government accused Qutb’s group of again planning to assassinate Nasser, and attack strategically selected locations. This time, Qutb was sentenced to death. Despite being offered amnesty in exchange for an apology, Qutb declined and was executed in 1966, thereby further expanding his iconic status within the Brotherhood as a martyr.96

At the time, Qutb’s ideology was more influential than that of any other Islamic scholar or writer. After his execution, he effectively became the ideological father of radical Islam. Qutb’s personality and teaching influenced the Brotherhood in every sense, and his opposition to Nasser represented the clash between pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism felt between Brothers and nationalists across the Arab world, and throughout history.

### 1.2.1 Emerging Divisions: The Brotherhood after Qutb

Once Qutb’s *al-Jāhilīyah* theory became a tool for *Takfīr*, the Brotherhood began questioning whether violence was applicable within Islam. By encouraging Muslims to judge each other on their faith and forcing the application of *Sharīᶜah*, a gateway was opened for further violent understandings of Islam.97 This was unlike al-Banna’s ideology, which viewed society from the perspective that God judges Muslims alone, and social reform as vital, slowly enforcing Islamic values to achieve the Islamic state. Yet Qutb called for society’s restructuring based on Islam’s core rules. Therefore, although Qutb and al-Banna concede on the importance of Islam becoming a religious state, their paths markedly diverge regarding its application. Due to this ideological contrast, members had to personally establish whether they were with Qutb or al-Banna. In the failure of these two paths to meet, two wings were created within the Brotherhood: Qutbist ‘Hawks’ and al-Bannaist ‘Doves’.

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96 “al-Islāmīyūn: Intiqām al-Mufakkir,” [Islamist: The Intellectual Revenge], *Aljazeera*; Sīsī, Fī Qāfīlat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, [In the Convoy of the Muslim Brotherhood], 737-738.
The Brotherhood’s al-Murshid al-‘āmm [Supreme Guide] attempted to return al-Bannaist thought to the movement by supervising a group whose main mission was to redefine Takfīr, based on the Qurʿan and Sunnah only. The group wrote Duʾāh lā Quḍāḥ [Preachers not Judges],98 which states that the theory of al-Jāḥiliyyah is not Qur’anic and that it was not mentioned in the Sunnah. Preachers not Judges’ key points were to confirm the commitment of the Muslim Brotherhood to the Sunnah sect, which proclaims that anyone who says ‘al-Shahādatayn’ [the phrase, “There is no God but God and Muḥammad is his Prophet’] is Muslim, that nobody should judge the truthfulness of people’s intentions, and that Muslims are not to be labelled ‘infidels’ due to their actions. The book also declares that committing sins does not make people Kāfir, and does not give legitimacy to accusations that they have moved from Islam to al-Jāḥiliyyah.99

The book is an attempt to return to the core of al-Banna’s ideology, which is found in his letters and speeches, calling for the modernity and adaptability of Islam within the state, rather than dissecting individuals’ faith. Although the book does not refer to Qutb in name, it tries to separate the Muslim Brotherhood from his ideology. Al-Huḍaybī’s efforts contributed to the Brotherhood’s two conflicting branches, which are still witnessed today. The book may have been a strategy for the Brotherhood’s survival, as it presented al-Huḍaybī as a new leader after the death of al-Banna and Qutb, and was a chance for the Brotherhood to move towards something more sustainable. Furthermore, al-Huḍaybī’s continuation of the Brotherhood can be seen as a reflection of al-Banna’s denouncement of the al-Jihāz al-Khāṣṣ, in which al-Huḍaybī was denouncing Qutb also as “not Muslim and not Brotherhood”.

The two books embody the two diverging opinions of political Islam, but the Brotherhood integrated the differences of these two books into the movement, with an internal divide of the Hawks, Qutb’s front, and Doves, al-Huḍaybī and al-Banna’s front.

1.3 The Establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan

Al-Banna envisioned a universal Islamic movement that would transcend Egypt’s, and even the region’s, boundaries, as established in the Nizam Asasi [Basic Regulation] of 1945, in which he states that the Muslim Brotherhood’s “perspective towards Islam works in every time and place”.100 Therefore, the Brotherhood’s expansion into the Levant was part of al-Banna’s transnational project to unite all Muslims in order to create the Ummah. Accordingly, al-Banna was seen to recruit Islamic personalities within the Levant in order for them to transport his ideas and advocate them across the area. This strategy was successfully completed by 1945 when he had established a branch in every capital in the Levant.

As part of this plan, the Brotherhood participated in its first external event – al-Mu’tamar al-Islāmī al-Awwal [The First Islamic Conference], held in Jerusalem on December 18, 1931. The main purpose of this conference was to organise the protection of Holy Sites against Jewish settlers. The conference presented the first opportunity for the Brotherhood to build a network among Islamic personalities of the Muslim world, specifically those from the Levant, such as Muṣṭafá al-Sibāʾī, and ʿAbd al-Laṭīf abū Qūrah.

Networking with influential leaders saw the movement’s first step towards the transnational goal when an Islamic group called Jamʿiyat al-Makārim [Assembly of Generosity] was established in Jerusalem in 1942, with Islamic affiliation towards the Brotherhood. This was followed in Syria, when Shabab Muḥammad [The Youth of Muhammad], led by Muṣṭafá al-Sibāʾī, linked itself to the Brotherhood before changing their name in 1944 to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Following the establishment of the Syrian Brotherhood, and due to the importance of Palestine within ṭd Ramaḍān, on November 19, 1945 to establish the official branch of the Brotherhood in Jerusalem, which was extended later with branches in Lydda, Jaffa, and Haifa.101

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101 Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 11-12.
The history of the Jordanian Brotherhood stems from direct communication with al-Banna after a salesman, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf abū Qūrah, moved to Egypt to embark on his religious education and met al-Banna, by whom he was significantly influenced by. Consequently, after moving back to Jordan he began preaching al-Banna's Brotherhood ideology. However, it was not until a visit by Abū Ḥakīm ʿAbidīn (the General Secretary of Egyptian Brotherhood), to Jordan in 1945 that the movement's association was established in Amman. ʿAbd al-Laṭīf abū Qūrah created the Majlis Idari [Administrative Council] of the Brotherhood, consisting of eight persons including himself: ʿAbd al-Rahmān Khalīfah, Aḥmad al-Khaṭīb, Yūsuf Barqāwī, Shaykh Jamīl Barqāwī, Māmduḥ al-Ṣarāyirah, Mufliḥ al-Sā’d, and Muslim al-Nābulusī. This group aimed to create a charitable association according to al-Banna’s model, and begin the induction step of his reform plan in Jordan. Abū Qūrah was elected as the first Marāqib al-ʿĀmm [General Supervisor] of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. The movement’s main achievement during this early stage was the establishment of the Islamic Educational College in 1946, which was the first unit in the configuration stage, and ensured infrastructure for future Brotherhood generations.

However, when the 1948 Arab-Israeli war took place, the Brotherhood both east and west of the River Jordan unified in support of the Arab armies. The Palestinian Brotherhood established a base in Beersheba, and the Jordanian Brotherhood settled in ‘Ayn Kārim, west of Jerusalem. The Jordanian troop was renamed Ubayda under the command of abū Qūrah and consisted of 120 Brothers. On April 14, 1948, the two Brotherhood branches merged in Bethlehem, but later, as a result of the Arab Armies’ defeat, Jordanian troops were forced to retreat to Amman. Nevertheless, the Jordanian army was able to protect the West bank and consequently, newly appointed King ʿAbdallāh I declared unity between the two banks of the

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105 Hajrasi al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, wal-Qadīyāt al-Fīlasifṭīyyah [Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian Cause], 46-51.
106 Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 11.
Jordanian river, as well as the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Discussing Egypt’s poor effort in an interview with Zaka’īyā Luţfī, King Hussein addressed the Brotherhood as a key player in their attack:

Can you tell me where [the Egyptian Army] fought? Excuse me, I mean Farouk’s army in 1948. You’ve entered Gaza, the Arabic city which has not a single Jewish person in it, then you entered Ashkelon until the Jewish took it from you without a fight, and you made from your black hyena army [metaphor for cowardice] a legendary army, when you did not enter a single battle, and did not win any confrontation, and if not for the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities near Hebron and Bethlehem, the record of Farouk in Palestine would not honor him much.

This statement by the King acknowledges the significance of the Brotherhood’s participation across the Levant in the 1948 war, as they had entered battles such as Kfar Darom (Gaza), in which a total of 58 Brothers died by May 13, 1948. Soon after the Arab defeat, the two Brotherhood branches were merged under the general supervision of abū Qūrah.

The context of this merger cannot be removed from the context of defeat. The two branches were in the early stages of development, particularly the Palestinian branch, which was too weak to oppose the enemy alone after the defeat. Secondly, Jordan had acquired a new status of guardianship of the West Bank, implying a feeling of unity between the two banks and giving them cause to believe that there should be just one unified branch.

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Due to the hostile situation in the aftermath of the assassination of al-Nuqrāshī, the Egyptian Brotherhood was banned on 1948. In response, abū Qūrah endeavoured to establish a stronger branch in Jordan and Palestine under the reign of King ʿAbdallāh I, of whom they were in full cooperation with, making Jordan a refuge for the outlawed Egyptian Brotherhood.

At this stage in the history of the Jordanian Brotherhood, the movement and regime enjoyed close cooperation based on mutual interests including the liberation of Palestine. To reach this end, the regime sought for the extension of Jordan by expanding its territories to the West Bank, as per the Jericho Conference of December 1, 1948. The Brotherhood saw this as testament to the regime’s commitment to the Palestinian issue, thus strengthening their bond. Furthermore, the movement perceived this as the first stage of the unification of the Ummah, which is part of their guiding ideology.

Soon, however, the political stability was challenged as King ʿAbdallāh I was assassinated on July 20, 1951 while attending prayer in the al-Aqsa mosque of Jerusalem. The reasons for his death are ambiguous, however, it is interpreted that it may have been due to his attempts to enter peace negotiations with Israel. Further, Sir John Baggot Glubb (Glubb Pasha), leader of the Arab Legion, noted that there was an atmosphere of peace after the 1948 war, but “if Jordan attempted to make peace, the other Arab countries would turn on her”. This argument is strengthened by the fact that five days prior to the King’s assassination, Riyāḍ al-Šulḥ, a former prime minister


of Lebanon who was considering similar negotiations, was also assassinated in Amman. Ten people were accused of the assassination of the King, including ʿAbdallah al-Tall, the Military Governor of Jerusalem, and Musa al-Husseini, a close relative of the Mufti of Palestine.

From the beginning of the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom, common enemies, such as the UK and Israel, united citizens both sides of the River Jordan. However, their unification was enriched by the cooperation between the Islamists and the King, who proclaimed to share an Islamic identity, and a mutual understanding of the necessity of Palestine’s liberation. Therefore, the two banks were unified by something larger than just a leader or political institution for decision-making. Rather, all Jordanian identities were brought towards a national identity, which became based on the religious fusion of the regime and Brotherhood.¹¹⁶

Furthermore, the confrontation between Qutb and Nasser affected the Brotherhood in Jordan, pushing the Brotherhood closer to the Jordanian regime due to the sharp contrast of Nasser’s pan-Arabic ideology against the Islamic Jordanian monarchy. Therefore, the Qutb-Nasser confrontation became the main symbol in Jordan for the confrontation of the Brotherhood and the Leftist / Nationalists, who were following the pan-Arab path that had been developing parallel to the Brotherhood’s path. Inevitably, this led to a clash of pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism, exacerbated by the state’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood. Due to their relative freedom in Jordan, the movement sought to further al-Banna’s third executive stage by entering politics to continue the path of protecting Palestine and implementing gradual reform.

Chapter Two A Group Not a Party: The Marriage of Convenience
During King Hussein’s rule, Jordan saw the transformation of the Brotherhood from a socio-religious movement into a political actor. The movement’s influence was shown in the 1956 elections, which, by integrating political actors into the political process, were intended to repair Jordan’s stability after being damaged by the Baghdad Pact riots. The movement succeeded in restoring stability within the context of political pragmatism; the Brotherhood developed an uneasy alliance with the regime through the mutual need for legitimacy. The Brotherhood’s role in the 1967 Six Day War and the Civil War of 1970 presented internal dilemmas for the movement in regards to the Palestinian identity. However, the Brotherhood tactfully overcame this issue through a display of diplomacy towards the regime, which, in contrast to the Brotherhood’s experiences in Syria, Iran, and Egypt, joined forces to unify and solidify Jordan, whilst enjoying the benefits and legitimacy gained therein.

However, despite this mutually beneficial relationship engendered after the 1956 election, indications of future conflict began to surface, revealing that the Brotherhood and regime’s tenuous relationship relied on mutual benefits rather than an ideological cohesion.

Therefore, this chapter’s timeline traces how the movement transformed from one that only preached for Islam, into a valid political actor within the Jordanian parliament. A key factor in legitimising the movement lay in its ‘alliance building’ stage, which is when Jordan saw the Brotherhood side with the Leftists and Nationalists against the regime’s policies, only to later transfer its alliances towards the regime. This period is key in revealing the Brotherhood’s pragmatism and ability to sway public opinion – a gravitas that would fully realise itself in the Brotherhood’s early political establishment. Whether with the Leftists and Nationalists, the regime, or the Fedayeen, the Brotherhood’s alliances had major effects on the structure of the movement itself, but arguably also, the structure of the country’s politics.

2.0 Becoming a National Political Actor (1949 – 1954)

In 1952, the new King Talal\(^1\) declared a new Jordanian Constitution to uphold and protect the unification of Jordan and Palestine, granting Palestinians the right to

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\(^{1}\) King Talal took the thrown after the assassination of his father, King ʻAbdallah I, in Jerusalem. He ruled Jordan from July 20, 1951, until August 11, 1952, before being forced to abdicate the thrown to his son, King Hussein, for health reasons. The Constitution of 1952 is his biggest achievement.
participate in politics.²

The new constitution was considered to be a step towards democratisising Jordan. It stated that Jordan is an independent state, part of the Arab nation, and that its governmental system is parliamentary, with a hereditary monarchy. The constitution declared the separation of powers (executive, legislative, and judiciary) and established the Audit Bureau to supervise the state’s expenses and organise Jordanian rights and duties, creating a new parliamentarian life in Jordan.


Image 1: The Map of Palestine and Jordan Post-1948
al-Fuḍayl al-Wartalānī, founder of the Algerian Brotherhood, al-Baṣḥir al-Ībrāhīmī, along with many other world leading political and Islamic scholars from Arab countries. This assembly was formed to discuss how to deal with religious sites, such as the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqṣa, which were in Jordanian custody after the 1948 War.

However, the main call of the conference was to create awareness for the Palestinian issue in Islamic countries, sharing Jerusalem’s threat of Israeli settlements, and calling for the rejection of all peace processes or treaties dealing with Israel. Those attempts were opposing pre-existing agreements on Arab-Israeli relations, including the call to launch peace treaties with Israel under the 1949 Armistice agreement, and King ‘Abdallah I facilitating peace with Israel through external encouragement to accept the United Nations’ resolution 181 from 1947 that would divide Palestine.

With the participation of sixty Brotherhood members ranging from Egypt to Iraq, the conference was the first attempt by the Jordanian Brotherhood to challenge the regime’s authority. The main decisions adopted at the conference were that:

- Jordan was recognised as a part of the Islamic world
- Shari‘ah was reinstated as the ultimate demand of the Muslim Brotherhood
- The question of Palestine was acknowledged as an Islamic issue; therefore, general mobilisation was needed to liberate it.

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The conference was an important event for the Muslim Brotherhood as it was the first time for the highest leaders of the movement from all around the Islamic world to meet in one place, and emphasised the Palestine issue as paramount to Brotherhood ideology. As a result of the conference, three committees were conceived to raise awareness of the Palestine issue, led respectively by Amjad al-Zahawi, Muhammad Mahmud al-Sawwaf, and ʿAli al-Tantawi. By request of the conference, they travelled around the Islamic world, mainly to non-Arab countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and India, in order to preach the Palestinian issue, generating support from these external Muslim communities. In doing so, the Brotherhood created awareness not only for Palestine but also for itself. Therefore, the Brotherhood itself transcended regional boundaries to become recognised among these other Islamic countries as a transnational movement.

On July 20, 1951, Jordan entered a stage of instability caused by the death of King ʿAbdallah I, followed by the abdication of his successor, King Talal, in favour of his son, the young Crown Prince Hussein in August 1952. Furthermore, in the second half of the 1950s, the East Bank of Jordan began to receive waves of refugees from the West Bank after the unification. The population’s increase in non-Jordanian descendants was thought to be a threat to the royalty and young King Hussein, who needed the political groups’ and tribes’ loyalty to prove the Hashemite monarchy after this Palestinian influx. However, during this time the Jordanian and Palestinian Brotherhoods were merging, defending religious and political values, proving its ability to mobilise and organise supporters during the 1948 war, and further solidified by the General Islamic Conference with the support the movement gained from the prominent politicians and scholars therein. The conference’s effects proved ever more relevant afterwards, once the issue of Palestine had been established as a point of identification for the regime and Brotherhood, potentially splitting the Brotherhood’s loyalty between the regime and Palestine.

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By the 1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood had established organisational and ideological consistency. The Jordanian branch shadowed the Egyptian mother movement in its internal structure, and Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Rahman Khalīfah was appointed as al-Murāqib al-ʿāmm [General Supervisor] of the movement. At this time, the Brotherhood’s general concern was managing the Palestinian refugee camps by providing charity and building schools, such as the al-Barr school in the ‘Aqabat Jaber Refugee Camp, in 1956.\(^\text{11}\) The Jordanian Brotherhood also established its first magazine, al-Kifāḥ al-Islāmi [The Islamic Struggle] on August 9, 1954, edited by Yūsuf al-ʿAzm.\(^\text{12}\) These developments empowered the Brotherhood and its involvement in Jordanian society.

However, in October 1953, Jordan and Israel violated the Armistice agreement.\(^\text{13}\) The Israeli army, led by (then) Major Ariel Sharon, attacked the Qibya village, northwest of Ramallah in the West Bank, which, after the unification, was situated on Jordanian territory. The attack, which left 69 Palestinians dead, was a reprisal of the Palestinian Fedayeen\(^\text{14}\) killing a woman and her two children in Yehud Village, east of Tel Aviv.\(^\text{15}\) In response, the Muslim Brotherhood organised a mass protest, the first of its kind in Jordan’s history,\(^\text{16}\) with protesters demonstrating against the Israeli occupation and Western imperialism. This protest was the first major political act of the Jordanian Brotherhood, and shifted the way the Brotherhood was perceived by the regime, transforming it from a religious force to a political one.\(^\text{17}\)


\(^{12}\) Al-Kifāḥ magazine, under a governmental decision on October 18, 1957, was closed. Altogether, 41 volumes of the magazine were published in three years; Ziyād Abū Ghunaym, Tajribat al-Sihāfah al-Islāmiyyah fi al-Urdun fi al-Khamsīnāt “Ṣaḥīfat al-Kifāḥ al-Islāmī”: Dirāsah Wathāʾiqtāyah [The Experience of the Islamic Press in Jordan in the Fifties, “The Newspaper of the Islamic Struggle”: Documentary Study], (Kuwait: Dār al-Wathāʾiqr, 1986).


\(^{14}\) The Fedayeen consists of Leftists and Nationalist Palestinian fighters from Fateh, jihad and other Palestinian fighting groups under the PLO leadership.


The issue of Palestine became the main issue in the relationship between the regime and the Brotherhood after the General Islamic Conference and the Qibya event. Their relations deteriorated further since the regime, in an attempt to honour its side of the Armistice agreement with Israel, did not address the attack with political action. Through this, the mutual trust established between the Brotherhood and regime in the time of King Ḥusayn I was undermined, and demands for the government to define its official stance on the Palestinian case were raised.

A year later, the Egyptian Brotherhood faced deteriorating relations with the Free Officers’ movement in Egypt. Under the accusation that the Egyptian Brotherhood had tried to assassinate the president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the movement was banned in 1954, as stated in Chapter One. The Jordanian Brotherhood recognised the possibility of the Egypt scenario repeating in Jordan. Therefore, in order to protect itself and support their Brothers in Egypt, the Jordanian Brotherhood participated in a public conference devoted to the Egyptian Brotherhood, held in Damascus, March 1954. In this official gathering, the General Supervisor, Khalīfah, stated that revolutions might break out in some Arab countries as a result of repression. He also criticised the pro-Western policies of some countries, referring specifically to Jordan. Furthermore, the Syrian General Supervisor, Mustafa al-Siba‘i, made an even stronger statement, criticising the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and the Jordanian army who refused to arm refugees to fight on the borders with Israel during the clash.

The Qibya event could have led to another conflict between Palestine and Israel, and was therefore the new King Hussein’s first test, creating a focal point for his relations with the Brotherhood. In defence of the British Army’s non-intervention, Sir

20 Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 19-54.
John Bagot Glubb (Glubb Pasha)\(^23\) wrote that it was impossible to protect the whole country: “there is half a million refugees … and a border nearly 100 miles long”, thus they could not monitor all the borders and the movement of the Palestinians.\(^24\) However, to diffuse the tensions of anti-British sentiment in Jordan, King Hussein dismissed British officers, such as the Brigadier Teal Ashton of the West Bank.\(^25\)

Within the context of a pre-arranged protest against alcohol consumption at Deir Alla agricultural project in June 1954, the Brotherhood took the opportunity to express their disapproval of the King and British army’s treatment of the Qibya event. In addition to their call to close the agricultural project, they raised the slogan, ‘Down with Glubb Pasha,’\(^26\) calling for the intensification of the Jordanian army’s Arabisation.\(^27\)

The government was forced to acknowledge the Brotherhood in this matter, but rather than succumb to their demands, Prime Minister Tawfiq abū al-Huda instead did not allow the movement to hold a second Islamic conference in Jordan, following the Damascene one earlier that year. In July 1954, Hasan Ḥudaybī, the second Supreme Guide, visited Jordan to campaign for solidarity with the Egyptian Brotherhood against Nasser’s aggression, however the conference had to be held again in Damascus instead.

Furthermore, abū al-Huda's cabinet took another step in challenging the Brotherhood when a warrant was issued to imprison leader Khalīfah during his trip to Syria.\(^28\) The government's main objective was to change the structure of the movement before it became more conservative. The Brotherhood had no choice but to acquiesce, replacing Khalīfah with the less politically conservative General Supervisor, in order to avoid the arrest of members, as seen in Egypt. With a new leadership, a considerable shift in the Executive Bureau’s attitude towards the regime was witnessed, with the Brotherhood’s new leadership showing a new loyalty for the regime.

However, soon after the arrest warrant for Khalīfah was cancelled due to the

\(^{23}\) Glubb Pasha was the leader of the Arab Legion (The Jordanian Army), 1939 – 1956.
intervention of the Iraqi Brotherhood’s leader, Muḥammad Maḥmūd Ṣawwāf, and the i, who persuaded the King to grant Khalīfah the right to return to Jordan. The series of actions taken by the Jordanian regime were meant not only to smother the Muslim Brotherhood, but also to strengthen the regime’s control over the country, as the growing popularity of political parties was seen as a threat to the young King, who had just turned 21.

The situation in Jordan was no different from the political situation elsewhere in the region. The growing popularity of Nasser’s pan-Arabism and new regional agreements, such as the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of July 1954, impacted on regional politics. This treaty, which ended 73 years of British military presence in Egyptian territory, was followed by the Baghdad Pact: the alliance between the United Kingdom and regional participants established in 1955 to resist Communist influence in the Middle East. These regional events led to increasingly conservative internal policies within Jordan. The reformist path was introduced by King Talal and followed by King Hussein through the 1952 constitution, which states that Jordan’s system of government is parliamentary with a hereditary monarchy. This allowed political parties including the Brotherhood to enter politics, but was, however, soon after replaced by the enforcement of security procedures, adopted in response to the military coup in Egypt, Nasserism, and the growing power of political parties within the country.

2.0.1 Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr

Whilst establishing its political backbone, the Jordanian Brotherhood tried to distinguish itself from other Islamist groups and theologies, such as Ḥizb Al-Taḥrīr [The Liberation Party], which was established in 1953 by Sheikh Taki al-Din al-

32 This was known as the Baghdad Pact until 1959 when Iraq withdrew from it. Later it was called CENTO (Central Eastern Treaty Organisation).
Nabhani, who had close relations with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood and al-Nabhani’s organisation coincided ideologically regarding the centrality of the Palestinian case, and the importance of establishing an Islamic state. However, al-Banna and al-Nabhani disagreed on the best way to create an Islamic state. Al-Nabhani’s methodology consisted of three stages:

- The formation of underground activist groups and the mobilisation of supporters
- Muslims take over the regime
- Apply Islamic laws and rules, or Islamisation.

The Tahrîr Party called this a ‘winning strategy’ under which they would successfully establish an Islamic caliphate. As outlined, the strategy relies on creating loyal followers in the army – due to the soldiers’ ability to initiate a coup – and change state policy in order to ensure the return of the caliphate. Though most of the party leaders were either from Jordan or Palestine, the movement affirmed that Jordan is neither very suitable to apply the caliphate on itself, nor a suitable base for establishing it in other states. This suggests that the party was looking for a more Islamic country with a stronger army and position among Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, or Egypt to implement their plan.

In 1952, al-Nabhani’s group appealed to be legally recognised as a political party. This request was rejected on account of the group’s undisguised opposition of the ruling system and its strict religious ideology, which could have created tension among Jordanians.

Despite Brotherhood ideology being founded on al-Banna’s theory of gradual

36 Taqī al-Dīn Nabhānī, Al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah [The Islamic State], (Damascus: Maṭābi’ al-Manār, 1952) 40-41.
change, the *Tahrīr* Party attracted some Qutbists in the beginning of its establishment. However, the *Tahrīr* Party’s extreme understanding of change, which lacked a theoretical foundation and scholarly implementation of societal and Islamic change, caused the Brotherhood to distance itself. At the same time, the Brotherhood’s ideas were beginning to develop at the hands of Qutb’s powerful literature in the 1950s such as *Social Justice in Islam*, *al-Mustaṣqal lī-Ḥāthā al-Dīn* [The Future of this Religion], and *The Battle of Islam and Capitalism*. This meant the *Tahrīr* party adopted Qutb’s ideas as a theoretical framework to establish their plan of change rather than building a theoretical framework for itself, which differentiated the party from the Brotherhood.

### 2.0.2 The Baghdad Pact

In the 1950s the Middle East experienced a wave of divisions between the Soviet-led East and US-led West. Egypt participated in the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia, held by the so-called ‘non-aligned’ states of Asia and Africa, most of which were newly independent of their former colonial authorities. However, Egypt reoriented the balance of the Middle East’s non-aligned states when it signed an arms trade agreement with Czechoslovakia in the same year worth $250 million. Nasser’s decision to buy weapons from the Eastern bloc was due to the Tripartite Agreement of 1950 disallowing the sale of weapons to Egypt, which could be used in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The strengthening of the Soviets in the Middle East directly threatened the Western bloc’s influence and its enforced balance between Arabs and Israelis, and as a consequence, the UK established the Central Treaty Organisation, commonly known as

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42 Bandung Conference: A meeting of representatives of ‘non-aligned’ Asian and African states, which took place on April 18 – 24, 1955, in Bandung, Indonesia. It was the origin for the Non-Aligned Movement in the Cold War between the US and the USSR.
44 The Tripartite Agreement was issued by the UK, US, and France in 1950, to limit the Arab-Israeli arms and guarantee a territorial status quo in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In: Golani, “The Historical Place of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal”, 803-827.
the ‘The Baghdad Pact’, in 1955 with alliances in Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, to prevent Soviet expansion in the Middle East. Jordan found itself pressured by the UK to join the Baghdad Pact.45

Jordanian officials declared their intention to join the Pact, despite it being unpopular among Jordanians,46 and the King appointed abū al-Hudā, Sa‘īd al-Muftī and Hāz’a al-Majālī as Prime Ministers between May 1954 and December 1955, to endorse the Baghdad Pact, however, they resigned within days or months due to Jordanian citizens’ rejection of their intentions.47

With a lack of representation, protesters had taken to the streets, setting fire to ministries and the American Center of Culture, leading al-Majālī to call on the Jordanian army to intervene,48 which resulted in two hundred injured protesters, leaving ten dead.49 In order to calm tensions, the King appointed Ibrahim Hashem as Prime Minister solely to organise elections, offering the protesters a chance for representation.50 Hashem accordingly ensured in his governmental statement that his government had no right to intervene in politics or the signing of treaties, however, this had little effect and when he decided to delay the election of 1956 riots broke out again and the King replaced him with Samir al-Rifā‘i.

However, due to the continuous anger in the streets, al-Muftī, followed by Hashem, returned to Cabinet to supervise the 1956 election process, ensuring that the election would take place, and the signing of the Baghdad Pact would not. The riots against the Baghdad Pact were unprecedented in Jordan’s history, and the confusion in dealing with them led to the formulation of seven of the shortest governments in Jordan’s history, between May 4, 1955, and October 28, 1956.

The changes in the country led the Brotherhood to change the way they perceived the regime and their existing alliances with the monarchy since its establishment. The movement decided to join the Nationalists and Leftists’ block. The Leftists comprises,\textsuperscript{52} \textit{al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī al-Ishtirākī} [The National Socialist Party], \textit{al-Ḥizb al-Shuyū’ī al-Urdunnī / al-Jabhah al-Waṭanīyah} [Communist Party / National Party], in protest of the Baghdad Pact.\textsuperscript{53}

\begin{table}[h]
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
Prime Minister & Beginning & End & Duration \\
\hline
Tawfik abū al-Huda & May 4, 1954 & May 29, 1955 & 25 days \\
Saʿīd al-Mufti & May 30, 1955 & Dec 14, 1955 & 6 months, 14 days \\
Haza’a al-Majali & Dec 15, 1955 & Dec 20, 1955 & 5 days \\
Ibrahim Hashem & Dec 21, 1955 & Jan 7, 1956 & 17 days \\
Samir al-Rifa’i & Jan 8, 1956 & May 21, 1956 & 4 months, 13 days \\
Saʿīd al-Mufti & May 22, 1956 & Jun 30, 1956 & 8 days \\
Ibrahim Hashem & Jul 1, 1956 & Oct 28, 1956 & 3 months, 27 days \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Duration of Seven Jordanian Governments, 1954 – 1956\textsuperscript{51}}
\end{table}


\textsuperscript{52} It is worth mentioning here that due to the Law of Resisting Communism, instated on May 2, 1948, communism was banned in Jordan. As per this law’s third mandate, communists would be sentenced to prison temporarily if they were members of a communist entity, were advocating communism, or if an individual published a communist document, or was found in possession of one. Therefore, Jordan did not have a communist party during this period, and communists joined Leftist and National goals instead, due to common goals. Therefore, the concept of ‘Leftist’ is used to include those Nationalists or Communists who were harmed by this law. In: Ahmad ‘Ārif and Ibrīl Kafārinah, \textit{al-Tajribah al-Dimuqrāṭīyah al-Urdunīyah: Tajribat al-Khamṣīnīt biwa al-Tajribah al-Ḥadithah} [The Jordanian Democratic Experience: The Experience of the Fifties Until Modernity: 1956-2007], (Amman: Dār Qindīl lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzī‘, 2009), 138 – 139.

However, joining the Baghdad Pact was considered a betrayal against Arab nationalism for the Leftists, Nationalists, and the Brotherhood, as it provided the West with a stronger role in the region. Further, due to Nasser (the main advocate of Arabism) refusing to sign the Pact, and his cooperation with the Soviet Union instead of the West, the Brotherhood’s alliance with the Leftist and Nationalist parties can be argued to be the first instance of the Brotherhood prioritising national goals over their religious objectives. This collaboration between the Brotherhood and Leftists in Jordan intensified when they adopted the same agenda against Westernisation. Protests against the Baghdad Pact turned into riots against Western institutions in general, as seen with attacks on the American Quaker project in ‘Ayn Dibbin, and the Christian Baptist Hospital in ‘Ajlun on January 9 and 12, 1956.

Under these conditions, the King informed British representatives that joining the Pact had become impossible due to disturbances in the country. This decision was not easy, as opposing the Pact meant the possibility of losing financial aid from the British Government.

With the rise of Nasserist popularity, followed by the Nationalists, the regime and the Brotherhood united forces. Again, the movement was considered loyal to the regime’s powers, recommencing their previous alliance with King ʿAbdallah I. Therefore, when preparing for the 1956 parliamentary elections, the government introduced new legislative guidance for the national Islamic institutions that included instructions on how to express support to the royalty during the Friday prayers. New legislation was used to forbid Islamic preaching of any kind inside mosques without governmental license stating who was teaching and what kind of teaching was going to

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55 Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 25; The riots and attacks are ambiguous. The subject is ignored in Muslim Brotherhood literature, however, other texts such as Shmuel Bar’s The Muslim Brotherhood (25) claims that the Brotherhood became more militant, collaborating and adopting Leftist agenda, and joining the attacks as a dual effort. On the other hand, Stephen Blackwell argues that the riots were a British backed plot to prevent the US from establishing a dominant position in Jordan. In: Stephen Blackwell, British Military Intervention and the Struggle for Jordan: King Hussein, Nasser and the Middle East Crisis, 1955-1958 (New York: Routledge, 2009), 24-29.

take place. According to this law, using mosques for political agitation could be punished by fines or imprisonment if without a licence.\textsuperscript{57} This new legislation became the government’s foundation for breaking down the \textit{Tahrîr} Party, as the government would not permit the party to a licence.\textsuperscript{58}

Excluding the \textit{Tahrîr} Party members’ individual participation in elections, the party as a whole was not permitted the legal political legitimacy by the government to join the election or Friday preaching, unlike the Brotherhood, who believed in the regime’s legitimacy, and approved of the state’s degree of recognition for Islam, which held the possibility for further Islamisation. Although the Brotherhood represented an opposition to the regime at grass-roots levels, as seen in their solidarity with the banned Egyptian Brotherhood and their participation in the Baghdad Pact riots, the movement was ultimately seen as a loyal opposition, identifying that their criticisms, in contrast to the \textit{Tahrîr} Party, centred around the regime’s relations with the West, not the regime or its powers. Therefore, as its relation with the regime improved, the Brotherhood distanced itself further from the \textit{Tahrîr} Party.

The \textit{Tahrîr} Party did not believe in the regime’s legitimacy, or its will to apply Islam in politics, and considered Jordan to be un-Islamic. Due to this opposition, new legislation was introduced leading to the dismissal of the party and arrest of its members, with its leader al-Nabhani voluntarily exiled to Lebanon in preparation for the 1956 elections.\textsuperscript{59} Abolishing the \textit{Tahrîr} Party could be considered a strategic step to repair relations between the government and the Brotherhood, as after it was dismantled, the Brotherhood remained the only Islamic movement in the 1956 election, thus empowering its campaign.

At this stage, the Muslim Brotherhood successfully mobilised civilians to protest, proving its ability to practice politics in a new capacity. Furthermore, its ability to cooperate with other political parties was shown in its coordination with the Leftists to serve their national goal of minimising Westernisation in Jordan, as seen through opposition to the Baghdad Pact. This also proved that the movement’s religious and


\textsuperscript{58}Bar, \textit{The Muslim Brotherhood}, 24.

national agendas may not necessarily contradict one another and that the moderate position of the organisation’s political goals in an Islamic state was possible to adopt and apply. The Brotherhood made it possible to cooperate with the Jordanian regime and was able to participate in the 1956 elections.

The period between April 1955 and October 1956 presents pragmatic, political developments for the Muslim Brotherhood, moving their alliance with the Leftist and Nationalist parties to the regime, which they had renewed common interests with. Their participation in politics was not only seen in the form of protest, but also in their being an important actor in the regime vs. Leftist dilemma. In contrast to the Tahrīr Party, they adopted a moderate discourse, accepting the state’s application of Islam and the regime’s authority over the country, making them a tool for the regime against the Leftists. However, this proximity to the regime did not mean that the Brotherhood was in full acceptance of King Hussein’s monarchy. Abū Fāris described this, saying:

The stance that the movement takes may meet with some of the regime’s stance, however they should know that this closeness does not mean recognition and loyalty come without adequate application of Islam, because loyalty is a matter of belief, given only to God and His messengers.\(^\text{60}\)

Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood’s pragmatism comes from their development in adapting within Jordanian society, both in their belief and their mission. Therein, they successfully positioned themselves within the regime, adapting their ideology to the regime.

### 2.1 Participation in Elections (1956)

Although King Hussein agreed with the UK that Jordan would allow elections as part of a democratic process in return for the British Army’s departure from Jordan,\(^\text{61}\) he also thought that establishing parliamentarian life would put an end to the Baghdad Pact riots, and bring back the Leftists and Muslim Brotherhood, who had participated

\(\text{60}\) Abū Fāris, Ṣafahāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [Pages from the Political History of the Muslim Brotherhood], 14.

in the riots, and thus stabilise the country.

In the 1956 election, Jordan saw the emergence of Leftist and Nationalist parties, Islamic parties, and pro-regime parties including the conservative right-wing, Ḥizb al-Ummah [The Nation Party] and al-Ḥizb al-ʻArabī al-Dustūrī [The Arab Constitutional Party].

The Brotherhood entered the election with five candidates, four of which represented the East Bank and only one candidate for the West Bank. The Brotherhood’s manifesto included the cancellation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty; the acceptance of financial aid from Arab states rather than the UK; the resistance of conciliation, settlements, and creating individual solutions to protect Palestine; and the enhancement of Jordan's military while continuing the Arabisation process.

With a similar agenda, the Leftists, as led by the National Socialist Party, entered the elections demanding the replacement of British subsidy with Arab aid; the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty; the recognition of Israel as an illegal state; the establishment of diplomatic relations with Communist states; and an extension to women’s political rights.

Being permitted to participate in the election meant that the Brotherhood would also enter into political life. However, in facing this opportunity, the movement found itself with several internal dilemmas, such as questioning its role in society – whether it was advocating Islam by building hospitals, schools and other social institutions through the association’s charity work – or, if it was an initiative for reforming the society. Choosing the latter as a priority, its main goal is to re-establish society on Islamic terms and Qur’anic teachings. Therefore, the Jordanian Brotherhood considered the parliamentary elections a tool for launching social reforms and applying Islamic rules. In other words, it was a chance to implement an Islamic social order across Islamic lands, as per al-Banna’s ideology.

Secondly, the question of participation divided the Jordanian Brotherhood into two ideological groups: followers of al-Banna and followers of Qutb. Al-Banna acknowledged the urgent need for the Brotherhood, who risked being outlawed, to take

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64 Betty S. Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan the Street and the State, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2005), 173.
part in the election in his “Risālat al-Intikhābāt” [Election Letter], reasoning that parliament was a “lung that [would] allow the Brotherhood to breathe.” The group also referred to the decision declared at the Muslim Brotherhood’s sixth conference in 1941, in which the Guidance Council granted permission to participate in the national election, in order to implement their goals.

In “Risālat al-Intikhābāt,” al-Banna presents a framework for the Brotherhood’s participation, however, in the letter he reminds the reader that in the two times that the Brotherhood participated in previous Egyptian elections, it entered with just two and six candidates, demonstrating that the purpose of participation was not political dominion, but rather inclusion and reassurance that it was spreading the Brotherhood’s Islamic agenda gradually. This presented an ethical approach, which was a more desirable path for members of the Brotherhood. Therefore, the al-Bannaist group in Jordan prioritised political participation within the political system based on the founder’s teachings.

However, the Brotherhood was also influenced by Qutb ideology, which regarded Jordan as an unviable and illegitimate entity, whose only redeeming political value was its potential as a base for the struggle against Israel. This led many representatives of the Qutb group to favour non-participation in these elections, arguing that Jordan was not a model in which to apply Islamic rules.

Perhaps the best example of Qutb’s opinion on elections is in his book, Li-Mādḥā Aʿdamūnī [Why they Executed Me], where he commented on an election by saying:

Establishing Islamic ruling in any country will not come by these methods [elections] and it will not happen but by a slow and long-term approach, targeting the base, not the summit [of involvement], and starts from re-planting the religion.

69 Sayyid Qutb, Karam Dakrūrī, Yūṣuf Qaraḍāwī, and ʿAbdallah ʿAzzām, Li-Mādḥā Aʿdamūnī [Why did they Execute Me], (Cairo: Manshūrat Nūn, 2007), 43-44.
The difference between al-Banna and Qutb is that al-Banna presents elections as an essential way to create Islamic change, bringing Islam to the political system gently and proving the role of the Brotherhood. He looks to the possibility of working from the top down, changing the leadership as well as working at a grass-roots level. However, as outlined above, Qutb rejects the idea of elections, stating that change would be established from the ground up, reinstalling people’s faith as a foundation of such change.

This clash has appeared in the leadership of the movement since 1954, leading the Qutbist leader, abū Qura to resign in favour of the al-Bannaist leader, Khalifah, who became the new General Supervisor. Abū Qura’s opinion that the parliamentarian path of the organisation was a farce and that such participation would not lead to the application of Shari‘ah, considering the share of seats the Brotherhood might win. However, this argument failed in the face of al-Banna’s group, who led the Jordanian Brotherhood into the elections.70

Additionally, there was influence from the Taḥrīr Party, which decided to join the elections as independent candidates after being banned as a whole in 1956. The Taḥrīr Party’s involvement could have reduced the Brotherhood’s Islamic presence, since the two parties shared the same religious background, and the Brotherhood did not want the Taḥrīr Party to increase its popularity at their expense. The Brotherhood decided to enter the elections as independent candidates and not as a political party opposing the Taḥrīr and Leftist parties, taking a progressive step towards political life.

Therefore, on October 21, 1956, Jordan witnessed its first elections where multiple parties were able to join, rather than independent candidates only. One hundred and forty four candidates participated in the elections to compete for 40 seats, with 74 candidates belonging to political parties, and 70 independent candidates. The ath Party: one, and Independent: five) and the Brotherhood gained four seats out of the five candidates who participated.

70 ‘Ubaydī, Jama‘at al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdun wa-Fīlaṣṭīn [The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and Palestine], 105-120.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>East Bank Candidates</th>
<th>West Bank Candidates</th>
<th>Seats won</th>
</tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>11</td>
</tr>
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<td>Arab Constitutional Party</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ath Party</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Allocation of Seats in 1956 Elections

According to the Constitution, the party who wins the elections is granted the right to appoint the Prime Minister, however, no party or block gained a majority that would allow it to do so. Therefore, the National Socialist Party nominated its leader, Sulaymān al-Nābulusī, for Prime Minister as they received the biggest share of seats, despite losing in his district.


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When al-Nābulusī was appointed Prime Minister, the Brotherhood found itself with a new dilemma: the new Prime Minister’s affiliations with the neighbouring countries ruled by Nationalists that were counted on the Soviet Bloc, such as Syria, ath Party and some independents opposing the Baghdad Pact were favoured by the Brotherhood, but not in terms of their relations with Nasser due to his clash with the Brotherhood in Egypt.⁷³ Therefore, the decision was made in parliament to oppose al-Nābulusī’s Leftist government, in fear he would follow Nasser’s steps against the Brotherhood in Jordan. To gain support, al-Nābulusī offered the Brothers the opportunity to enter his government, but this was declined.⁷⁴

The parliament’s main achievement in 1956 was the cancelation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, which was a united goal for all political groups.⁷⁵ Following the cancelation of the treaty, the differences between the Brotherhood and the Leftists widened. For example, in the three days the government dedicated to celebrating the end of this treaty (March 14 - 16), clashes occurred between the Leftists and the Brotherhood, in which gunfire was exchanged after the Leftists raised pictures of Nasser, and many were wounded.⁷⁶

Despite the Brotherhood accepting some socialist values, there is still a significant disagreement of how they view the state, whether in a secularist or Islamic context. Leftists and Nationalists want to see Jordan as a secular socialist state, while the Brotherhood sees Jordan as a future Islamic state. Therefore, despite their commonalities in the 1950s, the two movements still conflict over the others’ understanding of religion in state reform. The Leftists issued the logo, ‘Socialism is the Solution’ for political reform and the Muslim Brotherhood responded by raising the logo, ‘al-Islām huwa al-Hall’ [Islam is the Solution].⁷⁷

Jordan promptly saw a clash escalate between the King and the new government regarding Soviet influence in the country. The King issued a letter on

⁷⁴ To justify their decision, on February 8, 1957, an official statement entitled “No to the call for Obscurity” was published in al-Kifāḥ magazine. See Appendix 2.5.
⁷⁵ “Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs”.
⁷⁶ Charles Johnston, British ambassador for Jordan at the time, claimed that the “Communists stole the show” by chanting for Nasser, Nikita Khrushchev, and Nikolai Bulganin, the leaders of the Soviet Unions. In: Johnston, The Brink of Jordan, 46.
⁷⁷ Calling for the return to Islam as a solution to the ills that had befallen Muslim societies. In: Mashhūr Mustafā, al-Islām Huwa al-Hall [Islam is the Solution], (Egypt: Dār al-Tawzi‘ wa-al-Nashr al-Islāmīyah, 2001). See Appendix 1: Glossary.
February 2, 1957 to the Prime Minister, denouncing Communism in Jordan. The King further expressed his concerns regarding the Soviet’s infiltration of government staff:

The Present Cold War between the two world blocs has brought to our country certain principles and imperialism, which is about to die in the Arab East, will be replaced by a new kind of imperialism… No gap must be left to allow the propaganda of communism to ruin our country… We hope that you and your colleagues, the ministers, will adopt an attitude which ensures the interests of this county and stops the propaganda and agitation of those who want to infiltrate through to the ranks of the citizens.\(^78\)

The King’s alarm over communism was related to his fear of Leftist and Nationalist ‘traitors’ within the government, such as Minister of Justice and Education, Shafiq Rusheidat, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, ʿAbullah Rimawi, and the Chief of Staff, Ali abū Nuwar who had assumed Glubb Pasha’s role after he was dismissed, and had once been “a close friend” of King Hussein.\(^79\) Furthermore, King Hussein was alerted to the possibility of these personalities’ loyalty being compromised by external players,\(^80\) and was reaching a defensive stage where he felt his monarch was threatened in the face of al-Nābulusī’s growing confidence and alliances with the Soviets and Egypt, especially without the British mediation brought by Glubb Pasha. The King’s growing caution stressed the al-Nābulusī’ government and in response, Nationalist and Leftist parties united their powers in parliament to pass a decision on April 3 that pushed for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Russia.\(^81\) The King took no step to over-rule their decision,\(^82\) rather adopting a “waiting game”.\(^83\)

The al-Nābulusī government later provided the King with a list of rejected


\(^{79}\) Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, 159.

\(^{80}\) See Appendix 3.3 for full quote.


\(^{82}\) Johnston, The Brink of Jordan, 53 - 55.

\(^{83}\) Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, 157.
personnel on April 7, including the Director-General of Security. Three days later the King dissolved the government. At this point, the Brotherhood furthered its support for the regime against the Leftists by supporting Ḫusayn Fakhri al-Khalīdī as a Prime Minster along with the Arab Constitutional Party and the independent tribal parliamentarians, making the Brotherhood closer to the right-wing loyalists.

Using the conflict between al-‘Nābulusī and the King in the stress of the environment, the army General, Aḥlū Nuwar, made a coup attempt on April 13 through a Zarqa unit, led by those calling themselves ‘Free Army Officers,’ and drawing close similarities to Nasser’s coup in Egypt. The Free Officers believed in Nasser’s idea of the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) and with this in mind, it was stated that Jordan must become a republic to be able to unite with the other Arab countries. However, the situation was diffused when the King intervened after seeing that his fears were being realised, regaining control and sending the dissenters to trial. King Hussein recounts the event in his biography with:

We had reached a stage when many officers and politicians did not really know where they were going. Some were genuinely nationalist but felt that Jordan was too small to stand-alone. Some decided to offer themselves to other Arab states, which in fact means offering their services, in most instances, to communism. Thus, our once efficient Army began to deteriorate. Soon it was composed of differing factions, each with its own political beliefs.

However, al-‘Nābulusī was not associated officially with the situation, and to diminish the idea that the Communists had had a footing in government, or had conspired to make a coup, the ex-Prime Minister was reassigned within days in the new Ḫusayn Fakhri al-Khalīdī government as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The

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86 See Appendix 1: Glossary.
87 Amtūsh, Mahāfṭāt ft Tārtkh Jamā‘at al-Ikhwān [Periods in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood], 29.
88 Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, 157.
arrangement lasted for little over a week, from April 15 to 23, continuing the pattern of unstable and short Jordanian governments during this time.\(^{90}\)

On April 24, 1957, protests in support of the Leftists took place in Amman.\(^{91}\) Feeling threatened by the continued popularity for al-Nābulusī, and the possibility of the protests turning into riots in the West Bank where the Leftists convened, the King resigned al-Khalīfī and appointed Ibrahim Hashem. The new Prime Minister did not ease the stress in the streets, however, which led the King to impose emergency law and an immediate curfew on April 25, dissolving parliament and banning all political parties.

The Leftist parties met in Nablus on the West Bank to oppose the King’s decision. A letter was sent reminding him that the King reigns but does not rule. Leftist leaders addressed the King with their demand for him to respect the constitution, which states that the prime minister is to be appointed by the winning party.

The event of April 24, 1957 is very similar to the 1955 Baghdad Pact riots, when Communists led the streets against imperialism. However, the support of the Brotherhood in the Baghdad Pact guaranteed a wider acceptance for Communists and both were able to avoid Jordan from participating in that treaty and moved the country towards democratisation, launching the 1956 election. However, the alliances map changed in Jordan after the Muslim Brotherhood resumed relations with the regime. Therefore, the Brotherhood armed its followers in the West Bank to face the Leftists and to help the regime enforce control over the area, helping the security forces in searching for Communists. Reinforced by the Brotherhood’s active support, the King’s power over the two banks was demonstrated, and effectively made the Brotherhood a vital limb of the Jordanian regime.\(^{92}\)

Abū Fāris expressed fear from the Leftists by saying that the Free Officer movement was gaining support from the Egyptian regime, cautioning that if they came to power they would follow Nasser’s steps in fighting the Muslim Brotherhood.\(^{93}\) Therefore, the Brotherhood had a cause to serve the King’s interests over the


\(^{93}\) Abū Fāris, Ṣafahāt min al-Tārtkh al-Siyāsat lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdūn [Pages from the Political History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 37.
Leftists’. In the latter half of the fifties the two trends of the Muslim Brotherhood – al-Bannaist and Qutbist – began to appear ever more distinct, however, to avoid the ongoing problems with the Brotherhood regionally, as seen with Nasser banning the Egyptian Brotherhood, the two wings of the Jordanian Brotherhood united. Fear of the Leftists monopolising the Palestinian resistance caused both wings of the Brotherhood to favour the regime, especially due to past ties with King ʻAbdallah I, and mutual participation in the 1948 war.

Therefore, at this stage the movement was moving as one front with a unified decision, however, the support demonstrated for the regime was not for the regime only, but was rather built on past loyalty, which presented an in-road for the Brotherhood’s prerequisite to balance Palestinian support, which ensures their existence in Jordan. Furthermore, in the same year, 1956, when the Brotherhood was taking place in the Jordanian parliament, the mother movement in Egypt was being suppressed by the Nasser regime. This inalienable fact cannot be overlooked when observing the Jordanian Brotherhood and Jordanian Leftists/Nationalists’ dynamic, as it demonstrates the Brotherhood’s vulnerability to Leftist and Nationalist agendas, which did not hide its support for Nasser and pan-Arabist ideology at the expense of the Brotherhood movement.

Despite these clashes, the al-Nābulusī government could be considered the most progressive period in the history of Jordan due to his impact on democratisation and willingness to cooperate with the parliament in order to adopt new legislation. New laws passed under this government included those regarding Political Parties, Publication, Preaching and Guidance, Municipality, plus Bedouin supervision guidelines, and amendments to the Defence Act and Electoral Law. In addition he insisted on the cancellation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and managed to attract financial assistance from Arab countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, as alternatives to British aid.

96 Egyptian subsidies did not last long due to the 1956 war in which Israel, the UK, and France invaded Egypt on October 29 to regain control over the Suez Cannel following Nasser’s decision to nationalise it.
Additionally, the Arab Solidarity Agreement was signed in 1957 to strengthen regional cooperation.\footnote{Richard H. Nolte, “The Arab Solidarity Agreement March 18, 1957,” Institute of Current World Affairs, 2008, accessed December 2, 2014, http://www.icwa.org/txtArticles/RHN-71.htm.} After the failure of the coup attempt, the majority of the Leftists were imprisoned. The King also changed the constitution without any parliamentarian approval or supervision to end the first democratic experience in the country. Furthermore, the King rewarded the Brotherhood by allowing it to continue operating in the country despite the ban of political parties in 1957, on the basis that they were considered a religious entity and not a political one.\footnote{Rāniyah Jā’bārī, “Hukūmat Sulaymān al-Nābulūsḥ Shiqq ‘āṣā al-Taba’iyah” [al-Nābulūsḥ Government and the Freedom form Dependency], 18-23.} The Brotherhood, therefore, continued to act as an ideological, but generally loyal, opposition to the regime.\footnote{Amnon Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank Under the Jordanian Regime, 1949-1967 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 185-189.}

In this period, the Muslim Brotherhood was keen to build an educational basis for the movement, which comes from their belief in the importance of education. Therefore, the Brotherhood’s first social activities began by building the Islamic Scientific College in 1947, along with many schools and colleges around the country. They also established the pillar of their social welfare system, the Jam‘īyat al-Markaz al-Islāmī [Islamic Centre Society], in 1963, along with the Islamic Hospital and other medical centres, in addition to mosques. Thus, the 1950s and 1960s reflected the introduction of the Muslim Brotherhood to Jordanian society and its growth in popularity.\footnote{Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for Research,” Mediterranean Politics, 2002, 7 (3): 187-211.}

\subsection*{2.2 Palestinian Forces and the 1967 War}

The question of Palestine in Jordan was raised again in the 1960s as their largest representatives and advocates, Leftists and Nationalists, were now isolated from the Jordanian political scene. Primary Jordanian political actors supported the regime’s security measures under the Emergency Law and the Muslim Brotherhood became the only group allowed to participate in politics after the prohibition of political parties in
1957. The problem of Palestine remained a pivotal issue in Jordanian politics, especially once the West Bank was considered part of Jordanian territory and its residents held Jordanian citizenship following unification.

Furthermore, the Palestinian issue was strengthened by Nasser’s call for the Arab League Summit to be held in Cairo in 1964. The main objectives of the conference were to elaborate upon common principles for Arab countries regarding Israel and to discuss the issue of water distribution in the region. However, the Palestinian question became a sticking point for this gathering. Nasser defended the idea that Palestine should be represented as a separate entity, which corresponded with his general approach towards pan-Arabism and his support of liberation movements. However, Jordan, after the unification, remained the sole representative of the West Bank. This quandary was especially problematic for the Jordanian Brotherhood, whose leadership was caught between Palestinian liberation and the Brotherhood benefiting from Jordanian Government support. Nevertheless, the Arab league made a decision to authorise the establishment of the Palestinian entity and appointed Ahmad al-Shukeiri to initiate contacts between Palestinians and other Arab countries.

At the outset of the Summit, the Jordanian authority was forced to declare its position on Palestine. Even though King Hussein defended the idea that the West Bank must be controlled by Jordan to avoid Israeli occupation that would threaten the security of the whole region, he was forced to surrender to al-Shukeiri and Nasser. As a result, the Jordanian army withdrew from the territory and the Jordanian authority repealed tax collection from the West Bank’s inhabitants to make way for the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). Inspired by the Nasser initiative to coordinate Palestinian actions against Zionism, the PLO became more influential in the Palestinian territories that Jordan had relinquished. King Hussein, in order to show his consent with Nasser and the Arab League, took part in the opening of the Palestinian National Council Conference on June 2, 1964 resulting in the declaration of

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103 Ahmad al-Shukeiri is the former assistant to the Secretary General for the Arab League during 1950–1956, and later the first leader of the Palestinian Liberation Front.
the PLO charter.\textsuperscript{106}

The Jordanian Brotherhood debated their involvement in the fight for influence over Palestine. On the one hand, as argued by Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, “the Brotherhood perceived Palestine as one of its core ideological stands: the unity between Jordan and Palestine was considered to be the first step towards unification of the Unmāh.”\textsuperscript{107}

On the other hand, Muslim Brotherhood leaders did not want to lose the privileges gained from the regime, seen especially after supporting it against the Leftists. The position of the Brotherhood in this issue was also challenged by the members of Palestinian descent, for whom a Palestinian entity was seen as a more desirable outcome than the citizenship they had been granted in Jordan. The Jordanian Brotherhood, represented by Ali Hawamdeh, participated in the discussions with Qutb in Cairo. Qutb proposed that the Brotherhood should not join forces with \textit{Fateh} in the PLO. He said, “It’s not for [the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood] or for our current time”.\textsuperscript{108} Even though the PLO was partially formed by Brotherhood members such as Khalil al-Wazir and Slah Kahlaf, who participated in the Brotherhood troops’ war in 1948, the organisation was considered nationalistic with political standpoints, and not religious like the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, from the very beginning Brotherhood members were cautious in their participation in these public debates.\textsuperscript{109}

Al-Wazir and Slah Kahlaf are also leaders of the \textit{Fateh} movement, which was established on January 1, 1965 as a political party, though it has existed as political movement since 1959 when Yasser Arafat and al-Wazir began publishing the newspaper “Filāṣṭīnunā” [Our Palestine].\textsuperscript{110} This new group represented an alternative approach to the Palestinian issue, succeeding in prioritising a nationalist standpoint over other ideological, religious, or tribal considerations. The unification of Palestinians and the liberation of the Palestinian people were stated as its main objectives.

However, these considerations did not prevent the Brotherhood from recognising and supporting the PLO in 1964, and its first chairman, Ahmad al-

\textsuperscript{107} Interview with Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, August 24, 2012, Amman, Jordan.
\textsuperscript{108} Amūsh, \textit{Maḥaṣṣātāt fī Ṭārīkh Juma’at al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn} [Periods in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood], 64.
\textsuperscript{109} Amūsh, \textit{Maḥaṣṣātāt fī Ṭārīkh Juma’at al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn} [Periods in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood], 60-65.
Shukeiri, becoming the leading representative of the Palestinians. Nevertheless, when al-Shukeiri chose the Leftists over the Brotherhood in the executive committee of the PLO, its relations with the Brotherhood disintegrated.

Due to demonstrations that broke out in Jordan as a consequence of Nasser’s execution of Qutb and other Brotherhood leaders in Egypt on August 29, 1966, the King welcomed the Egyptian and Syrian Brotherhood who were exiled by their regimes, reversing any possible improvements of relations between Jordan and Egypt. As a counterbalance, the Jordanian Brotherhood participated again in the 1967 elections to show good intentions and good relations with the regime. However, three Brotherhood representatives were elected out of forty seats, and General Supervisor ābād al-Rahman Khalīfah lost his seat. It was ironic that the Brotherhood did not gain an advantage in this election in the absence of Leftist and Nationalist competition. In fact, their gaining three seats from forty was one seat less than the 1956 election against the Leftist parties. It was the rise of Fateh in Jordan that diminished the Brotherhood’s popularity, as they assumed Palestinian representation, which had been the main source of the Brotherhood’s vote. This fall in Brotherhood popularity was the first sign that a new organisation was taking place in Jordan, filling the void of the Nationalists and Leftists.

In June 1967, when Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were engaged in war with Israel, the Brotherhood did not have the same freedom to participate in military events as it did in the 1948 war. The beginning of 1967 showed sporadic clashes of artillery between the Israeli and Syrian armies and Israelis and Palestinians infiltrating each other’s territories for minor attacks. However, on April 7, Israel shot down six Syrian aircrafts, escalating the conflict into war. This led the Israeli army to intervene in Jordan, which was later deplored by the UN Security Council. Israel continued to carry

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112 ʻUbaydi, Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [The Muslim Brotherhood], 169-171; Miller, Aaron David, The PLO and the Politics of Survival, (Georgetown University, Centre for Strategic and international Studies, 1983).
115 Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 30.
116 Ibid.
out a pre-emptive air force attack against Egypt. Within six days, Israel won the war seizing control over the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.\textsuperscript{117}

![Image 2: Map of the Levant, Pre and Post 1967 War\textsuperscript{118}]

The Jordanian Brotherhood entered the war through the PLO under \textit{Fateh} leadership, having established four bases to engage in the conflict. Three Brotherhood \textit{al-Shuyūkh} resistance bases were formed in Jordan during the war, fighting side-by-side with the \textit{Fateh} bases. One of the main brigades representing the Brotherhood in this war was \textit{Bayt al-Maqdis} led by ʻAbdallah ʻAzzām, and camped in the village Rufaydah, Jordan.\textsuperscript{119} This base became known after the battle of \textit{al-Hizām al-Akhḍar} [The Green Belt] in al-Ghor [the Jordan Valley].\textsuperscript{120} In describing the nature of the \textit{al-Shuyūkh} bases al-Mashūkhī said:

\textsuperscript{120} ʻAmr ʻĀyid, \textit{Silsilat Maʻārik al-Thawrah al-Filaṣṭīnyah: Ma‘rakat al-Karāmah} [Series of the Battles of the Palestinians Revolution: The Battle of al Karameh], (Rām Allāh: Markaz al-Dirāsāt al-Istrāṭijyāyah, 2005).
My position within al-Shuyākh was Management Unit Officer. The name al-Shuyākh is a term we were given by the villagers and the inhabitants of the areas around the bases [Jordan Valley], and comes from the word Shaykh [leadership of religious background].\textsuperscript{121} We received this name due to the nature of the Brotherhood in these bases, whose members are committed religiously and ethically. We treat them well and we don’t steal from them in contrast to the Fedayeen.\textsuperscript{122}

Similarly the Egyptian Brotherhood participation was limited in the 1967 war in providing support to the Sinai Egyptian Bedouin due to the measures implemented by the Egyptian army to prevent the Brotherhood from taking part in any other form of activities in the desert, except their support to the PLO. Therefore, although they did not take direct action in the war, they participated ideologically and financially by supporting the army and Bedouins.

Due to the creation of Fateh, the Brotherhood was side-lined, making way for a Palestinian entity to represent Palestinian nationality, rather than the Brotherhood’s more universal representation of religious and societal matters. In the 1948 war there was no official Palestinian representation, therefore the Brotherhood, and individuals working under the Brotherhood’s wing, represented the Palestinian struggle in this war. Their effort included recruiting volunteers and mobilising civilians. Therefore, in 1967, Nasser gave support and recognition for Fateh, Nationalist, and liberation movements. The recognition of Fateh created for Palestinians the choice of not only Islamists, but also Nationalists, who were supported by the Nasser regime and other Arab states, unlike the Islamist groups who were being discredited throughout the Arab world. This meant that the Brotherhood found itself disregarded and fighting side-by-side with the Fedayeen to assume even a minimal role within al-Shuyākh bases.

\subsection*{2.2.1 The Brotherhood and the National Identity Dilemma (Black September)}

From the beginning of the 1967 war, the activity of Fateh was considered related to the Muslim Brotherhood, with Arafat himself participating in the Brotherhood militia

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{121} Shaykh: singular of Shuyākh, which in the Jordanian accent, refers to leadership of religious background.
\item\textsuperscript{122} Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan.
\end{itemize}
attacks against British troops in the Suez Canal in 1951.\textsuperscript{123} In addition, many representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood cooperated with \textit{Fateh}. Along them were ‘Abdallah Muṭawwi’ (founding member of the Kuwaiti Brotherhood), ‘Umar Bahā’- al-Dīn Amīrī (leader of Syrian Brotherhood), Issam al-Attar (General Supervisor of Syrian Brotherhood), Izz al-Dīn Ibrahim (representing the Egyptian Brotherhood, also founder of the Libyan Brotherhood), and Tawfīq Shāwī (leader of the Egyptian branch).\textsuperscript{124}

After 1967, the Muslim Brotherhood agreed with \textit{Fateh} to keep the \textit{al-Shuyūkh} bases operating in Jordan in order to continue military attacks on Israel.\textsuperscript{125} According to Ishāq Ahmad Farhān (leader of one of the three Brotherhood bases)\textsuperscript{126} the meeting between the Muslim Brotherhood and \textit{Fateh} to discuss the situation of Jordan after the 1967 war took place at Qindīl Shākir’s house.\textsuperscript{127} At this meeting, the necessity of jihad was stressed by Saad al-Dīn al-Zmaili and Khalil Ibrahim al-Wazir, the cofounder of \textit{Fateh}.\textsuperscript{128} The two organisations agreed that Jordan was weak and that Jordanian forces were not able to engage in war with Israel again. Therefore, they considered the \textit{al-Shuyūkh} bases essential to continue their resistance. In this context, ‘bases’ began to be thought of as a hub of militant activists, recruiting and mobilising volunteers. The agreement between Arafat and the Brotherhood resulted in the establishment of Brotherhood \textit{al-Shuyūkh} bases neighbouring the \textit{Fedayeen} bases. The two organisations shared responsibilities: Arafat provided weapons and provisions, while the Muslim Brotherhood, through the members of its Kuwaiti branch such as ‘Abdallah Muṭawwi’, were responsible for financing the bases and paying salaries to the

\footnotesize{126} Ishāq Aḥmad Farhān is one of the leaders of the Brotherhood, and the first Brotherhood Minister in the Wafsi al-Tal government of 1970.  
Fedayeen.\textsuperscript{129}

The Fedayeen, which originally means ‘one who sacrifices himself’ or ‘martyr’,\textsuperscript{130} are groups of paramilitary Palestinians, consisting of armed militias or guerrillas representing different ideologies from nationalism to pan-Arabism. These groups formed as a consequence of the defeat of the Arab army during the war. The majority of the Fedayeen were refugees from Gaza and the West Bank, who fled Palestinian territories during Egypt and Jordan’s control. They were also enriched by the participation of politically active refugees from Lebanon.\textsuperscript{131}

After the Brotherhood-Fateh agreement, a total of five bases in Azraq, Jerash, Irbid, and Zarqa were formed (Bayt al-Maqdis, Gaza, al-Mughair, al-Khalīf and Al‘a‘l). Three Egyptian trainers who fled to Jordan after Nasser’s attack on the Brotherhood (Ṣalāḥ Ḥasan, Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, and ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ali) supervised the bases; around 250 to 300 Brothers were trained at that time before their presence was reinforced with the addition of another two bases on the borders with Palestine.\textsuperscript{132} Brotherhoods from Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Sudan formed these bases.\textsuperscript{133}

The Brotherhood and the Fedayeen bases were active after the 1967 war across the borders between Jordan and Israel, trying to create minor damages inside the Israeli territory. The violation of the Fedayeen by crossing the borders led the Israeli army to infiltrate Jordan on March 20, 1967 reaching the village of Karameh, north of the King Hussein Bridge (Allenby Bridge). With air force raids, Israel launched attacks on Jordanian Brotherhood and Fedayeen bases where military means were limited to armament for artillery duels and small-scale incursions, which obliged the military forces of Jordan to intervene, escalating the war.\textsuperscript{134} Although the Israeli army faced the Fedayeen before the Jordanian military forces could interfere, the eventual presence of

\textsuperscript{129} Tawfīq Shāwīt, 	extit{Mudhakkirāt Nisf Qarn min al-‘Amal al-Islāmī} [Memories of Half a Century of Islamic Activism, 1945-1995], (Cairo: Dār al-Shūrūq, 1998), 15; Amūsh, 	extit{Maḥaṣṣātī ft Tārīkh Jamā’at al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn ft al-Urdun} [Periods in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 68.


\textsuperscript{132} Amūsh, 	extit{Maḥaṣṣātī ft Tārīkh Jamā’at al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn ft al-Urdun} [Periods in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 69.

\textsuperscript{133} Interview with Ibrāhīm al-Mashtūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan; Mohsen Saleh, 	extit{al-Tarīq išrā al-Quds} [The Path to Jerusalem], (Cairo: Markaz al-‘Ilam al-‘Arabi, 2003) 195 - 196.

\textsuperscript{134} Nevo, 	extit{Jordan in the Middle East: The Making of a Pivotal State, 1948-1988}, 61-95.
the national military resulted in Israel’s gradual withdrawal.

The battle of Karameh is considered to be part of the ‘Thousand Days War’, which began in July 1967 after the clash between Egyptian and Israeli armies on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, which broke the cease-fire that had been established after the previous war, in June 1967. The war did not cease until the ‘Rogers Plan’ was signed in Egypt and Jordan to ensure the ceasefire of all parties involved. This plan was named after the US Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, and was signed on December 9, 1969 to stop the Fedayeen attacking Israel from the Jordan Valley, in exchange for Israel stopping the War of Attrition in December 1970.

Each party claimed victory over the other. For Jordan victory was claimed due to its ability to protect its land from infiltration. Israel on the other hand claimed victory because it successfully pushed the Fedayeen into Jordan, and away from the borders. However, the Palestinians claimed victory firstly because the Fedayeen proved its military presence and ability to fight separately from Arabs, achieving what they could not in the 1948 and 1967 wars. Secondly, their claim of success gave them popularity, which extended throughout Arab countries, creating the belief that an independent Palestinian resistance was the solution, which empowered the Fedayeen to reclaim the Palestinian issue from Arab custody, becoming sole representative of the Palestinian people. Alternatively, the Jordanian Brotherhood argued that there was victory due to their Islamic involvement, compared to previous wars when secular armies, led by secular regimes, lost. This made the Karameh battle essential for the growth of the Fedayeen and the Brotherhood.

The joint effort of the regime and PLO caused the King to welcome the Fedayeen into Jordan, claiming that “we are all Fedayeen,” which gave the

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139 Abū ‘Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad, 12-151.
movement recognition and a home for its activities. Soon after, an agreement was signed between the King and the **Fedayeen** to clarify and organise the relationship between the state of Jordan and armed fighters within the country. The agreement consisted of seven points:

1. Members of these organisations were forbidden to walk around cities armed and in uniform;
2. They were forbidden to stop and search civilian vehicles;
3. They were forbidden to compete with the Jordanian Army for recruits;
4. They were required to carry Jordanian identity papers;
5. Their vehicles were required to bear Jordanian license plates;
6. Crimes committed by members of the Palestinian organisations were to be investigated by the Jordanian authorities;
7. Disputes between the Palestinian organisations and the government were to be settled by a joint council of representatives of the King and of the PLO.

Within two years, the **Fedayeen** power expanded throughout the country. 133 **Fedayeen** bases were situated in Amman alone, changing its purpose from military hubs towards having a sense of social authority in the capital, providing arbitration, schooling, and shops in the areas they controlled in violation of their agreement with the King. The victory in the battle of Karameh became reason for **Fedayeen** troops to take advantage and control the territories of the bases, undermining the legitimacy of the government. This shift in the **Fedayeen**’s activities and their growing influence in the country threatened the regime. The King named the movement traitors of the regime and refused to uphold the previously signed agreements.

The **Fedayeen** raised slogans such as ‘All authorities for resistance’ and

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'Amman is the Arabic Hanoi’, referring to Hanoi in Vietnam, which became known as a centre for resistance against The US. The *Fedayeen* went even further with one extreme slogan, declaring that ‘The downfall of Amman is the first step towards the fall of Tel Aviv.’ This meant for the King that their objective would naturally fall upon the monarch’s downfall, threatening both him, and the country.\(^{143}\)

Al-Mashūkhī explained that the situation was heated between the army and *Fedayeen* after they extended their control in the refugees’ camps and the territories around the *Fedayeen* bases. He said:

> The people were complaining from [the *Fedayeen*] and their habits of drinking. I and others mediated in different occasions between [the people and *Fedayeen*] before the Jordanian army could get involved and cause a clash. Eventually [the *Fedayeen*] had to leave.\(^{144}\)

The King further accused the *Fedayeen* of trying to assassinate him twice in Zarqa in June 1970. Henceforth, King Hussein formed a military government that would limit the activities of the *Fedayeen* in Jordan, essentially creating a civil war, now known as Black September, in which the main *Fedayeen* leader, Salah Khalaf, refused to surrender.\(^{145}\) From then on, the Chief of the Royal Court, Wasfi al-Tal (later Prime Minister), who supported the idea of forming the military government, occupied a legendary position in Jordanian politics and became thought of as a national figure who prevented the *Fedayeen* from controlling Jordan. At the same time, his actions and involvement made him a target and enemy of the *Fedayeen*.\(^{146}\) For his justification of Black September, al-Tal claimed that:

> These groups that my government dealt with were not *Fedayeen*, or Palestinian fighters ... The accusation that we finished the resistance movement is wrong. Those are just militant movements who aim for political chaos and those who believe in the

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\(^{144}\) Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan.


Arab and Palestinian issue cannot count them as their representatives. As the King said, if there were no Fedayeen activities, it would be our responsibility to create the resistance ourselves because it is our right to fight the enemy who is taking our land.\footnote{147 “Wasfi al Tal yataḥaddathu ‘an Aḥdāth Aylūl al-Abyad” [Wasfi al-Tal Explaining White September], \textit{Kufurjayez}, August 16, 2010, accessed December 2, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2iyATAIUw.}

Al-Tal stripped the Fedayeen of its resistance distinction by stating that they did not participate in any action against Israel, and their disrespect for Jordan was reason enough for the government to reject them and justify their attack on the bases. The Brotherhood refused to join in this conflict, declaring on September 14, 1970 that the army and Fedayeen’s main responsibility was to liberate Palestine, not to fight against each other. The statement distressed Arafat and the PLO,\footnote{148 Amūsh, \textit{Mahaṣṣātāt Ṭaṭārīkh Jamā‘at al-İkhwān al-Müsliμīn} [Periods in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood], 84.} as it meant that the Brotherhood’s al-Şhu’yûkḥ bases, of which 
\textit{Fateh} had been responsible for the last two years, refused to support the Fedayeen activities by rejecting its participation in the conflict. This meant that the Fedayeen lost the support of the Brotherhood, splitting the Palestinian front. As the Fedayeen no longer represented the Palestinians as a whole, the conflict between the regime and Fedayeen became a politically based conflict rather than identity-based.

The Muslim Brotherhood had taken the middle ground, previously issuing a statement on June 14, 1970, three months before the conflict occurred, entitled “This Blind Sedation [is] in the Interest of Whom?”\footnote{149 See Appendix 2.1 for full quote.} which addressed both the Jordanian army and the Fedayeen. By blaming Israel for the conflict, the Brotherhood avoided any kind of involvement or criticism for not intervening in the war. The Brotherhood did not participate in the Fedayeen war and no other actions beside the previous declaration were taken to support King Hussein. Even so, the Brotherhood's statement gave the King a great advantage over the Fedayeen. The fact that the Brotherhood decided to stay neutral in the conflict eliminated the issue of religion from the war against the Fedayeen. The King considered the Brotherhood's declaration another proof of loyalty, emphasising their relationship, which was built on the previous elimination of Leftists and Nationalists from politics.\footnote{150 Ḥātim Yūsuf Abū Zāyidah, “Jihād al-İkhwān al-Müsliμīn fi Ḥarb Filasṭīn” [The Muslim Brotherhood Jihad in the Palestinian War], \textit{Al Qassam}, September 2009, accessed September 9, 2013, http://www.alqassam.ps/images/userfiles/image/books/jihad_alakwan.pdf.}
The timing of the statement can lead to many conclusions. On one hand, the Brotherhood’s non-intervention was not defined with a clear statement that they were supporting the Jordanian regime; rather they were avoiding aligning with either side of the conflict. Issuing the statement three months before the conflict occurred meant that even if the Fedayeen won, or the situation changed in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood would not be in confrontation with the Fedayeen, as they were not supporting the regime publically. Ultimately, however, their position on this conflict benefitted the regime more than the Fedayeen as their stance avoided an identity-based conflict.

The Fedayeen's defeat led to the creation of the Black September group, which aimed to take revenge on the regime. The Fedayeen were forced to retreat to Lebanon to reform their forces; the Black September group was created to differentiate militant activity from political issues that became the responsibility of Fateh led by Arafat. The group organised a series of attacks on important politicians in Jordan. They succeeded in assassinating Wasfi al-Tal in Cairo but failed in the attempted murder of the head of the Royal Court, Zaid al-Rifai, on a trip to London.\(^{151}\) This group thereafter became notorious worldwide, most notably with the Munich mission, when eleven Israeli athletes were kidnapped and killed during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Germany.

\[2.3\] Sectarianism and the Syrian Brotherhood

The Brotherhood’s non-intervention empowered its position as an association rather than party, however, the regime alliance renewed during the clash with the Fedayeen was again challenged by the Syrian Brotherhood event that was started in Hamah city in 1980,\(^{152}\) marking the first instance of a sectarian conflict in the modern history of the Levant.

The Syrian Brotherhood’s crisis with the regime firstly appeared in 1975 when Ibrahim Youssef, with Marwān al-Ḥadīd and ʿAbd al-Sattār al-Zaʿīm, initiated the secret militia in affiliation with the Brotherhood, under the leadership of Marwān


\(^{152}\) Amùṣ, Ṭāḥthāt fī Tārīkh Jamāʿat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [Periods in the History of the Brotherhood], 87.
Hadīd, called al-Talī‘ah al-Muqātīlah [Fighting Vanguard], to assassinate the ‘Alawī leadership.\(^\text{153}\) Youssef, the leader of this group, was an officer within the Aleppo Artillery School,\(^\text{154}\) and led the attack against the school on June 16, 1979.\(^\text{155}\) This sectarian group was motivated by their violent rejection of the ‘Alawī and its control over Syria.

The Syrian Brotherhood, represented by the General Supervisor, ‘Adnăn Sa‘d al-Dīn, acknowledged that the attack was committed by Brotherhood members, but denied that the actions were endorsed by the Brotherhood, rather that they were purely independent.\(^\text{156}\) One can argue that the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria developed in this period an anti-‘Alawī perspective. Sa‘d al-Dīn disowned the group as independent of the Brotherhood, but did not condemn their actions,\(^\text{157}\) similar to al-Banna when he discovered that the private militia had attempted to assassinate the judge Ahmad al-Khazendar in March 1948. However, soon after there was a failed attempt to assassinate al-Assad on June 26, 1980 in Damascus. In response his brother, Refa‘at al-Assad, declared a campaign against the Brotherhood by attacking Hamah, the city in which the Syrian Brotherhood’s headquarter was located, with the intention of eliminating the Brotherhood after issuing Law Number 49,\(^\text{158}\) which sentenced anyone linked to the Brotherhood to death, thus legitimising the attack.\(^\text{159}\)

To justify the Syrian Brotherhood’s retaliation, Khalīfah stated that jihad was compulsory as a protective means against the regime. After the Jordanian


Brotherhood’s Shoura Council convened, the Brotherhood – al-Bannaist and Qutbist – united in the need to support the Syrian Brotherhood, providing limited support of armaments and training for Syrian fellows in Jordan. The main argument during this meeting had been if they should travel through Iraq to participate in Syria, if they should train the Syrians in Jordan, or if supporting them with arms alone was enough. In the end they decided to supply weaponry as well as training the Syrian Brotherhood in Jordan. This plan was reinforced by the Jordanian regime granting the exiled Syrian Brotherhood the right to reside in Jordan.160

The context of Jordan’s cooperation with the Brotherhood around the Syrian crisis is controversial, as some affirm that Jordan supported the creation of Brotherhood bases similar to the al-Shuyūkh bases within the Fedayeen war on the borders of Jordan. This argument can be found in James P. Piscatori’s and Khalīl ‘Alī Ḥaydar’s writings,161 while Bassām Amūsh claimed that these training bases were established in Iraq, not Jordan.162 Abū Fāris, in contrast, claimed that Jordanian support was limited to financial and militant aid, which actually harmed them since the Jordanian regime was already cautious of a repetition of recent events in Egypt.163

This accusation of the Jordanian Brotherhood intervening against the Syrian regime, especially after Jordan embraced the exiled Syrian Brothers, stressed the already tenuous relations between the two countries.164 This accusation found further ground when Hafez al-Assad said on December 8, 1980:

The dens from which plotting against Syria sprang and from which the sabotage acts were carried out in Syria remained in Jordan, in Amman and other cities … the Jordanian role has led to the treacherous murder of hundreds of people from all sectors of [the] Syrian population.165

160 Ibid, 93-94.
162 Amūsh, Mahaṭṭat ft Ṭārīkh Jamā’at al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn ft al-Urdūn [Periods in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 94.
163 Abū Fāris, Ṣafahāt ūn al-Ṭārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn ft al-Urdūn [Pages from the Political History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 52-53.
165 Satloff, “They Cannot Stop Our Tongues: Islamic Activism in Jordan”, 12.
However, Jordan’s poor relationship with Syria actually originates from the 1970 Civil War, when Syria supported the Fedayeen by sending troops to the north of Jordan’s borders, pushing back the Jordanian army. The head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Ahmad Jibril, confirmed Syrian support in this intervention, saying “King Hussein feared from the Syrian intervention in the battle, therefore, he requested from the Israelis to help him push back the Syrian army.”

Israel sent its air force to do so, as their interest was to maintain the truce with Jordan and prevent Jordan from becoming a Fedayeen hub. In response to this action Syria cut its relations with Jordan on August 12, 1971.

When the chance arose in the Iraqi-Iranian war of 1980, Syria supported the Iranian regime, while Jordan supported the Iraqi regime, but the conflict between the two countries deepened within the 1980s, where along with the Brotherhood issue, the exiled Syrian Judge, ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Bakri, was assassinated, and the Syrian regime was accused of kidnapping Hisham Muheissen, a Jordanian diplomat in Beirut, as well as the attempt to assassinate Prime Minister Mudar Badran.

However, with the Syrian Brotherhood’s flight to Jordan, the Brotherhood experienced a swell in popularity, particularly due to the distinct lack of competition, as the Brotherhood and regime had eliminated the Leftist parties, and Palestinian movements. This left the Brotherhood as the only active movement. However, this caused the King concern regarding the rising public support the Brotherhood gained after the Hamah event. Therefore, when there was Syrian militant activity on the

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166 Amūsh, Mahaṣṣāt fa Tārīkh Jama‘at al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fa al-Urdun [Periods in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 98.
167 Manāṣir “Ṣāfih min al-Tārīkh al- Urdun” [Pages from the History of Jordan].
168 Manṣūr, “al-Qiyādah al-‘ammah al-Filaṣṭīniyyah Kamā yawāh Ahmad Jibrīl” [Palestine-General Command as Seen by Ahmad Jibril], part 5.
170 ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Bakri was involved in the trial of Hafez al-Assad, and was assassinated by three employees of the Syrian embassy in Jordan on July 30, 1980, before Hafez al-Assad became president on November 21, 1970. The culprits were arrested, and two were sentenced to death on October 26, 1980, while the third was the diplomat Ghayth al-Zalibi, and was released.
borders, the King revisited his position towards the Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia intervened to mediate this clash over Jordan hosting the Syrian Brotherhood and allowing their activities against Syria in Jordan.\(^{173}\)

To avoid the escalation of the situation between the two countries, Saudi Arabia’s Prince, later King, ʻAbdallah Ibn ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz, met both King Hussein and Hafez al-Assad in December 1980, over the claim of Jordan hosting the Syrian Brotherhood.\(^{174}\) This happened simultaneously with the King changing his discourse towards the Brotherhood in Jordan, where he firstly discharged the Brotherhood's minister of Awqāf [Religious Endowments], Kamil al-Sharif, who had occupied the position from 1974.\(^{175}\)

The Brotherhood did not intervene publically in order to keep its alliance with the regime and to maintain the safety of the Syrian Brotherhood in Jordan. However, the King then issued a public apology for being “deceived, along with a large section of the Jordanian people, by this criminal group [Syrian Brotherhood]” and warned, “this straying group, which abused our trust … no longer has a place among us.”\(^{176}\) This marked an indisputable shift in the regime’s relation with the Jordanian Brotherhood. In response to the King’s speech, the intelligence service accordingly captured the Syrian Brotherhood members and sent them back to Damascus to eliminate the Syrian Brotherhood's existence in Jordan and to limit the Jordanian Brotherhood from becoming involved in Syrian affairs. The purpose of the King’s actions during this time was to quell the Brotherhood’s popularity, and repair relations with Syria.\(^{177}\) However, the Brotherhood had to rethink their alliances to the regime accordingly, and conversely, an increase was seen regarding the Brotherhood’s popularity.

Al-Mashūkhī was one of the main personalities to deal with the Syrian Brotherhood and their residence in Jordan. In his interview, he confirmed the King’s new attitude:


\(^{176}\) See Appendix 3.2 for full quote.

The intelligence department began calling me regularly to question me about the Syrian Brotherhood. They took my passport more than once due to my visits to Syria, to stop [the Muslim Brotherhood] from going there. We have been asked to inform them if something new happens [with the Syrian Brotherhood].¹⁷⁸

The tense relationship between the two countries regarding the Brotherhood remained unstable until King Hussein's death in February 1999, when Hafez al-Assad participated in the royal funeral in Amman, giving the new King his blessings.¹⁷⁹ The Syrian Brotherhood crisis damaged the good relations the Jordanian regime and Brotherhood engendered in the period after 1957, in which they allied against the Leftists and met in understanding towards the conflict with the Fedayeen. The Syrian Brotherhood’s exile from Jordan further impacted relations between the Brotherhood and regime, however, the Brotherhood left this crisis with popularity in the Jordanian street and the Jordanian universities. It was not until 1988 that they regained their alliances.

¹⁷⁸ Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan.
Chapter Three The Crisis From Within
As explored within this chapter’s timeline, the Brotherhood and the regime’s relationship continued to fluctuate throughout the following two decades, with 1988 appearing as a milestone in their relations due to the Habat Nisān [April Uprising], and its consequences on the re-establishment of parliament in Jordan. The effects of the uprising upon the Brotherhood and regime were felt in their full capacity a year later in 1989, when the movement was encouraged to participate in politics and the government for the first time. This brief, yet palpable, camaraderie would mark the peak of the relationship between the regime and Brotherhood.

However, with the unprecedented popularity of the Brotherhood both within, and externally to, the parliament and government, the regime took action to minimise the movement’s role. An electoral law established in 1991 became another major turning point in their relations, as it, arguably, was designed to minimise the Brotherhood’s possible percentage in the following elections. This would allow the regime to pass a peace treaty with Israel that had been rejected by the movement following the Madrid conference in 1991.

Interviews conducted with the leader of the IAF, Zakī bin Arshīd, present insight into how this ‘one vote system’ caused the crisis between the Brotherhood and regime, and further interviews with key leaders present the Brotherhood’s structural changes within this period that safeguarded it against being outlawed. These interviews describe the structural organisation of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and clarify the movement’s stances towards the peace treaty itself, and how specific leadership would manage the normalisation of relations with Israel if they were in a position of power.

### 3.0 Habat Nisān [The April Uprising]

The PLO had been acknowledged by the Arab League as the only legitimate representative for the Palestinian people, and at the Rabat Summit conference of 1974, King Hussein seconded the Arab League on this matter. Therefore, if the West Bank

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1 “Seventh Arab League Summit Conference,” Resolution on Palestine, Rabat, Morocco - 28 October 1974

was to be governed by the PLO, then the unified parliament of the West and East Bank was no longer necessary. It was dissolved on April 18, 1974 to be replaced with al-Majlis al-Waṭanī al-Istishārī [National Advisory Council]⁵ to govern and provide non-obligatory consultation on general policy issues. The council stayed in place for ten years until 1984, when the King, by emergency law, asked the 1974 parliament to reconvene.⁶ As the West Bank was no longer part of Jordan, complementary elections were held in 1984 to replace the former representatives of the West Bank with Jordanian East Bankers.⁷ The same geographical areas as the April 27, 1967 elections were used to replace the West Bank parliamentarians. In 1984, two more members of the Brotherhood entered parliament, ⁸ Abdallah al-ʻAkāyilah in Tafilah, and Ahmad al-Kūfahī in Irbid, in addition to the two pre-existing seats the movement had.⁹

The King decreeing a law to disengage the West Bank from its territory in a speech on July 31, 1988 followed reconvening the parliament,⁴ and he abandoned the 1.3 billion dollar plan to redevelop the West Bank, in order to place full responsibility upon the PLO for the Palestinian territories.⁷ This also led to the severance of all administrative and legal ties with the occupied West Bank.⁸ King Hussein permanently changed the electoral map,⁹ politically dividing the East and West Banks, which resulted in the total isolation of Palestinians from Jordan, wherein new official borders separated the two previously unified banks. It also meant that the Brotherhood could

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² See Appendix 1: Glossary.
⁹ See Appendix 3.1 for speech.
no longer represent the West Bank and its attention became limited to Palestinians in Jordan, thus losing its main support. Therefore, the Brotherhood lay in wait for its first chance to re-legitimise itself within the new political context.

In the following year, upset over economic crisis and undemocratically appointed councillors caused an outcry by Jordanian citizens who were underrepresented by the National Advisory Council. The country thus experienced further challenges in 1989 due to a revolt, which had lasting ramifications for the Brotherhood and regime. The events of 1989 revealed significant oversights and a lack in policy-making, particularly with regard to the economy. The preconditions of the Ma'an events can be found in the unbalanced Jordanian economy relying mostly on international financial support. From its establishment, Jordan has relied on foreign aid. At first this mostly came from the UK, until its influence over the Middle East passed on to the US in the 1950s. During the Cold War, the US government provided large subsidies to the Arab countries exporting oil. In the 1980s, however, global levels of aid were subjected to general reductions. New geopolitical and global economic trends forced countries in the Middle East to adjust their reliance on donations and international help. This became even more crucial for Jordan, as the country did not have many means to attract further financial support since neighbouring countries had entered the Gulf War. The Jordanian government, in this changing global context, failed to build a self-sustaining economy, trying to solve economic problems merely by rent-seeking.

Aside from international help, the Jordanian economy was highly dependent

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on regional help from the Arab League. There were two major interests for the Gulf States to support Jordan. On the one hand, there were close ties between the countries based on Jordanian skilled labour working in the Gulf, which Jordan's economy benefited significantly from. On the other hand, the Gulf States were supporting Jordan financially due to its front-line position with Israel. This meant that for the Gulf States, Jordan was seen as the first line of defence against Israeli expansion.

Since the end of the 1970s the regional situation has been reshaped significantly due to the Iranian revolution and changes in the oil market, which limited bilateral aid and skilled labour export to the Gulf States. This had a severe impact on Jordan’s economy. The government's strategy to replace the diminishing aid was to borrow, however, this led to a dramatic increase in public debt, reaching twice the level of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1988.

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To make matters worse, the country simultaneously experienced a chain of events generating internal instability, starting with the disengagement of the West Bank being contested.\textsuperscript{20} Also, however, Prime Minister Zaid al-Rifāʾi was accused of favouritism and corruption, as seen with his implementation of policies that violated human rights and freedoms, such as the forced dissolution of the Jordanian Writers Association, which was replaced with a bureaucratic union controlled by the state in September, 1988.\textsuperscript{21} Violation of freedom of speech also occurred through the replacement of three newspapers’ executive boards with editors loyal to the


\textsuperscript{20} Curtis, “Peace, Bread and Riots,” 54-66.

Furthermore, al-Rifa‘i’s government (1985-1989) began to control 60% of the biggest newspapers in the country (al-Ray and al-Dustūr) by means of buying into companies who owned shares of them. Additionally, the government of Zaid al-Rifa‘i continued to restrict the activities of many organisations, associations, and student unions by forbidding their gatherings and preventing pro-Palestinian activities to support the Intifada in December 1987.

The power that the Prime Minister had under the emergency laws allowed his government to oblige all entities, public or private, to report on their employees and workers based on what the government called a ‘Security Scan’.

On March 9, 1989, the government officially requested financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) within the framework of a sponsored economic adjustment and austerity plan to reorganise the country's debt. To fulfil the conditions of this contract, the government issued a new policy raising fuel prices in Jordan. This led to public protests all over the country: fifteen drivers of public transportation companies went on strike in Irbid and Ma‘an and were soon joined by thousands of individuals.

In direct response, the Ministry of Interior Affairs reverted the fuel prices to the previous figure before the information could be published in local newspapers. Strikes in the north, such as in Irbid, subsided, whereas in Ma‘an, the poorest city in Jordan, public protests grew, spreading to other regions of Jordan to create what has been called Habat Nisān. Riots erupted and spread, reaching Irbid and involving the public Yarmūk University, and the Jordan University of Science and Technology.

The Ma‘an events developed rapidly. When the police injured 17 protesters on April 18, 1989, the crisis spread to the south of the country. City after city became

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25 Ibid., 8-37.
involved in the protest, including southern cities of Tafilah, Karak, and Madaba. In response to these events, the youth of central Jordan launched a series of meetings to support the south, which eventually caused the cities of Salt and the capital, Amman, to become involved. These events had outgrown local dimensions and became an issue of national importance. Soon the protesters’ demands, which previously had been confined to the economic sphere, expanded into claims of political failure. These grievances broadened the agenda of the *Habat Nisān*, concerning the failure of the regime to protect the West and East Banks’ unity. Therefore, the protester’s slogans not only called for the regulation of fuel prices, but also for the:

- Resignation of the al-Rifa‘i government and the imprisonment of state functionaries accused of corruption;
- Creation of a government of national unity representing all political ideologies;
- Organisation of free and fair elections;
- Re-establishment of political life and cancellation of the emergency and temporary laws.

The (non)involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Ma‘ān events can be understood in light of the previous events with the Syrian Brotherhood in Jordan, wherein relations between the Brotherhood and regime reached crisis point. This vulnerable relationship can be seen in King Hussein’s letter to Zaid al-Rifa‘i on November 12, 1985:

But all of a sudden we discovered the truth about the whole affair and we realized what was happening. It emerged that some groups which have had to do with bloody

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events in Syria were actually living in Jordan, hiding behind religious groups.³²

As recorded by ‘Amūsh, the King claimed he was declaring this to “reveal the truth for all and let it be known that he [King Hussein] was deceived by the Muslim Brotherhood”, secondly, “to warn all and make them aware of the nature of this devil group”, and thirdly “to let this group, which broke our trust, know that it has no place in society”.³³ This statement was a warning for the Brotherhood to keep a low profile during national or regional events, and therefore any participation in Habat Nisān could have resulted in the banning of the movement.

In the interviews conducted for this research, Brotherhood members generally avoided answering questions regarding the movement’s position towards, involvement in, or division due to, these events in 1989. However, the interviewees attested the legitimacy of the protests’ goals, and necessity at the time, and yet members also stressed that any Brotherhood involvement in the uprising was performed by individuals, independent from the Brotherhood itself, thus indicating members’ fear surrounding possible accusations of the Brotherhood initiating the protests.

However, ultimately the government did not take any action against the Brotherhood. The purpose of the King’s statement was to minimise the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and to announce that its actions would no longer be tolerated. The threats were clearly successful as the Brotherhood avoided officially intervening in the Ma‘an events for fear it would meet the same end as the Syrian Brotherhood.

With rare publications on Habat Nisān, the events remain debatable. Despite scholars not disagreeing on the reasons that caused the event, the scale of the protests are highly debated.

The government adopted a conspiracy theory, claiming that the events were influenced from external sources such as foreign actors.³⁴ It is possible to justify the argument that there was foreign involvement in the protests by referring to the attempt

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of some protesters in Ma‘an to raise the Saudi flag. There was also usage of some slogans that named King Fahd bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz. The protesters even wrote the name of King Fahd on the walls of the city to challenge the Jordanian regime. Therefore, the Saudi presence in the protests presented a direct threat of self-autonomy against the Jordanian regime.

Those who found alternative reasons for the events, such as Rīmāwī, Wardam, Kasāsibah, and Ḥaddādīn, argue that the events of 1989 were fully spontaneous, stemming from political frustration, and due to the serious accusations of corruption against the government of Zaid al-Rifa‘ī. In addition, the economic crisis that led to the collapse of the Jordanian currency in 1988 had affected the transport sector significantly: the city of Ma‘an, being the poorest city in the country, was the one to suffer the most from these factors. Defenders of the spontaneity argument say that the political parties and politically motivated groups, using existing economic problems, found a fertile ground to raise political slogans to re-establish political life and revive parliament after they were banned.

Another economic perspective, offered by, for example, Qarān, Curtis, and ‘Āyid, argues that the Ma‘an events happened purely due to the country’s economic

35 Jāmi‘ah al-Urdunyyah [Jordan University], Ma‘ān: Azmah Maftūbah [Ma‘an: Open Crisis], 7-59; Abū Rummān, “Habet Nisān” [April Uprising], 20.
circumstances. The Jordanian Dinar in 1982 equalled 2.95 dollars, but the economic crisis led to a drop in its value making it equal less than 1.73 dollar in 1989. This meant that every Jordanian experienced a loss of 41% from his/her capital and income.44

However, even though this economic austerity and the collapse of the Jordanian Dinar had a high impact on the protests, if the protests had been influenced solely by economic factors,45 then the following years from 1990 to 1991 should have been marked with further protests when the Gulf War caused an influx of Jordanians to return. That, however, did not happen.46

Therefore, the 1989 Ma’an riots, sparked by a volatile economic climate, were faced with an inadequate security service that then failed to implement preconceived riot control procedures, resulting in the escalation of aggression, the jailing of over 350 protesters, and the death of twelve.47

That year also highlighted the mismanagement of Jordan’s internal and external policies. Jordan refused to accept the invitation of US President Jimmy Carter to follow Egypt in the Camp David peace process.48 The significance of this was that internally Jordan demonstrated the absence of political life and the weakness of its parliament by discussing new policies, such as the price changes, without adequate transparency and elected representation, thus causing protests.

The King returned to Jordan after an official visit to the US on April 23, 1989, and accepted the resignation of al-Rifa‘i’s government. Prince Zaid bin Shaker was appointed new prime minister and a call for parliamentary elections was issued. The decision allowed any political parties to enter the elections, which relieved the political tension and the protests subsided.49

44 This figure comes from this calculation: \((1.73 - 2.95) ÷ 2.95 × 100\% = -0.41355932203\)
47 Abū Rummān, “Habat Nisān” [April Uprising], 32-55.
The protests ended after an agreement between all political actors in Jordan to sign up to the ‘Jordanian National Charter’. The King agreed on 60 representatives from different political ideologies, including the Brotherhood, in April 1990. This document marked the historical conciliation between the regime and its political opposition. In its eight chapters, declarations from the constitution were listed, such as the country’s form of government (monarchy); the country’s official language (Arabic); equality of the citizens before the law; respect for political plurality and the army; the state’s objective to free the economy from its dependency on foreign aid; and the commitment of the state to be gradually transformed into a democracy. However, the charter did not include any kind of strategy to achieve the goals.

Taking into account these pitfalls, the importance of the National Charter, acknowledged to be the second most important document after the constitution (despite its numerous mandates), is based on two matters: firstly, this document became one of the first attempts to initiate agreement between the ruling groups and the opposition, and secondly, the Charter defined Jordan as a state of law and political plurality, declaring it obliged to protect its civility and democracy. Also, the need to exercise the political right of citizens through voting in elections and the legitimacy of the existence of political parties were declared; the latter were allowed to work freely after being banned in 1957.

The Charter marked reconciliation between the regime and the Jordanian politicians, correcting the hostilities engendered during Habat Nisān. The main goal of this reconciliation was to democratise the country by creating a parliament that contained all opposition voices within the monarchy-ruled political system. Therefore, the King had the opportunity to rebrand the Brotherhood as a political alliance, drawing a line under the Syrian Brotherhood crisis.

Furthermore Ma'an is a hub of traditionalist loyalty towards the regime. As a home and capital for King ʿAbdallah I when he arrived from Mecca, the city is

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51 ʻAmūsh, Mahāṭṭāt fī Tārtīkh Jāmaʿat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdūn [Periods in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 262.
symbolic of the country’s birth. This means that when the regime is in need of loyalty, bringing Ma’an’s leadership and tribes to the parliament is a sure way to re-engage the loyalty that the country was built on. Therefore, the King’s main purpose was to democratise the parliament and thus empower the Brotherhood from a politically unofficial role to a legitimate one. It therefore had the blessing of the regime and the advantage to join the election of the following year. Ultimately, after being threatened with being banned, the Brotherhood was rewarded for its non-intervention during national upheaval and was qualified to reach the next state in Jordan’s history.

3.1 Re-Democratising Jordan Post-1989

The return of the Brotherhood to parliament in 1984, filling the gap of Palestinian representatives in the national legislative body coincided with the First Intifada, which carried a clear Islamic tone, echoed by the establishment of Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah [Islamic Resistance Movement / Hamas], the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Palestinian uprising was thus endorsed by the Jordanian Brotherhood, resulting in its increased popularity among Jordanian-Palestinians. Further support for the Palestinian cause was demonstrated through the Brotherhood taking a more significant role in public social activities within Jordan, such as protesting. Muslim Brotherhood members representing both the West Bank and East Bank unified their forces in general protests during the Intifada. The collaboration of the West and East Bankers from the first day of protests showed the integration of the movement with the public agenda as such, acknowledging the Brotherhood's claim to represent the Palestinians in exile. This solidarity further highlighted the recent failures of the Jordanian government to maintain unity.

In 1989, Zaid bin Shaker became Prime Minister, supervising political reform after the Ma’an events, and managing the electoral process for the first elections since the 1967 war. Although political parties were still banned, in 1989 the candidates were allowed to form political blocks regardless of their ideological orientation. The King,

54 “Law Of Election To The House Of Deputies, Law No. 22 for the Year 1986”; Philip J.
therefore, declared that the country should stop the usage of emergency laws and that a liberalisation process should be launched: “To continue Jordan’s liberalisation process… and to reiterate our deep commitment to defending the human rights and dignity of our citizens… we decree that martial laws are cancelled”.

Following the King's call to re-establish political life in Jordan under the promise of free and fair election (which also incurred the limitation of the security departments’ influence on elections, which had been rife), the Brotherhood decided to join the elections. The movement agreed to offer 27 candidates whereas other political entities did not manage to unify their party lists, deciding to run elections on individual bases. As a result, the Brotherhood gained 22 seats from a total of 80 alongside ten other successful individual Islamists. The Brotherhood also succeeded in promoting ‘Abd al-Latīf ‘Arabīyāt as the speaker of the parliament.

The electoral success of the Brotherhood in 1989 was ensured for a number of reasons. First of all, the Brotherhood entered the elections with a large number of candidates, maximising its chances to gain many seats in parliament. Secondly, in the 1989 election a new voting system, ‘block voting’, was introduced. Block voting is a system used in multi-member constituencies where voters can elect more than one representative in each constituency. Voters can cast as many votes as there are available seats and the candidates with the most votes win, even if they have not managed to secure a majority of the votes. The third assurance of electoral success was

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58 Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 77.

59 “Law Of Election To The House Of Deputies, Law No. 22 for the Year 1986”.

the law that had banned political parties from taking part in the elections, not associations. Therefore, the Brotherhood entered as a block, non-political association, allowing it to use the charity centres to campaign for their representatives while distributing charity. In addition, the Brotherhood utilised Mosque prayers to encourage people to join the elections and vote.61

Finally, the engagement of the Brotherhood in the Palestinian issue and the strengthening of the connections between Jordan and Hamas through the Brotherhood members limited Fatah’s role among the Jordanian-Palestinians. In disagreement with this course of events, Fatah also boycotted these elections. As a consequence, the Muslim Brotherhood represented the majority of Jordanian-Palestinians.

These reasons, along with the Brotherhood’s role in the Intifada, contributed to its success in the 1989 elections.62 Following the elections, King Hussein appointed Mudar Badran, the former Director of Intelligence, as Prime Minister on December 1, 1989, to form a new government two years later in 1991.63 Badran found himself obliged to meet with the Brotherhood, inviting them officially to join the government due to the movement’s success in the election.64 The Brotherhood agreed to join if Badran would offer it seven ministries of the Brotherhood’s own choice.65 The Prime Minister did not approve these conditions, but shortly after, Badran initiated another attempt to cooperate with the Brotherhood, in which they voiced new conditions for joining the cabinet, such as

- Requesting that Badran would promise to apply *Sharī'ah* Law in education and economy


63 Mudar Badran served as the Director of the secret service in 1968, and was the head of the Royal Court between 1975 and 1976, and again in 1989. He was prime minister three times in 1976-1979, 1980-1984, and 1989-1991.


• Declaring that the government will support the resistance movements against colonisation anywhere
• Establishing an Islamic University along with Sharia school in Yarmūk University
• No negotiation on the Palestinian land and supporting Palestinians resistance.  

This was the first time in the Muslim Brotherhood’s history that a branch approved of joining a government, or even negotiated with a government. Bradran accepted the conditions and the Levant witnessed the first Islamists to enter government.  

The Brotherhood selected five ministries of their choice, four of Jordanian decent: Yusuf al-‘Azm of Ma’an (Social Development), ‘Abdallah al-‘Akayila of Tafilah (Education), Ibrahim Zayd al-Kaylani of Salt (Awqāf), Majid Abd al-Raḥmān Khalīfah (Labour); and only one to Palestinian decent: ‘Adnan al-Jaljuli of Tira (Health). Two further ministries were allocated to independent Islamists, Muhammad Ibrahim al-‘Alawna, (Agriculture), and Jamal al-Sarayira (Transportation and Communication).  

The selection of these Brotherhood members was pragmatic as the members were mostly of Jordanian descent, thus demonstrating the Brotherhood’s Jordanian agenda. Ultimately, however, the Brotherhood’s parliamentary involvement turned out to be an intense period in Jordan’s history as when the movement came to power, the whole region became involved in the Gulf War in which the US led a coalition to force the Iraqi military to withdraw from Kuwaiti territories.  

The 1989 events represent the second real democratic experience since the Leftists were empowered in 1956. The first time Jordanians had the right to vote, they

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68 Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 40-41.

chose the Leftists, however, the second time around they favoured Islamists, thus demarking a notable shift from the left (Nationalist; Socialist; Communist) to the right (Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists).

The election produced two political strands: tribal, pro-regime members, and Islamists. These strands became the dominant two areas thereafter in every following election. Therefore, it can be understood that the King fulfilled his promises after Habat Nisān by bringing the two actors in that event to lead the country in the parliament and government.

3.2 IAF vs. One Vote System

The adherence to the democratic procedures that the country declared in 1989 came into conflict with the regime’s orders to change the electoral system from a block voting system into a one vote system. This marginalised the political parties and caused their gradual exclusion from the elections in the following years.

As a result of the 1989 elections, an 80-member legislature was elected using the block voting system. Eight seats were reserved for Christians and another three for Circassians or Chechens. For the 1989 elections, Jordan was divided into 20 constituencies based on the block voting system in which voters cast as many votes as there were seats in the district. Each constituency or geographical election area had from two to nine seats. However, the distribution of seats was not fair, as it did not consider the population of each area. For example, the fifth district of the capital Amman, and the city of Ma‘an, both had five seats in the parliament, but the capital’s fifth district had double the number of voters than the city of Ma‘an.

The block system favoured the Brotherhood. The representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood were competing with the pro-monarchist independents, whose

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71 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Jordan Parliamentary Chamber: Majles al Nuwaab Elections Held in 1989.
political affiliation was easy to identify. Analysis of Jordanians’ electoral behaviour shows that their voting behaviour was dependent on the type of voting system used. In the situation where each voter on average had three votes in the block-voting system, he would base his choice on the culture of his society. Thus, each voter has an ethical responsibility to vote firstly in favour of his tribe or family member candidate, who represented, for example, the pro-monarchist group. Secondly, he/she is obliged to vote according to his religion by giving a vote to a Muslim Brotherhood candidate or independent Islamist. Only with his/her third vote, a Jordanian citizen could exercise some freedom and willingly choose either a pro-monarchist or Islamist candidate.

The Brotherhood won 30% of the seats with less than 20% of the votes, whereas the pro-monarchists won approximately 60% of the total votes but filled only 40% of the seats. This result confirmed beliefs that the block vote system gave advantages to the Brotherhood over the other candidates of pro-monarchist orientation. The Brotherhood obtained 22 seats out of 80 becoming the largest block in parliament in addition to 14 seats gained by independent Islamists, giving the Islamists a total of 36 seats out of 80. This large representation forced the Prime Minister to comply with their conditions to form a government.

In this parliamentary period, the Brotherhood showed an effective participation in, and cooperation with, the government to pass important political and economic reforms in a number of areas, such as:

- The ratification of the market reforms required by the IMF and World Bank, including austerity plans for government spending
- New regulations for press and publications that ensured more freedom for

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75 Interview with Zakī bin Arshīd, August 31, 2012, Amman, Jordan.
expression

- Lobbying to repeal the ban on political parties
- Passing laws against financial and administrative corruption.78

The advantage the Brotherhood gained in the 1989 elections was caused by the gaps in the block vote system. To prevent further enlargement of the Brotherhood’s significance in Jordan, another electoral reform was passed to introduce a one vote system for the 1993 elections.79 Along with this reform, political parties were legalised for these elections, after having been banned since 1957 to allow other ideologies to compete with the Brotherhood. Finally, campaigning in mosques, which had been widely used for the 1989 elections, was officially prohibited.80

One of the primary reasons for the regime to go to such lengths to minimise the Brotherhood’s representation and influence in the national legislative authority was not due to its reluctance towards organised and strong political opposition, but new international inclinations of the Jordanian government: the King intended to engage in the peace process with Israel.81 The King, as well as each government official, realised that as long as the Muslim Brotherhood had significant representation in parliament, peace decisions would not be agreed on nor passed through parliament.82 According to Zaki bin Arshid,

The ‘one man, one vote system’ allowed each citizen to vote once, meaning the individual would vote according to his origin or tribe before voting for the Brotherhood or an independent (non-tribal) candidate. Therefore, the government emphasised a division among Jordanians based on origins and descent, where

80 Reynolds, Jordan: Electoral System Design in the Arab World, 53-56.
82 Interview with Zaki bin Arshid, August 31, 2012, Amman, Jordan.
Jordanians of Jordanian origin found the elections a place to define and defend their tribes while Jordanians of Palestinian origin defended their roots by voting for the Brotherhood due to the Palestinian roots of most of the Brotherhood’s members and its call for the return of Palestine.\textsuperscript{83}

Therefore, taking into account the traditionalism of Jordanian society, which is reflected in electoral behaviour and the political incentives of the Jordanian government, the one vote system was introduced. Primarily, this change should have challenged the popularity of the Brotherhood among the Palestinian-Jordanians.\textsuperscript{84}

In compliance with studies on the electoral behaviour of Jordanians, the introduction of the one vote system sought to make the population more responsible for its choices, which ought to be based on candidate agenda rather than tribal or religious affiliations.\textsuperscript{85} The events of the 1970 Civil War between representatives of Jordanian and Palestinian origins were still in the population’s memory, effecting the government’s management of the electoral geographic areas.\textsuperscript{86} As it was proved by the previous elections, small cities and rural areas with a majority population of Jordanian descendants were granted an equal number of seats to big cities with its predominant Palestinian-Jordanian majority. Following these methods, the government guaranteed more tribal pro-monarchy parliamentarians, allowing law and treaties to pass without being prevented.\textsuperscript{87}

Due to this crucial turn in Jordan’s politics from a regional to international arena, a shift took place within the Brotherhood’s structure, reacting to the government’s challenging decisions by establishing a new political party called The Islamic Action Front (IAF) Trapped by its decision to legalise political parties, the government was forced to register and recognise the new party.\textsuperscript{88} The IAF became the

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{84} Abū Fāris, Ṣafahāt min al-Tārtkh al-Siyāṣī lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [Pages from the Political History of the Muslim Brotherhood], 168; Hanna Y Freij, "Liberalization, the Islamists, and the Stability of the Arab State: Jordan as a Case Study," The Muslim World, 86, 1 (1996): 1-32.
\textsuperscript{87} Interview with Zakī bin Arshīd, August 31, 2012, Amman, Jordan.
political embodiment of the Brotherhood, entering elections with the slogan “al-Islam huwa al-Hall” [Islam is the Solution]. The slogan suggested that the Brotherhood’s program called for the replacement of current laws with more Islamic ones. Also, it suggested that Islamic values, ethics, and morality were the main points of its agenda and that with those values and ethical principles the Brotherhood would fight corruption.

On September 7, 1993, when King Hussein called for new elections to continue the democratic path that had been established in 1989, the Brotherhood did not doubt its participation, despite their objections to the one vote system. This was mainly for two reasons; firstly, they had tasted the fruits of participation and wanted to continue down the same path, and secondly because having a political presence presented a legitimate way of interrupting any attempt to make peace with Israel.

Furthermore, participation put them in contrast with the more extreme oppositions such as the Salafist movement, which was beginning to strengthen its roots in Jordan during this period, and by comparison, the Brotherhood was recognised as a loyal, non-violent political opposition. Therefore, the Brotherhood opposing the regime and yet still participating in the election with appropriate deference generated a sense of democracy in Jordan.

In this 1993 election, the IAF obtained only 17 out of 80 seats, in addition to five seats won by independent Islamists. In other words, the IAF won 20% of the seats with 17% of the votes, while the pro-monarchists won 60% of the seats with 58% of the votes. The total number of votes in this election was 822,295.

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89 See Appendix 1: Glossary.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan Democratic People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>ath Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan Arab National Democratic Party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 2: The 1993 Election Results

With this result, the Brotherhood remained the largest block in parliament. However, as the movement lost three seats, it was not granted the same power it had had in previous parliaments. The movement had reservations regarding the purpose of the one vote system, however, they still participated in the 1993 elections. When the results came in they decided unanimously that it was a strategy implemented to limit their success.

However, the change in the regime and Brotherhood’s relationship may have also been related to the government’s shift in prioritising international affairs over internal affairs after losing Gulf aid. The Jordanian Government making a step towards peace with Israel in 1991 was at the expense of its relations with the Brotherhood, and marked a new stage in their relationship, made public within parliament.

3.3 The Brotherhood and IAF’s Structural Differences

94 Inter-Parliamentary Union. *Jordan Parliamentary Chamber: Majles al-Nuwaab Elections Held in 1993.*
In light of the new one vote system, the Brotherhood became more critical of what the regime may do next. Within this context, the establishment of the IAF can be seen as a strategy for survival. For instance, if the regime decided for any future reason to dissolve the Brotherhood, the IAF would remain a contingency since it holds a political party licence and is headquartered away from the Brotherhood’s offices, and is therefore technically separate from the Brotherhood.

To most researchers studying the movement, the Jordanian Brotherhood’s structure is ambiguous. Despite many members of the Brotherhood also being members of the IAF, the IAF have a different and independent leadership to the Brotherhood. However, addressing leaders of the IAF as leaders simultaneously of the Brotherhood, and vice versa, is a common mistake.

Therefore, before entering into a discussion about the peace process, an understanding of the Brotherhood and IAF’s structures must be reached, especially in regards to the internal election processes, which are deciphered by tracing the progression of members who later became leaders.98

Zakī bin Arshīd describes the IAF leadership as having a:

Very democratic standard, where the IAFs foundation votes for leadership, which assumes the right and ability to make decisions on their behalf … the IAF have many branches around the country and can be considered as constructing a primary foundation of field work, with an immediate, face to face relationship with the community.99

Therefore, the selection of the Brotherhood, or IAF’s, respective leadership begins in the bases of the Shu'b [Branches]. These branches of the Brotherhood, which Arshīd refers to, are located across the country.

Confusion surrounding the selection of leadership typically comes from similarities between the IAF and the Brotherhood as both branches elect their leadership in internal elections and follow mirrored governing procedures. For instance, the elected leadership of both branches become representative members of their respective Shoura Councils. The leaders of the branches meet and discuss the

98 This information was gained through unofficial discussions with members of both the Brotherhood and IAF in fieldwork visits to Brotherhood branches in Madaba city and al-Abdli, the IAF headquarters in Ash Shumaysani and Amman, the Islamic center in Zarqa city, and through personal interviews with the Arshīd and al-Gharāybah.
policies of the IAF and Brotherhood respectively, however, the Shoura council’s main purpose is to choose the Maktab al-Tanfidhī [the Executive Bureau] of members that work as respective governments. The two branches differ in that the IAF’s Shoura Council elects its own Secretary General, and the Brotherhood’s Shoura Council elects its al-Marāqib al-‘āmm [General Supervisor].

The Brotherhood and IAF operate under a similar system to the political parliamentarian system, in which the government is established from gaining majority in parliament. Within the Brotherhood, there are two main wings: the Doves, led by Rahīl al-Gharāybah (among others), and the Hawks lead by Arshīd. As the same members of the Brotherhood happen to be members of the political IAF, any majority in the Brotherhood’s Shoura Council – either Doves or Hawks – will be mirrored within the IAF’s Shoura Council. This in turn means that the Brotherhood retains influence in the IAF’s policies regarding the regime, despite technically being separate. For instance, if the majority in the IAF’s Shoura Council were the Brotherhood’s Doves, decisions such as participation in the parliamentarian election would be more favourable than the Hawk’s boycott.

However, the main difference between the IAF and the Brotherhood is not within leadership structure, but how they accept new members. With the IAF, an individual can simply attend the headquarters and complete a membership application. In contrast, the Brotherhood carefully selects its members via networking and word of mouth, or through participation in its charity system.

When Rahīl al-Gharāybah was asked for the reason of the Brotherhood’s meticulous selection process, and the impossibility of an individual approaching the movement independently, he said:

The movement looks for specific abilities, energies, and forces. We search for these qualities and therefore it is not possible for just anybody to become a Muslim Brotherhood member. Individuals become members because the Brotherhood wants him/her. Not the contrast. Specifically, the qualities required are those that foster public concern, have strong faith in Islam, and share the Brotherhood’s values. In addition, s/he must be friendly and desirable.100

Therefore, the Brotherhood differs from the IAF in that it is selective, and

100 Interview with Rahīl al-Gharāybah, August 24, 2012, Amman, Jordan.
exclusively religious. The IAF’s more relaxed membership process means that non-Muslims are able to join. However, this is not necessarily the IAF’s choice, but a legal obligation for political parties to practice a membership process devoid of religious discrimination.  

Furthermore, the IAF does not require any induction period to join the party: you are a full member from the first week after signing the membership application. The Brotherhood, on the other hand, requires an introductory period to assess the candidate before s/he becomes a member. Nevertheless, the IAF restrict their new members from running in any internal elections and must complete three years before joining the leadership, which can be understood as a replacement for the introduction period of the Brotherhood’s system.

The Brotherhood has a complex system for accepting new members, which can be ambiguous to outsiders. As previously mentioned, when the new member enters the Brotherhood, or is selected to enter the Brotherhood, he or she is put through an extensive program. Firstly the candidate enters the Usrah [educational family], which can be understood as a circle of members who meet weekly and educate each other on religion. A Nakib [captain] leading the Usrah provides tasks to develop its members’ skills. Once a month regional Usar [singular: Usrah] meet to form a Katībah [troop], in which they embark on trips and lectures to strengthen relations and extend skills among regional Usrah.  

At this stage, the new members will be in a tutorial period or induction, in which they can establish themselves in the movement and meet other members. It is then that each new member will decide on which sector s/he is interested in, whether charity, politics, proselytisation or development. At the end of the course the new members are distributed among departments and entities that share similar concerns or have compatible interests.

Furthermore, there are no assigned responsibilities for the candidate at this stage, however, the Brotherhood directs missions to them via their Nakib in order to measure their commitment, understanding of Brotherhood ideology, and ability to

101 Mandate five: A.) The political party is established on the basis of citizenship and equality between all Jordanians, with a commitment to democracy and respect for political plurality. B.) It is forbidden to establish a political party based on religion, race, sectarian, class, gender, or origins; “Irādah Malakīyah bi-al-Muwāfaqah Qāntūn al-Ahzāb al-Siyāsīyah” [Royalty Approval the Political Parties Law], Al-Rai, June 6, 2012, accessed on December 2, 2014, http://www.alrai.com/article/518840.html

102 Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 15-16.
continue in the movement and extend its values. The missions are diverse: candidates may be asked to volunteer in a social capacity, memorise a particular verse of the Qur’an, join in a protest, or plan a celebration.

After this stage, which can take up to three years, the candidate continues to the next step in which s/he can run for election to start their leadership plans in the movement. The member’s next stage is based on his/her interests or the area they are already working in. For example, if a member is working in the Islamic Centre School, a natural progression is to become a teacher or principle.

After this, if the individual thinks that s/he is qualified enough, and has created a successful network inside the movement, then s/he can join the internal elections to become a member with the Shoura Council. Once integrated therein, s/he can run for the highest positions in the Muslim Brotherhood, such as member of Maktab al-Tanfidhi [the Executive Bureau], or even the head of the Jordanian Brotherhood itself.

Overall, the Usar are located within the Brotherhood’s Shoura system, constituting Shu’b [branches], in which new and old members convene and select local leadership. Each Shu’bah [branch] elects a chief, deputy, secretary, and treasurer. The leadership of the Shu’bah then becomes members of the Shoura council. The Shoura Council, which consists of 45 members elected for four year terms, internally elects their Executive Bureau and General Supervisor for the Jordanian Brotherhood as a whole. Therefore, the system closely mirrors the parliamentarian system.

Despite not having an Usrah or Katibah, the members of the IAF elect their Shoura Council, who in turn elects the Secretary General (IAF’s version of General Supervisor) and Executive Bureau. Other than this difference, the Brotherhood and IAF run parallel in their organisational system. Regional branches of both Brotherhood and IAF still have a certain autonomy to act appropriately to their locations’ issues. As Arshid stated,

In political and sovereign issues, this system is centralised… decisions are made via central concerns only… there are regulations which determine the roles of these branches in order to compromise the branch’s polices with the central body. Therefore, the branches can be decentralised regarding many autonomous issues such as protesting, organising conferences, lecturing and charitable causes.

103 Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 15-16.
104 Interview with Zaki bin Arshid, August 31, 2012, Amman, Jordan.
Rahīl al-Gharāybah specifically describes with Brotherhood by stating that:

The Muslim Brotherhood is centralised movement in which the Amman headquarter has the ability to make decisions, and the branches and sub commissions follow in tow. Supervision from the government [on Muslim Brotherhood and IAF activities] is unnecessary because we supervise ourselves internally. But as I said earlier, the government tries its best to put obstacles in front of us, but our branches are still extending throughout the country.105

Despite the strong structure that the Brotherhood and IAF uphold, there is still a margin of disagreement between the leadership such as Rahīl al-Gharāybah on how much the movement is centralised and how much the Branches have freedom to independently act politically or socially. However, despite this disagreement, members of the Brotherhood and IAF are ultimately unified by the strong organisational structure that engenders loyalty from the early stages of participation via its hierarchal system. This creates leaders from different descents, different wings inside the movement, and different theologies, as seen with the Hawks and the Doves, who are ultimately still unified within the movement.

3.4 The Peace Process

The peace process between Jordan and Israel had been attempted previously during King Hussein’s reign, when US President Richard Nixon visited the region in 1973 to initiate peace talks.106 The Brotherhood had been aware of Nixon’s intention of creating closer Jordanian-Israeli relations, and organised protests against his visit and any kind of normalisation of relations with Israel. These actions against King Hussein in front of the American President caused the regime to briefly arrest ʿAbdu al-Rahman Khalifah (the General Supervisor) along with other leaders of the movement.107 Nevertheless, Jordan’s general pro-peace approach changed in 1975, when the

107 Abū Fāris, Ṣafahāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdunn [Pages from the Political History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 150-152.
government criticised temporary treaties between Egypt and Israel regarding the Sinai desert and subsequently the government accepted a position of opposition closer to that of the Brotherhood. As a result, the Brotherhood was endowed with more freedom, and recommenced protesting against Israel. Yet, the Brotherhood was cautious in its public protests.

Due to the regime arresting Khalifah, the Brotherhood began to realise that its mutual understanding of the Palestinian question that it had built with the regime during the 1948, 1967, 1968, and Fedayeen war, had changed. This was proven in 1977, when the Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat visited Jerusalem and appealed with the Knesset to initiate peace between Egypt and Israel, stating, “I come to you today on solid ground, to shape a new life, to establish peace.” With these words al-Sadat, who was working independently of the Arab front, declared Egypt’s intention to initiate peace and end the hostility with Israel. The Jordanian regime adopted a moderate position in response, not clearly stating rejection of al-Sadat’s speech as other Arab countries did.

The Brotherhood may have reached premature conclusions, however, as Jordan did not accept the Camp David peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1978, arguing that it marginalised the Palestinian cause. Jordanian authorities considered the treaty as partial peace only, aiming to neutralise the role of Egypt in the Palestinian conflict, whereas Jordan looked for a coherent peace agreement between all the parties of the conflict. The 1978 treaty was concluded to neutralise the Egyptian military, whose intervention in war was the most probable compared to other Arab states bordering Israel. Paradoxically, this treaty did not remove the fear of a military solution of the conflict in the future – should Israel initiate a war with Jordan, Egypt would not engage itself on a military level due to the Camp David commitments.

108 'Amūsh, Mahāṭṭāt fī Tābīkh Ḥamā‘at al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [Periods in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood], 86-87; Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 34.
109 Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 32-34.
111 Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 33-34.
Those commitments were thus considered a loss of support from Egypt, making the treaty a threat to Jordan.\textsuperscript{114}

Since the 1973 Nixon visit, Jordan began leaning towards making peace with Israel. King Hussein declared his acceptance of Resolution 242 on several occasions, however, many of Jordan's peace efforts were cautious and remained secret until 1980 when Jordan openly declared its support for Resolution 242\textsuperscript{115} at the Arab League’s 11\textdegree summit in Amman.\textsuperscript{116} The King emphasised his intentions in a speech in Strasbourg at the plenary of the European parliament the following year, declaring:

\begin{quote}
Jordan's King, government, and people exerted all efforts contributing to making a number of peace initiatives a success … we have tried all paths, we saved no effort, and worked more than we can bare towards the friend and the enemy alike to see a permanent just peace and our region is still in turbulence.\textsuperscript{117}
\end{quote}

However, when the opportunity for peace arose in the Madrid Peace Conference, King Hussein knew that the Brotherhood, who was at that time not only a strong block in the parliament, and official party under the IAF, but also part of the government, would present substantial opposition. Therefore, the King dismissed the government of Mudar Badran, thus eliminating the Brotherhood’s representation, and appointed Taher al-Masri on June 19, 1991\textsuperscript{118} who led the Jordan-Palestine bilateral talks with Israel at the Madrid peace conference of 1991.\textsuperscript{119} The King was aware that his decision would likely initiate a crisis with the

\textsuperscript{117} Al-Hassan bin Talal, al-Sa’y Nahwa al-Salām [The Pursuit of Peace] (Egypt: Al-Ahram Commercial Press, 1984), 128.
\textsuperscript{118} Al-Masri was the Jordanian Prime minister from June 19, 1991- November 21, 1991. As a Jordanian of Palestinian origins, he has a special interest in Jordanians of the same descent.
Muslim Brotherhood, who perceived their governmental involvement as the pinnacle of their alliance with the regime, due to their positions in critical situations that the King faced during 1956, 1970, and 1989.\textsuperscript{120} The Brotherhood responded to the regime’s dissolution of the government by escalating radical rhetoric when addressing the internal, regional, and international relations of Jordan. This can be seen firstly by the Brotherhood’s objection to the 1991 Gulf War,\textsuperscript{121} which can be summarised with ‘Abdu al-Rahman Khalifah issuing a statement declaring the US Army an imperialist body, trying to control the region and its natural resources, situating the Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{122}

Despite both the Jordanian regime and Brotherhood favouring an Arab solution, the regime’s reasoning was based on its relationship with the former Iraqi regime, strengthened by intensive economic and trade relations between the two countries, whereas the Brotherhood’s view, in contrast, was based on opposing the intervention of non-Muslims in the affairs of Muslim countries.

Accordingly, the General Supervisor of the Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement calling for resistance against the domination of the ‘colonisers’ who were said to humiliate the people of the region, and called for their withdrawal from Kuwait.\textsuperscript{123} On January 17, 1991, the Brotherhood issued a communique entitled “Arab Leaders Exile America from our Pure Land”, stating:

\begin{quote}
We believe that it is the obligation upon every Muslim in Jordan to stand against The American / Zionist aggression, and it is necessary that the believing public attack the invading forces and the American interest everywhere. We call the Arab and Muslim people to stand against regimes (who support the American invasion).\textsuperscript{124}
\end{quote}

However, peace in the Middle East became a key issue for US foreign policy following the Gulf War, whose Iraqi occupation led to Kuwait’s declaration of

\textsuperscript{120}ʻAmūsh, \textit{Maḥaṭṭāt ft Tārīkh Jāmā’at al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn ft al-Urdun} [Periods in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 171.
\textsuperscript{121}Tal, “Dealing with Radical Islam: The Case of Jordan”, 139-156.
\textsuperscript{122}Bar, \textit{The Muslim Brotherhood}, 43.
\textsuperscript{124}Abū Fāris, \textit{Ṣafāḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāst lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn} [Pages from the History of the Muslim Brotherhood], 276.
independence via coalition forces led by the US.\textsuperscript{125} Therefore, the US was eager to enforce UN Resolution 660 in order to oblige Iraq to withdraw its army from Kuwait by all possible means, even if that meant starting a new war. This put the US in a delicate situation on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, as it was supposed to enforce previously discussed UN resolutions on the Palestinian issue.\textsuperscript{126} Having refused to apply Resolution 242 and 338 to maintain the 1967 status of Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan as occupied territories, Israel threatened the position of the US in the region.

Therefore, the Gulf War obliged the US to pursue peace in the Middle East, benefiting from some popularity among the Gulf States' regimes for its military intervention.\textsuperscript{127} It was on this basis that the Madrid Conference took place to engage Arab countries and Israel in peace talks for the first time. However, the Madrid negotiations led to the signing of individual peace treaties instead, starting with the Oslo peace treaty in Norway, 1993, attended by Shimon Peres, Minister of Foreign Affairs (later President of Israel) and the PLO’s Secretary of the Executive Committee, Mahmud \textsuperscript{c}Abbas.\textsuperscript{128}

The Brotherhood rejected the Oslo Accords in the same way it rejected Camp David, but for many reasons the signing of the Oslo treaty was considered a bigger disappointment for the Brotherhood. Firstly, the treaty made the PLO renounce violence, preventing any kind of resistance to Israel,\textsuperscript{129} forcing it to delete from its charter all references related to military action against Israel as well as any slogans that called for the destruction of Israel.\textsuperscript{130} Given that the core ideology of the Brotherhood calls to spare no efforts in liberating Palestine (including military efforts) the Oslo

\textsuperscript{129} Based on Article I; Watson, \textit{The Oslo Accords}, 40-75.
agreements also diminished this as a possibility for the Brotherhood, and furthermore the PLO was recognised by Israel as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This selective policy excluded Hamas and Jihad al-Islam, and any other organisation calling for resistance, from representing Palestine in the international stage, making the PLO sole representative of the Palestinian issue and the Palestinian people on the global scene. Therefore, the Brotherhood asserted their stance across the whole of Palestine, rejecting the entire concept of peace negotiations.

3.4.1 Wadi Arabah

The Brotherhood was not the only party to oppose peaceful solutions in regards to Israel. Other political actors shared similar stances, for example, Mudar Badran described the peace process as “Istislām lā salām” [Surrender, not peace]. He said that, “Since the economic crisis in 1989, Jordan was pressured to accept peace the American way. If it had been based on justness and fairness with a two state solution, I would have accepted it, but what was proposed was surrender.”

Badran explained that Jordan rejected US President Ronald Reagan's 1982 peace offer, as its conditions were not fair. His statement provided another logical reason for the King to dissolve his parliament. The Brotherhood believed that the peace plan was predetermined, and that the Brotherhood itself had been the only obstacle barring the King from completing it. They used the King’s appointment of Taher al-Masri as Foreign Minister in the Badran government directly before dissolving it, and reappointing al-Masri as Prime Minister after its dissolution, as proof

133 Reagan’s plan was delivered in his speech on September 1, 1982. Following the intervention of Israel in Lebanon in June 1982, Regan considered it time to move to the next step after Camp David Accords and prepare for the autonomy – Not state – of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza, within a five year period until self-governance was achieved. This in turn meant Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territory in exchange of peace. Unfortunately, Jerusalem’s position was not mentioned in this plan until the last stage of negotiations. Moreover, the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin called the plan a “national suicide for Israel” and the PLO and Arab States simultaneously rejected it. Therefore, it was never implemented; “Address to the Nation on United States Policy for Peace in the Middle East,” Regan, September 1, 1982, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/90182d.htm.
that they had been ignorant of some larger long-term plan to facilitate peace.\textsuperscript{134} 

In this sense, al-Masri's government was considered a peace-making authority.\textsuperscript{135} Therefore, the Islamist organisations within parliament combined their efforts to a vote of censure, including discharging al-Masri from his post less than five months after his appointment. This was possible as the constitution granted parliament the right to dissolve the government by a no-confidence vote. At the same time, the constitution assures the prime minister’s right to dissolve parliament. To everyone's surprise, al-Masri did not execute his right, but resigned in order to maintain the parliament. The parliament being able to intervene in the King’s power of appointment was the first real democratic achievement of the country since the 1989 events.\textsuperscript{136} 

However, the King continued with his peace plan, and when US President Bill Clinton visited the Middle East on October 25, 1994, calling for the signing of the \textit{Wadi Arabah}\textsuperscript{137} peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.\textsuperscript{138} When the treaty was realised, the IAF leader, Ḥamzah Manṣūr, gave a long speech in parliament publically recording the IAF and Brotherhood’s objections. The Brotherhood’s critical standpoints stated that the treaty considered the Jordanian right to land, water, and sovereignty without considering the Palestinian right, making this ‘partial’ peace. Furthermore, the Brotherhood argued that because Palestine was once part of Jordan, the latter is responsible for ensuring the same rights in Palestine.\textsuperscript{139} 

Secondly, out of their concern of \textit{Ummah} and unity, the Brotherhood suggested that instead of Jordan pursuing alliances with neighbouring Arabs, the regime was co-ordinating with the enemy, and that Jordan would not have a strong relation with any Arab state after signing the treaty and binding itself to Israel. Thirdly, it was pointed out that Israel did not fulfill any of its international commitments, causing doubt of the Israeli commitment to Jordan. The fourth point emphasised the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[134] Rawāshidah, “al Masri yakshifu Tafāṣīl Ghayr Mu’lanah’an Tashkīlīh” [al-Masri Reveals Details Undeclared about his Cabinet].
\item[137] See \textit{Appendix 1: Glossary}.
\item[138] King Hussein, “Treaty of Peace between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan And The State of Israel,” October 26, 1994, accessed May 25, 2014 http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/peacetreaty.html; Based the Jordanian-Israeli treaty, a number of Jordanian laws against Israel were cancelled, such as law number 30 for the year 1973, which forbade selling property; law number 10 of 1958 which boycotted Israel; law number 66 of 1953, forbidding all trade with Israel, to comply with law number 14 of 1994’s peace treaty. 
\item[139] Ḥamzah Manṣūr, \textit{Kalimāt wa-Mawāqif} [Words and Stances], (Amman: Dār al-Furqān, 1998) 33-34
\end{footnotes}
Brotherhood’s rejection of Resolutions 242 and 338 as they both concerned a land occupied since 1967, and the resolutions do not consider this land as occupied before that date.\textsuperscript{140}

Therefore, four fifths of Palestine is not included in these two resolutions. Furthermore, they also stated that the treaty was based on borders between Jordan and Palestine from the British Mandate Period. This meant that Palestine’s borders with Jordan became borders with Israel instead. The King points out that the treaty would end all hostility, and would marginalise the role of Jordan in any future conflict between the Arabs and Israelis. According to the Muslim Brotherhood, this treaty served the Zionist dream of security, and in this sense Jordan would be obligated to defend Israel against any threat. Furthermore, the Brotherhood presented an argument concerning the economy, pointing out the Jordanian boycott of Israeli products would end, disallowing any protectionist policies that Jordan had previously taken. Finally, the Brotherhood acknowledged the refugees and evacuees who reside in Jordan, and their right of return, which would be complicated after the application of this treaty.\textsuperscript{141}

Following signing the treaty, King Hussein invited Clinton to give a speech in the Jordanian parliament,\textsuperscript{142} which was, however, boycotted by the Brotherhood which maintained a unified rejection of the treaty, and demonstrated that there was a strong, unrepresented opposition to it.\textsuperscript{143}

However, the Brotherhood went further, and a letter to President Clinton was sent on behalf of the IAF parliamentarians in which the US was accused of supporting dictatorship in the region.\textsuperscript{144} The letter to President Clinton was accompanied by another letter addressed to the American congress on May 14, 1996, stating that:

\begin{quote}
It is the right of the oppressed, homeless Palestinian people who are sentenced to death and are imprisoned, to exercise their rights in order to defend their legitimate right to land, water, holy places and to live on their land and the land of their parents, the right to fight to regain their raped land from the rapists.\textsuperscript{145}
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{140} Ibid, 33-36.
\item\textsuperscript{141} Ibid, 36-37.
\item\textsuperscript{144} For: “Risālah Maftūḥah ilā al-Ra‘īs al-Amrīkī” [Open Letter to the American President], see \textit{Appendix 2.2}.
\item\textsuperscript{145} “Risālah ila Ra‘īs Majlis al-Nuwwab al-Amrīkī” [Letter for the President of the American
These letters were intended to declare the Brothers' total rejection of the *Wadi Arabah* treaty and to declare their support of militant resistance against Israel. Their refusal to mention the name ‘Israel’ in the correspondence proved their rejection of its existence. The emphasis on the rights to the land was the Brotherhood’s declaration of jihad against the occupation of Muslim land. The King used the anger of the Brotherhood and its boycott of Clinton's speech to point out that democracy prevails in Jordan as it allows the liberty of political parties to boycott the President’s and King’s speeches following the 1989 events. In contrast, the Brotherhood understood the King inviting President Clinton to speak in parliament as ignorance to the Brotherhood’s standpoints and to the parliamentarian authorities.

After all, events between 1988 and 1994 proved the regime’s ability to use all means to manipulate politics in Jordan. The one vote system was used to minimise the representation of the Brotherhood in parliament, which then allowed the passing of the *Wadi Arabah* peace treaty even while the Brotherhood was represented in parliament. This treaty is remembered historically as one that passed through parliament with the Brotherhood’s abstention. This secured the Jordanian regime from any future historical accountability on the matter since the opposition, even in discordance with those events, took part in the name of democracy. Thus, the treaty was acknowledged as a parliamentary treaty ratified through the voting system of elections.146

The treaty itself achieved a comprehensive peace between Jordan and Israel, based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Both sides recognised each other’s independence and sovereignty, as well as the shared borders, however, without recognition of the borders drawn under the Israeli military rule after the 1967 war. Also, the treaty achieved the prevention of, indeed even the threat of, the use of armed violence, with both countries taking all necessary measures to stop terror and violence.

In just one month's time, diplomatic relations were established, including opening embassies and exchanging ambassadors.147 Additionally, Jordan was granted

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146 Interview with Zakī bin Arshid, August 31, 2012, Amman, Jordan.
the right to supervise the holy places for Muslims and Christians in Jerusalem. Furthermore, the treaty regulated the sharing of water access and usage between both countries. This concerned the Jordan and Yarmūk Rivers, as well as the groundwater of Wadi Arabah. It was stated that both the Jordan River water and the groundwater of Wadi Arabah should be divided on an equal basis, despite three quarters of the Yarmūk River ultimately going to Israel. The treaty was respected in all its aspects except for the water division, creating an on-going problem and potential threat to the continuity of the peace treaty in the future.

However, the treaty did not adequately address the problem of Palestinian refugees. Even though the issue of Palestinian refugees in Jordan was mentioned, the agreement did not stipulate the right to return or to receive compensation for their sufferings. This kept the door open for controversies over the continuity of the treaty with regard to about half the Jordanian citizens of Palestinian descent (the actual figure cannot be confirmed). These issues continue to provide space for potential conflicts between Jordan and Israel.

The King decided to appoint the Dove’s leader ʿAbdu al-Taʿīf ʿArabiyyat, who had been head of parliament three times, as a member of the Senate Council. This can be understood as the regime trying to break the movement from within by favouring leaders of the Doves for governmental positions, as ʿArabiyyat could use his popularity within the movement to ease the radicalisation of the Hawks’ campaigns against the regime. This strategy has been seen previously with the appointment of Ishaq Farhan in 1970 as Education Minister, and Kamil al-Sharif in 1974, to exacerbate divisions within the movement and encourage internal support for the regime against the Hawks.

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Bisän, 1999), 67-77.
152 Jung, Dietrich, Marie Juul Petersen, and Sara Lei Sparre, Politics of Modern Muslim Subjectivities: Islam, Youth and Social Activism in the Middle East (New York: Palgrave
Discussion: The End of Alliance and the Question of Palestine

The subject of loyalty has been integral to the issue of Palestine since the establishment of Jordan. Jordanian tribes and minorities believed that the new state of Jordan would only thrive in the hands of a strong – Jordanian – regime, and therefore it was within their best interests to empower the regime with their loyalty. However, King ᶜʿAbdallah I and King Hussein could not avoid the threat of the unresolved Palestinian issue, as it affected the dynamics of Jordanian domestic politics.

Since 1948, repeated waves of refugees have entered Jordan from the West Bank. This is also due to the annexation of the two Jordan River banks, in which new educated peoples entered Jordan without the same loyalties to the regime as the pre-existing tribal and minority groups.¹⁵³ Therefore, the loyalty and support that the Jordanian regime had created was faced with immediate opposition from a new proportion of the population, thus empowering the Leftist and Nationalist opposition. This integration of a new category of people led eventually to a clash between descendants of Jordanian and Palestinian origins in 1970, which concluded with the PLO leaving Jordan after a bloody conflict with the Jordanian army.¹⁵⁴

However, the Palestinian problem remained a threat even after the PLO and other Palestinian political actors left Jordan. This is because Israel’s right wing, endorsed by Prime Minister Arial Sharon, announced the ‘Jordanian Option’ or what is also known as the ‘Alternative State Solution’. This was suggested due to the belief that Palestinians have what Sharon dubbed, the ‘Artificial Kingdom’ of Jordan, as an alternative Palestinian homeland, already existing due to the number of Palestinians living in Jordan and holding the nationality.¹⁵⁵

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Furthermore, the ‘Jordanian Option’ also suggests a federation between Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, which gradually pushes for the same idea of an Alternative State, as Palestinians would naturally become the majority in Jordan. This challenge makes the issue of Palestinians in Jordan a threat not only to the regime, but also to the very existence of the state of Jordan. Furthermore, Benjamin Netanyahu went further in his claims that Jordan is Palestine when he said:

Most of the Palestinians now live in the area or territory of the Palestinian mandate [Jordan]. The majority of them prefer this situation, and the continuation of being ruled under the Hashemite family of Jordan - this is certainly what Israel wants. There is no need to transfer Jordan into a ‘Palestinian state’ because it already has been that since its birth … [The PLO] demand national rights, which means creating another Arabic state, another ruling Arabic regime, and another Arabic army. [The PLO] are not satisfied with their Palestinian state, which is already established in East Jordan and in which a majority of Palestinians control most of the Israeli territory. They do not want to accept that a Palestinian minority lives outside the borders of Jordan in an Israeli territory in which they have full individual freedoms.156

The percentage of Jordanian vs. Palestinian descendants became a sensitive subject as any shift in this percentage may have become proof for the Israeli conviction. This also made the economic and political power of each descendant an issue of debate as Israel’s seed of doubt, teamed with memories of the 1970s clash, caused the two demographics to try and assert or determine their own right to Jordan.

Palestinian descendants see that Jordanian descendants dominate governmental and security sectors (as initiated by King ʿAbdallah I’s search for loyalty), while Jordanian descendants see that Palestinians control the market and trade in the country.157 Therefore, both do not feel that they have a complete citizenship in the country because each at some point has felt the threat of the other. For Jordanians, an increase in Palestinian descendants means losing the majority, and possibly a recurrence of actions taken against them as seen in the early 1970s. An increase in


156 Benjamin Netanyahu, Makom Tahat Hashemesh [Place under the Sun], (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1995), 205.
157 This occurred naturally when governmental and security jobs were taken by Jordanian descendants, and Palestinians were driven to the market trade for work.
Jordanian power results in the possibility of the Jordanians rescinding Palestinian descendants’ nationalities, and the facilities and privileges acquired therein, and/or asking them to leave Jordan – a country which has in fact embraced the Palestinians in a way unparalleled to any other country fostering these dislocated peoples.

Therefore, although the Jordanian regime provides Palestinian descendants with full citizenship, they do not have the full political rights of citizens. For example, one seat representing the rural city of Tafilah, which has a majority of Jordanian descendants, requires 19,691 votes, while another seat in Amman, which has a majority of Palestinian descendants, needs 85,728 votes. This means that the country prioritises parliamentarians from marginalised cities of mostly Jordanian descent, over big cities, like the capital, where most of the Palestinian descendants reside, keeping the balance in favour of Jordanian descendants over Palestinians. This therefore retains the imbalance of Jordanian descendants ruling the state - the foundation of the regime’s loyalty. By giving Palestinian’s incomplete citiizenships, Jordan ensures that the threat of becoming a Palestinian, or ‘Alternative,’ State remains an impossibility.

The turning point of the Palestinian question happened when Jordan and Israel signed the Wadi Arabah peace treaty. The Brotherhood considered this treaty to be against everything it stood for, becoming the point of drastic divergence not only between the Brotherhood and regime, but also between Jordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians. The treaty stabilised the country and throne, proving the power of the latter, and the Brotherhood saw the regime’s decision as a direct threat to any work towards a Palestinian solution, the right to return, and the movement’s understanding of Ummah.

It was clear that the Brotherhood and regime were visualising two different Ummah’s. King ʿAbdallah I and King Hussein emphasised a nation state, looking to Jordan’s interests when dealing with the question of Palestine, favouring a solution that prioritised Jordan’s security, safety, interests of borders, economy, and own people. In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood understands the Ummah in a wider context, in which small nations belong to a bigger Islamic nation, and therefore prioritising Jordanian interests above Palestinians’ would betray this understanding of Ummah.

Furthermore, in the Brotherhood’s opinion, it would be a betrayal to the

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Palestinians who were considered Jordanian until the application of the Arab League Summit decision of 1974, in 1988, parted the East and West Bank. Indeed, the Palestinian issue represents a source of legitimacy for the Brotherhood, as well as the core of its ethos. However, the topic of providing support and facilitating Palestine’s liberation became a subject of argument once the Wadi Arabah treaty was enacted. Therefore, the Brotherhood’s understanding of the Ummah and Palestine alike became compromised in the conditions of defeat and failure against Israel, whom the regime was normalising relations with.

Therefore, although peace with Israel is rejected on principle, the Brotherhood’s new leadership presented a different perspective to its forefathers’ mantra of jihad against Israel. For example, the dominant stance within the movement had been to liberate Palestine min al-Nahr ila al-Bahr [from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea]; a mantra which can be traced back to statements made in October 1968 which stated that accepting Resolution 242 would directly thwart the Islamic Ummah. 159

However, in contrast, when asked about the Brotherhood’s current reasons for rejecting peace with Israel, Zakī bin Arshīd said:

The aim of Islam is peace not war. ‘We are Muslim’ means that we are peaceful; therefore, peace is our priority. But as our example, the Prophet teaches us that the condition for peace is to be equal partners in peace under fair conditions. The situation of the peace we made [Jordan-Israel treaty] is built on our weakness, and its conditions are not fair upon us, therefore, this peace is not acceptable for the Brotherhood and we do not recognise it. 160

The shift in the Brotherhood’s understanding for peace is clear in this statement: peace is not rejected fully, as with previous Brotherhood leaderships. This statement was therefore followed with the question: Hypothetically, if the Brotherhood found itself again in parliament, and was able to lead a parliamentarian government, would its rejection of peace with Israel result in tangible actions? Would the Brotherhood lead Jordan in a war against Israel? Arshīd responded with:

159 This statement has been verified by the researcher at the Ummah Center for Studies on August 24, 2012.
No, despite the unfair conditions for peace, we as Muslims are committed to respect our treaties following the example of Prophet Mohammed, therefore, will keep the promises that Jordan made.  

In this sense, this leadership of the Brotherhood would be the ones to protect the treaty if they were in power, despite their vocal rejection of it. Arshīd’s statement demonstrates the liberal stance that the new Brotherhood leadership has adopted, and as this conversation progressed, further hypothetical questions emerged: If the Brotherhood was in parliament again, what framework would it apply to providing a solution to the Palestinian issue? Surprisingly, Arshīd announced that, “We are accepting all the international agreements and resolutions by the United Nations, including 242 and 338.”

This is to say that Arshīd accepts the two state solution and its consequences (i.e. sharing Jerusalem as corpus separatum), which can be understood as opposing the Brotherhood’s previous statements on this topic. However, his hostility towards Israel was made apparent when he continued that, “One day, when we unite the Ummah and conquer our weakness, we can prepare for taking back our right [Palestine].”

Here, Arshīd is stating that war and hostility will always be relevant in regards to the Palestinian issue. Perhaps this conflated understanding of peace with Israel stems from the Brotherhood realising its inability to make real change towards the Palestinian issue, and that peace was forced upon Jordan due to its weak stance towards the issue. Therefore, Arshīd’s claim that the Brotherhood is ‘choosing’ a peaceful path is in fact revealed as a farce, in which there is no other option or scenario where the treaty does not become realised.

Ultimately, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has developed a pragmatic stance over time, balancing ideology with political reality. On the one hand, the Brotherhood does not accept or recognise the State of Israel, while it considers Palestine a land of, and for, Palestinians, as currently under occupation. And yet, it finds the two-state solution acceptable.

On the other hand, the Jordanian Brotherhood state that all commitments made to treaties (and therefore promises) are subject to Islamic values: not respecting them would be considered an act of betrayal, something the Prophet himself proved never to
do, especially in his relations with Jews. Therefore, even though the Brotherhood rejected the peace treaty when not in power, its leadership has learned to accept these agreements of the state and confirms that if in power, they would uphold, and ensure the execution of, peace with Israel. However, this cannot really be proven unless the Brotherhood is again in power.

Despite being a charismatic leader of the Brotherhood and IAF, Arshīd’s position on Israel is not unanimous within the Brotherhood. For instance, when al-Mashūkhī was asked if peace was possible, and what kind of peace he would accept, he responded that the Brotherhood would ‘accept any peace that Hamas accepts.’

This statement can lead to many understandings. Firstly, not all of the movement’s leadership is on the same track as Arshīd, so if they were in power, the IAF accepting peace could exacerbate a pre-existing gap between the highest level of leadership within the movement. Secondly, al-Mashūkhī’s statement unifies Jordanian Brotherhood and Palestinian decisions, taking from the Brotherhood’s credibility as a Jordanian national movement which enjoys making independent decisions. The next chapter will present the devision between the Jordanian movement, and how this led to their boycotting the elections.

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164 Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s entrance into national political life became an example for the Islamists not only in Jordan, but also throughout the world, since the Jordanian Brotherhood was the first Islamist movement to enter a parliament and government and to influence national politics by official means.¹

At the same time, the debates around the 1989 elections led to fractures within the movement and, consequently, to the formation of a branch with a more liberal agenda. Yet, as for the 1993 elections, the movement, weakened by the peace process and the introduction of the one vote system,² faced another internal conflict: ideological differences overshadowed discussions on political participation and the organisation retreated to its al-Banna vs Qutb theology. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood faced its first internal political crisis.³

Understanding the underlying dilemmas and divisions within the Brotherhood regarding national and regional agendas is paramount to fully understanding the Brotherhood today, and how it functions. As regional occurrences such as the growth of Hamas caused the Hawks to return to the Palestinian issue with renewed fervour, differences between members regarding their national and regional stances regarding participation and boycott continued to grow.

Therefore, this chapter’s timeline explores how the rise of Hamas, combined with Jordan’s internal issues regarding the peace treaty and normalisation of relations with Israel, pushed the Brotherhood towards its first boycott in the 1997 elections. However, during this period there was a shift in the regional situation, particularly after the 9/11 events in the US, in which the Brotherhood developed a fear of being compared with other religious groups that were considered extreme. Accordingly, the splintering divisions of the Brotherhood had to overcome their differences between themselves and the regime in order to participate in the 2003 election and thus avoid association with religious extremism.

Furthermore, this chapter explores the period between 1995 and 2003, when the Brotherhood focused its efforts on establishing a new social wing for the movement, culminating with the Association of the Islamic Centre, which became a

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key component in the movement’s socio-religious positioning in Jordan, distancing it from extremist comparisons and crystallising the movement in Jordan’s daily life. In a personal interview, Raḥīl al-Gharāybah discusses the social growth of the Brotherhood in Jordan and its importance on election day, revealing how this social wing impacted citizens’ votes.

**4.0 Preconditions for Division**

There were different reasons for the feeling of political defeat to emerge within the movement after the *Wadi Arabah* treaty was signed. Firstly, through its parliamentary participation, the Brotherhood was involved in the peace process with Israel: their unwitting support contributed to a general feeling that the Brotherhood had relinquished the Holy Land. Furthermore, disregarding the significant share of seats in the parliament, the law to limit the Brotherhood’s activity had been promulgated. Such control over political life in the country executed by the government enabled real confrontation between the Brotherhood and the regime.

With these developments as a backdrop, two mutually opposed groupings were formed, namely the *al-Hamā‘im* [Doves] and the *al-Suqūr* [Hawks]. On the one hand, this division represented two distinct ways, one moderate and one conservative, to consider the movement’s relation to the state.

The discordance of views regarding the social and political involvement of the movement occurred when al-Huḍaybī, the General Supervisor of the movement, departed from the teaching of Qutb.

The Hawks’ argument stemmed from Qutb’s *Milestones* and thus included references to *Takfīr* [judging other Muslim’s faith]. ⁴ This group argued that it became obvious after the experience of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that Islamic societies and their ruling regimes were infidel. However, the other faction did not consider the Egyptian experience as repeating in Jordan, just as this group did not proclaim the Jordanian political elite *Kāfir*. ⁵

The Doves group had a significant privilege in this opposition, since the *Kufr*

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⁴ *Takfīr* and *Kufr*: See *Appendix 1: Glossary*.
of the Jordanian regime could not be used as an argument in these debates. Firstly, the Jordanian Constitution declared the supremacy of *Sharī'ah*, that Islam was the religion of the State, and that the King must be Muslim.\(^6\) Secondly, the King descends from the family of the Prophet Muhammad.\(^7\) Despite the fact that the King does not emphasise his descent in politics, the Brotherhood endorses it to accentuate an element of Islam within the regime. As a result, the division within the Brotherhood was not regarding the regime’s Islamic legitimacy, but rather was limited to the movement’s political participation and discussion of state laws adopted by the parliament.

The division between the Doves and Hawks deepened during debates that took place on the applicability of democratic procedures in the country. The Hawks emphasised the need to apply *Sharī'ah*, rejecting the humanitarian laws of the country. Conversely, the Doves did not see any contradiction between the existing laws and *Sharī'ah*, but they wanted to see the laws made by man brought into conformity with Islamic principles. Furthermore, they encouraged more consideration for *Sharī'ah* while discussing the law bill, namely they appealed to lawmakers to be as close to ‘god’s rules’ as possible. This debate entered the public domain with the first prime minister to be appointed in 1989 after the *Habat Nisān* events, Mudar Badran, inviting the Brotherhood’s members, to join the government in 1991. Despite the fact that the argument of participation in parliament first arose in 1956; the difference then was that the Brotherhood did not have the same popularity or organisation as the Leftists as Qutbist ideology had not yet crystallised, and therefore they did not have an option but to participate. However, after 1989 the Brotherhood emerged as a strong and popular political figure, whose (non)participation would create much larger ripples across Jordan. With the Brotherhood’s increasing definition among other political actors, the split between Qutbists and al-Bannaists also became more defined, exacerbating the internal debate regarding participation, however, in 1991, for the first time in the Muslim Brotherhood’s history, the movement gained the right to rule, joining the government and being responsible for the implementation of their program toward a more Islamic state.

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\(^6\) *Jordan, The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan* (Amman: Press & Publicity Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1952), Chapter 1, Article 2: “Islam is the religion of the State and Arabic is its official language”.

\(^7\) *The Constitution*, Article 28, “The Throne of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is hereditary to the dynasty of King Abdullah Ibn al-Hussein in a direct line through his male heirs as provided hereinafter.”
This idea of entering the Jordanian government was unprecedented for the Muslim Brotherhood. Such decisions entailed the formation of the new Islamist generation called ‘Ulamā’: the scholars. These rationalist scholars, led by internationally recognised Islamists, Rāshid Ghannūshī and Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, called for reforms from within the state. This faction launched the promotion of the Islamic “civilian” state, in which the role of Islamists would be shaped through reform from within. The Brotherhood accepted this ideology and adopted the concept of ‘reform from within’ the democratic system, which encouraged entering politics through democratic procedures to make gradual Islamic change not just from a grass-roots level, but also from the government level. Nevertheless, their ideological partition was preserved and presented itself in any activity the Muslim Brotherhood took part in, both in Jordan itself and in dealing with other branches of the Brotherhood around the world.

Commonly, Brothers of Palestinian origin, such as Muḥammad abū Fāris, Hammam Sāīd, and Abd al-Munaym abū Zanat, represented the Hawks. At the same time, the Doves mainly consisted of Jordanian-descendants, for example Abd al-Latīf Arabīyāt, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Dhunaybāt and ‘Abd al-Raḥīm ‘AkJūr. In other words, this division in the movement occurred between the Hawks, representing the conservative wing with Palestinians whose concerns, for example, were the strengthening of the relationship with Hamas or boycotting elections. Alternatively, the Doves represented Jordanian tribal roots and, consequently, advocated for closer ties with the government and the regime. However, the implementation of the one vote system in effect caused voters to make their decision based on their Jordanian or Palestinian origin, emphasised this division within the Brotherhood around participation.

Furthermore, during the 1993 elections, this division played a crucial role. Following the dissolvance of government and parliament between 1989 and 1991, the Brotherhood decided to enter the 1993 election. Despite the Hawks’ increasingly empowered call for boycott, the Hawks and the Doves agreed to enter the elections to avoid any possible complications with the regime, even though the new one vote system did not favour the movement. This election resulted in 17 seats out of 80 for the

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8 See Appendix 1 for the ‘Rationalists’.
10 Ibid., 9-10.
Brotherhood. Compared to the 20 seats gained in 1989, the Brotherhood considered these results a defeat, caused mainly by the change of election law.

The Brotherhood faced yet another development. Instead of entering the election with one consolidated list of candidates, the Brotherhood was also represented by two independent candidates: Abd al-Majīd Muhammad Aqtash and ʿAbdallāh Dhīb. These candidates, who represented Brothers of Palestinian-descent, won the election in their districts. However, the movement did not endorse this participation and in turn suspended their memberships for a year. This situation attracted attention to the heterogeneity of the movement, since it was the first recorded example of Brotherhood members participating without the movement’s approval. This reflects the tension within the Brotherhood at this time, as the Brotherhood was balancing its internal disputes in the face of a major political turning point, in order to remain on good terms with the regime.

Until this stage, the Brotherhood had become an example of a democratic Islamist movement. It had proved by its participation in the elections that democracy and parliamentarian participation can be used as a means to gradually Islamise the country in terms of laws and political action. However, the crisis with the regime led to an exacerbated internal dilemma, questioning whether there was any benefit in taking the democratic path and participating in the elections.

At the same time, the IAF’s Shoura Council made efforts to ensure that changes from within the Islamist political party would avoid the overly radical rhetoric of some of its leaders in the Brotherhood. This was also meant to prevent the Jordanian regime from responding violently to the Brotherhood. For this reason, the IAF’s Shoura elected the pro-regime Doves leader, ʿAbd al-Majīd Dhunaybāt, as a new General Supervisor in 1994 in an attempt to soothe the destruction of the forty year

alliance.\textsuperscript{15,16}

Ultimately, however, the alliance was irretrievable in wake of the peace treaty, which had shown both parties that they no longer shared the same understanding of the Palestinian issue, which had been fundamental to their alliance.

4.1 The Brotherhood’s First Boycott: 1993 – 1997

In the period between 1993 and 1997, several governments replaced one another. In June 1991, Taher al-Masri was appointed Prime Minister but he subsequently resigned in November of the same year to avoid a no-confidence vote from the Brotherhood. The King re-appointed Zaid ibn Shaker, (November 21, 1991 - May 29, 1993) who was well known for having managed the crisis of 1989. However, the Brotherhood refused to join his government as it was associated with facilitating peace with Israel.\textsuperscript{17} Similarly, the Brotherhood refused to support Abdelsalam al-Majali (May 29, 1993 - January 1, 1995); however, the share of the Brotherhood in the parliament was not enough to dismiss al-Majali or to influence the King’s decision to appoint him. The King, to avoid any complication after signing this treaty, reorganised the government and appointed Zaid ibn Shaker (January 8, 1995 - February 4, 1996) for the third time to insure the stability of the country. This turbulent period finished with the government of Abdul Karim al-Kabariti (February 4, 1996 - March 19, 1997).\textsuperscript{18}

Within this decade, none of the previously mentioned Prime Ministers prohibited the Brotherhood’s participation in their governments. During 1993-1997, the Brotherhood block in parliament refused to support these governments to prove their opposition to the regime and their rejection of peace negotiations. Therefore, the

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\textsuperscript{16} Bar, \textit{The Muslim Brotherhood}, 170.

\textsuperscript{17} Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḡadīr Abū Fāris, Ṣaḥḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyyāṣ līl-Ikhwān al-
Muslimīn fī al-Urdūn [Pages from the Political History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], (Amman: Dār al-Furqān, 2000), 139.

\end{flushleft}
relatively short terms of these governments were caused by the lack of the Brotherhood’s percentage compared to the tribal and independent candidates. Over 50 tribal parliamentarians won seats, compared to just 16 for the Brotherhood, meaning the amount of seats the Brotherhood held were not enough to stop the government’s trust, nor the signing of the Wadi Arabah treaty, but were enough to inhibit the government.

Due to the continuous rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Parliament, the Brotherhood began to feel that the government was surveilling them, and to state their position, the head of the Muslim Brotherhood’s parliament block, Hamzah Mansūr, addressed the government of Abdul Karim al-Kabariti with an open letter on March 2, 1996. As specified, Jordan was facing a decline in public freedom since the government, through martial practices, put restrictions on the activity of parliamentarians, political parties, preachers, and journalists. Also, the Muslim Brotherhood addressed the State Security Court with proof that they were subjected to close surveillance. However, a body of Islamic fundamentalists who used violence marked this period. The Brotherhood’s appeal was to make a clear distinction between cases related to the legal activities of the Muslim Brotherhood and to other Islamist groups, such as the Salafists, Muḥammad’s Army, and abū Sayyāf’s group among others.

To bring their accusation of governmental surveillance to the public domain, the Brotherhood issued a communiqué on their press conference on July 6, 1996, as

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19 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Jordan Parliamentary Chamber: Majles al-Nuwaab Elections Held in 1993.”
21 The State Security Court was established in 1959, under the Emergency Law, as exceptional act. According to Martial Law, the State Security Court was established to deal with treason, drug matters, espionage, and terrorism. It consisted of three military judges and three civilian judges. The civilian judge’s role was, however, marginalised in the court. Despite the termination of the emergency laws in 1989, and the reestablishment of political and parliamentarian life, the court continued to operate. See: “Qānūn Maḥkamat Amm al-Dawlah raqm 17 li-sanat 1959” [State Security Court Law Number 17 for the Year 1959], Diwān al-Fatwā wa-al-Tashrīʻ [The Court of Fatwa and Legislation], accessed June 3, 2014, http://www.dft.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_dataentry&pid=12&leg_id=%20647.
22 Muḥammad’s Army: The group, captured by the Jordanian intelligence in 1991, was accused of many terrorist acts, such as exploding the car of an intelligence officer, burning the French cultural centre. The group was released in 1992 due to King’s Amnesty.
23 Abū Sayyāfīs was accused of leading a terrorist group and was sentenced to death; however, Sayyāfīs was also amnestied in 2007.
24 See Appendix 2.4 for communiqué.
ordered by al-Kabariti. In this conference the Brotherhood addressed the ‘selective justice’ of the State Security Court, as a number of the Brotherhood’s members were condemned for criticising the royalty Itālat al-Lisān [Lengthening the Tongue] as a part of their activity in the parliament.\(^{25}\) The communique contained the following request:

1. To grant amnesty to all convicted by the intelligence department
2. To investigate all cases of psychological and physical violence toward prisoners in the intelligence service’s cells and to punish the people responsible for it
3. To stop imprisoning innocent people and to stop instigating the internal crisis.\(^{26}\)

Despite the publicity the Brotherhood’s communiqué received, on March 19, 1997 the King reappointed Abdelsalam al-Majali to supervise the election – the same Prime Minster who introduced the one vote system. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood officially boycotted the 1997 election declaring that the one vote system made it impossible for them to participate.

The Brotherhood rejecting peace and the result of the one vote system, combined with the accusation of surveillance, caused them to boycott. This document, Bayān al-Muqāṭa [Communiqué of the Boycott], also listed guidelines that the Brotherhood developed for running the elections. The benefit of such an engagement (since the 1989 election, the Brotherhood influenced developments in various areas: human rights, charity, social, cultural, educational spheres, health care, etc.\(^{27}\) was doubted after the Brotherhood was faced with close surveillance of its members, infringement of public freedoms, implementation of the law on criticising the royalty,

\(^{25}\) Itālat al-Lisān [Lengthening the Tongue]: This law can be understood as the prohibition of offensive speech against the King and the royal family, and the sentence is from one to three years; “Law number 16, mandate number 195 for the year 1960” Named Itālat al-Lisān [Lengthening the Tongue], Gender Clearing House, accessed May 28, 2014, http://www.genderclearinghouse.org/FR/FR/upload/Assets/Documents/pdf/code-penal-jordanie-arab.pdf.

\(^{26}\) Abū Fāris, Ṣafāḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [Pages from the Political History of the Muslim Brotherhood], 142.

and changes in the public policies toward closer relations with Israel. As for the 1997 elections, despite being led by the Doves’ General Supervisor, ‘Abd al-Majīd Dhunayb, the Brotherhood still opted for the boycott. To address the regress of freedom in Jordan, its retreat from democratic perspectives after the 1989 events, the contentious peace process, and the implication of the one vote system, the Brotherhood added to their Boycott communiqué the following:

Election is taking place without real participation of the citizens in decision-making or policy building. Thorough analysis of the current political situation confirms that both the development of freedoms and democracy, as well as the role of non-governmental organizations is moving backwards. Accordingly, whatever the result of the elections, the role of a parliamentarian will be limited; the opposition will have no power in the parliament and in the political structure, having no ability to exercise influence on decisions or legislation procedure within the parliament.

With this statement, the Muslim Brotherhood highlights the end of the era of mutual alliance with the regime. The Brotherhood started to represent opposition in the street, rather than inside the parliament. Both the regime and the Brotherhood suffered in this confrontation. The movement lost its ability to affect the political process at parliamentary and governmental levels, just as the regime lost an important factor of legitimising important controversial issues, such as the peace treaty. The 1997 elections resulted in the establishment of a parliament loyal to the regime: 68 of 80 seats belonged to party members loyal to the regime and 12 seats went to the independents. Both the regime and the movement reached a critical moment.

However, it also became clear to the Brotherhood that it was impossible to introduce change from within the system while boycotting the election. To lose the

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28 ‘Abd al-Majīd Dhunayb, leads the Doves wing of the Brotherhood, and was the General Guide of the Jordanian Brotherhood. He mediated between the regime and the Brotherhood frequently, for which he became a member of the Senate three times in his career.
possibility of implementing Islamic change, which had unified the Doves and Hawks in the Brotherhood’s political participation, would remove their reason for cooperation, empowering the Hawks and naturally leading the movement towards boycott. Therefore, the Doves pushed the Brotherhood to revisit the divisive question concerning their participation in government. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood suggested a new, revised path to improve the situation, including the following steps:

1. To bring about constitutional reform that would ensure the separation of authorities, and ascribe to the legislative branch a central role in legislating, accountability and supervision
2. To replace the one vote system with a modern voting system, in order to assure fairness and justice, so as to enable people to vote for their representatives
3. To improve the economic situation and to oppose corruption in its different forms. To stop all non-legal actions against political parties and non-governmental organisations and to open up space for peaceful opposition
4. To stop any and all attempts to limit the freedom of citizens to foster public participation in the making of decisions which will affect the rest of their lives
5. To stop the normalisation of the Zionist enemy and to close all the doors for its penetration.32

Thus, for the first time, the Muslim Brotherhood mentioned the constitution and the separation of powers clearly in their statement. On one hand, this can be understood as a threat to the regime, since the constitution gives the King great powers, such as to appoint the prime minister, government cabinet members, the president of the Senate, and convene and adjourn the House of Representatives without any accountability. Therefore, any constitutional reform would take from the power of the King in favour of the parliament. On the other hand, the Brotherhood might take the demand for constitutional reform and the separation of powers further by demanding a constitutional monarchy, where the king reigns but does not rule. This statement grabbed the regime’s attention.

Despite the suggestions for constitutional reform, these conditions were raised by the Muslim Brotherhood not to readjust their relationship with the government or to

32 Abū Fāris, Saḥḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [Pages from the Political History of the Muslim Brotherhood], 161.
close the door on discussion or cooperation, but in contrast, to gain attention and to face the government with the necessity of these crucial issues suggested in the communiqué. If the conditions were met, the Brotherhood would be able to go back to parliamentary work.

However, one of the Doves’ leaders, Ishāq Farḥān, who was also head of the IAF’s Shoura Council, suggested that the government should temporarily extend the 1993 parliament until a new election law could be agreed on. This would give the government a chance to return to mediation with the Brotherhood by involving them in changing the law. This shows the willingness (and desperation) of the Doves to participate in the political process, and find mutual ground with the government – but only if they could guarantee a benefit that would convince the Hawks to revisit their boycott decision.

The period from 1993 to 1997 led to the radicalisation of the movement’s discourse, as per the boycott communiqué. In this situation, the ideological division inside the movement became visible: the Doves lost influence in favour of the Hawks. After the division the Doves once again entered the political scene with the participation of Muḥammad Azāyida, ‘Abdallāh ‘Akāyīlah, Muḥammad Ra’fat and Salāmah Ḥāyyārī in the 1997 election as independent candidates against the movement’s decision to Boycott. Other Brotherhood members showed their distrust of the movement’s direction by voting in the election. In order to punish participants (candidate or voter) and return the control over Brotherhood members, the Brotherhood held an internal court to try the violators, and consequently expelled at least 15 Brothers from the movement.

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33 Ishāq Farḥān: A leader of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood; former mister of education, minister of Islamic affairs, and senator. He has been expelled from the movement due to his participation in the government in 1973, but returned as one of the most charismatic political leaders.


36 The movement’s decision to boycott the elections meant not participating in the election on all accounts, i.e., not participating as a candidate or as a voter or in the campaign of any other candidate.

In its approach to undertake reforms from within, the Muslim Brotherhood aimed to gradually move the political system toward a more Islamic one, based on implementing Islamic law in different spheres, for example in education, family law, in the Penal Code, and in international treaties. The tactics corresponded with the al-Banna path of gradual change. However, when the Brotherhood understood that it was impossible to reach the proposed Islamic reform due to the policies of the regime, both wings of the Brotherhood began to doubt the application of democracy in Jordan. When the Brotherhood agreed on the democratic conditions of participation, such as the election and parliament, they did not expect the government to minimise its role in favour of traditional tribal opposition. These factors created an atmosphere of distrust between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian regime.

The deep impact of the 1997 boycott left the Brotherhood in danger of splitting into two groups, especially given that those leaders who were publicly expelled from the Brotherhood, like Bassām ‘Amūsh, issued statements against the decision to boycott.38 Nevertheless, the Brotherhood proved its ability to survive as a political entity during the July 9, 1998 Shoura Council election, when the movement met once again to elect its leadership within the atmosphere of the boycott clash.39 The Doves entered the elections represented by ‘Abd al-Laṭīf ‘Arabīyāt (former head of parliament), Jamīl abū Bakr (Speaker for the movement), and Iṣḥāq Farḥān; the Hawks were represented by Hammām ‘Abd al-Raḥīm Saʿīd and Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Qādir abū Fāris. The Shoura Council accepted the re-appointment of the Doves leader, ‘Abd al-Majīd Dhunaybāt, as General Supervisor.40

This proved that despite the differences in identities and the various dissent of its members, what ideologically unifies the Brotherhood is their zeal to create a more Islamic state, along with their self-proclaimed duty to liberate Palestine, whether the members were born on the East or West Banks of the Jordan River. This internal election reflects the teachings of their founder in what they refer to as a ‘golden rule’: “We gather on what we agree upon, and we excuse each other on that we dispute

4.2 King ʿAbdallah II and Hamas

Soon, a number of administrative decisions caused further divergence between the Brotherhood and regime. The most important point in the Brotherhood’s critique was the Law on Publication, enforced on September 1, 1998 by the second government of Abdessalam al-Majali. The Muslim Brotherhood considered this law to violate human rights, especially in its limitation of free speech by forbidding criticism of the government. In addition, small publishing houses were forced to close their newspapers, increasing the government’s control over national mass media. The Brotherhood argued that it was by these methods that the government attempted to close the door on public criticism of the Israeli peace treaty, and the activities of a parliament that was operating without adequate opposition.

Although relations between the Brotherhood and the regime were tense after the 1997 elections, there was still room for negotiation, and both sides tried to meet at a compromise. Therefore, the coronation of King ʿAbdallah II, after King Hussein’s death on February 7, 1999, represents a new page in Brotherhood-regime history.

At this stage of its development, the Jordanian Brotherhood became the central Islamist organisation in the Levant area. This title was possible, first, because the Brotherhoods in other countries (such as Syria) were illegal, and second, due to the merging of the Palestinian and Jordanian branches after the unification of the two Banks of the Jordan River in 1948. Hamas was formed as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1987 following the events of the Palestinian uprising in the occupied

42 The main changes in the laws were in raising the capital of the weekly newspaper from 15 thousand to 300 thousand Jordanian Dinars (JD), and raising the daily newspaper from 300 thousand to 600 thousand JD. This was in addition to raising the fines from five JD to 30 JD, which limited the number of articles in the newspapers.
territories of Israel (the First Intifada\textsuperscript{44}). This status was officially stated in Hamas’ Charter of 1998.\textsuperscript{45}

The Islamic resistance movement self-classifies as the jihadi wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. Therefore, it is specifically representative of the Palestinian resistance the Brotherhood pronounced to take. For this, supporting Hamas’ jihadi activities gave the Jordanian Brotherhood, who claimed to prioritise the Palestinian issue, legitimacy among the Jordanian-Palestinian population. Abū Fāris confirms that:

\textbf{The Hamas Charter and some of its statements say that the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, is part of the universal Muslim Brotherhood. This means that, regarding the Palestine question, Hamas abides by the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology and views, especially since it is an Islamic issue and can therefore be solved through jihad. The Muslim Brotherhood must extend all kinds of material and moral aid, support and help it. … Hamas is a part of the Muslim Brotherhood … it is the Muslim Brotherhood’s strike wing.}\textsuperscript{46}

Hamas in Jordan strengthened essentially due to a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between the government headed by Prince Zaid bin Shaker and the leadership of Hamas; negotiations resulted in an unwritten, verbal, and mutually recognised contract, according to which the Jordanian state allowed political and media activities of Hamas in the country in exchange for their non-interference with Jordanian matters, and a renunciation of any militant activities in Jordan.\textsuperscript{47}

The establishment of Hamas’ offices in Jordan was due to an important political act of King Hussein. After the ratification of the peace treaty with Israel, the

\textsuperscript{44} Intifada: A form of spontaneous popular protest. The first intifada of 1987 started in Gaza and flourished throughout Palestine. The protest began during the funeral of four Palestinians in Gaza and turned into clash with the Israeli army. Students of al-Shaykh Ahmad Yāsīn organised to fight, naming themselves Hamas (Harakat [Movement], al-Muqawamah, [Resistance] al-Islamiyah [Islamic]).


King also tried, as a counterbalance, to support the Palestinian resistance movement. At the same time, the King tried to prove that the Palestinian issue and bilateral agreements with Israel are two distinct and separate issues for Jordanian policy. Therefore, official affirmation of Hamas’ presence in Jordan was considered a compromise for Palestinians. The Prime Minister of Jordan at the time of the crisis with Hamas, Abdelraouf al-Rawabdeh, (March 4, 1999 – June 18, 2000) referred to the decision of his predecessor, Zaid Ibn Shaker, to support Hamas activity in Jordan only if Hamas complied with certain requirements, namely refraining from military activity.⁴⁸

Despite the Wadi Arabah treaty, this ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between the Jordanian regime and Hamas was honoured. However, it did put pressure on Jordan as for the activities of Hamas inside the Palestinian territories, which made Hamas a “burden” on the shoulder of the country. At that point, Jordan started to demand that the Hamas leaders leave Jordan, especially those not of Jordanian nationality, such as Mūsá abū Marzūq and Imād al-‘Alami.⁴⁹

When King ⁶Abdallah II came to power not only amidst political crisis in terms of the regime’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, but furthermore during 1997, two years before ⁶Abdallah’s accession, Jordan’s relations with Israel also deteriorated. This was due to an attempt by the national intelligence agency of Israel, Mossad, to assassinate Khālid Mash‘al,⁵⁰ the head of the political bureau of Hamas, on September 25, 1997, two months after the Muslim Brotherhood declared its boycott.⁵¹ This failed attempt challenged the relationship between the two countries for the first time after the ratification of the peace treaty. King ⁶Abdallah addresses this event in his autobiography, Our Last Best Chance, implying that when he ascended to the throne,⁵²

⁵⁰ Ibrāhim Mash‘al is a Jordanian national with a Jordanian passport, same as many of Hamas and PLO leadership. He is also he head of the Branch Chief in Jordan and Political Office, and is a main media figure of Hamas; Alex Altman, “Hamas Leader Khaed Mashaal,” Time, January 4, 2009, accessed June 23, 2014, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1869481,00.html
the internal problem with the Brotherhood collided with a new clash with Israel, in the form of this assassination attempt.52

The Brotherhood issued a number of public statements on the assassination attempt through Hamas and the IAF. In the Communiqué of the Muslim Brotherhood of September 25, 1997, the IAF’s of September 27, and Hamas’ of October 7, the Jordanian regime was accused of concealing information from its citizens and trying to protect the Wadi Arabah treaty as priority over dealing with the assassination attempt.53 Later, the conflict between Jordan and Israel was resolved: Mossad agents, condemned for attempting the assassination of Mash’al, were exchanged for the spiritual leader of Palestinian Islamists, the founder of Hamas, al-Shaykh Ahmad Yāsīn, who was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1989.54

The exchange reflects the pragmatism of King Hussein in balancing the internal and external problems facing the country. He did not want the peace treaty to be threatened, and yet had to find a way to respond to Islamists inside the country after Mash’al was attacked within Jordanian territory. His negotiation, which led to freeing al-Shaykh Ahmad Yāsīn, a symbol for Palestine and the Islamic resistance, had a positive effect on Brotherhood members. Even those who are considered to be the most cautious in dealing with the regime, such as Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, said, “We will never forget King Hussein’s effort to save Mash’al, and freeing our Shaykh Aḥmad Yāsīn. He will be always remembered by the movement for that”.55 This statement demonstrates how the King’s acumen on this matter transferred the movement’s loyalties to the regime. One can therefore assume that if the assassination attempt had happened before 1997, the Brotherhood’s decision to boycott may have been different.

However, the death of King Hussein marked the end for the activity of Hamas in Jordan as well as a new shift in relations between the Brotherhood and the royalty. Six months after King ʿAbdallah II took the throne, Jordanian security captured 16

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55 Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan.
members of Hamas in Jordan, while its leadership was visiting Iran. They were accused of the illegal possession of weapons.\(^{56}\) Therefore, there was a threat of incarceration if Hamas leaders were to return to Jordan, and they were given the choice to not return to Jordan, encouraging the leaders to choose political exile.\(^{57}\)

Based on the ‘gentleman’s agreement,’ Hamas was seen as a Jordanian movement with leaders of Jordanian nationality (holding Jordanian passports), serving firstly Jordanian, not Palestinian, interests. Nevertheless, the investigation led the government to the conclusion that Hamas in Jordan is not a Jordanian movement. This condition led to banning the movement within the country.\(^{58}\)

Thus, by deliberate confrontation with Hamas, King ‘Abdallah II began a new stage in the relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organisations. Clearly, he departed from the path of his father, King Hussein, who balanced the relations between Islamists of the East and the West Bank and managed to overcome the severity of the boycott by the exchange of Yāsīn.

Thus, Hamas embodied individual frustrations and the efforts of the resistance, offering an alternative choice, leading to the strengthening of the Hawks in the Brotherhood, who took a more lenient orientation towards Hamas in its right to resist the peace plans. Therein, the Jordanian Brotherhood witnessed the Hawks wing rise within the movement, as led by Zakī bin Arshīd, who was later internally elected as a general secretary for the IAF.\(^{59}\) Due to this, the Jordanian Brotherhood contained Hamas within Jordan.

### 4.2.1 Jordan in the 9/11 era

The events of September 11, 2001, with the four coordinated attacks by al-Qaeda\(^{60}\) in

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\(^{59}\) Gharā‘ybah, ““al-Taf‘ulāt, al-Dākhiliyyah wa-al-Tanẓīmiyyah fi Jamā‘at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimīn” [Internal and Organisational Interactions inside the Muslim Brotherhood].

\(^{60}\) Al-Qaeda: Global Islamic fundamentalist organisation led by Osama bin Laden aimed at fighting the West and its influence on the Islamic world. Also works to re-establish the caliphate.
the US, highly affected the power balance not only on a regional scale, but also required every national government in the Middle East to reconsider its stance towards Islamist organisations and groups. To avoid the possible destabilisation of the state, the Jordanian government adopted a number of ways to empower the security departments run by the Ministry of Interior, the Intelligence Department and the army.\footnote{Abū Rummān.\textit{ The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections}, 4-6.}

In this atmosphere, the Muslim Brotherhood found itself at the centre of attention due to its connection and influence on al-Qaeda both ideologically (Bin Laden was a follower of Qutb), and organisationally: the current leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, members of the Jordanian Brotherhood occupied high positions in al-Qaeda, for example, Abdallah Azzām, the influential Palestinian from the West Bank, mentor of Osama Bin Laden, and co-founder of al-Qaeda was deemed a pioneering vanguard, the core of a new Islamic society. For these reasons, the Brotherhood became an appropriate candidate to be blamed for any possible future attack on Jordan or the region.

The Brotherhood had a marginal position in Jordan after King Abdallah II took the throne. On the one hand, the King did not want a strong Islamist opposition to his authority within the country, whilst on the other hand, the King did not undertake any active steps to engage the Brotherhood in state governance, i.e., no traditional welcome meeting took place between the King and the Muslim Brotherhood.\footnote{Abū Rummān, \textit{The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections} \textit{ Ibid.}} Further, in light of the new policy, the Brotherhood became a concern for state security, and the Ministry of Interior Affairs, led by Samir al-Habashneh, monitored their activity.\footnote{Abū Rummān, \textit{The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections} \textit{ Ibid.}} This surveillance was increased after Jordanian intelligence became a strategic partner for the US in the Middle East in their fight against terror.\footnote{Moḥammad Abū Rummān, “Dināmikyīyat al-Azmah byna al-Hikam al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdūn” \textit{The Dynamic of the Crisis between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Regime in Jordan}, \textit{Al Jazeera}, July 7, 2006, accessed May 30, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/pages/84a33a67-9eeb-490f-9aef-18dd703ee726#0.} The 9/11 events shaped the way in which the regime dealt with the Brotherhood, and justified the most important decision affecting the Jordanian parliament – its suspension in 2001 on the last day of
the thirteenth convocation of the parliament on June 16, 2001.65

The reason for this decision is debatable. According to the 1976 amendments to the Constitution, the King has the right to postpone parliamentary elections indefinitely in case of any national or regional instability. In the context of the Second Intifada (al-Aqsa), which broke out in 2000, and the immediate events proceeding 9/11, the King found it necessary to defer elections to the House of Representatives. This decision also accounted for the peace process between Jordan and Israel, which could be threatened by potential Islamisation of the parliament, if parliament continued to function.66

Other political actors in the country criticised the position of the King in this aspect. According to the Constitution, a King of Jordan is endowed with powers to appoint a prime minister, Majlis al-Ayan [Senate Council], and the president of the Senate. The King can also dissolve parliament and dismiss the prime minister and the cabinet at his discretion.67 Therefore, the King is the head of the executive and legislative powers in Jordan, and he has the sole right to suspend parliament, as per July 24, 2001.68 However, even with such authority, other political actors and parties were questioning the applicability of King ʻAbdallah’s decision in 2001, since Jordan, being adjacent with Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Israel, was never stable. A complicated regional situation was not sufficient reason to postpone the election. Yet, the King’s promises to change the electoral law in the meantime minimised the criticism of the opponents.

Additionally, from an economic point of view another reason could be found for deferring the 2001 elections. It could be argued that postponing the elections

allowed the government to issue a temporary law\textsuperscript{69} to deal with the economic situation of the country during this period, with its 30\% unemployment rate and 12\% poverty rate.\textsuperscript{70} Extreme political actions were required to meet the International Monetary Fund’s condition for economic reform, regarding taxation and privatisation.\textsuperscript{71} Thus, King ʿAbdallah II appointed ʿAlī abū al-Rāghib as Prime Minister to govern the country during a state of national emergency.\textsuperscript{72} Al-Rāghib’s government issued 213 temporary laws in this period (June 19, 2000 – October 22, 2003)\textsuperscript{73} to make the al-Rāghib government one of the longest and most controversial governments in the history of Jordan,\textsuperscript{74} as the amount of decisions and laws adopted by this government highly outnumbered any other Jordanian government or parliament.

From the King’s point of view suspending the elections could be seen as the only way of countering the pro-Islamist orientation of the Jordanian population following the events of 9/11. For many Muslims, the confusion after the events in the US once again highlighted traditional colonised narratives, reviving the anti-West orientation in the Arab world.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{69} Based on mandate 194 from the 1953 temporary law: When faced with urgent situations where expenses cannot be delayed, such as public disaster or war, and parliament is not in session or is dissolved, the government has the right (with the King’s approval) to issue temporary laws.


\textsuperscript{74} The parliament may approve or modify these laws. If the parliament rejects the law then the government, with the approval of the King, immediately declares the nullity of the law, and its effect. However, due to the lack of opposition in the parliament most of these laws were approved by the next parliament in 2003.

\textsuperscript{75} Fareed Zakaria, “Why Do They Hate Us? America in a New World”, News Week, 2002,
This mood corresponded acutely with the regional political environment in the aftermath of 9/11. Therefore, any elections to take place at this time could be significantly influenced by the anti-west opposition of Jordanians in terms of both international relations and the economic situation. The US intervention in Iraq may lead to the formation of a parliament with an opposition majority from Islamist and Leftist groups, including the Brotherhood. During a course of events in Iraq, a re-appraisal of the 9/11 events took place in Jordan, however, the public opinion shifted once again against the US-led coalition occupation in Iraq.

4.2.3 Iraq

On March 20, 2003, US forces attacked Iraq as a continuation of the ‘War on Terror’. The official Jordanian position on this matter was non-intervention in Iraqi affairs, including revising the scope of the American-Jordanian treaty. The role of Jordan in this war was limited to facilitating medical help and undertaking refugee support. However, the state’s position was widely criticised by Jordanians, mainly due to the different path King ‘Abdallah II took form his father, King Hussein, as the new king’s attitude towards Iraq was considered by the opposition as pro-Western orientation.

Throughout its history, Jordan preserved close ties with Iraq in political, cultural, and economic domains. Moreover, the popularity of Saddam Hussein was considerable in Jordan due to his pro-Palestinian position. Jordan also had strong economic connections with Iraq and enjoyed certain benefits in oil prices. The former King Hussein preserved good relations with Saddam Hussein, which also served to stabilise diplomatic relations between the countries, since Jordan remained the only state in the region to have diplomatic relations with Iraq after the international economic sanctions on Iraq were implemented in 1991. Therefore, Jordan played the

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role of a mediator between the US and European countries and Iraq before the war, and implemented the ‘Oil for Food Programme’ in 2003.\(^{78}\)

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan supported the mother movement in Egypt in its position towards the US intervention. The Egyptian Brotherhood’s *Murshid* [Supreme Guide] declared that Iraq was occupied Muslim land and it was an Islamic obligation to free it.\(^{79}\) A Brotherhood communiqué was issued on March 20, 2003 to address Americans as aggressors occupying Iraqi lands. Following this, the Muslim Brotherhood called for resistance. The Communiqué stated four important issues:

- Any aggression against Muslim people is unacceptable and to be resisted, whoever the aggressor may be;
- Defending Iraq does not mean defending the Iraqi regime, and it is for the regime to assume responsibility for the series of crises they caused when asserting power over their own people and their neighbouring countries. The unity of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi territories cannot be comprised;
- The Iraqi people have the right to change their regime independently;
- Supporting the Iraqi people is a *Fard* [obligation],\(^{80}\) with the need to consult with the people of Iraq themselves.\(^{81}\)

Thus, the moderate Brotherhood movement in Jordan was pressured into the radicalisation of following the path of the mother movement, which declared that jihad had become a *Fard* due to the invasion of Islamic lands. Maʾmūn Huḍaybī (*Murshid* of the movement) explained the jihad that the movement calls for:

\(^{78}\) Known as the ‘Oil for Food Programme’ (OFFP): when one oil barrel in 2000 cost 30 USD on the internal market, Iraq sold it to Jordan for 9.5 USD; the payment was not only in money but also in consumer goods. The export from Jordan to Iraq in 2001 equalled 420 million, a quarter of which were Jordanian products. See: Scott Laskowski, “al-Urdun wal-ʾIrāq” [Jordan and Iraq], United State Institute for Peace, Special Report no.178, Dec 2006, accessed May 30, 2014, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr178_arabic.pdf.


\(^{80}\) *Fard*: an obligatory act for Muslims (such as prayer). If ignored, will result in punishment on the Day of Judgment.

In the case of aggression on an Islamic country, jihad becomes a *Fard Ayn* [compulsory obligation] … but jihad must be in the framework of authority … the Iraqi war will emphasise the religious feeling between Muslims and it will spread the Islamic movements.  

Ma’mūn Ḥudaybī refers here to the organisational work of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1948 war, in which the Egyptian and Jordanian Brotherhoods were working in support and coordination of the Arab government to liberate Palestine by recruiting and training civilians to enter the war. Here, he is calling for a similar cooperation between the Brotherhood and government to recruit and organise the jihad to liberate Iraq from the US occupation.

Even though the Jordanian Brothers did not participate in the conflict, they recognised and supported the effort of the resistance under the previously outlined conditions, and raised public awareness of the occupation and danger of US aggression. Due to the lack of representation in parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood used their influence in the mosques to raise such awareness.

Moreover, the path of King ʿAbdallah II, firstly to expel Hamas from Jordan, then to suspend the parliament and postpone the elections, and finally to hold an ambivalent position towards the war in Iraq resulted in a deepening of disagreement between the Brotherhood and the King.

### 4.3 The 2003 Elections

The 2003 election, however, did not suspend the anti-war appeals of the Muslim Brotherhood. Thereby, within the Brotherhood, a compromise was met to not make any public statements or communiqués regarding the Iraq war that could have complicated already fragile relations with the government before the 2003 election, in

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85 Election Law No. 34 for the year 2001, and amendment of Law No. 11, 2003.
which the Brotherhood decided to partake. The idea was to resume anti-war and anti-Western sentiment in the mosques. Due to this, the responsibility of handling such a conflict of interests transferred from the higher, organisational level of the movement, to a more individual and personal level, helping the Brotherhood avoid official conflict with the government.

In the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, the Bush Administration pursued a new policy in the Middle East. It claimed that terrorism resulted from the lack of reform in the region and, therefore, in order to prevent any future attacks, affected countries should undertake democratic reforms. This shift in US foreign policy influenced political agendas in the region and encouraged election processes in countries such as Egypt, Iraq, and Palestine. Thus, it became essential for the Jordanian government to recommence the parliamentary life and reconcile with the Muslim Brotherhood along with further integration of Jordanians of Palestinian origin into Jordanian parliamentary life.

In 2003, the Brotherhood found itself in a critical position, as it saw the King’s steps regarding the suspension of Hamas and parliament as a threat to Islamic activities in Jordan, reinforced and legitimised by 9/11, which provided the perfect opportunity for the regime to weaken the Brotherhood. Therefore, the Brotherhood’s decision to participate, despite Jordan’s peace with Israel, and seeing no critical changes in the election law, was due to the movement’s fear of further confrontation with the regime. The participation in 2003 sent the message that the Brotherhood is a national, Jordanian movement, firmly against radical Islam, and relevant to Jordan and its grievances, despite opposing the regime’s policy towards Israel and Iraq. Therefore, due to changes in attitude towards Islamic parties after 9/11, the movement had to move past its divisions, which may have harmed the movement if it appeared to be radical or against the elections. Thereby, rather than concerning itself over internal disagreements, the movement entered the 2003 elections to protect its reputation.

The development of the election law later became the main official reason to suspend elections in 2011. The new law was based on temporary law number 34 of the

87 Ellen Lust-Okar, and Saloua Zerhouni, Political Participation in the Middle East, Boulder, (Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008).
al-Rāghib government. Amendments were introduced to guarantee transparency of the election to the House of Representatives, such as:

- Lowering the voting age from 19 to 18
- Assigning judiciaries to supervise the electoral process
- Assigning Civil Status departments to prepare information tables for voters
- Increasing the parliament seats from 80 to 104
- Quota of six seats for women to guarantee a minimum representation in parliament.

These changes in the election laws, however, could not influence the electoral behaviour itself. Assigning a judicial system to supervise the process did not change the way Jordanian citizens voted. The one vote system, which forces a voter to choose not between political candidates, but based on his/her own identity(ies), cannot guarantee representative results. Therefore, this new law would lead to an increase in differentiation among Jordanians based on their descent every time they are faced with the necessity to vote for their representative in the parliament. Thus, the election would not act as a stabiliser of the situation, nor would it bring voters together in choosing their best representative. On the contrary, the elections would differentiate people from each other, forcing them to vote for representatives of their roots, who would protect their identity before others.

Furthermore, the government retained electoral districts based on geography, which had been discredited in past elections, while giving equal representation to small cities at the expense of larger cities (people in large cities are more likely to vote for ideology than in rural areas). More importantly, the population of large cities is mainly represented by Jordanians of Palestinian descent (mostly in Amman and Zarqa). Equality of seats based on geographical division will therefore minimise the an and Salt. The new law once again confirmed a situation where, for example Zarqa with a population of 764,650 people in 2004 had the same ten seats in the parliament

as Karak with a population of only 204,185. In total, 765 candidates participated in elections and 2.3 million citizens registered to vote to fill the 110 seats in the parliament.\textsuperscript{91} Moreover, the voter turnout in big cities was even lower: 43\% (out of 1,942,066) for Amman, and 48\% in Zarqa. Whereas in small towns, with a majority of Jordanian-descent voters, the turnout was higher, for example, Karak had a turnout of 82\%, Mafraq, 81\% (out of 244,188), and Jerash 82\% (out of 153,602). As a result, only 20 parliamentarians representing Jordanians of Palestinian origin were elected in 2003.\textsuperscript{92}

This electoral reform did not address the core of the problem, which was the one vote system, and the geographical distribution of seats – it was a cosmetic procedure to bring the opposition back to the political process. However, broad participation in this election was highly important for the regime as well, because in the former election of 1997, only 47.45\% of the registered voters took part after the Muslim Brotherhood’s boycott, putting the credibility of that election process in doubt.\textsuperscript{93} Therefore, this election needed to present Jordan as a modern democratic state in the Middle East after 9/11 and the occupation of neighbouring Iraq.

In 2003, due to the Brotherhood’s participation in the election, the traditional division of the Hawks and Doves was renewed. However, this discrepancy did not become public as in 1997. Consequently, the IAF made a decision for the 2003 elections to participate with a separate list of candidates, and not through the movement.\textsuperscript{94} This was a strategic move to show a certain independence from the Muslim Brotherhood, even though most of the Brotherhood’s members were also


\textsuperscript{94} Interview with Zakī bin Arshīd, August 31, 2012, Amman, Jordan.
members of the IAF party.

At this point, the Brotherhood created a new strategy in dealing with the regime and the differences inside the movement. The movement decided to appoint Brothers who were of Jordanian tribal origins for the leading positions in the movement. There are several different reasons for this. Firstly, it is possible to argue that this strategic shift in leadership was devised to advertise the IAF as representative of both Jordanian- and Palestinian-descent citizens rather than solely Palestinian. Secondly, Jordanian descent members are less likely to be persecuted. Also, Jordanian descent members better facilitate negotiations and mediation with either government or state security departments if such persecution should be realised. Thirdly, and most importantly for election purposes, it may influence the chances of a candidate being elected if a voter is deciding between his tribal and religious affiliation. This is especially true for voters of specific geographical areas, and tribes, which the Muslim Brotherhood cannot access with their Palestinian predominance.

The result of the 2003 elections was unexpected for the Muslim Brotherhood.\(^95\) In 2003, the movement succeeded in taking 17 of 110 seats, one more than in 1993, at which time there were just 80 seats.\(^96\) This meant that in 1993 the Muslim Brotherhood was represented by 20% of parliament while in 2003, only by 15% (a 5% decrease of seats and, therefore, of their role in parliament; or 10% less seats than in 1989 when the Brotherhood gained 25%: 29 out of 80 seats).

Also, the impact of the one vote system became noticeable regarding the Leftists, who entered the election in one unified block of seven leftist parties led by al-Ḥızb al-Shuyūṭī al-Urdunnī [The Jordanian Communist Party] and Ḥızb al-Shaʿb al-Dimūqrāṭī al-Urdunnī [The Jordanian People's Democratic Party], but left with no seats.

The reasons for the drop in popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2003 can be explained by the exclusion of the Brotherhood from the national political scene due

\(^96\) 36 candidates out of 80 in the 1993 election gained 16 seats, 30 candidates out of 110 seats in 2003 gained 17 seats only.
to their boycott of the 1997 elections.\textsuperscript{97} It can be argued that the Brotherhood undertook a deliberate move not to challenge the regime through dropping the number of their candidates to 30 despite the increase of parliamentary seats.\textsuperscript{98} This diplomatic approach of the Brotherhood suggested that the movement was looking for ways to reconcile with the regime and for their participation in politics to not threaten the legitimacy of the current government. The regime acknowledged the Brotherhood’s olive branch and in response dismissed the Minister of Interior who had been appointed in 2001 to supervise security inspections against the Brotherhood. This was a message from the state that relations with the Brotherhood would be more normalised as would their political acceptance.\textsuperscript{99}

4.3.2 The Social Wing

The most notable feature in the 2003 election was the use of the Brotherhood’s social system (schools, university, hospitals, and charities) in the election to support the IAF. Despite the claim of separation, the IAF uses the same structure as the movement, relying on the same voters and network that the Brotherhood has built over time. Thereby, the issue of linking the Brotherhood’s social activities and charitable causes to vote collecting is a common accusation for the movement, and is often heard during election time. Indeed, accusations that the Brotherhood advertises for IAF members through its social wing need to be answered by the Brotherhood itself. While Zakī bin Arshīd recognises that other parties can exploit the social activities of the Brotherhood in the lead up to elections, he said:

\begin{quote}
The Islamic movement is ideological, political, and idealistic because of its Islamic rules. It aims to improve, and peacefully change the society through social work … The movement’s social work is objective and may therefore present unforeseen
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{97} This argument is shared by many experts on the Muslim Brotherhood including abū Rummān, in: \textit{The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections}, 56-72; and “Amūsh in \textit{Maḥāṭṭat ft Tārīkh Jamā’at al-İkhwān al-Muslimīn ft al-Urdun} [Stations in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan].

\textsuperscript{98} Interview with Zakī bin Arshīd, August 31, 2012, Amman, Jordan.

benefits. We reach out to people and communicate with them without expecting anything in return. But if they do wish to return the goodwill, *which is usually the case*, it will be a tool to empower our political purposes. [Italics added for verbal emphasis]^{100}

Arshīd then quoted a verse of Qurʾān: “is the reward for good [anything] but good?” to give this usage of the movement’s social activities a religious backing.^{101} On the other hand, al-Gharāybah firmly denies this claim stating:

It is an accusation against the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan that we try to use social channels to reach political objectives. Our response to this comes from our message that is ‘social work for social change’; this message has been followed from the early 1950s until the current day. It has been a message for the Jordanian people, without any consideration of political agenda, since before the existence of parliamentarian representation in this country… We maintain the same ideas, and we do not impose any ideologies or new methods for living upon the Jordanian people. Therefore, we don’t think about our social work and its effects on the Election Day.^{102}

However, whether or not the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood recognise or deny the direct influence of the social wing, no one can deny the indirect influence it has had on the voting process. Since the 1970 Civil War, the Brotherhood has built a strong system, enjoying the freedoms it gained upon the exile of the Fedayeen, and reaching places that the government cannot reach, such as refugee camps. As testament to al-Gharāybah’s statement, the Islamic Centre takes care of thirteen thousand orphans in Jordan, whilst the development ministry cannot care for more than four thousand.^{103}

When entering the Islamic Center in Zarqa, or the Islamic Hospital in Amman, one realises immediately that it is run by the preachers of the movement, and there is no governmental presence involved. Similarly this is seen in refugee camps such as Baqa’a and Wihdat, where most inhabitants study or receive treatment from either UNRWA, or the Muslim Brotherhood’s schools and clinics.^{104} The Brotherhood argue

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^{100} Interview with Zakī bin Arshīd, August 31, 2012, Amman, Jordan.


^{102} Interview with Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, August 24, 2012, Amman, Jordan.

^{103} Ibid.

^{104} “Camp Profiles,” United Nations Relief and Work Agency UNRWA, accessed December 2,
that government bureaucracy makes it impossible for the latter to reach and change these places. Additionally, it is argued that the government lacks the power to make real changes in society, since the King appoints it, and therefore works within the framework that he sets. In regards to the Jordanian Prime Minister, who had neither a plan nor agenda of his own to develop the country, al-Gharāybah said:

Jordan has many entities and departments representing the community but it cannot do what it should due to the governmental power over these entities. While the governments that come to power do not perform their constitutional role, and representatives become just high-class employers without any governmental responsibilities.¹⁰⁵

The lack of a plan and strategy to deal with societal problems come from the political system the regime created based on the one vote system. Further, al-Gharāybah’s claims of governmental beurocracy has a hidden tone, implying that the central government is unable to make descisions towards the governmental departments and entities around the country due to either unwillingness to help, or because of a lack of understanding of the needs of those areas.

The website of the Islamic Centre claims to care for 33,000 orphans, 7,000 poor families, and teach 1,500 students at its own expense.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, the charity wing, which is run through the Islamic Center, runs 55 schools, a large hospital with thirty health centres and clinics around the country, with a total of 3,500 employees. The Islamic Center steps in when the government fails, creating the need for Brotherhood services in all corners of the country. The political influence, and loyalty, gained from those who have benefitted from their services – be they employees, those in need, or the student body – is quantified on Election Day.

Some newspapers estimate that the Islamic Center alone was worth $1.5–2 billion in 2006, however, these figures remain unverified by authors Ḥilmī Asmar, and Marwān Shaḥādah,¹⁰⁷ and may be exaggerated unless they include accounts held with

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¹⁰⁶ This contradicts al-Gharāybah’s early statement: The Islamic Centre official Website: http://islamicc.org/ar/
the Islamic Bank, of which the Muslim Brotherhood is the largest shareholder. Whether or not these figures are verified, a general idea of the enormity of the Brotherhood’s internal economy, in such a small country as Jordan, is revealed.

![Image 1: Branches and Activities of the Social Wing of the Brotherhood, through the Islamic Center Around Jordan](image-url)

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The 2003 election was of great significance for Jordanian political history not only because the King had delayed this election since 2001, but also because the Brotherhood decided to return to the parliament after the 1997 boycott. Even though the Brotherhood gained only 17 seats (15% compared to 21% in 1991 and 25% in 1989), their participation was a sign to prove the important role of the parliament and the need to promote political democratisation despite the events the region experienced (Iraqi war, 9/11). Thus, entering the parliament even with the lowest percentage was a success for the Brotherhood, and indicated the rationalisation from both the regime and the Brotherhood in accepting each other. However, beyond parliamentarian relations there was another kind of clash with King Ⓐbdallah II. A rise of Islamist radicalism in the country, the Iraqi War, and the growth of Jihadist Salafism in Jordan, which led to the Amman Bombing in 2005 and the association between the Brotherhood and Islamic violence in Jordan, put the movement’s existence at risk again.
Chapter Five From Participation to Boycott: Radicalisation
In this chapter’s timeline, the two parallel lines that emerged in Jordan during the post-9/11 period will be explored. The first line embodied the Salafist movement’s growth, and the development of radical understandings of Islam. The Salafist movement used violence to achieve Islamic objectives such as creating an Islamic state, and in the 1990s fragmented, creating the Jihadist Salafist movement, which furthered these violent understandings of Islam. The second line moving parallel to the Salafists was the Brotherhood and its modernisation. The Salafists influenced the Brotherhood insofar as causing the Brotherhood to participate in political life due to fear of association with radicalism after 9/11. This either-or discourse resulted in the stratification of the Islamic movements, causing the Brotherhood to develop a modernist behaviour. Therein, as this chapter explores, the Brotherhood participated in the 2003 election after six years of boycott, despite their reasons for boycott remaining the same. The two Islamist movements came head to head in a battle of ideology and necessity, modernism and radicalism, however the regime’s purported fear of the Brotherhood juxtaposed these parallel lines in the 2007 election, pushing for the Brotherhood’s 2010 final boycott.

In order to understand the Brotherhood’s decision to boycott, the chapter progresses in its timeline by presenting the reasons for why the movement participated in the 2007 election. Using Zarqa city as a case study to track the Salafist movement’s growth in Jordan and its consequences on the Brotherhood, this chapter presents Hamas’ success in the 2006 election and its effect on the Doves and the Hawks of the movement to choose a new leadership and to enter the 2007 election.

The results of the election, however, were unexpectedly low for the Brotherhood, who subsequently accused the regime of committing electoral fraud against them. Doubting the benefits of being part of the political process, the Brotherhood were forced to retreat from participation, thus developing a stance similar to that of the Salafists towards politics and participation. Although these similarities are general, a splinter group of the Hawks have developed a stronger association with the Salafists, resulting in the ‘Salafist Brotherhood’, who pit political reform and the Palestinian issue as driving incentives. In personal interviews with three key leaders, these internal transformations can be clarified, particularly in the case of the new Hawks’ leader, Ibrahim al-Mashūkhi.
5.0 The Salafist Movement vs. the Muslim Brotherhood in Zarqa

Zarqa is the second biggest city of Jordan, located to the east of Amman. After the 1948 and 1967 wars with Israel, it was an obvious retreat for refugees due to its available space and proximity to the Zarqa and Jordan Rivers. Also during this time, Jordan was undergoing a series of economic, political, and social challenges. Due to these events converging with an influx of Palestinian refugees who later were granted citizenship, Zarqa became an incubator for Islamic movements such as the Brotherhood and the Salafist movements. To further this trend, the city also became a destination for Iraqi refugees from 2003 onwards. The influx of refugees resulted in poverty, and a high rate of unemployment compared to other cites in Jordan. Social and economic instability instigated a radicalisation of attitudes. Soon, the city became well known as a centre of fundamentalism.

The rise of Islamism in the region can be traced back to 1968, when the Israeli army attacked Fatah and the Brotherhood in Jordan. The consolidated forces of Fatah and the Brotherhood via the Shuyūkh bases, with the help of the Jordanian army, won the Karameh Battle in 1968. This victory promoted Islamist representation in the region. It was believed that success over Israel was due to the strong religious faith of the Brotherhood, in comparison with the Six Day War in which the Arab Armies were faithless and led by a secular state, and thus defeated. Furthermore, after the withdrawal of the Fedayeen from the region, an ideological gap inside the refugee camps occurred. In the 1960s, the Brotherhood managed to assert more control over the poorest territories and camps by organising charity and financial aid.

Thus, after clashes between the PLO and the Jordanian regime in the 1970s,

there was a rise of radical Islam in the area. Besides the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood in the refugee camps, the Salafist movement started to take root in the region.\(^6\)

In general, Salafism can be defined as a social and religious movement, calling for social reforms, opposing ethical and religious corruption, emphasising close adherence to the model of the Salaf or 'predecessors' (the first generation of Muslims, the Prophet’s companions and followers).\(^7\) The Salafists, like other Islamist groups in the area, call for the return to the Qur’ān and the Sunnah as the only guidance for social and private life. Yet, the Salafists, unlike other ideological Islamist movements, reject any possible adaptations of Islam in current political developments. They do not accept theoretical and practical adjustments of Islam, including politically, such as seen with the Brotherhood’s practices of forming political parties, running for elections, and opposing a regime or participating in government, altering Islam to fit their agenda. To this end, traditional Salafists refer to the Qur’ānic verse that refers all political matters to the ruler:

O you who have believed, obey God and obey the Messanger and those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to God and the Messenger, if you should believe in God and the Last Day. This is the best [way] and best in result.\(^8\)

In this sense the Salafists understand that the ruler of the state monopolises politics, and obeying the ruler is to obey God. Therefore, the main difference between the Salafist movement and other Islamic movements, the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, is political, referring to the issue of participation in political processes both in establishing political parties (and participating in the elections) or forming an opposition to a regime.\(^9\) In addition, despite Qutb’s opinion toward changes of the society, the Brotherhood generally defends gradual social changes through participation in national politics that would eventually empower the movement to


\(^7\) See Appendix 1: Glossary.


introduce more Islamic legislation and therefore to develop society within norms of the Qur’ân. The Salafist movement, conversely, orientates towards a strict application of the Qur’ân and the Sunnah, and rejects any law that is not derived from the Islamic sources of legislation.\footnote{Marc Lynch, “Islam Divided Between Salafi-Jihad and the Ikhwan,” \textit{Studies in Conflict \& Terrorism}, (2010) 33:6, 467-487.}

Furthermore, Salafism rejects all kinds of modern or fashionable practices, such as visiting tombs, graves of holy people in order to get closer to God or celebrate the Prophet’s birth, or any other practices that are not mentioned in the Qur’ân and the Sunnah.\footnote{Henri Lauzière, “The Construction of Salafiyyah: Reconsidering Salafism from the Perspective of Conceptual History,” \textit{International Journal of Middle East Studies}, 42 (2010), 369-389; T. Stanley, “Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism,” \textit{Terrorism Monitor}, (2005) 3:14, 8-10.} Despite common convictions, the Salafist movement does not have a unified theology. Their ideological standpoints are being constantly transformed and adapted by Sheikhs and Imams in accordance with historical events the Salafists experienced. This lack of ideological consistency results in diversity within the movement. Historically, the following patterns can be distinguished:

- \textit{Tarikhiyya Salafiyyah}: An historical development of Salafism, going back to Aḥmad bin Muḥammad bin Ḥanbal in the third century AH and bin Taymiyyah.\footnote{Bin Taymiyyah is one of the leading Islamist political thinkers; who laid down the main principles of political Islam (\textit{al-Hisbah}) and Salafism. All Islamic schools of the four Imams, al-Shafīʿi, al-Hanbali, al-Maliki, and al-Hanafi, accepted bin Taymiyyah’s theory and followed his path and teachings. Bin Taymiyyah claimed that the Qur’ân and Shari‘ah should rule the Islamic state as the sole sources of legislation for the Ummah.} At that time, Salafiyah’s main focus laid in the interpretation of Qur’ân and Sunnah: idiomatic interpretation vs. literal interpretation;

- \textit{Wahhabi Salafiyyah}: associated with bin Abd al-Wahhab,\footnote{Abd al-Wahhab’s first rule for society stresses the main Islamic prohibitions such as alcohol, premarital sex, and gambling. He then prohibited what he thought un-Islamic in his time such as tobacco, magic, and any proximity of men and women in public spaces. Bin abd al-Wahhab’s theory could not be published without power and authority in the Arab Bedouin society, therefore he allied himself to the al-Saud tribe of warriors. This cooperation between bin Abd al-Wahhab and bin Saud produced the first Wahhabi entity in 1744.} who in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century established a state ruled exclusively by Shari‘ah (state is responsible for enforcing ethical and social purity);
• Nationalist Salafiyyah: an attempt launched in North African Arab countries, mainly Morocco, to reconcile between a reformist understanding of Salafiyyah and a calling for jihad, for political liberation of the Islamic states;

• Jihadi Salafiyyah (Jihadist Salafism): radical Islamist groupings inspired by Qutb (Ṣāliḥ Sārīyah’s group,14 Jamā’at al-Takfīr wa-al-Hijrah,15 and Abdu Asalam Faraj’s group);16

• Conservative Salafiyyah: rooted in Saudi Arabia (Hay’at kibār al-‘Ulamā’ / Council of Senior Scholars), is a mixture of historical and Wahhabist Salafiyyah: Salafiyyah theology occupies significant religious part in society and justifies the state’s attempt to oppose common threats for conservative regimes.17

The Salafist movement in the Middle East in its historical development went through similar phases in constructing its theology. Yet, recently the dominant tendency is the Conservative Salafiyyah, influenced by the Saudi Arabian understanding and organisation of Islam within the state.18 Despite this ideological domination, in certain areas, due to different experiences and the strong personal influence of some Imams, other currents of Salafism can be distinguished. Despite a general tendency in the Zarqa region, due to its particular historical and political situation, Jihadist Salafism became the main approach to understanding Salaf, and to applying Islam.

14 Ṣāliḥ Sārīyah in his message Risālīt al-Ayman [The Message of Belief] argued that the leaders of the Muslim world are infidels and the first step to create the Islamic state is by obliging them to step aside.
15 The Jma’āt al-Takfīr wa-al-Hijrah’ [The Group of Infidel and Emigration] mission is in the group’s name: ‘Takfīr’ [the right to judge Muslims based on behaviour which deviates from the Islamic path as they see it] ‘Hijra’ [emigration] means that they left or emigrated from society, which itself is already infidelic from their perspective. Therefore, they label themselves as ‘al-Jma’a al-Islamiah’ [The Muslim Group] as the only existing Muslims. For this reason they emigrate from society to prepare for establishment of their mission of re-giving Islam to the people.
16 Faraj was one of the true believers of bin Taymmyah’s fatwas and theory about jihad with his confirmation of the need for the application of jihad against the leaders of the Ummah [nation] to end colonisation. In his book “Al-Farīdah al-Gaa’aibah” [The Absence of Obligation], he presents his opinion that the domination of the West over the Islamic lands is a result of the current Islamic leaders. Therefore, he issued a fatwa stating that jihad is Fardayn.
Zarqa is the centre of the Salafist movement in Jordan. The city occupied this position after Sheikh Nasser Eddin al-Albani19 fled from Syria to Zarqa after the confrontation between Islamists and the regime.20 It was due to the significance of his personality for the development of the movement that Salafism in Zarqa became conventionally known as al-Salafiyyah al-Albāniyyah. From the beginning of the 1980s, al-Albani declared that his movement would not join with Jordanian politics in accordance with Salafism’s basic concept of refusing to partake in political partisanship. This standpoint minimised the confrontation in mosques over the recruitment of new members between the Brotherhood and the Salafists. Their ideological differences made a clear boundary between the two movements based on their understanding of political participation. Thereby, al-Salafiyyah al-Albāniyyah can be considered as a conservative traditional version of Salafism to call for the application of the Qur’an and the Sunnah without any involvement in power or opposing the regime.21

As al-Albani became popular in Jordan, his preaching inspired many within the Brotherhood’s leadership, such as ᶜAbdallah ᶜAzzām.22 However, ᶜAzzām took his own path in his understanding and preaching for Islam. In the 1970s, through his activity in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, ᶜAzzām opposed the non-interference ideology of al-Albani. The most famous fatwa23 of the former stated24 that jihad became Fard Ayn.25 Having taken the path of jihadism, in 1984, ᶜAzzām established the bureau of services for the Arab Afghans to recruit Arabs to the Afghani war. For this purpose, he published numerous books and pamphlets to motivate and to mobilise youth in joining

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19 Sheikh Nasser Eddin al-Albani: Islamic Scholar, one of the most influential Salafiyyah references, because of his known work on Hadith, such as Kunūz al-Sunnah: Rasa’il Arba’ [Treasures of Sunnah: Four Masses], (Demascus: Al-Maṭba’ah al-‘Umūmīyah, 1965.
22 ᶜAbdallah ᶜAzzām: a leader of the Brotherhood in the al-Shuyūkh bases during the Karameh battle of 1968
23 See Appendix 1: Glossary.
25 See Appendix 1: Glossary.
the war in Afghanistan. Originating from Zarqa, ‘Azzām’s call gained wide acceptance by radical youth supporting the idea of jihad to free the Islamic lands.

Besides ‘Azzām’s charisma and encouragement, there were other factors for the radicalisation of Islam in the region. At the end of the 1980s, readings of Islam began to be used as justification for change through violent means. This was caused by the significance of Qutb’s *Milestones*. Another factor was the Iranian revolution and the assassination in 1981 of Anwar al-Sadat, the Egyptian President. These developments empowered the jihadists in the Salafist region. The first attempt of jihadism to enter the political scene took place in the al-Shuyūkh bases, when representatives of the Hawks left the organisation. This was in order to create a Qutbist, jihadist movement that would create changes to the regime in Jordan and establish the Islamic State under the leadership of Muḥammad Rīf`at Saʿīd Ṣāliḥ.

However, there were important internal developments in Jordan, specifically in Zarqa, which contributed to the rise of Jihadist Salafism in the area. At the end of the Afghanistan war in 1989, numerous Arab *Mujāhidūn* [soldiers] returned to Jordan, as did others who took part in the Gulf war. Those returnees had significant influence on the ideological map of the area.

According to Sameh Khrys, the Arab Afghans were considered *Mujāhidūn* and heroes in Afghanistan, but were not welcomed in Jordan on their return, and were not granted the respect they believed they deserved being the Arab fighters and liberators of Afghanistan from the Soviet occupation. When they returned, the lifestyle of the country had already been significantly changed by the introduction of a new,

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29 Muḥammad Raʿfat Saʿīd Ṣāliḥ retreated from his *jihādist* ideas after debates with al-Albānī, and participated in the 1997 election, succeeding in accessing the parliament; Abū Rummān, *Jordanian Salafism: A Strategy for the Islamization of Society and an Ambiguous Relationship with the State*, (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010), 43-44.

30 *Mujāhid*, plural: Mujāhidūn: a person who chooses jihad to defend the Islamic land or apply Islamic rules.

Westernised lifestyle, identified primarily by a more liberal way of dressing and increasingly consumerist behaviour. The Afghan Arabs rejected these social changes on the grounds that they had been fighting the West in Afghanistan, while Jordan seemed to have been indulging in its influences. It was those returnees who contributed mostly to the radicalisation of the attitudes in the area and who promoted further fundamentalism.

Secondly, a few years later, masses of Jordanians were expelled from the Gulf States following the defeat of Saddam Hussein. For Islamists, the war in Iraq meant a war of the West against Muslims, even if they did not approve of Saddam Hussein’s regime. At the time, more than 160,000 people, mostly of Palestinian descent, settled in Zarqa, joining the ranks of the poorest in the area.

Furthermore, the Islamists from the Brotherhood itself or Jordanians who supported the Brotherhood disapproved of the initiation of the peace process, which led to the Wadi Arabah treaty and its ratification while the Muslim Brotherhood was in parliament. This issue questioned once again the value of Islamist movements’ participation in national political life and presented Salafism as an alternative Islamic way of dealing with aggression against Muslims, Palestine, and the regime.

Yet, it was the influence of Isam Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi (al-Maqdisi), who crystallised Jihadist Salafism in Zarqa. In Democracy is Religion, al-Maqdisi criticised the political decisions of the regime, stating that governmental actions, such as approaching peace with Israel, were against Islam. In his round-trip of Jordan, al-Maqdisi met Mahmud abū Omar abū Katada, a famous Salafist leader. Al-Maqdisi


35 Abū Rummān, Jordanian Salafism: A Strategy for the Islamization of Society, 49.


37 Mahmud abū Omar abū Kutada had popularity with Islamists in Jordan, however he did not
and abū Katada, who consider themselves Jihadist Salafists, argued that Salafism is not confined to the strict application of Islam as ascribed to the followers of the Prophet’s Companions. In addition, based on their interpretation of Qutb’s Jāḥiliyyah and al-Ḥākimīyyah,38 they began to criticise and discredit the Jordanian political regime, labelling its members as infidels as in other Arab countries. Due to this, al-Maqdisi and abū Katada called for a political upheaval based on military action.

Abū Musab al-Zarqawi, future leader of Jordanian radical Islamists, belonged to the school of al-Maqdisi. Inspired by Ḍā‘ūr Aẓzām, he followed Mujahidin Arabs in 1989 to Afghanistan, however, he did not participate in the war against the Soviet army. Nevertheless, after his return, he joined the al-Maqdisi group in Jordan.39 Al-Zarqawi and his teacher were arrested by the Jordanian government in 1993, both being accused of forming the terrorist group Bayḍat al-Imām [Pledge of Allegiance to the Imam].40 In 1996, al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi were sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment; however, in 1999 they were released on general amnesty by the new King Ṭābialláh II.41

After being released, al-Zarqawi engaged in different activities in Pakistan and Iran, before finally settling in Iraq.42 In the early years of the Iraqi war, he established the terrorist group al-Tawhid wal-Jihād [Unity and Jihad], which became known as the

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38 See Appendix 1: Glossary.
41 Abū Rummān, abū Hanieh, al-Hall al-Islāmī fī al-Urdun [The Islamic Solution in Jordan], 281-362.
‘al-Qaeda of Iraq’ after its alliance with al-Qaeda in 2004. It was in Iraq that al-Zarqawi received worldwide attention: Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State in the Bush administration, mentioned his name in the UN as a leader of a terrorist organisation and the extension for al-Qaeda.\(^\text{43}\)

Al-Zarqawi also managed to extend the jihad to secular countries neighbouring Iraq such as Jordan.\(^\text{44}\) His organisation is thought to be responsible for bombing three hotels in Amman, leaving 57 dead and 115 injured.\(^\text{45}\) The events of November 9, 2005 became known as Black Wednesday or the Amman Bombing. Al-Zarqawi also attempted several terrorist attacks in Jordan against the regime, as with the attack on the intelligence department in Amman.\(^\text{46}\)

Al-Zarqawi was not the only one to threaten Jordan from the inside. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Jordan became a centre of Muslim radicalism with individuals and groups using interpretations of Islam to justify violent acts. As stated above, the Jihadist Salafism developed two focuses for their activity: to fight Israel and to oppose the infidel Jordanian regime.\(^\text{47}\) Besides al-Zarqawi, a number of terrorist groups established themselves around the country.\(^\text{48}\)


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<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Jaysh Muḥammad</td>
<td>Arson attacks against the French Cultural Council and British bank&lt;sup&gt;49&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Muḥammad’s Army]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>al-Nafīr al-Islami [Islamic Mobilisation]</td>
<td>Failed attacks on two parliamentarians, Layth Shubaylāt and Ya’qūb Qirsh&lt;sup&gt;50&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Talāmīdḥ Jāmiʿat Muʿtah [Muʿtah University Students]</td>
<td>Accused of attempting to assassinate King Hussein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Bayʿat al-Imām [Pledge of Allegiance to Imam]</td>
<td>No action to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Jordanian Afghan</td>
<td>Fought Westernisation including the bombing of cinemas (e.g., Slwa in Zarqa, Ravioli in Amman), and was also accused of attempting to assassinate Abdelsalam al-Majali&lt;sup&gt;51&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Millennium Plot</td>
<td>Failed series of terrorist attacks called the Millennium Plot, taking place on the first day of the new millennium in many countries around the world, including the US, Canada, and Jordan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Cells Formulated to Counter Jordanian Regime in 1990s

Most of these groups were not fully-fledged terrorist organisations or networks. They were mostly individuals or small groups acting according to their limited resources. They failed in achieving their goals and were all exposed by the Jordanian Security.

The most organised group, however, was Bayʿat al-Imām [Pledge of Allegiance to the Imam]<sup>52</sup>. Its activity threatened the regime and al-Zarqawi was later

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<sup>50</sup> King Hussein became involved personally and granted them amnesty: Layth Shubaylāt became one of the leading oppositional personalities later, and Ya’qūb Qirsh withdrew his nationality and left for the West bank; Abū Rummān, abū Hanieh, *The Jihadi Salafist Movement in Jordan after Zargawi*, 121-123.

<sup>51</sup> Mostly the group were young Jordanians who had never been to Afghanistan. They were individually granted amnesty with time; Joas Wagemakers, "A Terrorist Organization that Never Was: The Jordanian “Bayʿat al-Imām” Group," *The Middle East Journal* 68, no. 1 (2014): 59-75.

recognised as the number one threat to the country due to the Amman Bombing in 2005. Al-Zarqawi accused his enemies of being infidels in order to justify his actions. Relying on the Jāhiliyyah concept, they legitimised the killing of other Muslims from their own Ummah [nation] and religion. In turn, al-Maqdisi was linked to a set of terrorist attacks called the Millennium Plot, which was a failed series of terrorist attacks planned to take place on the first day of the new millennium in many countries around the world, including the US, Canada, and Jordan.53

Nevertheless, it was not al-Zarqawi who made Zarqa important for media, but the strong Salafist movement, to whom al-Zarqawi belonged. The movement, in addition to other jihadist organisations and radical networks, for example, the Afghan Arab, made Zarqa the centre for radicalism in Jordan.

Jordan’s main tribune for struggling between theologies and clashes between al-Albanism and Jihadist Salafism influenced the country as a whole and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. In the outset of al-Albani, the Jordanian Salafist movement, although not being recognised by the Jordanian regime, did not challenge the state publically and, moreover, did not use religion as a means of violence or oppression over other Muslims. However, in the course of these events, the movement transformed itself drastically.

The Jordanian Salafists were influenced in their ideological development by a variety of factors. New ideological currents established in the region affected the Jordanian Islamists, such as the legacy of Qutb’s preaching, the Islamic Revolution’s influence, and the experience of the Egyptian Islamists in general. At the same time, internal social changes instigated the radicalisation of Islamists in the country, i.e. the Gulf War and its numerous returners influenced the traditional al-Albani Salafiyyah.

All this gave rise to a new generation of Salafists who believed in the global jihad. It also gave rise to more radical leaders, such as al-Maqdisi, despite their different interpretations of al-Albani. Al-Maqdisi’s calls to jihad as Fard Ayn lead to the development of a strong jihadist orientation within Jordan. As an outcome, stronger, more developed networks were established, issuing a call for violence against the regime by Bay‘at al-Imām. Later in 2000, this network was linked to al-Qaeda’s Millennium Plot. All these developments transformed the jihad mission of Salafists into more extreme and organised forms, enabling al-Zarqawi’s activities and the

53 Dennis Piszkiewicz, Terrorism’s War with America a History (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003), 121-131; Ragland, “Fighting Passions,” 35-46.
transformation of the movement from operating underground into being officially recognised in Jordan.

The events of the so-called 11/9 attacks (Black Wednesday) left Jordanians with the same identity dilemma that US citizens faced after 9/11. Citizens were faced with both an increase in violent understandings of Islam, and yet conversely, a seemingly more pro-West leaning of the government. For example, on the one hand, Jihadist Salafists were using Islam to justify their use of violence. On the other hand, the state declared an entirely different position via the Amman Message, according to which enforcing Takfīr was forbidden, selectively only eight Islamic schools were recognised and fatwas were organised. Generally Jordanians did not agree with the pro-western foreign policy of the government, which pushed for peace and normalisation of relations with Israel. King Hussein’s unpopular decision to negotiate with Israel was continued by King ⁶⁶Abdallah. Moreover, the King moved Jordan’s alliance with the Iraqi regime over to co-operating with the US.

A 2006 research study by the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS) sought to measure Jordanian public opinion in the post 9/11 era by taking a national sample consisting of 1,104 interviews from all demographics of the Jordanian community. According to the CSS poll, the Amman explosions changed Jordanians’ perspectives of Islamist movements, which use violence as a means of their activity. For example, in 2004, 67% of Jordanians described bin Laden’s al-Qaeda as a “legitimate resistance organisation”. After 11/9 this dropped to 20%. Further, the percentage of people who regarded al-Qaeda as a terrorist organisation increased from 10.6% to 48%. This dramatic increase, as shown in the table below, also relates to Islamist organisations using Islam as a means to justify violent acts. Overall, it can be described as a new understanding of resistance among Jordanians.

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56 Burayzat, “Mā Ba’da Tafjīrāt ‘Ammān al-Ra’y al-ʿĀmm al-Urdunīrwa-al-İRhabi” [In the Aftermath of Amman Bombing, the Jordanian Public Opinion and Terror], 6.
The results of the CSS report indicate that Jordanians had re-evaluated the possible use of violence after it was used in their own territory (only 6.2% regarded violent actions as legitimate resistance). According to the CSS report, Hamas and Hezbollah gained unprecedented popularity before gradually decreasing. Whilst individuals’ views on the attacks on the World Trade Centre progressed towards recognising it as a terrorist attack from 2004 to 2006,\(^{58}\) views on attacks against US troops in Iraq did not receive the same supportive response. Even so, there was an increase in the recognition of 9/11 as a terrorist attack.\(^{59}\)

The activity of the Jihadist Salafist movement in Jordan resulted in the transformation of the country into a security state, considered as a threat to any Islamist organisation in the country. To prevent possible terrorist attacks based on Takfir, mosques with Imams linked to the Brotherhood or Salafists were closed across the country. Furthermore, in 2004 the government arrested 30 Imams for preaching without governmental license in violation of the Seventh Preaching and Guidance Law for the 1986 instructions, including people from the Brotherhood’s Shoura Council such as Ibrāhīm Zayd Kīlānī, Ahmad Kūfahī, and Jamīl abū Bakr, who were accused of preaching. According to these instructions, a license for any preaching in mosques

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\(^{57}\) Based on: Burayzat, “Mā Ba’da Taťtrāt ‘Ammān al-Ra’y al-‘Āmm al-Urdunīrwa-al-Irhāb” [In the Aftermath of Amman Bombing, the Jordanian Public Opinion and Terror].

\(^{58}\) In 2004, 34.6 per cent addressed al-Qaeda’s attack on the World Trade Centre as a terrorist attack; in 2005, 61.4 per cent addressed it as a terrorist attack.

issued by the Awqāf [Religious Endowment] Ministry was required. Therefore, the freedom of preaching was infringed upon, and the government made a step towards recruiting Imams to preach a governmentally permitted kind of Islam, which excluded alternative opinions or views of the Brotherhood and the Salafists.

This governmental decision interfered with the basic freedoms of Jordanians. Freedom House acknowledged the shift in Jordan’s democracy rankings, as Jordan’s ‘freedom score’ had risen from a 4.5 freedom rating in 1998, to a 5.5 in 2003 (1 = best, 7 = worst) before the 11/9 explosions of 2005.

Furthermore, on March 6, 2005, the government issued the law of limiting professional associations’ participation in politics. These associations were not allowed to convene in meetings without permission from the Ministry of Interior. This affected all kinds of non-governmental organisations through which the Muslim Brotherhood could influence their adherents. For example, professional associations, such as the Doctor and Engineers’ Union, were a platform for Islamists – mainly the Brotherhood – to gather and mobilise the public in political matters such as protesting or striking on social matters or in the name of Palestinian liberation. This new legislation complemented the 1997 Law on Publications according to which freedoms of journalists and political parties were significantly limited. These actions were taken to support the one vote election law in Jordan, which emphasised tribal and identity-based votes over ideological.

Officially, those laws were not intended to foil any particular social groups. Every citizen was subjected to limitations on their political freedoms and representations, either in the one vote system, or in the law of Professional

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61 In 1998: Five = civil liberties and four = political rights.

62 In 2003: Five = civil liberties and six = political rights.


Associations, which limited the freedom of political gatherings. Generally, these provisional laws were issued for Jordan’s transitory state caused by regional events, such as the Iraq war, and internal events, such as the terrorist activity of the al-Zarqawi group or the Jihadist Salafists’ attempts to clash with the regime. However, in practice these laws were passed to smother the activity, influence, and most probably the political representation, of the Muslim Brotherhood in parliament and government.

Despite the common ideological background of all the Islamic groups in Jordan, each presents itself as a true version of Islam, inadvertently discrediting other movements as infidels. For example, in their understanding of infidel, the Salafists oppose every other political movement in Jordan, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, which deliberately chose to accept the existing regime and work as a legal opposition in the Parliament under the IAF party. Nevertheless, the decision to exclude the Brotherhood from policy making, taken by King cAbdallah II, contravened the previous approach of King Hussein who addressed the Brotherhood or other legally active Islamists during every legitimacy crisis, as seen with the Leftist threat in 1956, the 1970 clash, or even in the wars with Israel in 1948, 1967, or 1968. By this, King cAbdallah II once again emphasised the different path he was taking in Jordan, which required the normalisation of crisis between them.

The rise of Jihadist Salafism in Jordan was combined with the success of another Islamist group in the Levant at this time – Hamas, which changed the Brotherhood’s perception of participation.

5.1 The Dilemma of Hamas and the 2006 Success

Members of the Brotherhood who have Palestinian origins occupy a dominant position within the movement, and would hold the majority if their numbers in leading positions were taken into account. For example, between 2003 and 2007, 14 out of 17 parliamentarians elected as representatives of the Brotherhood were of Palestinian descent. Furthermore, Palestinian origin is generally acknowledged to be a reason for the radicalisation of the movement, since their origin defines their political stance and
compels them to foster a Palestinian-oriented direction in their agenda.66

This traditional opinion was challenged by the emergence of a new generation of Brotherhood members among the movement’s leadership, who were of Jordanian descent. Those such as Zakī bin Arshīd and ‘Alī ‘Atūm, allied with the new Palestinian leadership who were known to be closer to Hamas, such as Sa‘ūd Abū Mahfūz, Yāsir Za‘ātirah, and Mu‘īn Qaddūm.67 Although the origin of the Brotherhood’s members remains a valid ground to differentiate between the two wings of Hawks and Doves within the Brotherhood, the political stance and position towards the regime’s political agenda and towards Hamas’ organisation is a bone of contention within the movement.68 Since the government’s decision to close the Hamas office in Jordan in 1999, the movement was placed in a grey area as for its priorities towards a Jordanian or Palestinian direction.69

Hamas acted as an alternative to Fatah and the PLO after the failure of the Oslo and Camp David accords in order to find a solution for the Palestinian people in the path of resistance by rejecting Fatah’s peace plans, which failed to be implemented by the Palestinian authority. Hamas’ path broke the status quo that had been reached with the Palestinian issue after individual states, international communities, and international organisations’ failed attempts at offering a solution.

On January 25, 2006, Hamas participated for the first time in a Palestinian parliamentarian election, winning 42.9% of the vote (74 out of 132 seats) with a turnout of 77% of voters. Therefore, they won a majority of seats enabling them to formulate the government, and the Jordanian regime faced the reality of a return of Islamists in their backyard.70

Hamas’ success affected the Hawks almost directly. Less than two months after the election on March 3, 2006, the Brotherhood’s Shoura Council placed its trust

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69 Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashkhf, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan.
in Sālim Falāḥāt, who, despite being counted as a Doves member, strongly supports Hamas. The number of Brothers who rejected the Brotherhood’s nearly ten-year partiality of the Doves spiked in the wake of the regime’s treatment of Hamas, causing the Brotherhood to favour Falāḥāt’s pro-Hamas agenda over that of the Doves’ former supervisor and pro-regime candidate, ‘Abd al-Majīd Dhunaybāt, and Hawks leader Hammām ‘Abd al-Raḥīm Sa’īd.71

They chose Falāḥāt to balance their relation with the regime on one hand, as they had had a Doves Brother as General Supervisor since 1994, re-electing Dhunaybāt for 12 years to make the position that of a mediator with the regime. On the other hand, bringing a Hamas element to the Supervisor position corrected the role of Hamas in Jordan by legitimising it in front of the regime. Therefore, their reason for trusting Falāḥāt was in their desire to create a third path, combining the Palestinian case and Hamas with a pro-regime Brother.

However, soon after the election, it was announced that military rockets and explosive materials belonging to Hamas were detected in the North of Jordan. This was used to accuse Hamas of attempting to use Jordan’s territories to launch terrorist attacks,72 leading the government to cut all relations with Hamas and to avoid any communication with the new Islamist government in Palestine.

From the Brotherhood’s point of view, Hamas was a representative of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine; thus, any governmental or regime policies to break this relation were not accepted, and were considered an attack on the Brotherhood, and any pro-Hamas leadership, such as the General Supervisor himself. However, this connection was endangered when the government officially declared that Hamas was planning a terrorist act on Jordanian territory.

The Brotherhood defended Hamas and accused the government of attempting to fabricate such an incident as to set Jordanian society against it - which they failed

A report by the University of Jordan’s CSS showed that during this public anti-Hamas campaign, 69.1% of people considered Hamas a legitimate resistance organisation in Jordan, and only 7.8 regarded it as a terrorist organisation.

The Brotherhood’s split regarding Hamas and their actions became obvious when several Brotherhood members showed their support for resistance movements in Iraq. For example, four parliamentarians from the Brotherhood, claiming to represent themselves not the movement, participated in the funeral of abū Musa’ab al-Zarqawi on June 10, 2006.

Nevertheless, Jordanians discuss the killing of al-Zarqawi, which is commonly seen as a part of an anti-terrorist campaign, differently. The CSS report also showed that during that time more than 45% of people had a positive view to the killing of this leader because he is considered a terrorist who killed innocents in the Amman Bombing of 2005 and more than 30% of the people had a negative view of his death, considering him a martyr. This demonstrates that al-Zarqawi had unprecedented support for his activities in Jordan.

Yet, the government arrested two of the parliamentarians as a consequence of their participation in the funeral. One of those was Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī. Publically, al-Mashūkhī has refused to answer questions relating to his reasons for attending the funeral, however, during a personal interview he responded for the first time with:

The funeral is for the family of the dead not the dead himself, and when I visited him I was visiting his family, not blessing his actions. I am considered the chief of the area [Jabel al-Amir Hassan] therefore I was performing a societal responsibility by visiting one of the funerals which happened in my area, not visiting the people who vote for me.

In other words, al-Mashūkhī is saying that he was not presenting himself as a

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76 Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan.
parliamentarian acting on behalf of the movement, but rather he was presenting himself independently as a chief of the area. He claimed that when arrested by the military court (and subsequently found not guilty), the regime wanted to imprison him and associate the Brotherhood with terrorists. Al-Mashūkhī claims that the military judge and prison guards were receiving frequent phone calls to keep him detained, and he uses this as evidence for his claim.\textsuperscript{77}

Despite al-Mashūkhī’s claims in this interview that his status as chief of the area is prioritised above his political presence, he drops in the fact that prior to his visit to the funeral, there was a speech in al-Manarah Mosque presented by abū Fāris describing al-Zarqawi as a martyr.\textsuperscript{78} This contradicts al-Mashūkhī’s statement and suggests that despite the Muslim Brotherhood rejecting the Amman Bombing, they still believe in the Iraqi resistance movements. This belief has a strong presence inside the Hawks of the movement, including al-Mashūkhī and abū Fāris. Taking a step based on this belief, and visiting the funeral is also a message to their followers within the Brotherhood that they stand with the resistance. Furthermore, one can argue that this support is compatible with the previously discussed statement in Chapter Four, which, issued on March 20, 2003, stated “Supporting the Iraqi people is a Fard [obligation]” making this visit conducive to their support of the Iraqi resistance.\textsuperscript{79}

However, in response to those arrests, Zakī bin Arshīd resigned.\textsuperscript{80} The government responded by taking control of the Islamic Society Centre, the financial wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, accusing it of corruption. This was considered a big move since under the Islamic Society Centre there are 550 branches for the movement including hospitals, schools, and charities in 64 areas around the country.

Over the following two years, relations between the government and Brotherhood remained stable. However, the 2006 elections in Palestine changed the

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.; 16 non-Brotherhood parliamentarians attended the funeral of al-Zarkawi. Most of them are from the Bani Hassan tribe that al-Zarkawi is also part of, but none of them have been accused of disturbing Jordan’s stability as the Brotherhood members have.


scene and proposed a scenario of fear and destabilisation again. Hamas winning the elections posed the question inside the Jordanian Government: What if they win in Jordan? In regards to the next election, this notion was distressing for the regime, especially after the Brotherhood had changed its partiality towards Hamas.\footnote{Abū Rummān, The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections, 52-54.} If the Brotherhood were to implement the Hamas model of 2006 in the 2007 Jordanian election, the regime ran the risk of an Islamist parliamentarian majority forming an opposition government against the regime’s policies.

\section*{5.2 The 2007 Elections}

Following the electoral victory of Hamas in Palestine and the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (gaining 88 out of 454 seats), the Jordanian Brotherhood expected to repeat this trend in the 2007 elections. However, the Jordanian regime had its own way of dealing with the growth of political Islam in the area.

King ʿAbdallah II launched a campaign aimed to engage Jordan in the international arena. Aside close cooperation with the US, the King began communications with the European Union having introduced the national reform plan mission supported by the EU (EU-Jordan Action Plan), which was adopted in 2005. This cooperation resulted in the introduction of various initiatives such as “We are all Jordan”, aiming to mobilise the country for political reforms in order to encourage its development.\footnote{In July 2006, the “We Are All Jordan” youth forum gathered 750 representatives of youth organisations to discuss priorities for political reforms. The following aims were listed: national security, sufficient governance and independence of the judiciary, alleviating poverty, improving human rights, fighting against terror and Takfīr ideology, and an independent Palestinian state; King ʿAbdallah II, “We are All Jordan,” accessed July 7, 2014, http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/initiatives/view/id/4.html; King ʿAbdallah I, “al-Naṣṣ al-Kāmil li-Wathiqat wa-Barnāmāj ʿAmal “Kullunā al- Urdu” [The Full Text for the Document and the Program of We Are All Jordan Youth'], accessed July 7, 2014, http://kingabdullah.jo/uploads/wearealljor_ar.pdf.} Agreements with the EU and other international organisations compelled the regime to abide by international laws and regulations, namely to further the democratisation of the country.

Thus, in 2007 Jordan experienced two contradictory developments: on the one hand, the rise of the popular support for radical Islamist parties in the region made it
necessary for the regime to smother the activity of the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF; on the other hand, encouraged by the agreements with the EU and other international players, the government had to ensure freedom of political life and participation. The main question of 2007 was, therefore, if the regime would manage to balance its international commitments with the Islamists within the parliament.

In an interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel in June 2006, King Abdallah II, in response to a question about the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in the elections, explained:

They have to redefine their relationship with us. They have been working in a grey area in recent decades. I think society throughout the world now has to decide what is good and what is evil. I believe that the majority of the Brotherhood wants a good future for this country, and a good future for their children. I think that we can all work as a team. But there are some principles. Takfīr [declaring other Muslim’s infidels] is not one of them.83

The King’s statement was seconded by public confirmation from the government to ensure free and fair elections. Therefore, the Brotherhood decided to enter the elections of 2007, despite their previous disagreement on the electoral law and the legislation restricting general freedoms of Jordanians, such as the Law on Publication, Law on Professional associations, and laws regulating preaching.

The IAF publicised the list of candidates who were to run for the elections. Surprisingly, the list consisted of only 22 candidates competing for 110 parliamentary seats. This number was significantly lower, as shown in the table below, than any previous list of candidates.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Winners</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 (by-election)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8 seats to be filled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 (IAF established)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Number of Brotherhood Candidates and the Elections Results 1954-2007

The IAF’s decision to enter the elections with such a small number of candidates has two explanations. The Brotherhood, after boycotting the previous 1997 election, did not want to deepen confrontation with the regime by gaining many seats in parliament. This tactical decision aimed to gradually permeate the political arena with Brotherhood members, and receive approval from the regime after sustained poor relations with King Abdullah II. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood limited its list to 22 candidates, which could be considered the smallest in the history of electoral participations for this movement. For example, in the 1989 elections – the first elections the Brotherhood participated in – the candidate list consisted of 29 nominees competing for 80 seats in the parliament, whereas in 2007 it was 22 candidates for 110 places. Overall, in November 20, 2007, the new parliamentary elections consisted of 885 candidates contesting for 110 seats. However, limiting the number of candidates from the Brotherhood was an attempt by the new leadership to correct relations with the regime by demonstrating that they were not shadowing Hamas or looking to participate in the government.

On the other hand this can be interpreted as a weakness of the Brotherhood’s

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political presence due to their unstable participation and dilemmas during every
election. The candidate list presented by the IAF could corroborate the hypothesis of
an internal weakness of the IAF before the 2007 elections. Therefore, the
Brotherhood’s previous boycott combined with the poor result in 2003 caused them to
enter with a small list so as not to risk a large number of Muslim Brotherhood
candidates failing.

Nevertheless, the results were unexpected. The Brotherhood gained only six
seats, two of them coming from Amman and only one from al-Balqa.\(^85\) where the
biggest refugees’ camp in the country is located, representing their largest voting-base.
Likewise, the IAF did not gain any seats from Zarqa, which historically presented the
largest support for the Brotherhood.\(^86\)

Due to this, the Muslim Brotherhood lost twelve seats compared to seventeen
seats gained in the previous 2003 elections. As shown in Table 4 below, the tribal
candidates gained the major share of seats along with some independents.\(^87\) To explain
these results, the Brotherhood declared fraud had been committed. Informal evidence
of various falsifications was collected, such as vote buying, bussing, ballot-stuffing, or
changing voters’ registered districts.\(^88\) Furthermore, the Brotherhood leadership
accused the government of using the army to prevent supporters of the Brotherhood
voting.\(^89\)

The National Centre for Human rights in Jordan, which has provided evidence
of widespread fraud by buying votes all around the country, has made similar
statements.\(^90\) However, the government, via the Interior Affairs Minister, rejected the

Result for all the Candidates for the 15th Parliament], Addustour, Nov 23, 2007, accessed
Jordanian Parliamentary Elections, 64.
\(^87\) Markaz al-Ummah lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Abhāth, al-Intikhābāt al-Urduniyah li-‘ām 2007 Bayna
Riwayyatayn: Qir’ah ft Mushārakat al-Harakah al-Islāmiyyah ft al-Intikhābāt al-Baladtyah wa-
al-Niyyātīyah ft al-Urdun lil-‘ām 2007 [Jordanian Elections in 2007 Between Stories: Reading in
the Participation of the Islamic Movement in Municipal and Parliamentary Elections in
Jordan for the Year 2007], (Jabal al-Luwaybdah, Amman: Markaz al-Ummah lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-
Abhāth, 2008).
\(^88\) Examples of fraud in the 2007 elections were presented by Asher Susser in: “Jordan:
Preserving Domestic Order in a Setting of Regional Turmoil,” Brandies University, Crown
Centre for Middle East Studies, No 2, March 2008, 5, accessed July 7, 2014,
\(^89\) Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashukhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan; Abū Rummān, The
\(^90\) Taqrīr Markaz al-Waṣṭānī li-Ḥuqūq al-Insān, Muṣyīrāt l-Intikhābāt al-Niyyātīyah 2007
accusations. The ministry claimed the elections to be free and fair and that the results represented the real weight of the Brotherhood on society, thus dismissing the allegations.⁹¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House of Deputies, general legislative elections</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>Seats in 2007</th>
<th>Increase or decrease of seats from 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent / tribal representatives</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>+12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Action Front (IAF)</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>110</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: The 2003 Elections Compared to 2007 Elections⁹²

Despite all the attempts to accuse the government of defrauding the election, no legitimate evidence was provided. However, the Brotherhood’s accusation of the regime’s intention to control free expression of popular will might be proven by its deliberate restrictions on international electoral observation and monitoring by local NGOs. This fact was also highlighted in an EU report, which confirmed that the elections were organised and controlled solely through the Ministry of Interior, which opened the door for doubt of the government’s supervision of the electoral process.⁹³

Following the elections, King ʻAbdallah dismissed the government of Marouf al-Bakhit who supervised the stabilisation period after the Amman Bombing, and

appointed Nader Dahabi to lead a new government.\textsuperscript{94}

The 2007 parliament endured until 2009, despite debates over its legitimacy, however, it did not receive approval from the people of Jordan, as shown in Image 1. In 2009, the International Republican Institute (IRI) undertook a survey with 1000 individuals over 18 years old, questioning, “If the parliament could accomplish anything worth recognition.”\textsuperscript{95} Due to its lack of credibility, the majority of those asked declared that the parliament was not serving people’s interests. The same question was asked about the government and only 41\% offered support to it.

Did the current parliament accomplish anything worthy of recognition?

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image1}
\caption{Parliament Approval Rating}\textsuperscript{96}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{96} The International Republican Institute (IRI), “National Priorities, Governance and Political Reform in Jordan, National Public Poll”, 11.
Therefore, in 2009, for the second time since 1999, the King and his royal edict dissolved the parliament, and proceeded to call for new elections in the following year.

Sālim Falāḥāt, who became Supervisor in 2006 with the promise of improving Jordan’s relations with Hamas, had completely failed in implementing his agenda. With his understanding, participating in the 2007 election and providing minimum candidates might restore relations with the regime and salvage the Brotherhood’s position in Jordanian politics. However, the election result caused him to resign with this Executive Bureau, and an internal Shoura Council election was called for on April 30, 2008. Again, Falāḥāt proposed himself for the Supervisor position, but did not succeed. In this election the Brotherhood developed a new stance, electing Hawks leader, Hammām ‘Abd al-Raḥīm Saʿīd, of Palestinian descent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supervisor</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Abd al-Laṭīf abū Qūrah</td>
<td>1945 - 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad Abd al-Raḥmān Khalīfah</td>
<td>1953 - 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sālim Falāḥāt</td>
<td>2006 - 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hammām ‘Abd al-Raḥīm Saʿīd</td>
<td>2008 - Present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Muslim Brotherhood General Supervisors from Establishment until Present

The Brotherhood’s transition from pro-regime Doves leader, Dhunaybāt, to pro-Hamas...
Doves leader Falāḥāt, and finally to the Hawks’ Hammām Saʿīd, demonstrates the deep impact of the 2007 Palestinian election, and the Brotherhood’s re-evaluation of its relationship with the regime.

5.3 The 2010 Elections

From 1999 to 2003, Jordan experienced a decline in economic, social, and political stability. During this time, King ʿAbdallah attempted to wipe the West’s perception of a non-democratic Jordan, which was gained due to involvement in the Iraqi war, and the parliament’s suspension. Additionally, the anti-terrorist campaign after the Amman Bombing in 2005 had controversial outcomes in regards to Islamist relations and public freedoms.101 The general situation was worsened by the mistrust of the government due to the 2007 elections.

Observers from Freedom House and Democracy Web marked the situation in the country. Both organisations’ reports on the country’s development confirmed that between 2007 and 2010 Jordan has lost two points for political rights and two points for civil liberties. It was a significant drop down the one to seven scale, where one is free and democratic.102 The 2007 elections had a large impact on Jordan, shifting it from the most democratically promising country in the Middle East, as stated in 2006, to a restricted country in 2010, with a score of six in political rights and five in civil liberties. On a political rights scale, Jordan matched Afghanistan, and on civil rights – Yemen.103

Being internationally recognised as not having parliamentary opposition, teamed with the mobilization of European plans,104 pushed the authority to rethink the


104 Commission of the European Communities, 2008.
election process in order to provide more assurances for both Jordanian citizens and international observers of the transparency and freedom of the expression of popular will.

Taking all of this into account, the 2010 elections were highly encouraged by the regime, and the government tried to raise awareness of the importance of these elections in order to increase participation. The intensive use of social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter were promoted for the elections in general and for every candidate. Special websites addressed Jordanian youth alongside popular singers highlighting the need for the elections in national advertisements.\textsuperscript{105} As part of a national campaign to encourage citizens to vote, the government declared the Election Day a holiday.\textsuperscript{106}

New electoral law was introduced for the 2010 election,\textsuperscript{107} and the number of seats in the parliament increased from 110 to 120. Ten new seats were assigned for big cities, such as Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid, with a higher percentage of Jordanians of Palestinian origin taking seats. Furthermore, the government increased the transparency of the elections by introducing public lists of candidates for each geographic circle.\textsuperscript{108}

One of the pre-election reforms was the introduction of electoral circles. The territory of the country was divided into circles based on the population with the number of seats allocated proportionately. This invention, called afterwards ‘illusionary districts’, complicated the electoral law. Those ‘virtual circles’ inside the election’s geographical circles delimited each area with smaller numbers of candidates and known numbers of voters.\textsuperscript{109} Therefore, previously formed districts created a zone

\textsuperscript{105} Websites have since been removed, such as www.ElectionJo.com.
\textsuperscript{108} Abū Rummān, al-Іkhwān al-Muṣlimīn Mā ba’da Muqāṭa’at al-Іntikhābāt I’ādat Tarṣīm al-Dawr al-Σiyāṣt lil-Harākah [The Muslim Brotherhood after the 2010 Election Boycott: Redrawing the Political Role of the Movement], 3-5.
\textsuperscript{109} Martin Beck and Lea Collet, “Jordan’s 2010 Election Law: Democratization or Stagnation?”
divided into multiple sub-districts. This partition emphasised the one vote system problem and encouraged tribalism, thus leading to an identity crisis for Jordanians, pushing voters to support family relatives or tribal leaders, and undermining political ideology.110

A new electoral law was introduced in 2007.111 According to the law, a political party must have 500 members from five different cities to be registered for elections. Based on this law, 24 out of 36 political parties in place during 2007 were dissolved; by 2008 Jordan had a total of 12 political parties, including the IAF.112 The application of this law weakened the already feeble political ideological competition in the 2010 election.

In King ʿAbdallāh’s call for elections, it was stated that the 2010 elections were to be “a model of integrity, impartiality and transparency.”113 Despite this encouraging statement, the main obstacle foiling free expression for Jordanians remained in place: the main demands to reform the one vote system had been ignored since 1993. Another disregarded issue was that the elections were solely organised by the government, rather than a third-party electoral body, which, as remarked by a report by the National Democratic Institute, led to “significant voter scepticism and apathy.”114 Due to this, changes undertaken by the government could be considered a

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‘cover’ for its desire to preserve the status quo in the country.

Partial electoral reforms became the main reason for the Hawks to pass the statement on boycotting the parliamentary election. This decision was supported by 52% of the movement’s Shoura Council, but the division within the movement deepened when five of the Brotherhood’s members were expelled for their decision to run in the elections as independents.115

Every national election was seen by the Brotherhood as a chance to introduce Islamic reforms. However, their continuous participation in parliament since 1989 had not provided any noticeable changes, and choosing to boycott the 2010 elections brought the country back to a 1997 situation.116 The 2010 electoral law continued to minimise the role of the Brotherhood in Jordanian politics.117

By insisting on the one vote system, the regime forced the Brotherhood to rethink its approach of parliamentary participation. It became clear for the Brotherhood that their engagement in political life was no longer viable, and participation in elections or parliament became discredited as a means of introducing social change.118

On July 30, 2010, the Muslim Brotherhood announced, via the IAF, that it would boycott the election. Nevertheless, the government encouraged voters to participate, with a turnout of 53% out of the 2.37 million eligible voters.119 Participation in rural areas was higher than in the bigger cities - only 34% of voters in Amman and 34% in Zarqa voted – indicating the effect of the boycott, since these were


the main cities of Brotherhood supporters.\textsuperscript{120} 

The National Democratic Institute noted that there had been a clear improvement after the previous election in 2007 and recommended further improvements in the way elections were administered.\textsuperscript{121} Such reports could be grounded on the fact that, having eliminated the threat of the Brotherhood in the elections, the regime had no reasons to intervene in the voting. The pro-government parties or independent tribal candidates supporting the regime’s agenda won most of the seats.

To justify the boycott, 306 notables signed a communiqué, putting forward their concerns about the way Jordan was governed.\textsuperscript{122} Firstly, it was acknowledged that the country was amidst deep demographic, social, and economic crises, which could be seen in a spread of poverty, unemployment, high prices, wage depreciation and the dramatic rise in the state’s debts. Also, the growing ambitions of the “Zionist entity” in Jordan were mentioned along with the impact of “the anarchical peace negotiations” in which Arabs and Palestinians were involved.\textsuperscript{123}

As for the 2010 elections, the communiqué claimed that the government issued the election law without any kind of consultation with political parties or NGOs. Therefore, the law “was constructed behind closed doors,”\textsuperscript{124} without paying attention to the important proposals made by the national institutions, especially those that came from the oppositional political parties (e.g., mixed votes, local areas, and national votes). The government, instead, insisted on imposing the election law (one vote system), which would confirm again the absence of the political side of the elections.


\textsuperscript{123} “Bayân 306 Shakhshîyât Waṭanîyât Muqāṭî‘ al-Intîkhâbât al-Urdûnîyât” [The Statement of 306 Personality for Boycotting the Election].

qualifying only individuals with the agenda to improve public services, rather than political parties’ lists of nominations. Therefore, the government re-produced the dissolved parliament with members fully loyal to itself and the regime, rather than creating a parliament that supervised the government objectively and independently.

The communiqué declared that the government was fully responsible for the crisis in the country. The various parties, activists, and national personalities’ stances showed their commitment to freedom, justice, and equity, and their devotion to build authentic democracy based on institutional rule of law, highlighting that ‘the nation’ is the prime source of authority.

To summarise, due to the failure of the 2007 election, the 2010 elections resulted in introducing a common platform for opposition leaders to disregard their religious or tribal background. For the first time, the regime was opposed not only by the Islamists in the country, but also from other political parties, who found themselves excluded from political life and unable to voice their criticisms due to the regime’s trajectory of creating a one-colour parliament.

The significance of the 2007 election is that it was the last one that the Brotherhood participated in. It is hard to measure the implications of the 2010 boycott on the Brotherhood’s popularity and public support, as its size and popularity remains unquantified since its last participation in 2003; however, it is obvious that the regime and Brotherhood reached a peak in their crisis during these elections, and that the battle over electoral law changed the rules of politics in Jordan: It is no longer a power game occupied with parliament seats passing Westernised or Islamised laws.

After 2010, the crisis touched on the issue of monarchal legitimacy. In other words, claims for electoral reform extended to questioning the extent of the King’s power and the essence of the constitutional monarchy.125

Three key questions emerge from the concentration of this study: the role of Palestine in Jordan, the struggle of King ʻAbdallah II to balance between economic and political reform to establish a democratic Jordan, and perhaps most importantly: the issue of the Salafist Brotherhood. During the 1990s, and especially after 9/11, the Muslim Brotherhood has tried to distance itself from Salafist ideology, to show the

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movement as modern compared to them, and able to work with the regime despite historical disagreements. However, despite the Brotherhood’s endeavours to protect themselves from radicalisation, the shadow of Salafism has continued to follow the Brotherhood, and what they try to oppose lurks within their own membership.

**Discussion: Internal Transformations**

Jordan’s struggle with the question of Palestine and reform has become a central antagonist between the regime and Brotherhood. The period between 1997 and 2010 saw increasing marginalisation of the Brotherhood, alienating it from the political game, and leading it towards an agenda increasingly focused on Palestine and reform, which in turn could increase their own influence. Simultaneously, the regime would not fully address these issues for fear of harming itself, thus resulting in a power struggle that would affect the whole country.

As explored throughout this research, the Muslim Brotherhood is internally experiencing a number of structural and ideological changes. Generally, distinctions between the Hawks and Doves can be seen through three levels of analysis: firstly, members’ interests are influenced by their origins, whether of Palestinian or Jordanian descent. This element is crucial to the Jordanian Brotherhood as the Palestinian issue is at the core of its ideology. However, the Jordanian Brotherhood members are divided regarding this centrality of the Palestinian issue, as individual origin determines the choice between two distinct agendas: the Palestinian agenda or the national Jordanian agenda.

Secondly, the Brotherhood’s conflict over participation, whilst having its demands for changes in electoral law overlooked by the regime, caused critical changes within the new Brotherhood generation. This generation did not experience the alliance period with the regime, and thus its understanding of participation is limited to the crisis period of 1991 onward. This means that the Hawks, who emphasise the question of Palestine, became popular among the second generation who brought a new understanding of participation. These two generations’ differences in experience and agenda have caused further division since 2007, regarding the Brotherhood’s relations with the regime, and understandings of reform in Jordan.

However, the third and most important element in distinguishing differences between members’ ideologies is to look to their understanding and acceptance of
Hamas’ concepts and activities, including its role in Jordan, where a substantial divide emerges with the Hawks who traditionally advocate an increased Hamas presence within the Brotherhood. When dividing the movement’s history into stages, three distinct phases appear. The first stage, from the establishment of the movement to the late 1980s, was oriented purely towards the Doves and focused on building alliances with the regime. These alliances helped both the Brotherhood and the regime survive in a densely conflicted era. Due to these empowering results, the Muslim Brotherhood made political continuation a priority. Simultaneously during these years, the Salafist movement emerged due to personal relations between some Brotherhood members and Salafist personalities such as al-Albani, who influenced and taught many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī and Ḥabīb al-Azzām.

The second stage is when the relations between the Brotherhood and the regime peaked with the Brotherhood’s participation in government. However, on one hand, disagreements surrounding the value of participation grew as the tributary of Qutb theology, which forbade involvement with regimes that do not apply šaría fully, was still strong inside the Brotherhood, and on the other hand, the involvement of the Palestinian component inside the Brotherhood continued to cause conflict. The division within the Brotherhood widened, finally creating the Hawks and Doves. Nevertheless, the Doves’ decision to participate politically was increasingly popular, strengthening the Doves’ agenda over the Hawks.

The third stage took place after the Western orientation of the country had been established, and the government had enacted an election law against the Brotherhood enabling it to sign the peace treaty with Israel without hindrance. Another factor was a new king taking the throne with a liberal national agenda considered by Islamists to be hostile. This led to the rise of the Salafist movement in Jordan, including the Jihadist Salafists and consequently the Amman Bombing.

The internal organisation of the Brotherhood has been discussed comprehensively throughout this research, however, further differences have since occurred within the movement, deviating in various ways from original Brotherhood ethos and ideology. This can be recognised within the details of the following interviews with Brotherhood leaders Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, Žakī bin Arshīd, and Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī.
Personal Differences: The Interviews

Raḥīl al-Gharāybah is the former head of the Brotherhood’s political bureau, member of the Executive Office, scholar of Ummah studies, and head of the Doves, known by his good relations with the Jordanian regime. Zakī bin Arshīd is one of the most charismatic personalities within the movement, and is often looked at as an informal primary leader. As a former head of the IAF, Arshīd is now known as a leader of the Hawks, retaining close ties to Hamas. Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī is Jordanian of Palestinian origins, a parliamentarian, and was a lieutenant in an al-Shuyūkh base during the 1968 war. Al-Mashūkhī also represents the Hawks.

At an individual level, differences can be easily identified between members of the Hawks and Doves. For example, when I interviewed al-Gharāybah, who is of Jordanian origin, his approval of the regime was as clear as his criticisms of the government, who he accused of opposing the Brotherhood at every available occasion. He explained a common source of conflict as being the government obstructing the Brotherhood from obtaining busses:

Every time the Muslim Brotherhood tries to collaborate with any community around Jordan they face a war from the Government to stop them, even if it’s to buy a bus … obtaining a license appears to be impossible sometimes and it becomes a reason for altercation with the government. The government creates or plays with the regulations and laws to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from owning that bus.126

Al-Gharāybah also elaborated on the domestic and external pressures placed on the government to resist the Muslim Brotherhood:

Indeed there are two kinds of pressure on the Government: Internal, which comes from weak competitors - I do not want to mention names – then international. The international pressure is extremely dangerous in that it keeps trying to ruin the reputation of the Muslim Brotherhood through the propaganda of terrorism and extremism for the sake of drying out the spring of Islamism.127

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127 Ibid.
The ‘internal’ factors al-Gharāybah refuses to name insinuate the Royal Court and security entities, restricting his criticism to the government without explicitly identifying the regime. At the same time, al-Gharāybah demonstrates his loyalty to the throne throughout the interview, which he suggests represents a balance and meeting point between all political groups and minorities in the country. In reference to the throne he deliberately names the regime and undoubtedly accepts the position and role of the King in politics. Al-Gharāybah does not resent the King’s political involvement but he demands changes and political reforms in the country, including changes in the King’s constitutional powers, whilst still recognising King ʿAbdallah II as the head of the State.

Al-Gharāybah mainly focuses on governmental policies, in accordance with the Doves’ agenda. Generally, the Doves differentiate between the King and the government by not holding the King responsible for governmental policies. Furthermore, they call upon the King to intervene in internal politics to change the government’s path regarding key issues such as the election laws and the marginalisation of the Brotherhood. In this regard, the Doves, as led by al-Gharāybah, focus on the reconciliation between the Brotherhood and the regime to avoid confrontation, isolating their issues with the country’s management purely to the government, considering the King beyond criticism, thus deeming the government directly responsible for the issues in place that the Brotherhood rejects. Therefore, he leads those of the Brotherhood who believe in political participation as a way of sustaining the prioritisation of the Jordanian agenda, with an overall objective loyal to the internal affairs of Jordan.

While on the Hawks’ side, the Zakī bin Arshīd interview highlights different issues such as the problems between the IAF and the government. He explicitly claims that the government works systematically to marginalise the movement and displace it from society due to fears that its influence and power may overtake the regime’s. He explains,

The government stands against any Islamic or non-Islamic influences [of the Brotherhood] in order to retain and empower its authority on Jordanian society. Therefore, the government does not allow the movement to compete, or establish any kind of rights for the population, in order to keep its absolute powers over the weak
and controlled society.\textsuperscript{128}

In contrast with the Doves, Arshīd considers the relationship between the Brotherhood and the Jordanian government as confrontational. He suggests that the government utilises all political powers in initiating laws and regulations to stop actions by the movement: “The government raised the heat on the conflict with Islamic groups through many new laws such as the Preaching and Guidance law and the State Security Court.”\textsuperscript{129} Arshīd referred to NGOs’ reports to support his arguments, proving that the government employs all the tools of the state in its confrontation with the Brotherhood:

Many organisations and NGOs reported the negative impact of these laws. Human Rights Watch, for example, reported the growing numbers of Islamic prisoners and the inhumane living conditions coupled with torture specifically towards Islamists. Furthermore, the Centre of Strategic Studies at the Jordanian University [CSS] concluded through surveys that 80\% of Jordanians fear to declare their opinions about the Jordanian government’s actions or its political practices.\textsuperscript{130}

Arshīd represents a generation of Jordanian-origin Brotherhood members who were pushed into leadership positions by the movement after the 1990s due to the one vote system’s inescapable incline towards those of tribal backgrounds, therefore forcing the Brotherhood to prove that the movement was Jordanian more than Palestinian, as is often accused.

Arshīd’s popularity was gained due to his full support of Hamas, qualifying him as the Secretary General of the IAF party, and later, the Deputy General Supervisor of the Brotherhood. He claims “Jordan lived in a freer atmosphere between 1954 and 2004, when the laws enforced guaranteed and offered more of freedom and rights for the people and parties.”\textsuperscript{131}

In his reference to the period before King ʿAbdallah II’s accession to the throne, he implied that King Hussein was more serious in his democratic intentions than the current King. Due to the nature of this criticism, he does not mention King

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{128} Interview with Zakī bin Arshīd, August 31, 2012, Amman, Jordan.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
Abdallah II as explicitly as the Hawks typically do, yet does openly blame him for the shift in the country’s political agenda against the Brotherhood. Though he is considered to be a leader of the Hawks in Jordan, he is in fact conservative in his criticism of the royal family and uses the concept of the state vs. Brotherhood to avoid mentioning the regime. Such a position is more extreme than that of the Doves, but still it accepts the King and sets him above criticism to avoid any direct confrontation with the monarch himself.

The main difference in their approaches to the King’s role is that Hawks take their accusations further. Arshīd claims that the government, lawmakers, security departments, and King make one unit, and that political reform can only take place once the constitution and King’s powers have also been reformed. Soon after the interview, Arshīd published a paper in which he claims that the monarchy becoming fully constitutional and the re-organisation of the King’s authority is of popular demand. In this paper, Arshīd focuses on the reform of the state, not the King himself. The Hawks demand more than the Doves: they are not willing to accept partial change, such as changing the election law or the government policies. This position has remained dominant with the Hawks since the Israel peace treaty was signed.

At present, variations in members’ opinions have grown increasingly disparate, and the Brotherhood’s views towards numerous issues are varying further based on these differences, which are increasing beyond traditional differences of the Hawks and Doves. These changes can be understood through the details of al-Mashūkhī interview, who, unlike al-Gharāyah or Arshīd, did not only criticise the government and the state, but went further to criticise the regime itself, naming King ³Abdallah II as the reason and source for the problems of the country.

Al-Mashūkhī represents a well-respected, popular leadership, not only within the Brotherhood, but also on the ground, where he collected most of his votes into parliament from younger Brotherhood members and those from refugee camps, particularly in Zarqa. Due to his more challenging experiences with the Jordanian regime, he became known as one of the leaders of the Hawks. Al-Mashūkhī claims

“King ʿAbdallah jailed me twice.” Evidently, al-Mashūkhī directly blames King ʿAbdallah II for his arrest after visiting al-Zarqawi’s family in 2006. Al-Mashūkhī is not just a popular leader, but also represents a generation of the Brotherhood who joined an al-Shuyūkh base in Jordan and fought in the Karameh battle, asserting him as a strong believer in the Palestinian cause.

Al-Mashūkhī’s respect in the movement is not due to his position as former parliamentarian only, but also to his contributions to society, such as his effort in the distribution of charities, and his work with the Islamic Charity Centre in the Zarqa refugee camp. He also influenced Islamists in his area when he convinced al-Albani, along with other Brotherhood members, to leave Damascus and move to Zarqa in the 1980s. In explaining why he opposes King ʿAbdallah II, al-Mashūkhī makes a comparison between King ʿAbdallah II and his father King Hussein, arguing that the new King opposed the policies of his father and changed the path of the state towards confrontation with the Brotherhood directly. He said, “King Hussein assimilated the Muslim Brotherhood, and kept an open line [of communication] with us personally,” in contrast to King ʿAbdallah II who cut all lines with the movement once empowered. He continues, suggesting that King ʿAbdallah II fights Islamists under the guise of fighting terrorism, with:

When [King ʿAbdallah II] fights terrorism, he actually fights Islamists, and he does not appoint anyone who is religious for high positions in the state, despite their qualifications. He confirms that [the regime] stole the Islamic Charity Center to break [Muslim Brotherhood’s] relations with the society.

He stresses that the King works constantly to secularise the country. In this he is convinced that King ʿAbdallah II utilises all tools targeting the ‘nationalisation’ of the Muslim Brotherhood properties such as the Islamic Centre, and introducing changes to the country’s laws to guarantee the limitation of the movement’s activities by all means in order to keep it under control. By doing so, there is no space or

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133 Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan.
134 This controversial event refers to al-Mashūkhī visiting the funeral of al-Zarqawi in 2006.
135 Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan.
136 Al-Mashūkhī refers here to the government’s decision to dissolve the board of directors of the Islamic Center.
opportunity for the Brotherhood to be part of any union with the Jordanian regime. However, one of al-Mashûkhî’s main points of comparison between the late King and his son is the lack of meetings offered to the Brotherhood since King ʿAbdallah II’s accession. For example, when asked about the effort made by the Brotherhood to meet the succeeding King, al-Mashûkhî mentioned an attempt in 2008 to reconcile with King ʿAbdallah II when the movement requested a meeting with the Royal Hashemite Court Chief, Basem Awadallah. The answer received from Awadallah was “As long as I exist in this post, this meeting will not happen.” This sent a clear message to the Brotherhood that they are unwelcome in the Royal Court, emphasising the Brotherhood’s feelings of alienation.

He also added that there are no Islamist personalities in King ʿAbdallah’s counsel to offer advice on the movement or Islamic matters. Through this he understands the King is not interested in an Islamist opinion. When asked about a possibility or chance of reconciliation with the King, al-Mashûkhî said “It’s too late; the gap between the Brotherhood and the regime is too big.” He continued with, “King ʿAbdallah is not assimilating the Muslim Brotherhood … We are in need now of a regime which respects the rights of humans”. Therefore, al-Mashûkhî cuts any kind of future reconciliation with the regime and is no longer willing to participate in politics. I suggested reforms such as changes in the election law, government, and even constitutional changes which may affect the King’s powers, in order to introduce the possibility of good intentions between the regime and the Brotherhood, and yet his answer was repeated, “It's too late, the gap is too big.” This position reflects a deep frustration and disappointment that he may share with many members of the Hawks, resulting in the severance of all kinds of communication with state politics.

Al-Mashûkhî believes the regime can no longer respond to the country’s problems, arguing that the King is the sole reason for the current political and economic situation in Jordan. Dangerously, he adds that he does not see any value in the continuation of King ʿAbdallah’s power, stating that:

King ʿAbdallah is not prepared and he has never prepared for ruling Jordan. He was

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137 Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashûkhî, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan.
138 Ibid.
brought up outside and was suddenly put in power, he is not of us, and he was not
brought up to be a King. On the contrary, Prince Hamzah was the one who was
brought up in our culture and our tradition, which qualifies him as the most worthy to
become a King.\textsuperscript{139}

Despite carrying these views against King ʕAbdallah II and his powers, he still
has high regard for the Hashemite royalty and speaks of Prince al-Hassan with great
respect, describing him as an ideal model for King, as well as Prince Hamzah.

These shocking statements addressing the regime as a cause for state
fragmentation forms a new narrative for analysing the Brotherhood. The case of al-
Mashūkhī is an alarm for a new division within the Brotherhood and indicates the
growth of a new kind of Brotherhood. These same opinions can be found among those
who do not value political participation after what they claimed to be a fraudulent
election controlled by the state; those who consider themselves victims of state policies
and regime confrontation; and those who considered the normalisation of relations
with Israel to be a betrayal against the Jordanian people. Both the Hawks and Doves
have reached the conclusion that they are in direct conflict with the government or
regime, but neither demands the severance of connection with the regime despite the
Hawks’ attempt to boycott the elections and demanding constitutional changes.
However, the Hawks’ boycott is a tactical move, as part of a strategy led by Zakī bin
Arshīd, to loudly express dissatisfaction with the current situation and to apply
pressure for political reform in the country. Leaders on the other side of the divided
Hawks, such as al-Mashūkhī, directly call for the Brotherhood’s renouncement from
politics, and to continue the boycott indefinitely.

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid; Prince Hamzah bin al Hussein was Crown Prince 1999-2004, and half-brother of King
ʕAbdallah II.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflicting Issues</th>
<th>Doves</th>
<th>Hawks</th>
<th>New Hawks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The King / regime</strong></td>
<td>Do not criticise or mention • Retain loyalty</td>
<td>Mention with reservation • Retain diplomacy</td>
<td>Criticise freely • Declare war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
<td>Problems / confrontation in procedural matters</td>
<td>State confrontation: alternative to address regime indirectly</td>
<td>Royal family to find new king</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reform</strong></td>
<td>Government is not interested in current reform. The King is necessary for reform.</td>
<td>Change constitutional powers: power to parliament. Then participate in election</td>
<td>Impossible with current King</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participation</strong></td>
<td>Pro-participation. Involvement with parliament allows Brotherhood to contribute</td>
<td>Conditional: reforms in political process, constitution, and election laws</td>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Conflicting Issues within the Brotherhood

The above statements made by Hawks leaders realise the formation of a new group led by popular leaders such as al-Mashūkhī. This new sub-group can be associated more with the Salafist movement than the Brotherhood. As explained earlier, the Salafists are similar to the Brotherhood in that they both call for the return to the Qurʾan and Sunnah as the only possible social and private guidance yet the Salafists, unlike the Brotherhood, reject any possible adaptations of Islam into current politics. Therefore, the Salafists do not accept the Brotherhood’s practices in forming political parties, running for elections, and participating in government. The main difference between the Salafist movement and the Muslim Brotherhood is fundamentally political. Due to this, the new Hawks are more likely to be associated with the Salafists than the Brotherhood. However, there are also significant differences between the two in that the new Hawks’ preserved attachment to al-Banna theology and teachings, conversely to Salafism. This unique mix of Salafist and Brotherhood beliefs appears to create a new, extremist wing within the Hawks: the ‘new’ Hawks, or, the ‘Salafist Brotherhood’.
Salafist Brotherhood

Despite following the teachings of al-Banna, the Salafist Brotherhood differ further from the Muslim Brotherhood, as they do not believe in the gradual change al-Banna preached, and they are not willing to participate in politics, nor in government, as they do not believe slow development is viable to create an Islamic State in Jordan. Disagreement and division within the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the previously mentioned transitions of the movement led to a rise in Salafist orientation.

The issue of a new wing within the movement mirroring Salafism is not dangerous in itself, as the Salafist movement in general is peaceful, calling for social reforms, opposing ethical and religious corruption, and emphasising close adherence to the model of the Salaf. In contrast, the peaceful Salafist can be more supportive to the regime, because if Salafists believe that the regime is Islamic and applying Shari'ah, then the rule forbids opposition to it and enforces acceptance of the monarch’s orders. However, the issue in Jordan is that the current Salafist movements are mostly condemning the regime for its Western orientation and relations with Israel, and furthermore they do not see any actual application of Islam. On that basis, and with recent events such as the war in Iraq, and the continued occupation of Palestine, the Salafist movement has turned into Jihadist Salafists, with the belief that Islamic changes come through jihad and violence. Jordan is one of the countries that incubates Jihadist Salafists in the region and world through a generation of Jordanians such as al-Maqdisi, abū Kutada, and al-Zarqawi, who are the main references for Jihadist Salafists.¹⁴⁰

As long as Salafists remained free from jihadist encouragement they were of benefit to the regime. However, the case in Jordan has developed into the Salafists opposing the regime’s Western polices. Harbouring this extreme version of Salafism within the country, and there being a new, frustrated, wing within the Brotherhood, which could potentially become jihadist, we may see an impact on the Muslim Brotherhood’s whole politics, especially when popular leaders such as al-Mashūkhī are involved and gaining more popularity amongst the youth.

This transformation in the Jordanian Brotherhood’s ideology implies the

importance of maintaining moderation in both sects of the Brotherhood through political participation, as both the Doves and Hawks had generally shared a belief in political participation and cooperation with the regime. If this had been maintained by the regime, the leaders of the Brotherhood could have influenced the movement’s fundamental beliefs with the possibility of gradual Islamic change by working from within the state system and through formal political channels, thus encouraging mediation, understanding, and democracy rather than pushing members of the Brotherhood into an increasingly extreme position. If that route had appeared to be successful, then a peaceful change may have gradually taken place and the Salafist movement could have been inspired to approach the Brotherhood with a Brotherhood Salafist rather than Salafist Brotherhood.

The engagement of Islamists in a time of rising jihadist fundamentalism could have been an opportunity and an efficient tool in the hands of the state to fight radicalisation and the call for extreme change. If the regime had not marginalised the Islamists, especially the Brotherhood, through lack of effort in integrating them into political life, they could have influenced into acceptance of the regime and political participation.

Within Brotherhood ideology, Qutb’s ideas are still used and viable, despite many efforts to limit his influence, as seen in Hasan Huḍaybī’s book Doah Du‘āh Lā Quḍāh [Preachers not Judges], the ideas of al-Ḥākimīyah, Jahiliyyah and al-‘Aṣabah al-Mu‘minah which are still alive among the Salafists, Jihadist Salafists, and the Brotherhood themselves.

These ideas are still used to mobilise and recruit new members for extreme methods of change, and to judge Takfīr individuals and regimes as infidels, for the purpose of creating the Islamic state. Therefore, with many attempts to reinterpret Qutb and many arguments about the misinterpretation of Qutb’s thoughts, he is still present in the mind of the Islamist. Although the Muslim Brotherhood has prioritised participation over confrontation with the Jordanian regime in some eras, this is clearly not sustainable. In the situation today, in which both wings of the Brotherhood consider themselves to be in confrontation with the regime, Qutbian ideology could be revived and utilised by more extremist Brotherhood members such as al-Mashūkhī, in order to mobilise further extremism against the regime.

Al-Mashūkhī said, “I am not a fan of the Brotherhood’s ideology. I am a fan of
its way of achieving change and reform.”

Therefore, when the Brotherhood and its ideology become insufficient in responding to vital changes, and when the Brotherhood’s alternative, Salafism, is not enough to make changes in Jordan, Jihadist Salafism proves to have a stronger presence and be more attractive to the Islamists who do not believe in participation anymore, as seen with the situation in Zarqa city. The Doves leader, al-Gharāybah, said:

Fighting the internal powers inside any country in the third world is a Western policy. It is based on creating an internal enemy and drives the public to worry and make their internal enemy a priority of internal affairs. There is nothing weaker than a society that is fighting itself.

This means communication between the Brotherhood and the regime is a necessity now in order to stop further radicalisation, and only with the Brotherhood’s participation can the regime limit fundamentalism in Jordan and guarantee further stability in the country. The reasons that led to a crisis with the Brotherhood are the same reasons creating a clearing for the developing Salafist movement in Jordan. Failing to answer the question of Palestine or deal with political freedom violations and the Brotherhood’s participation has led to the growth of an alternative body of Islamists creating another path in a situation where they feel attacked or undermined by the regime.

The debate over the King and Brotherhood’s relationship turned from being an issue between the Hawks and Doves, to a debate among the Hawks themselves, who reached radicalised conclusions of how to address the regime within a revolutionary rhetoric. The development of which has raised the alarm that what went wrong between the Brotherhood and regime could result in a national disaster. Addressing the developing Salafist phenomenon within the Brotherhood, and working towards reconciliation rather than the perpetuation of conflict, would protect the country from potential backlash from this radical sub-wing.

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141 Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan.
Conclusion
Since its establishment seventy years ago by the first General Supervisor, ‘Abd al-Latif Abū Qūrah, the Muslim Brotherhood has been searching for a way to apply an agenda of political Islam in Jordanian politics, but without success. By evaluating the Muslim Brotherhood’s experience in Jordan, and its application of political Islam within the political system, it is clear that the question of whether the Brotherhood is compatible with parliamentary politics cannot be answered with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Rather, the answer balances on a myriad of variations caused by the Brotherhood’s disparate ideologies that are both compatible and incompatible with the parliamentary system due to differing backgrounds, beliefs, and experiences of Brotherhood members.

The main division of the Brotherhood historically occurs between the ideologies of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, realised in the respective Hawks and Doves divisions, which do not share the same understandings of political participation. Al-Banna sought political participation as a means to develop an Islamic state, whereas Qutb had different ideas for applying Islam that assumed a non-participation stance. These disparities have caused a clear point of division between a moderate, politically active Brotherhood, and one that is more radical.

Although al-Banna’s methods of gradual societal reform were historically standardised in the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, this research argues that there are more Brotherhood groups steadily turning against al-Banna’s approach, and towards alternative, even radical ideologies in light of the Brotherhood’s political alienation in Jordan. This transition in the Brotherhood’s trajectory has shifted it from its adaptable and compatible position towards the Jordanian parliamentary system to working against it outside of political accountability.

An important element in understanding the Jordanian Brotherhood is in acknowledging why its original trajectory positioned the movement as loyal to al-Banna’s methods and loyal to the Jordanian regime. The Brotherhood adapted to Jordan’s political environment using al-Banna’s practice of political participation only because the regime was ready to accept the movement wholly. This is to say that if the Jordanian Brotherhood had faced a regime such as Nasser’s in Egypt, it would most likely have adopted Qutb’s ideology, which throws into question the credibility and motivation of the Brotherhood’s adaptation to democracy in Jordan, and how they would manage democracy if they came to power.

Therefore, despite the fact that the movement may have appeared democratic in its former political participation in Jordan, and its application of democratic
elements within its internal Shoura Council elections, the Brotherhood has latently fostered scholarly and ideological backings that do not accept democracy and could easily drive them into dictatorship, as indicated with ‘new’ Hawks, which this study has called the ‘Salafist Brotherhood.’

The failure of the Brotherhood to implement a recognisable Islamic agenda in Jordan is linked to a general failure of the application of political Islam across the Islamic world today. As there is not a unanimous international, or even national, understanding of political Islam, how it should interact with concepts such as democracy and parliament is still contentious and contradictory of al-Hākimīya and Shoura. This means that the compatibility of Islamic movements to parliament or democracy will remain at the discretion of Islamic personalities, scholars, and the leaders of the movements’ internal wings as to whether they are imposing reform and modern understandings of political Islam, or whether they reject the modern state system and democracy as contradictions of Islam.

Findings

This study presented a history and analysis of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood contextualised within five main chapters, beginning with its establishment period from 1921 to 1954, followed by the Brotherhood’s entrance into political life and the peak in Brotherhood-regime relations from 1955 to 1988; both periods are seen as an era of alliance between the Brotherhood and the regime. The second stage in this relationship is demarked as a crisis period from 1989 to 1997, followed by the Brotherhood’s first boycott and its internal divisions that occurred between 1997 and 2003, concluding with a radicalisation period of 2004 – 2010 and the movement’s concluding political boycott.

Building on these five chronological divisions, the research sought to answer five corresponding sub-questions in order to ascertain if the Muslim Brotherhood is compatible with Jordan’s modern political system. Juxtaposing specific questions against the outlined alliance and crisis periods enabled the researcher to deduce the behaviours and patterns regarding the Brotherhood’s participation in politics, and with the regime.

The first question this study posited was how the Brotherhood’s relationship

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766 See Appendix 1: Glossary.
with the regime evolved parallel to Jordan’s transformation from an emirate in 1921 to an independent monarchy in 1946. This good relationship between the Jordanian Brotherhood and regime was formed largely because King ʻAbdallah I claimed that the Hashemite family directly descends from the Prophet Muḥammad, which drew a line of common interest with the Brotherhood. In 1945, King ʻAbdallah I opened the Muslim Brotherhood Headquarter in Amman, marking the beginning of a forty-year alliance with the Hashemite monarchy.

During this time each found in the other a source of legitimacy, and communalities in religion and Palestine, where they were both using Jordan as a platform for Palestine’s liberation, initiating mergers with the West Bank, and entering the 1948 war together as an alliance.

The events surrounding the Baghdad Pact, and the Arabisation of the Arab Army moved the Brotherhood into a wider role in politics in 1956, driven by confrontation with the UK in Jordan. This presented the second question of what the conditions of the Brotherhood’s re-entrance into political life were within the period of 1955 – 1988.

The two deciding factors that brought the Brotherhood into politics was the Brotherhood’s loyalty to King Hussein, who was facing confrontation with the Leftists and Nationalists, and the Brotherhood’s own distrust of these emerging parties. The secularist trend of the Leftist movement, which contradicted the Brotherhood’s goal of implying Islamic reform in Jordan, was the main reason for the Brotherhood to ally with King ʻAbdallah I, who they viewed as an Islamic personality, habitually supporting the Brotherhood’s bids to imply Islamic reforms. This caused both the Qutbist and al-Bannaist divisions within the Brotherhood to support the regime’s mission to oust the Leftists, who, if they reached power, would be in direct confrontation with the Brotherhood anyway, as they would not imply any Islamic agenda.

Furthermore, the Leftists ran the risk of copying Nasser, who was in the process of crystallising his ideology of pan-Arabism, which in its own view, was against the Brotherhood. Therefore, fearing the Brotherhood’s destiny in Egypt, and the demise of their goal of Islamic reform, the Brotherhood chose the regime over the Leftists and Nationalists due to their communalities in understanding the Palestinian issue and Islam.

Although the Jordanian Brotherhood entered politics pragmatically to protect
the interests of the movement, its ties with the regime were significantly strengthened, and the Brotherhood was later seen as loyalist, working to avert national crises such as the incident with the Fedayeen. Therefore, during this period, the Brotherhood utilised al-Banna’s model to avoid the Egyptian Brotherhood experience, countering alternative ideologies in Jordan, and monopolising the political environment so they were the only movement implementing tangible changes. During this alliance period the Brotherhood and regime’s unity towards Palestine and the implementation of Islamic values fortified them against conflict, laying the foundations of their alliance on their common enemies.

Soon after this thriving era of alliance the two fell into their own crisis, demarked from 1989 to 1997, giving rise to the third question of why the crisis occurred, and why the Brotherhood then decided to boycott the political process in 1997. The 1989 Habat Nisān event is elemental to this question, marking a turning point in their relations. The uprising began in the south of Jordan, where tribes are typically located, and thus is a traditional source of loyalty to the monarchy. As this loyalty was vital to the King’s success and continuation, he quietened the South’s criticisms against him by recommencing political life in Jordan, calling for elections in 1989. The Brotherhood did not participate in this uprising as involvement would have given the spontaneous event an air of organisation, with the Brotherhood positioned against the regime. Furthermore, during this time there were not reasons enough to enter an uprising that would escalate with the Brotherhood’s involvement, as if it failed, it could later harm the movement and its alliance with the regime.

The regime responded to this as if it were a personal favour, by facilitating the Brotherhood’s successful entrance into the first parliament since 1967, where it also participated in government. However, the success of the Brotherhood threatened the King’s agenda, as he was moving towards implementing peace with Israel and strengthening Jordan’s ties with the West. To counter his miscalculation of fully supporting the Brotherhood, King Hussein then made a series of measures to limit the Brotherhood, including the formation of the one vote system, and signing the peace treaty under the noses of the parliamentary Brotherhood members.

Therefore, this era marks a deviation from the path that the Kingdom was built on in 1946, empowering Qutb’s ideology within the movement, which pushed for boycott and successfully gained it in 1997, in response to the sudden changes in the Brotherhood’s relationship with the regime.
The period from 1998 to 2003 then escalated this crisis, and the Brotherhood’s boycott affected the internal dynamics of the movement. However, the Brotherhood did return to politics at the end of this period, thus posing the fourth question of what the issues were for the Brotherhood to re-participate after its strong statement in 1997, and despite the growing divisions within the movement.

Although the conflict between Palestinian/Jordanian descendants within the movement has always been present, returning the Qutbist element to the movement in the form of boycott created recognisable divisions between members. The conflict was then established in two opposing wings, with the Jordanian al-Bannaist Doves against the Palestinian Qutbist Hawks. In this sense, the Muslim Brotherhood reflected societal divisions as well as ideological differences, which could then be transferred onto a public platform, due to King Hussein reneging on the understanding he had built with the Brotherhood over the Palestinian issue by pursuing peace with Israel.

The transition in the Jordanian regime’s attitude towards Palestine was furthered when King ʻAbdallah II came to power, as he immediately exiled a strong Palestinian element from Jordan – Hamas – placing the movement and regime in another confrontation. Furthermore, the new King’s economic vision and complacency over political reform was demonstrated in the suspension of the 2001 parliament during the hostile environment of 9/11. The General Supervisor, ʻAbd al-Majīd Dhunaybāt, of the Doves wing, led the Brotherhood back into parliament in 2003 despite internal disagreements, to demonstrate its modernity and continued prioritisation in al-Banna’s model rather than Qutb’s, and to bar the King from using the movement’s non-participation against them in this new environment.

Therefore, similar to their 1956 participation, when the Brotherhood was led by the Doves’ ʻAbd al-Laṭīf Abū Qūrah the Brotherhood participated in politics in 2003 not because they accepted or believed in Jordan’s political system or the new King, but rather as a necessity to protect their own survival, and in this case, to protect them against negative associations of political Islam in the 9/11 era since participation became the standard to differentiate between moderate and non-moderate Islamic movements in the post 9/11 era.

Therein, the final era from 2004 to 2010 accounts for the breakdown of this tepid attempt at re-integrating into a political system that the Brotherhood had renounced. This period posits the fifth and final question of how the Salafist movement affected the Brotherhood-regime relationship, and the Brotherhood’s political
participation.

The study utilised the city of Zarqa as a case model to refer to the growth of Islamist ideologies in Jordan competing with the Muslim Brotherhood, especially since the Brotherhood’s al-Banna model has failed to achieve tangible changes towards a more Islamic Jordan, or towards a Palestinian solution. Due to this failure, Jordan since 1989 has developed a body of radical Islamists who use Islam and violence to initiate change, as seen with ʻAbdallah ʻAzzām, and abū Musab al-Zarqawi, who was responsible for the Amman Bombing in 2005, and the exportation of the ideology into Iraq.

Therefore, the modernity of the movement became central to differentiate between it and the Salafists. The Brotherhood participated in the 2007 election to make these differences clearer, however, winning just six seats caused the Brotherhood to claim the election was fraudulent. Whether true or not, by not achieving seats in that parliament, the Qutbists of the movement were empowered, obtaining leadership within the Shoura Council and initiating a new stage in the movement’s history by declaring an indefinite boycott of elections thereafter.

However, further than this account of an increasingly Qutbist Brotherhood, the study presented a stronger influence for the Salafists within the movement, who have created a third wing – the Salafist Brotherhood – which opposes not only the parliamentary system and democratic procedures in Jordan, but also the monarch’s power and legitimacy. This has caused the Brotherhood to lose any ‘modernity’, as well as its compatibility with Jordan’s parliamentary system. As merely a sum of its parts, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has thus become one of the most radical movements in the country today, capriciously opposing the regime whilst not being accountable.

The Dynamics of the Crisis

The precarious dynamics of the Brotherhood-regime relationship is the main reason for the Brotherhood’s transformation, empowering a Qutbist ideology that calls for boycott and resolute stances against the parliamentary system. Within the context of a changing relationship with the regime, and with close analysis of the two monarchs of the crisis era, this study identified three respective points of crisis.

The three moments of crisis during King Hussein’s rule, initially coercing the
Brotherhood into its radicalised position, consisted firstly of the King’s intention to enter peace with Israel by dissolving the government that the Muslim Brotherhood was part of in order to attend the Madrid Peace Conference; secondly the introduction of the one vote system that the Brotherhood considered a tactic to limit the movement; and finally, signing the *Wadi Arabah* peace treaty whilst the Brotherhood was in parliament.

The Brotherhood responded to King Hussein’s changes by adapting a stronger agenda towards Palestine, strengthening its ties with Hamas, and pushing leaders supporting Hamas into higher positions, such as Zakī bin Arshīd and Sālim Falāḥāt, and finally, by boycotting the 1997 election.

King ʿAbdallah II furthered the confrontation through an additional three decisions. He firstly denied all communication with the movement at the outset of his reign, and secondly adopted an anti-Hamas agenda, which accelerated its crisis with the Brotherhood. The final event was the supposed ‘fraudulent’ election, which epitomised this crisis. The regime’s extreme path in dealing with the Brotherhood was mirrored in the radicalisation of the movement to boycott, turning the movement from a moderate participant into a negative, and even radical, alienated opposition.

The Brotherhood therefore lost their political footing within King ʿAbdallah II’s reign, and so focused their reaction in protests by joining the Palestinian Intifada in 2000 to declare their rejection of the King’s policies towards Israel and Hamas, finally declaring an indefinite boycott in 2010.

Although these six developments are easily identifiable as turning points for the Brotherhood, further latent contexts within these monarchs’ rule cannot be overlooked. Whilst these issues are not the sole actions of the monarchs, they occurred due to a deviation in the understandings of the communalities on which the Brotherhood built its alliance with the regime, such as the Palestinian issue and societal reform, giving way to the Salafist Brotherhood.

The Palestinian issue is central to the Brotherhood’s driving ethos, particularly as the West Bank was once part of Jordan and thus the Palestinian identity is very much merged with the Jordanian identity, causing a sense of strong responsibility and loyalty to the Palestinian issue among members of the Brotherhood. This relationship can, however, be terse, as Jordanian descendants typically fear an increased Palestinian majority in parliament, while the Palestinian descendants fear that their citizenship could be undermined or even revoked by a nationalistic agenda. The Palestinians’ fear
has pushed them towards the Muslim Brotherhood, which is identified as a well-established organisational body positing Palestinian rights as central to its ideology, supporting resistance as an ethos, and claiming that Palestine is an Islamic issue rather than an independent nation’s, whilst condemning the Israeli occupation and settlements.

These attributes resulted in the Brotherhood’s popularity on the Jordanian streets, bonding them to the Palestinian identity, refugee camps, and Jordanian descendants. Prior to the Madrid Peace Conference, the regime and Brotherhood were united in understanding the Palestinian issue, which engendered cooperation and alliance between the two when faced with wars with Israel or the Fedayeen. Since the Madrid Peace Conference, however, their understandings changed, leaving the previous alliance with no mutual ground or understanding, and significant distrust due to the normalisation of relations with Israel, and the regime’s exile of Hamas. Therefore, the clash of descent denies Jordan a fully representational parliament, as the regime protects Jordanian descendants by laws that guarantee their majority, and the Palestinians vote for the Islamists, as they are the only option representing Palestinian rights in Jordan and keeping the question of Palestine alive.

The second issue of political reform in Jordan is subject to the Palestinian–Jordanian dilemma, as it could lead to an identity imbalance between Jordanian descendants and Palestinian descendants, which has deterred reform from ever taking place. Thus, the Brotherhood’s demands of political reform are not going to be met by the regime whilst the issue of descent is maintained. This will also maintain the Brotherhood-regime crisis, as the question of Palestine is a concern for both parties, eventually resulting in further radicalisation of the Brotherhood’s dealing of the political process, turning the boycott from a strategy into a status quo.

Therefore, the struggle of reform also stems from the bifurcation of the Brotherhood pushing for political reform, and the King pushing for economic reform. Although the movement’s objectives were organically political, such as reversing the one vote system, and encouraging freedom of expression and freedom for political parties to function without hindrance, King ⁷Abdallah II’s agenda naturally eclipsed that of the Muslim Brothers.

The failure to address political reform and Palestinians in Jordan gave rise to radical voices and the return of Qutbists in the Brotherhood, who share many understandings with the Salafists. The attraction of this movement to Brotherhood
members is that the burgeoning Salafists represent an alternative way of dealing with the regime closer to that of Qutb’s ideology, where the application of Islam is paramount, and members do not compromise Islam with the regime.

The Salafist Brotherhood phenomenon that the study highlights is symptomatic of the crisis of the Brotherhood-regime relationship, and a reflection of the Brotherhood lacking a unified understanding of the state, the application of Islam, the Palestinian issue, or reform. Therefore the study argued that in these unstable conditions, other Islamic movements in Jordan, such as the emerging Salafists, easily inspire Brotherhood members to shift from the al-Banna path to extreme alternatives.

This is seen in the outcomes of the interviewees of this research, whose experiences have since reflected the Brotherhood’s internal crisis. After the interviews were conducted, the leader of the Doves, Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, was exiled by the movement due to his leniency towards the regime, while Zakī bin Arshīd, the head of the Hawks, is on trial due to his criticism of the country’s foreign affairs and relations with neighbouring countries. This means the Brotherhood will be led into a new stage in Jordan by emerging Salafist Brotherhood personalities such as Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī. This emphasises the findings of this study that a further division within the Brotherhood is becoming empowered, and that al-Mashūkhī will lead the movement into a new stage in Jordan with an increasingly radicalised agenda towards the regime.

What if the Muslim Brotherhood came to Power in Jordan?

Up until 2010, studies of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan have centred on the uniqueness of the movement’s relationship with the regime, in stark contrast with the Egyptian Brotherhood and other Islamic groups in the region such as Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Salafists, who have poor relations with their governments and regimes. The unique case of the Jordanian Brotherhood demonstrates Jordan’s ability to integrate Islamist movements in modern state politics.

However, the current situation has revealed the Brotherhood to be radical and unstable, and combined with the events that the Arab World is experiencing, the perception that reconciliation between the Brotherhood and regime is even possible has been challenged. Attempts by the regime in Jordan to marginalise the Muslim Brotherhood through election violations, laws against the Brotherhood, limiting its participation in political life, and neglecting its reasons for boycott broke the balance
that King ʿAbdallāh I and King Husseinz had maintained, resulting in the Jordanian Brotherhood now being considered one of the most radical groups in Jordan.

King ʿAbdallāh II forced the movement into the streets after closing the door on political reform, and now wings within the movement are calling for constitutional reforms that touch even the King’s powers. Yet the recent security approach that the government has begun to use against the protesters has caused them to retreat into more conservative and potentially radical positions as demonstrated by abū Fāris’ *Fatwa* encouraging protests against the government, claiming that “if any of [the protesters] die he or she will go to heaven and [the security forces] to hell.”

This reveals that the Brotherhood-regime relations had been more than unstable – that they were built on the foundations of the Brotherhood’s fear from the regime’s ability to prohibit it, and when this fear was realised, the underlying crisis within the Brotherhood became public. Therefore, the Brotherhood’s apparent modernisation in accepting the regime was not a choice, nor a unique collaboration between a regime and Islamic movement, but in fact an obligation for the Brotherhood’s survival, inspiring the question, ‘What if the Muslim Brotherhood came to power, and what would Jordan look like under the Brotherhood’s rule?’

Because King ʿAbdallāh I and King Husseinz embraced the Brotherhood during the early stages of Jordan’s formation, the Brotherhood prioritised the ideology and methods of al-Banna rather than Qutb. Therefore, its alliance with the regime was the only factor moving the Brotherhood away from initiating drastic change that Qutb advocated. Therefore, as established, the Brotherhood prioritised the ideology of its liberal wing for the sake of pragmatism only, whilst still holding from within Qutbīst ideology that rejects democracy.

The Brotherhood’s division into three wings – Doves, Hawks, and Salafist Brotherhood – that this study presented, demonstrates that the Brotherhood is split between three separate leaderships who control the actions of the Brotherhood separately, based on each leaders’ interests and personal understandings/relationship to the regime, rather than a comprehensive decision-making process. Therefore, if the

Brotherhood came to power within the existing parliamentary system in Jordan, the King would have to appoint one of the leadership of the movement as a Prime Minister. Since these three wings are different in the applications of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, power would be subject to the views and interests of the leader of the wing that would be selected.

To clarify, if the majority in the Shoura Council consisted of the Doves, it is likely that Raḥīl al-Gharāybah would be chosen as Prime Minister, and if the majority were with the Hawks, Zakī bin Arshād would be chosen. Al-Gharāybah and Arshād’s agendas would differ in issues regarding the constitution, charity and education, economy, security, foreign affairs, and Hamas.

Al-Gharāybah, for example, would maintain the constitutional power of the King, due to his loyalty and the Doves’ belief in a Jordanian trajectory for the movement. Conversely, Arshād would push for a constitutional monarchy, challenging the power of the King to create a stronger parliament to maintain it as a stepping-stone for creating change.

Furthermore, al-Gharāybah would empower Islamic change and charity distribution through state institutions such as the Awqāf and development ministries, and would focus on education to present Islamic changes through the state curriculum, creating a generation of Jordanians whose education is more adaptable to the Brotherhood. The Hawks, as led by Arshād, would also invest in education, however, they would also push for the distribution of charity to be increasingly independent from the state by empowering Islamic NGOs and associations such as the Brotherhood’s Islamic Centre, which arguably has more experience and scope than the government. This means that independent institutions would work with the state in order to reach wider demographics, rather than the state monopolising limited charity distribution through the Awqāf or development ministries.

The Muslim Brotherhood in general has no economic plans or solutions to Jordan’s problems, meaning that the Doves’ al-Gharāybah would maintain King ʿAbdallah II’s economic agenda and initiatives, whilst pushing for further integration of Islamic economic institutions such as Islamic banks and schools. Arshād, on the other hand, would try to implement the Muslim Brotherhood’s economic management, which showed success in individual Brotherhood projects, such as the Islamic Bank, Islamic Hospital, and the Islamic Centre, to use the Brotherhood’s skills within his government to create change.
Furthermore, security (police, army, intelligence, etc.) and foreign affairs traditionally fall under the King’s jurisdiction, therefore the Doves would not attempt to change the security situation, keeping this issue in the sole custody of the monarch. However, the Hawks would call for a constitutional monarchy, which would empower the Prime Minister in matters of security and foreign affairs; therefore, the Hawks would change the security department leadership to civilian leadership to ensure that it does not challenge the movement or its authority on security decisions.

In regards to foreign affairs, the key issue would be the peace treaty with Israel, and as explained, while the Hawks and Doves currently oppose the treaty from their external position, the Brotherhood would respect the treaty if they came to power. However, in a situation, for example, where Gaza was attacked by Israel, the Hawks’ support for Hamas would not stop at public speeches and condemnations of Israel, but the hypothetical leadership would facilitate Hamas as much as possible whilst outwardly respecting the treaty to avoid confrontation with Israel.

Therefore, while the Doves stay true to al-Banna’s theory of gradual Islamic change, and wish to maintain Jordan’s democratic process and the King’s powers as they stand today, the Hawks’ perceive obtaining power as a transitional act. If they were to reach government, the Hawks would keep Jordan’s democratic entities, but would adjust them according to their objectives. This maintains the possibility that the Hawks would create dictatorship and theocracy in the name of democracy if they were to achieve total power, and eventually abandon democracy to establish the Islamic state based on Qutb’s ideology.

However, differences within the Brotherhood become more extreme when addressing the Salafist Brotherhood, who, like the Hawks, push for a constitutional monarchy and control over the security department, but also push for constitutional changes to a stronger application of Islam, trying to make the Qur'an and Sunnah the sole reference for state legislation. Furthermore, while the Doves and Hawks might allow alliances and power share with other political parties – liberals or leftists – the Salafist Brotherhood would only ally with other Islamic movements. In this sense, it would not be surprising if the Salafist Brotherhood would obligate Zakat as a form of tax upon Jordanians, and making Jordan theocratic rather than parliamentary.

The Salafist Brotherhood would also compromise the stability of the country, as they would publically reject the peace treaty with Israel. Therefore, the question of what the Muslim Brotherhood would do if they came to power is problematic, and
more associated with the decisions of the individual leaders and wings, and how they view the Islamic state in Jordan; since they are divided in their opinions there is not an absolute answer, which maintains the Brotherhood as an unstable political force within the Jordanian political system.

Therefore, to avoid a possible scenario where the Hawks and the Salafist Brotherhood obtain power, King ʿAbdallah II must acknowledge this threat of an unstable Brotherhood, rather than marginalising it. By allowing limited participation, and empowering leaders such as al-Gharāybah, the regime would be able to encourage modernisation and political participation within the movement. By engaging loyal leaders, such as the Doves, within the system, the King would calm voices such as al-Mashūkhī’s, which call for extreme changes in his authority.

What Should the Regime Do?

The research conducted in this thesis suggests that there are two imperative ways in which the regime can forestall further radicalism of the Brotherhood in Jordan. The first suggestion is to implement internal reforms on the laws the Brotherhood opposes, i.e. the election law, the distribution of seats in each constituency, and the assurance of free, immunised, political expression of party members. Secondly, regional reform of the relationship with Hamas, whose acceptance in Jordan would result in support for the regime from the Brotherhood, Islamists, and their followers. Although Hamas is considered a terrorist organisation by the US, re-opening its media office in Jordan would facilitate minimal, controlled, relations with the movement, reconciling the regime’s pro-Western policy with internal demands.

By involving the Brotherhood in politics, they would be implicated in the running of the country, and the inevitable problems governments experience therein. This means that the Brotherhood would not be able to place sole blame on the regime for every problem encountered, as they would also be responsible for the country and people. By giving this responsibility, the ‘holy’ image is also removed from the movement’s actors, rendering them accountable politicians. This is to say that when in power, if one fails to provide answers for the people’s needs and the political problems one faces, then that actor will be responsible for his/her actions and decisions as an accountable human, rather than an elusive representative of Islam, and politically empowered Brothers would be viewed differently at the grass roots.
The contrast is that exclusion from politics and decision-making results in empowered popularity as he/she can argue that those in power are not Islamic, their solutions fail as they are not built on Islamic ground, and that they therefore do not represent the people’s faith. To summarise, exclusion from politics results in the religious empowerment of the Brotherhood outside of governance, who can hide behind religious screens, whilst inclusion results in the accountability of its members.

This study has demonstrated that the Brotherhood’s fragmentation was caused by its crisis in relations with the regime, and losing its officiated footing within Jordan. Although there are demonstrable reasons for the regime to continue its disregard of the Brotherhood, particularly since there has been a rise in Salafist voices within the Brotherhood, its stance towards the movement is clearly unsustainable as it is increasingly alienating the Brotherhood and pushing it towards extreme rhetoric. Therefore, a level of diplomacy adopted by the regime may calm the dissenting voices, and bring the Brotherhood back under control, as seen successfully during King 6Abdallah I’s reign, and the early years of King Hussein’s. The proposition is that in highly religious countries such as Jordan, there must be the opportunity and reason for Islamist groups to participate in politics, only achievable after tangible changes in the regime’s attitude towards the Islamists have been demonstrated. Therefore, the primary step in repairing the political environment in the country is to re-open channels of communication with the Brotherhood, and an impartial acknowledgement of it.

Dealing with the movement should be on the basis that they are Jordanian first, and with a meaningful message to reform state politics. Furthermore, integration and empowerment of the Doves could be used as a tangible tool against Takfir, or any groups that justify violence for change. Therefore, the movement works with its ideology as Islamic, and its agenda as reform – politically and religiously – to prove the existence of the state of Jordan and the continuation of its regime.

What Should the Muslim Brotherhood do?

Despite the criticism it receives, and its current situation with the regime, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s path into politics and communications with the regime became a positive example for Brotherhoods internationally, which copy the model of the Jordanian Brotherhood when initiating political involvement. In tracing the Brotherhood’s steps, they establish a political wing of their group, as seen with the
Egyptian Brotherhood’s *Hizb al-Hurriyah wa-al-‘Adlāh* [Freedom and Justice Party], followed by establishing a social wing, which focuses on charity, education, and aid. Finally, they participate in political elections to join the parliament, and thus represent the people and Islamic reform, through a civil democratic system.

The Brotherhood’s main contribution is in changing the meaning of political Islam, declaring that it participates for the sake of politics rather than chasing power. Although it claims to have the ability to win more seats, it limits its presence in parliament by proposing fewer candidates so as to not intimidate the government, demonstrating that having a valued voice is prioritised over obtaining a majority, or pursuing power.

However, despite the Brotherhood’s attempts at assuring their Jordanian agenda, they have further to go in successfully proving it. The threat of an Alternative State is real, and occupies a space in the minds of Jordanian people and the regime. Therefore, professing a heavily Palestinian-orientated agenda in Jordan may harm the Brotherhood more than benefit it as of late. However, electing Jordanian descendants as leaders of the Brotherhood is not enough to reassure Jordanian citizens. A gradual but evident transition of charitable work towards more Jordanian locations, such as establishing health centres in villages and cities with higher Jordanian-descent populations, is one way to reassure Jordanians, and therefore reconnect Jordanian and Palestinian descendants who are looking increasingly divided. Moreover, assurance that the Jordanian Brotherhood exerts full structural and managerial independence from the Egyptian mother movement and Palestinian Hamas would regain the people’s confidence in the Brotherhood as a fully ‘Jordanian’ movement.

The slow response of the regime to the Brotherhood’s needs may in turn harm the regime in the near future. The Brotherhood’s demands will accelerate, inevitably calling for a new leadership to implement real political reform, as already seen with the Salafist Brotherhood who were formed from the Brotherhood’s alienation. Partial reform of the election process – not the election law itself – indicates a half-hearted, or even false, reform, serving the interests of the regime’s image as a Westernised, reformist regime. This false image can be best highlighted in the contrast between the country’s economic liberation and political limitations. State policy should be directed towards meeting people’s expectations of political reform for the sake of the survival and continuation of the Hashemite regime.

Jordan is at the brink of a crisis. The identity division between Jordanian and
Palestinian descendants, combined with the rise of Jihadist Salafist groups, ought to be acknowledged as serious and palpable threats to the country. The crises in refugee camps, which are mostly occupied by Palestinian descendants, should no longer be thought of as only developmental and economic, but also should be recognised as a breeding ground for Qutbian ideology, where the seeds of extremism are thriving. Reform is necessary to extinguish this fire before it consumes the country, but such reform is only possible with full cooperation between the regime and the Brotherhood.

However, their relationship exists in an undistinguished, grey area. By not asserting a clear stance of either opposition or alliance to and with one another, they create confusion and an unstable environment for Jordan. The persistent dilemma of the regime and Brotherhood prioritising their own separate survivals is unsustainable. In order to survive each must direct attention away from itself, and prioritise Jordan and its people’s survival as of paramount importance. Ultimately, this study showed that the consequences for the regime’s stance against political Islam, reform, and the Muslim Brotherhood, is leading to the further destabilisation of Jordan, mirrored in the Brotherhood’s boycott of the national political system.

Limitations and Further Study

Through an historical approach, this study utilises a timeline that divides the history of the Brotherhood in Jordan into five periods. Firstly, from 1941 to 1953, the study deals with the establishment of the movement and its ideological development. Secondly, the period of 1954 to 1987 is explored, crystallising the role of the Brotherhood within politics and its ‘marriage of convenience’ with the regime. Thirdly, the study looks to the subsequent crisis between the Brotherhood and regime between 1988 and 1995, and fourthly, the participation, boycott, and internal divisions within the movement that occurred between 1996 and 2003. The final fifth section in the study’s timeline deals with the period between 2004 and 2010, presenting the effects of the Salafist movement upon the Jordanian Brotherhood, and how the movement developed its stances into a final and indefinite boycott. Through this historical approach, the study was able to investigate the Brotherhood and explore how this dynamic informed the political survival of the Brotherhood in Jordan.

Furthermore, the methodology of this study also relies upon personal interviews to reach an understanding of members’ key historical stances that have
effected the Brotherhood’s current situation in relation to the regime. However, during the field-work for this study in 2012, it became apparent that the Arab Spring’s volatile and unpredictable environment may have resulted in limitations for the study, causing Brotherhood members to be reluctant to answer questions pertaining to their position in Jordan, and regionally, at that time.

The 2011 Arab Spring saw the sudden rise of regional branches of the Brotherhood, as in Egypt and Tunisia, only to fall just as suddenly soon after. Jordanians had taken to the streets in protest of the regime and its reforms, sister movements of the movement had been banned, and members executed. In 2012, during this highly chaotic period with the regime, asking Jordanian Brotherhood members what their personal views of the regime and Jordanian politics were would have called for direct confrontation, potentially asking them to incriminate themselves either with their own movement, or with the regime. Any response would have been conditional, biased, or shackled by the situation, and thus unreliable for use in this paper. Furthermore, the chances of actually securing interviews with an angle on the current situation would have proven unlikely, and the researcher may have risked blacklisting himself as intelligence. Therefore, the sensitivity of this period directly affected the possibility of obtaining valuable interviews. Personalities such as Abū Bakr, the speaker of the Brotherhood, and Kūfaḥī, withdrew from the study and other leaders cancelled their appointments before beginning the interview process.

However, as the main purpose of this research was to gain understanding of the Brotherhood’s relationship with the regime, the researcher had to find an alternative route around this markedly unpredictable period. By stopping the study in 2010, the researcher was able to freely interview Brotherhood members on historical events, using an historical analysis to project current and future actions, whilst fulfilling the study’s purpose of pin-pointing the regime and Brotherhood’s conflicting relations. Using 2010 as a natural end point, the researcher was able to circumvent the regional chaos and create a clear timeline of how the Brotherhood reached its 2010 crisis, revealing the movement’s patterns of attitudes, stances, and ideologies, and thus predict its next moves.

Further limitations of this study derive from the lack of written materials by the Brotherhood itself regarding its politics, stances, and actions generally and during key events. Although some leaders, such as Ḥamzah Mašūr and Ishāq Aḥmad Farḥān, issued books regarding the Brotherhood’s political experience in the parliament in
1988, these are not comprehensive, nor reliable, enough to determine an answer to specific questions regarding the Brotherhood’s development. However, interviews from leaders and decision-makers of the movement were crucial in understanding the Brotherhood’s actions.

There are further limitations pertaining to written materials in Jordan, as records of the 1970 war and the 1988 Habat Nisān event do not exist. For example, the Jordanian University archive, which is considered to be the oldest archive in Jordan, has no records for the 1988 events, and the main newspapers, al-Rai and al-Dostor, do not have any records in their archives that report these events at the time of their occurrences. Due to this lack of written materials, it is a necessity that any researcher of this movement must contact the Brotherhood directly for interviews and information, whilst also relying on secondary sources for the history of key events in Jordan.

Despite these limitations, with primary and secondary sources and rich interviews, this study provides a new understanding of how and why the relationship between the Jordanian Brotherhood and the regime has transformed. The originality of this thesis comes from the methodological framework that it employs, following the role of the Brotherhood in main political events that the country experienced, looking to the transformation of the Brotherhood in each stage of its development, and the subsequent development of its pragmatic approaches to deal with each event and crisis. This study provides an original lens through which to understand and analyse the Brotherhood in Jordan, which penetrates the movement as a whole and focuses on the inner organisation of the two wings of the Hawks and Doves. The study thus makes an original contribution by identifying a specific strand of radicalism that is rising within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafist Brotherhood, thus predicting further future fragmentation of the movement. Furthermore, this study is unique in that it provides policy-makers, decision-makers, and academics alike, with a comprehensive analysis and informed prediction of how each Brotherhood division could affect Jordan as a whole if it rose to power in the Brotherhood, or independently.

The study presented the conditions that pushed the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood towards radicalism prior to the Arab Spring - mainly consisting of its internal relations with the regime. However, the Arab Spring, combined with the growing Jihadist Salafism, attacks against Gaza, and most of all the failure of the Brotherhood in Egypt to maintain power, has pressured the Jordanian Brotherhood
regionally, potentially making a space for Qutbist ideology to inform reactions against these regional events. Therefore, the Arab Spring’s regional impact on the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood may be a key question building on this study’s findings.

Furthermore, key future research may address the new developments of the Salafist movement within the era of the Arab Spring, as the Salafist movement in Egypt shadowed the Brotherhood’s political participation by establishing a political party and joining the 2012 election, presenting an interesting study into the possibility of the Jordanian Salafist movement joining the political process. These are areas with considerable potential for further research.

However, there are three specific areas of further study that should be looked at in depth. Firstly, comparing the two riots in 1955 and 1989 against the backdrop of the democratisation process incurred by the Arab Spring in 2010, evaluating the results and the reform’s implications on the regime and Brotherhood. The 1955 riots were politically motivated and led by political actors, whilst the 1989 riots were originally motivated by economic concerns, only to become political later, but without the same amount of political actors involved due to the political parties ban. Studying these two parties and the acceleration of the citizens’ demands can provide understanding for the ways in which Jordanians protest in terms of why and how quickly they can turn against the regime. By making a pattern of analysis for these protests, they can be compared to the Arab Spring phenomenon of protesting in Jordan, and give further understanding to how it began in Jordan and how it will grow, since the Arab Spring merged the two reasons of the 1989 and 1955 protests – politics and economics. These two years can also be compared within the context of the democratisation process incurred by the Arab Spring in 2010, evaluating the results and the reform’s implications on the regime and Brotherhood.

The second suggested area for further research asks how the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in the Arab Spring affect the Jordanian branch, and its participation in the reform protest of 2011. In answering this question, the study would also ask how the empowerment of the Egyptian Brotherhood in 2012 empower the Jordanian Brotherhood and its stances towards the continuation of boycott, as well as questioning the failure of the Egyptian Brotherhood to contain the Jordanian branch, and to retain its political influence in Egypt. The Arab Spring presents a unique scenario in which the Muslim Brotherhood mother movement in Egypt, and one of its branches, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, can be compared and contrasting,
following the mother movement’s effects upon one of its branches in a very linear and obvious way, thus presenting further understanding of the international organisation of the Brotherhood.

The final area for further research is a continuation of this study’s main findings regarding the Salafists of Jordan. This is particularly relevant after the transformation of the Egyptian Salafist movement, where the ideology was given more moderate stances, such as those associated with the Brotherhood, when they formed the political party Hizb al Nur [Al Nur Party], and participated in the 2011 parliamentarian election. This significant transformation of the Salafists’ role opens up a possible discourse or comparison with the Jordanian Salafist movement which is mainly prevalent in the cities of Zarqa and Ma’an. Furthermore, the same ideological transformation and moderate stance towards politics is important to be studied, particularly with the possibility of the Salafists of Jordan participating in politics, and how it could change the share of Brotherhood seats in parliament due to sharing the same agenda. This could be an important step in analysing the possible future of a representative regime and moderate political Islam against extremism.

These areas of potential future study, drawn from 2010 and the Arab Spring in light of the Brotherhood’s final political participation, can be built on this study to provide further understanding for the Muslim Brotherhood and its interaction with the regime. This serves in providing policy-makers with an understanding of Islamic movements in Jordan and how to involve them in the political system, empowering them in a moderated arena, and thus decreasing the possibility for extremism.


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Appendices

Appendix 1: Glossary

The transliteration in this study is based on the Oxford Transliteration System. The researcher has cross-referenced sources in the Stanford Online Library system and WorldCat organisation to ensure correct Arabic to English transliteration, which did not previously exist. Words already existing in English are not transliterated, but for clarification the researcher has supplied fresh translations.

- **Jihad**
  
  *Jihad* is a noun, meaning ‘struggle’ and derives from *juhd*, the verb for ‘effort.’

- **Sunnah**
  
  Representing the actions and words of the Prophet Mohammed. *Sunnah* is a source of legislation created to complete *Qur’anic* ruling, and to explain that which is not in the *Qur’an*.

- **Sharī‘ah**
  
  Direct translation is ‘way’ or ‘road’ and is the divine law for Muslims, building its rules from the *Qur’an* and *Sunnah*.

- **Shourah**
  
  Literally translates as ‘consultation’. Associated with *Majlis al-Shourah* [The Consultation Council]. In Jordan, ‘Shourah Council’ refers to the Parliament, and its legislative powers. The *Shourah* Council within the Muslim Brotherhood refers to the council of elected Brotherhood from branches of the movement. The Executive Council and the General Supervisor of the movement is elected through the *Shourah* Council, and vote for general polices of the movement.

- **Ummah**
  
  *Ummah* literally means Islamic ‘nation’ or community of believers under Islamic rule.

- **Majlis al-Ummah**
  
  In Jordan the *Ummah* is referred to in terms of the House of Representatives, as *Majlis al-Ummah* [the Nation’s Council], which consists of the *Majlis al-‘Ayān* [Senate Council] in the upper chamber of parliament, and *Majlis al-Nuwāb* [Council of Representatives] in the lower chamber. The upper council members are appointed by the King and are half the number of *Majlis al-Nuwāb*. The electorate elects the lower chamber for four-year terms, in which they practice legislative power.

- **Sufism**
  
  *Sufism* is thought of as an Islamic path for Muslims to reach *Haqīqah* [ultimate truth], which is God himself. There are many different scholars of *Sufism*, providing different understandings of how to reach God by following his rules in varying degrees of austerity regarding acts of worship, fasting, nocturnal isolation prayer, and in how one thinks of God. These differences in understandings resulted in different *Turuq* [paths] (plural: *Tarīqah*) of Sufi worship, such as al-Shādhilīyah.
Most Sufists practice Dhiker, which is a form of repeated prayers glorifying god.

- **Al-Tariqah al-Shadhiliyyah**
  Named after its scholar, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhiliyy, a path of Sufism, focuses particularly on the human soul and intention of worshipping. Al-Shadhiliyyah is also considered to be one of the most popular *Turuq* in the Arab World, especially in Egypt, where a generation of Sufi scholars reside, such as ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Ḥasanī, whose application of al-Shadhiliyyah’s Sufism became known as al-Ḥasanīyya-al-Shadhiliyyah. Abd al-Wahhab al-Ḥasanī is considered to be a great influence on Hassan al-Banna, and his Shadhiliyyah teaching became part of the general theology of al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood.

- **Fard**
  An compulsory act for Muslims, such as prayer, if ignored, will result in punishment on the Day of Judgment. *Fard* has two branches 1) *Kefayah*: if some Muslims performed the act or obligation, others are not obligated to do it, however if none do it, it becomes *Fard Ayn*. 2) *Ayn*: every able Muslim is required to do it. For example, *jihad* is *Fard Kefayah* as it is not an obligation upon all Muslims; however, if Islamic land was under threat, *jihad* becomes *Fard Ayn*.

- **ʿUlamāʾ**
  Plural of ʿĀlim, which is an Islamic scholar and philosopher. The ʿʿUlamāʾ represents Islamic theology and is a source of Fatwa [Islamic Rule].

- **Fiqh**
  Translating as religious ‘jurisprudence.’ The ʿʿUlamāʾs (fuquhāʾ) interpretation of the Qurʾan and Sunnah to make laws and Fatwas.

- **Fatwa**
  Islamic ruling: a scholarly opinion on a matter of Islamic law. Fatwa is a law on how to practice or to judge based on Islamic references of the Qurʾan, Sunnah, or the Prophet’s Companions, which are used as examples of how to deal with present-day situations.

- **Salafism (Salafiyyah)**
  A social and religious movement calling for social reforms, opposing ethical and religious corruption, and emphasising close adherence to the model of the Salaf [Predecessors]. The Salafiyyah, like other Islamist groups in the area, calls for the return to the Qurʾan and Sunnah as the only guidance for social and private life.

- **Salaf**
  The ‘predecessors’ were the first generation of Muslims, and the Prophet’s companions, whose actions represent model behaviour for Muslims to follow.

- **Takfīr**
  Commonly the word is translated as ‘infidel’, and derives from Kufr. To proclaim someone a Kāfir is to say he/she is an infidel, an unbeliever. The act of Takfīr, therefore, is to charge someone with Kāfir, which traditional Islam rejects. However, Qutb’s concept of jāhiliyyah [ignorance of pre-Islam], opened the door to Takfīr being used by Muslims against Muslims, which was previously unprecedented. This means passing judgment on other Muslims’ faith and loyalty to Islam. Which is prohibited in
traditional Islam as this would be a personal relationship between an individual Muslim and God.

- **Al-Jāhilīyah**

An era of ‘ignorance’ in polytheistic religions before Islam. Modern Islamists have re-invented this concept to refer to the current political situation in the Islamic world, which they claim is Jāhilīyah due to poor adherence to ‘true’ Islam. Derives from jāhil [ignorance], which represents Arabs’ ethical deviation, and worshipping other deities before Islam, which is not accepted under Islamic laws. Therefore, when entering Islam, one must cut all attachments to his/her previous life. Qutb implied this concept on the present day, claiming that Muslims are lacking the application of Islamic laws and Islamic values in their daily lives.

- **Al-Hākimīyah**

‘The Principle of Divine Governance’ was first brought to attention by al-Mawdūdī and was further developed by Qutb. God is the only ruler and source of legislation and governance of the Islamic state, as outlined in the Qur’ān, and to deviate from his teaching is un-Islamic. For instance, Qutb rejected all laws but god’s laws, calling for the rejection of man-made governance in order to allow divine law to rule.

- **Itālat al-Lisān**

A Jordanian law enacted in 1960 literally translating as ‘Lengthening the Tongue,’ which can be understood as a prohibition of offensive speech against the King and Royal Family. The sentence for breaking this law is from one to three years prison sentence.

- **Caliph & Caliphate**

Caliph directly translates as ‘successor’, referring to the successor of the Islamic state after the death of the Prophet Muhammed in 632 AD. Caliphate is the ruling system of the Caliph.

- **Jam‘iyat al-Markaz al-Islāmī**

The Association of the Islamic Center, established in 1965, is the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s social wing. The Center runs hospitals, schools, orphanages and poverty care, clinics, mosques etc., which are open to the general public.

- **Al-Marāqīb al-‘āmm**

Translates as ‘General Supervisor’ of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. Every branch in every country has a Marāqīb al-‘āmm to supervise the branches’ activities. The Muslim Brotherhood as a transnational movement has a Murshid [Supreme Guide], who is also the leader of the Egyptian Brotherhood.

- **Maktab al-Tanfīdhī**

The ‘Executive Bureau’ of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. The IAF’s Executive Bureau has nine members, and the Brotherhood, six, all of which are appointed through internal Shoura elections.

- **Awqāf**

Plural of Waqf. Directly translates as ‘religious endowments,’ and is the name of ministries that manage religious endowments such as mosques, charities, or other assets that may aid the community.
Al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī al-Iṣtiḥrāʾī

The ‘National Socialist Party’ was established on July 7, 1954, and was led by its Secretary-General Sulaymān al-Nābulusī. The party led the coalition government of 1956 for the first and last time in the Jordan’s history.

Hizb al-Wafd [The Delegation Party]

This party was resultant of the nationalist movement in Egypt that rose up at the end of the First World War. Headed by Saad Zaghloul, the group led the delegation with Reginald Wingate, the British governor of Egypt, to terminate the British occupation. Therefore, the name of the party, al-Wafd, represents the delegations for freedom. However, the ultimate failure of the delegations, and the exile of Zaghloul, led to the 1919 revolt. Thereafter it became the most popular and influential party in Egypt until 1952, when Nasser dissolved all political parties.

Al-Majlis al-Waṭanī al-Iṣtiḥārī

The National Advisory Council: Due to the recognition of the PLO by the Arab league, and the subsequent suspension of parliament in 1974, there was a gap in legislation, in which there was no entity to make new laws. Jordan issued Temporary Law in 1978 in order to establish The National Advisory Council, which would create legislature in the absence of another entity. The council consisted of 61 personalities who were appointed, not elected. The council was unable to question the government, nor ministers. Within this period there were three councils, each occupying two years: April 15, 1978 – January 11, 1984.

Habat Nisān

Translates as ‘April Uprising’ in reference to the 1989 riots in Jordan, which began in Mā‘ān city on April 15, due to changes in fuel prices, and spread throughout the whole country. In response to civilians’ demands, the King dissolved the government responsible and declared the democratisation of the country and return of the parliamentarian life.

Mujāhidīn

Translating as ‘Fighters,’ Mujāhidīn is plural of Mujāhid: the person who acts out jihad. Mujāhid is a person who chooses jihad to defend Islamic land or apply Islamic rules.

Intifada

Intifada, or ‘Uprising’, is a form of spontaneous popular protest. The First Intifada of 1987 started in Gaza and flourished throughout Palestine. The protest began during the funeral of four dead Palestinians in Gaza and turned into clash with the Israeli army. Students of Shaykh Ahmad Yāsīn organised themselves to fight, naming themselves Hamas.

Harakat al-Muqāwamah al-Islāmīyah

Hamas is the commonly used acronym of Harakat al-Muqāwamah al-Islāmīyah [Islamic Resistance Movement]. It is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, established on December 6, 1987, during the first Intifada, by Shaykh Ahmad Yāsīn and uses resistance as an alternative to negotiations. Hamas entered the 2006 Palestinian election for the first time and gained 76 seats out 132. However, Fateh refused to participate in Hamas’ coalition government. Consequently, this led to the Fateh government in the West bank and Hamas in Gaza.

Shu’b

The Shu’b are Branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, each of which constitutes a collection of Usar [circles]. Each Usrah
[singular of Usar] is a group of four to five members, one of which is a Nakib [Captain] who leads the Usrah and speaks on its behalf at Branch meetings. A collective Usar creates the Branch, and the collective Branches create regional Branches and these regional Branches elect internal leaders to run and represent them at the Shoura Council.

- **Wadi Arabah**

  *Wadi Arabah* is the name of the Jordan-Israel Peace treaty, signed on October 26, 1994. The treaty was signed in *Wadi Arabah*, which is located on the southern borders between Jordan and Israel.

- **Al-Islam huwa al-Hall**

  This slogan, ‘Islam is the Solution’, derives from al-Banna’s understanding of Islam, in which he called for the return to Islam as a solution to the ills that had befallen Muslim societies. Independent Egyptian Brotherhood members publicly used the slogan in the election after the administrative court accepted its use on October 17, 2000. The Jordanian Brotherhood entered the elections as independents under the emergency law, but identified themselves by campaigning under unified slogans such as 'Islam is the Solution.' The slogan calls for the refusal of foreign, imported ideologies, and the perseverance with Islam as the only way for Muslims to escape the poverty and backwardness they had reached.

- **The Fedayeen**

  Consisting of Leftists and Nationalist Palestinian fighters from Fateh, jihad, and other militarised Palestinian groups under the PLO’s leadership

- **Shuyūkh Bases**

  Shaykh is singular of Shuyūkh, which, in the Jordanian dialect, refers to leadership of religious background. Al-Shuyūkh resistance bases were formed in Jordan during the 1967 war. These bases consisted of three Brotherhood brigades and operated in Jordan under the leadership of Fateh and Fedayeen. A main brigade representing the Brotherhood in this war was Bayt al-Maqdis led by ʿAbdallah ʿAzzām, which camped in the village Rufaydah.
Appendix 2: Statements of the Muslim Brotherhood

1. To Whom it Interests, this Blind Sedation, June 14, 1970:

There is a hypothesis that all the soldiers of the Jordanian army, true believers and brave, and the guerrilla fighters, honest and brave, agree on a unified goal, which is to liberate the occupied land [of Palestine] by defeating the Zionist enemy. The guerrilla and the army men are all our brothers and sons, same as the Palestinians and the Jordanians, who represent one people and share the same blood and belief.

Why do they fight? Over what do you quarrel? For the sake of whom are they shedding blood and killing?

How, you Muslims, do you tolerate your sons and brothers killing each other? Why good people are not coming forward to fight the sneaky hands, moving in the dark promoting hatred and sedition.

The guerrillas and the army are fighting each other according to the plans of Jews and their agents. These bloody fights must be stopped and we should not return to it.

The weapon, used to kill each other, is paid by the Ummah, which later on will accuse both parties for wasting this money. This weapon should be preserved to kill the enemy: Israel and its allies, America and all others on their horizon.

The fights are triggered by the tribal poor norms and this sedation was provoked by dubious people, whom we are about to point at.

- Cited in: Abū Fāris, Ṣafahāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdūn [Pages from the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 49. This statement has been verified by the researcher at the Ummah Center for Studies on the August 24, 2012.

2. IAF Letter to US President Bill Clinton, October 26, 1994:

Freedom is a sacred basis in your country, and democracy is a way of life in your country and you call on people all over the world to believe in and implement these principles. These are excellent principles, but your actions towards nations and people around the world are in contradiction with these principles: they are totally against freedom and democracy. The CIA and Pentagon will destroy nations and spare no effort in an unbelievable manner, even if it takes all forms of military action, for the sake of keeping countries implementing and following US policies which would only protect American interests... True believers of freedom and democracy would never accept what has happened to the Palestinian people.

Your country, the UK, France and others have supported the Zionists to conquer Palestine and drive 4 million Palestinians out of their homeland for the purpose of settling Jewish groups
from different origins and countries in Palestine. Nowadays, your country is blessing the
leaders of countries in the Arab region to sign peace treaties against the will of their people.
This kind of peace which is patronised by the USA would only be temporary due to the fact
that it is not accepted by the people or goes against their will since it is an unjust and unfair
peace.

• Cited in: “Risālah Maftūḥah ilā al-Ra‘īs al-Amrīkī” [Open Letter to the American
President], October 26, 1994, The Parliamentarians of the Islamic Action Front,
quoted in ‘Amūsh, Maḥāṭṭāt fī Tārīkh Jamā‘at al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdun
[Periods in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 173-178.

Boycott Why Do We Boycott 1997 Election?], July 3, 1997:

The limitations and the distortions, which were introduced by law to the Shoura process over
time, led to the formation of a parliament that represents neither the citizens’ demands, nor the
different social segments of the Jordanian society. Shoura councils are fully administered by
the government and they are adopting all the laws and decisions required by the regime.
Despite the fact that the one vote system being rejected by various popular and social
movements, it was enforced as a permanent law. This demonstrates extreme lack of respect,
with no weight given to the social, non-governmental organizations and political movements.

• “Bayān al-Muqāṭa ‘“ah li-Mādhūh Nuqāṭī’ al-Intikhābāt 1997” [Communiqué of the
Boycott Why Do We Boycott 1997 Election?], Issued on July 3, 1997 accessed May
al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdun [Pages from the Political History of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Jordan], 158.

4. Official Statement in Al-Kifāh: “No to the call for Obscurity”, February 8, 1957:

The Muslim Brotherhood rejected to participate in the government when the position was
offered, and the existing [al-Nābulusī] government is best suited to explain this rejection.
The Muslim Brotherhood said openly and loudly that we would watch the government
closely, supporting the good and liberating steps, and oppose every time the government
deviates from righteousness.
We repeat clearly today, for those who are spreading their poisons amongst our diligent and
aware people, that we are not seeking positions or to be assigned as ministers rather we seek
freedom and the rights of the people, is this understood, you astray [Leftist] people?
5. IAF Letter Addressed to the American Head of Congress, May 14, 1996:

The Middle East is a crucial area for the world due to its resources, and it was for this reason that colonisers continued to intervene in order to control its fortunes. It was stated that the last colonisation took the form of Jewish migration to Palestine, who claimed it was their historical right from thousands of years ago. The letter continued to suggest that if the Israeli claim is to be taken into account, the US should consider claims of the indigenous Native American, whose right to American soil is comparatively only four hundred years old.

- Abū Fāris, Ṣafahāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān [Pages from the Political History of the Brotherhood], 95. This statement has been verified by the researcher at the Ummah Center for Studies on the August 24, 2012.

Appendix 3: Other Statements

1. King Hussein, “Address the Nation”, July 31, 1988:

Citizens, Palestinian brothers in the occupied Palestinian lands, to display any doubts that may arise out of our measures, we assure you that these measures do not mean the abandonment of our national duty, either towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, or towards the Palestinian cause. Nor do they mean a relinquishing our faith in Arab unity. As I have stated, these steps were taken only in response to the wish of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and the prevailing Arab conviction that such measures will contribute to the struggle of the Palestinian people and their glorious uprising. Jordan will continue its support for the steadfastness of the Palestinian people, and their courageous uprising in the occupied Palestinian land, within its capabilities. I have to mention, that when we decided to cancel the Jordanian development plan in the occupied territories, we contacted, at the same time, various friendly governments and international institutions, which had expressed their wish to contribute to the plan, urging them to continue financing development projects in the occupied Palestinian lands, through the relevant Palestinian quarters.


But all of a sudden we discovered the truth about the whole affair and we realized what was happening. It emerged that some groups which have had to do with the bloody events in Syria were actually living in Jordan, hiding behind religious groups and pretending to be adhering to religion. This group has been connected with international organizations based in foreign and Arab and Islamic capitals hatching plots against the Arabs. The group's members were in reality outlaws committing crimes and sowing seeds of dissension among people. I hereby announce that I was quite deceived along with a large section of the Jordanian people by this criminal group. I am pained by what had happened because I am not in the habit of denying the truth or condoning deception. I warn all citizens against the evil designs of this rotten group and urge all citizens to prevent them from implementing their evil plans that aim at causing divisions among Arab ranks and sowing seeds of dissension in our midst through concealing themselves behind religious pretences and through using our religion to achieve their goals. I am confident that the vigilant Jordanian family is capable of exposing the evildoers, deceivers and conjurors and preventing them from achieving their goals. I warn this group which went astray and which abused our trust that it has no room amongst us anymore. We cannot harbor conspirators or deceivers or those who mean to do harm to our nation and we will not allow anybody to sow seeds of dissension between Jordan and any other Arab
country. Anyone who causes harm to our brothers is an enemy of ours.

- The *Jordan Times* was contacted and confirmed the content of the article in the December 2, 2014, but no copies were available. However, the full speech can be found in Satloff, “They Cannot Stop Our Tongues: Islamic Activism in Jordan,” 19-20, and Bar, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 38. The statement has also been verified by the researcher at the Ummah Center for Studies on August 24, 2012.

3. King Hussein, “Uneasy Lies the Head”:

Infiltration by Soviet or U.A.R. influence was directed at several key men in Army and the government. We learned that [ābū Nuwar and Rusheidat] were making regular visits to Damascus and holding meetings with the Soviet military attaché there … Rimawi was a member of the then Neo-Communist *Ba'ath* Party. He and the other Ministers drove regularly to Damascus, especially after important cabinet meetings. They returned the following morning. These three all received money … Altogether these traitors brought well over $300,000 in Jordanian money into the country, some for themselves, some to be used for bribery.
