Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry

Choi, Jay Pil, Chowdhury, Subhasish M. and Kim, Jaesoo (2016) Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 118 (4). 816–840. ISSN 0347-0520

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    We investigate simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflict in the shadow of within-group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' group-conflict efforts. A more symmetric group faces a higher degree of internal conflict, and might expend more effort in external conflict when the group-conflict effort technology is highly complementary. Depending on the degree of complementarity, the stronger player's relative contribution to external conflict might be higher in a more asymmetric group and, as a result, it is possible for the weaker player to earn a higher payoff. In the absence of any complementarity, the rent-dissipation is non-monotonic with the within-group power asymmetry.

    Item Type: Article
    Uncontrolled Keywords: asymmetry,collective action,conflict,group contest,c72,d72,d74,h41
    Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
    Related URLs:
    Depositing User: Pure Connector
    Date Deposited: 22 Mar 2016 09:08
    Last Modified: 21 Mar 2019 11:20
    DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12152

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