Dilemmas of a ‘democratic peace’:
World War One, the Zimmerwald Manifesto and the Russian Revolution

Francis King

Abstract
This article looks at the influence of the Zimmerwald Conference of 1915 on the peace policies of the Petrograd Soviet, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks after February 1917. It highlights the problems involved in simultaneously trying to defend a revolution, work for a just international peace, and maintain the front in a war which no longer makes any sense. It suggests that insisting on ‘peace without annexations and indemnities on the basis of self-determination of nations’ was not realistic given Russia’s war exhaustion and the war aims of the other belligerents. However, it also shows that no other peace aim had any political support within Russia.

Key words: World War One, Russia, soviet, socialists, peace, Zimmerwald

The history of World War One is littered with peace initiatives. States, international bodies, religious institutions, political movements and ad hoc committees all tried at various times to help put an end to the slaughter. Most of these initiatives also had some ulterior political motive, whether it was to end the war to the advantage of one or other belligerent side or simply to increase the weight and prestige of the sponsor of the peace move. Few had any lasting relevance – they were floated, promoted, and quietly ditched when they failed to gain much traction.

 Socialist bodies also put forward peace initiatives, often aimed not only at ending the senseless bloodshed, but also at working towards reconstructing the socialist international, which had been shattered following the débâcle of 1914. By far the most significant of these initiatives was the international conference organised in September 1915 at Zimmerwald,
near Berne, by the Swiss labour leader Robert Grimm and others. The slogans and demands of this conference – notably ‘peace without annexations or indemnities’ – gained wide acceptance among Russian socialists in particular after 1915. Following the fall of the Tsar in February 1917, the Petrograd Soviet was headed largely by former adherents of Zimmerwald, and ‘peace without annexations or indemnities’ became a cornerstone of the Soviet’s position on the war. On this, there was widespread consensus. Unfortunately, there was little consensus on the more practical questions of how to achieve such a peace, and what revolutionary Russia should do in the meantime. This article looks at some of the debates among Russian revolutionaries in 1917 about the war and how to end it, and explores the very real dilemmas they were trying to tackle.

I. Zimmerwald and Kiental

The story of the Second International’s failure in 1914 has been told many times. Its 1907 Stuttgart congress had resolved that in the event of war breaking out in Europe, socialists in and outside parliaments should ‘intervene in favour of its speedy termination and … utilize the economic and political crisis created by the war to rouse the masses and thereby to hasten the downfall of capitalist class rule’.¹ At Basel in 1912, the International had reiterated that stance, and as late as 29 July 1914 its International Socialist Bureau held its last great peace rally in Brussels, with speakers from France, Germany, Britain, Russia, the Netherlands and Italy.² By early August 1914, as the war spread across Europe, the majority socialists of most belligerent countries had quickly rallied to their respective flags, and used their position to help to damp down class struggle and rally their labour movements for the war effort.

The anti-war minorities in the socialist parties were at first disorientated, but before long they began to re-establish contacts. Neutral Switzerland was important here in several respects: its geographical position (it could be reached from France, Germany, Austria and Italy), its traditional role as a place of exile for Russian revolutionaries, its relatively high level of political freedoms, and the keenness of Swiss socialists like Grimm to facilitate the reconstitution of socialism as an internationalist movement. Grimm’s newspaper Berner Tagwacht grew in circulation to become one of the most important German-language socialist-internationalist publications during the war, while Berne and its recently-opened Volksbhaus were the venue for several international gatherings in the course of 1915.³ The most significant of these gatherings,
first mooted by the Italian Socialist Party, brought together 38 leading European anti-war socialists in the little hillside village of Zimmerwald, near Berne, between 5–8 September 1915.

The manifesto adopted at Zimmerwald called on the working class ‘to reorganise and begin the struggle for peace’, and continued:

This struggle is also the struggle for liberty, for brotherhood of nations, for socialism. The task is to take up this fight for peace – for a peace without annexations or war indemnities …

Of all the national contingents, the Russian’s was one of the largest and most representative of the diversity of the country’s anti-war left. It was also certainly the most illustrious: there were the Bolsheviks Lenin and Zinoviev, the Mensheviks Pavel Aksel’rod and Yuliy Martov, the then non-aligned Trotsky, as well as Viktor Chernov and Mark Natanson for the Socialist-Revolutionaries (SRs). Other notable representatives were Karl Radek (Poland), Giacinto Serrati and Angelica Balabanoff (Italy) and Christian Rakovsky (Romania). Many of the future leaders of the Petrograd Soviet in 1917 were there, as were many future founders of the Communist International in 1919.

Lenin and his supporters at Zimmerwald found the manifesto unsatisfactory for its failure to denounce opportunism in the socialist movement strongly enough. Their minority ‘Zimmerwald Left’ group stressed the need to replace ‘civil peace’ with ‘civil war’ although quite what they meant by that was not fully spelled out. A follow-up conference at Kiental in April 1916 produced resolutions somewhat closer in spirit to the Zimmerwald Left. The Kiental manifesto, adopted on 1 May 1916, demanded an immediate armistice, declaring that ‘the hatred towards the war and the will to social retaliation is growing in all countries … the hour of peace between the peoples is inevitably approaching’.

Internationalism was not simply about avoiding chauvinism and refusing to blame the war entirely on one side or another. The war was an international calamity, caused by an international system (imperialist capitalism), and was to be ended by the international efforts of the working-class and socialist movements in overthrowing their militarist rulers. The socialists who gathered at Zimmerwald and Kiental did not consider the possibility of the ruling militarist clique being overthrown in only one state, and the question of how the newly revolutionary state should relate to its military opponents.
II. Russian socialists and World War One

The outbreak of war had split the socialist movement in Russia, as it had everywhere else, and the divisions over the war effort and whether to support it cut across the existing factional divides. Those who supported Russia’s war effort became known as ‘defencists’, while the ‘internationalists’, regarded all the belligerent states as culpable and refused to support their own ruling class against those of the Central Powers. Defencists sometimes referred to all the internationalists as ‘defeatists’, but the wish to see Russia militarily defeated was a minority position among the internationalists. Lenin argued at the end of September 1914 that ‘the defeat of the tsarist monarchy … would be the lesser evil’, and around the same time raised the slogan of ‘turning the imperialist war into a civil war’. Positions like this put Lenin and his supporters on the extreme left of the internationalist socialist spectrum.

As a whole, Russia’s socialists tended to be less swayed than the socialists in the other warring states by the patriotic fervour of August 1914 and after. They had little stake in the existing order, and even if Russia were militarily defeated, it was not likely to be overrun. Even figures like the defencist Menshevik Aleksandr Potresov, who supported the war effort from the outset, rejected the ‘civil peace’ policy adopted by the majority socialists in Germany and France towards their respective states and capitalists. Potresov envisaged a fight against both German semi-absolutism and militarism at the front and Russian autocracy in the rear. For its part, the Russian state showed little interest at first in trying to co-opt the labour movement for the war effort after the Western European fashion. Instead, on the outbreak of war many socialist leaders in Russia – Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and SRs – were rounded up and sent into internal exile in Siberia. Some were mobilised for war service.

As the details of the Zimmerwald conference and manifesto reached Siberia towards the end of 1915, they met with broad sympathy from many of these exiles. In the city of Irkutsk, an informal internationalist group of social democrats – including Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and non-aligned – gathered around the leading Menshevik Irakliy Tsereteli, while a parallel grouping of internationalist SRs formed around Abram Gots. Collectively, these currents came to be dubbed ‘Siberian Zimmerwaldists’.

Although these labels were used at the time, they can mask the fluidity of Russian socialism at this time. In his memoir of the revolution Tsereteli recalled socialist gatherings between 1914 and 1917 as little more than ‘exchanges between individuals or groups, lost in exile, in the
underground, or in emigration’. He noted that not one of the revolutionary parties managed to maintain regularly functioning organisational structures during the war. Moreover, disagreements over the war did not necessarily result in formal splits or breakdowns in political relationships within those political groups which continued to function in Russia. For all the incessant agitation by Lenin and Zinoviev from Switzerland for a complete rupture with ‘opportunism’, many Bolsheviks in Russia continued to work with whatever other socialists were at hand. Mensheviks were even less inclined to break completely with their comrades. In Tiflis, Georgia, the internationalist majority in the local Menshevik organisation even voted funds to allow the defencist minority to publish a paper.

The fluid, tangled, and ambiguous nature of the relationships within the Russian revolutionary milieu would have a profound effect on the behaviour and positions of the socialist leaders of the soviets following the overthrow of Tsar Nicholas II in March 1917.

III. The first weeks of the revolution

With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the fall of the Tsar and the outbreak of revolution in 1917 was a manifestation of Russia’s war exhaustion. That was not necessarily how it was perceived at the time. The generals who accepted Nicholas’s abdication did so in the hope that it would provide a fillip to the war effort. Although there was certainly a strong desire for peace among the workers and soldiers who came together across Russia to found soviets in March 1917, they did not immediately adopt internationalist anti-war positions. In Kazan’, on the Volga, for example, a leaflet issued in the first days of March by the local executive committee of the soldiers’ and workers’ soviet was entitled ‘Freedom, Victory and Full People’s Power’, and argued that, in view of the aggressive nature of German militarism, ‘only a victorious end to the war can secure the freedom we have won’.

The revolution gave soldiers and sailors real political weight. The fall of Tsarism had been precipitated by a mutiny in the Petrograd garrison. Across Russia, soldiers sent representatives to the soviets, and were the predominant force in many of them. The first chairman of the Kazan’ Soviet, for example, was one Second Lt. Poplavsky. Soldiers’ and sailors’ committees in the army and navy claimed all sorts of rights, including the power to arrest senior officers suspected of ‘counterrevolutionary’ attitudes. Central and local governments and soviet bodies always had to take account of the mood of the forces in their decisions. And, as 1917 wore on, power dissipated and
the state and administrative machinery crumbled, deploying bodies of armed men increasingly became the main means for making things happen.

The first days of the revolution gave the defencists in Russian socialism some weighty arguments. The internationalist social-democrat Nikolay Sukhanov recalled that in Petrograd, during those first days, he had been persuaded to act against his own views and try to dampen down anti-war sentiments on the streets, on the grounds that ‘if it began as a movement against the war, the revolution would immediately destroy itself through internal dissensions’. At this stage it was essential to keep the army as a whole, not just the mutinous Petrograd garrisons, on the side of the revolution, so that armed force could not be used to restore the old regime.

A Provisional Government had been rapidly formed in Russia following the fall of the Tsar. It was composed of liberal politicians from the Tsar’s pre-war consultative parliament (the Duma), and took office with the consent of the Petrograd Soviet, formed at the same time. Some of these liberal politicians imagined, in this early phase, that the armed forces of free Russia would fight as well as those of France. In early March the Provisional Duma Committee published an educational pamphlet on the French army, *The Republican Soldier*, by M. Matveev, a Russian journalist with the French forces. It explained how, despite France’s republican civil equality, discipline was paramount in the French army. This, Matveev urged, should be the model for the armed forces of revolutionary Russia, which, alongside their French comrades ‘as brothers and allies will not stop on their path until complete victory is achieved’.

A problem with ‘victory’ was that it had never been clearly defined. It was well known that the Tsarist government had made various agreements with the Entente about war aims, and that it had sought control of the Dardanelles. After February 1917 this aim became the totemic example of the predatory Tsarist foreign policy which revolutionary Russia had to renounce. The Petrograd Soviet, which until June generally spoke for all the soviets across Russia, set out its own position on the war on 14 March 1917, proclaiming that

> the time has come to begin a decisive struggle against the acquisitive ambitions of the governments of all countries; the time has come for the peoples to take into their own hands the decision of the question of war and peace …

> … the Russian democracy announces that it will oppose the policy of conquest of its ruling classes by every means, and it summons the peoples of Europe for common decisive action in favour of peace …
The soviet called on the workers of Germany and Austria-Hungary to ‘throw off the yoke of your semi-autocratic rule, as the Russian people have cast off the ‘Tsar’s autocracy’." The Menshevik Nikolay Chkheidze, in his speech introducing the appeal in the Soviet, even made this a condition for peace talks, declaiming theatrically ‘before speaking of peace, we are suggesting that the Germans follow our example and overthrow Wilhelm … if the Germans pay no attention to our appeal, then we shall fight for our freedom until the last drop of blood’. This reflected the revolutionary euphoria of the first weeks of the revolution, as well as the almost messianic view of the moral authority of revolutionary Russia which afflicted the whole socialist spectrum. The appeal affirmed that Russia

will firmly defend our own liberty against all reactionary attempts both from within and without. The Russian revolution will not retreat before the bayonets of conquerors, and will not permit itself to be crushed by foreign military force.

The soviet appeal was a well-crafted compromise. The reaffirmation of the need for defence reassured not only the defencists among the soviet parties, but also official Russia. The call for peace without annexations (indemnities were not mentioned), and the call to revolution in Germany and elsewhere were points to which Zimmerwaldians could readily subscribe. From the left, Stalin editorialised in the Bolshevik paper Pravda the next day, on 15 March

The revolutionary soldiers and officers who have overthrown the yoke of tsarism will not quit their trenches so as to clear the place for German or Austrian soldiers or officers … We cannot permit any disorganisation of the military forces of the revolution! War must be ended in an organised way, by a pact among the peoples which have liberated themselves, and not by subordination to the will of the neighbouring conqueror and imperialist.

In its turn the Provisional Government, under pressure from the soviet, issued a declaration on war aims on 27 March, affirming that

the aim of free Russia is not domination over other nations, or seizure of their national possessions, or forcible occupation of foreign territories, but the establishment of a stable peace on the basis of the self-determination of peoples.
While the declaration stated that this ‘would be made the basis of the foreign policy of the Provisional Government’, it added the seemingly innocuous rider: ‘fully observing at the same time all obligations assumed towards our Allies’. The SR paper Delo naroda greeted the Provisional Government declaration ‘with a deep feeling of moral satisfaction’. The Mensheviks’ Rabochaya gazeta expressed its ‘great satisfaction’, even though it noted that the declaration ‘did not … do away with the aggressive programme of the Allied powers, nor did it cancel the obligations of Russia to fight for this programme’.

At the end of March 1917, there seemed to be a broad consensus on war and peace stretching from the liberals to the far left. However, this consensus was more apparent than real, as several political crises would soon show.

IV. Siberian Zimmerwaldists into revolutionary defencists

Before the overthrow of the Tsar, social-democratic defencism in Russia had been hampered by the fact that there was little in the Russian social order that social democrats thought worth defending. The revolution changed all that. Russia had become a free country almost overnight, but this precious freedom was fragile, threatened by restorationists from within the country and the Central Powers from without. More importantly, across the country socialists and revolutionaries had gained not only freedom but also responsibility for the fate of Russia – a country embroiled in a war which was not going at all well. As Tsereteli observed in his memoir, commenting on the first days of the revolution in Irkutsk, Siberia, ‘the revolution had inherited the war, and had to continue to wage it actively until its conditions for peace could be realised’.

The revolution in Irkutsk was an important formative experience both for Tsereteli and for central soviet policies between April and October 1917. For the first two weeks after the fall of Nicholas, Tsereteli had been the leading figure in the three bodies which emerged to replace the old regime locally: a Committee of Public Organisations, a Soviet of Workers’ Deputies and a Military Organisation. Social democrats, SRs, non-party people, representatives of local businesses and the previous local authorities had worked together in various combinations in these bodies to run local affairs, maintain order, and stand guard against counterrevolution. Siberian Zimmerwaldists had, in effect, taken over the local administration. Tsereteli recalled that a few days after they had
taken over, he was unexpectedly asked to decide whether military supplies from Vladivostok should be allowed to pass through Irkutsk on the way to the front. His decision that the freight should not be stopped, a decision his colleagues supported, was, he concluded, ‘a psychological turning-point, the start of that “revolutionary defencism” which predominated in the democratic milieu for the first eight months of the revolution’.  

Tsereteli, Gots, and other Siberian exiles arrived in Petrograd from Irkutsk at the end of March. As senior, albeit second-rank, representatives of their respective parties, they rapidly assumed leading positions in the Petrograd Soviet. The bloc they formed endured as the leading bloc until the autumn. The top party leaders were out of the country, and did not arrive back in Russia until days or even weeks later. Meanwhile, Siberian Zimmerwaldism had largely transmuted into revolutionary defencism, combining an insistence on a democratic peace with a concern that the front must be maintained. It was a policy dictated by the circumstances in which its proponents found themselves, but it had a very limited shelf life. It committed Russia to continue to fight, but not in order to win, at a time when both Russia’s allies and enemies were still committed to war until victory – whatever ‘victory’ meant in practice.

V. Which way to peace?

Russia was not alone in needing peace in 1917. The war was taking its toll on all the belligerents, but Russia’s need was more urgent, and was becoming more so by the day. But how was peace to be achieved – through victory, a settlement, or international revolution?

The option of an annexationist victory was effectively ruled out within two months of the fall of Nicholas. Some liberal politicians, such as the Provisional Government’s first foreign minister Pavel Milyukov, still hoped for military victory and a share in a carve-up of the vanquished. Milyukov did not consider that the government declaration of war aims invalidated existing plans and treaties agreed with the Allies, and it was no secret that he still wanted control of the Bosphorus. However, when he (reluctantly) sent the statement on war aims to the Allied governments with an explanatory note spelling out that the treaties still stood, there was a storm of protest in Petrograd, with massive street demonstrations on 21 April. ‘Bourgeois’ demonstrators supporting Milyukov and demanding war until victory clashed with workers and soldiers calling for Milyukov to go, no annexations and an end to the war. Some demonstrators were
armed and shots were fired. The ensuing political crisis put an end to Milyukov’s ministerial career, and at the same time obliged the Menshevik and SR leaders of the Petrograd Soviet to abandon their policy of standing aside from government. On 5 May a coalition Provisional Government was announced, with five representatives of the Soviet, including Chernov and Tsereteli, and minus certain representatives of the right, most notably Milyukov. In its initial declaration, the new coalition ‘reject[ed] ... all thought of a separate peace’, and ‘adopt[ed] openly as its aim the reestab-
lishment of a general peace ... without annexations or indemnities, and based on the right of nations to decide their own affairs’. It also under-
took to try to convince the Allies of the desirability of this approach to a general peace. Annexationist victory had become politically off-limits in Petrograd, and it was becoming clearer that the soldiers were, for the most part, not inspired to fight for it.

Meanwhile, the internationalist camp in Russia had regrouped follow-
ing the defection of most of the Siberian Zimmerwaldists to the cause of national defence. The return of Lenin and other Bolshevik émigrés from Switzerland via Germany at the beginning of April played a key part in this. Within 24 hours of arriving in Petrograd, Lenin had effectively scuppered an initiative meeting which aimed to reunify the entire Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDRP) – Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and non-aligned. He did so by insisting on a policy of no support for the Provisional Government and no concessions to revolutionary defencism. For Lenin, the war would only become a worthwhile, revolutionary, war on condition:

(a) that the power pass to the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants aligned with the proletariat; (b) that all annexations be renounced in deed and not in word; (c) that a complete break be effected in actual fact with all capitalist interests.

He followed this with a swipe at the editorial attitude up to that time of the Bolshevik paper Pravda under Stalin and Lev Kamenev, dismissing its calls for the capitalist Provisional Government to renounce seizures of territory as ‘senseless’. Although Lenin initially presented these views as merely his personal opinion, it was not long before Stalin and the previous Bolshevik leadership in Petrograd fell into line, and those Bolsheviks who could not accept Lenin’s new intransigent policy quit his party. Thereafter, the Bolsheviks were fully ‘internationalist’, although their approach set them apart from other internationalists.
The Mensheviks and SRs, on the other hand, were at sixes and sevens on their attitudes to the war effort, their attitudes to the Allies, and how best to try to end the war. The full range of opinions had been expressed at the Petrograd SR conference on 3 April. Abram Gots, introducing the resolution on the war, repeated all the internationalist nostrums about the culpability of the ‘imperialist circles of all the belligerent states’ for starting the war. However, Gots continued, the responsibility the Russian democracy now bore for the fate of the country and revolution ‘obliges us to reconsider our tactical attitude to the war’. Gots proposed that the government should call a conference of the Allies to devise a non-annexationist peace programme, and that there should be a conference of socialists of all belligerent countries to reconstruct the International. In the meantime, the front had to be maintained. To defend Russia was to defend both the revolution and the International, since, Gots argued, ‘Russian democracy is now the mainstay of the international socialist movement, its main fortress and bastion’. Gots’s speech and resolution summed up the tactical approach of revolutionary defencism – a three-pronged policy of state diplomacy, international socialist diplomacy and urging the troops to hold the line at the front in the meantime.

Opposing Gots from the left at the conference, Boris Kamkov criticised the continued alliance with Anglo-French imperialism, which made a mockery of Russia’s renunciation of annexations. Kamkov urged that the secret treaties between Tsarist Russia and the Allies be published, and declared that the SRs’ task should be ‘to carry the revolutionary movement into all countries’. Vladimir Trutovsky also urged that Russia ‘should throw off the yokes of the governments of England and France’ and, unusually, went further to make the normally taboo suggestion that ‘we should conclude a separate peace with Germany if it renounces indemnities and annexations’.

An army officer, Vladimir Utgof, observed in the discussion that ‘although the army wants peace, it cannot just stand and do nothing, “remain organised just where it is”, because that would be suicidal and ruinous’. He was right. There was general consensus that the army needed to be doing something, but little agreement on what, or, perhaps more importantly, to what end. Rank-and-file soldiers and sailors were also increasingly asking themselves what they were doing in the forces and why. The lack of a clear answer fostered increasing tendencies towards desertion and insubordination.
VI. The Allies and their socialists

Once it had become clear in the Allied states that the Russian monarchy was gone for good, and that the Petrograd Soviet wielded real influence in Russia, officially-sanctioned delegations of Allied majority socialists hurried there in April and May 1917. They were led by figures like the French socialist minister Albert Thomas, Emile Vandervelde from Belgium, and the British minister Arthur Henderson, and their main task was to bolster Russia’s war effort, encourage civil peace in the rear and sell the line of ‘war until victory’ on behalf of their respective governments. They were not very warmly received by most of the soviet parties, who were looking for allies for their own peace policy.33

It was only small groups on the right of the soviet spectrum, Georgiy Plekhanov’s Edinstvo group and the People’s Socialists, who saw eye-to-eye with the Allied majority socialists. Nonetheless, the revolutionary defencist majority in the Soviet did not seek to break with the Allies, but rather to persuade the Allies to renounce any annexationist plans in their war aims, as part of the effort towards a just peace. They also wanted support for a socialist peace conference, intended to be held in Stockholm that summer. The diplomatic mission of the Allied socialists reinforced the idea, very attractive to all parties in the Soviet, that revolutionary Russia and its socialists could play the key role in ending the slaughter.

The projected peace conference, discussed below, was a cornerstone of the soviet majority’s plans to end the war on acceptable terms. Getting the Allied socialists on board with the idea was essential if international socialist diplomacy was to work. Initially, at least, the soviet majority had considerable success here. Marcel Cachin and Marius Moutet from France were won over both to the conference and the peace formula, and even Henderson overcame his initial reluctance to the idea.34 There was, however, a trade-off. As Albert Thomas claimed at the Petrograd Soviet on 29 May, shortly before his return to France: ‘the French socialists undertook to compel the French government to renounce imperialist war aims … on condition that Russia does not conclude a separate peace and takes steps to maintain the real strength of its army’.35 He emphasised the efforts and political costs to the French socialists of fulfilling this undertaking. For Thomas, the ostensible war aims could be tweaked, so long as Russia continued to fight Germany.
VII. The Mensheviks and their dilemmas

When the Mensheviks gathered for their ‘All-Russia Congress of the RSDRP’ in early May 1917, the honeymoon period of the revolution was already over. Tsereteli and Matvey Skobelev were now government ministers, and therefore directly shared responsibility for Russia’s foreign policy and military stance. At the same time, a semi-detached opposition around Martov, the ‘Menshevik-Internationalists’, was organising separately and maintaining a running critique of the official party position.

The congress resolution on the war, moved by party leader Fedor Dan on 9 May, very much echoed the Soviet declaration of 14 March. It called for peace without annexations and indemnities on the grounds that an end to the war by a decisive victory of one coalition of powers over the other would serve as a source for renewed militarist chauvinism and the weakening of the international proletarian movement.36

It is noteworthy that victory for the Allies was seen as no less dangerous than victory for the Germans. The resolution called instead for a struggle for ‘a general peace through the united efforts of the international proletariat’, and explicitly rejected a separate peace on the grounds that it would ‘give one group of powers the possibility of winning a decisive victory over the other’.37 The party’s task was to ‘help defend the country from the danger of a military rout’ and at the same time ‘launch the widest and most energetic struggle for a general peace’.38

Unfortunately as time went on, the perspective of the Soviet declaration was looking less and less plausible. Workers and their organisations in the other belligerent countries had not heeded the Soviet’s call, and continued to follow their imperialist leaders. Meanwhile, the ability of the army to defend revolutionary Russia was increasingly in doubt.

In the congress discussion, both defencists and internationalists were able to point out fatal flaws in the arguments and schemas of their opponents. The internationalist Osip Ermansky argued that the call to raise the fighting capacity of the army ‘is destroying the work being done to reconstruct the International’.39 On the defencist side, Aleksandr Potresov pointed out that the internationalists completely ignore the question of what we should do before peace is achieved, if the international path of agreement between the proletarians
of the interested countries ... does not rapidly give tangible results, does not stop the war, does not lead to this peace.⁴⁰

Potresov supported the two-track approach of Dan’s resolution, albeit with greater stress on the role of the army rather than that of the international working class, but in his turn largely ignored the fact of that army’s disintegration. A defencist delegate from the Dvinsk front, Mikhail Krom, argued that ill-considered slogans were being misinterpreted by the soldiers in the trenches. ‘Down with the war’ was often being taken to mean ‘dump your weapon and go home’,⁴¹ when what was needed was greater discipline and cohesion.

An international socialist conference figured in the schemas of all Menshevik factions, although there was no consensus about the participants or agenda. Robert Grimm of the Zimmerwaldian International Socialist Committee, one of the groups seeking to convene an international conference, addressed the Menshevik congress on 9 May. His speech would only have pleased Martov’s faction. He blasted the ‘social patriotism’ of the Menshevik majority’s decision to enter a government willing to countenance offensive military operations. The Provisional Government had no right to claim the mantle of Zimmerwald, Grimm argued, because ‘a government which seriously desires peace must first of all declare its willingness to conclude an immediate truce’.⁴²

Unfortunately, Grimm was also trying a bit of non-socialist, traditional-diplomatic peace-making at the same time. On 12 May he sent a telegram to the Swiss foreign minister Hoffman outlining the need for peace in Russia and suggesting that should ‘a German offensive in the East ... not take place, the liquidation [of the war] might be carried out in a relatively short period’.⁴³ A week later, he received a reply from Hoffmann, relaying German assurances that ‘Germany will not undertake an offensive so long as an agreement with Russia seems possible’.⁴⁴ When Hoffmann’s telegram was revealed in the Russian press in early June, Grimm was accused of being a German agent and promptly deported from Russia, with the full agreement of the socialist ministers he had criticised so roundly. He had few defenders in Russia: anything which smelled of a separate peace was disavowed by everyone.

VIII. The First All-Russia Congress of Soviets, June 1917

Peace was no more in prospect by the time the first congress of soviets opened in Petrograd on 5 June. Most of the delegates, from across Russia,
supported the revolutionary-defencist line of the Menshevik-SR majority in the Petrograd Soviet, although the internationalists were well represented. On the eve of the congress, the internationalist social-democratic newspaper Novaya zhizn’ attempted to address the question of what Russia’s military stance should be before a democratic peace can be reached? Its leader-writer Vladimir Bazarov argued that since the Allies would not renounce annexations, Russia should break with them, and declare that

we are continuing the war on our own account, and will continue it until such time as our enemies accept our peace terms, not only in relation to us, but in relation to all belligerent countries. The salvation of the revolution demands not a separate peace, but a separate war – a genuinely ‘liberative’ war, not directed against German imperialism, but against imperialism in general.45

The main effect of this article was to give the revolutionary defencists a convenient foil at the soviet congress. The Menshevik leader Dan started his speech introducing the soviet majority motion on the war by demolishing the notion of separate war: ‘only a separate peace can come from a separate war, not a general peace’.46 Alternatively, if

Russia starts waging war with openly revolutionary and anti-imperialist goals ... we shall see our salvation not in the speediest conclusion of peace, but in the most successful and victorious pursuit of that war. This separate war will turn into a revolutionary war for the liberation of Europe and the start of its socialist transformation, as advocated by the Bolshevik comrades.47

Instead, Dan repeated the familiar formula of the past three months – trying to shore up the front while pressing the Allies to renounce imperialist war aims, and working towards a socialist peace conference. Moreover, he argued, Russia would only carry any weight with the Allied governments if it had some armed force to deploy,48 and raised the possibility that offensive action might be one of the ways to boost both the fighting capacity of the army and Russia’s diplomatic weight.

Dan was followed by Lenin, whose speech was more concerned with exploiting the revolutionary potential of the war than with finding ways of ending it quickly:
We say, the only way out of the war is revolution. Support the revolution of the classes oppressed by the capitalists, overthrow the class of capitalists in your own country, and thereby set an example for other countries.49

As only revolution could end the war, Lenin saw little use in trying to convene further international socialist conferences to discuss possible peace plans. As for the bogey of a separate peace, Lenin slew it thus:

We say, no separate peace with any capitalists, particularly with the Russian capitalists! … We do not recognise any separate peace with the German capitalists and will enter into no negotiations with them; but neither do we want a separate peace with the British and French imperialists.50

The path to peace set out in the Bolsheviks’ motion to the congress was beguilingly simple. They proposed that the congress itself should seize power, form a government, and then

immediately appeal to all belligerent governments and separately to the working classes of these countries, setting out the peace conditions in full and proposing that peace negotiations be opened immediately … It will unmask all these governments, make it impossible for them to maintain their power over the oppressed classes, and clear the path to the world socialist revolution.51

Speaking after Lenin, Russia’s war minister Aleksandr Kerensky, struck a very different tone as he outlined the strategy behind the government’s peace policy:

We are proceeding gradually, obliging both the government of our own country and the governments of the democratic countries of Europe gradually to move over to our positions under the influence of a democratic public opinion which is becoming ever more organised …52

Kerensky was sure that the government’s foreign policy, which had raised the question of revising war aims with the Allies, ‘will undoubtedly bring enormous and positive results’.53 In the meantime, as befitted his Cabinet position, Kerensky’s main concern was with raising the effectiveness of the army.
This was also the concern of Aleksandr Vilenkin, a professional army officer and political liberal who had joined the People’s Socialists in 1917 so that he could take part in soldiers’ soviets. Vilenkin sardonically remarked that the congress discussion had shown that the political course of the soviet majority ‘will not bring us any closer to concluding peace’, but he was particularly scathing about the internationalists’ ‘ostrich politics’.

... we need to decide whether to fight or not. If we don’t fight, then – I shall say those words which clearly frighten everyone – then it’s separate peace ... And if we don’t want that, then, up to the time when the German ruling circles are broken, we need to be strong and prepared, to prevent them from attacking and destroying us.

Plekhanov, in a long and uncompromisingly pro-war-effort speech, expressed a fear held by many on both sides of the debate: that Russia could end up as ‘something like China in Eastern Europe’. Plekhanov related this perspective to a separate peace, others feared it might happen if either side ‘won’ outright.

The votes of the Menshevik-SR majority at the congress reaffirmed the policy of the past three months. The fighting capacity of the armed forces would be bolstered. An offensive would help this and boost Russia’s diplomatic weight. There would be efforts to persuade the Allies to embrace a peace programme, and a parallel programme of socialist diplomacy aimed at fostering peace and reconstructing the International. It was not long before these perspectives started to unravel.

IX. The June Offensive and its aftermath

The military offensive which had been presented as a hypothetical, operational measure on 9 June was launched on 18 June, while the soviet congress was still in progress. Russian forces attacked Austrian forces in Galicia, pushing towards Lvov. A resolution supporting the offensive and the army was moved at the soviet congress the next morning by Tsereteli, who claimed that the offensive had shown the world that the democratic ideals of our domestic and foreign policy have not only not demoralised the army, as the enemies of the revolution have tried to claim, but that this enthusiasm has boosted the fighting capacity of the army. Comrades, this is a turning point in the Russian
revolution, when it will show the power and force of the new democratic ideals which have been realised in the rear and at the front.\textsuperscript{57}

Viktor Chernov, supporting Tsereteli, expected that the success of the offensive would mean that ‘the voice of revolutionary Russia will carry more weight, will have greater influence, and maybe lead Europe ... towards liquidating the war’.\textsuperscript{58} However, the omens were not good. A demonstration in Petrograd on 18 June called by the soviet congress to support the offensive turned into an anti-war demonstration through a mass mobilisation of Bolshevik supporters. ‘Enthusiasm’ was clearly not felt by everyone.

The offensive had some initial successes, but it had faltered by the end of June. The Austrian and German forces counterattacked, and the Russian armies were routed. There were widespread reports of pillaging of Russian villages by groups of Russian soldiers retreating in disarray. The government and army chiefs put much of the blame on Bolshevik and internationalist agitation among the troops, insubordination, and the power of soldiers’ committees to delay implementation of orders while the troops discussed and voted on them. Military commanders demanded an end to army democracy. Supreme Commander General Aleksey Brusilov wrote to Kerensky on 11 July calling for ‘iron discipline in all its plenitude and the death penalty for traitors’;\textsuperscript{59} the latter measure was enacted the next day. In the following days military censorship was reintroduced, and the Bolshevik papers \textit{Pravda} and \textit{Okopnaya pravda} (‘Trench Truth’) were banned. The Petrograd Soviet protested, but to no avail. ‘Democratic ideals’ at the front were – officially, at least – over.

Besides attempts to reassert control in the army, the government also took repressive measures against the Bolsheviks in response to unruly Bolshevik-inspired armed street demonstrations of sailors, soldiers and workers in Petrograd on 3–5 July 1917. The débâcle at the front and the disorders in Petrograd led to strong calls for the restoration of order at the front and in the rear. For a few weeks in the summer, the military leadership was in the political ascendancy in Petrograd. On 19 July, Kerensky appointed General Lavr Kornilov, a career officer who made little attempt to present himself as a friend of the revolution, as Supreme Commander in place of Brusilov.

The generals had few ideas beyond tighter discipline in the front and rear, the removal of army committees and ‘politics’ from military affairs, and the hope that these measures might restore the army’s fighting ability. They were unable to make much progress in turning round
the disintegration of the Russian army, accelerated as it was by the disintegration of the Russian economy in the rear. But by their actions they raised the spectre of ‘counterrevolution’ in soviet circles. Kornilov overplayed his hand at the end of August by moving Cossack troops towards Petrograd; Kerensky denounced his action as a ‘mutiny’ the Soviet mobilised forces to defend Petrograd and meet Kornilov’s troops. The ‘mutiny’ fizzled out as the Cossacks refused to advance any further. This marked the end of the military leadership’s brief ascendancy in Petrograd. It also marked the breakdown of the last vestiges of discipline in the Russian army, as groups of revolutionary soldiers hunted down ‘Kornilovite’ officers. On 3 September, the soviet Central Executive Committee was obliged to publish an appeal in Izvestiya to the soldiers: ‘In the interest of the revolution, refrain from lynching. Use self-restraint, soldiers!’.

X. The failure of socialist diplomacy

If a successful offensive might have given Russia more weight in pushing for peace talks, a failed offensive certainly had the opposite effect, as the fate of the Stockholm peace initiatives showed. The Russian socialists had placed enormous hopes in socialist diplomacy as a way of breaking through the logjam of official intergovernmental relations, dominated as they were across Europe by the very people who bore responsibility for the war. The idea was very seductive – if a socialist peace conference succeeded not only could it help secure a just peace, it could also help reconstruct the International, and massively increase the prestige of the socialist movement and of revolutionary Russia.

In the spring of 1917 there were three parallel initiatives to call a socialist conference in Stockholm. The Dutch delegation to the International Socialist Bureau, a non-Zimmerwaldian body which declared it ‘adopted the standpoint of Kerensky and Wilson’, resolved to relocate to Stockholm and call an international conference, to which both majority and minority socialists from both the Entente and Central powers would be invited. The Zimmerwaldian International Socialist Committee then issued an invitation, to the internationalist socialists only, also to meet in Stockholm. Finally, on 2 May, the Petrograd Soviet issued its appeal ‘to the socialists of all countries’, which also proposed an international conference. Socialist diplomacy proved to be no less delicate than its bourgeois counterpart, as wrangling took place over who was to be invited, who was prepared to sit in the same room as whom, and the question of whether war guilt should be off-limits or the first item on the agenda. In
response to the Soviet appeal, Henderson, Thomas and Vandervelde stated on 22 May that they could not agree to a meeting with German majority socialist representatives present.⁶² There was clearly lots of persuading to be done before any useful conference could even be convened, whatever its likely outcome. The conferences, originally intended for May, had to be put off several times.

To try to move things along, the first soviet congress sent a five-man delegation on a tour around Europe from 16 June, charged with holding talks with all the socialist party representatives they could meet, and possibly to combine the soviet initiative with the Dutch-Scandinavian one. The delegation, led by the social democrat Iosif Goldenberg and the SR Nikolay Rusanov, travelled via Sweden to Britain, where they met with Henderson and the Labour leaders, France, where they met socialist and government leaders, and then Italy. They painstakingly worked to win majority socialist opinion in Britain and France round to the idea of taking part in Stockholm; only the Italian socialists were already favourable. The Russian delegates stuck to the soviet policy of no separate peace, much to the relief of the British and French majority socialists. This earned them a favourable reception with majority socialists in London and Paris, but weakened their position in relation to the governments of those countries. The prospect of a separate peace was the only remotely credible threat they could have deployed.⁶³

Even the possibility of a separate peace was losing its force in the aftermath of the June offensive débâcle, as Allied governments effectively wrote Russia out of their military calculations. The prospects on the Western front were improving for the Allies after the United States had joined the war on 6 April, and Germany’s policy of unrestricted submarine warfare had failed to destroy Allied shipping. The French and British governments had no further need to humour the soviets – the French government refused to grant passports for delegates to go to Stockholm, followed on 11 August by the British government. The Stockholm initiative was scuppered. The Zimmerwaldians did manage to hold a small conference there between 5–12 September 1917, but their exclusively internationalist gathering was of little significance to Russia’s peace efforts.

The last gasp of soviet diplomacy in the period of the Provisional Government took place in early October, in connection with an upcoming Inter-Allied Conference on War Aims, to be held in Paris. The soviet Central Executive Committee requested to be represented at the talks by the Menshevik former labour minister Matvey Skobelev. It drafted a peace plan on which he was to insist, with ‘peace without annexations and
indemnities on the basis of the right of nations to self-determination’ as its first point. The Provisional Government objected, the Allies protested against Skobelev attending at all, and Bonar Law commented in the House of Commons that the conference would be about how to wage the war, not its aims.

Even as the Provisional Government entered its death throes, the taboo on a separate peace remained sacrosanct. One of its final quixotic acts was to dismiss the war minister General Aleksandr Verkhovsky for having publicly argued that Russia could no longer fight and therefore had to conclude peace before calamity struck. He had not actually called for a separate peace, but even pointing out the obvious truth was unacceptable. Verkhovsky was sent away on leave on 21 October. Kerensky’s government had four days left.

XI. October – annexations, indemnities, but no peace

The Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets opened on 25 October, at the same time as Bolshevik-directed forces were in the process of deposing Kerensky’s government. This fact overshadowed all other considerations. It led to a walkout by most of the non-Bolshevik delegates, and the question of peace was barely aired at the congress. One speaker who did raise the issue was the Novaya zhizn’ journalist Boris Avilov, who addressed the triumphant Bolsheviks:

The Allies refused to talk with Skobelev. They will never accept the proposition of a peace conference from you. You will not be recognised either in London or Paris, or in Berlin … You cannot count on the effective help of the proletariat of the Allied countries … revolution in Germany [is] impossible during the war …

Avilov foresaw only two possible outcomes – either a separate peace with Germany, or a peace between the Allies and the Central Powers at Russia’s expense. Trotsky, for the Bolsheviks, responded in full rhetorical flight:

There are only two alternatives; either the Russian Revolution will create a revolutionary movement in Europe, or the European powers will destroy the Russian Revolution!

The decree on peace, one of the first decrees adopted by Lenin’s new Council of People’s Commissars on 26 October, stuck very much to the
motion the Bolsheviks had proposed at the first soviet congress in June. It addressed both the peoples and the governments of all the belligerent countries, proposed an immediate armistice and the opening of peace negotiations. It also expressed its confidence that the workers of Britain, France and Germany ‘by comprehensive, determined and supremely vigorous action, will help us conclude peace successfully’. The process of self-demobilisation of Russia’s army through desertion, in the expectation of peace, continued to gather pace.

Only the German government responded to the call of the decree. On 2 (15) December 1917 a preliminary armistice agreement was signed between Soviet and German representatives at Brest-Litovsk. The subsequent treaty, also concluded at Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918, involved annexations at Russia’s expense, although officially no indemnities. These came in a supplementary treaty of 27 August 1918, which obliged Russia to pay 6,000 million marks ‘as compensation to the loss to Germans caused by Russian measures’.

Brest-Litovsk was met with a wave of indignation, not only from the other political forces in Russia, but also from within the Bolshevik Party, where Nikolay Bukharin and other ‘left communists’ demanded a revolutionary war. On the right, the treaty symbolised the Bolsheviks’ betrayal of Russia. As the country collapsed into civil war in the summer of 1918, and anti-Bolshevik ‘white’ forces and ‘governments’ emerged around the periphery, rejection of Brest-Litovsk was a common aim of them all, right up to the armistice on the western front in November 1918. The fact that none of them had armed forces capable of waging such a war, and that some of them were thousands of miles from the nearest German troops, did not seem to matter. A short-lived ‘Provisional All-Russia Government’ formed in Ufa, in the Urals, on 8 September 1918 included ‘non-recognition of the Brest Treaty’ and ‘continuation of the war against the German coalition’ as part of its quixotic programme.

In the event, World War One ended messily on the eastern front, with a variety of separate peaces and separate wars. Many of those separate wars were fought on the territory of the former Russian Empire, where the imperialist war turned into several civil wars. In European Russia, the last of those wars was not over until 1921.

XII. Conclusion

The Zimmerwald movement was finally buried in March 1919, by the leaders of its former left wing, at the First Congress of the Communist
How should its legacy be assessed? Its major achievement was to set the terms of Russia’s quest for peace in 1917. It made Russia’s peace aims far clearer than its war aims after February. But clarity is not the same as attainability.

As a political slogan, ‘peace without annexations and indemnities on the basis of self-determination’ was excellent. It neatly encapsulated the aspirations of those socialists who resisted the lure of national chauvinism. It was also very attractive to the losing side in the war. A just and honourable peace may not be as desirable as victory, but it is much better than defeat, with all that might entail.

As a political goal, the Zimmerwald slogan presented serious theoretical problems: What counts as an annexation? Who has the right to self-determine, and how? The practical problems were even more serious: How can everyone be persuaded to sign up to it? Why would the winning side want to forgo the fruits of victory?

But, alas, as a non-negotiable precondition for concluding peace, the Zimmerwald slogan was a disaster. For eight months, revolutionary Russia remained trapped in a war it was losing, with Allies it did not trust, fighting not in order to win, but in the vain hope of a principled peace which would give honour and credit to the revolution. No separate or compromise peace could even be considered. All that time, Russia’s armed forces were crumbling, its economy was collapsing, and its internal politics were becoming increasingly polarised and violent. Yet the Russian revolutionaries of all parties and factions retained their almost messianic view of the historic role and significance of their revolution, their conviction that it should provide a political and moral lead to the working people of the world, and their determination not to besmirch it by concluding a shabby deal with German imperialism. It blinded them to one sad, but inescapable, fact: in war, the losers do not get to dictate the peace terms.

Notes

1. Resolution adopted at the Seventh International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart, on www.marxists.org/history/international/social-democracy/1907/militarism.htm
3. See Julia Richers, ‘Bern als Zentrum von Geheimdiplomatie, Spionage and
11. For this and other leaflets issued in Kazan’ during the February revolution, see www.archive.gov.tatarstan.ru/_go/anonymous/main/?path=/pages/ru/3ipd/931vyst/77Revolysiy
25. As reported in *Edinstvo*, 4 April 1917, republished in Ziva Galili and Albert

26. This is according to the *Edinstvo* report, Galili and Nenarokov, *Men' sheviki v 1917 godu. t. 1*, p176.


29. Ibid., p22.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p25.


37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ermansky’s speech in ibid., p333.
40. Potresov’s speech in ibid., p331.
41. Krom’s speech in ibid., p328.


43. Telegram from Grimm to Hoffmann, in ibid., p621.
44. Telegram from Hoffmann to Grimm, in ibid.
45. V. Bazarov, ‘Chto zhe dal’she?’ in *Novaya zhizn*', No. 40, 4/17 June 1917, p1


47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., p312.
50. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., p340.
55. Ibid., p343.
56. Ibid., p368
58. Ibid., p87.
67. Cited in ibid., p120.
69. The texts of the treaties are given in full in Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, here p440.
70. ‘An Act to Form an All-Russian Supreme Authority’, 8 September 1918, English translation on www.korolevperevody.co.uk/korolev/ufimtsy.html