Right-Wing Refugees and British Politics, 1830-1871

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2016

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the role of right-wing refugees in British politics during the middle years of the nineteenth century, considering the relationships which these refugees established with British politicians, and the difficulties which their multifarious activities created for the makers of British foreign policy. Whereas the contribution of left-wing refugees to British politics and diplomacy during the Victorian era has been considered at length by numerous historians, the relationships which their right-wing counterparts formed with British politicians and the diplomatic concerns which they created have found little attention. This thesis seeks to redress this imbalance by analysing an overlooked but nevertheless important series of networks and controversies in which these exiles became involved during the tumultuous middle years of the nineteenth century.

The study first considers the largely diplomatic implications of the presence of the former Charles X of France and his court in Britain during 1830-32, before turning to the difficulties and opportunities which both the Carlist and Miguelite pretenders and their refugee supporters presented for British governments and politicians alike throughout the 1830s and 1840s. The next three chapters consider the apogee of refugee influence over British politics during the years 1848-50, when the victims of the European revolutions of 1848 intrigued with allies in both Britain and continental Europe alike. The final two chapters then chart the rise of the refugee Orléans branch of the French royal family into highly-regarded political actors, whilst considering the diplomatic implications of their presence in Britain.

This study suggests that whereas left-wing refugees boasted a modest political legacy and provoked several international controversies, those of the right not only enflamed diplomatic dispute but often actively intervened in British high politics. It therefore posits that refugees played a far wider and more important role in nineteenth-century Britain than previously noted.
Contents

Acknowledgements 4
1. Introduction 5
2. A Miserable Emigration? The French Bourbons, 1830-32 27
3. Carlist and Miguelite Refugees, 1832-51 47
4. Conservative Political Networks, 1848-49 91
5. The Whig government and the Exiles, 1848-49 124
6. Dynasty, Government and Conspiracy, 1848-50 147
7. Orléans and Orleanists, 1850-57 167
8. The Orléans in Exile, 1857-71 198
9. Conclusion 239
10. Bibliography 244
Appendix: French and Spanish Royal Family Trees 286
Acknowledgements

In writing such a ‘great work’ (as Thomas Otte was so kind to dub this study), one accumulates a great number of debts. Based as it is on substantial archival research, my grateful thanks go out to those who allowed me to use manuscript material, and their hardworking staff, especially those of the British, French and Czech National Archives, the Royal Archives, the British Library, the Bodleian Library, Somerset History Centre and the University of Southampton Library, where so much of this research took place. The correspondence between Henry Reeve and Francois Guizot is quoted by permission of the syndics of Cambridge University Library. I should like to acknowledge the gracious permission of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II to quote from material in the Royal Archives.

I am incredibly grateful to the School of History at UEA, where I have learnt so much on my academic journey since arriving in Norwich as an undergraduate in the autumn of 2007. My greatest thanks go to my supervisors, Geoff Hicks and Tony Howe, for their encouragement, advice, knowledge, patience and suggested avenues of research.

Finally, this study owes a great deal to the support of my friends and family.
1: Introduction

The Right-Wing Exiles\textsuperscript{1} of the Mid-Nineteenth Century

During the late eighteenth century, and throughout the nineteenth, Britain received innumerable conservative or right-wing refugees. But although the histories of the \textit{émigrés} of the French \textit{ancien régime} and later liberal and radical refugees have been charted, the right-wing refugees of the mid-nineteenth century have been ignored, in spite of their high contemporary profile.\textsuperscript{2} After the French July Revolution of 1830, Charles X and his court fled to Britain; his successor Louis Philippe, along with his court and ministers, most notably François Guizot, made the same journey after another revolution in 1848; and in the flurry of revolutions that followed, the Orleanist exiles were joined by the fallen Austrian Chancellor Prince Metternich and the Prince of Prussia (later Wilhelm I of Germany).\textsuperscript{3}

Others arrived at different junctures. The Spanish pretender Don Carlos sought refuge after military defeat in 1834, only to escape and wage civil war whilst fellow-exiles intrigued in his favour; Carlos’ son Count Montemolin escaped house arrest in France in 1846, to promote his claim to the Spanish throne; and the fallen Portuguese usurper Dom Miguel fled from Rome in 1847 with the hope of exploiting civil war in Portugal. Further French politicians including Adolphe Thiers arrived after President Louis Napoleon’s \textit{coup d’État} in December 1851. Among the most high-profile of these refugees, only the Orléans branch of the French royal family resided in Britain for a decade or more.

Nevertheless, these exiles possessed either the political capital to influence British politicians, or enough support abroad to create diplomatic concerns, or indeed both. One of Charles X’s advisers could have precipitated war with France; Don Carlos’ escape escalated civil conflict in Spain; Dom Miguel’s departure would have

\textsuperscript{1} The words ‘refugee’ and ‘exile’ were used interchangeably.

\textsuperscript{2} i.e. Burrows, Simon, \textit{French Exile Journalism and European Politics, 1792-1814} (Woodbridge, 2000); Carpenter, Kirsty, \textit{Refugees of the French Revolution: The French émigrés in London, 1789-1802} (Basingstoke, 1999); Carpenter, Kirsty and Mansel, Philip (eds.), \textit{The French Émigrés in Europe and the Struggle against Revolution, 1789-1814} (Basingstoke, 1999); Weiner, Margery, \textit{The French Exiles, 1789-1815} (London, 1960); the historiography concerning left-wing refugees is discussed below.

precipitated British military intervention in Portugal and probably the defeat of Lord John Russell’s Whig government; the victims of the Revolutions of 1848 intrigued with British allies; and the Orléans became highly esteemed by British politicians.\(^4\)

Although not a homogeneous community, right-wing refugees were certainly conspicuous. Their actions and ambitions often threatened to create controversy both at Westminster and in the councils of Europe.

The question of which refugees might be considered “right-wing” poses some difficulties. Even the words ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ were rarely used to describe British politicians, who were elected under myriad labels, until the 1830s. The terms right- and left-wing were not applied to British politics until the late 19th century. Yet they were used in relation to French politics, and would have been understood by informed Britons.\(^5\)

Charles X, Metternich, Dom Miguel and Don Carlos can easily be classified as reactionaries or absolutists – opponents of popular government, and thus firmly on the “right”. But although Montemolin \textit{claimed} to be a liberal, appearances can be deceptive. Montemolin’s professions have been dismissed by historians, whereas his radical brother and successor Juan was rejected by the reactionary Carlist movement.\(^6\)

Similarly, although both the Orléans and their supporters retained liberal pretensions, historians have identified the Orléans and their followers as right-wing, and questioned the authenticity of their liberalism.\(^7\) Roger Magraw and Pamela Pilbeam emphasise that the Orléans represented an oligarchic and elitist political system, and Theodore Zeldin suggests that Orleanism in practice and in theory were two very distinct things. Supported by a wealthy, propertied electorate, Louis Philippe’s “liberal” regime soon became somewhat authoritarian and elitist. It has also been described as a ‘failed right-wing experiment’, and even the ostensibly liberal Guizot


\(^7\) i.e. Du Pay de Clinchamps, Philippe, \textit{Le Royalisme} (Paris, 1967); Rémond, René, \textit{The Right wing in France from 1815 to De Gaulle} (Philadelphia, 1969)
dubbed his supporters in the National Assembly the ‘Conservative Party’. Those who fled France in early 1848 were right-wing by the standards of both their contemporaries and later historians.

This distinction is complicated by the role which Orleanists played after 1848. Although they defended the “social order” against the French Second Republic, Orleanists later espoused parliamentary government during the authoritarian regime of Napoleon III, and thereby ‘rediscovered the virtues of liberalism’. Two of Louis Philippe’s sons, the Prince de Joinville and Duc d’Aumale, were thought more liberal than their father, and the ex-King’s grandson the Comte de Paris was considered ‘conscientious, cultivated and liberal’. This was reflected in British perceptions of the refugee princes: Aumale and Paris were considered not to be ‘self-pitying and useless’ pretenders, but ‘duty-minded military men with a surprising streak of democratic idealism.’ However, Thiers, a leading Orleanist, remained ‘on the right’ as well a ‘prominent liberal’, and Orleanist conceptions of parliamentary government were anathema to the Republican left, which ‘had no wish to copy’ Britain’s aristocratic constitution. Orleanism became simultaneously liberal and right-wing, and in the French National Assembly elected in February 1871, the Orleanists, including Aumale and Joinville, composed the centre-right, which advocated ‘conservative institutions’ to resist ‘the rising flood of democracy’. Although Paris appeared to be one of the first ‘socialist millionaires in the early 1870s’, he became known as an ambitious opportunist, and his second exile from France after 1886 owed much to burgeoning conservative support. Appearances notwithstanding, the Orléans and their supporters were right-wing by French standards.

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9 Rémond, *Right Wing*, p.149


13 Zeldin, *Passions*, p.423-4
The reverse could be applied when considering another refugee, the fallen Spanish Regent General Espartero, who arrived in Britain in 1843. In practice, Espartero’s rule could be considered conservative, and even authoritarian. But Espartero was a partisan Progresista – a party regarded as ‘radicals’ or ‘liberals’ in Britain, whose Moderado counterparts provided an ‘alternative to either exaggerated liberalism or royalism’. Furthermore, some Moderados were otherwise ‘akin’ to the absolutist Carlists were it not for their loyalty to Queen Isabella II. In terms of party politics, the position which Espartero occupied was that of a liberal.

Even more complicated is how to classify Louis Napoleon, French President (1848-52) and Emperor (1852-70), a refugee in Britain during the 1830s, 1840s and 1870s. Although the historian René Rémond identified Bonapartism as a right-wing ideology, those who professed loyalty to the Bonapartes represented all shades of opinion, albeit with ‘core’ principles ‘based almost exclusively on an interpretation of’ the first Napoleon’s achievements. Louis Napoleon himself cooperated with conservatives during his presidency, and simultaneously identified himself as a ‘Socialist’. Perhaps it would be most accurate to posit that Louis Napoleon almost defies ideological classification, a quality which, in conjunction with the historiographical attention his life has attracted, excludes him from this study.

Not all right-wing refugees left a mark upon British politics. Judah P. Benjamin, the former Secretary of State of the Confederate States of America who fled to Britain, instead practised law. Benjamin’s dramatic escape to the Bahamas occasioned a dispatch from the Governor, which was subsequently sent to the Foreign Office with the intimation that Benjamin would seek asylum in Britain. But despite this concern, Benjamin, who remained ‘a conservative’, abandoned politics, aside from writing a ‘weekly leader on international affairs’ for the Daily Telegraph. For this reason, he too falls beyond consideration.

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16 Hazareesingh, Sudhir, From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French Democracy (Princeton, 1998), pp.31-36; Plessis, Alain, The Rise and Fall of the Second Empire (Cambridge, 1985), p.54
The same applies to the Carlist General Ramon Cabrera. Renowned for both military
genius and extreme cruelty, Cabrera resided in Britain from 1849 until his death in
1877. It was widely supposed that his marriage to the heiress Marianne Richards in
1850 ‘civilised’ him, and they settled into a peaceful married life with the approval of
her family. However, the refugee General had been so vital to Carlist operations that
he often attracted speculation.\textsuperscript{18} When the Carlist sympathiser Lord John Manners
entered the Cabinet in 1852, the Catholic \textit{Tablet} reported that this had irked the
Spanish government, for Manners had been Best Man at Cabrera’s wedding.\textsuperscript{19} \textit{The
Times} often conjectured about Cabrera’s involvement in unsuccessful uprisings, and
when a Spanish revolution seemed likely in 1865, one senior Carlist asked Cabrera
what he would do, a matter of the highest importance.\textsuperscript{20}

Yet Cabrera’s presence appears never to have attracted a formal protest; and rumours
that Britain supported his fellow-exile the Carlist pretender Juan were summarily
dismissed. By September 1860, certain Spanish Ministers thought that Juan was
‘favoured’ by Britain. Although the story was ‘so preposterous’ that the British
\textit{Chargé d’Affaires} in Madrid thought it ‘almost an act of folly’ to report, to assuage
Spanish concerns, he sought confirmation that it was nonsense.\textsuperscript{21} This was a rare
exception to Spanish disinterest in exile activity after the 1840s, and whilst Cabrera
corresponded with Juan’s son and successor “Carlos VII”, he eventually pledged
loyalty to the Spanish crown.\textsuperscript{22} Exiles who avoided controversy unsurprisingly
created little diplomatic contention.

\textbf{Refugees, Asylum and British Law}

During the nineteenth century, Britain hosted innumerable refugees, and as Bernard
Gainer notes, ‘England’s tradition of asylum was an old one.’\textsuperscript{23} Although all ‘aliens’

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\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{19}] \textit{Tablet}, 20 March 1852
\item[\textsuperscript{20}] \textit{Times}, 24 January 1855; 2 June 1855; 14 April 1860; 26 September 1868; Princess Beira to Marianne Cabrera, 8 December 1865, OC10548
\item[\textsuperscript{21}] R. Edwards to Lord Russell, 18 September 1860, FO 72/984/120
\item[\textsuperscript{22}] Holt, \textit{Carlist Wars}, pp.227-30, 239-40, 264-65
\item[\textsuperscript{23}] Gainer, Bernard, \textit{The Alien Invasion} (London, 1972), p.2
\end{itemize}
were banished from England in 1155 and Jews were banished *en masse* in 1290, over the proceeding centuries, migrants largely came to be welcomed, so long as their presence provided an economic benefit.\(^{24}\) By the late 16\(^{th}\) century, hospitality to foreign refugees was considered a tradition, as religious migration to Britain became increasingly common.\(^{25}\) A pledge of support from King James I is regarded as a turning-point in the history of toleration of these migrants.\(^{26}\) From 1657, Jews were again admitted, and after 1685, England ‘opened her doors wide’ to the French Protestant *Huguenots*.\(^{27}\) It is interesting to note that the word ‘refugee’ – derived from the French *réfugié* – entered the English lexicon as a result of the sympathy which they found.\(^{28}\) German Protestants were similarly welcomed to settle in England from the reign of Edward VI onwards, attracted by economic opportunities and political freedoms.\(^{29}\)

These migrants could become the subject of suspicion and jealousy; during times of distress, attempts were made to restrict their employment, and they were sometimes treated as potential foreign spies as well as economic competitors.\(^{30}\) But by the turn of the eighteenth century, the right to enter Britain was rarely contested, an attitude which was bolstered by the *laissez-faire* economics which prevailed in the nineteenth.\(^{31}\) Political tradition and economic orthodoxy dictated that foreigners could enter Britain as and when they wished.

As Bernard Porter notes, in nineteenth-century Britain, the term ‘refugee’ covered ‘a multitude of situations’. Deposed monarchs and royalists, the ‘remnants of revolutionary armies’ and escaped prisoners were all granted asylum; and from 1823 until the end of the nineteenth century, Britain did not expel a single refugee. Whilst refugees in France were subject to innumerable controls, foreigners could freely reside in Britain, and ‘Aliens Acts’ allowing their deportation were only imposed when Britain appeared vulnerable to foreign subversion, amidst war with France in 1793, and revolutionary turmoil throughout Europe in 1848. During the periods 1826-

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\(^{25}\) Ibid., pp.36-7  
\(^{27}\) Roche, *Key in the Lock*, p.45  
\(^{28}\) Cottret, *Huguenots*, p.2  
\(^{29}\) Panyani, Panikos (ed.), *Germans in Britain since 1500* (London, 1996), pp.4-5, 32-34  
\(^{31}\) Roche, *Key in the Lock*, p.56
48 and 1850-1905, British governments had no power to expel refugees, and nobody was deported under the 1848 Act’s terms.\textsuperscript{32}

Objections to controlling entry and exit were also based upon practical grounds. It was then possible to use passports issued by foreign governments, and before the genesis of photographic identification, travel under another’s name. One ground for the rejection of the compulsory use of passports for entry into Britain was that it could not prevent refugees from intriguing or even waging war abroad. When the matter was debated by the Commons in March 1851, both the Conservative Lord Mahon and the Whig Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston commented upon how the easy acquisition of foreign passports had allowed two right-wing refugees - Don Carlos and the Duchesse de Berri – to leave Britain and lead violent uprisings. Rather than consider introducing stringent passport controls, MPs rejected effective intervention as impossible when diplomatic missions could issue passports as they pleased.\textsuperscript{33}

Some British laws did affect foreigners alone. Under legislation concerning the ‘Registration of Aliens’, upon landing in Britain, ‘numbers, names and occupations of foreign passengers’ had to be reported to the local authorities. Captains were fined £10 per passenger for failing to do so under the 1793 Aliens Act, raised to £20 in 1836.\textsuperscript{34} According to one Immigration Officer-cum-historian, the latter regime represented the nadir of British attempts to control immigration.\textsuperscript{35} While the entry and exit of aliens was subject to few regulations, refugees’ activities, which threatened to undermine Britain’s foreign relations, sometimes rendered them liable to surveillance. Until a scandal erupted over the opening and sharing of the Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini’s correspondence with Austria in 1844, the Home and Foreign Offices occasionally connived to open refugees’ letters on behalf of foreign governments. The morally questionable nature of this practice, which undermined the

\textsuperscript{33} Hansard, 20 March 1851, cxv, cc.223-26
\textsuperscript{35} Roche, Key in the Lock, pp.4-6
right of refugees to undertake political activity, ensured that it was rarely used, and quickly abandoned.36

In addition, foreigners could not own land or hold Crown Offices until 1871. As Aumale’s secretary acidly recalled, a foreigner could ‘enjoy the liberties of the English constitution, but English soil is withheld from him’.37 These stipulations could be evaded; in 1852, Coutts’ bank purchased the Twickenham mansion Orléans House on Aumale’s behalf.38 But when the respected Belgian diplomat Sylvain Van der Weyer protested about being unable to purchase property in 1864, the law remained. According to Palmerston, by then Prime Minister, the ‘possession of land’ was ‘the source of some political influence’, and should remain in British hands. Otherwise, British politics would be left open to foreign interference, especially during elections.39 Property ownership’s place at the heart of politics ensured that this law elicited strong responses on both sides.

Nevertheless, refugees enjoyed a great deal of freedom in Britain. Although some abused their asylum, it could not be effectively stopped, and so insignificant was surveillance upon refugees that during the 1850s, it was dominated by a sole detective named John Sanders.40 This approach reflected both Britain’s aversion to the growth of government security apparatus and the refugee’s right to British liberties, and foreign requests to tighten such legislation were habitually refused. Many European governments felt vulnerable to ‘revolutionary subversion’, and these complaints were usually groundless.41

Such liberality was not motivated by generosity alone; as Porter notes, the 1793 Aliens Act was ‘casually dismantled’ in 1826 because it was considered a sop to absolutist governments.42 It took a refugee plot of great significance to make a British government pursue a stronger line. In early 1858, an Italian refugee named Felice Orsini left Britain for France, and armed with British-made bombs, he killed eight

37 Porter, Refugee Question, p.4; Laugel, Auguste, England, Political and Social (New York, 1874), p.94
38 See chapter 7.
39 Palmerston to Lord Westbury (copy), 20 February 1864, Broadlands Papers (hereafter, ‘BP’), PP/LB/162
40 Porter, Refugee Question, p.117, pp.151-59
41 Ibid., pp.46-48
42 Ibid., p.134, p.71
people and wounded 142 in an attempt to assassinate Napoleon III. This plot to murder a vital partner alarmed Palmerston’s government, but its attempt to make Conspiracy to Murder a felony in response was resoundingly defeated, albeit in a vote heavily influenced by party politics.\textsuperscript{43} Although refugee plots were a diplomatic liability, British liberties were not considered worth sacrificing.

Only later in the century did attitudes change. Whereas the Aliens Acts of 1793 and 1848 had sought to exclude ‘spies, subversives, agitators and fanatics’, the nature of immigration to Britain changed as the nineteenth century wore on. As economic migration became increasingly common, so did opposition to it, especially on the ‘radical right’.\textsuperscript{44} By 1890, the Conservative predilection for protectionism and Liberal support for free trade had crystallised into opposing views on the right of entry, and in 1905, Arthur Balfour’s disintegrating Unionist government passed a new Aliens Act. The new law targeted those deemed ‘undesirable’, and represented a first attempt to ‘permanently restrict immigration’, its illiberalism and ‘rank prejudices’ in deep contrast to earlier attitudes.\textsuperscript{45} Although the Liberal administration charged with its enforcement did so unenthusiastically, the Act’s harshness and the prior transformation of public opinion have attracted significant attention. As Jill Pellew noted in 1989, ‘much of its story’ has already been told.\textsuperscript{46} The same is not true of the conservatives who fled to Britain in the middle years of the nineteenth century.

**The Historiographical Context**

Numerous studies have considered the experience of liberal and revolutionary refugees in nineteenth century Britain. Karl Marx’s exile has been the subject of substantial scholarship, Mazzini’s correspondence with the Ashurst family was published in the early 1920s, as was a study of French radical refugees, and these works were complemented in mid-century by several works considering left-wing refugees and their British sympathisers.\textsuperscript{47} Further important works have appeared

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p.6; Hicks, Geoffrey, *Peace War and Party Politics: The Conservatives and Europe, 1846-59* (Manchester, 2007), pp.176-77
\textsuperscript{44} Glover, David, *Literature, Immigration and Diaspora in fin-de-siècle England* (Cambridge, 2012), ch.3
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., pp.1-4; Gainer, *Alien Invasion*, p.144
since 1979. That year saw the publication of Porter’s study of the ‘Refugee
Question’, which provides the sole monograph overview of the problem which
refugees posed for British politicians during the mid-nineteenth century, and Thomas
Kabdebdo’s study of the Hungarian ‘diplomat in exile’ Francis Pulszky, which
highlights the difficulties even liberal refugees had influencing elite politicians. The
various refugee communities and their British supporters have since found further
consideration.

Much ink, then, has been expended about refugees of the broad left. But with a few
exceptions, notably the art collector and historian Aumale, and the conspiring French
Bourbons, conservatives’ experiences of exile - let alone their relationships with
British politics - have often been dismissed. Judith Cromwell’s biography of the
Russian intriguer Princess Lieven, who also fled Paris in 1848, only briefly mentions
her hopes to split Russell’s government; and John Charmley, another recent
biographer of Lieven, essentially concluded his study at 1840. Yet Lieven remained
politically active into the 1850s, and even acted as an Anglo-Russian intermediary
during the Crimean War. Metternich’s most recent biographer merely noted the
fallen Chancellor’s continued interest in politics, while Guizot omitted his exile from
his memoirs. Ostensibly removed from positions of influence, their activities in
exile were assumed to be of less interest - or in Guizot’s case, a regrettable coda to his
career.

Rollin après 1848, et les Proscrits Français en Angleterre (Paris, 1921); Rudman, Harry W., Italian
Nationalism and English Letters (London, 1940); Wicks, M.C., The Italian Exiles in London, 1816-
1848 (Manchester, 1937); Carr, E.H., The Romantic Exiles (Harmondsworth, 1949)

Kabdebdo, Thomas, Diplomat in Exile (Boulder, 1979)
i.e. Ashton, Rosemary, Little Germany (Oxford, 1986); Finn, Margot, After Chartism: Class and
Nation in English Radical Politics, 1848-1874 (Cambridge, 1993); Freitag, Sabine (ed.), Exiles from
European Revolutions: Refugees in Mid-Victorian England (Oxford, 2003); Jones, T.C., French
Republican Exiles in Britain, 1848-1870 (PhD Thesis, Cambridge University, 2010); Bantman,

Cazelles, Raymond, Le Duc d’Aumale (Paris, 1984) is the most complete biography; his artistic
interests are considered in Woerth, Eric, Le Duc d’Aumale: l’étonnant Destin d’un Prince
Proscrit (Paris, 1967), Beach, V.W., Charles X of France (Boulder, 1971), Bertier de Sauvigny, G.A.
(ed.), La Conspiration des Légitimistes et de la Duchesse de Berry contre Louis-Philippe, 1830-1832
(Paris, 1951). Berri has numerous biographers.

Cromwell, Judith, Dorothea Lieven (London, 2007), pp.229-31; Charmley, John, The Princess and
the Politicians: Sex, Intrigue and Diplomacy, 1812-40 (London, 2005)

Thomas, D.H., ‘Princess Lieven’s Last Diplomatic Confrontation’, International History Review 5:4
(1983)

Siemann, Wolfram, Metternich: Staatsmann zwischen Restauration und Moderne (Munich, 2010),
pp.110-11; Guizot, François, Mémoires pour servir à l’Histoire de mon Temps (8 Vols., Paris, 1872)

Recent publications suggest a shift in focus. Exiled royalty were the subject of a collection of essays in 2011, and further recent essays have briefly considered the French royalty who resided in Britain after 1789, impressionistically charted Dom Miguel’s British sojourn, analysed Disraeli’s friendship with Metternich, and concluded that the Orléans’ experience of revolution deeply affected Queen Victoria.\footnote{Mehrkens, Heidi, ‘The Politics of Waiting: The Imperial couple, Napoleon III and Eugenie’, Mansel, Philip and Torsten, Riote (eds.), *Monarchy and Exile: The Politics of Legitimacy from Marie de Médicis to Wilhelm II* (Basingstoke, 2011); Mansel, ‘Courts in exile: Bourbons, Bonapartes and...} This trend is reflected in a few standalone works. Palmerston’s apparent...
preoccupation with exile influence over the *Times* during 1848-49 has been charted by Lawrence Fenton, albeit with little explanation; the Comte de Paris’ diaries of his service during the American Civil War have been edited and published; Sylvie Aprile has devoted a chapter of her study of French refugees to royalty; and Wolfram Siemann has considered Metternich’s relationship with Britain. 58 Albeit in a scattered and sometimes impressionistic fashion, historians have begun to reconsider right-wing refugees’ multifarious activities.

The wider historiography also suggests that right-wing refugees found support and influence. The adventurer William Bollaert’s 1870 memoirs allude to the intrigues of Carlist refugees, especially the financier Moritz von Haber, and Lord John Manners’ biographer acknowledged the Tory MP’s zealous support for Montemolin. But these stories have been plotted skeletally, and in Bollaert’s case, from memory long after. Although Haber’s relationship with Disraeli has interested the latter’s biographers, they have not considered Haber in his own right. 59 Only in connection with the lives of others have these refugees’ activities found some consideration.

Those who arrived in 1848 found rather more recognition. Metternich’s letters to Disraeli were utilised by his biographers, and Metternich’s correspondence with the Tory politician Lord Aberdeen about Disraeli’s prospects was considered by M.E. Chamberlain. 60 Metternich’s correspondence in exile was also utilised in a study of his relationship with Hungary. 61 However, these exiles’ activities remain under-analysed. Although both Chamberlain and E. Jones Parry considered Aberdeen’s interest in the Orléans’ ambitions, and David Brown utilised Aberdeen’s

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correspondence with Guizot in his biography of Palmerston, Aberdeen’s relationship with the refugee Guizot remains largely unexplored. A published selection of their correspondence includes little from this period. Because the political historian finds more interest in their subject’s career, these exiles have been relegated to the role of supporting characters.

When Osbert Wyndham Hewett charted Lady Waldegrave’s rise as a political hostess, he paid little attention to her cooperation with the Orléans aside from her initial efforts, and thereafter largely cast them as a nuisance to his subject. Conversely, in emphasising the cosmopolitan nature of aristocratic politics, K.D. Reynolds acknowledged Waldegrave’s links with the Orléans, and Lieven’s with the Russian court. The wider historiography thus suggests that right-wing refugees found both support and influence, often as a result of their presence in elite social circles. This prompts the question of what role right-wing refugees - who inhabited the same exclusive social circles as British politicians - played in British politics.

Diplomatic histories similarly suggest that these exiles’ activities influenced the course of British politics. Although Porter claims that ‘refugees were hardly an issue’ during the 1830s and 1840s, both Chamberlain and Robert Franklin have considered the difficulties of granting asylum to the fleeing Charles X, whilst chapters in two further studies have analysed the public response to the French Bourbons during 1830-32. But the impact which their presence (or even the 1832 rebellion in the Vendée, led by Charles’s daughter-in-law Berri) had upon Anglo-French relations remains unexplored. Other right-wing refugees certainly concerned British diplomats. Edgar Holt emphasised this in briefly charting Don Carlos’ exile, and Roger Bullen’s intensive study of the splintering Anglo-French *entente* during 1846-48 reveals both

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Palmerston’s concerns about Montemolin and interest in him as an ally against French ambitions in Spain.66

However, these are insights within wider surveys, and other studies prompt further questions. While Roy Austensten notes that the refugee Metternich continued to correspond with Austrian politicians and diplomats, historians have often simply accepted or dismissed wild opinions which Palmerston promoted about the exiles of 1848; that they formed part of a vast conspiracy against him, or that Louis Napoleon’s 1851 coup d’état was a justified response to the Orléans’ apparent plots.67 Palmerston was not alone in at least ostensibly fearing exile ambitions. The possibility of Orléans Princes reigning in Mexico, Greece, Spain and France all concerned British diplomats and politicians.68 These exiles’ ambitions all found British attention, often at critical diplomatic junctures. However, their contribution to British political history has been overlooked as a whole, and is therefore scattered, recorded in little detail without being given any consideration as a subject in its own right.

This study seeks to build upon the existing, fragmentary research which has offered a glimpse into the experience of right-wing refugees in British politics during the mid-nineteenth century. It does not seek, as previous studies of refugees in Victorian Britain have done, to chart the history of a migrant community. Rather, its object is to explore the multifarious impact which right-wing refugees had upon British politics, as an influence upon British contemporaries and as a diplomatic problem for successive British governments.

Such a work is needed to counterbalance the attention given to left-wing refugees and economic migrants in the history of nineteenth-century Britain. This study seeks to

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66 Holt, Carlist Wars, ch.5; Bullen, Entente, ch.8-9.
understand how right-wing refugees influenced the course of British politics, either as the collaborators of British politicians, or as a source of contention with Britain’s neighbours. It seeks to demonstrate that right-wing refugees participated in and influenced the course of British politics with more success than their radical fellow-exiles, and that their presence similarly created diplomatic difficulties.

Refugees in British Politics

The idea that prominent left-wing refugees found sympathy and exercised some influence amongst British contemporaries has long been recognised. Although Mazzini became progressively less “respectable” owing to his advocacy of violence, the Italians who arrived in Britain in the 1820s were moderate liberals, and their ‘congeniality’ combined with ‘direct acquaintance’ with mostly Whig politicians. Many British hosts had ‘already met them in the aristocratic salons’ during Grand Tours, and the Italian language was widely understood among Britain’s elite. Others who arrived in the 1830s and 1840s also found widespread sympathy. Two of the most prominent Italian liberals, Antonio Panizzi and Giacomo (James) Lacaita, became respected figures in Whig circles, and Lacaita’s naturalization was witnessed by a Baronet and an MP.69 Even Orsini became a martyr, for his plot indirectly contributed to Italian unification.70 As representatives of what was considered a noble cause, they were highly regarded by both their contemporaries and later historians.

More notably, the refugee leader of the 1830 Polish Uprising, Prince Adam Czartoryski, was fêted by Whigs and radicals upon his arrival in Britain in 1831. Although the Cabinet refused to sanction military assistance for Poland (by rebelling, the Poles had ‘forfeited whatever rights they had under the Treaty of Vienna’), Czartoryski’s efforts secured several Commons debates on Poland, and Britain did attempt to discourage reprisals against the Poles.71 While this fell short of Czartoryski’s hopes, it demonstrates that his exhortations found support from

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sympathetic politicians and the Earl Grey’s Whig government alike. Czartoryski later chose to reside in Paris, but many Poles found asylum in Britain, and further support was forthcoming.

The Literary Association of Friends of Poland, established in 1831, was supported by such diverse figures as ‘Peel, Shaftesbury, Dickens and Gladstone’, and in 1834, Parliament voted a grant of £10,000 for Polish refugees, ‘renewed annually until 1838’. Polish refugees even received the patronage of Whig politicians. Palmerston sent one, Wojciech Chrzanowski, to Turkey as a military adviser, and another, Ladislas Zamoyski, was instrumental in promoting the exiled Poles’ aims into the 1860s. Although the influence which Polish refugees exercised was restricted by the violent nature of Polish uprisings against Russian rule, their cause has been recognised as having received significant attention.

Exiled Spanish liberals also found regard. Those who fled to Britain after the re-imposition of absolutism in 1823 were welcomed and became ‘decisive to a growing awareness’ of Spanish literature. Twenty years later, Espartero was also fêted. Upon Espartero’s fall in a coup d’état and subsequent flight, the British Minister, Arthur Aston, strongly defended him. When the leader of the coup accused Espartero of treason, Aston recorded that this was ‘utterly false’, and further manifested his disgust in refusing to attend a thanksgiving service. The removal of Espartero’s titles and the filing of false charges against him invoked further disdain from Aston.

The liberal diplomat’s sympathies were echoed by the Conservative Prime Minister. Sir Robert Peel hoped ‘that everything should be done to show him civility’, and although Aston’s partisanship necessitated his replacement, Espartero was presented to the admiring Queen Victoria and Prince Albert. The ex-Regent was also honoured

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72 Wilson, F.M., They came as Strangers (London, 1959), p.130
74 Howard, David, The Invention of Spain: Anglo-Spanish Cultural Relations, 1770-1870 (Manchester, 2007), pp.123-25
75 Aston to Aberdeen, 6 August 1843, FO 72/627; Aston to Aberdeen, 18 August 1843, Ibid., nos.168-9
76 RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1843:26 August, 10 November
by Whigs. ‘Palmerston says we are all Progresistas… and Espartero is the head of that party’, noted Lady Palmerston in 1847. However, much to her regret, Espartero devoted little time to politics in exile. He also spoke little English or French, a problem which also afflicted at least one Carlist refugee; the Bishop of León struggled to converse with the Irish politician Daniel O’Connell because their only shared language was Latin, which both spoke with incomprehensible accents! Nevertheless, Espartero provides a useful example of a widely esteemed liberal refugee.

After the turmoil of 1848, aristocratic politicians increasingly ignored revolutionary refugees. Those who had led many of the revolutions of 1848 were generally far more radical than the refugees who previously fled Poland, Spain and Italy. When both Gladstone and Palmerston were invited to a meeting held on behalf of Italian refugees in 1851, presided over by the Chartist Bronterre O’Brien, Palmerston did not even reply. Radical refugees were received by few of Britain’s elite, except for Lord Shaftesbury and Susannah Milner Gibson, the wife of Radical MP Thomas Milner Gibson. Nor was the public necessarily sympathetic to their causes. The Jersey office of L’Homme, a newspaper set up by Victor Hugo, was ransacked after it libelled Queen Victoria, and Hugo himself was verbally abused.

By the 1850s, support for these refugees was limited to radicals rather than aristocratic Whigs, let alone Conservatives. Both Tories and Whigs deplored the radical refugees’ views and activities. Lord Lyndhurst spoke of their desperation and hostility “to all regular governments”, and in 1853, Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon asked the journalist Henry Reeve to ‘thoroughly’ condemn refugees’ ‘abuse of hospitality’ in the Times. Although Britain offered asylum to all, its political elite was unsympathetic to plots which attracted diplomatic protests.

78 Lady Palmerston to Lieven, 12 September 1847, Ibid., p.293
80 Police report, 20 August 1851, HO 45/3918
81 Hewett…And Mr Fortescue, n.159; King, Bolton, Mazzini (London, 1902), p.144
83 Hansard, 27 March 1851, cxv c.626; Clarendon to Reeve, 4 March 1853, Laughton, John Knox, Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of Henry Reeve (2 Vols., London, 1898), i p.289
Such refugees instead associated with British counterparts. As Margot Finn notes, by 1851-52, middle-class radicals had organised numerous charitable appeals on behalf of refugees who had fled to Britain after the failed revolutions, and ‘the late Chartist press’ was heavily influenced by refugee thought.\(^8^4\) Like refugees from elite backgrounds, they found support from British contemporaries; ‘networks of sociability, services and patronage that proved of mutual benefit’ were all established, whilst ‘radical ceremonies’ reinforced partnerships between Chartists, exiles and the public.\(^8^5\) Although Miles Taylor has downplayed these exiles’ importance, their assimilation into political networks guaranteed influence over their allies. As Thomas Jones notes, John Stuart Mill’s writings were influenced by the exiled Louis Blanc, and Finn similarly comments upon radical and Chartist circulation of Mazzini’s publications.\(^8^6\) Much like their right-wing counterparts, revolutionary refugees found attention from British sympathisers.

However, unlike those of the left, right-wing refugees usually possessed the social standing which allowed access to ‘high society’, and thus senior politicians. The elite environment in which diplomacy and politics was conducted has itself been subject to significant review in recent decades, particularly the relationship between partisan politics and foreign policy – which such exiles were well-placed to exploit.\(^8^7\) Historians have also traced the political importance which aristocratic networks held. For example, Leslie Mitchell and Peter Mandler have charted the political significance of Whig networks, whilst K.D. Reynolds has explored how women, including the Orléans’ patron Lady Waldegrave, were able to exercise influence in aristocratic social circles.\(^8^8\) Michael Bentley has similarly charted the ‘environments’

\(^8^4\) Finn, *After Chartism*, pp.164-65, pp.116-17

\(^8^5\) Ibid., pp.120-1


\(^8^7\) i.e. Parry, J.P., *The Rise and Fall of Liberal government in Victorian Britain* (London, 1993);

of late-nineteenth century Conservatism. What is clear from these studies is that the importance of personal relationships in Victorian politics should not be underestimated; and right-wing refugees could often exploit these relationships. These refugees were largely aristocrats, if not royalty, and ‘the landed classes’ dominated British high politics. The British aristocracy also ‘looked down on almost everyone’ except for foreign aristocrats and royalty, and as David Cannadine notes, Europe’s elite shared a ‘transnational perspective’. Brought up to ‘speak French as the language of diplomacy and high society’, many aristocrats were equally at ease in London, Paris, Rome or St Petersburg. As a consequence, elite refugees often easily assimilated into London’s high society. Much as Reynolds suggests of aristocratic women, their status allowed them to become political actors.

This was further accentuated by past acquaintances with British politicians. For example, Guizot was a historian of England and former French Ambassador to Britain; Lieven had been Russian Ambassadress between 1812 and 1834; and Metternich had known Wellington and Aberdeen since the wars against Napoleon and subsequent European Congresses. Familiarity bred respect, and those who fell victim to revolution or led political opposition abroad were uniquely placed to exploit British concerns about foreign affairs. Moreover, fear of revolution persisted throughout Britain’s elite. For this reason, the exiles of 1848 found a great deal of attention from British politicians. Similarly, the social position held by some of the Orléans ensured that they were treated as authorities on French affairs, and could thus shape elite perceptions of Napoleon III’s regime. When the causes they advocated found attention and support, right-wing refugees could advise and influence sympathetic British politicians.

The role of “society” was an important one. Aristocrats flocked to London during the ‘season’ to engage in an ‘intense struggle’ for celebrity and influence in clubs and drawing-rooms, a stepping-stone to the ‘political realm’, and senior politicians led a

89 Bentley, Michael, Lord Salisbury’s World (Cambridge, 2001)
92 Reynolds, Aristocratic Women, p.4
‘dual existence’ devoted to both fashionable pastimes and ‘public business.’

Politics and sociability were closely intertwined, and as Reynolds notes, invitations to social functions were considered an effective method of gaining support. Aumale’s secretary thought it impossible to enter a parlour without ‘finding politics side by side with pleasure’, whilst the salon and hostess both benefited from the lack of ‘highly organised’ political parties. The ambitious thus had to secure attention in a social sphere open only to the titled or wealthy, although by the later 1860s, “society” was fragmenting, and party organisations had begun to encroach upon aristocratic influence. Only “respectable” people could “enter society”, and the widely execrated French Bourbons, Don Carlos and Dom Miguel were not considered as such. Nevertheless, many of their fellow-exiles were, and this accorded them access to political circles which their left-wing contemporaries could seldom enter. Whilst many right-wing refugees’ mere presence created diplomatic controversy, the moderate and/or well-connected could also exercise a significant degree of political influence.

A New Study

This study seeks to redress the lack of attention which these right-wing refugees have received from historians, and progresses chronologically from the fall of Charles X in 1830 to the Orléans’ return to France in 1871. By exploring two broad themes - the role which right-wing refugees played in British party politics and the impact of their activities upon the course of British foreign policy - it considers an overlooked but nevertheless important series of networks and controversies.

The study begins by charting the exile of Charles X and his court in Britain from 1830-32. This analysis exposes previously overlooked diplomatic disputes centred upon the exiles’ right to asylum and French unease at their continued plotting. It first considers the controversies surrounding the fallen court’s arrival in Britain and the combination of privilege and execration which they met, and then explores the

difficulties which these exiles found in engaging with British politics and the various concerns which their plots, especially Berri’s rebellion, created among British diplomats and politicians. It finally reveals that their departure, previously ascribed to French pressure, was the result of no such demarche.

The theme of right-wing refugees creating difficulties for British governments is further developed in considering the experience of Carlist and Miguelite refugees. This third chapter first analyses Carlos’ brief, disastrous exile in Britain and the Whig government’s responsibility for it, the limited support which Carlist refugees found in Britain, and the problems which they presented to British diplomacy during the mid-1830s, before contemplating Montemolin’s and Miguel’s sojourns in Britain during 1846-51. Whilst Montemolin secured the support of Tory Carlists and Palmerston, Miguel’s potential departure for Portugal to intercede in civil conflict threatened British intervention, and thus the British government’s survival. This chapter suggests that Carlist and Miguelite refugees had a modest impact upon British party politics but often frustrated British diplomacy.

The next three chapters consider the apogee of refugee influence over British politics during the years 1848-50, centred upon the intrigues of Metternich, Guizot and Lieven, who hoped to reunite the Conservative party and precipitate Palmerston’s downfall. The first chapter considers these exiles’ influence upon Conservative politics, and the degree of support which they found both inside and outside Parliament. The second then charts their relationship with Russell’s government by considering the exiles’ interactions with Whig politicians, their role in the development of British foreign policy and their relationships with the royal family. The third chapter considers the question of ‘refugee conspiracies’ and their impact upon British politics and diplomacy. These chapters argue that during these tumultuous years, right-wing refugees played an important role in the formation and critique of British foreign policy, as well as developments in party politics, especially in attempts to reunite the shattered Conservative party.

The final two chapters chart the rise of the Orléans family from pariahs supported by a few loyal Britons into highly-regarded political actors. The first of these chapters also considers Thiers’ brief exile and his influence over British politicians, and the
importance which rumours surrounding the Orléans played in Palmerston’s response to Louis Napoleon’s 1851 coup d’état. At the same time as considering the Orléans’ political fortunes in exile and the encouragement they received from British patrons, these chapters explore the problems which their presence created for the makers of British foreign policy, as candidates for numerous vacant thrones, and as a regular nuisance in the conduct of Anglo-French relations.

Although these exiles have often been ignored, this study contends that they exercised a degree of influence over British politicians and created an important series of challenges for British diplomacy. It argues that the influence they had over British politicians at a national level was far greater than that established by their left-wing counterparts. This study will also shed new light upon the history of British politics and diplomacy in the mid-nineteenth century by providing an example of the many outside influences which affected the conduct of British politicians. Although its refugee subjects did not achieve their ultimate goals, they certainly succeeded in influencing the course of British politics.
2: A Miserable Emigration? The French Bourbons¹, 1830-32

Much like other European convulsions which were to follow, the July Revolution created a wave of right-wing refugees. This chapter explores the political and diplomatic implications of the exiled court’s presence. It will consider the relationship between the sympathy they received as refugees and the lack of political support they found, while charting the effect their presence had upon British diplomacy. Their sojourn in Britain may have been miserable, but it demonstrates the complex range of responses which characterised British governments’ relationships with such exiles.

On Sunday, 25 July 1830, King Charles X of France signed the ‘Four Ordinances of Saint-Cloud’, and set in course a revolution, his abdication, and exile in Britain. The revolution in France inspired a series of conflagrations throughout Europe, and at this tumultuous time, good relations with Orleanist France were vital. This was not only to restrain France’s revisionist ambitions; as a fellow constitutional state and near neighbour with a large army, France was an ideal ally for Britain against absolutism in the councils of Europe. Between 1830 and 1832, the Great Powers squabbled over the fates of Belgium, Greece, Portugal and Poland, and further revolutions erupted in Germany and Italy. But while Britain sought agreement with the French government, both countries experienced turmoil. In Britain, agrarian riots created consternation in late 1830, and during 1831-32, domestic politics were dominated by increasingly acrimonious debates over Whig attempts to introduce parliamentary reform. By 1832, Tory resistance, especially in the House of Lords, appeared to threaten revolution.²

Meanwhile, France was racked by discontent and even uprisings, some of which were encouraged by the exiles. Charles requested an estimate of his supporters’ strength barely a month after his ejection, and received the reply that if Charles’ scheming daughter-in-law the Duchesse de Berri and her son the Duc de Bordeaux (Charles’ grandson and anointed successor) arrived in the royalist west, an army could quickly be raised to march on Paris. Charles failed to lead, and by November the project was

¹ The ‘Elder Branch’ of family, who reigned in France prior to Charles X’s fall in 1830, are usually identified as the French ‘Bourbons’; the Orléans comprised a cadet branch of the French royal family, and are considered to have been a separate dynasty. For family trees of the royal families mentioned in this study, see the appendix.
² Bourne, Foreign Policy, p.332; for the reform debates, see Pearce, Edward, Reform! The Fight for the 1832 Reform Act (London, 2003); Fraser, Antonia, Perilous Question: The Drama of the Great Reform Bill 1832 (London, 2013)
abandoned.³ He and his personal followers thereafter abstained from politics. Yet some exiled courtiers ‘dreamed of’ restoring Bordeaux.⁴ This reached a disastrous climax in May 1832, when Berri (who had already left Britain) led an unsuccessful insurrection in the Vendée with the eventual hope of restoring Bordeaux.⁵ Exile plots threatened to adversely affect Anglo-French relations, and the exiles’ departure was attributed to French complaints of British inactivity in the face of refugee machinations.⁶ The French Bourbons proved to be a thorn in the side of British diplomacy.

Only rarely did these exiles find support from British politicians, although they were sympathetically received in their new home in Edinburgh. Even Tories were disappointed to hear of exile plots against Orleanist France, and Lord Palmerston, appointed Foreign Secretary in the Reform government of 1830-34, famously wrote after the July Revolution that he would drink to liberalism ‘all over the world.’⁷ Rather than influence the course of politics, their presence created debate and concern at an exceptionally restive time.

Before examining the French Bourbons’ exile, it is necessary to consider the circumstances in which they fell, which precipitated unrest and calls for reform throughout Europe.⁸ Charles’ reign (1824-1830) was characterised by political repression, and although intense activism ensured that liberals acquired ‘the balance’ of the National Assembly in 1827, the King refused to appoint liberal Ministers and made effective government impossible. A further election in 1830 returned a liberal majority, and persuaded that France was in danger, Charles signed the ordinances, drawn up by Prime Minister Prince Polignac. The Chamber of Deputies was to be dissolved, its powers curbed, and its narrow electoral franchise restricted; the liberty of the press was to be suspended; and additional reactionaries were to join the cabinet.

The Ordinances provoked violent rage, and protests steadily grew. By 29 July, army units had fled Paris, now under revolutionary control, and on 2 August, Charles fled from the nearby Palace of Saint-Cloud. The King and his son the Duc d’Angoulême abdicated their rights to the throne in favour of the 10 year-old Bordeaux, and Charles appointed his cousin the Duc d’Orléans Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom and Bordeaux’s Regent. The court retreated first to the Palace at Rambouillet, and then slowly towards the coast, optimistic that they would be asked to return. But on the 9th, Orléans was proclaimed Louis Philippe, King of the French by liberal deputies. Charles reached Cherbourg on 16 August. Although he requested asylum in Austria, it was believed that the ex-King would seek asylum in Britain, and ‘not move again.’ The exiled court remained in Britain for just over two years, and finally left for Austria September 1832. It was, one exiled courtier later recalled, a miserable second emigration.

Although the July Revolution was ‘celebrated’ in Britain ‘as a victory for the middle classes against a repressive and ultraconservative regime’, and Anglo-French relations had been in a parlous state, the refugee royal family found some sympathy. Whilst the emergence of a new regime offered an opportunity to reset Anglo-French relations, it also occasioned regret and trepidation among Tories. The former Prime Minister Lord Grenville thought it ‘a great misfortune’; Queen Adelaide (a Tory sympathiser) was deeply affected by the exiles’ plight; and the Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington, considered the change of regime a bitter, but necessary, pill to swallow. He had to recognise ‘la nouvelle France’ or resign.

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12 Charles Greville, 31 July 1830, ii p.19; Jupp, Peter, British Politics on the Eve of Reform (Basingstoke, 1998), p.5; Pinkney, Revolution of 1830, p.41
Most accepted the July Revolution as a *fait accompli*, and while they pitied Charles and his court, they had little sympathy for his politics. Even Ultra-Tory newspapers had long condemned Charles’s ardent Catholicism, and only ‘a few Ultras (with the Duke of Cumberland at their head)… would have liked to go to war to support the claim of the Duke of Bordeaux.’ For most of this grouping, Charles’ fall was lauded – it was a ‘death blow to Popery’ in France. Tory sympathy for the exiles owed more to deference towards royalty than politics, and some were even hostile. Curiously, the Whig MP for Caithness, George Sinclair, who had known Charles during his first exile in Edinburgh, felt a ‘profound sympathy’ for the ex-King, and unsuccessfully urged King William IV to continue to recognise Charles’ reign. Most Tories were ambivalent about Charles’ fate.

This ambivalence was reflected in the government’s response to the ex-court’s flight. King William IV was ‘disposed to receive’ Charles, but Wellington cautiously replied that the ‘Old Pretender’ (son of the deposed James II) had been removed from Paris upon British requests on three occasions. The Prime Minister feared that the presence of a rival court would cause disagreement with France, and this was reflected in the cabinet’s decision on 4 August to offer the ex-court asylum in exchange for a promise not to plot their return. While these strict terms had no legal basis, Orleanist France was an unknown quantity, and good relations with it were vital.

Meanwhile, the British Ambassador to France, Lord Stuart de Rothesay, attempted to ensure that Charles was sent into an honourable, British exile. Because the ex-King was unwilling to leave France in an American vessel, on 5 August, Stuart sent on Charles’s request to be taken aboard a British ship to Foreign Secretary Aberdeen. Charles also wanted Wellington to ‘send out some ships to intercept him at sea and prevent’ the exiled court’s departure. Wellington, Aberdeen, and Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel concluded that this was ‘utterly impossible, unless they mean to provoke

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15 Thomas Grenville to Buckingham, 12 August 1830, Buckingham, i pp.37-38
a war’, and Stuart was told that the United States would not *kidnap* the exiles.\(^\text{18}\) Such ridiculous demands could never be accepted, and the exiles’ destination remained uncertain; Orléans thought Italy, Saxony or the Netherlands all likely. But the latter two would have posed a ‘serious inconvenience’ to France, and Stuart thus sought ‘to induce [Charles] to abandon that intention, whilst preventing the appearance of contact.’\(^\text{19}\) Although this communication threatened to imply that Britain supported the ex-monarch, Stuart wanted Charles to seek asylum across the Channel to prevent conflict elsewhere, and on the 15\(^{th}\), eight days after receiving the British offer of asylum, Charles agreed to sail for Spithead to consider his options.\(^\text{20}\)

However, the government feared that the exiles could become a diplomatic problem. Upon landing, Charles wished ‘at least to remain in England [until] he had an answer from Austria’ and ‘escape from the *surveillance* he was under.’ Wellington replied that ‘it was most desirable the King should not establish himself here’ and again cited the ‘Old Pretender’; but he felt that a temporary residence ‘could not be objected to.’\(^\text{21}\) The Prime Minister remained wary that France might fear exile plots, and Peel agreed that Charles should only be offered asylum if he considered his abdication ‘complete’. Peel also advocated loaning the exiles the royal palace of Holyroodhouse in Edinburgh, at a safe distance to stop them from ‘disturbing the order of things now established in France.’\(^\text{22}\) The two statesmen hoped to reconcile hospitality with preventing exile intrigues in France, and because Charles was ‘desirous of continuing exclusively private[ly]’, the cabinet concluded that there was ‘no reason’ to refuse a temporary asylum.\(^\text{23}\)

This welcome declaration of abstention from politics appeared to preclude French protests about an *émigré* threat, and allowing the fallen court to settle in Britain

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\(^{18}\) Stuart to Aberdeen, 5 August 1830, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43085 f.83; 8 August 1830, Arbuthnot, ii p.377; Chamberlain, *Aberdeen*, p.239; Aberdeen to Stuart (copy), 8 August 1830, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43085

\(^{19}\) Stuart to Aberdeen, 5 August 1830, FO 27/412/388; Stuart to Aberdeen, 10 August 1830, Ibid., no.411; Stuart to Aberdeen, 13 August 1830, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43085 f.130; Stuart to Aberdeen, 14 August 1830, Ibid., f.135. Throughout this thesis, square brackets are used either to denote missing words, make clarifications, or alter the tense of a sentence.


\(^{21}\) Arbuthnot, 26 August 1830, ii pp.380-1

\(^{22}\) Peel to Aberdeen (copy), 16 August 1830, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40312 f.124

satisfied concerns about their future comfort. As Aberdeen noted, leaving the exiles to ‘seek an uncertain refuge, from port to port, would have afforded a spectacle little honourable to’ Britain. The government also hoped that they would ‘fix their abode... at a distance from the metropolis’, in ‘privacy and seclusion’. The offer of a conditional asylum (which had no legal basis) was calculated to avoid causing offence throughout Europe.

The royal exiles were simultaneously execrated and pitied. In a display of sympathy from the government, customs officers were ordered not to interfere with their baggage, and their confessor was swiftly granted the necessary licence. Meanwhile, several British aristocrats offered the exiles accommodation, and they accepted Lulworth Castle on the Dorset coast from the Catholic Cardinal Thomas Weld. Weld’s offer alone was tinged with political sentiment. Whereas the exiles had been met with revolutionary tricolors at Portsmouth, Weld was a committed legitimist.

As a secluded and apparently safe location, Lulworth appeared an ideal residence. But although personal and political sympathy had ensured that the fallen court entered into a relatively comfortable exile, many British friends refused to visit Charles. The ex-king was a political outcast.

The exiles’ residence at Lulworth quickly produced a clash with France. The new French Ambassador, Prince Talleyrand, argued that Britain should honour its close relationship with France by assigning the exiles ‘a residence fifty miles in the interior’, away from any intrigue which might be launched from the French coast.

The British government had no right to make such a demand, but it did hint to Charles

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24 Aberdeen to Stuart (draft), 19 August 1830, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43098, no.45
that residing on the south coast ‘gave a pretext to numerous intriguers’ to cross.\textsuperscript{30} The slightest suggestion that Britain would tolerate exile intrigues had to be quashed, albeit without compulsion and within the confines of the law. Rather than leave Lulworth, Charles again applied for asylum in Austria, and although it was rumoured that he would ‘quit the seaside’ for the Catholic Lord Arundell’s ‘magnificent mansion’, Charles decided to remain.\textsuperscript{31}

The ex-King had ignored British suggestions, and more dangerously for British diplomacy, he also broke his promise to abstain from politics. Because Louis Philippe had received the new title “King of the French”, the French throne was left legally vacant, and on 24 August, Bordeaux was quietly proclaimed “King” of France.\textsuperscript{32} Rather than accept exile, Charles had begun to plot his grandson’s restoration within a week of his arrival, and he soon sought to influence British policy. On 6 October, Charles asked Wellington to save his arrested former Ministers from execution, and although he had no desire to compromise the government, he thought that the Duke would respond.\textsuperscript{33} The government did not adopt Charles’ suggestion.

Instead, they were forced to guarantee the Charles’ freedom. When walking in the grounds of Lulworth Castle, Charles found himself surrounded by creditors, to whom he had owed money since the \textit{emigration}. The ex-King’s rank was deemed to necessitate radical measures. Wellington believed that ‘the proceedings’ would ‘be commenced’ before Charles received an answer from Austria, and thus sought to prevent his arrest.\textsuperscript{34} The Duke suggested that a sympathetic diplomat such as Neapolitan Minister Count Ludolf could announce that Charles was attached to a diplomatic mission, and thus ensure his immunity.\textsuperscript{35}

However, Peel did not see how the government could ‘interfere’, and thought it ‘unworthy’ of Charles to ‘evade the law’ by doing this. The Home Secretary instead sent a Metropolitan Police Constable to protect Charles from this ‘malicious and

\textsuperscript{30} Talleyrand to Madame Adelaide, 2 October 1830, Duc de Broglie (ed.), \textit{Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand} (trans. Mrs A. Hall) (4 Vols., London, 1891), iii no.4
\textsuperscript{31} Montbel, p.376; Bence-Jones, Mark, \textit{The Catholic Families} (London, 1992), pp.133-38; Wellington to Lord Nugent (copy), 28 August 1830, WP1/1138/44
\textsuperscript{33} Charles to Marquis de Choiseul, 6 October 1830, WP1/1148/18
\textsuperscript{34} Wellington to Peel, 9 September 1830, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40309 f.179
\textsuperscript{35} Wellington to Aberdeen, 9 September 1830, FO 27/423
wanton annoyance’, and calm fears that Bordeaux could be kidnapped. The assistance which the government could provide was extremely limited; the policeman was cautioned against interfering with the course of the law, and Charles was told to seek legal advice.\(^{36}\) Although unsympathetic towards exile ambitions, senior ministers thought that arrest was beneath the dignity of an ex-monarch, and did what little they could to preserve his liberty.

The exiles proposed a solution. They asked the British court for ‘the same refuge which had been granted’ during the emigration: apartments at Holyrood, a royal palace, inside which nobody could be arrested. The request, which satisfied the government’s concerns, was quickly granted. It both maintained the exiles’ dignity and, owing to the distance from France, restricted their scope for intrigue, which had become a serious concern.\(^{37}\) As early as 17 September, Stuart had reported that the exiles had begun to communicate with ‘their friends in France’.\(^{38}\) The further the exiles were from France, the more difficult it would be for intriguers to meet them.

The Bourbons’ arrival in Edinburgh elicited a muted response. They arrived before they were expected, and the few well-wishers who welcomed them did so respectfully. Yet the press was hostile, and it took the intervention of the Tory novelist Sir Walter Scott for them to be widely welcomed. A letter which Scott sent to the Edinburgh Weekly Journal transformed the exiles’ reception from one that was ‘rough and insulting’, worsened by the Whig Edinburgh Review, to one of sympathy, out of respect for Scott.\(^{39}\) Scott acknowledged that Charles’s experiences had ‘taught him anything but wisdom’, but added that he had resided in Edinburgh during the emigration, sent substantial relief for the victims of a devastating fire in 1824, and had done ‘nothing to forfeit’ their goodwill. Furthermore, the exiles would bring ‘excellent custom’ to local tradespeople.\(^{40}\)

\(^{36}\) Peel to Wellington (copy), 11 September 1830, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40309 f.181

\(^{37}\) Gontaut, ii pp.215-6

\(^{38}\) Stuart to Aberdeen, 17 September 1830, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43085 f.189


The exiles largely endeared themselves to Edinburgh society. The Duc and Duchesse d’Angoulême were praised for their charity, and some courtiers later ‘praised the hospitality of the Scotch’, who gave them ‘the most marked attention and respect.’ The expenses of their ‘very large establishment’ indeed ‘conciliated’ the ‘tradespeople’, and during out breaks of cholera, Charles allowed the poor to visit his two doctors for free.41 However, Berri attracted great opprobrium.42 Whilst the exiles were largely well-received, Scottish hospitality had its limits.

Despite their relocation, the exiles’ became a source of contention in Anglo-French relations. The French Consul in Edinburgh was ordered to observe them closely, and Talleyrand believed that Berri attracted too much attention when she visited London in November.43 The French government also began to spy on the exiles and their French adherents.44 The twin problems that the ex-court retained supporters in France and attracted curiosity in Britain bred suspicion about both the stability of the Orléans regime and British intentions regarding the exiles. Even the most benign contacts threatened controversy. After Queen Adelaide accepted a donation for a charity bazaar from them, she apologised to Talleyrand’s niece, and a reception held in Berri’s honour by Ludolf in October 1830 gave especially ‘great umbrage’ because Wellington was invited.45

Stuart was also suspicious about exile ambitions. On 1 November, he sent Aberdeen a report which warned that Brittany was a ‘barrel of gunpowder’, and that Berri had rejected overtures to lead a rebellion there.46 Yet in spite of these concerns, Britain was more worried about the exiles’ protection, and a few sentries were provided to guard Holyrood. As Mary Cosh notes, the government thought Charles was too old to be actively plotting.47 Once the exiles had reached Edinburgh, the British government had ceased to consider them a threat to the French regime.

41 *Examiner*, 17 April 1831; Raikes, 22 April 1835, ii pp.88-89
43 Talleyrand to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 5 November 1830, Pallain, Georges (ed.), *Correspondance Diplomatique de Talleyrand: Ambassade de Talleyrand à Londres, 1830-1834* (2 vols, Paris, 1881) i no.20; Talleyrand to Marshal Maison, 13 November 1830, Ibid., i no.25
44 Louis Philippe to William IV (copy), n.d., WP1/1134/43
46 Stuart to Aberdeen, 1 November 1830, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43085 ff.264-68
Their successors would make the same mistake. Wellington resigned on 16 November after a combination of Ultras, Whigs, Radicals and liberal Tories rejected the civil list, and the leading Whig Lord Grey was asked to form a government. The exiles feared that the new government, composed of supporters of parliamentary reform, would restrict their freedom, but Grey and Palmerston agreed to communicate with the exiles through the same intermediary as Wellington. British policy towards the exiles continued to be based upon the principle of providing asylum to all who sought it.

The degree of support which the exiles received from British politicians also remained static. The day before Wellington’s fall, ‘all of the great people’, attended another reception held for Berri. But despite this social interest, exile appeals were ignored. On 20 December, Charles wrote to Wellington that he wanted to ‘enlighten’ Europe about the ordinances, Bordeaux’s claim to the French throne, and his status as Bordeaux’s regent. He thus asked Wellington to make this known to King William and the government. Wellington does not appear to have replied, but in January 1831, Charles sent both him and Grey a pamphlet about the July revolution. Grey ignored it, and sent it to the King, whose secretary thought that the Queen would have been interested. The pamphlet was otherwise overlooked. Although French Legitimists ‘abounded’ in Britain, they kept to themselves and regularly quarrelled; Berri consequently quit Holyrood in 1831, and the French government recognised that the exiles had little influence. The vast gulf between Bourbon absolutism and British constitutionalism rendered the exiles’ views ridiculous in the eyes of British politicians.

This pattern was repeated in Scotland. Admiral Sir Philip Durham shot with Charles, but this was a courtesy for Durham’s kindness during the emigration, and in 1831,

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48 Damas, ii pp.344-45; Palmerston to Wellington, 7 December 1830, WP1/1155/12; Grey to Wellington, 9 December 1830, WP1/1156/1
50 Charles X to Wellington, 20 December 1830, WP1/1156/17
51 Choiseul to Wellington, 12 January 1831, WP1/1173/16
52 Grey to Sir Herbert Taylor, 14 January 1831, 3rd Earl Grey (ed.), The Reform Act, 1832: the Correspondence of the late Earl Grey with His Majesty King William IV and with Sir Herbert Taylor (2 Vols., London, 1867), i no.41; Taylor to Grey, 14 January 1831, Ibid., i no.42
53 Duchesse de Dino to Baron Barante, 5 June 1831, Barante, Claude de, Souvenirs de Baron Barante, (8 Vols., Paris, 1890), iv p.253; Dino to Barante, 31 March 1831, Ibid., iv p.109
Durham told the ‘noble’ Louis Philippe that he was the ‘fittest man to rule France’. Although a Tory and an old friend, Durham did not receive Charles on political grounds, and the Whig Lord Rosebery also shot with the exiles. Other Scottish aristocrats similarly received the exiles for reasons independent of politics. Bordeaux spent time with the Earl of Morton’s children, and the Duke and Duchess of Hamilton befriended the exiles despite their ‘distasteful politics’, as did the Duke of Buccleuch. The exiles even discouraged the few displays of support they found. Although progresses through the Highlands were arranged for Bordeaux, and he was received by minor Lairds who were privately Jacobites (traditional allies of the French Bourbons), the exiled court discouraged sympathetic demonstrations. Neither the exiles nor their hosts wished to attract attention.

The exiles took little interest in British politics, although some courtiers visited local Tories including Scott. Involvement in politics was anathema to many of the exiles, but curiously, the Duc d’Angoulême later noted that his family would ‘never forget the sentiments.... testified to us’ by Lord Dalhousie and his ‘excellent compatriots.’ Sir John Hope, Lords and Ladies Melville, Morton, Wemyss and Rosebery, and the Duke and Duchess of Buccleuch were ‘particularly’ singled out. Whether these sentiments were political or merely friendly is unclear. For the most part, these figures were Tories, and Dalhousie was ‘a somewhat old-fashioned’ one, his politics ‘largely fixed’ by the excesses of the French revolution. However, the Whig Sinclair also had private ‘interviews’ with Charles, and although the exiled court’s governess claimed that the July Revolution was an Orleanist conspiracy, her comment appears to have been treated as a curiosity. Edinburgh’s social elite was simply intrigued by the fallen court.

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57 Damas, ii p.348; Mackenzie Stuart, *French King*, pp.120-28; Steuart, *Bourbons*, p.99
58 Duc d’Angoulême to Dalhousie, 11 September 1833, Dalhousie Papers, GD45/14/500
59 Whitelaw, Marjory (ed.), *The Dalhousie Journals*, (3 vols., Ottawa, 1978-82), iii n.9
60 Grant, *Sinclair*, pp.237-44; ‘Anecdote of the Duchess de Gontaut (1830)’, Balfour Papers, GD433/2/143/19
Meanwhile, the French government became increasingly concerned by exile ambitions to interfere in French politics. On 16 March, Lord Granville, the new British Ambassador to France, was warned that the French Foreign Minister, Count Sébastiani, remained opposed to the exiles’ continued presence.\(^{61}\) Because the exiles had encouraged Legitimist protests, Sébastiani read Granville a letter he had written for Talleyrand, which instructed him to ask the British ‘to remove’ Charles. Louis Philippe had filed the letter away, ostensibly because ‘persecuting’ his cousin was ‘most repugnant to his feelings’. The King suspected that Sébastiani had sent Talleyrand a copy anyway, and asked that Charles might be ‘induced’ to leave for Austria without apparent ‘compulsion’.\(^{62}\) Although they disagreed as to how, both the King and his Foreign Minister wanted the exiles to leave Britain. But when Talleyrand urged the Home Office to keep watch over them, he was told that Britain was a hospitable nation which only registered foreigners’ arrivals.\(^{63}\) Even in the wake of serious French concerns, British hospitality was not watered down.

However, the British ambassador to Russia, Lord Heytesbury, was worried about potential exile intrigues. On 23 February, Heytesbury reported that a member of the exiled court, Baron Damas, had arrived in St. Petersburg to announce that Charles would continue to abstain from politics and that the Duc d’Angoulême had renounced his abdication from the French succession. Heytesbury concluded that the exiles deceived themselves in believing that they had Russian support.\(^{64}\) He soon changed his mind. On the 28\(^{th}\), the Ambassador sent Palmerston copies of the document Damas had presented, which was ‘something more than an act of abdication’, rather ‘a protest against the usurpation of Louis Philippe and a proclamation of the rights of… Bordeaux.’\(^{65}\)

Another secret dispatch included further revelations. Damas had presented a letter from Berri, exhorting Nicolas to remember Bordeaux, ‘despoiled of his inheritance, and abandoned by the sovereigns of Europe’, whilst Charles’s letter had recommended Bordeaux to Nicholas’s ‘protection’. Heytesbury was sufficiently

\(^{61}\) Palmerston to Granville (copy), 8 March 1831, Palmerston Papers, Add. MS 48453 no.37; Granville to Palmerston, 16 March 1831, FO 27/427/143

\(^{62}\) Granville to Palmerston (confidential), 17 March 1831, BP, PP/GC/GR/133

\(^{63}\) Minute, March 1831, HO 44/24 ff.23-4

\(^{64}\) Heytesbury to Palmerston, 23 February 1831, FO 65/191/24; Heytesbury to Palmerston, 25 February 1831, Ibid., no.38

\(^{65}\) Heytesbury to Palmerston, February 28 1831, Ibid., no.43
worried to approach the Russian government, and was assured that Nicholas had told Damas that he would ‘lend himself to no intrigue’ unless Louis Philippe broke any treaty. This was the limit of Russian assistance; Foreign Minister Count Nesselrode refused to fund an uprising and implored Damas’ ‘speedy’ departure. The prospect of Russian support for exile plots threatened to complicate relations with France, and transformed British nonchalance towards the exiles’ activities into concern.

French complaints continued into May, when Sébastiani began daily to ask Granville, apparently on Louis Philippe’s behalf, whether Berri had given birth to an illegitimate son. Grey was not surprised that the French ‘should be rather jealous; the exiles were ‘certainly always endeavouring to intrigue both at Paris and in the provinces’. He would have been ‘glad if they could be induced to’ leave, but rejected coercing them as excessively harsh. Palmerston agreed that it seemed ‘ungracious’ and ‘almost ungenerous’ to force the elderly Charles out ‘without some better ground... than these verbal communications.’ However, he was interested in Berri’s departure to Bath, and speculated that her health was a mere ‘pretence’. Although concerned by exile machinations and sympathetic to French complaints, Grey and Palmerston strongly defended the right to asylum.

Palmerston consequently delivered a warning to the exiles. On 24 May, he met an exiled courtier, the Duc de Blacas, who was passing through London, and after Blacas denied sending arms to France, or that the exiles could even afford to, Palmerston warned him that King William had ‘two duties to perform’: hospitality to Charles, and ‘good faith and friendship’ towards Louis Philippe. In short, abuse of their asylum would not be tolerated. However, British policy remained unchanged, and Granville was reminded that if the exiles’ communications with supporters did not ‘go beyond a certain point, they ought not to excite any serious uneasiness’. The British Consul at Hamburg was nevertheless ordered to help French investigations into the apparent purchase of arms. While exile plots were again downplayed – Palmerston having chosen to believe Blacas - some concession was made to French concerns.

66 Heytesbury to Palmerston (secret), 5 March 1831, Ibid., no.50
67 Granville to Palmerston, 13 May 1831, BP, PP/GC/GR/160/1-2
68 Grey to Palmerston, 5 May 1831, Ibid., PP/GC/GR/1980
69 Palmerston to Grey, 6 May 1831, Grey Papers GRE/B44/2/55
70 Palmerston to Granville, 24 May 1831, Granville Papers, PRO 30/29/14/6/2 ff.5-6
The exiles were also execrated in Parliament. Perhaps most notably, the Whig MP and historian Thomas Macaulay’s famous speech of 2 March 1831 in favour of parliamentary reform invoked Charles’s fall and flight.\footnote{Stewart, Robert, \textit{Party and Politics, 1830-1852} (Basingstoke, 1989), pp.28-29} He was not alone in doing so, and even Tories were critical of the exiles. On 4 August, Aberdeen suggested that recognising Doña Maria as Queen of Portugal (whom the British government wished to replace her usurping uncle Dom Miguel) would be as nonsensical as recognising Bordeaux as King of France.\footnote{\textit{Hansard}, 4 August 1831, v c.729} However, the Tories continued to be associated with the fallen Bourbon regime. So offensive was this notion that when Lord Chancellor Brougham accidentally implied that Lord Strangford had ‘any particular affection for the Bourbons’, he was met with an angry response.\footnote{\textit{Hansard}, 21 February 1831, ii c.770-77} It is unsurprising that in October, Wellington merely acknowledged a letter from Moritz von Haber, a Legitimist financier who had fled Paris in 1830, which concerned the July Monarchy’s ‘attack’ on the French peerage.\footnote{Haber to Wellington, 7 October 1831, WP1/1198/29}

Nevertheless, Legitimist exiles began to publish a French-language newspaper in London. Entitled \textit{Le Précurseur}, its first issue declared its independence, but its tone was incredibly reactionary. It denounced Parliamentary reform and condemned the Orléans regime as a republic in disguise.\footnote{\textit{Précurseur}, 5 February 1831} It was also deemed suspicious by the \textit{Times}, the most influential paper in Britain, which the \textit{Précurseur}’s second issue condemned for alleging that it had received £2000 from Holyrood.\footnote{\textit{Précurseur}, 12 February 1831} Unsurprisingly, the \textit{Précurseur} attracted little interest, and embroidered the slightest suggestion of British sympathy for legitimism. On 12 March, it printed the ‘Opinion of Lord Stanhope in favour of the restoration of Henri V’ (i.e. Bordeaux) – quoting a speech the eccentric Ultra had made about legitimism in 1818.\footnote{\textit{Précurseur}, 19 March 1831, 7 May 1831, 12 March 1831} The \textit{Précurseur} similarly lavishly praised a letter from ‘A French Royalist’ to the Editor of the \textit{Times}.\footnote{\textit{Précurseur}, 19 November 1831, 11 February 1832} Even if it was free from the exiled court’s subsidy, the \textit{Précurseur} certainly supported them, but utterly failed to engage with British politics.
Berri’s departure in July created some debate. On the 2\textsuperscript{nd}, Palmerston heard from a \textit{Courier} journalist that she had left for southern France at the request of certain military units, ‘furnished with money by Russia’. This news was communicated to Grey, whilst reports of ‘important events’ were expected ‘in a few hours’.\textsuperscript{79} Although the latter report proved untrue, Palmerston had certainly been concerned, and Grey feared that Berri had departed for more than the European summer.\textsuperscript{80} Berri seemed intent on rebellion, and her departure appeared to pose a serious threat to France. However, British diplomats in Italy largely dismissed anxieties about Berri’s ambitions, and when fears of Russian support for the exiles resurfaced in March 1832, Granville dismissed the idea.\textsuperscript{81}

British diplomats instead worried about exile intrigues elsewhere. On 16 February 1831, after a series of Legitimist protests in Paris, Granville warned his colleague at Madrid, Henry Unwin Addington, of Sébastiani’s fear that Berri and Bordeaux would be permitted to enter Spain (which under the rule of the reactionary Ferdinand VII had delayed recognition of Louis Philippe), an eventuality which could cause serious disagreement.\textsuperscript{82} Although a Franco-Spanish dispute, Granville hoped that Addington could defuse it. Sir Charles Bagot, the British Minister to the Netherlands, was similarly worried by the activities of a French financier named Ouvrard, whom he feared could do ‘a world of mischief’. By March 1832, Bagot was ‘nearly satisfied’ that Ouvrard was an ‘agent’ of Charles X, and cooperating with the Dutch government in an attempt to stall negotiations on Belgian independence.\textsuperscript{83} Although the French shared these concerns, it transpired that Charles had rejected an overture from Ouvrard.\textsuperscript{84} Bagot’s fears were nullified by the ex-King’s circumspection.

Meanwhile, Charles’ fall was increasingly invoked as a lesson by British politicians. As debates over reform intensified in 1832, radical journals ‘frequently reinforced’

\textsuperscript{79} Palmerston to Grey, 2 July 1831, Grey Papers, GRE/B44/2/81
\textsuperscript{80} Damas, ii p.336; Grey to Lieven, 6 July 1831, Guy (ed.), \textit{Correspondence of Princess Lieven and Earl Grey} (3 Vols., London, 1890), ii p.254
\textsuperscript{81} A.J. Foster to Palmerston, 9 July 1831, FO 67/84/67; Foster to Palmerston, 11 July 1831, Ibid., no.68; G.H. Seymour to Palmerston, 8 October 1831, Palmerston Papers, Add. MS 60298 f.105; Seymour to Palmerston, 16 October 1831, Ibid., f.106; Granville to Palmerston, 12 March 1832, FO 27/445
\textsuperscript{82} Granville to Addington (copy), 16 February 1831, Granville Papers, PRO 30/29/15/14 f.124
\textsuperscript{83} Bagot to Palmerston, 2 March 1832, BP, PP/GC/BA/146/1
\textsuperscript{84} Dejean, Etienne, ‘La Duchesse de Berry et le Comité Carliste de La Haye’, \textit{Revue Historique} 110:1 (1912), pp.39-46
their own belief that reformers would triumph by referring to Charles’s flight to Holyrood, and so desperate was Queen Adelaide’s opposition that she ‘suggested it might be better for King William to join him there.’ She was not the only Tory to make such a comment; Lord Stormont publicly stated that he would rather see William ‘take his chop’ with Charles at Holyrood than a reformed Parliament. This harsh rhetoric was quietly reciprocated by Palmerston, who authored newspaper articles which accused the Tories of collusion with both Charles X’s regime and the exiles. Charles’ opposition to reform was now considered a display of conservative principle as well as derided as political suicide.

Amidst these debates, the refugee banker Haber and one of Charles’ ex-ministers, Baron d’Haussez, attempted to engage with British politics by writing a pamphlet with the novelist Benjamin Disraeli, entitled *England and France: Or, a Cure for the Ministerial Gallomania*, a critique of the Whig government’s Francophile foreign policy. Haber and Haussez ‘plied Disraeli with documents’ including French cabinet papers and Dutch diplomatic dispatches. Haber offered further Legitimist assistance, but the pamphlet was unsuccessful. As Jane Ridley notes, it was censured by the *Times* for being ‘coloured with absolutism’, and Disraeli (by then a Tory MP) later repudiated it. Despite the influential paper’s criticism, Haber thought the review a ‘great step forward’, and asked his publisher to persuade the Tory *Standard* and *Morning Post* to reprint it. Even this virulent criticism was of a heavily-edited publication; comments left by the Tory critic John Wilson Croker on a proof of *Gallomania* rejected Legitimist sentiments. Haber’s absolutist views were rejected out of hand. Even when the exiles found British collaborators and tailored their propaganda to appeal to Tory sentiments, it still had little appeal.

Suspicions that Berri would launch an insurrection finally emerged among British diplomats in May. Berri, whom British law had allowed to leave freely, struck on

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85 Poole, Steve, *The Politics of Regicide* (Manchester, 2000), p.166
86 *Hansard*, 21 May 1832, xii c.1146
87 Articles for the *Globe*, BP, PP/PRE/B/24/2; PP/PRE/B/32-33; PP/PRE/B/37/1
88 Bollaert, *Wars*, i p.342; Haber to Disraeli, 16 March 1832, Dep. Hughenden 233/1, ff.53-54; Ridley, *Young Disraeli*, pp.111-13
89 Haber to John Murray, 2 May 1832, Smiles, Samuel (ed.), *A Publisher and his Friends; Memoir and Correspondence of the late John Murray* (London, 1912), p.323
90 Marginated proof, John Murray Archive, Ms. 42158 p.9, p.52
91 Hamilton to Palmerston, 2 May 1832, FO 27/446/35; Hamilton to Palmerston, 4 May 1832, Ibid., no.40; Hamilton to Palmerston, 5 May 1832, Ibid., no.44
the 15th. Anglo-French relations appeared threatened, and Grey thought Granville’s return to Paris ‘very desirable’, owing to his knowledge of ‘the principal persons’ there.\footnote{Grey to Palmerston, 20 May 1832, BP, PP/GC/GR/2107} Without the presence of a popular ambassador, there was a serious threat of Anglophobic sentiment influencing the French government’s response. Soon after, Palmerston heard that a ship was suspected of ‘being destined for the Thames… to receive a cargo of arms to be disembarked on the French coast’, and the French were duly informed.\footnote{Thomas Spring Rice to Palmerston (minuted by Palmerston), 25 May 1832, FO 27/458} The apparently serious threat which Berri’s revolt posed to both France and Anglo-French relations transformed Britain’s passive attitude towards exile activity into an active one.

After Berri’s insurrection collapsed, British diplomats speculated about her next act. A.J. Foster, the British Minister to Sardinia, reported Berri’s supposed arrival in Spain on 23 May, and on the 26th that she would not be allowed to reside in Sardinia.\footnote{Foster to Palmerston, 23 May 1832, FO 67/87/37; Foster to Palmerston, 26 May 1832, Ibid., no.38} More seriously, fears of Tory-Legitimist cooperation emerged. On 1 June, the British Chargé d’Affaires in Paris speculated that the insurrection had been intended to coincide with the appointment of a Tory government in Britain, as had been threatened when King William refused to create Whig Peers to ensure the passage of the Reform Bill.\footnote{Hamilton to Palmerston, 1 June 1832, FO 27/447/69} Although the idea may well have appeared ridiculous, this coincidence might have invited strong French protests, and Berri’s potential return was considered worrying; the British Consul at Nantes even sought ‘instructions… in the possible event of the Duchesse de Berri demanding an asylum in his house’.\footnote{Hamilton to Palmerston, 8 June 1832, Ibid., no.81} However, Sébastiani confided in Granville that she would probably attempt to ‘embark for Britain’, and that ‘secret orders’ had been given to allow her escape, because Louis Philippe wanted her to avoid punishment.\footnote{Granville to Palmerston, 14 June 1832, Ibid., no.135; Granville to Palmerston, 15 June 1832, Ibid., no.142} Whereas British diplomats were worried by what might happen if Berri attempted to return, her failure and Louis Philippe’s magnanimity tempered the dispute.

In the autumn, the fallen court left Britain. Rumour credited their departure to the spread of cholera to Edinburgh, but as Talleyrand informed Lord Holland, there was
no such outbreak. Diplomatic pressure was also rumoured to have forced their departure. The diarist Thomas Raikes recorded that

‘In consequence of representations … that the exiles were plotting rebellion and assisting the Carlist party in France…our Ministers intimated [that]… they must give up all correspondence with their old adherents or quit [Britain].’

The British Minister to Tuscany provided another explanation. After the Duke of Reichstadt (Napoleon’s son and heir, and also the Austrian Emperor’s grandson) died in July, Austria was ‘no longer sorry to have little Bordeaux as a pledge’. Neither of these stories are borne out in archival sources. As Blacas told Palmerston, Charles decided to leave because of the damp climate and the continued ‘annoyance’ of his creditors. Although French protests appeared the most likely cause, the exiles departed by choice.

They also demanded substantial government assistance. The Duchesse d’Angoulême was a poor sailor, and the exiles wished to borrow two government vessels; one for her via London and Rotterdam, and another to allow the court to depart from Leith. Palmerston feared that this would offend the French by raising the threat of her entry into France. Grey rejected Palmerston’s reasoning, and saw no reason for French objections, because they would probably prefer that the exiles resided in Austria. Although happy to be rid of the exiles, the British feared that mismanaging their departure could seriously offend the French. Even during the last days of their exile, the fallen court remained a potential block to good Anglo-French relations.

Further concerns about the exiles threatened to upset Louis Philippe. Austria would only offer them asylum with the other powers’ consent – and Louis Philippe would apparently only allow Charles’s departure after Berri ‘had quitted France’.

Although Louis Philippe accepted that the British government could not prevent

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98 Brown, Chambord, p.26; Talleyrand to Holland, 1 July 1832, Holland House Papers, Add. MS 51635 f.79
99 Raikes, 10 September 1832, i pp.81-82
100 31 October 1832, Seymour Diaries, Add. MS 60299 f.48
101 Palmerston to William IV (draft), 25 August 1832, Grey Papers, GRE/B45/1/278/1-4
102 Ibid.
103 Grey to Palmerston, 28 August 1832, BP, PP/GC/GR/2140
104 Granville to Palmerston, 29 August 1832, Ibid., PP/GC/GR/332, Granville to Palmerston, 31 August 1832, Ibid., PP/GC/GR/335
Charles’ departure, he suggested that they should ‘use their influence’ to delay it, whilst stories of Austrian connivance in Berri’s uprising emerged.\textsuperscript{105} It now appeared as though Britain would have to persuade them to remain to appease France, an incredibly unlikely prospect. Additionally, in late August, the Austrian Chargé, Philipp von Neumann, presented Palmerston with a draft note to be signed by British, Prussian, Austrian and Russian representatives, affirming that there was no political motivation behind Charles’s departure.\textsuperscript{106} Although Grey and Palmerston wanted Charles to leave (and feared that Metternich wanted to have Bordeaux ‘in his possession’), they opposed showing ‘any active interest’.\textsuperscript{107} They could not make Charles remain, and accession could have implied ‘a joint interest’ in assisting the exiles.\textsuperscript{108} The British government had no interest in being dragged into a dispute concerning the troublesome exiles.

However, its attempts to ease their departure failed. On 6 September, Palmerston promised Blacas that the exiles would receive the required ‘facilities’, and although Blacas complained, he admitted that it was ‘hardly possible’ for Charles to leave without a guarantee of asylum in Austria.\textsuperscript{109} Palmerston did his utmost to secure two suitable vessels, but the impatient Angoulême was prepared to ‘go by the common packet’. Although Neumann had ‘suspended the delivery of passports’, she acquired passports from the Dutch and Hanoverian Ministers, and left just before she could be told that the steamship \textit{Lightning} was ready.\textsuperscript{110} It was instead sent to Leith, but the other exiles had already departed, cheered by local notables including Lord Cathcart.\textsuperscript{111} Whereas exile impatience had nullified government efforts to be rid of them, the people of Edinburgh were sad to see their benefactors depart.

The exiled Bourbons and their supporters had proven to be a nuisance to successive governments, simultaneously condemned and graciously received, even at the risk of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{105} Granville to Palmerston, 31 August 1832, Ibid., PP/GC/GR/335
  \item \textsuperscript{106} draft memorandum, Ibid., PP/GC/NE/10/encl.1
  \item \textsuperscript{107} Grey to Palmerston, 26 August 1832, Ibid., PP/GC/GR/2139/1-2; Palmerston to Grey, 16 September 1832, Grey Papers, GRE/B45/1/288/1
  \item \textsuperscript{108} Palmerston to Grey, 29 August 1832, Ibid.; GRE/B45/1/281; Grey to Palmerston, 31 August 1832, BP, PP/GC/GR/2142/1
  \item \textsuperscript{109} Palmerston to Grey, 6 September 1832, Grey Papers, GRE/B45/1/284/3-4
  \item \textsuperscript{110} Palmerston to Blacas (draft), 13 September 1832, FO 27/460; Palmerston to Grey, 14 September, Grey Papers, GRE/B45/1/287/5; Palmerston to Admiralty (draft), 14 September 1832, FO 27/460; Palmerston to Blacas (draft), 14 September 1832, Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} Palmerston to Blacas (draft), 17 September 1832, Ibid.; \textit{Morning Post}, 26 September 1832
\end{itemize}
a breach with France. Although their status was respected, they very rarely formed political connections, and whilst their plight found considerable sympathy – enough for the British government to loan them a property - their ideals found little interest. However, they had found a germ of support, and saw their fate regularly invoked as a lesson by British politicians. More importantly, their presence created a great deal of concern among British diplomats and politicians, to the extent that British officials feared far more French complaints about the exiles than were actually received. Yet no change was made to Britain’s liberal asylum policy. Whilst the exiled court did not exercise any influence over British politicians, and its presence did not force a change to government policy, the exiles’ liberties had been defended. Their activities had certainly influenced the course of both British politics and Anglo-French relations.
3: Carlist and Miguelite Refugees, 1832-51

After the French Bourbons left Britain, another group of reactionary refugees began to affect British politics; associates of the Spanish pretender Don Carlos and Portuguese usurper Dom Miguel, who were joined by Carlos himself in 1834. This chapter first explores these refugees’ roles in British politics during the 1830s, concentrating upon Carlos’ brief exile, refugee attempts to secure the support of British politicians, and the impact of their activities upon British diplomacy. It then considers further controversies which occurred after Carlos’s son and successor Count Montemolin and then Miguel fled to Britain in 1846-47, focusing upon responses to Miguel’s plans to exploit civil war in Portugal, and Palmerston’s interest in Montemolin as a potential ally against French influence in Spain. Albeit from the fringes of party politics, these refugees influenced the course of British diplomacy, debates inside and outside the cabinet and even conflicts in the peninsula.

Refugees in Britain and Warfare in the Peninsula

Before considering the role which these refugees played in British politics, it is necessary to outline the disputes in which they took a part. After King João VI of Portugal died in 1826, the Portuguese succession was disputed between his sons: the relatively liberal Pedro, Emperor of Brazil, and his reactionary brother Dom Miguel. Pedro engineered a compromise whereby his daughter Maria II became Queen under Miguel’s regency, but Miguel usurped the throne, and in April 1831, Pedro left Brazil to support Maria’s claim by force of arms. The liberal forces, or ‘Pedroites’ subsequently obtained British and French support, and by late 1833 had secured a series of beachheads in Portugal.¹

In September 1833, Ferdinand VII of Spain died and was succeeded by his infant daughter Isabella II under the regency of her constitutionalist mother Maria Christina. Reactionaries including Ferdinand’s brother Don Carlos rejected Isabella’s succession, ostensibly over the ‘Salic Law’ which had previously prevented females from inheriting the throne; and while Britain and France supported the ‘Christino’ government, ‘Carlist’ rebellions broke out in support of the pretender, who had been

¹ Livermore, H.V., A New History of Portugal (2nd Ed.), (Cambridge, 1976), pp.266-79
exiled to Portugal. Carlos and several loyal military units supported Miguel, but in April 1834 Britain, France and Spain entered into a ‘Quadruple Alliance’ with Pedro, which soon triumphed. Miguel was banished to Rome and Carlos fled to Britain, ‘adamantly refused’ to surrender and then escaped to Spain. The Carlist rebellion escalated into a violent proxy war between absolutism and constitutionalism, and as Sir Charles Webster noted, Palmerston made a ‘capital blunder’ in allowing Carlos’ escape. The pretender’s brief exile, which failed to pacify Spain, was a notorious one.

While Carlos’ family and his adviser the Bishop of León accompanied him into exile, other absolutist refugees in Britain supported the Carlist and Miguelite causes. The refugee banker Haber funded their campaigns; Baron Capelle, a former French Minister who had arrived in 1830, recruited troops for Carlos; and another French refugee, Louis Auget de Saint-Sylvain, became Carlos’s ‘most active’ diplomat. Saint-Sylvain, who had fled France to Madrid in 1831, accompanied Carlos into exile, and was “ennobled” as the Baron Los Valles for helping him escape Britain. These efforts were also supported by a Portuguese refugee and former diplomat named Antonio Ribeiro Saraiva. United by their support for Carlos and Miguel, the exiles were often referred to as Carlist ‘agents’. This definition did not apply to refugees alone, because a network of unofficial Carlist ‘diplomats’ had been established by 1834. Nevertheless, refugees were among the most active supporters of peninsular absolutism in Britain.

They were supported by few British politicians. Palmerston feared that absolutist victories would transform Spain and Portugal into Austrian puppets, and he actively supported constitutionalism in the Peninsula. This policy was accepted by liberals,
but many Tories, non-interventionists by nature, also favoured Miguel’s rule in support of “order”. In July 1833, the exiled legitimist officer Marshal Bourmont, who had fled France after Berri’s revolt, arrived in Britain en route to lead Miguel’s forces and met Wellington and Lord Beresford.7 Meanwhile, although Aberdeen was initially tempted to support Carlos, most Tories came to distrust the pretender. Wellington’s meeting with Bourmont was the sole display of support which a mainstream Tory offered to an absolutist refugee during these years; unlike Carlism, Toryism offered order and ‘peaceful progress without the risk of... counter-revolutionary violence.’8 There was little ideological similarity between the two parties, and as Foreign Secretary for a brief period in 1834-35, Wellington followed a largely neutral course towards Spain on the grounds that the Carlist war was a dispute between Spaniards.9

However, a reactionary current continued to flow in conservative politics. The 1833 Commons contained around 50 Ultras, ‘reabsorbed’ into the Tory (or as it was increasingly known, Conservative) Party, and after Tory electoral gains in 1835 and 1837, perhaps 100 of 319 opposition MPs were ‘Ultras’.10 This current sometimes manifested in supporting the Carlists. With the assistance of Carlist refugees, Lords Carnarvon and Londonderry, and the MPs Samuel Grove Price, Donald MacLean and Peter Borthwick campaigned in the Carlists’ favour. The Morning Post and Morning Herald also supported Carlos, and some Tory officers such as Lord Ranelagh even fought for him.11 The sympathies of a minority allowed liberals to conflate Toryism with Carlism, a viewpoint which was shared by the Spanish Minister to Britain, Count Miraflores. At the time of Carlos’s arrival, Miraflores feared that Carlist exiles would abuse British hospitality, abetted by Tory sympathisers.12 Carlist and Miguelite refugees indeed exploited British liberties, but found little Tory assistance.

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7 Times, 17, 19-20 August 1833
9 Holt, Carlist Wars, pp.72-75
11 Spiers, E.M., Radical General: Sir George de Lacy Evans, 1787-1870 (Manchester, 1983), pp.105-6; Bollaert, p.20; Fraser’s Magazine, August 1838, pp.220-34
As the war in Portugal turned against Miguel, Haber was thrust into involvement in the conflict. By late 1832, Miguel was desperate for funds, and consequently turned to Haber. Haber was an unreliable financier, and even Tories rarely invested in his schemes, citing precepts of non-intervention. But despite this difficulty, Haber secured the support of a London Merchant Bank, Gower and Nephew.\(^{13}\) This was no political or financial coup; in contrast to the limited funding Haber secured, both the British government and British financiers generously supported the Pedroites.

Nevertheless, Haber’s promise of a 10 million franc loan funded the expansion of Miguel’s forces.\(^{14}\) It proved to be too little too late, and Haber’s fortunes subsequently declined with those of Carlos and Miguel. By October 1833, he was reportedly at his ‘wits’ end’, failing to raise money in London.\(^{15}\) British financiers and politicians alike refused to support the absolutist princes, and Haber began a more successful venture.

From March 1834, he ‘entrusted’ Saint-Sylvain and an Englishman named William Bollaert to carry dispatches and money between the pretenders and the absolutist courts. On one occasion, Bollaert carried £4000 for the Carlists’ immediate use.\(^{16}\)

This too was a lost cause, for on 26 May, Miguel surrendered. Under the terms of what became known as the Convention of Évora Monte, Carlos and Miguel were banished from the peninsula, and Miguel soon left for Italy.\(^{17}\) Meanwhile, the new Portuguese government disclaimed responsibility for paying back Haber’s loan.\(^{18}\) Constitutionalist victory threatened to ruin Haber, make his operations obsolete, and dissuade investors from supporting any future loans he might arrange. But as George Villiers (who had replaced Addington at Madrid) warned Palmerston, the treaty had not deterred the Carlists.\(^{19}\) Carlos’ flight did not herald the end of the absolutist threat in the peninsula.

According to correspondence put before Parliament in 1838, Carlos had suddenly asked unprepared British representatives in Portugal for passage to Britain. Yet ‘much

\(^{13}\) J.L. da Costa to Haber, 24 December 1832, Vianna, Antonio (ed.), Jose da Silva Carvalho e O Seu Tempo (3 vols., Lisbon, 1891) i p.473; Haber to Viscount Santarem, 31 May 1833, Ibid., i p.221
\(^{14}\) Marichal, Spain, p.44; Dalbian, Denyse, Dom Pedro (Paris, 1959), p.249
\(^{15}\) Morning Chronicle, 29 October 1833
\(^{16}\) Bollaert, Wars, ii p.2, ii pp.83-86
\(^{17}\) Macaulay, Neill, Dom Pedro (Durham, NC, 1986), pp.297-98
\(^{18}\) Livermore, Portugal, p.271
\(^{19}\) Villiers to Palmerston (copy), 23 May 1834, FO 72/432/62
was always omitted’ from ‘blue books’, often to absolve government error, and this was no exception.20 The edited dispatches imply that on 27 May 1834, the British Minister to Portugal, Lord Howard de Walden, reported that if Carlos wished to ‘be conveyed to England’ or elsewhere in northern Europe, he and his suite would be received aboard HMS Donegal. This was agreed to by representatives of the Quadruple Allies, and was such a sudden development that Howard feared that the refugees might arrive before his dispatches.21 Carlos’ departure was thus a work of improvisation, organised without time to consult the allied governments. However, Britain had long contemplated sending Carlos into exile. The Spanish government had sought to persuade Carlos to settle in Italy as early as June 1833, and although he refused transport there, Britain adopted a modified version of this policy. In September 1833, Rear-Admiral Parker, commanding a British flotilla off Portugal, acknowledged plans to ‘place a warship’ at Carlos’ disposal, ‘should he express a wish to proceed to England’.22 The British government had considered the eventuality of Carlos seeking asylum for some months, and was willing to facilitate it.

Despite Carlos’ previous refusal to leave, military defeat seemed to guarantee his departure, and 12 days before Miguel’s surrender, Howard and Parker decided to offer Carlos passage to Italy. Howard believed that Carlos’ life ‘now depends upon his speedy departure’, for the Spanish commander in Portugal, General Rodil, wanted him shot; if presented with the choice of exile or death, Carlos would almost certainly choose the former. Yet Howard had to admit that the Quadruple Treaty left Carlos ‘at liberty to proceed whither he may choose’.23 This was a fatal mistake on the part of its signatories. Indeed, Palmerston later admitted that Britain and its allies ‘had forgotten to take precautions’ against this eventuality.24 Rather than guarantee Carlos’ banishment, the Treaty allowed him to choose his destination – including countries which would allow him to either intrigue or leave for Spain, namely liberal Britain and sympathetic Holland.

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21 Howard to Palmerston, 27 May 1834, Convention of Évora Monte (London, 1838), no.2; Howard to Palmerston, 29 May 1834, Ibid., no.3
22 Parker to Admiralty, 1 June 1833, ADM 1/360/203; 10 August 1833, NMM/PAR/118; Parker to T. Hardy (copy), 2 August 1833, NMM/PAR/71 p.16; Parker to Admiralty, 3 September 1833, ADM 1/361/326
23 Howard to Palmerston, 14 May 1834, BP, PP/GC/HO/298/1
24 Webster, Palmerston, i p.399
On 17 May 1834, Saint-Sylvain, Parker and Howard agreed terms for Carlos’ ‘escape’ and ‘safe passage’ to Portsmouth. Carlos had no desire to go to Italy, and instead wished to reach the Netherlands. As Howard had initially feared, Carlos would find asylum without punishment. But although Howard was disgusted by this settlement, he was confident that Carlos’ plans were ‘not very defined’, because ‘the idea or rather necessity of escape’ had come to the pretender ‘so suddenly’.  

Despite Carlos’ defiance, Howard hoped that the pretender might yet accept defeat and exile. It is therefore unsurprising that Palmerston prevented the publication of passages which described Carlos and his supporters’ desperation, and referred to Howard and Parker’s decision to ‘receive’ them ‘in accordance with the general instructions... to protect persons whose lives might be in danger.’  

Although Howard underestimated Carlos’ resolve, had he not been hamstrung by the Quadruple Treaty and able to present Carlos with the choice of exile in Italy or death, then the pretender’s disastrous sojourn in Britain might have been avoided. Meanwhile, Palmerston gloried in the Treaty’s success. In an article for the *Globe*, he boasted that Alliance’s formation alone had precipitated Miguel’s surrender and Carlos’ departure. Despite the Treaty’s shortcomings, the Foreign Secretary was optimistic that Carlos was resigned to exile in England.

Even without the hindsight that Carlos would escape, the British government did not allow Carlos to land as a refugee. After the *Donegal* reached Portsmouth, Miraflores and the Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, Sir John Backhouse, attempted to persuade Carlos to accept the ‘same engagements as Miguel’ and a ‘handsome’ pension of £30,000. This plan had royal support; King William refused contact with Carlos unless he accepted Miraflores’ terms. Bribery and royal pressure appeared useful means of persuading Carlos into exile, but the pretender refused to negotiate.

Palmerston’s hope to persuade Carlos to accept defeat had failed. Carlos’ rebuff prompted Miraflores to request the pretender’s arrest, but Palmerston refused, because Carlos had not broken any British law. Instead, Carlos was granted asylum, ostensibly

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25 Howard to Palmerston, 17 May 1834, BP, PP/GC/HO/291/1-3
26 Howard to Palmerston (copy), 31 May 1834, FO 72/432
27 ‘For *Globe*’, BP, PP/PRE/B/53/1
28 Palmerston to Graham, 14 June 1834, Graham Papers, Add. MS 79766 ff.129-30

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to make it easier to ‘keep an eye’ on him, and Palmerston promised Miraflores that he would prevent Carlos’ escape. Yet Britain could not restrict Carlos’ movements. He was free to leave and completely undermine Palmerston’s promise. Although controlling Carlos was a vital element of British policy, it was completely impossible without the pretender’s acquiescence.

Palmerston was confident that Carlos was a weak man who would not call his bluff, and reassured Villiers that the pretender’s character was ‘a security against much danger from him.’ Palmerston believed that Carlos would remain ‘for some time’, and had refused a pension because of the influence of his sister-in-law Princess Beira, and his advisor the Bishop of León. This was wishful thinking. Carlos’ refusal to negotiate attested that he retained his ambitions, and Grey thought Backhouse’s failure ‘a matter of regret rather than surprise.’ The Prime Minister doubted whether Carlos should be allowed to remain at Portsmouth, and wanted him to be told that ‘no attempts to disturb the peace of Spain’ would be tolerated. Unlike Palmerston, he recognised that this was a matter for ‘very careful consideration’.

Grey was right to be concerned, for other exiles had made financial agreements with Carlos. Haber, ‘accredited and recommended’ by A.L. Gower, agreed a £5,000,000 loan on 14 June, and Saraiva provided a million francs, apparently from Charles X. Rather than force him to accept exile, Carlos’s sojourn at Portsmouth had allowed him to prepare to return to Spain.

The treatment meted out to Carlos occasioned a British supporter to protest in the House of Lords. On 20 June, Londonderry asked Grey (soon to step aside in favour of Melbourne) ‘in what manner… Ministers intend to receive the illustrious Prince’ and how long Carlos would be ‘detained’, and protested that asking him to ‘renounce the rights he possessed’ was ‘beyond anything that had ever been heard of in history’. Carlos had ‘the same right to protection and good treatment’ as Queen Maria (who had visited in 1831) and Charles X, and Londonderry castigated the government’s attempts to ‘seduce men in their misfortunes from the path which their duty... required

29 Talleyrand to Comte de Rigny, 16 June 1834, Broglie (ed.), Talleyrand, pp.282-83; Holt, Carlist Wars, pp.54-57; Ridley, Palmerston, p.237
30 Ibid.; Grey to Palmerston, 16 June 1834, BP, PP/GC/GR/2312
them to follow.’ Grey could only answer that Backhouse had been sent to treat with Carlos, who would thereafter be received as a Prince. Despite this concession, Londonderry subsequently asked whether Carlos had been subjected to the ignominy of using ‘hackney coaches’, and again whether Backhouse and Miraflores had attempted to force Carlos to abandon his ‘just rights’. Grey replied that papers explaining the government’s actions would be published ‘when the proper time arrived’. 32 Whereas Whigs condemned Carlos, the reactionary Londonderry supported his right to asylum and entitlement to the privileges usually reserved for fallen royalty.

Carlos’ fellow-exile General Moreno was also subjected to argument and controversy. When Governor of Malaga in 1831, Moreno had ordered the execution of a Briton named Boyd, who had joined a group of liberal rebels. In the Commons, Whig MP William Hutt condemned the ‘bloodthirsty… cruel tyrant’, who had used corpses as ‘steps… to ascend to power and favour.’ The difference between Londonderry and Hutt’s attitudes towards Carlist refugees could hardly have been starker, and such was the controversy surrounding Moreno that his right to asylum was questioned; in a series of articles attacking Palmerston, the Times argued in favour of Moreno’s arrest. Yet there were no grounds to arrest him, and Palmerston forcefully replied in the Globe that whilst Moreno was a brute, Boyd had brought misfortune upon himself.33 The Times’ criticism was easily dismissed, but its campaign found attention. Moreno consequently wrote a letter to the Courier which asserted that he had acted upon orders.34 Although the government supported Moreno’s right to asylum, the refugee General was thoroughly execrated.

However, Londonderry was not alone in his support for Carlist refugees. Carlos rented Gloucester Lodge in Brompton, where he received French and Portuguese supporters and ‘a few Tories’ including Londonderry and Cumberland (now an increasingly peripheral figure).35 Whilst Carlos was ‘surprised and delighted at the idea of a foreigner and a perfect stranger’ defending him when he met the Carlist

32 Hansard, 20 June 1834, xxiv cc.595-97
33 Hansard, 27 June 1834, xxiv cc.937-41; draft articles, 23, 26-28 June, 4 July 1834, BP, PP/Pre/B/59-63
34 Morning Post, 27 June 1834; Palmerston to Mr Boyd (draft), 17 July 1834, FO 72/436
pamphleteer William Walton, many visitors were ‘greatly annoyed at Carlos’s ignorance of his rightful position and interests’. 36

Even supporters were unimpressed, and Wellington baulked at assisting him. When a Thomas Morgan suggested founding a state under Carlos in the Canaries to improve British commerce and Tory prospects, Wellington replied that he could not endorse ‘any counsel given to Don Carlos to attack’ a British ally. 37 Wellington favoured neither the Carlists nor foreign adventures, and he visited Carlos to persuade him to accept exile. The Duke deplored Carlos’ warlike intentions, and explained that escape was impossible, that a Tory Ministry would not recognise him as King, and that he did not have ‘a large party’ of British supporters. Wellington thought that proffering his customary bluntness was ‘the best service [he] could do’ to prevent Spain from descending into chaos, and even warned that details of their conversation would reach ‘Downing Street in two hours’. 38 Yet the Morning Chronicle accused him of supporting Carlos. 39 Despite being intended otherwise, Wellington’s visit was interpreted as a display of favour.

A week after he reached London, Carlos escaped with Saint-Sylvain, who had procured Mexican passports under false names. 40 As Donald Southgate notes, ‘there was no means of keeping’ Carlos in Britain, ‘and he slipped away’. 41 Carlos’ escape made Palmerston’s promise to Miraflores look ridiculous, and on 10 July, the Spanish Minister warned Palmerston that Carlos had fled ‘incognito’ to return to Spain. He added two days later that Moreno had left for France. 42 This was followed by a further blunder. Both were headed for France, but this news was not effectively communicated to the French.

36 Talleyrand to Rigny, 7 July 1834, Broglie (ed.), Talleyrand, p.291; Walton, A Reply to the Anglo-Christino pamphlet entitled “The Policy of England Towards Spain” (London, 1837), n.8
39 Morning Chronicle, 30 June 1834
40 Los Valles, Don Carlos, pp.182-83
41 Southgate, Most English Minister, p.76
42 Miraflores to Palmerston, 10 July 1834, BP, PP/GC/MI/615; Miraflores to Palmerston, 12 July 1834, Ibid., PP/GC/MI/616
Although Wellington had told Carlos that ‘the first tidings of his departure would be communicated to France’, Talleyrand was not told anything until Grey mentioned it to him four days later. According to Lord Ellesmere, ‘Talleyrand was furious, for though Lord Palmerston wrote to the French Government, had he told Talleyrand, the news would have reached Paris earlier.’ The blame for Carlos’ escape could not be laid at Britain’s door alone; ‘somehow or another’, St-Sylvain had obtained French visas.

Nevertheless, British liberties had allowed their departure, and Palmerston had prevented France from quickly arresting the pretender. Painfully aware of the government’s failure to prevent Carlos’ escape, Palmerston waited ‘impatiently’ for news, worried that the Catholic Weld family had helped Carlos escape – a potential cause for further Spanish complaint - and remained uncertain of his whereabouts until at least 27 July. But as early as the 7th, Carlos had assumed control of a growing army. Palmerston’s complacency had helped Carlos to escape.

Moreover, en route, Carlos, who had ‘high hopes of receiving’ Haber’s promised funds, authorised a ‘royalist banker’ to ‘undertake negotiation of Haber’s loan in France’. Rather than weaken his cause, Carlos’ brief exile had allowed him to strengthen his hand financially, and after two Radical MPs, G.F. Young and George de Lacy Evans, fruitlessly asked Palmerston whether Carlos ‘was in Spain or not’, a Carlist gloated to Young that Carlos was ‘no longer enjoying English hospitality’, and that a Christino General and 3000 troops had defected. Whereas Palmerston thought that Carlos would be rendered harmless in exile, British liberties had allowed Carlos to reinvigorate the Carlist cause. The British Ambassador to France even warned that French Legitimists were ‘absurdly elated’ by Carlos’ arrival in Spain, and might ‘excite disturbances’ if Carlos had ‘any success whatever.’ Fortunately for the British government, no rebellion broke out in France. However, Carlos’ escape bound Britain to send arms and warships to Spain, for the Quadruple Allies were pledged to

44 Holland to Granville, 14 July 1834, Granville Papers, PRO 30/29/9/4
45 Palmerston to Granville (copy), 25 July 1834, BP, PP/GC/GR/1535; Palmerston to Granville (copy), 27 July 1834, Ibid., PP/GC/GR/1537
46 Ridley, Palmerston, p.238
47 Holt, Carlist Wars, p.69; Henningsen, Striking Events, ii pp.230-31
48 Commons, 21 July 1834, Mirror of Parliament iv p.2858; anonymous to Young, [1834], Young Papers, Add. MS 46712 f.73
49 Granville to Holland, 25 July 1834, Holland House Papers, Add. MS 51605 f.130
defeat him.\textsuperscript{50} The pretender’s brief exile had proven completely counterproductive, and forced Britain into an expensive commitment.

Carlos’ escape unsurprisingly attracted virulent Spanish criticism. On 16 August, Miraflores protested that Howard’s ‘amiable but fatal’ offer of ‘a philanthropic and humane asylum’ had been ‘eluded in an unworthy and disingenuous manner’, and that more blood would be spilled than ‘was intended to be spared’. Although British hospitality was deemed counterproductive, the Spanish government was confident of victory, and only sought British moral support.\textsuperscript{51} However, Carlist victories ‘rapidly’ undermined the Christinos, and obliged Britain to send further materiel to Spain. Carlos’ sojourn in Britain had led to the severe weakening of a British ally, and in August 1835, Palmerston ordered British ships to refuse Carlos protection.\textsuperscript{52} In recognition of the chaos he had created, Carlos’ unwillingness to accept exile was rewarded with the loss of a right routinely granted to fleeing royalty.

Some sympathy was shown when Carlos’ Portuguese wife Maria Francisca died near Portsmouth in September. Stuart de Rothesay, the former Minister to Portugal, shared the front carriage of her funeral processions with Capelle and the Bishop of León, and King William sent his condolences.\textsuperscript{53} Two journals dismissed this display because she had been ‘neglected... whilst living’; it was an act of courtesy rather than heartfelt grief.\textsuperscript{54} Nevertheless, Palmerston was disgusted by an attempt to make political capital out of her passing. When the Tory paper John Bull blamed the government for Maria Francisca’s demise, the Foreign Secretary responded savagely in the Globe. The public, he contended, had not forgotten that Britain had saved Carlos and his suite from becoming ‘marked prisoners’. Whereas he would later deny it to avoid censure, Palmerston now (anonymously) admitted complicity in their escape. This had ‘perhaps’ been overgenerous, but Carlos had not admitted defeat in return for his life, as a ‘man of honour’ should. Palmerston added that the stress caused by Carlos’ escape would have hastened Maria Francisca’s death.\textsuperscript{55} Rather than ignore this scurrilous article, Palmerston turned its argument on its head.

\textsuperscript{50} Ridley, Palmerston, p.269
\textsuperscript{51} Miraflores to Palmerston (copy), 16 July 1834, FO 72/433
\textsuperscript{52} Marichal, p.63; Palmerston to Granville (draft), 14 August 1835, FO 27/498/25
\textsuperscript{53} Standard, 18 September 1834; Los Valles, Don Carlos, p.285
\textsuperscript{54} United Service Magazine, October 1834, pp.251-52; New Monthly Magazine, October 1834, p.224
\textsuperscript{55} ‘Globe’, BP, PP/PRE/B/65/1-2
Carlos’ family otherwise lived relatively quietly.\(^{56}\) As Miraflores informed Palmerston, Maria Francisca had avoided other Carlist refugees ‘as much as possible’, because they wanted money.\(^{57}\) The refugees who sought her assistance did, however, inspire two British officers to join Carlos’s ranks.\(^{58}\) Beira, who ‘held her court periodically in Duchess Street’, found minimal support, and among the exiles’ few British defenders were the Henningsen family, devout Catholics whose home became a rendezvous for ‘Legitimist émigrés’. Amelia Henningsen thought the Carlist refugees ‘fine fellows and good Catholics’, and one, the ‘clever, kind-hearted’ Chevalier Ossense, a former Inquisition judge, ‘took down all our prejudices against that much vilified institution’.\(^{59}\) Yet these views were untypical of Britons. Although Bollaert advised Beira, he provided information concerning British politics which was ‘more truthful than pleasing’, and few invested in Haber’s loan.\(^{60}\)

Exile fortunes did not improve under a Tory government, underlining the lack of support which they could rely upon. In November, after several cabinet ministers resigned, King William appointed a minority Tory government, initially led by Wellington before Peel could return from Italy. Wellington then served as Foreign Secretary. He pursued a largely non-interventionist course, and accepted the ‘liberal regimes in Spain and Portugal’.\(^{61}\) The exiles were ‘anxious to know how far they could depend upon the Tory government’, but correctly suspected that it would neither assist nor persecute them. Soon after Wellington assumed office, he ignored requests from the Bishop of León that he prevent the departure of British Christino recruits.\(^{62}\) This pattern continued throughout the Tories’ ‘Hundred Days’.

Although Tories were more sympathetic to the Carlists than the Whigs, Wellington officially favoured neither side. By April 1835, he had ‘reprimanded’ Londonderry and Strangford for involvement in Beira’s affairs, and told a Miguelite agent that a

\(^{56}\) Los Valles, *Don Carlos*, p.237  
\(^{57}\) Miraflores to Palmerston, 29 July 1834, BP, PP/GC/MI/617  
\(^{58}\) *Fraser’s Magazine*, August 1838, pp.230-34  
\(^{59}\) Young, Margaret (ed.), *The Reminiscences of Amelia de Henningsen* (Cape Town, 1989), pp.91-95  
\(^{60}\) Bollaert, *Wars*, ii p.147, ii p.110  
\(^{61}\) *Wellington*, nn.6-7, n.14  
\(^{62}\) Bishop of León to Wellington, 20 November 1834, Ibid., ii no.49; Messrs. Tucker and Wheatley to Wellington, 21 November 1834, Ibid., ii no.61; Bullen, ‘Party Politics’, p.53; Bollaert, *Wars*, ii p.128
projected expedition would be sunk. Wellington had ruined the exiles’ hopes, and in February 1835, he rejected a suggestion that he should employ Haber as an intermediary with Carlos. Haber’s disreputable reputation had probably preceded him. However, a week later, Haber sought Wellington’s assistance in saving the lives of 27 Carlist officers who had been arrested aboard a British ship. Intrigued, and concerned by the fact that both sides had committed atrocities, Wellington asked whose authority Haber wrote upon. Wellington repeatedly insisted that Haber demonstrate his credentials, and Beira’s verbal authorisation was deemed insufficient. Although willing to regulate the conflict in Spain, Wellington was wary about collaborating with Carlist refugees.

Soon after, Beira made another approach via Londonderry, written by the pamphleteer Walton. Wellington unsurprisingly rejected it. Humanity, he contended, was not unilateral, and he could not sanction the release of prisoners unless both Christinos and Carlists did so. Wellington rejected a further appeal, even though Beira dissociated herself from it, because it would ‘compromise the dignity of the King’. Whether the exiles found the support of Ultra-Tories or otherwise, Wellington was incredibly cautious, and angered by their persistence. Although Wellington sent Villiers a dispatch concerning the 27 officers, Villiers and the Spanish Prime Minister had already discussed their fate. The officers’ lives were spared, but they were not allowed to rejoin the war. Whilst the officers were saved, it was without collaboration with the exiles, and not to the Carlists’ advantage.

In spite of exile intrigues, the royal status of Carlos’s family was respected. Wellington facilitated communication between Beira and King William, and after the Whigs resumed office in April, Palmerston organised the departure of Carlos’s family. In a letter to William, Carlos thanked him and the British people for their

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64 John Wilks, Jr. to Wellington, 7 February 1835, Wellington, ii no.873
65 Haber to Wellington, 15 February 1835, Ibid., ii no.905
66 Wellington to Haber, 15 February 1835, Ibid., ii no.906
67 Wellington to Haber, 17 February 1835, Ibid., ii no.925; Haber to Wellington, 19 February 1835, Ibid., ii no.935; Wellington to Haber, 20 February 1835, Ibid., ii no.936; Haber to Wellington, 21 February, Ibid., ii no.948; Wellington to Haber, 21 February, Ibid., ii no.949
68 Londonderry to Wellington, 2 March 1835, Ibid., ii no.985; Wellington to Londonderry, 3 March 1835, Ibid., ii no.986
69 Memorandum, 7 March 1835, Ibid., ii no.1002
70 Villiers to F. Martinez de la Rosa, 10 March 1835, Ms. Clar[endon]. C.454 f.314
hospitality, and explained that his family had to leave for their health, whilst he had
departed to pursue his ‘legitimate rights’ and share the perils of warfare with his
‘subjects’. The appeal was accepted, probably because it ensured their departure.
They were loaned a government vessel, and £20 was spent on their ‘conveyance and
entertainment’. Carlos’s family had not proven popular; although an ‘English
capitalist’ (probably Gower) instantly paid £1500 contracted in Beira’s name when
she was arrested for debt, she retained few British supporters. On her and Carlos’
birthdays, ‘Carlist Spaniards’, especially ‘emigrants’ whom she supported, rather than
Britons, had paid their respects to her. Attended by mostly Spanish sycophants, they
attracted little praise. As the Age commented, Beira’s ‘sojourn here, owing the
company she kept’, did the Carlists ‘no service’.

To Carlos’s anger, neither did Haber’s fundraising. Additional loans were floated in
Paris and The Hague, and when it was reported that Carlos had refused to receive
loans in April 1835, the Morning Herald published a letter from Haber asserting
otherwise. Carlos remained reliant upon subsidies from his allies, and British
indifference forced Haber to make up the shortfall himself; by August 1835, he had
sent £70,000. Although Tory papers willingly published Haber’s protests, he found
little support.

Tories were nevertheless accused of collaborating with the exiles. In mid-1835,
Carlos issued the ‘Durango Decree’, which declared that foreign prisoners would be
shot, and it was widely denounced in Britain. The Chronicle urged the Bishop of León
to leave, before he was hurt for being among Carlos’s advisers. However, de Lacy
Evans, the commander of the British Legion raised to fight the Carlists alongside the
Christino army, later recalled that Beira and the Bishop had been ‘in intimate
communication with the English Carlists’, and that the Decree’s ‘primary objective’

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71 Strangford to Wellington, 25 December 1834, Wellington, ii no.484; Wellington to Strangford, 26
December 1834, Ibid., ii no.485; Ludolf to Palmerston, 21 April 1835, BP, PP/GC/LU/8; Palmerston to
Ludolf (copy), 25 April 1835, Ibid., PP/GC/LU/11; Don Carlos to William IV, 11 February 1835, Ibid.,
PP/GC/LU/11/enc. 1
72 Civil Contingencies (London, 1836), p.8
73 Palmerston to Ludolf (draft), 11 May 1835, FO 70/144
74 Court Journal, 4 April 1835, 2 May 1835
75 Age, 21 June 1835
76 Morning Chronicle, 26 September 1834; Standard, 28 November 1834; Examiner, 26 April 1835
77 Bollaert, Wars, ii p.94; ii p.100; ii p.154, ii pp.113-17; Mosley, ‘Intervention’, pp.206-10
78 Age, 19 July 1835
was ‘to check the recruiting of men and officers’ whilst giving Tories ‘a convenient weapon of attack’.

According to this argument, the brutal Durango Decree was both an example of Carlist barbarity and a document concocted by the exiles and their Tory sympathisers to dissuade British volunteers from joining the Christino forces.

One instance of Tory-Carlist collusion lends some support to this theory. In July 1835, Londonderry embarrassed Melbourne in the Lords when he asked the Prime Minister whether the Durango Decree was ‘compatible’ with the Eliot Convention (a localised agreement between the belligerents not to kill prisoners.) After Melbourne dismissed the Durango Decree as a fake and added that the convention covered the Legion, Londonderry ‘produced a copy of the decree signed by’ Carlos, and ‘authenticated... by the Bishop of León’. With the Bishop’s support, Londonderry had revealed that the Decree existed, and that British recruits to the Christino army were in greater danger than the government admitted. *John Bull* noted that Melbourne was ‘constrained... to hold his tongue, and look remarkably silly’. In light of this exchange, Evans’s charge appears more credible, because the decree suited both the exiles and the Tory opposition, who were opposed to the Legion’s existence on non-interventionist grounds. Wellington and Lord Hill, the conservative Commander-in-Chief, even acted to prevent eligible officers from volunteering. However, it should be noted that Palmerston initially believed that the Durango Decree was a fake, ‘a menace to deter people from enlisting’. Evans could well have embellished the idea that the decree was a forgery to exaggerate the links forged between Tories and the exiles.

The exiles also propagated their cause in print. Haber claimed to have ‘advised’ sympathetic newspapers, and apparently ‘did his best to apologise for Carlos’s political shortcomings’. Although Carlos’s absolutism undermined Haber’s efforts, Palmerston could not ‘conceive how the *Chronicle*... came to suggest a marriage between Carlos’s son and Isabella’ in May, unless Haber had persuaded the editor to

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80 *John Bull*, 6 July 1835
81 Spiers, *Radical General*, p.68
82 Palmerston to Wylde (copy), 13 July 1835, BP, PP/GC/WY/21
83 Bollaert, *Wars*, ii p.130
It was entirely unexpected that a Whig newspaper might promote a plan advocated by the Carlists’ allies as well as Tory newspapers, the latter possibly owing to Haber’s advice.

Los Valles’s biography of Carlos, published in August, was praised by Tory journals. But the book was accorded little value by its publisher, who had paid £180 for the English copyright of a work by Charles X’s ex-Minister d’Haussez, and paid Los Valles a mere £20. These rare instances of exile opinion finding publication were hardly propaganda coups, and when Palmerston warned Howard that two of his staff were believed to have distributed Miguelite pamphlets for Saraiva, both strenuously denied the accusation. No further action appears to have been taken.

Palmerston created a greater sensation by humiliating the Bishop of León. When the Bishop requested British help to free the 27 Carlist officers (who were now held at Coruña) in October 1835, Palmerston could ‘not refrain from expressing the greatest surprise’. He had not expected to ‘hear the principles of humanity and the precepts of religion invoked by the representative and adviser’ of a Prince who thought slaughtering prisoners a ‘military duty’. The Bishop, he scathingly continued, would have been ‘better entitled to appeal to the humanity and religious feelings of the British government’ if he publicly appealed to Carlos to retract the ‘disgraceful’ Durango Decree. Palmerston would only negotiate after its repeal, and he agreed to an ‘indiscreet’ publication of the exchange, implored by Queen Christina and her Prime Minister. It soon appeared in the British press, and while Palmerston’s riposte amused liberals, a Tory paper used it as an opportunity to abuse the British Legion.

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84 Palmerston to Villiers, 22 May 1835, Bullen, Roger and Strong, Felicity (eds.), Palmerston: Private correspondence with Sir George Villiers (afterwards fourth Earl of Clarendon) as Minister to Spain, 1833-1837 (London, 1985) (hereafter ‘Palmerston-Villiers’), no.118
85 Riasanovsky, N.V., Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-1855 (London, 1959), p.253; e.g. Standard, 15 December 1834; Morning Post 2 February 1835
86 Bullen, ‘Party Politics’, p.53; Morning Post, 11 August 1835; Standard, 24 August 1835
87 Memorandum of agreement, 1833, Bentley Papers, Add. MS 46612 f.9; Memoranda of agreements, 31 July 1835, Ibid., f.170 and 20 August 1835, Ibid., Add. MS 46649 f.73
88 Palmerston to Howard (copy), 30 November 1835, Palmerston Papers, Add. MS 48440 f.181; denials by Major Dodwell and Mr Meagher, 17 December 1835, Ibid., ff.215-20
89 Palmerston to the Bishop of León (draft), 20 October 1835, FO 72/455
90 Villiers to Palmerston, 3 November 1835, Palmerston-Villiers no.157; Villiers to Palmerston, 7 November 1835, Ibid., no.159
91 Palmerston to Villiers, 13 November 1835, Ibid., no.162; Bell’s Life in London, 31 January 1836; Age, 31 January 1836
Although the Bishop’s overture was easily condemned as hypocritical, Palmerston’s response was not universally praised.

The Bishop’s overture was subsequently defended in Parliament. On 5 February 1836, Grove Price announced that the Bishop had written in ‘the mild spirit of a clergyman,’ and charged that Palmerston had sneered at a petition for mercy. Palmerston admitted using harsh language, but added that the appeal had been made after Carlos had spurned calls to rescind the Durango Decree. His reply had been proportionate, and he had already acted ‘in favour of the prisoners.’ Grove Price, he concluded, had been ‘wholly misled’. Meanwhile, Londonderry derided Palmerston’s letter as ‘most useless and uncalled for’, and wanted the exchange published for the Lords to ‘judge for themselves as to the success of the application’. Melbourne agreed, because the prisoners had been captured legally. Londonderry’s attack was easily dismissed, and subsequently censured by Peel and Wellington. These attempts to extract political advantage neither influenced British policy nor found the backing of the Tory leadership, although on 12 December 1837, Borthwick, Grove Price and Maclean secured the publication of further papers concerning the prisoners. Exile arguments were easily dismissed, and the prisoners became a cause célèbre for Carlist refugees and Carlist Tories alone.

A Series of Desperate Overtures

In the summer of 1836, Los Valles attempted to negotiate with the British government. On 16 June, the Standard reported that ‘some sensation’ was ‘excited in the City’ when Los Valles visited the Foreign Office, and it was rumoured that he had presented terms for an armistice. Whilst financiers welcomed the prospect, Palmerston suspected that Los Valles wished to arrange a marriage between Isabella and Carlos’ eldest son. Los Valles was turned away, and again rebuffed on 20 June, when he appealed on behalf of the 27 prisoners. Palmerston explained that he could not receive letters from him, for reasons which had since ‘acquired additional force’;

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92 Hansard, 5 February 1836 xxxi c.125, cc.141-42
93 Hansard, 12 February 1836 xxxi cc.315-6
94 Londonderry to Peel, 16 March 1836, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40422 ff.62-64
95 Hansard, 12 December 1837, xxxix cc.992-1011
96 Standard, 16 June 1836
97 Palmerston to Villiers, 14 June 1836, Palmerston-Villiers no.224; Palmerston to Villiers, 20 June 1836, Ibid., no.227
Carlists had ‘deliberately assassinated’ six Legionary prisoners.\(^{98}\) This unlikely scenario (probably deliberately) precluded any discussion.

Undeterred, Los Valles ‘contrived to get admission’ to Backhouse’s home. Los Valles argued that ‘cold-blooded massacres’ were as ‘odious’ to Carlos as they were to Palmerston, and that if Britain offered to guarantee the Elliot convention to cover all Spain and foreign combatants, he would use ‘all the means in his power’ to gain Carlos’s signature. Backhouse thought that Palmerston would consider this appeal, but Palmerston adamantly refused; he could not communicate ‘upon any subject whatever either directly or indirectly’ with Carlos or his agents. Villiers was instructed to inform the Spanish government of this exchange, lest they heard ‘any erroneous report’.\(^{99}\) The politically damaging idea that the government had negotiated with the Carlists could not be tolerated.

As the Standard’s report of Los Valles’s interview indicates, the exiles continued to find support from conservative journalists. Saraiva became a ‘regular correspondent for the Morning Post’, and by late 1836, Haber had apparently befriended J.G. Lockhart of the Quarterly Review, Thomas Barnes of the Times, and other journalists from the Courier and Sun.\(^{100}\) But when Haber suggested in a letter to the Morning Post that the great powers should impose an armistice in Spain, his call was echoed by John Bull rather than any of the papers which he claimed to have links with.\(^{101}\) Haber’s influence over supposedly sympathetic titles was not guaranteed, and by placing ‘great emphasis’ upon Carlist atrocities, liberal publications claimed ‘a monopoly of moral virtue’.\(^{102}\) The brutality of the Carlist forces ensured that exiles’ limited contacts in the press were of little use.

However, in March 1837, Haber achieved a notable coup. When Palmerston heard that Haber (whom he had ‘frequently declined’ to meet) had a scheme to overthrow Carlos, who had ‘behaved ill to him’, it piqued his interest. Haber believed that by publicising Carlos’s debts, he could prevent him from borrowing money and

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\(^{98}\) Los Valles to Palmerston and minute by Palmerston, 20 June 1836, FO 72/472

\(^{99}\) Minute by Backhouse, 3 July 1836, FO 72/473; Los Valles to Palmerston, 4 July 1836, and minutes by Palmerston, 4-5 July 1836, Ibid.; Palmerston to Villiers (draft), 13 June 1836 FO 72/456/48

\(^{100}\) Howe, ‘Miguel’, p.76; Bollaert, Wars, ii p.284

\(^{101}\) John Bull, 26 February 1837

\(^{102}\) Bullen, ‘Party Politics’, p.58
purchasing supplies; that if Britain guaranteed the pardon and promotion of Carlist officers, he could ensure their defection; and that a marriage between Carlos’ son and Isabella, accompanied by terminating Maria Christina’s regency, could end hostilities. Haber also hoped that Carlos’ debts to him would be repaid by Spain – a ‘trifle’ of £300,000.

Palmerston thought Haber’s suggestions unworkable. Because Carlist materiel largely came from Russia and Austria, choking Carlos’s access to credit would have achieved little. Furthermore, Britain could not guarantee any defections, although Palmerston thought that the Christinos would sponsor such an arrangement. This point alone was accepted. Palmerston thought that marrying Isabella to her adult cousin was politically impossible, and would undermine the concept of legitimacy – especially if he was substituted for a younger brother who could be brought up as a liberal, which Haber suggested as an alternative. 103 Desperate for money, Haber had failed to impress the curious Palmerston.

Meanwhile, the exiles continued to find limited Tory support. In early 1837, ‘a few Tory underlings’ were alleged to have received ‘speeches ready-made from the financial agents of Don Carlos’ (i.e. Haber.) 104 But although Saraiva had intrigued with Tories whilst a diplomat, this had since ceased; that October, he unfavourably compared Aberdeen with the pro-Carlist Lord Carnarvon. 105 Reactionaries alone remained supportive of the exiles’ efforts. Haber later recalled that a London newspaper had praised him for his ‘intercessions’ and for expressing ‘great sorrow and regret’ at the Durango Decree, and in April 1837, MacLean told the Commons that Haber had persuaded Carlos to spare six British prisoners, which supposedly proved that Carlos was not a ‘cruel despot’. Similarly, in May 1838, Los Valles ensured the inclusion of two British officers in a prisoner exchange. 106 Yet such praise stemmed from rare magnanimity rather than continued demonstrations of principle. The Carlist Tories’ statements would have hardly troubled Whig publicists.

103 Palmerston to Melbourne, 26 March 1837, The Melbourne papers from the Royal Archives, Windsor Castle (East Ardsley, 1974), reel 5
104 Westminster Review, January 1837, p.307
105 Spectator, 24 August 1833; 10 October 1837, Inspeção das Bibliotecas Eruditas e Arquivos, Diário de Ribeiro Saraiva 1831-1888 (2 Vols., Lisbon, 1951) ii p.163
106 Bollaert, Wars, ii pp.181-82; Morning Chronicle, 19 April 1837; Hansard, 18 April 1837, xxxvii cc.1407-08; United Service Journal, August 1841, pp.532-34
Indeed, when Carnarvon published an account of earlier Iberian travels with an appendix describing the ‘Basque Provinces’ in late 1836, he and the exiles lost a pamphlet war. Villiers produced a reply, and in response, Carnarvon revised his book with exile assistance. Charles Henningsen, who was ‘intimately acquainted’ with the Bishop of León, offered to consult him prior to his departure for Spain, and Carnarvon received letters from the Bishop which apparently proved that Carlos would not renew the Inquisition. Carnarvon’s pamphlet consequently referred to these sources and other correspondence written by the refugee Bishop, and he was not alone in deploying exile professions against Villiers’ work.

In a separate reply, Walton asserted that the Bishop had told him that Carlos fought for tradition; that he had witnessed him ‘declare’ his opposition to the Inquisition; and that contrary to Villiers’s narrative, a French Carlist shot by the Christinos was not a combatant – he had left Britain for Spain after the Bishop told him that Carlos disliked commissioning foreigners. Exile testimony appeared compelling, but in another pamphlet, Villiers dismissed it as insufficient evidence of what Carlos ‘might do’ in power; the Inquisition had to ‘reign...and well the Bishop knows it’. Moreover, Carnarvon’s ‘friend’ would not have allowed the publication of the New Testament in Spanish as the Christino government had. Simply reminding Tory Carlists of their friends’ alien values was sufficient argument to nullify exile claims, even in 1837, when Carlist forces marched to within 15 miles of Madrid. These military successes ensured that exile activity concerned the British government. On 28 April, a James Henderson warned Palmerston that Capelle was Carlos’s ‘most prominent and indefatigable agent’ in London, ‘minutely acquainted’ with his ‘wants and circumstances’, and had ‘dispatched’ at least one officer to the ‘ranks of Don Carlos’. Carlos was also making ‘great assertions’ to obtain funds, and intended to march on Madrid, Seville and Cadiz with 40,000 men, which Capelle believed

107 J.R. Gower to Carnarvon (n.d., 1836), Carnarvon Papers, 75M91/E26/32; Gower to Carnarvon, 21 February 1837, Ibid., 75M91/E26/40; Gower to Carnarvon, 21 February 1837, Ibid., 75M91/E26/42; Gower to Carnarvon, 21 February 1837, Ibid., 75M91/E26/44
109 Walton, A Reply, p.50, pp.89-90, pp.176-77
111 Ibid., p.183
112 Marichal, Spain, p.113
possible with sufficient funding. Capelle (who had openly travelled to Rotterdam in August 1836, probably to secure funds) had unintentionally revealed the Carlists’ plans.

When Los Valles visited Holland in December, the British Minister, E.C. Disbrowe, promised Palmerston that he would ascertain Los Valles’ ‘object’, and what turned out to be a mission to the reactionary King Willem I occasioned further intelligence. Upon meeting Willem, Los Valles confidently claimed that Carlos could have entered Madrid ‘had he chosen to’. Los Valles also claimed to have met Louis Philippe, who was ‘decidedly friendly to Don Carlos’, although the Czar was ‘the only sovereign really attached to the cause’. More importantly, Willem promised to consider a ‘proposal’ from Carlos. Like Capelle’s boasts, Los Valles’ mission attracted attention and exposed new Carlist ambitions.

After Los Valles returned to London, he left for Vienna to explain Carlos’ failure to take Madrid, and ‘obtain more funds from the northern courts’. Los Valles’ infamy preceded him, and exposed the apparent futility of his exertions. On 15 January 1838, the British Minister to Prussia reported that Los Valles had ‘made no impression’. Los Valles had failed, and the same appeared to happen in St Petersburg. The British Ambassador, Ralph Milbanke, reported that on the advice of Carlos’s suite, Los Valles had not asked to meet Czar Nicolas, and had been told that Russia could neither provide more money, nor recognise Carlos unless he triumphed. It was also rumoured that Los Valles had been ‘commissioned’ to secure support if the Quadruple powers held a conference on Spain. Milbanke supposed that this was ‘not... far from the truth’; yet he had been deceived.

As Philip Mosley notes, Los Valles secretly met Nicholas, and convinced him to offer Carlos 3 million francs if Prussia and Austria did the same. Although these figures were subsequently reduced and Palmerston was warned that Russia was funding

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113 Henderson to Palmerston, 28 April 1837, FO 72/493
114 Certificate of Arrival: Baron Capelle, 4 August 1836, HO 2/8/1137
115 Disbrowe to Palmerston, 8 December 1837, FO 37/206/89
116 Disbrowe to Palmerston (Secret), 8 December 1837, Ibid.
117 Bollaert, War, ii p.314
118 Lord William Russell to Palmerston, 15 January 1838, FO 64/215/5
119 Milbanke to Palmerston, 20 February 1838, FO 65/242/5
Carlos, this initiative realised vast sums.\textsuperscript{120} Los Valles had succeeded, and upon his return to Britain, he continued to proselytise. On 7 April, the \textit{Morning Post} published a letter from him which condemned parliamentary criticism of the Durango Decree.\textsuperscript{121} He remained committed, and as Carlos Marichal argues, it ‘would not be an exaggeration’ to say that these funds kept Carlist forces active.\textsuperscript{122} Their final campaigns owed much to his efforts. Villiers, on leave in London, observed that although ‘Carlist agents here’ thought these sums inadequate compared to what the Christinos received, they remained optimistic.\textsuperscript{123} The freedom of movement accorded to Los Valles had served only to help the Carlists.

Los Valles had hoodwinked Milbanke, but Disbrowe remained suspicious. Although he was shown letters which demonstrated ‘a complete failure of a new Carlist loan in London, Paris and Belgium’ in May, Disbrowe warned Palmerston that Carlist agents intended to state otherwise, to raise the value of either Haber’s original loan or a new one.\textsuperscript{124} Haber’s loan cast a long shadow, but when Palmerston sought to moderate the war in 1838, he turned to the absolutist courts.\textsuperscript{125} Carlos’s allies remained a greater concern than Carlist refugees, and in June, Los Valles was reportedly sent to warn them that without ‘speedy and efficient assistance’, Carlos would be ‘compelled to give up’.\textsuperscript{126} Even as the conflict came to an end, Carlist refugees continued to foster suspicion. However, during 1839-40, the Carlists were defeated, and over 30,000 ex-combatants fled into France. Carlist refugees now became a French problem on a much larger scale.\textsuperscript{127}

Carlist refugees were of little consequence under Peel’s Tory government of 1841-46. Capelle, Los Valles and Haber all left, and although ‘the Saraiva of London notoriety’ remained, his attempts to influence Portuguese politics through pamphleteering were mocked.\textsuperscript{128} In May 1842, the Portuguese Minister, Baron Moncorvo, sent Foreign Secretary Aberdeen one of Saraiva’s pamphlets to consider. He could not explain some ‘very extraordinary declarations’ it made, and believed that its publication

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120} Mosley, ‘Intervention’, pp.209-13
\item \textsuperscript{121} \textit{Morning Post}, 7 April 1838
\item \textsuperscript{122} Marichal, \textit{Spain}, p.115
\item \textsuperscript{123} Villiers to Lord William Hervey, 9 August 1838, FO 528/31
\item \textsuperscript{124} Disbrowe to Palmerston (Confidential), 15 May 1838, FO 37/210/44
\item \textsuperscript{125} Mosley, ‘Intervention’, p.214
\item \textsuperscript{126} \textit{Times}, 4 June 1838
\item \textsuperscript{127} Holt, \textit{Carlist Wars}, pp.191-92; \textit{Standard}, 26 August 1840; Burgess, \textit{Refuge}, pp.92-95
\item \textsuperscript{128} \textit{Morning Post}, 20 May 1845; \textit{Times}, 26 September 1843; \textit{Morning Chronicle}, 10 April 1844
\end{itemize}
would give Portugal ‘a good pretext to act with great severity’ towards Miguelites. Only the pamphlet’s extraordinary nature created concern, and other appeals similarly fell flat. When a Carlist officer who guarded Maria Fernanda’s grave fell into poverty in 1841, he appealed to Aberdeen, invoking British hospitality and the charity of a Protestant congregation; but although Aberdeen lamented his ‘distressed situation’, he added that he could not help. Saraiva was even seemingly ignored when, in 1843, he offered Aberdeen an opportunity to influence Carlist policies. The Foreign Secretary was uninterested in both refugees’ misfortunes and their schemes.

One final influx of Carlist refugees did find assistance. In 1844, France began to land Spanish refugees in Britain; and whilst a former Legionary organised assistance for recently-arrived liberals, certain Tories assisted the Carlists. Ranelagh provided them with financial assistance and paid for their passage to the Netherlands where King Willem ‘provide[d] for them’, and the Tory Whip Lord Beverley likewise provided relief, because they had received little ‘sympathy and consideration’, and ‘deserved more attention… than their adversaries’. Aberdeen rejected Ranelagh’s appeals for assistance, and a petition in these refugees’ favour was consequently put before the Commons on 13 March 1845. It pleaded that the refugees relied upon the charity of ‘a nobleman and his friends’, and sought either ‘subsistence’ or conveyance ‘to other countries which may afford them a less terrible fate’, but fell upon deaf ears. Thousands of petitions were submitted annually, and further attempts to attract attention failed. Although Ranelagh paid for legal assistance, the refugees obtained neither relief nor Spanish passports. Carlist refugees still only found support from a few devoted Tories.

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129 Moncorvo to Aberdeen, 27 May 1842, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43150 ff.235-6
130 Fernando Maxima Peñaranda to Aberdeen, 13 September 1841 and draft reply, 16 September, Ibid., Add. MS 43237 ff.329-330
131 Saraiva to Aberdeen, 8 August 1843, Ibid., Add. MS 43241 ff.137-40
132 Morning Post, 25 April, 21 June 1844; G. Fitch to Aberdeen (copy), 23 May 1844, HO 45/801
133 G. Lyall to Ranelagh, 28 November 1844, Ms. Ashburnham 2902 f.5; Beverley to G. Merry, 23 August 1845, Ibid., f.7
134 Morning Post, 27 December 1844; Journals of the House of Commons Vol. 100 (1845), p.133; Morning Chronicle, 5 May 1845; Morning Post, 13 February 1845, 3 June 1845; Leys, Colin, ‘Petitioning in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, Political Studies 3:1 (1955), pp.52-54
A different Don Carlos?

Don Carlos’ eldest son and successor as Carlist pretender appeared to have the potential to transform this situation. As a charming young man, Count Montemolin was an ideal propagandist for Carlism, and anxious to obtain British support, Carlos (who had ‘abdicated’ in 1845) ordered Montemolin to escape from house arrest in France in September 1846. Montemolin was welcomed to Britain. He was allowed to visit the Royal Naval Dockyard at Portsmouth, and even joined a club, albeit the Travellers’, which welcomed foreigners. The refugee pretender was treated as a distinguished visitor, and he found support from Tory Carlists, whose leading lights now comprised Peter Borthwick and Lord John Manners, both members of ‘Young England’, a faction which favoured a strong monarchy and church. Whilst Borthwick had supported the Carlists since the 1830s, the younger Manners had a romantic ‘passion for… legitimate monarchy’. Yet earning the confidence of other British politicians presented a rather more difficult task.

Whigs and mainstream Conservatives alike continued to abhor Carlism, and it had also lost newspaper backing; the editor of the Morning Post, Charles Eastland de Michele, was a lone steadfast supporter. In these circumstances it appears surprising that the refugee prince might have attracted the interest of Britain’s aristocracy. However, Montemolin’s views appeared sufficiently moderate to garner wider support. The pretender espoused liberal beliefs, and in 1844, an acquaintance had claimed in a pamphlet that Montemolin was an Anglophile constitutionalist. Although this assessment has not stood the test of time, Montemolin’s liberal affectations intrigued Britons outside of Carlism’s existing constituency. Most notable among them was Palmerston.

136 F. Merry to Palmerston, 22 March 1847, FO 72/735; Cardigan, Recollections, p.79; Morning Post, 4 December 1846
137 Faber, Richard, Young England (London, 1987), pp.173-75
138 Whibley, Manners, i pp.75-80, i p.98
139 Michele to Ranelagh (copy), 31 January 1845, Eastland de Michele Papers, MS Eng. Lett. C.675 f.150
140 Ramos Oliveira, Modern Spain, p.74; Cardigan, Recollections, p.89; Aronsen, Royal Vendetta, p.59; Bullen, Entente, p.272
Palmerston’s interest in Montemolin was driven by both the pretender’s apparent moderation and diplomatic expediency. Soon after the conflict in Spain had ended, the great powers began to consider the marriages of Queen Isabella and her sister Luisa in what became known as the ‘Affair of the Spanish Marriages’; and Montemolin, as the ‘legitimate’ successor, was the absolutist courts’ preferred suitor. Aberdeen sought to ensure the selection of a compromise suitor acceptable to Britain and France, the only great powers which recognised Isabella; but Peel’s government fell in June 1846 after it repealed the Corn Laws with the assistance of opposition MPs. The Conservative party split into free trade (‘Peelite’) and Protectionist factions, and a minority Whig government was appointed under Lord John Russell. With the belligerent Palmerston back at the Foreign Office, Anglo-French relations worsened, and after Louis Philippe and his Foreign Minister François Guizot engineered the Spanish marriages in France’s favour, Palmerston and the British Ambassador to Spain, Sir Henry Bulwer, began to consider cooperating with Montemolin to check French influence in Spain. As an apparently liberal prince with the support of the absolutist courts, Montemolin appeared to have the potential to unite the enemies of the French government.

Montemolin was championed by Tory supporters. On 14 November, Borthwick announced Montemolin’s arrival in London to Michele, which he thought should be published ‘as a leader’, for Louis Philippe ‘dreaded nothing so much … and he would not like to read [it] in the Morning Post.’ However, Borthwick’s triumphalism was tinged with a degree of fear. On the 17th, he arrived at the Foreign Office to announce that the pretender was at risk of assassination. This concern for Montemolin’s safety was complemented by an attempt to capitalise upon his charm. Manners concluded that although ‘many people’ ‘would be happy to receive’ Montemolin, they might not do so ‘if he [were] paraded as a king’, and that it would be ‘much better… if the regal title be dropped’, because there was ‘something absurd in the idea of a

143 Borthwick to Michele and L.J. Mackintosh (‘Immediate and important’), 14 November 1846, Eastland de Michele Papers, MS Eng. Lett. C.668, f.143
144 E.J. Stanley to Bulwer, 17 November 1846, Bulwer Papers, 1/68/11a
King receiving half a dozen English gentlemen’. Montemolin could accordingly enter society and promote his claims. This small group had quickly organised publicity, access to political circles and (as Borthwick hoped) protection for Montemolin.

More significantly, Manners, Ranelagh and Borthwick organised a subscription to fund a Carlist uprising. On 8 October, Manners wrote to Carnarvon, and although they had never met, Manners thought that their ‘agreement and sympathy on nearly all matters’ would elicit a response. Carlist guerrillas were ‘determined to make another vigorous effort to restore the legitimate King and free Spain from French influence’, but were constrained by the Carlist General Ramón Cabrera’s ‘detention’ in England, and a lack of funds. £200 or £300 would allow Cabrera to ‘reach the scene of action’, and Manners was confident that Britain would ‘take no part whatsoever’ against it.

Carnarvon was alarmed. Although he offered a ‘liberal contribution’, he preferred to ‘assist in the good cause’ rather than to ‘produce it’. The idea that a few Tories and exiles might start a war threatened to be an embarrassing and bloody failure. Manners acknowledged that aiding rebellion was ‘unquestionably a very grave matter’, but believed that Cabrera could attain ‘a speedy success’. ‘A lady’ provided the funds, and within weeks, Manners wrote on 23 October, it would become clear whether Spain favoured Montemolin. Manners’ optimism knew few bounds; he predicted that once the rebellion ‘assumed a definite shape and substance’, he could easily procure ‘a city loan’, because it would be ‘midsummer madness’ to fund civil war by subscription. Such was the Tory MP’s enthusiasm for Montemolin that he was willing to support a rebellion in his favour.

In spite of Manners’ enthusiasm, both subscription and rebellion faltered. Whilst subscribers demanded results, refugees demanded money; and the subscribers did not know whether their money was spent upon arms, or to save ‘a mob of Spaniards from starvation.’ Costs continually increased, and tensions divided its organisers after a few

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145 Manners to Michele, (n.d., 1846), Eastland de Michele Papers, MS Eng. Lett. C.674 f.107
146 Manners to Carnarvon, 8 October 1846, Carnarvon Papers, 75M91/E43/91
147 Manners to Carnarvon, 23 October 1846, Ibid., 75M91/E43/96
weeks. The ‘new Carlist war organised in England’ itself soon degenerated into a series of dawn guerrilla raids. A few Tories and exiles had, as Carnarvon feared, created an unsuccessful insurrection.

Other Tories were horrified. Manners’ biographer claimed that the subscription revitalised Carlism in Britain, and that some Tories were impressed by Montemolin, including Londonderry and the former minister Lord Lonsdale. But the Protectionist leader in the Commons, Lord George Bentinck, was dissuaded from meeting Montemolin by Russian Ambassador Baron Brunnow, and Bentinck’s lieutenant Benjamin Disraeli was dismayed. Bentinck was ‘sorry’ to hear that Manners had started ‘the Montemolin subscription with a view to a Carlist movement in Spain!’, and that ‘Peter, our Peter’ (Borthwick) was its treasurer. The Tory leadership, which continued to advocate non-interventionist foreign policies, also remained opposed to Carlism. Although Manners argued that Louis Philippe had acted ‘quite disgraceful[ly]’ towards Montemolin over the Spanish Marriages, Disraeli rejected an invitation to meet him. Tory support for Montemolin remained limited, but Brunnow had to persuade Manners not to ‘go to sea with Cabrera and be hanged as a pirate’. Even the most enthusiastic Tory Carlist conceded that joining a rebellion was inherently dangerous.

However, Montemolin also met and impressed Palmerston, who was ‘most agreeably surprised’ by his intellect and appearance. Whilst this interview ‘almost appeased’ Manners’ ‘Carlist indignation’, it enraged Whigs. The idea that the Foreign Secretary had met the Carlist pretender was unacceptable to his colleagues, but Palmerston was not alone in forming a positive view of the refugee pretender; his close ally Bulwer had adopted the idea of uniting the Carlists and liberal Progresistas under Montemolin’s leadership.

150 Whibley, Manners, i pp.258-59
151 Lord George Bentinck to Disraeli, 9 November 1846, Dep. Hughenden 89/1 ff.42-43
153 Whibley, Manners, i pp.258-59
154 Ibid.; Manners to Disraeli, 30 September 1846, Dep.Hughenden 106/1 f.26; Manners to Disraeli, 28 December 1846, Ibid., ff.30-1
155 Bulwer to Palmerston, 23 September 1846, BP, PP/GC/BU/276/2
Although Montemolin’s apparent moderation made him appear an attractive means of uniting anti-French forces in Spain, Guizot rejected the idea that Palmerston could effectively cooperate with the pretender. After Montemolin’s escape, Guizot had feared that the Carlists and Progresistas would unite under Palmerston’s patronage, and his suspicions were raised by the unlikely news that the exiled Progresista regent Espartero had met Cabrera.\textsuperscript{156} Soon after Montemolin and Cabrera reached Britain, a French diplomat saw Espartero at the Foreign Office.\textsuperscript{157} But by 6 October, the French Foreign Minister had concluded that the heterogeneous nature of Palmerston’s coalition rendered it impossible.\textsuperscript{158} The idea was little more than wishful thinking.

Montemolin was nevertheless thrust into British calculations. Owing to French pressure, on 10 October, Queen Isabella married her cousin the Duke of Cadiz; the same day, her sister Luisa married the Duc de Montpensier, one of Louis Philippe’s sons. This arrangement was meant to ensure that Isabella would not have any children with an allegedly incapable husband, and that after Isabella’s death, either Luisa, Montpensier or their offspring would inherit the throne.\textsuperscript{159} Palmerston had to find a means of restoring British influence in response, but in early November, Bulwer rejected supporting a revolt in Montemolin’s favour. He added that although Cadiz and his father wanted to marry Cadiz’s sisters to Don Carlos’ sons, this could ‘never’ be arranged, and suggested that Palmerston sought ‘a husband who might assist us here’.\textsuperscript{160} Days later, Bulwer warned that the French had ‘promised to aid’ this search.\textsuperscript{161} Louis Philippe and Guizot were determined to entrench French influence, and the opportunity to utilise Montemolin would have disappeared if French influence secured the marriages of Cadiz’s sisters.\textsuperscript{162} In these difficult circumstances, it appeared that securing Montemolin’s marriage to one of Cadiz’s sisters could restore some British influence at Madrid.

\textsuperscript{156} Guizot to Comte Jarnac, 17 September 1846, Fonds Guizot (hereafter ‘FG’) 42/AP/7/2/128; Guizot to Jarnac, 21 September 1846, Ibid., 42/AP/7/2/129
\textsuperscript{157} Guizot to Bresson, 25 September 1846, Ibid., 42/AP/8/38/184
\textsuperscript{158} Guizot to Comte Flahaut, 6 October 1846, Ibid., 42/AP/8/40/27; Guizot to Jarnac, 1 November 1846, Ibid., 42/AP/7/2/146
\textsuperscript{159} Bulwer, \textit{Entente}, p.147
\textsuperscript{160} Bulwer to Palmerston, 7 November 1846, BP, PP/GC/BU/292/2
\textsuperscript{161} Bulwer to Palmerston, 12 November 1846, Ibid., PP/GC/BU/296/1
As a consequence, Palmerston again met Montemolin. This interview attracted criticism in Spain, and on 26 November, he explained it to Queen Victoria as ‘only an attention which he thought due to a [Spanish] Prince’. But he was ‘very agreeably surprised’ by Montemolin’, who appeared ‘quite liberal in his political opinions.’ Roger Bullen characterises these meetings as an attempt to assess ‘Montemolin’s character and his willingness to fall in with whatever plans Palmerston might evolve’; ‘the short term tactical consideration seems to have been uppermost in his mind.’ Yet Palmerston was remarkably candid about how impressed he was by Montemolin. He even told the British Ambassador to France, Lord Normanby, that Montemolin would make ‘a very good sovereign’. Palmerston saw great potential in Montemolin, and was intrigued by thepretender’s claim that he had twice rejected French requests to marry Isabella and become King, with the Salic Law restored. He subsequently advised one of Montemolin’s attendants that the prince should reconcile with the ruling branch of his family and marry one of Cadiz’s sisters, to reunite ‘all the political parties in Spain.’

Even if this idea was a mere contingency, Palmerston’s retelling of these meetings suggests that he thought Montemolin an ideal ally. In reply to Bulwer’s request for ‘a husband for one of’ Cadiz’s sisters, Palmerston consequently argued in favour of Montemolin. The Foreign Secretary was deeply impressed by the refugee pretender; he was ‘very sorry for Isabella, for Spain, and for Europe’ that Montemolin was ‘not Isabella’s husband.’ Palmerston argued that if Montemolin married an Infanta and the Salic Law was restored, the refugee prince would become third-in-line to the throne. This would apparently lead ‘the eastern powers to acknowledge Isabella’ and practically exclude Montpensier and his future offspring from the succession. Although wary of Montemolin’s absolutist allies, Palmerston thought that with British support, the Carlist pretender could undermine French ascendency at Madrid.

163 Palmerston to Victoria, 26 November 1846, Bourne, Kenneth (ed.), The Papers of Queen Victoria on Foreign Affairs (Bethesda, 1990), (hereafter, ‘QVFA’), vol. J46 no.16; Bullen, Entente, p.177; Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 27 November 1846, BP, PP/GC/NO/412
164 Palmerston to Victoria, 26 November 1846, QVFA, vol. J46 no.16
165 Palmerston to Victoria, 30 November 1846, Ibid., no.25
Meanwhile, Manners contemplated how ‘to place the young prince favourably among English society.’ Montemolin was ‘everything we could wish [for]’, having ‘made a gratifying impression upon all who ha[d] seen him’; ‘most intelligent and quick’, he also spoke English ‘very well’. 167 Another Carlist Tory, Lord Strangford, described Montemolin as a ‘bright fellow, very sensible’ and ‘admirable’. 168 Like Don Carlos, Tory Carlists considered Montemolin’s a propaganda tool, and the Duke of Devonshire, the Duchess of Somerset, Lord Dillon, Lord Lonsdale, Lord Brougham and Lady Dinorben all invited Montemolin to receptions. 169 The personable pretender easily attracted attention.

Montemolin also received support from the *Morning Post*, which regularly reported his activities. 170 Brief articles recorded meetings with several politicians, including Carlist Tories (Strangford, Ranelagh, Carnarvon, Manners, Borthwick and Lord Combermere), Tory MPs Lord Pollington and Quintin Dick, and the Radical MPs Thomas Anstey and David Urquhart. 171 Although these men were largely insignificant and/or eccentric, these meetings demonstrated that Montemolin found support from British politicians. Montemolin’s supporters even arranged royal visits, including a visit to Hampton Court. An official report even cited Montemolin amongst the foreign notables who had visited Pentonville prison. 172 Yet these activities were also ridiculed. *Punch* mocked the Post’s fawning, and caricatured ‘ye King’ receiving ‘Jenkins of ye Post, ye Under-Sheriffs and ye other [minor] fashionables’. 173 By March 1847, Montemolin had made ‘no progress’, because people ‘only’ thought ‘of Ireland and domestic affairs’. 174 Despite his early promise, a lack of interest in Spain precluded Montemolin’s chances of obtaining widespread support.

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167 Manners to Carnarvon, 7 December 1846, Carnarvon Papers, 75M91/E43/97
169 Devonshire to Merry, 30 August 1847, Ms. Ashburnham 2902, f.32; Duchess of Somerset to Merry, 18 February 1847, Ibid., f.19; Dillon to Merry, 30 April 1847, Ibid., f.20; Lonsdale to Merry, 28 May 1847, Ibid., f.23; Lady Dinorben to Merry, Ibid., f.2; Brougham to Merry, 16 June 1847, Ibid. f.26
170 By December 1846, such articles appeared daily.
171 *Morning Post*, 1 December 1846; 8 December 1846; 12 December 1846; 16 December 1846; 22 December 1846; 24 December 1846.
172 Manners to G. Merry, 18 May 1847, Ms. Ashburnham 2902 f.21; *Second Report of the Surveyor-General of Prisons* (London, 1847), p.216
173 *Punch* X (1846), p.259; *Punch* XII (1847), pp.50-51
Enter Dom Miguel

Meanwhile, Miguel threatened to embroil Britain in a foreign conflict. Miguel fled Rome in January 1847, and hoped to reach Portugal via Britain to take advantage of the *Patuleia* ('Little Civil War') of October 1846 to June 1847. A ‘Septembrist’ junta hoping to restore the liberal 1822 constitution occupied Oporto, and suspicions that it would ally with the Miguelites drove France and Spain to consider military intervention. British opposition subsequently ensured that Queen Maria was instead persuaded to ‘agree to a joint mediation of Britain, France and Spain between the belligerents.’ This compromise was engineered because had Miguel reached Portugal, Britain would have had to intervene militarily, a policy which was anathema to the Radicals and Peelites upon whom the government relied for survival. Miguel presented Britain with a problem, and both his manners and objectives were considered objectionable; even British Carlists recorded their dislike of Miguel after meeting him.

Once Miguel reached Britain in February, the government began to fear the prospect of him leading loyal troops. Perhaps owing to memories of Don Carlos’ escape, the government took the extraordinary expedient of monitoring him; after a ‘private informant’ told Palmerston that Miguel was residing at his supporter Captain Bennet’s Islington home, it was put under police surveillance, because Miguel intended to join the loyal General MacDonnell once he had ‘a sufficient force under his command’. Meanwhile, the Miguelite exile Saraiva invited Palmerston to meet Miguel, ‘to hear… how liberal his views and opinions were.’ Palmerston dismissed the offer. Any contact was unacceptable, because Miguel had arrived ‘with hostile intention towards the Queen of Portugal’, and Saraiva was ‘strongly’ recommended to ask Miguel to ‘consider the difficulties of his enterprise, and the extent of the assistance which the Queen may possibly receive from her allies.’

Any Miguelite adventure would have been immediately repulsed, but Britain would not intervene in Portugal. As Russell reminded the Queen, Britain was bound only to

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175 Bulwer to Palmerston, 2 January 1847, *Correspondence Related to the Affairs of Portugal* (London, 1847), no.127; Ridley, *Palmerston*, pp.431-33
177 Strickland, p.143; Richards Diary, 12 June 1850, OC10544
178 Palmerston to Victoria, 12 February 1847, QVFA vol. J56, no.49
protect Portugal against foreign invasion or Miguel. He and Palmerston similarly rejected their colleague Lord Lansdowne’s view that intervention would be possible without Miguel’s departure. The exiled usurper was at the centre of arguments between Victoria and her government; whereas the Queen wanted to uphold the Portuguese throne, the government insisted that Miguel’s return alone could incur British intervention.

Further disagreements soon erupted. On 13 February, Palmerston announced to the cabinet that Miguel was in London, and had sent Saraiva to him in the belief that they would be supportive. It was eventually decided that Palmerston should warn Miguel to expect no British support, that it would be dangerous for him to go to Portugal, and that ‘the spirit of the Quadruple Treaty would [then] authorise interference’. However, Victoria and Albert remained concerned about Maria’s regime. On the 15th, Russell told the cabinet that the royal couple were ‘exceedingly anxious about Portugal’ and that he had corresponded with Victoria on ‘the difficulty of interference’. Russell recommended guaranteeing Anglo-Spanish intervention if Miguel reached Portugal or if Miguelite forces entered the war, and Victoria hoped that the cabinet would not ‘alter this scheme’. It instead met strong opposition. Although Home Secretary Sir George Grey argued that Carnarvon was ‘in communication’ with Miguel, and Palmerston knew that Montemolin had visited Miguel, suggesting Carlist interest, both the Queen’s concerns and Russell’s compromise were rejected. The cabinet insisted that Miguel’s appearance alone would justify British intervention.

Palmerston took the threat of Miguel’s departure seriously. The next day, having been informed that Miguel had been overheard saying that he ‘contemplated leaving for Oporto on the packet of Wednesday next’, Palmerston requested that it was detained ‘till the arrival… of the morning mail of… the 18th’. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Auckland, subsequently told Admiral Parker, commanding a fleet off Lisbon, that ‘Bennet’s voyage to Portugal’ was ‘indefinitely suspended’; ‘the owners

179 Palmerston to Russell, 10 February 1847, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/6B ff.58-59; Lansdowne to Russell, 12 February 1847, Ibid., f.69; Memorandum, 13 February 1847, Ibid., f.70-72
180 Hobhouse Diaries, 13 February 1847, Add. MS 43749 f.108; Bullen, Entente, pp.240-1
181 Hobhouse Diaries, 15 February 1847, Add. MS 43749 ff.111-14
182 George Bernard to Palmerston (confidential), 15 February 1847, FO 63/672 f.128; E.J. Stanley to Col. Maberly, 16 February 1847, Ibid., f.129
of the steam packet would knowingly have nothing to do with him’. Bennet appeared to have ‘shown the white feather’ upon being told this. This news did not assuage the Portuguese government. Although Bennet’s departure had been prevented, Palmerston’s actions convinced them that he shared their heightened concerns.

Nevertheless, Britain continued to reject precipitate action. On 27 February, Auckland warned Parker that Bennet intended to embark for Portugal, and although sceptical of Miguelite strength, Auckland suggested that Parker prevented the Miguelite Captain from ‘doing mischief’ by intimating that ‘there would be danger in his going ashore and he might be induced to go on to Gibraltar’. Parker agreed, and added that Portuguese emissaries had apparently been sent ‘to communicate with Miguel on the subject of his landing’. Auckland remained alive to the threat of Miguel’s return, and sought to ensure that Bennet would not serve his master.

Even outlandish rumours of Miguelite activity on British soil spurred government action. On 23 February, Moncorvo sent the Foreign Office what he deemed ‘a great insight into the future plans of D. Miguel & its [sic] party’. A Miguelite junta had supposedly been formed in London to raise materiel, and profit from Septembrist successes. These Miguelites apparently sought Montemolin’s support, and thus the services of Carlist officers. The letter also claimed that Miguel’s supposed conversion to liberalism was both a ploy to court Montemolin and proof that the junta wanted Miguel at its head. Miguel could even supposedly levy 1800-2500 troops in London and Morocco, who could reach Portugal within 25 days of grouping at Gibraltar.

This startling information, which seemingly threatened a serious breach with Portugal and an escalation of hostilities, was relayed to Lieutenant-Governor Wilson, and Colonial Secretary Lord Grey wanted confirmation of Miguelite activity. This concern was reflected in Wilson’s own response to the conflict; he was forced to

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183 Auckland to Parker, 16 February 1847, Parker Papers, NMM/PAR/157A
184 Fragment, BP, PP/MM/PO/51
186 Auckland to Parker, 27 February 1847, Parker Papers, NMM/PAR/157A
187 Parker to Auckland (copy), 9 March 1847, Ibid., NMM/PAR/84 p.17
188 Palmerston to Moncorvo (copy), 18 February 1847, FO 63/671
189 [3rd] Earl Grey to Palmerston, 24 February 1847, Ibid.
‘assure’ the Portuguese Consul at Gibraltar that Miguel had not ‘clandestinely embarked’ upon a Septembrist vessel.\(^{190}\) Meanwhile, the political dangers of British intervention had become apparent. Fearing parliamentary questions from former Minister to Portugal Lord Beavvale, Lansdowne asked Russell whether he thought it ‘expedient’ to ‘say that Miguel's appearance in Portugal would put us in a difficult situation as to interference’, ‘inclined to think that it would’.\(^{191}\) British intervention in Portugal, even if Miguel returned, appeared politically impossible. So long as Miguel remained in Britain, the government would be safe, and consequently even the most unlikely plots attributed to Miguelite exiles were taken seriously.

The report of Miguelite forces being prepared in Gibraltar and Morocco was subsequently dismissed. Wilson thought it ‘difficult to conceive a more inaccurate notion’. If there were any European troops in Morocco, they consisted of a few deserters, and ‘the fallacy with regard to Gibraltar’ was ‘equally preposterous’.\(^{192}\) This news was passed to Moncorvo with an assurance that plotting would not be tolerated at Gibraltar, and a warning against rumour-mongering.\(^{193}\) However, Palmerston happily accepted intelligence provided by Saraiva. France had apparently resolved to support Maria as her fall would result in the ‘certain destruction of all their Spanish schemes’, and had sent agents ‘of name and note’ to the British court, apparently finding the support of Queen Victoria and Aberdeen.\(^{194}\) While Palmerston would not tolerate the slightest hint of intrigue by Miguelite exiles, he welcomed rumours from them which signalled French support for the Portuguese regime. Miguel’s significance was quickly discounted. By 6 March, he was reportedly ‘anxious to return’ to Italy, and to ‘cover the truth of… his feelings… [said] that he must return to Genoa… from whence his invading expedition will accompany him!!!’ The Belgian government promised to prevent Miguel from reaching Germany, and Palmerston was ‘convinced that his being so well-watched and the incident of Bennet’s at Southampton must have made a great impression on his weak and not very courageous mind’.\(^{195}\) Even Moncorvo thought that Miguel had given up, ‘deceived in his expectations of countenance and support in England’, while

\(^{190}\) Wilson to Bulwer, 5 March 1847, Bulwer Papers, 1/71/49
\(^{191}\) Lansdowne to Russell, 24 February 1847, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/6B f.121
\(^{192}\) Wilson to Grey (copy), 18 March 1847, FO 63/734/51
\(^{193}\) Palmerston to Moncorvo (draft), 14 April 1847, FO 63/674
\(^{194}\) Saraiva to Palmerston and minute by Palmerston, 25 February 1847, BP, PP/GC/SA/37
\(^{195}\) Palmerston to E.J. Stanley (copy), 6 March 1847, Ibid., PP/GC/MO/96
Palmerston’s Undersecretary welcomed the news, which would moderate the war and rob the Spanish of a reason to invade Portugal. Palmerston agreed that Miguel would make ‘no attempt’, although the British Minister in Lisbon, George Hamilton Seymour, thought that Miguel ‘might yet give… a good deal of trouble’, because the ‘lower orders… look[ed] to him’. Whilst Miguel retained support in Portugal, the likelihood of his departure was increasingly written off.

However, reports that Bennet had smuggled Miguel into Oporto were taken seriously. On 13 May, Bennet brought a group of Miguelites to Portugal, apparently to ‘assist’ the Junta, and a week later, Parker reported that these agents had met Miguel in London. This escalated into reports that Miguel was aboard Bennet’s vessel, and the British consul at Oporto warned him ‘against taking any part in the contest... or harbouring’ exiles. Bennet unconvincingly replied that only Britons had been aboard, and Seymour was sufficiently apprehensive to warn Auckland that ‘suspicions were afloat that Dom Miguel himself was amongst’ them. Once these reports reached London, *The Times* printed a letter from Saraiva which stated that Miguel had not left. Nevertheless, Bennet’s involvement had made the threat credible, and deeply concerned British officials.

Preventing Miguel’s departure unsurprisingly remained a priority for Britain. On 14 May, having heard that Miguel had entered into negotiations ‘under the sanction… of Her Majesty’s Government’, Seymour expressed support to Palmerston, although he thought that negotiations would be more effective post-war, especially as Maria sought to conciliate Miguelites. Palmerston replied that ‘no such negotiation’ had begun, but he had spoken to ‘persons interested’ in Miguel’s fate, was aware of Miguel’s destitution, and had been told that Portugal would grant Miguel a pension if he renounced his claims. If Miguel obtained money before agreeing terms, it could be used ‘to create and organise disturbances’. Even in poverty, Miguel continued to

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196 E.J. Stanley to Bulwer, 8 March 1847, Bulwer Papers, 1/68/17b
197 Palmerston to Bulwer (copy), 9 March 1847, BP, PP/GC/BU/539; Seymour to Palmerston, 9 March 1847, QVFA vol. J57, no.9
198 Edwin Johnston to Palmerston, 13 May 1847, FO 63/664/101; John Robb to Parker (copy), 20 May 1847, TNA ADM 1/5572/73
199 Johnston to Palmerston, 17 May 1847, FO 63/664/103
201 *The Times*, 25 May 1847, 26 May 1847
202 Seymour to Palmerston (confidential), 14 May 1847, FO 63/648/143
203 Palmerston to Seymour (confidential, draft), 22 May 1847, FO 63/641/108
threaten British objectives. The slightest threat of Miguel’s return appeared dangerous while tensions continued to simmer.

**Montemolin Ascendant?**

As Miguel’s prospects fluctuated, Montemolin’s intentions were debated. On 29 March, having obtained a copy of a Spanish proclamation ordering reprisals against Carlist guerrillas, Borthwick defended Montemolin in the Commons. Borthwick declared that when it was issued, nothing close to an insurrection had existed, and that Montemolin had ordered his followers to refrain from violence. That Borthwick might defend Montemolin’s intentions would have been expected; but in reply, Palmerston lent qualified praise to the refugee prince. ‘[J]udging from the conduct which’ Montemolin had ‘pursued’ in Britain, Palmerston opined that civil war ‘would not meet [Montemolin’s] approbation’, and hoped that he would ‘restrain his followers’. These remarks irked Major-General Evans, the former commander of the British Legion, and Palmerston consequently added that ‘it would be a great abuse of’ of British hospitality ‘to... excite war’. 204 Palmerston had publicly declared that so long as Montemolin demilitarised Carlism, he had no criticism for the refugee prince.

Privately, Palmerston was convinced of Montemolin’s moderation. Upon being warned that the Anglophile Spanish prince Don Enrique might be exiled in February, Palmerston told Bulwer to ‘hint’ that Montemolin had impressed many in Britain with his constitutionalist views, in ‘striking contrast’ to ‘the conduct of Queen Isabella.’ 205 Montemolin’s example contrasted with Isabella’s behaviour, and Palmerston even opined that ‘if Montemolin had come here three years ago, and had made himself and his opinions known, he would by this time have been King of Spain.’ 206 This was a remarkable admission; that had British statesmen known of Montemolin’s apparent constitutionalism before, Britain and the absolutist courts would have ensured his marriage to Queen Isabella. Palmerston even thought that because Spain would eventually be forced to choose between Montpensier and Montemolin as king, a new Carlist movement would emerge, backed by ‘Spaniards of all parties’. 207 As far as Palmerston was concerned, Montemolin could unite and pacify Spain.

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204 *Hansard*, 29 March 1847 xci cc.560-71
205 Palmerston to Bulwer (draft,) 9 February 1847, FO 72/717/15
206 Palmerston to Bulwer, 11 February 1847, Bulwer Papers, 1/47/14
207 Palmerston to Bulwer, 5 March 1847, Dalling, *Palmerston*, iii pp.356-57
However, supporting Montemolin remained a controversial idea. As the diplomat Lord William Hervey informed Irish Viceroy Lord Clarendon (the former George Villiers), Montemolin was not favoured in Spain because it was thought that he had British support, strengthening Montpensier’s position.\(^{208}\) According to Hervey, Bulwer and Palmerston’s intrigues were counterproductive, and on 31 July, Russell suggested to Palmerston that the infant son of Queen Maria would be a better British candidate if Isabella died; whereas the Portuguese prince would find Progresista support, Montemolin was an ‘odious’, banished ‘symbol of absolute monarchy’, supported by a ‘violent party’.\(^{209}\) Having failed to break taboos about Carlism, Montemolin was unable to secure widespread support, and neither Manners nor Borthwick were elected in the general election of July-August 1847.\(^{210}\) Without a Tory champion in the Commons and still a controversial figure among Whigs, Montemolin’s advance had stalled.

**Miguel Debated**

Although the British government had rejected intervention in Portugal unless Miguel returned, in May, British forces joined France and Spain in a display of force to impose a peace settlement upon the Junta, which proved controversial at Westminster. Tories and Radicals pushed for a ‘motion of censure and affirmation of the principles of non-intervention’, and as E.J. Feuchtwanger notes, ‘the situation was not without danger’, for the two parties could ‘force a premature general election’. Palmerston consequently ‘had to keep his head down and did not speak’. The Radical Joseph Hume submitted a motion in the Commons while Protectionist leader Lord Stanley sponsored another in the Lords.\(^{211}\) Miguel almost seemed to have found a friend prior to the debates; on 2 June, Saraiva asked Disraeli for an interview on the matter of intervention in Portugal.\(^{212}\) Disraeli appears to have been intrigued, and Saraiva informed Miguel of Disraeli’s ‘kind intention of visiting him.’ Saraiva’s flattery knew few bounds. He begged Disraeli to attend ‘as a sort of political charity’, and provide ‘the support of your powerful logic and talent’. He even offered ‘any notes or data’

\(^{208}\) Hervey to Clarendon, 25 May 1847, Ms. Clar. C.529/2  
\(^{209}\) Russell to Palmerston (confidential), 31 July 1847, BP, PP/GC/RU/152  
\(^{210}\) Faber, *Young England*, p.116, p.156  
\(^{212}\) Saraiva to Disraeli, 2 June 1847, Dep.Hughenden 142/1 f.123
which Disraeli might need for his ‘piercing and cutting eloquence’. However, Disraeli did not speak, perhaps having decided that association with Miguel threatened severe criticism. Contact with Miguel remained a political liability.

During the debates, the government was attacked for considering a foreign intervention on the grounds of Miguel’s likely return rather than his actual appearance. The attacks were fuelled by published dispatches. Hume condemned the idea of British intervention, and was also deeply critical of the Portuguese government; their ‘unconstitutional measures’ had ‘united the Miguelites and Liberals’. However, he reserved some praise for Palmerston, who had ‘stated again and again that Dom Miguel was in England, living in retirement, and not likely to leave.’ Instead, Palmerston was at fault for tolerating Portuguese tyranny. According to Hume, only Miguel’s return should have justified intervention. This was echoed by Conservatives.

On 15 June, Lord Stanley quoted the same passage as Hume, and added that the war did ‘not turn upon the question who shall be Sovereign of Portugal, but upon the question who shall be the responsible Ministers of the Crown… and by what principles… the country shall be governed’. Peel similarly argued that Britain was only bound to intervene if ‘Miguel were to reappear in Portugal, or a descendant of Don Carlos in Spain’, rather than to establish ‘a particular party in the domestic government of either country’ as the government appeared to have wanted. Borthwick commented in the same vein that ‘there was no such thing as a movement on the part of Don Miguel’. The lack of any mention of Miguel’s attempted departure in the blue book made the government appear to have acted unnecessarily rashly.

In the government’s defence, Russell and Lansdowne also invoked Miguel’s potential return. To Lansdowne, there had been ‘three chances which this country had to contemplate if they did not interfere… the despotism of Doña Maria… a republic… and the despotism of Don Miguel.’ Although the junta had ‘carefully disowned

213 Saraiva to Disraeli, 7 June 1847, Ibid., f.125
214 Hansard, 11 June 1847, xciii cc.389-90
215 Hansard, 15 June 1847, xciii cc.561-64
216 Hansard, 15 June 1847, xciii cc.519-619
217 Hansard, 14 June 1847, xciii cc.479
anything like an adherence to Don Miguel’, they had been ‘favourable’ to him.\textsuperscript{218} According to this statement, Miguel’s return had been paramount amongst the risks posed by Maria’s defeat. Yet in the Commons, Russell declared that had the Junta succeeded, the Spanish Government ‘naturally supposed’ that Miguel ‘would have been raised in [Maria’s] place’, and that if Miguel ‘reigned in Portugal... the Carlists... would be strengthened’; Spain ‘could not and would not permit’ this. He added that ‘the idea that Miguel was to succeed, if the Junta triumphed’ was exaggerated, as perhaps were the ‘fears of the Spanish Government’.\textsuperscript{219} Whilst Lansdowne defended Britain’s policy of contemplating intervention to prevent a Miguelite regime, Russell defended it as a means of preventing Miguel’s return and Spanish invasion. The government avoided censure after Bentinck had the Commons ‘counted out’ and the Lords decided to allow Stanley a ‘triumph’ without defeating the government; but its Portuguese policy and perceived interventionist ambitions had come under significant scrutiny.\textsuperscript{220}

Meanwhile, the idea of pensioning Miguel off remained appealing to Palmerston. Were Miguel bribed into inactivity, his followers might disarm; and in an attempt to gain the Portuguese support for this plan, Palmerston explained his reasoning to Seymour. Miguel had been persuaded to reach Britain because it might ‘afford him some favourable opportunity’, and because his hopes were ‘extinguished’, he now merely sought asylum.\textsuperscript{221} By 20 October, it appeared ‘very likely’ that Miguel had instead accepted a pension from Prussia, and Palmerston reassured Moncorvo that it would ‘only be enough to enable [Miguel] to live in decent comfort’, rather than ‘get up an insurrection’.\textsuperscript{222} With the civil war over, Miguel no longer posed any threat, and his wellbeing superseded diplomatic concerns.

\textbf{Montemolin Eclipsed}

By the autumn, Montemolin had begun to trouble the government instead. Although the Carlist pretender had become the sole potential British candidate for the Spanish

\textsuperscript{218} \textit{Hansard}, 15 June 1847, xciii c.574
\textsuperscript{219} \textit{Hansard}, 11 June 1847, xcii cc.450-69
\textsuperscript{220} Walpole, \textit{Russell}, ii p.12
\textsuperscript{221} Palmerston to Seymour (draft), 26 June 1847, FO 63/641/158
\textsuperscript{222} Palmerston to Moncorvo, 20 October 1847, Moraes Sacramento Papers, Add. MS 63174 f.126
throne if Isabella were to fall, this was ‘not a happy’ conclusion for Bulwer. Clarendon was also worried, and told the Times journalist Henry Reeve that ‘we ought not... under any circumstances, support the pretensions of Montemolin’. It ‘would be disgraceful to us and useless to him’, throw the Progresistas ‘into the arms of the French’, and cause ‘another civil war in which we should be ranged on the side of fanaticism’. Whatever ‘his own wishes’, Montemolin would always be ‘the instrument of the absolute and fanatical party’. Moreover, the French had spread rumours of British support for Montemolin to undermine the Progresistas’ anglophile tendencies. As far as Clarendon was concerned, supporting Montemolin actually reduced British influence in Spain. Meanwhile, Bulwer feared that Montemolin had sanctioned a ‘slaughter’ committed by Carlist guerrillas in August. Bulwer still considered Montemolin a potential ally, and wanted the prince ‘to make some public disavowal’ to shame his supporters ‘into mere humanity’; but only in October did Palmerston receive one via Borthwick. By then, it was too late.

By 12 September, Palmerston had decided that Isabella’s marriage should be annulled so that she could re-marry and produce an heir, which would require the election of a Progresista government. This new plan to prevent a Montpensier succession did not require Carlist support. After Normanby claimed that ‘Montemolin would win in a canter’ if Progresistas had to choose between him and Montpensier two weeks later, Palmerston replied that this was highly unlikely, and that Louis Philippe had urged ‘Carlist bands’ to commit ‘acts of revolting cruelty’ and prevent any agreement with the Progresistas. Without any chance of success, Palmerston no longer supported Montemolin. The pretender had been eclipsed, and alive to Clarendon’s concerns, Russell warned Palmerston in November that Progresistas would probably prefer the Infanta Luisa (now Duchesse de Montpensier) to succeed Isabella, and that Britain should not object. Whig views of Montemolin remained overwhelmingly negative.

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223 Bullen, Entente, p.272
224 Ibid., p.265; Clarendon to Reeve (copy), 18 September 1847, Ms. Clar. Dep. Irish 1 p.56
225 Clarendon to Reeve (copy), 19 September 1847. Ibid., p.57
226 Bulwer to J.F. Pachero (copy), 6 August 1847, FO 72/724
227 Bulwer to Palmerston, 11 August 1847, BP, PP/GC/BU/376; Borthwick to Palmerston, 2 October 1847, FO 72/738
228 Palmerston to Lady Palmerston, 12 September 1847, BP, BR23aa/1/9
229 Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 27 September 1847, Ibid., PP/GC/NO/436
230 Clarendon to Russell (copy), 26 October 1847, Ms. Clar Dep. Irish 1 p.57, pp.109-10; Russell to Palmerston, 26 November 1847, BP, PP/GC/RU/167
As Anglo-French tensions increased in December, Bulwer returned to considering the Spanish succession. Montemolin remained an anti-French candidate, and Britain could no longer ‘rely wholly on the Progresistas; the great thing [was] to form a party that may serve as a link between’ the Carlists and Progresistas. Bulwer believed that ‘such a party’ could be formed from ‘five or six’ Spanish aristocrats, who could ensure the election of 80 to 100 deputies. He was even close to establishing a cheap newspaper to encourage ‘the national odium against [the] French … preparing the way for… Montemolin’. But when Isabella fell ill in January 1848, Palmerston did not want ‘a vacancy in the Spanish throne’.

Bulwer’s enthusiasm for Montemolin far outweighed Palmerston’s. Whereas Montemolin’s chances of regaining Palmerston’s support evaporated when Louis Philippe fell in February, Bulwer felt that Spain had to be saved from misrule. ‘The more I see of poor Spain, the more I am convinced that nothing but a deluge can save it’, he lamented. On 10 April, he reported that respectable ‘parties’ had begun to consider a republic, while others thought that ‘the dynasty must be changed - some turning their eyes… to Count Montemolin and the [liberal] Constitution of 1812’. Bulwer now believed that as the most likely leader of a constitutionalist movement in Spain, Montemolin deserved British support.

Bulwer even considered recognising Montemolin if a coup in his favour succeeded. Whereas the Spanish government’s increasingly authoritarian policies troubled him, Bulwer thought it ‘very probable that Count Montemolin might show himself, supported by the liberal party’. On 14 May, he reported that ‘many schemes were going on for bringing [Montemolin] forward’, and even wondered whether he should support a ‘military despotism in opposition to a prince advocating constitutional doctrines’. Had Montemolin arrived promising parliamentary government, Bulwer would have at least considered supporting him. However, within weeks Bulwer’s

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231 Bulwer to Palmerston, 29 December 1847, Ibid., PP/GC/BU/439/1-2
232 Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 23 January 1848, Ibid., PP/GC/NO/440
233 Palmerston to Bulwer (copy), 10 January 1848, Ibid., PP/GC/BU/571; Bulwer to Aberdeen, 30 January 1848, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43147 f.433
234 Bulwer to Palmerston, 10 April 1848, Correspondence between Great Britain and Spain, relative to the Internal Affairs of Spain, and the Expulsion of the British Minister from Madrid (London, 1848), no.23
235 Bulwer to Palmerston, 22 April 1848, Ibid., no.30
236 Bulwer to Palmerston, 14 May 1848, Ibid., no.57
support for Montemolin and his comments – which had since been published amidst his expulsion from Spain – had become an embarrassment for the government.²³⁷

Montemolin also found little attention in society. Whilst the heiress Angela Burdett-Coutts was willing to meet him, he generally only attended receptions held by Tory hostesses.²³⁸ Although Montemolin was among the ‘interesting’ figures Frédéric Chopin met on a visit to Britain, they met at a reception hosted by Lady Combermere, a Carlist like her husband.²³⁹ Lord Combermere himself was present at ‘more than one curious scene in which …Montemolin, his family and followers cut a ridiculous figure’.²⁴⁰ Whereas Bulwer still believed that Carlists and Progresistas could ally to enthrone Montemolin, Britain’s political elite had otherwise lost interest.²⁴¹ Montemolin retained British supporters, and received several on 28 July, one of whom thought that Montemolin might soon leave if ‘things [were] well in Spain’.²⁴² But the refugee pretender attracted further opprobrium when he was arrested in France for attempting to join a Carlist revolt in April 1849.²⁴³ Palmerston decried this ‘foolish expedition’, and his undersecretary’s wife castigated Montemolin for ‘amusing himself’ whilst others fought for his ‘hopeless’ cause.²⁴⁴

British Carlists thought otherwise. On 22 May, the Duchess of Inverness, a minor member of the royal family, held a ‘large’ reception for Montemolin, and the Morning Post remained supportive.²⁴⁵ Montemolin retained a germ of support, and prior to Inverness’s reception, Palmerston dined with her and Montemolin. It is entirely possible that Palmerston still considered Montemolin a potential ally, for the Foreign Secretary met Borthwick, Merry and Michele soon after.²⁴⁶ However, these meetings could equally reflect Palmerston’s growing influence over the Morning Post.²⁴⁷

²³⁷ Hansard, 5 June 1848, xcix cc.380-81
²³⁸ Angela Burdett-Coutts to F. Merry, 3 June 1848, Ms. Ashburnham 2902 f.39; Morning Post, 13 June 1848, 7 July 1848
²³⁹ Chopin to his family, 19 August 1848, Opieński, Henryk and Voynich, E.L. (eds.), Chopin’s Letters (London, 1932), no.261
²⁴⁰ Fraser’s, November 1866, pp.587-8
²⁴² Richards Diary, 28 July 1849, OC 10544
²⁴³ Bard, Rachel, Navarra: the Durable Kingdom (Reno, 1982), p.178
²⁴⁴ Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 1 April 1849, BP, PP/GC/NO/494/3; Lady Stanley of Alderley to Lady Eddisbury, 21 March 1849, Mitford, Nancy (ed.), The Ladies of Alderley (London, 1938), no.288
²⁴⁵ Richards Diary, 22 May 1849, OC 10544; Morning Post, 11 January 1849, 30 April 1849
²⁴⁶ 22, 23 May, 4, 6, 23 June 1849, BP PP/D/11
²⁴⁷ Brown, Foreign Policy, pp.30-31
most likely explanation would be that Palmerston hoped to retain contact with Montemolin as a contingency.

The refugee pretender left Britain soon after. Montemolin wished to marry a Miss Adeline Horsey, but their engagement was rejected by both her family and Montemolin’s suite, and Combermere persuaded them to end it in favour of a ‘royal alliance’. Montemolin thus departed for Italy. Although Miss Horsey ‘may have suddenly’ become uninterested when Montemolin threatened to ‘abdicate’ in order to marry her, Don Carlos did send a personal letter of thanks to Combermere for the services he had rendered.\footnote{Combermere & Knollys, ii pp.279-83; Holt, Carlist Wars, pp.214-15; Carlos to Combermere, 16 June 1849, Combermere Papers, 9406-185, folder 3} Whereas Don Carlos had hoped that Montemolin would exercise some influence in Britain, it appears likely that Montemolin was now persuaded to depart by a British follower.

Miguel remained in Britain until 1851, ‘living in retirement’ near Bexhill by 1849, and ceased to concern Palmerston.\footnote{John Bull, 9 June 1849} By January 1850, he had ‘no information about Don Miguel or his proceedings’, and had heard ‘nothing about him for a long time’, although he thought it ‘not unlikely that he may be planning some attempt on Portugal’.\footnote{Palmerston to Moncorvo, 8 January 1850, Moraes Saramento Papers, Add. MS 63174 f.137} The usurper’s final departure caused some consternation. On 15 August 1851, Lord Howden, the British Minister to Spain, learnt that the Spanish government believed Miguel had left to ‘make an attempt in Portugal’, and had ordered his arrest should he land in Spain. If this were true, Howden contended, it would give the Spanish Foreign Minister ‘an opportunity’ to resurrect the Quadruple Alliance.\footnote{Lord Howden to Palmerston, 15 August 1851, FO 72/786 /213} Because Miguel’s departure seemingly provided an excuse for Spain to invade Portugal, Palmerston replied that Miguel had left either to take the waters at Spa or Aix, or to reside in Germany.\footnote{Palmerston to Howden (draft), 25 August 1851, FO 72/780/149} He had actually departed to marry a minor German Princess. The British Minister at Frankfurt, Lord Cowley, dismissively reported that Miguel and his suite ‘talk[ed] with certainty of his being shortly again upon the throne’.\footnote{Cowley to Palmerston, 30 September 1851, FO 30/151/274} Previously important factors in British foreign policy, Montemolin and Miguel had passed into near irrelevance.
Nevertheless, both had influenced the course of British politics and diplomacy, albeit in divergent ways. Whereas Montemolin obtained some support which shaped British policies towards Spain and led some Britons to briefly reconsider their views about Carlism, Miguel’s ambitions influenced both the course of Britain’s Portuguese policy and the critique it received. That Miguel’s departure for Germany occasioned some concern demonstrates that whenever he threatened to leave Britain, he could cause diplomatic and political controversy. In contrast, throughout Montemolin’s sojourn in Britain, Palmerston and Bulwer recognised his potential to secure shared goals in Spain.

The activities of earlier Carlist and Miguelite refugees similarly influenced the course of British diplomacy. Although their entreaties to British governments were consistently rejected, these refugees often frustrated British objectives. Both Don Carlos’ escape and refugee fundraising allowed the continuation of the Carlist war in Spain, and the former incident was compounded by Palmerston’s failure to effectively liaise with British allies or understand Carlos’ determination. The freedom accorded to these exiles allowed them and their British collaborators to intrigue across Europe, and thus present a serious hindrance to British foreign policy.

However, only a residue of support for both Miguel and the Carlists existed in Britain. Few Britons were willing to offer these refugees practical support, and the rare exceptions to this rule - such as Gower’s willingness to fund Haber’s efforts, Bennet’s support for Miguel, and Manners’ funding for Montemolin’s rebellion - achieved little for absolutist forces in the peninsula. Meanwhile, parliamentary speeches made on the exiles’ behalf created little sensation, and were criticised by mainstream Tories. Not even Montemolin’s apparent commitment to constitutional government could secure him sustained support; indeed, Palmerston and Bulwer’s interest in him owed much to geopolitical considerations. Carlist and Miguelite refugees struggled to obtain sustained support outside of the most reactionary circles, and thus achieved little in Britain.
In the wake of the European revolutions of 1848, numerous fallen rulers and politicians fled to Britain, and formed or strengthened existing political relationships with Tory politicians which endured throughout the turbulent years of 1848-49. The exiles exerted a strong degree of influence over the course of Conservative politics in myriad ways: they provided information to shape perceptions of revolutionary Europe and encouragement for attacks upon the government; attempted to reunite the divided Conservative party, and shaped numerous writings and newspaper articles. In return, Conservative politicians collected intelligence for the exiles and acted as intermediaries in their communications with continental Europe. The most tangible results of these relationships were Tory attacks upon Palmerston and attempts to reunite the shattered party. Although the Protectionists and Peelites never reunited, these exiles’ influence over Conservative politicians and journalists threatened to defeat the struggling Whig government, and represent a high-water mark of refugee involvement in and influence upon party politics in mid-Victorian Britain.

By April 1848, London, remarked Lord Malmesbury, resembled a Congress.¹ Metternich, Princess Lieven, the Prince of Prussia (later Wilhelm I of Germany), Louis Philippe, and former French ministers including Guizot had all fled to Britain; and so many right-wing refugees arrived that the term ‘illustrious exiles’, given to French émigrés in the late eighteenth century, was revived in the press.² They had fled from a flurry of revolutions sparked by the French revolution of 1848, a great shock and the culmination of several years of economic misfortune and political unrest.³ The revolution in France had been precipitated when, after the right to protest was curtailed, opposition politicians began to organise ‘Reform Banquets’. Once these were subsequently banned, Parisians took to the streets, and on 23 February, ‘full revolt’ ensued after 40 or 50 people were shot by panicking troops. The next day, unable to rally the army or commission a liberal ministry, Louis Philippe abdicated and fled. An attempt to proclaim his 10-year-old grandson, the Comte de Paris, as

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² *Morning Post*, 1 March 1848; *Standard*, 1 March 1848; *Morning Chronicle*, 1 March 1848
King failed when crowds ‘invaded’ parliament. Radical Deputies then declared a republic.⁴

News of Louis Philippe’s flight reached London on 26 February, and guests at Lady Palmerston’s reception that evening were ‘troubled and melancholy’, worried about the ‘fugitives’.⁵ The fall of a constitutional monarchy was a terrific shock, and not only to Britons. Politicians and foreign diplomats alike were worried about the French royal family’s fate, and desperate for news. The Prussian Minister, Baron Bunsen, informed Angela Burdett-Coutts that Louis Philippe had fled, and that Guizot’s life was ‘certainly in danger.’ (Lieven, he added, had ‘already decamped on the 19th!’)⁶ The news that Louis Philippe had safely arrived in Britain on 2 March was greeted with relief, and a sympathetic welcome followed the first French refugees’ arrival. ‘[E]very demonstration of sympathy and respect’ was shown, and over 400 people, including the entire cabinet, Sir Robert Peel and Lord Stanley, paid their respects to the first arrivals, the Duc and Duchesse de Nemours.⁷ Guizot even reckoned that as Ambassador in 1840 and exile in 1848, he ‘received… the same welcome, except that it was more earnest and friendly in the days of my adversity’.⁸ In the wake of another French revolution and the birth of a new French Republic, personal sympathy overwhelmed political considerations.

Tory politicians were especially forthcoming in volunteering moral and practical support for these refugees. Peel offered the Orleans family £1000 when it was reported that their estates could be seized; Aberdeen ‘surreptitiously’ donated as much; Disraeli expressed grave concern, and Sir James Graham offered to do all that he could.⁹ Guizot’s children, who arrived after him, were welcomed by Antonio Panizzi of the British Museum and Lady Alice Peel, the wife of Peel’s brother Jonathan.¹⁰ Even the elderly Duke of Newcastle recorded a deep sympathy for Louis

⁴ Stearns, P.N., 1848: The Revolutionary Tide in Europe (New York, 1974) pp.73-74
⁶ Bunsen to Burdett-Coutts, (n.d., February 1848), Burdett-Coutts Papers, Add. MS 85282 f.2
⁸ Guizot, Memoirs of Sir Robert Peel (London, 1856), pp.337-8
Philippe.\textsuperscript{11} Although these demonstrations of support might appear to have been made free from political considerations, the favours which Whig politicians granted to the exiles were rarely on the same scale. Rather than offer funds or practical assistance, the Whig MP and wit Richard Monckton Milnes agreed to deliver a parcel to Paris for Louis Philippe, and his colleague John Evelyn Denison offered Guizot the use of his library.\textsuperscript{12}

Moreover, British Conservatives quickly began to cooperate with the exiles in the hope of weakening the Whig government and discouraging the spread of revolutionary sentiment. Lord Brougham, once considered a radical but now practically a Tory, corresponded with Metternich; Lady Beauvale, whose reactionary husband was a staunch opponent of Palmerston, began to send Lieven political advice; and Stanley’s ‘publicist’, John Wilson Croker, offered his influence over the \textit{Quarterly Review} to his former enemy Guizot.\textsuperscript{13} Desperate times called for personal differences to be put aside, and these relationships soon bore fruit. For example, Croker quickly published an article on the revolution based upon an interview with Louis Philippe, which defended the ex-King’s wisdom and moderation, and Louis Philippe was so impressed that he wanted it to be published in France.\textsuperscript{14} Whereas Whigs sympathised with the refugees on a personal level, Conservatives sympathised with the new arrivals on both personal and political grounds, and soon engaged with them.

Of all the refugees who reached Britain in the spring of 1848, Metternich perhaps found the most Tory support. The news of Metternich’s fall produced ‘general satisfaction’ and optimism in London society, but Aberdeen was shocked, and thankful that ‘the whole animosity of Vienna’ had turned against Metternich rather

\textsuperscript{11} Gaunt, ‘Country Party’, p.163
\textsuperscript{12} Louis Philippe to Milnes, 17 April 1848, Houghton Ms. 231/383; Aberdeen to Denison, 21 April 1848, Ossington Collection, OsC423
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Quarterly Review} 82 (March 1848), pp.541-568; Guizot to Louis Philippe, 30 September 1848, Archives de la Maison de France (hereafter, ‘AMF’) 300(III)57/170
than the entire regime.\textsuperscript{15} Whereas Whigs despised Metternich as the figurehead of Austrian absolutism, Tories sympathised with his obsessive fear of upheaval. Upon Metternich’s arrival in April, old ‘friends of the Napoleonic days’ (such as Wellington, Aberdeen and Londonderry) delighted in seeing him, and several British landowners offered to loan him properties. This surpassed the ex-Chancellor’s expectations.\textsuperscript{16} Metternich remained interested in politics; as Karl Obermann notes, in exile, he promoted counter-revolution and wrote memoirs which proudly recalled his life’s work.\textsuperscript{17}

Metternich’s interest and engagement in politics steadily increased. On 6 June, he wrote a speech with his ‘pupil’ Disraeli, and stressed the disunity of Italy to Aberdeen; by August, he was sending his son to Westminster to gauge the parties’ moods; and by January 1849, Palmerston apparently believed that Metternich was ‘governing Austria from Brighton’.\textsuperscript{18} Both European affairs and British debates upon foreign policy interested him, and although Tories apparently tried to hide it, many were interested in Metternich.\textsuperscript{19} Indeed, Heinrich Ritter von Srbik described Metternich’s residence as a centre of Tory opposition to Palmerston, and in October 1849, Aberdeen congratulated Metternich on the ‘impression’ he had left ‘upon all those who had the good fortune to approach’ him. ‘[E]veryone must have admired’ his equanimity, ‘composure of mind’ and ‘large and philosophick [sic] views... during a time of great trial’.\textsuperscript{20} Metternich’s presence was not merely appreciated by Tories; rather, they inspired each other during a difficult time.

\textsuperscript{15} Van de Weyer to M. d’Hoffschmidt, 21 March 1848, Ridder, A. de (ed.), \textit{La Crise de la Neutralité Belge de 1848} (2 Vols., Brussels, 1928), i no.161; Aberdeen to Arthur Hamilton-Gordon, 26 March 1848, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43226 ff.60-61
\textsuperscript{19} Pulszky, Ferencz, \textit{Meine Zeit, Mein Leben} (4 Vols, Leipzig, 1883), iii p.23; Andics, Metternich, p.281
\textsuperscript{20} Srbik, Heinrich Ritter von, \textit{Metternich: Der Staatsmann und der Mensch} (2 Vols., Munich, 1925), ii p.313; Aberdeen to Metternich (copy), 18 October 1849, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43128 f.292
It should not be underestimated how the restive state of Europe made the exiles’ ideals amenable to Tories. Revolutionary fervour appeared to grip Europe throughout 1848-49, and as Bulwer later recalled, the ‘threatening aspect’ assumed by British workers destroyed ‘almost all sympathy amongst the upper classes for liberal doctrines, and created a sort of enthusiasm in favour of an extreme policy of conservative resistance’. This was often manifested in opposing Palmerston, allegedly ‘the head of the liberal party on the continent’. Both revolutionary turmoil and Palmerston’s interventionist policies appeared to threaten the ‘social order’ throughout Europe. This created an audience for reactionary ideals and placed the exiles in an influential position with regard to the divided Conservative party.

The Protectionists were themselves divided; Disraeli, their leading orator in the Commons, was widely distrusted, even by their leader Stanley, who sought a reunion with the Peelites, not least over foreign policy. In spite of these schisms among Conservative politicians, reconciliation in opposition to Palmerston appeared possible, and the exiles, who associated with Protectionists and Peelites alike, were ideally placed to encourage one. Such a reunion was likely to cause difficulties for the government. Despite winning the previous summer’s general election, Russell’s Ministry relied upon opposition disunity to survive because of the difficulty of guaranteeing Radical or Irish support. In this febrile situation, the exiles’ continental links and encouragement could be exploited in opposition to the government, and even help foster Conservative reunion.

This placed the exiles in a potentially influential position. Lieven revived her salon, and by late March, she was doing ‘very well’; it was ‘full all day long’ with Russell, Peel, Palmerston and Aberdeen often in attendance. Although ill and ‘almost blind’, she also devoted herself to sharing European news. She even regarded it her duty to supply Lady Alice Peel with news from Paris. Lieven did not do this for altruistic

21 Autobiographical Memoir, Bulwer Papers, 1/410/1, pp.60-61
24 Charles Greville to Clarendon, 22 March 1848, MS Clar. C.521; Lieven to Count Benckendorff, 21 March 1848, Lieven Papers, Add. MS 58121 f.80
reasons. The former Russian Ambassadress wanted to alter the composition of the government by isolating Palmerston and influence British thinking upon foreign affairs. She remained formidable; as one historian noted, ‘people were still frightened’ of her in old age. As a forceful character with links to numerous British and French politicians, she was well-placed to encourage Tory opposition to Palmerston.

Her fellow-exiles also regularly associated with Conservative politicians. Whilst Guizot was equally comfortable in society as a former French Ambassador to Britain, Metternich met Wellington daily at the start of his sojourn in Britain, and Guizot met Aberdeen almost daily *throughout* his. Although Harold Temperley suggested that Guizot and Metternich were both politically ‘dead’, Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation that Guizot remained politically ‘active’ in exile is more accurate. Whilst friendships between British politicians and right-wing refugees were not necessarily politicised, personal relationships allowed exile integration into British politics.

Not all of these refugees intervened in British politics. The Austrian diplomat Philipp von Neumann, who fled to London on what was branded a special diplomatic mission, occupied himself with the affairs of the Habsburg dynasty, and Louis Philippe was ‘not unhappily absorbed in accounts and legal questions’. However, the ex-King ‘talked frankly and at length’, especially to ‘defend his peaceful foreign policy’ and ‘passive departure’. Peel, Wellington and Croker all visited him regularly. Conservative politicians took an interest in the fallen monarch, and despite his professed disengagement from politics, Louis Philippe’s loquacity suggested to observers that he exercised influence upon his visitors. On 12 April 1848, Brougham apologised to the ex-King for not visiting because he had intended to speak in the Lords, ‘to Paris rather than England’, and had wanted to ensure that

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26 Sudley (ed.), *Lady Palmerston*, n.303
‘what I should say might be known entirely to come from myself’. Barely a month after Louis Philippe’s arrival, opposition politicians had begun to fear criticism for being under exile influence.

The press quickly picked up on the support which the exiles found, especially from the opposition. *Punch* lampooned the refugees’ preferred hotel with a joke advertisement appealing to exiled princes, and suggested that Brougham had established a school for them. It was not alone in making such accusations. A republican newspaper later recalled that ‘the tongue of Brougham did the work of Metternich’, that Russell ‘learned to talk the principles and language of Guizot’ and that Louis Philippe contributed to the *Quarterly Review*, while *The Times* was under Austrian exiles’ influence. These suspicions of widespread exile influence were shared by liberal and conservative newspapers. The *Morning Herald* referred to Metternich as an ‘active diplomat’; the *Daily News* called the *Times* ‘his’ paper; and the *Examiner* suggested that the *Times* may well have been under Louis Philippe, Guizot and Metternich’s influence. The exiles’ prominent status and presence in political circles ensured that they attracted suspicion.

These fears became pervasive because the press was an important extension of partisan politics, and even diplomacy. As David Brown notes, Palmerston believed that ‘his policy abroad carried more weight’ with press approval, and was especially ‘well-informed in the use of the opinion-making media’. Additionally, in early 1848, a Peelite consortium bought the *Morning Chronicle*. Insinuations surrounding the *Times* are particularly notable; considered to have been either Aberdeen or Clarendon’s organ, it had by far the largest circulation of the London papers, was thought representative of British public opinion, and regarded as semi-official abroad. By distorting British journalism, the exiles could seemingly turn both public

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30 Brougham to Louis Philippe, 12 April 1848, AMF 300(III)57/106
31 *Punch* XIV (1848), p.97
opinion and European governments against the Whig government. This viewpoint was not mere speculation, but reflected the active interest which these refugees took in British politics, especially in the state of the Conservative Party, and Tory attempts to defeat the government upon questions of foreign policy.

**The Emergence of Conservative Political Networks**

As soon Guizot arrived in Britain, he expounded upon the events leading to his fall. On 3 March he discussed the revolution with Aberdeen, and on 5 March they spoke at length. He detailed which members of the French Provisional Government would be the most difficult for Britain to work with, and predicted an Orleans restoration.\(^{36}\) Aberdeen was not alone in his interest. Many visited Guizot, who predicted open warfare between moderate and radical republicans in France.\(^{37}\) He consistently blamed his enemies, ‘imputed no blame’ to Louis Philippe, and reckoned Palmerston ‘had done it all’.\(^{38}\) Guizot’s testimony was well-received, and the other refugees’ commentaries also attracted interest. British politicians were desperate for news, and each exile provided a different narrative. Whereas Louis Philippe spoke of Guizot’s resignation, Guizot spoke of his dismissal. Lieven also provided an explanation, and the only common element was the revolution’s suddenness.\(^{39}\)

This interest in refugee testimony soon transformed into a desire to acquire intelligence concerning subsequent further events in France. Understanding the French Republic was highly important, for as Geoffrey Hicks notes, in strategic terms, France remained both Britain’s ideal ally and the greatest threat to her security.\(^{40}\) In mid-March, the Peelite MP Lord Mahon recorded that Guizot expected a ‘sanguinary scene’ when the Paris National Guard was to make a demonstration; and although Louis Philippe had expressed a desire to live as a mere country gentleman, he was not

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\(^{36}\) Aberdeen to J. T. Delane, 3 March 1848, Dasent, A.I., *John Thadeus Delane* (2 Vols, London, 1908), ii p.76; Henry Greville, 5 March 1848, i p.231; 5 March 1848, Charles Greville (Strachey and Fulford ed.), vi p.29


\(^{38}\) Disraeli to Lady Londonderry, 1 May 1848, DL, v no.1643; Lane-Pool, *Stratford Canning*, ii p.168

\(^{39}\) Charles Greville (Strachey & Fulford ed.), vi pp.25-40

\(^{40}\) Hicks, *Peace, War and Party Politics*, p.1
immune from the temptation of politics. When Disraeli visited Louis Philippe in March, the ex-King offered him a selection of papers which he thought might be of interest. Disraeli did not decline the offer, but it transpired that the papers had been lost in Louis Philippe’s flight. The exiles willingly divulged information about the course of French politics, and Tories took great interest.

The exiles were also defended in the Times. As early as 1 March, the Belgian Minister, Sylvain van de Weyer, protested to its editor, J.T. Delane, that contrary to reports, he had not given his ‘suburban villa’ to the Orleans. A retraction was swiftly published, and on 14 March, Guizot thanked Reeve for its denial that the ex-Minister had written its leader on the revolution in France. The Times willingly corrected reports about the exiles, in part to disavow accusations of their influence. However, Guizot happily accepted an offer from Reeve to use his influence over the press in his favour. The ex-Minister had acquired another outlet for his views.

Aberdeen similarly ensured that the exiles’ views were supported in the Times. On 8 April, he sent Delane a letter to be ‘inserted’, which ‘would give great pleasure’ to the exiles; it was ‘a sort of justification of Louis Philippe’, and ‘in truth the only plausible explanation of that proceeding’. The exiles’ previous close contacts with Aberdeen and Reeve ensured that they would be defended in the press, and Guizot appreciated the occasional articles born of this relationship. In August, he was cheered by the publication of a letter from Aberdeen on the Spanish marriages, written in response to the Globe’s attacks (which were likely made on Palmerston’s behalf). Aberdeen provided Metternich with the same assistance before his arrival. When Delane sent the former Foreign Secretary a draft article announcing the Vienna revolution, Aberdeen objected to an assertion that Metternich’s flight would pacify Europe. Despite Metternich’s unpopularity, Aberdeen was determined to defend the ex-Chancellor. Although many came to fear exile influence over the press, these relationships were initiated by British allies rather than the exiles themselves.

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41 Mahon to Stanhope, 17 March 1848, Stanhope Papers, U1590/C317/15; Louis Philippe to Victoria, 3 March 1848, QVL ii p.162
43 Van de Weyer to Delane, 1 March 1848, TNL Archive, Delane Papers, TT/ED/JTD/03/22; Times, 2 March 1848; Times, 13 March 1848; Guizot to Reeve, 14 March 1848, Reeve-Guizot Correspondence, Add. 7615 f.19
44 Aberdeen to Delane, 8 April 1848, Delane Papers, TNL Archive, TT/ED/JTD/03/32
45 Guizot to Lieven, 23 August 1848, FG, 163M10/2054
46 Aberdeen to Delane, 20 March 1848, Delane Papers, TNL Archive, TT/ED/JTD/03/26
Upon his landfall in Britain, Metternich was uninterested in politics. He sought a ‘quite private’ life, and declined to visit Wellington at Stratfieldsaye because of the Prince of Prussia’s presence, in fear of ‘speculation and conjectures’. The uncertain state of Europe precluded anything resembling political activity, and Aberdeen opined to Lord Londonderry that their old friend Metternich, ‘deposed and depressed’ in the words of one historian, would only remain for ‘a few months’. The threat of political controversy and the fallen Chancellor’s own wellbeing threatened to render his sojourn in Britain a short one.

Despite his age and illness, Metternich soon engaged with old Tory friends. On 3 May, he sent Wellington news of the Austrian army, namely that Marshal Radetzky was on the offensive against Sardinia, which had declared war in March in the name of Italian unity. This was encouraging news for European and British conservatives alike, and although he rarely spoke in the Lords, the aged Wellington paid attention to such reports – in March 1849, he corrected Lansdowne on the progress of Austrian forces. Metternich’s German correspondents guaranteed that the ex-Chancellor knew about important developments, and he was not the only exile to whom Wellington paid attention; in May 1848, the Duke was surprised by Louis Philippe’s belief that France was too weak for war.

One overture from Metternich was an abject failure. On 22 May, Metternich brought two *Times* articles to Wellington’s attention, concerning the Frankfurt Diet and King Charles Albert of Sardinia. One had praised the Sardinian troops, disparaged the Austrians, and predicted a French intervention on the side of Sardinia. Although sympathetic, Wellington replied that he knew neither its proprietors nor editor. Had Metternich asked this favour of Delane’s friend Aberdeen, it might have been granted. Despite being willing to provide each other with political favours, effective political networks comprising the exiles, their Tory friends and European allies were yet to fully develop.

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47 Sandemann, George, *Metternich* (New York, 1911), p.306; Aberdeen to Londonderry, 27 April 1848, Londonderry Estate Archives, Durham County Record Office (hereafter, ‘DRO’), D/Lo/C79(6)
48 Metternich to Wellington, 3 May 1848, WP/2/158/37
49 *Hansard*, 29 March 1849, civ c.3
50 Wellington (ed.), p.22
51 Metternich to Wellington, 22 May 1848, WP/2/158/66; Wellington to Metternich (copy), 23 May 1848, WP/2/158/68
Metternich’s commentaries found a more receptive audience. Although his lengthy perorations bored almost everyone except Disraeli, Metternich’s knowledge was valued. He encouraged the circulation of his correspondence, and sent information which British correspondents provided to contacts in Austria.\(^{52}\) Aberdeen sent Metternich papers mentioning him ‘relative to the intervention of the King of Sardinia’ on 9 May, and in August, Beauvale, a former Ambassador at Vienna, explained the vast British opposition to Anglo-French intervention in Italy to him in detail, news which was in turn sent to Austria.\(^{53}\) In Beauvale’s opinion, the peace terms which France and Britain sought to impose upon Austria and Sardinia were the best possible, and the only possible danger was the declaration of a Sardinian republic, which would seek French assistance in a renewed war.\(^{54}\) These letters could contain sensitive information, and were evidently of great interest to Metternich, who could pass information on to further Austrian and British correspondents.\(^{55}\) At the centre of communications between Protectionists, Peelites and Austrian contacts, the coachman of Europe was transformed into a sort of Austrian mailcoach.

The Prince of Prussia’s brief exile followed a similar pattern. Society was ‘exceptionally friendly’, and Lady Westmorland, wife of the British Minister to Prussia, sent him German newspapers.\(^{56}\) The Prince had fled owing to events beyond his control (he was wrongly blamed for the shooting of protestors), and this ensured that he was received sympathetically. He too rejected an invitation to Stratfieldsaye, concerned that Metternich’s presence would make it resemble a ‘diplomatic conference for reactionaries’.\(^{57}\) The idea of implying any relationship between conservative refugees and Tory politicians appeared too controversial to risk attending.

\(^{52}\) Bibl, Viktor (ed.), Metternich in neuer Beleuchtung (Vienna, 1928), n.86; Stanhope, Wellington, pp.327-8
\(^{53}\) Aberdeen to Metternich (copy), 9 May 1848, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43128 ff.246-55; Journal, 8 August 1848, Metternich Memoirs, viii p.30
\(^{54}\) Beauvale to Metternich, 9 August 1848, RAM [Metternich Family Archive], AC 3/2A ff.3-4
\(^{55}\) Metternich to Beauvale (copy), 28 March 1849, Ibid., AC 3/2B f.85
\(^{56}\) Wilhelm to Friedrich Wilhelm IV, 4-5 April 1848, Friedel, Mathias (ed.), König Friedrich Wilhelm IV und Wilhelm I: Briefwechsel 1840-1858 (Paderborn, 2013), no.66
\(^{57}\) Valentin, Veit, Geschichte der Deutschen Revolution von 1848-1849 (2 Vols., Berlin, 1930-31), ii p.52
However, Wilhelm soon entered into discussions with British conservatives. By 8 April, the Prince had discussed the Prussian military with Wellington and former Indian Viceroy Lord Hardinge, and on 12 April, Reeve, Peel and Graham dined with the Prince, who afterwards spoke to each guest. ‘Everything he said vindicated the deepest distress and gloomiest anticipations’, and his Aide-de-Camp added that ‘the [Czar] had 400,000 excellent troops’ and a further 150,000 in reserve, which could ‘be at Berlin in six weeks’. This left Reeve distinctly ‘nervous’. 58 Whilst the Prince attracted interest, his pessimistic commentary also created concern. Nevertheless, according to Lieven, the Prince saw plenty of society, much to Bunsen’s joy. 59 He had successfully transformed his exile into a chance to promote his viewpoint.

Lieven similarly provided Tory politicians with European news. In late June, she warned Aberdeen that war could erupt while France offered to mediate between Sardinia and Austria, and that a change in the Pope’s ‘front’ (having previously supported Sardinia) would have a great effect. She explained the proposed Anglo-French mediation between the belligerents to him in great detail, and even warned that Stanley was not sufficiently active in the Lords. 60 These communications appear to have been intended to encourage a Tory reunion over foreign policy, and Conservatives came to value exile intelligence. Such was the reliance Wellington placed upon Metternich’s reports that after his departure, the Duke admitted ignorance of German affairs. 61 Guizot also shared information coloured with his own opinions; Disraeli accepted Guizot’s explanations for the revolution, and promoted them in Parliament on 16 August. Palmerston angrily replied that Disraeli was ‘not correct in his history’. 62

More significantly, Guizot supported Aberdeen in an attack upon Palmerston, which was itself coordinated between Protectionist and Peelite peers. After Bulwer read a critical dispatch concerning constitutional government to the Spanish Prime Minister

58 Wilhelm to Friedrich Wilhelm IV, 8 April 1848, Friedel (ed.), Briefwechsel, no.67; ‘Prince of Prussia. 12 April 1848’, Reeve Memoirs, Times Newspapers Ltd Archive [hereafter TNL Archive], BN5/HR/1
59 Lieven to Baron Meyendorff, 13 April 1848, Lieven Papers, Add. MS 58123 f.251
60 Lieven to Aberdeen, 27 June 1848, Aberdeen-Lieven, ii no.194; Lieven to Aberdeen, 9 August 1848, Ibid., ii No.195; Lieven to Aberdeen, 10 August 1848, ibid., ii no.196
61 Wellington to Lady Westmorland, 23 December 1850, Lady Rose Weigall (ed.) Correspondence of Lady Burghersh with the Duke of Wellington (London, 1903), pp.194-5
62 Disraeli to Lady Londonderry, 1 May 1848, DL v no.1643; Hansard, 16 August 1848, ci cc.160-75
verbatim, he was expelled on trumped-up charges. The resulting Parliamentary debates provided an opportunity to condemn Palmerston and Bulwer, whom Stanley made a scapegoat, and the Protectionist leader sought Aberdeen’s cooperation. Although initially sceptical, Aberdeen accepted Stanley’s invitation, and consequently sought Guizot’s assistance.

This was an ideal opportunity to unite Conservative peers against Palmerston, and as Palmerston’s former enemy in Anglo-French disputes over Spain, Guizot appeared a valuable ally in acquiring potentially damning evidence against the Foreign Secretary. On 5 May, Aberdeen asked Guizot to ‘have a word from’ Spanish Minister Javier Isturiz whether the dispatch which became Bulwer’s fateful lecture ‘was communicated to the Spanish government in the form in which it has been published’, suspicious that ‘the dispatch itself was not intended to be communicated’. Aberdeen subsequently mentioned that he had ‘no doubt whatever that [Bulwer] knew perfectly well what [Palmerston] was about when he made that communication’, and appeared ‘to have felt with perfect confidence, that he should meet with the approbation of this Government’. With Guizot’s assistance, Aberdeen confidently attacked Palmerston’s encouragement of Bulwer’s careless, high-handed behaviour.

This was not the only collaboration between the exiles and British politicians during the debates concerning Bulwer’s expulsion. Brougham appeared to speak on Guizot’s behalf, and when the Commons debated the issue in turn, so clear was the hand of Metternich in Disraeli’s speech that Palmerston immediately condemned him for being under the ex-Chancellor’s influence. Although these attacks on Palmerston were not jointly coordinated between the exiles and the Tory leadership, the exiles had provided individual members of the opposition with information and encouragement. When the Bulwer affair was again debated by the Lords in early June, Aberdeen needed to ‘meet more than one person’, perhaps implying that he spoke to Guizot in search of information, in addition to Stanley to coordinate the attack. This

64 Combermere to Londonderry, 5 May 1848, Londonderry Estate Archives, DRO D/Lo/C69(6); Aberdeen to Arthur Hamilton-Gordon, 4 May 1848, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43226 f.63
65 Aberdeen to Guizot (copy), 5 May 1848, Ibid., Add. MS 43334 f.16
66 *Hansard*, 8 May 1848, xcvi c.751
68 Aberdeen to Arthur Hamilton-Gordon, 1 June 1848, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43226 f.65
possibility is reinforced by the fact that Guizot remained interested in the Bulwer affair, and hoped to meet Isturiz again on 1 June.\textsuperscript{69}

However, the exiles’ and Tories’ hopes were dashed by the Spaniards’ ridiculous rationale for Bulwer’s expulsion (involvement in armed plots against the Spanish government), which rendered it ‘a national affair’, and the Tories failed to win over wavering liberals.\textsuperscript{70} Even with exile assistance, Aberdeen and Stanley could not defeat Palmerston, and they also failed to hide the exiles’ role. Lord William Hervey, a diplomat who was close to Palmerston, suspected that ‘the species of alliance formed between the partisans of Guizot in France and Aberdeen in England’ had not ‘been without its effect upon the latter, upon the subject of this… squabble’.\textsuperscript{71} Rather than defeat the government or censure Palmerston, cooperation between Conservatives and exiles had simply aroused Whig suspicion.

Whereas Guizot and Aberdeen had been close collaborators when they had been in office earlier in the decade, Disraeli and Metternich’s friendship had only recently been formed. Although the two men had been unacquainted before 1848, Disraeli had praised Metternich in his novels.\textsuperscript{72} As J.P. Parry notes, Disraeli cast himself as a new Metternich or Burke, fighting an ideological war, and in Disraeli, Metternich saw an ally and protégé.\textsuperscript{73} The Protectionist orator had held Metternich in high regard for some years, and Metternich gladly reciprocated by providing encouragement and information. Disraeli was obsessed with Metternich’s words, and shared his grave warnings about Germany, Italy and France with his patroness Lady Londonderry as early as 30 April.\textsuperscript{74} Metternich’s influence can perhaps also be seen in Disraeli’s 18 August speech, which condemned the French government’s revolutionary tendencies and poor finances, reflecting the contents of a letter Metternich had sent to him the

\textsuperscript{69} Guizot to Lieven, 31 May 1848, FG, 163MI9/1922
\textsuperscript{70} Charles Greville, 10 June 1848, vi p.194
\textsuperscript{71} Hervey to Reeve, 27 May 1848, Hervey Papers 941/61/1
\textsuperscript{74} Disraeli to Lady Londonderry, 30 April 1849, DL, v no.1820; Disraeli to Lady Londonderry, 12 August 1848, Ibid., v no.1684

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previous month;\textsuperscript{75} and Disraeli even adopted Metternich’s fear of revolutionary secret societies, a subject which he mentioned in Parliament as late as 1876.\textsuperscript{76}

Although Hicks has only described this relationship as possibly influencing ‘some of [Disraeli’s] parliamentary contributions’ and providing him with ‘a new supply of the gossip in which he loved to indulge’, their collaboration was hardly frivolous. Indeed, Charles Snyder asserts that Disraeli’s language in their correspondence indicates a strong sense of admiration.\textsuperscript{77} Disraeli’s relationship with Metternich was arguably of profound importance to him, and in return, Metternich encouraged the Protectionist politician. They often spent mornings discussing politics, and Disraeli was inspired even further by the ex-Chancellor’s praise.\textsuperscript{78} This viewpoint appears to have endured, for Metternich later described Disraeli as ‘foremost among the present leaders’ of Britain.\textsuperscript{79} Their friendship was characterised by mutual admiration and political cooperation.

Disraeli was not alone in receiving Metternich’s encouragement. In August 1848, Beavuval advised Metternich to encourage Brougham to speak in upcoming debates, hopeful to see ‘our line’ [i.e. British foreign policy] checked before the Lords divided.\textsuperscript{80} He would have needed little encouragement. A week before, Brougham had written to Aberdeen of the ‘joy’ among the Metternichs ‘and others of the faithful’ upon hearing of the Sardinian defeat at Custozza, implying that Metternich already had a circle of supporters.\textsuperscript{81} By the end of the Parliamentary session, the exiles had established working relationships with several British politicians, and with the express aim of defeating Palmerston.

Meanwhile, Metternich and Guizot founded a newspaper, \textit{Le Spectateur de Londres}. The \textit{Spectateur} was not a success. It was edited by Georg Klindworth (a spy who had worked for them both and was now also a refugee in London), and failed after three

\textsuperscript{75} Metternich to Disraeli, 7 July 1848, Dep. Hughenden 136/3, f.92; \textit{Hansard}, 16 August 1848, li cc.147-63
\textsuperscript{76} Snyder, ‘Disraeli’, p.26, p.33
\textsuperscript{77} Hicks, \textit{Peace, War and Party Politics}, p.28; Snyder, ‘Disraeli’,p.24
\textsuperscript{78} Wilson, Charles Rivers, \textit{Chapters from my Official Life} (London, 1916), pp.34-35
\textsuperscript{80} Beavuval to Metternich, 13 August 1848, RAM, AC 3/2A ff.33
\textsuperscript{81} Brougham to Aberdeen (copy), 6 August 1848, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43289 f.21
months. The paper initially impressed its founders. Guizot praised the first issue lavishly, and Metternich was also proud of the paper; however, the attention it gained was almost entirely negative from the outset. The exiles had catastrophically overestimated its potential appeal. Despite its deeply conservative tone, the paper’s foreign ownership had rendered it suspicious in the eyes of Tory journalists. Although Klindworth persuaded Disraeli to write an article, the *Morning Post* proclaimed that the *Spectateur* was backed by Guizot and therefore dangerous, and even Croker was suspicious. Guizot thus had to explain to Croker that Klindworth was politically reliable and had proven useful to himself and Metternich.

Metternich received the *Spectateur*’s demise poorly. On 27 August, Klindworth informed him that due to a lack of demand, he would end publication in October. After a mere month and a half of publication, the paper appeared to have no future, but Metternich thought otherwise, and appealed to the Russian Chancellor, Carl Robert Nesselrode for assistance. Metternich explained that the paper, which he described as a sensation in Germany and France, was run and financed by English friends, and needed further financial assistance. Metternich probably appealed to Russia because Czar Nicholas had provided him with funds for his personal upkeep, and his plea was couched in exaggerated, politicised terms to ensure that it was successful. But the *Spectateur* suffered from myriad problems.

The same day, Klindworth noted that English compositors struggled to arrange the newspaper’s French type, and that sixteen issues had cost £749 (~£60,000 today). The paper was both incredibly expensive to produce and difficult to print. Metternich was very angry, and subsequently warned Klindworth’s daughter that it had to continue, because a large sum was coming from St Petersburg. She replied that it

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82 Palmer, p.317; Disraeli to Metternich, 30 September 1848, DL, v no.1722
84 Agnes Klindworth to Disraeli, 27 August 1848, Dep. Hughenden 75/1; *Morning Post*, 4 July 1848
85 Guizot to Croker, 17 August 1848, Croker Papers, Add. MS 41128 f.27
86 Klindworth to Metternich, 27 August 1848, RAM, AC 9/156 ka. 6 ff.1-2
88 Klindworth to Metternich, 10 September 1848, RAM, AC 9/156 ka.6 f.7; George Schluze to Metternich, 8 November, Ibid., f.30
could not, because her father had left Britain.\textsuperscript{89} Klindworth’s unreliability and the paper’s lack of appeal had ensured that this appeal failed, and Metternich’s confidence in Nesselrode was misplaced. Neither anonymous friends nor Nesselrode supported the publication, and the \textit{Spectateur} retained a negative reputation amongst London’s refugee population for many years.\textsuperscript{90} Without an audience or sustained funding, the paper was a total failure.

However, one contact made through the \textit{Spectateur} had lasting consequences. Disraeli, who met the ‘mysterious Klindworth’ through his collaboration with the paper, was highly impressed by the German, who acted as his informant from July 1848, and continued to provide him with intelligence concerning European and British politics into the 1870s. Rather than destabilise the Whig government in 1848-49, Klindworth allowed Disraeli to plot intrigues against his colleagues and the Liberal opposition a decade later.\textsuperscript{91}

By the summer, the exiles had become bolder. Lieven sought to introduce Peel to the Legitimist Duc de Noailles, then visiting London, and Metternich returned to his previous confidence. In July, he extolled the virtues of ‘\textit{le système Metternich}’ to Wellington, who agreed that a social revolution was occurring in Italy.\textsuperscript{92} Wellington did not only find agreement with Metternich’s assessment of European affairs. He also wanted Metternich to inspire his fractured party, and upon Metternich’s failure to visit Stratfieldsaye in August, Wellington replied that it would have been an honour; they could have discussed numerous subjects, notably Germany, and he could have introduced Metternich to the Tories’ leading speakers.\textsuperscript{93} Although Metternich rejected this opportunity to expand his audience and potentially strengthen the Tory opposition, perhaps owing to illness, he remained deeply interested in politics. Throughout the summer of 1848, he talked ‘almost exclusively on the news of the day’, and British friends sought and valued his viewpoints.\textsuperscript{94} Brougham applied to

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\textsuperscript{89} Guizot to Lieven, 28 October 1848, FG, 163MI10/2124
\textsuperscript{92} Lieven to Peel, 10 July 1848, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40600 f.328; Metternich to Wellington, 14 July 1848 WP/2/159/12; Wellington to Metternich (copy), 27 July 1848, WP/2/159/34
\textsuperscript{93} Wellington to Metternich (copy), 22 August 1848, WP/2/159/84
\textsuperscript{94} Stanhope, \textit{Wellington}, pp.327-8
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both Metternich and Guizot alike for information on suffrage and reform, and Disraeli ensured that an article written for Metternich was printed in the *Times.* The ex-Chancellor had cemented his place in Tory counsels. Metternich’s ambition to influence the British press had finally found assistance, and while his words were considered inspiring, he was considered a fount of information.

Lieven actively demonised the French Republic prior to its first Presidential Election. In September, she told Lady Alice Peel that the election of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte (the future Napoleon III) would be a disaster. Although the information Lieven provided often changed - in less than two weeks, Bonaparte was transformed from finished into the most likely President - her negative opinion of him did not. She even revealed the likely composition of Bonaparte’s government to Aberdeen, news which she had received from a French general. Thiers would not be included, and would visit Louis Philippe, whilst another Orleanist, Odilon Barrot, would become Prime Minister. This apparently demonstrated Bonaparte’s weakness, for one of France’s leading politicians was instead treating with Louis Philippe. Lieven’s opinions, which detailed likely developments in French high politics, easily found an interested audience.

Meanwhile, Guizot contributed two articles to the *Quarterly,* ‘On the State of Religion in France’ in June, and ‘Public Instruction in France under M. Guizot’ in December. Guizot’s first article, the authorship of which became an open secret, has been described as accusing the French government of practising the ‘class politics of annihilation’, and was largely devoted to clerical involvement in French politics. He also described the February Revolution as unwanted, and bizarrely blamed the

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95 Brougham to Lady Westmorland, 10 September 1848, Weigall (ed.), *The Correspondence of Priscilla, Countess of Westmorland* (New York, 1909), pp.134-35; Disraeli to Metternich, 14 July 1848, DL, v no.1666
97 Lieven to Peel, 8 November 1848, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40600 f.499; Bugeaud to Lieven, December 1848, Lieven Papers, Add. MS 47377 f.37; Lieven to Aberdeen, 9 November 1848, *Aberdeen-Lieven,* ii no.202
This appealed to the basest Tory prejudices against Roman Catholicism as well as their fear of upheaval, natural subjects for a Protestant victim of a revolution. Guizot’s second article, although written in the third person, was outright self-promotion, concerning his tenure as Education Minister in the 1830s, and what ‘England… would do well to imitate or avoid in the system and practice of her neighbours’. According to The Economist, it did not have the effect it was intended to. Even when anonymised, exile-inspired works drew criticism. Nevertheless, Guizot hoped to shape the contents of other publications, and was pleased when, in late October, Reeve offered to introduce him to his colleague Henry Woodham, who also contributed to the Edinburgh Review. Although his articles in the Quarterly failed to attract positive attention, Guizot’s friendship with Reeve allowed him to obtain further contacts within the British press.

In late 1848, Brougham wrote a pamphlet which defended the ‘illustrious exiles’ and blamed the British government for the recent French revolution. It was reasonably successful, and soon ran to six editions. However, Brougham’s manuscript did not meet Guizot’s expectations. After reading an initial draft, Guizot sent the author some brief, constructive suggestions; that Brougham should have acknowledged that opposition to both dynasty and government had existed, and that France had not been peaceful in the 1830s. He instead suggested arguing that the July Monarchy had protected liberty from radicalism. This polite critique masked Guizot’s highly critical opinion of Brougham’s proposed work. Guizot sent Aberdeen a copy of his suggestions, and complained about the pamphlet’s ‘rash and inconsiderate’ content. Croker also received a copy of Guizot’s complaints, and replied that one of Brougham’s main faults was that ‘he does not read the other side of the argument’. Croker showed the letter to Lords Hardwicke, Stanley and Strangford, all of whom were ‘very much interested and pleased with it’.

100 Quarterly Review, June 1848, pp.200-217
101 Quarterly Review, December 1848, p.238
102 Ibid., p.256, Economist, 13 January 1849
103 Guizot to Reeve, 28 October 1848, Guizot-Reeve Correspondence, Add. 7615 f.27; Brogan, Hugh, ‘Woodham, Henry Annesley (1813–1875)’, DNB
105 Guizot to Brougham, 16 October 1848, QVFA Vol. J71, no.7
106 Aberdeen to Peel, 22 October 1848, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40455 f.451; Croker to Guizot (copy), 22 October 1848, Croker Papers, Add. MS 41128 ff.41-2
this cross-section of Tories supported Guizot’s contentions, which the author accepted; he subsequently edited his pamphlet. However, Brougham’s argument was not his own. His main contention - that the British press had contributed to the February revolution - reflected the opinion of Louis Philippe. Hobhouse had noted on 31 March that the ex-King ‘attributed his fall to the discontent… brought by the press, and chiefly the English press, accusing Lord Palmerston of encouraging the clamour’. Louis Philippe’s argument and Guizot’s suggestions had shaped a pamphlet designed to discredit the government. Once again, exile critique, although this time of their ally Brougham, rather than the government, was supported by a cross-section of Tory politicians. Conversely, Erzsébet Andics has suggested that the pamphlet betrayed Metternich’s influence. Little evidence exists to substantiate this, but a sketch written by Brougham in 1848, concerning revolutions, does include Metternich’s favourite sentiment that Italy had never been united.

Soon after, Guizot published a pamphlet of his own, entitled *Democracy in France*. Confident that it would be successful in Britain, Guizot sent copies to Peel and Aberdeen, and further copies to Lieven for her to give to Metternich and Mahon, who, like her, were wintering in Brighton. Guizot asked which Ministers he should send copies to (he suggested Russell, Lansdowne and Palmerston), but Lieven replied that he should just send Lansdowne a French edition, probably owing to his French family connections; she was scared to offend Russell and Palmerston. Although the exiles were engaged in often savage criticism of the British government, the loss of social relations with government ministers were not worth risking. Guizot’s pamphlet otherwise earned ‘great merit and success’ among Britain’s elite, although Brougham, while praising it, ‘asked him to add a page to tell us what the deuce he would be at’.

This was probably because the pamphlet was intended for a French audience –

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107 Lieven to Aberdeen, 18 October 1848, *Aberdeen-Lieven*, ii no.200
108 Hobhouse Diaries, 31 March 1848, Add. MS 43752 f.17
109 Andics, *Metternich*, p.283
111 Guizot to Lieven, n.d., FG, 163MI11/2198; Lieven to Guizot, 8 January 1849, Ibid., 163MI11/2200; Guizot to Lieven, 11 January 1849, Ibid., 163MI11/2207
112 Henry Greville, 11 January 1849, i p.316; Brougham to Aberdeen, 12 January 1849, Lord Stanmore (ed.), *Selections from the Correspondence of George, 4th Earl of Aberdeen* (14 Vols., Edinburgh, 1893), ix No.70
Macaulay thought that it gave ‘matter for thought’, but was ‘too abstract for [his] English notions.’ He felt that it would ‘fall quite dead… in London’.  

Whilst Guizot’s pamphlet was accorded a mixed reaction by British politicians, the support of British friends was vital to its production. Guizot’s liberal friend Sarah Austin pressed him to publish, and according to a thankful Guizot, it would never have appeared without Croker’s advice. The experienced publicist had advised Guizot that his pamphlet could be published in 24 hours, that printing it in French would limit its appeal in Britain, and that its export to France might be prevented by the French government. Guizot was reliant upon the advice of British friends, and he was also helped to promote the pamphlet in Britain. On 21 February, Aberdeen wrote to Delane that the Times’ review should provide a ‘dignified medium between the unqualified admiration of the Standard and the affected indifference of the [Palmerstonian] Globe’, and explain that it was ‘addressed to France’. Aberdeen wanted to subtly ‘give credit to so great a master of his art’. Had the Times’ review been comprised solely of platitudes and praise, unwelcome rumours of exile influence could well have proliferated. While the pamphlet was Guizot’s work alone, British collaborators were vital in both its production and promotion.

The Exiles and the Tory Leadership

In late 1848, the exiles again turned their attention towards the Conservative party. Although Disraeli’s forceful rhetoric had brought him to the fore of the Protectionists, he ineffectively shared their Commons leadership with the elderly J.C. Herries and Bentinck’s brother Lord Granby. After the divisive Bentinck’s sudden death in September, the question of his successors caught the exiles’ attention. Lieven reported Bentinck’s death to Guizot on 22 September, and Guizot discussed it with Croker and his publicist J.G. Lockhart the next day; he was told that it would not make rallying the party any easier, although Peel was anxious for a reunion. Despite their strong

113 Macaulay Journals, 8 January 1849, ii p.25
114 Guizot to Sarah Austin, 3 January 1849, Reeve-Guizot Correspondence, Add. 7615 f.30; Croker to Guizot, 22 October 1848 (copy), Croker Papers, Add. MS 41128f.41-2; Guizot to Croker, 28 October 1848, Ibid., f.43
115 Aberdeen to Delane, 21 February 1849, Delane Papers, TNL Archive, TT/ED/JTD/03/79
116 Stewart, Protection, pp.135-37; Bentley, Politics Without Democracy, p.90
117 Lieven to Guizot, 22 September 1848, FG, 163M10/2103; Guizot to Lieven, 23 September 1848, Ibid., 163M10/2104
interest in reuniting the Conservatives, the exiles could seemingly do little to help them. However, Bentinck’s death spurred Metternich, who was interested in Disraeli’s advancement. Prior to Bentinck’s death, Metternich had written to Disraeli concerning an article upon the Conservative leadership, which ‘asked many questions’ and gave Disraeli advice on pursuing the position of Tory leader in the Commons. This interest persisted, and in January, Metternich requested a ‘confidential dispatch’ on the matter from Disraeli, and for news of political developments to be sent to Brighton, where he often discussed politics with Mahon. While Metternich requested news about Tory prospects from a Protectionist, he discussed it with the Peelite Mahon. The ex-Chancellor was as interested in the party’s reunion as Guizot and Lieven, but unlike them, he was willing to intervene, and wanted to support his British protégé.

Metternich greatly underestimated the problems which Disraeli and his party faced. Disraeli replied to him that it would be a ‘great anomaly’ for a non-aristocrat to lead the Tories, and he would willingly follow anyone capable, ‘watch the Whigs, check Sir Robert Peel and beat back the revolutionary waves of the Manchester School’. When confronted with this letter, Disraeli’s biographer thought it ironic that an enemy of parliamentary government should advise one of the Commons’ leading orators.

The task of providing advice to the ambitious MP was actually beyond Metternich’s abilities. Metternich deferred to Aberdeen, and sent him Disraeli’s letter, which Aberdeen thought ‘one most extraordinary ever made to a publick [sic] man’; he scarcely knew ‘what answers would have been expected’. Aberdeen warned that Disraeli would be a ‘commander whom his troops would not respect, or obey with much alacrity’, and should be told to ‘point to the reconciliation and reunion of the great body of men by whose united efforts evil may be prevented, and good government secured’. Metternich consequently wrote a long letter to Disraeli which outlined the need for a united Conservative party. The letter was Metternich’s

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118 Journal, January 1849, Metternich Memoirs, viii p.45
119 Disraeli to Mary Anne Disraeli, 7 January 1849, DL, v no.1763; Metternich to Disraeli, 9 September 1848, Dep. Hughenden, 136/3 f.94; Metternich to Mahon, 31 December 1850, Stanhope, Miscellanies (London, 1872), p.146
120 Disraeli to Metternich (confidential), 13 January 1849, DL v no.1769
121 Monypenny & Buckle, Disraeli, i p.950
122 Aberdeen to Metternich (copy), 23 January 1849, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43128 f.283; Metternich to Disraeli, 25 January 1849, Monypenny & Buckle, Disraeli, i pp.1392-3
work, but the message was Aberdeen’s – that Disraeli should pursue Conservative unity rather than oppose Peel and his allies, in spite of the personal and political differences between them.

As Chamberlain notes, Disraeli did not detect Aberdeen’s role. Such was the value Disraeli placed on Metternich’s opinion that the ex-Chancellor could present Aberdeen’s advice as his own, and Disraeli heeded this advice. From 1849 onwards, he increasingly spoke of a ‘Conservative’ rather than ‘Protectionist’ Party, and soon attempted to create what J.B. Conacher called ‘an alternative system of agricultural relief’ to ‘wean his party off the pure milk of protection’. Whereas Lieven bemoaned the lack of a sole Tory leader, Metternich had actively intervened and persuaded Disraeli to seek reconciliation with the Peelites. This fitted in squarely with Aberdeen’s own ambitions to reunite the Tories and return to power. On 12 January, Guizot noted that Aberdeen would be very glad if Palmerston fell, and on the 28th, Aberdeen’s youngest son recorded that if his father were to ‘seize power it [was] now in his grasp’ while Palmerston ‘unwisely’ provoked him with ‘calumnious articles in the Globe, one of which he folded up to show Mme de Lieven’. Aberdeen subsequently discussed seeking office, albeit with ‘that shifty fellow’ Brougham. In conjunction with both Metternich and Brougham, Aberdeen had considered the formation of a broad-based Conservative government, and sought Lieven’s assistance in an attempt to restrain Palmerston. The exiles and Aberdeen’s interests coincided in reuniting the Tories and weakening Palmerston, and thereby played an important role in the ex-Foreign Secretary’s attempts to secure a united, Conservative government.

This increasingly cooperative atmosphere cheered Guizot, and on 1 February he announced to Lieven a widely anticipated attack by Stanley upon the government’s foreign policy. However, Guizot was concerned that exile interest might undermine any such attack, which would require Tory unity to succeed. Guizot had recently discussed politics with the influential courtier Charles Greville, but not mentioned

123 Chamberlain, Aberdeen, p.394  
124 see Conacher, J. B., The Peelites and the Party System, 1846-52 (Newton Abbot, 1972); Ramsden, Conservative Party, p.80  
125 Lieven to Lady Holland, 5 February 1849, Lieven-Holland, no.16  
126 Guizot to Lieven, 12 January 1849, Ibid., 163M111/2209; 28 January 1849, Stanmore Papers, Add. MS 49254 f.68
Disraeli’s ambitions, sure that Greville would repeat anything to Russell. Despite the exiles’ willingness to help the Tories, any intimation of exile interest in a Tory reunion would have galvanised the government in a debate.

However, Guizot’s optimism that the Tories would unite to defeat the government was misplaced. Palmerston survived this ‘mediocre’ attack, and Disraeli’s pretensions of leadership upset numerous Conservatives. Although Lieven commented on 19 March that Peel thought the cabinet was in a bad state, and that he would consequently act, exile optimism proved unsound, and exile suggestions proved unpalatable. Despite their deep interest in the Tories’ reunion and friendships with Peelites and Protectionists alike, the exiles’ various uncoordinated efforts proved to be in vain.

Meanwhile, Metternich pored over news provided by Conservatives. On January 17th, he thanked Mahon for sending him observations he had made in Paris, which provided an ‘interesting tableau’ of the ‘modern Babel’. This intelligence had a conspiratorial tone; it included an extract of a letter from a ‘man of the Whig party, but of very good sense’ (probably Palmerston’s opponent Edward Ellice) considering the likelihood of a Bourbon or Orleans restoration. Mahon willingly provided Metternich with information to fuel his interest in European affairs, and Brougham went even further, both in geographical terms and provision of information. Mahon noted on 15 January that Metternich had shown him a letter from Brougham, in Stuttgart, ‘giving some account of German affairs’. Brougham considered himself one of Metternich’s oldest English friends, and sent him letters ‘punctually and frequently’.

These networks bridged international borders. King Ernest of Hanover, formerly Duke of Cumberland, occasionally corresponded with Lieven, and in July 1848, Ernest was glad that she and ‘all [his] friends in England approv[ed]’ his policies. He added that nobody had done more to ‘unite Germany together’ than himself – ‘ask our

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127 Guizot to Lieven, 1 February 1849, FG, 163M111/2254
128 Guizot to Lieven, 3 February 1849, Ibid., 163M111/2260
129 Lieven to Guizot, 19 March, Ibid., 163M111/2288
130 Lieven to Guizot, 19 March, Ibid., 163M111/2288
131 Metternich to Mahon, 17 January 1849, Stanhope Papers, U1590/C350
132 Mahon to Metternich, n.d. (1849), RAM, AC10/467 ff.5-8
132 Mahon to Stanhope, 26 April 1848, Stanhope Papers, U1590/C317/15; Mahon to Stanhope, 15 January 1849, Ibid., f.16.
friend Metternich if this is not completely true’. The support of the exiles and their Tory allies encouraged the reactionary monarch, and on 4 January 1849, Strangford provided Metternich with a letter from Ernest, who had asked him to pass copies to Metternich, Wellington and Lyndhurst, judged by Ernest to be ‘persons worthy of confidence’. Ernest was happy that his policies had Tory approval, and added that ‘the majority of English politicians ha[d] no knowledge of the real state of Germany’. He accused Palmerston of being ‘as ignorant… as a schoolboy’, and insisted that the idea of a sole German state, the subject of vociferous debate in the German Diet, was preposterous, useful only to ‘radicals, democrats and bankrupts’. Rather than simply provide Metternich with intelligence, Strangford became an intermediary between the exiled Chancellor and European allies. Tories and exiles alike wished to see the restoration of “order” in Europe, and therefore facilitated each other’s communications.

**Metternich, Guizot and the Tory Press**

Metternich also claimed to exercise some influence over the British press. Whilst this claim may sound preposterous in light of Tory criticism of the *Spectateur* and the *Times*’ cautious attitude towards exile influence, it is quite possible that Metternich held some sway over British journalists. Unspecified journalists were among the ‘men of value’ whom Metternich associated with, and he did influence certain writers’ outputs. An article in the *Quarterly* on Germany that September was written with ‘hints and notes’ from him, and its contents reflect his viewpoints. The article claimed that institutions representing all Germany created after Napoleon’s defeat had been impracticable, as were the aims of the federal Diet, then sitting at Frankfurt and considering German unity. Although unwilling to publicise the assistance it had

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133 Ernest to Lieven, 22 July 1848, Lieven Papers, Add. MS 47351B ff.198-201
134 Strangford to Metternich, 4 January 1849, RAM, AC3/13A ff.3-4
135 Pocknell, Pauline (ed.), *Franz Liszt and Agnes Street-Klindworth* (Hillside NY, 2000), pp.xxx-xxxiv
137 Houghton et al, 1 p.731
138 *Quarterly Review* 83 (September 1848), pp.462-69; for similar opinions expressed by Metternich, see Disraeli to Lady Londonderry 30 April 1849, DL, v. no.1820; Stanhope, *Metternich*, p.328; Metternich to Aberdeen, 29 December 1848, Stanmore Papers, Add. MS 49275 ff.29-32; Metternich to Aberdeen, 4 January 1849, Ibid., ff.36-9; Metternich to Wellington, 7 June 1848, WP/2/158/97
received from the ex-Chancellor, the Conservative publication utilised his comments to attack the idea of German unity.

Metternich even took an interest in who wrote individual articles. In December, he asked Aberdeen who had written a leading article in the *Morning Chronicle* concerning the Diet, reflecting his view that Germany was as disunited as Italy, and that the ideas discussed at Frankfurt were impractical.\(^{139}\) Aberdeen replied that the author was the liberal MP John Macgregor, and agreed that although the British press had ‘materially contributed to the revolutionary outbreaks’, it was now ‘making full amends’ - or at least more ‘respectable titles’ were.\(^{140}\) Similarly, as Mary S. Millar describes, Metternich’s interest in the authorship of another article in the *Chronicle*, which predicted France’s lapse into dictatorship, led him to ask Disraeli who had authored it. Upon being told that the author was Strangford’s son, the Tory MP George Smythe, Metternich had several of Smythe’s articles translated for German newspapers.\(^{141}\) Even if they did not do the exiles’ bidding, Tory publications at least sometimes agreed with the exiles. Smythe consequently found both exile praise and patronage, and in turn, Metternich used the Tory MP’s words for his own ends.

Metternich continued to write for British audiences throughout his exile. Another *Quarterly* article, *The German Confederation and Austria*, published in the spring of 1849, was written under his supervision, and he was acknowledged as the author of around a third of its article on *Baxter’s Impressions on Europe*; Lockhart thought it ‘queer’ to have articles inspired by Louis Philippe and Metternich in the same issue.\(^{142}\) His ideas found an interested audience, and the *Quarterly*’s publisher had further plans concerning the ex-Chancellor. After Metternich read the publisher John Murray a draft chapter of his reminiscences, concerning his meeting with Napoleon in 1813, Murray offered him three or four thousand pounds for the completed work. Although Metternich suggested that it was too soon, he clearly sought further publicity by promoting the work, and the chapter struck the Tory writer Sir Travers

\(^{139}\) Metternich to Aberdeen, 29 December 1848, Stanmore Papers, Add. MS 49275 ff.29-32  
\(^{140}\) Aberdeen to Metternich (copy), 16 December 1848, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43128 ff.281-2; Parris, Henry, ‘Macgregor, John (1797–1857)’, *DNB*  
\(^{142}\) Metternich to Aberdeen, 11 April 1849, Stanmore Papers, Add. MS 49275 ff.71-2; Kern, J.D., Schneider, Elisabeth and Griggs, Irwin, ‘Lockhart to Croker on the Quarterly’, *PMLA* 60:1 (March 1945), pp.195-96
Twiss so profoundly that he could recall it 20 years later.\textsuperscript{143} As Metternich found further adherents among Tory journalists, they were increasingly receptive of his writings and willing to share his views.

Metternich’s hope that the \textit{Times} would cast Austria in a positive light was further fulfilled in August 1849, when Delane sought Metternich’s help in publishing reports from Hungary, where Austrian forces were combating nationalist rebels. In a letter to Aberdeen, Delane complained about the Hungarian revolution of which ‘we have lately heard so much and know so little’, and announced that he intended to send a correspondent named John Paton, to cover the war, furnished with a letter of introduction from Metternich. Although Paton was ‘a good Austrian’, Delane needed Metternich’s help to ensure access and prove that his correspondent would produce suitably pro-Austrian accounts.\textsuperscript{144} Rather than directly influence the contents of the influential newspaper, Metternich’s approbation was sought in order to produce pro-Austrian reports. The ex-Chancellor complied, and Paton did as expected; in an 1850 letter to Aberdeen, Metternich praised Paton’s supposed ‘impartiality’ and ‘accuracy’.\textsuperscript{145} Metternich’s intervention was crucial in the publication of these reports, and after his departure, Metternich claimed to have had greater influence than he could ever imagined over the \textit{Quarterly Review}, \textit{Times} and \textit{Morning Chronicle}, which he believed to defend his views and express his opinions.\textsuperscript{146}

Because few traces of his direct influence over the latter two publications exist, it might be argued that their output simply reflected agreement with Metternich on certain matters. However, at his suggestion, Austrian diplomats mounted ‘a counter-offensive in the British press’—one which could not compete with the Hungarian refugee Ferencz Pulszky’s influence over liberal titles, but was certainly noticed.\textsuperscript{147} When Kossuth visited Britain in 1851, British supporters publicly burned copies of the \textit{Times}.\textsuperscript{148} Although only directly responsible for a few articles, Metternich met

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{144} Delane to Aberdeen, 27 August 1849, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43247ff.58-9
\item \textsuperscript{145} Metternich to Aberdeen, 23 March 1850, Stanmore Papers, Add. MS 49275 ff.115-17
\item \textsuperscript{146} Metternich to Baron Kübeck, 31 December 1849, \textit{Metternich Memoirs}, viii no.1851
\item \textsuperscript{147} Roberts, I.W., \textit{Nicholas I and the Russian Intervention in Hungary} (London, 1991), p.70; for Pulszky’s success with the liberal press, see Kabdebo, \textit{Diplomat in Exile}
\item \textsuperscript{148} Fenton, \textit{Palmerston}, p.119
\end{itemize}
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various (unnamed) British journalists, and was also responsible for an Austrian propaganda offensive.

Conversely, Guizot was able to insert an article directly into the *Times*. During an attempt to be elected to the National Assembly, on 15 April 1849, Guizot requested that Reeve had his manifesto translated and published, confident that Reeve had been so kind to him that he did not hesitate to ask. The article appeared the next day, introduced with a statement that Guizot’s call for conservatives to unite into a ‘Party of Order’ was being read avidly and a major topic of conversation. This introduction was backdated the 14th, the day before Guizot had written to Reeve. Although Reeve remained supportive of Guizot’s ambitions, and even introduced his manifesto with a laudatory statement, any implication of exile influence had to be avoided.

Sympathetic journalists were not necessarily under exile influence. Articles in the *Times* and *Chronicle* found Lieven’s approval, and Metternich similarly praised the *Chronicle*. But the paper was in fact ‘quite under [Aberdeen’s] direction’. Tory papers more often reflected the exiles’ opinions than republished them. For example, when Strangford sent Metternich a *Morning Post* article in February 1849, he commented that Metternich might recognise ‘the hand of someone who studied in [his] school’, probably Smythe. There were conservative influences upon journalists independent of the exiles. Delane was pro-Austrian, and Reeve had ‘not inconsiderable influence’ over him. Moreover, according to Delane, Reeve was often inspired by ‘his dynastic tendencies, or rather those of his patrons’ such as Greville, which ‘constantly made us advocates of an unpopular and anti-national policy’ - and Greville was a friend of Guizot. The exiles could well have influenced the contents of other *Times* articles via their British allies. Although the exiles exercised a degree of influence over the British press, many Britons, including

149  Guizot to Reeve, 15 April 1849, Reeve-Guizot Correspondence, Add. 7615 f.34  
150  *Times*, 16 April 1849  
151  Lieven to Guizot, 2 August 1848, FG, 163MI10/2001 ; Lieven to Guizot, 10 November 1848, Ibid., 163MI10/2152 ; Metternich to John Murray III, 7 November 1848, John Murray Archive Mss. 42481; 18 December 1848, Stanmore Papers, Add. MS 49253 ff.42-3  
152  Strangford to Metternich, 19 February 1849, RAM AC3/13A ff.15-16  
154  Cook, *Delane*, p.54; Guizot to Reeve, 17 April 1848, Reeve-Guizot Correspondence, Add. 7615 f.21
journalists, simply came to the same conclusions about European affairs as right-wing refugees.

**Exile Influence and Tory Struggles**

By the summer of 1849, Metternich’s influence over Aberdeen had become obvious. The liberal MP Ralph Bernal Osborne savagely commented upon ‘the melancholy drone of the Scotch bagpipe, turned out of ... of Downing-street, raising a lament for what was called the lost glory of ‘our ancient ally’ (i.e. Metternich). This accusation is borne out in Aberdeen’s papers. Before speaking on renewed hostilities in northern Italy in March, Aberdeen was ‘very glad to receive’ Metternich’s critique of the Sardinians; he later gave ‘a thousand thanks’ for a memorandum on King Charles Albert of Sardinia, and asked Metternich to discuss the French intervention in Italy; and after a ‘satisfactory’ debate on Italy in July, Aberdeen returned a selection of papers to him. Metternich’s views and knowledge inspired Aberdeen’s speeches concerning the latest battleground of the revolutions, where Anglo-French attempts to broker a compromise peace had again failed.

The ex-Chancellor’s suggestions and links to Austria were of great interest to his British allies, and he was encouraged by their efforts in Parliament. Metternich lavishly praised a speech made by Brougham on 22 April, especially Brougham’s characterisation of Charles Albert as mad to renew hostilities. But by 3 April, Aberdeen was very sorry that Neumann would soon depart, for the refugee diplomat formed ‘the sole link between Austria and England who could be of real use’ in an ‘official capacity’. Aberdeen corresponded with the Austrian Ambassador in Paris for the same reason.  Although Metternich inspired a great deal of Aberdeen’s Parliamentary invective, the ex-Chancellor was not an effective channel for communication with Austria.

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155 *Hansard*, 21 July 1849, lvii cc.788-89
156 Aberdeen to Metternich (copy), 22 March 1849, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43128 ff.286-87; Aberdeen to Metternich (copy), 6 May 1849, Ibid., ff.289-90; Metternich to Aberdeen, 5 June 1848, Stanmore Papers, Add. MS 49275 ff.93-99; Aberdeen to Metternich (copy), 21 July 1849, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43128 f.291; *Hansard*, 20 July 1849 lvii cc.690-705
157 Metternich to Brougham (copy), 25 March 1849, RAM, AC 13/12A f.47
159 Aberdeen to Graham (copy), 24 June 1849, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43299, f.19
The exiles remained interested in a Tory reunion. On 4 July, Guizot announced to Lieven that Lord Lincoln, a leading Peelite MP, had told him that Peel would speak on Disraeli’s agricultural motion prior to the recess; but Guizot feared that Peel would not make concessions to the Protectionists.\(^\text{160}\) Although willing to see cooperation between Peelites and Protectionists, Guizot understood that a reunion could not come about over trade, and that foreign affairs offered firmer ground. Such an opportunity soon arose. On 19 July, prior to a debate on Italy initiated by Brougham, Aberdeen told Lieven that he was confident of success in September, and expected to gain a ‘respectable minority’ in the debate.\(^\text{161}\) Aberdeen was confident of eventually defeating Palmerston, perhaps with Lieven’s help, and two days later, she optimistically announced to Guizot that the debate had ended at 4AM, and that Lady Palmerston was worried.\(^\text{162}\)

Although Brougham spoke poorly and at length, Stanley and Aberdeen both excelled. This was a major debate, which attracted a great deal of Conservative support. Lord Heytesbury, the former Ambassador to Russia and a Tory, made his maiden speech aged 70.\(^\text{163}\) The government majority was a mere 12, and Palmerston condemned Aberdeen as being under Metternich’s influence. Yet despite this progress, the result was much to Guizot’s regret.\(^\text{164}\) The exiles’ British friends had inched closer to defeating the government with Lieven and Metternich’s encouragement. However, Aberdeen blamed Brougham for the defeat.\(^\text{165}\) While Aberdeen’s patient approach exasperated the ambitious Lieven, the Tory reunion and vote of censure against Palmerston which the exiles wanted had been scuppered by one of their allies. The chance of an exile-inspired Conservative reunion against Palmerston appeared to be lost.

Lieven remained confident that she could inspire such a reunion. She continued to provide Aberdeen with information on Whig weaknesses, and was overjoyed when the Cabinet was divided over colonial policy in August.\(^\text{166}\) Even during the

\(^\text{160}\) Guizot to Lieven 4 July 1849, FG, 163MI11/2332
\(^\text{161}\) Lieven to Guizot, 19 July 1849, Ibid., 163MI11/2351
\(^\text{162}\) Lieven to Guizot, 21 July 1849, Ibid., 163MI11/2356
\(^\text{163}\) 20 July 1849, BP PP/D/11
\(^\text{164}\) Lieven to Guizot, 22 July 1849, FG, 163MI11/2358; Guizot to Lieven, n.d., Ibid., 163MI11/2360
\(^\text{166}\) Lieven to Aberdeen, 15 August 1849, Aberdeen-Lieven, ii no.218
Parliamentary recess she sent Aberdeen information which implied that the government could be defeated.\textsuperscript{167} This came from multifarious sources; Bulwer provided news from Frankfurt, and on 1 August, Beauvale showed her a letter he had received from Ponsonby, the British Minister to Austria.\textsuperscript{168} Lieven had placed herself at the centre of intrigues against the government, and her best chance arose in September.

Lieven sent Guizot (who had returned to France) a letter from Beauvale dated 18 September, detailing how Palmerston and Russell had fallen out over the appointment of a Catholic governor of Malta. Beauvale expected that if the Maltese government and its ‘council of Jesuits’ were sacrificed, the Tories would not be offended, but the Radicals whom the government relied upon in the Commons would be.\textsuperscript{169} This meant that the Radicals and Tories might combine to defeat Russell, circumstances which could well have led to Russell’s resignation and the possible formation of a Tory government. Russell was forced to seek Radical support, and on 23 September, Guizot commented that there was no more that the Prime Minister could do.\textsuperscript{170} However, the crisis which had threatened to create an exploitable chasm had already passed. Palmerston told Lieven that the affair reminded him ‘of Lord Grey, who always said let a thing alone; in dropping it, it mends sooner than itself.’\textsuperscript{171} Although both Tory factions could have exploited this break in Parliament while Lieven exploited it in society, this crisis was averted as suddenly as it had emerged.

Lieven’s last intrigue in exile did not even receive Aberdeen’s support. In September, after the failure of the Hungarian revolution, disagreement erupted between Turkey and Russia and Austria over the extradition of defeated rebels who had fled to Turkey. While Austria and Russia demanded that the refugees, who were of Hungarian and Polish origin, were deported to stand trial, Britain and France supported Turkish refusals to do so. This disagreement threatened to escalate into conflict, and Lieven was horrified at the prospect. Throughout September and October, she kept Aberdeen apace of events. Lieven informed Aberdeen of Schwarzenberg’s negative response to

\textsuperscript{167} Lieven to Aberdeen, 10 September 1849, Ibid., ii No.222  
\textsuperscript{168} Lieven to Guizot, 25 July 1849, FG, 163M11/2366; Lieven to Guizot, 1 August 1849, Ibid., 163M11/2381  
\textsuperscript{169} Beauvale to Lieven, 18 September 1849, Ibid., 163M12/2497  
\textsuperscript{170} Lieven to Guizot, 23 September 1849, Ibid., 163M12/2505  
\textsuperscript{171} Lieven to Guizot, 23 September 1849, Ibid., 163M12/2507
a British despatch, disgustedly warned him about the ‘mischief’ being encouraged, and even suggested that war could only be averted by extraditing the refugees. However, war was avoided without the refugees’ deportation, and Aberdeen thought the government’s reaction pacific and sensible.\textsuperscript{172} Although he could have exploited Britain’s conduct during the crisis and its support for escaped rebels to unite the Tories against the government, Aberdeen agreed with Palmerston’s course, in spite of the detailed information which Lieven had provided him with. She returned to Paris soon after. But the exiles and their Tory associates continued to hold each other in high regard.

Whilst the exiles’ suggestions were sometimes rejected, they had established a reasonable degree of influence. Not only did they inspire Tory critiques of the Whig government’s foreign policy, but attempted to unify the Conservative party, and the failure of the \textit{Spectateur} notwithstanding, found a great deal of support in the press. The exiles of 1848 certainly made an impression amongst British allies, and vice versa. Ostensibly, these refugees do not appear to have achieved a great deal. Their goal of uniting the Tories proved unattainable even by the Tories themselves. In spite of Stanley’s hope to engineer a reunion, political and personal differences with Peel and his closest associates ensured that this ultimately failed, even though most Peelite backbenchers eventually joined the Protectionists.\textsuperscript{173}

Nevertheless, the exiles had encouraged the Tories, and vice versa, found support in the press and even came close enough to defeating the government to embarrass and frustrate Palmerston. In terms of influence exercised by refugees of either left or right over British politics, theirs was vast, and appreciated by their allies, some of whom continued to utilise these relationships in subsequent years and even decades. It should also be noted that the exiles were at the centre of a complex web of relationships between Palmerston’s Conservative opponents, revealing a previously unknown depth of Tory willingness to reunite over foreign policy. Although the Conservative party remained divided, the exiles’ efforts had enabled a degree of

\textsuperscript{172} Lieven to Aberdeen, 12 September 1849, \textit{Aberdeen-Lieven}, ii no.223; Malcolm-Smith, E.F., \textit{The Life of Stratford Canning} (London, 1933) pp.216-17; Lieven to Aberdeen, 28 September 1849, \textit{Aberdeen-Lieven}, ii no.227; Lieven to Aberdeen, 4 October 1849, \textit{Ibid.}, ii no.228; Aberdeen to Lieven, 11 October 1849, \textit{Ibid.}, ii no.231

\textsuperscript{173} Hawkins, \textit{Derby}, i p.389
strategic cooperation undertaken by the two Tory factions, which historians have previously failed to recognise.
Although refugee opinion had far less impact upon Whigs than the ideologically sympathetic Tories, the exiles’ prominence and political activities ensured that Whigs came into contact with their views. This chapter explores the complex relationship which developed between the exiles and members of the Whig government, one which swung between interest and concern as political necessities dictated. It first considers the exiles’ impact upon British foreign policy, and then contemplates the exiles’ social relations with Whigs, and how these interactions influenced both government policy and Whig perceptions of the course of events in Europe during 1848-49. The chapter also explores the political importance of the royal refugees’ relationships with the British royal family. Although the exiles were often hostile to the government, its relationship with them was highly complicated, coloured by attempts to both prevent and exploit exile intrigue.

Whereas Tories welcomed the exiles of 1848, members of the Whig government were both sympathetic to the exiles’ plight and incredibly critical of them. One junior minister, George Cornewall Lewis, reckoned that Louis Philippe would be treated respectfully, but without any ‘real sympathy’. Lewis joked that the ex-King had got his just desserts for banning dinners, and Guizot feared such a hostile reception from Whigs and Tories alike. Metternich was subject to especially harsh criticism: Palmerston remarked that people ‘say that I should be surprised at what an old twaddle he has become’. Central to these comments and expectations were the exiles’ failures to maintain order or introduce reforms, only to find themselves confronted with revolution. However, on 2 May, Palmerston called upon Metternich. Despite the ostensibly polar differences between the two statesmen’s views, Palmerston willingly met the ex-Chancellor, and such meetings were a regular occurrence. Whereas high society was often divided politically in France, in Britain, politicians who often violently disagreed met socially, a fact which impressed Thiers upon his arrival in 1852.

1 G.C. Lewis to Sarah Austin, 4 March 1848, Lewis, G.F. (ed.), Letters of the Right Hon. Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Bart. to various Friends (London, 1870), p.170; Guizot, Peel, p.329
2 Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 2 May 1848, BP, PP/GC/NO/459
3 Ibid.
4 Henry Greville, 18 March 1852, i p.421
In this setting, the exiles came into close contact with Whigs, and although their politics differed, there was a strong degree of mutual respect between the exiles and Whig politicians. While Hobhouse disliked Guizot’s ‘public character’, he found him ‘amiable in private’, and Macaulay similarly ‘liked and esteemed’ Guizot, but found his politics ‘detestable’.  

Hobhouse joked that while the ‘English funds’ had initially fallen after the revolution, they had risen back, which the Orléans would never do – he was relieved, however, that Guizot and the Orléans family were safe.  

Personal consideration triumphed over political differences, and the exiles found a great deal of attention from Whigs who criticised their roads to ruin. The liberal economist Nassau Senior befriended many of the ‘distinguished exiles’ who ‘made London society… so brilliant’, and Guizot was often received at the Whig bastion Holland House – he later recalled friendships with Russell, Lansdowne and Macaulay. As Aberdeen noted, Guizot won ‘universal respect and esteem’ in exile. Despite the differences between the exiles and their liberal hosts, they were welcomed as victims and accepted into the social circles which doubled as political forums. 

This social acceptance afforded the exiles access to discussions about British politics and diplomacy. By April 1849, Guizot could elaborate on Britain’s Austrian policy, Prince Albert’s ‘Germanic fantasies’, and even instructions sent to Prussia. They were not only able to obtain detailed information about British foreign policy. Upon Lieven’s departure, Russell’s wife sent ‘[o]ne little word of remembrance… in return for your many messages’. Lieven and Russell had settled and unsettled ‘the affairs of Europe’ at her ‘fantasie’.  

The exiles were at the centre of numerous discussions in high society concerning the fate of Europe at a critical time, and in turn they provided Whigs with information upon an informal basis. Clarendon thought Guizot’s opinions ‘always worth having’, although he held him more responsible for the turmoil of 1848-50 ‘than any other human’. 

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6 Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 2-6 March 1848, Hobhouse Papers, Mss Eur F213/22, p.236
7 Senior, Italy and France, i.p.v; Guizot to Sir John Boileau, 7 October 1867, Boileau Papers 66/117; Lord Ilchester, The Chronicles of Holland House, 1820-1900 (London, 1937), pp.374-75; Hayward, Abraham, Sketches of Eminent Statesmen and Writers with Other Essays (London, 1880), ii p.225
8 Aberdeen to Guizot, 23 July 1849, Stanmore (ed.), Aberdeen, ix no.110
10 Lady John Russell to Princess Lieven, [n.d., 1849], Lieven Papers, Add. MS 47377 f.46
11 Clarendon to Henry Reeve, 6 February 1850, Ms. Clar. C.534
Access to society afforded the exiles a degree of influence upon Whig perceptions of European events, and therefore government policy. Although the exiles’ ambitions focused upon encouraging Tory unity, interactions with Whigs provided an additional arena to promote their ideals and exercise their ambitions; and like the Conservative opposition, the Whig government sought to exploit the exiles’ continental links.

Not all of the exiles were met with such an ambiguous welcome by their peers; for in the British royal family, the exiled Orléans family had sympathetic friends who wielded some influence over government policy. Prince Albert visited the exiles soon after their installation at Claremont House in Surrey, loaned to them by King Leopold of the Belgians, and invited the fallen King and Queen to Buckingham Palace with Palmerston’s consent. That Albert visited alone has been interpreted as a snub; yet Queen Victoria was awaiting the imminent birth of her sixth child, and unable to travel.

Although the Queen was initially critical of Louis Philippe and blamed his downfall on being ‘blind to the facts’, she also credited the ex-King for 16 years of European peace. While Europe was plagued by revolutionary and counter-revolutionary turmoil, Louis Philippe’s reign represented a relative golden age, and the Queen soon forgave what she considered to be Louis Philippe’s greatest blunder, the Spanish marriages. The Queen was quickly transformed from Louis Philippe’s sympathiser to his open supporter.

This enthusiastic partisanship unsurprisingly caused a clash with the Foreign Secretary. Palmerston felt that Louis Philippe had ‘no doubt persuaded her’ that the revolution was his fault, and that only Prince Albert’s ‘good sense and influence’ had prevented ‘imprudent’ displays of sympathy. Both Sir George Grey and Palmerston consequently warned her to restrain her friendship for the Orléans, and Lord Grey also

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15 Charles Greville (Strachey & Fulford ed.), 1 June 1848, pp.69-71  
16 Charles Greville to Clarendon, 2 June 1848, MS. Clar. C.521
voiced a ‘strong opinion’ on showing ‘more than mere hospitality’. Any intimation of royal friendliness seemingly risked either discontent in Britain, or damaging good relations with the new French Republic, with which Palmerston sought an *entente* as a means of restraining its apparent ambitions to support republicanism throughout Europe, and securing Britain’s own foreign policy objectives.

The Prince of Prussia also received royal attention. As Hannah Pakula notes, Prince Albert attempted to ‘press his solutions to the German problem’ upon him, and thought that he successfully modified ‘his friend’s attitude’. This proved not to be the case, and Otto von Bismarck later ‘played skilfully’ on Wilhelm’s ‘deepest fears’ – a repeat of the revolutionary turmoil of 1848. Although the Prince was only present in Britain for a few months, he too found the royal family’s sympathy, and thereby briefly occupied a position from which he could influence their interpretations of events in Germany.

**The Exiles and British Foreign Policy**

Soon after the revolution in France, Palmerston feared that Orleanist plots might anger the French provisional government. This threatened to undermine the cornerstone of his foreign policy, for whereas Aberdeen and Guizot’s *entente cordiale* had been personal, the first object’ of Palmerston’s policy after 1848 was an *entente*, or agreement, between the French and British governments. Palmerston quickly instructed Normanby to state that the Orléans would be received merely as exiles, and that no plotting would be tolerated. This concern was actuated by the republic’s apparent weakness. ‘If I was to back an event to come off, I should lay the odds on the Comte de Paris’, he noted on 18 March. An Orléans restoration would have upset Palmerston’s hopes for both stability in France and Anglo-French cooperation, and he therefore sought to keep Orléans comfortable and uninterested in power.

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19 Ibid., pp.119, 167, 194
20 See Billy, 1848, for details.
21 Bullen, *Entente*, p.331
22 Palmerston to Clarendon, 18 March 1848, MS. Clar. C.524
On 19 May, Palmerston instructed Normanby to remind the French head of state, Alphonse de Lamartine, of his decision not to confiscate the Orléans properties, because the high-minded’ French nation would not wish to see them suffer ‘the pressure of penury’. These comments were calculated to flatter the new republican regime, but the French government was worried about a potential Orléans restoration in the weeks after the revolution. Louis Philippe’s officer sons (the Duc d’Aumale, Governor General of Algeria, and Prince de Joinville, a navy captain serving off North Africa) were of greater concern than the rest of the family, because of their potential to lead an Orleanist counterrevolution. Palmerston was right to avoid causing any offence in relation to the Orléans’ ambitions, considering the French republic’s initial fears of civil war.

Whilst the princes voluntarily followed their family into exile and resolved this concern by themselves, the exiles’ presence in Britain remained a potential point of contention with France. In August, the French Ambassador in London was recalled after he was seen walking ‘arm in arm with Guizot’; Palmerston joked to Normanby that ‘there never was a more rapid military movement’. But although he was amused by the incident, the Foreign Secretary was painfully aware that the slightest impression of favouring the exiles could offend the unstable republican government, and fears of an Orleanist restoration continued to circulate in Britain as the summer approached. Lady Normanby was sure that the French ‘would call for a King’ and ‘certainly some wish[ed] the Crown to go to’ Louis Philippe’s grandson the Comte de Paris’, while the diplomat Lord Howden warned Palmerston that a French correspondent had noticed that ‘a very steadily increasing party’, including the majority of junior officers (‘who entirely command[ed] the French army’) favoured appointing Joinville as Paris’ regent.

Although these reports were little more than gossip, they underlined widespread concerns about the Republic’s chances of survival, and were reflected in Palmerston’s own concerns. As far as the Foreign Secretary was aware, Parisian society favoured

23 Palmerston to Normanby (draft), 19 May 1848, Palmerston Papers, Add. MS 48557 no.223
25 Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 8 August 1848, BP, PP/GC/NO/469; Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 9 August 1848, Ibid., PP/GC/NO/470/1
26 Lady Normanby to Colonel Phipps, 27 May 1848, QVFA Vol. J69, no.90; Howden to Palmerston, 19 June 1848, BP, PP/GC/HO/912
Charles X’s grandson the Duc de Bordeaux (now also known as the Comte de Chambord); but Paris might be considered an alternative owing to his ‘infancy’. Whilst this exempted him ‘from blame’ for the revolution, it also disqualified him for the throne in tumultuous times. In Palmerston’s opinion, even after the repression of the violent ‘June Days’ motivated by the closure of ‘National Workshops’ for the unemployed, France was threatened with further revolutionary turmoil, and the ten year-old Paris’ accession would have compounded this.

Palmerston was not alone in fearing that the exiles’ presence was a potential threat to good Anglo-French relations. On 4 July, Clarendon advised Russell to ‘make some formal communication’ about Anglophobia in France. Although Clarendon blamed the Irish famine, it was made ‘the more necessary’ by the presence of Louis Philippe ‘and so many emigrants’, which could ‘incline the French people to believe that we are intriguing for a restoration’ and ‘ dispose them favourably towards their own republic and… war’. Any implication of Orléans influence over the British government was unacceptable, for it threatened to destroy Palmerston’s entente.

Not all of the exiles posed a threat to British diplomacy; Klindworth actually provided Palmerston with an opportunity. Once aware of Klindworth’s presence in April, Palmerston consulted Normanby. Although Metternich and Guizot had both fallen from power, their former intermediary – who had also been a British informant – was potentially of interest as a spy. Normanby replied that because ‘numerous copies of Guizot’s personal papers’ had recently been published, Klindworth, whose reports were amongst them, would be ‘a very useless agent, till he is forgotten again’. However, the refugee agent could be relied upon to ride for ‘the master of the moment’, and although paid a yearly pension by Guizot, Klindworth was only nominally a conservative. Klindworth offered his services to the Foreign Secretary in August, and Palmerston evidently followed Normanby’s advice.

In contrast, Metternich failed to influence British diplomacy. After Austria suffered several humiliating defeats to Sardinian-led forces, in May 1848, it sent a special

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27 Palmerston to Bloomfield (copy), 18 August 1848, Ibid., PP/GC/GL/231
28 Clarendon to Russell (copy), 4 July 1848, MS. Clar. Irish Box 3 p.22
29 Normanby to Palmerston (copy), 23 April 1848, QVFA, Vol. J69 no.19
envoy, Count Hummelauer, to London to secure a compromise peace. The settlement proposed the creation of a Lombardo-Venetian kingdom under an Austrian Viceroy, to prevent French intervention or Sardinian expansion, and even after further concessions, it was rejected by the British Cabinet.\textsuperscript{31} However, Metternich continued to support the idea. In a letter to Beauvale dated 12 August, Metternich stressed the necessity of the British government adopting it, perhaps hopeful that the former diplomat could persuade his brother-in-law Palmerston of its value.\textsuperscript{32} Metternich provided Beauvale with possible alternative peace terms, of which Palmerston made a copy; but Metternich’s efforts came to naught.\textsuperscript{33} By then, the Austrians had inflicted some severe defeats upon the Sardinians, and imposed an armistice.

Palmerston believed that Metternich no longer had any influence in Austria. When the Austrian diplomat Count Dietrichstein resigned from his London posting in May, Palmerston dismissed rumours that Metternich was cooperating with the Austrian Legation. Nothing ‘could be so absurd as the notion’ that Dietrichstein was ‘a follower of Metternich’, who had thought Dietrichstein ‘too liberal’ and ignored him for months on end. Although Dietrichstein had met Metternich ‘several times’, Palmerston thought that this was ‘surely [as] an act of courtesy’, ‘no more an expression of political concurrence’ than his own meetings with Metternich and Guizot.\textsuperscript{34}

Conversely, the Prince of Prussia upset Palmerston over the Schleswig-Holstein dispute. The Duchies, which owed allegiance both to Denmark and the Germanic Confederation, had rebelled against Denmark in March, and were invaded by Prussian forces on behalf of the German Confederation in April. Palmerston sought to mediate between Denmark and Prussia to prevent further hostilities, but the Prince thought little of these attempts. On 8 April, Wilhelm wrote to his brother, King Friedrich Wilhelm IV, that although negotiations between German diplomats and Palmerston had not quite failed, British sympathies were unmistakably Danish, and a ‘possible mediation’ entailed German troops being drawn back for few concessions. The Prussian King and Prince agreed that the number of Prussian troops had to ‘double...

\textsuperscript{31} Billy, 1848, pp.97-98  
\textsuperscript{32} Metternich to Beauvale, 12 August 1848, Metternich Memoirs, viii no.1947  
\textsuperscript{33} Metternich to Beauvale, 14 August 1848 (copy enclosed), BP, PP/GC/ME/633/1  
\textsuperscript{34} Palmerston to Ponsonby (copy), 13 May 1848, Ibid., PP/GC/PO/812
as quickly as possible’. Wilhelm thereby undermined Palmerston’s efforts, and in May Prussian troops entered Denmark. The Russian government ‘duly informed the British that a break in relations with Prussia was a distinct possibility’.35

Prussia and Russia were close allies, and this threatened to further complicate the affair. The Russian Minister told both Wilhelm and Palmerston that the Czar would support Denmark, but Palmerston was slow to share this information with the Queen or Prime Minister. When Wilhelm visited Victoria the next day and ‘alluded to this important communication’, she was left ‘excessively embarrassed’. Enraged, she summoned Russell to discuss it, and he had only just received notice.36 Palmerston’s jealous guarding of his responsibilities, often a point of contention between him, Russell and the Queen, had been checked by the Queen and an exile, albeit by accident rather than design. Although this incident had no diplomatic effect, it contributed to the dispute concerning ministerial responsibilities.

As the Schleswig-Holstein affair continued, Palmerston revised his opinion about Metternich, and attempted to take advantage of his presence, having correctly anticipated that Metternich’s instructions were disseminated throughout Germany. In August, Prussia, alienated from the Confederation, signed an armistice with Denmark, independent of the Confederation. The armistice was upheld with ‘Prussian arms’ and Disraeli observed that Palmerston had apparently settled the ‘affair’ by getting Metternich to ‘write to the Archduke John, appointed German regent by the Diet, counselling him to sign the armistice’.37

This overture was a novel, but nonetheless practical means of breaking the deadlock. But only on 19 September did the British Minister at Frankfurt, Lord Cowley, confirm the Archduke’s support for an armistice, after the Confederation was seemingly faced with war against the rest of Europe.38 Although an armistice was signed, it was not as a result of Palmerston’s overture to Metternich. Whilst Metternich corresponded with his successor Prince Schwarzenberg and others, sometimes via Ponsonby, he was yet

35 Wilhelm to Friedrich Wilhelm IV, 8 April 1848, Friedel (ed.), Briefwechsel, no.67; Billy, 1848, pp.119-122
36 Charles Greville (Strachey & Fulford ed.), 22-25 May 1848, pp.63-64
37 Billy, 1848, p.123; Disraeli to Lady Londonderry, 4 August 1848, DL V no.1677
to fully throw himself into German politics (which he had certainly done by May 1849) or re-establish his influence.  

As the summer ended, Palmerston became wary of Metternich’s intrigues. On 31 August 1848, he warned Ponsonby that ‘Metternich and others’ ‘amuse[d] their correspondents at Vienna’ with hopes of French support in Italy and ‘the want of power in France to go to war’. Palmerston added that such ideas were nonsense, and that the Austrian Foreign Minister, Baron Wessenberg, apparently knew ‘Metternich and England well enough not to be misled by’ him. He therefore implored Ponsonby to remind Wessenberg that ‘private and personal intrigues’ would achieve nothing in Britain. The Foreign Secretary wanted to discredit any intrigues initiated by Metternich before they could begin to influence the course of Austrian diplomacy. Palmerston initially blamed ‘Metternich’s [former] staff’ when Wessenberg appeared ‘drawn to’ his ‘practices’ in September, but he soon feared that others heeded Metternich’s advice. On 30 September, the Foreign Secretary noted that the Austrian ‘Court Party’ had seemingly been ‘deluded by Metternich’ or themselves into thinking that France was bankrupt, divided, and supported by Russia. He warned Ponsonby that such ‘blind infatuation’ would ruin Austria, and returned to this sentiment in another letter in November.

Palmerston became obsessed with the idea that Metternich was intriguing against him. In reply to a letter in which Palmerston ‘hinted’ that Archduke John ‘might be influenced by opinions coming from Prince Metternich’, Cowley noted that the Archduke had ‘heard directly’ from him ‘but once’ (i.e. the letter he had sent on Palmerston’s suggestion.) Such was Palmerston’s interest in the ex-Chancellor’s activities that on 14 December, they had ‘a long talk’ at Metternich’s residence.

Palmerston had convinced himself that Metternich’s influence was something to be

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40 Palmerston to Ponsonby (copy), 31 August 1848, BP, PP/GC/PO/815/2
41 Palmerston to Ponsonby (copy), 7 September 1848, Ibid., PP/GC/PO/816/1
42 Palmerston to Ponsonby (copy), 30 September 1848, Ibid., PP/GC/PO/818/1; Palmerston to Ponsonby (copy), 12 November 1848, Ibid., PP/GC/PO/819/1
43 Cowley to Palmerston, 12 November 1848, Ibid., PP/GC/CO/152
44 14 December 1848, Ibid., PP/D/10
feared, and he was not alone in his belief. The British Minister to Sardinia, Sir Ralph Abercrombie, also believed that Metternich still directed Austria’s Italian policy.45

However, the Foreign Secretary accepted that there were a myriad other influences at play. In January 1849, Palmerston argued to Cowley that Austria was ‘directed now by nearly the same men’ as it had been under Metternich’s rule, and he condemned bureaucrats of Metternich’s ‘school’, Tory servility towards Austria, royal dukes’ and duchesses’ notions about Hungary, and ‘Austrian agents’ for their links with the Times and for ‘buying’ the Chronicle’s support.46 While concerned about the ex-Chancellor’s influence in both Britain and Germany, Palmerston did not blame Metternich alone for pro-Austrian sentiment or specific Austrian policies. However, as one reactionary member of the Frankfurt Diet noted, whilst Metternich might not have been formulating Austrian policy, he was certainly leading ‘a fierce struggle against Palmerston’.47

The Foreign Secretary was willing to use the exiles as intermediaries with Russia and Austria. When a quarrel over the Hungarian refugees in Turkey broke, Lieven wrote to Lady Palmerston ‘in great anxiety’. Lieven worried that if Turkey remained ‘obstinate’, a European war was likely; but rather than encourage her husband to abandon his policy of supporting Turkey, Lady Palmerston prompted Beauvale to tell Lieven ‘that [the Czar] would not have a leg to stand upon’, and that both the British government and public supported Turkey.48 Rather than find her advice accepted, Lieven was warned that Britain would not yield.

Beauvale wrote to Metternich in a similar vein, asking whether Austria would support Russia in such an ‘outrageous proceeding’ as threatening Turkey. Having spoken to Palmerston, Beauvale believed that Britain would back Turkey, and claimed that Palmerston had shown him a letter written by Nesselrode which hinted at the Czar’s extreme ‘excitement’, ‘enjoying his position vis-a-vis Austria’. Although both Austria

47 J.H. Delmond to J.C. Strüve, 17 January 1849, Kaufman, Georg (ed.), Briefwechsel zwischen Strüve und Detmold in den Jahren 1848 bis 1850 (Hanover, 1903), no.90
48 Lady Palmerston to Lord Palmerston, 3 October 1849, Lady Airlie, Lady Palmerston and Her Times (2 Vols, London, 1922), ii p.128
and Russia wanted to intimidate Turkey, Beauvale warned that Russia considered the
refugees’ escape a *casus belli*, and that war would reduce Turkey to a Russian
province.\footnote{Beauvale to Metternich, 2 October 1849, RAM, AC 3/2A ff.55-57}
This warning, probably made on Palmerston’s behalf, was intended to
persuade Metternich into advising Austria to back down because war would weaken
Austrian influence in the east. Yet on 5 October, Lieven noted that Palmerston did not
appear to have decided to back Turkey, whilst Metternich and Beauvale agreed that
hostilities could not open in winter.\footnote{Lieven to Guizot, 5 October 1849, FG, 163MI12/2539; Lieven to Guizot, 6 October 1849, Ibid.,
163MI12/2542} Having failed to convince Metternich and
Lieven that Britain, France and Turkey would stand together, Palmerston’s efforts to
restrain Austria and Russia had suffered a major setback.

Further British attempts to prevent the dispute from transforming into a European
conflict also involved the exiles. On 6 October, Palmerston wrote to Ponsonby that
‘the rights of the case’ were against Russia and Austria, that the Russian and Austrian
Ministers acknowledged that Turkey was not bound to surrender the refugees, and
that Metternich reportedly thought it ‘a great mistake’.\footnote{Palmerston to Ponsonby (copy), 6 October 1849, BP, PP/GC/PO/837}
Even the ‘bribed’ *Times* and
‘bankrupt’ *Chronicle* agreed.\footnote{Palmerston to Ponsonby (copy), 11 October 1849, Ibid., PP/GC/PO/838}
Meanwhile, in an attempt to appease the Russians, Russell assured Lieven that the British Minister at Constantinople, Sir Stratford
Canning, had been wrong to cease ‘communication with the Russian Consul’.\footnote{Charles Greville to Clarendon, 15 October 1849, MS. Clar. C.522}
The threat which this dispute posed to the Hungarian refugees, Britain’s Turkish ally and
even the peace of Europe necessitated persuading Austria and Russia to withdraw
their threats by every possible means, and the exiles provided a vital channel of
communication.

However, the dispute ‘died away as quickly as it had arisen’.\footnote{Zarek, Otto, *Kossuth* (London, 1937), p.245}
By 16 October, the
Russian government had ‘changed their tone’ in response to British support for
Turkey and the refugees.\footnote{Bloomfield to Palmerston, 16 October 1849, BP, PP/GC/BL/195/1}
The near east remained at peace, and Turkey did not
surrender the refugees. In spite of Palmerston’s fears that the presence of right-wing
refugees in Britain would undermine British foreign policy goals, he was faced with
no such crisis. Neither did attempts to exploit the exiles’ high-level contacts abroad
have any tangible impact. Although the exiles had seemingly promised to both forestall British diplomacy and allow an additional diplomatic channel, in the event they did neither, in spite of Palmerston’s best efforts and worst fears.

**Society and Whig Politics**

Exile opinion often interested members of the government. While London steeled itself against the revived Chartists’ march to deliver their petition in early March, Lord Morpeth (who held cabinet rank as First Commissioner of Woods and Forests) noted that Lieven had warned that it had been ‘like this in Paris’ prior to the revolution. After the march proceeded peacefully, Lord Campbell found Guizot ‘lost in admiration’ for the people of London. Exile commentary generated interest, and such was the clamour for European news that Morpeth recorded Lieven’s frustration at hearing nothing from the Prince of Prussia. He had listened to the exiles earnestly, in search of both foreign news and opinion, and for the same reasons, Palmerston kept up social relations with Metternich and Guizot. Palmerston invited both to dine at the Foreign Office, and shook Guizot’s hand so vigorously that it appeared each would lose an arm.

Despite their political differences, Whigs happily received the refugees; but association with such discredited figures could be damaging, especially soon after the revolutions. Palmerston’s meeting with Guizot and Metternich was hidden from the press, and the cabinet found it ‘thoroughly necessary to contradict’ rumours that the Prince of Prussia was ‘driven from Berlin on account of his conduct’, unwilling to be regarded as harbouring a despot. Meanwhile Louis Philippe’s behaviour in exile did not endear him to Whigs. While Senior garnered information for an *Edinburgh Review* article from refugee ex-ministers, Louis Philippe’s peroration on his fall was

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56 8 March 1848, Lady Caroline Lascelles (ed.), *Extracts from Journals kept by George Howard, Earl of Carlisle* (privately printed, n.d.) p.57; Campbell to his brother, 11 April 1848, Hardcastle, M.S., *Life of John, Lord Campbell* (2 vols., London, 1881), ii p.239
57 Carlisle, 25 June 1848, p.62; Princess Lieven to Count Benckendorff, 26 April 1848, Lieven Papers, Add. MSS 58121, f.92.
58 Ridley, *Palmerston*, p.455; Charles Greville, 26 March 1848, vi p.161
poorly received. His willingness to recount his downfall – for which Whigs held him responsible – ensured that he was less popular among them than the other exiles, even though Whigs travelled to Claremont to visit him.

Conversely, Guizot’s experience as a historian and politician appealed to the government, and he was called before the Committee on the Public Business in the House of Commons, organised to consider the Commons’ procedures. While certain comments which Guizot made concerning the National Assembly of 1789 were thought inaccurate, his evidence was taken seriously, and he corresponded with the Whig MP John Evelyn Denison upon committee business in some detail. They also considered the creation of a committee office. They took a respectful interest in each other’s suggestions, and the Whig Lord Newark thought that Denison’s fellow committee member Peel’s intellect was put to good use in examining Guizot’s evidence to the committee. Whilst Guizot’s expertise was happily received (Disraeli later reminded the Commons that the “great master of debate” had contributed much to its deliberations), the report was never fully implemented. Nevertheless, Whigs and Conservatives alike appreciated this nonpartisan application of Guizot’s talents. The evidence which he provided was so highly regarded that it was cited in debates concerning parliamentary procedure as late as 1882.

By late 1848, further Whigs had turned to the exiles for intelligence. Ellice discussed French party politics with the former French Interior Minister Tanneguy Duchâtel; and Palmerston consulted Metternich about Austria’s new leaders. Clarendon, then visiting London, also shared the news that Thiers was to meet Louis Philippe with Lansdowne. Owing to their continental links and experience of government, the exiles had become an important source of information about Europe. Even

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61 Times, 11 September 1848; Guizot to Denison, 4 July 1848, Ossington Collection, OsC425
62 Guizot to Denison, 30 August 1848, Ibid., OsC431
63 Lord Newark to Denison, 9 September 1848, Ibid., OsC33
64 Hansard, 25 July 1856, cxliii cc.1433-34
65 Hansard, 26 February 1880, cclvi cc.1483; 20 February 1882, cclxvi cc.1168-75; 7 November 1882, ccxlvii cc.987; 9 November 1882, ccxlviii cc.1135-6
67 Clarendon to Lansdowne, 15 November 1848, Bowood Papers, Add. MS 88906/9/4/45
information provided by the discredited Louis Philippe was valued and shared in government circles. When the ex-King told Clarendon that France’s army was ill-equipped for a civil war, this was relayed to Russell and the Queen.\footnote{Russell to Victoria, 26 November 1848, QVL, ii pp.203-04} Clarendon also reported Louis Philippe’s belief that Louis Napoleon did not know ‘how to govern, from want of head and experience’, that ‘France cannot go to war, and… that Marshal Bugeaud talk[ed] of the army of the Alps as a \textit{fantôme}.\footnote{Russell to Palmerston, 7 January 1849, BP, PP/GC/RU/244} Although Whigs held Louis Philippe in contempt, these comments by the ex-King were considered valuable at a time of great uncertainty.

This was not a simple one-way exchange of information, for the exiles exploited news they received from Whigs. Lieven informed Guizot on 17 November that if Russell retired, Clarendon would become Prime Minister with Palmerston as Leader of the Commons; and after Lieven met Ellice and Aberdeen on 5 January 1849, she was able to confirm to Guizot that Russell disliked Palmerston.\footnote{Lieven to Guizot, 17 November 1848, FG, 163M110/2166; Lieven to Guizot, 5 January 1849, Ibid., 163M111/2190} Guizot agreed with Lieven’s comments. On the 8\textsuperscript{th}, he noted in a letter to her that at a reception hosted by Duchâtel, Ellice was ‘more hostile than ever’ about Palmerston, and added that Russell would have to ask Peel for ‘3 or 4 Ministers’.\footnote{Guizot to Lieven, 8 January 1849, Ibid., 163M111/2199} This information, which identified the government’s weakness and susceptibility to division, encouraged the exiles in their intrigues to reunite the Tories and defeat Palmerston.

The latter goal was shared by their informant and collaborator; Ellice was a Francophile Whig, and an opponent of Palmerston. Ellice’s niece Marion was also supportive of the exiles, and hoped that Guizot would return to the Assembly. In February, she thought that the French ‘had better have let M. Guizot stand for the Charente’.\footnote{Marion Ellice to Edward Ellice, 5 February 1849, Ellice Papers, Mss. 15071 f.11} This was far from typical Whig opinion; on 13 April, Normanby informed Lansdowne that the entire ‘moderate party’ were ‘unanimous in censuring’ Guizot’s manifesto, which contained ‘everything which ought not to have been said…and least of all by him’.\footnote{Normanby to Lansdowne, 13 April 1849, Bowood Papers, Add. MS 88906/10/17} Although Whigs were interested in Guizot’s commentary, he found little encouragement from them.
Meanwhile, Lieven struggled to glean European news. She appealed to Lady Holland for news from Italy in March and Paris in May, and even asked Lady Alice Peel for anything she might hear in Paris. The exiled Princess sought information from Whig and Tory contacts alike, and in turn, Lieven provided her correspondents with her interpretation of events in France, even to Lady Holland, who often resided in Paris.

Lieven provided her opinion to all who might pay attention, and was at the centre of discussions about European affairs in London. Although she disagreed with Whig assessments of European news, she was willing to receive intelligence from them, especially when it appeared to justify her own opinions. Of particular interest was one of Lady Holland’s letters which described Louis Napoleon being heckled; and in August 1848, Lieven sent Guizot a letter she had received from Bulwer, who had recently returned from Paris. According to Bulwer, the people spoke against the ‘mob’, and the ‘shopkeepers of Paris’ seemed to ‘fancy’ Joinville as a regent or head of state. This was a ‘very vague sort of sentiment’, and he thought that the moderate republican General Cavaignac would become President. Lieven evidently thought that this bade well for a monarchical future, and she was not alone in receiving encouraging news from Whigs. On 13 September, Ellice sent Guizot a long ‘dissertation’ mentioning the certainty of war in Europe, which he hoped Russell would adopt. Ellice even sent Lieven news from Madrid. Whatever news Lieven received was recycled in her intrigues, and Ellice, as a fellow opponent of Palmerston, was particularly willing to provide her with information.

It is doubtful whether Lieven’s exhortations were particularly effective in Whig circles. The harsh Austrian and Russian counterrevolution in Hungary during 1849 saw Hungarian forces defeated in battle and subjected to harsh punishments, and whilst this was naturally distasteful to Whigs, at least two of the exiles thought the exact opposite. When Lieven met Lady Palmerston in June 1849, she found her old friend more anti-Russian and anti-Austrian than ever, and Princess Metternich

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74 Cromwell, p.235; Lieven to Lady Holland, 7 March 1849, Lieven-Holland, no.19; Lieven to Lady Holland, 21 May 1849, Ibid., no.25; Lieven to Lady Alice Peel, 6 February 1849, Morier Papers, K5.6.48
75 Lieven to Lady Holland, 2 July 1849, Lieven-Holland, no.31
76 Lieven to Lady Holland, 17 August 1849, Ibid., no.33; Bulwer to Lieven, n.d., FG, 163MI10/2031
77 Lieven to Guizot, 9 August 1848, Ibid., 163MI10/2019; Guizot to Lieven, 13 September 1848, Ibid., 163MI10/2090
78 Lieven to Guizot, 22 July 1848, Ibid., 163MI9/1990
violently argued with Lady Palmerston and Lady John Russell about Hungary. After a harsh exchange with Lady John (Princess Metternich told Lady John that she sympathised with every ‘Judas’ in Europe), Lieven encouraged the feud.\textsuperscript{79}

Princess Metternich appears to have been highly unpleasant. She was ‘insolent’ to Milnes when he spoke to her husband about the likely terms for peace in Hungary, seemingly on the Hungarian patriot Pulszky’s behalf. \textsuperscript{80} Princess Metternich’s reactionary opinions did not commend her to Whigs, and not even Tory ladies found her opinions amenable. “I never thought such a thing in my life”, Lady Alice Peel retorted to Princess Metternich’s comments on ‘order’ and Hungary, which left the Princess to vent her anger to Marion Ellice. \textsuperscript{81} This correspondence interested Prince Metternich, who added to one of his wife’s letters that Marion’s correspondence was enchanting. \textsuperscript{82}

Despite their long-held dislike for Austrian absolutism, two Whigs defended Metternich in publications printed after his fall. Milnes’ 1849 pamphlet \textit{The Events of 1848} endorsed ‘Palmerston’s over-enthusiastic prediction’ of post-revolutionary peace, and also argued that Metternich had been forced to balance the interests of different nationalities instead of fostering provincial loyalties as he had wished. \textsuperscript{83} This argument was advanced in Parliament by Macgregor, who defended Metternich as an earnest reformer. \textsuperscript{84} Macgregor also noted in a pamphlet that Metternich’s views on economics had been ‘far in advance of others in power’ in Austria, and praised him for carrying an Anglo-Austrian commercial treaty ‘to a satisfactory and very liberal termination’ in 1838. After meeting the exiled Prince, Macgregor was ‘convinced that great injustice had been done to that eminent personage by public writers’. \textsuperscript{85} These views hardly coincided with Whig support for progress and liberty, and even historical assessments of Metternich’s rule: as Austrian Chancellor, he had been wary

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{79} Lieven to Guizot, 22 June 1849, Ibid., 163MI11/2315; Charles Greville to Clarendon, 15 October 1849, MS. Clar. C.522; Palmer, \textit{Metternich}, p.323
\bibitem{80} Pope Hennessy, \textit{Milnes}, i pp.286-7
\bibitem{81} Princess Metternich to Marion Ellice, 5 May 1849, Ellice Papers, Mss.15099, ff.126-8
\bibitem{82} Princess Metternich to Marion Ellice (docketed by Prince Metternich), 30 August 1849, Ibid., ff.163-6
\bibitem{84} Hansard, 21 July 1849, lvii cc.804-5
\bibitem{85} Macgregor, \textit{Sketches of the Progress of Civilisation and Public Liberty} (London, 1848), n.25
\end{thebibliography}
of economic development, and even feared that the construction of railways would encourage subversion. The fact that both men met Metternich in exile suggests that personal contact with the ex-Chancellor could sometimes overcome (desired) prejudices.

Liberals also remained interested in Guizot’s opinions until his departure, for in the autumn, Guizot was again consulted by the government. Asked by Radical MP William Ewart to appear before a Parliamentary committee on public libraries, Guizot willingly obliged. His contribution was praised by both the Quarterly and the liberal Athenaeum, and although his evidence was later criticised, Guizot’s praise for openly loaning books was adopted by the campaigner Edward Edwards. Guizot’s evidence was supported by other experts who were examined by the committee, and the final report quoted him twice. Although Guizot was not considered its most important contributor, his advice was nonetheless well-received.

The British Government and three Royal Families

In spite of the virulent criticism which he attracted from Whigs for the Spanish Marriages and precipitating the February revolution, Louis Philippe’s fall profoundly affected both the Queen and Palmerston. On 25 February 1848, the Queen cancelled a dinner upon hearing that Louis Philippe had arrived in Britain, and in anticipation of the ex-King’s arrival, summoned Palmerston to talk to Prince Albert about the Orléans. Motivated by both familial and political considerations, the Queen was deeply worried about the ex-King’s fate. Although cautious about ‘harbouring ejected royalties’, which ‘the country would not like’, Palmerston put a steamship at Louis Philippe’s disposal at her request. Despite the political risks of helping a symbol of conservative resistance reach Britain, Palmerston was disposed to save the ex-King.

91 Victoria to Palmerston, 26 February 1848, BP, PP/RC/F/347
92 Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 27 February 1848, Ibid., PP/GC/NO/444
With little certainty about their whereabouts, Palmerston attempted to ensure the refugees’ departures for Britain, and adopted the suggestions of an early arrival. Upon the refugee Duchesse de Montebello’s suggestion, Palmerston instructed Normanby to ensure the Duchesse d’Orléans’ escape from Paris, for which £400 was provided in gold. Palmerston added that he was ‘very sorry’ at Guizot’s rumoured detention, and urged Normanby to prevent his murder by other prisoners.\footnote{Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 27 February 1848, Ibid., PP/GC/NO/445} The same day, he instructed the British consuls at Le Havre and Cherbourg to quickly arrange the ex-King and Queen’s departure if they arrived nearby, and even attempted to ensure that British steam packets were made available to ensure the Duchesse de Montpensier’s safe passage to Britain.\footnote{Palmerston to G.W. Featherstonehaugh and W.D. Jones (confidential, copy), 27 February 1848, FO 881/223/1; Auckland to Palmerston, 26 February 1848, BP, PP/GC/AU/50; Auckland to Palmerston, 29 February 1848, Ibid., PP/GC/AU/51} Personal and political considerations drove Palmerston to ensure that members of the deposed Orléans court and regime reached Britain safely as a humanitarian necessity.

Palmerston and the Queen also agreed that the Orléans family should have retained their estates and rental incomes. On 3 March, the day that the ex-King and Queen arrived at Newhaven, Palmerston suggested to the former French diplomat Count Jarnac that he should ‘apply to’ him if the Orléans needed money, and the next day, instructed Normanby to inform Alphonse de Lamartine, the Provisional Head of State, of Britain’s ‘sincere pleasure’ at France’s decision not to seize their properties, a decision ‘honourable to the French government and nation.’\footnote{Minute, 3 March 1848, Ibid., PP/GC/JA/8; Palmerston to Normanby (draft), 4 March 1848, Palmerston Papers, Add. MS 48557 no.79} Although not a British responsibility, this was a welcome decision which had good diplomatic effects. The British Ambassador to Russia, Lord Bloomfield, reported that when he mentioned to Nesselrode that the Orléans’ ‘private property... would ultimately be returned’, the Russian Chancellor responded with ‘much satisfaction’.\footnote{Bloomfield to Palmerston, 20 March 1848, FO 65/348/61} This reduced the likelihood of a Russian-led reaction against France, and thereby strengthened Palmerston’s new entente.

Meanwhile, Lansdowne granted ex-Queen Marie Amélie the right to undertake Catholic worship at Claremont, and Palmerston provided them with £200 from the
unaccountable secret service fund, although he was concerned that this might be misinterpreted as support for a restoration.\textsuperscript{97} This was an accurate observation; many republican newspapers had declared that Britain wished to ‘restore Louis Philippe’.\textsuperscript{98} In the wake of revolution, the British government attempted to maintain the Orléans’ dignity, perhaps to restrain their ambitions as well as out of sympathy and deference.

However, relations between the government and the Orléans quickly soured; Marie Amélie recorded that Palmerston’s sympathy disappeared under a fortnight after their arrival.\textsuperscript{99} This apparently stemmed from Palmerston’s suggestion that Louis Philippe should not reside at Claremont on the grounds of expense to the British state, and to prevent a dispute with the French government.\textsuperscript{100} Humanitarian concerns were quickly replaced by political and diplomatic ones, and although the former editor of the \textit{Morning Chronicle} sent Palmerston a correspondent’s letter which praised his ‘noble sympathy’ for the Orléans whilst pursuing ‘amicable relations’ with France, this apparent public support for treating the Orléans sympathetically was ignored.\textsuperscript{101} The need for good relations with the new French republic had quickly triumphed over fears for the Orleans’ fate.

The potential arrival of another ex-King threatened further difficulty. On 21 March, having heard of escalating protests in Berlin, Palmerston urged Lord Westmorland, the British Minister to Prussia, to seek the appointment of a liberal ministry, or else Friedrich Wilhelm IV would be ‘added to the list of royal exiles, but without [any public] sympathy or compassion’.\textsuperscript{102} The seemingly wilful tyranny of the Prussian King suggested that he would be left a miserable exile.

Instead, on 27 March, Westmorland reported that the King’s brother Wilhelm, Prince of Prussia, would be ‘sent to remain in England’.\textsuperscript{103} Westmorland felt some sympathy.

\textsuperscript{98} Peter Renouf to his Parents, 29 April 1848, Cathcart, K.J. (ed.), \textit{The Letters of Peter Le Page Renouf} (4 vols., Dublin, 2002-04), ii p.95
\textsuperscript{100} Palmerston to Victoria, 8 March 1848, QVFA vol. J69, no.64
\textsuperscript{101} Charles Steel to Easthope (copy), March 1848, Easthope Papers, Add. MS 86844
\textsuperscript{102} Palmerston to Westmorland (copy), 21 March 1848, BP, PP/GC/WE/190
\textsuperscript{103} Westmorland to Palmerston, 27 March 1848, FO 64/285/236
Wilhelm was not responsible for the brutal repression of protests, and had even fled Berlin; but after it was rumoured that he ‘was returning at the head of the troops’, Friedrich Wilhelm begged him to go to Britain, ‘with a commission to the government’. The Prince was also wrongly accused of opposing all reform. ‘I am sure you will be kind to him’, Westmorland counselled. The scapegoat Prince was forced to flee, and the Prussian authorities attempted to ensure that he was not treated as a fallen tyrant; Bunsen even ensured that the *Times* reported that Wilhelm was on a ‘confidential mission’ to Queen Victoria. Whereas Palmerston had hoped that the threat of Friedrich Wilhelm’s flight would persuade the Prussian government to meet demands for reform, the King’s younger brother instead fled as an innocent victim.

Wilhelm received a particularly warm welcome from the British royal family. Although Lansdowne appears to have objected to the Prince residing in Britain, Prince Albert persuaded the cabinet otherwise. Albert thought that Wilhelm should not ‘be confounded’ with ‘banished’ royalty; rather, his appearance was ‘to a certain degree invested with a diplomatic character’, and he deserved ‘a formal audience’ presented by Palmerston and Bunsen. The Queen’s continued recovery from childbirth suggested that he might receive Wilhelm on her behalf.

Wary that rumours about Wilhelm might inflame passions in Britain (the Prince’s ‘diplomatic mission’ was such an obvious charade that *Punch* caricatured him as being quite literally kicked out of Prussia), Palmerston only allowed the two Princes to meet secretly. On 2 April, Wilhelm dined with Albert, and afterwards had an audience with the Queen. Victoria recorded that ‘the Communist & Republican plan’ was to pit army and people against each other. Wilhelm had found her attention, and optimistic that an exchange of ideas might occur, Albert showed him a ‘paper about the German Constitution’. Not only was Wilhelm welcomed, but his accounts of the revolution shaped the Queen and Prince’s views, and he in turn appeared to accept Prince Albert’s plans for reforms of German government.

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104 Westmorland to Palmerston (confidential), 29 March 1848, Ibid., no.237
105 Westmorland to Palmerston, 30 March 1848, BP, PP/GC/WE/173
106 Valentin, *Revolution*, ii p.52
107 Eyck, Frank, *The Prince Consort* (Bath, 1975), p.79
109 *Punch XIV* (1848), p.145; RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1848: 2 April
This was not the case, for although Wilhelm willingly discussed German affairs with the royal couple, he thought Albert’s plans unrealistic.\textsuperscript{110} On 18 April, Victoria and Wilhelm discussed German affairs, and the next day, they again considered ‘the sad & dreadful events’ in Berlin.\textsuperscript{111} The Queen continued to sympathise with his plight, and Wilhelm’s exile was soon over. On 11 May, Westmorland reported that Wilhelm had been recalled upon ‘honourable’ terms, and that opposition posed no serious risk.\textsuperscript{112} The Queen remained interested in Wilhelm’s opinions until the end of his exile; when he bade farewell, she noted his continued fears about republicanism in Germany.\textsuperscript{113} Yet no real exchange of ideas had occurred. As Frank Eyck notes, they merely ‘consolidated a close friendship’.\textsuperscript{114}

Meanwhile, the court became ever more supportive of the Orléans, ‘despite or without’ Palmerston’s knowledge.\textsuperscript{115} The royal family were dedicated supporters of their exiled peers. To discredit the fallen regime, the French government published both Guizot and Louis Philippe’s correspondence in a publication named the \textit{Revue Retrospective}, which ‘left a different impression upon the Queen’ and Palmerston concerning the Spanish Marriages. Victoria used the opportunity to criticise Palmerston’s conduct during the affair, although she added that nothing ‘clear[ed] the French government in the least’.\textsuperscript{116} While Palmerston blamed Louis Philippe for the February revolution, the Queen disagreed, albeit to a point, and she rejected concerns about receiving the Orléans. Victoria argued that they were exiles rather than pretenders, but Russell objected to her receiving the ex-King and Queen (whereas meeting her cousin the Duchesse d’Orléans was acceptable on the grounds of familial ties.) In Russell’s opinion, much depended on ‘the circumstances’ – if one of Louis Philippe’s sons were ‘to regain the French throne... the reception of Louis Philippe’ have ‘naturally invite[d] suspicions’. Moreover, the French government was weak.\textsuperscript{117}
As well as potentially offending the French government, Russell feared its substitution for an extremist one, a prescient concern before the ‘June Days’ uprising, and Victoria’s argument that the Orléans were ‘comparatively forgotten’ was discarded.\(^{118}\) However, without consulting her Ministers, the Queen concluded that there could be no political objection to her receiving the Orléans at Osborne House, which was her private residence, rather than a royal palace.\(^{119}\) Although the government wanted to prevent any display of friendship or sympathy between the Queen and the exiled Orléans, worried that this would severely affect the nascent *entente* with Republican France, the Queen was adamant that she would receive them, and that such receptions had no political connotations.

The Queen remained a strong partisan of the Orléans. On 6 August, she asked Russell to discuss the potential seizure of the Orléans’ estates with the French Minister. Angry at being asked to tackle this sensitive question, Russell deferred to Palmerston, who acquiesced, intent on arranging their financial security. Although the two Ministers disagreed over making such an approach, Palmerston told Normanby to ask the new head of state, General Cavaignac, privately, for any ‘public representation might be met with the answer that the Republic would not furnish funds for its own overthrow’.\(^{120}\) Whereas a formal approach could have caused outrage in France, Palmerston hoped that this would suffice to keep the Orléans’ estates in the hands of their rightful owners.

However, as France appeared to enter a period of relative stability, the British government became uninterested in the Orléans. By late November, Russell had ‘no political objection’ to Victoria receiving the Nemours, for the presidential election had ‘completely absorb[ed] attention’ in France; and having overcome his previous reservations on the issue, he asked whether Normanby should again press Cavaignac on the Orléans’ properties (although this question was already largely revolved.).\(^{121}\)

The exiled royal family appear to have been more interested in securing their future financial wellbeing than politics.

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\(^{118}\) Victoria to Russell, 1 June 1848, *QVL* ii pp.176-77

\(^{119}\) Victoria to Russell, 13 July 1848, Ibid., ii pp.184-85

\(^{120}\) Russell to Palmerston, 6 August 1848, BP PP/GC/RU/218; Russell to Victoria, 17 August 1848, QVFA vol. 369 no.101; Woodham-Smith, *Victoria*, p.285

\(^{121}\) Russell to Victoria, 26 November 1848, QVFA vol. J71 no.35; Charles Greville, 25 November 1848, vi p.239
Although the exiles of 1848 had appeared to pose a risk to the British government’s foreign policy aims, for the most part they did no such thing in spite of their high profile and the support which they boasted both overseas and in Britain. Instead, Whig Ministers not only provided them with humanitarian assistance, but treated them with dignity. They were often approached by Whig politicians, even senior ministers, for information about foreign affairs, both for partisan purposes and to structure government policies. They were also turned to, albeit largely unsuccessfully, as a means of communication with foreign governments in times of crisis. At a time of great uncertainty and turmoil, the British government acted with a great deal of circumspection in dealing with these refugees. However, Palmerston retained a great deal of distrust towards them, an attitude which not only raised eyebrows but negatively affected his policies. Although the government expected to be subjected to diplomatic criticism for allowing exile intrigues to continue unchecked, British foreign policy was instead influenced by perceptions of exile ambition and information which the exiles provided.
This chapter explores how Lord Palmerston developed the idea that the exiles were actively conspiring against him, the extent to which these ideas reflected actual exile activity, and how and why he pleaded an exile conspiracy. It first explores Palmerston and Bulwer’s concerns about Orleanist intrigue in Spain, the opposition it found, and the shadow it cast over Anglo-Spanish relations for almost two years. The second half of the chapter then considers Palmerston’s development of the idea of a vast exile-led conspiracy, how he and the supportive diplomat Lord William Hervey promoted it, and how it appeared to re-emerge after the exiles’ departures. It then considers the manner in which Guizot and Lieven encouraged the Tories’ attack upon Palmerston over the ‘Don Pacifico’ affair in 1850, and how Palmerston revived the idea of a conspiracy against him in these circumstances. Although often based upon scant evidence, Palmerston pursued – or argued that he pursued – two separate exile-led conspiracies, which inspired and justified some of his most controversial policies in 1848-50.

Whilst the exiles’ presence in Britain did not affect British foreign policy as adversely as the Whig government feared, Palmerston’s concern that they would scheme against him certainly did. As Sir Charles Webster noted, during Palmerston’s earlier stewardship of the Foreign Office, the Whig statesman was ‘always in conflict’ with domestic and foreign opponents, and his private letters ‘often contain extravagant assertions... written in the heat of the moment to convey an immediate reaction.’ Accordingly, unless read in conjunction with Palmerston’s dispatches, these letters can give the reader ‘a misleading impression of his attitude towards the problems with which he had to deal’.¹

Although far from delusional, Palmerston was often aggrieved by perceived intrigues against him, and while some of these comments can be chalked up to frustration, others reflect genuine plots. The most obvious example is the ‘cabal’ which attempted to undermine his policies in the Middle East in 1840, whose members included Greville, Guizot, King Leopold of the Belgians, and Francophile Whigs such as

¹ Webster, Palmerston, ii p.700
Ellice, Clarendon and Holland. Other comments closely reflect Webster’s analysis. Palmerston had thought – or at least claimed - that Wellington (then his colleague in Lord Liverpool’s government) was under Metternich’s influence in the 1820s, and after the July Revolution, several Whigs had believed that Metternich and Wellington had conspired ‘against the chartered liberties of France’. The refugees of 1848 were subject to similar conjectures.

Although the revolution in France transformed Palmerston into Louis Philippe’s protector, the Foreign Secretary feared that his former adversary would continue to intrigue against him in Spain. These concerns played such a prominent role in Palmerston’s Spanish policy that comments about Orleanist intrigue could not even be hidden from correspondence which was printed after Bulwer’s expulsion, and Bulwer shared these suspicions. In his biography of Palmerston written in the 1870s, Bulwer recalled that ‘the party of the King of the French’ (i.e. the Moderados) lost its protection with Louis Philippe’s fall. These fears expressed by both Palmerston and Bulwer appear to have been genuine, and are traceable in both official and private communications. This imagined Orleanist intrigue contributed to Bulwer’s expulsion from Spain, and thereafter both Palmerston and Hervey argued that the malign influence of the exiles actively prevented the restoration of diplomatic relations with Spain.

Palmerston’s conceptions of exile conspiracy were not limited to Orleanist intrigues in Spain. By 1849, he had developed a vast conspiracy theory; that the British royal family, King Leopold, Aberdeen, Charles Greville, Reeve, Delane, Guizot, Louis Philippe, Metternich and Lieven had united against him. Several historians have commented upon this ‘conspiracy’. Whereas Donald Southgate dismissed it, H.C.F. Bell, Lawrence Fenton, Phillip Guedalla and James Chambers all expressed a belief in its existence. J.P. Parry notably recorded that Palmerston believed this ‘cabal’ plotted his downfall over the ‘Don Pacifico’ controversy in 1850. Its existence and breadth both remain disputed. However, it is likely that amidst constant friction with the

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2 Bourne, *Palmerston*, pp.590-616
3 Ibid., p.282, p.329
4 Bulwer to Palmerston, 12 March 1848, *Despatches from Sir Henry Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston* (London, 1848), no.7; Dalling, *Palmerston*, iii p.239
5 See Guedalla, *Palmerston*, ch.4; Southgate, *Most English Minister*, p.268; Chambers, *Palmerston*, p.276; Fenton, *Palmerston*, ch.6; Parry, *Patriotism*, p.198; the additional notion that Palmerston
court and colleagues including Russell and Lord Grey, Palmerston fused old suspicions and rumours together, and exhaustively promoted them to shore up support for his policies. In January 1850, after Aberdeen arrived in Paris to visit Lieven, Ellice commented that he was ‘quite prepared for the abuse of our friends at home, as one of an anti-Palmerstonian conspiracy’.  

So regularly had the Foreign Secretary promoted the idea that it became a predictable response to any meeting between his diverse opponents.

Whilst Guizot and Lieven certainly had ambitions, Palmerston’s supposed cabal overestimated the exiles’ political reach. The two exiles did conspire with Conservative politicians, and they were also considered ‘the mother and father of the fusion’, a campaign to unite French monarchists behind Chambord’s claim if he accepted the Comte de Paris as his successor. But there could not have been an overarching exile-led conspiracy, for its supposed members did not cooperate as one. For example, Reeve later recalled that during 1848, he ‘wrote a great deal in the Times’, and believed that his articles ‘would be the best key’ to his own view of the tumultuous year, rather than anyone else’s. He also condemned Metternich’s ‘effete despotism’ and ‘wretched twaddle’. Rather than simply act as the exiles’ voice, Reeve retained his independence while occasionally publishing articles for Guizot, and other collaborations were equally unlikely. In Palmerston’s opinion, the ‘three main witches who filled the cauldron’ in 1848-49 were the exiles’ supposed friends Brougham, Stanley and Aberdeen; but even these British opponents rarely cooperated. Stanley was surprised when Brougham promised to aid Protectionist opposition to the repeal of the Navigation Acts, which prevented the import of foreign goods in non-British vessels.
Neither did Lieven and Guizot conspire with Metternich. Upon meeting Guizot in April 1848, Metternich spoke for an hour and a half, and Guizot could not get a single ‘syllable’ in edgeways.\textsuperscript{12} Meaningful cooperation was impossible in such circumstances, and when Lieven and Metternich met in October 1848, they seemingly ‘talked of very ordinary matters’. Metternich was also ‘completely put down’ by Lieven, whom he bored. When he read his memoirs to her, she ‘threw herself with a desperate gesture of weariness’.\textsuperscript{13} Although Lieven and Guizot had been confidantes since 1837, they were not part of an organised conspiracy, and Lieven sometimes disagreed with Guizot. Unlike him, she sympathised ‘with any fallen monarch, so long as he was not of the [Orléans] family’.\textsuperscript{14} In spite of the exiles’ efforts to inspire the Tories and their arguments with the Whigs, personal and political differences divided both the exiles and their British friends, and precluded the possibility of such an arrangement.

It is also highly unlikely that the exiles conspired with the Court. As David Brown notes, the years of 1846-50 were marked by a power struggle between the Queen, Palmerston and Russell; but the royal family did not cooperate with the exiles, a combination which would have been incredibly controversial and difficult to hide. Guizot admitted that he lacked links with the court, and rather than support Court opposition to Palmerston, Aberdeen only occasionally supplied the Queen with ‘intelligence from his European friends’.\textsuperscript{15} Both Lieven and Metternich received the Queen’s uncle, the Duke of Cambridge, but mutual friendships do not equal a conspiracy, and Louis Philippe’s correspondence with Victoria and Albert largely consists of friendly expressions rather than anything even vaguely political.\textsuperscript{16} Although the court was opposed to Palmerston’s policies, much like the exiles and the Tories, they did not establish a political relationship with either. The sheer size and political diversity of this supposed conspiracy made its existence all but impossible.

\textsuperscript{12} Reeve to Clarendon, 2 May 1848, MS. Clar. Irish Box 23
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.263-64; Temperley (ed.), \textit{Lieven}, n.209, n.215
\textsuperscript{16} Lieven to Guizot, 16 April 1848, FG, 163M/9/1914; for example, Louis Philippe to Victoria (copy), 22 May 1849, AMF 300(III)57/2
The idea of a conspiracy faded away once the refugees began to leave. In September 1849, Lady Palmerston was ‘glad to hear the Metternichs [sic] settled to go to Brussels… and Madame Lieven goes to Paris in a fortnight’. The ‘old click’ [sic] would ‘be broken up’.\(^\text{17}\) The exiles’ departure meant that this supposed conspiracy could no longer be pleaded. But when Lieven and Guizot encouraged Aberdeen to join the Protectionists in attacking Palmerston’s Greek policy over the ‘Don Pacifico Affair’ in 1850, with apparent royal acquiescence, Palmerston railed against the apparently resurgent conspiracy.\(^\text{18}\) Although something resembling this cabal did come into existence, it did not do so during Metternich, Guizot and Lieven’s exile, and only in a much looser form than the one which Palmerston had previously pleaded.

**Phantom Orleanist Intrigues**

Both Palmerston and Bulwer believed that the Orléans would intrigue from the outset of their exile. In Palmerston’s opinion, the Duc de Montpensier, who had fled France for Britain, would always be ‘the enemy of England’, and Palmerston ‘thought [that] the moment was come for settling the question of the Montpensier succession’ and removing the ‘Louis Phillippist Party’ from power in Spain.\(^\text{19}\) By preventing the Montpensiers from settling in Spain, Palmerston hoped to prevent further Orleanist intrigue, severely weaken the governing conservative (and previously Francophile) Moderados, and then install a liberal government which would ‘finally resolve the succession question.’\(^\text{20}\)

Yet the chances of enacting such an arrangement had already been compromised. In a series of communications dated 29 February, Bulwer had already reported that Isabella had offered the Montpensiers refuge, independently of her government, and that ‘their presence would be unpopular’ and ‘impolitic’.\(^\text{21}\) Her invitation was intended as a courtesy not to be acted upon, and Isabella had ‘no sympathy’ for Louis Philippe; but the Spanish government ‘pretend[ed] to say that we can now have no

\(^{17}\) Lady Palmerston to Palmerston, 28 September 1849, Lamb Papers, Add. MS 45554 f.27  
\(^{18}\) Disraeli’s Reminiscences, p.34  
\(^{19}\) Palmerston to Bulwer, 18 April 1848, Bulwer Papers, 1/18/1a-b ; Autobiographical Memoir, Ibid., 1/710/1, pp.58-61  
\(^{20}\) Bullen, Entente, p.290  
\(^{21}\) Bulwer to Palmerston (copy), 29 February 1848, Palmerston Papers, Add. MS 48571, no.21
objection to their residence… nor to their possession of the Spanish throne’. 22

Britain’s Foreign Secretary and Minister to Spain had separately concluded that Louis Philippe would continue to intrigue with his Spanish allies, with the express aim of securing the Spanish throne for his family.

Palmerston turned to Queen Victoria to prevent such an eventuality. On 7 March, he portentously warned her that Louis Philippe sought her acquiescence in the Montpensiers’ departure, ‘an ill return for the hospitality’ shown to them, which would imply that British policy on the ‘Montpensier question’ had ‘changed’. According to Palmerston, an eventual Orléans restoration raised the possibility of the Orléans eventually reigning in both France and Spain. 23 The Queen agreed to help prevent the Montpensiers’ departure, but she did not do so to forestall Orleanist intrigues. In her opinion, if the Montpensiers departed for Spain, memories of ‘the unfortunate Spanish affair…might render’ Louis Philippe’s exile ‘difficult, besides making us inimical to Paris’s possible and eventual success.’ She accepted the ‘painful’ conclusion that the Orléans family’s sojourn would have to be limited. 24

However, when Palmerston attempted to argue this policy to the ‘inner cabinet’ which took major decisions on foreign policy, he met strong opposition. Its other members, Russell and Lansdowne, disputed Palmerston’s fears; both believed that a ‘good Republic’ was the only likely government in France for the moment. 25 Russell took ‘a milder view of the Montpensiers journey’. Britain could not prevent the Montpensiers from reaching Spain, and if the Duchesse were excluded from the Spanish succession, it would leave the Carlist Count Montemolin next in line for the throne – which he considered a far more dangerous prospect. 26 Palmerston’s concerns about Orleanist ambition were rejected as exaggerated, and his hope to prevent the Montpensiers’ departure as impossible.

22 Bulwer to Palmerston, 29 February 1848, PP/GC/BU/446/1; Bulwer to Palmerston (copy), 29 February 1848, Palmerston Papers, Add. MS 48571, no.22; Bulwer to Palmerston, 29 February 1848, BP, PP/GC/BU/445/1-2
23 Palmerston to Victoria, 7 March 1848, QVFA vol. J69 no.121
24 RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1848:7 March
25 Brown, Foreign Policy, p.88; Palmerston to Lord Lansdowne, 7 March 1848, Bowood Papers, Add. MS 88906/9/23; Russell to Lansdowne, 5 March 1848, Ibid., f.25
26 RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1848:10 March
So important was the idea of controlling the Orléans to Palmerston that he attempted to do so in spite of his colleagues’ opposition. Palmerston ‘tried to induce Louis Philippe to order the Montpensiers to stay here and not to go to Spain.’ The ex-King ‘refused very indignantly’. Palmerston consequently told the ex-King to leave Claremont within two weeks, and his treatment of Louis Philippe, ‘a little crazy and weak in nerve and intellect’, left the court so ‘disgusted’ that Palmerston ‘sustained a complete reverse’, leaving the Orléans free to remain. Louis Philippe protested, ‘talk[ed] very loosely and foolishly’, and created such a ‘noise’ that King Leopold gave the Orléans permission to reside at Claremont indefinitely.27 The ex-King and the British court had foiled Palmerston’s attempt at coercing him.

Meanwhile, Bulwer attempted to prevent the Montpensiers’ arrival in Spain. On 12 March, he reported to Palmerston that certain ministers sought to make Spain ‘a sort of stronghold for the Orléans family, the first step being the establishment’ of the Montpensiers, who had been sent a steamship, despite him warning the Spanish Prime Minister, Ramon Narvaez, of ‘the danger of this course’.28 As Orleanist intrigues seemingly continued unchecked, both Bulwer and Palmerston had delivered apparently fruitless warnings. Bulwer’s fears were meanwhile scorned by others. The French Minister to Spain, the Duc de Glücksburg, thought that Bulwer acted as though the entire Orléans family would arrive in Spain on the basis of Moderado dislike of the French Republic, and Guizot told Reeve that Narvaez had welcomed the French Revolution, ‘since it left him more entirely his own master’.29 Although the Moderados remained ideologically sympathetic to the fallen regime, they were not under the exiles’ influence.

Nevertheless, Bulwer pursued phantom intrigues. On 16 March, he wrote to Palmerston that the Spanish government looked to bring the Montpensiers to Spain, towards ‘their union of the Orléans dynasty’, and that the Duchesse de Montpensier could bring Queen Isabella under her influence (and by extension, Louis Philippe’s.)

27 Charles Greville (Strachey & Fulford ed.), 20 March 1848, vi p.4; Henry Reeve to Mrs. Villiers, 22 March 1848 MS. Clar. Irish box 23
28 Palmerston to Bulwer, 10 March 1848, Bulwer Papers, 1/48/4a; Bulwer to Palmerston (copy), 12 March 1848, Palmerston Papers, Add. MS 48571, no.41
Bulwer feared both Orléans usurpation in Spain and an Orléans restoration in France, and believed that it was now ‘time to settle the Montpensier question’, having reminded the Spanish government that British policy remained unchanged.\textsuperscript{30} Bulwer added that he had also ‘a little frightened certain people’ and left the Moderados willing to get out of ‘the scrape they were getting into.’\textsuperscript{31} He remained convinced that the Orléans coveted both thrones, and was optimistic that he could forestall supposed exile intrigues.

Further suspicions reinforced Bulwer’s view of the Spanish government’s motives. On 19 March, Bulwer reported that the Spanish government had circulated a story that Victoria had ignored the Montpensiers when they arrived for an appointment to make their farewells. This was intended to excite ‘a Spanish feeling in favour of… a Spanish princess who had been ill-treated’.\textsuperscript{32} As far as Bulwer was concerned, this Moderado propaganda was an attempt to promote the Orléans connection over that with Britain. On 19 March, he noted that the government wanted to make the pregnant Duchess’s arrival ‘a point of national honour’ and make Spain a ‘miniature Coblenz’ (i.e. an émigré beachhead). 12 days later, he added that Glücksburg was waiting to be ‘placed at the head of… Montpensier’s establishment.’\textsuperscript{33}

Bulwer was convinced that the Orléans wanted to establish Spain as base for their intrigues. He later noted that ‘Guizot and his friends’ had continued to intrigue through their ‘agents’ – French diplomats who remained loyal to Louis Philippe, hoping to precipitate Palmerston’s downfall.\textsuperscript{34} In Bulwer’s opinion, both Louis Philippe and his fallen Minister were responsible for Moderado policies. Yet republican France sought good relations with Spain, and with British diplomats there.\textsuperscript{35} Bulwer’s conspiratorial viewpoint had become dangerously entrenched in the face of the French government’s pacific policies.

When Palmerston repeated his concerns about supposed exile intrigues in Spain to Russell and Lansdowne in late March, he was again rebuffed. Lansdowne thought that

\textsuperscript{30} Bulwer to Palmerston, 16 March 1848, BP, PP/GC/BUL/448/2-3
\textsuperscript{31} Bulwer to Palmerston, 16 March 1848, Ibid., PP/GC/BUL/449
\textsuperscript{32} Bulwer to Palmerston, 19 March 1848, Bulwer Papers, 1/53/23a
\textsuperscript{33} Bulwer to Palmerston, 19-31 March 1848, BP, PP/GC/BUL/450/1-3
\textsuperscript{34} Dalling, \textit{Palmerston}, iii p.249
\textsuperscript{35} Lamartine to Lesseps, 11 April 1848, DDGP, i no.529
Palmerston’s complaints about Louis Philippe were groundless, and Russell agreed. Although he also complained that Louis Philippe and Guizot had grumbled and intrigued ‘like ungrateful dogs’, he did not think that they were interested in undermining British influence in Spain.\textsuperscript{36} Palmerston again ignored Russell’s viewpoint. A week later, he sent Bulwer a dispatch concerning Montpensier’s marriage without telling Russell, who angrily asked Lansdowne to ‘interfere before I say all I think’.\textsuperscript{37}

This dispatch became Bulwer’s fateful lecture to Narvaez, which precipitated his expulsion from Spain; and that such an offensive dispatch was sent in the first place antagonised the Prime Minister. Upon Russell’s prompting, Lansdowne warned Palmerston that Orleanist ambitions were ‘now the phantom of a danger rather than the reality’. Russell was also ‘annoyed’ at Palmerston for sending the dispatch without permission.\textsuperscript{38} To underline the serious nature of this complaint, Russell personally warned Palmerston that his belief that a Montpensier succession was barred under the Treaty of Utrecht (signed in 1713 to settle the Spanish succession) was incorrect. Russell thought Palmerston’s attempts to curb Orleanist intrigue ‘imprudent and unwise’, and he rejected the idea of renewing a ‘chronic quarrel…on account of the bad faith of an old and deposed Sovereign and his baffled and exiled Minister’.\textsuperscript{39} Palmerston had both disobeyed Russell’s warnings about meddling in Spain and overestimated his own authority. The course which the Foreign Secretary had continued to pursue, independently combating unlikely Orleanist intrigues, was rejected as excessive and inappropriate.

Meanwhile, Bulwer continued to pursue the Montpensiers. In early April, he unsuccessfully sought a blockade of Spanish ports to prevent their arrival, and then protested to Palmerston that the Spanish government was ‘mediating an attempt at exciting an insurrection in the south of France’ in Joinville’s favour.\textsuperscript{40} This assessment of the threat posed by Louis Philippe’s son and the level of concern in France was almost certainly inaccurate. However, his continued activities and

\textsuperscript{36} Russell to Clarendon, 21 March 1848, MS Clar. Irish box 43
\textsuperscript{37} Russell to Lansdowne, 29 March 1848, Bowood Papers, Add. MS 88906/9/25
\textsuperscript{38} Lansdowne to Palmerston (confidential), 30 March 1848, BP, PP/GC/LA/66
\textsuperscript{39} Memorandum by Russell, 27 March 1848, Ibid., PP/GC/RU/194/1
\textsuperscript{40} Parker to Bulwer (copy), 11 April 1848, FO 72/743 f.105; Bulwer to Palmerston (copy), 14 April 1848, Palmerston Papers, Add.MS 48571, no.67
warnings met Palmerston’s approval, and ignoring Russell and Lansdowne’s concerns, Palmerston wrote to Bulwer on 20 April that he hoped that Spain would not ‘act upon the foolish scheme of’ becoming ‘the stronghold of the Orléans family’. France, Palmerston added, would probably ‘return to Monarchy’, and he would not let both fall to Orleanist ambition.⁴¹

The Foreign Secretary’s fears found wider recognition. According to at least two newspapers, Louis Philippe was responsible for Bulwer’s expulsion.⁴² This viewpoint also found the approval of Irish Viceroy Lord Clarendon. Clarendon suggested to Palmerston that Spanish Minister Javier Isturiz’s ‘account of the public feeling, and perhaps some friendly advice’ from Guizot, Louis Philippe and Spanish Queen Dowager Christina had led to Bulwer’s expulsion. He suggested that to improve relations with Spain, King Leopold ‘would be a suitable mediator if Spain wanted – with results honourable to Britain’.⁴³ Whereas the exiles and their supposed Spanish cronies had destroyed the chances of restoring British influence in Spain, the Anglophile Leopold could help to redress this balance. Palmerston concurred, and added that Spain had been ‘much encouraged, if not prompted by the Orléans family and [ex-] Ministry’ to expel Bulwer, because such a ‘row’ would prevent Britain from extending its influence at Madrid.⁴⁴ Palmerston retaliated by expelling Isturiz, and Clarendon praised his ‘farewell note’.⁴⁵ As far as Palmerston and Clarendon were concerned, the Orléans retained a degree of influence over the Spanish government, and this relationship had to be ended.

However, Guizot appears to have had little interest in Spain. On 10 June, he joked to Lieven that at a dinner with Wellington, Aberdeen and Lyndhurst, the conversation had focused upon marriages – not Spanish ones, but changes to marriage legislation in Scotland.⁴⁶ Beyond their interest in the debates concerning Bulwer’s expulsion, the exiles did not use Anglo-Spanish discord as a basis for intrigue.

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⁴¹ Palmerston to Bulwer, 20 April 1848, Bulwer Papers, 1/48/12
⁴² Leeds Mercury, 27 May 1848; Examiner, 27 May 1848
⁴³ Clarendon to Palmerston, 29 May 1848, BP, PP/GC/CL/485/5-6
⁴⁴ Palmerston to Clarendon, 30 May 1848, MS. Clar. C.524
⁴⁵ Clarendon to Russell, 18 June 1848, Ibid., Irish Box 3, p.9
⁴⁶ Guizot to Lieven, 10 June 1848, FG, 163MI9/1940
Palmerston remained concerned by apparent exile intrigue in Spain. At the start of the summer, he even claimed to have evidence that Louis Philippe was doing so specifically to ‘do [him] an ill turn’. Whether this was a bluff or otherwise is unclear, but at least one warning which implied Orleanist intrigue arrived in August, when Palmerston was warned by L.C. Otway, the British consul who had remained at Madrid, that the supposed Orleanist stooge Glücksburg was ‘busier than ever - his presence… and the position he assume[d]’ were ‘quite a scandal’. Such stories convinced Palmerston that Orleanist intrigues continued.

Although Palmerston appears to have made little further comment over the summer, on 7 November, he noted in an overwrought draft addressed to Normanby that ‘the declaration repeatedly made’ by France that ‘dynastic interests… would no longer create a difference’ had not ‘been acted upon according to the natural sense of the words’. Even when France had been shorn of Louis Philippe for more than six months, ‘agents of the French government’ apparently followed ‘precisely the same’ policy as before. The new French Minister to Spain, Ferdinand de Lesseps, aided by Glücksburg, was supposedly ‘one of the most active and zealous instruments’ of Louis Philippe. Moreover, the Spanish government had been ‘put into office and maintained therein by the influence of the late King’. This argument bears little resemblance to the circumstances in which Lesseps was appointed, and the policies he was charged to pursue; Lesseps was ‘on excellent terms with the [Spanish] royal family’ and various Spanish politicians prior to arrival, and had been sent to foster good relations.

King Leopold’s mediation also invited the Foreign Secretary’s suspicion. On 2 January 1849, Palmerston warned Howard de Walden, the British Minister to Belgium, that it was worth remembering that Leopold’s ‘connection with England was out of date, whilst his connection with France and the Bourbons [was] a matter of today and tomorrow’. This argument posited that although Leopold was the widower of Britain’s Princess Charlotte, Queen Louise of the Belgians was Louis Philippe’s daughter. King Leopold would therefore favour the Bourbons in ‘all personal

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47 Charles Greville (Strachey & Fulford ed.), 1 June 1848, vi pp.69-71
48 L.C. Otway to Palmerston, 18 August 1848, FO 72/743 ff.171-2
49 Palmerston to Normanby (draft), 7 November 1848, Palmerston Papers, Add. MS 48557 no.495
questions’. Palmerston had initially hoped would help to restore Anglo-Spanish harmony now was derided as a supporter of Louis Philippe’s intrigues.

This was not an accurate appraisal of the situation, and perhaps calculated to push Howard into pressuring Leopold into a more active, pro-British approach in his mediation. According to the diplomat Lord Howden, who maintained contacts in Paris, rumours spread by Spanish politicians about the progress of negotiations and the terms Britain would accept were a more likely cause of Leopold appearing to support terms favoured by Spain (and by convoluted extension, Louis Philippe.)

Palmerston was intent upon delivering a blow to both the Spanish government and their supposed exile toadies, probably as a means of strengthening his hand in negotiations over the restoration of diplomatic ties.

The stumbling block in the negotiations was Bulwer, whom Palmerston insisted should be reinstated as British Minister to Spain. As early as September 1848, Clarendon had warned Palmerston that Spain was ‘anxious to make peace with England because France was an unreliable ally, and would ‘submit to any reasonable conditions except the return of Bulwer permanently.’ Yet this appeal made no difference, for both Palmerston and Russell refused Spanish overtures which did not make ‘the proper reparation’ for Bulwer’s expulsion (i.e. his reinstatement). Rather than exile intrigues with the Spanish government, the British government’s obstinacy was largely to blame for the delayed restoration of diplomatic ties. This insistence on Bulwer’s reappointment eventually became irrelevant; in March 1850, he was appointed Minister to the United States. Obstinacy and suspicion had guided Palmerston’s policy, and delayed the renewal of diplomatic relations until May 1850.

Whereas some of Palmerston’s claims about exile influence in Anglo-Spanish disputes appear to have been made to bolster support for his policies, his concerns

51 Palmerston to Lord Howard de Walden (copy), 2 January 1849, BP, PP/GC/HO/859/1
52 Howden to Bulwer, 23-25 December 1848, Bulwer Papers, 1/38/53-54
53 Van de Weyer to Palmerston, 14 March 1849, FO 72/738
54 Clarendon to Palmerston (copy), 15 September 1848, MS. Clar. Dep. Irish Box 3, p.145
55 Palmerston to Howden (copy), 7 August 1849, BP, PP/GC/HO/956/1; Palmerston to Van de Weyer, 30 August 1848, Ibid. PP/GC/VA/78/1
56 Draft note, 14 March 1850, FO 72/738
57 Palmerston to Van de Weyer, 10 May 1850, Ibid.
about Louis Philippe appear to have been largely genuine; Palmerston remained concerned about Orleanist intrigue at Madrid after diplomatic ties were restored. In June 1850, he warned Howden, now appointed Minister to Spain, that ‘the restoration of some branch of that family’ in France or Spain remained possible, and added to Russell that it was ‘of immense importance to England that Spain should be as independent as possible of France’.  

Although it reflected strategic realities, this comment also reflected Palmerston’s continued hatred of the Orléans. Rather than restore liberal government in Spain and forestall exile intrigues, Palmerston and Bulwer’s antagonistic approach, driven by imagined Orleanist ambition, reduced British influence at Madrid, created dispute in the cabinet and worsened antagonism with Spain.

**An Exile Conspiracy?**

Palmerston was not alone in making accusations about exile conspiracies. In May 1848, rumours of exile collusion emerged in Italy; in June, certain British newspapers accused King Leopold of supporting the Orléans; and more strikingly, in late August, a French newspaper unmasked the exiles’ ‘organised conspiracy against France’. The *Morning Chronicle*, which was cast as their mouthpiece, fervently denied this allegation. Owing to the number of fallen rulers who had fled to Britain, such theories were not uncommon, and had emerged across Europe. The exiles’ presence, popularity amongst Britain’s elite and their multifarious activities made an exile conspiracy appear a distinct possibly, at least to those geographically and/or socially separated from London society.

This suggests that Palmerston adapted existing rumours about the exiles’ influence to discredit his opponents before the public, and strengthen his hold over public opinion. By July, Palmerston had begun to make similar accusations. ‘I hear the Foreign Office says all sorts of ill-natured things of me’, Reeve complained to Clarendon on 3 July. Although suspected of passing his time with Guizot, Louis Philippe and Metternich, he only saw Guizot ‘occasionally’, had once been presented to Louis Philippe, and

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58 Palmerston to Howden, 18 June 1850, QVFA vol. J50 no.36; Palmerston to Russell, 2 July 1850, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/8E ff.106-7
59 M. Denois to Lamartine, 9 May 1848, DDGP, ii no.864; Van de Weyer to Hoffschmidt, 9 June 1848, Ridder (ed.), *Crise*, i no.333; *Morning Chronicle*, 26 August 1848

159
had never met Metternich.\textsuperscript{60} Reeve and Guizot were close collaborators; Hervey was, by his own reckoning, never ‘as intimate with Guizot’ as Reeve had been, even during Hervey’s posting in Paris.\textsuperscript{61} But when Guizot dined at Reeve’s in November, the entire party disagreed with Guizot about Spain.\textsuperscript{62} Friendship with the exiles did not equate to being in league with them.

By the end of February 1849, Palmerston had written at least two articles for the \textit{Globe} which implied that the \textit{Times} was colluding with the exiles, and inspired at least one more. On 12 January, he wrote in a draft article that the \textit{Times} looked back ‘with affectionate regret [to] when… Aberdeen and Louis Philippe and Guizot… reigned at the Foreign Office’, attacked its insinuation that his Spanish policy had been motivated solely by hatred of the Orléans, and that his Swiss policy had been intended to ‘plague’ Metternich. Whilst the \textit{Times}’ stance was ‘very childish nonsense’, the exiles’ supposed hold over it and Aberdeen was backdated to his time as Foreign Secretary.\textsuperscript{63} This approach served to demonise Palmerston’s opponents as the tools of unwelcome foreign influences, and it certainly provoked some of his targets. Prince Albert noted in December 1848 that Palmerston had ‘weapons in his hands (\textit{vide} Louis Philippe, Guizot, Metternich)’; and on 16 January 1849, Graham warned Peel that the \textit{Globe} had ‘ascribed’ an article in the \textit{Times} ‘to the hostile intrigues and influence of Guizot and Metternich’.\textsuperscript{64}

\textit{Globe} writers followed Palmerston’s lead, and he praised one for hitting ‘the right nail on the head… the foreign and absolutist cabal’ of Louis Philippe, Guizot and Metternich. He added that if \textit{The Globe} were to ‘touch upon these matters again before the meeting of Parliament’, it ‘might allude to the great expectations’ which they supposedly entertained through Stanley and Aberdeen.\textsuperscript{65} Accusations of conspiring with the exiles were an ideal means of discrediting the Tory opposition, and Stanley was therefore added to the list of conspirators. However, such ideas were easily condemned by those with an inside knowledge of politics and diplomacy. In a letter dated 27 January, Clarendon admitted to Russell that he heard ‘nothing official

\textsuperscript{60} Reeve to Clarendon, 3 July 1848, MS. Clar. Irish box 23

\textsuperscript{61} Hervey to Reeve, 3 March 1848, Hervey Papers, 941/61/1

\textsuperscript{62} Guizot to Lieven, 24 November 1848, FG, 163MI10/2184

\textsuperscript{63} Article for \textit{The Globe}, 12 January 1849, BP, PP/PRE/B/140/1

\textsuperscript{64} Eyck, \textit{Prince Consort}, p.118; Graham to Peel (confidential), 16 January 1849, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40452 f.317

\textsuperscript{65} Palmerston to the Editor of \textit{The Globe}, 25 January 1849, BP, PP/PRE/B/141
or authentic upon foreign affairs’, and asked the Prime Minister how Metternich and Guizot were supposedly ‘endeavouring to get us into a war’. Claims of an exile conspiracy appeared far-fetched to the experienced diplomat and politician.

While Palmerston promoted it in the press, Hervey pleaded this ‘cabal’ to Clarendon. Hervey’s attention was first caught by the *Times*’ coverage of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte; its editorial line about the French President had alternated between criticism and qualified support since the former refugee had entered French politics. Its recent turn towards criticism proved its sale ‘to Louis Philippe and Aberdeen’, because a new Napoleonic Empire would make both an Orléans restoration and Montpensier’s succession impossible. However, this misread a complicated situation. The *Times*’ journalists were not united in their opinions, and Aberdeen considered Louis Napoleon ‘a step to something better’; the article which spurred Hervey’s response may well have been inserted at Aberdeen’s suggestion. Such convoluted theorising failed to take the various influences upon the *Times* into consideration.

Hervey also argued that with Aberdeen’s help, Louis Philippe had ingratiated himself at Windsor, where ‘some countenance’ was given to attacks on Palmerston, and that Guizot was behind Aberdeen’s complaints about British policy towards Spain; otherwise, Aberdeen would not have supposedly instructed the *Quarterly* and the *Times* to describe the Spanish marriages as ‘cleared up’, described Guizot as ‘able and upright’ (which Stanley had also done), and used his ‘mistake’ to attack Palmerston. Hervey does not appear to have considered that anybody might view the marriages differently from him, or that court opposition to Palmerston might not be part of an overarching conspiracy. He was thankful that Clarendon believed that Guizot ‘and his associates’ would fail to enact a restoration.

Although this last statement implies that Hervey had failed to persuade Clarendon that the exiles posed any risk to British diplomacy, he continued to send Clarendon letters which argued that an exile conspiracy existed. In April, he argued that Aberdeen, the

66 Clarendon to Russell (copy), 27 January 1849, Ms. Clar. Irish box 3, p.250
67 Hervey to Clarendon, 17 December 1848, Ibid., Box 16
68 18 December 1848, Stanmore Papers, Add. MS 49253 f.42
69 Hervey to Clarendon, 3 February 1849, Ms Clar. Irish box 16
70 Ibid.
exiles and their ‘host of toadies’, he added, still exploited the *Times* and *Quarterly*.\(^{71}\) Guizot’s association with the *Quarterly* was an open secret, and so the *Quarterly* became implicated in this wide-ranging conspiracy. Yet the exiled minister’s articles were written without Aberdeen’s knowledge.\(^{72}\) Any known exile activity was subsumed into this broadening plot, in spite of Clarendon’s rejection of the idea.

Meanwhile, Palmerston continued to condemn the exiles in the press. On 6 June, he asked the editor of the *Observer* to ‘draw the public attention to the fate of the plotters and instruments of the late French government in Spain’, and soon after told the *Globe*’s editor that a recent *Times* article had been written under the influence of ‘French exiles’.\(^{73}\) A further *Chronicle* article angered him in July, which accused Lady Palmerston of rudely not inviting the exiles to receptions – Palmerston sent the *Globe*’s editor a list of attendees matching the description.\(^{74}\) So confident was Palmerston in his assertions that they entered his diplomatic and political calculations. On 21 June, he wrote to Howard that ‘*The Times* got information as to Leopold’s having busied himself with our quarrel with Spain’ from Aberdeen, who had acquired it from either ‘Leopold’s people’ or Spain. The resulting article, ‘the concentrated essence of the hostility of Louis Philippe, Guizot, Metternich and others’, was apparently intended to mislead ‘persons abroad’.\(^{75}\)

This diplomatic juncture appeared to be intertwined with a parliamentary attack. On 23 June, Palmerston wrote to Lansdowne that the exiles had inspired Aberdeen to table a question on the slow renewal of Anglo-Spanish ties. Van de Weyer had recently received the latest Spanish terms, written by Foreign Minister the Marquis of Pidal, which were basically the same as those made after Bulwer’s expulsion; and because Pidal and Montpensier were ‘*amis damnés*’ of Louis Philippe and Guizot, when Pidal ‘sent off his inadmissible proposal to Brussels’, he had also ‘sent word to Guizot to stir up Aberdeen to attack us if we did not at once accept it’.\(^{76}\) Two days later, Palmerston added that preventing Anglo-Spanish reconciliation was ‘an obvious interest of the Orléans’, and Aberdeen was their natural cat’s-paw. If exile

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\(^{71}\) Hervey to Clarendon, 1 April 1849, Ibid.

\(^{72}\) Aberdeen to Mahon, 1 December 1848, Stanhope Papers, U1590/C328/21

\(^{73}\) Palmerston to Blackett, 6 June 1849, BP, PP/PRE/B/142; Palmerston to the Editor of *The Globe*, 10 June 1849, Ibid., PP/PRE/143/1

\(^{74}\) Palmerston to the Editor of *The Globe*, 9 July 1849, Ibid., PP/PRE/A/12

\(^{75}\) Palmerston to Howard, 21 June 1849, Palmerston Papers, Add. MS 45176 f.175

\(^{76}\) Palmerston to Lansdowne, 23 June 1849, Bowood Papers, Add. MS 88906/9/23
interference became obvious, he would ‘politely insinuate something’ in the Commons, in the hope that accusations of refugee interference would galvanise support.\textsuperscript{77} This convoluted argument appeared sufficiently plausible to justify both Palmerston’s insistence that Bulwer was reinstated and condemn both Aberdeen and the exiles. So confident was Palmerston in the plausibility of this idea, and its potential to tar the exiles, that he expressed it to the widely-respected and well-connected Lansdowne.

However, Aberdeen’s speech gave Palmerston no such opportunity to demonstrate a damning link between the exiles’ ambitions to strengthen the Tories and Louis Philippe’s apparent interests in Spain.\textsuperscript{78} Rather than attempt to prevent Anglo-Spanish reconciliation, Aberdeen had called for it, and did so from an apparent position of ignorance as to the progress of negotiations. Having attempted to justify his argument to Lansdowne as a means of galvanising support against Aberdeen, Palmerston’s conspiracy was confirmed as a phantom.

Palmerston’s exhortations thereafter lost their sensational edge. In late August, he warned Normanby that ‘if Glücksburg remained at Madrid, it would undoubtedly ‘mean everlasting interruption’ of Anglo-Spanish ties and Isabella being substituted by the Duchess of Montpensier. Yet rather than comment about the exiles’ supposed influence in Spain, he added that he wanted Glücksburg, Queen Christina’s ‘humble slave’, to be replaced as French Minister.\textsuperscript{79} Although Palmerston’s opponents in Spain remained the same, he made no comment about Louis Philippe or Guizot influencing them, and when he complained about the \textit{Chronicle} and \textit{Times} to Normanby soon after, Palmerston made no reference to the exiles.\textsuperscript{80} Whereas he had once attempted to demonise his opponents as part of exile-led conspiracies, Palmerston now attacked them on political grounds. Palmerston’s war with the \textit{Times} also came to an end; Reeve entered into a truce with Palmerston, and the \textit{Times} no longer needed to be cast as the exiles’ paper.\textsuperscript{81} With a return to relative calm in Britain and Europe, and having

\textsuperscript{77} Palmerston to Lansdowne, 25 June 1849, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} 20 June 1849, Stanmore Papers, Add. MS 49254 f.89; \textit{Hansard}, 25 June 1849, cvi cc.801-8
\textsuperscript{79} Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 29 August 1849, BP, PP/GC/NO/504
\textsuperscript{80} Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 3 September 1849, Ibid., PP/GC/NO/505; Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 17 October 1849, Ibid., PP/GC/NO/513
\textsuperscript{81} Koss, S.E., \textit{The rise and fall of the Political Press in Britain} (2 vols., London, 1984), i p.72
made a truce with at least one enemy in the press, Palmerston began to dilute his arguments about exile intrigue as his fallen enemies returned to Europe.

However, in the summer of 1850, Lieven and Guizot encouraged Aberdeen to cooperate with Stanley over the ‘Don Pacifico’ affair. The controversy stemmed from Palmerston’s support for extravagant compensation claims made by a Gibraltarian Jew, David Pacifico, whose property was destroyed during anti-Semitic riots in Athens; Palmerston ordered a British naval blockade when Pacifico’s legal challenges failed. As Hicks notes, it provided ‘the first crisis over foreign policy since the dust had begun to settle after the revolutions of 1848’, and a ‘broad range of parliamentary opinion condemned the government’s Greek policy in the Lords’, following Aberdeen and Stanley. This provided a potential opportunity for a Conservative reunion, although both Stanley and Disraeli were unenthusiastic about forcing a vote in the Commons, which would prove counterproductive given Palmerston’s strength there.82

Nevertheless, members of the supposed ‘cabal’ of 1848-49 were interested in defeating Palmerston. Lieven and Guizot both encouraged Aberdeen, and the court was ‘favourable but not complicit’.83 Only after the exiles had left Britain did a ‘cabal’ with links to Windsor loosely emerge, and as the Don Pacifico affair had developed, Palmerston had become cautious about Guizot’s former influence in Greece. In February, he had warned Normanby that the French mission at Athens was the same which Britain ‘had to… cope’ with during the whole reign of Louis Philippe’.84 As in Spain, Orleanist threats seemingly remained in Greece owing to the presence of Orleanist diplomats, and Palmerston’s suspicions grew. On 28 May, he again wrote of the ‘Guizotish Chronicle and the venal and actually sold Times’ – and to the well-connected Normanby.85 Palmerston subsequently ‘detected’ Lieven and Guizot’s attempt to unite the Tories. As far as the Foreign Secretary was concerned, this was ‘a shot fired by a foreign conspiracy’, and he ‘revelled in the cry it had ricocheted in his favour’. During the Commons debate on the controversy, Sir James Graham’s argument that Palmerston was responsible for the fall of Louis Philippe

82 Hicks, Peace, War and Party Politics, pp.38-42; Hawkins, Derby, i p.381
83 Disraeli’s Reminiscences, p.34
84 Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 12 February 1850, BP, PP/GC/NO/524/2; Thomas Wyse to Palmerston, 8 February 1850, Ibid., PP/GC/WY/75/2
85 Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 28 May 1850, Ibid., PP/GC/NO/547/1
produced the mocking response that the French would not tolerate a foreign cabal plotting against their Ministers. 

Bernal Osborne’s contribution to the debate followed similar lines, and this did not augur well for the Tories. Whilst Graham, a Peelite and former Whig, had attacked Palmerston, Osborne, previously a liberal critic, supported the Foreign Secretary. The Tories lost the vote, and as Stanley and Disraeli feared, their collaboration with Aberdeen – and by extension, Aberdeen’s foreign collaborators – was rendered a political liability. Palmerston’s victory made him so popular among both the public and liberal MPs that he felt it would make any attempt by Russell to remove him impossible. Even if Palmerston had been defeated, Guizot and Lieven’s involvement would have made the Tories’ victory a pyrrhic one.

The nearest thing to a conspiracy between the [former] exiles, the Tories and the court was a failure, and the conspirators did not even share the same objectives. Prior to the affair, Lieven told Ellice that if a Tory ‘coalition’ had been formed, then the government was truly threatened. Yet whereas she only wanted them to ‘get rid of one minister’, Aberdeen wanted to defeat the government. The former exiles and their allies instead failed in both of their ambitions, and so strong was Palmerston’s animosity that his accusation that the Tories were supported by ‘foreign intriguers’ was even communicated to Turkish newspapers. These accusations probably had little impact upon Britain’s elite; Sarah Austin ‘asked [Guizot] in vain what means’ he, Metternich and Lieven had of influencing the British public. Nobody could ‘answer, but merely assert that it was true’. Nevertheless, in light of the nature of Palmerston’s triumph, it is tempting to suggest that even if the exiles had inspired a successful vote of censure against Palmerston in 1848-49, both Tory disunity and Palmerston’s trump card of claiming an exile conspiracy would have prevented the survival of a Conservative government in Russell’s stead.

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86 Brown, Palmerston, pp.323-24; Dasent, Delane, i pp.102-3
87 Bagenal, P.H., *The Life of Ralph Bernal Osborne* (London, 1884), pp.112-13
89 Brown, *Foreign Policy*, p.112
90 Lieven to Ellice, 24 February 1850, Ellice Papers, Mss. 15035, f.114; Lieven to Ellice, 28 February 1850, Ibid., f.116
91 ‘Account of Greek Debate... to Sir S. Canning for insertion into the Turkish Papers’, BP, PP/MM/GR/42
92 Austin to Guizot, 3 July 1850, Ross (ed.), *Three Generations*, i pp.248-49
Why did Palmerston and Hervey pursue a phantom conspiracy? The most likely answer appears to have been to acquire support, peddling exaggerated stories to the public, and perhaps also Clarendon in case he was recalled from Ireland, where he was relatively isolated from political gossip. The same could be said of similar information sent to Howard in Belgium. Whereas Fenton, Bell, Guedalla and Chambers took Palmerston’s complaints of an exile conspiracy seriously, the Foreign Secretary’s accusations cannot be borne out when considered in conjunction with other sources.

Although certain exiles cooperated with Palmerston’s enemies and caused him a great deal of unease - which seemingly necessitated a virulent press campaign - they never dislodged him from the Foreign Office. However, Palmerston and Bulwer’s fears that Louis Philippe would continue to intrigue in exile led to both Parliamentary criticism and a suspension of relations with Spain, which itself caused unease for the government. Whilst accusations of exile-led conspiracy did little to harm Palmerston’s enemies, except during the Don Pacifico affair, Palmerston and Bulwer’s genuine fears of Orleanist intrigue created arguments within the government and an unnecessary suspension of relations with Spain. Accusations of exile conspiracy had achieved very little for the British government.
This chapter explores the Orléans’ position in British politics during the early-to-mid 1850s. It considers their transformation from relative outsiders to an ambitious hostess’s protégés and the relationship between British foreign policy concerns and the support they received, similarly explored through Thiers’ brief exile during 1852. The impact of their ambitions, both real and supposed, will also be considered, especially the rumours which Palmerston used to justify approving Louis Napoleon’s coup in December 1851. While the Orléans’ political standing improved, Louis Napoleon’s fears ensured that they remained a concern for British governments. These fears ostensibly lessened after the exchange of state visits in 1855, and by 1857, the Orléans began to have a dual impact upon British politics, as both a foreign policy concern and as the friends, even protégés of aristocratic politicians.

Although the Comte de Paris’s confirmation in July 1850 was attended by several peeresses, Aberdeen and Lady Alice Peel (described as an ‘Orleanist conspirator’ by Lady Normanby) were by then the sole notable Britons who actively supported the Orléans. A memorandum listing Orleanists who had visited Louis Philippe suggests the Queen’s interest, but she could only appeal to Ministers on their behalf; and whereas Conservative politicians had collaborated with the exiled Guizot, Metternich and Lieven, they accepted the new order in France under President Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. When Malmesbury visited Louis Napoleon at this time, he ‘stressed that the Conservatives were neutral in French domestic and constitutional questions’, and would not ‘thwart any of his domestic or dynastical policy’. Neither Stanley nor Aberdeen ‘would... quarrel with him’. ¹

Noninterventionist ideology precluded supporting Louis Napoleon’s rivals, and as Parry notes, most British politicians and businessmen thought that the President alone could control ‘the army and the socialists’. Through Anglo-French cooperation, Britain could ‘maximise its own international influence’ and ‘check’ French ‘impetuosity’. ² By January 1851, the entire British press appeared to support Louis

¹ Odorici, Luigi, Claremont-Weybridge, 1848-1866 (Paris, 1871) pp.6-7; Chamberlain, Aberdeen, pp.396-99; Lady Normanby to Lady Alice Peel (n.d., c.1851-52), Morier Papers, K3.6.10; Memorandum, 19 June 1850, QVFA Vol. J72, no.41; Hicks, Peace, War and Party Politics, pp.32-33
² Parry, Patriotism, p.206, p.213
Napoleon, and after the President’s *coup d’état* that December, even Aberdeen thought that the only alternative to this, ‘the most lawless despotism ever witnessed’, was revolution. While Louis Napoleon was deemed necessary, the Orléans found little support.

The Orléans’ presence nevertheless created controversy. Protectionists considered Aberdeen ‘with his Orleanist contacts’ hostile to Louis Napoleon, and in 1852, Queen Victoria noted that the President was ‘in constant fear of the Orléans; he shudders every time he hears of any member of the poor family having been to see us’. Their supposed influence at court was still feared, and they remained subject to rumour. Journalists and youthful aristocrats alike speculated about the *fusion*, and Palmerston insisted that Louis Napoleon’s *coup* was a justified response to the Orléans’ schemes. He also argued that he was dismissed as Foreign Secretary due to their influence. For as long as Palmerston retained his prejudice against the French Bourbons, the exiles continued to influence his policies; and as Louis Napoleon’s anxieties became known, the Orléans’ presence threatened to seriously complicate Anglo-French relations.

However, Louis Napoleon’s authoritarianism simultaneously bred sympathy for refugees. After the *coup*, he exiled both left- and right-wing opponents, and the most eminent of the latter, former Prime Minister Adolphe Thiers, was received as a victim in Britain. Once a liberal, by 1851, Thiers had become a ‘high Tory and protectionist’, and one of his speeches had been translated and distributed by Protectionist Tories. These complex views endeared Thiers widely in public opinion, and he was even received at 10 Downing Street by Prime Minister Lord Derby (formerly Stanley). Thiers’ exiled allies were also feted. Charles de Rémusat met Reeve, Mahon, Palmerston, Russell and Ellice; and General Le Flô, the sole Orleanist

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3 Aberdeen to Ellice, 7 January 1851, Ellice Papers, NLS Mss 15057 f.111; Aberdeen to Ellice, 13 December 1851, Ibid., f.123
4 Hicks, p.144; RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1852:14 February
5 Peter Borthwick to Algernon Borthwick, 7 October 1850, Leeds University Library, Special Collections, Glensk-Bathurst Papers, Ms. Dep.1990/1/1088; G.W. Stanley to W.V. Harcourt, 24 August 1850, MS Harcourt Dep.199 f.57; Ashley, *Palmerston*, ii ch.7; Parry, *Patriotism*, p.203
6 Ridley, *Palmerston*, pp.536-37
8 *Morning Post*, 18 March 1852
in the exile community in Jersey, was received by local aristocrats. Friendship, rank, misfortune and amenable opinions attracted attention, and when the Orléans’ French estates were confiscated in 1852, British opinion was aghast. Orléans and Orleanists alike found at least moral support in exile in Britain.

Yet for much of the decade, the Orléans were rarely received in society. Reeve was ‘the only stranger’ at a Claremont dinner in September 1855, and on the night of Lady Clarendon’s grand reception in April 1854, the Orléans visited the Duchess of Kent. As Philip Mansel notes, they did not ‘interact with the English as easily as the [émigré] Bourbons... or Louis Philippe himself.’ Although they remained close to the British royal family, most of the Orléans ‘spent every evening together’, and had very little contact with British politicians. The Princes also had to give up precedence to French Ambassadors, and therefore could ‘not go out much into the world.’

But while his brothers the Duc de Nemours and Prince de Joinville retired from public life, the Duc d’Aumale became ‘a sort of favourite’ in society. Unable to attend events frequented by French diplomats such as public banquets, Aumale ‘entered a few houses where he could’ and met ‘all the most brilliant people’. As a historian and patron of the arts, he made the acquaintance of politicians including Russell, Lansdowne and Mahon, and fellow bibliophiles such as British Museum Librarian Antonio Panizzi. Even Palmerston made some rapprochement when they met in 1856, and by 1857, the Aumales had established friendships with the Conservative Lady Salisbury and the liberal Lady Waldegrave, both rising political hostesses whose roles in party organisation made them serious politicians in their own right. Social eminence remained a vital prerequisite for refugees to engage with British politics, and Aumale’s interests allowed him to do so while avoiding a potentially controversial meeting with Louis Napoleon’s representatives in Britain.

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10 RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1852:25 January
11 17 September 1855, Reeve Memoirs, TNL Archive, BN5/HR/1; Morning Post, 6 April 1854
12 Mansel, Philip, ‘Courts in Exile’, pp.120-21
13 Review of Reviews, November 1897, p.475
14 Ibid.; Aumale to O. Blewitt, 8 April 1856, BL Loan 96 RLF folder 3
15 Cazelles, Aumale, p.174, p.183
16 Senior to Alexis de Tocqueville, 20 August 1856, Simpson (ed.), Tocqueville, ii pp.147-48; Den Boer, Pim, History as a Profession, (Chichester, 1998) p.38; Lady Burghchere (ed.), A Great Man's Friendship (London, 1927), n.18; Hewett, Strawberry Fair, pp.131-2; Mansel, ‘Courts in Exile’, p.121

169
British Responses to Dynastic Schemes, 1849-1851

As Chamberlain notes, during 1849-50 Aberdeen ‘did his best to prevent the reestablishment of a Bonaparte dynasty’. He and Louis Philippe began to discuss the fusion in December 1849, and soon after, Aberdeen assessed its prospects in Paris. As far as Aberdeen could tell, ‘considerable progress had been made’, but only in a crisis ‘could all be carried into effect.’ Persuading Legitimists and Orleanists to cooperate was incredibly difficult, and Peel failed to reassure Aberdeen when he suggested that ‘the modern history of France’ was ‘the substitution of one crisis for another’. While both statesmen supported Louis Philippe’s efforts, they were hamstrung by the difficulty of persuading the two dynastic parties to accept a compromise succession. Aberdeen identified the problem as Thiers’ refusal to proffer his support, and once aware of Thiers’ opinions in some detail, Aberdeen again spoke with Louis Philippe. He sent Guizot details of their discussion, including Louis Philippe’s willingness to meet Thiers, and that he and his sons accepted the fusion.

Aberdeen and the Orléans’ shared hope to secure a French monarchy made him an ideal intermediary between the ex-King and his French supporters, and the fusion was crucial to him. ‘It may be true that neither Legitimists nor Orleanists have the least chance... at present’, Aberdeen wrote to Londonderry, and he agreed that Louis Napoleon had to be supported temporarily, to preserve ‘order and tranquillity’. But the republic could ‘never last’, and a Bonaparte dynasty would be ‘impossible’. Aberdeen knew neither when, nor ‘in whose person’ monarchy would be restored.

Uninterested in which Bourbon eventually reigned, Aberdeen and Louis Philippe’s shared goal of ensuring the fusion seemingly promised both a future for the Comte de Paris, and order in France without the threat of Bonapartist expansionism. But when Peel died in July, the Orléans lost a ‘dear friend’. His death underlined the fact that

17 Chamberlain, Aberdeen, pp.396-99
18 Aberdeen to Peel (copy), 8 January 1850, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43065 f.405 ; Peel to Aberdeen, 18 January 1850, Ibid, f.409
19 Aberdeen to Guizot, 31 January 1850, Stanmore (ed.), vii, no.188; Aberdeen to Lieven, 22 January 1850, Aberdeen-Lieven, ii no.256; Aberdeen to Guizot, [February 1850], Stanmore (ed.), Aberdeen, viii no.203
20 Aberdeen to Londonderry, 17 April 1850, Londonderry Estate Archives, DRO D/Lo/C79(14)
21 Nemours to Jonathan Peel, 3 July 1850, Morier Papers, K1.2.2
the Orléans had lost British supporters rather than gained them in exile; and Louis Philippe himself died in August 1850.

Although the Queen, Aberdeen and Peel had supported the campaign to unite the two branches of the French Bourbons, not all of the Orléans’ British supporters were fusionist. The liberal writer Sarah Austin considered the Duchesse d’Orléans her ‘heroine’ (but was never ‘what is called an Orleanist’) and Lady Alice Peel also supported the Duchesse. While Lady Alice provided Lieven with intelligence about dynastic intrigues, Lieven attempted to push Lady Alice and the Duchesse to accept the fusion. Lieven even wrote of the Duchesse’s ‘beloved President’, whose triumph she had ensured by preventing the fusion; she was the ‘sole obstacle’, who should be told of her error. It was ‘very unwise’ not to see the fusion as ‘their only chance’, for otherwise Bonaparte would be ‘there for life’. Lieven’s tone became ever stronger; by May 1851, the fusion was in ‘very good health and getting stouter every day’, whereas ‘[y]our party may be discernible by a microscope’. These exhortations failed to convince Lady Alice and the Duchesse. Although Lady Alice and Aberdeen were considered intermediaries between the fusion’s French supporters and the Orléans family themselves, they had little influence upon these machinations.

Late 1851 saw discussion of Joinville seeking the French Presidency. In the belief that Louis Napoleon would seek re-election (despite being limited to a single term by the French constitution), Thiers decided to use the Orléans ‘to prevent the declaration of a new French Empire’, and hoped that Joinville would stand in the election scheduled for May 1852. The princes initially declined, but Joinville ‘was almost persuaded’. British responses to Joinville’s ambitions were largely negative. Reeve was enthusiastic; but the Quarterly Review noted that Joinville was considered ‘hostile to England’, and the liberal writer Walter Bagehot thought that republican institutions

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22 Hamburger, Lotte, Troubled Lives: John and Sarah Austin (Toronto, 1985), p.157; Austin to Guizot, 31 August 1849, Ross (ed.), Three Generations, I pp.248-49; Austin to Lansdowne, 31 March 1855, Bowood Papers, Add. MS 88906/10/19/122; Lieven to Lady Alice Peel, 15 December 1849, Morier Papers K5.6.64
23 Chamberlain, Aberdeen, p.397; Lieven to Lady Alice Peel, 29 September 1850, Morier Papers., K5.7.19; Lieven to Lady Alice Peel, 8 January 1851, Ibid., K5.7.40
24 Lieven to Lady Alice Peel, 22 January 1851, Ibid., K5.7.41
25 Princess Lieven to Lady Alice Peel, 15 May 1851, Ibid., K5.7.49
26 Circourt to Reeve, 11 July 1852, Reeve-Circourt Correspondence, Add. MS 37423
could ‘never be administered by a Bourbon or Orléans prince’. Queen Victoria considered the idea inherently flawed, and thought that he should have declined because it put him ‘in a false position towards the royal family… and the republic’. She and Russell hoped that the government (i.e. Palmerston) would ‘take no part in the matter’ and not ‘encourage violent articles’. An unlikely Joinville victory seemingly threatened both French institutions and Britain, and in such circumstances excessive criticism of his campaign might have caused severe Anglo-French disharmony.

Lord Normanby, the British Ambassador to France, was even more concerned by the prospect of a Joinville presidency. By August, he feared that republicans might back Joinville because their own candidate could never obtain a majority, and ‘produce confusion’ by joining conservative supporters. The idea of ‘Red Republicans’ acquiring a degree of influence outweighed doubts as to whether Joinville might stand, and Normanby concluded that if Joinville had no ambition, a prompt denial would be an ‘act of true patriotism’. As far as the British Ambassador was concerned, either a Joinville Presidency or a government supported by the republicans would have been incredibly unwelcome. However, on 17 August, he reported that Joinville might not accept the nomination, and that although Joinville’s supporters wanted to nominate him for a Paris by-election, if Joinville were elected for Paris, the French government might revise the constitution to allow Louis Napoleon’s re-election as President. Initially worried by the Pandora’s Box which Joinville could open, Normanby’s fears were allayed by French government’s willingness to check Orleanist ambitions.

Joinville did not stand for election in Paris and thereafter Normanby and Palmerston dismissed his chances. Normanby soon thought that Louis Napoleon would win the scheduled election under a revised constitution, and considered Joinville’s candidacy ‘so extraordinary’ that he hardly believed it would ‘assume a definite shape’. There

28 Reeve to de Tocqueville, 1 November 1851, Correspondance Anglaise, i no.60; Quarterly Review 89 (October 1851), pp.265-67; Thompson, J.M., Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire (Oxford, 1954), p.126
29 RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1851:3 September; Russell to Palmerston, 5 September 1851, BP, PP/GC/RU/421/1
30 Normanby to Palmerston (confidential), 8 August 1851, FO 27/902/234
31 Normanby to Palmerston, 14 August 1851, Ibid., no.241
32 Normanby to Palmerston, 17 August 1851, Ibid., no.244
were ‘many reasons why it should be avoided’, and although ‘moderate republicans’
would support Joinville, the moderate republican General Cavaignac, had ‘persevered
with his own candidateship’, ‘a great blow to the Joinvillists’. Joinville’s campaign
had been rendered irrelevant.

However, in October, Normanby became concerned by Louis Napoleon’s fear that
King Leopold was intriguing in Joinville’s favour. The British Minister to Belgium,
Lord Howard de Walden, was warned that King Leopold should desist, and that if he
was not intriguing, ‘the sooner and the more explicitly’ he made it known, ‘the
better.’ These efforts succeeded. Joinville could count upon support neither at home
nor abroad, and having dismissed this ‘idle report’, Palmerston warned Russell that in
the unlikely event of Joinville or a socialist’s triumph, ‘we should have to sleep with
one eye open’. Although a Joinville presidency would have been unwelcome, it was
of less concern than Louis Napoleon’s paranoia, which threatened to escalate into a
dispute with Belgium, an eventuality which could have spiralled into an international
crisis.

Orleanist plots were also discounted by British politicians. By 20 November,
Palmerston thought that Louis Napoleon’s certain re-election would be ‘the best thing
for France and for England’, and he would not even regret the establishment of a
Bonaparte dynasty. The Bourbons had ‘always been hostile’, and Britain would gain
nothing ‘by substituting [Chambord] or the Orléans family for the race of
Buonaparte’. Despite his ancestry, Louis Napoleon alone promised stability, and
‘knew the faintness of heart of those who were trying to overthrow him’. The
monarchists might have been wished success if they ‘fairly said that they want to re-
establish a monarchy’ but they seemed unready, and wanted to overthrow ‘the next
[best] thing’. The President alone promised stability and Anglo-French harmony,

33 Normanby to Palmerston, 5 September 1851, BP, PP/GC/NO/381/1-2
34 Normanby to Palmerston, 2 October 1851, Ibid., PP/GC/NO/384/1
35 Palmerston to Howard (copy), 6 October 1851, Ibid., PP/GC/HO/866; Normanby to Palmerston, 16
October 1851, Ibid., PP/GC/NO/385/1
36 Palmerston to Russell, 24 October 1851, Gooch, G.P.(ed.), The Later Correspondence of Lord John
Russell, 1840-1878 (2 Vols., London, 1925) i p.270; Palmerston to Russell, 21 October 1851, Ibid., ii
p.85
37 Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 20 November 1851, BP, PP/GC/NO/576
and Russell agreed that Louis Napoleon would be re-elected. Both dismissed the prospect of the Orléans’ immediate return.

Similar notions had been long disregarded. As early as 1850, Aberdeen had condemned ‘the repeated notices of expected coups’, and rejected rumours of a depressed Louis Napoleon wanting to restore the monarchy. Ellice was even more dismissive; French newspapers reported ‘expected coups’ daily ‘to keep up excitement and ensure [sales]’. Although these rumours never amounted to much, they continued to arrive in Britain. Louis Napoleon’s rule appeared secure, but nevertheless, one contemporary charged that a ‘dislike for Louis Philippe... rather than a sentiment of generosity towards Louis Napoleon’ made Palmerston ‘espouse his cause’. Despite the unlikelihood of an Orleanist coup, Palmerston retained a strong prejudice against the Orléans.

The Orléans, Louis Napoleon’s coup d’état, and Lord Palmerston’s Dismissal, 1851

On 2 December, Louis Napoleon launched his coup d’état against the French Assembly to establish his dictatorship, and in the following days, Palmerston argued that the President had pre-empted an Orleanist plot, an explanation few historians have accepted except for Philip Guedalla. Although recent studies have considered both Louis Napoleon’s impact upon British politics and the role of public opinion in Palmerston’s response to the coup, this aspect of Palmerston’s reaction remains largely unexplored, and offers further explanations for his actions. Whilst it is accepted that Russell’s dismissal of Palmerston was precipitated to a greater or lesser degree by the Foreign Secretary’s approval of Louis Napoleon’s coup contrary to
government policy, relatively little consideration has been given to the reasons Palmerston gave for his actions – in which the Orleans played a prominent role.

In the hours after Louis Napoleon struck, Palmerston was ‘anxious to receive… some explanation’, and on the 3rd, before the cabinet adopted a ‘neutral policy for the time being’, he expressed his approval of the coup to the French Minister, Count Walewski. Rather than wait to see how his colleagues would respond to the coup, Palmerston had decided to support Louis Napoleon. This mistake ensured that Palmerston’s declared policy was now completely different from the one he had to follow in public. Were Russell to discover this, Palmerston would have risked dismissal, and the Foreign Secretary had to persuade Normanby to back his policy.

He was soon provided with an explanation for his course. Palmerston later claimed that on the evening of 3 December, he was told by a former attaché (Augustus Craven) and his wife that at Claremont the previous Friday, the ladies had been ‘in a great bustle’ and expected to be in Paris the next week. The Foreign Secretary subsequently wrote to Normanby that although ‘we… cannot be supposed to know as much as people at Paris did about what was going on amongst the Bourbons’, it was ‘well known here’ that the Duchesse d’Orléans was preparing to be called to Paris with her son ‘to commence a new period of Orléans dynasty’. These explanations continued to develop, and Palmerston continued to act independently. On the 5th, the cabinet adopted a ‘strictly neutral’ attitude and he instructed Normanby to do the same, but added that ‘the party at Claremont were reckoning last week upon being at Paris again before the end of next week’.

In defiance of his colleagues, Palmerston pieced together an Orleanist plot in an attempt to persuade Normanby to follow his own course. This instead angered Normanby, whose working relationship with Palmerston was already strained. Although he ‘did not dispute any knowledge’ which Palmerston might have, Normanby thought that it would have been in Louis Napoleon’s interest to let an

45 Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 2 December 1851, BP, PP/GC/NO/578; Chamberlain, Palmerston, p.75; Ridley, Palmerston, p.537; Southgate, Most English Minister, pp.291-95
46 Memorandum, 29 September 1858, BP, PP/MM/FR/27
47 Guedalla, Palmerston, p.320; Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 3 December 1851, BP, PP/GC/NO/579/1
48 Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 5 December 1851, Ibid., PP/GC/NO/581; Ridley, Palmerston, p.537
Orleanist coup break out, ‘for we know by the reception of the Joinville candidature that it would have been a miserable failure’.\textsuperscript{49} As Southgate notes, Normanby had hoped that Palmerston would express ‘a Whiggish horror’ at the bloodshed and imprisonment of legislators, rather than send ‘humiliating’ rebukes to him;\textsuperscript{50} but he was also angered by Palmerston’s rumour-mongering. Palmerston had incurred Normanby’s opposition, at the risk of revealing and undermining his independent policy.

Palmerston’s explanations continued to develop. On 7 December, Peter Borthwick told him that a former aide-de-camp of the Orléans believed that although Joinville had been dissuaded from resisting the coup, Aumale would do so.\textsuperscript{51} This story did not originate with Borthwick’s son Algernon, the Morning Post’s Paris correspondent; Borthwick explained to his son on 6 December that he had ‘reason to believe’ that Joinville and Aumale were en route to Lille to see whether ‘any royalists would accept their leading’; he supposed this would fail.\textsuperscript{52} As an apparently credible rumour, it was circulated quite widely. The editor of the Morning Chronicle, J.D. Cook, heard that Joinville and one of his brothers had ‘left Claremont in a hurry’, ‘ready for an opening if one should offer’. Cook believed that this would merely harm Joinville, but Palmerston, rather than dismiss Joinville’s chances, immediately requested that inquiries were made to the police at Claremont. Although it transpired that Joinville was unwell, Palmerston told the cabinet that he thought it ‘likely’ that Aumale and Joinville ‘might go to Lille’.\textsuperscript{53}

Palmerston had lied to his colleagues, and they appear to have accepted this story, for on 8 December, the courtier Charles Greville hurriedly wrote to Sir James Graham that Joinville and Aumale had ‘gone off to Lille’. He had heard from Lansdowne, straight ‘from the Cabinet, where it [was] believed’. Palmerston had also mentioned that despite apparent opposition at Claremont, Joinville had said he would go even if Aumale refused, and that Joinville’s rooms there reportedly ‘look[ed] as if he was

\textsuperscript{49} Normanby to Palmerston, 7 December 1851, BP, PP/GC/NO/397/1-3
\textsuperscript{50} Southgate, Most English Minister, p.287
\textsuperscript{51} Memorandum, 29 September 1858, BP, PP/MM/FR/27
\textsuperscript{52} Peter Borthwick to Algernon Borthwick, 6 December 1851, Glensk-Bathurst Papers, Ms. Dep.1990/1/1131; Algernon Borthwick to Peter Borthwick, December 1851, Ibid., Ms. Dep.1990/1/1139
\textsuperscript{53} Memorandum, 29 September 1858, BP, PP/MM/FR/27; Cook to Newcastle, 8 December 1851, Newcastle Collection NeC1203; 7 December 1851, Hobhouse Diaries, Add. MS. 43756 f.80
Curiously, Palmerston recorded in his diary that the Princes had gone to Lille, perhaps suggesting an initial belief in this rumour prior to hearing of Joinville’s illness. Palmerston also mentioned their departure to the Queen, but she rubbished it. Joinville was ‘very ill’, and Aumale was detained in Naples by ‘the Duchesse’s health’. Although this rumour was soon exposed to him as a canard, the Foreign Secretary capitalised upon it in an attempt to find support for his policy of supporting Louis Napoleon.

The same day, Palmerston provided the editor of the Globe with a further explanation for his actions: ‘almost certain’ conflict between the royalist majority in the Assembly and Louis Napoleon, who had struck ‘before they could disarm him’. All ‘traditions of order and tranquil security’ belonged to Monarchy or Empire, and the Bourbons could not promise it. A Legitimist restoration was politically impossible, and while the Orléans had relied upon ‘popular choice’, they had lost it in 1848. Whereas a Bourbon or Orléans restoration threatened civil war, Louis Napoleon represented ‘the real interests of France’. According to this more reasoned explanation, the Orléans were merely among those who had to be kept from power. The idea of an Orléans conspiracy and the Princes’ supposed departures served as convenient excuses for Palmerston’s pursuit of a separate policy towards Louis Napoleon, which had to be hidden from his colleagues to ensure that he remained in office.

However, Normanby angrily rejected the idea of an Orléans conspiracy. Although the Duchesse d’Orléans had ‘some foolish... advisers’, the failed Joinville candidacy had terminated their schemes. Rather than ensure that Normanby supported his policy, Palmerston had alienated his Ambassador to France, but he stood his ground as the political situation demanded, unable to reveal his true reasoning and split from Russell. On the 10th, he explained the rumour to Normanby as one of a succession of schemes, certain that ‘the people at Claremont’ had openly believed that ‘events... would bring about their return’. He also explained his reasons for supporting Louis Napoleon. Had the monarchists had a suitable pretender, ‘a disinterested candidate’ in the President’s position ‘might have... abdicated’, but enthroning the unpopular

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54 Greville to Graham, 11 December 1851, Graham Papers, Add. MS 79649 ff.123-25
55 7 December 1851, BP, PP/D/12; Victoria to Palmerston, 8 December 1851, Ibid., PP/RC/F/505
56 Palmerston to Blackett, 8 December 1851, Blackett Papers, ZBK/C/1/B/3/3/21
57 Normanby to Russell, 8 December 1851, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/9J pt. 1 ff.75-76
Chambord, the 12 year-old Paris with his ‘foreign mother’ and Thiers, or even a Joinville presidency would have created widespread strife. Conversely, Louis Napoleon had acted ‘believing... that the majority of the nation, and the bulk of the army’ favoured him.\(^{58}\) Fearing the exposure of his behaviour, Palmerston supported his growing reserve of rumours by arguing that the French President alone promised order.

Normanby could not ‘attempt to contend with the miscellaneous gossip’ of Palmerston’s ‘anonymous informants’, having ‘found out something of the source from which so much of this is derived’.\(^{59}\) He again wrote to Russell on 15 December, and although his main complaint was that Palmerston had provided instructions contrary to his remarks to Walewski (which were interpreted as British policy), the Orléans remained a major point of contention. As for the ‘triumph’ of the monarchists and the Orléans, which ‘Lord Palmerston always treat[ed] as the same thing, neither... were at that moment the least likely’. Palmerston had ‘persevered in his own opinion’ while ignoring ‘the best information’ which Normanby was ‘avowedly furnished by the highest authority’; the ‘supposed conspiracy’ was not ‘pleaded by the President’, but a \textit{canard} circulated ‘by all connected with the Elysée’ – i.e. Louis Napoleon’s closest supporters. Palmerston had ‘no better ground for asserting its existence’ than his letter of the 10\(^{th}\), a ‘lame and impotent conclusion’.\(^{60}\) Normanby had revealed that Palmerston had acted independently and justified it with rumours. As Charles Greville noted, this ‘Orleanist plot’ and ‘the violence which the Assembly was about to have recourse to’ were probably ‘mere pretences... to cover’ Louis Napoleon’s ‘violence with something plausible which the world might swallow’.\(^{61}\)

This appears to have been Louis Napoleon’s course. Palmerston’s arguments reflect those later promoted by the then-\textit{Préfet de Police}, C.É. de Maupas; that a royalist insurrection would have precipitated civil war, and that royalists had planned a \textit{coup} despite their own divisions. Maupas added that after the \textit{coup}, ‘Orleanists were told

\(^{58}\) Palmerston to Normanby (copy), 10 December 1851, BP, PP/GC/NO/583/1-2; Brown, \textit{Palmerston}, p.327

\(^{59}\) Normanby to Palmerston, 11 December 1851, Ibid., PP/GC/NO/398/1

\(^{60}\) Normanby to Russell, 15 December 1851, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/9J pt.1 ff.193-202

\(^{61}\) Dubreton, \textit{Aspects de M. Thiers} (Paris, 1948), pp.218-19 ; Charles Greville, 14 December 1851, vi p.430
that their princes had just landed at Cherbourg, where ‘troops had immediately placed
themselves under their command’.  

Reliable observers dismissed such ideas. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in a letter to the
Editor of the Times that the ‘Assembly... may have included... certain conspirators’,
but that most deputies sought ‘moderation towards him to the verge of weakness’; and
Ellice believed that there was ‘no truth in the report of the Orléans Princes going to
France’ or an ‘Orleanist complot’. The explanations that centred upon the Orléans,
which Palmerston deployed to shore up his support for Napoleon, were simply
excuses which other well-informed figures cursorily dismissed. Yet as they seemingly
excused Palmerston’s support for Louis Napoleon and were centred upon his former
enemies, he willingly accepted them.

Both Palmerston’s approval of the coup and his attempts to justify his actions with
rumours about the Orléans contributed to his dismissal. His position was already
weak; several Cabinet Ministers had complained to Russell about him, and strongly-
worded letters from Lady Normanby reached General Phipps, Normanby’s brother
and Prince Albert’s secretary. Palmerston calmed tensions by writing Normanby a
despatch which explained that he had simply expressed an opinion to Walewski.
When the Queen requested alterations, she was told that it had already been sent.
Palmerston’s habit of doing this had long irked both her and Russell, and on 17
December Russell demanded his resignation.

These events were in part driven by rumours about the Orléans. Although Palmerston
did not mention the Orléans in the dispatch, he did opine that Bonaparte and the
Assembly could not have co-existed much longer, and that the Assembly's divisions
‘would only be the starting point for disastrous civil strife’. He had previously
mentioned this in relation to the Orléans’ possible return, and his ‘explanation for the
Queen’ for sending the dispatch mentioned Nemours [rather than Aumale] and
Joinville’s supposed plan (Nemours had apparently developed cold feet). In response,

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p.357
63 Halsted, J.B. (ed.), December 2, 1851: Contemporary Writings on the Coup d'état of Louis
Napoleon (New York, 1972), p.38; Ellice to his daughter in law, 9 December 1851, Radford (ed.),
Ellice, i p.252
64 Ridley, Palmerston, pp.529-38; Brown, Palmerston, p.328
65 Palmerston to Normanby (draft), 16 December 1851, FO 27/897/617
Russell rebuked Palmerston for answering the wrong question. Palmerston continued to defend his reaction to the *coup*. He denied expressing his ‘entire approbation’, and again suggested that the best interests of Europe were with Louis Napoleon, because the Assembly could only offer a republic or restoration. The Orléans remained central to his explanation:

‘I know, at least it was told to me... that those who were... at Claremont expected something which they considered favourable to their interests to happen at Paris before the end of that week... preceding the 2\textsuperscript{nd}.’

Less assertive in explaining their apparent role than before, Palmerston backdated his knowledge of the Orléans’ “plot” to before 3 December.

This argument provoked Palmerston’s dismissal. Russell maintained that Palmerston had ‘mistaken the question at issue’. He had disputed whether Palmerston should have expressed ‘an opinion’ to Walewski, and ‘most reluctantly’ concluded that Palmerston could not remain Foreign Secretary. Russell had already decided to support Normanby, and graver was Palmerston's approval of the *coup* ‘contrary to the line of neutrality’; the Prime Minister would tolerate no further transgressions. Although there is ‘no simple answer’ for Palmerston’s dismissal, his fixation upon the Orléans was used to justify his response to the *coup*, which was the final straw. Indeed, the royal adviser Baron Stockmar calculated that Palmerston’s hatred of the Orléans and desire for an *entente* inspired his actions. Palmerston’s attempt to extricate himself from a dispute of his own creation had failed. His response to the *coup* and subsequent rumour-mongering had catalysed his dismissal and departure from the government.

Palmerston continued to attempt to justify his actions. A few days after his dismissal, Queen Victoria was told that an ex-*aide-de-camp* of the Orléans had believed that

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67 Palmerston to Russell, 16 December 1851, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/9J pt.2 ff.23-28
68 Russell to Palmerston (copy), 17 December 1851, Ibid., ff.29-31, f.38
69 Russell to Lansdowne, 15 December 1851, Guedalla (ed.), *Secret*, p.138
‘Joinville had certainly had the mad intention of going to France, and fortunately given up... when he saw that there was... no call for them.’ Yet this declaration had been ‘a sort of fit of desperation, caused by annoyance & excitement’ rather than a serious intention.¹⁷¹ This suggests that Borthwick had adapted the story to justify the coup. Whereas Palmerston had acted as though this was a serious plot, the Queen dismissed it. However, in February 1852, Palmerston offered another explanation. Louis Napoleon had supposedly been ‘forced to act’ in the belief that that the Orléans had bribed the British press, and that they were responsible for royal hostility towards him.⁷²

Palmerston also received information which appeared to confirm earlier rumours. He later recalled that after the coup, the Princesse de Joinville had told the Portuguese Minister that she had expected to be in Paris by 20 December, while his brother, the British Minister to Naples, informed him that Aumale had left Naples before the coup, ‘quite suddenly... having heard of the illness of his mother’.⁷³ This allowed Lady Palmerston to tell Panizzi that Aumale had ‘taken the pretence of his mother’s illness’ to leave before news of the coup arrived, and had ‘meant to be in or near France.’ Another ‘very good authority’ had said that Aumale would have met Joinville and travelled to Lille, where they were ‘sure’ that the garrison would support them.⁷⁴ With little evidence for their assertions, the Palmerstons capitalised upon rumours, and in reply to his son’s contention that there was no Orleanist conspiracy against Louis Napoleon, Borthwick argued that Louis Napoleon’s rule was ‘absolutely necessary for France and for Europe - not by the fact of a conspiracy against the President individually – but... a conspiracy... against France.’⁷⁵ The use of rumours about the Orléans to justify supporting the coup could only be rationalised with desperate backpedalling.

The Palmerstons also blamed the Orléans for his dismissal. While Palmerston encouraged the Morning Post to blame the ‘hostile intrigues’ of the Orléans, Austria, Russia, Saxony, Bavaria and Prussia, Lady Palmerston told Beauvale that Russell had

¹⁷¹ RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1851:31 December
¹⁷² Guedalla (ed.), Secret, p.215
¹⁷³ Memorandum, 29 September 1858, BP, PP/MM/FR/27; Temple to Palmerston, 4 January 1852, Ibid., PP/GC/TE/129
¹⁷⁴ Lady Palmerston to Panizzi, 18 January 1852, Panizzi Papers, BL Egerton MS 3677 ff.289-90
¹⁷⁵ Peter Borthwick to Algernon Borthwick, 16 December 1851, Glenesk-Bathurst Papers, Ms. Dep.1990/1/1136
‘used exactly the same expressions’ as Palmerston in favour of the coup, and that Normanby had ‘proposed to cease relations’ with Louis Napoleon. ‘How curious it is that out of this... statement that so much mischief should have arisen’ she noted, considering it ‘an intrigue of’ Normanby, Phipps and Prince Albert, ‘worked up by the deep disappointment of the Orléans overthrow and the hopes which Normanby had helped to raise.’

She told others of the Orléans’ supposed designs, the Princesse de Joinville’s comments, and that they had been prepared to leave, before the coup had ‘cut in just before theirs’. Lady Palmerston even wrote to Lieven that Thiers had ‘told... people at Lady Alice Peel’s... about the plans which had been made to arrest’ the President ‘days later’. He apparently denied this once told that such ‘frank talk’ played into Louis Napoleon’s hands.

Some did blame influences upon the Queen for Palmerston’s dismissal; Malmesbury and Disraeli both saw the hand of Aberdeen and several diplomats, but not the Orléans, and as Russell wrote to Lady Palmerston, ‘there has been no conspiracy.’ Charles Greville similarly noted that Russell could say ‘“alone I did it!”’, for ‘not one of his colleagues’ knew that he would dismiss Palmerston. ‘[N]obody’ could say that there was a ‘conspiracy’, although the Queen was overjoyed.

This assessment was almost certainly accurate. For the Palmerstons alone, the Orléans were behind the events of December 1851.

**The Orléans Property Decrees, 1852**

When the French government confiscated their vast estates in January, the Orléans found widespread sympathy in Britain. While the Standard and Morning Chronicle both condemned the idea of an Orléans conspiracy, ‘the injured and outraged exiles applaud[ed] and thanked’ the British press, and ‘in private conversation’, the Queen was ‘very hostile’ to Louis Napoleon. The confiscation was a ‘refinement of

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76 Brown, Palmerston, p.330; Bell, Palmerston, ii p.53; Lady Palmerston to Beauvale, 7 January 1852, BP, BR29/17/4
78 Lady Palmerston to Lieven, 27 January 1852, Lieven-Palmerston, pp.298-99
79 Hicks, Politics of Foreign Policy, p.54; Russell to Lady Palmerston, 28 December 1851, Walpole, Russell, ii p.141
80 Greville to Graham, 23 December 1851, Graham Papers, Add. MS 79649 ff.146-47
81 Standard, 13 January 1852; Morning Chronicle, 23 January 1852; Clarendon to Reeve, 9 February 1852, Laughton, Reeve, i pp.58-59; Cavendish, Society, Politics and Diplomacy, 6 January 1852, p.220
cruelty’, and she ‘and many others’ were convinced that Bonaparte’s ‘wicked deed’ would receive ‘the punishment it so richly deserve[d]’.\textsuperscript{82} Even Louis Napoleon’s British supporters were incensed. The Duke of Rutland rebuked Lady Londonderry that her ‘former friend’ would alienate both ‘his real friends’ and those who saw him as the ‘least of two evils.’\textsuperscript{83} Palmerston thought the confiscation counterproductive, and Malmesbury thought it ‘tyrannical’. While Malmesbury recognised that this was technically an obligation to sell, but it was ‘really the same thing’ as a confiscation, and he wrote ‘a strong remonstrance’ to his old friend; but Louis Napoleon replied that it was necessary, because Orleanist agents had attempted to bribe French senators.\textsuperscript{84}

The confiscation also troubled British diplomats. G.H. Jerningham, \textit{Chargé d'Affaires} at Paris, repeatedly expressed his disgust to Palmerston’s successor, Lord Granville.\textsuperscript{85} Jerningham was not alone. Howard thought that events following the \textit{coup} had ‘produced the worst effect’. The confiscation and banishments had ‘completely undermined all … confidence’ towards Louis Napoleon in Belgium.\textsuperscript{86} Meanwhile, the British \textit{Chargé} in Berlin feared that Britain might be drawn into another dispute. Although Prussian Minister-President Baron Manteuffel asked the Belgian Minister to advise King Leopold against signing ‘any protest on the subject’, if the confiscation proved illegal, he was ‘disposed to admit’ King Leopold’s ‘right’ to protest. Manteuffel regretted the sudden confiscation, which British influence could ‘have been usefully exerted to prevent’, and thought that Britain ‘might... assist King Leopold’.\textsuperscript{87} Although Louis Napoleon’s actions appeared reprehensible, Britain had to avoid criticising them, because it could have been drawn into international disagreement, and thus aligned against France.

In Madrid, Lord Howden was more sanguine. The ‘furious’ court had forced the government to ‘write a very strong remonstrance to be presented... at Paris’ as the

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\textsuperscript{82} RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1852:25 January
\textsuperscript{83} Rutland to Lady Londonderry, 27 January 1852, Londonderry Estate Archives, DRO D/Lo Acc.451(D)16/4
\textsuperscript{84} Guedalla (ed.), \textit{Secret}, pp.216-17; Malmesbury, 25 January 1852, i pp.300-1; Malmesbury to Cowley, 2 March 1852, Ibid., i p.310
\textsuperscript{85} G.H. Jerningham to Granville, 16 January 1852, FO 27/928/46; Jerningham to Granville, 29 January 1852, Ibid, no.64; Jerningham to Granville, 26 January 1852, Ibid., no.57; Jerningham to Granville, 4 February 1852, FO 27/929/76
\textsuperscript{86} Lord Howard de Walden to Granville, 25 January 1852, FO 10/164/15
\textsuperscript{87} Henry Howard to Granville (confidential), 29 January 1852, FO 64/340/60
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dowry of the Duchesse de Montpensier (formerly the Infanta Luisa) was ‘placed in mortgage on some of the land’, which ‘would not bring half of its value’. Even Moderado newspapers, previously ‘violently hostile against anything English’ were consequently critical to the point of favouring ‘England and an English alliance’. Howden was ‘astonished at [his] own success’. Faced with an incredibly critical and personal reaction to Louis Napoleon’s actions, Howden capitalised upon the anger which the confiscation created to restore some of Britain’s standing in Spain.

Granville did not protest against the confiscation. He informed the Queen that the Belgian Minister thought that if Louis Napoleon was ‘inclined to agree to what is just’, he would rescind the decrees without ‘being pressed’, and would attribute British remonstrances to ‘Claremont influence’. It was therefore impossible to take ‘a high tone’. Although ‘very moderate language’ would have implied that Britain was ‘not much interested’, Granville would not ‘give a direct refusal to those interested in these decrees’. Passivity was the best policy, and Victoria and Albert did not allow their sentiments to ‘influence’ the Foreign Secretary. Any implication of sympathy for the exiles would have needlessly angered Louis Napoleon, and was therefore rejected out of hand.

Normanby’s replacement, Lord Cowley, was also hostile to the confiscation. On 17 March, he reported to Malmesbury (who had replaced Granville after Derby formed a Protectionist government) that people felt ‘that their fortunes [were], in a great measure, in the hands of a single individual, and that their properties may be attacked as suddenly and inexplicably as... the Orléans family[’s]’. But although the confiscation and its aftermath seemingly demonstrated the arbitrary nature of the French regime, Cowley rejected precipitate action. When his Belgian colleague suggested submitting ‘the question of the Orléans family property, as far as it [regarded]’ King Leopold to arbitration, Cowley warned that this would ‘irritate the President unnecessarily’.

88 Howden to Sir Robert Gardiner, 1 February 1852 (copy), Howden Papers, Ms. Eng. Lett. 2759 p.442
89 Granville to Victoria (copy), 7 February 1852, Granville Papers, PRO 30/29/31
90 Van de Weyer to King Leopold (copy), 9 January 1852, Ibid., PRO 30/29/120
91 Cowley to Malmesbury, 17 March 1852, QVFA vol. J73 no.56
92 Cowley to Malmesbury (copy), 27 June 1852, FO 519/209 pp.98-99
and legal fiascos, Cowley recognised that any representation would have worsened concerns about the Orléans’ supposed influence in Britain.

The Orléans sidestepped the confiscation with the help of their British bankers. Angela Burdett-Coutts was close to the Orléans, and ‘came immediately to their assistance’. Although the amount of financial support she gave is uncertain, they were certainly ‘glad of her help’; Aumale wrote to her in late March about a ‘secret proposal’, perhaps related to the purchase of Orléans House, which was bought on Aumale’s behalf by Coutts’ Bank and leased to back him, because foreigners could not then purchase property in Britain.  

93 Coutts’ was able to take decisions on the Orléans’ behalf to evade both British laws which penalised foreigners and the French government’s attempts to weaken the Orléans’ influence. The sale of the great Chantilly estate to Coutts’ was also ‘a false one’. Coutts’ pretended to buy it from Aumale to prevent its confiscation, and rented its ‘Petit Château’ to Cowley as a summer residence. 94 Unencumbered by diplomatic realities as the government was, Coutts’ were able to help the Orléans both retain their profitable estates and acquire further property in Britain.

Enter Thiers, 1852

Thiers’ potential arrival also created concern for British politicians. After he was initially expelled to Belgium, it was expected that he would leave for Britain. Although Marion Ellice commented on 17 December that friends feared that he would be suspected of conspiracy in Britain, she soon conjectured that they would ‘be much joyed at his crossing the Channel’, to ‘make mischief (or rather... be suspected of doing so)’. 95 Thiers was ‘uncertain’ whether to go to Italy or Britain; Ellice commented that if Thiers and his allies were ‘wise, they [would] come here’. He had already invited his friend to London. 96 However, both Orleanists and the Orléans were opposed, ‘for fear of reports of intrigues at Claremont’. 97 Thiers’ potential arrival

93 Healy, Edna, Coutts & Co, 1692-1992: The Portrait of a Private Bank (London, 1992) p.299, p.342; Aumale to Angela Burdett-Coutts, 30 March 1852, Burdett-Coutts Papers, Add. MS 85275 f.1 ; Schedule of Title Deeds and Documents, MCC/CL/L/CC/8/049/1/1
94 Richter, L.M., Chantilly in History and Art (London, 1913), p.119
95 Marion Ellice to Edward Ellice, 17 December 1851, Ellice Papers, Mss. 15071 f.178; Marion Ellice to Edward Ellice, 21 December 1851, Ibid., f.173
96 Ellice to his daughter in law, 17 December 1851 , Radford (ed.), Ellice, i p.253
97 Ellice to his daughter in law, 21 December 1851, Ibid., i p.254
seemingly threatened Anglo-French accord, and more dangerously, Howard feared
French protests about Thiers’ presence in Belgium, still seemingly a likely target for
French invasion. On 6 February, he reported that the French statesman had left,
‘carrying out his original intention of settling in England’, because ‘his continued
residence... had produced disagreeable correspondence’ with France.98 Granville was
thankful for his departure.99

Upon arrival, Thiers immediately announced his presence to Ellice and threw himself
into politics.100 After several French Ministers resigned over the confiscation, he
spoke about their replacements in detail at a reception; at another, he told guests that
he believed Louis Napoleon would declare a new Empire; and he responded in detail
to questions about whether the French army would be expanded.101 Thiers’ loquacity
attracted great interest, but he did not devote his exile to proselytising. When he dined
with Ellice and Hobhouse on 17 February, the conversation focused upon cabinet
procedure, and days later, when the Whig Sir John Hobhouse asked him what France
would make of rumours that Palmerston would join the Protectionist government, he
‘could not tell’.102 Nevertheless, his opinions were valued and shared. Aberdeen noted
that Thiers was convinced Louis Napoleon wanted to invade Belgium, and the same
day, upon hearing of the confiscation, a fellow-exile urged Thiers to raise this and
other ‘socialist’ acts with the British government.103

Thiers was feted by liberals and Conservatives alike, sometimes simultaneously; on
25 February, he dined with Ellice, Disraeli, and the Radical Charles Villiers.104 His
opinions even reached the royal family. As was his habit, the Whig economist Nassau
Senior recorded his conversations with Thiers, and Senior shared his transcripts with

98 Howard to Granville, 12 January 1852, FO 10/164/5; Howard to Granville (confidential), 6
February 1852, Ibid., no.23
99 Memorandum, January 1852, Granville Papers, PRO 30/29/20/5 ff.61-63
100 Lieven to Lady Holland, 5 February 1852, Lieven-Holland, no.44; Thiers to Ellice, 12 January
1852, ‘Letters and signatures of eminent Frenchmen’, Add. MS 21512 f.82
101 Henry Greville, 27 January 1852, i p.409; 18 March 1852, p.420
102 17 February 1852, Hobhouse Diaries, Add. MS. 43756 f.115; 21 February 1852, Ibid., ff.123-4
103 Aberdeen to Guizot (copy), 26 February 1852, Aberdeen Papers, BL Add MSS 43334 f.41;
Duvergier to Thiers, 26 February 1852, Halévy, E. (ed.), Le Courrier de M. Thiers (Paris, 1921),
pp.290-91
104 Disraeli to Derby, 25 February 1852, DL vi no.2238

186
an interested Prince Albert. Thiers was also privy to discussion of British politics; he informed Ellice that the Peelite Sir James Graham was willing to support the Whigs in that year’s general election. The exiled former minister had quickly won the trust and support of a wide range of figures in British political life.

Such was Thiers’ popularity that Malmesbury lobbied for his exile to be rescinded. Walewski complied, worried by the ‘coldness of England to the new regime’. So well-received were Thiers’ opinions that his exile had become counterproductive in the eyes of both the French and British governments. After a continental holiday, Thiers returned in the autumn for ‘the usual round of country houses’, and even discussed free trade with the Radical John Bright. He continued to attract attention, and Aberdeen praised him after they met in December. More controversially, Disraeli’s eulogy at Wellington’s funeral plagiarised one made by Thiers, who subsequently alerted the Peelite journalist Abraham Hayward; this revelation was publicised to some acclaim. Throughout his exile, Thiers had allowed his remarks to be used for political advantage.

**British Hospitality and French Concerns, 1852-55**

In contrast to the welcome which the British aristocracy gave to Thiers, the British royal family only gave the Orléans moral support. In the wake of the threatened confiscation of the Orléans’ properties, Queen Victoria wanted them to remain ‘passive’, and Prince Albert hoped that ‘when returned to calmness from the very natural indignation which the unjustifiable treatment of all their friends has occasioned’, they would consider Louis Napoleon’s dictatorship a ‘necessary stage’ in France’s ‘malady’, which had to ‘be cured before constitutional government [could] be established’. When Nemours protested against the confiscation to Prince

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105 Simpson (ed.), *Conversations with distinguished persons during the Second Empire* (2 vols., London, 1880) i pp.1-138; Senior to Albert, 11 December 1852 (and draft reply, 12 December), RA VIC/MAIN/Y/18/195
106 Thiers to Edward Ellice, 11 March 1852, Ellice Papers, Mss. 15056 f.70
108 Allison, *Thiers*, p.204
109 Aberdeen to Lieven, 7 December 1852, *Aberdeen-Lieven*, ii no.464
111 Victoria to King Leopold, 4 December 1851, *QTL* ii p.334; Albert to Aberdeen, 3 January 1852, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43046 ff.160-61
Albert’s brother, Ernest II of Saxe-Coburg, Albert hoped that Ernest would protest upon legal, rather than familial grounds.\footnote{Ernest II, \textit{Memoirs}, iii p.23} Owing to the risk of incurring French displeasure, the relationship between the two royal families had to be limited to friendship.

Yet even this friendship antagonised Louis Napoleon. After Malmesbury instructed Cowley to explain a visit to Antwerp by the Queen as ‘merely a family visit’, his French counterpart, Édouard Drouyn de Lhuys, questioned Cowley because ‘she met the Orléans family’ at the funeral of the Queen of the Belgians. Cowley responded as requested, and criticised ‘the President’s unwarrantable jealousy of the civility shown… to the Orléans family’. Drouyn ‘fully admitted the President’s fault, and lamented… the susceptibility of his character’.\footnote{Malmesbury to Cowley, 4 August 1852, FO 519/196 f.151; Cowley to Malmesbury, 9 August 1852, Wellesley, V. and Sencourt, R. (eds.), \textit{Conversations with Napoleon III} (London, 1934), p.7} The French President’s paranoia was now clear, and in July, Cowley reported that Louis Napoleon was angered when the Duchesse d’Orléans met four French generals in Belgium, and accepted explanations that King Leopold was neither complicit nor aware of her visit.\footnote{Cowley to Malmesbury (confidential), 8 July 1852, FO 27/935/398} Any rumoured collaboration had to be neutralised, and on 1 November, Cowley reported that a German diplomat had ‘had several confidential interviews’ in Switzerland with some of the Orléans. Their language was very ‘reasonable’; they ‘had no party in France, and… admit[ted] that… Louis Napoleon [was] necessary and desirable’.\footnote{Cowley to Malmesbury (confidential), 1 November 1852, FO 27/939/644}

As far as Cowley was concerned, this admission of weakness by the Orléans and their unwillingness to challenge the status quo in France was an admirable act which would only serve to improve Anglo-French relations. Nevertheless, Derby feared that the Orléans had ‘been imprudent’ when Louis Napoleon, who had now declared himself Emperor Napoleon III, ‘heard things and expressions… which did a great deal of harm’, and he ‘begged’ Queen Victoria to warn them, in case they ‘\textit{unintentionally compromised us seriously}’. Derby even worried that she might be blamed if Britain rejected an Anglo-French alliance, seemingly influenced by ‘mistaken friendship for the Orléans’.\footnote{Derby to Victoria, 16 December 1852, QVL, ii p.498; Victoria to King Leopold, 23 November 1852, Ibid., ii p.491} In the Prime Minister’s opinion, the Orléans’ opinions and friendship
with the Queen remained problematic. Napoleon’s paranoia concerning the Orléans was a far greater threat to British diplomacy than their actual activities.

After the Protectionists’ budget was rejected in December, Aberdeen was appointed Prime Minister in a Whig-Peelite coalition, and as Malmesbury predicted, Aberdeen cooperated with Napoleon. Nemours congratulated Aberdeen, who offered ‘any service in [his] power’ in reply, albeit tempered by ‘the obligations of duty’. He could only do a small favour. Customs duties were remitted on ‘certain items’ imported for the Orléans, and both he and the Chancellor, Gladstone, wished to avoid interference. If the Orléans were found to be abusing the law by selling imported items, it ‘might perhaps give rise to questions of a disagreeable manner.... which had better be avoided’. They agreed that duties should be paid on anything intended for sale, but Aberdeen believed that the consequences could be ‘painful to all concerned’. Even this seemingly innocuous favour could have upset Napoleon and harmed both the Orléans and the government.

Russell, now Foreign Secretary, also feared that the Orléans might compromise British diplomacy. In April, Malmesbury told him that Napoleon had complained of the Queen’s ‘Orleanist predilections’, and that in 1850-51, the French government had ‘made up its mind to the necessity of war with England’, having apparently discovered supportive letters from the British court to Orleanist leaders. Russell’s subsequent complaints about Victoria’s relationship with the Orléans were strong enough to leave her ‘annoyed and vexed’. Russell seemed ‘to expect that because the Emperor disliked it, we should now change our course’, whereas Derby had merely hoped that they were ‘prudent in their language.’ The ‘poor exiles and near relations’ were rarely received, never invited to ‘state parties’, nor spoken to about ‘politics’, except for her ‘close relatives’ the Nemours. Victoria was also ‘struck’ by their ‘extreme prudence and moderation’, even when Palmerston had promoted ‘an Orleanist plot’. Aberdeen was instructed to prevent further ‘speeches’, and to remind Russell that in reply to complaints, he should state that Britain had ‘promptly’

117 Nemours to Aberdeen, 11 January 1853, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43133 f.344; Aberdeen to Jarnac (copy), 21 January 1853, Ibid., f.436
118 Aberdeen to Dumas (copy), 18 February 1853, Ibid., Add. MS 43051 f.314
119 Aberdeen to Dumas (copy), 15 March 1853, Ibid., f.316
120 3 April 1853, Vincent, John (ed.), A selection from the diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby between September 1869 and March 1878 (London, 1994), p.105; 28 November 1853, Ibid., p.113
recognised the Second Empire. In the Queen’s opinion, Russell’s suggestions were excessive, contrary to British customs of hospitality, and reflected poorly upon her efforts to avoid creating offence.

However, suggestions of Orléans influence had to be discouraged, and indeed, prior to Derby’s fall, Malmesbury had warned Cowley that Stratford Canning had ‘given the French the idea that the Aberdeen school [was] hostile’. Napoleon had ‘always thought so and I have often assured him not, but now he will be convinced he was right’. Malmesbury felt that Stratford had undone his efforts to assuage the Emperor’s fears. He had assured Napoleon that Victoria had no enmity towards him, merely friendship for her ‘Orleanist relations’. Protectionists, Peelites and Whigs all agreed that Britain had to cooperate with Napoleon, and that the Orléans should abstain from politics.

The Orléans also concerned both the British and French Police. Surveillance by the latter appears to have been more stringent; whereas few Metropolitan Police reports survive, Lord Holland compared French surveillance of the Orléans to the close attention British visitors were subjected to in absolutist Naples. Along with a record of Louis Philippe’s death, only one Metropolitan Police report concerning the Orléans survives, recording their visitors and Joinville’s departure for Ireland in March 1852. Although this lack of records may reflect a destruction of material, it appears likely that the Metropolitan Police simply took little interest in the Orléans’ movements. Indeed, when John Sanders (the detective usually charged with observing refugees) was sent to Jersey to monitor the exiles there, Le Flô was only mentioned in passing as the main target of a French agent. Joinville’s journey caused some concern because he had suddenly left England, and Sanders concluded that Joinville was probably visiting the former French diplomat Count Jarnac in Ireland. Whilst the French authorities were far more vigilant, Britain only appears to have monitored the Orléans’ movements when their activities appeared to threaten unrest in France.

121 Memorandum by Victoria (copy), 31 December 1852, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43046 ff.216-17
122 Malmesbury to Cowley, 9 December 1852, FO 519/196 f.216
123 Malmesbury, 20 March 1853, i p.389
124 Henry Greville, 1 August 1852, ii p.430
125 Report, 26 August 1850 (copy), FO 27/889; Report, 15 March 1852, MEPO 3/14
126 Reports, 10 August, 7, 16, 26, 28 September, 14, 22 October 1852, HO 45/4547A
127 Report, 17 March 1852, MEPO 3/14
However, the Queen was worried by Joinville’s Anglophobe reputation when an article he had written for the *Deux Mondes* was published in February 1853; a pamphlet by Joinville concerning the possibility of a French invasion had created panic a decade before, and Victoria thought that Joinville had acted with ‘folly & imprudence’, for the new pamphlet created ‘great indignation’ and ‘the appearance of the greatest ingratitude’. She did ‘not put any bad interpretation upon it’, but thought ‘the want of judgment & feeling... inexcusable, & the imprudence incredible!’

The Duchesse de Nemours was ‘cautioned’, ‘for their own sake’s’, and Aberdeen downplayed the ‘episode’.

Aumale attracted more positive attention. The exiled prince was subject to some publicity upon buying ‘the celebrated Standish Library’ in 1851, and became a ‘prominent and active member’ of the bibliophile Philobiblion Society, founded in 1853. Many of its members were politicians - including Whig MP Monckton Milnes, and Tory MP William Stirling-Maxwell, and Aumale was invited to become its patron. Although replaced as patron by Prince Albert, Aumale became one of its leading hosts. The Philobiblion established an ‘enviable position in cultural circles’, and Aumale became ‘widely known as a collector of fine arts’. Aumale’s association with Reeve also began in 1853; Reeve noted that they first ‘[m]ade acquaintance... at Lady Alice Peel’s - at his request’. Lady Alice also invited Lansdowne to meet Aumale. Through his own interests and with Lady Alice’s support, Aumale began to establish friendships with influential Britons.

Nevertheless, the Orléans remained unpopular, and in late 1853, they were named in another supposed conspiracy. After briefly resigning, Palmerston fell out with Prince Albert, and did little to discourage a series of ridiculous newspaper attacks upon the Prince. It was alleged that Albert was part of a German, Coburg, or even ‘Austro-Belgian-Coburg-Orléans’ clique which sought to make Britain a Russian puppet, and he could not defend himself publicly. King Leopold subsequently protested, but
Palmerston believed that there was ‘some truth in Albert’s Orleanist leanings’, and only disavowed the stories once the consequent press campaign spiralled out of control. He also took the opportunity to ask Leopold to ‘inspire’ better feelings towards Napoleon ‘at Windsor’; although Palmerston thought that it ‘quite natural’ for the Queen and Prince to show goodwill towards the Orleans, he considered a ‘courteous’ relationship between the court and Napoleon a diplomatic necessity.

However, Palmerston’s resignation led Napoleon, already concerned by the royal family’s ‘Orleanist connections’, to believe that the government’s ‘apparent paralysis’ was due to ‘a pro-Orleanist Aberdeen… playing France for a fool in the east’. Although he had bolstered his reputation, mostly at Albert’s expense, but also that of the Orléans, Palmerston’s actions had triggered Napoleon’s fears about the exiles, and as the Crimean War approached, Britain and France supported Turkey against Russia. The Queen sympathised with the ex-soldier Aumale, who had to remain inactive, but good relations with Napoleon were vital. Any association with the intriguing Orléans still threatened to derail relations with France – now both a potentially dangerous neighbour and a close ally.

The Queen and government both feared that the Orléans’ intrigues might upset the alliance. Upon hearing that Chambord wished to visit Nemours in Britain in January 1854, Queen Victoria was alarmed. She hoped that the reports were ‘unfounded’, for they were ‘too alarming to be entertained for a moment’, and quickly sought Aberdeen’s advice. In a far harsher tone, Palmerston warned Aberdeen that the reports should be contradicted ‘without delay’, as it was ‘impossible that such a meeting should be permitted… in a royal palace’. Both the Orléans’ critic and defender were worried about the supposed reception’s likely fallout, and the Prime Minister shared their concerns.

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136 Palmerston to Leopold (copy), 20 January 1854, Palmerston Papers, Add. MS 48578 ff.18-21
138 RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1855:30 March
139 Victoria to Aberdeen, 13 January 1854, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS. 43048 f.137
140 Palmerston to Aberdeen, 13 January 1854, Ibid., Add. MS 43069 f.202
Although Aberdeen thought that the story had probably been fabricated to discredit the government and create ‘suspicion in France’, he urged Victoria to persuade the Orléans not to receive Chambord.\textsuperscript{141} She warned that such a visit would be an embarrassment, and create ‘umbrage’ in France. Although France was Britain’s ‘very intimate ally’, her friendship with the Orléans made Britain’s position ‘very delicate’.\textsuperscript{142} Nemours replied that the false report came from Russia, and that publicising such a visit would be political suicide.\textsuperscript{143} Aberdeen was relieved by Nemours’ announcement, and Victoria thought the affair satisfactorily resolved, although Nemours did not ‘see the danger’.\textsuperscript{144} Serious concerns remained about the Orléans’ tact and reputation for intrigue.

\textbf{A Change in Fortunes, 1855-57}

Eventually, Napoleon appeared to accept Victoria and Albert’s relationship with the Orléans. Although he had feared that the royal couple ‘had an avowed antipathy against him’, by June 1854, they ‘had been so kind to [him] that [he] could never doubt the sincerity of their feelings’.\textsuperscript{145} These increasingly positive sentiments were shared in Britain. Queen Victoria had ceased to despise Napoleon, and in 1855, they exchanged state visits.\textsuperscript{146} Extensive preparations were made to ensure that Napoleon’s visit to Britain was a success, and on the orders of Palmerston (appointed Prime Minister after Aberdeen fell), prominent radical refugees were warned that if the ‘least annoyance’ was given, he would immediately introduce an Alien Bill to expel all political refugees.\textsuperscript{147} The Orléans were also targeted. Much to their horror, while French policemen brought to Britain to ensure Napoleon’s safety threw cordons around Buckingham Palace and Windsor Castle, two were posted outside Claremont, and another at the nearest station.\textsuperscript{148} Britain appeared to have yielded to Napoleon’s paranoia despite the Orléans’ quiet existence.

\textsuperscript{141} Aberdeen to Victoria (copy), 14 January 1854, Ibid., Add. MS. 43048 f.141; Aberdeen to Palmerston (copy), 13 January 1854, Ibid., Add. MS 43069, f.204
\textsuperscript{142} Victoria to Nemours (draft), 13 January 1854, RA VIC/MAIN/Y50/16
\textsuperscript{143} Nemours to Victoria, 14 January 1854, RA VIC/MAIN/Y50/17
\textsuperscript{144} Aberdeen to Victoria (copy), 17 January 1854, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS. 43048 f.151; RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1854:16 January
\textsuperscript{145} Cowley to Clarendon, 16 June 1854, Wellesley and Sencourt (eds.), \textit{Conversations}, p.57
\textsuperscript{147} Vitzthum, \textit{St. Petersburg and London}, 1 p.154; Guest, \textit{Napoleon III}, ch.6
Nevertheless, the visit saw discussions which were to the Orléans’ benefit. Upon meeting Napoleon, Victoria mentioned the Orléans, and spoke frankly, anxious to ‘not have this untouchable ground’ between them. In reply, Napoleon asked Victoria to tell the elderly ex-Queen, who occasionally visited Spain, that ‘she must travel through France if the return journey... [was] too difficult’.\textsuperscript{149} Napoleon seemingly had few concerns about the Orléans, and Victoria appreciated his remarks. Aberdeen debated the value of the offer; this ‘act of civility’ was ‘certainly no great matter, but as an indication’, it was ‘not altogether without value’\textsuperscript{150}. However, Victoria was impressed, and urged the ex-Queen to ‘accept it as a proof of [her own] unalterable friendship’. She added that Napoleon now understood her sentiments; he ‘could not object to [her] seeing the members of the family’.\textsuperscript{151} Napoleon’s flattery gave both the Queen and her government the impression that the Orléans’ presence no longer appeared to affect Anglo-French understanding.

Privately, Napoleon remained concerned, and in late August, Howden, who had known Louis Philippe’s sons ‘familiarly’ from ‘their earliest years’, was accused of carrying letters for the Orléans. While Clarendon gave him the benefit of the doubt, Palmerston disagreed. Howden would not \textit{knowingly} have served as ‘the channel for any intrigue or correspondence politically hostile to the Emperor’, but could well have ‘undertaken to carry private letters’. This was ‘no great harm in itself, but imprudent in a Minister’.\textsuperscript{152} These fears persisted, and in November, Napoleon complained to Malmesbury about British conduct in Spain, and ‘accused Howden of conspiring with the Orleanists and Montpensier’.\textsuperscript{153} British diplomats had to account for Napoleon’s paranoia, and a rumour related to the \textit{fusion} did create concern. When Montpensier visited Chambord in August, the British \textit{Chargé} in Madrid forwarded the Spanish
government's grave concerns to Clarendon. Yet these fears were soon allayed.\(^{154}\) For once, British concerns seemingly outstripped Napoleon’s.

Proposals to place Aumale upon a putative Mexican throne similarly worried the British more than the French. A former French diplomat, Viscount Gabriac, ‘gathered together a number of wealthy [Mexican] conservatives’ to ask Britain and France to support a ‘monarchical intervention’, and after they chose Aumale as their preferred candidate in September 1856, Gabriac approached the British Consul. Gabriac spoke ‘at length’, and believed that Mexico would accept ‘any foreign prince offered’, although it would be impossible to select a British, Spanish or Italian Prince, or a Bonaparte. Aumale alone possessed the requisite ‘religion, character, talent, years and fortune’, and could apparently be installed with a small European force. Consul Lettsom was sceptical, but as requested, he asked Clarendon to consider it.\(^{155}\) Clarendon was dismissive, and joked that he would prefer to send Isabella II of Spain to Mexico, a godsend to Spain which would make Mexico no worse.\(^{156}\)

The idea of an Orléans candidacy was discounted, but it was disconcerting, and Clarendon sent Cowley a copy of Lettsom's dispatch to ascertain further details. Walweski, now Foreign Minister, knew nothing of Aumale's role; he assured Cowley that the scheme had no official backing, and added that another supporter, the Marquis de Radepont, would visit London. While Clarendon paid little attention to Radepont, Napoleon gave his ‘unqualified consent’ if Aumale were to accept.\(^{157}\) This was a worrying prospect; if Aumale accepted, then Napoleon might have backed the scheme to sideline the Orléans, and weakened his own regime. Napoleon’s intentions concerning the Orléans, rather than their activities, had again created apprehension.

Meanwhile, the Orleans began to be received in society. After Palmerston and Aumale met amicably in August 1856, Senior commented that ‘Holland House will be marked with black in the Tuileries Register’.\(^{158}\) This happened in strange circumstances; Palmerston mistook Aumale for the Comte de Castiglione at a

\(^{154}\) Otway to Clarendon, 18 August 1855, FO 72/869/85; Otway to Clarendon, 10 September 1855, Ibid., no.107
\(^{155}\) W.G. Lettsom to Clarendon (Confidential), 19 September 1856, FO 50/294/184
\(^{156}\) Hanna, A.J., and K.A., Napoleon III and Mexico (Chapel Hill, 1971), pp.18-20
\(^{158}\) Senior to Lansdowne, 24 August 1856, Senior Papers C229
reception, and greatly offended the Comtesse, a cousin of Sardinian Prime Minister Count Cavour. He avoided an ‘international misunderstanding’ by asking to be invited when Aumale next dined there.  

Association with the Orléans no longer appeared to risk offending Napoleon, although conversation was not ‘an easy matter, as you [had] to be constantly on your guard against touching any of their sore points’.

This did not prevent their entry into political circles. In January 1857, the Nemours attended their ‘first large dinner party’ in exile at Windsor, with the Derbys and Sir George Grey in attendance, while the Aumales were received as ‘intimate friends’ at Hatfield House, increasingly ‘a meeting-place for distinguished spirits in every sphere’.

The Aumales also befriended Lady Waldegrave, an ambitious liberal hostess. Waldegrave was initially unwilling to meet the Aumales, whom her husband, the Conservative MP George Harcourt, had met at both Milnes’ and Holland House, but they insisted upon meeting her, and she quickly came to like them. The Aumales soon benefited from this friendship. The increasingly popular hostess ‘determined’ that the ‘Saturday [Review]’s great influence should be exercised’ for her ‘new protégés’, and so ‘complete was her enslavement’ of its editor, J.D. Cook, that she compared it to Lady Palmerston’s increasing influence over The Times. Another protégé, the liberal MP Chichester Fortescue, wrote pro-Orléans articles for the Saturday, along with Hayward for Fraser’s, the Quarterly and the Edinburgh. A young William Vernon Harcourt also joined her roster of journalists. The Saturday proved to be a consistently anti-Bonapartist paper. The Orléans had quickly acquired support from both politicians and the press.

In some respects, little had changed in the Orléans’ position in British politics between 1850 and 1857; they still had few enthusiastic British supporters, and schemes centred upon them continued to trouble the Foreign Office. This is not to say that their presence had been of little consequence. Palmerston’s attempt to deploy rumours about them to excuse his conduct in response to Louis Napoleon’s coup had resulted in his dismissal and subsequent row with Russell (which was not resolved

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159 Bishop, M.C., A Memoir of Mrs. Augustus Craven (2 vols., London, 1894), i pp.111-12
161 Burghclere (ed.), A Great Man's Friendship, n.18; RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1857:21 January
162 Hewett, Strawberry Fair, p.121, pp.128-31
163 Ibid., pp.131-32, p.137; Reynolds, Aristocratic Women, pp.177-78
until 1859), and both rumoured and actual Orleans intrigues had caused serious concern. Moreover, they had steadily acquired the support of British politicians. Whereas their dynastic intrigues had been of interest to only a few supporters during the early 1850s, by 1857 Waldegrave had begun to build support for them. Meanwhile, disputes with Napoleon regarding the Orléans seemingly no longer threatened Britain’s relations with France, now an authoritarian Empire rather than an unstable Republic. The Orléans had been transformed into popular figures who had the potential to influence British politics, much as Thiers had been during his brief exile in 1852.
8: The Orléans in Exile, 1858-1871

During the later years of the Orléans’ exile, their presence touched upon numerous aspects of British politics. Their dignity, advice and writings won them respect, and when their presence or activities concerned British governments, this was often tempered by their status, although Lady Waldegrave’s ambitions were vital to their advancement. This chapter explores how the Orléans established themselves in British politics, the influence they exercised, and their links with the press. It also considers the impact which they continued to have upon British foreign policy. While they never regained the French throne, the Orléans’ presence and opinions continued to influence both British politics and diplomacy, owing to the reputation they established in Britain and Napoleon’s continued fears about their ambitions.

By the late 1850s, the Orléans, especially Aumale, had achieved great prominence. Even the previously hostile Palmerstons recognised the Aumales’ social standing and gave them a grand reception in 1859.¹ The Orléans were no longer political and social pariahs, and this success owed much to Lady Waldegrave’s ambition. While her houses became ‘active centres of the Liberal party’, she was also the Orléans’ ‘preferred hostess’. Waldegrave’s influence over Aumale was widely acknowledged, and by 1859, she had also discussed several ‘projects’ with the Comte de Paris.

Waldegrave sought to use the Orléans as a stepping-stone to cross-channel influence, and in the wake of Napoleon’s fall, certain ‘wags’ intimated that if Chichester Fortescue (her protégé, and from January 1863, third husband) died, she would become ‘Duchess of Aumale and perhaps eventually Queen of France.’²

But the Orléans were not merely Waldegrave’s pawns. As David Steele notes, their acceptance into ‘English, and more especially Whig, society’ brought them ‘into contact with leading politicians.’³ They hosted numerous receptions, and Aumale, ‘brilliant in conversation’, ensured his own fame; even the discriminating Charles

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¹ Morning Post, 31 March 1859
³ Steele, E.D., ‘Orléans, Louis Philippe Albert d’’, DNB
Greville praised him lavishly. Louis Philippe’s grandsons also become popular. Gladstone once invited John Stuart Mill to a breakfast ‘with the added inducement that the social lion was to be... the Comte de Paris,’ whose brother, the Duc de Chartres, received the Russells and Clarendons. This regard guaranteed a degree of influence over British politics, and in 1877, six years after their departure, the German Minister to France believed that Britain exercised significant influence there through the Orléans’ ‘connection with the English aristocracy.’

The Orléans also cooperated with British journalists. An 1858 French government report recorded links between the Times and both French monarchists and the Orléans, while Richard Cobden believed that the Orléans held a financial stake in the newspaper. Although these rumours were dismissed by British diplomats, the Times was at least ‘avowedly anti-Bonapartist and very pro-Orleanist.’ This was not their only link to the press. While Waldegrave mediated between Aumale and J.D. Cook, the supportive journalist Abraham Hayward exercised great influence, and Aumale ‘furthered’ an acquaintance with Walter Bagehot, a critic of Napoleon III in the Economist. With Waldegrave’s help, the Orléans acquired a strong degree of support from various newspapers, and the Princes’ writings also found attention, including articles in the Orleanist Revue des Deux Mondes, and a work on British Trades’ Unions by Paris.

Through their labours and connections, the Orléans attracted further recognition, and they retained favourable financial facilities. In 1861, the Duchesse d’Aumale wrote to Angela Burdett-Coutts about a secret transaction of £20,000, and the Orléans were thankful for the work of Coutt’s partners. Coutt’s also purchased Paris’ home York

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4 Gardiner, Harcourt, i p.244; Charles Greville, 20 March 1858, vii pp.181-82
5 Shannon, Gladstone, ii p.387; Laughton, Reeve, ii p.128
7 AN F18/544/A Carton 2, Dossier 67; Richard Cobden to John Bright, 18 June 1860, Cobden Papers, Add. MS 43651 ff.130-32
10 Woerth, Aumale, pp.111-12
11 Duchesse d’Aumale to Burdett-Coutts, 20 July 1861, Burdett-Coutts Papers, Add. MS 85275 ff.38-39; Aumale to Burdett-Coutts, 25 September 1868, Ibid., f.4; Paris to Burdett-Coutts, 24 September 1868, Ibid., Add. MS 85274 f.18; Paris to Burdett-Coutts, 13 May 1870, Ibid., f.19

199
House on Aumale’s behalf. Personal relationships with Britain’s elite were vital to the Orléans’ rise, for they ensured political support, publicity and financial stability.

There were limits to this success. One attendee found a ball at Orléans House ‘dull, and no wonder’, because ‘there were more French royalists present than anyone else’, and the Orléans often sojourned abroad, which limited the number of receptions they could attend. Such absences reduced their political reach, and the Aumales often antagonised Waldegrave. They even attempted to dissuade her from remarrying, fearful that Fortescue would ‘deprive them of her company’. Their ambition and reliance upon her patronage could clearly produce friction. Yet Waldegrave and the Duchesse shared an ‘obsessive friendship.’ The Orléans and Waldegrave remained both firm friends and political allies, though the Orléans were not obsessed with politics. While Aumale ‘diverted’ himself writing history, the Duchesse d’Aumale admitted to Lady Salisbury that ‘Lady Clarendon works, and I do nothing.’ The Duchesse d’Orléans and the elderly ex-Queen instead dedicated themselves to religion and family.

Far more problematic was Joinville’s Anglophobe reputation. Although his infamous 1844 pamphlet was not included in an 1859 collection of his writings, Sarah Austin thought the publication ill-judged, and one journalist thought his ‘foolish hostility’ unforgivable. He remained widely despised, and Aumale’s ‘liberal tendencies’ contrasted with Nemours’ and Joinville’s ‘narrow outlook’. Aumale’s brothers’ retirement from public life perhaps benefited the Orléans’ liberal image.

Toleration and sympathy extended beyond Whig society. Tories also admired the Orléans’ qualities; aside from Lady Alice Peel and Lady Salisbury, Nemours wrote of

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12 Paris to W.M. Coulthurst and H.L. Antrobus, 3 February 1875, LMA Acc.1789/6/3
13 Lord Ronald Gower, My Reminiscences (New York, 1884), p.311; Aumale to Denison, 31 October 1862, Ossington Collection, OsC783
14 Hewett, Strawberry Fair, p.172, p.181
15 Ibid., pp.xii-xiii, p.201
16 Den Boer, History, p.38; Duchesse d’Aumale to Lady Salisbury, 4 December 1861, Mary Derby Papers, MCD 213/8
his long friendship with Disraeli, and Lord Stanhope (formerly Mahon) and Aumale exchanged ‘wonderful French bons mots’. More significantly, Disraeli dedicated his novel *Lothair* to Aumale, his second-greatest friend, and did not ‘know [Aumale’s] equal.’ Malmesbury similarly thought Aumale ‘very gentlemanly and agreeable’. Conservatives admired Aumale, and the exiles also remained close to the British royal family. Although Queen Victoria and Prince Albert established a ‘fairly close’ relationship with Napoleon, Cowley was appalled by their ‘violence and indiscretion’ against the Emperor in 1860, and Napoleon remained ‘jealous’ of the attention the Orléans received.

The Orléans also remained a headache for British diplomats. The wartime alliance with France came to an end after 1856, and as David Brown notes, ‘by 1858 France again seemed to be positioning itself as a rival to Britain’. Numerous Anglo-French disagreements occurred between then and Napoleon’s fall in 1870, including disputes over Italian unification in 1858-59, Poland in 1863, and Schleswig-Holstein in 1863-4. Nevertheless, a degree of cooperation continued, and to Palmerston, Prime Minister for much of the period, ‘Anglo–French harmony seemed the best guarantor of international relevance and influence in both countries.’ Napoleon remained an important partner, and he was wary of the Orléans, whose ambitions and activities continued to influence British foreign policy. Three of the princes participated in the American Civil War, during which time Joinville attempted to prevent Anglo-American conflict; Aumale’s candidacy for the vacant Greek throne, and his potential rule there deeply concerned British statesmen; the Duc de Montpensier’s attempts to gain the Spanish throne in 1868-70 resurrected fears of Orleanist influence in Spain; and after the Franco-Prussian War, many Britons considered the likelihood of an Orléans restoration. As the Orléans’ ambitions grew, they had an ever greater impact upon British politics and diplomacy.

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Initial Efforts and Controversies, 1857-61

By late 1857, the Orléans had established themselves in society, and as Waldegrave’s protégés. The Aumales’ ‘second appearance’ came in June 1857, and in December, the Nemours were introduced to Lord Grey. Soon after, Waldegrave met Paris, and wrote of Joinville’s ‘honourable character’. She was deeply impressed by the family, and Fortescue also toiled on their behalf; one article in their favour was finished at 3 A.M. ‘with great difficulty’. Waldegrave not only ensured that her own energies, but also those of her protégé Fortescue were put into providing the Orléans with publicity, and this attention was gladly reciprocated. By August 1858, Waldegrave dined at Orléans House ‘as often as [the Aumales were] allowed’, because the ex-Queen constantly invited them to Claremont; they only otherwise rejected an invitation from Waldegrave when Queen Victoria ‘sent for them’. This remarkably strong friendship supplanted older allies. After Madame Graham received the Aumales in 1860, Lady Clarendon ventured that her guests ‘were pleased at seeing your royalties’. Aberdeen nevertheless remained supportive; Paris visited him in the summer of 1858, and he passed on a message from Aumale to the Prime Minister, Derby. But the Orléans had new, enthusiastic patrons.

Their company was soon widely valued. The Whig politician Lord Carlisle found Aumale ‘most intelligent and pleasing’ and by August 1858, the more Clarendon saw of Aumale, ‘well-informed and gentlemanlike’, the more he admired him. Lady Theresa Lewis similarly thought Aumale, ‘the most perfect model of a Prince’, and Clarendon believed that ‘next to Macaulay’ he had ‘the most varied and extensive amount of knowledge of anyone he knows.’ Such remarks speak volumes about how highly Aumale’s character and opinions were esteemed, and while he discussed

24 8 June 1857, Carlingford Diaries, Add. MS 63712 f.109; 12 December 1857, Ibid., f.163
25 Hewett, *Strawberry Fair*, p.134; Waldegrave to Fortescue, 1 September 1858, SP, CI/260
26 Fortescue, 2 December 1857, p.115
27 Waldegrave to Fortescue, 26 August 1858, SP, CI/255; Waldegrave to Fortescue, 21 July 1858 (annotated by Fortescue, 1895), Ibid., CI/237; Waldegrave to Fortescue, April 1858, Ibid., CI/225-27
28 Lady Clarendon to Pauline Graham, 17 August 1860, Hobbs MS 32/221
29 Aberdeen to Guizot (copy), 15 November 1857, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43334 f.70 ; Aberdeen to Guizot (copy), 12 July 1858, Ibid., f.78
31 Lady Theresa Lewis to Lady Morley, 15 November 1859, Morley Papers, Add. MS 48259 ff.148-9
French affairs with literary contacts such as Alfred Tennyson, Lady Alice Peel quoted French news from the Duchesse d’Orléans’ in correspondence with John Bright. The intelligence which the Orléans provided was as valuable as their company, and the Aumales, among ‘the principal entertainments’ at Strawberry Hill, soon became a fixture in society. On one occasion in 1859, they dined with the Granvilles and went ‘afterwards to the Clarendons’. Waldegrave’s efforts had quickly paid off, and ensured the Aumales’ place in Whig networks.

However, Waldegrave’s attempts to establish popular support for the exiles proved costly and ineffective. In 1858, Waldegrave helped Aumale to establish the weekly Continental Review, an anti-Bonapartist newspaper dedicated to European affairs. But although it quickly attracted attention from both the public and the London newspapers, its appeal as an ‘exclusively continental’ paper soon wore off. In spite of the efforts of its staff - including J.D. Cook of the Saturday Review – the sheer expense persuaded Aumale to instead focus upon influencing French-language newspapers in Belgium. Other efforts to influence the press in the Orléans’ favour were unsuccessful. Although the Statesman was in ‘daily contact’ with Aumale, supporting the Orléans lost it sales, while Waldegrave subsidised it by £50 weekly, and she failed to have an article inserted into the Times in Aumale’s favour. Without subsidisation, British newspapers were rarely supportive.

Meanwhile, the Aumales’ rise threatened Anglo-French relations. In February 1858, Derby formed a second government after Palmerston fell in the wake of a botched attempt on Napoleon’s life. An Italian refugee named Felice Orsini and three accomplices had attempted to blow up the Emperor’s open carriage, killed eight bystanders and left over 140 wounded. The plot was hatched in Britain, and Palmerston’s government was defeated in an attempt to introduce legislation to placate Napoleon. As Hicks notes, ‘Britain’s apparent vulnerability to attack, even invasion created widespread concern’, and the government therefore sought to ‘reduce

32 Tennyson to Emily Shelwood, 25 March 1859, Lang, C.Y. and Shannon, E.F. (eds.), The Letters of Alfred, Lord Tennyson (3 Vols., London, 1881), ii p.218; Lady Alice Peel to Bright, 17 February 1858, Bright Papers, Add. MS 43389 f.94
33 Bradbury, Sue, Joanna, George and Henry: A Pre-Raphaelite Tale of Art, Love and Friendship (Woodbridge, 2012), p.240 ; Waldegrave to Fortescue, March 1859, SP, CI/284
34 T.C. Sandars to Cook, 29 October 1858, 2-P[apiers]A[umale] 3/1
35 Hewett, Strawberry Fair, pp.141-42; Fortescue, 20 June 1858, p.132
tension with France’. The Orléans provided a potential further point of contention, and by late March, they had ‘reason to believe’ that French spies were attempting to implicate them in imagined ‘plots’.

Painfully aware of the regime’s paranoia, they still sparked a minor incident. On 10 April, Victoria noted that Aumale ‘spoke very nicely about’ the new French Ambassador, the Duc de Malakoff, his “loyauté” and ‘determination to maintain the alliance’. Aumale’s commentary was welcome, and in conversation with Victoria, Malakoff praised the Princes, especially Aumale. This presented Waldegrave with an opportunity to intercede in Anglo-French relations via Aumale, and she organised a meeting between him and Malakoff. News of their meeting leaked, and on 17 April, the Queen recorded that Napoleon’s ‘abominable’ Foreign Minister Walewski ‘had tried to make mischief between’ Malakoff and the man he had replaced, Count Persigny.

Concerns about the Orléans’ popularity fed into official anxieties. When Malmesbury sought advice about whether Lady Derby should invite Paris to a reception on 2 May, the Queen replied that she would ‘prefer not being consulted’, and Cowley initially hesitated, ‘certain’ that making enquiries would have ‘the worst effect.’ The Orléans’ presence was a sensitive matter to both the Queen and the Emperor, and Cowley thought that in response to similar enquiries, he would probably be told that they could ‘do what they pleased’, and that this would cause unnecessary ‘irritation’. Knowing Napoleon’s ‘foibles’ regarding the Orléans, he thought it ‘very unfortunate’ that their desire ‘to go into the world should have occurred in this manner’, and feared resuscitating ‘ill-will against us’. Cowley added that Napoleon was ‘well aware’ of intrigues including the Duchesse d’Orléans’ correspondence with his ‘most decided enemies’.

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36 Hicks, *Peace, War and Party Politics*, p.188, p.199
37 Charles Greville (Strachey & Fulford ed.), 21 March 1858, vii p.353
38 RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1858:10 April
39 RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1858:17 April
40 Hewett, *Strawberry Fair*, pp.137-8
42 Victoria to Malmesbury, 2 May 1858, Malmesbury Papers, 9M73/448; Cowley to Malmesbury (copy), 3 May 1858, FO 519/223 ff.256-7
43 Cowley to Malmesbury (copy), 3 May 1858, Ibid., f.259
Caution appeared necessary, and when Cowley discussed the matter with Finance Minister Achille Fould, he agreed that Paris should ‘enter society’, although ‘public men’ should not show ‘any extraordinary marks’ of attention. Cowley concluded that ‘there was no necessity for giving dinners exclusively for them’. It was therefore permissible to receive the Orléans so long as they were not feted, and Malmesbury was ‘much obliged’ for Cowley’s ‘prudence’. ‘[T]he Princes won’t be asked by Lord D[erby] or me’, he noted on 4 May, and soon added that it would be ‘better not to invite’ them to Ministers’ houses. Malmesbury’s caution exceeded Cowley’s, but Cowley was ‘very glad’ of it, for after Malakoff’s ‘accidental rencontre’, Napoleon reflected that during his exile, ‘ministerial houses’ had been ‘shut to him’. Although the Aumales remained close to Lady Salisbury and the Peels, the government’s vigilance and hope to appease Napoleon restricted their scope for influence in Tory circles.

This policy did not please the Queen. Soon after, she enquired of Malmesbury whether court mourning could be ordered after the death of the Duchesse d’Orléans. Treading carefully about the emotional issue, Malmesbury drew up a paper which she returned to the Foreign Office for future reference. Having set a precedent for honouring deceased exiles contrary to government policy, Victoria added that she was glad to that a ‘universal feeling seem[ed] to pervade France’ after the Duchesse’s death. She remained a partisan of the Orléans, and was disgusted by Napoleon’s allusion to his own exile. Whereas Napoleon had been an ‘outlaw’, the Orléans were exiles and former allies, ‘living quietly... and… [closely] related to’ her, and receptions by ministers had created no problems previously. In her opinion, the government’s caution was excessive.

The Orléans also provided the Queen with intelligence on Italian affairs. When France and Sardinia consolidated an alliance with the marriage of Victor Emmanuel’s daughter to Napoleon’s cousin in 1859, Victoria recorded that Aumale was ‘not unprepared’ for it. Similarly, as Franco-Austrian conflict became increasingly likely
in 1859, Aumale told Clarendon that he would not be surprised if Napoleon made ‘a
good plan of campaign and clever combinations, but that in the event of a reverse... he
would probably want decision.’\textsuperscript{50} This proved to be correct; Napoleon suddenly
sought peace, and in October, the Whig Lord Carlisle praised Aumale, with whom he
had ‘talked strategy’.\textsuperscript{51} As an authority on French affairs, Aumale was approached for
his opinion.

However, when Joinville warned Prince Albert that France had secretly arranged to
annexe Savoy, he precipitated an argument between the royal couple and the
government.\textsuperscript{52} This made the Queen ‘angry and belligerent’, and Palmerston and
Russell (who had replaced Derby and Malmesbury in a Liberal government in June
1859) feared that precipitate action could undermine trade with France. While
Joinville’s warning had spurred Victoria, it was not welcomed by Ministers who were
already well aware of Napoleon’s plans.\textsuperscript{53} Moreover, Russell feared that the slightest
implication of sympathy for the exiles would damage relations with France. When the
Foreign Secretary referred to Louis Philippe as a ‘most peaceful sovereign’ in a July
1859 debate, he quickly added that he meant ‘no offence to’ Napoleon.\textsuperscript{54} (Appealing
to their expertise seems to have been deemed less offensive.\textsuperscript{55})

The Liberal government also defended the Orléans. When Aumale received
threating letters in September 1861, his friend the Duke of Newcastle (then
Colonial Secretary) ensured that the affair ended quietly. Newcastle concluded that
the author probably wanted to extort money, and thought that Aumale should ignore
it, but because the author \textit{could} have been an assassin, he secretly warned Sir Richard
Mayne, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, without mentioning Aumale,
considering his ‘natural dislike’ of entanglements.\textsuperscript{56} Aumale’s wishes were respected,
but the writer, named Gratieu, was ‘under the patronage of [Orsini’s accomplice.] the

\ \textsuperscript{50} Clarendon to Manchester, 27 April 1859, Kennedy (ed.), \textit{My Dear Duchess}, p.53
\textsuperscript{51} Carlisle, 12 October 1859, p.299
\textsuperscript{52} Martin, Theodore, \textit{The life of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort} (4 Vols., London, 1877-79), v
n.10
\textsuperscript{53} Hearder, H., ‘Queen Victoria and Foreign Policy’ in Bourne, K. and Watt, D.C., \textit{Studies in
History} (Cambridge, 1935), p.90
\textsuperscript{54} Hansard, 21 July 1859, clv cc.204-5
\textsuperscript{55} Hansard, 5 August 1859, clv c.1022
\textsuperscript{56} Newcastle to Aumale (copy), 12 September 1861, Newcastle Collection, NeC10890/1 pp.74-77
notorious Bernard’. Newcastle recommended that Gratieu should be watched, and the letters secretly returned to him with a warning.\textsuperscript{57} It was not thought ‘desirable’ to notify the French government.\textsuperscript{58} The threat of Anglo-French strife ensured that the case was resolved quietly, and French protests about the Orléans were curtly dismissed. In March 1861, Cowley reported that the ‘number of Orléans Princes’ at the Duchess of Kent’s funeral had given ‘great umbrage’, sentiments which were expressed in the ‘ministerial’ \textit{Patrie}. In response, Russell and Clarendon both condemned ‘the wanton and revolting article’ which created panic throughout Europe and ‘an extent of mischief’ which was ‘very little anticipated.’\textsuperscript{59} This attack on the Orléans, who had won the trust of Britain’s elite, merely bolstered sympathy for them.

\textbf{Aumale’s \textit{Lettre sur l’histoire de France}, 1861}

In April 1861, Aumale caused a sensation when he published a savage response to a derogatory speech about the Bourbons made by Napoleon’s cousin, Prince Napoleon or “Plon-Plon”. Aumale was concerned about how the pamphlet would be received; he ‘constantly’ consulted Waldegrave about it, and asked Newcastle whether he should publish under his own name.\textsuperscript{60} He knew from the outset that its contents would be controversial, and its success created other concerns. Because the pamphlet was printed while the French Interior Ministry moved offices, their normal censorship failing, over 3000 copies were sold in France. Cowley damningly noted that the censor, ‘either an Orleanist or an ass’, ‘let it pass’ and ensured ‘some hours’ of printing. Next came ‘the folly of interdicting the further sale’, an act of ‘madness’ which increased demand.\textsuperscript{61} The French government’s behaviour appeared chaotic, and the pamphlet was well-received by British sympathisers. Prince Albert noted that although many considered it to be ‘unseemly on the part of a prince’, he though it a huge, amusing blow to Napoleon III.\textsuperscript{62} Hayward, who received a copy from Aumale, thought that ‘it would damage these blackguards’, while Disraeli praised it as a

\textsuperscript{57} Newcastle to Aumale (copy), 2 October 1861, Ibid., pp.80-83
\textsuperscript{58} Newcastle to Mayne (copy), 13 October 1861, Ibid., pp.88-89
\textsuperscript{59} Cowley to Russell, 29 March 1861, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/56; Col. Cameron to Clarendon, 5 April 1861, Ms Clar. C.104, f.118; Russell to Clarendon, 9 April 1861, Ibid., f.117
\textsuperscript{60} Hewett, \textit{Strawberry Fair}, p.156; Aumale to Newcastle, 15 March 1861, Newcastle Collection, NeC12791
\textsuperscript{61} Cowley to Clarendon, 21 April 1861, Ms. Clar. C.87 ff.69-72
‘masterpiece of composition – of trenchant sarcasm, and incisive logic’, and Lord Carlisle was also impressed.63

Aumale also attracted diplomatic attention. ‘All Paris’, Cowley noted on 15 April, was interested in Aumale’s pamphlet. The ‘serenity of the Palais Royal [was] very much upset’, and all politics was ‘laid aside’; nothing else was ‘heard of’.64 It was a remarkable event, and Russell regretted his friend’s publication. He did not think it became ‘a Prince, a gentleman and an exile’ to taunt Prince Napoleon, ‘who would fight’, and he found Cowley’s account ‘very curious’; ‘the less that Prince Napoleon [was] esteemed... the better’.65 Cowley added that its impact would be minimal. While the French government feared that another impression could reach workers and the army, only Orleanists reaped its rewards.66 Despite the controversy which surrounded it, the pamphlet alone created no Anglo-French dispute.

However, Aumale feared facing Prince Napoleon in a duel, and this created new concerns.67 Russell concluded that the French attached more importance’ to it; although diminishing ‘the weight of Prince Napoleon’ remained desirable, ‘mere scolding’ would have ‘little effect’.68 There was a serious risk of an international incident, and as Cowley wrote to Clarendon, Parisian society could ‘talk and think of nothing else but whether’ Plon-Plon would issue a challenge.69

Impressed by the pamphlet, Clarendon thought that Napoleon’s Ministers looked foolish insisting that Prince Napoleon fought, and in reply to Cowley, he simultaneously praised Aumale’s qualities and disparaged his actions. He and many others thought that Aumale had ‘made a mistake’, and ‘was descending from the high position he had created for himself.’ Aumale’s ‘courtesy and agreeableness and wonderful extent of information’ had made him popular in society, yet this was

63 Hayward to Stirling-Maxwell, 10 April 1861, Carlisle, H.E. (ed.), A Selection of the Correspondence of Abraham Hayward (2 Vols., London, 1886), ii pp.54-55; Disraeli to Sarah Bridges-Williams, 17 May 1861, DL viii no.3578; Carlisle, 7 July, 12 July 1861, p.328
64 Cowley to Russell, 15 April 1861, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/56 ff.270-1; Cowley to Russell 16 April 1861, Ibid., f.274
65 Russell to Cowley (copy), 18 April 1861, Ibid., PRO 30/22/104 f.322; Russell to Cowley (copy), 20 April 1861, Ibid., f.324
66 Cowley to Russell, 26 April 1861, FO 27/1390/627
67 Hewett, Strawberry Fair, p.156
68 Russell to Cowley (copy), 24 April 1861, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/104 f.326
69 Cowley to Clarendon, 21 April 1861, Ms Clar. C.87 ff.269-72
‘utterly useless... in France’. Therefore, he must have responded to Plon-Plon to attract publicity. Although the ‘obese’ Plon-Plon would have fared poorly against the ‘first rate swordsman’ Aumale, a duel could have ensued.\footnote{Clarendon to Manchester, 22 April 1861, Kennedy (ed.), My Dear Duchess, p.150; Clarendon to Cowley, 24 April 1861, FO 519/178, ff.417-19}

Although the affair ended quietly, serious damage could have been done. It was ‘under serious consideration’ whether Prince Napoleon would challenge Aumale, suddenly ‘an important personage in France.’\footnote{Wellesley and Sencourt (eds.), Conversations, pp.216-19} Aumale was praised; Napoleon showed a ‘great odious ingratitude’ towards the Orléans, and the French government was not alone in believing that the pamphlet could have done great harm in the provinces and the army.\footnote{22 April 1861, Monnier, P.(ed.), Henri-Frédéric Amiel: Journal Intime (12 Vols., Lausanne, 1976-1994), iv p.138; Gray, Notables, p.202; Simpson (ed.), Conversations with distinguished persons during the Second Empire (2 vols., London, 1880), i p.246, i p.299} Its success also encouraged Waldegrave. Visiting Zurich in August, she noticed that ‘Aumale’s photograph [was] in all the shops’ and that Belgian reprints of his pamphlet were ‘a great sensation all over Switzerland.’\footnote{Waldegrave to Fortescue, 30 August 1861, SP, CI/425}

Aumale’s quarrel with Plon-Plon remained a potential flashpoint in Anglo-French relations. A year later, Clarendon heard that Plon-Plon and the Orléans both planned to rent Holland House that summer, and related his fears to Cowley. As well as a duel, there was a risk that the Orléans’ French visitors might meet Plon-Plon.\footnote{Clarendon to Cowley, 9 May 1862, FO 519/178 ff.566-67} When Cowley sought further information, Clarendon asked ‘Monseigneur himself.’ Aumale was aware of the ‘absurd’ story that Plon-Plon feared him, but thought that they had ‘no quarrel’, for Aumale believed he had had ‘the last word’.\footnote{Clarendon to Cowley, 17 May 1862, Ibid., ff.579-80; Steele, ‘Villiers, George William Frederick, fourth Earl of Clarendon (1800–1870)’, DNB} The chances of Aumale causing a diplomatic crisis had increased with his popularity.

Paris similarly found British attention when he turned his eye and pen to the Near East. French ambitions there had long concerned Britain, and his travels with Chartres in 1860 were followed by British diplomats. The Consul-General in Cairo reported that they appeared ‘much pleased’ prior to visiting works for the Suez Canal, and the Consul in Jerusalem remarked that his French colleague had ‘no objection’ to them
travelling under their titles, and took ‘no notice of them’. The fact that the French Consul was so accommodating to them was deemed noteworthy. Upon his return, Paris thanked Waldegrave for reading his travel journal, and explained his intention to publish. Paris believed that Syrian independence would benefit Europe, and he castigated the British policy of supporting the Ottoman Empire. He also had reservations about British public opinion and reforms promised in 1856; there was plenty of evidence of Turkish misrule in blue books and parliamentary debates. Paris had an eye upon influencing British opinion and was unsurprisingly praised in the Saturday. The Daily News was also supportive of Paris’ work, and Paris replied to Senior that he was ‘far too indulgent’ about it. Although he rejected British policy (and disputed the wisdom of doing so with his patron), Paris found genuine praise, and not only from Waldegrave’s organ.

The princes were increasingly well-regarded. However, in June 1862, the writer Harriet Martineau saw no chance of Napoleon’s reign ending ‘till he dies; nor of the Orléans family [ever] succeeding him.’ They had ‘no prestige’, and in France, nobody cared ‘a straw’ for them beyond a small, repressed Orleanist ‘clique’. She supposed that Aumale was ‘the best of them’, but as a family, they were neither ‘princely’ nor republican, ‘however estimable among friends’. Although the Orléans had many British friends, few supported their ambition to rule France.

Britain, the Orléans and the American Civil War

When Joinville, Paris and Chartres entered the American Civil War on the side of the Union in the summer of 1861, they were severely criticised. The princes hoped to embarrass Napoleon by supporting liberty, and while Joinville ‘politely’ rejected a naval command to act as an adviser to General McClellan, Secretary of State William Seward ‘waived the rules’ so that Paris and Chartres could fight. Many British aristocrats sympathised with the rebel Confederacy, whose representative in Britain

77 Paris to Waldegrave, 20 July 1861, SP, WW69/12
78 Saturday Review, 9 November 1861
79 Daily News, 27 November 1861; Paris to Senior, 15 March 1862, BL RP 7705
80 Martineau to Reeve, 2 June 1862, Martineau Papers, 7HRM/2/096b
was ‘delighted’ that the Princes had joined the Union army, because he thought it would expedite French recognition in retaliation, the opposite of what the Princes and Fortescue wanted.82 Their departure seemed mistaken, and in November, Reeve advised Aumale ‘to get them home’. Although the Athenaeum praised both Paris’ pamphlet and their enlistment, other publications attacked their decision.83

Involvement in such a controversial conflict seriously threatened the position they had won in Britain, and the explanations they provided for their departure denied any interest in combat. On 28 August, Paris informed Victoria that whilst Joinville would place his son in the United States Naval Academy, he and Chartres would tour Canada and the United States, so far as the latter was possible.84 The Duchesse d’Aumale simply informed Lady Salisbury that Paris was taking a ‘rather long voyage’.85 But while King Leopold of the Belgians recognised that they wanted to ‘show courage’, they risked ‘being shot for... the most rank radicalism’.86 He accused them of ‘ingratitude’ and of supporting the Union because its triumph ‘would be a French interest’, keeping ‘an enemy for England ‘en reserve’. This rendered their service ‘the more reprehensible’, and jeopardised their relationship with the British royal family.87

Nevertheless, Joinville attempted to prevent conflict from erupting between Britain and the United States. After an Anglo-American dispute erupted in October when an opened diplomatic bag revealed that a British Consul had negotiated with the Confederacy, Joinville made numerous warnings in Washington, including that Britain was ‘most unfriendly’ and ready to recognise the Confederacy, while Napoleon was so ‘concerned with European affairs that he would let England have her way anywhere else’. Joinville even clashed with the British Minister, Lord Lyons, who said that ‘they will do nothing.’ Indeed, when he visited Washington to meet Seward, Joinville was told that the affair had been resolved.88 However, matters

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82 Ibid., passim; Fortescue to Waldegrave, 15 November 1861, SP, CI/440
83 Fortescue to Waldegrave, 28 November 1861, Ibid., CI/445; Athenaeum, 2 November 1861; Standard, 21 October 1861; John Bull, 26 October 1861
84 Paris to Victoria, 28 August 1861, RA VIC/MAIN/Y51/13
85 Duchesse d’Aumale to Lady Salisbury, 12 November 1861, Mary Derby Papers, MCD 213/14
86 Leopold to Victoria, 17 October 1861, QVL, iii p.579
87 Leopold to Albert, 6 December 1861, quoted in Balance, Francis, La Belgique et la guerre de Sécession, 1861-1865 (2 Vols., Paris, 1979), n.239; Leopold to Victoria, 6 December 1861, Ibid., n.238
worsened when a Union warship intercepted the British mail packet RMS Trent and two Confederate Diplomats, en route to Europe, were removed. Britain became exasperated with Seward’s belligerence, and war seemed possible. Joinville anticipated such a reaction, and acted quickly. On 18 November, the Times correspondent W.H. Russell noted that Joinville had protested ‘in the highest quarter’, and in a letter subsequently sent to Victoria, Joinville warned Leopold that there was ‘a great danger in this fight if it continue[d]’.

Joinville even attempted to persuade President Lincoln to restrain Seward. Lincoln’s advisers disagreed as to how to deal with the affair, and probably at Joinville’s suggestion, McClellan led the charge in arguing that Britain might respond threateningly. Seward told Joinville “[l]et them give up the principle, and we shall give up the men”; and although McClellan warned that Seward was bluffing, on 1 December, Joinville wrote to Lincoln. Joinville warned that ‘one broad fact’ would ‘strike everybody abroad’; that the commissioners had been removed from a neutral vessel in international waters, a right which ‘no state’ would allow. Joinville advocated their release before ‘the pressure of any foreign remonstrance’, and to ‘save a lot of trouble without any loss of dignity’. Within days, it might become ‘too late’ to prevent ‘an inopportune foreign war’ which would bring ‘incalculable evil upon humanity.’

This emotionally charged appeal was grounded in international law, but when Lincoln received it, he ‘categorically’ told McClellan that they would not be released, and Seward, who also received a copy, was unwilling to ‘hear bad news’, especially from McClellan, ‘whom he disliked’. Joinville’s heartfelt appeal had fallen flat in the face of American belligerence.

His efforts were better appreciated in Britain. On 30 November, the dying Prince Albert crucially encouraged the Cabinet to make a peaceful resolution possible. The Orléans were not far from his thoughts. Meanwhile, members of the government commended the Orléans. Upon receiving Joinville’s letters, Aumale told Clarendon

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89 Ferris, N.B., Desperate Diplomacy: William H. Seward's Foreign Policy, 1861 (Knoxville, 1976), p.196
91 Ibid., p.218
92 Joinville to Abraham Lincoln, 1 December 1861, Lincoln Papers online
93 Foreman, World on Fire, p.176
94 Ibid., p.179
95 Longford, Victoria R.I., p.300
that Joinville had ‘advised the immediate restoration of the commissioners and British protection’. Clarendon, who thought Aumale ‘no bad judge of things here and abroad’, immediately warned Lord Russell. 96 Joinville’s intervention was important news, and because he passed Joinville’s advice to Lincoln, Lord Russell wished that ‘McClellan could be made dictator’. 97 Joinville’s warning steadied British nerves, lessening the immediate risk of conflict, and on 24 December, Aumale sent Newcastle a copy of Joinville’s letter, which Joinville wished him to send to a ‘very small number of people’. 98

Newcastle’s cabinet position probably influenced this decision, and Reeve was also sent a copy. While impressed, Reeve feared war. 99 Although Henry Greville recorded that Joinville’s actions made ‘it almost certain that the message expected’ would ‘make war inevitable’, The Times stated that Joinville was right, and Senior heard that Joinville’s ‘advice’ had been ‘very useful’; Lincoln had apparently ‘yielded’ to Joinville’s ‘remonstrances’. 100 Various narratives circulated, and on 7 January, Reeve told the Duke of Argyll, Lord Privy Seal, that the influential Senator Charles Sumner ‘had told Joinville that personally he agree[d] with him’. 101 Joinville’s exertions and Aumale’s attempts to publicise them paved the way for Britain’s continued pacific response.

On 21 July, Joinville and his nephews arrived in Britain. Their appearance at an exhibition days later was a ‘sensation’, and appeased by their resignations from the United States army, King Leopold smoothed their relationship with Victoria. 102 They soon shared intelligence about America in society. 103 But their opinions remained unpopular. In October, Paris wrote Waldegrave what she called a very affectionate note; he could not deprive himself ‘entirely of the pleasure of seeing’ her, ‘anxious to argue’ about America. 104 Even the Orléans’ patron disagreed with their opinion, and

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96 Clarendon to Russell, 8 December 1861, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/29 ff.76-79
97 Russell to Cowley (copy), 9 December 1861, Ibid., PRO 30/22/104 f.396; Ferris, N.B., The Trent Affair (Knoxville, 1977), p.61
98 Aumale to Newcastle, 24 December 1861, Newcastle Collection, NeC12793
99 Reeve to Laugel (n.d.), 1-PA/137/8
100 Times, 8 December 1861; 8 January 1861; Henry Greville, 12 February 1862, iii pp.415-6; Simpson (ed.), Second Empire, ii p.69
101 Argyll to Denison, 7 January 1862, Ossington Collection, OsC778
102 Aumeur (ed.), Paris Journal, n.59
103 Henry Greville, 23 July 1862, iv pp.159-60
104 Waldegrave to Fortescue, 24 October 1862, SP, CI/499
in September, Joinville advised Seward that Union victories alone would ‘destroy all the absurd hopes which [British and French] people put in an amicable settlement’ between the belligerents, a message which he shared with Lincoln.\textsuperscript{105} On both sides of the Atlantic, exile opinion found interest – but not necessarily agreement in Britain.

The war also coincided with a cotton famine and mass unemployment in Lancashire.\textsuperscript{106} Paris, who toured Lancashire during December 1862, was ‘deeply impressed’ by ‘the wonderful organisation of national charity’ to alleviate its effects.\textsuperscript{107} ‘[S]truck by the charitable spirit which inspired the superior classes’, he supportively described Christmas in Lancashire in an anonymous Deux Mondes article.\textsuperscript{108} Despite its anti-Bonapartist tone, as Paris informed an appreciative Waldegrave, its ‘only object’ was to ‘stimulate private charity in France’, and he believed that it would have been inopportune to comment on hostilities. Unable to defend the Union, Paris praised the British aristocracy, and Waldegrave was not alone in being impressed.\textsuperscript{109}

The Princes’ opinions continued to find interest. An article believed to be by Joinville intrigued Lyons, who sent a copy to Lord Russell, and in late 1863, Seward was informed that recent articles attributed to Joinville had been ‘everywhere reprinted and read’.\textsuperscript{110} Their opinions also interested Gladstone.\textsuperscript{111} But these commentaries were better received in American government circles.\textsuperscript{112} Crucially, many of Joinville’s letters, which Seward thought to signal European support for the Union, impressed Lincoln.\textsuperscript{113} Albeit obliquely, the Orléans contributed to some improvement in Anglo-American relations.

\textsuperscript{105} Joinville to Seward, 19 September 1862, Lincoln Papers online; Seward to Lincoln, 8 October 1862, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{106} See Henderson, W.O., \textit{The Lancashire Cotton Famine, 1861-1865} (Manchester, 1969)
\textsuperscript{107} Paris to Milnes, 26 December 1862, Houghton MSS 19/11
\textsuperscript{108} Paris to Milnes, 1 January 1863, Ibid., 19/12; King, Edward, \textit{French Political Leaders} (New York, 1876), pp.266-67
\textsuperscript{109} Reeve to A. Laugel (n.d.), 1-PA/137/4
\textsuperscript{111} Morley, \textit{The Life of William Ewart Gladstone} (3 Vols., London, 1903), ii pp.189-91
The Orléans still struggled to promote the American cause in Britain. On 16 October 1865, the *Morning Post* announced that a letter written by Joinville, which announced that the Royal Naval was in decline, had been published in America. Although every allowance was made for a ‘high spirit’ in exile, Joinville’s commentary was unwelcome. The *United Service Magazine*, which had praised Joinville for publicising French sailors’ grievances, condemned him for having ‘again... fired an express shot at England’.115

British politicians otherwise praised Aumale’s counsel. In December 1862, Clarendon visited Hatfield House to meet Aumale and discuss Napoleon’s ambitions in Mexico.116 Clarendon subsequently wrote to Russell that Aumale considered Napoleon’s Mexican expedition his ‘greatest mistake’, sure ‘that we have only yet seen the beginning of it.’ Napoleon had ‘no intention of’ withdrawal, obsessed with the idea that ‘there [was] a fabulous amount of mineral wealth’ there, and that the United States would take great offence. Clarendon trusted this assessment, because Aumale remained in touch ‘with all his old military friends’.117 Russell similarly noted that Aumale’s information on Spain ‘quite agree[d] with ours’, and Aumale was even approached for advice on the Swiss education system.118 Whilst supporting the Union cost the Orléans British goodwill, their opinions were otherwise valued by British politicians.

**Aumale and the Greek Throne, 1862-63**

When the Greek throne became vacant after King Otto fell to a revolution in late 1862, his potential replacement with Aumale deeply concerned the British government. Greek independence was upheld by the three ‘Protecting Powers’ of Britain, France and Russia, and owing to strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean, it was vital to Britain that Greece remained independent.119 As a French (or at least Orleanist) candidate for the vacant throne, Aumale’s candidacy...

Palmerston’s opposition was remarkably dogmatic. ‘If [Aumale] were King... all the Orléans Frenchmen would flock thither, and it would become a centre of intrigues of all kinds against England, Turkey, Austria, and [Napoleon.]’ Palmerston decided that Greece could not obtain the British-occupied Ionian Islands under Aumale, and warned the Greek Chargé of a subsequent ‘invasion of Greece by Orleanists’.\footnote{Prevelakes, Dynasty, p.101; Huetz de Lemps, Roger, Aumale L’Algerien (Paris, 1962), p.166} This reflected British opinion to a certain degree, for Aumale’s candidacy received little support. Waldegrave was ‘sure’ that he would make ‘an excellent King’, but Fortescue did not ‘admire [her] reasons for wishing to choose a king for the Greeks, though... sure they are good ones’, and the Peels expressed ‘much surprise’ at her ‘wish to lose [her] royal friends by sending them to Greece.’\footnote{Waldegrave to Fortescue, 7 November 1862, SP, CI/503; Fortescue to Waldegrave, 10 November 1862, Ibid., CI/509; Waldegrave to Fortescue, 10 November 1862, Ibid., CI/510} Of Aumale’s British friends, Waldegrave alone wanted him to assume the throne, a potential stepping-stone to power in France.

But in mid-December, while the Greek legislature favoured Victoria’s second son Prince Alfred, Nicolas Bourée, the French Minister to Greece, began to ‘openly’ advocate Aumale, who suddenly become an unofficial French candidate; Aumale was not subject to the ‘self-denying ordinance’ secured by Palmerston, under which Britain, France and Russia agreed not to support members of their royal families.\footnote{Scarlett to Russell, 14 December 1862, FO 32/305/148; Dontas, Greece, p.4} This attempt to subvert the ‘ordinance’ ensured that Aumale’s candidacy was soon discussed by British and French diplomats. On 16 December, Henry Elliot, en route to assume a special mission in Greece, met Foreign Minister Drouyn in Paris, reported that the idea was thought ‘extremely distasteful’. If Aumale was discussed at Athens, he would ‘throw cold water upon the suggestion.’\footnote{Elliot to Russell, 16 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/64 ff.208-10} The idea that France might support Aumale seemed ridiculous. Russell agreed. Although he did not ‘know what
objection we could make’, French objections seemed certain, and Cowley doubted that Aumale would agree to become King.125

Dynastic rivalry seemingly rendered the prospect impossible, and on 23 December, Cowley reported that Napoleon and Drouyn had decided that if Aumale were ‘accepted into the circle of European sovereigns’, he would have to recognise Napoleon.126 [S]urprised about Aumale, Russell agreed, and consequently did not think that Aumale would accept; ‘but if he did’, Napoleon’s escape from Elba ‘would have its counterpart’.127 His occupation of the Greek throne would quite literally be a staging-post to that of France.

As 1863 dawned, Aumale’s candidacy re-emerged. On 1 January, Russell pressed Palmerston to reply to the Queen about the candidacies of Princes Alexander and William of Baden, because if Britain did not decide soon, ‘a Russian candidate’ or Aumale would be chosen by the Greek legislature.128 Elliot shared these concerns.129 He even warned Cowley that Aumale’s ‘private fortune would be a nearly irresistible argument in his favour’. Unless Britain suggested an alternative, Elliot expected ‘to see him coming to the front.’130 Napoleon’s reason for ‘not disliking’ the idea was that the Greek King had to ‘acknowledge him as Emperor’. British procrastination, lavish bribery and tacit French support were a dangerous combination. Russell’s familiarity with the Orléans reinforced his view that Aumale’s candidacy was impossible. Russell replied that this would dissuade Aumale, whose sons would never join the Greek Church as the constitution stipulated. Although ‘very fond’ of Aumale, Russell thought that as King of Greece, ‘he would be surrounded by French intriguers of all kinds’. Britain could not ‘recommend his election for obvious reasons’.131

125 Russell to Cowley (copy) 18 December 1862, Ibid., PRO 30/22/105 f.149; Cowley to Russell, 19 December 1862, Ibid., PRO 30/22/58 f.250
126 Cowley to Russell (confidential), 23 December 1862, FO 27/1448/1420
127 Russell to Cowley (copy) 20 December 1862, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/105 f.151
128 Russell to Palmerston, 1 January 1863, BP, PP/GC/RU/755
129 Elliot to Russell, 9 January 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/65 f.1
130 Elliot to Cowley, 9 January 1863, FO 519/183 f.15
131 Russell to Elliot (draft), 15 January 1863, FO 32/315/11; Russell to Elliot (draft), 15 January 1863, minuted by Palmerston, Ibid., no.18
Elliot discouraged Aumale’s candidacy. He was not convinced that Bourée could keep ‘quiet’ as ordered, and by 26 January, Aumale had ‘gained much ground.’ Napoleon’s policy of quietly supporting Aumale left Elliot powerless to protest, but there was soon a ‘marked change in [Bourée’s] manner’. He had seemingly changed his mind under duress, and now hoped that Aumale ‘would not accept if elected’. To reinforce this, Elliot told him that it was believed in Britain that Aumale would not willingly recognise Napoleon. Aumale’s fame and pride in his family’s history were easily exploited in an attempt to prevent Bourée from campaigning in his favour. On 5 February, to prevent Bourée’s intrigues once and for all, Elliot ‘fairly frightened Bourée’ by telling him that every copy of Aumale’s ‘Life of Condé’ had been seized in France. Bourée ‘positively jumped off his chair’; were Aumale elected, he would have been ‘a ruined man and never forgiven.’ Aumale’s proscribed status was a formidable weapon in dissuading the French Minister’s wayward ambitions.

Yet Aumale’s candidacy refused to disappear. By February, he was apparently willing to ‘try his hand’, and amongst Greek parliamentarians whose debts suddenly disappeared, one could command 35 votes – ‘quite worth buying’ if Aumale would ‘pay handsomely’. Elliot and Scarlett, the British Minister to Greece, now feared that Aumale might succeed, an idea which was ‘gaining ground in certain quarters at Paris’. Enthusiasm on the part of Aumale and both French and Greek supporters were worrying developments. Moreover, the bribes apparently came from Paris. ‘If he is willing to stand and spend money you will require a good man to beat him’, Elliot warned Russell. Cowley was also warned that Aumale had ‘declared himself ready to accept’. Rumour fed concern, and as candidacies came and went, only Aumale and William of Baden were ‘spoken of’. Without instructions, Elliot would have to state that he did not know who Britain supported, and it was believed that Aumale would ‘become popular’. Inaction in London weakened Elliot’s arguments and thereby strengthened Aumale’s chances. Meanwhile, Waldegrave remained supportive. On 6 March, she reminded the Duchesse that ‘from the first moment’, she

133 Elliot to Russell, 28 January 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/65 ff.24-5
134 Elliot, 5 February 1863, pp.154-5
135 Prevelakes, Dynasty, p.119
136 Elliot, 12 February 1863, p.156; Scarlett to Russell (confidential), 13 February 1863, FO 32/318/97
137 Elliot to Russell, 13 February 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/65 ff.49-50
138 Elliot to Cowley, 13 February 1863, FO 519/183 ff.23-24
139 Elliot to Russell, 16 February 1863, FO 32/216/62
had been convinced that it would be ‘desirable’ for the Orléans if Aumale became
King. She added that ‘his language should be most guarded’ because the government
thought the Orléans unfriendly towards Britain.\textsuperscript{140}

Elliot continued to worry. Aumale was ‘brought permanently forward’ in March, and
while ‘influential Greeks’ had ‘unquestionably’ communicated with the Orléans,
Aumale retained ‘a strong body of supporters’. This situation was worsened by
Britain’s ‘long silence’, which still threatened the election of either Aumale or
William of Baden.\textsuperscript{141} Without a “British” candidate, Elliot could not see how Britain
could justify rejecting either; Aumale had ‘powerful supporters at Paris’, and would
gain support without a “British” rival.\textsuperscript{142} Procrastination still seemingly presaged
Aumale’s election, and on 22 March, Elliot warned that the head of the “French
Party” had returned from Paris with news that Aumale would accept.\textsuperscript{143} Palmerston’s
fears appeared realised, but Russell, ‘assured on good authority’ that Aumale would
not accept without French support, ‘intimated’ that Britain favoured Prince William of
Denmark.\textsuperscript{144} Private information and the emergence of a new compromise candidate
finally promised a solution to the problems posed by Aumale’s candidacy.

Had the protecting powers failed to find an acceptable candidate, Aumale could have
been elected, and his supporters remained ‘very busy’. Nevertheless, William of
Denmark became King George of Greece.\textsuperscript{145} Despite Aumale’s popularity in Britain,
his candidacy had created serious unease for Elliott and Palmerston. The Orléans had
retained both their reputation for intrigue and the support of French schemers.

‘Every year it gets better’ – Society and Politics, c. 1863-68

As the 1860s wore on, the ambitious Orleans attracted ever more favour from
Britain’s elite. After balls at Strawberry Hill, the Aumales insisted that the guests –
‘half the diplomatic corps and most of the Liberal Party’ – then danced at Orléans
House, and as Victoria noted after Paris’s wedding in 1864, ‘ever year it gets better,

\textsuperscript{140} Waldegrave to Duchesse d’Aumale, 6 March 1863, 1-PA/39/30
\textsuperscript{141} Elliot to Russell, 19 March 1863, FO 32/216/96
\textsuperscript{142} Elliot to Russell, 20 March 1863, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/65 ff.79-80; Elliot to Russell, 20
March 1863, FO 32/216/103
\textsuperscript{143} Elliot to Russell (confidential), 22 March 1863, Ibid., no.106
\textsuperscript{144} Russell to Elliot (draft), 25 March 1863, FO 32/315/60
\textsuperscript{145} Elliot, 29 March 1863, p.166
and now they are so popular and go everywhere. The wedding was attended by royalty, diplomats, and politicians including Lords Russell, Clanricarde and St Germans. Paris also accepted Waldegrave’s offer to ‘kindly take care of the matter of’ journalists, grateful that Delane ensured that the names of French guests were omitted from the newspapers. The wedding was a display of favour from Britain’s elite, but at a ball held by Chartres afterwards, the few ‘old friends of a fallen dynasty’ were ‘raked together with a painful observance of royal forms’. Whilst many British politicians respected the Orléans, very few supported their dynastic ambitions.

However, Delane was willing to assist further. Waldegrave courted his support, and in May 1863 she encouraged the Duchesse to tell Aumale that ‘Delane dines here tomorrow’. She was prepared to exploit this connection, and by late September, Waldegrave could point to a favourable article in the Times, with which she was ‘much pleased’. Waldegrave had cultivated the support of the most powerful newspaper in Britain, and Aumale was appreciative. When the Times stated that the status quo would not immediately change in France, Aumale informed Waldegrave that he agreed with this and other editorials. Cautious, but trenchant criticism of Napoleon coincided with Aumale’s views and desires.

Although King Leopold had been granted Claremont for life before he loaned it to the Orléans, on 6 July 1864, Palmerston canvassed Gladstone, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, about its future, because it might prove ‘useful as a residence for some... member of the royal family’. King Leopold objected, and it was decided that Claremont would eventually become ‘part of the Crown property’. Palmerston’s prejudice against the Orléans was overwhelmed by this interjection, and upon Leopold’s death in late 1865, the Orléans were again threatened with eviction. Although this threat was mitigated by Palmerston’s death weeks before, Queen

146 Hewett, Strawberry Fair, p.183; Victoria to Princess Victoria, 2 June 1864, Fulford (ed.), Dearest Mama (London, 1968), p.342
147 Annual Register, May 1864, pp.80-81
148 Paris to Waldegrave, 25 May 1864, SP, WW69/19; Paris to Waldegrave, 28 May 1864, Ibid., WW69/20; Paris to Waldegrave, 6 June 1864. Ibid., WW/22
149 J. Adams to C.F. Adams Jr. 3 June 1864, Levenson (ed.), Adams Letters, i pp.433-4
150 Waldegrave to Duchesse d’Aumale, 1 May 1863, 1-PA/39/37
151 Waldegrave to Aumale, 29 September 1863, 1-PA/39/43
152 Aumale to Waldegrave, 1 November 1865, SP, WW67/14
153 Palmerston to Gladstone, 9 July 1864, Guedalla (ed.), Gladstone and Palmerston: The correspondence of Lord Palmerston with Mr. Gladstone, 1851-1865 (London, 1928), no.242; Palmerston to Gladstone, 15 July 1864, Ibid., no.243
Victoria thought it dishonourable that ‘the venerable [ex-] Queen’ should suddenly be ‘stripped of everything that enabled her to live’ there, and recommended warning its trustees.\(^{154}\)

The trustees - Derby, Lord Powys and the courtier Sir Edward Cust – thought that ‘every generous mind’ had to wonder about ‘the destiny of the present illustrious occupants’. The government was willing to place Claremont at the ex-Queen’s ‘convenience’, and the trustees wished to defer the sale; but this would cost perhaps £5000 annually.\(^{155}\) Russell, who had succeeded Palmerston as Prime Minister, was also sympathetic; and although Gladstone expressed amazement at the demands ‘made upon the public’ for the ‘venerable and illustrious’ ex-Queen, whose ‘children... may be called immensely rich’, he respected Leopold’s wishes.\(^{156}\)

On 21 March 1866, the government decided that Claremont would be rented to Marie Amélie for life, subject to Parliamentary approval.\(^{157}\) This resolved the problem of expense, but on 24 March, Marie Amélie died. Victoria and her government’s efforts had been in vain, and the next day, she visited Claremont and condemned France as a ‘rather ungrateful country’.\(^{158}\) The ex-Queen’s death revealed Victoria’s sympathies, and because Nemours was compelled to leave Claremont, she granted him the vacant Bushey House, which he ‘gladly’ accepted.\(^{159}\) Widespread sympathy had ensured that the Orleans retained a free residence.

Meanwhile, the Orléans’ opinions on military affairs were increasingly valued. In December 1867, Fortescue discussed ‘the new military convention in France’ with the ‘impressive and interesting’ Joinville.\(^{160}\) Aumale was also concerned, and in April, the Times praised an article he had written on the subject.\(^{161}\) This review was the result of an initiative by the Aumales. On 15 March, the Duchesse sent Waldegrave an article

\(^{154}\) Phipps to Russell, 13 December 1865, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/15H ff.67-68
\(^{155}\) Memorandum, Ibid., ff.69-70
\(^{156}\) Russell to Gladstone, 14 December 1865, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44292 f.255; Gladstone to Russell (copy), 15 December 1865, Ibid., f.265
\(^{157}\) Letter to Sir Charles Gore, 21 March 1866, CRES 35/4010
\(^{158}\) Memorandum, 26 February 1866, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/15D ff.435-6; RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1866:25 March
\(^{159}\) RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1866:15 April
\(^{160}\) Carlingford Diaries, 12 December 1866, Add. MS 6377 f.125; ‘Woodnorton, December 1866’, Ibid., f.133
\(^{161}\) Times, 29 March 1867
from the *Deux Mondes*, to which Aumale had added the ‘parting words’, for her to send to Hayward and Delane. Aumale also sent a copy to Disraeli, again appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer.\(^{162}\) Such articles were now routinely attributed to the Orléans. The *United Service Magazine* lavishly praised the article, and in 1866, Joinville wrote to the *Standard* to deny authoring a pertinent article on the Battle of Lissa.\(^{163}\) Although Waldegrave’s patronage and other personal contacts remained vital, the Orléans’ publications and opinions were genuinely respected.

Waldegrave even ensured that articles by Paris were published virtually verbatim. Upon reading one *Times* article in 1868, he ‘recognise[d] whole sentences from the one [he] wrote yesterday’, and praised further articles in the *Telegraph, Standard* and *Globe*.\(^{164}\) Waldegrave could not always ensure publicity, but the Orléans were now widely praised in the press. When Paris visited Spain in February, Chartres sent him articles from the *Star, Pall Mall Gazette, Spectator* and *Saturday* which mentioned him, ‘delighted’ to see Paris ‘presented to the public under such a good light.’\(^{165}\) Waldegrave’s efforts had ensured that Paris was praised in a cross-section of British periodicals, and when she mooted an ‘arrangement’ with the *Morning Chronicle*, Aumale was ‘somewhat prepared to accept’.\(^{166}\) She had taken advantage of the Orléans’ considerable fame and improved reputation to acquire substantial press support. Even Joinville was praised by the radical *Westminster Review* for tutoring his nephews and his development of the French navy.\(^{167}\)

Such was Aumale’s renown in aristocratic circles that when he sent copies of his work *The Military Institutions of France* to British politicians in 1867, he received much genuine praise. Both Disraeli and Gladstone expressed their gratitude and friendship; an impressed Stanhope promised to review it in *Fraser’s*; and Delane, who ‘spoke highly of it,’ promised a review.\(^{168}\) It was even mentioned in Parliament.\(^{169}\) The high

\(^{162}\) Duchesse d’Aumale to Waldegrave, 15 March 1867, SP, WW 68/109; Aumale to Disraeli, 13 March 1867, Dep. Hughenden 138/3 f.3
\(^{163}\) *United Service Magazine*, May 1867, pp.74-81, p.94; *Standard*, 24 November 1866
\(^{164}\) Paris to Waldegrave, 13 July 1868, SP, WW69/74
\(^{165}\) Chartres to Waldegrave, 9 February 1868, Ibid., WW70/23
\(^{166}\) Aumale to Waldegrave, 16 January 1869, Ibid., WW67/35
\(^{167}\) *Westminster Review*, 1869, p.239
\(^{168}\) Disraeli to Aumale, 16 April 1867, 2-PA2/1; Gladstone to Aumale, 16 March 1867, Ibid; Stanhope to Aumale, 15 March 1867, Ibid.; Waldegrave to Aumale, 26 April 1867, Ibid.
\(^{169}\) *Hansard*, 19 May 1868, cxcii c.532

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estimation of Aumale’s abilities was reflected in the fact that the book was acclaimed across party lines, and positive reviews were promised rather than sought.

Meanwhile, Napoleon remained concerned by the Orléans. After meeting Napoleon in 1867, Clarendon noted that the Emperor ‘spoke... with the bitterness of alarm’, and not without reason, because Aumale was ‘devoured by ambition and the spirit of revenge’, capable of ‘accepting a republican ladder... to power... with the intention of kicking it down.’\(^{170}\) It was entirely possible that the ostensibly liberal Aumale could topple him with the support of either republican politicians or royalist officers, and Napoleon’s fears were amplified by the Orléans’ friendship with Queen Victoria. In June 1868, a French semi-official newspaper condemned the fact that the Aumales had been formally received at Buckingham Palace.\(^ {171}\) The Orléans remained a nuisance in Anglo-French relations.

**Iberian Difficulties and British successes, 1868-70**

After the Spanish “Glorious Revolution” of 1868, both Britain and France became concerned about the prospect of Orleanist intrigue, for amongst the candidates to succeed the deposed Isabella II was Montpensier, supported by the centrist Union Liberal party.\(^{172}\) Clarendon, who returned to the Foreign Office under Gladstone in December 1868, feared that Montpensier’s election might provoke Napoleon to invade Spain, and Montpensier ‘and his money’ became a constant annoyance.\(^ {173}\) French diplomats feared Orleanist ambition, and their anxieties intrigued the British Minister, Sir John Crampton. Crampton thought that Montpensier ‘may be King of Spain yet’; he had money, and would apparently ‘be backed up by the Orléans family and Prussia so as to take a large slice in the £20 million [Spanish government] loan’, which nobody else would. The Orléans’ wealth seemingly guaranteed that Spanish politicians could be bought, and another British diplomat had already speculated that Montpensier would probably gain Prussian support. Yet Montpensier ‘made both the cause of royalty and himself ridiculous’ by offering to help 'put down rebels at

\(^{170}\) Wellesley and Sencourt (eds.), *Conversations*, p.319
\(^{171}\) *Standard*, 29 June 1868
Cadiz’. Although the exiles could have actively supported Montpensier’s efforts, his behaviour made his candidacy seem irrelevant.

Nevertheless, Clarendon recognised the potential for both exile intrigue and French attempts to complicate matters by attempting to counter it. In February 1869, he warned Crampton that Montpensier was unfit to rule, and would be ‘so ill-liked’ by Napoleon that Spain would be subject to a ‘guerre sorde’ of espionage and vigilance to prevent ‘Orleanist intrigues’. Although Clarendon rejected taking ‘any part against him’, he hoped that ‘the Spanish liars’ could never ‘say that you had done or said anything’ to favour Montpensier. Even the slightest suggestion of British support for Montpensier had to be avoided, and Clarendon also warned Lyons, who had replaced Cowley at Paris, that Napoleon had ‘trouble in store for Spain’. However, Montpensier’s candidacy hardly blossomed. By late 1869, British diplomats thought him ‘the reverse of popular’ and his election impossible. The potential for exile plots informed, but did not drive British policy.

Meanwhile, Aumale found it difficult to preside over banquets because the press, especially the Times, seemed ‘to make voluntary allusions about what is happening in France’ whenever he did. The support which Waldegrave solicited had now begun to backfire, and made it impossible for him to speak in public without the risk of harming Anglo-French relations. Yet the whole family depended upon Waldegrave’s ‘advice and influence’. On 21 December, Aumale and Paris ‘cried out at her for wishing the [Colonial Office] for [Fortescue] instead of Ireland’. As press support plateaued, the Orléans remained reliant upon Waldegrave, and could not afford for her to leave.

174 Crampton to Clarendon, 20 December 1868, Ms. Clar. C.486 ff.62-64; William Doria to Stanley (confidential), 11 November 1868, FO 63/945/25 175 Clarendon to Crampton, 9 March 1869, MS. Clar. C.475 f.6 176 Clarendon to Lyons, 22 February 1869, Ms. Clar. C.148 f.101; Clarendon to Lyons, 20 March 1869, Ibid., f.169 177 Layard to Clarendon (copy), Layard Papers, 31 November 1869, Add. MS 39121 f.1; Layard to Clarendon (copy), 27 December 1869, Ibid., f.8; Percy French to Clarendon (Confidential), 20 October 1869, FO 72/1211/173 178 Aumale to Waldegrave, 15 January 1868, SP, W67/29 179 Hewett, Strawberry Fair, p.200 180 21 December 1868, Carlingford Diaries, Add. MS 63679A f.108
The decline of the Second Empire encouraged the Orléans’ supporters. On 17 October 1868, Hayward gloated to both Gladstone and Lady Holland that their ‘prospects [were] looking up’, whilst the Bonapartes were ‘losing ground daily’. Yet rumours of the Emperor’s illness ‘stirred something of a panic’ in Clarendon. Stability in France remained of paramount importance to British politicians, and the Orléans were not considered Napoleon’s ideal successors. Nevertheless, Waldegrave remained optimistic that her protégés could regain the French throne or otherwise be of use to her. When Aumale announced that he would visit Ireland, Waldegrave was adamant that he attended a ball, for ‘the Dublin folk’ to ‘have the honour of meeting’ him. When the Duchesse d’Aumale died in 1869, Waldegrave’s ambition crept into a letter of condolence; she thought that Aumale should find solace in having ‘a dear son to live for, devoted relations and... high duties to fulfil’, thoughts which ‘must constantly be kept in mind.’ Her ambition to influence British and French affairs remained tied up in their success.

Intelligence from the Orléans also remained valuable. In October 1868, the British Minister to Bavaria recorded a conversation with Paris at (Nemours’s son) the Duc d’Alençon’s wedding there, notably that the French ‘war party’ was not as strong as thought, and that Napoleon had no desire for war. Similarly, in June 1869, Paris sent Waldegrave a letter which he wanted passed to Colonial Secretary Lord Granville, and added that elections in France had been a great success for the opposition. When Aumale told Clarendon that ‘the present men’ in France were ‘all his friends’, but would serve Napoleon ‘faithfully’, this news was passed to Lyons. But after liberal reforms were passed in France the next May, Paris ‘abandoned his hopes of... restoration and made plans to settle in America.’

1869 also saw the publication of Paris’s book upon British Trades’ Unions. Paris’ efforts found support from quarters sympathetic to the subject. It was translated by

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181 Hayward to Gladstone, 17 October 1867, Carlisle (ed.), *Hayward Correspondence*, ii p.164; Hayward to Lady Holland, 17 October 1867, Holland House Papers, Add. MS 52126 f.109
182 Herkless, ‘Clarendon’, p.459
183 Waldegrave to Aumale, 28 August 1869, 1-PA/39/82
184 Waldegrave to Aumale, 6 December 1869, 1-PA/139/91
185 Henry Howard to Stanley (secret and confidential), 10 October 1868, FO 9/189
186 Paris to Waldegrave, 9 June 1869, SP, WW69/73
187 Clarendon to Lyons, 5 February 1870, Ms. Clar. C.474/2 f.350
188 Zeldin, *Ollivier*, p.162
Senior’s son and introduced by Radical MP Thomas Hughes, and as Mark Curtoys notes, it had a ‘pronounced effect upon contemporary opinion’. Paris ‘identified’ unions ‘with the success of English civic and moral values’, and concluded his work ‘in terms likely to appeal to Whig-Liberal opinion’. 189 The Orleanist pretender nevertheless believed that it would have wide appeal in Britain. When he sent a copy to Disraeli, Paris wrote of Unions as a natural product of a liberal and civilised society, and of his desire to publicise the example British statesman set with their concern for the working classes. 190 Similarly, in presenting a copy to Victoria, he praised the hospitality which allowed him to publish, free from partisan ‘passions’. 191 Paris considered himself a neutral observer, and was therefore willing to promote it widely with the hope of influencing British opinion.

The book was widely praised by liberals and radicals. 192 Watching the Commons on 7 July, Paris ‘had the pleasure of hearing [his] little book quoted’ by his ‘friend’ Hughes in ‘very flattering’ terms. 193 Gladstone was also impressed, and Paris was pleased that they agreed about Unions, because British policies would have a great influence worldwide, particularly in France. 194 The book was also lauded by several journals. 195 However, on 26 April, the Comtesse de Paris found that a review which Waldegrave had promised had not appeared, and Paris subsequently discovered that the Times had decided not to publish it. He hoped that Delane would ‘be more courageous when the translation [was] published’. 196 The Times’ support was not guaranteed, perhaps because Paris’ work commented upon a thorny question of domestic policy.

Meanwhile, the Orléans prospects in Spain were destroyed as the ‘feeling against Montpensier built up to a white heat’, abetted by French diplomats. In January 1870 he lost a by-election, and in March, he killed the radical prince Don Enrique in a duel.

190 Paris to Disraeli, 12 May 1869, Dep. Hughenden 138/3 ff.19-20
191 Paris to Victoria, 8 August 1869, RA VIC/MAIN/Y51/101
193 Rothstein, Theodore, From Chartist to Labourism (London, 1984), p.188; Paris to Denison, 8 July 1869, Ossington Collection, OsC1182
194 Paris to Gladstone, 30 May 1869, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44420 ff.319-20
195 British Quarterly Review, July 1869, pp.245-46; Spectator, 24 April 1869, pp.505-6; Edinburgh Review, 1869, p.203
196 Comtesse de Paris to Waldegrave, 26 April 1869, SP, WW69/71; Paris to Waldegrave, 9 May 1869, Ibid., WW69/72
Montpensier’s candidacy was thus practically annulled, and legally barred in June. Although Crampton’s replacement, A.H. Layard, was certain that intrigues were being ‘actively pursued in [Montpensier’s] favour’ in early March, he thought that the duel added ‘another chapter’ to the ‘history of the crimes and misfortunes of this unhappy family.’ Their old reputation for intrigue had been superseded by one for misfortune.

Aumale jumped to Montpensier’s defence. On 13 March, he replied to a telegram from a shocked Victoria that Montpensier had been treated in a very low manner, and was inexperienced with pistols. This was reinforced by Clarendon, who added that according to Layard, ‘Montpensier had behaved extremely well & the insult put upon him had been fearful.’ Despite the serious nature of the news, Montpensier was treated sympathetically, and without reference to Louis Philippe’s intrigues in Spain two decades before. Aumale added to Victoria that Montpensier had never wished to fight, and would probably be pardoned, and she remained sympathetic. ‘What a terrible thing... poor Montpensier and his promise’, she wrote to Aumale on 14 March, condemning Enrique’s ‘provocation’.

At this tragic moment, the Queen stood by the Orléans, and the duel spurred her to consider their future. On 15 March, Clarendon wrote to Lyons about the Montpensier duel, because the Queen was ‘exceedingly’ interested’, and wondered ‘whether the present French government with their Orleaniste proclivities’ thought that Napoleon was ‘much endangered’ by Montpensier ‘wearing that crown of thorns’. Lyons found it ‘rather curious to see how little attention’ Montpensier’s duel attracted. What little was said was disapproving, and the Orléans had ‘never exc[ited so little interest in France as at the present moment’. Despite their popularity in Britain, the Orléans’ prospects looked equally poor in France and Spain.

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198 Layard to Clarendon (copy), 5 March 1870, Layard Papers, Add. MS 39121 f.22; Layard to Clarendon (copy), 13 March 1870, Ibid., f.24.  
199 Aumale to Victoria, 13 March 1870, RA VIC/MAIN/Y51/122; RAVIC/MAIN/QVJ/1870:14 March.  
200 Aumale to Victoria, 17 March 1870, RA VIC/MAIN/Y/51/123; Victoria to Aumale, 14 March 1870, 1-PA/21(A)/8.  
201 Clarendon to Lyons (copy), 15 March 1870, Ms. Clar. C.474/2 f.393.  
In the wake of the duel, Aumale sought advice from British supporters. Waldegrave and Fortescue bizarrely believed that the duel would ‘make’ Montpensier King, because of Enrique’s undesirable character, and in reply, Aumale condemned Enrique, to whom Nemours had responded in the *Times*.\textsuperscript{203} But although Montpensier’s ambitions had not been treated as an extension of his family’s, Aumale feared for their reputation. On 15 March, he sent General Peel several articles, worried whether they should ignore ‘the insinuations contained in them’, or whether they should be answered, Peel subsequently advised him to ‘write nothing unless any facts could be stated which’ gave ‘a different complexion to the affair’, because the newspapers had ‘generally stated the case very sensibly.’ Aumale agreed, and Peel hoped that Lady Salisbury would too.\textsuperscript{204} Restraint seemed a wise course for the exiles; but press criticism was minimal. On 14 April, Paris read the *Times* article on Montpensier’s banishment with great pleasure; ‘I only see how justice is done to my Uncle, and... the difficult position in which he finds himself’.\textsuperscript{205} The *Standard* even printed a letter from Aumale which professed that Montpensier could not shoot.\textsuperscript{206} The Orléans were both absolved of blame and permitted to defend themselves, although among their British friends, Waldegrave and Fortescue alone supported Montpensier’s ambitions.

By 1870, a potential Orléans restoration was again under discussion in Britain. On 1 February, Chartres wrote to Waldegrave that they ‘were very much interested by a letter’ published in the *Pall Mall Gazette*; ‘An Observer’ had praised the Orleanist party, but disagreed that ‘we may get back to France as citizens’.\textsuperscript{207} Press opinion remained encouraging, and Aumale was ‘in good spirits as to the family prospects.’\textsuperscript{208} The support of the crown and significant sections of the press encouraged the Orléans to believe that their restoration was increasingly likely, and Disraeli shared these sentiments. On 10 January, Lord Derby, son of the late Prime Minister, heard from Disraeli that the Rothschilds believed Napoleon had been outmanoeuvred by the constitutionalist Orléans; and in July, Disraeli clarified his thoughts to Stanhope. It

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{203} Waldegrave to Aumale, 13 March 1870, 1-PA/140/7; Aumale to Waldegrave, 13 March 1870, SP, W67/57
\bibitem{204} Aumale to General Peel, 15 March 1870, Morier Papers, K1.2.7; General Peel to Lady Salisbury, 15 March 1870, Mary Derby Papers, MCD 221/61
\bibitem{205} Paris to Waldegrave, 14 April 1870, SP, WW69/87
\bibitem{206} *Standard*, 24 April 1870
\bibitem{207} Chartres to Waldegrave, 1 February 1870, SP, WW70/34
\bibitem{208} Hayward to Lady Holland, 11 May 1870, Holland House Papers, Add. MS 52126 ff.86-87
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was a ‘curious and interesting time’ to visit Paris’s home, and although one guest thought the Orléans ‘forgotten’, Disraeli thought that they ‘may be wanted. Nobody is forgotten, when it is convenient to remember him.’

Disraeli was prepared for a restoration, and so was Waldegrave. On 5 March, she sent Aumale a Morning Post article concerning the Orléans, which she had just received from Algernon Borthwick, now its editor, who had recently spoken to Napoleon. She was cheered by the fact that Napoleon was ‘almost despairing as to his dynasty continuing on the throne of France’. Although Napoleon ‘hope[d] for the best’, she ‘rather believe[d]’ that he would fall. It appeared probable that the Orléans might be recalled upon Napoleon’s death, and owing in part to Waldegrave’s efforts, they attracted increasingly supportive comment.

**Britain, the Franco-Prussian War and an Orléans Restoration? 1870-71**

At the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in July, the Orléans maintained significant sympathy from Britain’s elite. This was an ideal environment for the Orléans to accrue British support for their ambitions, but as early as 11 July, Paris told Victoria that it would be too dreadful “pour notre civilisation d’avoir une guerre de succession.” The idea of dynastic struggle disgusted him, but when Aumale, Joinville and Chartres volunteered their services to France, they were rejected because their presence ‘might be misunderstood’, despite their ‘new pretensions to liberalism.’ Joinville’s alter ego was soon unmasked, but Chartres served under the name of an illustrious ancestor, Robert Le Fort. They had decided to support the French war effort rather than precipitate some kind of dynastic struggle.

Waldegrave, meanwhile, became increasingly ambitious. While the Orléans ‘assumed the airs of dauphins, she asserted’ that Aumale would become French President, and

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210 Waldegrave to Aumale, 5 March 1870, 1-PA/140
211 RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1870:11 July
‘earmark[ed] the Paris Embassy’ for Fortescue.214 This confidence was reinforced by Aumale’s secretary, Auguste Laugel, who informed her on 16 August that France was ‘tired’ of Napoleon, and Aumale was ‘still ahead’; he only had to ‘watch the fatal events’.215 Waldegrave’s hopes seemed close to fruition, and Fortescue was also encouraged by Napoleon’s weakness, having learned that Algernon Borthwick of the Morning Post ‘considered him gone’.216 As Napoleon’s grip on power loosened, the Orléans’ patrons were optimistic of success – and their own advancement.

British scrutiny now fell upon the support which the Orléans had accrued. Although an Irish Tory newspaper accused Waldegrave of leading British newspapers to support the Orléans, the origins of their partisanship were contested.217 On 13 August, Derby noted that the Times was ‘writing up very unmistakable hints, the deposition of the Emperor, and calling to power of one of the Orléans princes’, and speculated that this was due to the apparently ‘Orleanist’ Granville’s influence;218 Lady Derby (previously Lady Salisbury) also wondered what had ‘made Delane suddenly Orleanist’, and General Peel thought that this ‘proceed[ed] from the Rothschilds.’219 The success of Waldegrave’s efforts only became apparent once Napoleon’s fall appeared likely.

Waldegrave’s support for the Orléans now appeared farsighted. As one correspondent informed her, the Orleanist General Trochu seemed ‘to be the coming man.’ It looked as if her ‘prophecies would come right.’220 Waldegrave appeared poised to assume great influence, and because Aumale possessed ‘the qualifications making a great General and statesman’, she implored him to wait to ‘use his best gifts’. The Lord Chancellor agreed that ‘the only hope for... France was the Orléans Family’, and advised Aumale that the ‘best of them’ should not ‘end their lives recklessly’.221 Patience among both the Orléans and their British supporters seemingly guaranteed success.

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214 Jullian, Edward and the Edwardians, p.98
215 Laugel to Waldegrave, 16 August 1870, SP, WW83/310
216 Fortescue to Lord Spencer, 11 August 1870, Althorp Papers, Add. MS 76908 f.156a
217 Hewett, Strawberry Fair, pp.214-15
218 Derby Diaries, 13 August 1870, p.67
219 General Peel to Lady Derby, 20 August 1870, Mary Derby Papers, MCD 221/67
220 Byng to Waldegrave, 9 August 1870, SP, WW83/108
221 Waldegrave to Aumale, 23 November 1870, 1-PA/140/9
The Orléans’ future suddenly became a matter of great interest and importance when Napoleon was captured after the disastrous Battle of Sedan. On 3 September Granville announced to the retired Russell ‘the wonderful news’ that Napoleon had been ‘snuffed out like a candle’; and on 14 September, Fortescue wrote to Gladstone that Waldegrave had received ‘a long letter’ from Paris, which showed ‘their readiness to acknowledge [the French Republic] as an authority capable of making peace’. This was a wise decision. As Henry Greville informed Lady Holland, the Princes had acted ‘with judgement lately’, confident that they would regain the ‘rickety’ French throne within a year. The Orléans and their British friends waited for France to enact an unpopular peace, which they could eventually exploit to ensure an Orléans restoration.

A Foreign Office paper predicted post-war Orleanist ascendancy, and as T.G. Otte notes, throughout ‘the autumn and winter... a Bonapartist, or at any rate monarchical, restoration seemed a distinct possibility’ to British diplomats. In this atmosphere, Granville even seemingly considered an Orléans restoration. On 15 September, he opined to the retired Russell that it would be ‘dishonourable to use Britain’s influence in favour of old friends.’ The idea appears to have crossed their minds, but Britain, without any allies in Europe, could not have enforced such a settlement. Moreover, the republic found widespread support in Britain. Aumale’s friend Bagehot noted that an Orléans monarchy had little appeal, and in the Fortnightly Review, John Morley called for ‘not... a makeshift Orleanist monarchy, but... a French Republic.’ The Orléans could not compete for support with a tenacious French Republic, which continued to fight against overwhelming odds.

The Orléans nevertheless remained a source of counsel. On 4 October, Gladstone informed Granville that Aumale had talked to Reeve and that Paris had written to Waldegrave, ‘very much in my sense’ about Alsace and Loraine. Hayward also met

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222 Granville to Russell, 3 September 1870, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/16F f.252; Fortescue to Gladstone, 14 September 1870, Gladstone Papers, Add. MS 44122 f.167-69
223 Henry Greville to Lady Holland, 13 September 1870, Holland House Papers, Add. MS 51217 f.225
224 ‘Report by Mr West’, 20 October 1870, FO 425/98/35-36; Otte, Foreign Office Mind, pp.64-65; Raymond, Policy and Opinion, p.177
225 Granville to Russell, 15 September 1870, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/16F f.259
227 Raymond, Policy and Opinion, pp.154-57
Aumale, who was furious ‘at the’ irreparable disgrace’ of Sedan, to ‘talk over the Emperor’. In the wake of Napoleon’s fall, Aumale’s opinions remained valued, and his relationship with the royal family also remained a potential point of contention with France. On 18 November, Granville warned Gladstone that the Prince of Wales had been especially ‘unwise in his talk’, sought an interview with Aumale to ‘ascertain his views on the proper conditions of peace’, and advocated enthroning Aumale. Rumours of British support for their ambitions had to be quashed.

While the Orléans waited, neither they nor the British government wanted their prospects to be discussed. Aumale told Waldegrave that he ‘would not object to [dining] and meet[ing] people if they would talk of anything but the war’, and in late October, he told Lady Holland that while he had no objection to meeting her friends, ‘political or otherwise’, he expressed unease at the idea of dinners ‘to meet royalty’. The impatient Waldegrave even recorded that Aumale would not meet ‘anyone in society if he [could] help it.’

Whereas the Orléans advocated restraint, their British supporters extolled the Orléans’ hopes and Napoleon’s fall. In early November, William Stirling-Maxwell, a Conservative MP and friend of Aumale, publicly claimed that after Napoleon had heard that Aumale had ‘lately occupied’ a study room at the British Museum’s library, he had responded that he would “very likely one day replace him, as he replaced me.” Other British friends were equally optimistic. Hayward thought that the Orléans had ‘a capital chance’ if they played the waiting game. By December, he was confident that Aumale stood ‘higher than any man in France’, and made ‘honourable mention’ of him in an article for Fraser’s. But Paris twice explained to Waldegrave in November that Britain could not influence events in Europe.

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229 Gladstone to Granville, 4 October 1870, Ramm, Agatha (ed.), The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1868-1876 (2 Vols, London, 1952), i no.319; Hayward to Stirling-Maxwell, 21 October 1870, Carlisle (ed.), Hayward Correspondence, ii p.218
230 Granville to Gladstone, 18 November 1870, Ramm (ed.), Gladstone-Granville, i no.364
231 Waldegrave to Fortescue, 1 August 1870, SP, CI/572; Aumale to Lady Holland, 24 October 1870, Holland House Papers, Add. MS 52115, f.128
232 Waldegrave to Harcourt, 2 October 1870, Ms. Harcourt Dep. 93 f.43
234 Hayward to Stirling-Maxwell, 15 November 1870, Carlisle (ed.), Hayward Correspondence, ii p.220
235 Hayward to Waldegrave, (n.d.), SP, WW32/9; Hayward to Waldegrave (n.d.), Ibid., WW32/12
236 Paris to Waldegrave, 9 November 1870, Ibid., WW69/95; Paris to Waldegrave, 21 November 1870, Ibid., WW69/96
association with the struggling republic or neutral, helpless Britain would have
damaged their hopes. Throughout early 1871, however, the princes often landed in
France, and British friends were told little of their activities.²³⁷

Nevertheless, British supporters continued to assist the ambitious Orléans. On 10
March, Fortescue showed Gladstone ‘a letter from a French banker’ to Paris
concerning France’s ‘enormous [financial] difficulties’, which proposed ceding
France’s Indian possessions to Britain in return for guaranteeing a loan of £100
million. The Prime Minister was ‘most struck by it’.²³⁸ Fortescue remained willing to
support the Orléans, and in April, he received a ‘very interesting’ letter from Aumale,
who was ‘biding his time somewhere in France, not without danger’.²³⁹ The ambitious
Orléans had begun to do something which British politicians could not: restore the
family’s standing in France.

Meanwhile, Lyons contemplated the likelihood of a restoration in France. Of ‘the
various pretenders’, he supposed that none ‘would wish to be… responsible for such a
peace as must be concluded’.²⁴⁰ Any immediate restoration was unlikely, and by 10
February, the Assembly appeared likely to favour a temporary ‘moderate republic’, to
‘prepare the way for a constitutional monarchy’.²⁴¹ The future of France remained
uncertain, and as Lyons fled Paris on 26 March, prior to the rise of the Commune, he
commented that if the Assembly ‘[got] hold of a general’ and dependable troops, they
would ‘very likely proclaim Henri V or some other Monarch’.²⁴²

The Orléans’ prospects returned to the fore in May. On the 16th, Lyons reported that
the fusion between Paris and Chambord would be ‘much easier than the one between
their respective parties’.²⁴³ The possibility had returned with an Assembly determined
to elect a King, and after Joinville and Aumale were elected, Lyons believed that they
would take their seats despite Thiers’ objections. The ‘favourite combination’ among

²³⁷ Baumont, Aumale, pp.64-71; Carlingford Diaries, 15 January 1871, Add. MS 88912B f.14; General
Peel to Lady Derby, 24 January 1871, Mary Derby Papers, MCD 221/86; RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1871:6
March
²³⁸ 10 March 1871, Carlingford Diaries, Add. MS 88912B f.45
²³⁹ 6 April 1871, Ibid., f.60
²⁴⁰ Lyons to Granville, 7 January 1871, Granville Papers, PRO 30/29/85; Lyons to Granville, 7
February 1871, Ibid.
²⁴¹ Lyons to Granville, 10 February 1871, Ibid.
²⁴² Lyons to Granville, 26 March 1871, Ibid; Lyons to Granville, 27 March 1871, Ibid.
²⁴³ Lyons to Granville, 16 May 1871, Granville Papers, PRO 30/29/85
monarchist deputies appeared to be Aumale as Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, ‘to prepare the way’ for Chambord as King. However, on 2 June, Lyons reported that Monarchists feared that the Republicans would gain over 100 seats in a series of by-elections, and more startlingly, if the Assembly proclaimed Chambord, many towns might refuse to recognise him or Aumale’s new roles. An Orléans restoration now appeared unlikely.

Lyons continued to fear the Orléans’ return. While the validity of the Princes’ elections was debated, Lyons spared Granville ‘a list of conjectures’, although he believed that their election could precipitate Thiers’s resignation or the proclamation of Chambord and Aumale. But after the debate, Thiers told Lyons that he had not resisted, having feared a ‘dangerous’ ‘feeling of soreness among the right’. Speculating about a ‘Republican present’ and ‘Monarchical future’, Lyons did not ‘know what ha[d] become’ of the idea to give Thiers two years’ grace. Yet the ‘threat of a revived fusionism’ ‘clinched’ a ‘marriage of convenience’ with Bismarck and ensured the republic’s survival. Any restoration was now practically impossible, and on 13 June, Lyons recorded that Thiers had received Aumale, Joinville and Chartres, who were treated ‘with even more than the usual respect shown to Royal Princes.’ The Orléans had quietly returned without creating turmoil.

The Orléans’ British friends were effusive in their praise and expectations. Waldegrave wished that ‘all [would] go well for the future of France and those who are worthy to lead her’, and ‘rejoice[d] most sincerely that things are as they are, and as I believe they will be, although she regretted losing sight of ‘so many good friends’. Delane added that ‘all the Englishmen’ whom Paris had met felt ‘sincere respect and goodwill’ towards him. He was not the only journalist who expressed

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244 Baumont, Aumale, p.63; Hewett, Strawberry Fair, p.221; Osgood, S.M., French Royalism under the Third and Fourth Republics (The Hague, 1970), p.9; Lyons to Granville, 30 May 1871, Granville Papers, PRO 30/29/85
245 Lyons to Granville, 2 June 1871, Granville Papers, PRO 30/29/86
246 Lyons to Granville, 5 June 1871, Ibid.
247 Lyons to Granville, 9 June 1871, Ibid.
248 Mitchell, Allan, The German influence in France after 1870 (Chapel Hill NC, 1979), pp.52-53
249 Lyons to Granville, 13 June 1871, Granville Papers, PRO 30/29/86
250 Waldegrave to Paris, 13 June 1871, AMF 300(III)/421/165; Waldegrave to Paris, 15 June 1871, Ibid., f.175
251 Delane to Paris, 26 June 1871, Ibid., f.396
such sentiments. Edward Levy of the *Daily Telegraph* warned that patience and ‘above all, devotion to France’ were ‘the duty of all who wish well to the suffering country’.\(^{252}\) Although Reeve congratulated Paris, he added that numerous questions needed to be addressed before the restoration of order and liberty in France, and on 6 June, Hayward informed the ‘Dear Boy’ Paris of his regret that he did not ‘follow my advice to keep... quiet for some days’. Paris had acted without his ‘usual wisdom’, and Hayward was sorry to be frank; but his despair came from enthusiastic support.\(^{253}\)

Queen Victoria was also supportive. Nemours praised her as an ‘*excellente et fidele amie*’, an assessment which she thought she had fulfilled, and allowed Nemours to retain Bushey Park, for she feared for the stability of France. ‘Paris, [Chartres] & Aumale’ also expressed ‘their unbounded gratitude for all [her] kindness’. Their hope to establish a constitutional monarchy ‘[did] credit to them.’\(^{254}\) Yet although the Queen now felt free to advocate their restoration, the government disagreed. Gladstone was ‘glad’ that Paris ‘acquiesced in the Republic’, for ‘the conduct’ of the French pretenders was ‘not merely mischievous, but ridiculous’.\(^{255}\) The Orléans had won the respect of Britain’s elite, but their claim to the French throne never found widespread support in Britain; and from July onwards, division and electoral defeats began to weaken French royalism.\(^{256}\)

The regard they had won amongst Britain’s elite owed more to their conviviality and ability to provide information rather than their potential as an alternative to Napoleon. Although they had exercised a significant degree of influence in exile, few British politicians returned the favour and supported their ambitions. That a British government never supported the Orléans is unsurprising – this would only have created a breach with France. Their ambitions, or at least their rumoured ambitions, to rule elsewhere in Europe had also concerned British governments, which feared not only strife with France in such circumstances, but also the potential risks of such an ambitious family occupying a European throne. The most they could have realistically hoped for was to influence the views of British politicians while waiting to be recalled to the French throne. Although they achieved the former goal, both their ambitions

\(^{252}\) Edward Levy to Paris, 19 June 1871, Ibid., f.250

\(^{253}\) Reeve to Paris, 16 June 1871, Ibid., f.188; Hayward to Paris, 8 June 1871, Ibid., f.55

\(^{254}\) Victoria to Aumale, 26 June 1871, 1-PA/21(A)/12; RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ/1871:28 June


\(^{256}\) Bury and Tombs, *Thiers*, p.210
and diplomatic realities had rendered them a problem for successive British governments.

Epilogue

Right-wing refugees continued to come to Britain after 1871. Don Carlos’ grandson arrived in 1876; several of the Orléans were again exiled in 1886; the controversial French politician General Boulanger arrived in 1889. But they had little impact upon British politics. Although received by a few ‘old supporters’ and the curious, the Don Carlos who arrived in 1876 was verbally abused upon arrival and widely ignored. He left Britain after three months. Boulanger’s exile followed a similarly uneventful course, for the refugee General retired from politics before leaving Britain to commit suicide in 1891. The British Ambassador to France, Lord Lytton, correctly thought that rumours of Boulanger’s return to France in May 1890 were an ‘electoral manoeuvre’. These later refugees simply sank into anonymity, and found no serious British support. Even the Orléans Princes who arrived in the summer of 1886 attracted little attention. Boulanger similarly left little trace amongst the society pages. The right-wing refugees of the late 19th century neither sought nor found influence in Britain.

The Orléans did occasionally worry British governments after 1886. Paris remained active in French politics, and he supported Boulanger for some time in return for a restoration. Although Lytton thought this alliance fraught with contradiction, it did cause the Ambassador a significant degree of worry, and Paris’s presence created occasional concerns for British governments. He was not invited to a Jubilee dinner for ‘every European dynasty’ in 1887 because his presence would have offended Republican France, and the brief engagement of his daughter Hélène to the Duke of Clarence threatened friction with both France and Germany.

257 Times, 6 March 1876; Gordon, J.M., Chronicles of a Gay Gordon (London, 1921), ch.6; Legge, Edward, King Edward in his True Colours (London, 1912) pp.330-31; Times, 9 June 1876
258 Otte, Foreign Office Mind, p.180; Lytton to Salisbury, 3 May 1890, FO 27/3001/34
259 Lyons to Lord Rosebery, 12 June 1886, FO 27/2797/306; Lyons to Rosebery, 23 June 1886, Ibid., no.330; Lyons to Rosebery, 25 June 1886, Ibid., no.333; Lyons to Rosebery, 13 July 1886, FO 27/2798/385; Lyons to Rosebery, 16 July 1886, Ibid., no.386
260 Although Boulanger met Lord Randolph Churchill upon arrival, the latter had also fallen from grace. Times, 27 April 1889
262 Lytton to Salisbury (secret), 1 June 1888, FO 27/2906/320

236
engagement was averted, any hint of favour being shown to the exiles had to be avoided. When Paris visited Jersey in 1887 to receive French supporters, Prime Minister Lord Salisbury ordered the Lieutenant Governor not to give any ‘official reception or demonstration’; and despite Salisbury’s opposition, Paris’ son the Duc d’Orléans served as an aide-de-camp to Lord Roberts in 1888-89. Any suggestion of British favour being shown to the exiled Orléans was avoided for fear of creating offence.

Yet the French Republic’s resilience ensured that the Orléans’ activities caused little diplomatic controversy. Even when the Duc d’Orléans was imprisoned for arriving in France via Lausanne in 1890, provocatively seeking to undertake military service, his family was blamed rather than Britain, and French politicians were more concerned about the political implications of his sentence. Neither did exhortations written by Paris create dispute. A manifesto which he issued in September 1887 had so little impact that, as the British Chargé d’Affaires reported, one French minister thought that even if it had been issued when the Assembly was sitting, it would have simply motivated a ‘violent onslaught from the extreme left’, and thereafter been ‘quickly forgotten.’ These exile appeals were considered so insignificant that an 1888 letter from Paris to the Mayors of France only attracted widespread attention when it was impounded by the police.

Conversely, Aumale’s return was thought politically useful in France. By January 1889, Lytton correctly anticipated that the embattled government, scared that Boulanger might launch a coup, would recall Aumale to placate the right-wing opposition. Unlike his nephew and great nephew, Aumale was treated as an elder statesman who did not pose any risk to the Republic’s survival. ‘Conservative’ had replaced ‘Royalist’ as a party label in France, and by 1891, Lytton thought Orleanism dead.

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264 E. Egerton to Salisbury, 23 February 1890, FO 27/2997/81; Egerton to Salisbury, 8 February 1890, Ibid., no.53-4; Egerton to Salisbury, 12 February 1890, Ibid., no.65
265 Egerton to Salisbury, 16 September 1887, FO 27/2357/365
266 J. Elliot to Salisbury, 9 July 1888, FO 27/2907/382
267 Lytton to Lady Lytton, 1 January 1889, Lytton Papers, Add. MS 59612 ff.115-6
It is possible that the Duc d’Orléans’ later activities had some effect upon Anglo-French relations; although considered to have been a buffoon and playboy, the French Interior Ministry monitored his supporters, some of whom made a pathetic attempt at a *coup* in 1899. However, the Prince spent little time in Britain and from 1900, principally resided in Belgium, having been obliged to leave Britain for congratulating a French cartoonist for an obscene caricature of Queen Victoria.\(^{269}\) Although the Duc d’Orléans’ peripheral position in the existing historiography does not necessarily signify that his actions had no consequences for British diplomacy, it is highly unlikely that the aimless pretender’s activities created any great international controversy. Without meaningful support in Britain or France, the Orléans’ later exile was a coda to their previous one, and their activities ceased to seriously affect British diplomacy.

The Orléans’ 1871 departure thus marks the end of a period when right-wing refugees’ opinions and activities had a serious bearing upon the course of British politics and diplomacy. Not until the disputes over offering asylum to members of the Russian Imperial family and ‘White Russian’ refugees in the wake of the Russian Revolution and Civil War, or perhaps even the arrival of multi-party governments-in-exile during the Second World War, did right-wing refugees again occupy a prominent position in British politics.\(^{270}\) Whether their early 21st century counterparts – such as the fallen oligarch Boris Berezovsky, or Pakistani ex-President Pervez Musharraf – left any such legacy is a task for future historians.


9: Conclusion

A more nuanced understanding is required of the position which refugees occupied in Victorian politics. Right-wing refugees comprise a class of political actors who have been overlooked, and when they are re-inserted into the narrative of British politics, its shape undergoes some changes. Whilst Porter plotted the array of problems which left-wing refugees caused for successive British governments, this study adds several more: Bourbon, Carlist and Miguelite exiles all created challenges for the makers of British foreign policy. It also provides numerous instances of refugees influencing British politicians. For example, Carlist refugees were able to mobilise British supporters, and the exiles of 1848 established a strong degree of influence over numerous British contemporaries, which almost precipitated the fall of Russell’s government. The Orléans’ wide-ranging influence later made them both important political actors and a problem in Anglo-French relations. Right-wing refugees thus influenced both government policies and party politics.

Although these exiles relied upon informal political networks, they often exercised a strong degree of influence upon Conservative politicians. Whilst Charles Whibley contended that Lord John Manners did much to revive the Carlist cause in Britain around Montemolin in 1846-47, and Roger Bullen plotted the limits of Tory support for Don Carlos, this study demonstrates that Carlist refugees found the support of several Conservatives during the 1830s and 1840s, which ensured that refugee opinion found wider attention. It also argues that Aberdeen’s cooperation with right-wing refugees during 1848-50 was greater than M.E. Chamberlain suggested, and comprised an important part of an exile-inspired attempt to reunite the shattered Conservative Party. Many historians have been intrigued by Disraeli’s relationship with Metternich, and this study affirms its close nature, demonstrating that further working relationships were established between the exiles and Conservative politicians. The position which these refugees established suggests that influences upon Toryism and the political environments which allowed them to intervene in British politics are both ripe for further consideration.

The refugees considered in this study did not cooperate with Conservatives alone. Montemolin’s supposed liberalism ensured that he attracted interest from Palmerston
and Bulwer, and the exiles of 1848 also forged links with the governing Whigs. Far more significant was Lady Waldegrave’s support for the Orléans. Whilst Hewett and Reynolds both recognised that Waldegrave exercised an important role as a political hostess, neither fully considered her support for the Orléans throughout this period. Waldegrave’s career certainly deserves further attention in light of her efforts to transform these exiles from figures at the periphery of ‘society’ to respected political actors. Although the existing historiography correctly hints that the Orléans were close to both Waldegrave and Queen Victoria, it understates the importance they assumed with the help of their Liberal patroness.

This study also sheds new light on the career of Lord Palmerston. Among its contentions is that the Orléans’ supposed ambitions were a major factor in his response to Louis Napoleon’s coup d’état, an aspect which has previously attracted little attention; for example, David Brown instead focused upon the importance of Palmerston’s response to the coup and his subsequent dismissal in domestic politics. This study proposes that Palmerston’s personal correspondence, commenting upon supposed exile intrigues, demonstrates a more sophisticated response to the role played by the Orleans. This was not an emotional reflex (as Webster identified in his responses to earlier crises), but a willingness to construct and/or promote rumours, lie to colleagues and even pursure phantom intrigues for political ends.

Whereas several historians, most recently Lawrence Fenton, have stated that Palmerston pursued a refugee conspiracy in 1848-49, this thesis posits that the ‘conspiracy’ was a canard which Palmerston deliberately pleaded to strengthen his own position. It also argues that Palmerston’s support for Montemolin was genuine, rejecting Bullen’s assertion that he had little serious interest in the Carlist pretender. Moreover, the narratives which Palmerston concocted in blue books about Don Carlos’ flight, Dom Miguel’s ambitions and the Orléans’ supposed intrigues in Spain expunged their importance in three embarrassing episodes. Palmerston’s responses to right-wing refugees were thus an important influence upon his actions, especially between 1846 and 1851, offering a counterpoint to the existing historiography which emphasises his pragmatism and political nous during this period.¹

¹ i.e. Billy, 1848; Brown, Politics of Foreign Policy
The impact of these exiles’ activities upon British foreign policy was more significant than previous works suggest. In considering Anglo-French relations during the tumultuous period of 1830-32, diplomatic historians have focused upon flashpoints such as the Belgian revolution and the Polish rebellion; this study adds that the activities of the exiled Bourbons, especially the Duchesse de Berri’s attempts to instigate rebellion in France, simultaneously threatened to cause discord.\(^2\) Whilst historians have considered Don Carlos’ brief exile, it also argues that the freedom accorded to Carlist refugees posed a further threat to British diplomacy, and that Grey’s government was responsible for the disastrous policy of allowing Carlos to escape to Britain. Those who arrived in the late 1840s caused further concern. Whereas Bullen gave little consideration to British concerns about Dom Miguel, this study argues that his ambitions influenced both the conception and critique of British foreign policy.\(^3\) It also builds on Bullen’s brief analysis of Palmerston’s failure to check the exiled Orléans’ supposed ambitions in Spain to suggest that the Foreign Secretary’s enmity for Louis Philippe was a major factor in Anglo-Spanish relations during 1848-50.\(^4\)

As the Orléans’ ambitions and Louis Napoleon’s unease about them grew, so did the attention they received from the Foreign Office. The Orléans’ attempted fusion of claims to the French throne, their supposed plans to counter Louis Napoleon’s coup, their close relationship with the British court and the confiscation of their French properties all created greater apprehension than previously suggested. British concerns about the Orléans continued throughout their sojourn in Britain. For example, although Amanda Foreman downplayed the Orléans’ role in the American Civil War, this study suggests that they did much to defuse Anglo-American tension, most notably during the Trent Affair, and that their opinions on the conflict found British attention. It also posits that the prospect of Aumale obtaining the Greek throne, whilst given little regard by Prebelakes, was considered a serious threat to British interests, and that the Orléans’ activities as far afield as America and Jerusalem concerned British diplomats. Throughout the period considered, both right-


\(^3\) Bullen, *Entente*, ch.8-9

\(^4\) Ibid., pp.290-92
wing refugees’ activities and perceived intentions regularly affected British foreign policy.

Individual biographies aside, refugees in Victorian Britain have often been considered in the form of communities. Whilst Bernard Porter briefly identified a few ‘famous’ refugees, his study concentrates on the problem posed by refugees as a whole. Yet it was as individuals that right-wing refugees had their greatest impact – as the protégés and advisers of British politicians, as well as inspiration to their supporters abroad. Britain’s neighbours feared not only revolutionary subversion, but usurpation, civil war and counter-revolution, all the end goals of the refugees considered above. Whereas left-wing refugees boasted a modest political legacy and provoked diplomatic and/or political disputes, those of the right not only enflamed controversy but often actively intervened in British high politics.

This study thus alters our understanding of Britain’s relations with France in 1830-32; Britain’s role in the civil wars in Spain and Portugal; its elite’s reaction to the tumultuous years of 1848-49, and their relationship with Louis Napoleon. The presence and activities of right-wing refugees, who exploited British liberties to fund and inspire their struggles, had a strong bearing upon Britain’s relations with her neighbours, and even the course of foreign conflicts. Russell’s first government of 1846-52 saw the apogee of right-wing refugee activity and bore the brunt of their multifarious impact. Palmerston’s Spanish policy was first influenced by his interest in Montemolin and then by fears of Louis Philippe’s intrigues; Dom Miguel’s ambitions were at the centre of Britain’s Portuguese policy in 1847; the exiles of 1848 influenced the government’s foreign policy and Tory opposition to it, as well as the government’s relations with the British royal family; and Palmerston’s attempts to justify his response to Louis Napoleon’s coup resulted in his dismissal, itself a blow to the ailing government. Thereafter, the Orléans’ ambitions and Louis Napoleon’s fear that they might usurp him regularly affected the course of British politics and diplomacy.

Tory and Whig/Liberal responses to right-wing refugees generally differed. Whereas Whigs and occasionally Conservatives welcomed liberal refugees, and both criticised

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5 Porter, pp.13-15
revolutionary ones, British politicians developed a wide range of relationships with right-wing refugees. A few reactionaries and eccentrics feted Carlists and Legitimists, whilst the rest of the political spectrum abhorred them; both Conservatives and (to a lesser degree) Whigs welcomed and cooperated with those who arrived in 1848; and Orleanists were treated sympathetically by the majority of British politicians, except at junctures when especially close cooperation with France was deemed necessary. Whilst Tories were more generous to refugee royalty in 1830 and 1848, they often shared Whig concerns about the risks which right-wing refugees posed to British diplomacy (Derby’s three governments were especially concerned about offending Louis Napoleon by showing regard to the Orléans), and both Tories and liberals took an interest in refugee counsel when it appeared particularly useful.

When left- and right-wing refugees are considered together, it becomes clear that refugees played a far wider and more important role in nineteenth-century Britain than previously noted. Left-wing refugees were lauded in the 1820s and 1830s, and became a diplomatic concern throughout the 1850s. The desire to protect radical refugees played a major role in the fall of a government in 1858, and these refugees’ views influenced a few radicals and Chartists. In contrast, right-wing refugees affected British diplomacy throughout the mid-nineteenth century and established political relationships with wide range of British politicians. If refugees of the right are considered in conjunction with those of the left, then the position occupied by refugees in mid-nineteenth century Britain is transformed from one of relatively peripheral influence to one of importance across the political spectrum, whilst the impact their presence had upon British diplomacy is transformed from a particular problem in the 1850s into a mutating series of problems over several decades. From this study has emerged a more complex picture of the ‘Refugee Question’ which suggests refugees played an important role in British politics throughout the mid-nineteenth century.
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Appendix: French and Spanish Royal Family Trees

French Royal Family: House of Bourbon ("Elder Branch")

Charles X of France (r. 1824-1830) m. Maria Theresa of Savoy (d. 1805)

Louis, Duc d'Angoulême (disputed Legitimist Pretender, 1836-1844) m. Marie-Thérèse de Bourbon

Charles, Duc de Berry (d. 1820) m. Caroline of Naples

Henri, Duc de Bordeaux and Comte de Chambord (Legitimist Pretender, 1830/1844-1883)

French Royal Family: House of Orléans

Louis Philippe, King of the French (r. 1830-48) m. Marie Amélie of Naples

François, Prince de Joinville m. Françoise of Braganza

Ferdinand, Duc d'Orléans (d. 1842) m. Helene of Mecklenburg-Schwerin

Antoine, Duc de Montpensier m. María Luisa of Spain

[Marie] Louise m. King Leopold of the Belgians

Louis, Duc de Nemours m. Victoire of Sax-Coburg-Gotha

Henri, Duc d'Aumale m. Caroline of Naples

François, Duc de Chartres


Philippe, Duc d'Orléans, Orléanist Pretender 1894-1926