Reimagination of Turkey: The Emergence and Challenges of Post-Kemalist Nation-State Identity
(2001-2011)

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ABSTRACT

This research investigates the emergence of Turkey’s post-Kemalist nation-state identity and its challenges in the post-9/11 era. By challenging the argument that there is essentially one understanding of Turkey’s identity, it exposes competing perspectives on Turkey’s new identity and its place in the world. To reveal the process of domestic power struggle in maintaining and transforming Turkey’s Kemalist identity, the study takes Ruth Wodak’s Discourse-Historical Approach in a search of different discourses on Turkish national identity and foreign policy in Turkish media from 2001 to 2011. On the historical context of Turkish politics in the post-9/11 period, the study argues that Turkey’s post-Kemalist identity crisis in the last decade has shaped both Turkish nation-state identity and foreign policy discourse which has directly targeted the Kemalist and Europeanist world view and empowered the nation’s Muslim and non-European perception of ‘self’ and the perception of Turkey’s place in the world. In this context, this study makes a significant contribution to Turkish politics, nationalism and media studies through a critical observation of different political positions and antagonisms in Turkish media discourse, considering the changes and challenges within the conceptions of new Turkey's identity.
**LIST OF CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTRODUCTION</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Aim of the Study: Understanding the Process of Discursive Construction of</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Turkey's Identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Literature Review on New Turkey's Identity</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Importance and Contribution of the Project</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Selection of the Case Studies</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Structure of the Project</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER ONE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE THEORY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY: THE NATION-STATE IDENTITY,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND THE MEDIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. Theorising the Nation-State Identity</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. Towards a Discursive Approach to Construction of Nation-State Identity</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3. Nation in Narrative: Discourse Historical Approach to Construction of</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4. The Methodological Critics and Limitations</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5. The Media and National Identity: Imagined Communities and Banal</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6. The Main Assumptions of the Thesis and the Application of DHA to the</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case of Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7. Searching Competing Discourses of Turkish Identity in the Turkish</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7.1. The First Stage: Establishing the Main Themes of Turkey's Identity</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7.2. The Second Stage: Investigation of the Discursive Strategies</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7.3. The Third Stage: Examination of the Linguistic Means and Realisations</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the Discursive Strategies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER TWO</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY: THE CONSTRUCTION OF TURKISH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATION-STATE IDENTITY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. The Origins of Different Narratives of Turkish Nation:</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. The Construction of Official Kemalist Nation-State Discourse</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. Non-Muslimhood in Turkish Nation and Nationalism</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4. Competing Nationalisms in Turkey: The Secular versus Islamist Turkish</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalisms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.5. Competing Nationalisms in Turkey: Turkish Nationalism versus Kurdish Nationalism  
2.6. The Challenges of Turkey's Kemalist Identity in the Post-Cold War Era with Transformation of the Domestic Power Relations and the Rise of the AKP  
2.7. The European Identity and Turkey's Europeanisation Process under the AKP Government  
2.8. The Paradigm Shift after September 11th 2001 and Redefinition of Turkey's European/Western Identity  

Conclusion  

CHAPTER THREE  
NATION AND RELIGION: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE CONTESTED NARRATIVES OF TURKISHNESS  
Introduction  
3.1. The Importance and Background of the Case of Hrant Dink  
3.1.1. The Identity of Hrant Dink: Non-Muslims in Turkish National Identity Discourse  
3.1.2. The Crime and Punishment: Blaming Others or Saying 'We Killed Hrant Dink'  
3.1.3. The Discursive Construction of Common Political Past of the Nation: ‘Those Crazy Turks’  
3.1.4. The Discursive Construction of the Common Political Present and Future: The Banalisation of the Extreme Right and Violence  
3.2. The Case of the Presidential Elections of Turkey in 2007: Secularism and Islam in Turkish Nation-State Identity  
3.2.1. On Understanding of the Nation and National Identity: Which Turkey?  
3.2.2. Being the President of Turkish Republic: Who Should Represent the Turkish Nation?  
3.2.3. The Republican Demonstrations in the Turkish Media  
3.2.4. Turkish Media Coverage on the Results of 2007 National Elections  
Conclusion  

CHAPTER FOUR  
NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY: THE CASE STUDY OF TURKEY'S KURDISH QUESTION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION  
Introduction  
4.1. Reimagining Turkey's Place in Europe  
4.1.1. Representation of Turkey’s European Integration in the Pro-Secular Media Discourse  
4.1.2. Representation of Turkey’s European Integration in the Post-Kemalist Discourse  

4
4.2. The Kurdish Question and European Union Membership Debates in the Pro-Secular Discourse
4.3. The Kurdish Question in the Post-Kemalist Discourse
4.4. AKP’s Kurdish Initiative in Turkish Media
4.4.1. AKP’s Kurdish Initiative in the Pro-Secular Discourse
4.4.2. AKP’s Kurdish Initiative in the Post-Kemalist Discourse

Findings and Conclusion

CHAPTER FIVE
TURKEY'S NEW IDENTITY: 9/11 AND IRAQ WAR IN TURKISH MEDIA
Introduction
5.1. The Constructed Link Between the Events of 11 September 2001 and Iraq War in the Media
5.2. The 9/11 Events in the Turkish Press
5.3. Decision-making on Turkey’s Role in Iraq War
5.4. The Iraq War in Turkish Media
5.5. Reimagination of Turkey: the Debate of the Axis Shift in Western Orientation of Turkish Foreign Policy in Turkish Media
5.5.1. Kemalist Discourse on New Turkish Foreign Policy: Islamisation of Turkey
5.5.2. Advocate Media: Expanded Axis in Turkish Foreign Policy
Findings and Conclusion

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
Introduction
6.1. Theoretical and Methodological Results
6.2. The Empirical Findings: Reimagination of Turkey
6.2.1. The Nation and Identity: Being Turk and Muslim
6.2.2. The Construction of Non-Europeannes in Turkey's New Identity
6.2.3. The New Turkey: Post-Kemalist Narrative and Its Challenges
References
Sources of Turkish Newspapers
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As Edward Said noted, each of us is an exile, constantly unsettled and restless in our pursuits. In our endless quests, dwelling is impossible. I think the search begins within us and ends with us; but we are no longer the same persons as in the beginning. Sometimes we lose our sense of belonging to a place. For me, the sense of belonging comes with the sense of will and the fact that I meet individuals who work to make this world a better place. They do this selflessly despite the hegemonic fact of the dark and pessimist reality of politics and its everyday production by the banality of evil. In this context, I think that the PSI in the UEA constituted one of the most plentiful grounds for my intellectual development in exploring new insights and perspectives on studying Politics. Therefore, every single year of my PhD in the UEA, I have felt that I have completed my studies in the most appropriate school. What makes me say this is the undoubtedly immense contribution my supervisors and the academic members of the PSI have played in my overall advancement.

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INTRODUCTION

On 29 May 2013, the largest wave of protests in Turkey’s history was sparked when the Turkish police violently intervened during an environmentalist peaceful protest in Gezi Park, which was against an urban renewal project to save one of the last green public spaces in Taksim Square, Istanbul (Bilgic and Kafkasli 2013). This national turmoil spread to demonstrations in seventy-seven cities, resulting in eight deaths, more than 8,000 injuries and approximately 5,000 taken into police custody. However, what may not have been expected and what made the ‘Gezi spirit’ unique was the huge variety of group profiles, mostly students and urban youth, including Kemalist secular nationalists, Turkish ethno-nationalists, liberals and leftist nationalists, anti-capitalist Muslims, artists, feminists, human rights and LGBT activists, football club fans and, last but not least, Kurdish nationalists. In addition, these protests proved that a new citizenship and civil society-state relationship have been emerging in Turkey. The protesters demanded to participate in decisions regarding their lifestyles, common spaces and future, specifically on relationships with neighbouring countries, growing neo-liberal restructuring and destruction of cultural geography, social memory of cities, the forests, the mountains and the rivers of Anatolia, namely, what makes them a nation (Oktem 2013). Despite the fact that Turkish Prime Minister R. Tayyip Erdogan enjoyed popular support as seen by his third election with almost 50 per cent of the general vote in June 2011, the massive explosion of discontent erupted towards him. He responded pejoratively (Erkoc 2013, p.45) to the ‘other 50 per cent’ of Turkey (Ozbudun 2014) and provoked his supporters to press for demonstrations, which sharpened political polarisation. Thus, Gezi protests presented ‘the clash of nations’ (Atay 2013) in Turkey, as the sign of construction the new identity and culture.
In the last decade, Erdogan’s policies have led to success in economic progress, political neutralisation of the military and Kemalist laicite (secularism\(^1\)) and acknowledgement of Kurdish cultural rights and religious minorities’ rights (Muftuler-Bac and Keyman 2012). However, the resistance showed both that the nation has emancipated from Kemalist authoritarianism and rejected new authoritarianism (Taspinar 2014) that imposes socially conservative,\(^2\) Sunni Islamic-inspired policies in both domestic and foreign relations (Yesilada and Rubin 2013; Uzgel 2013). Within this context, this thesis argues that there are different Turkeys and the tension involved in the attempts of both maintaining and transforming Turkey’s Kemalist identity. For a better understanding of new Turkey, it is important to shed a light on competing discourses of Turkish nationalism, their intermingled nature, in particular the process of how the new dominant Muslim nationalism became hegemonic in Turkey by a power struggle over the last decade. It should be kept in mind that hegemony is not necessarily imposed through coercion, but through the organisation and creation of a common consent for the change. Hence, the object of this study is to search on the process of power struggle over the Justice and Development Party’s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) post-Kemalist imagination of the nation that has changed the image of Turkey and its place in the world from 2001 to 2011. In this context, it presents a critical discussion on how different discourses of Turkish nation-state identity construct, interact, contrast and coexist with each other through the Turkish media by unpacking and examining the concepts of contested Turkish identity, which has a great importance for consolidation of pluralist democracy.

\(^1\) In Turkish literature, the term is used as ‘laicite’ (laiklik); however, this thesis prefers the term ‘secularism’, which is more appropriate for covering issues of religion, identity and politics. For the conceptual discussions see also: Bhargava, R. (ed.) (1998), Secularism and Its Critics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

\(^2\) In 2009, Binnaz Toprak published an outstanding empirical study on the religion and conservatism in Turkey. The study proved the fear of secularists circles, increasing social and political pressure of religious lifestyles upon secular lifestyles.
The Aim of the Study: Understanding the Process of Discursive Construction of New Turkey's Identity

Since the AKP came to the power in 2002, there has been an ongoing debate about the emergence of New Turkey.³ Chriss Morris described the political, economic and cultural reforms of Erdogan's AKP as a 'quiet revolution on the edge of Europe' in *The New Turkey* (2005). In August 2014, Ahmet Davutoğlu declared to the AKP Party Congress that they imagined the New Turkey and nobody would stop their walk to that destination.⁴ By pro-AKP journalists and academics, this has been portrayed as a project of redefining and re-establishing of Turkish nation-state.

My study defines this historical process as an emergence of the post-Kemalist Turkey. By analysing Turkish media discourse, it reveals that it has been emerging through the power struggle of contested perspectives on Turkish nation-state identity and its place in the world. It does so by, first, challenging the argument that there is a particular Kemalist conception of Turkish nation-state (Azak 2013; Alaranta 2011; Casier and Jongerden 2010; Ciddi 2010; Karasipahi 2009; Zurcher 2004), which causes a cleavage between the Republican secularist bureaucratic centre and the Muslim periphery. Instead, it empirically reveals that there are competing Turkish nationalisms and representations of identities in the last decade. It points outs that the both secular and Muslim identities of Turkey are historically constructed and mutually constitutive. Secondly, it challenges the argument that suggests there is a settled preference in favour of European Union (EU) membership and Western alliance in Turkey based on a consensus view that

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Turkey's place is/should be in Europe and the West. Instead, it shows there are competing perspectives on Turkey's foreign policy identity and Turkey's prospective membership of the EU as a crucial matter of the nation-state's collective future. It empirically articulates why they have these discourses and how they have reshaped their discourses through the power struggle in the last decade. In this context, two key questions provide the starting point for this research's inquiry: Which discourses are competing in the construction of Turkey's post-Kemalist nation-state identity? How do they imagine Turkey and place it within the international world of nation-states? In order to indicate the discursive diversity, particularly it relies on a central research question – How did the Turkish media construct such discourses on national identity, Europe and the West in dealing with domestic and foreign policy debates during the last decade?

The Literature Review on the New Turkey's Identity

Is the new Turkey democratic and Muslim, Western and European or Middle Eastern and secular? There are multiple answers to these questions based on which knowledge is referred to in history and politics. Looking at the final years of the Ottoman Empire and its failure in political and economic systems, the West was seen as a source of insecurity but also inspiration for establishing a new system (Bilgin 2011, p.74). Thus, Turkey's identity and security policies came to run in parallel with Europe and the West. Despite the fact that military and economical Westernisation process of Turkey dates back to the Ottoman Empire times, which was a way of improving security at home and abroad, it has recognised as fundamental principal of the Republic since 1923. The difference between the two periods (Fokas 2008, p.88) is the twin aims of Westernisation and Europeanisation of Turkey linked with secularist programme of its founder and first president M. Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938). As Thomas W. Smith noted in his book Between Allah and Ataturk: Liberal Islam in Turkey (2005, p.308), Turkey became the only secular, democratic, pro-Western country in the Islamic world. During the
Cold War, Turkey maintained Westernisation in the Kemalist line and had distant relations with the Arab and Islamic world. The security reasons, such as Soviet threat, also pushed Turkey further to the West. The NATO membership and Turkey’s Western-oriented policies contributed to the country’s Western identity (Bozdaglioglu 2003).

With the end of the Cold War, Turkey searched for a new identity in international relations. Although Turkey became a candidate country of the EU in 1999, the 9/11 Islamic terrorist attacks in New York diversified the definition of the threats in and outside Europe. The EU has put more focus on the military and technological dimensions of security as it has been seen in border management. The growth of identity-based conflicts and 'securitised' (Waever 2000) culture through the ‘war on terror’ and repositioned Turkey and redifined its importance for the West. Whilst Turkey historically and strategically emphasized its Western identity over its Eastern identity, the main references changed from being Western and secular to being Muslim and democratic. In other words Turkey's 'moderate' Islamic character became 'markeable' (Tank 2006, p.470) as a model for the other Muslim countries. This phenomenon brought forth a new agenda for Europe in dealing with Turkey's position within the framework of 'the clash of civilisations' (Huntington 2002) and its implications for the country's EU accession. In the context of the relationship between democracy and Islam in the post-9/11 era, Turkey's Muslim population and Western values changed the value of the idea that it is a bridge between the East and the West, Christianity and Islam (Somer 2007). However, Kemalist secularist circles began to express their anxieties about the idea that Turkey was represented as a model of Muslim rather than secular democracy (Yavuz 2009, p.245).

In this context, rather than focusing on the perception of a Muslim-Secular dichotomy within the concept of ‘national identity’, this thesis sheds light on the ‘process’ of emergence of new Turkey’s identity through power struggle
of different nationalist discourses and reveals non-European discourses in Turkish media. Hereby, it exposes how Turkey as the ‘Other of Europe’ discursively constructs its identity; thus it differs from publications that analyzed Turkey’s place in Europe with different dimensions of Turkey's possible EU membership (Cengiz and Hoffmann 2014; Nas and Ozer 2012; Cakir 2011; Usul 2010; Arvanitopoulos and Tzifakis 2009; Faucompret and Konings 2008; Jung and Raudvere 2008; LaGro and Jorgensen 2007; Zurcher and Van der Linden 2007; Arikan 2006; Baykal 2006; Joseph 2006; Ugur and Canefe 2004; Carkoglu and Rubin).

In his book 'Strategic Depth', the main architect of the new Turkish Foreign Policy, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (2006) argued that Kemalist Republican elite neglected the Ottoman past and cultural ties in the Middle East and caused Turkey's alienation to its historical and religious ties with the Arab/Islamic world. Given this perspective, in fact, some previous decision makers, such as the president Turgut Ozal (1989-1993) had defined his approach as neo-Ottomanism, and the coalition government's foreign minister Ismail Cem (1997-2002) represented Turkey as 'straddling civilizational divides' (Bilgin and Bilgic 2011, p.173) between the West and Islamic world. He aimed to develop cultural and economic relations with its neighbours; however, Turkey's relationship with its neighbours inevitably focused on security and military relations at his time, Turkey had an 'active', but hard/confrontational policy in the 1990s (Hale 2012; Oran 2011; Bilgin 2005; Larrabee and Lesser 2003), mostly tied to the Kurdish issue (Altunisik and Martin 2011, p. 570). Unlike the 1990s, Turkey developed a deeper relationship with the Arab/Islamic world in the 2000s. In particular, the problematic relationship with the EU, growing security interests in the post 9/11 process and the rational approach towards the West have embraced a new strategic thinking in Turkish foreign policy. According to Davutoglu’s discourse, Turkey cannot wait forever at the EU door (Murinson 2006, p.952) and needs to form its ‘own axis’ to develop a re-engagement with the Middle
East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and even with Africa. The representatives of the AKP claim that the Middle East is not an alternative to Europe and that Turkey has an active diplomacy in the region to bring stability to Europe (Rumelili 2011, p.241). They argue that the traditional Kemalist foreign policy of Turkey had a focus on the importance of military security and balance of power that was based on securitisation and threat definition. This perspective hindered improving relationships with the region. In the last decade, the military’s power (symbolic and actual) in Turkey's political discourse has decreased (Bilgin 2011, p.78). Parallel to this, Turkey put more emphasis on diplomacy in foreign policy and less emphasis on the use of force in prioritising its economic interest. The cost-benefit calculations and adoption of pragmatic approach in relationships with the EU and US caused a 'shift of axis' from the transatlantic to Eurasia and Turkey’s pivotal role as a benign regional power (Onis and Yilmaz 2009) emerged a Middle-Easternisation (Oguzlu 2008) tendency in TFP. Growing disagreements over Iraq, Iran, Syria and Kurds have determined mutual relationships, especially with the US and increased the speculations about Turkey's foreign policy choices.

The Iraq War and Turkey's 'no' vote for the deployment of US troops on 1 March 2003 provided an example of Turkey's shifting identity (Tank 2006, p.469). Regarding to Tank's point, Oguzlu and Kibaroglu (2009, p.577-578) claimed that the West's approach towards Turkey led Turkish decision makers adopt different policies. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey's membership in the NATO has no longer guaranteed its place in the Western international community. That means, not just Turkey has repositioned itself, but the West's new perspective located it in the Greater Middle East rather than in Europe.

The notion of geographic imagination is employed by Aras and Fidan (2009) in order to analyse new official Turkish political rhetoric. They argue that
renewed geographic imagination and activism in foreign policy launched intensive security, trade, energy and cooperation relations in the Eurasian region. Fidan (2010, p.109) argued that Turkey reconstructed its foreign policy in parallel to the post-cold war developments. However, it failed due to the lack of confidence. AKP's new political elite changed this tendency and Turkey has had self confidence for the democratic reform process and reformulation of foreign relations. Like Fidan, Sozen (2010, p.106-108) used the concept of 'self confidence' in explanation of the paradigm shift in TFP by the revival of Ottomanism in national and international policies of Turkey. Instead of Kemalist positivist-modernist narrative which is built on rejection of Ottoman heritage, Turkey's relations with Arabs, Muslims and Kurds moved to a resurgence and normalisation track in the revival period. Neo-Ottoman orientation brought Turkey closer to the Islamic world. In Yesiltas's analysis (2013), a liberal oriented geopolitical practice and a conservative Islamist vision represent a main rupture from the old Kemalist geopolitical vision in TFP. Ozkan (2014, p.134) refers to Ahmet Davutoglu's writings of 1980s and 1990s and reminds that Davutoglu believes the Western model democracy is not adequate for the Islamic world. The lack of religious values turned the West into a dangerous mechanical supremacy, thus the political regimes of the Middle East should derive their legitimacy from Islam. He explains it as the logic behind why Davutoglu supported An-Nahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria with a pan-Islamist vision, but ignored the influence of Arab nationalism, sectarianism, secularism and socialism in the region (ibid. p.136).

Significantly, Bilgin and Bilgic (2011) investigated how concepts of civilisational geopolitics have created a 'new geographic imagination' under the AKP. They highlighted what is different about Davutoglu and AKP's approach to Turkey. In the new geographic imagination Turkey is located outside Western civilisation and is imagined as the leader of its own civilisation, which changes the definitions of 'us' and 'others' (ibid p.173).
Cagaptay's (2013) analysis, Turkey's revisionist new position neither challenges the Western order nor it changes its axis from the West, it has a broader international cooperation in the world within deeply embedded economic and political bonds with the Western world. These bonds rest on more than shared strategic alignment (ibid p.803). Turkey's political tradition and success in foreign policy, democracy, secularism and women’s emancipation have been consolidated within the Western order. Moreover, in 2012 Oguzlu argued that some internal and external determinants continue to drive Europeanisation process under the third term of the AKP. In the terms of internal dynamics, liberal democratic steps should be taken, for instance, for the Kurdish dispute. Externally speaking, rising regional challenges after the Arab Spring requires Turkey's European transformation to be able to deal with the problems.

Onis (2013) points out two main challenges of majoritarian democracy in the age of the AKP’s new Turkey. First, a consensus and mutual toleration needs to be constructed among the secularists and religious conservatives in the public life as well as pluralism should be protected under the law for every citizen, particularly for the minorities. Second, a compromise needs to be built on the matter of territorial unity of the Turkish state and the political rights of the Kurdish citizens. This means something should be done beyond the cultural and group rights of Kurds. In related to Turkey's transformation, Omer Taspinar (2014, p.49) called it as 'the end of the Turkish model' which referred to its positive democratic image replaced by authoritarianism in domestic politics, cronyism and corruption in economy and deadlock in foreign policy. The AKP aimed to end the Kemalist nature of the Republic, thus it reduced the power of the Turkish army in the politics, thus utilised the power of Gulenist network in the Turkish judiciary and governed the Ergenekon trials for this purpose (ibid p.54), which led to the imprisonments of many journalists, writers, military officers, including General Ilker Basbug.
Given literary attempts to understand and identify new Turkey's identity under the AKP government. According to these previous analysis, three main factors behind the construction of post-Kemalist nation-state identity appear: The first factor is the role of 9/11 and post-Cold War international system; the second factor is the role of Turkey's bid for EU Membership; and the third factor is the role of the AKP government in changing domestic power relations. Different notions are used to explain the role of the AKP in this change such as Davutoglu and AKP's worldview (Altunsik 2009), the idea of pan-Islamism (Ozkan 2014), neo-Ottomanism (Sozen 2010; Fisher Onar 2009a; Fisher Onar 2009b; Kiniklioglu 2007), new geographic imagination (Aras and Fidan 2009; Aras and Polat 2007), geopolitical vision (Yesiltas 2013); civilisational geopolitics (Bilgin and Bilgic 2011); civilisational discourse (Duran 2013); the triumph of AKP's conservative globalisation towards the domestic and international developments (Onis 2011; Onis 2010); the West's approach towards Turkey (Oguzlu and Kibaroglu 2009) and the religion (Sadik 2012). Most of the studies have looked at the AKP's identity with a focus on Islam or conservatism. Among others, Fisher Onar, by making use of speech act theory (2011), analysed four main narratives in AKP's discursive repertoire which helped to understand the multiple threads of AKP activism: democratisation; post-Islamism; Ottomanism; and Turkey Inc. story. Fisher Onar's constructivist approach is well suited to unpack the contradictions in AKP's policies and positions on a range of issues. But, her study did not cover the debates of nationalism, like other studies. If one surveys the main concepts, it is seen that the concept of national identity is not used to identify new Turkey's identity. The words of Islam and AKP are used together synonymously. Religion is taking for granted in the political researches on the AKP, but the notion of nationalism frequently is not taken into account. However, the main power struggle in reconstruction of Turkey's identity is based on how people diversely see the common past, present and future of the nation-state. Nationalism is a way of seeing, interpreting and structuring the world, which can be constructed or represented in several
different ways by various social agents and power relations. It is therefore, the lack of the concept of nationalism in the analysis that cloaks some discriminatory discourses in the new emerging nation-state discourse. It should be remembered that Islamists do not avoid being nationalist; hence while analysing construction of Turkey's new identity, the concept of national identity is accepted as the backbone of this study. Recently White (2013) wrote a book titled *Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks* in which Saracoglu (2013) defined the AKP's 'strategic depth' in foreign policy as the doctrine of nationalism. According to Saracoglu, nationalism in AKP's discourse is ignored in the literature due to the Party challenged with the official Kemalist nationalist imagination and its understanding of Turkishness (ibid p.53). This challenge has cloaked its nationalist discourse. It is accepted as AKP opposes nationalism, in fact, it opposes Kemalism. Saracoglu reminded that new Islamic conservative nationalism is a collective product of Turkish right-wing ideologies and traditions (ibid p.58), which consists new Turkish foreign policy discourse in the present. In addition, Gurcan (2013) distinctively made a comparative analysis in Turkish press on the paradigmatic transformation of Turkish foreign policy. Despite the lack of perspective of nationalism, the study indicated that five newspapers from the realist, anti-government camp had a pessimistic interpretation of TFP while five liberal, constructivist and pro-government newspapers had an optimistic interpretation of TFP.

Therefore, the academic literature mainly emphasized what AKP brought to the Turkish politics as a pivotal or hegemonic actor; however the power struggle of competing nationalist discourses has been highly neglected in the examinations of transformation of Turkey's identity from the Kemalist discourse to the post-Kemalist discourse. Therefore, this study differs from the previous studies by going beyond these debates with a focus on the concept of nationalism and enlightening the process of power struggle in the media for the construction of post-Kemalist nation-state discourse in Turkey.
Understanding 'the process' of discursive construction of new Turkey’s identity serves to see the historicity of nationalist discourses, their symbiotic relationships and highlight how Islamic conservative nationalism became dominant with the AKP government in the last decade. To sum up, this thesis aims to understand ongoing process of construction of new Turkey discourse through a more fundamental question: What does it mean to be a Turkish and what is the place of this nation in the world?

**The Importance and Contribution of the Project**

To contribute to contemporary Turkish studies, this thesis intends to deepen understanding of the dynamic nature of Turkey’s identity from September 2001 to June 2011. It argues that Turkey’s international identity has been reconstructed by historical antagonisms among different Turkish nationalisms and their power struggle with Islamist and Kurdish nationalism in the Turkish political sphere. In this context, this research is engaged in the struggle to define Turkish national/state identity by questioning how different Turkish narratives relate themselves to Islamist and Kurdish narratives and to the notion of Europe and the West. To unpack how beliefs and traditions inform national identity construction and how these practices arose in their specific historical context and power struggle for hegemony, a Discourse-Historical Approach (Wodak et al. 1999) is taken to analyse the media data on Turkish nationalism and the developments in Turkish politics in the 2000s.

In this context, this thesis seeks to make an original contribution in a number of ways in application of DHA to Turkish Studies. First of all, the case of Turkey serves to make an original contribution to literature on religion and nation-state identity. Second, it contributes to debates on the broader application of Critical Discourse Analysis in international relations and nationalism studies, and particularly how we understand the process of discursive construction of nation-state identity within the power struggle of competing perspectives on the nation. Furthermore, it aims to highlight the
dynamic and discursive nature of national identity by providing a detailed examination of different Turkish nationalisms, their origins and how they have developed in the post 9/11 period. Therefore, it takes as its starting point major concepts in the literature of Turkish nationalism and foreign policy, and it surveys the variety of political challenges to, and transformation of, these concepts. It also contributes to the literature on Turkish foreign policy and Turkey-EU Relations, in particular to the discussions on Turkey's place in Europe and the West, with a critical analysis of how Turkey discursively constructs itself as the Other.

To avoid focusing exclusively on the official governmental discourse or the circles at the top of the current political power pyramid, conceptual variety and challenges are explored in the media discourse. The role of media discourse is crucial in the expression of ideas regarding how people think about themselves and others. Moreover, it also affects how they live in a particular way. Therefore, examining how the Turkish media represents concepts of nation and identity reveals the way people think about their nation and identity, contributing valuable information to both studies of media and politics.

The Selection of the Case Studies
In discursive construction of nation-state identity, the question of what it means to be ‘foreign’ is difficult to define in the complex interrelationships of dynamic political, historical and international contexts. Therefore, this study refers to the literature of foreign policy. David Campbell (1992 p. 37) recalls that the word ‘foreign’ was used to mean ‘distance, unfamiliarity, and alien character of those people and matters outside of one's immediate household, family, or region, but still inside the political community that would later comprise a state’ until the 18th century. This means foreign policy building should consider all kinds of practices of differentiation and
exclusion in all levels of social interaction from the individual level to the
global level, which articulate identity within and outside the borders of each
state. Media data allows the context of Turkey’s identity to be linked to wider
social and international relations. Additionally, representations of Turkish
identity in the media allow for comparison of various ways of being Turkish
and a part of Europe and the world. To realise the targeted aim of studying on
Turkey's post-Kemalist identity and its challenges, three case studies are
selected. The first case study examines the domestic power struggle of
definition of Turkish nation-state identity and articulates the main
antagonisms in various imaginations of being a Turk. The second case study
indicates how this domestic power struggle and antagonisms in different
perspectives on Turkish nation-state identity determine different perspectives
in foreign policy, particularly in Turkey's EU policy. Lastly, the third case
study shows that new Turkish foreign policy discourse contributes the
domestic power struggle and the construction of Turkey's post-Kemalist
nation-state identity.

Case Study One: Discursive Construction of Turkish National Identity in the
Context of Religion: This case analyses discursive constructions of Turkish
national identity, with a specific focus on what it means to be Turkish, or
how the Turks imagine themselves as a nation, in terms of themes such as
being Muslim, secularist or non-Muslim. It therefore seeks to answer these
questions: How does Turkish media discourse reconstruct and challenge post-
Kemalist Turkish identity in terms of religion? Which concepts of Turkish
national identity are naturalised, negotiated or contested? In this context, it
looks at the media coverage around two particular events: the assassination
of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007 and the clash of Turkey’s
secularist and Islamic identities during the 2007 Turkish presidential election.
After the killing of human rights activist Armenian journalist Hrant Dink on
19 January 2007, more than 100,000 people at his funeral protested his
assassination by shouting: ‘We are all Hrant Dink; we are all Armenian’. He
became the symbol of anti-racism in Turkey. Therefore, the media coverage of his assassination is chosen as the first case to represent inclusion and exclusion narratives of non-Muslim elements in defining the Turkish nation. It will also show the reactionary discourse of ‘We are all Turks’. The second part of the case study analyses the power struggle to choose Turkey’s president in 2007 and represents the binary nationalist imaginations of Turkey in terms of secularism and Islam.

Case Study Two: Turkey and EU Relations in the Context of Turkey’s Kurdish Problem: This case study demonstrates that domestic struggle over the definition of Turkish national identity determines Turkey’s international identity and relations. Specifically, by evaluating reconstruction of Turkish self-imagination and the redefinition of Turkish identity through the Kurdish problem as a crucial element in the Turkish foreign policy toward the EU, it is possible to understand why Ankara redefined its vision and how the integration process strengthened not only the voice of nationalism or Euroscepticism in Turkey, but also the voice of pluralism. It searches for how the supranational (European), national (Turkish) and subnational (Kurdish) identities relate and challenge each other in the discursive construction of Turkey’s post-Kemalist identity.

Case Study Three: The Relations between Turkey and the West in the Case of 9/11 and the Iraq War: As the final case, this research explores how Turkey’s new external policy, in particular policy towards the US/West and Middle East, empowered the construction of the post-Kemalist narrative of the nation. Therefore, it observes how the media coverage of the events of 9/11 and the Iraq War reconstruct different discourses of Turkish identity. By observing the multiple definitions of Turkey’s new IR identity, the third case offers an analysis of different discursive constructions of Turkish foreign policy’s orientation, whether it is Western, Eastern, Eurasian or other, to better understand Turkey’s self-identification of its place in the world.
The Structure of the Thesis

The research consists of seven chapters. Chapter One is devoted to introducing my theoretical and methodological framework. This introductory chapter will review the relationships among the discourse analysis, the media, national identity, in particular, the chapter concentrates on the concept of ‘discourse’ and the role of the media in reconstruction of nationalism as an ideology.

Chapter Two presents the historical background of Turkish nationalism and Turkish foreign policy. It reviews this literature to challenge the argument that there is just a specific Turkish nationalism and explores the origins of the main branches of Turkish nationalism. It demonstrates that Kemalist nation-state ideology and its Turkish identity construction is the key factor driving Turkey’s policy towards its citizens and the EU/West. It portrays the origins of the current problems and polarisations of Turkey as different perspectives on Turkish nationalism that have different understandings of history and foreign relations based on diverse worldviews. Chapters Three, Four, and Five analyse the Turkish media discourse in three case studies for examination of the power struggle in defining the post-Kemalist narrative of the nation-state. Chapter Three focuses on the media coverage of the assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007 and the struggle in Turkish Muslim and secular identities in the process of Turkey’s 11th presidential election in 2007. Chapter Four analyses Turkish press reports on European integration and examines the images of the EU with a specific focus on Turkey’s Kurdish question. Chapter Five extends the arguments that are sustained across the topic of the ‘shift’ in Turkish foreign policy’s Western orientation by analysing the Turkish media coverage of 9/11 and the Iraq War. Chapter Six, the concluding chapter, provides an overall discussion and conclusion. It sums up the comparison of Turkish nationalisms and different Turkey imaginations; and newly emerging ‘self’ and ‘other’ relationships in the post-Kemalist narrative of the nation.
In this structure, an alternative explanation is provided by exploring the ways in which discussions around Turkishness, Muslimhood, European and Western identities are used to redefine Turkey’s nation-state identity in the last decade under the AKP rule. By the discourse-historical analysis on these key themes in Turkish media, Turkish national identity is shown as a dynamic and negotiated concept which is open to the challenges and constructed through the power struggles. This perspective challenges to the idea that suggests a Kemalist nation-state identity which has had European and Western orientation its politics since the Republican foundation in 1923.

With the application of discourse-historical approach in the case of Turkey and working on the Turkish media discourse as the original contribution to the literature, the process of emergence of post-Kemalist nation-state identity with the hegemonic Muslim nationalism and non-European discourse is evidenced by a range of empirical data, which reveals how different Turkish nationalisms have contested and overlapped with each other in discursive construction of new Turkey.

What have been naturalised in every day discourse give clues for establishing an emancipatory discourse for a pluralist understanding of Turkish nation. Involving dominant discourse, its opposition and resistance help to overcome polarisations which cause losing the ‘daily plebiscite’ of living together peacefully in Turkey. In this context, it is hoped that this thesis contributes to raise an awareness of tensions produced by the identity construction processes, discriminatory and exclusive practices committed for defining new ‘others’ for the sake of daily political interests, which are highly dangerous actions for the collective future of Turkey.
CHAPTER ONE
THE THEORY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY:
THE NATION-STATE IDENTITY, DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND THE MEDIA

Introduction
This dissertation argues that the discipline of International Relations can benefit from interdisciplinary studies to analyse the role of new actors in world politics. To analyse the case of contemporary Turkey's identity, it appeals to Nationalism and Media Studies. In this context, this thesis employs these studies through a comparative discourse analysis in the Turkish press to reveal how the Turks define themselves and others (the EU/West) and view their place in the world. In this context, the leading role of Turkish media is considered in interpreting, constructing and representing different ideologies of nationalism (Keyman and Kadioglu 2011) across the country. A deeper understanding on the struggle between competing versions of the definition of ‘Turkish’, Turkish Foreign Policy vision, even different answers to the question of where should Turkey’s place be in the world of politics is suggested to be had by applying the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) (Wodak et al 1999) to different Turkish newspaper coverage. In this context, this chapter presents a detailed theoretical and methodological background for the thesis. More specifically, to explore different discursive constructions of Turkish nation-state identity in the media, as related to Turkey and EU/West relations, this chapter presents a framework of the concepts of the media, national identity, discourse analysis and their interactions. It leads to an understanding of how the concepts of the Turkish nation and the domestic power struggle on its definition, as they are constructed in the media (Chapter Three), and how the media construct and negotiate concepts of the nation in their coverage of foreign policy (Chapter Four and Chapter Five).
1.1. Theorising the Nation-State Identity

The term ‘identity’ means ‘the relationship between two or more related entities in a manner that asserts a sameness or equality’ (Wodak et al. 2003, p. 11). It comes from social psychology and is connected with the image of individuality and the distinctiveness constructed by an actor through relations with ‘others’ (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996, p. 59). Locating the nation as a distinct group involves locating other nations, which provides a categorization and identification of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ members (Billig 1995, p. 66). This establishes a unity based on an imagination, recognition and definition of 'us' and 'them' by promoting a sense of belonging together in a common present, past and future. In other words, national identities are situated within the historical narratives that construct the 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983) in a narrative (Wodak et al. 1999) that shares the past through the present and expected future. In this context, this research argues that Turkish identity does not have a fixed meaning; rather, its meaning changes with different historical circumstances and contexts. For a comprehensive understanding of the diversity of Turkish nationalism and the struggle to define Turkish identity in the last decade, this section summarises general approaches to the concept of national identity and introduces the discursive approach to the study of nationalism in the examination of different constructions of Turkish national identity in the media discourse.

In the literature of International Relations (IR), even realists argue that the national identity and culture make a difference among nations, as Hans Morgenthau (1993) noted in Politics among Nations. However, there is no agreement on how identity matters should be studied within the constructivist and rationalist frameworks in the literature of IR theory. In the classical realist tradition of international political analysis, which has been the dominant approach to explaining interstate relations in the literature, foreign policy should be made by politicians, attuned to the national interest and free
of the influence of extraneous domestic factors such as national identity (Mermin 1999, p. 147). Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979), as a key contribution to realist international relations theory, assumes that the international system is a material structure consisting of military and economic resources rather than ideas and norms. Under this realist fundamental assumption, neorealism (Mearsheimer 2001) does not allow us to theorize the construction and reconstruction of state/national identity. Neoliberalism (Keohane and Nye 1997) also does not offer an explanatory theory of how nation-state identity is constructed; since its focus is on political economy, environmental issues and human rights (Lamy 2008, p. 135). Within the contemporary mainstream approaches of International Relations, both these approaches fail to consider the role of political culture, norms, identities, domestic interests and non-state actors in foreign policy decision making. As a critical reaction to these mainstream theories, social constructivism is concerned with normative structure (Barnett 2008, p. 168) and ideas. By analysing the effects that political identities, norms and culture have on national interests and policies in specific historical contexts, the social constructivist approach (Katzenstein 1996; Lapid and Kratochwil 1997; Wendt 1999; McSweeney 1999; Wilmer 2002) has demonstrated the importance of the social dimensions of international relations. Constructivist scholars argue the identities shape perceptions and determine intentions for the states' policies. As a source of interests and preferences, national identity has considerable influence on political decision making because it shapes a vision that is a possible, legitimate outcome (Saideman 2002, p. 177). Hill and Wallace’s (1986, p. 8) statement also supports the assumption of the study based on the crucial linkage of national identity and nation's place in the world:

‘Effective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a nation state’s ‘place in the world’, its friends and enemies, intersects and aspirations. These underlying assumptions are embedding in national history and myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret them and external and internal developments reshape them.’
It can be argued that the nation-state identity in international politics is constructed in interaction with both domestic and international ‘others’ rather than simply in one or the other. Nationalism is not just a collective political identity of a modern society, but also a particular way of seeing and thinking about the world through a nationalist discourse. It locates the nation physically, legally and socially within the world of nations. The reality is that we live in a world of nations and all fundamental rights and other social and economic rights are defined, regulated and institutionalised by this system. Despite the fact that a person would argue she/he is a world citizen without a nationality; however, it does not allow her/him to cross borders and travel the world without an identification of a place and a nation. The logic of national thinking makes sense of act in the contemporary world, frames language, habits, doing things, organise social, political and legal frameworks.

Various definitions of ‘nation’ and explanations of the rise of nationalism have been offered in the literature (Hutchinson and Smith 1995; Ozkirimli 2000); however, the concepts that define the ‘nation’ revolve theoretically around two approaches and arguments linked to them: the political nation by the will of a state’s citizens and the nation that is linguistically and ethnically defined by culture. According to the Habermasian definition of the concept (1993), national identification is based on a constitutionally equal citizenship and patriotism that takes place in the framework of universalistic principles and political culture, regardless of any differences in race, religion, gender, language or ethnicity. This type of civic nationalism can be evaluated in terms of Ernest Renan’s concept of nation, which is based on the will of individuals to live together. Yet in a culturalist perspective, Anthony D. Smith’s (2009) definition of nation is a ‘named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members’. In the sense of cultural or ethnic nationalism, what gives unity to the nation is inherited by birth and blood (Ozkirimli 2005, p. 23).
Although the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is useful for the purpose of description, the terms cannot capture the complexities that inhere in the culturalisation of politics and the politicization of culture. This classification leads to a normative project of dividing nationalisms into two camps, one is the civic-good nationalism of the West and other is the ethnic-bad nationalism of the Rest (ibid. p.24). However, all nationalisms combine both the cultural and the political together and all nationalist discourses have common dimensions: the spatial, the temporal, the symbolic and the everyday (ibid. p.179). Ozkirimli reminds (ibid. 25) Roger Brubaker's (1998) nationalism categorisation of the 'state-framed' versus the 'counter-state'. To what extent these are exclusive is equivocal, thus seeing nationalism as a form of 'discourse' can work for capturing what is common in all nationalism, how different nationalisms challenge, overlap and intersect with each other.

In the debate on how nations have emerged, three main classical theoretical approaches address the nature of the nation and nationalism: the primordialist, the ethnosymbolist and the modernist (Ozkirimli 2000). The primordialists (Shafer 1968) consider that nationality is a natural part of human beings and predetermined in the same way as being a member of a family. For ethnosymbolists (Smith 2000, 2001), nations come from pre-existing ethnic ties and the features of political and social landscapes that rely on a legacy of myths, symbols, values and memories of past. Benedict Anderson (1983), John Breuilly (1994), Ernest Gellner (1983) and Eric J. Hobsbawm (1991) represent the modernists and explain that nations are the products of the direct or indirect consequences of political movements and the rise of the modern state. Rather than using these pioneering approaches, new approaches to nationalism transcend the classical debate by proposing interdisciplinary analyses in such areas as globalisation studies, post-colonial theories, feminism, postmodernism and discourse analysis (Ozkirimli 2000, p. 198). These fields of study place nationhood in the daily reproduction of specific ways of life, ways of viewing and interpreting the world.
This distinction in approaches to nationalism is useful to elucidate different perspectives on Turkish nationalism and how Turkishness is defined through these diverse perspectives. For instance, the Kemalist perspective can be accepted as a modernist approach, whilst ethno-nationalist perspective can be considered as a primordialist approach. However, to demonstrate competing perspectives and the struggle to redefine the Turkish nation-state identity during the last decade, this study approaches nationalism from a discursive perspective. The discourse-analytic approach connects the nation and state by indicating the national unity as a discursive construct (Calhoun 1994). According to this approach, the nationalist way of thinking, feeling, evaluating and speaking makes people understand and define themselves as a nation.

1.2. Towards a Discursive Approach to Construction of Nation-State Identity

In the most essential Foucaultian meaning in spoken or written language use (Fairclough 1995, p. 131), 'discourse' frames the objects of knowledge, beliefs and values and simultaneously constitutes social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief. Thus, it sustains or changes social relationships in society and among societies (Mayr 2008). Different discourses reflect different perspectives on the world, regulating and determining “individual and collective doing and/or formative action that shapes society” (Jager 1993). Discourse constitutes what people know, how people know, what they speak about and what they silence about themselves and others. It governs how to think and write about the nation (Waever 2002, p. 29) under the influence of power relations and interest order. In this context, the discursive constructive vision of nation as an imagined community (Anderson 1983) is useful in identifying strategies used in the definition of self and other relations. In a nutshell, nationalism resides in discourse and is shaped by discourse.
With the previous points in mind, this study argues that discourse analysis is the most appropriate method for identity questions in Politics that concentrate on self/other relations, often engaged in contrasting narratives of identities as ‘others’ being the opposite of ‘us’. The investigation of this research has a distinctive motivation that offers a way to see varying contested, converse or complementary ways of conceptualisation, recognition and configuration in Turkey’s identity construction as attuned to the complexity of in-group and out-group definitions. Determining how these groups involve, exclude, engage and connect with each other and how their identities are embodied and expressed in the media discourse are the most urgent tasks for this research.

Different narratives of nationalisms are different constructs of the nation and different evaluations and mappings of it (Wodak et al. 1999). Based on this discursive approach to nationalism, this thesis argues that Turkish national identity is discursively constructed and that a fundamental conflict has existed between competing nationalist discourses in Turkish society (Canefe 2008, p. 394) over the definition of what Turkish identity should be and how to place Turkey in the world. Changing and separate definitions of ‘Turkishness’ shed light on the struggle between the domestic actors and ideologies and illuminate competing views of the world that differ with regards to Turkey’s regional and world role.

There is a plurality of theoretical approaches and methods within the discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is useful in examining the ways in which discursive practices convey meaning to nationalist discourses through both contestation and communicative action. Four theoretical approaches and methods of discourse analysis can be delineated (Carta and Morin 2014): interpretive constructivism; poststructuralism, discursive institutionalism and critical discourse analysis. In the versality of discourse analysis, constructivist authors such as Kubalkova (2001) use the most ideational
approach which focuses on the concept of cooperation. Poststructuralist studies emphasis on the concept of the power. For instance, Ole Waever (2001) offers a discursive view of an identity that is more unstable, where identity explanations are measured with material factors such as economics, energy or military power. This can tackle the shifts in national identity and foreign policy and to elucidate why the same nation-state identity can lead to highly different policies. Vivien Schmidt's discursive institutionalism (2008) explores discursive interaction and the representation of ideas within given institutional context. According to this approach, institutions influence agents and are being influenced by agents (ibid. p.134). Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) goes beyond these approaches, like others it seeks to understand and explain the social world and politics, but it also aims to criticise and change society. Discourses are seen as tools that reproduce the social relations and domination of a group over another. It has clearest commitment to practical ways of linguistic analysing texts.

As noted, this study attempts to analyse Turkey’s identity discourse considering national and international factors, with a specific focus on the nationalist ideologies, values, beliefs and perceptions in the media. This idea considers the importance of the national context in the determination of the policy positions of all relevant actors and why a policy works and changes in a particular way at a given time. In this context, Rosenau (1980) proposes to include individual, governmental, societal and systemic factors as the sets of independent and explanatory variables in his study. The existing literature presents a framework that identifies the domestic factors in foreign policy in

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5 As the framework for domestic sources of foreign policy and mapping of a model for the analysis of foreign policy discourse, Clarke (1996 pp. 22-37) defines six sets of variables. These are the constitutional ‘power map’ of the state political culture, beliefs, psychological processes of the key political leaders and officials in decision making, group dynamics of policy making and the information-processing characteristics of any system. Within the new approaches of foreign policy analysis, the impact of domestic factors on foreign policy is explained by three main approaches (Alden and Aran 2011, pp. 47-55). One primarily says that foreign policy is sourced by the structural forms of the state, such as the institutions and regime. The second focuses on the economic system and interests of some elite groups and,
relation to conditional parameters which depend on the geographic, political and social context of cases. Rosenau’s contribution may work in a multilevel analysis, but this study addresses the domestic power struggle over the definition of Turkey's identity, which enables to understand new Turkey's post-Kemalist identity through combating national imaginations, shifting perceptions and priorities in domestic and foreign policy.

Analysing political elites and decision makers’ discourses is often considered in traditional IR literature. The discourse analysis offers a mechanism and a systematic account of internal responses to international impulses. Basically, it applies to both official and non-official texts (Waever 2001, p. 26), but predominantly to public texts that stretch the concept of ‘political’, involving dominant discourse, its opposition and resistance. It creates a structure, or frame, which can link different elements of decision making, such as bureaucratic politics and institutions, domestic pressure and interest groups and perceptions of individuals in the general policy line. According to this perspective, national identity is a source of power and different imaginations of identity produce different policy outcomes. A change in national imagination denotes shifting perceptions on the 'self' and 'other' identities and policy priorities, that is, the perceptions about who we are and who our friends, rivals, and enemies are. This framework also supplies a way to examine how national interests are formed and articulated within a wider political debate. This is also a tool for understanding how official discourse is reproduced, represented, legitimised or resisted in relation to the larger public. This 'multi-layered structure of discourse' (Diez 2001, p.14) enables to observe continuity and changes in construction of nation-state identity. Therefore, it provides a good indication of power relations and how national identity discourse might change. To sum up, the discursive approach to national identity clarifies the mechanisms of norms and ideologies in their last, the pluralist approach perceives foreign policy as a product of sub-state and non-state actors, societal interest groups, state decision makers, public opinion and the media.
production, transformation and how they exercise their power and influence in a historical context.

As an example of poststructuralist study, in ‘Writing Security’, David Campbell (1998) analysed the construction of US identity during the Cold War through foreign policy discourse. According to Campbell, US foreign policy discourse during the Cold War had productive influences on state identity. He argued that the Soviet threat in the discourses and practices of security during the period was an identity-constitutive tool for the United States. In the field of security studies, the Copenhagen School (Buzan et al. 1998; Neumann 1999) has done works on particular acts of securitisation, determined by speech-acts; but Ole Weaver and some of his colleagues (Diez 2001; Hansen and Waever 2001) are more interested in how certain vision and meaning of Europe relates to the concepts of nation and state. As a pioneering study, Ole Waever (1990) demonstrated in Three competing Europes: German, French, Russian that different organising principles, different ‘European’ values and different boundaries to West and East of these three ‘Europes’ constitute the contrast between their approaches to European cooperation and integration. In this regard, Henrik Larsen (1997) elaborated domestic political discourses on Europe in France and Britain and their impact on foreign policy. William Wallace (1998, p. 681) pointed out that Larsen’s study failed by not addressing how British and French discourses were constructed and reconstructed through the active process of political debate on Europe. This means it requires a clear understanding of the processes of the struggle and interaction between actors and their competing discourses. Critical Discourse Analysis can be used to overcome this shortage which enables to explore the versality of discursive constructions of the nation, produced by various agents and in various historical and political contexts, their competing concepts of the nation in flux and in dialog with other forms of identity (Inthorn 2007). In this way, Larsen (2014) showed in his latest study that poststructuralist studies can
work with linguistics methodological tools of CDA. In fact, both approaches are interested in the analysis of the historical and political context of discourse and its critical stand to taken-for-granted knowledge (Aydin-Duzgit 2014); however CDA does more with its goal of emancipatory critique which covers the comparison of different representations of the discursive and non-discursive aspects of social reality. How language is used by people, how meaning is created in context, how language use represents the exercise of socio-political power and control in abusing, dominance and inequality are particular interests of CDA (Richardson 2007, p.115). Making these ideological effects of particular ways of using language more visible, CDA has a political stance on the side of dominated, disadvantaged and oppressed groups (Wodak 2001, p.188) and against dominating groups and inequality. By taking explicit position provides an essential motivation for analysis for the purpose of understanding and exposing bias of what has been naturalised in everyday experience and actions. In this context, the questions arise as how some groups of people are labelled and categorized; how some forms of emphasising negative sameness and negative common features of generalisation are used to represent contrasting identities, which are expressed by discursive practices. Understanding the manner in which social relations and issues of power are reproduced through various forms of representation gives clues about where to start for a change and transformation concerning equality, emancipation (Forchtner 2011), democracy and pluralism. In this context, this research sees nationalism as an ideology, as patterns of belief, practice, assumption, habit and representation that are reproduced daily. Specifically, Ruth Wodak's Discourse-Historical Approach of CDA\(^6\) is suitable for use in research that explores nationalist

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discourses in their own historical and linguistic production context. It defines the linguistic constructive strategies of national identities which allow understanding the changing and competing meanings of the identities through the discursive changes.

1.3. Nation in Narrative: Discourse Historical Approach to Construction of National Identity

Seeing the nation as a discursive construct conducts it with regard to the concept of narrative. People narrate different understandings of their social world, themselves and collective experiences (Defina 2003, p.17). Narrative recapitulates past events with a temporal and logic order. That is to say, the construction of a collective self-image concerning collective national identity is formed through the narrations of common past, present and future. Narratives, therefore, are about the birth of the nation, its past events, developments, where it came from to its present situation and where it is going to go in the future (Forchtner and Kølvraa 2012, p.381). This perspective understands national identity discourse as a social and historical setting and context dependent.

The collective memory of the nation is based on a selective reading and construction of the history (Inthorn 2007, p.10). Different memories of the past inform the ways of how to think about the nation and its identity. Thus, a change in dominant understanding of history can transform dominant concepts of national identity. It matters due to a specific nationalist discourse and its institutionalism and legalisation by the state legitimise hierarchy and formulate particular domination which directly constitutes power relations amongst actors. A dominant group (and its discourse) imposes its self-image on a wider population and builds its hegemony over other groups, namely,
different ethnic or religious groups and disadvantaged groups.

In a summary, like other identities, nationality is a narration which people tell about themselves and the position of others based on that. Narration of an ‘identity’ is a specific way of telling, related to how collective experience is expressed, discussed and negotiated in members of specific community. This sets them aside from other communities. Searching on these different narrations on the collective experience allows us to see various contradictory experiences and perceptions; more specifically different constructions of a so-called one identity in a certain time period. Thus, perception of a national identity in a narrative configuration (Wodak et al. 1999, p.14) enables us to see its continuity, discontinuity, diversity and dynamicity. Therefore, for a better understanding of domestic power struggles for hegemony and reconstruction of Turkish nation-state identity, nationalism must be placed in the context of competing ideologies and their historical integration and exclusion dynamics in Turkey.

As noted before, Ruth Wodak et al. (1999) developed the Discourse Historical Approach in Critical Discourse Analysis and dealt with diverse understandings on nationhood in the case of Austria by analysing different discursive constructions of Austrian identity. On the subject of a common political present and future in the narrative of Austrian national identity, they analysed commemorative speeches and policy addresses of Austrian political representatives of the European Union and Europe. For instance, the analysis of Chancellor Franz Vranitzky’s (1986-1997) speech (ibid, p. 100) exemplified how a political discourse on a foreign policy issue (European Union membership) simultaneously constructed the national identity (Austrian) discourse. In Vranitzky’s discourse, the EU member, Austria, was positively portrayed by using a strategy of perpetuation to demand continuity of the status quo which imagines the Austrian community as an internationally respected, social and stable nation-state. According to Wodak,
this positive self-representation alleviated the fears regarding Austria’s membership in the EU. As seen in the example, this approach helps to show various discursive constructs of a specific national identity that are given different shapes according to context, public and language. This leads to a comparison of different discourses on one and the same topic and how they interconnect and challenge with each other. This approach is suitable for use in research that explores diversity of discourse on one national matter.

The concept of ‘intertextuality’ (Chilton et al. 2013, p. 53) allows identification of the linkage of all texts to other texts through reference to the same themes and actors in the narration of nation. This includes the reappearance of a text’s topic or main argument in another text in different ways and for various purposes, including political purposes that reshape power structures. In this manner, intertextuality enables the observation of continuities and discontinuities in the discursive construction of national identity (Leeuwen and Wodak 1999). In this regard, coverage of the events in media discourse contributes continuous transmission of meaning over time. The themes of national identity appear in the media texts again and again through references to the meanings of the themes derived from its context and recontextualised or repeated utterances producing the same meaning of the events in different historical circumstances. This is why this discursive approach is chosen for this research, in particular to demonstrate the dynamic and hybrid character of Turkey’s identity in the last decade.

Because of these, Wodak’s constructive strategies and Discourse-Historical Approach is adopted as a valid tool of observation of the continuity, shifts and diversity in the discursive construction of Turkish national and international identity. Significantly, specific characteristics of the Turkish case requires the consideration of three aspects of ‘critique’ (Wodak 2006, p.8-9), in order to uncover contradictions and dilemmas in different discourses of Turkish nationalism (‘text or discourse imminent critique’).
exhibiting the functions of discursive practices in aiming manipulation, persuasion or resistance (‘socio-diagnostic critique’). Furthermore, DHA enables us to cope with the main problem of Turkish national identity, which shows how it deals with its hybrid character and its past. It is used in criticising the present way of dealing with Turkish history (‘retrospective critique’), at revising an actual ‘picture’ or ‘narrative’ of the collective past as a new, responsible way of dealing with its consequences and effects. DHA was employed to integrate information about historical sources of diverse perspectives on Turkish nation-state with their social and political backgrounds and diversity. This interdisciplinary, problem-oriented approach (Wodak 2001, p.69) has powerful and efficient features for the methodology:

– DHA includes **systematically available background knowledge** of the context and the case in the analysis and interpretation of the text (Wodak 2005, p.188).
– DHA sees discourse with their **historicity** (Krzyzanowski and Wodak 2008, p.31) related to their struggle in continuity, change and transformation. This focus makes it a more suitable approach by CDA to understand a historical and political process through its particular temporal and spatial conditions. Using DHA contributes to indicate how diverse local, national or regional discourses exist and their contradiction to different forms of change and transformation.
– Linguistic realisations on all levels of language in their specific context in which they were made address the origins of power relations, specifically the problems of inequality and discrimination; thus **the context dependent** discursive analysis provides the secret key to decoding the presentation strategies employed in production and reproduction of these kinds of stereotypic and unequal socio-political relations.
– DHA enables to see **pluri-perspectivity** (Wodak 2009, p.39) related to various differing positions and voices in a certain socio-political field.
1.4. The Methodological Critics and Limitations

One of the main questions in the critic of Critical Discourse Analysis\(^7\) is about what motivates selection of a fragment for the analysis. Widdowson (2004, p.63) argues that pretext in CDA forms making the selection of features for special attention in the discursive action. He identifies it as ‘interpretative partiality’ that causes pretextually positioned reading based on the purpose of analysis. To what extent what is unaccounted in the analysis matters to particular textual feature come into play in interpretation? Is CDA imposing a selective attention as Widdowson perceived? He claims that readers follow analysts’ samplings and leading to confirm their findings by imposing interpretation (ibid. 166). Surely, the textual analysis depends on the relationship between the text, context and pretext (ibid. p.166). Thus, different contexts and pretexts might give rise to diverse interpretations and analyses. What Widdowson is suggesting, then, is that (ibid. 169) CDA might be more critical about its practices in consideration of different readings of the text, different social-cultural backgrounds and ideological positions of readers to understand the text (ibid. p.170). These assumptions are perceived as irrelevant, if one looks how the method of CDA is improving. Here it is thought that CDA is critical in regarding not seen the findings conclusive or definite which invites researchers to an inspiring re-evaluation of the data. For interpretations, giving a general account of the historical context of the focus period does not necessarily drive to a correlation or a certain analysis of discourses. On one hand, pretext given demonstrates the sources of a specific language usage; on the other hand, tracing the discourse can drive new insights to reading social practices and historical process. By following the principle of triangulation of Discourse Historical Approach (Weiss and Wodak 2003, p.22), rather than simply focusing on linguistic dimension, this research incorporates historical, sociological and international dimensions of construction of Turkey's identity in different three case studies. Therefore, it

is nourished and advanced from a multi-case discourse analysis and multidisciplinary work, including Politics, History, Sociology, Nationalism, and Media Studies. DHA enables to show how the media narrative realise representational and actional meanings of discourse in different intertextual relations in particular content and construct specific understandings of Turkey’s Kemalist and post-Kemalist identities and positions.

Widdowson also notes that unstabilized and unfixed methodology in using synthesis of different theories compromise institutional and pedagogic disadvantages. But, this point can be seen as a progressive hand of the methodology in its break usual traditional procedures in doing social sciences, leaving the tendency to fit studies unequivocally into one box of paradigm or a school (Waever 1997, p.2). This has been already argued in The Future of International Relations (Neumann and Waever 1997) in saying ‘No more masters!’ with the attempt to trace unboxable persons in the discipline of IR and presenting comprehensively some authors who are difficult to be labelled. Moreover, CDA does not offer systematicity in doing analysis, but it brings a new epistemic order based on a moral stance. Working against unquestioned inequality and status quo in social relations as a mission, not drawing concrete lines for working encourage to improving limits of open ways in doing analysis without stabilizing or normalizing ‘given’ principles is also parallel with its socio-political stance. Additionally, this moral position works in the parallel way of doing social science.

1.5. The Media and National Identity: Imagined Communities and Banal Nationalism

From this research’s perspective, the roles of media in expressing, reproducing and spreading ideologies and values to wider social and international structures or supporting/confronting them constitute a crucial relationship between society and the media (Richardson 2007, p. 114). These
roles make them ideological instruments that produce meanings and naturalise power relations; thus, they become the means to realise domination. Thus, the role of media discourse is crucial in the expression of ideas regarding how people think about themselves and others and, moreover, how they live in a particular way. Language structures our thinking, reflects and produces meaning and arguably defines all social phenomena (Finlayson 1999, pp. 47-48). Thus, different worldviews operate within a certain framework of language habits. In a nutshell, different discourses constitute meanings about social relations and different forms of life. Secularist or Islamist, Europeanist or Eurasianist, all perspectives are internal to a variety of ways of thinking and living in the world. With respect to this assumption, this research looks at how different discourses in the Turkish media represent the way people think about their nation and identity. In addition, it maps the distinctions of challenging discourses and the way such distinctions may be mechanisms of the reconstruction of identity politics in both Turkey’s domestic and international relations.

In the literature, the media’s power in politics is discussed widely, particularly in terms of construction and distribution of the images of political actors and building a global civil society, public sphere and political activism (De Jong et al. 2005). Essentially, local, national and international news agencies circulate information and images between countries and form relationships between people from the local level to the international level (Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 2001, p. 127). Correspondingly, the media have contributed significantly to the social construction of images of the nation and its place in the world (ibid. p. 142). As a tangible illustration, in the case of the US print media’s influence on its international relations, Van Dijk (1999, pp. 21-64) demonstrates the description of the positive in-group and negative out-group in US foreign policy based on the discourse of the *New York Times*. In his analysis, in the American prestige press, Israelis represent the “we” group in a favourable light and the Hamas leaders, Muammar
Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein typically represent enemies, and “them”. Consistent with this line of thinking, an analysis of Turkish media can determine how Turkey under the Islamist AKP government maps itself and others in its changing relations with its strategic allies, the United States and the EU.

According to Nye (2004), increased information flows through the media have caused the loss of government’s traditional control over information in relation to politics. The speed in moving information has created a system in which power over information is much more widely distributed, which means decentralisation and less official control of government agendas (ibid. p. 53). In that spirit, the media are not just the means of reproduction of power relations, but also pluralizing forces which work against the government’s ability to influence and control. Moreover, the media are powerful channels for the 'soft power' (Nye 2006) of the states in setting the political agenda in politics, distributing the foreign policy discourse and convincing people to improve cultural, political and economic cooperation among nations. Thus, in 21st century world politics, the new communication and mass media are increasing the importance of soft power, specifically, its ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion. These developments encouraged a strengthening of the non-state-centric discourses and the entry of Media Studies into the discipline of International Relations (Golding and Harris 1997). In Taylor’s (1997 pp. 58-9) summary of the historical development of the media and international political relationships, the television station CNN8 is presented as being a direct channel of diplomacy among politicians, the public and the rest of the world:

“Much has already been written by historians about that increasing

8 For three different approaches to the CNN effect in international politics, see Livingston (1997). “The Al Jazeera effect” (Seib 2008) takes the media influences a significant step further. The concept encompasses the use of new media as tools in every aspect of global affairs, ranging from democratization to terrorism.
role, from the Anglo-German press ‘wars’ in the build-up to the First World War to the role of newspapers, the cinema and radio in the program of ‘moral rearmament’ prior to the Second World War. A growing amount of literature also now exists about how the media came to be deployed as a psychological weapon, at home and abroad, first between 1939 and 1945 and then subsequently during the Cold War. Today, however, if a statesman wants to make a public statement or send a message across the world, he has the option of doing so on CNN rather than through traditional diplomatic channels.”

As Taylor noted, government departments, individual officials and ministers use mass media as direct channels to societies with the purpose of explaining policy to their nation and overseas publics to advance or conceal policy opinions. Therefore, the media seems to enable the evaluation of international society by distributing information that builds bridges between groups and individuals around the world. This makes the media an integral part of diplomatic relations. Robinson (2004, p. 31) suggests that the media play four roles in the policy-media interaction: a supportive media, an uncritical role for official policy; non-influential and non-supporter of any side of the debate; critical media, having limited influence to change policy; and side taker media, effective in policy outcomes. News coverage can be useful for justifying state actions by shaping what people think. For instance, after the events of 9/11 and the declaration of a “war on terror”, the war against Iraq in 2003 was defined as a war of liberation by the White House in the United States and the government produced a media campaign to support that policy. The media were a considerable ally in provoking the war and sustaining public support for it. The media helped the state to legitimate its power. With those points as guidance, the news media have an important job in defining issues, primarily to help the public understand the newest array of priorities and alliances. It can be argued that the media may affect through its power to shape public opinion and influence politicians (Cohen 1965).

In the media and politics literature, some studies point out the role of the
media in political economy (Herman and Chomsky 2002), political communication (Semetko and Scammell 2012), the state’s propaganda (Jenks 2006; Taylor 1999), provoking war (Beck and Downing 2003), humanitarian crisis (Goving 2004; Shaw 1996; Seib 1992), justifying policies (Seib 2006, p. 22), legitimating the system (Gans 2003, p. 74), consolidation of democracy (Schudson 1999; Roselle 2006), mobilizing people and political activism (Cottle 2011; Taki and Coretti 2013), changing the state-citizen relationship (Street 2011, p. 262-264), agenda-setting (McCombs 2014; Boydstun 2013; Chaffee and Dearing 1996; Protess and McCombs 1991) and some examine how the media affect on decision making and policy-making (Seib 1992; Holsti 1992; Wolfsfeld 1997; Gilboa 2002; Cusinamo-Love 2003; Wolfsfeld 2004; Miller 2007; Robinson 2012). This literature confirms that the media has an important role in mapping a nation-state’s place in the politics and the world of nations. Instead of these various media influences on the politics, this study limits its scope and focuses on the media’s role in identity politics, namely its function in the re/construction of national identity discourse.

As widely acknowledged in the literature (Mcnair 1998, p. 6), the media as an ideological communicative vehicle do not just transmit the facts to audiences but also the contested assumptions, attitudes, beliefs, values and worldviews of society. Thus, the media represent agents of socialisation and powerful sources of social meaning. Put together, they reproduce the social norms and ideologies in the social construction of reality for audiences (Devereux 2009, p. 15). In shaping people’s understanding of social reality, the media constitute a primary source for the definition of and image of social identities with respect to culture (McQuail 2000, p. 4). Despite these facts, the role of the media was ignored in the most of the writings on nationalism and identities (Madianou 2002, p.28). Early studies in this area did not directly address the relationship between the communication and nationalism. Karl. W. Deutsch's (1953) *Nationalism and Social*
Communication is accepted as the most prominent study in the area. Later, Elizabeth L. Eisenstadt's (1979) *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change*, Ernest Gellner's (1983) *Nations and Nationalism* and Benedict Anderson's (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* point out the role of the print technology and their contribution to the emergence of nationalism:

‘The convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation’. (Anderson 1983, p.46)

For Anderson, the print media, in particular the newspapers and novels standardised the language, played a role of creating a sense of belonging to same community for the readers and considering themselves as parts of this imagined community. Newspapers remind readers that they are members of a particular nation and belong to a homeland through the nationalist thinking reflected in the content of the newspaper text. In routinely repeating habits of language in using small words (Billig 1995, p. 93) such as 'we', 'our' and 'us', the daily ritual of reading newspaper reproduces and distributes the national discourse and creates different ‘imaginations’ (Anderson 1983) of the nation. Micheal Billig (1995, p. 97) points out that 'banal nationalism' as people’s daily nationalism is established by social arrangements that appear 'natural' or unnoticed. The nation is reminded, indicated and 'flagged' (ibid. p. 6) in the daily lives of citizens. Newspapers play a particularly important role in building the daily national discourse and production of nationalism by nationalizing the news with their various messages and stereotypes.

Here, it must be noted that this thesis is not interested in relationship between audiences and media, in particular, in the questions of how audiences interpret and appropriate media messages and how do media texts have any nationalist effects. With a consideration of massive literature on the issue⁹, it

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can be argued that as the media represent ideological dilemmas, controversies and debates as people engage in sense-making and debate with different ideological and cultural positions. Regarding this point, Billig (2009) argued that people use the rhetorical tools of 'common sense' for thinking and sense-making. The stress here is information-processing is a public activity. That means individuals are not simple passive receivers of information and messages of the media, thus the media audience is not homogeneous. By underlining the link between argumentation and thinking in his psychological perspective, Billig (ibid p.348) explained that his study on the unconscious aspects of nationalism is based on a psychology of the unnoticed, which presents the daily world as belonging to the world of nation-states. In this context, on one hand this thesis accepts the diversity of perspectives both in the media and in the public; on the other hand it limits its interest in how the concept of Turkish identity is negotiated in the media. That is to say, it does not analyse how the media affect the public. As it is noted in Reading Media Theory: Thinkers, Approaches, Contexts (2009, p.288), the media tell the person in the mass who he/she is, they gave him/her identity; even they tell what she/he wants to be, how to get that way, how to feel she/he is that way: 'the media bring the reader, listener, viewer into the sight of larger, higher reference groups -real or imagined- which are looking glasses for his self image.'

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Sabina Mihelj makes a critical revision of Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* in her *Mediated Nations* (2011) as an appropriate starting point to develop an alternative approach to nationalism and the media with an emphasis on their link with power and politics. Mihelj comments on the reasons of Anderson's theory's worldwide appeal and popularity. First, the idea of nations as imagined communities had its 'iconoclastic potential' (ibid p.12) in post-1989 Europe due to rising anti-nationalist sentiments after the Cold War. This process urged people to think about alternative, post-national, global or cosmopolitan forms of collective imagination and belonging. Anderson's book was used for critical reflections about nationalist claims and ultimately, rejection of nationalist appeal. It was meant to inspire the option of a universalist identification or the option of not belonging to a specific group (ibid p.13). The second reason for the iconoclastic potential of *Imagined Communities* was what it offered in contrast to existing modernist theories of nation and nationalism. Rather than seeing nationalisms as reflections of fundamental realities in the modern world like industrialisation, decolonisation or revolution, Anderson's theory provided an examination of the cultural aspects of nationalism and different forms of national imagining over a variety of historical contexts (ibid p.14). However, Mihelj argued that the link between national imagination and its genesis and distribution by the power of print capitalism in the particular social and economic contexts was neglected and unexplored (ibid p.15). *Mediated Nations* challenges this trend by exploring how nationalism structures the world we live in and becomes embedded in institutionalised categories, routines and expressions in ordinary life. In this context, drawing on the theory of alternative modernities, comparative media research and historical research on national belonging, Mihelj looks at multiple political projects of modernity and their multiple configurations of nationhood and mass-communication. Her case studies show that the media transmit competing conceptions of histories and nationhood, whilst general themes of nationalism seem virtually universal
and taken for granted. In addition, Mihelj shows that Billig's theory can be applied to non-Western and non-democratic nation-states and their banal reproduction of national symbols. It can be done in different levels such as national, sub-national, supranational and non-national. Therefore, she offers a discursive approach to nationalism which allows explaining multiple attachments to collectivities, complex and hybrid webs of cultural and social formations in the international context and beyond existing boundaries of nation-state system. This approach enables to unpack various social, political and economic mechanisms shaping national imagination and operating through micro level and macro level relationship of power, structures and state policies.

As this study argues, Mihelj points out that nationalism is much more than a political doctrine, movement or sentiment (ibid p.17). In this discursive approach, nationalism is a way of seeing, interpreting and structuring the world, which can be constructed or represented in several different ways by various social agents, structures and power relations. That means, as the social world fundamentally divided and structured along power relations and perspective differences, there are different national imaginations and nationalist visions of the world. To be accepted and institutionalised, these nationalist perspectives would compete for acting as a representative of the nation and serving the nation's interests. Thus, there would be a struggle for achieving legitimacy (ibid p.19). This introduces new questions about which social norms, values and memories are fundamental to the nation in interpretation and justification of being a nation and in definition of ongoing struggle both within and between ideological groups to dominate others.

In answer to some of these new questions, Michael Skey (2011, p.10) explores which interpretations and categorisations of nations are taken for granted by particular groups and how they are accepted as 'common sense'. Each group may seek to stabilise the benefits that community membership
accrues (ibid p.29) and privilege their own definition of what the nation is physically, culturally and historically (ibid p.12). The dominant group defines and regulates the conditions of belonging within the nation-state. In order to secure a sense of self, community and place, a power struggle would happen between the dominant group and other groups. Each would struggle to maintain a knowable and manageable sense of identity and community in response to social and political transformations due to the fear of uncertainty. All aim to be dominant in order to reduce uncertainty and provide an ongoing secure sense of place in a threatening world.

The nations construct their narratives from past experiences to the present, with a will to live together in the future; their existences are happening, changing, developing or vanishing among the traces of the history. This is why the nation cannot be treated as a stable entity to observe its characteristics. Both continuity and change should be accounted for when reproducing the meaning of nationhood. With an intention to conceptualize ongoing struggles of perpetuating or challenging nationalist discourses, Skey (2011) offers to use the concept of 'sedimentation' (ibid p.12) which enables the perception of bifurcation in perspectives of national identity entailing a diversity of interests. With an agreement on these points, as articulated in the previous section, this thesis uses the concept of 'narrative' (Wodak et al 1999) in order to shed light on discourse-historical process to exhibit how a particular discourse (Post-Kemalism in Turkey) became established, regulated, institutionalised and became dominant generating hierarchies of status associated with the identities.

Among important contributions to the existing empirical works in the literature, Clary-Lemon (2010) used DHA in analysing oral-history interviews with fifteen members of the Irish Association of Manitoba to explore how national and subgroup identities such as immigrants are discursively constructed in the context of assimilation and dissimilation.
Within the Romanian context, Tileaga (2005) examined the notions of ethnicity, racism and ideology to provide a critical investigation of the taken-for-granted forms of prejudice and discrimination about ethnic minorities. In order to challenge existing stereotypes, Prentice (2010) studied social attitudes towards Scottish independence by analysing historical debates on British and Scottish identities through structured survey methodology. Some studies utilized the corpus techniques in CDA, in particular corpus linguistic method, namely automated semantic tagging¹⁰. Rather than this, DHA's the establishment of the main themes is taken as the starting point in this study and the newsprint media discourse is analysed for searching different perspectives on the nation in Turkey.

Beside these studies, a significant amount of research has been undertaken on discourses of identity in the newsprint media from a variety of geographical contexts.¹¹ Li (2009) compared discourses of two daily newspapers in the US (The New York Times) and China (China Daily) in two selected events to find out which particular discursive strategies employed to construct national identities. Dekavalla (2010) analysed the discursive construction of national identity in Scottish and in English/UK newspapers. With a focus on the UK's two general elections after devolution, in particular the 2001 and 2005 campaigns, she compared an Anglo-British perspective and Scottish

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perspective in the coverage of the issues. However, the case of Turkish national identity has not been studied yet. A number of studies have examined discourses of Turkey's bid for EU membership in the newsprint media in the UK, Greece, Slovenia, Germany, France and Spain (Aksoy, 2009; Koenig et al., 2006; Negrine, 2008; Negrine et al., 2008; Schneeberger, 2009; Tekin, 2008, 2010; Buckingham 2013). Tekin's study (2008) pointed out the French media's negative portrayal of Turkey’s candidature; moreover it showed the discourse that constructs Turkey's EU membership also constructs a collective European identity. Connectedly, Buckingham's findings (2013) indicated that despite the official support, the media narrative in the most respected newspaper of Spain, *El País* depicted Turkey as Europe's cultural other with references to Turkey's democratic deficits, historical cultural differences and the place of religion in Turkey's society. In the terms of 'national identity' and 'religion', a CDA of discourses of 'national piety' has been carried out by Hjelm (2014). Hjelm's work challenged with the privileged position and hegemony of the 'folk church in Finland by deconstructing the discourses that reproduced the status quo of religious inequality and national identity.

This study aims to both build upon these works benefited from CDA, in particular Wodak's DHA and to address a gap in the literature by examining how Turkey constructs its national identity and as the other of Europe in the Turkish newsprint media discourse. This will be undertaken by revealing the competing discourses that actively construct Turkey's 'Muslim', 'secular', 'European, and 'Western' identities.

1.6. The Main Assumptions of the Thesis and the Application of DHA to the Case of Turkey
In theoretical context, two prepositions underlie the framework of this research. The first central assumption is that the media's role in identity
construction demonstrates the daily construction of nationalism and its discourse-historical production (Wodak et al. 1999). In particular, analysing newspaper discourses is useful for understanding ideological relations in society and how the relations and structures of power are embedded in everyday language. The second assumption of this study is that identities are dynamic; thus, there can be different, unstable discursive constructions of national identities depending on the different contexts. In other words, since nationalism can shift with different ideologies and contexts, there is no single national identity. This means that diverse concepts of national identity can coexist (Wodak et al. 1999).

Based on these assumptions, this research argues that there is no ‘single’ Turkish nationalism (Ozkirimli 2011, p. 89) and that there is a struggle between different interpretations of post-Kemalist Turkish national identity in the first decade of the 2000s. As the main object observed in this project, this can be analysed by performing a search on how the competing discourses of Turkish nationalism are expressed, regenerated and employed in the Turkish media.

Two prepositions are built on the 'imagined communities' concept of Benedict Anderson (1983) and 'banal nationalism' of Micheal Billig (1995). According to these prepositions, belonging to a nation means imaging the ‘we’ opposing the ‘other’ in terms of domestic and external relations. The imaginations of the nation map its place in the world and define its conception of insiders and outsiders, allies and enemies. Departing from these points, this study argues that the media, particularly the press, are one of the main sources of nationalist beliefs; therefore, the influential forms of institutionalised nationalism reside in the media discourse, which may produce a sense of belonging to a nation but also the stereotypes and prejudices in everyday lives towards other nations. Analysis of media discourse is a useful resource for studying ideological and identity relations
in domestic and external relations to develop an understanding and awareness of how self and other relations are embedded in the everyday language (Bell and Garret 1999). Therefore, in this research, the leading role of Turkish media is considered in representing different ideologies of nationalism (Keyman and Kadioglu 2011) as well as interpreting and constructing power relations in the Turkish political sphere.

As noted before, interpretation of contradictory memories of the past embodies different meanings and perspectives regarding the present, national days, rituals and matters; thus what people know or how people look at the history determine today's struggles to secure a nation's future. That is, the past is interpreted based on how they want to live, justifying their ‘normal’ as a continuation of what has occurred before (Inthorn 2007). That means there would be competing narratives (Wodak et al 1999), which are used to justify their own national imaginations and current interests.

In this conceptual context, this thesis reveals that the main problem for Turkish nationalism is dealing with its hybrid character and history (Canefe 2002). In a paradox, the attempt to create a ‘democratic society’ has reiterated the past traumas of traditional ‘others’ within Turkey that were, until then, locked in the pages of the past. In the terms of religious and ethnic identities, different versions of national narrative have been spoken in dealing with the ‘common past’. Reinterpretation of the past has also urged many to rethink the definition of citizenship and the situation of minorities in Turkey. The demands for equal, civic, democratic and constitutional citizenship push authorities to do something in legislation. Although many of the secular elites and the military have been uncomfortable with the political reforms promoted through EU conditionality (Tocci 2005), the harmonisation packages which came into force by the AKP, brought significant changes (Keyman 2007; Ozbudun 2009; Parker 2009) to the minority rights, religious freedom and right to life and retrial.
This process prompts and embodies the limits of domination, exclusion and inclusion in the concept of the nation and citizenship. More importantly, it determines the struggle over economic, political and symbolic resources and who owns and controls national, cultural, material, even natural capital. With this emphasis on and interest in differences, discourse analysis renders a more dynamic framework for studying the clash of different world views and identities, which can acknowledge the wider socio-political relations and structural changes. Thus, this study applies discourse-historical approach to map out a range of Turkish national identities, their power struggle in reconstruction of new Turkey's identity, their perspectives on Europe and the West in general.

As noted, the collective memory of the nation is based on a selective remembering and forgetting of past events. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and National Independence War, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his friends established the Turkish Republic in 1923. Despite the fact that the country’s population was overwhelmingly Muslim, the Kemalist revolution embraced a secular identity to build a modern nation like the European states in the West. In addition, the military and the legal system were structured to protect this Kemalist secular identity. However, three main factors have triggered a reconstruction process of Turkey's identity since the end of the Cold War: the paradigm shift in the international relations with 9/11 events and its influence on Turkey's international identity; Turkey's Europeanisation efforts; and a fundamental change in Turkey's domestic power relations with the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). In November 2002, AKP with Islamist roots won more than a third of the vote and formed a single-party majority government in the Turkish Grand

12 AKP’s historical success in Turkish politics doubled when it managed to increase its vote to 46.5 per cent in the 2007 general elections, despite the economy playing the biggest role in determining voter preferences (Kalaycıoğlu 2010, p. 29), followed by religiosity and other cultural factors that help determine party identification.
National Assembly (TGNA). Although almost half of the general vote was left unrepresented (Sen 2010, p. 60) due to a ten per cent national threshold, the AKP changed the internal power relations and struggle for hegemony in Turkey by gaining almost two-thirds of the seats and the legislative apparatus. This gave Islamists and Kurds, two groups that were traditionally outside Kemalist nation-state identity, now had power in Ankara against a secular military-civil bureaucracy (Casier and Jongerden 2011). This was the beginning of a silent counter-revolution that transformed Turkey's identity and reconstructed the post-Kemalist nation-state identification. This thesis argues that this struggle more than the centre-periphery cleavage (Mardin 1973), it is a clash of different Turkeys. In this regard, the empirical part of the research sets out to answer these questions: How do these different Turkeys engage, converse and struggle with each other in defining Turkish national identity? What impact, if any, did the governmental transition in November 2002 have on Turkey’s identity in terms of domestic and international relations; namely, in its Turkish, Muslim, European and Western identity?

Instead of the Kemalist-Republican secular construction, AKP's Islamic conservative nationalism is transforming Turkish nation-state identity at the level of state institutions and public culture (White 2013), which also indicates there is an on-going struggle between different definitions of national tradition. The logic of post-Kemalist transformation is a worldview constructed on the basis of a selective reading of the Ottoman and Turkish history of religious, cultural and ethnic identity. Newly emerging Islamist ideology is repositioning and reconstructing Turkey’s political terrain in foreign policy in terms of creating a new macro-identity among populations that share the Ottoman Islamic heritage (Davutoglu 2006).

In the case of Turkey, the argument of the research is twofold based on the political and historical context of the last decade. The first part of the
argument is that Turkish Kemalist nation state identity has been redefined by the new Muslim conservative political elite and Kurdish identity by using the post 9/11 international politics, European integration process (Zucconi 2009, p. 25) and its democracy discourse. Remarkably, the EU adaptation process has been served to anchor and guarantee the legitimacy of the AKP and its policies. The second is that Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s effect in Turkish foreign policy has directly targeted the Kemalist worldview. Identifying a reimagined Ottoman imperial project (Fisher-Onar 2012, p. 63) has become more effective in conditioning and shaping the state’s policies and the society’s Islamic perception of ‘self’ (Saracoğlu 2013) and non-European identity. In a nutshell, both the developments in domestic and international politics enhanced the AKP government’s power for construction of Turkey’s post-Kemalist nation-state identity.

To follow the post-Kemalist transformation of Turkish nation-state identity and its challenges, four contested main discourses of Turkish nationalism (Ozkirimli 2011) can be observed in Turkish media: Kemalist nationalism; Islamist nationalism; ethnic-nationalism; and liberal nationalism. In the selected three case studies, different ideological perspectives on the Turkish nation will be compared in order to show how and why they struggle to resist or maintain the post-Kemalist reconstruction of Turkey's identity. Primarily, media discourse contributes to understanding the ways in which Turkish national identity and its place in the world is imagined, discussed and embodied through daily practice of reading newspaper. It illustrates different yet common forms of Turkish nationhood in their continuity and change. It also provides a better articulation of the ways in which particular discourses are stabilized or challenged through daily routines and discussion patterns which offer multiple clues to a population’s sense of nationality and how this reflects their imagination of their nation's collective past, present and future.
Consequently, the aim of this research is not just to identify multiple discourses of Turkish nationalism and their struggle to shape their own unique Turkish nation-state identity, but also to develop a deeper reading of historical and political production, negotiation and evolution of these competing identities in the nation's narrative. It explores the privileged and disadvantaged status of particular groups within the Turkish national setting and discovers which discourses contribute to the realisation of the ongoing construction of the post-Kemalist sense of Turkishness as the new national self. It especially focuses on how Islamists justify their new status and benefits, how secularists challenged their dominant position and how other nationalist discourses contribute to this power struggle in redefinition of Turkey’s identity. Finally, the case studies are examined to allow a comparative element that enables the transformation of self/other relations to be analysed systematically in the national and international context. By seeing the symbiotic nature of antagonisms in Turkish nationalism, the results also impact considerably contemporary attempts to cultivate a Turkish nation-state identity in the process of writing a new constitution, which is needed in order to allow a post-secular and pluralist understanding.

In the national media, the linguistic processes and strategies in the creation, negotiation and establishment of identities construct how people and nations define who they are (De fina et al. 2007, p. 18) and how they map their nation in the world of nations. In line with these assumptions, this study attempts to analyse the Turkish identity discourse in the national media considering national and international factors, with a specific focus on the domestic actors’ ideologies, values, beliefs and perceptions. With these points as guidance, this dissertation examines how the meanings of a particular national identity and nationalism are constructed in newspaper discourse, which serves to justify positions and interests of particular groups in their relation with each other, the EU and the West. Thus, Critical Discourse Analysis is used as the method for the media research to find links between
changing power relations and empowering ideological discourse in Turkey.

Using this method clearly shows the link between power relations and empowering ideological discourse in the three case studies, which demonstrate the shifting constructions of Turkey, the EU and the West as represented in the Turkish media in the first decade of the 2000s. The first case study demonstrates the multiple articulations of Turkishness in complex constellations of competition and interaction of definitions. The second case study illustrates the media discourse regarding the debate over Turkish national identity and its particular challenge with the Kurdish issue, which reflects European influence and contention over the integration process. Lastly, the third case study examines how discursive construction of Turkish nation-state identity in the media can be projected on the ‘West’ by understanding the way the ‘USA’ is articulated in the case of 9/11 and Iraq War. Media analysis investigates how foreign policy discourse works as an identity-making tool that erects boundaries and specifies what constitutes the self, its allies and enemies (Messari 2001, p. 227) and their changing meanings in the construction of post-Kemalist nation-state identity.

With a consideration of these points, this thesis asserts that a discourse analysis of the common national political past, present, and future can reveal why Turkish people think as they do about themselves and others. The research assumes that the different narratives on nationhood are different imaginations of the nation, and these contested imaginations determine the nation's identity and power relations. Therefore, it offers a discursive historical approach to the Turkish case by paying direct attention to the power struggle over redefinition of Turkey's identity in the 2000s through multiple discursive constructions of national identity in different narratives of nation that identify Turkishness in competing perspectives. Thus, a discursive approach is assumed to be a fruitful and beneficial method for studying and contemplating the dynamic and complex character of Turkish
nationalism.

1.7. Searching for Competing Discourses of Turkish Identity in the Turkish Press
In the last section it is argued that DHA is used in this study as a method for analysing political discourse in the media to find links among changing power relations and empowering ideological discourse in Turkey in the last decade, between 2001 and 2011. This method can demonstrate how the media discourses create meanings about national identity of Turkey that serve to justify persons' positions and interests of them and to criticise others in relationship with each other, with the EU and the West. In turn, the crucial question is ‘which media?’

In fact, in the history of media and politics in Turkey, the subject of political pressure on the media has usually been the armed forces, the elected government and the judiciary (Baris 2005). The Turkish state’s control over the media discourse has become a part of its construction of a particular citizenship and civil society-state relationship. The laws and regulations draw the borders of the media discourse, based on the state’s vision of an ideal citizen, and hinder the media’s ability to deliberately promote plural, opposing voices in society.

For example, this is obvious when looking specifically at Turkish television. Gencel Bek’s study (2004), titled *News Reporting in Turkish Television and Tabloidisation*, examines the structure of private television broadcasting in the 2000’s (Akkor Gul 2011 p.34) and the media autocracy in Turkey (Akser and Baybars-Hawks 2012). In order to protect economic interests in other sectors such as education, construction and telecommunication, the big businesses in the television sector dramatically drive self-censorship and fail
to develop a presence independent from the state. Therefore, the big media patrons lack the ability and will to function properly as the ‘fourth estate’ that challenge the state’s interests and policies. In particular, Turkey has witnessed new ownership and control relations in the media economy-politics of the last decade. Beside the neoliberalisation of political Islam, the neoliberal media have become conservative under the AKP government (Cam and Yuksel 2015, p.67). Based on these findings, it is clear that the goal of this study cannot be achieved by analysing television discourse.

Nevertheless, Turkish newspapers are very helpful in identifying various discourses based on different ideologies and in understanding the struggle of power and strategies of logics of equivalence and difference within identity constructions. Of course, even newspapers present certain difficulties, and there are certain features of journalism in Turkey that must be taken into account. One encouraging characteristic that makes this study feasible is that Turkish newspapers have very courageous columnists who regularly run the risk of being sent to jail, as Noam Chomsky expressed in an interview in January 2012. Despite the fact that the journalists and columnists are citizens and members of the public, Turkish national dailies are not purely opinion newspapers of regular writers and journalists; they rank citizens

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14 Before the AKP government in 2001, six media group dominated the sector: Dogan, Medya, Cukurova, Rumeli, Ihlas and Dogus. Currently, the media industry is divided into the biggest six of the media groups in Turkey: Dogan, Cilik, Cukurova, Dogus, Fox and Ciner. On the transformation of Turkish media industry in the last decade, see: U. Uraz Aydin (ed.) (2015) Neoliberal Muhafazakar Medya (Neoliberal Conservative Media), Istanbul: Ayrinti Yayinlari.

15 According to 2012 data from the International Press Institute (IPI), more than 700 journalists are on trial in Turkey in cases brought on the basis of several provisions of the Press Law, the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law. The International Committee to Protect Journalists report (2014) points out that Turkey is the world’s leading jailer of journalists; for instance, 232 journalists were behind bars in 2012 and 59 journalist lost their job just during the Gezi Park protests.
discourses that have different backgrounds such as students, political activists, poets, soldiers or doctors. Radikal newspaper remains a valuable source because it uses public discourses to speak out the socio-political matters, even when the editorial articles remain silent. Cumhuriyet newspaper also devotes its second page to this purpose. Thus, even though Critical Discourse Analysis requires knowing whose discourse is being represented, it is possible to apply this method to the Turkish media by using its daily newspapers.

The language used by newspapers when referring to social actors, events, background, context or consequences tend to be influenced by ideological beliefs, which can lead to biased word choices dependant on particular interests, concerns and positions. This can subtly lead to misinformation. What is reported and how it is reported can change or maintain the understanding of nationalist narratives in a dynamic process. Even though narratives are supposed to be about reporting past events, they can impose certain meanings of world and stereotypical ways of thinking that serve the interests of those in power (Gillespie 2006, p.114-115). In this context, news reporting and opinion articles on the events that appear in the selected newspapers, provide essential clues in uncovering ideological fault lines and power struggle in the Turkish political sphere.

Therefore, four daily newspapers have been chosen for surveying and comparing different discourses of Turkish nationalism in Turkish press. These are the secularist Cumhuriyet, right-wing Hurriyet, Muslim conservative Zaman, and liberal-leftist Radikal. In consideration of the fact

16 According to their average daily circulations, the highest number, 969.775 is Zaman’s, however it does not reflect the newsstand sales; 92% of Zaman’s copies is distributed to subscribers. Second is Posta 436.656 and it is followed by Hurriyet 423.190. On the list Cumhuriyet has 50.277 and Radikal has 31.804. See more: http://www.hik.gov.tr/istanbul/ocak-2012-tiraj-raporu/ In addition, the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) shows (August 2012) that 38% of the population uses internet regularly, and among them 73% uses it for accessing daily news: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=10880
that *Radikal* has lost its place in Turkish press since 2007, another liberal newspaper *Taraf* has also been included in the data analysis in order to show how liberal press played a role in reconstruction of post-Kemalist nation-state discourse.¹⁷

Turkey's oldest newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*, was named by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1924, and it still represents Republican Kemalist discourse. Thus it is chosen for analysing how the changing nature of Kemalist nation/state identity is perceived by this political circle. Looking at the discourse of the one of the nation’s bestsellers, *Hurriyet* clearly exemplifies the populist, mainstream type of Turkish nationalism, especially since its slogan is ‘Turkey for Turks’. To demonstrate the link between the AKP government and Islamist circles from 2001-2011, the religious Gulen movement’s newspaper, *Zaman*, has been chosen to analyse the discourse of the Islamist version of Turkish nationalism and its role in reconstruction of Turkey's post-Kemalist nation-state identity. Lastly, *Radikal* and *Taraf* have been selected as the best examples of a liberal approach to Turkish nationalism, including voices of the leftist groups, non-Muslims, Kurds and civil protestors.¹⁸

In order to properly analyse Turkish national identity discourse in the press, research must follow three stages: (1) the main themes of a specific discourse must first be established; (2) the discursive strategies must be investigated; and (3) the linguistic means and realisations of the discursive strategies must be examined (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009 p. 93). Therefore, each case study

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¹⁸ In this project, the concept of ‘liberalism’ is used in meaning the world view founded on ideas of liberty, equality, pluralism and refers to the proliferation of opinions, beliefs and identities against the tyranny of the majority (Tocqueville 1835; Mill 1859) and the homogeneity in the way that people think.
begins with a description of the key themes of the discourses. This is followed by an investigation of the discursive strategies used to develop Turkish nationalism as an ideology and the discursive construction of different national identities. Finally, each case study examines the linguistic means and realisations of discursive strategies in order to observe how particular themes can be argued to contribute the re-construction of Turkish nation-state identity. However, before presenting the case studies, it is important to discuss how main themes, discursive strategies, and linguistic means were identified.

1.7.1. The First Stage: Establishing the Main Themes of Turkey’s Identity

This study accepts that all aspects and complexity of Turkish identity cannot be covered in a thesis, and this is beyond the scope of it. Rather than, this study indicates the contested nature of Turkey's identity as a 'fluid and negotiated concept' (Inthorn 2007). In order to demonstrate how the distinguished discourses can be said to contribute to the establishment of post-Kemalist Turkish national identity, specific themes should be defined. After reviewing the case of Turkey, it can be seen that Kemalist construction of secularist Turkish nation-state identity has been challenged by Islamic and Kurdish identities in the last decade, both in national and international level, particularly in the means of ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ a European or Western country. In order to examine different discursive constructions of Turkish nation-state identity in national and international context, three themes of Turkish identity are laid out in three selected case studies from the last decade (2001-2011): being Turkish, being European and being Western.

Using both manual and digital search for key words reveals how elaborately and associatively ‘Muslim, Secular, Non-Muslim, European, Western identity’ themes are presented in the coverage of Turkey’s identity. To tackle the large body of these articles, these selected themes qualify and limit the
‘sampling frame’ (Bertrand and Hughes 2004, p.67). Related to the data collection,\textsuperscript{19} the selection procedures are developed parallel to the main research question that seeks to highlight the diversity and dynamicity of Turkish national identity discourse.

To what extent and in what forms Turkish nationhood is flagged or reconstructed daily by the press can be analysed on randomly selected days (Yumul and Ozkırımlı 2000). However, in the case of the Assassination of Hrant Dink, the titles and discussions on the next day of the event, which was 20 January 2007 and following week days were given priority in the sampling. For the event of Presidential Elections in 2007, the weeks of the largest Republican meetings in April and those of the General Elections in July were the main focus of analysis. In the second case study, the milestone dates in Turkey and EU relations such as 17 December 2004 and 3 October 2005 were viewed as the most important. Therefore, in order to see reconstruction of post-Kemalist nation-state identity through transformation of Turkey's discourse on Kurdish problem, the discussions of Kurdish Opening in the media discourse were given the most emphasis. In the last case study, the West and Turkey's Western identity discourse were emphasized by sampling articles addressing the events of 9 September 2001 and 1 March 2003, the date of Turkey's decision regarding the Iraq War.

The websites of the newspapers allow an archive search, in particular

\textsuperscript{19} Total number of the selected data is 197. Please see the numbers of the data in detail at the References part of the thesis. On account of the fact that the data collected from Turkish daily newspapers is all in Turkish, the example statements of discourses should be translated into English. Language and translation surely matter for the analysis in the issues of bilinguality. However, avoiding the semantic shifts and transformation in order to keep the meaning in two languages, are still possible in certain respects. First of all, translated texts can be double checked by the native bilingual translation experts, this is intended for this study as well. Secondly, the sources of original texts of the data will be added at the references section of the research. Significantly, the methodology of research, Discourse Historical Approach serves as very detailed historical background information for the social contexts and the cases. Therefore, with this given knowledge we can help to overcome the difficulty of studying in two different meaning worlds, thus it can be argued that the bilingualism will not affect research’s discourse analysis in the terms of meaning or content.
**Cumhuriyet** permits access to electronic copies from the 1920s to 2000s. Thankfully, **Taraf** was willing to post copies of the relevant newspapers. The other three newspapers provide online archives, but these are not like the printed versions. Therefore, in order to supplement electronic work, it was necessary to visit the **National Library** in Ankara to view the printed versions of the newspaper for the selected dates. For instance, in the first case study, the key word search of 'Hrant Dink Suikasti' (Assassination of Hrant Dink) on **Hurriyet's** website gives the number of times this phrase appeared: in 2007, the year of the event, it was 58. However, it dropped to 21 in 2008 and to 11 in 2009. These results were further narrowed by searching simultaneously for the phrase 'Hrant Dink Suikasti' (Assassination of Hrant Dink) and 'Türk Kimliği' (Turkish Identity). This time, the number of appearances was only 17 in 2007, 6 in 2008, 3 in 2009 and only once in 2010 (Table I, p.316). These numbers diminish even more by adding one more term to the key word search such as 'Muslim' or 'secular'. In this case, this means the sampling was completed while assuming that the idea of a Turkish nation is a discursive construct and in dialogue with other forms of identity, such as being non-Muslim, Muslim and/or secular.

This study will focus on the most important contributors to this topic who consistently addressed this issue. The key word search method adopted above quickly revealed who wrote about this topic and how many times they did so. For example, Ozdemir Ince wrote about 'secularism and Islam' 125 times; Cengiz Candar 24 times; Cuneyt Ulsever 22 times; Emin Colasan 21 times; and Bekir Coskun 15 times. Most, but not all, of these columnists wrote in their newspapers every week during the last decade. The articles of each selected columnist are easily accessible online. The columnists were chosen based on their intensity of salience in the newspaper. Each of them used commented on the daily political agenda and openly identified their ideological view. This study does not seek to label or define the writers into specific categories, but to focus on what each writer said about his/her own
identity and ideology. I must note that I hesitate to label the writers. I think that it is not ethical. My priority is what the writer says about his/her identity and ideology. In addition, it should be kept in mind neither label, either ‘Kemalist’ or ‘Islamist’, is meant to be limiting or insulting. Instead, these are accepted as handle concepts to catch and find out ‘dynamic’ meanings.

To sum up, the specific dates of the events, the key words with the key themes and the key writers are taken into account in the samples used for analysis. Bearing in mind the different ideological standpoints, within non-positivist qualitative research, the generalisation from the sample to the whole nation is not intended. However, on the assumption that repeated discourse in each newspaper would be representative of ideological argumentations in particular perspectives and privileging certain viewpoints, this ‘purposive sampling’ (Bertrand and Hughes 2004, p. 199) should establish a profile for distinguishing the perspectives of the main discourses of Turkish national identity.

1.7.2. The Second Stage: Investigation of the Discursive Strategies

After designing the research, defining the themes and managing the data, one has to determine which discursive strategies are best for analysing and evaluating the data, which will demonstrate whether these achieved certain political, psychological or other kinds of objectives in national narrative. Strategies can be categorised as constructive, destructive, perpetuatory or transformatory (Wodak at all 1999 p. 33-42). According to the content of each case study, therefore, the discursive strategies in the constitutive process of national identity were investigated to demonstrate how these themes contribute to particular power relationships and/or ideological standpoints. This research, mainly seeks to reveal constructive strategies, which attempt to construct and establish new Turkey's post-Kemalist national identity. In order to show the challenges of this identity in the midst of domestic power struggles, it focuses on strategies of perpetuation, which aim to continue
Kemalist national identity; and strategies of transformation, which aim to transform Kemalist national identity and its components into a post-Kemalist identity. The discursive strategies employed are as follows:

- Linguistic construction of common political past (with reference to the pre-Islamic; Islamic-Ottoman; Republican-Secular);
- Linguistic construction of common political present and future in the representation of achievements and problems of citizenship and democracy;
- Linguistic construction of common past with Europe/European Union;
- Linguistic construction of common present and future in the context of Turkey’s bid of European membership and Turkey’s Kurdish question.
- Linguistic construction of being Western in the context of religion and secularism;
- Linguistic construction of common past, present and future with the West/Europe/USA in the context of representation of the link between the 9/11 and Iraq war;
- Linguistic construction of issue of ‘axis shift’ in Turkish Foreign Policy’s Western Orientation.

1.7.3. The Third Stage: Examination of the Linguistic Means and Realisations of the Discursive Strategies

After the definition of the content and strategies of the first case study, the last dimension of the analysis is looking at the linguistic means in the discursive construction of Turkish national identity. In the analysis, constructive strategies are chosen because they best allow observation of Turkish nationalism, that is, the developed sense of belonging together in the common past and future with a feeling of unity and uniqueness that defines insiders and outsiders (us/them) within Turkey. In this context, the first case
study attempts to identify how Turkish newspapers have constructed national identity in the last decade, within the debates of Presidential elections and the assassination of Journalist Hrant Dink in 2007. Perhaps the most obvious form of a developed sense of Turkish nationalism can be seen in the secularist and non-secularist identity contradiction, demonstrated in the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ rhetoric employed within this religious theme of Turkish national identity. This also serves to show to what extent minorities are included and excluded in the different narrative of the nation. In dealing with social inequality and racism (Wodak 1997, p.36-42), the problem of ethno-religious prejudices and discrimination in Turkish national identity discourse will be located in the power struggle of competing self-definitions of Turkish nation. On the one hand, with regard to Turkey’s secular/Islamic identity, the case of the Presidential elections in 2007 demonstrates how perpetuatory strategies have been applied by Kemalist discourse actors in an attempt to maintain Republicanist state/nation tradition. On the other hand, it also shows how transformatory strategies have worked to change the secular component of Turkish national identity into another identity in Islamic discourse or liberal discourse.

In order to find out the linguistic realisation of narratives of common past, present and future, the analysis should focus primarily on lexical units such as personal references, spatial references and temporal references (ibid. p.35). Discursive strategies of nomination in referring to people, events or objects, distinguishes the different collective representations via anthroponomy, personal deixis, synecdoche, metonymy and metaphors. Linguistic representation of social actors and events indicates sameness and difference between people in connection with constructive discursive strategies.

Perhaps the most obvious form of a developed sense of Turkish nationalism can be seen in the secularist and non-secularist identity contradiction, demonstrated in the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ rhetoric employed within this
religious theme of Turkish national identity. This also serves to show to what extent minorities are included and excluded in the different narrative of the nation. In dealing with delete social inequality and racism (Wodak 1997, p.36-42), the problem of ethno-religious prejudices and discrimination in Turkish national identity discourse will be located in the power struggle of competing self-definitions of Turkish nation. For instance, particular ways of nomination of Hrant Dink such as ‘Armenian’ or ‘Turkish’ demonstrate a clear difference. Therefore, inclusive or exclusive, activated or passivated, personal or impersonal and specific or generic reference to the events, people and places is closely associated with the newspaper’s standpoint that empowers the voices of certain actors and silencing others (Li 2009, p.94).

On the one hand, with regard to Turkey’s secular/Islamic identity, the case of the Presidential elections in 2007 demonstrates how perpetuatory strategies have been applied by Kemalist discourse actors in an attempt to maintain Republicanist state/nation tradition. On the other hand, it also shows how transformatory strategies have worked to change the secular component of Turkish national identity into another identity in Islamic discourse or liberal discourse. This clash of Secular-Muslim interpretations of nation can be traced through depicting the linguistic realisations of nomination of representative actors such as AKP’s presidential candidate Abdullah Gul or President Ahmet Necdet Sezer as a symbolic name for Republican secularism.

In the analysis of the first case study, the use of personal pronouns such as ‘we’ and ‘they’ to address the self/other relations, is important in understanding who are included in the definition of Turkish nation and who are excluded. Media coverage of the Presidential elections in 2007 gives fruitful material for the data analysis of the power struggle on re/construction of national identity discourse to those seeking to observe different perspectives of the nation and world in Turkish political discourse during the
last decade. Even the critical landmarks in this process are selected to narrow down the empirical source material of the case, the selection of the articles are further narrowed down in a qualitative manner based on the joint appearance of the words ‘Turkishness’, ‘Islam’ and ‘laicism’ (*laiklik* is a more appropriate word instead of secularism in the case of Turkey).

For the last step of analysis regarding the second case study, the analysis focused on changing definitions within Turkey's sense of European identity. These can be seen both in the opposition and supporting argumentations through the representation of EU membership and nationalist conceptions constructed in the national press. Therefore, the focus of linguistic analysis of these themes is both constructive and deconstructive in the constitutive process of national identity in the context of European integration. The use of ‘us/them’ provides the change to unpack the Turkish press’s discursive construction of Europe, with wider implications for the Turkish people’s imagined nation. Therefore, the use of pronouns (‘I’, ‘you’, ‘we’) implies an imagined ‘Europeanness’ or ‘non-Europeanness’. By providing context from Turkish nationalism and the origins of Turkey’s Kurdish problem with regard to Turkey’s will of EU membership, the data analysis will demonstrate how each diverse use of language exhibits the an embedded national and international identity discourse of Turkey, and to what extent this challenges or operates within the ever-changing power struggles of the last decade. To explore the linguistic means in the construction of Turkey and Europe’s common political present and future, the specific content of Kurdish problem is particularly important. Whether the European integration process has promoted unification, identification and solidarity, or has threatened national identity by supporting differentiation, will be put into question.

The last case study for the searching on Turkey’s Foreign Policy identity, particularly Western identity, focuses on the events of 9/11 and Turkey's decision on Iraq War in March 2003. Both of these events thematically serve
to analyse the vision of Turkish Foreign Policy from a social constructivist and identity perspective. This means that the study’s interest in the events is limited to how the Turkish press represents and constructs the self/other relationships in the means of Islamic and Western identity. Therefore, the security and military dimensions of the issue are not covered in the selection of the data. Specifically, the third case reveals the link between the events of 9/11 and the way that the media linguistically represents the relationship between Islam and the West. It also considers how these representations discursively construct post-Kemalist Turkish national identity, contribute to the domestic power struggle and the debate of Turkish foreign policy shift.

Conclusion
In summary, this research relies on two key propositions. First, it does not accept that there has only ever been one narrative of Turkish national identity; instead it assumes that there have been multiple narratives of Turkish national identity competing with each other for domination since national identity is a dynamic concept. Second, it depends on DHA analysis of the Turkish media discourse as the means to explore these contested discursive constructions of Turkish national identity. On these assumptions, the thesis empirically shows that there is no ‘single’ Turkish nationalism. This thesis empirically shows that there has been an emergence of post-Kemalist nation-state identity through the power struggle of between different narratives of Turkish nation in the last decade under the AKP government. All three of the case studies help to show how this post-Kemalist identity has emerged and contributed to a new, more diverse sense of Turkish nationalism. The case studies also reveal both how the traditional others of Kemalist nation-state could create a common consent in the construction of new Turkey and how it has been challenged during the transformation.

Shedding light on the process of this significant and historical change, which has exposed Islamist nationalism and a non-European identity within
the Turkish nation-state instead of a solely secular and Europeanist one, is crucial for a deeper understanding of the contemporary Turkish politics. In particular, this greater knowledge of the emerging new self/other relationship of Turkey allows for an increased understanding of the unique relationship between Islam, national identity and democracy in International Relations and European Studies.

After clarification of the theoretical contexts, in order to explore the processes of ideological constructions in the media, the historical and socio-political context for the emergence and challenges of Turkey's post-Kemalist nation-state identity are given in the next chapter of the research.
CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY: THE
CONSTRUCTION OF TURKISH NATION-STATE IDENTITY

"When your ‘identity crisis’ has lasted for some 200 years it is no longer a crisis. It is your identity.”

Introduction
This chapter reveals that the discourse of Turkish nationalism has had numerous evolutions and branches from its rise in the late nineteenth century to the emergence of post-Kemalist nation-state identity in the present. At the time of the founding of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his adherents set the goal of lifting Turkey up to the level of contemporary civilization' as expressed in his speech in 1924 (Lewis 2002, p.292): ‘The Turks are the friends of all civilised nations. Countries vary, but civilisation is one, and for a nation to progress is most taking part in this single civilisation.’ Their images of the civilised Turkish nation-state were modern and secular, thus the way of civilisation had appeared clear, distancing itself with the Islamic Ottoman past and the Eastern way of life and instead cooperating with the civilised and modern West.

In this regard, Turkey is defined as a ‘torn country’ by Samuel Huntington (2002, p.139) in ‘the Clash of Civilisations’ in his interpretation of the world of civilisations and the remaking of the world order after the Cold War period. Turkey is torn due to its Kemalist leaders attempting to shift Turkey to another (Western) civilisation, even though it has a predominantly Muslim culture. But as Huntington argued (ibid p.147), in the post-Cold War era national, ethnic, and religious identification issues continued to emerge, and

Turkey’s Kemalist secularist identity has been under challenge at home while its Western or European identity has been questioned more internationally. Since a response to this challenge is required, Turkey has been in the process of redefinition of its national/state identity, which is complicated and painful, both culturally and politically. The common approach accepts that there is a cleavage between the Republican secularist bureaucratic centre and the conservative Muslim periphery (Mardin 1973) in Turkey. Rather than, this thesis argues that the secular (European-Western) and Muslim identities of Turkey are historically constructed and mutually constitutive (Turner and Zengin-Arslan 2013) due to their power struggle; therefore it concentrates on the diversity in existing understandings of Turkish identity and it reveals that changing domestic power relations have changed dominant discourse in Turkey's nation-state identity discourse and led to the emergence of a post-Kemalist discourse. Therefore, it offers a discursive approach for understanding of new Turkey's identity and its place in the world.

This chapter demonstrates that Kemalist Turkish state has not been neutral (ibid. p.207) in creating Muslim secularism, which makes Turkey as an original example in identity politics of International Relations Studies. Such a paradox, what divides and maintains Turkish national unity is Muslim identity and its secular interpretation. Despite the fact that it has highly polarised Turkey in the last decade, the both sides have benefited from this struggle, as Kadioğlu and Keyman (2011) defined that these are symbiotic antagonisms. Therefore, this thesis offers an anti-essentialist conceptualisation of these identities, their difference and mutual relations, which open up possibilities of democratic interaction, post-secular pluralism (Connally 2000; Habermas 2008) and 'ethos of engagement' (Martin 2011, p. 131) among different traditions, faiths and ways of living them. This engagement in becoming plural may be healing to Turkey's 'social and historical wound left open by the incompletion of the struggle of civil rights' (Finlayson 2011, p.17).
In order to shed light on the origins of contested discourses on Turkish national identity and the emergence of Turkey's post-Kemalist nation-state identity, this chapter will provide the historical framework for analysing different elements of Turkey’s identity such as Turkic, Islamic, secular, European, and Western. It invokes three major factors that have urged re/construction of Turkey's identity since the end of the Cold War: the international paradigm shift, especially with 9/11 events; Turkey's bid for EU membership; and the rise of the political Islam and transformation of domestic power relations with the pro-Islamist Justice and Development Party's (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) government since 2002.

In the last decade, reformist AKP aligned itself with the West/EU to consolidate democracy. This attempt legitimised its actions to transform domestic power relations, significantly Turkish self-image at the domestic and international levels. Throughout the last decade Turkey’s internal dilemmas and contradictions in identity politics have reached the top of the agenda of the country in its reflection into international relations of Turkey, particularly relations with the EU/West. Within this context of Turkey, the object of this chapter is to present a critical discussion on the national identity and foreign policy interactions that will assist in providing a historical framework to study Turkey’s post-Kemalist nation-state identity, its challenges and changing EU/West relations. To realise this goal, this chapter begins with a presentation of the historical roots of Turkish nationalism and its challenge with the Kemalist state’s traditional others: Non-Muslim, Islamist and Kurdish identities. Then, it seeks out the evolution of discourses of Turkish nationalism and its relations with the others in changing internal and international circumstance during the 1990s and 2000s.
2.1. The Origins of Different Narratives of Turkish Nation: Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism

This section deals with the concepts of Turkish nation while locating the perspectives on Turkish nationalism within the theories of nationalism. In Turkish nationalism studies, Nergis Canefe (2002) points out that the hybrid nature of the multi-ethnic, multicultural, and multi-religious Ottoman history and heritage constitutes one of the two obstacles hindering the examination of the Turkish case. Another obstacle is that the political and cultural denial of the Ottoman heritage since the Republican establishment. The Kemalist tradition of secular nationalism of the Republican era is formulated against the idea of a continuum that links the Ottoman legacy and Islamic Turkish history. According to Canefe, ignorance of the Ottoman origins of the Turkish nationalist movement and an overwhelming modernist trajectory in analysing Turkish nationalism limit understanding of the Turkish case (ibid. p.134). This is because this Kemalist narrative has been influenced officially and popularly by the counter-narratives, their reading of history and selection of events that differently built their imaginations of the nation. Thus, as she argues, the central problem of the construction of Turkish national identity can be identified as its dealings with its own history and hybrid character. Nergis Canefe (2002) offers an ethno-symbolic alternative (Smith 1999; Hutchinson 2000) for studying Turkish nationalism and its popular appeal. Canefe applies an historical ethno-symbolism method to the Turkish case in looking at the myths of the Turkish people's origins, memories, traditions, and ways of life in a distinctly Muslim Turkish Anatolian society in related symbols of its ethnicity. She shows that Kemalist narrative and myths of nation selectively highlight the history of Turkish people in Asia Minor. This specifically Kemalist reading on the political past serves for imagining a secular nation by creating distance from the Islamic character of the Ottoman era. She overcomes the certain break between the Ottoman and the Kemalist Republican narrative that hinders seeing the social, cultural, and economic determinants of emerging Young Ottoman and Young Turks movements as
the birth of Turkish nationalism in the late Ottoman times. Therefore, to gain a deeper understanding, the role of the national awakening, imperial legacy and power struggle in the nation-state building process are taken into account for a classification of Turkish nationalism in this section.

The Ottoman Empire had a multi-religious, multicultural, and multilingual millet system\(^1\) that was organised on the basis of religion (Inalcik 1997). In the period of the Ottomans it was used to identify legally organised different religious communities such as Jewish millets, Armenian millets, or Kurdish millets. For the sake of the building of a nation-state, Kemalist modernist elites of Turkey rejected the Ottoman millet system and tradition (Bozdogan and Kasaba 1997), and instead invented a new tradition associated with an imagined Turkish ethnicity that had its roots, myths, and past in Central Asia (Neyzi 2002, p.141). With the intention of unifying the people, the nation-state would be based on the Turkish language and culture rather than on religion. Turkish was accepted as the official language of the state due to the fact that it was the general language of communication of the Anatolian peoples. Thereafter, Turkish identity, history, and society were redefined, systematised, and centralised by the state institutions. For that matter, the words used to refer to ‘nationalism’ in the Turkish language are also ideologically differentiated by the users. Rather than using the term ‘milliyetçilik’, Kemalists prefer to use the term ‘ulusçuluk’ (Ozkirimli 2011, p.95) or ‘ulusalcılık’ (Bora 2003) to identify their Turkish nationalism, which has a secular modern meaning. The origins of this difference of perspectives on Turkish nationalism will be clarified in this part of the chapter to tackle the complexities of the contested debated issue, which is how Turkish identity was constructed and how it has had other branches of doctrine.

Although, the words ‘Turk’ and ‘Turkey’ were mostly used to refer to the

\(^1\) The word ‘millet’ comes from the word ‘milla’ in Arabic, which means Islamic community.
Ottomans in European literature, this usage covered not only Turkish-speaking people but also other Muslims in the Empire as well (Kushner 1977, p.8). On the other hand, in Ottoman writings the word ‘Turks’ signified the peasants of Anatolia, Turkish-speaking Ottomans, with an insulting sense. This identification had changed by the time of the Sultan Abdulhamid Period, in the second half of the 1800s, when the term ‘Turk’ became widely used in Ottoman publications and even the newspapers were labelled as ‘Turkish newspaper’ (ibid. 21). Thus, in the pre-Hamidian period the term means ‘Turks as the rulers of the Ottoman Empire,’ and then it was used to denote a historical, linguistic, and ethnic entity. It is worth noting that the ruling class and state officials had to know the Turkish language as a requirement for employment; however Turkishness did not hold a privileged position; for instance the state showed a definite lack of effort in spreading the Turkish language among the population and in dealing with public education. Umut Uzer (2011, p.113) supports that argument by noting that Turkishness and pre-Islamic Turkish history were ignored in the Ottoman Empire due to the goal of strengthening Ottoman and Islamic solidarity.

In ‘The Emergence of Modern Turkey’ Bernard Lewis (2002, p.3) provides the literature with a much-needed general perspective for understanding the main stream of influence that gave rise to modern Turkey: the Islamic, the Turkish, and the local (Anatolian elements such as the Hittites, the Byzantine, the Seljuk, the Rumelian, the Balkans, and Perso-Arabic influences). In the debate over the emergence of Turkish national consciousness, Lewis develops his argument from the book by P. Wittek (1952) ‘Le Role de Tribus dans L’empire Ottoman’ which analyses the Ottomans’ descendents who are claimed as Turkish nomadic tribes, particularly the Oguz Turkish tribe of Kayi. Lewis (ibid p. 9) writes that at the time of Murat (1421-1451), Ottoman history and literature elaborated the Oguz legend. Significantly, a pure and simple central Asian Turkish language was used in literary schools in writing folk poetry (Kushner 1977, p.3) at the end of the fifteenth century. Indeed,
making Turkish the official state language in the times of the Ottomans, rather than Persian or Arabic language such as in other Turkish dynasties, as the Seljuks and the Mamluks did, contributed to maintaining the Turkish character of the Empire (ibid p.2).

According to Lewis (ibid, p.9), the key here was that the sense of Turkishness was retained among Anatolian people in their folk literature, but a Turkish national consciousness bloomed in the nineteenth century as an outcome of Turcological studies, set off by Turkish emigrants from the Russian Empire. The growing interest in, and awareness of, Turkish history produced the first publications concerned with the genealogy of the Ottomans, such as Ahmet Mithat’s ‘History of Modern Times’ in 1877. According to this narrative, the state of Oguz Khan and the Turks were extensively accepted for pointing out the fathers of the Ottomans who were tribes of Central Asia (Kushner 1977, p.27). In the eighteenth century, the Turks had been influenced by Islam and, the language and culture of the Persian and Arabic. The Turkish Seljuks brought Islam from south-west Asia to Anatolia. Moreover, the transfer of the Caliphate from Abbasid Caliphs to the Ottomans gave the Sultans a mission to expand it to the borders of Western Anatolia. They protected and spread the power of Islam against the Christian West during the six centuries. Therefore, ‘Ottoman,’ ‘Turk’ or ‘Muslim’ had been used to identify them in European literature, and the term referred to the territories of the Empire. Similarly, in the writings of Ottoman history, the country, the ruler, and its army were defined with a reference to religion as ‘the land of Islam,’ ‘the Padishah of Islam,’ and ‘the soldier of Islam’ (Lewis 2002, p.13).

Under the ideology of Ottomanism, all communities in the Empire enjoyed their rights as long as they maintained their loyalty to the Sultan. During the collapse of the Empire different doctrines came to be known to hold the unity. During the same period, the non-Muslim public’s demands upon the Empire
and the secularisation by the Tanzimat (1839) pushed for reactionary anti-Western attitudes (Kushner 1997), while Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek nationalism and restlessness were growing like warning bells of separation. In the following decades, territorial losses made the Empire overwhelmingly Muslim; therefore the authorities and Sultan Abdulhamid emphasised Islamism and Islamic institutions of the state (Deringil 1991), particularly the symbolic power of the Caliphate among the Muslim world with the intention of strengthening the legitimacy of the regime between 1876 and 1909. It can be argued that nationalist movements among non-Muslim communities of the Empire and their positions in the First World War played a role in construction of Turkish identity as Muslim, both in the Kemalist and Islamist imaginations of the nation.

The greatest historians of the time, such as Hayrullah Efendi (1817-1876) and Ahmed Refik Pasa (1823-1891) indicated the importance of the Islamic character of Ottoman history, culture, and religious affiliation to identify different groups and residents of the Empire in the millet system. Equally critical was the fact that as an outcome of Ottoman modernisation, the westernised Ottoman colleges and academies emerged with a new political culture and a new class that had a vision to do politics differently (Canefe 2002, p.140). Meanwhile, the Ottoman imperial system, tradition, and reforms began to be questioned by the rising military-bureaucratic elite. In the 1860s the Young Ottomans movement opposed the Hamidian politics and practices with an offer for new ideological and political answers based on Turkism. By the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, the new elite encouraged the formation of commercial companies fostering a Turkish entrepreneurial class and created a bourgeoisie class among the Turks in order to construct a society to cope with the capitalist economy (Ahmad 1993, p.45). Here it is useful to manifest the way in which their ideas of liberalism, constitutionalism, and nationalism (Poulton 1999) could reach the masses of the empire. On this point, Kushner (1997 p.14-19) supplies detailed
knowledge on the role of newspapers and periodicals of the Hamidian Press in giving rise to debates on Turkish nationalism, westernisation, Islamism, and secularism. He argues that surely the press caused increasing awareness of separate Turkish cultures among educated elites and a desire to westernise the country due to being aware of the scientific and technological power of Europe. Literature on Turkish nationalism supports the point on the existence of a growing body of Turkist publications in the Young Turks period, but there is common agreement in the literature (Hanioglu 1986; Deringil 1991; Kayali 1997) about whether the Young Turks of the CUP were Ottomanists due to their desire for the continuation of the Islamic Empire. This historical reading on the origins of Turkish nationalism as an emergence of imagination of being a part in a national community can be classified under the modernist approaches to nationalism, specifically in the means of Anderson (1983) who argued that print media contributed to the rise of national consciousness and the nation as 'imagined community' among people.

Contrary to the Ottomanists, various ‘pan’ movements arose as pan-Slavism and pan-Turkism (Uzer 2011, p.114) during the collapse of the Empire. One of the first attempts to place Turkism as an ideology distinct from Ottomanism and pan-Islamism was Yusuf Akcura’s essay (1904) entitled, ‘Three Kinds of Policy’ (Uc Tarz-ı Siyaset). His suggestion for ‘a Turkish national policy based on the Turkish race’ was inspiring for the formulation of Turkish nationalism and ideas. Akcura claimed that Ottomanism failed to create unity in the state due to the fact there was no Ottoman nation. Pan-Islamism was challenging due to external obstacles and resistance by the Christian powers. But, a Turkist policy as the third choice could provide a base of unity and loyalty within the Empire among the many millions of Turks within and beyond the frontiers.

These doctrines contributed to defining the nation’s linguistic, cultural, and political boundaries in the wake of the First World War. It was the time of the
War of Independence when Islam was used by Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) and the Young Turks to mobilise the Muslim public (Poulton 1999, p. 119) against the old order and European imperialism in the Versailles system. Ozkirimli calls it ‘the short-term tactical alliance of the Kemalists with Islam’ (Ozkirimli and Sofos 2008, p.58). In the National Pact (Misak-I Milli) that drew the boundaries of Anatolia, the religion was the only legitimised unification element in that sense. It must be noted that the press was used by Mustafa Kemal to provoke Anatolian political mobilisation, to raise a freedom and independence voice against the foreign powers, specifically two newspapers, *Irade-i Milliye* and *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* played a role in spreading a national awareness and turning the resistance into a national war (Kologlu 1993; Yust 1995; Tamer 2010). After a national Turkish state was established in 1923, this alliance was severed by Mustfa Kemal Ataturk and the governing elite because Islam was seen as a link with the old order and Ottomanism. As Sami Zubaida (2009, p.118) notes, this break with popular religion was a deliberative part of the nationalist project designed to empower a 'progress' discourse against 'backwardness' to cope with foreign domination. In this context, it can be argued that anti-imperialism has been one of the main characteristics of Kemalist nationalism since the beginning, as a consequence of the war against European powers for Turkish nation-state building.

### 2.2. The Construction of Official Kemalist Nation-State Discourse

For the governing elite, the word ‘Turk’ meant Turkish citizenship; it was a noun, not an adjective (Heper 2011, p.50). To be a Turk, it was enough to accept the principles of Kemalism, Turkish culture, and language. Nobody was excluded as long as that person was willing to be assimilated into Turkishness, similar to French nationalism (Oran 1997). Therefore, the concept of the 'nation' of the Turkish Republic had the roots of a legacy of the French Revolution, in the words of Ernest Renan 'the will to live together'
(Soysal 1999, p.12) rather than the ethnic or religious origins of the population. Based on this assumption, Soner Cagaptay notes (2002, pp.67-82) that the first definition of the Turkish nation was territorial. As declared by Atatürk, ‘The people of Turkey who have established the Turkish state are called the Turkish nation,’ and this nation was inhabited by different ethnic groups including Turks, Kurds, Jews, Arabs, Lazes, Armenians, etc. The second definition recognised all Muslims who were in the Turkish nation in terms of the emerging Turkish history thesis. The ethno-religious definition as the third definition accepted that those who were ethnically Turkish was designated by the policy of the ruling Republican People's Party between 1935 and 1937.

Cagaptay's work demonstrates the dynamic character of Turkish nationalism in the nation-building process. Ottoman historians, Sukru Hanioglu (2011), Halil Inalcik (1998), and Serif Mardin (2010) point out continuing state and society traditions and legacies from the Imperial times to the Republican times. Like Canefe, Hanioglu (2011) refers to the pre-Republican times for identifying and classifying Turkish nationalism and its origins. Mardin (2010) diagnoses an on-going problem in the centre-periphery relations in Turkey. He notes that Turkey has a strong state tradition that always led the top-down modernisation and transformation of society. What appears differently in Inalcik's article (1998) is that he argues Atatürk's legacy, the Ottoman world state legacy with poet Fuzuli, Yunus Emre, or Suleymaniye Mosque live together in every single Turk's national history and conscience. He notes that not only conservative parties but also all other political parties, and Kemalist circles too, enjoys living Ottomanist romanticism (ibid. p.13).

Faroz Ahmad in 'The Making of Modern Turkey' (1993, p. 2-3), emphasises the army’s role from Ottoman times to the present in Turkish history and politics. He suggests an institutional continuity that demonstrates contested world-views and their historical origins in modern Turkish politics. By the
last quarter of the nineteenth century, some military officers had been politicised against the sultan, Abdulhamid II (1876–1909), which launched the Young Turk revolution, which continued for a decade until the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. The Ottoman administration and the sultan Vahdettin were not capable of resisting the Great Powers and imperialism; therefore the old regime agreed to sign the Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920. The Turkish nationalists and the army expected the sultan to stand up for Turkey’s rights, but he was collaborating with the external powers.

That was why the army gave their loyalty to the movement led by Mustafa Kemal (ibid. p.8). Not the least, the army's intervention in politics continued under the Republican system with the three experienced military coups in Turkish political life. Related to this, Metin Heper (2011, p.51) points out that the state elites, especially the army officers, traditionally do not trust the political elite in Turkey. They attempt to change or form the way of doing politics when they see it is required, because they believe that the politicians might pursue their own profits rather than the national interests. This point is significant for a better understanding of the current power relationship in Turkey. In addition, looking at the political fault lines drawn during the establishment times of the Republic contributes to completing other parts of the puzzle of the power and identity politics of Turkey.

For Ayse Kadioglu (2011, p.45) Turkish nationalism was not an outcome of national awakening; it was a project constructed from above by the Kemalist state elites. Fuat Keyman (2011, p.20) argues that nationalism dominantly affected the features of the process of making modern Turkey, and it still influences the Turkish state ideology and society in different contents and articulations. In his analysis, the state-based transformation of traditional society into a modern nation aimed to reach the level of 'western civilisation' in order to save the state and secure its existence. Such as a Gellnerian
modernist explanation, Keyman introduces that the Kemalist elite fostered a rapid industrialisation and socio-economic modernisation in a Weberian fashion (ibid. p.17) and constructed a secular and modern national identity by instrumentalisation of Western reason and rationality. He makes an outstanding distinction between two state-based modernisations, from the Empire to the Republican times. To compete within the European state system, the Ottoman state employed modernisation, especially within the military\textsuperscript{22}, as the expediency to the empire's decline. Similarly, with modernisation the Republican elite aimed to have a more secured and powerful state, but their understanding of the concept was not just martial or technological. They believed that Western advancement and its institutional political structure could be achieved by requiring a regulation of state-society relations in supplementing Western cultural practices. So this time, the state designed reforms to change every aspect of societal relations and everyday practices of individuals. In this context, Islam was identified as the main obstacle to progress, and thus secularism was seen as one of the most important reforms to enlighten people and make progress in society. In Mardin's words (2006), it was a transition from a religious community governed by a sultan to a secular nation-state. In this regard, Keyman notes (2011, p.18) that 'Turkey did not rise phoenix-like out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire'. In making modern Turkey, the Islamic identity and Kurdish identity, or the Ottoman past, were excluded as ‘others’ to create a nationalist identity. The Republican system was established by the Kemalist imagination and its victory against foreign invaders and the old regime supporters.

As noted, after the victory of the resistance, the Turkish Republic was proclaimed on 29 October 1923, and Mustafa Kemal became its first president. There were rivals and opponents to the new regime, from the sides

\textsuperscript{22} The ‘New Army’ (Nizam-i Cedid), which replaced the army of the Janissaries in 1826, was the creation of Sultan Mahmud II (1807–1839); his aim was to create a modern fighting force along European lines (Ahmad 1993 p.4).
that wanted to maintain monarchy and the Caliphate or seek an American mandate for Turkey. Since the beginning, Islamists would always be able to manipulate the symbols of religion as counter-force to the Kemalists and new regime (Ahmad 1993, p.49). Moreover, the religious reaction and counter-revolution movement unleashed a Kurdish rebellion in the eastern Anatolia and influenced the region in February 1925. As a result, the Law for the Maintenance of Order was passed by the national assembly to silence the opposition. In the following two years, over 500 people were sentenced to death by the special courts known as Independence Tribunals (ibid p.58). It can be argued that this period and how it is remembered by the Kemalists, Islamists and Kurdish people has a significant place in their imaginations of Turkish nation-state. After elaborating the general breaks and institutional continuities from the Ottoman past to the Republican times, in the context of Kemalist nation-state discourse and its historical challenges, the next sections elucidate the place of Non-Muslim, Islamic and Kurdish identity in Turkey and Turkish identity in detail.

2.3. Non-Muslimhood in Turkish Nation and Nationalism
M. Kemal Ataturk's nationalism was a kind of pluralist one in order to realise the goal of having the support of all communities in Anatolia for the newly established nation-state. Moreover, this was a ‘genius’ nationalism (Smith 2005, p.437) in its ability to mix the organic/ethnic and the civic/territorial, even though there were almost fifty different ethnic groups in the country. In the first decades of the Turkish Republic, Turkish nationalism looked like a ‘civic nationalism’ based on the constitution, but in its application to practice it was ethno-religious nationalism. The state had taken actions to legalise the exclusionary practices. These applications were described as ‘racist’ by some authors (Maksudyan 2005), while some (Aktar 2000) preferred to say it was simply a cultural homogenisation process without targeting any different ‘race’ motif, but it was certainly a discrimination of non-Muslims as an ‘out’ group from Muslims as a group who did belong to the According to the
Lausanne Treaty, only non-Muslim people were recognised as minorities (Ors and Komsuoğlu 2008, p.409). The treaty was signed in 1923 between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey after the Ankara government’s abolution of the Peace Treaty of Sèvres of 1920 that was between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies of World War I. Article 40 of the Treaty stated that Turkish citizens belonging to non-Muslim minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish people. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage, and control, at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.

All citizens were defined as Turks in the Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution. This looked like a civic understanding of citizenship; however, its application to social reality in the 1930s was different. It was even a ‘volkish nationalism’ in Kieser’s (2008, p.ix) words, meanings an undemocratic, unequal, elitist, discriminative interpretation of identities by favouring Turkish-Sunni identity. Being a part of the Turkish nation for the non-Muslim citizens included some conditions for assimilation such as internalising the Turkish language as their mother tongue, adopting Turkish culture, and loyalty to the ideal of Turkism (Bali 2008, p.43) based on a willingness to live together. These provisions were still not enough; they had a strong struggle against discriminative laws in the 1930s like the law on Settlement in 1934. These laws meant that non-Muslim citizens were differentiated from the Turkish self.

From the perspective of the Republican elite, there were reasons for this ‘de facto discrimination’ (ibid p.48). Non-Muslims were insider foreigners, in other words, ‘strangers whose loyalty was suspect’ (ibid p.49). Their past was not commonly shared; for instance, they did not fight in the National War of
Independence, and some of them even became allies to ‘others’. Relations between the state and non-Muslim citizens turned to a harder situation based on the attempts of writing Turkish national history and the reading of common history from different perceptions. Some historians chose to emphasise the discourse of ‘We lived together for more than five centuries’, while others chose to focus on just a selected part of the history, specifically the last century of the Ottoman Empire. In the 1930s Turkish nationalism was still a cultural nationalism (Ozkirimli and Sofos 2008, p. 167) that motivated and worked by a massive process of homogenisation through the Turkification of names and surnames; forcing citizens to speak Turkish with ‘citizen speak Turkish!’ campaigns; Turkifying minority schools; dismantling their communities and non-profit organisations; and finally nationalism took on an economic tone in the Turkification of the economy via the Capital Tax Levy in 1942 (Bali 2012; Bali 2000; Aktar 2000). In addition, the National Consumption Society was established in order to encourage people to buy national products and goods. Consequently, Turkish nationalism spread in various aspects of socio-economic life.

When Atatürk died in 1938, the war and the extension of German power over Europe had already brought a defensive attitude to Turkey in order to secure the country by following a policy of neutrality. Given this external threat and circumstances of instability, considerable inflation and economic crises emerged in Turkey. Therefore, the government decided to approve the capital tax in November 1942 for the sake of maintaining control over the national economy. In fact, the categorising of taxation rates for taxpayers was based on their religion and nationality (Lewis 2002, p.298). Non-Muslim citizens had to pay up to ten times as much within fifteen days, and people who could not pay the tax levy within a month were even deported for forced labour to Askale to be used in breaking stones for the new roads. Greek, Jewish, and Armenian defaulters were subjected to punishment and were sent to Askale in early January 1943.
Bernard Lewis quotes the failure of the capital tax to achieve its economic objectives in the book by the Finance Director of Istanbul, Faik Okte (1951), which was titled ‘The Catastrophe of Capital Tax’. In Okte’s evaluation of the results of taxation, it caused the collapse of the price policy and benefited the black market while it had ended with an atmosphere of ‘lawlessness and disorder’. More significantly, with this kind of classification of unjust and discriminatory taxes on foreign and non-Muslim citizens, the confidence of the citizens in the state and society, financial probity, and religious tolerance were shattered (ibid p.301). Non-Muslim citizens’ presentation as a threat to the Turkish self, homogeneity, and socio-economic interests was not just sneaking into policies of the state, but also into everyday discourse as ‘the enemy within’ (Neyzi 2002, p.146).

Tragically this was seen in ‘the Events of September 6–7th’, when the Greek minority in Istanbul became targets for racist attacks in 1955. In the outbreak of violence, the populist manipulation of national sentiments by politicians, the Turkish media, and the intelligentsia contributed to the fearful atmosphere and radicalising and mobilising of the discontented public (Kuyucu 2005, p.375-376). Turkish press coverage of the Cyprus issue and the false news coverage that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's house had been bombed - where he had been born in 1881 in Thessaloniki, in northern Greece- caused great nationalist aggression in Istanbul and made non-Muslims open targets. These events documented how the politicisation of a foreign policy issue by the power of the press resulted in domestic crises. More specifically, it underlined the definition of being Turk through being Muslim.
2.4. Competing Nationalisms in Turkey: The Secularist versus Islamist Turkish Nationalisms

A deeper search in the literature shows that there are different readings on Turkish history and the evolution of secularism from the imperial times to the republican times. As widely accepted in the literature, for the sake of being at the level of modern civilisations, the Republican system put the concept of the nation in the place of the religion. Based on the concept of Turkishness instead of Islam in the establishment of the Republican system, the old order was replaced by the new one with signifiers such as the removal of the Caliphate and abolishment of the fez that were the bastion of Islamic identification, and, in M. Kemal Ataturk’s words, the emblem of uncivilisation, ignorance, and hatred of progress (Lewis 2002, p.268). In other words, to be secular meant to be modern (Yavuz 1998, p.11). The idea and normative-ideological state project of secularism was inherited from the Enlightenment that required constructing an anthropocentric change (Casanova 2011) in the understanding of the world through a process of maturation, emancipation, positivism, and scientific reasoning.

The struggle against Islamists emerged and intensified during the single-party period (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) between 1923 and 1946. Hale and Ozbudun (2010, p.22) call it ‘assertive secularism’ that bans or limits the aspects of Islamic identity in the public sphere and individualises the religion. This was not a passive secularism that implies state neutrality to the religion. However, this specific tone of secularism was accepted by large segments of society, particularly among the supporters of the CHP. The fear of ‘Islamic reactionism’ (Azak 2010) became the fundamental characteristic of Turkish

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23 Sociologist Niyazi Berkes (1964) in The Development of Secularism in Turkey analyses the evolution of the Ottoman-Turkish modernisation and secularisation from the 18th century to the 20th century in focusing on three originators of the ideas, Ibrahim Muteferrika, Namik Kemal, and Ziya Gokalp. According to him, before Atatürk, Ziya Gokalp had already idealised a secular religion and culture for the Turks and triggered a break between the state and religion. Berkes argues that the Ottoman system was not theocratic or feudal, but had an Eastern despotic character. This character had to be left inevitably and naturally due to the effects of European modernisation and nationalisation.
secularism. Reproduction of this fear by the political and intellectual elites spread the securitisation of secularisation (Bilgin 2008) to everyday life in Turkey. In this context, these listed Kemalist reforms in the regulation of political, cultural, and social life served to rapidly eradicate the ties with the Islamic Ottoman legacy (Karasipahi 2009, p.22):

- The abolition of the sultanate in 1922 by a decree of the Grand National Assembly (prior to the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923).
- The abolition in 1924 of the caliphate, which had symbolised the unity of Muslim ummah. The origins of the caliphate went back to the period after the death of Prophet Muhammed; Ottoman sultans had assumed the title of caliph in the sixteenth century.
- The abolition in 1924 of the office of Seyh’ul-Islam, the highest religious authority in the administration of the Ottoman Empire, one of whose functions had been to oversee the suitability of political decisions to Islamic law.
- The abolition in 1924 of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations (Seriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti).
- The abolition in 1924 of the Seri’at courts, religious courts based on Muslim law.
- The abolition in 1924 of the medrese, which had been important centres of religious learning in the Ottoman Empire.
- The interdiction of religious brotherhoods (tarikat) in 1925, and the ban on all their activities.
- The passage of a law in 1925 outlawing the fez in favour of the western hat; the republican regime also discouraged the veil for women although it did not outlaw it.
- The adoption of the Gregorian calendar in 1925, replacing the lunar Hicri and solar Rumi calendars.
- The adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926, giving equal civil rights to men and women.
- The adoption of European numerals in 1928.
- The change from Arabic to Latin script in 1928.
- The deletion in 1928 of the second article of the 1924 constitution, which stated Islam to be the state religion.

Under the cloak of the multi-party system, not only was the Kemalist elites’ secularist nationalism represented in politics as happened in the single-party
period of the Republican Peoples Party (CHP), but also conservative versions of Turkism integrated into Turkish politics. In the 1950s, the Democrat Party (DP) changed the tone of secularism through a discourse of rejection of the statist, elitist, and military-dominated political tradition of the CHP. The DP was opposed to the ‘militant secularism’ in the vocabulary of religious conservatism (Kuyucu 2005, p.371-372) and had overwhelming popular support. Under Adnan Menderes the DP opened the Imam-Hatip schools, which were the first religious state-sponsored schools for training religious leaders. They also added an optional religion course to the curriculum of elementary schools.

The DP’s successive Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) represented the conservative-right in the 1960s. The political Islamism benefited from the rising political and economic importance of villagers and town peoples’ votes in multi-party politics (Noyon 2003, p.69). Local notables and rural conservatives supported the economic aspects of modernisation and social conservatism that fed political Islam on the periphery (ibid p.70). It was noteworthy that Necmeddin Erbakan was the first leader of political Islam (Kavakci et al. 2010, p.44) in the Republic and who established the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) in the late 1960s. Erbakan later led the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) in 1973 and the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) in 1987; however, each party was shut down by military intervention owing to religious agitation and the aim of destruction of the existing state order. In the times of military interventions, Islamists challenged the state’s dominance of religion even more. For instance, in a 1971 military coup 85 students (aged between 8 and 20) were arrested due to ‘studying Arabic and Islam’ and wearing religious garb (ibid. p.184).

Without an understanding of the post-1980 period, the legacy of Turgut Ozal and Turkey’s embedded politics to neo-liberalism in his time; there would be
a lack in covering the rise of political Islam in Turkey. This also provides clues for how in the first decade of the 2000s the Justice and Development Party (AKP) became the successor of conservative right parties’ votes of the 1990s, the ANAP and the DYP. Turkey’s transformation of its economy to a free-market economy with the January 24th Decisions by the 1980 military coup continued with Turgut Ozal’s policies of opening up the Turkish markets to international market and foreign competition. The elimination of leftists and ultranationalists by the military regime and the adoption of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS) as the state ideology of Turkish nationalism’s mixture with Sunni Islam emerged as a political opportunity structure (Eligur 2010, p.226) to power the Islamist social-economic movement in Turkey. Basically, the military’s solution to the political polarisation of the country and the leftist communist threat was the TIS (Oktem 2011) that opened the doors to organisational and mobilisational activities for the Islamist activists and entrepreneurs.

Turgut Ozal’s alliance and social networks with the Islamists, particularly the Naksibendi Islamic Brotherhood, encouraged cooperation with Saudi and Kuwaiti finance and played a vital role in the establishment of the Islamist capital and wealthy business class (Eligur 2010, p.227). Ozal’s main goal seemed to be to promote a modern society with a liberal economic rationality and the conservative values of traditional society (Kalaycioglu 2002 p.46). Nilufer Gole (2000) defined Ozal’s policies as 'engineering pragmatism with cultural conservatism' by making use of Ozal's academic background in engineering. His party’s (ANAP) ideology was a combination of Islam, nationalism, economic liberalism, and social democracy. Regarding this developments, Kamrava argues (1998) that the success of Islamist parties in the 1990s was based on the interplay of three factors: the nature and evolution of the Turkish political system backed financially by the country’s growing Islamist business sector; the generally acknowledged failure of most political parties and politicians in the post-1980 coup era; and the
organisational capabilities and populist platforms of the Islamists and their dedicated party activists capitalised on the failures of others.

In 1993, Ozal died suddenly of a heart attack, so under the leadership of Mesut Yılmaz in the 1990s, ANAP moved towards a right-wing position committed to free-market capitalism and nationalism (Onis 2004). Süleyman Demirel assumed the position of president in June 1993, and simultaneously the next leader of Demirel's True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi: DYP), Tansu Ciller, ascended to become Turkey's first female prime minister. This was the time of the end of the Cold War when the discourse of liberalism and democracy was utilised by the Islamists to articulate and expand their Islamic message of ‘Just Order’ (Eligur 2010, p.278) to the voters, and more significantly to the socio-economically aggrieved masses, in other words, the ‘excluded’ voters. With the rhetoric of ‘Just Order’, the return of Necmettin Erbakan ended the Islamist voters’ mass support of the ANAP. Erbakan and the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi: RP) had begun that gradual process since the 1991 national elections (Yesilada 2002, p.67).

In 1995, for the first time in Turkish history, the RP under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan became the leading party in the country by claiming 21% of the total vote of the general election. Erbakan headed the coalition government of the DYP/RP after charges of corruption brought down the ANAP/DYP coalition in 1996. However, the Islamists could rule the coalition government for just one year. The Turkish military pushed Erbakan’s party out of office on February 28th 1997, which is called a 'soft coup' in the literature of Turkish politics. The RP was banned on January 16, 1998, after the Constitutional Court ruled that the party's religious platform contradicted Turkey's secular constitution and ‘Turkey's philosophy of life’ (Hale and Ozbudun 2009, p.22). This was not just a state or regime matter but it concerned a way of living in a secular society based on separation of religion and worldly affairs. It means separation of social life, education,
family, economics, law, manners, and dress codes from religion.

Basically, Turkish secularism was based on a Kemalist world-view and its project of modernity in the form of a legal constitutional and institutional separation of the secular state and religion. This sounds like a democratic secularism with state neutrality toward the space of religion. However, looking at the history of state regulation and management of religion demonstrates a problem of religious pluralism in Turkish society. If laicism is the separation of religious and state affairs as mostly expressed in Turkey, it requires the autonomy of religious organisations, the absence of state intervention in their organisation, and independence of the state from every form of religious legitimisation of its own power. Legal secularity should provide civil and political equality for all Muslim, non-Muslim, and non-believer citizens, along with the prohibition of discrimination.

The secular and religious distinction and its hand in juridical, institutional and everyday practices in Turkey cannot guarantee the individual religious freedom of the members of the majority and minority religions. Turkish republican laicism forced a secular public sphere free from religion, like the means of a Habermasian concept of ‘rationalisation of the life-world’, but the state highly securitised secularism and politicised the majority’s religion. The Kemalist state banned religious parties and symbols in the public sphere; it controlled all religions, but only financially supports Sunni-Islam (Stephan 2011, p.120). According to 2010 annual data from the department of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri), the number of mosques (81,984) was higher than the number of schools (67,000) in Turkey, while the construction of religious spaces and places of worship for minorities was illegal. The Turkish state employed 117,541 people under the Diyanet, including the clerics in the mosques. The capacity of all mosques was 25 million; however, the number of people who regularly prayed in the mosque every morning was 2 million. These numbers additionally show that Turkish secularism
means a synthesis of Islam and the secular nationalism (Mardin 2000, p.16) by the establishment of state control over religion and a bureaucratisation of Turkish Islam from the top down (Kocan and Oncu 2004, p.466).

This research advocates that these contradictory policies and the historicising and politicising of secularism by the Kemalist state created the secular/religious binary (Hurd 2011, p. 176-181), which specifically has been seen in the rise of the AKP in the 2000s and its challenge with secularist institutions of the Kemalist state. Thus, it can be argued that recent developments in Turkish politics can be well conceived with a projection on Kemalist imagination of the Turkish state-nation. So, this part of the chapter is devoted to highlighting the origins of the secular/religious binary in Turkey.

2.5. Competing Nationalisms in Turkey: Turkish Nationalism versus Kurdish Nationalism
Kurds are one of the main Muslim indigenous people in Turkey, particularly in Southern region, but being Kurdish is not a singular identity in the region. The Kurdish population constitutes major enclaves in Turkey, Iran, Syria, Iran, and Armenia; thus it can be argued that Kurdish nationalism is a product of the interaction between local and global politics in the twentieth century (Yavuz 1998, p.10). Some authors note that Kurdish political consciousness in terms of having a separate language, history, and culture as an ethnic community dates back to the early 1890s (Natali 2007, p. 384; Ozoglu 2009, p.63), with the movement of Kurdish Teali Cemiyeti (Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan). Yegen argues (2007 p.119) that the Kurdish issue has constantly bothered the Turkish nationalism of the same era since the beginning of the twentieth century. However, this second largest 'territorial-linguistic community' of Turkey was triggered to assert its ethnic identity beyond resisting Turkification (Yavuz 1998).
This research's literature accepts that the concept of Kurdish problem is context-dependent and dynamic. It looks at the Kurdish question in the inter-state paradigm of identity and power politics with a consideration of regional and transnational frames of analysis. In this context, this section shows the historical evolution of the Kurdish question in Turkey and the complexity of identifying the problem and the solutions offered through the competing perceptions.

This identification of the dominant factors in the evolution of Kurdish identity in historical stages (Yavuz 2001, p.2) provides its challenges with Turkish national identity formation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1878-1924</td>
<td>Resistance against the centralisation of the Ottoman state within Naksibendi and Kadiri Islamic networks and identity differentiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-1961</td>
<td>Kurdish identity formation as 'reactionary', 'tribal', and an outcome of regional 'backwardness' to the nation-building project of Mustafa Kemal and the denial of the existence of the Kurds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1983</td>
<td>Secularisation of Kurdish identity within the framework of the broader leftist movement in Turkey between the 1960s and 1970s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-1998</td>
<td>The PKK-led violent insurgency, internationalisation of Kurdish problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2008</td>
<td>The arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, the head of the PKK; Europeanisation of Kurdish problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-present</td>
<td>AKP government’s Kurdish Initiative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Turkey, depending on how one perceives the nature of the struggle, this recognition problem has been identified as the South-east question, the terror problem, or the Kurdish question (Argun 1999, p.90). Different definitions of the Turkish nation and national identity portray the problem from different discourses through various inclusion and exclusion perceptions. In words it
remains diverse, but what has not changed is the Kurdish problem that has emerged with continuous tragic results. Forty thousand people died and nearly one million people from south-eastern Turkey had to emigrate from their lands. Moreover, thousands of soldiers and PKK militents lost their lives in the armed struggle.

According to Icduyuıgıl et al. (1999, p.993), the aggressive assimilationist policies of the newly founded Turkish Republic towards other ethnicities hindered the expression of other identities and languages in Turkey. In particular, the state and nation building deficiencies in Turkish identity caused an exclusion of Kurdish identity and the birth of the problem. On the other hand, Islamist groups claim that the main cause of the Kurdish Problem is the Republican policies of secularisation that caused the destruction of the Islamic brotherhood between peoples (Sarigil 2008). Constructing common Islamic ties in the country can end the conflict by weakening the ethnic separatism (Cizre-Sakallioglu 1998).

After the 1980 military intervention, the depoliticisation of against the left and right movements and the promotion of the role of religion to cement the consolidation of nation and society was the state project that also provided an atmosphere for growing and politicising identity politics. Although the Constitution of 1982 defined a Turk by stating, 'Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk' in a civic nationalist sense, the existence of a separate Kurdish identity was not recognised. The Article 89 of the 1982 Constitution stated that 'no political party may concern itself with the defence, development, or diffusion of any non-Turkish language or culture; nor may seek to create minorities within our frontiers or to destroy our national unity'. Moreover, the Article 3 of the Law 2932

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24 It is acronym of Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan in Kurdish, means Kurdistan Workers' Party, which is listed as a terrorist organization internationally by several states and organizations, including the NATO and the EU.
declared Turkish as the ‘mother tongue’ of all Turkish citizens and prohibited the use and dissemination of other languages as a mother tongue, which, in reaction, turned the Kurdish language into a symbol of Kurdish nationhood (Yavuz 1999, p.14). As a reaction to the Turkish-Islamic synthesis of the new interpretation of state policy, Kurdish ethno-nationalism intensified the ethnic struggle (Donmez 2006, p.558). On the other hand, Turkish nationalist perception of the Kurdish question, in particular the MHP's perception was based on denial until the 1990s. For its followers, ‘Kurdish-Turks’ were open to the manipulation of external separatist powers, and the solution was Turkification by building the consciousness of belonging to the Turkish nation, because ‘Kurds are the Turks who have forgotten their Turkishness’ (Bora and Can 2004).

Commonly, the Kurdish problem has been seen as an issue of regional economic development or a military security matter rather than an ethno-political problem (Saracoglu 2009, p.240). The Kemalist state authorities claimed that their citizens of Kurdish descent enjoyed full rights as Turkish citizens (Gunter 2000, p.849). The official refusal of the existence of a Kurdish problem defined it as a terror problem. In this perspective, if there was a struggle for the human rights, it was a democratic demand for every citizen. Connectedly, this perception within the official discourse tended to ground the militarisation of the Kurdish problem and the securitisation of the Kurdish identity in the 1990s on the outcome of the Cold War bipolarity and the rising leftist discourse. Thus, when it became a national security concern (Ozcan 2011), the state discourse addressed it in a militarised and authoritarian manner.

This literature on Turkey's Kurdish question exhibits the existing diversity in understanding and nomination of the problem. It can be said that different definitions of the issue bring out different solutions. Yegen (2011) elaborates the Kurdish problem perceptions of three distinct Turkish nationalisms:
mainstream, extreme right-wing, and left-wing Turkish nationalism. The mainstream version views the discontent of Kurds and their rebellion of 1925 as the resistance of pre-modern tribal social structures to the foundation of the nation-state. In other words, it was nothing, but the resistance of the logic of revolution and resistance of the past to the present. With the cessation of Kurdish revolts in the 1950s, the component of mainstream perception had new focus through the discourse of massive underdevelopment in south-eastern Anatolia and the lack of economic integration between the region and the national market. The left-wing Turkish nationalism referred to the problem with the same vocabulary such as regional inequalities, feudal relations, and regional backwardness; however, this perception also recognised the ethno-cultural aspect of the Kurdish question. At the same time, a racist version of Turkish nationalism appeared and became a political movement in the 1960s and the 1970s. Yegen (ibid p.236) cites from this perspective's spectacular intellectual representative, Nihal Atsız, who suggested that the reason behind the Kurdish unrest was foreign incitement and that they had no alternative but to leave the country as the Armenians had. One of the most noteworthy findings of Yegen is that all of the Turkish nationalisms perceived that Kurds could become Turkish; therefore Kurds did not experience massive discrimination in citizenship practices like non-Muslim citizens did. That was because the Kurds were expected to be Turks under the umbrella of a homogenised, mono-linguistic Muslim nation. Significantly, he concludes that both the Turkish state and ordinary Turkish citizens have been revising their perception of Kurds. They used to believe the problem could be solved by means of re-Turkification in a massive assimilation, but not anymore. Yegen concludes that building connections with non-Muslim inhabitants by saying 'Jewish Kurds' (ibid p.240) or 'Armenian Kurds' indicates Turkish nationalists perceive Kurds as a disloyal, untrustworthy people on Turkish territory.

In regard to the emergence of Turkey's post-Kemalist identity, this section considers the developments brought by the military coup of September 1980 that transformed Turkey beyond the paradigm of the ‘first modernity’ (Atasoy 2009, p.70). First of all, the Kemalist paradigm has been faced with challenges under the neo-liberal restructuring of the Turkish economy after 1980. The consequence of neo-liberal globalisation led to the emergence of an ‘ideology of the excluded’ (Onis 2001, p. 282) in demanding economic and political power from the Kemalist state. By reference to social injustices, two traditional ‘others’ of the state participated in the identity politics that were the growing concerns of Islamic rich capitalist religious groups over political rights, and the emergence of Kurdish claims to cultural rights in the 1990s.

In the 1990s, it seemed that Islamic orientation to the politics of neo-liberal social and global transformation had been more successful than the Kemalist paradigm's adaptation to globalisation (Gambetti 2009). Turkish Islamic groups have participated in the institutionalisation of neo-liberalism, and some of them have even moved beyond the national borders and turned into global movements by enlarging civic engagement in the economy, particularly the Naqshbandi religious order, the Nurcu community, and the Gulen community (Atasoy 2009 p.108).

By the 1990s, one of the results of the Gulf War was the appearance of the tragedy of Iraqi Kurds in the news media, which caused economic and social internationalisation of the Kurdish question (Yegen 2007, pp.135-136). The post-Cold War ideas of liberalisation and globalisation concerning identity, difference, culture, and human rights contributed to visibility of the discontent of the Kurdish masses and the rise of Kurdish demands. Turgut
Ozal, the prime minister of Turkey between 1983 and 1999 and president from 1990 until 1993 acknowledged the Kurdish reality. He responded to the international and domestic developments of the 1991 Gulf War and the Kurdish question; in this regard he met with the leaders of two Iraqi Kurdish factions, Mustafa Barzani and Jalal Talabani. Ozal’s liberalisation of the country’s policy transformed the discourse of Kurdish nationalism, demanding their collective identity in a democratic context (Donmez 2006, p.561). Kurdish parties could enter parliament, representing Kurdish demands though non-violent means, although members of the parties had close relationships with the PKK (Guney 1999, p.126).

After the Cold War, the ideology and discourse of the PKK had a mutation that was shifting towards concepts such as ‘democratic solution’ and enjoying human rights within the existing borders of Turkey (Romano 2006, p.124). In 1999, the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, and becoming a candidate country for membership in the EU opened the door to constitutional liberalisation in line with EU requirements relating to the Kurdish problem in Turkey.

Since 2003, the US occupation of Iraq has changed the discourse of Kurdish nationalism by the establishment of Kurdish self-administration as a federal state in Iraq. Due to increasing sympathy with the Kurdish political authority among Kurds (Yegen 2007, p.178), the scenarios of demands of rebels for independence of the Kurds in Turkey added a new dimension to the Kurdish problem (Saracoglu 2009, p. 655). That is an anxious prospect for Turkey, sourcing a fundamental change in Turkish nationalism’s image of Kurds.

There are diverse opinions on how the Kurdish national demands are being articulated within the discourse of democracy, and what is the political project of the Kurdish national movement that is seek to build (Gunes 2009, p. 262). A federal type solution for Kurdish demands in Turkey is debated.
Accordingly, Canefe (2008, p.394) notes that Turkey's Kurds prefer to identify themselves as a part of Turkey in the European Union, instead of as citizens of a possible united Kurdistan. Contrary, Laciner (2012) argues that taking liberal steps on the issue demonstrated that the problem is beyond human rights and democracy; whether the PKK espouses a separate Kurdish state is clear.

Furthermore, the rising tension of the reactions towards the attacks of the PKK and spreading anti-Kurdish discourse in popular media and the internet have caused the Kurds to become the 'primary other' (Arsan 2012; Yegen 2006) of the Turkish nation in daily life, with the recognition of them as separatist people. The link between the Kurds and the PKK has become more visible. The attachment between the Kurds and the PKK separatism marginalised attitudes against the Kurdish people in everyday life (Saracoglu 2009, p.653). In this context of regarding Turkish people's views on the issue, Mesut Yegen (2011) argued that Turkish nationalism's perception of the Kurdish question has had an evolution from 'banditry to disloyalty'.

However, a liberal discourse on the question has been strengthening in academic and political debates in terms of democratisation in the last decade. The historical steps towards recognising certain political and cultural rights of Kurds have now been taken in reality. The amendments on cultural rights with the candidacy of Turkey to join the European Union provided the instruments for the massive production and reproduction of Kurdishness in Turkey, and thus the Kurds gained a status that has a possibility of hindering their assimilation into Turkishness (Yegen 2007, p.178). But, since 2006, the national disappointment regarding relations with the EU has triggered the anxiety of Turkish nationalism regarding the Kurdish question in Turkey (Tocci 2007, p.141). In this context, Celik and Blum’s workshop study (2007) demonstrated that the failure of the EU process would lead to a re-emergence of a more aggressive Turkish nationalism with a mixture of anti-Western and
anti-imperialist sentiments (ibid. p.577). But, an EU process that goes well would create a stable political environment within Turkey (ibid. p.575). The EU would be a national project that both Turks and Kurds could support and create an environment in which moderation and mutual accommodation are possible with a construction of the ‘self-confidence’ of both the Turkish state and the Kurdish community.

In addition, different perspectives of Kurdish nationalism position Turkey's Kurds differently in the power struggle. For instance, the PKK and the BDP can be seen as the manifestation of a secular and leftist version of Kurdish nationalism. As the other type of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, traditional elite nationalism and religious-conservative nationalism have mainly been represented under the mainstream centre-right parties in relation to socio-economic reasons (Sarigil 2010). They were seen as 'loyalists' or 'pro-state' (Somer 2011, p.273) in Turkish political life. Looking at this profile of Kurdish nationalism demonstrates why the AKP has benefited from rising Islamic conservatism in the south-east and the weakness of opposition parties that adopt a security-orientated approach to the Kurdish conflict. Before the AKP came to power, secularist CHP was a supporter of a democratic resolution. Their sentiments against the government's conservative agenda failed their social democrat approach in the means of the freedom of religion and ethnic pluralism. The PKK's control of the BDP creates a security dilemma for Kemalist secularists; hence they could not cooperate with Kurdish leftists in order to cope with the AKP's Islamic conservative political identity. It seems that Kurds have prefered to ally with the Islamists in the transformation of the Kemalist nation-state identity for the consolidation of democracy in the last decade. In this manner, polarisation over secularism contributed to the complexity of the Kurdish question.

Although Islamist groups and the RP came out against Turkey's application for the membership in the European Union in the 1990s, Recep Tayyip
Erdogan’s newly formed party, AKP emphasised its strong support for Turkish entry into the EU in its election campaign of 2002. Although the party had Islamic roots and supporters, they changed their discourse to form an ideological moderation in domestic politics. Sayari notes (2007 p.201) that Erdogan and his group were convinced that the state elites would not permit a pro-Islamist party with anti-system tendencies to stay in power even if it controlled a plurality of seats in the parliament. Discursive moderation of the party ideology strengthened the party’s credibility and legitimacy with the Turkish voters, winning support from the conservative and nationalist voters. In 2002, the election was a victory for the AKP by gaining 34 percent of the total vote. Indeed, the weakness and fragmentation of the political opposition of the 1990s has played a beneficial role in the emergence of the AKP’s dominance in the post-2002 Turkish party system.

The development of Turkey in the 2000s led by pro-Islamist AKP has affected many core problematic areas of national policies, discourses, and identities in Turkey, such as the representation of Islamic groups in politics and the acknowledgement of cultural and political rights of Kurds and non-Muslim minorities. The AKP has recently brought an alternative form of modernity to Turkey in regard to Islam and democracy relations (Kaya 2011). The process of Turkey’s integration with the European Union empowered the ruling party AKP’s legitimacy in transforming Turkish domestic and foreign policy, particularly Kemalist state structure and identity politics, such as highly sensitive issues involving religion, the military, and minorities (Toktas and Aras 2013). EU membership process required the broadening of individual and liberal freedoms and consolidating European norms and values in Turkey. In order to satisfy the EU criteria, Turkey had to integrate the demands of identity politics into the national identity.
2.7. European Identity and Turkey's Europeanisation Process under the AKP Government

One of the main assumptions of this study is that national identities are defined by the actor's interaction with, and relationship to, other actors in international and domestic politics. In the context of European identity, it can be argued that there is no single European identity (Katzenstein and Checkel 2009, p.213); this is because of the various nations of Europe have very different mean levels of European identity (Bruter 2005, p.135) and very different experiences in European integration (Kaiser and Elvert 2005). A topic in European affairs as identity would take a reference for definition between the various and confusing meanings of 'identity' (Cerutti and Lucarelli 2008, p.3-4); thus European identities should be understood in a broader sense in the terms of pluralism, multiculturalism, and unity in diversity (Delanty and Rumford 2005). The purpose of this section is to give an overview of the socio-cultural aspects of Turkey-EU relations and to highlight the findings of some of the previous studies that were conducted to address the cultural debates of Turkey's place in Europe.

The image of the Turks in Europe has been formed and reformed for 700 years due to socio-political and cultural reasons. During the expansion period of the Ottoman Empire, particularly the fifteenth century, the time of the conquest of Istanbul by Fatih Sultan Mehmet, the image was of 'threat', 'fear', 'grand', 'enemy', 'barbaric' and 'cruel'. Muslim and Turk had no differences in the Middle Age perception of Europe and they were considered to be the 'enemy of Christianity'. As significant historical events, the expansion of the Balkans and the occupation of Vienna had a negative impact in the minds of the Europeans (Tilly 1990, pp.273-276). Kula argues (2006, p.308) that newspapers such as 'Neue Zeitung' and 'Türkendrucke' printed the events, conquests, and occupations that spread the fear of Turks and created a mass fear and common perception of Turks that was dominant in the memories of Europeans during almost two centuries in Eastern Europe.
After the eighteenth century, the fall of the Ottoman Empire caused changes in the perceptions of the Europeans regarding the Turks. Reformation, Enlightenment, and Colonialism movements transformed the social, philosophical, and political relationships of Europeans with 'others' (Kula 2006). Turks had not been a 'threat' anymore in the eyes of the powerful bourgeoisie of Europe and, had been more of a mystery of the Orient (Said 1977) to discover. The spread of the movement in the works of art, music, and literature that was called *Turquerie* was a main indicator in the early Modern Age. The Turkish culture, way of life, and dressing became fashionable, especially in France, where people had their portraits done in Turkish robes and kaftans. In the diaries of travellers and merchants, and the reports of envoys and consuls, the Turks were represented from both a positive and a negative perspective according to the influence of romanticism and exoticism (Soykut 2007, p.203). They were ‘religion-wise’ the ‘others’ in the Middle Ages; this situation changed slightly, and they became ‘culture-wise’ the ‘others’ (Delanty 2001; Goody 2005).

The nineteenth century visual representation of the Turks was the image of ‘the sick man of Europe’ that dominated the main character of the East Question with the collapse of the Ottomans. Another important phenomenon that had a vast impact on European perceptions of the Turks was the Turkish Independence War that took place after the First World War and the image of M. Kemal Ataturk, 'the founding father of modern Turkey' (Ozyurek 2006, p.1) was printed in the newspapers of many countries of the world (Gursoy 1989). As indicated before, Turkey had taken Europe as a model of modernisation (Kamali 2006) long before even the founding of the Republic. Turkish history has in some respects a striking number of parallels with that of Western Europe (Zurcher and Linden 2007, p.68). Turkey's modernisation and westernisation have been the continuous state identity policy of Turkey since the construction of an official discourse by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s. The impartiality policy of Turkey during the Second World War
was followed by the western alliance foreign policy during the Cold War period. In this foreign policy context, the relations between the EC/EU and Turkey date back to 1963, which was the year of the signature of the association agreement. Moreover, in the 1960s Germany and the central European countries required a workforce from Turkey to repair the damage of war and strengthen their industries. The migration of Turkish guest-workers who came from rural areas with economic woes had a negative impact on hosts' perceptions of the Turks (Kaya and Kentel 2005). Although there has been the development of good impressions and friendships between the groups, the image of migrant workers in Europe has become a stereotype of the general image of the Turk in Europe (Burcoglu 1999). Turkey’s strategic significance during the Cold War encouraged its definition as ‘European’ (Coban 2012), but since at least the early 1970s, Europe sought to develop a collective identity based on shared civilisational values, thus, the definition of ‘European’ has shifted to what has been described as the ‘democratic tradition’ of European integration (Smith and Wright 1999). Although signing the Ankara Treaty was recognition of Turkey's Europeaness, the paradigm change at the end of the Cold War caused an increase in debates on democracy, human rights, and identity in international relations that triggered reinterpretation of Turkish identity in Turkey and Europe (Yilmaz 2007).

The economic, political, and social factors have gained importance in Europe’s approach to Turkey in regard to the EC and the EC has begun to put greater emphasis on standards of the candidate countries to have institutions guaranteeing democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and respecting and protecting minority rights, formulated by the Copenhagen Summit of 1993. As Verney points out (2007) Turkey’s image has not corresponded with the democratic European ideal in the 1990s. Turkey applied for full membership in the EC in 1987. After the Customs Union agreement was signed between Turkey and the EU in 1995, Turkey adopted a major package
of constitutional change for democratic reformation and finally the European Council granted Turkey candidacy in 1999 in Helsinki.

After the Cold War, European decision makers started to construct their own security culture beyond the NATO security agenda. For instance, migration has been seen as a challenge for European Integration in regard to it as a source of new insecurities. This has had major implications for Turkey's accession to the membership. In particular, Turkey's large population and its cultural differences have been questioned after the Eastern enlargement. With the dissolution of the communist regimes of the Central and Eastern European Countries, the Turkish application for full membership lost its significance for the EU with the emerging process of integration of Western and Eastern Europe. Turkey was pushed to the back of the queue as the post-Cold War Europe redefined itself (Bilgin 2007). This period made more apparent the issue of human rights in crystallising the difference between perceptions of security in Turkey and Europe in the individual, societal, and national dimensions of the term. In a nutshell, before the Cold War, Turks were the significant ‘other’ of Europeans over which they defined their own identity strategic considerations. During the Cold War period Turkey occupied the buffer state role as a barrier to the Soviet threat; thus this perception of Turks as the others of Europe lost its significance. Since the end of the Cold War era, the debate about Turkey’s identity, culture, and place in Europe has been raised once again (Redmond 2007, p.306).

After the trauma of February 28th 1997, the Islamists has been back with new defence tactics (Keyman 2012) with the discourse of democracy and utilizing European Union membership as a political opportunity and a liberal tool kit for the Islamist demands (Eligur 2010, p.278). Turkish nation/state identity has been reconstructed by new emerging political elites of pro-Islamist AKP and Kurdish parties through using the EU as a legitimate power (Zucconi 2009, p.25), and it has shaped what constitutes Turkish Foreign
Policy. In the 2000s, EU accession process provided a much-needed legitimisation of the pro-Islamist AKP government, and democratic reform would also guarantee the party’s political power, given the unlikelihood of the party being banned like its predecessors (Narbone and Tocci 2007, p.239). The EU conditionality triggered a process of structural change in the Turkish political system that is a response to the policies of the European Union. Changes that were closely identified with Europe have been made to direct attention to the problems of democracy as human rights and its consolidation (Keyman 2007; Ozbudun 2009). However, many of the secular elites, the military and Turkish nationalists were uncomfortable with the political reforms promoted through Europeanisation process (Muftuler-Bac 2005, p.21). The harmonisation packages entered into force by the AKP, brought significant changes (Parker 2009, p.1093) to the freedom of association, and deterrence against torture and mistreatment; and they also amended the Penal Code, the Law on State Security Courts, the Press Law, the Law on Political Parties, the Law on the Use of the Right of Petition (Gunter 2007, pp. 117-123; Cizre 2004 p.109). In addition to these they introduced significant legal changes expanding the freedom of expression, religious freedom, and right to retrial. A state-centric, security-orientated vision of Turkey that had a number of serious problems (Oktem et al. 2010), such as democratic deficit, a legitimacy crisis, human rights violations, minority rights, torture, the rule of law, and economic instability showed unexpected fundamental developments to create a more rights-based citizenship regime.

Despite the fact that the years between 2001 and 2005 were very significant, from the adoption of the National Program for membership to the launch of the negotiations at the end of 2005, public survey reports found that there has been a dramatic drop in the support expressed by the Turkish public since 25

25 According to the Survey of Turkey’s EU Perception that was published in 2007 by the International Strategic Research Organization, the rise of the ‘privileged partnership’ debate and sentimental issues on Cyprus engendered the fall of support of Turkish citizens for EU accession (from 75 percent to 45 percent) since the negotiations started in 2005. The
continued dispute over Cyprus suspended Turkey's EU negotiation talks on eight chapters in December 2006. In 2007, the Turkish Foreign Minister and chief negotiator with the EU, Ali Babacan, claimed that ‘certain negative statements’ and perceptions of European officials and politicians led the Turkish people to think that they were ‘not wanted’ in the EU. EU leaders' expression of a 'privileged partnership' instead of full membership in a deal with the arguments on Turkey's population, geography, and culture 'would weaken the Turkish public's trust in the EU'. Similarly, in September 2013 Turkish EU Affairs Minister Egemen Bagis argued that Turkey would probably never join the European Union because of prejudicial attitudes by the bloc's existing members. In this context, some factors were underlining this downward trend of the Turkish people's perceptions of the EU. As an important factor, asymmetrical relationship with the EU increases negative perceptions in Turkey (Taraktas 2008, p.254). For instance, the Customs Union agreement established an asymmetrical relationship, in that Turkey had to comply with decisions but could not participate in the decision-making. In addition, Turkey's exclusion from the list of candidate countries in 1998 has strengthened the public impression that the EU was using 'prospective accession' to exploit Turkey through the Customs Union. Moreover, EU reforms’ effects on breaking Turkey's taboos play role in Turkish Euro-scepticism, specifically in the issues of the Cyprus policy, Kurdish Problem, civil-military relations, Armenian genocide claims. One of the significant factors is mutual rise in negative perceptions of the Muslim and Western world in post 9/11 process. In this context, European reluctance to include Turkey is not negligible. The ‘privileged partnership’ and ‘open-ended process’ debates raised by the EU leaders as well as vocal rejections

percentage of people who think 'the EU does not treat equally towards Turkey' was 81 percent in November 2006. Similarly, Hakan Yılmaz's research project (2009), which was financed by the EU, aimed to uncover the European perceptions of Turkey and trace the Euro-sceptic narrative. The research found that 60 percent of the respondents agreed with the view that the EU treated Turkey with double standards. In addition, in September 2013 a German Marshall Fund report indicated that support for EU membership among the Turkish public is still around 44 percent.
by the public to Turkey’s EU membership contrast with the Kemalist idea of the ‘grandeur’ of the nation and produces a feeling of being undermined (Taraktas 2008, p.255).

In light of the historical indicators that draw a general portrait of a Europe reluctant for inclusion of Turkey in the Union, on the other side of the coin, a deeper understanding of Turkish perspectives should also be considered in explaining both new Turkish self-identification and cultural debates in the context of Turkey’s place in Europe. Thus, this study challenges the argument that Turkey wants to be an EU member and argues new Turkey's post-Kemalist identification does not locate it in Europe. In this regard, as Canefe and Bora’ (2005, p.126) suggested, the debates should go beyond the accession issue:

'Europe constitutes a key part of Turkey's relations with the outside world. However, it would be a mistake to reduce the Turkish society and state’s relations with Europe to the issue of inclusion in the European Union. Turkey has a long history of opposing, admiring, copying, denying, naming and judging things European. In this regard, the Turkish modernization project and its defenders as well as its critics have a complex relationship with the idea of Europe and what constitutes European identity. The current state of relations between European states and Turkey, revolving primarily around the issue of inclusion in the EU, thus has to be examined in light of this cultural background and the political debates that lie beyond the accession debate.'

2.8. The Paradigm Shift after September 11th 2001 and Redefinition of Turkey's European/Western Identity

Although Turkey became a candidate country for EU membership in 1999, the 9/11 attacks in 2001 changed the paradigm yet again. In the aftermath of the Islamic terrorist events of 11 September 2001 and the later bombings in London and Madrid that resulted in the association of terrorism with Islam in Europe (Canan-Sokullu 2011). The events provoked mutual aggression and cultural conflicts, in other words, like 'the clash of civilisations' (Huntington
that defined 'Islam' as a civilisation confronting the West or Europe. The identity and security concerns of Turkey and the EU diversified in definition of the threats in and outside the community. The EU has put more focus on the military and technological dimensions of security as it is seen in border management. On the other hand, Turkey's political transformation had consequences for the redefinition of national security and formulation of Turkish foreign policy in general. The EU accession process encouraged a change of the tools that are used in foreign policy-making (Altunisik and Martin 2011, p.579). For instance, the military’s power (symbolic and actual) in Turkey's political discourse has decreased (Bilgin 2011, p.78). Parallel to this, Turkey put more emphasis on diplomacy in foreign policy and less emphasis on the use of force in prioritising its economic interest. Moreover, in the shadow of the clash of civilisation thesis, Turkey's conservative elites benefited from the post 9/11 atmosphere and U.S advocacy of moderate Islam as a state model for the Muslim world (Eligur 2010, p.282).

The Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu’s (2009-2014) Strategic Depth approach (Davutoglu 2006; Duran 2006; Sozen 2010), has been blended with five new principles: balance between security and freedom; zero problems with neighbours; multidimensional and multi-track policies; a new diplomatic discourse based on firm flexibility; and rhythmic diplomacy. Based on a new geographic imagination (Aras and Fidan 2009) and civilisational geopolitical vision (Bilgin and Bilgic 2011), the AKP’s conservative ideology has repositioned and reconstructed Turkey’s political terrain in foreign policy in terms of creating a new sense of a macro-identity among populations that share the Ottoman Islamic heritage and targeting zero problems with Turkey's neighbours. In the new geographic imagination Turkey is located outside Western civilisation and it is imagined as the leader of its own civilisation, which changes the definitions of 'us' and 'others' (ibid p.173). The logic of this transformation is a world-view that is constructed on the basis of a selective reading of Ottoman administrative practices in the
issues of religious, cultural, and ethnic identity. In this regard, it offers a rearticulating of Turkish nation-state identity from a post-Kemalist perspective.

There has been more emphasis on using soft power with dialogue, economic liberalisation and economic interdependency, which led to an increase in efforts towards engagement with other regions, especially with the Middle East due to the rising Euro-scepticism in Turkey since 2006. In addition to the anti-EU discourse, a nationalist reaction with an anti-USA and anti-globalisation discourse began to appear in Turkish public discourse due to the growing instability and the human costs of the Iraq War. Since the crucial March 1, 2003 decision not to allow US troops through Turkish territory during the invasion of Iraq, Turkey has moved as an independent actor in foreign policy (Ozcan 2011, p.74). The problematic relations with the USA have contributed to a major increase in anti-American and anti-West sentiments in Turkey.

The main axis of Turkish foreign policy before the AKP government in the 2000s was the Turkey–United States–Israel triangle. In opposition to that, during the AKP era, Israel has become the most unfriendly country to Turkey, according to 40 percent of the people (TESEV 2010) due to the events in Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009, the Davos incident between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli President Shimon Peres, and the flotilla episode with Israel’s military intervention on the flagship Mavi Marmara in March 2010. The United States is also seen as the second most unfriendly country to Turkey by 33 percent of the people of Turkey, followed by Greece and France. On the other hand, the countries considered most friendly

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26 Nasuh Uslu, Metin Toprak, Ibrahim Dalmis, and Ertan Aydin, “Turkish Public Opinion towards the United States in the Context of the Iraqi Question,” MERIA 9, no. 3 (September 2005): 6
27 Soner Cagaptay, “Where Goes the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?” Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2004): 3
towards Turkey are Iran (13 percent), Azerbaijan (10 percent), the US (10 percent) and Pakistan (9 percent). Consequently, it seems that EU membership and alliance with the West has lost its attraction in Turkey while interest in the affairs of the East and Muslim countries is rising. Turkey has improved its relations with its regional neighbours and involvement in the Middle East in increasing economic and political relations with the Muslim countries.

Turkey’s improving relations with Iran and its vote against the resolution of the UN Security Council about the Iranian nuclear program caused questioning of whether it was shifting its axis, moving away from its traditional Western orientation to the East or the Islamic world. Since 2008, indicators of Islamisation of international relations increased (Criss 2010, p. 53). In July 2008 during the African summit, Ankara hosted Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, who is responsible for the massacre of 200,000 non-Arab Africans. Moreover, the deterioration of Turkish–Israeli relations after the Gaza War (2008–09) created a scandal at the Davos World Economic Forum on March 2, 2009. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan in anger shouted insults at Israel’s President Shimon Peres in the meeting. The AKP government's relationship with Hamas also strengthened the view that Turkey is diverging from Western orientation in its Middle East policies. The AKP’s emphasis on Turkey’s geopolitical position and its cultural and historical connections with an aim of being a regional and global power has changed the axis of its relations with regional powers. But internal and international dynamics create new challenges to follow a democratic project, as it was seen in the Kurdish issue.

**Conclusion**

In the Chapter 1, it is argued that self-imagINATION of a nation is about how a nation reflects on its identity in the presence of others; in other words, self-
image is always constructed vis-à-vis another. In this context, throughout the Chapter 2, it is demonstrated that Turkey's self-image is often constructed vis-à-vis the West or Europe. Kemalists imagined Turkey as a secular, modern, Western and a Turkic country with a specific focus on the Republican times. The Republican elites’ perception of the Turkish "self" as European with a civilizing (Yavuz 1998, p.27) mission caused Turkey's inclusion in different Western institutions as NATO and the EC provided necessary institutional grounds for the statist elite to restructure domestic politics. In the terms of domestic others, Turkish nation-state identity is constructed against non-Muslim, Islamist and Kurdish identities. It is also indicated that since 2002, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the reformist Islamists identified a reimagined Ottoman imperial project and searched for a non-territorially defined identity have become more effective in conditioning and shaping the state's policies and the society's perception of 'self'. This Chapter revealed that the post-Cold War international paradigm shift, Europeanisation process and new civilisational imagination of AKP have emerged a reconstruction of Turkey's identity, which can be called as 'post-Kemalism'. For a comprehensive understanding of this normative change in Turkish politics rather than just seeing different representations of the EU/West, this study contributes to existing literature by analysing the power struggle in the revision of Turkish national identity and Turkish foreign policy. In this manner, this thesis argues that there are different Turkeys with different imaginations of the nation and the state. In comparing the different discourses of Turkish nationalism via the case studies in the national and international context, it shows Turkish identity as a negotiated concept and deconstructs long-lasting polarisations in definitions of Turkish national identity, particularly essentialist, naturalised concepts of the nation that predominantly hinder the solutions to live together. In addition, the questions of how the ‘us/other’ relations emerge through these discourses and how various ideological positions are formed, are useful to shed light on Turkey’s place in the world and its international relations.
CHAPTER THREE
NATION AND RELIGION: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE
CONTESTED NARRATIVES OF TURKISHNESS

Introduction
This chapter explores the emergence of the post-Kemalist narrative of Turkey and its challenges through analysing different discourses of Turkish identity in terms of religion and nation. This thesis argues that ‘religion’ is a major constitutive content of Turkish nationalism and it has played a crucial role in the domestic struggle in redefinition of Turkey’s inter-national identity. As the main principles and components of Turkey’s Kemalist nation-state identity, secularism is seen fundamental for the conditions of democracy and modernity in Turkey. In this context, for the articulation of construction of post-Kemalist Turkish nation-state identity in Turkish media discourse, this chapter analyses the case of assassination of journalist Hrant Dink and the national tension during Turkey's Presidential Elections in 2007.

3.1. The Importance and Background of the Case of Hrant Dink
A human rights activist, Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, was shot by a seventeen-year-old Turkish extreme-nationalist on 19 January 2007 in Istanbul. Dink’s case and its trial became a unique symbol of anti-racism in Turkey (Goktas 2009). At his funeral, more than 100,000 people chanted “We are all Hrant Dink. We are all Armenian.” However, this expression was responded to with “We are all Turks” slogans throughout the country. This

28 It should be noted that he had been on trial with the accusation of ‘humiliating Turkishness’ for three years because of the way Hrant Dink identified himself as ‘I am not Turk. I am from Turkey and I am Armenian’ in a speech that he gave in a conference that took place in Urfa in 2002. He was a Turkish citizen, but an Armenian, instead of using the term ‘Turkish Armenian’, ‘Armenian’ is used to identify since he preferred this identification.
was reiterated in a weekly published comic, *Penguin*, in the form of a sarcastic caricature. It was represented in an ‘alien’ story. In front of a spaceship, an alien says to a stubble and burly Turkish man: “Hello earthling! We are friends.” But the man says: “Not Earthling! We are Turks!” and in anger, “What’s wrong with you?” Frightened the alien apologises: “Well, Pardon,” and wants to leave the place. This comic summarises well the ethnic nationalist discourse and the anger of Turkey towards others, as Kerem Oktem (2011) called Turkey an ‘angry nation’.

Within the media, this discourse of ‘angry nation’ has been reproduced, distributed and has become more visible. It is also important to note that the perpetrator of the assassination, Ogun Samast, said (Turkmen-Dervisoglu 2013, p.680): “I am not guilty. Guilty are the headlines that showed Dink as a traitor. I learnt about Dink from newspaper headlines.” It can be argued that the media has played a role in reproducing nationalist discourse and portraying Dink as a political figure who was targeted (Goktas 2007) by right-wing radical Turkish nationalists. Therefore, the media coverage on the event of the assassination of Hrant Dink is chosen in the first case of the project to represent inclusion and exclusion narratives of non-Muslim elements in definition of the Turkish nation.

This case has a great significance to illustrate that the anger and hatred discourse in the media distribute the banal nationalism in the daily usage of language. Naturalising the hatred and anger discourse to the others and construction of Turkish identity by expression of discrimination or by strengthening alienated features of the others, transforms murderous actions to stories of heroism with legitimating strategies. The murderer, Ogun Samast was seen as being proud of killing the Armenian. He was held in high esteem. His pictures were taken with the Turkish flag behind him after he was taken to the custody; the posters of ‘Turkey lost one of its enemies’ were seen in the football stadium; even the news written that linked the jumping
white beret sales with the Samast’s clothes seen on his photos of the assassination day (Radikal 13.01.2008).

What is more, Hr ank Dink’s case gives fruitful evidence for the main assumption of the thesis, which is the dilemma in Turkish nationalism in dealing with its past and memories. Rather than acceptance of past victories and traumas as the different sectors of common past both in pre-Islamic, Ottoman and Republican narratives, selective reading of the national history in construction of various imagined collective memories leads to contested perspectives of Turkishness, but also exclusion and denying some ‘others’ in national discourse. Hrant Dink was deconstructing Turkish and Armenian nationalist discourses; his critical stand was unacceptable or easily misunderstood by Turks or Armenians. Thus, his identity and his world view challenged with mainstream Turkish nationalism.

Dink had caught Turkish nationalists’ attention, which bothered them while expressing the problems of Armenian community; demanding for their cultural rights or expressing his own stance related to the debate of history. This was not liked by the official Turkish thesis, and had been the case since it first started publishing AGOS in 1996. The events that led to his murder were directly related to the competing narratives of nation and misinterpretation of his goal of construction, a new discourse for common future. On one hand one, Dink called the mass killing of Armenians in 1915 in the Ottoman land as ‘genocide’, on the other hand he was critical of the ways in which two nations reflected this memory – rejection of Turks and the acknowledgment ‘obsession’ of Armenians (Turkmen-Dervisoglu 2013, p.680). In an article entitled On Armenian Identity (Agos, 13.02.2004), he suggested that Armenian diaspora’s hatred was deep-rooted in the past trauma towards the Turkish people which should be purified from the nature of the nation. However, his metaphoric expression allowed it to be interpreted in a totally different meaning when it was taken out of context:
“The clean blood that will replace the blood poisoned by ‘the Turk’ is present in the noble vein that will be established by the Armenian with Armenia.” This sentence was read out as a representation of racism, degrading, insulting Turkishness in Turkish media (Goktas 2009), and of distortion of Atatürk’s words in his Speech to the Turkish Youth: “Oh, youth of Turkey’s future, (...) the strength you need to present in the noble blood that flows in your veins.” Therefore, he became an open target of Turkish nationalists.

But the last straw that broke the camel’s back was the news about Atatürk’s daughter ‘Sabiha Gokcen’ that he published with the headline of ‘Sabiha Hatun’s Secret’ on 6 February 2004. In the report, Armenian relatives of Gökçen were mentioned and she was claimed to be actually an Armenian orphan taken from an orphanage. When this news was published in Turkey’s highest selling newspaper Hurriyet above the fold with reference from AGOS in 21 February 2004, what was done was done and Turkey became loose. All columnists made negative-positive comments related to this news for more than fifteen days. Statements were given from different parties. According to some of those, Dink was ill-intended in trying to create an earthquake in Turkish national identity by suddenly removing the ‘Turkishness’ of a person, who was turned into a myth and symbol of Turkish woman. The most important of all these was the written statement of the Chief of General Staff on 22 February 2004: “Opening such a symbol into discussion is a crime against national integrity and national peace, whatever purpose it carries.” This interpretation of the case of Sabiha Gokcen shows that the identification of a historical Turkish character with a minority identity is perceived as degrading just by naming her ‘Armenian’, insulting nomination of social actor or insulting Turkishness. The statement illustrates an approach that being Armenian is imagined as the other of Turkish national identity and a threat to national unity.

Based on the article 301, Hrant Dink was sentenced to six months in jail,
claiming that he publicly insulted Turkishness. In Dink’s decree of the Supreme Court Penal General Board, the concept of Turkishness was defined as it was related to the human element of the state and by this concept the Turkish nation was meant (Cumhuriyet 30.01.2007, p.1). So, what is in Turkishness that must be untouched? The ground of article 301, Turkishness is defined as the common entity generated by the joint culture unique to Turks. This entity is larger than the concept of the Turkish nation and includes societies living outside Turkey and who participate in the same culture. The intention of Turkishness is the whole humanitarian, religious and historical values generating the Turkish nation and national spiritual values composed of national language, national emotions and national traditions. Jurisdiction therefore decrees that ‘Turkishness’ is defined as ‘Turkish nation’.

This explanation constitutes the content of Turkish identity appearing in the context of the article 301. It assumes a non-territorial and cultural Turkish identity on the one hand, however, it also connects it on the notion of ‘nation’ on the other hand. It imagines a Turkish nation in and beyond the boundaries of Turkey that has a common national past and present. Stressing on the national values, but not clarifying what those values are, makes the definition flux: If common religious values make Turks a nation, which religion is that; if common language as Turkish presents Turkishness, does it also integrate whom have different mother tongue as Armenian; if common historical values constitute Turkish nation, which historical period and memories are shared in and beyond Turkey? Therefore, this linguistic construction of Turkishness and Turkish nation produces an open reading and causes different interpretations based on the different understanding of persons. This point can be illustrated in the case of various identifications of Hrant Dink in the Turkish media.
3.1.1. The Identity of Hrant Dink: Non-Muslims in Turkish National Identity Discourse

My homeland, the village who tries constantly to become a city,
Here is another murder committed in the square of that village...
Again in front of the eyes of everyone...
Again right in the very middle of the big silence of the huge crowd...
My homeland, now the wet-eyed giant shot from the Hrant Dink side of his heart...
Everyone has his own We, inside of We, inside of us...
Lots of small We scattered around with an evil We bigger than us...
Who are we? Which of one us are inside which We?
Which part of We inside of We?
Well, the ones not wanting to hurt those who don’t think like them
How many persons We are?
In fact we are too many...
More than we ever think...

Yılmaz Erdoğan, 20 January 2007

On 20 January 2007, Turkish newspapers commented on the assassination of Hrant Dink. Among the writers and reporters, Turkish poet and author Murathan Mungan (Radikal 20.01.2007) caught the point made him a target of extreme Turkish nationalism, the reason was Hrant Dink ‘was seen’:

‘Hrant Dink ‘was seen’, to be seen to be visible is important. The thing that made him a target board was, first of all the fact that he could be ‘seen’ as an Armenian. In this country Armenians are usually ignored. They have been obliged to live without cutting a swathe. Their names, surnames, identities have been grayed, blended into the crowd. To be seen means to exist, resemble, remind, which means ‘being watched’. Either with the 301st article or barrel... Minorities have also strong memory. They remember more. Not only remote history, but also 6–7th September events. Therefore their mutism is deeper. Moreover, a daily warning of the official language, which mentions even Apo as ‘Armenian offspring’, doesn’t even let memory go back that far.”

In this quotation, Mungan identified Dink as “Armenian” and mentioned the difficulties of being a member of a minority in Turkey. He used the topos\(^{29}\) as being seen for referring the cultural and political situation of minorities in the country. As if they, their names, surnames and identities are invisible, they

\(^{29}\) Or ‘topoi’: parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises in the shape of content-related warrants that connects the argument with the conclusion (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, p.74).
can survive. Since the DHA concern the notion of 'history' in the analysis of the text, in the excerpt the emphasis on strong memories of minorities is remarkable. Either the collective past experiences such as the events of 6–7 September when Greek minorities in Istanbul were attacked by the extreme-nationalists in 1955, either specific language use in the present keep their memories strong. Mungan took attention to discriminative language use by reminding Apo - the leader of the PKK- is called as 'Armenian offspring', which is used insulting to the Kurdish identity by making use of a non-Muslim minority identity. As Reisigl and Wodak (2001) noted predicational strategies, namely what traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to minorities indicate racist political discourse. Racist concepts which imply a kind of genetically-defined, imagined Turkishness, surfaced in nationalist discourses, and this has decisively contributed to the genesis of a national perception of Turkey. In this imagination, minorities are expected to be assimilated into Turkishness and to be unseen.

From what perspective or point of view are these characteristics expressed is also important in analysing the exclusion, discrimination, suppression and exploitation of minorities. When the examples are overviewed, it is clear that religion works in essentialising and internalising manner for the purpose of Turkish national identity and examples mirror Muslim majoritarian perspective. In the newspapers, relating to Dink's funeral, by raising the questions such as ‘Is it appropriate or not to pray al-fatehah for Hrant Dink?’ (Hurriyet, 25.01.2007), the articles served to reproduce the discourse of Dink’s non-Muslimhood and difference. This reference to an Islamic worship at the funeral can be evaluated as a particularising synecdoche that is associated with the Muslim imagination of the nation and otherness of non-

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30 In this respect, Yegen's work (2011, pp.240-245) points out that the usage of the term of 'Jewish Kurds' in the Turkish media builds a some sort of connection between Kurds and non-Muslims. This connection can be summarised as the non-Muslim peoples are seen untrustworthy in Turkey; thus it shows the shift in the Kurdish image in Turkish nationalism and constructs the idea that the Kurdish question is one of disloyalty.
Muslims. As an important national ritual and practice, the form of the funeral was debated in the Turkish media. The representation of the routines of everyday life in the news also contributed to the nation’s self-perception. The banal representation of daily life (Billig 1995), such as the shared religious and cultural habits, norms and values of Turkish people, not only linked private lives to the national public sphere but their mediation through the newspapers strengthened their identification as Turks and Muslims.

The Prime Minister’s counsellor, AKP Deputy of Adana, Omer Celik’s statement published in Radikal was: “My friend Hrant was a patriot, his funeral must be covered by the Turkish flag.” According to this example, being a patriot is enough to carry the national symbol such as the Turkish flag, but, whether it is enough to be a Turk is still questionable. Regarding Dink’s patriotism, Perihan Magden (Radikal, 20.01.2007) wrote Dink was more Turk than her:

“Brother, such a good man you were. Such a polite and clean, such a brave and straightforward, such a devoted, canonical hallal man you were, Hrant Dink. First of all, you were more Turk than I am. You were a real child of Anatolia (literally in positive meaning), a real patriot that loved these lands, these nations, these humans much, such a big hearted, brave man you were.”

In this linguistic realisation of the national narrative, the expression of plural collectivities in Anatolia as ‘these nations’ is the example of imagining Turkey with other culture and nationalities different than Turkishness. The writer’s intentional choice of the words of ‘hallal man’ and ‘Turk’ to describe him, implies a hidden criticism of what was not accepted in Dink’s identity in the eyes of some masses who see themselves more Turk than others based on the distinction of religion and ethnicity. Distinctively, being Turk is defined through the love of the lands and peoples in Anatolia. Here, what makes a person a Turk is the desire to live in Turkey together with other nations. National membership is defined by citizenship and it is mostly thought that the fundamental condition of being Turk is the desire to be Turk,
particularly for the minorities. Being born in Turkey, growing up in Turkey, having ancestors who lived in Turkey, does not make every individual equal with others. The dilemma of Turkish citizenship for minorities appears here. Non-Muslims are accepted as Turk but not enough Turk. In this context, Yuval-Davis (2010; 2011) differentiates between belonging and the politics of belonging. Belonging tends to be naturalized through emotional attachments, about feeling a part of a land and a community, in other words, the senses of being ‘at home’. This feeling include struggles around the determination of who is involved in a community. Belonging is politised in multi-layered structures of political projects such as citizenship, nationalism, religion, migration, globalisation and cosmopolitanism. In the state-society relations and everyday life relations, non-Muslims are reminded that they are different. The problem is that the majority determines what they should forget and remember about their identities.

In Turkish media coverage, 'Is the slogan ‘we are all Armenian’ right or wrong for you' was another question associated with being Turk. Writer of Those Crazy Turks novel, Turgut Ozakman (Hurriyet 26.01.2007) noted that he did not approve shouting the slogan: ‘we are all Armenian, we are all Hrant Dink’. His justification of the argument was based on the idea that imagined Turkishness as a territorial identity in the boundaries of Turkey. According to this definition of the nation, in Ozakman’s words, most of the participators of the demonstration were not Armenian; thus saying ‘Hrant Dink was one of us’ should have been ‘Hrant was Turk too, he was an Armenian with Turkish origin’. This perspective echoes Kemalist imagination of the Turkish nation, such as Cuneyt Ulsever (Hurriyet 21.01.2007) underlined the importance of recognizing him as a Turk:

"Do they have any conscience? Those who don’t change 301 on one way or another, who still commemorate Hrant with a cold title such as ‘citizen of Turkish Republic’ and don’t have the heart to call him ‘Turk’... who think they will get rid of the responsibility by saying ‘There was no demand for protection.’"
According to Ulsever’s expression, ‘citizen of Turkish Republic’ is a cold reference; it is therefore Dink should be identified as 'Turk’. In fact, how are persons named and referred to linguistically is a crucial question of studying the identity politics and politics of belonging. These examples revealed the complexity of how to call minorities in Turkey: Turk; Armenian; Armenian originated Turkish; Turkish originated Armenian; citizen; and patriot. From this thesis’ perspective, beyond different nominalisations, the point is how these identifications are used, in which perspective and discourse in the terms of exclusion or inclusion in maintaining or challenging existing power relations. Surely, ignoring the difference and individuality of the other is not the inclusion. But, calling minorities as Turks is not protecting or guaranteeing their cultural and political rights to live and exist in how they are and who they are. Therefore, the question is how to guarantee equal citizenship in practice and everyday life relationships in order to reduce the difficulties of being different than the majority identity. More significantly, Ulsever mentions about the negligence and the denial of Dink's demand for protection which address to an institutional and social exclusion. In this context, Yegenoglu’s (Radikal 28.01.2007) article argues that different ethnic groups are discriminated against and they become targets of racist attacks in Turkey; the case of Dink is not an individual case. Yegenoglu looks at the picture from a post-nationalist perspective by underlining the concept of anti-racism not patriotism:

“Hrant Dink not only reminded us that he had an Armenian identity, but also expressed the hardships of being Armenian and different in this country, which means he criticised the ‘racism’, which we never could name. Since he was right from here, he was one of the hosts of this country, he wanted to criticise the racism to which both he and the identity group he belongs to are exposed. Let’s name it. Hrant Dink was an anti-racist fighter for freedom of expression. This is far more important than how much he loved this country.”

In the quoted paragraph above, Hrant Dink is described as an ‘Armenian host of this country' which linguistically constructs the in-group membership
categorisation to denote territorial boundaries of the nation, furthermore, the
discursive construction of difference between among Turks and Armenians is
observed 'with the selective use of the plural pronoun of we' and 'the identity
group he belongs to'.

In a Cumhuriyet (23.04.2007) newspaper article published by translating
from the German newspaper Der Tagesspiegel (20.01.2007) that was entitled
‘Turks are living a lie’, Suzanne Gusten criticised Turkey’s constitutional
citizenship for being just on paper and did not guarantee Christian and
Jewish minorities could feel at home. She argued that Turkey presented itself
as a country of tolerance at the crossroads of cultures, but this was not true.
Non-Muslim minorities such as Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians and other
Christians, together with Jews, did not even comprise 0.5 per cent of the
country’s population and they constantly felt that it was a lie:

“\textit{The belief that only a Muslim Turk can be a real Turk, still seals}
national identity. This belief is not just valid in the religious or
nationalist part of the political spectrum. This view has strongly
leaked into the Turkish state itself and sealed it. For example, the
fact that inspection of Christian schools has always to be done by an
ethnical – more clearly Muslim – vice principal has been reflected in
law texts. Christian citizens are not real Turks for the Turkish state
and they are not to be trusted.}”

The excerpt above demonstrates two cases of interdiscursivity (Wodak 2007,
p.206) that need to be underlined. The first one entails the interdiscursivity
with the discourse on Muslimhood which is considered as a cornerstone of
the constructed Turkish national identity. The second one concerns the
interdiscursivity with the state discourse that is influential in broader Turkish
state-society relationships and conditions of Christian citizens. Construction
of Turkish identity with Muslim identity excludes non-Muslims in state
discourse and in the implications of the state institutions. Interdiscursivity is
utilised to entail a integrative logic that suggest interconnectedness. The
connection between being Turk and being Muslim in Turkish nation-state
discourse, assumes a conditionality to call one as a real Turk. Gusten draws
out attention to the massive negative associations and connotations in illustrating ‘Christians are not to be trusted’. This negative representation also comes out with xenophobia. In the following text (Kaplan, Cumhuriyet 31.12.2005), the prejudice to foreigners in Kemalist discourse is appearing in a direct accusation:

“Former Land Office Deputy Director Ozkaya told of the disadvantages of property sale to foreigners: Shores will be closed to Turks... They polluted the lands of the world; now they graze our land to make agriculture. By using the power of the dollar now, they are trying to do what they couldn’t do in the Independence War.”

In this quotation, the term of foreigners connected with the memory of the Independence War in the case of selling property to them refers to power abuse, domination or imperialism. This discourse also demonstrates the leftish tone of Kemalist nationalism and the main opposition party, 'centre-left' CHP. In relation to the finance sector Cumhuriyet (19.01.07) reported that “Foreigners are establishing full sovereignty by buying the shares of the banks, whose small part they have bought”. This linguistic representation of the act portray that foreigners are sneaking into Turkish economy step by step for establishing domination. This idea is synonymous with the fear of 'This country is getting sold'. Ekrem Dumanlı (Zaman 23.01.2007) commented on this 'fear' and criticized the perception of 'suspected' and 'disloyal' foreigners in Turkish society with a reference to the expression of 'getting stabbed from behind':

"Extreme statements are turning Turkey into a mental hospital and we are not aware of it. In saying 'This country is getting sold', many conspiracies are being put forward. In this regard 'traitors, cooperators, inattentives' appear. Fear of separation, break up, getting stabbed from behind date back to the Balkan Wars"

In this example, the reference to the memory of the Balkan Wars that appeared in the Islamist discourse represent their narrative and remembrance of national past different than the Kemalist discourse, their imagination of themselves as national community. It was the collapsing times of the
Ottomans and the birth times of the ideal of the modern Turkish nation-state. The emphasis on the continued fear shows the clash of different narratives of the nation. Using the metaphor of mental hospital while describing the present fear of Kemalist nationalists construct 'them' in opposition to 'conservative democrats' as the rational or modern ones. The Kemalist nation-state discourse is portrayed as an old fashion perspective. This illustrates a transformation of anti-westernisation in Turkish Islamist discourse and their adaption to globalisation, at least in the context of economic relations. This sceptic discourse can be read as Kemalist paradigm's adaptation problem to neo-liberal transformation as Zeynep Gambetti (2009) argued that Islamic orientation to the politics of globalisation has been more successful in Turkey. In the big picture of contemporary Turkey this makes Islamists more effective and pragmatic in governance of changing dynamics of politics and establishing the post-Kemalist nation-state discourse.

3.1.2. The Crime and Punishment: Blaming Others or Saying 'We Killed Hrant Dink'

While the murderer of Dink had not yet been named, the headlines of the newspapers mostly pointed to the external powers or evil powers being behind the action. This section shows that the blaming others strategy used in linguistic representations of responsible actors is a common feature in both the pro-secularist and Islamist discourse. They referred the 'external forces' in the coverage of the 'evil' actions that promoted the nationalist discourse. The highest political representative of the country, Prime Minister Erdogan put emphasis on the same agenda: “I curse this villainous murder. It is meaningful that this murder took place while the so-called Armenian genocide claims are in the agenda.” This also points to the strategies of justification of the self-victimising Turkey. The newspapers did not only to aggregate the nationalist paranoia amongst Turkish people against 'foreign'
Armenians but also justified and legitimized their exclusion and being cast as the 'enemy' within the nation. Foreigners were seen as scapegoats, as it was obvious in this text (Zaman 20.01.2007):

“Assassination of Armenian origin journalist Hrant Dink has been considered by intelligence officers and strategists as ‘the act of external forces’. Experts, who interpret the assault as a sign of an operation towards Turkey, point out that it was made in a period, in which the Armenian genocide proposal is on the agenda at US Senate.”

From a populist nationalist perspective Hurriyet’s report (20.01.2007) was written as if it was verifying conservative newspaper, Zaman’s arguments:

“American National Community of Armenians (ANCA), which embodies radical Armenian organisations, blamed Turkey for the murder of Hrant Dink in the armed attack and gave signs that this murder will be used towards the passing of the new ‘genocide’ proposal from the US Congress.”

In this context, the connection between the murder, the 1915 debates of Ottoman Armenians in the First World War and the current conditions of Turkey are the negative aspects of present and the past and directly associated with historical stereotypes. The mentality of 'they will use it against us' can be evaluated from the perspective of the strategies of avoidance and blaming others. In this way, the media’s representation can also influence Turkish peoples’ attitudes and views against the non-Muslims and Armenians. This perspective is common in the Turkish media and can also be seen in the following text from a pro-secular discourse:

"Let us look at the atmosphere in Turkey in which these murders are committed. 1) A constant deterioration in political relations and conditions in Turkey both inside and outside. a) Exclusion from the EU and disappointment. Single-sided and unfair pressures of the EU on the Cyprus issue. b) Path to the dissolution in Iraq and the composition of Kurdish state. Depending on the shift of the Kurdish issue in our country to a different channel, this time to political ground. EU support to the Kurdish issue. Growing struggles with the US in this field. c) Growing political support to claims of the Armenian genocide on political grounds, moreover legal supports coming into the agenda also in the US.” (Cumhuriyet 20.01.2007)
This text is written by Orhan Bursalı on the Dink case implies a rationalisation strategy. This strategy functions to present this murder as a nationalist response to deterioration in Turkey’s political, economical and social conditions; however it banally naturalizes the violence and the hatred to other nations. In this example, the rhetorical devices employed to enhance the persuasiveness of Turkish discourse. The EU and the US are presented as the supporters of Turkey's Cyprus problem, Kurdish problem and Armenian problem. Moreover, Bursalı argues that ‘Islamist-racist’ politics possess a ground that carries violence into the agenda in order to grow. This discourse presents the clash of ideologies in Turkey. This point turns the examples to debate ‘blaming imagined internal others’ for the negative actions and events. On one hand, Kemalists blame Islamists; on the other hand Islamists blame Kemalist nationalists. For example, Ihsan Dagi (Zaman 23.01.2007) claimed that whoever invented the 301st article of the Turkish Penal Code and supported it, had a share in the preparation of this attack. This denotes the Republican People’s Party who wanted to maintain the article against the insulting nominations of Turkishness. It is important to remember that by this date the face and identity of the murderer was known; and therefore the debate focused on the searching ‘someone inside to blame’ as an opportunity to create a platform to political speculation instead of emphasising the identity or mentality of the young murderer Ogun Samast. According to the given text Cumhuriyet addressed the Islamist racist politics responsible; contrary to that, Zaman (23.01.2007) viewed Kemalists and leftist groups responsible for the violence in the streets of Turkey:

“The sage of nationalists (‘ulusalcılar’) is determined to divide Turkey. Kemalists, natural born supporters of the NATO, Special Warfare experts, anti-West nationalist movement completed its composition three years ago and now they are making appearance in the streets under the leadership of trotskyist, marxist and maoist Dogu Perincek.”

Here, the topos of 'dividing Turkey' appears in blaming others discourse again. This portrays leftist, Kemalist and anti-West nationalists as the 'others'
in the imagination of post-Kemalist Turkey. The deliberations in the discourses tacitly indicate the new positions of the political actors in changing power relations of Turkey. What is more noteworthy in these examples is that the discursive construction of the event in both Kemalist and Islamist discourse link with scepticism towards an international actor and an in-group allied with out-group. Beyond these discourses of blaming others, *Radikal* could face with another ‘We’ inside ‘We’; for instance Ismet Berkan titled ‘We killed Hrant Dink’ (20.01.2007).

“First of all, this is a racist murder. I used to recall ‘deep state’ in such murders, now I don’t. I don’t, because those who created the nationalist environment in Turkey fed such a beast, that there are hundreds of ‘Valley of the Wolves’ children, who try to concern themselves with the situation by thinking that deep state is not nationalist enough. This atmosphere was created in Turkey step-by-step and with consciousness. Among those who have created this murderer nationalist atmosphere, there are advertisers and politicians, so-called opinion leaders, journalists and producers of movies and serials. Blood that leaked out of Hrant’s dead body has smeared on all contributors.”

References imply that Turkish populist nationalism, supposedly shared by the majority of Turks, is naturalised, produced and reproduced in the media and political discourse in the variety and range of realisations. This perspective also supports the idea of ‘the killer is one of us’, a member of our family, friends and neighbourhood as Cem Erciyes (Radikal 28.01.2007) wrote:

“From now on we see that Ogun Samast is one of the noncompliant, hopeless, aggressive and ‘nationalist’ youngsters of our neighbourhood. He is one of the teenagers who exist in every neighbourhood, whose numbers reach incredible heights as they reach into Anatolian cities. Those who define themselves as nationalist, patriot, who can adopt every kind of pressure, torture, murder and militarism ‘for the sake of the homeland’ are right near us. In our family, friends and neighbourhood. They are the natural ground of the state that pressurises every kind of opinion against dominant opinion, they are the natural supporters of the media, politicians, who can do anything in the name of populism.”
In this representation of Ogun Samast, Erciyes criticises the populist nationalist discourse that is constructed naturally with ‘anything can be done for the sake of the nation and the land’ mentality. This nationalist world view is used for justification of torture, murder and militarism and turns the teenagers of the angry nation to the killers. In this context, the worst thing might be the attempt of exculpation of the killer or making a hero out of him, transforming him into a national role model for the youngsters, which might spring up new Oguns from every corner of the country who are ready to protect the nation, ready to die or kill.

When one analyses the discourses of the four newspapers, it is seen that only Radikal did not hesitate to define the assassination of Hrant Dink as a racist attack. Neither pro-secular nor Islamist discourse construct a pluralist post-Kemalist discourse for the non-Muslims of the country. Rather than finding a scapegoat, alienating the responsibilities of the bad events in Turkish society, ignoring the origins of the problem, even making a conscious selection of not seeing, hearing or writing would be seen in the Turkish media for the sake of keeping the unity of the nation (!).

In order to have a better understanding of dynamic nature of Turkish national identity and why people think what they think about themselves and others, a historical perspective is required to see how common political past, present and future are imagined in different competing discourses of Turkey. To do this analysis of competing perspectives, firstly the multiple narratives of past will be taken into account in the following part of this chapter. This will be followed by analysing discourses on the difference between then and now with regard to imagining a future. Numerous examples will be given to show symbolic boundaries of the national body of Turkey through the variety and range of linguistic strategies of construction of self as the Turkish nation and others as internal or external foreigners.
3.1.3. The Discursive Construction of Common Political Past of the Nation: ‘Those Crazy Turks’

‘We are of people that are living in the hell but willing to change there into Heaven. Staying and living in Turkey are both our real desire and our requirement for our respect to thousands of friends whom we know and don’t know that struggle for democracy in Turkey and support us for that. We would stay and resist. But if we were obliged to go one day... We would set out just like in 1915... Like our ancestors... Without knowing where to go... By walking through the paths they walked... By suffering, living the agony. But while all this is happening I am going to regard this truth as my only guarantee. Yes, I can see myself in the sole anxiety of a pigeon, but I know that in this country people do not touch pigeons. Pigeons keep their lives going even right in the middle of cities, among the crowds of people. Yes, little bit fearful, but yet free.’

Hrant Dink, Agos, January 2007

These lines are taken from the last article of Hrant Dink who believed in transforming Turkey into heaven where everybody can live in peace and safe in democracy. Despite the fact of the fearful living, he never wanted to leave from Turkey as their ancestors had to go. On 24 January 2007, Hurriyet gave its first page to cover 'Dink’s funeral under the title of ‘Turkey became one heart’ and wrote his wife, Rakel Dink’s words: You did not leave your country, my love.'

This confirms that the memory of the past is still alive in the minds; therefore this thesis assumes that analysing diverse discursive construction of the common political past of the nation is useful for a deeper understanding of the origins of current political polarisations in Turkey. Observing different readings on the history, pinpoints naturalised conceptions of the nationhood and how ideological perspectives drive problematic ways of dealing with the common experiences and hinder the spirit of living together. On this context, the discourse analysis shows that Islamists glorify the period of the Ottoman Empire and blame the Republican period for current problems of the nation. On the other side of the discourse, the Independence War and Republican
period in Kemalist memory is essential to the survival of the nation from the ashes of the Ottomans. On this clash of memories, the Kemalist newspaper Cumhuriyet’s image of the Turkish nation appears clearly in the selection of their words. Comparing the times of before Atatürk and after Atatürk gives concrete evidence for how secularist, Republicanist people imagine Turkey.

In 2006, a historical novel about the establishment of the Republic and national revolution, the sale of Turgut Ozakman’s Those Crazy Turks reached a record high, something which had not been seen for long time. Its timing was crucial to its success as it was a symbol for resistance to deconstruction of Kemalist nation-state identity. Kemalists referred to this book for gaining new inspiration and power for a second independence war. By using the passages from this book, Oktay Akbal wrote an article in Cumhuriyet (27.10.2005) indicating how Turks have been changing from crazy Turks to bewildered Turks. Using information inherited from the Ottoman times in 1922, it justified why Kemalists chose to remember the Republican times as sacred and glorious to their nation:

“The truth about Turkey in 1922: ‘The population is 13 million. Primitive agriculture. Almost no industry. Most of the mines, harbours and railways are under the administration of foreign companies. There are 153 second- and first-level schools with just one university. Only 7 per cent of the people are literate. It is not even 1 per cent among women. Half colony in the terms of economy. Income per capita is 4 lira, average public spending per capita is 50 kuruş. Infrastructure is insufficient in every field. There are almost no scientific studies. Anatolia is in the hands of incapable religious schools. Religious communities, lodges and monasteries are everywhere. The laws are behind the necessities of the age. In principle, women have no social lives and rights. It is even harder to imagine women being doctors, engineers, lawyers, mayors, deputies, ministers one day. Women have no right to vote and stand for election. In summary they are counted as citizens. The country is almost in the medieval ages...”

In Akbal’s quotation from Turgut Ozakman, the main emphasis is on the Kemalist revolution that established a modern nation-state from a failed
‘medieval’ state. In economical, industrial, educational, agricultural, legal and social areas, Kemalist revolutions and their influences on every aspect of social and political life are underlined and illustrated with historical references. Turgut Ozakman summarises the conditions of the first years of the Republic and adds how Kemalist policies made a progress in a few years in this poor country. Revolutions aimed at raising people to meet the modern age, giving priority to science and logic, enlightening Anatolia. When Ataturk died, Turkey had iron, steel and national industries. It could manufacture planes and submarines. Harbours and railways were nationalised; 3000 km of new railways were constructed. The average development rate of the last fifteen years was 10 per cent. Community houses and Public Schools were established, university reform was realised and modern laws were put into effect. The new state paid its debt to the women and women had equal rights to men.

In the quotation, before Republican system, Turkish society is described as if it was in medieval times in the 20th century, with a specific emphasis on the existence of religious communities everywhere, no science and no equal rights for women. Akbal writes what Turkish Revolution brought to Anatolia in fifteen years between 1922 and 1938 with the quotation from Ozakman that are ‘modern laws’, ‘enlightenment’, ‘science and logic’, ‘woman rights’, ‘national education and economy’. These are also hints on how to read Kemalist nationalism and its narrative of the nation. In this reading, there is a strong emphasis on Islam and its influence on the education and social life in the society, making it the reason for underdevelopment. As the guarantor of modernism and democracy, secularism is the one of the central terms in this understanding of the Turkish nation. Therefore, Kemalist nationalists use the references from the period of Ataturk to lead the secularisation of their society. This discourse shows the milestone of Kemalist Turkish national history, before and after Ataturk. This narrative of the past argues that the Republican system has provided the citizens with equal rights anywhere in
the country. In relation to the discursive construction common political present, this modern, secular image of Turkey is under threat again; in his column Akbal calls Turks ‘crazy’ against the ‘others’ who are willing to live in the times before Ataturk:

“Ozakman's ‘The Crazy Turks’ warns us once more... the confused, cowards, flatterers, heresiarchs, deniers and those who are willing to divert the country to the old ways!... Just as the crazy Turks created a new, lively, strong and new Turkey out of defeats and despair we have a duty that awaits us; to combine our crazy ideas with logic and science, to destroy retrogressivism and closed-minded thoughts with the lessons of the history... Tens of thousands of citizens should absorb ‘The Crazy Turks’! They should find themselves, their honour and identity in the pages of the book. They should be willing to come together again under the idea of Turkish Revolutionary Forces.”

This text exhibits a strategy of persuasion and Kemalist resistance to change and distinguishes between ‘crazy Turks’ who are modern, open-minded, enlightened citizens with logic and science, and others 'the confused, cowards, flatterers, heresiarchs, deniers' who aim to take the country to the old, dark days. This directly targets the domestic power struggle for redefinition of Turkish nation-state identity under the AKP government. As noted before, the collective memory of social groups is of particular significance for the construction of the national identity. In this context, we find a diversity of interpretations of the Republican revolution and the narrative of crazy Turks. For instance, Islamist readings of national past and present are used to blame Kemalist construction of national identity and the ‘crazy Turk’ model citizens as the origin of the extreme nationalism and the assassination of Hrant Dink. In this context of different narratives of the nation, in Zaman newspaper an article titled 'Rethinking on Nationalism' was written by Ihsan Dagi (Zaman, 21.01.2007). In this example, the discourse of Crazy Turks and modern politics of nation-state are perceived as the causes of destroying the culture of living together and the recent problems of Turkey. In this narrative, the times of the Ottoman Empire are idealised in the account of living in a heterogenic society in the terms of multireligious,
multilingual and multiracial features. Republican national identity and citizenship discourse is also represented as the obstacles of the democratisation process due to its perception of religious and ethnic minorities:

“In the framework of those efforts a ‘crazy Turk’ model has been invented, who fights against the whole world, who is alone, aggressive and reactionist. Crazy Turks are called to hold arms by the army, jurisdiction and politicians with cries of ‘We are losing the motherland’. Abandon this ‘defensive’ psychology. The harm you have caused by crying, ‘We are losing this country’ has accessed its limit. Try to be more in peace with your society and history. Stop seeing citizens of this country as enemies and a threat who are with headscarf, tarigah, Kurdish speaking and Armenians and Greeks. Let’s face it: This attack took place in the productive ground that was created by the chauvinist nationalism that is rising in Turkey. Values before the arrival of the CUP, which means before ‘modern politics’, have to be found again. Culture of living together must be built again just like what we had before the idea of single race, single language, single religion based homogenous national state turns modern society into a ‘society of extremism’.”

In the expression of ‘who are with headscarf, tarigah, Kurdish speaking and Armenians and Greeks’, the Islamists, Kurds and non-Muslims are portrayed as the ‘others’ of Kemalism's homogenous nation-state identity construction. To sum up, this text functions to resist this mentality and aim to construct a post-Kemalist nation-state identity. Similarly, in the next quotation made by Ali Unal, the strategy of transformation is employed to challenge Turkishness based Kemalist nationalism:

“In the beginning of the 20th century, anti-Arabism and Turkishness-based nationalism movements, together with ‘minority rights’ which Europe constantly stressed, fastened the break up and collapse of the Ottoman Empire and severed the ties of Turkey with the Islamic world for a long time. Today Kemalist nationalists (ulusalcılar) are serving the same goal in the same way by bringing ethnical and sectarian sensibilities into agenda somehow. From one side Sunni majority are silenced due to the fear of recession and reactionism and on the other side Alevis are being put in front of them as a different identity.” (Zaman, 23.01.2007)
Here, what is noteworthy is that he has chosen to come up with Islamism and the power of Islam in Ottoman Empire's multiculturalism as an argument against Kemalist Turkish nationalism. If we remember the origins of different narratives of Turkish nation that are outlined in the Chapter 2, we see three main ideologies behind existing Turkish nationalism: Islamism, Ottomanism and Turkism. Unal refers to the Ottoman times, but he underlines the place of Islam and relations with the Islamic world. Viewed in the passage, opposing the Kemalist secular discourse, the threat of collapse in current day Turkey is defined in the context of weakening the power of Islam as the results of secularist policies in domestic and foreign relations. These different images of Turkey based on different world views present contested doctrines in their challenge with collective historical experience and formation of post-Kemalist nationalism.

3.1.4. The Discursive Construction of the Common Political Present and Future: The Banalisation of the Extreme Right and Violence

For living in a peaceful and pluralist society, the discourse of democracy is suggested by Hrant Dink as a condition for building mutual understanding and confidence between Armenians and Turks in Turkey. However, Dink's death entailed a milestone in the Turkish and Armenian relations. Rhetorical strategy in the media strengthened the Otherness by connecting the strategies of predication (Tekin 2008) to the historical images of the sides still alive in their imaginations. Attaching positive values to the Self and negative values to the Other played a crucial role in the construction of identities and banalisation of hatred.

In the next example from the Zaman newspaper (22.01.2007), after the assassination of Dink, Armenian columnist Etyem Mahcupyan used a pessimist discourse to live in the future together in using the expression of 'not holding the hand of other Turk':
“We will not hold the hand of the other Turk that cannot tolerate Hrant and cannot even stand his existence, and reaching out to the murderer. We are not in the situation of understanding him. They say the murderer is not mature yet. If it was Hrant, he would say: ‘That’s it. Are Turks mature?’ We are already aware of the fact that we live in a society whose maturation has been hindered, but maybe it is time to ask this question: Is this a society ‘whose age is lessened’ for the actions that turn its own identity problem into acts of violence towards the other and ritualise it?’"

In Mahcupyan’s article, ‘we’ identifies Armenians and Turkishness is expressed as the ‘other’ of Armenian identity. The negative predication indicates that the Turkish Other in this discourse is derogated. On the debate of reducing murderer Ogun Samast’s age, he paid attention to strategy of avoidance from responsibility by a topos of immaturity of the nation and meant that it was a deliberate action utilizing it for the acts of violence. A few days later, in the same newspaper (Zaman 25.01.2007), a response was given by Alev Alatlı to Mahcupyan’s statements associated with the relations between Armenians and Turks and their common future:

“They must be made to understand that what Mahcupyan call ‘boasting’ is in fact ‘dignity’ of Turks, what they call ‘hostility’ is ‘heroism’, what they call ‘immaturity’ is humbleness. As Turks, we are also wondering which Armenian will determine our relationships for tomorrow: Is it the Armenian who lost his heart with his face turned towards to the European diaspora, or the Armenian whose face turned towards ‘his life comrades’, with his heart beating in his place? Is it the Armenian who ritualises his own identity problem by turning it into an act of violence/ humiliation/ insult towards the other/Turks and relies on the support of Europe to continue his attitude, or the Armenian who will take no offence from the ‘change’ that will be the undoing of his memory related to ‘Turks’?”

In Alatlı's sentences, the discourse of 'disloyalty' of Mancupyan, namely Armenians of Turkey, is underlined. In two opposing discourses what is apparently seen is the strategy of blaming others. Members of groups tend to think of themselves with in-group favouritism and portray the nation as better than the other nations (Tekin 2008, p.739). In this context, positive
Self presentation manifests itself as references on the Turks with positive lexical such as ‘dignity’, 'heroism' and 'humbleness'. Contrary to that, negative representation of Armenians constructs differences and Armenian identity as the out-group. Discursive construction of Other is fed by historical xenophobic stereotypes. Contested memories and the role of these memories in problematic identity constructions and ‘Other’ imaginations demonstrate the obstacles for linguistic construction of collective political future.

In the leftist newspaper Radikal, Ahmed Gokcen (18.02.2007) goes beyond the debates of being Armenian or Turk and the debates of being conservative or not, he stresses on the culture of justification of any violence in Turkey. He uses the neologies to identify new types of nationalism by uniting two words as 'kimlik+keş'; kahra(man)yak; şiddet+perest:

“However we, who have some ‘Mediterranean’, some ‘Eastern’ characteristics, had prepared our cultural infrastructure hundreds of years ago to impose violence anytime, anywhere. Because our blood flowed ‘hot’, we were ‘excited’, we were ‘emotional’, we were ‘larky’ and we had countless ‘sensibilities’... We, getting jealous of violence of the neighbour, are watching with great admiration the appearance of violence in front of us with as an esteemed gentleman/lady in black jackets... Violence, which is becoming legalised thanks to our admiration today, are causing ‘identityaddicts’, ‘heromaniaxs’ and ‘violencephilias’ to come into existence not only from the nationalist conservative side, but also from all sides living in Turkey. Consoling words of yesterday such as ‘It is your father. It is normal that he beats’ are today replaced by words such as ‘He is the cop he beats’, ‘He is your husband he beats’, ‘He beats because he has problems’, which are not consoling at all.”

In this text, the group of ‘we’ refers to the Turks. ‘Mediterranean’ and ‘Eastern’ identical descriptions are used for addressing typical Turkish national character which implies cultural features such as being hot-blooded, excited, emotional and sensible. This imagination of the Turkish nation urges to naturalization and banalisation of the violence. Gokcen criticises
glorification and normalisation of violence through the power relations from the family level to the state level. Without targeting any specific group of people, he notes everybody is responsible for reproduction of this violence culture in Turkey.

Hasan Bulent Kahraman (Radikal 28.01.2007) contributes the debate of violence culture in Turkey, linking its roots in the state culture and power relations. He uses the term of fascism for explaining the case of Hrant Dink, a view not often expressed in Turkish media. In his discourse, the construction of ethnic Turkish nationalism and its engagement with religion constitutes the parameters of fascism. Crucially, the state itself creates it and from state discourse to everyday discourse, ‘the banality of evil’ spreads and reproduces fascism: “Famous definition of Arendt is now known to everyone: ‘the banality of evil’. Hrant is just the victim of this!” Kahraman widens his argument in noting that the state is directly a tool of violence in Turkey and society is closely engaged with fascism. He underlines an intense and interactive relationship between elements on which fascism sits and rules:

'If we say that women beaten at home, students exposed to violence by their teachers at school, civil servants experiencing domination of their chiefs are direct addressees of violence, we will say that no one in Turkey will be excluded from violence. Let us widen it in an abstract plan: Individuals without social security, a claimant who cannot take his right at court, a citizen who cannot transmit his political view to the parliament, are those who are exposed to secret types of violence. Let us look at this from a different orbit: Those who can't talk in their mother language, those who are forced to keep their cultures under pressure, those who are deprived of the expression of their identities.”

Here, Hasan Bulent Kahraman’s definition of violence addresses its social, economical and cultural dimensions. He portrays it as a matter of domination that privileges certain expression of identities. That is to say, certain power relations from the family to the state reproduce violence and normalisation of
violence in everyday relationships of individuals. His remarks on social security and representation of views in the national parliament are quite crucial, if one considers the election threshold is ten per cent to have a seat in Ankara and that almost half of the votes are not represented in parliament. The remainder of the votes are shared among the ruling and opposition parties, but the government has the majority of seats that dysfunctions the opposition. As Kahraman expressed, there are different forms of violence towards the minorities who are disadvantaged in the power circle. Although every individual is constitutionally accepted as Turk, different practices and perspectives on identity politics brought about long-lasting problems in Turkey. Some are accepted as less ‘Turk’ than others. Some social, economical and cultural rights of minorities, particularly non-Muslim citizens' are neglected. However, the case of Hrant Dink indicates that Turkey is far from the protection of the fundamental human rights of minorities as the freedom of expression and the right to life. Regarding these identity politics, Cirakman (2011) argued that Turkish self-image has had a transition from secular and/or civic to ethnic nationalist in the means of politicisation of Turkishness.

Throughout the section, the discourse analysis shows that there are tangled up conceptions and use of language for identification of non-Muslims in Turkey, whether or not they belong to the Turkish nation. The difference in multiple narrations of nation, selective and ideological reading on common history are indicated as sources of current understandings and definitions of the others of the nation-state. More noteworthy, politicisation and instrumentalism of the themes used for othering do not get to the roots of the problems. Linguistic expressions of othering minority identities in saying ‘Armenian offspring’ or implying ‘she is a member of a Christian sect’ are employed for enervating opponent groups. Highly common in contested narratives, blaming others strategy hides the depth of the problem, normalises, turns the criminals into the heroes and reconstructs the political
atmosphere for racism and hatred crimes.

The situation of human rights, especially with regard to political freedom, ethnic and religious minorities remains an issue of great concern that may undermine Turkey’s democracy discourse. In this context, the year of 2007 is a crucial milestone in the last decade due to the assassination of Hrant Dink and for reviewing the place of non-Muslim identity in post-Kemalist Turkish nation-state discourse. 2007 is also clamorous, compelling and momentous for examining the pro-secular and Islamist identities of Turkey during the national tension of presidential and general elections. The following part of the chapter examines the fault lines among the divided Muslim majority of Turkey through the case study. It observes the different discourses on the problems of Islam’s place in Kemalist nation-state building and it reveals the anxiety of Republican population that internalises secularism and does not want to be forced to change its secular way of life. This comparative perspective helps to overcome dogmatic, naturalised and imposing understanding of nationalist perspectives, lifestyles and political polarisations. It is believed that uncovering these multiple, contested conceptions of the nation and problematic identity politics opens a negotiation platform for an alternative way of searching a practice of living together with a new perspective of social contract and diversity management.

3.2. The Case of the Presidential Elections of Turkey in 2007: Secularism and Islam in Turkish Nation-State Identity

In this section, Secularist-Islamist nationalist polarisation will be analysed in the case of the Presidential elections of Turkey in 2007. It can be argued that every election resulted with the victory of the AKP used to legitimatise the power of government in questioning Kemalist tradition and reconstructing the post-Kemalist nation-state identity on a non-securitisation of Islamic identity. Arguing as being representative of the majority of Turkey, the AKP
has managed to change the way of doing some ‘national habits’ which have never been touched by any other previous governments. Topics such as abandoning the celebration of the Commemoration of Ataturk, Youth and Sports Day in the stadiums on 19 May which is the symbol of the start of National Independence War; or giving more importance to the commemoration of Sultan Abdulhamid rather than Ataturk in the parliamentarian agenda. Moreover, using democracy discourse for emancipation of religious ‘freedoms’ in order to live in an Islamic way in every aspect of social life, and using governmental support, brought about a deep polarisation in the terms of secularism debates in the 2000s in Turkey. In particular, stressing on secularism and defence of Republican values raised a sharp contradiction of Islamists-Rebuplicanists in the society in 2007.

With the influences of this circumstance and tension, a nationwide political crisis was provoked by secularists and the army when Turkey’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul was nominated as presidential candidate by the ruling the AKP in April 2007. As a response, the e-memorandum on the website of the military was published to warn that it would intervene if secularism was put at risk. The main opposition party, the CHP brought the issue of the presidential election to the Turkish Constitutional Court, arguing that the first round of voting in parliament was invalid on procedural grounds. This caused serious unrest among the AKP followers. Society was fragmented to the camps. Kemalist secularist masses with the discourse of protecting the Republican state system organised mass demonstrations against the AKP’s hidden agenda to islamise Turkey (Hojelid 2010, p.468). In opposition to that, the AKP and Islamists complained about the non-pluralist and illiberal form of secularism and state-society relationship that discriminated against religious people and inhibited religious freedom (ibid. p.476). The gap between the incumbents and the CHP has continued to widen (Ciddi 2008 p.438) before the election of July 2007 which affected the results. The Republican Party came in second with 20.8 per cent of the vote, trailing
behind the AKP’s 46.5 per cent which represented a slight increase in the vote share of the CHP from 2002 (19.4 per cent) and a large increase for the AKP (34.4 per cent in 2002). It shows that the political polarisations in Turkey are used for maximising the political profit from the turmoil by sharpening the political party affiliation. What is missing and forgotten in this political calculation is that it is not a win-win game. Politicisation of identities jeopardises the mutual respect and confidence among people. Both the ways of dealing with assertive secularist practices and religious pressure on people are threatening and ominous; whereas the main point is guaranteeing the pluralism in the society. This section of the chapter demonstrates how Turkish media represents this power struggle between secularist and Islamist circles through this selected historical political process in order to see how they imagine Turkey and the Turkish nation in the terms of religion and secularism.

3.2.1. On Understanding of the Nation and National Identity: Which Turkey?
The events in 2007 showed that the secularisation project of the Kemalist elites reached to the level of the broad masses and had a strong influence on Turkish society in terms of modernisation. According to Merve Kavakçı Islam’s point of view (2010, p.41), the Kemalist reforms as ‘forced modernisation’ caused a fragmentation of society in Turkey into two camps: one modern Turkey and the other Turks who lived, thought, and dressed differently. In the case of dressing, her volume on ‘headscarf politics in Turkey’ discovers the linkage between politics, a woman’s body, and clothing. She argues that the Kemalists’ strict anti-veil politics created ‘a war waged by women against women’ (ibid. p.42). Kemalist women perceive the black veil as embarrassing for a modern image of Turkey in the eyes of other nations (ibid. p.44), which is seen humiliating or undermining the way of life of the ‘other Turkey’. It is also evidence of how the top-down invention of a
tradition expanded to the masses and was internalised. If one accepts that women in particular are the main reproducers of the nation biologically, culturally and symbolically (Yuval-Davis 1993), the importance of divided perceptions on ‘womanhood’ in Turkey can be well understood.

Alev Cinar’s *Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time* (2005) provides an even deeper account of Turkey’s revolutionist break from the Ottoman-Islamic way of living with a specific focus on the concepts of ‘clothing the national body’ and the appearance of women in public places. Through the regulation of clothing, the categorising of gender, class, status, and religion, a public-private distinction was operating through different interventions upon the body. Clothing is one of the most effective signs for recognition and differentiation (ibid 2005, p.55) that determines these identity categories, most crucially the national identity. States and nations are represented by their people in the body of man and woman. Thus as it is noted by Cinar (2005, p.53), ‘the body is metaphorically employed not only as a symbol of the nation and its boundaries, but also as a material space where the boundaries of the public and the private are drawn toward the construction of the national public subject’.

In other words, the politics of body serve to form a sense of belong to a nation. In the case of Turkey, unveiling the female body during the formative years of the Republic constituted the public realm as a secular domain. This gendering intervention legitimated with the rhetoric of liberation of the body/nation (ibid. p.62) from the Islamic covering, closing or hiding culture. The state encouraged the visibility of women representatives in various jobs such as pilots, lawyers, and politicians, wearing elegant European dresses in the public sphere and in the media as national signifiers of western-oriented secular modernity. By this way, Turkish woman had a distinctive body, face, and voice. This emancipation of the female body generated a new order of power relations and made the secularists’ elite circles advantaged groups in
the centre. The state elites’ particular interpretation of modernity sneaked into the state’s citizenship regime (Donmez and Enneli 2011, p.1) as an inclusion/exclusion mechanism for managing society. Beyond the constitutional discourse, it functioned to gain privileged positions for secularist Kemalist identities and pushed others, namely conservative Islamic identities, into a secondary position. This point elucidates the origins of the power struggle in Turkey's last decade. Imagining Turkey as secular or Islamic is not just a matter of state regime, but also a matter of life style that determines how the Turks want to live.

In the last decade, the argument that AKP’s islamisation of the country and state institutions is mostly supported by pro-secularist Cumhuriyet’s news reports with the numerous examples of negative connotations of political continuation driven by the ruling party. For instance, a report titled ‘the headscarf ban is not operational’ noted that ‘Hacer Yıldırım, who is working as a teacher in the Narlı town of Lacin a sub-province of Corum, enters the classroom wearing a headscarf since the AKP came into power’ (Cumhuriyet, 27.10.2005). These kinds of news were used for verifying their argumentation of what changed by the AKP. In another example, the ban on alcohol was regarded as an attack on ‘the secular and democratic Republic, fundamental rights and freedoms’. It was reported that the ban on alcohol in Lake Mogan and Goksu Park of Ankara met with a strong reaction. Moreover, it was identified in negative connotations by using the words of ‘a disgrace for the capital’ (Cumhuriyet, 20.10.2005). Similarly, in a report titled ‘Waiting for God for Help’, the argumentative scheme which was used as a strategy of transformation indicated a change in the AKP period:

“Are we in the modern times? The municipalities of AKP who are busy with the alcohol ban disregarding human health... Diarrhoea continues in Malatya... The situation is clear... Applicants to the hospital have reached eight thousand. The number of infected people has reached to forty thousand...” (Cumhuriyet 03.12.2005)
The adverbial expression of ‘the modern times’ in the question is employed for establishing an oppositional discourse to the government's local policies, which argues AKP is not doing the necessities of modern life, instead it is taking the society to the premodern times. The argument is supported by illustrations of AKP’s alcohol, ignorance of the public’s health and raising an epidemic in Malatya. A common activity in negative predication is to compare and contrast the positive traits with the negative traits. The pro-secular media discourse exhibit a resistance against the transformation driven by the pro-Islamist AKP. With the metaphor of ‘TRT, AKP’s farm’ (Cumhuriyet, 08.06.2006), it was claimed that the state-owned television and radio institution, the TRT turned into the media organ of the AKP with their programmes propagandising the sharia. The ‘farm’ in the lexical structure of description of TRT addresses to a relationship between the word and some aspects of the material world (Fowler 1991, p.81), where the AKP does what it wants as it owns this state institution.

In the debate of Islam and modernism, in Hurriyet, Ozdemir Ince writes an article entitled: ‘Headscarf and Semiology’ (24.08.2007) which claims using Islamic symbols in the public space such as in the academia or hospital does not indicate the interdependence of modern public and private life in a society, but shows the ‘fragmented individual’ and Islamic society:

“The headscarf should not be conceived as a ‘modern privy’ as Nilufer Gole is trying to sell. The headscarf of a woman who uses the computer and microscope, who works as a doctor or a CEO, does not represent a modern and secular individual or society but signifies a fragmented individual and a totalitarian Islamic community which uses technology.”

Given that content, the last passage also serves to see how some ideological groups perceive the relationship between Islam and modernism in terms of science and secularism. Frequently visible in the articles are the signs that belief in religion and modernity cannot operate together. In this orientalistic
approach, scientific and religious identity causes a fragmented body of a nation. This perspective can be accepted as a Kemalist positivist approach as well. Moreover, Ince (Hurriyet, 26.08.2007) underlines the objections of stressing on Muslimhood of the population: “Nobody is even aware that sentences beginning with ‘a country in which 99 per cent of the population is Muslim as in Turkey’ are a violation to secularism and killing secularism.” In this anthropomorphic presentation of secularism, it is clear that Islam is seen as a direct ‘threat’ to the Republican secular system by Kemalists. In April 2007, this topos of threat was widely used in the pro-secular discourse of newspaper Cumhuriyet. Its columnist Erdal Atabek described this threat as Turkey’s transformation and separation:

“Turkey is being transformed to two separate countries: ‘Secular, independent Republic of Ataturk’ and ‘religion axial moderate Islamic republic’. Secular, independent Republic of Ataturk is clearly in danger. It is now clear that Turkey is aware of the danger.” (Cumhuriyet 23.04.07)

Atabek warns against heteronomy in using the words of ‘two separate countries’ with a comparison. Positive Self presentation is a remarkable strategy in making a selective use of lexical and adjectives such as 'independent' character of the ‘founding generation’ (Wodak et. al 2006, p.41) and M.Kemal Ataturk. In addition, there is a negative connotation of political continuation in the state-religion relations. The warning against the loss of national autonomy and secularism is emphasized with the topos of danger, which demonstrates a resistance to Islamic transformation of Turkey. In this example, 'Turkey' appears as a metonymy, first it implies the country, then in the last sentence it refers to the nation or the people. Moreover, 'Republic of Ataturk' is a synecdoche of the state, 'Turkey'. These examples of language use show that the meanings of the state and the nation overlap in the discourses. Thus, the pro-secular circles interpret the recent changes in the state discourse as the threat to their identities and nation. Ersin Kalaycioglu (2007) explains how this threat is perceived by some circles, particularly by ‘young officers of the army’: 'These people do not only consider their
lifestyle under threat, but that their lives are also under threat. They are afraid that those without headscarves will be attacked with acid and hanged as in Iran.' The point made by the example of Iran is highly important to see how some groups have internalised secular system and ways of life in Turkey. It is therefore the pro-secularist discontentment is more than a resistance to a regime change, but a deeply rooted fear of death.

In this context, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (Radikal, 14.04.2007) stated that the political regime had never been in more danger since the foundation of the Republic and added:

"However, there are three important facts that these circles need to be aware of: First bringing the theocratic state – whether it is moderate or radical – and democracy is an approaching violation to history and science. Second, it is inevitable that the moderate Islam will quickly turn into radical Islam. Third, the Republic of Turkey made her choice of regime 84 years ago with the foundation of the Republic. This regime is an enlightened modern regime bound to the principles and revolutions of Ataturk and the nationalism of Ataturk based on a secular, democratic and social state of law."

In this speech of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, three aspects of ‘critique’ (Wodak 2006, p.8-9) can be examined in the search of specific characteristics of the Turkish case. ‘Text imminent critique’ uncovers contradictions in different discourses of Turkish nationalism, namely Kemalist nationalism and Islamist nationalism. ‘Socio-diagnostic critique’ explores the functions of discursive practices in aiming persuasion or resistance. The emphasis on positive characteristics of secular regime such as being enlightened, modern and democratic intends to maintain Kemalist nation-state identity and resist to an Islamic transformation. Furthermore, ‘retrospective critique’ reveals how a narrative of the collective past plays a role in the ways of dealing with its consequences and effects. The stress on ‘Turkey made her choice in 84 years ago with Kemalist principles and revolutions’ illustrates the present
way of dealing with Turkish history and the pro-secular perspective on present problems.

*Radikal* also gave place to opinions on the side of the government. Abdullah Gul commented on the concerns of the President: "I am not fully aware of what Mr. President said but the Turkish people do not believe that. On the contrary, it is not only Turkey but also foreigners trust Turkey today." *Zaman*’s (14.04.2007) report took the line of supporting Gul’s statement that noted Turkish people did not agree with Sezer’s ideas on the regime. According to *Zaman*, President Sezer’s statement given one month before the end of his term had been met with strong reactions. Sezer described democratisation as a threat and claimed that the regime is in danger, but he could not put forward tangible evidence. 'Most of the people' did not share Sezer’s views. This news coverage demonstrates the AKP government's claim that they represent the majority of the Turkish people. They claim that Turkey governed by a Kemalist elitist minority who were not aware of the Turkish people’s demands and sentiments. Hence, the AKP government and new elite in-state bureaucracy aim to change the old image of Turkey and offer to do things in their own way.

Although there was a rising tension on the side of Kemalist circles against Islamisation, the members of the AKP opted to use the concept of conservatism. Consistently and insistently they were saying that they were not Islamists but conservative democrats. Therefore, liberal and some leftist circles were supporting the changes driven by the government. On the other side, the opposition around the CHP produced the discourse of Islam was coming. Using the terms ‘threat’ and ‘anti-revolution’ caused politicisation of Islamic identity and its holders, including those who never intended, even thought about opposing the state's regime and secularism. While describing the turban as an ideological weapon of political Islam, the masses with any kind of ordinary headscarf were pushed towards the polarisation discourse
that took Turkey to an early general election decision driven by the Presidential election crisis.

3.2.2. Being the President of Turkish Republic: Who Should Represent the Turkish Nation?

President of the Turkish Great National Assembly, Bulent Arınc, stated (Hurriyet, 14.04.2007) that “We will elect a religious president” and harshly reacted to President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s statement of “The political regime has never been in more danger since the foundation of the Republic.”: “It is not the regime that is in danger but the power of the status quoists that is in danger. This is a bitter and relentless claim.” In this expression, there is a presupposition claiming the Republican system created the status quo of its advantaged and disadvantaged groups in construction of power relations. Arınc’s sentences represent the views of Islamists who think the Kemalist nation-state system requires a change in existing power relations. The AKP transforms the nature of central administration and bureaucracy by bringing the voices of the religious masses to Ankara. Zaman (22.04.2007) illustrated this resistance to change in the context of President Sezer’s attempt to veto power. Emine Dolmaci claimed that Sezer’s definition of the President was ‘a shield to state, a barrier to action’. She compared Sezer with Kenan Evren who was the President of Turkey at the time of the 1980 military coup: "Sezer who has vetoed fifty-nine laws during his four years with the AKP government, double the amount achieved during the coup when President Kenan Evren vetoed twenty-six laws." Comparing the negative aspect of the past with Sezer’s present acts also portrays the opinions of people who think the opposition parties are preventing AKP’s attempt to consolidate democracy.

What kind of President should represent Turkey? Author Ayla Kutlu answered this question for Cumhuriyet (30.01.2007). She expressed her
belief that the first six articles of the Constitution defining “the form of the state, the characteristics of the Republic, unity of the state, official language, flag, national anthem and capital and irrevocable provisions, fundamental objectives and duties of the state, sovereignty” simultaneously defined the beliefs, philosophical thought system and protective notion of the President of the Republic of Turkey. Kutlu noted regarding the concerns about the spouse of a President who is wearing a headscarf as a role model to women: “The spouse of the President should at least have a modern identity.” This expression demonstrates the Kemalist understanding of modernity and its links with the nation’s secularist identity; therefore the wife of the President, as the female face of Turkey, should have a modern appearance.

Cuneyt Ulsever (Hurriyet, 26.08.07) transcended the symbolic power of the headscarf and its usage in the public area with a specific focus on how social policies could influence the other ways of life and how Islamic dress might be politicised and used for putting pressure on the sameness of some citizens and the differentiation of others:

“While social policies determined how to behave, dress and eat, they also determine how we think, whether we are aware of it or not. The dominant life style gradually affects the ‘other’. For example a lady who basically covers her head with a headscarf may begin to use turban just because of the interrogative looks she receives. The National Vision, which thinks that it is seizing control of the state by electing Abdullah Gul as President, may further increase the social imposition in this term.”

Ulsever's text is useful to tie the nationalist discourse and power. If a certain discourse becomes dominant, it has the power of control people's ways of thinking and behaving. As noted in previous chapters, nationalism is a way of seeing, thinking and structuring the world we live in, thus it is much more than a political doctrine (Mihelj 2011, p.17). The social world fundamentally divided and structured along power relations and perspective differences. There are different national imaginations and nationalist visions of the world and for achieving legitimacy these perspectives would compete for acting as
a representative of the nation. Each group may privilege their own perspective of what the nation is physically, culturally and historically (Skey 2011, p.12). By the example of the headscarf issue, Ulsever expressed the anxiety of the secularist circles and their struggle to secure a sense of Self and maintain a knowable and manageable sense of identity and community in response to the social and political transformations due to the risk of Islamic imposition.

3.2.3. The Republican Demonstrations in Turkish Media

This section articulates that there are different interpretations of Turkish nationhood and nation-state identity. In the articles, how in-group and out-group presentations are constructed by using the words of ‘we’ and ‘you’ show different identifications in Turkish society. In addition, the analysis of mood structure (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, p.83) of the comments serves to understand the struggle for the power between the pro-secularists and Islamists during the Republican meetings in 2007. Moreover, the examples highlight interference of concepts of 'nation' and 'state' in the Turkish case. For instance, Cumhuriyet (14.04.2007, p.1) underlined the significance of the secular Republican regime and the Islamist 'danger' towards the 'Republic of Turkey':

“The Republic of Turkey, for the first time in its history, is in such great danger. Hundreds of thousands of people meet in Ankara Tandogan square to manifest that the Republic is not without ownership. We are aware of the danger.”

This expression implies that the pro-secularist community imagines 'we' as the guardians of the Republican system and rhetorically its owners. On this context, during the spring of 2007 Cumhuriyet newspaper called people to the squares of the country for the demonstrations against the AKP government and its 'Islamic' policies. Mustafa Balbay (Cumhuriyet, 30.04.07) stressed the co-responsibility of everyone in Anatolia to protect the
modernity of the country, secular regime of the state and the unity of the nation:

“We are in a time in which Ataturk’s statement ’If the issue is country, the rest are details’ fits perfectly. At this point, it is not about the left-right, the military-civil, but just Turkey. Everybody willing to preserve the national unity, secular structure and modernity of Turkey should take part. In this context, the left-right political circles, the NGOs originated in Anatolia, the professional chambers, the military, civilians, everybody has a duty. Tandogan-Caglayan is the manifestation of this responsibility.”

In contrast to the pro-secularist Cumhuriyet’s discourse, Vahap Coskun (Zaman, 14.04.2007) used a different rhetorical perspective towards the Republican demonstrations, in noting ‘Please admit that you are having difficulty in absorbing democracy.’ He added that there was rising tension in the society for the Presidency in such a central position in the system, made by others who consider themselves to be 'the real owners of the state and the landlord of the people'.

According to Radikal's coverage, the participants at the meetings, most of who were coming from other cities, chanted the slogans: “We are not pro-coup; we are revolutionist”, “We do not want an Imam in Cankaya”, “Cankaya is secular and will remain so”. The crowd objected to Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s ascension to the Presidency and targeted the USA: “Damn American imperialism!” Radikal reported that Ataturkist Ideas Organisation vice Director Nur Serter said: "Turkey says ‘stop’ to those who treat the democracy as a tool and who seek alliance with the peshmarga camps. We are nationalist, Kemalist and patriots. We are the enlightened future of Turkey, the real children of the country and follow in the footsteps of our Ataturk.” This speech reflects the mentality of the Kemalist nationalism. Kemalists’ definition of ‘we’ is an example of positive Self presentation, which is seen in the lexical units as ‘enlightened future’ and ‘real children of the country’. The hidden meaning in Serter’s speech is
participants of these meetings think that democracy is not the real destination for the government; but it is a vehicle to arrive at the other intended destination. In this text, combination of propositions supplies a typical narrative of Kemalist nationalists who argue that the AKP has an agenda of Islamisation Turkey. This instance implicitly constructs sameness within the group and cannot avoid the usage of ‘we’ meaning ‘the Turks’ but ‘Kemalists’. The statements are used as an important device to express the views that Kemalists do not want a person with an Islamists past in Cankaya, where the house of Ataturk and Republican system is symbolised. This discourse aims to promote a certain, secular image of Turkey. Here, Kemalist self-identification as ‘the real children of the country’, the expression of Islamist critic on Kemalist mentality in the previous example as ‘the real owners of the state and the landlord of the people’ and ‘the real child of Anatolia’ in the case of Hrant Dink point a repetition and constitute an intertextuality.

By referencing Nur Serter in lexemes with semantic components constructing difference and exclusion, Zaman (17.04.2007) establishes a different narrative on the meetings associated with non-Muslimhood and anti-headscarf discourse. It is claimed that Serter is a member of a sect who believe they have encountered the spirit of Jesus. This argumentation employs a trivialisation strategy that has the function of degrading Republican protests. Zaman reminded that Nur Serter established persuasion chambers in the university against the headscarf protests when she was the vice rector of Istanbul University. What people know or how people look

31 The headscarf was banned in 1987 in the Turkish universities. When Turkish Army compelled Erbakan government to implement the ban without exception in 1997, some professors and teachers tried to persuade female university students in ‘persuasion rooms’ to take their headscarves off. This caused the spread of headscarf demonstrations in the country. See more: Ismail Guven (2010) Globalisation, Political Islam and the headscarf in education, with special reference to the Turkish educational system, Comparative Education, 46:3, 377-390; Amélie Barras (2009) A rights-based discourse to contest the boundaries of state secularism? The case of the headscarf bans in France and Turkey, Democratization, 16:6, 1237-1260; Evren Celik Wiltse (2008) The Gordian Knot of Turkish Politics: Regulating
at the experiences and struggles in the past is based on a selective reading of the history (Inthorn 2007), but this determines present struggles to secure their future as how they want to live it on their ways of life and perspectives of world. Reminding to readers her role in the headscarf protests and labelling her with a membership of the sect, construct a discourse of 'they are not like us' and build an opponent discourse against the secularist protesters. What is forgotten here is people who call themselves as secularist in Turkey are the members of Muslim majority in Turkey. What divides Muslims are the ways they want to live their life and beliefs.

_Zaman_ (14.04.2007) used massive negative associations and connotations to describe the participants of the pro-secularist meetings: “Ataturkist Ideas Organisation members are uncomfortable at being called pro-coup.” Linking the AIO with the military coup was also supported by a visual means of realisation, a photograph showing one of the banners in the meeting read: “The laws of the military intervention shall be in effect.” _Zaman_ argued that the leftist, revolutionist groups -according to Islamists these are non-religious groups- organised the demonstrations: “The only right-wing to attend the meeting was Yasar Okuyan”. This example corresponded with a trivialisation strategy in presentation of the meetings. More noteworthy, was that the modality of _Zaman_ appears in a first page report by just giving a small detail from the meeting of thousands of people in Tandogan. Without noting why this event was organised or what its the agenda and content was, demonstrations were directly connected with the AIO with negative other representations: “Tuncay Ozkan’s provocation angered even the AIO. Ozkan’s speech, even if he was not in the programme, caused chaos.” With limited knowledge and making personal references to the leftist, revolutionist or pro-coup masses, this coverage let different readings on the events and

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what was actually going on in the country. In this context, Radikal’s (15.04.2007) interpretation on the meetings was entitled ‘important warning for Erdogan’ by giving details of the aims and discourses of the participants.

As is seen in these examples, Islamist and Kemalist discourses construct, deconstruct and reform each other. Beyond the Islamists-Secularist polarisation, Baskın Oran (Radikal, 20.05.07) noted that the other participants in the meetings defended the third way in the discourse of ‘neither the patten (medieval shoe) nor the army boots’. According to his observation, one of the most important slogans of the republican meetings was anti-imperialism. What were common and easy to observe in these meetings were the direct and indirect forms of marginalisation of non-Muslims and the West:

“They aim to found the Pontus, they will turn Fener into Vatican, and they divide us by using missionaries, Armenians demand land, transsexuals are everywhere, etc. More direct ones are: The EU will divide Turkey. One of most common banners is: ‘Neither the USA nor the EU’... Of course there are those in the meetings who say ‘neither the patten (medieval shoe) nor the army boots’. But the majority of those say: ‘If we are losing secularism, our Army will be our crown’.”

3.2.4. Turkish Media Coverage on the Results of 2007 National Elections

AKP has achieved a rare success of having 46.5 per cent in the general elections of 2007 held under the tension of the discussion on the Presidency and the memorandum. Radikal’s (23.07.2007) comment on the results was ‘the memorandum of the people’. It was supported by the quotation from Erdogan’s speech: Upon the question ‘Did Mr. Gul’s ineligibility affect the result?’ Erdogan replied: ‘Of course. People reacted both to the Constitutional Court and the barriers on the way of Mr. Gul.’

Mahfi Egilmez (Radikal 23.07.2007) demonstrated the main reason for the
AKP’s success was the economic performance following the economic crisis: the decrease in inflation, sustainable growth, decrease in budget deficit, decrease in debt burden and tolerable current deficit rate and direct foreign investment in Turkey all contributed greatly to AKP. In opposition, Emre Kongar (Cumhuriyet, 30.07.2007) argued that it was surprising that the AKP could not get more votes; only reaching 46.6 per cent due to the AKP using both religion and money as election tactics and also the fact that it had these powers behind it: “international capital, national capital, the USA, the EU, international media, national media, central bureaucracy, municipalities, religious communities, some of the minorities, Northern Iraq Kurd Administration, Iraq’s Kurdish origin Head of State, Greece, Cyprus Greek Administration.”

In addition, Cumhuriyet (24.07.2007) reported that AKP had increased its votes mostly in Eastern and South-eastern regions. AKP received 60 per cent of the votes in the region and this was mainly due to the fact that AKP resisted the Army’s operations in Northern Iraq before the elections and thereby gained the support of the people. Another reason was that the community leaders of the region – where the religious communities are quite strong – steered their followers towards AKP which meant that illiterate voters could not be organised to vote for the independent deputies of DTP. This information argues that the general increase in AKP’s votes was based on the Kurdish people’s support in Eastern and South-eastern regions of Turkey. It was a fact that the alliance of Kurdish and Islamists for reconstruction of the Kemalist nation-state identity has been a crucial factor in reconfiguration of power relations during the last decade.

In order to challenge with the Kemalist state legacy, there was a populist support to the AKP. Some liberal and leftist writers also joined this camp for the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. Hadi Uluengin (Hurriyet 24.07.2007) wrote that it was a civil victory against the militarist, secularist,
and old Kemalist paradigm. The newest paradigm was born on July 22. Mehmet Barlas (Hurriyet 28.07.2007) supported this argument in noting the elections of 2007 changed the power relations in Turkey. The centre, the power and the cities were shared by the both urban and rural populations. Cengiz Candar (Hurriyet 24.07.2007) declared that the election result was a glory of democracy. He added that this made him happy to be a part of this country and nation. Bekir Coskun (Hurriyet, 24.07.2007) interpreted the AKP’s success and its overwhelming victory as the acknowledgment of the Turkey's changing face, which he described as the transformation of secular Republic into a moderate Islam through these elections. The high level of votes meant that the support for the AKP enabled it to realise its imagination of Turkey. From a bigger picture of the results, Haluk Sahin (Radikal 23.07.2007) noted three discourses on Turkey associated with the election results: “I have thought that this election would have three messages before we started to get the results: if the AKP reaches a majority more than 40 per cent ‘Do not touch my democracy’, if the total votes of the CHP and the MHP reach to 40 per cent ‘Do not play with my Republic’…And of course depending on the votes of the independent deputies: ‘We are here as well!’”. This demonstrates that different priorities constitute different messages and answers to what comes first for Turkey, namely, Islam, democracy, secular Republican system, equal constitutional citizenship or pluralism. It refers to the political polarisation in Turkey and constructs intra-national difference; in other words, internal sub-national differentiation between Turkish people.

**Conclusion**

This chapter showed that the national media do not only symbolize and represent the nation but also construct it by speaking for and to the nation. The media coverage of the events from 2007 demonstrated the national tension and power struggle for maintaining Turkey's Kemalist nation-state identity and challenging post-Kemalist discourse. The newspaper texts
regarding two politically and culturally important incidents for examination of Turkey's post-Kemalist identity were chosen and the data was tested based on the content, strategies used in the discursive construction of national identity and the linguistic means employed. The ideological stance of the newspapers was a determinant in the national imaginings they represented. Therefore, the presentation of the actors, the political past and present in the texts were primarily between the strategies of perpetuation and of transformation depending on the ideological, political affiliation of the newspapers.

The study confirmed that there are competing narratives of the Turkish nation. The power struggle was fundamental among the secularist and Islamist versions of Turkish imagination of the nation. During the struggle, the AKP's post-Kemalist official discourse of national identity was challenged by the discourse of Kemalist and ethno-nationalist people. Yet, in some cases both challenging discourses were presented in the same newspapers. However, the case of Hrant Dink revealed that the discourse of otherness of non-Muslims was dominant in the newspapers, which revealed its impact on popular discourses and its power in the all Turkish nationalist ideologies while Muslim identity appeared as the main component of Turkish national character. The examples confirm that being Muslim constructs a unity in Turkish people, but the ways of living it divide them. In this context, the nation-state's foundation and formation of secularism are problematic components which diversely appear in the competing narratives of the nation's history.

What is very much alive in the Kemalist imagination of the Turkish nation are the memories of the Independence War and Republican legacy of M. Kemal Ataturk. In the present, its ideologists are constructing a new independence war discourse with a strategy directed against the AKP and its transformation in Turkey's Kemalist domestic and foreign policies. It points
out that the negative aspects of the present have to be confronted and a continued fight for a change aimed at the AKP; therefore Kemalists organised Republican demonstrations and called Turkish people for a rising up. Common to all Kemalist discourse is their belief that the Republican system and their secular life is under Islamist threat. In *Cumhuriyet*, certain political continuities are portrayed in a negative way that presents the achievements of the Republican system as being in danger. In the selected texts, the fear is interwoven that Turkey could again become a ‘dark’ country by the supposed proof that reactionism has always been there, today more than ever, and, of course, it is strongest within an international alliance of internal and external enemies of the Republican system. The main strategy in the Kemalist *Cumhuriyet* newspaper underlines the threat against the secular system and the aim for maintaining the Kemalist narrative of the nation. This perpetuation strategy, which has been used several times, is the strategy also used by the columnists of the *Hurriyet* newspaper in the simultaneous emphasis on secularism. On the other hand, Islamists use the strategy of transformation and express a perception that sees these opponent movements as the resistance to change and democracy. Therefore, Zaman writers stress that Kemalist opponents seek for the status quo that perpetuates their privileged positions against ‘Muslim majority’. Islamists address that there has been a downward Kemalist pressure on their way of life since the early years of the Republican system. On the whole, it can be said that the strategy of self-victimhood and ‘we are the victims’ thesis are common in both sides, referring to ‘others’ as being very one-sided. On one side, Kemalists blame others that they have threatened the secular and modern character of the nation in expression of a concern about a possible loss of significance of Kemalist Republican structure; on the other, Islamists blame others that they have controlled their expression, Islamic ways of living and raise concerns that Kemalist nationalism ended the multicultural legacy of the Ottoman Empire; thus the Republican state feeds racism and racist event towards others which is seen in the case of Hrant Dink. Again, the victim thesis was
put forward in the different discourses as in the case of Hrant Dink. ‘Turkey is targeted’ argumentation is present in most of the texts that have been investigated. In some articles, the past experiences with Armenians are mentioned, drawn upon strategies of justification and relativisation. Liberal leftist newspaper, *Radikal* is the only one that openly named the event as fascism and criticised the national character and climate that reproduced naturalised violence. It can be said that the analysed texts from Dogan Media Group’s *Radikal* and *Hurriyet* show that these newspapers covered oscillating news reports during these events. Where it occurs in the texts, it frequently not only serves the purpose of self-representation but is also part of an aim of promoting national identification and emphasis on the difference between secularist, Islamists and liberal interpretations of Turkish nation-state identity. It can be easily identified through the analysis that there is a common problem. A critical feature of these different discourses of Turkish nationalism is their failure to promote an alternative language to live together without exclusion of any other different lifestyle or world view. They harshly compete for hegemony. Once they have the chance to get power, they use this power to oppress others. Beyond the main clash for reconstruction of Turkish nation-state identity, the most disadvantaged group seems to be the non-Muslims whose future and identification depends on highly polarised and politically divided Muslim majority. It can be said that new Turkey's identity constructs a post-secular, privileged, modern Muslim identity and builds xenophobic relationship with non-Muslims and seeks pragmatic relationship with the 'Christian' West. Thus, post-Kemalism as the new dominant nationalist discourse fails to challenge with the shortcomings of Kemalist nation-state identity and citizenship formation. Nevertheless, top-down neo-conservative social engineering reproduces and sharpens the domestic antagonisms between different discourses of nationalism in Turkey.
CHAPTER FOUR
NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY: THE CASE STUDY OF TURKEY'S KURDISH QUESTION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Introduction

This thesis argues that the last decade witnessed a political struggle on redefining Turkish nation-state identity on both national and international levels. On this preposition, the Chapter Three focused on the concept of religion and empirically showed there are competing discourses of Turkish national identity in the emergence of post-Kemalist transformation. This chapter observes how these different discourses and their power struggle for the domination reconstruct the Turkish debates on European Integration and Turkey's Euro-peanness. It is devoted to challenge the massive literature that place the country in Europe and focus on Turkey's 'possible' or 'prospective' EU membership, rather than it goes beyond the membership debate and shows discourse-historical construction of different non-European identity of Turkey by finding out how contested perspectives on the nation-state imagine Turkey, its regional and civilizational belongings. For that purpose, this part of the project reveals the national and international embedding of post-Kemalist Turkish national identity construction in analysing how Turkish media represent Kurdish question in dealing with the domestic power struggle on redefinition of Turkish nation-state identity and its relations with the EU.

4.1. Reimagining Turkey's Place in Europe

In the Republican history of Turkey, Kemalist secular nationalism became the Turkish state’s official ideology and Turkish army was the main state institution where Kemalist ideology is guarded. Being in favour of westerni-
sation and modernism, engendered Kemalist state elites cooperated with the European/Western institutions. More than four decades after its application for an association with the European Economic Community in 1959, Turkey's status as a candidate country was recognised in December 1999. Economical, political, strategic and pragmatic arguments based on an essentialist reading of Turkey's bid for EU membership dominated the Turkish debate. However, the question of whether Turkey is European and its belonging to European civilisation has continued as a centuries-old discussion about its identity (Tekin 2008).

Within the post-Cold war international politics, European integration process meant something much more related with changing power relations and reconstruction of nation-state identity in Turkey. Paradoxically, changing power relations with pro-Islamist AKP government forced Europeanist Kemalist nationalism face up to Republican history with its traditional others in the 2000s. Likewise, this chapter indicates that Kemalist nationalists joined the Eurosceptic camp due to the international developments and amendments for EU membership which empowered Islamism and Kurdish rights whilst eroded the power of the army that was the guardian of secularism and regime. Under the leadership of Deniz Baykal, the Kemalist nationalist CHP’s policy of opposition was increasingly marginalised after the year of 2002. The party members argued that their mission was protecting the unity and the secular character of the Turkish state against the threats, and the way the AKP drove Turkey towards the moderate Islamic state. The CHP transformed its discourse to fear politics that were based on securitisation with the rigid understanding of secularism and national sovereignty (Onis 2009, p.24-25). Even representatives of the party showed an ultra-nationalist tendency with a position of opposition to democratisation reforms and Europeanisation (Carkoglu and Kalaycıoglu, 2007). The CHP generally criticised the EU policy of the AKP government in terms that the AKP tried to manage the EU process alone. Concerning the membership issue, CHP officials raised the claim that
both opposition and governing parties in the parliament should participate to
decision making instead of how the AKP acted, bypassing parliament during
the EU membership process (Gulmez 2008 p.430).

According to CHP, AKP policies for the bid of EU membership jeopardised
Turkey’s national interests, driving Turkey onto a different path from full
membership. Baykal criticised some expressions in the EU Commission’s
Progress Report of 2004 saying that it was unacceptable that the negotiation
process was stated to be ‘an open-ended process’ and a suspension of the
negotiations by a qualified majority vote (ibid p.428). It can be argued that
CHP followed soft Eurosceptic policies by raising opposition with the aim of
preserving national interests while they supported Turkey’s full membership
with the pretext of being treated equally by the EU. The report welcomed
adopting 261 new laws from October to July 2004 which meant a remarkable
improvement was observed in fundamental rights and freedoms. On the other
hand, the CHP presented a reaction to the AKP’s policies with regard to the
claim that the government tended to use the EU accession process to recon-
struct the secularism principle of the state and foster spreading of an Islamic
way of life over Turkish society (Gulmez 2008, p.426).

The chapter also presents that under the AKP government Muslim national-
ists were particularly willing to go along with Turkey’s alignment with EU
requirements in terms of religious rights and normalisation of the civil-army
relations against military’s traditional omnipresent role. But, AKP’s Turkey
changed gears in consolidation democracy. From one vantage point, it was a
tactical decision which proved that Turkey had to slow its pace until the
Islamist decision-makers could get more from this alignment, as was seen in
the head scarf issue. As an important example, when the AKP attempted to
introduce a proposal for recriminalizing adultery in the new Turkish Penal

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32 Nora Fisher Onar and Meltem Müftüler-Bac , The adultery and headscarf debates in
Turkey: Fusing “EU-niversal” and “alternative” modernities?, Women’s Studies
Code which was called a ‘very worrying development’ by European officials, which forced the AKP to withdraw their proposal.

This section seeks to answer one essential question by working on Turkish media discourse: How do different Turkish political discourses portray opposing European and Turkish imaginations through the debate of Turkey’s EU integration? Turkish nationalism, its representatives in Turkish media and parliament in the 2000s can be categorised in four main discourses: Secularist Kemalist Discourse (Cumhuriyet and the CHP); Islamist Discourse (Zaman and the AKP); Ethno-nationalist Discourse (Hurriyet and the MHP) and Liberal (including left) Discourse (Radikal, the BDP and others). On this classification, a sub-categorisation is needed to manage the data and observe the different perspectives on Turkish identity. First, the pro-secular discourses ofCumhuriyet and Hurriyet which aim to preserve the Republican, Turkish identity construction is analysed under the Kemalist discourse title. Secondly, Islamist and Liberal discourses of Zaman and Radikal are observed together due to the fact they employ the strategy of transformation for reconstruction of post-Kemalist identity and citizenship. The first group represents the oppositional and challenging discourses to post-Kemalist narrative of the AKP. The second group shows the domestic alliance to destruct Kemalist nation-state identity. This distinction also lets us see the intermediate colours and shades between main discourses of Turkish nationalism.

Each of the discourses in the first group is proved to be homogeneous on the issue of national sovereignty and Euroscepticism in arguing the EU process is a ‘threat’ for national unity. But the Kemalist discourse excels in claiming secularism is endangered as well. The data additionally demonstrates that each of the discourses in the second group presents the views seeing the EU process as a chance to challenge the Kemalist state, particularly the army-state. However, Islamists give high importance on Islam and the freedom of religion in consolidation of democracy in Turkey with the support of the EU. Liberal argumentation encapsulates the demands from the EU process on a
large scale with regard to democracy and the rights of others in the nation-state. All these differences and similarities in interpretation of outcomes in Turkey’s EU integration reveal the shades of understanding being Turkish and Turkey’s place in Europe from different perspectives of Turkey. The following sections show how specific discourses in the newspapers in formulated two groups contribute to the post-Kemalist construction of Turkish nation-state identity with relation to EU integration discussions.

4.1.1. Representation of Turkey’s European Integration in the pro-Secular Media Discourse

In this section, instances from Hurriyet’s and Cumhuriyet's framing of the EU, exemplify Eurosceptic nationalist discourse in the Turkish press and how they demonstrate the process against Turkey’s national interest in terms of domestic issues. In the week of 3 October 2005, the decision of the EU was mentioned on the front pages of all newspapers. The given launch to membership negotiations was portrayed with a metaphor of journey. Nevertheless, perception and description of this journey was expressed differently based on their different ideological stands. The EU as 'them' versus Turkey as 'us' discourse was constructed in Cumhuriyet (04.10.2005, p.1), employed a negative presentation with the adjective selection such as 'challenging and open-ended': “Turkey's EU journey beginning in 1959, has taken a challenging and open-ended turn. Negotiations began... As a result, in case of entering an ‘open-ended’ process in order to see Turkey with them and to have Turkey at their hands, the EU bosses will not lose anything, but rather gain.”

This quotation can be viewed in connection to a tangible feeling of Euroscepticism. For Eurosceptics, specifically, the debates on ‘open-ended process’ and ‘privileged partnership’ of Turkey instead of full-membership in the EU, brings into being a feeling of ‘it is not a fair game for Turkey’. In this example, the syntactic choice in ‘Turkey at their hand’ has a significance by
aiming disparagement of Turkey’s status as a passive subject in the Turkey-EU relations. Metaphorically, the EU politicians and decision makers are mentioned as ‘the bosses’ that decisively contribute to the national perception of EU identity whose content is a ‘company’ seeking for maximising its profits through Turkey’s journey. This linguistic designation seems suitable in distinguishing Cumhuriyet’s leftist, Kemalist ideology which corresponds to anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism.

Anti-imperialism in Kemalist nationalist discourse can be evidenced by a look at the books of Cumhuriyet columnist Erol Manisali who strongly presents the EU process with the concept of ‘colonisation as liberation’ (2009, p.109). In his book A Process of the EU or Serves?, Manisali notes that Western imperialism aims for establishing a Moderate Islamic Republic in Turkey; neither a democracy nor a modern civilisation. He adds “on the 28 February, some of Islamist politicians who were first soldiers think that soldiers can be taken from their way with the help of the EU and the USA” (ibid. p. 104). At this point, it should be pointed out again, for Kemalist nationalists and its representatives such as the Cumhuriyet newspaper or Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), the Turkish army’s powerful position in the state is an essential fact in order to maintain its mission in protecting the regime and secularism. Therefore, Kemalists have discontents due to EU effect on the ala-turca civil-military relations offering new understanding of nation-state relations, namely a post-Kemalist one.

Therefore, analysing Kemalist nationalist discourse from Cumhuriyet’s coverage serves to see how and why Kemalists turn out to be Eurosceptic in changing power relations in Turkish politics. As has already been mentioned in the previous chapters, Kemalist nationalists imagine Turkey as a European and secular nation, but by holding a democracy discourse with regard to EU relations, pro-Islamist AKP government’s stress on the religious freedoms in Turkish public life accommodates a ‘threat’ narrative against the process. In order to have a deeper understanding of this power struggle on reconstruction
of nation-state identity and everyday life nationalism, these passages with secularism component from Cumhuriyet demonstrate narratives about Kemalist portrayal of the EU which identify the Turkish nation through certain linguistic means.

For instance, in Cumhuriyet’s front-page (04.10.2005 p.1), among the many European politicians commanded on the EU’s decision on Turkey, British Foreign Secretary J. Straw is chosen for the news report, who identified Turkey as ‘European’ in his speech. Under the title of ‘I congratulate the secular Turkey’, it was reported that Straw said Turkey was a Muslim and secular country. Turkey was a European country, which was very definite and noted there was a difficult process with Turkey. Here, the title of the news is remarkable due to the fact that it puts forward the adjective of ‘secular’ which is the privileged principle of M. K. Ataturk. Being European is discursively constructed in self-identifications of Kemalists. At a broader level, interdiscursivity can be discerned with national identity constructs whereby secularism is linked with the condition of being modern and European. This is how Kemalists define and want to see Turkey. As noted before, by the Kemalists, Europe and the West are always seen as the place of modernism, civilisation, scientific and rational thinking, all of which were Ataturk’s main targets for Turkish society. Therefore, Turkey’s bid for the EU membership corresponded with the Kemalist ideas. Emre Kongar’s excerpt assumes that European and Turkish identities do not exclude each other as long as Turkey’s democracy, secularism and social justice are protected in the national and European levels:

“Kemalism is the way of modernity, science and civilisation for Turkey; the present expression of this is ‘Democratic, secular and social law state’ written in the Constitution. As long as the European Union continues to be a Union for the realisation of this goal both in itself and in Turkey, joining of Turkey to the Union is, of course, suitable to Kemalism.” (Cumhuriyet 10.10.2005, p.3)
That is to say, Kemalists place Turkey in Europe just as if the specific principles of Ataturkism are guaranteed. Otherwise it would be a ‘betrayal’ to the inheritance of him as Dursun Atilgan warns:

“The ones who seem to undertake the discipleship of some of the members of the EU parliament are those who make expressions and suggestions such as: ‘You cannot join the EU with Kemalism’. With such behaviours: ‘Remove the photographs of Ataturk from the public offices’ exhibits that they are ready to fulfil their orders. Yes, a ‘Betrayal Side’ is at work in our Turkey. This side is in a struggle for expunging the person who wrote history from the history. However, the dynamic forces taking care of the ‘consignation’, that’s ‘Honour Side’, cannot tolerate and will not tolerate the mullah-minded ministers and their offices that are in such a betrayal.” (Cumhuriyet 13.10.2005)

In this text, Atilgan calls ‘honour side’ to fight against the ‘betrayal side’ that supports ‘You cannot be a part of the EU with Kemalism’ idea of some European parliamentarians and their attempt to erase Ataturk from the history of the nation. He points to the AKP government and describes their ministers as ‘mullah', in other words with Islamic mentality. This particular way of language use in relation to Turkey’s relations with the EU simultaneously constructs difference discourse in division of ‘we’ as Kemalists on the 'honour side' and ‘they’ who are in power on the 'betrayal side'. This example is the aspect of the power struggle in the changing balance of power since AKP became the leading party in the parliament in 2002.

In this context, Erdal Ataberk’s article demonstrates why Kemalists hold a Eurosceptic discourse in relation to the claim AKP uses the EU integration process and democracy discourse to conceal their intention to spread religiosity to whole state institutions. Atabek uses the allegory of umbrella implies the belief that the EU support is used in making ‘contra-revolution’ towards Republican revolution:
“Everything clearly shows that Turkey is living a ‘contra-revolution’ under the guise of democracy...The religiosity organised from bottom to top and supported by foreigners acquires all of the state institutions... This foreign-backed planning is step by step walking towards the success... The bribe given by rulership to the EU doesn’t prevent the application of this plan, but rather it is changing into an umbrella hiding the contra-revolution.” (Cumhuriyet 23.04.2007, p.3)

With reference to the Sevres Treaty and the topos of separation threat, the strategy of perpetuation is used in Hurriyet report (09.11.2007, p.17): “Ninth Naval Forces Commander and former Prime Minister Bulent Ulusu said that the decisions of the European Parliament (EP) include the decisions of the Treaty of Sèvres.” In terms of discursive construction of common political past, this reference to the treaty - designed to divide the Ottomans and prompted the national resistance to European forces after the First World War - tacitly positioned the ‘we’-group (Turks) against ‘they’-group (Europeans). This imagined group of Europeans is also associated with negative representation of the collective present which refers to ‘they’; Europeans want to invade and divide ‘us’ again. This has the function of resistance to possible change driven by the European integration process. Euroscepticism clearly appears in both newspapers’ coverage of the EU; particularly presenting the memory of Sèvres Treaty reminds us of the common past in the First World War, which has an identity constitutive function to strengthen the Otherness of Europe by relating it to the historical image of nation still alive in the Turkish social and political imagination. What is different in Hurriyet and Cumhuriyet is the Kemalist nationalist Cumhuriyet highlights the fear of loss in Kemalist principals, predominant secularism of Turkish Republic, and gives importance to the role of the army in both the state and politics. In this context, Cumhuriyet directly targets the pro-Islamist government AKP’s EU politics. Kemalist discourse represents a belief that the Islamists are instrumentalising the EU adaptation process in order to change the secular regime. Ethno-nationalists seem not to share these concerns. Additionally the leftist
tone of Kemalist nationalism puts an emphasis on anti-imperialist characters in Cumhuriyet’s discourse in opposition to Turkey’s EU membership. Inevitably, due to the mentioned economic sanctions, most of the time Hurriyet seeks a balance between opposition and government discourses, and covered different opinions. There is no doubt it had a great struggle in doing journalism.

There are clearly different modes of interpreting Turkey’s EU integration and redefinition of Turkish national identity in the 2000s, which corresponds to the different political mentalities and identities. As can be seen, pro-secular discourse uses the strategy of perpetuation to maintain the status quo in collective Kemalist identification of the Turkish nation. By the critical analysis of this discourse, the Kemalist resistance to change in Turkey's nation-state identity in the EU integration process is pointed out.

However, critical discourse analysis requires more, and in the following section, the examples of opposing discourses from pro-Islamist newspaper Zaman and liberal-leftist Radikal contribute the evidences of why Kemalists and ethno-nationalists resisted against Turkey's post-Kemalist transformation and changing power relations in the first decade of 2000s. This serves to clarify the Islamist perspective and liberal perspective in Turkish nation, and shows the diversity and extent of the demands and expectations from the EU membership of Turkey.

4.1.2. Representation of Turkey’s European Integration in the post-Kemalist Discourse

In this section, discourse analysis reveals how Islamists pragmatically shifted to be Euro-supportive. It also provides clues about limits of their support. On European Union's Turkey's accession decision in October 2005, Zaman ad-
dressed Turkey’s bid for EU membership with the reference of the East/West binary as the representative of Islamist nationalist discourse:

"The East and the West have the same concern: It would be a mistake to exclude Turkey. EU-Turkey membership negotiations will start tomorrow. However, contests of some countries raised concerns about the process... The scenes bringing together the Eastern culture and Western values implied these comments as ‘Turkey is the intersection point of civilizations’.... Turkey as a member of EU will be a solution for Middle East countries." (Zaman 02.10.2005 p.1)

Here, Turkey’s identity is introduced in combination with East culture and West values which places it as a part of both civilisations. A Muslim country with Western values is also a model for the Middle Eastern and Islamic countries. It is additionally presented that ‘misunderstanding of Islam will be corrected’ (ibid. p.12). According to this, the symbolic meaning of Turkey’s membership in the EU is shown by the justification strategy and argument of its possible positive achievements such as correction of negative imaginings of Islam in Europe. The negative outcomes of Turkey’s exclusion from the Union are presented in connection with the ‘concern’ that would send the message of ‘ongoing Crusade mentality’ (ibid p.13) or the clash of civilisation between Christian and the Islamic world.

According to Ali Bulac’s (Zaman, 10.11.2004, p.5) argument, Europe’s anxiety is rooted in Turkey’s different mentality and symbolism, in one word, Islam. He holds an argumentation of difference in Turkey’s and Europe’s ways of life and thinking. The argumentation is empowered with interdiscursivity in the quotation from author Cemil Meric (Zaman, 27.10.2004 p.6): ‘Either we burn all Quran or we demolish all mosques. We are still the Ottomans in the eyes of Europeans, Ottoman; so Islam. A mass, dark, dangerous enemy!’

Bulac notes that if the EU process is cut, ‘Turkish Jacobean elites’ at their privileged status will go on to employ inequalities and pressures on the great
masses of believers in Turkey (Zaman, 06.11.2004 p.6). However, he criticises the EU process with regard to new identifications as minorities while there is no development in the life of ‘the great mass that has been living under pressure for a century’. In his evaluation, these definitions might destroy Islamists’ historical identification framework that is based on the religion which is: “Islam has one nation; a Muslim community cannot be governor of another Muslim community.” He argues that the EU does not consider the millions of Muslims’ demands of fundamental religious rights and freedoms in social and public sphere; but the EU recognises “the shamelessness of homosexuals and lesbians who commit against Allah, their nature and the essential principles of Genesis as the rights and freedoms should be protected by the state” (Zaman, 03.11.2004, p.5).

The concrete symbol of his critic on the EU adaptation process is seen in the headscarf issue: “EU Progress Report does not refer to the ban of headscarves in Turkey, and Turkey supports these limitations in fundamental rights and freedoms in the meantime while sitting on the negotiation table by not mentioning it” (Zaman, 12.11.2005 p.7). Moreover, he defines the ECHR’s supporter decision on the issue as ‘biased’ to Muslims (Zaman, 06.12.2005, p.6). He concludes that this circumstance drives an opinion change in the minds of millions of people about the EU and Turkey’s membership. They think that there is no sense in supporting the EU integration as long as it does not guarantee their religious life and freedoms. Bulac calls it ‘disingenuousness’ of the EU (Zaman, 16.12.2006, p.7).

What is noteworthy in Ali Bulac’s statements is that he thinks he expresses his opinions as a representative of ‘great Islamist masses’ or ‘millions of people’ in Turkey. In this context, secularist Kemalist elites are called ‘Turkish Jacobean elites’ by him in the narrative of common past and present, particularly in connection with the religious freedoms. Apparently, he imagines Turkey as a Muslim nation. He does not emphasise on being Turk, but being
Muslim and religious. This Islamic world view also shows itself in the discourse of relationship with the EU. On one hand, when he mentions about Europe’s concerns he quotes from Cemil Meric in order to argue: “They do not want us in the Union, it is because we are Muslim, we are different.” On the other hand, when he mentions about Turkey’s bid for EU membership, he illustrates it with the headscarf issue and means: “We want to be in the Union because we are Muslim and we want the EU guarantee of Islamic religiosity in public life.” Although his reference to the ECHR’s decision in 2005 on the headscarf problem portrays a distrusted EU image in making use of ‘biased’ and ‘disingenuous’ adjectives. Thus, if one looks at Zaman’s coverage, it occurs how Islamists rationalise why the EU lost Turkish public support in 2006. More importantly, Bulac’s comments and critics provide clues in decoding the AKP’s adherents’ demands from government and the EU process. It shows why the AKP has taken concrete steps in the Islamic agenda to satisfy its voters, not the EU, since 2006. This point simultaneously contributes the explanation in origins of secularist Kemalists rising and mass demonstrations during the Presidential Elections and Cumhuriyet’s slogan of “Are you aware of threat?” in 2007 which is widely indicated in Chapter 3.

In relation to Turkish national identity discourse, such as ‘religion’, another theme, ‘modernism’ is frequently mentioned in relation to Turkey’s EU membership. It can be said that there is a broad consensus concerning the modernity theses among Kemalist and Islamist nationalist discourses in Turkey. But they have contradictory perspectives of modernism. While Kemalist understanding of modern Turkey’s position in the civilisation of Western/European, Islamists do not necessarily place it in Europe, in other words, 'beyond Edirne':

“Turkey needs to be a modern and developed country, not to join the EU. Even if Turkey doesn’t have the needs in his noble blood to be a modern country, it has these needs in his brain between his two ears, not beyond Edirne.” (Zaman 02.10.2005, p.9)
This perspective of 'non-European' modernism clearly appears in Zaman’s remarks. It also challenges Kemalism with the selection of words of ‘noble blood’ which is an indirect quotation from Ataturk’s ‘Speech to Youth’. In his speech, Ataturk declared that Turkish youth had the power in their noble blood to save their country against internal and external enemies. By confronting this Kemalist discourse, it is noted what Turkey needs is in its head, not in Europe. This illustrates how a discourse on foreign policy simultaneously reflects the internal power struggle on reconstruction of national identity.

From a different perspective than the Zaman newspaper, the following example in the liberal left Radikal (04.10.2005 p.6) newspaper portrays a Turkish self-image as the other of Europe:

“All of the newspapers were very nice yesterday. Blue, blue, deep blue. European colour. Each of the newspapers was rightly so angry at Austria... Many people asked the same question yesterday: ‘Why Austria? What are their problems with us?’ The first thing that comes to mind is that we threatened them to occupy Vienna. To be Muslim, to be Turkish, to be dark and hairy... Austria doesn’t want Turks because of cultural reasons... If we take into consideration that the only country in Europe where the racists have come to power in recent years is Austria, I think we may easily understand this attitude called ‘cultural racism’... But, our society mostly consists of good and innocuous people. Composed of hard-working and honest people, happy in kindness, sad in misdeed. Secretly crying for rueful films. Just like the Austrians. Like everyone.”

In the selected passage it seems that adopted constructive strategy aims to promote the determination of the difference between Turkey and other European countries in making use of the example of Austria and its opposition to Turkey’s EU membership. He ironically states that Europe rejects Turkey, ‘us’ because of ‘we’ are ‘Turkish, Muslim, dark skinned and hairy’. This is a self-portrait of the Turkish nation. What defines the difference between Turkey and the EU members is demonstrated through ethno-cultural references, es-
especially to the image of Turkish people, in other words, the dark, hairy body of the nation. He justifies his Turkey as an unwanted country thesis with a reference from history. His usage of the topos of Vienna Invasion of Ottomans verbally constructs a negative image of the common political past of two countries that refers to historical hostility positioning Turks as a ‘threat’ to Austria’s national territory or political space. In the terms of construction of common political present, Alkan questions why Austria does not want Turkey in the EU and explains it with the reference to ‘cultural racism’ rising in Europe nowadays. These argumentations are followed by a conclusion in what is common culturally in Turkish and Austrian people. He uses the topos of similarity in emphasising that Turks are like Austrians and all human beings in joy and sorrow. Alkan’s discourse can represent a human perspective in this coverage of Turkey and the EU relations. This means that ethnocultural or national difference cannot be a topic in the future of Turkey’s integration with the Union. But the common goal and values may lead the common political future as Kurdish politician Osman Baydemir addresses:

‘Baydemir: ‘We will solve the Kurdish problem together.’ While replying to the questions of journalists, Baydemir said that Turkey is a country having the conscience of the EU. Baydemir, noting that the history of the EU is a reflection of a painful process to emerge into the daylight, said that: ‘They had great pains. But people managed to meet on a common currency, flag and borders. We, as Turkey, as Turks, Kurds, Circassians and Lazes may benefit from this experience.’” (Hurriyet 26.09.2005, p.8)

Baydemir mentions about the ‘great sorrows’ in Europe’s past in linking how they achieved construction of common values as currency, flag and borders learnt by the lessons of war. In negative representation of Europe’s past and positive representation of Europe’s present, Baydemir suggests that we use this experience to build a unity in Turkey among Turks, Kurds, Cherkessk and Lazes. Surely, using the pronoun of ‘we’ and identifying all as ‘Turkiye-liler’ (people from Turkey) has a solidarity-enhancing function (Wodak et al 1999, p.100). He signals the distinct identities of these communities and pre-
fers to employ ‘Turkiyeli’ for common identification instead of ‘Turks’. In this case, the distinction in being a part of a people and being a part of the state/land is accounted. However, as noted in Chapter 4, the nomination of ‘Turkiyeli’ linguistically seems problematical owing to the fact that ‘Turkiye’ means ‘the land of Turks’. This example leads to the observation of Turkey’s EU integration debate in terms of reconstruction of national identity and citizenship. Specifically, Turkey’s Kurdish question provides numerous instances associated with Turkey’s tension in the preservation and redefinition of national identity in the last decade. Keeping in mind this point, the next two sections are devoted to seeing how the Turkish media address the links between Kurdish Question and Turkey’s bid for EU membership surrounded by this tension.

4.2. The Kurdish Question and European Union Membership Debates in Pro-Secular Discourse

As might be expected, the Kurdish issue is an important topic in the EU and Turkey relations due to the fact they would be considered as minorities. In the context of democratic consolidation, this issue requires their cultural, social and economic rights to retain their own group identity. For instance, the right of education in their mother tongue is a crucial part of it. As noted in previous chapters, the Turkish state did not recognise Kurds as a distinct group when nominating all Muslim communities of Turkish Republic as Turks. Kemalist discourse in the media supports this state argument. As in this example, in coverage of the problem they mostly call them ‘Kurdish originated citizens’ which means they are Turks. The Progress Report (Cumhuriyet 27.10.2005) emphasises that 'Kurdish originated citizens' don’t have enough cultural rights. Concerning the Progress Report, it is reported that neither Kurds nor Alevi want to be nominated as minorities in Hurriyet:
“Both DEHAP representing the Kurds, and the representatives of the Alevis are angry with being implied as ‘minorities’ in the Progress Report of the EU. DEHAP administration said that ‘Kurds are the primary founders of the republic’ by emphasizing that they don’t consider themselves as ‘minority’. The leaders of the Alevi community said that: ‘We are the primary component of this country’ by stating that they see themselves as secular Turkish citizens devoted to Ataturk.” (Hurriyet 08.10.2004)

*Hurriyet* quotes their justification strategy with reference to a common political past. The narrative of ‘we established Turkey together’ is used to keep the solidarity and demand for continuity. They express their loyalty towards the Republican system. But it must be interpreted as a message to demand equal position such as the majority, Sunni Muslim Turks. This requires recognising their cultural rights and sharing power equally. However, *Hurriyet* does not mention this dimension of the issue. This text enhances the ethno-religious version of the Turkish nationalist discourse with the idea of ‘we are all Muslim and Turk; there is no problem, but the EU wants to separate us’. This definition of ‘we’ does not include Non-Muslim citizens of Turkey. This distinction also glosses over ‘our Kurdish brothers’ in Emre Kongar’s Kemalist discourse:

“In the framework of the EU, the extreme elements of the groups such as Armenian, Greeks, our Kurdish brothers have attempted to impose their demands rooted from historical problems that are against Turkey’s interests and sometimes these attempts succeed like the decision of European Parliament on ‘Recognition of Armenian Genocide’.” (Cumhuriyet 10.10.2005, p.3)

As an example for the ethno-nationalist perspective on Kurdish issue, in columnist Ozdemir Ince’s expression (Hurriyet 10.03.2007, p.11), personification of Kurdish nationalism is realised by the use of verbs and nouns such as ‘twaddle’ and seditious’. He justifies his argument in illustrations and warns about the possible consequences of education in the mother tongue such as autonomy, federation and separate state. By means of discursive construction of common future, this is presented as a problem for the unity of the nation.
In order to keep the status quo, he adopts a strategy of perpetuation. The issues of honour killing and resistance to learn Turkish are addressed as negative representation and hasty generalisations of Kurds. Ince complains that despite the fact these problems are all made by the Kurds, they are shown as the Turks caused them. This strategy of avoidance functions the argument that Turks are not the ones to blame for Kurdish issue. Ince notes that European countries where Kurdish nationalism grows in are also responsible of the problem.

Despite the fact that the AKP government has tried to solve the Kurdish problem, the armed struggle of PKK consists the dark side of it which increases the complexity of the power struggle on nomination and recognition of the issue. It puts forward the idea that Europeanisation of the problem or a democratic solution is not enough and that the PKK and external allies of it want more and more from the Turkish state. Regarding this idea, Mehmet Ali Birand from the Hurriyet newspaper interprets intensifying PKK attacks in 2006 as a resistance of organisation towards normalisation and democratisation of the region:

“Once upon a time the PKK would see the European Union as an advantage. It would believe that it could obtain the democratic rights more widely and more quickly thanks to the EU. It is seen that this approach has begun to change in recent months. It is pointed out that when the PKK see that the life of the region is more rapidly normalising than their estimates, the PKK started marginalisation and tried to prevent this normalisation. There is a truth in this.” (Hurriyet 11.04.2006, p.6)

Surely, the European Integration process contributed to the visibility of Kurdish culture and identity in the public sphere of Turkey. Paradoxically, as much as civic understanding of citizenship has been realised in providing a feeling of unity and solidarity to the state, the awareness of being Kurdish and having a separate identity have been reproduced and formed Kurdish nationalism towards Turkish nationalism. It may not pretend to be an
obstacle for living under the umbrella of the same constitution if the equality of these nationalisms is guaranteed in the law and its application. However, the problem remains in questioning how some Turks insist on keeping their privileged identity and how some Kurds reflect on unforgettable denial of their identities in the last century. Moreover, it matters the ways in which the mutual loss and sorrows in the discursive construction of common past can be replaced with positive representation of common present and future. The following section traces how Islamist and Liberal versions of Turkish national identity discourse in the Turkish media represents the Kurdish problem, its origins and the solution in dealing with Turkish identity. Interestingly, observed data indicates that all three selected discourses signify ‘Turkish state’ as the source of Turkey’s Kurdish issue. Rather than blaming external others, they face off collective past against the Kemalist nation-state.

4.3. The Kurdish Question in the Post-Kemalist Discourse

In terms of narrating the national history of Turkey, particular historical events and facts are portrayed through certain linguistic means. These linguistic realisations identify exactly how Turkey imagines itself as a nation. Inevitably, a nation’s origin and foundation are mostly addressed (Wodak et al. 1999, p.83) in these narratives. Regarding this point, Islamist, liberal and leftist discourses refer to the established time of the Turkish nation-state to indicate the historical and political roots of the Kurdish problem, specifically the denial of Kurdish cultural rights in the nation-building process of the Republic. In both the Islamist and Liberal discourses, there is a common factor which determines the way in which the origins of Kurdish Question is referred to and which actors and institutions received attention from these explanations. Islamist Zaman’s columnist Mumtazer Turkone and liberal Taraf’s author Ayhan Aktar, focus on the exclusion of Kurdishness in the discursive construction of common political past of the nation. Turkone adopts the topos of ‘fear’ to demonstrate the causal relations in the evolution
of the Kurdish problem and their exclusion in the nation-building process. He reminds Turkey was built like a Simurgh mixing the ashes of the empire and underlines the way to get rid of the fear of losing was to create a nation who would live within the state. He argues that the ones who attempted to create the nation with this fear were unfair to the Kurds:

“They ignored their native languages and identities because they thought that these would make them ‘another nation’, and tried to destroy them. Today, we are looking for the consent of a nation consisting of the honourable and equal individuals, and the state in which the Kurdish will live with their native language and identities based on this consent. Now we are in a moment that means fate can tip the scales for hope. Perhaps, we will change the history continuing for 210 years, in 2010... This year will be the starting date of a civilised life in which the armed tyranny will end, this beautiful country will get rid of the gangs forever, and everyone will be on his own way, self-and-future-assuredly.” (Zaman, 01.01.2010, p.7)

In the article, Turkone reminds the collective past of the nation and how the fear of intervention and the loss of the homeland motivated the independence war against external others. This even reflected the first words of the Turkish national anthem as ‘Do not fear’, which calls on the sovereignty and flag of the nation to be defended until the last man dies in the homeland. Then he notes how this fear turned to create ‘internal others’ in the construction of the Turkish nation-state. The lexical units in the text, particularly the personal pronouns give clues in blaming ‘other’ strategy. He uses a negative connotation, metaphor of the ‘armed tyranny’ to present ‘them’, the foundation elites of the Republic, namely the Kemalists. On the other hand, ‘we-group’ is formed in the argumentation of ‘we will change the history continuing for 210 years, in 2010’. By the strategy of transformation, a necessary discontinuation is referred to in the representation of the common present and future with the will of a civilized life for everyone. Significantly, this example confirms how Muslim conservatives and Kurds became successfull in creation of a common consent for challenging ‘Kemalist army-state’ and construction of post-Kemalist nation-state identity.
In the second chapter, the citizenship status of minorities in Turkey is given to provide background information for a variety of possible nominations for minority identification. It is also noted that Muslim communities, including Kurdish people, are not considered as minorities in Turkey. If one looks at the empirical studies, the majority of Kurdish people (75%) identify themselves as the citizens of Turkish Republic and view themselves (65%) as a part of the large Turkish nation (Yilmaz 2014). These identifications are followed by religious Muslimhood with 34 per cent and ethnic identity with 8 per cent. Turkish as a common language has been a significant factor in contributing to the national feeling and construction of a common culture and identity in Turkey. This idea makes some Turkish nationalists critical against the argumentation of supporting the linguistic distinction of Kurdish language and culture. Certainly, language is the most important element of Kurdish ethnic identity. Therefore, the debates on the Kurdish problem constantly involve the discussion on the right of education in their native language.

In this context, just as Turkune, Ayhan Aktar mentions how the foundation elites of Turkey imagined a ‘unique’ nation and criticises the Kemalist perspective’s Turkist ethnic interpretation of citizenship and exclusion of other languages due to their fear of heteronomy and collapse of the state:

“I guess, the people who have the Turkist ideology within the founding of the Republic are nowadays turning over in their graves. They have mainly had the dream of a nation consisting of a people who are involved in the Turkish ethnic identity or a people who are ready for going up in smoke in the consciousness of Turkist. According to them, it is out of the question for other ethnic groups ‘speaking languages other than Turkish’ to be in the Turkish nation. The formula of ‘one language=one nation’ was true for pure-blooded Kemalists. Speaking another language among people would cause the foundation of a nation in the state and separatism, ‘maazallah’ (God forbid).” (Taraf, 08.06.2009, p.8)

He employs a sarcastic language use with idioms like ‘turning over in their
Ahmet Altan’s following remarks in *Taraf* demonstrate why liberals supported Islamists for construction of a post-Kemalist state citizenship and identity politics. He addresses the main problems in recognition of freedom in Turkey through the illustration of Kurdishness, Aleviness, Muslimhood and individuality:

“We are in the same fight since the founding of the Republic. There are four major topics. The religion problem is symbolised by the headscarf. The Kurdish problem is symbolised by the mother tongue. The Alevi problem is symbolised by the compulsory subject. The individualisation problem is symbolized by the military service issue. The source of all these problems is based on the same place and the same reason. Sunni pious says to the state: ‘Accept may existence’ while saying ‘Accept the headscarf of my child’. Alevi says to the state ‘Accept may existence’ while saying ‘accept the djemevi as a place of worship and don’t forcibly teach my child Sunnism’. Young people say to the state ‘Accept that I’m an individual, I have a life’ while saying ‘Don’t impress me, don’t intervene with the course of my life’. The state gives all of them the same answer: ‘I do not accept; you do not exist’.” (*Taraf*, 23.10.2010, p.5)

In Altan’s presentation, the personal pronoun of ‘we’ is used in the meaning of people or public in Turkey. The topos of ‘we are in the same boat’ positions people of Turkey against the Kemalist state. He adopts an anthropomorphic usage for referring to the position of the state as the ‘other’ that is responsible for the problems and power struggle in the country. By noting the problematic issues created by the state system, such as seeing all of the people as a potential ‘criminal and enemy’, he contends that: “it’s time to found a new republic by burying this one.” (*Taraf*, 08.01.2011 p.11) The strategy of dissimilation in argumentation directly demonstrates the will of
reconstruction of Turkish nation-state identity in the ‘new republic’. He presents it as everybody’s demand for the change which supposes a state for people’s life, not people’s life for the state: “The public started to say ‘what kind of regime, brother’.”

As the examples point out, liberals and Islamists share a consensus on the opposition to Kemalist system’s imagination of Turkish nation-state and the Army’s position within it. According to these perspectives, the largest common denominator of the Kurdish political movement was ‘hostility to the state’ due to Turkish state prohibiting their language, torturing them, murdering people was almost the only reason for a harsh Kurdish rebellion (Zaman 31.07.2011 p.13). However, the components of the Kurdish issue have been changing. It was argued that the power against PKK was not armed authorities or military-state anymore, therefore the weapons and terrorist acts could not be effective in the face of legitimate power. With this argumentation, Zaman contributed to construct the AKP's discourse of new Turkey. On the Kurdish rights, Islamists build their arguments on the emergence of a new paradigm and destruction of the old Republican one in the context of Kurdish problem:

“The Republic tried to ‘create’ a nation in which the Republic thought that the state would be safe in the use of all of its possibilities. The Kurdish language was banned. The Kurdish identity was denied. Here is the reached point: This paradigm completely broke down. Today, this policy thought to portray the state as one piece, is the most serious threat against the existence of the state. We need a new paradigm.” (Zaman, 28.10.11 p.15)

In the passage, it is argued that the old Kemalist paradigm has been changing and the perspective of enemy-state is replaced by the AKP that has gained the votes of half of the general population and forty per cent of the Southeast region where the Kurds mostly live in. If one looks at the numbers of the Kurdish seats in Ankara (more than 100 in 550), this is a valid argument. As the main aim of the thesis, for a better understanding of the ‘process’ of the
power struggle of redefinition of Turkey’s identity, it is crucial to reveal how Islamist version of Turkish nationalism looks at the Kurdish problem. Moreover, it must be underlined that this thesis reveals the essentialist understanding of Turkish national identity in the search for different discourses of Turkish nation-state identity. It accepts different levels of identifications and belongings to the nation; thus it does not exclude Kurdish or Armenian voices in Turkish media.

Regarding the last point, in the next article, the leftist BDP’s Kurdish Deputy Aysel Tugluk presents a disagreement on the AKP’s role in the solution of the problematic relationship between the Kurds and the state:

“They met on a new state strategy as: ‘We will solve the problem on the basis of liberal state and individual rights’ with the approach of ‘There is not a Kurdish problem; there are the problems of my Kurdish brothers’…. The Kemalist elites and traditionalist conservatives, who are the different faces of the same administrative device, played the role of the state on the Kurdish issue on every occasion. Nowadays, this is the issue... the actual effective actor and the projection in determining the work style and political perspective should have included the Imrali and the peace works and negotiations. That the meaning of it has never been achieved shouldn’t be drawn. I mean that it should be the main axis.”

(Radikal 18.09.2011, p.6)

As in the previous example, Tugluk emphasises ‘the role of the state’ in the Kurdish problem of Turkey. However, she rejects either Kemalist army-state and neo-conservative liberal state. She expresses a different solution which can be provided by the Kurds through negotiating with the PKK and its leader Abdullah Ocalan. The metonymy of Imrali is employed when referring to Ocalan, though it is the name of the place where he is a prisoner. In fact, there are sharp differences in perspectives on Ocalan in Turkey. The emphasis on ‘Imrali’ symbolises Kurdish fight for ‘freedom’; this is why it is noted that it should be the main axis for the solution. This discursively constructs a kind of heteronomisation and autonomisation in Turkey’s
national identification. In addition, it shows differences in some Kurds’ imagination of Turkey’s common political present and future.

Like Tugluk, another deputy of Kurdish party Sirri Sureyya Onder writes for the leftist Radikal (08.11.2010, p.4). In the following quotation, Onder uses the strategy of justification and relativisation (Wodak et al 1999, p.36) in order to emphasise the difference and heteronomy of Kurds in Turkey. Specifically, he highlights the difference between the Kurds. He narrates this difference and different imaginations of the homeland by making use of a question in Kurdish “Tu ji kîjan welatê yi?” that means “Which village are you from?”:

“The witnesses of the speaking of two Kurds who met in their province know that, the question is: ‘Tu ji kîjan welatê yi?’ This question means: ‘Where are you from?’ or ‘What is your country?’ But, both of them are actually from Urfa or Viranşehir, Siverek, Diyarbakır, Kahta... I mean they are both from the same town and city, but it is their village or lineage that determines them and makes them known. And this lineage or village is a kind of DNA chain, they are so important. It detects their movements, shames, prides, honours and all of the social behaviours... Each of them has their own ‘homeland’ habits, language, timbre, flavour, colour. Of course, this is different from the concepts of ‘homeland, country, and state’ that you know. Yes, there is no flag, no school, no mosque and no police station in this homeland. Let’s just say that there are water wells, sheep, kids wearing rubber shoes, women with colourful dresses, kohl-full eyes, cherry caftans, and men with shalwar-keffiyeh.” (Radikal, 25.10.2010 p.8)

The linguistic construction of ‘national body’ (Wodak et al 1999, p.30) in this text distinguishes Kurds’ ‘natural space’ and culture from each other in the sub-national level with a reference to their localities. A hyperbole is used in stressing different and colourful culture of the Kurds. The presentation of Kurdish homeland without the state and the state institutions demonstrates

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the gap between Turkish state and Kurdish people in this example. This imagination of a stateless land of the Kurds is problematical in terms of institutionalisation of nationhood and everyday production of Turkish national identity in the means of the construction of ‘collective national consciousness’ (ibid. p.84) in their homeland. Especially, it identifies the lack of feeling of belonging to a Turkish nation-state. In this regard, what they do not have in their village is the constitutive of what is common between them. It can be seen as ‘recognition’ matter in the mutual relationship between the Kurdish society and Turkish nation-state.

To point out his perspective on the Kurdish question and solution, S.S. Onder wrote (Radikal 08.11.2010, p.4): “Today, the AKP government and liberals, by their nature, do not work out with the exception of creating obstacles for peace... The solution can only be found with the common wisdom of the Kurds and socialists.” The use of linguistic expressions manifested that a democratic or a liberal solution is clearly repudiated by the BDP members. They distance themselves from this kind of liberation or emancipation. Their discourse implies that they fight for a socialist solution. In the terms of discursive construction of common future in relation to the problem, he makes a division between ‘we-group’ including the Kurds and socialists and ‘they-group’ including the AKP and liberals.

On this issue, the liberal and left perspectives offer to redefine a constitutional citizenship for guaranteeing the group and cultural rights to build the unity of the nation. Islamist perspective’s suggestion for the road map of the Kurdish solution is based on religiosity in the region that means establishing an ideological umbrella of Islamic political identity as an alternative to Kurdish nationalism. Since then ‘conservative democratic’ discourse has highlighted its Islamic shade more and more in the internal and external policies of Turkey after every national election victory of the AKP.
As noted before, Prime Minister Erdogan stated in his 2005 Diyarbakir declaration that: “There was a reality of Kurdish problem in this country.” In 2008, Erdogan argued that they solved the Kurdish problem by the consolidation of democracy, but the PKK problem has not been ended. They have named and described it through a security perspective. In this process, it is not just the government that changed its discourse on the Kurdish question, but also liberals and leftists reviewed their perspectives on the problem. They have become more critical on both sides of the issue. In order to set up a basis in which peace can be achieved, the AKP launched a ‘Kurdish Initiative’ in 2009. This can be accepted as a milestone in the evolution of the issue. In the next section, the Turkish media’s Kurdish Initiative coverage is analysed in order to see how dynamically national identity has been referred to and how the process and meanings have been readdressed.

4.4. AKP’s Kurdish Initiative in Turkish Media

Although the main theme of this chapter limits the analysis of Kurdish question in the ethno-political dimension from a right-based perspective, it should be noted that Kurdish question’s security dimension has inevitably influenced the power struggle and contributes to the complexity of the problem. In fact, the PKK side of the problem is frequently covered by the Turkish media in respect to the attacks, military operations and the funerals of martyrs. Esra Arsan’s work (2013) points out that a revenge discourse and ‘we versus them’ discourse is common in the coverage of the funerals. She argues that the Turkish media heroise the deaths for the Turkish side, but dehumanise for the Kurdish side. In her examples from Turkish newspapers, it can be argued that there is both a dehumanisation and misidentification tendency in the coverage of the PKK and its members. In the news report of martyr funerals, they do not use the word ‘Kurdish’ in a hesitation of linking

the PKK problem with the Kurdish problem. However, when the AKP government launched the Kurdish Initiative, the media could not avoid presenting this connection.

As a part of disarmament of the Kurdish Initiative, thirty-four PKK members entered through the Khabur border gate in October 2009. In the news coverage of events, linguistic representation of the actors in using the concept of ‘terrorist’ or ‘people’ made a difference in the eyes and images of public in their identification of PKK members. Prime Minister Erdogan said (Radikal 22.10.2009, p.1): “We set out with good faith. We are saying that mothers don’t cry anymore. Look, thirty-four people returned to Turkey, and they were released within the framework of our laws. Hopefully we are looking forward to many more. I’m looking forward to returning all our people to the mountains, leaving their weapons behind.” On the other hand, Hurriyet reported (22.10.2009, p.1) that in his press conference, CHP Leader Deniz Baykal criticised the return of the terrorists to Turkey and said: “The terrorists have become heroes.” The pictures created a tension in Turkish society due to they were ‘showing off’ such as this process was the PKK’s victory.

Linguistic representation of ‘democracy initiative’ or ‘national unity projection’ in Turkish media was crucial for disarmament and peace-building. In this respect, Cengiz Candar (Radikal 23.10.2009) warned “Do not be blind” to peace-building. Murat Belge (Taraf 24.10.2009 p.5) underlined that “there are no victory or defeat in peace.” But MHP leader (Cumhuriyet 18.08.2011 p.1) called for government to abandon ‘the so-called demolition project’. Due to a massive opposition to the process, Turkey again went back to the strangulation of Kurdish problems by retreating government and intensifying attacks on the PKK in 2010. The data analysis in the following section gives a detailed account of the different discourses on the AKP’s Kurdish Initiative in the Turkish media. It demonstrates that since
2006 the matter of EU membership has lost importance in the political agenda of Turkey, the external ‘other’ in Turkey’s Kurdish Question has been replaced, going from ‘the EU’ to ‘global forces’, in other words, the USA or the West (Europe and the USA).

4.4.1. AKP’s Kurdish Initiative in the Pro-Secular Discourse

The data from the study of *Cumhuriyet* and *Hurriyet* newspapers demonstrates that Euroscepticism, anti-globalisation and anti-westernisation are closely connected with the reaction to the changing dynamics in the necessitated reconstruction process in Turkey. However, in the context of the AKP’s Kurdish Initiative in 2009, opposition to transformation is expressed with an emphasis on ‘globalisation’ in both discourses. As it can be seen below in Bahceli’s statements, external sources of the PKK problem are shown in aiming to bring about the downfall of Turkey. Moreover, the AKP is pictured as being an ally with the global forces:

“Chairman of MHP Devlet Bahceli said that: ‘The AKP is a global political vendor. PKK is a global armed vendor. Both of these vendors have undertaken the tender of destroying our country from the same centre, but by using different channels by the global negotiation method and have already gone to work on this’.” (Hurriyet 22.06.2010)

Similarly, a Kemalist writer, Suheyl Batum (*Cumhuriyet* 23.07.2010, p.9) nominates Kurdish Initiative as Barzani Initiative:

“We always say, ‘*a minority group*’ drove out Turkey’s nail day by day... Moreover with ‘the support of international status quo’ this ‘minority group’ went totally wild. All they wanted was to govern *Turkey* which could not govern itself, by taking advantage of this deficiency and this was supported by foreign policy, Armenian policy, Cyprus policy and the desire to seize the judiciary. There was also ‘*Barzani Initiative*, written by the new bosses whom they tried to palm off as South East or Kurdish Initiative... *The thing which was good for global capital was considered good for them as well. International scale bosses are still trying to write the ‘scenario’. Their *puppets* that are in Turkey are playing*.”
This passage portrays the leftist tone of Kemalist nationalism that describes the current political situation in Turkey as being highly dependent on the external powers. Warning of a threatened national interest in foreign policy issues and blaming ‘government’ tacitly for collaborating with the international bosses can be interpreted in reading the power struggle in Turkey. He adopts the strategy of blaming others using the idiom ‘driving out Turkey’s nail’ meaning an attempt to collapse Turkey. To trivialise ‘government’ he calls it ‘a minority group’ in an effort to identify who are responsible in the present situation. He employs the allegory of puppets in order to argue the AKP and its foreign policy serve for the interests of ‘new bosses’ of ‘global capitalism’. Based on a similar argument, in a previous excerpt, it is shown that Dursun Atilgan (Cumhuriyet 13.10.2005) addressed Islamists as the ‘betrayal side’. Kemalists complain that ‘they’ who are in power get their power from global capitalism to maximize their interest. This also reflects their fear of globalisation of the Kurdish issue. The examined data demonstrates there is an axis shift in the subject of blamed ‘others’ in the problem, the European powers is replaced with the West and Middle Eastern actors.

By the strategy of discontinuation Deniz Som (Cumhuriyet 17.01.2008 p.17) emphasises the difference between the times of ‘before’ AKP government and ‘then’:

“The principles of the full independence and the national sovereignty of Kemal Ataturk are already buried and the funeral prayer of secularism is performed! Also, when ‘the strategic partner’ ends the trouble of terrorism, welcome to Moderate Islamic Republic of Turkey!... Turkey is sold, destroyed, burned and made Arab. While martyrs are described as head and the murderers are described as dear; he is a Prime Minister who says these things.”

In this text, he warns against the loss of national sovereignty and independence principles of M. Kemal Ataturk. He pays particular attention to the laicism principle and the way it is personified. He makes his
argumentation with the topos of funeral prayer which points to laicism being murdered. Punctuation marks and bold characterisation of Mustafa Kemal signal the seriousness of the current situation. The fear of losing national sovereignty and independence of Kemalist principles is expressed. Ironically, ‘Moderate Islamic Republic of Turkey’ is welcomed by Som. He refers to ‘the government’ through the metonymy of the ‘strategic partner’ which marks AKP’s relationship with the USA and implicitly addresses its alliance in the Great Middle East Project. What is interesting to note is his warn against Arabisation of the nation. This can be read as a discontentment from the religiosity in Turkey, in other words, Islamisation of the nation. As mentioned in previous chapters, for the Kemalists, not Arabisation but Europeanisation of Turkish identity is frequently perceived as a positive component in terms of modernisation. He also notes that the Prime Minister calls ‘the murderers’ as ‘dear’. Here, in a hidden meaning, he refers to the PKK’s leader Ocalan and expresses his disturbance of calling him as ‘Dear Ocalan’. It should be reminded that the PKK members are identified as ‘baby killers’ in Turkish media. Moreover, the nomination of ‘martyrs’ as ‘head’ is criticised by Som, which can be interpreted as him complaining about the trivialisation strategy in reducing it to quantisation for the function of alleviating the importance of the loss of Turkish army. Topos of changed circumstances and ‘threat’ indicate the resistance to the post-Kemalist transformation by a strategy of perpetuation. Kemalists challenge to Turkish state’s changing discourse on Kurdish identity and Islamic identity.

In this context, Erol Manisali presents the Islamist developments and Kurdish initiative as the outcomes of global dynamics. In a tacit discourse, Manisali contends Turkey should keep its unique identity and policy without any influence from the external forces. Turkey’s external relations are portrayed with the negative connotation of ‘mandate’. In this text, neither the Middle East dependence nor Western dependence is recommended in Turkey’s foreign relations:
It is an interesting paradox that a wide range of people who are troubled by the Islamist developments are now in a position supporting unilateral dependence about the EU. It is an implicit result of the global dependence on a situation which they have brought to a choice position between the Middle East dependence (mandate) and Western dependence (mandate)… While the right and the extreme right are strengthening in Europe and the USA, new policies for Turkey and the region are making the internal dynamics of the country more dependent. For example, Southeast (or Kurdish) initiative is completely carried out by global dynamics. In fact, it has become a global problem for Turkey’s geography, not an internal problem of Turkey.” (Cumhuriyet 22.11.2010 p.13)

This is an explicit warning of a threatened national sovereignty. However, he marks globalisation of internal issues, in the terms of internationalisation of Kurdish problem in the region. He names it ‘south-east’ which signifies the regional difference and identification, and uses a parenthesis for naming ‘Kurdish’. This shows that Kemalist reluctance to define the problem as ‘Kurdish’ has been changing. It was the official Kemalist discourse which has put forward the social and economic underdevelopment of the region as the origins of the problem and to justify Kemalist state’s identity politics. In general, there was not a consensus associated with the attempt of the AKP in Turkish press and society. Opposing the Kemalist and etno-nationalist circles, the liberals, leftists and Islamists were eager to have a consensus for the achievements in the Kurdish issue. This claim was validated by these groups’ ‘Yes’ decision on the referendum for the new constitution in 2010 as Fuat Keyman wrote in Radikal:

“The decision of ‘yes’ by 58 per cent and ‘no’ by 42 per cent is the appearance of the demand of the public on the solutions of social problems in the political area and the consent of public shown in this direction as a result of referendum. With this result, the society of Turkey ‘called for citizenship’ for (a) a New Constitution and (b) the solution of the Kurdish problem, and request the solutions of this problems from the political parties in the ‘political area’. The decision of 58 per cent ‘yes’ is a citizenship call for both symbolising the social consent for new Constitution and saying to political parties ‘we are ready for a new constitution’, and applying-requesting the democratic initiative period to revive for the solution of the Kurdish problem.” (Radikal 26.09.2010 p.6)
Keyman interpreted the results of the referendum as the symbol of the social consent for new constitution of Turkey and the solution of the Kurdish problem. This discursively constructs a common consent for AKP’s formation of post-Kemalist nation-state identity. As might be expected, there were different motivations from the sides to try and achieve an agreement for a new citizenship definition. For instance, the leftist circles wanted to transform certain political continuities rooted by the military-coup constitution. They said, “not enough, but yes” to the draft due to the fact they were not interested in who were reforming the nation-state identity, but they were interested in the aim of erasing the political traces of 1980. In this context, how Kurdish identity should be represented, included or excluded in the new constitutional citizenship is one of the main contents of new Turkey’s national identity. Although, the general intention seems to solve the gangrenous issue, the political culture, the way of doing politics and the political struggle cannot bring about the building of mutual confidence on both sides. With the aim of finding out how the Turkish media represented and reproduced this political struggle through supporter different discourses on the Kurdish Initiative based on different ideological stands, the following section focuses on the coverage of Islamist Zaman, leftist *Radikal* and liberal *Taraf* on this topic.

4.4.2. AKP’s Kurdish Initiative in the Post-Kemalist Discourse
Islamist nationalist discourse in the Turkish press is apparently a supporter of AKP’s Kurdish Initiative. In terms of discursive construction of collective ‘we-group’, *Zaman*’s columnist Mumtazer Turkone uses a positive self-representation strategy for integration of Kurds in ‘we all’ and ‘ourselves’: “It’s the Kurds themselves who will eradicate the terrorist swamp and we all need to trust Kurds and I mean we need to trust ourselves.” He (*Zaman* 17.01.2010, p.12) adds in the bold characters to highlight that “The initiative on the other hand deserves constructive and enriching language and
contribution. As terror is a result, if the agents disappear the terrorism will be vaporised by itself.” The strategy of rationalisation appears by indicating terror as a result of the problem not just the problem itself. The causal reasons should be found out and fought against to end terror as the outcome of the Kurdish problem. More significantly, he underlines the necessity of the specific positive language use in discussion on the Initiative in order to have positive results.

He questions the strict and aggressive discourse of the MHP through the argumentation of the MHP profits arising from the ‘Kurdish uprising’ and ‘the blood of terror’. Here, discursively, ‘uprising’ is a remarkable nomination of the Kurdish problem. He (Zaman 25.06.2011, p.13) justifies his argument in noting they use the mosque courtyards where the funerals of martyrs are held, as a meeting place, and claims ‘how many votes does a funeral cost?’ question is the main reason for the escalation of terrorism. Therefore, he (Zaman 09.01.2011, p.10) presents that MHP ethno-nationalism and Kurdish leftist nationalism are constitutive of each other. They feed and reconstruct each other: “Kurdish question nurtured and raised the Kurdish nationalism (ulusalcilik). Yet would not the Kurdish question and nationalism massificate the MHP as an anti-thesis? Aren’t these two contradictions getting power from each other?” As it has been demonstrated, argumentation patterns are based on the strategy of emphasising the negative common features of both sides. Apart from him, Turan Alkan (Zaman 25.12.2010) directly stated: “Kurdish Initiative was a right policy.” He noted what was targeted was right; but why it could not reach its destination due to the government did not prepare the society and there was a panic of the opposition, ‘what if the initiative works'.

This argument can be deduced from the leftist author and academician Murat Belge’s comments on the nature of opposition in Turkey: ‘The whole aim of ‘opposition’ in today’s crisis is by any means to remove this government, the party of this government and the social population who created them from
power.’ He amalgamates this point with why the government’s intention to find a ‘peaceful’ and ‘democratic’ solution for the Kurdish problem came across with non-striking intense opposition. Without any exceptional viewpoints, they were opposed to whatever the government had to offer on the solution (Taraf 25.12.2009, p.7). In addition, he addresses the impatience shown on the government’s ‘democratic initiative’:

“I had said that the people who expect results from the ‘initiative’ in two days couldn’t think of asking ‘What did you do? What did you succeed?’ to the ones who bring the events to these days, for twenty-five years, by making ‘cross-border’ operations, by burning a village in one day and a forest in another day, by making laws.” (Taraf 28.12.2009, p. 9)

In Murat Belge’s article the temporal dimension of the problem is touched by the negative narrative of the past experiences of twenty-five years. By illustrating what had been done before, he justifies his critic on the impassionate attitude of some sides about the government’s attempt to sort out the longstanding historical problem in a few days. For many reasons, one can assume that he is right on this argumentation if one looks at the negative representations of AKP’s initiative in the context of the common political future in both Turkish nationalist and Kurdish nationalist discourse. By examining Aysel Tugluk’s expression (Radikal 18.09.2011 p.8), it may be argued that not just the MHP and the CHP (ethno-nationalists and Kemalist nationalists), but also Kurdish nationalists did not contribute to the discursive reconstruction process of the will to live together: “No one deceives himself, this process leads to civil war. And at the end of the process, will the desire and the ideal to live together remain? Do not remain! A famous phrase: ‘When the blood is shed, the redemption must be paid!’” In this expression, the language of war is justified by the strategy of balancing one crime with another. Causal explanations such as the lack of living together are shifting responsibility to the ‘others’. The ‘redemption’ metaphor refers the cost of violence as retaliation. This discourse reproduces the never-ending cycle of
violence in the Kurdish question and legitimises it by blaming others.

In this context, the liberals, leftists and social democrats turn debating on the AKP’s and the PKK’s U-turn to the non-functional military solution which has been tried for twenty-five years. While negotiations beyond the closed doors are not working for the peace, the last circumstances spring to mind, more polarisation and crystallisation in Turkish politics. Ahmet Altan presented this point with the allegory of hungry cavemen in order to criticise other political parties copycatting the extreme nationalist MHP politics in the peace-building process:

“They are making a hash of peace, dipping their hands into the peace like three cavemen trying to share a cake with cream. As in the fights of those hungry moments every time, ‘the most wild’ one likens everyone to himself. As the most wild in this fight is the MHP, it is common attitude to be like the MHP. The AKP, CHP and PKK imitate the MHP.” (Taraf 25.08.2009, p.5)

In addition, Altan commented on his disappointment of Kurdish contribution to the ‘democracy initiative’ with the argument that it is just a representative of a particular region or ethnic group and it is silenced on the common issues of Turkey:

“While there was a cut-throat ‘battle of democracy’ in Turkey, it was breaking our hearts that the Kurds were standing aside and did not get involved in the fight as if the democracy was only interesting the Turks. Kurdish politicians were just expressing the problems related to their race and their regions, and they were keeping silent in the face of our common problems, just like Erbakan lovers before February 28 with a strange ‘communitarianism’.” (Taraf 28.02.2010, p.9)

Interestingly, he uses the illustration of Islamists before the postmodern military intervention of February 28th for describing the present Kurdish politicians. The matter with Kurdish politicians is pointed out as not being a Turkey’s party, merely a regional party. As noted before, the Islamists could
become the majority party with the AKP’s revisionism and conservative democracy discourse. Otherwise they would keep on being representative of a specific Islamist community. Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP succeeded by being the voices of others with the discourse of ‘democracy for everyone’, which was also convincing both the liberal and leftist sides. During the last decade Prime Minister Erdogan has been arguing that they are against ethnic nationalism. But their tone of Sunni Islamism in their discourse has become more ocular day by day. Finally in 2012, he declared their four principles in Adana: “one state, one nation, one flag and one religion.” He underlined that he did not include ‘one language’. After the opposing comments, the party members said, ‘one religion’ might be a tongue slip.

More problematically, the dominance of security and its fight against terrorism discourse turned Turkey’s democracy into a downhill battle, using the cases of Ergenekon, Balyoz and KCK to apply the general term of ‘terrorism’ to the new Penal Code effectuated in 2006. In the cases of Ergenekon and Balyoz, hundreds of people (mostly army officers and journalists) were taken into custody. In the case of the KCK, the same happened to the Kurdish people (mostly politicians and journalists). The polarised political situation in ‘the war of all against all’ lost them the chance of peace-building once again. As Ahmet Insel writes in Radikal, questioning of the legitimacy of violence is difficult in Turkey due to the fact that both parties – the state and the PKK – are becoming anti-politics in the case of the Kurdish problem:

“The idea that the solution to this ‘gangrenous problem’ will be achieved with an extremely bloody fight seems to have dominated both parties. Both parties are demanding an absolute allegiance to itself. Both parties are firmly hugging the concept of ‘just war’. The politics of violence is destroying the politics.” (Radikal 23.10.2011)

For how these problematic cases discredited the Turkish judiciary and how the media played a role in that, see Dani Rodrik (2011) ‘Ergenekon and Sledhammer: Building or Undermining Rule of Law’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring, Volume 10 No:1
In contrast to blaming ‘others’ strategy used in most of the media discourse, in the *Radikal* newspaper, Fuat Keyman (11.09.2011) strategically employed constructive discourse on the topos of ‘responsibility’ which has a unity and solidarity-enhancing function in the Kurdish issue. He underlined the importance of a new constitution writing process for equal citizenship as a chance to build democratic and peaceful collective present and future of Turkey. He invited the AKP and the BDP to behave responsibly towards the Kurdish problem, to establish the will of a common present and tomorrow on the basis of ‘peace, democratic negotiations/ equality/ justice/ conscience/ language’, by taking lessons from the pains and mistakes of the past. The necessity of learning from common past experiences was expressed by Keyman in making use of the transformation strategy. On how to change the ongoing struggle, from a social democracy perspective he offered a specific language use in peace-building, a language of equality, justice and conscience. Beyond others, this is an alternative, pluralist imagination of Turkey.

**Findings and Conclusion**

The thematic content of discourses on Turkish national identity contains the construction of a collective past, present and future; a common psychical geography and borders; and a common culture. The concept of a Turkish nation as an imagined community is built on these elements in the different discourses. Using this perspective of the nation, in this chapter, the discourse analysis as the methodological framework of study is applied to investigate how these contents of Turkish national identity are generated and reproduced through Turkish media discourse in the context of Turkey’s European Union membership and Kurdish problem. This assumes to reach the multiple faces of Turkey from a national and an international level; official and oppositional; constitutional and cultural models of identity in relation to the internal power struggle in the 2000s, particularly giving rise to the power of two traditional
others of Kemalist state: Islam and Kurds. Based on this essential assumption, it is discovered that there is not one simple understanding of the EU and Turkish identity construction depending on the context of Turkey’s Kurdish question. Here, the main argumentations of different discursive constructs of Turkish national identity are outlined and the strategies applied in these constructions are summarised as the findings of the detailed linguistic analysis of the case study.

The detailed discourse-analytical investigation of Kemalist discourse of Turkish nationalism from the Cumhuriyet newspaper provides the Kemalist conceptualisation of nation and self-perception in the selected, specific to the EU context. Europe is seen as a symbol of modern life and thinking by Kemalists, they tend to argue that “we are not against the EU; but we have conditions: Kemalist principals and national sovereignty must be preserved.” With regard to issues such as the common national past, they refer to Kemalist legacy and its institutions. In the discursive construct of the common present, they address Turkey’s membership of the EU with regard to preserving secular identity of state and its guardian army. With the belief in the AKP’s instrumentation of the EU adaptation process in order to Islamisation of the country cloaked in the discourse of freedom and democracy, they perceive the EU process as a ‘threat’ to the regime of the state, to unity of the nation, its independence and sovereignty. Moreover, they argue that the EU harmonisation is misappropriated by the Kurds for realisation of their opposing demands to Turkey. With regard to the Kurdish question, the EU was represented as ‘external other’, while European integration was at the top of Turkey’s agenda. While non-European and Muslim identity discourses were becoming dominant in the last decade, the public support and political agenda for the EU were lost attention in Turkish media. In addition, the ‘blamed others’ have been redefined in 2009 as the USA, the West or global actors.

Kemalist discourse addresses to ‘homogenisation’ under Turkish identity and
citizenship by the strategy of perpetuation and justification. This homogeneity point is also common in the ethno-nationalist discourse of the MHP. However, the ethno-nationalists do not underline secularism or Kemalism; but Turkic and Muslim characters of the nation which can be called as populist nationalism. The best seller Hurriyet newspaper is chosen to illustrate this perspective of Turkish nation. Despite the fact that some Hurriyet authors criticise what is happening in Turkey from different perspectives, Hurriyet tends to be more populist in parallel with government policies in assuming representing majority mentality and an imagined collective everyday life culture in the focused timeline.

In contrast to Kemalist discourse, the self-perception of Islamist discourse positions Turkey culturally as a part of the Muslim world. They focus on Muslimhood in the discursive construction of their difference from the West. However, they argue that they are in favour of Turkey’s bid for EU membership in terms of common values; mainly democracy. In the data analysis, it is seen that this democracy discourse is instrumentalised by the Islamists in order to justify transformation of Kemalist nation-state with regard to secularism and citizenship policies. With a reference to Muslimhood, ‘Islam has one nation’ discourse is used in opposition to the Kemalist state’s unequal identity policies, particularly its relationship with the Kurds. Therefore, they seem to be supporters of EU conditionality in consolidation of the Kurdish rights. However, Zaman’s coverage of the headscarf issue apparently indicated that they lost interest in being a part of the Union due to the fact that they could not get what they expected from the EU, namely support of religious freedom in Turkey. Certainly, they put Islam at the heart of their view of the world and relationships with the others. Because of that, secularist politics of the Kemalist state is defined as ‘armed tyranny’ to Muslim people. They make a distinction between the Kemalist state and the Muslim nation. Based on this, they offer a commemoration and reconstruction of the state’s Islamic identity as a solution to Turkey’s
problems. They even see the AKP’s self-identification of ‘conservative democrat’ rather than ‘Islamic’ as the problem; it is not enough to provide a common identity and sense of belonging among Muslims. In a nutshell, they argue that ‘Islam is the answer’ in relation to the internal and external others of Turkey. Although this concept of the nation still maintains the situation of ‘all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others’, in particular, for the rights of the secularists, non-Muslims and LGBTs. It is therefore, this thesis makes an original contribution the literature through analysing Turkey’s new identity with a specific focus on the concept of ‘national identity’ and power struggle of different Turkish nationalisms. It reveals that how the notions of Turkish nation-state identity is naturalised with the references to the majority’s religion.

In addition to the other findings, this chapter found out that as Islamists, the liberal-leftists’ main motivation in supporting Turkey’s EU membership is the necessity of transformation in the Kemalist state structure. Therefore, they endorse the AKP’s attempts in the reformation process. Indeed, all discourses of the Turkish nation identity claim to be in favour of democratisation. However, the content of the concept is diverse in to what extent they want it for the ‘others’ who do not think, do not live, or do not wear, as them. Reformation in the state-society relations, the state-military relations or the state-minorities relations requires redefinition of power relations. This inevitably points out who resist and who encourage the changes in discursive construction of Turkish nation-state identity while empowering traditional disadvantaged groups of the state. In this point, the pluralist perspectives of liberal-leftists and social democrats, as it is seen in Taraf and Radikal, do not exclude some specific groups or define new others in the nation formation for the sake of satisfying the majority’s identity demands. Related argumentation patterns demonstrate that this pluralist view of the world reverberates through the developments both for EU membership and the AKP’s Kurdish Initiative. This is why these groups have been supporters in the AKP’s pro-EU, pro-Kurdish Initiative and pro-
reconstitution campaigns. Recently, what is particularly remarkable is the AKP’s emphasis on Islamic character of Turkey and reluctance in vitalising the EU reforms have shifted the perceptions of liberal-leftists, social democrats and the socialist wing of the Kurdish movement in the changing power relations in Turkey. Unfortunately, new process widens the fault lines between the sides; namely Turks versus Kurds; Islamists versus Secularists; Turkey versus Europe.
CHAPTER FIVE

TURKEY’S NEW IDENTITY: 9/11 AND IRAQ WAR IN TURKISH MEDIA

Introduction

Based on the international circumstances in the last decade, the third case study in this chapter turns to a closer analysis of Turkey’s Western identity in international relations. In the broader international level, the debates of Islam versus the West after 9/11 events and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 influenced the importance of Turkey’s Muslim and secular identities. In the post-9/11 process, Turkey's pro-Islamist AKP government internationally became more of an issue in the terms of its role in Iraq intervention, transformation of radical Islam, the West-Islam world relations and in particular the USA’s relationship with Islam. In relation to the USA’s occupation in the region, Collin Powell’s ‘moderate Islamic formulation’ (Oktem 2013, p.82) triggered a debate using Turkey as a model for moderate Muslim democracy. However, ‘America’s loyal Muslim ally’, Turkey’s negative decision on the Iraq war in March 2003 was unexpected and interpreted as the turning point in reorientation of Turkish Foreign Policy. In this context, interconnectedness of domestic and foreign identity categories in the events of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, serve a comprehensive reading case on competing discourses of the Turkish nation in the domestic struggle on the construction of post-Kemalist nation-state identity.

Regarding these points on Turkey’s international identity, this chapter traces the themes on Turkey’s Muslim identity, Secular and Western identity in the representation of the events of 9/11 and the Iraq War in Turkish media. The discourse analysis of the media texts also provides clues to the deeper understanding of Turkey’s 'no' decision to the war against Iraq on 1 March
2003\textsuperscript{36} in terms of rising anti-Americanism and the final debate on whether Turkish Foreign Policy shifted its Western orientation. The comparative perspective observes the articulation of Turkey’s post-Kemalist identity across multiple discourses, not just within official discourse. It empirically presents that national identity and foreign policy discourses are reproductive and constitutive of each other. The time period of the discourse analysis ends in 2011, and therefore does not cover emerging challenges of Turkish democracy and Turkish Foreign Policy during the political uprisings of the Arab world.

5.1. The Constructed Link between the Events of 11 September 2001 and Iraq War in the Media

The events of 11 September 2001 – the terror attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and on the Pentagon near Washington DC – changed the construction of US national security paradigm and the containment-plus strategy for Iraq (Ritchie and Rogers 2007, p. 53-54). It rapidly evolved through a number of stages to take the Bush administration to the military-led regime change in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The first part of the new strategy was based on ‘war against terrorism’ by attacking and eradicating al-Qaida in Afghanistan. The second part of the paradigm targeted the states that harboured and assisted terrorist organisations. By December 2001, the administration had expanded the new war on terrorism in the third step of the post-9/11 paradigm by the inclusion of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In October 2002, neo-conservative administration declared the doctrine of pre-emptive war against WMD-armed ‘rogue states’ (ibid p. 105) in the National Security Strategy. The suggestions on 9/11 were sponsored and supported by the Iraq administration (ibid. p.73) and its WMD programmes

\textsuperscript{36} Despite the opposition of Turkish public opinion, the final decision at the TNA surprised both Turkish and American governments. See more: Oran, B. (2013) Türk Dis Politikası, Cilt III: 2001-2012, İstanbul:İletişim, p.269-276
confronted to comply with UN demands for disarmament, presented Iraq as the main threat in the definition of the war on terrorism. These suggestions were used by means of the domestic and international justifications for a possible war with Saddam Hussein’s regime. The White House showed its determination on taking pre-emptive action in signing the ‘Authorisation for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002’ on 16 October 2002, which was followed by the resolution of UN Security on 8 November 2002. Iraq’s failure to comply with all UN resolutions, rid itself of weapons of mass destruction, and its support for terrorists did not give them a second chance as it was considered a ‘hostile’ country; then on 19 March war began (ibid p. 110).

Most of America’s traditional allies, especially European states, opposed its attack on Iraq but it did not wait long before building a consensus for action with the expectation that it should be followed (Sarwar 2006, p.26). The removal of the Iraqi dictator was seen as a liberal war that had the right motives in pursuit of universal values (Cox and Kitchen 2010, p.82). It was the destruction of liberal internationalism (Sniegoski 2005, p.116) in the rejection of international cooperation and international law, or in its unilateralist stand on pre-emptive action by ‘the abuse of America’s intelligence agencies’ (Bamford 2005); although there was no proven link between Saddam and 9/11. However, the Bush administration could convince American public opinion. Therefore, the outbreak of the Iraqi War was not just about the power of ideas but about the alliance of ideas with power as Cox and Kitchen noted (2010, p.83). President George W. Bush quoted from George Marshall (Kaplan and Kristol 2003, p.135) that “our flag will be recognised throughout the world as a symbol of freedom on the one hand, and of overwhelming power on the other.” The question in this case was how the USA could gain the public’s support. Certainly the media had a major role in the result. Public opinion matters regarding the decision on war. The importance of public opinion in foreign policy making was already
given in the theoretical chapter in the terms of domestic sources of foreign policy. In the academic literature the role of American media in ‘selling the war on terror’ (Mackiewicz 2008) was indicated in the various attempts (King and Wells 2009; Bennett et al. 2007; Dadge 2006; Nikolaev and Hakanen 2006; Rampton and Stauber 2003; Miller 2003; Gupta 2002). Among these contributions, King and Wells (2009, p.158) indicated how narrative of the Iraq War was framed by the Bush administration. Given the title of the New Way Forward, the administration’s surge morality tale offered all the components of a complete and substantive frame: it defined a problematic situation (upsurge in sectarian and al Qaeda-sponsored violence in Iraq), identified its causes (beliefs and actions of terrorists and those who harbour them), conveyed a moral judgement of the players involved (a heroic new protagonist confronting the evil enemies of democracy), and endorsed a remedy (a military build up that would lead to victory both in Iraq and the war on terror)… From the moment of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush articulated a highly consistent narrative that the United States had been forced into a monumental struggle representing nothing less than a battle of the civilised and democratic good against the forces of terrorist evil. Integral to this frame was the struggle’s difficulty and length, but Bush always reassured his audiences that the forces of good would eventually prevail. While admitting mistakes had been made in the past, throughout 2007, the administration would continue to insist that success was still possible in Iraq.

Inevitably, this narrative was followed in the media. The 9/11 terror and the images of the planes hitting the World Trade Centre towers and their collapse, were mediated repeatedly by the mass media which was claimed to be ‘the most documented event in history’ (Kellner 2003, p.144). The narrative was constructed, reconstructed and rereconstructed (Gupta 2002, p.12) in the media discourse. Kellner argues that the United States media coverage of this traumatic event increased the feeling of insecurity and war hysteria, while failing to provide a coherent account of what happened, why it happened,
and what would count as responsible responses. Moreover, the discourse in
the news demonstrated a ‘clash of civilisation’ model in the linkage of Islam
and terrorism that led to call for a ‘justified’ war against Iraq. The March
2004 poll of the University of Maryland found that 57 per cent of Americans
believed that Iraq provided substantial support to al Qaeda before the war
and 60 per cent of people believed that pre-war Iraq had WMD (Dadge 2006,
p.2). More worryingly, Bennett et al (2007, p.43) brought up the matter that
nearly 70 per cent of people in America maintained to believe that Saddam
had assisted the 9/11 terrorists, despite credible challenges shown within
months of the invasion.

All these numbers of misconception reflected that the media’s reporting
failed to provide the truth to the public. At this crucial point, Dadge (2006)
asked “Why the media failed us?”, in other words why did the watchdog fail
to bark in the US? In his account, the reasons laid behind the media’s
contribution to preparing the public to go to war were given in regard to the
US media-politics at the relevant time. First, the climate of patriotism
after the attacks was easy to be manipulated by the Bush administration while
dissent was seen unpatriotic. Second, the difficulty of reporting and testing
on intelligence issues when the media have no access to the original source,
left the information area to the Bush administration’s own message. Finally,
private commerce to uphold the official discourse and the pressure on
journalists from other elements of the media and American society in the
atmosphere of heavy politicisation and partisanship caused the press to be
drifted (ibid. p.144).

Surely, after 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, responding to the demands of
national and international security in using force by the licence of democracy
discourse caused a significant rethinking of strategies (Weiss et al 2004) for
maintaining international order and peace. US unilateralism to go to war had
a negative impact on the legitimacy and credibility of the UN (Ayoop 2004,
These events remapped the global politics (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004) and reflected the general importance of identity politics in declining the distinction between foreign and domestic definition of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ in contrasting identifications of the ‘self’ and ‘other’.

The consequences of the US-led coalition invasion of Iraq, created an anti-Western Muslim transnational support base and the politicisation, radicalisation and mobilisation of a segment of Muslims worldwide (Gunaratna 2010, p.110). Significantly, the anger in the Arab and Muslim world came from American support to Israel in Palestinian issues doubled by the result of the Al Jazeera television’s real-time coverage of Iraqi civilian casualties and the destruction of Iraqi infrastructure (Seib 2008; Ayoop 2004). In this context, Rampton and Stauber (2003) gave the numbers of world opinion on the war with Iraq. On 18 March 2003, the Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press published a survey showing the percentage of people in France who held a favourable view of the United States had dropped from 63 to 31 since the beginning of 2002. In Italy, the percentage had fallen from 70 to 34; in Russia, from 61 to 28; in Turkey, from 30 to 12 (ibid. p.6). Even in the long time US ally, England, the percentage decreased to 48 from 75. In the Turkish case, rising anti-American sentiments in the Turkish public formed problematical perceptions of the West in general and the US in particular.

5.2. The 9/11 Events in the Turkish Press

To see the construction and everyday production of ‘we’ and ‘them’ distinction in Turkey’s external relations, a search on different meanings of September 11th events in Turkish public discourse is a fruitful case that can lead to discussions on the Iraq War and whether Turkish Foreign Policy is losing its Western orientation. In this section, the linguistic representation of
political actors in the discourse analysis is driven by the main question which is basic and clear: What is September the 11th? There are various answers to this single question, but one of them was repeated and became quite remarkable in the pro-secularist Turkish media discourse (Cumhuriyet 15.10.2001, p.12; Hurriyet 11.09.2002, p.5): It is the day when the American dream died away with the terrorist attacks.

Similarly, in the pro-Islamist Zaman’s coverage (13.09.2001, p.8), it was mentioned as American legend destroyed. In these instances, the verb choices as 'destroy' and 'died away' were used to mean the end of ‘American legend’ and ‘American dream’. This strategy of discontinuation serves to discursively destruct the hegemony of the USA and its ideal in the international power relations. In these coverages of 9/11, deleting agency or the exclusion of participants as those responsible for the attacks and nominalisation reduces a whole clause to its nucleus (Billig 2013, p.25).

In addition, the ‘war’ discourse was covered by Turkish media since the day following the attacks. They accentuated that the USA was trying to save the ones buried under the wreckage while seeking for those responsible at the same time. President George W. Bush stated that it was going to be a long-lasting war between ‘the good and the bad’ (Hurriyet 12.09.2001, p.1). Hurriyet (13.09.2001, p.1) used a manhunt metaphor for addressing the investigation of the USA for the responsible people: 'The USA started a manhunt.' It was reported (Hurriyet 29.01.2002, p.11) that Bush claimed in his address to the nation that Iraq, Iran and North Korea, which he described as the ‘devil axis’, were trying to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and could attack against the USA and its allies. Linguistic choices of Hurriyet in the coverage of the USA’s response to the events were remarkable as it reproduces the discourse of war between 'good and bad' or the war against the ‘devil axis’.
Related to the last point, the pro-Islamist Zaman’s coverage focused on the meanings of events and results for the Muslim world in addressing American President George W. Bush’ statement that this was a crusade against terrorism and barbarism. Ali Bulac (25.09.2001, p.7) asked whether this controversial term was used coincidentally as a slip of the tongue or it was a purposeful reference to mean that the Christian world aimed to start a holy war against Islamism and Muslims. This religious reference to negative aspects of the common political past and its traces in the present problems discursively constructs the American image as the ‘other’ in Islamist imagination of the nation. There was a tendency of scepticism on what was behind the attacks in Turkish press coverage of the 9/11. Newspapers portrayed a distrusted and unreliable image whilst the strategy of euphemising worked for blaming the USA in linguistic representation of the responsible social actors and circumstances which fed terrorism.

In both the pro-secularists and pro-Islamists newspapers, the metaphor of movie manifested the stereotypical image of the USA in Turkey. With a reference to American movies under the title of ‘Death fiction reality’, Zaman authors argued that the terrorists gained their inspiration from American culture (13.09.2001, p.8) and added: 'They were prepared for the Star Wars but they had an unexpected beat.' Karakis and Kutay described the September 11th event as a scenario which the USA had also participated in, and claimed that the assassination was reported to authorities in advance. More interestingly, they referred to a special expression from the Ottoman times for using an allegory in reminding and judging American power in the Gulf War: 'Do not be supercilious my sultan, there is an Allah greater than you!' This Islamic reference to Allah and connection to an ‘evil’ past event with a present one (the 9/11 attacks) reminded a heavenly justice in relation to using a super power like a sultan.

Ataol Behramoglu (Cumhuriyet 15.10.2001, p.6) wrote on 9/11 from a supra-national perspective: 'All the wars in the world, all the pain or happiness are
our common experiences. Or they shall be… Even though this is just a far dream for now, it is worthy of imagination.' In Behramoglu’s expression, 9/11 was mentioned as a common experience of humanity. He addressed the pain and happiness, in doing so, he pointed to the importance of human dimension in the war, the victims of the attacks. This reminds us of what is generally ignored in the analysis of international relations. In linguistic expressions of the wars, ‘the state is targeted’ discourse is used which functions to justify the interests of nation-state, despite what it takes; however the fact is the individuals are real victims or responsible of wars. At the first anniversary of September the 11th, Cumhuriyet (11.09.2002, p.4) commented on the issue of internationalisation of terrorism and the attacks proved how necessary international cooperation was in order to overcome terrorism. It was noted that globalisation in economy revealed some economic imbalances more clearly and it would be a great fault to ignore injustices. Using linguistic expressions to emphasise the social and economic injustices demonstrates the social democratic side of Cumhuriyet and the leftist tone of Kemalist nationalist perspective that was clearer until the AKP came into power in November 2002.

Moreover, regarding Turkey’s interests, Kemalist coverage launched to form a direct link between Turkey’s domestic and external relations in the context of 9/11. America was blamed by using a sceptical discourse. Orhan Bursali (Cumhuriyet 11.09.03, p.06) argued that the USA utilised what happened on September 11th by saying it was the greatest excuse of history which helped the conservatives who had totally got hold of Bush to start putting their attempts to make the 21st century the ‘American Century’ into practice. With regard to these attempts, it was sceptically questioned whether the USA avoided preventing this attack on purpose of Americanising the Middle East and around. More importantly, Bursali commented on the relation between 11 September 2001 and Turkey’s military coup of 12 September 1980. By constructing a linkage between two events, he address to 'the pawns of
Washington' and 'betrayals' in the land of Mustafa Kemal who played a role in serving to USA's ‘Islamic blockade’ plan by supporting Islamism in Turkey against the Soviet Union:

“Turkey has been suffering from the 11th September of the USA. At the same time, from its own 12 September 1980 had two faces; the first one was the USA behind the coup and the second was the incapability of our politicians to rule the country. At the same time, members of El-Qaeda and the Taliban of Afghanistan were the greatest friends of the White House brought about by itself. The ‘Green Belt’ in other words, ‘Islamic blockade’ plan was in force against the Soviet Union and Turkey was among the most significant players of this plan. The ones who grabbed power started to apply American Islamism propaganda in the country by working as the pawns of Washington. This was one of the greatest betrayals of ‘the most Kemalists’ to the land of Mustafa Kemal and to his basic principles. The things we have experienced are the results of this policy. The bond between September 11th and September 12th is not an irony of fate.”

However, Zaman newspaper and Islamists make different readings on history. Bulac identified ‘Islamophobia’ as being constitutive of new ‘others’ of the Western world (Zaman 21.01.2004, p.7). According to him, the hatred against Communism and the Soviet Union in the Cold War period has now been directed against Islam as a religion and to the Islamic world as a block. The order that governs today’s international relations has been shaped based on othering Islam. During this time great tragedies will take place on Islamic lands under the deep influence of the West and its ‘blind hatred against Islamism’. He grounds these argumentations with negative representation of Western culture in the terms of racism, ethnocentrism and hegemony:

“The Western world doesn’t have the experience to live together and share things with the others due to its history and the cultural codes it has today. The only thing that human life understands from the deep wisdom it possesses is to establish hegemony. A self-centred culture always has the potential to turn into racism or ethnocentrism. The Western world has always sought an ‘other’ that is a source of threat to it, brought a policy to cover it and established hegemony over that.”
Contrary to this character of the Western world, Ali Bulac (Zaman 12.02.2004, p.6) paid attention to the feeling of ‘belonging to a whole’ in the Islamic world, which he based on no country’s claim that it is different from or superior to another. By making use of this strategy of justification he held the allegory of Hadj, he claimed that totalitarianism was opposite to the spirit of Islam. Man, woman, young, old, black, white, northern, southern... Many people around the world come together in the Holy Land to perform their pilgrimage duties. Thus, he assumed that an observation on Hadj might show characteristic differences between the Western and Islamic world:

“When hajis come out of ihram you see many different clothes. It is as if the international fashion show of the culture of humanity has started on the streets of two cities. Then you will understand that Western life style is totalitarian and paranoid actually, that it can’t tolerate another lifestyle, differences and orders an aggressive attitude at the level of official policies to eliminate all colours and lines.”

As it has been demonstrated, the Islamist press was interested in the effects that 9/11 had on the Islamic world. On the other hand, liberal leftist Radikal took a different position in the terms of individual rights and freedoms. Haluk Sahin (Radikal 10.09.2003, p.9) elaborated that ‘the entire world’, and particularly the USA, keep on paying the cost of September 11th and that this will continue for many more years. He named these costs as restricted freedoms, tensed nerves, increased bigotries and social paranoia... From a liberal nationalist perspective, ‘we are all in the same boat strategy’ was presented in the terms of international paradigm change after 9/11. Ahmet Insel (Radikal 30.12.2002, p.4) also point out the costs of ‘following the track of new imperial interventionism’. In his analysis, not just Americans, but also around 1,000 civil Afghans who paid such salvage to Afghanistan with their lives, were also buried under the wreckage of the twin towers. The rapid collapse of the Taliban regime and the short term results of the military intervention organised by the USA, justified the ones supporting the policy
by using a greater violence against violence. Therefore, his side, which consists of people who were against war as a principle, was worn down by the things experienced after September 11th. Paying attention to the general costs of the events and change in the world contribute to the debate from an internationalist approach. It did not reduce the problem to a national one by warning about the negative results and the continuity of the common future of all the nations.

In the context of rejection, the adoption of the hegemony of violence, using terrorism as a political means of struggle, Aydin Engin (Cumhuriyet 11.09.2002) criticised the general perspectives on the meaning of September 11th in Turkey. He gave tangible examples of answers if one asked what 9/11 is: “It is the final date for the submission of the candidate parliamentarian lists to the Supreme Election Board.” or “It is Wednesday; are you asking that?” These statements illustrate ordinary perceptions of time in the individual or national level, portraying an ignorance of international events. The Islamist perspective was: “It is the holy jihad of Islamism against the American devil. It is a perfect lesson taught by Muslim warriors to the ones who were conspiring against Islamism… If September 11th is not celebrated as a feast, this is because of the cruelty of a presuming state; it is because people were forced to be without imams.” In his linguistic designation, parallel to Cumhuriyet’s secularist perspective, Engin sarcastically criticised the Islamist view of the world by his lexical choices and exaggeration of typical Islamist arguments against the Kemalist state. This corresponds with the domestic power struggle on redefinition of Turkish nation-state identity. In the last decade, Islamists have justified their efforts in challenging the Kemalism tradition and secularist policies by making use of suppression discourse in blaming Kemalists for assertive policies that limited their freedom of expression or religion. Specifically, the post-modern military intervention process of 28 February and its consequences employ a past trauma which unites Islamists like cement. This is why Engin deconstructed
this blaming of others or self-victimisation strategy with giving a sarcastic example of Islamic discourse: “If September 11th is not celebrated as a feast, this is because of the cruelty of a presuming state, it is because of people were forced to be without imams.” Kemalists believe that Islamists misuse the discourse of suppression, that is to say, the state intervention is related to the regime and fundamental principles of the Republican system, the secularist policies do not touch people’s beliefs or way of life. They contrarily justify it in arguing that the Turkish state supports Diyanet (has the largest budget among other state institutions) and provides religious service (imams are state officers) in every mosque in every corner of the country. That means the nation is not without imams or religion and has never been. This point in this example illustrates how a media coverage of an external issue (9/11 events) simultaneously reproduces ideologies, contested understandings of the nation in discourse and, last but not least, the domestic power struggle on identification of a nation-state identity.

Engin went on to give other examples of answers to the “What is 9/11” question which he defined as ‘reasonable’ answers based on knowledge: “It was a blind reaction sourced by misery against the horrible attacks of American imperialism against the modest communities of the Middle East and Middle Asia.” This is can be seen as a leftist perceptive which he was opposed to “considering the terror of the modest as righteous”. Instead of this, he offered defending peace for the sake of peace without bending in front of the power of terrorism and the terrorism of power. Lastly, he demonstrated the pragmatist, in-humanist approach seeking to maximise national interests: “Certainly it is a milestone in the new world order… In this sense, Turkey must take a really delicate approach to foreign policy. We shall not forget that the world is being re-designed and Turkey must have a most advantageous strategy in this process.” After all these possible answers and perspectives, he invited the reader to come up with their own answers in the anniversary of
September 11th and ask once more what could be done for peace in a time when the clouds of war were gathering above the country.

5.3. Decision-making on Turkey’s Role in Iraq War

In this part, Turkish media’s coverage of Iraq War exemplifies how competing memories of the past would accommodate different perspectives on present problems of domestic and foreign policies. Moreover, analysing different perspectives on the war in Iraq as a foreign policy issue demonstrates ongoing clash of contested narratives of the nation for domination.

On the morning of 1 March 2003, the day of decision-making on the Iraq War in the Turkish National Grand Assembly (TNGA), the concept of American invasion was used in the pro-secularist discourse against the government’s will of allying with the USA. In Cumhuriyet, it was argued that once the TNGA permitted foreign soldiers, the USA would have the chance to settle its soldiers in the most strategic areas of the Turkish land. In the following passage from Cumhuriyet (Cetinkaya, 01.03.2003, p.3), the linguistic construction of common political past was realised in temporal reference to M. Kemal Ataturk and Turkey in his presidential period. The notion of national independence was emphasised in comparison between the 1930s and 2000s:

“The issue Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was most sensitive about was independence. Ataturk preserved his independence even against his closest allies. Ataturk’s Turkey is now under invasion by American soldiers. 60–70 thousands of soldiers will stay in Turkish land for six months. There is 1930’s Turkey and here is 2003’s Turkey. You do the evaluation!”

In Kemalist discourse, ‘intertextuality’ commonly appears with references to the times of M. Kemal Ataturk. Linguistically, the most noteworthy detail in
this example is the usage of pronouns with regard to Ataturk. Without any meaning lost in translation from Turkish to English, 'Ataturk preserved his independence even against his closest allies', shows nation-state identity's incarnation in Ataturk's identity in the Kemalist perspective of the nation. The continuity of ‘Ataturk’s Turkey’ from the 1930s to 2000s expresses the immortality and eternity features of Kemalism in their understanding of the nation. The strategy of perspectivation is remarkable in the expression of 'Ataturk's Turkey is now under invasion by American soldiers.' Here, America is constructed as not only threatening Turkey in general terms, but also as a danger for 'Turkey in the Kemalist imagination.' This example strengthens the Otherness of America in the Turkey's national imagination. Moreover it helps to the writer to transfer a resistance discourse to a change from Ataturk's Turkey to a different Turkey in the 2000s.

Apparently, Kemalists tend to refer to the times of founding the Turkish Republic to define the concepts of ‘we’ and ‘them’. The next quotation from Ilhan Selcuk’s article reminds this Republican narrative and affirms that the historical struggle is still alive in Turkey today, which might be seen in the case of the Iraq War (Cumhuriyet, 01.03.2003 p.2):

“Kemalism is the Anatolian style of ‘Enlightenment’ in European civilization history; it has been the first in an Islamic community. Are there any other countries in the world which were founded by fighting against both internal and external powers?... Unfortunately, the Armenian and Greek diasporas still continue their struggles in Europe and the USA today. The struggle between the powers of Lausanne and Sevres is updated... The USA is persisting on settling in Iraq. One question: Will the USA settle in Northern Iraq to be friends with Turkey, or to divide Anatolia? ... The question becomes hotter day by day; does the USA want to found a puppet Kurdish state in Iraq which would be affiliated to it in fact? Does our ‘strategic partner’ persist on dominating Iraq to set the Anatolian people at odds with each other? ... Is the Iraq War of the USA an implicit war against Turkey in fact?”
The common intertextuality in Kemalist discourse again works in this quotation. As shown in the previous case studies, particularly in the case of Turkey’s EU integration, Kemalism is supposed to be the ideology as a mental framework that transforms Anatolian Muslim society to an enlightened, secular, rational, European society. In the article, Selcuk mentioned how Kemalists succeeded this transformation despite the internal and external enemies. In a nutshell, in the Kemalist narrative of nation building, signing the Sèvres Treaty after World War One by the Ottomans was a betrayal as the acceptance of selling and dividing the country. By the victory of the Independence War against external European powers and internal powers such as Armenians, Greeks, Kemalists replaced it with the Lausanne Treaty in the 1920s. At the same time, they were faced with local Islamic resistance to state authority and Kemalist central government. With a departure from this national history, he questions whether the USA, with its allies in Europe and Turkey, implicitly are in a war against Turkey to try and divide the country. What is more, his way of adverting the 'Armenian and Greek Diasporas ' gives evidence of how Kemalists perceive non-Muslim citizens of Turkey, essentially as the treacherous enemy within. This discourse analysis reveals that this specific Kemalist identification and worldview reflects their interpretation of Turkey’s current internal and external relations. Findings strongly verify the interconnectivity of national identity and foreign policy discourse, and demonstrate how they reproduce each other.

“This is illegal and inhumane in every sense. The people who put Turkey in the position of a beggar, bargainers, that means war provocateur and a hired soldier, and their supporters are not patriots, rather, they degrade the country, stain the national honour... Though these values may have no meaning for some, the man on the street, the ordinary citizen takes breath with them; if they are still upright despite all the economic troubles, this is because they possess such values... So, let’s shout ‘NO WAR!’ in the great demonstration to be held in Ankara today! ... And call the political, military and other administrative powers for giving an ear to this wish.”
In the excerpt above, Ataol Behramoglu (Cumhuriyet 01.03.2003 p.6) wrote that the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s decision would cause an invasion of the country by American soldiers; therefore he called people for demonstration to say ‘No’ to war. Moreover, Behramoglu insinuatingly expressed the economic political dimension of allying with the USA in Iraq. In expression of ‘they’ and ‘some’, he implicitly blamed the government and its supporters for putting national honour behind the economic interests. He claimed that national honour and patriotism were more important than material benefits to Turkish people. He naturalised these nationalist ideas in his words of the man on the street takes breath with these values. In this text, ‘no’ decision on the ‘illegal and inhuman’ war in Iraq is represented as a general opinion of ‘the ordinary citizen’. The passage also points out the Kemalist idea that Ankara does not represent what the Turkish people want for their country and nation.

The Cumhuriyet newspaper justified opposition discourse to the government’s policy on the Iraq War by referring to the Turkish public opinion. It was reported that according to the survey of SONAR, 83 per cent of the citizens did not want American soldiers in the country (Cumhuriyet 01.03.2003 p.6). The opposition was covered including both Kemalist CHP and Islamist AKP supporters’ protests (ibid. p.8): “Since yesterday evening, ‘Peace Guard’ members of youth branches of CHP have started keeping ‘Peace Guard’ in Guvenpark opposite the Turkish Grand National Assembly where the war license will be negotiated”. “Islamists protested against the AKP government for the first time because of its Iraq policy... The first ‘Friday Protest’ since the AKP government was made in Beyazit yesterday.” Cumhuriyet reported that at the end of the Friday prayer, a young group of 500 people, most of whom were Islamists, gathered around the mosque and shouted “Allahuekber!”. The group who had just come out of the mosque and the turbaned women that had been waiting at the square, shouted against the USA, UK and Israel with the slogans they held in their hands: “No War”,

225
“We won’t be the soldiers of the USA”, “We won’t be an enforcer!”, “No bargaining over the blood of brothers.” It was claimed that demonstrators accused Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of being a partner to the co-conspirators and cruelty.

In the last example, both Islamist and secularist discourses are portrayed as they opposed the Iraq war using the Peace Guard or Friday Protest. It can be said that common motivations and concerns as being against American imperialism or intervention to a Muslim country, constitute a collective voice of ‘No War’. The USA image as a foreign ‘threat’ unites the opposing domestic powers. That is because anti-Americanism is a popular discourse in Turkey.

Relevantly, the Hurriyet newspaper (01.12.2002, p.4) informed that the ‘No War in Iraq’ demonstration was organised by the ‘No War in Iraq Coordination Council’ with the participation of 140 civil society organisations which included various unions, trade associations and political parties and more than ten thousand citizens. What was prominent and significant in the coverage of the protest was its concern with a speech made in the demonstration. In the cited speech, it was claimed that the process which started on September 11th brought the war closer, and the USA, which accused Iraq for having weapons of mass destruction which posed a threat to all humanity, was the greatest manufacturer of these weapons in fact. The USA wanted to use Turkish soldiers for its aims in Iraq.

Beyond this anti-war discourse, in Hurriyet’s coverage there were some who considered the war as a ‘means of profit’. In related to these profit calculations, Yalcın Dogan (Hurriyet, 11.12.2002, p.10) argued that it was time to persuade Turkey due to the fate of the country linked to the triangle of the USA–EU–Turkey and the binary of Islam-Christianity after the events of 9/11. This point also demonstrated why the AKP was reluctant to say ‘no’ to the USA’s demands:
“There is a single title for the bargaining between Bush in Washington and Tayyip Erdogan: ‘Take the bases, give the EU!’ or ‘Take the EU, give the bases!’… Turkey will open its bases and the USA will increase its pressure on the EU! … It is evident that, Tayyip Erdogan doesn’t show a negative attitude against these wishes of Bush in order to empower himself for the EU. In the meantime, Bush considers Tayyip Erdogan within the perspective of September 11th, and mostly within the framework of a meeting and consent between ‘Islamic-Christian’ civilizations … Soldier, base, land, here’s the issue, here is the fate.”

The excerpt above introduces three cases of interdiscursivity that need to be underlined. One concerns the interdiscursivity with the discourse on 'pragmatism' which is considered as a cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy regarding its relations with the USA, including the EU. The second one entails the interdiscursivity with the post 9/11 paradigm that reviews the importance of Turkey's Muslim identity in the international politics and its meaning for Christian West civilisation seeking a moderate role model for other Islamic countries. It changed Turkey's position within the framework of 'the clash of civilisations' (Huntington 2002) and main references changed from being Western and secular to being Muslim and democratic (Tank 2006 p.468). The third one relates to the realism is found to be in Turkey's rational approach towards the West where foreign policy is seen as the arena of seeking to maximise nation-state interests. This realist perspective on foreign policy reproduces the hegemony of the USA power in the international politics and its role in Turkey's relations with the EU, which does not challenge it.

In this sense, the best seller Hurriyet newspaper columnists seemed to be taking a realist, interest-based approach to Turkey’s role in the Middle East and the world. For instance, Cuneyt Ulsever noted (Hurriyet 26.12.2002, p.7) that life meant energy and trade. This portrayed as the ‘inevitable logic’ in the emerging global world at the beginning of the 21st century. He believed, whether Turkey participated or not, the USA’s efforts would determinate new
geographical borders. Based on these arguments, he suggested that the right question was not whether Turkey would join the Iraq War. The right question was whether Turkey would take an active role in the new order that established in the Middle East, even a better question was at which side Turkey wanted to be in the newly established order of the Middle East. This example shows Turkey's search for a new role and identity in changing international circumstances of the last decade.

Like Ulsever, Mehmet Ali Birand's (Hurriyet, 09.01.2003, p.5) contribution to the debate supported the realist perspective on the Iraq War. Birand believed that the USA was establishing the new order and that this operation would change the Middle East, making it unrecognisable. Washington settled into a region of the world with the Afghanistan operation made after September 11th. Now it’s the turn of the Middle East. He underlined Turkey had to think ‘great’ and see all the dimensions of this situation. With a departure from this point, he draws attention to the fact that Turkey was face to face with a basic preference:

“Turkey will either cooperate with the USA in accordance with its own interests and not participate in unproductive bargains and thus will have a voice in the new order; or will be stuck within in-party conflicts, unproductive reactions of Arabic countries and ideological incentives. There is not a middle way for this. Policies to please all haven’t been discovered, yet. If it is desired to put restrictions and coquetry into practice that will make Washington feel sorry, if there is that much courage, if a suicide is desired for both the party and the country, then we shall at least take side with Saddam and the Arabs... Foreign policy won’t work with half-expectancy.”

In the expression of topos of new order, Birand imagined Turkey as a pivotal country in its neighbourhood and defined taking sides with the Arabs as suicide for the AKP and Turkey. Apparently, it was not an identity-based approach to foreign policy. He stressed on that Turkey should chose its side. Contrary to this Westernist perspective, the Islamist writers disagreed with
Birand by defining that the red line of Turkey was fighting against the Muslims and Arabs. As my study defines the historical process of emergence of the New Turkey and reveals that it has been emerging through the power struggle of contested perspectives on Turkish nation-state identity, these examples effectively demonstrate different perceptions on Turkey, Turkey's place in the world and its relationship with the neighbours and other international actors.

Ali Bulac (Zaman, 08.11.2010 p.6) constructed a collective ‘we’ discourse for Muslims in noting Turkey could take decisions against the Islamic and Arab world or participate in such opposing alliances, but could never be a fighter against the Muslims. He addressed to the common past for justification of his argumentation: “Mustafa Kemal, who knew what Yavuz meant to do, was aware that Turkey had to avoid fighting against the Muslims and Arabs despite the fact that the New Turkish Republic put its Islamic history aside and put great distances between itself and the Arab world.” This statement reinforced the Islamic character of the Turkish nation and its continuity from Ottoman times to the present day. This was because Muslimhood of Turkey was not negligible, even secularist Republican policies ignored the importance of the Muslim world. On these opinions, he concluded that the same ‘reflex’, religious sentiments caused the rejection of the Permit of 1 March 2003 in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

It is important to note that this culturalist discourse and blaming Kemalists, positions Turkey far from the Islamic world and reconstructed the AKP’s foreign policy, particularly after 2007. This world view of Islamists was similarly used for redefinition of Turkey's role in the region and world. In Zaman it was argued (26.05.2007 p.7) that the USA, or another power, cannot shape Iraq and the region. Certainly Turkey can; but Turkey can manage this by trying other methods and ways. It can be said that this argument represents Davutoglu (2006) influence on Turkish foreign policy, particularly his principle of 'zero problems with neighbours', improving
economical, cultural and historical relations. The importance of soft power and diplomacy in new Turkish foreign policy is indicated with a stress on developing other methods and instruments in relation to Iraq. More noteworthy, 'Turkey can do what other powers cannot do' argumentation signals how Islamists map Turkey as a regional pivotal power that is capable of reshaping Iraq and the region. In this context, it can be argued that a 'new geographic imagination' under the AKP government is based on the concepts of civilisational geopolitics. In this new geographic imagination Turkey is located outside Western civilisation and it is imagined as the leader of its own civilisation, which changes the definitions of 'us' and 'others' (Bilgin and Bilgic 2011 p.173).

Beyond all these interest-identity accounts on the war against Iraq, the ethical and legal dimensions of the war were taken into account by Radikal newspaper authors. Fuat Keyman (Radikal 23.02.2003 p.5) assumed that Turkey might not choose the way of supporting American policies in Iraq. Keyman criticised America’s foreign policy’s discourse on the global fight against terrorism which was just security and military based, while the USA was disregarding the serious global problems for economic, cultural and humanitarian reasons. He rationalised his ethical argument based on a consideration of international law and norms. According to him, the USA divided the world into two polar as ‘we/friends’ and ‘others/enemies’ in order to empower its hegemony and unilateral world vision. After 9/11, American foreign policy makers in the Bush period imposed a mentality of ‘I am powerful, I am right’ on international organisations and actors such as the United Nations and the NATO. What was more outstanding in his remarks was the point that addressed the lack of legitimacy in the USA’s intervention in Iraq. Based on this, he argued the matter was not just peculiar to the case of Iraq, but also this illegitimate war constituted a problem for existence and the role of international organisations and law in the new world order and new power relations. This can be summarised as Talat Seringul (Zaman
09.12.2001, p.10) noted what was remarkably lost in New York was not the Twin Towers; it was seeking for peace lost in political blindness.

All in all, the data analysis demonstrated that the USA image as a foreign ‘other’ can unite different discourses of Turkish nationalism. Apart from the fact that they had different motivations for opposition to the USA hegemony in the Middle East, dominant discourse was also an anti-war discourse. Thus, the interest-based approach of realists and pragmatists could not work to integrate Turkey into the war, at least on 1 March 2003.

5.4. Iraq War in Turkish Media

The USA Senate issued a report on Iraq in July 2004 and stated that all information the intelligence services, such as the CIA, revealed as an excuse for the invasion were false. Neither weapons of mass destruction nor any bond between Saddam and El-Qaeda were detected. The New York Times and Washington Post newspapers somehow confessed that they had become an instrument in an unfair invasion and manipulated the society (Zaman 20.11.2004, p.7). As noted before, while these newspapers published the news coming from the White House on their front pages, they didn’t give much attention to counter information or opinions, thus they played an important role in the invasion by influencing and manipulating public opinion for supporting the war in Iraq. Considering these facts and news from Iraq, Turkish newspapers kept anti-American discourse during the Iraq War. Different than others, the leftist Radikal (Alkan 03.09.2004, p.4) newspaper held a different stand with a 'we are in the same boat' argumentation in its understanding of the responsibility against the tragedies experienced in the world:
“We must show reaction against the tragedies experienced in the USA, Iraq and Russia. It is not enough just to criticise the war and the pains the USA keeps going in Iraq. We must be able to criticise the children taken hostage in Ossetia, in the same manner. If we keep praising Hitler and Osama bin Laden when it serves our benefits, we’ll witness the slaughter of more children and the murder of workers from Nepal, just because of the fact that they are Buddhists, destruction of the twin towers, Madimak Hotel and the expansion of the belief that Islamism is a religion that hugs terrorism. And we’ll be responsible for all these to some extent.”

As was indicated in the last section, Hurriyet columnists seemed to support allying with the USA in shaping newly emerging Iraq and Middle East. However, the news reports in dealing with Iraq turned out to be critical of the situation. It was highlighted that the bond between El-Qaeda-Saddam, which the USA showed as an excuse for its invasion of Iraq, was never revealed. The number of soldiers the USA army have lost in Iraq had extended beyond the number of the people killed in terror attacks organised in the USA on 11 September 2001 (Hurriyet, 27.12.2006, p.7). It was questioned how the USA had turned the world upside down for eight years after the attacks of September 11th, and that the world still had doubts about this ‘greatest destruction’. USA’s President Bush invaded this country claiming that it brought ‘freedom and democracy to Iraq’. But the situation was that more than one million people lost their lives in Iraq in five years, more than four thousand American soldiers had been killed and more than thirty thousand were injured (Hurriyet, 11.09.2008, p.6).

Ergun Yildizoglu’s (Cumhuriyet 11.09.2007, p.4) approach to the USA’s ‘invade’ in Iraq constructed a specific Western image of Kemalist Turkish nationalism. He used the metaphor of the ‘white men’ with a ‘noble duty’ to describe the USA’s role in Iraq. According to his perspective, due to its inability to invade and become imperial in this century, the USA both had to harmonise the economic systems of underdeveloped countries with its own
economic system and form a political system that would enable leaders to allow this ‘project of being civilised’ to come into power, by the way it created cultural conditions that reproduce imperialism. It can be said that this coverage of the Iraq War from the Cumhuriyet newspaper demonstrates controversy faced of Kemalist Turkish nationalist imagination, which is having a love-hate relationship with the West. Adoring the West, arguing about being Western and in the West, but permanently and inevitably sceptical to it.

Similarly, Emre Kongar (Cumhuriyet 11.09.2006, p.3) argued that Americans were trying to understand how the largest public opinion against the USA was formed in Turkey. He explained this phenomenon was in fact, the result of the USA's faults. The first wrong step they took was in Turkey in empowering Islamists and bringing them to power. The coalition government under the presidency of Ecevit, forced this government into an election, when in fact it was planning to remain in force for two more years, and brought the AKP to power. Thus, the secular and democratic governmental structure in Turkey was sacrificed to the ‘Moderate Islamic State model’ for short-term interests. Islamists already had anti-American political and ideological feelings. In the meantime, they faced the opposition of modernist groups in favour of a secular and democratic governmental structure as they supported the Moderate Islamic State model. As a result no one was left to look at the USA through objective eyes. This image of the USA refers to a direct connection with the domestic power struggle in Turkey while portraying the AKP as a part of the USA’s strategic project in the Middle East. Therefore, anti-imperialist Kemalist nationalists tend to be anti-American with a belief of the Islamist government is backed by the USA.

On the Islamist side, the Iraq War was covered by Zaman from an anti-American Islamist perspective, but with different political motivations and justifications from the pro-secularist newspapers. Ali Bulac noted that the
situation was sufficient to meet the legal definition of genocide in Iraq (20.11.2004, p.7):

“The cruelty a Muslim society is exposed to, has now reached horrible levels. Occupation forces are slaughtering kids, women, elderly and civil people regardless of any religious day. They invade the mosques, destroy Allah’s homes and cruelly kill the ones crawling on the ground in pain. While leaving Vietnam, American soldiers had raped hundreds of thousands of women. Now they are raping tens of thousands of Muslim women in Iraq.”

In Bulac’s analysis, negative predication of Americans as the out-group is a dominant strategy that is othering the USA, even demonizing it. Intertextuality is incurred with a reference to the philosopher John Naisbitt’s opinions about Bush’s fundamentalist Christian identity. It was argued when Bush mentioned the word ‘crusade’ twice, that he didn’t use this word coincidentally or for any other reason apart from its literal meaning. Bulac supported Naisbitt’s arguments by giving figures from Iraq such as American soldiers put crosses on their tanks, insulted the Q’uran or swept over the sacred feelings of Muslims disrespectfully and with hatred. According to him, the battle between civilisations was realised on Muslim lands, on the basis of this ‘sick culture’ which was polluting their sacred beliefs. Bulac concluded in noting that these were all Muslims’ problems: ‘We are all interested.’ In these linguistic expressions, the Islamist ‘we’ identification was for Muslims as opposed to the ‘they’ identification as that of Christians. In representation of the Iraq War, referring to the Q’uran, Allah, mosque and Muslim women reminds the people that they are a Muslim nation and discursively strengthens this feeling. He defined what was sacred for Muslims and made a hasty generalisation about Americans and their culture (sick) prompted by his perception of what was happening in Iraq. Consequently, this Islamist discourse reproduced anti-Americanist discourse in Turkey through the Iraq War.
In order to have a deeper understanding of ‘We are all interested’ discourse and Islamist definition of ‘we’, the following text presents a justification of the argument in noting “we feel responsible for other Muslims in Turkey’s socio-cultural geography” (Zaman 27.01.2007, p.5). In the text, the borders of Turkey’s socio-cultural geography is mapped in the Balkans, Caucasians, Middle Asia, whole of the Middle East and the middle of Africa. This definition of geography is based on the Islamic historical past of the nation in the Ottoman Empire lands of Anatolia, Middle East, North Africa, Balkans and the Caucasians. Otherwise, this map would include Malaysia or Indonesia which have Muslim populations too. But, Turkey’s interest in the defined land seems the idea of Muslim brotherhood in given examples such as the people of Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq. The USA, as a non-Muslim power, is called an ‘other’, a foreign power in Turkey’s historical geography:

‘Political geography of Turkey is as defined in the National Pact; socio-cultural geography extends to Balkans, Caucasians, Middle Asia, whole of the Middle East and the middle of Africa. All pleasant and unpleasant events on this geography have an influence on our people. We feel sorry for a Caucasian tribe, to the people of Palestine and Iraq just as we feel sorry for Bosnia. We feel responsible for all this geography. The region is under the invasions and pressures of foreign powers today; this increases anger in Turkey. What does feeling sorry for the people of Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq have to do with ‘ethnic nationalism’ or ‘racist chauvinism’.

This text discursively constructs Islamist understanding of ‘our people’ based on the aforementioned Turkey’s socio-cultural geography. This imagination of Turkey relocates it in its neighbourhood and inspires new Turkish Foreign Policy in redefinition of who are the foreigners of the nation. As noted in previous sections, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s culturalist Strategic Depth perspective on Turkish Foreign Policy has brought redefinitions in Turkey’s international identity and its relationship with other nations. Davutoglu argues that Turkey should not insist on being Western
(Fisher-Onar 2013, p.64). It embraces Turkey’s position at the crossroads of civilisations and targets to embrace Turkey’s political, economic and cultural reach within multilateral foreign policy and rhythmic diplomacy. This vision entails rehabilitation of the Ottoman era in a way predicated on two pillars of *historical depth* and *geographical depth*. For an observation on how these redefinitions are negotiated in public discourse, the next section observes how the Turkish media represented the new discourse of Turkish Foreign Policy.

### 5.5. Reimagination of Turkey: the Debate of the Axis Shift in Western Orientation of Turkish Foreign Policy in Turkish Media

By highlighting linkages between domestic and foreign policy making, this section aims to demonstrate domestic debate on Turkey’s international identity and whether there is a shift in the orientation of the country, namely from Westernisation to neo-Ottomanism or Islamisation. On the axis shift debate Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan answered the comments (Taraf 11.06.2010, p9): “We not only share the same geography with the Arabs, breath the same air or live the same seasons, we share the same history, we have the feeling of a common culture, common civilisation.” He further stated (Taraf 13.06.2010, p.8): “Foreign newspapers claiming this serve for Israel. Who are you serving for then?” Apparently, the definition of ‘we’ in Turkey's official discourse has been changed by discursively addressing common political past, present and culture with the Arabs. The Prime Minister went to Kuwait and Qatar and also addressed to the common future with the Muslim countries (Hurriyet 16.01.2011, p.7): “We are together, that’s enough for us!” and added: “If obstacles are removed, fifty-seven Islamic countries will become self-sufficient with its production, technology and brain power.” The Prime Minister both caressed the soul of the hosts with these words and blinks at the conservative votes inside. Nevertheless, it
has been argued that Turkey has settled the Middle East as the place emptied by the EU in its foreign policy since Turkey’s European Union process has suspended in 2006. The Middle East politics has occupied a privileged place in Turkish foreign policy as the times of the Ottoman Empire (Walker 2013, p.156). On the issue, the President of the Turkish Republic, Abdullah Gul (Taraf 15.06.2010) stated that it is either ‘lack of knowledge or a bad will’ if one commented on Turkey’s relationship with Muslim countries as a deviation of axis. Turkey participated in 98 per cent of the decisions given by the EU in foreign policy. According to him, nothing was more nonsense than discussing Turkey’s axis by looking at its relationship with its neighbour or any other country in its region.

Among the newspapers that are analysed in this research, the Kemalist *Cumhuriyet* claimed that there has been an axis shift in Turkish Foreign Policy’s Western Orientation. *Cumhuriyet* empowered this opposing stand by referring to oppositional political actors as Onur Oymen from Kemalist CHP declared Turkey was playing a leading role in radical Islamic countries (Cumhuriyet 12.06.2010 p.8). Deniz Bolukbasi from the MHP said that under AKP’s power, Turkey was experiencing a backbone deviation not an axis deviation. Ahmedinejad, Hizbullah’s leader Nasrallah and Hamas’s leader Haniye were in Erdogan’s photo frame. In related to the resistance to change in Turkey’s identity, it was not surprising that *Cumhuriyet* occasionally cited from the members of ethno-nationalist MHP, who had the same strong concerns in preserving Turkish national identity as the Kemalists. It was reported that the leader of MHP, Devlet Bahceli stated the centre had gone away from Ankara many years ago and that it had already become affiliated with the axis of Erivan, Erbil, Brussels and Washington.

Whilst the official state discourse is changing and redefining the relationship with other nations, it is important to observe what alternative perspectives think about it in order to see the big picture of Turkey from a wider political discourse. Therefore, this section is devoted to doing a media analysis in an
effort to shed light on the power struggle on redefining Turkey’s identity in international relations.

While opposition parties express their unrest against AKP’s relationship with the Islam world, some other political actors in Turkey’s big picture such as big business patrons, liberals, leftists and even most of the Kurdish people, were seen supporting government policies and positioning themselves in changing power relations up until 2011. For instance, it was reported (Taraf 17.06.2010 p.10) that businessmen in the East Mediterranean thought that it was wrong to evaluate Turkey’s recent intense cooperation with the Arab world as an ‘axis deviation’. It was presented as Turkey's target was extended. Kazim Celiker (Taraf 15.06.2010 p.9) justified Turkey’s relations with these countries in the AKP period by noting the axis inevitably deviated towards the trade as the consequence of the global crisis. The developments in global economy played a great role in Turkey’s turning towards the Middle East and Far East (Taraf 20.06.2010 p.11). It was reported that the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USA, Gordon said (Taraf 13.06.2010, p.12): “Turkey’s role in the Middle East is not a preference against the West; it is a part of its foreign policy.” Liberal press supported AKP government's policies, in particular Turkish foreign policy activism, with such as the news entitled (Taraf 15.06.2010 p.11): ‘The EU approval to Turkey’s axis’, reporting Stefan Fule put an end to the comments on Turkey’s axis has deviated, it has moved away from the West’ with these words: 'I don’t think Turkey’s steps are in conflict with the EU membership process.' In the liberal discourse, we see the strategy of justification and perpetuation for ongoing transformation in Turkey and Turkey's relationships with other countries. That means, the liberal press contributed to reconstruction of Turkey's post-Kemalist nation-state identity.

Concerning this new political atmosphere in Turkey, the following section analyses Kemalist arguments in the axis shift debate as the opposition discourse, then the paper turns to analyse other discourses advocating official
discourse and concludes with remarks relating to the new emerging challenges of TFP.

5.5.1. Kemalist Discourse on the New Turkish Foreign Policy: Islamisation of Turkey

In this context of Turkey’s partnership with other countries, Oztin Akguc (Cumhuriyet 25.07.2010 p.12) suggested Turkey should remain neither in the axis of the West nor Arab-Islam. Turkey shall be in its own axis and shall move in the direction of its own axis: “It cannot be successful in that if it follows the EU, obeys the USA or walks through the Arab-Islam states... Main theme of our National Anthem is in the line ‘I have lived freely for all eternity’. To live freely can be managed by forming its own axis, not by deviating towards the axis of the East.” Lexical choices in the text underline the national sovereignty and the will of independence. This argumentation is justified with the lyrics of the Turkish National Anthem. The selected sentence of “I have lived freely for all eternity” discursively reproduces the image of the Turkish nation that has never lived under any other state’s political authority in its history. This also reconstructs the main motto of the Kemalist nation state: “Turks have no friends, but Turks.” This discourse simultaneously serves to give us a deeper understanding why some argue there has been a paradigm shift in Turkey’s relations with others in terms of the new Turkish foreign policy’s principles of ‘zero problem with neighbours’. This point requires more analysis, thus, first the discursive construction of resistance to this paradigm shift will be revealed, and then the discourses with the strategy of transformation will be analysed to complete a bigger picture of the power struggle in maintaining and changing Turkish identity.

Huner Tuncer (Cumhuriyet 31.01.2011 p.15) interpreted the so-called change in Turkish Foreign Policy as leaving Ataturk’s honourable foreign policy. He
asserted that ‘Ataturk’s Turkey’, which only trusted in its own power and stood on its own two feet in an international community, has been changed and taken its power from dependency on foreign countries. All Kemalist values are consciously neglected, internal and external policies are attempted to give a new shape in the direction of AKP’s Islamic values and beliefs. He confirmed this argumentation with the example of ignoring Ataturk’s ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ principle while being so close to the Arabic countries in the Middle East.

On extending relations with Turkey’s neighbours, Cuneyt Arcayurek (Cumhuriyet 17.04.2010 p.10) reminded what Davutoglu said in a meeting with the Arabs: “Jerusalem will become a capital city in the near future. We’ll go there altogether and perform prayers in Al-Masjid Al-Aqsa.” However, he held a critical stand on where the new path in foreign policy might take Turkey:

“There is no doubt the river is flowing again, but its bed has been changed. Now it is flowing towards the East not the West. Certainly the Arabs will say that ‘water’ (RTE) has found its way! Angrily he is asking: ‘What’s this hatred against the Arabs?’ Then he is trying to justify the Arabs. According to him, the historical fact that the Arabs cooperated with the British in the First World War and stabbed Turkey in the back is just a ‘local event’ in that period. Let’s think where the new way will lead us.”

In this passage, the river metaphor is used to refer to Turkish Foreign Policy. The shift in the river’s bed and where the water goes are descriptive of the East regarding Turkey’s current relationship with the Arabs. More significantly, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is using the reference to water as those responsible for the change, reiterating this by using his initials, ‘RTE’ rather than his full name. ‘Water has found its way’ means Erdogan moves naturally towards the Muslim countries. Arcayurek opposes his discursive reconstruction of historical narrative on the Turk-Arabian relations in repeating the Kemalist national history discourse that
argues the Arabs betrayed Turks in the First World War. Based on this treacherous image of the Arabs in the common political past, he raises a sceptical question on what these events may mean in the common political future.

Similarly, Guray Oz (Cumhuriyet 30.01.2010 p.6) criticises the reinvention of the past, in particular, the relations between Turkish and Arab people. Oz identifies pro-Islamist reconstruction of common political past and present with the Arabs as an outcome of ‘consciousness deviation’, which is the main method of axis shift that has been realised step by step and sometimes silently since 2002. What is worth noting is that he makes a distinction between different dimensions of so-called ‘axis shift’ in Turkish politics. For him, it is not about improving trade relationship with Arab countries or the USA, Russia, and China. But, when the values, human rights, democratic rights are in question, it matters where Turkey heads. The situation of the journalists, intellectuals and the system of the law show that it heads to dictatorship governance in the Middle East:

“If the journalists and numerous intellectuals accused of terrorism cannot be released and the judge of the court is not listened to, if more and more suits are brought against the journalists among whom is the author of what you are reading now, this means the human rights part of the axis deviation has greatly improved and has come a long way towards a quite acceptable dictatorship governance in the Middle East.”

To justify his argument of ‘consciousness deviation’, he reminds how Erdogan has employed this in the case of Iraq. According to him, the people forget about AKP’s submission of the Permit of March the 1st to the Assembly and now they support the shift in Erdogan's USA discourse. Erdogan brings to account and blames the USA: 'We haven’t forgotten the widows in Iraq, what you have done there?' This means Erdogan controls and manipulates what people know and believe about Turkey's relations with the other nations. It challenges with AKP’s new Turkey rhetoric.
Like Guray Oz, Emre Kongar (Cumhuriyet 12.06.2010 p.3) argued that Turkey’s axis has already deviated from a modern and democratic Western country to a ‘Middle Eastern authoritative-totalitarian country’ both internally and externally. He claimed that internal structural changes and the political facts experienced during the eight years of AKP government have driven Turkey to this shift. Concepts like Atatürk, Kemalist, Kemalism, laicism, struggle against reaction have started to be used in the same meaning with pro-coup mind-set and defenders of these concepts coming to be treated as criminals. ‘Conservative’ policies have clearly been put into practice from the dressing style of society to the food-beverage culture through central government, the state and municipalities; for example, drinking and buying alcoholic drinks have become a problem especially in small cities. Mechanisms have been established to track, listen to and record everybody anywhere and anytime. These tracking and listening records which are signs of an ‘authoritative-totalitarian’ regime alone have been leaked to the media sometimes in the form of a legal disguise and sometimes through completely illegal ways; nothing is left as the private life of an individual. These alone are enough to see that Turkey has deviated to an authoritative-totalitarian regime from a democratic one, but there are more other indicators. The media has been directed by economic and financial measures, a fully supportive media group has been created and a few independent media have been threatened with large tax penalties. Media members, intellectuals, university lecturers, rectors, educators, politicians and even jurisdiction members have been imprisoned and their period of detention has actually been transformed into a prison sentence despite the protests of all bars. Jurisdiction has become open to the pressures of the political power and media and suggestions that will put the superior organs of jurisdiction totally under the auspices of politics have been submitted for referendum.

Emre Kongar’s points give comprehensive clues as to why the Kemalists want to maintain Turkey's Western identity and resist ‘Islamisation’ of the
country by the AKP. This demonstrates how a discourse on foreign policy may work in preserving a national identity or provide a justification for a change. It is because a decision on the EU or cooperation with the Muslim countries is directly related to 'Which Turkey do people want to live in, a democratic or an authoritarian one?' or 'How do they want to live?' and 'With whom?'

In this context, the next text illustrates the everyday production of nationhood through the debate of ‘axis shift’ in Turkish foreign policy. Deniz Kavukcuoglu (Cumhuriyet 27.04.2011 p.15) stated that the face of the AKP government has long been turned towards the Middle East instead of the West. He claimed this changed the image of national lands and cities. The pitch-black clouds the AKP government brought over Istanbul are overwhelming. Sheiks, emirs, sultans, kings allure them so much; and certainly those ugly skyscrapers in Istanbul, those seven star hotels of unmannerliness, too… Day by day, beautiful Istanbul is attempted to be transformed into Arabia under the hegemony of political Islamism. In his language use, ‘Arabisation’ of Istanbul is negatively portrayed with the concepts of ugliness and unmannerliness, which can be seen as a humiliation of Arab culture. Here, the image of Arab and Middle East are represented as the ‘others’ of Turkey through the stereotypical construction of political Islam with an allegory of black clouds. Contrary to that, ‘enlightenment’ emphasis discursively constructs Turkey’s distinctive situation and national difference from the Arab countries. He expressed his unrest from Arabic and Islamic influence on Turkey, in particular on Istanbul. He noted how this changed his feeling of belonging:

“Until recently, when they asked me, ‘Where are you from?’ I said, ‘I’m from Istanbul’. It was true, indeed. I was born and grew up in Istanbul. But now I answer this as, ‘I’m from Izmir’. This city where I go to at least once a year, where my parents and grandparents were born and grew up is still warmer, closer to me. Above all, it is more enlightened.”
This quotation contains highly personalised phrases (me, I said, I answer) and it conveys a rigid conception of Turkey through the expression of Izmir’s uniqueness in enlightenment. He distinguished Izmir from Istanbul and other parts of the country. Here, the symbolic meaning of city and city life is remarkable in order to understand the reproduction of power relationship in everyday life. Izmir, one of the Western cities of Turkey, is known as castle of Kemalism or ‘non-Muslim Izmir’ in Islamist discourses. Therefore, the shift in his feeling of belonging to a city from Istanbul to Izmir seems a personal sentiment, this nevertheless rhetorically symbolises secularist nationalist resistance to Islamisation. Based on this observation on the changing city life and his feeling of belonging, Kavukcuoglu ends his passage with a call to regain consciousness right away, feed and foster hope, transfer and extend it to cities, protest against reaction, get out of the darkness and arrive at light. Then remain there forever, just like Izmir.

5.5.1. Advocate Media: Expanded Axis in Turkish Foreign Policy

An overview on the developments in Turkish Foreign Policy in the last decade demonstrates that neo-Islamist elites have been successful in the integration of Turkey to neo-liberal politics and globalisation. Therefore, it can be said that pragmatism has dominated Turkey’s relationship with the others and the media discourse.

The Muslim conservative newspaper Zaman (01.01.2010, p.8) reported that Turkish people believed there was no shift in Turkish foreign policy. According to USAK’s survey, eighty per cent of people supported progress in relationship with neighbouring countries. Moreover, in order to support government policies, the opinions from economic and business sectors that were parallel to the official state discourse on foreign policy have been covered. In contrast to the Kemalist perspective, Ihsan Dagi wrote (Zaman
He argued that the AKP transformed the Kemalist-militarist regime by the help of the West. Those who blamed the Islamist AKP turned its face to the East aimed to fear the West and position themselves on the side of the Kemalist-militarist again. Dagi (Zaman 20.02.2009, p. 12) called ‘silent revolution’ for what the AKP brought to the Turkey’s external relations. He defined it as a liberal transformation that was based on cooperation, negotiation and multilateralism. Essentially, he claimed if one looked at Turkey through Kemalist eyes, its language use and practise, the liberal transformation could be understood. In this Kemalist traditional narrative, Turkey was surrounded by its enemies. This security discourse was instrumentalised for establishing, legitimatising, reproducing and maintaining a militarist social and political order. For the sake of keeping security against invented internal enemies, the regime victimised democracy, law and pluralism which were seen as luxurious and risky demands. Dagi indicated that the authority of militarist political culture fell by a new perspective on other states and people. The perspective changed from ‘everybody is a potential enemy’ discourse to ‘everybody is a potential partner for cooperation’ discourse. According to his analysis, this was liberalisation of Turkish foreign policy by redefinition of its privileged principles as democracy, economic development. Therefore, it was argued that it was not the axis deviation.

On these emerging developments, Mehmet Ali Birand wrote the previous world order is no longer present (Hurriyet 20.10.2010, p.6). For him, the times when the USA and Europe looked down on Turkey and managed the world are all in the past. A new world order is being established and Turkey is trying to find its own place in this new order. With a departure from this belief, he found the axis shift debate exaggerated (Hurriyet 16.06.2010, p.6): 'Erdogan took two steps, we all protested... Some of us are frightened.' He noted what was behind the worries, the deviation which began with foreign
policy might continue internally with the deviation in the secular system. He advised: 'We shall not frighten ourselves in vain.' He believed, anyone, even those among the most radical Islamists, would not like to see an economically downfallen Turkey dealing with the war between the Turks-Kurds. Turkey cannot go anywhere by promoting anti-Westernism.

In Radikal, Eyup Can (12.06.2010, p.11) asked whether Turkey was falling out with the USA and caring for the Middle East Union more than the European Union as the ‘re-awakening of New Ottomanism’. In his opinion, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu is neither a typical Islamist nor a romantic Ottomanist. He supported the objective of Turkey’s new target, which the Middle East Union intends to turn this generation into a generation of complete security and economic integration. Here, Can reproduce the official discourse emphatically in the same way as the discourse of government representatives. When the AKP came to power, they consciously distanced themselves from the traditions of Turkey’s mainstream Islamist movement, National Outlook, rather they reformed a conservative discourse, encapsulating centre right parties’ sentiments. Despite the fact that neo-Ottomanism does not appear in Davutoğlu’s ‘Strategic Depth’ approach, the historical depth means that the Ottoman Empire and its cultural focus is highly on Muslim solidarity, particularly Sunni Islam (Oktem 2013, p.78).

On the debate of neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign Policy, Cengiz Candar (Radikal 30.06.2010 p.8) supported Turkey’s newly emerging identity in international relations. He reminded us firstly of Stephen Kinzer’ words on the re-rise of Turkey in the new century particularly on the old Ottoman geography: 'In the new world map, Turkey isn’t located at the side of anything. Rather, as it has always been on this geography, it is just at the centre of the great Eurasia land. Turkey’s location and its ability to integrate into the Ottoman heritage, Islamism and democracy successfully provide the perfect strategic potential not only for itself but also for the USA and the
He further quoted from Obama’s speech in the Turkish Grand National Assembly: ‘The ones discussing about the future of Turkey are wondering whether you will be pulled towards one way or the other. I guess they don’t seize understanding of one thing: Turkey’s greatness comes from its ability to stay at the centre of everything. Here (in Turkey), the West and the East are not separating from each other. Just the opposite, they are coming together.

Using these argumentations, it was claimed that the world needs Turkey as a country to undertake the role of a mediator, peacemaker and arbitrator. Candar proved these roles of Turkey in noting Turkey was trying to relieve the tensions between Iran and the USA, Syria and Iraq, Armenia and Azerbaijan. No diplomats other than Turks were accepted in Tehran, Washington, Moscow, Tiflis, Damascus and Cairo. No other country was respected by Hamas, Hezbollah and Taliban while maintaining good relationships with Israel, Lebanon and Afghanistan governments. The obstacle before Turkey can take its ‘global role’ is defined as ‘interior’ by Candar with a reference to Stephen Kinzer. A country that cannot solve its Kurdish problem cannot ensure ‘civil peace’ and will not be able to reach any ‘strategic skyline’. Turkish law still restricts freedom of expression and the minorities are not protected completely, either. While Turkey is on its way to become one of the indispensable forces in the world, there is one important obstacle it has to pass – it’s time to organise its own country. Undoubtedly, this perspective on ‘peace’ confirms the main assumption of this research in validating the link between Turkey’s identity constructions in relation to insider and outsider others of the nation-state.

Davutoglu’s ‘zero problems with neighbours’ formula in the language of diplomacy and democratisation built an inclusive platform for both Turkey’s neighbours abroad and at home (Fisher-Onar 2013, p.72). Soft power of Turkey in foreign policy in embracing economic liberalism empowered the
AKP’s legitimacy in pursuit of democratic initiatives for traditional domestic others of Turkish nation-state, non-Muslims, Kurds and Alevis. This is why it has given 56 per cent support in its nation-wide referendum for constitutional reform in September 2010. The rhetorical shifts of government from democracy discourse to security discourse came out, the limits of Sunni-Islamic conservative change (Kadioglu 2013, p. 54), consolidating parties power, conservative values and interests in politics rather than aiming democracy for whole people. Therefore, the main challenges facing Turkey nowadays is the tendency of a conservative majoritarian populism, which causes a strong anxiety in the secularist and liberal people of the country as is shown in the previous section by Kemalist discourse. The democratic depth appears to lack the ingredient for ensuring different lifestyles and rights of the others that constitute half of the population.

Beyond the domestic challenges, political movements and transitions in the Arab world continue to put Turkish foreign policy to a serious test in terms of balancing its regional and global policies. The main challenge of Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East is facing its relations with USA, Israel, Iran and Syria. For instance, on the one hand Turkey improved its relations with Iran due to its energy and security interests; on the other hand, Turkey found itself in the opposition camp to Iran with regards to their approach to the Syrian uprising. The Syrian regime’s brutal reaction to the demonstrators has damaged the AKP government’s ties with President Bashar al-Assad and its economic and cultural engagement with Syria. Turkey’s democracy discourse and soft power policy failed in the Syria test. Since 2011, the AKP government has shifted to a security discourse towards the emerging challenges in domestic and external affairs.

**Findings and Conclusion**

Differences in the conceptualisation of Turkish inter-national identity employ
different inclusion and exclusion categories, which involve different actors in
the 'we' group and 'they' group. On this assumption, the first case study
showed that religion and different interpretations of it shift discursive
construction of Turkish identity and antagonisms. The second case study
revealed how these antagonisms project different foreign policies; therefore it
moved the issue of Turkey's post-Kemalist identity formation into Turkey's
European integration debate and redefinition of Turkey's external relations.
Lastly, this case study demonstrated that the concepts of foreign policy,
which is embedded in the news discourse, construct and shift new Turkey's
identity depending on the domestic power struggle. It analysed how foreign
policy discourse in the Turkish media constructs and challenges emerging
post-Kemalist Turkish nation-state identity and the power struggle on
definition of this identification. It focused on the representations of 9/11 and
Iraq War in order to trace conceptualisations of Turkey's inter-national
identity, in particular its Western, Middle Eastern, Muslim and secular
identities. In this way, it argued that there are competing Turkish national
identity discourses, which map Turkey and its relations with other nations in
various ways.

According to the ATAUM's academic survey (2010) on Turkish public
perceptions on Turkish foreign policy, 37.5 per cent of the participants
identified the USA as Turkey’s enemy, 10.9 per cent Armenia and 10.6 per
cent Israel. The country most likely to befriend Turkey is Azerbaijan with
29.9 per cent, None with 16.7 per cent and KKTC (Northern Cyprus Turkish
Republic) with 15.6 per cent. Here, it is clear that Turks abroad are defined
as friends of Turkey. When it comes to the identity of Turkey, diversity
appears in the answers. 28.9 per cent of the survey participants defined
Turkey as a European country, 22.6 per cent say Turkey is a Turkic country,
15.5 per cent view it an Islam country, 11.4 per cent say Middle Eastern, 8.7
per cent note Mediterranean and 8.6 per cent define it as an Asian country.
This quantitative study of ATAUM showed the diversity of perceptions on Turkey's foreign policy identity. This project contributed to the debate with a further understanding of why and where these different perceptions exist and come from, and how they relate and challenge with each other. David Campbell (1998, pp.48-50) noted that nation-state identity is secured through discourse of danger, that requires definition of difference and 'otherness' for securing the 'self' and its world. The state and 'man' grounds and justifies its policies and actions by offering who and what 'we' are, who and what 'foreigners' are, and what 'we' have to fear. Therefore, national security and foreign policy texts locate and define national identity and values and nation's place in the world. As Campbell illustrated US foreign policy against Soviet threat in the 60s reinforced American identity. The definition of the enemy as the communism system itself and discourse of 'freedom under God versus ruthless, godless tyranny' (ibid p.30) reproduced religious character of the nation.

Similarly, in the case of 9/11 and Iraq War, this chapter showed that Turkish media reminded and constructed Muslimhood of Turkish nation. During the war in Iraq, a common 'enemy' perception united the different nationalist discourses on anti-Americanism. The findings confirmed that Turkey has been searching for its new place in the new world order, in particular in changing dynamics of the Middle East. The Turkish media defined a pivotal role for Turkey in transformation of the region. Thus, the majority of the reporting and columnists interpreted that Turkish foreign policy has not shifted its Western orientation, but it expanded its axis. Post-Kemalist reimagination of Turkey is just challenged by the Kemalist discourse of Cumhuriyet newspaper. The representation of the foreign policy issues in the media involves representing boundaries which mark the inclusion and exclusion, or who belongs, to the unity. The examples showed that the Arabs are one of the external others in the Kemalist identity discourse. On the other hand, new state discourse of Turkey constructs a sameness discourse and
stresses on the common cultural and historical roots between Muslim countries. In addition, neo-liberal, pragmatic politics of Islamist AKP government helped to improve Turkey's relationship within its Muslim neighbourhood.

For a general evaluation of the axis shift in Turkish Foreign Policy, the examples from Zaman, Taraf, Hurriyet and Radikal indicate that the Turkish media supported the AKP and its policies in foreign relations. It is a fact that Muslim intellectuals, liberal democrats and socialists came to the point of consensus for a democratic transformation and wanted to distance themselves from Kemalist authoritarianism and 'isolationism'. The re-imagination of the nation during the last decade shows that Turkey’s engagement with neo-liberal politics has satisfied some liberals and they seemed eager to portray Turkey as the ‘Western country of the Middle East’ (Birand, Hurriyet 25.03.2011, p.8). However, this general support can be read as growing self-censorship (Arsan 2013) and there has been widespread silence in the Turkish media due to increasing government pressures and Erdogan’s intolerance against the dissident voices of the media. However, the warnings for ‘peace at home’ as a condition of ‘peace in the borders and abroad’ appear in drawing the limits of support in line with AKP’s re-imagination of Turkey.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

Introduction
This thesis has shown that a deeper post-Kemalist transformation has been going on in Turkey since the AKP came to power in 2002. In this regard, the analytical research agenda examined how Turkish national identity in domestic and foreign policy constructions articulated by the Turkish media reinforced or contested with each other in maintaining and transforming the Kemalist nation-state identity between 2001 and 2011. The literature on Turkey's new identity is mostly built upon the AKP’s influence in Turkish politics that focus on the role of the Islam and Ottoman heritage in its discourse (Ozkan 2014; Duran 2013; Fisher Onar 2011; Bilgin and Bilgic 2011; Sozen 2010; Altunisik 2009). In contrast, this has focused on the concept of national identity and has contributed to the literature of Contemporary Turkish Studies and Nationalism by being the first to apply Ruth Wodak’s (2001) Discourse-Historical Approach to the 'process' of power struggle in the discursive construction of Turkish nation-state identity in the Turkish media. It challenged the both the dominant view of Turkey as a Kemalist state (Azak 2013; Alaranta 2011; Casier and Jongerden 2010; Ciddi 2010; Karasipahi 2009; Zurcher 2004), characterised by its secularism and that has aimed to be a part of the large family of European states for the past fifty years (Cengiz and Hoffmann 2014; Nas and Ozer 2012; Cakir 2011; Usul 2010). It has examined the form taken by challenges to Turkey's Kemalist identity, focusing in particular on the AKP’s Muslim conservative and non-European narrative of the nation over the past decade. It concluded that there is not just the clash of different narratives of Turkish nation-state,
but a complex interdependence between Islam, secularism, modernism and Europeanisation in Turkey. The thesis has also made an important contribution to discourse analysis in Politics (Larsen 2014; Hansen 2006; Waever 2001; Diez 2001) by making use of Critical Discourse Analysis and ‘making sense of diversity’ (Carta and Morin 2014); the complexity in the identity of Turkey said much about both the religious and cultural dimensions of International Relations, in particular European and Middle East Studies.

In contrast to the state-centric explanations that dominant in international relations literature, in particular in the study of Turkish Foreign Policy (Hale 2012; Oran 2011), approached Turkish politics from a media perspective. Outcomes of foreign policy decision-making directly influence the daily lives of individuals. What people think about themselves and others matters, reproduced in the media and considered in foreign policy making. This work responded to this gap in literature of Turkish Politics by paying attention to the national tension on definition of Turkey’s identity through analysing discursive practices as fostering or reinforcing relations of domination in the media.

Furthermore, the Turkish case has assumed even a greater importance during the writing this thesis. Identity politics and the rhetoric of 'blaming others' in different national imaginations have become pervasive in Turkish politics and society. Moreover, political parties have benefited from the polarisation of the electorates. Identity matters have been instrumentalised in order to cloak social, economic and political problems of Turkey. It seems that banal nationalism and banality of evil in Turkey has been difficult to overcome and a 'daily plebiscite' of living together peacefully has been lost (Ozkirimli 2014). In this context, this thesis may raise awareness of the tensions, as part of the processes by which identity is constructed, and discriminatory practices committed for the sake of political interests. To highlight how the thesis has contributed to academic scholarship concerning the struggle over
Turkey's identity, the theoretical and methodological assumptions of the research will be revisited in the first section below. It outlines the key themes and issues that an application of the critical discourse analysis to the case of Turkey. Then, the empirical findings will be connected together in the content of the discursive constructs of Turkish national identity in domestic and international contexts at the first decade of the 2000s. These will be summarised in the light of the main strategies and forms of linguistic realisations in the Turkish media discourse.

6.1. Theoretical and Methodological Results
This project took its theoretical inspiration from two disciplines: nationalism studies and media studies. The theoretical starting point is an approach that adopts nationalism as an ideology; as patterns of belief, practice, assumption, habit and representation that are reproduced discursively (Wodak et al 1999) by the state, its institutions but also in the daily lives of citizens in everyday conversations (Billig 1995). Based on this assumption, the concept of nation is defined as a mental construct of the imagination of the nation (Anderson 1983) in people's mind, embedded in ideological power relations, politics and the everyday language. An imagined unity is based on recognition and opposition in definition of ‘us’ and ‘them’, by promoting a sense of belonging together in a historical narrative (Wodak et al 1999). Beyond official state discourse, there are multiple understandings of nationhood in political discourse according to different identities and ideologies that diversely imagine national uniqueness and difference towards ‘others’. It is also assumed that nation-state identity is constructed in interaction with both domestic and international ‘others’ rather than simply one or the other (Campbell 1998; Neumann 1999; Diez 2001; Hansen 2005; Waever 2006). In three case studies, in discursive practices of differentiation and exclusion in the media articulated construction of the national identity and its self/other relations within and outside the borders of Turkey.
Based on this discursive approach to nationalism, this thesis has argued that Turkish national identity is discursively constructed and that a fundamental conflict has existed between competing nationalist discourses in Turkish society over the definition of what Turkish identity should be and how to place Turkey in the world. Examination of these changing and contrasting definitions of ‘Turkishness’ has shed light on the struggle between the domestic actors and ideologies and illuminated competing views of the world that differ with regards to Turkey’s regional and world role. In so doing, the thesis has made an original contribution to the study of contemporary Turkish nationalism. With a specific focus on the media, expanding the focus beyond official state discourse to a wider set of actors within debate provided an indication of how and why dominant Muslim conservative and opponent political discourses changed as a consequences of the transformation of power relations over the last decade. Thus, the research broadened the analytical scope to media discourse in order to demonstrate competing discursive constructions of Turkish national identity by considering the major ‘symbiotic antagonisms of nationalisms’ (Kadioglu and Keyman 2011) in Turkish politics.

Chapter One outlined the theoretical and methodological framework for analysing the struggle on over redefining Turkey’s inter-national identity in media discourse. By taking a critical stand, Ruth Wodak’s discourse-historical approach (1999) was formed the methodological framework for investigating the different discursive construction of thematic identities in the case of Turkey. This theoretical part assumed that discourse affects the way in which people define and talk about identity politics and how they express their ideologies, perspectives on the world and social relations. It argued that different perspectives on the nation construct ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ between groups and an identification of ‘we’ and ‘they’. This framework for studying Turkish national identity construction in the post 9/11 historical domestic and international context, made it possible to bring out the tension
in maintaining and changing Turkish identity. It also showed that the media is a site where both official state discourse and opposing discourses could be studied as part of the investigation of Turkey's post-Kemalist identity transformation. Chapter Two was devoted to build the historical background for studying Turkey's identity. Since the main assumption in the Turkish case is that there are multiple Turkish nationalisms rather than an essentialist, single Turkish nationalism, the historical overview and literature on Turkish nationalism in Chapter Two examined the origins and developments in different versions of Turkish nationalisms. It argued that the official concept of Kemalist nation-state identity has been challenged by the AKP's new imagination of the nation which has played the main role in redefining nation and the relationship of Turkey with Europe and the West in the post 9/11 world.

This chapter suggested that a power struggle existed between two understandings of what it means to be a ‘Turk’ and narratives of Turkish nation-state in the first decade of the AKP government, which articulate various mainstream Turkish nationalisms: the pro-secular narrative consists of Kemalist nationalism and ethnic-nationalism; the post-Kemalist narrative consists of Islamist nationalism and Liberal nationalism. The thesis then moved on to an empirical study of how they imagine the nation and the different ways in which they define Turkish identity depending on their particular perspectives, the context and the ongoing power struggle in Turkey. The empirical part aimed to make clear what led different interpretations and perspectives of Turkish national identity, and showed why analysing media discourse empirically was appropriate for studying these processes. That is the fact that the media provide readily accessible and useful data in the form of ideologically diverse language usages. By the discourse-historical approach, it was shown that, specific language usages established power relations and served or challenged hegemonies in the context of the construction of a post-Kemalist nation-state identity in Turkey. The key
question concerned how Turkish media discursively re/constructs Turkey's inter-national identity. It discussed both the national and international dimensions in three of the thematic chapters (Chapter 3, 4, 5). The rationale was to throw light on the interaction between national identity and foreign policy by bringing out how media discourse link the two.

In relation to Islamic, secular and non-Muslim elements in Turkish national identity, critical discourse analysis was applied in Chapter Three to the case of the assassination of Hrant Dink and the Presidential Elections in 2007. The second case study in Chapter Four demonstrated how European identity was influential in the reconstruction of Turkish identity and its challenge with Kurdish identity, showing how this struggle also played a role in changing perceptions on whether Turkey should aspire to become a member of the European Union. Finally, the third case study in Chapter Five showed how 9/11 and the Iraq War served to reveal multiple imaginations of Turkey, its Western, Muslim and secular identities in the international context. In these three different discursive contexts, five newspapers were used, to survey a broad range of constructs of Turkish identity, the form taken by each, how they challenged each other, and their implications for Turkey's future.

In summary, this thesis is perhaps the first academic attempt to examine the discursive construction of Turkish nation-state identity within wider political and thematic discourses, comparing how being Turkish, Kurdish, Muslim, Armenian, European and Western have been discursively articulated in relation to a domestic power struggle over the last decade. It has investigated the various ways of being Turkish in the changing conditions of the post-9/11 area of international relations. Since these events are still relatively recent, these analyses remain provisional, even if the thesis has highlighted the complex and dynamic processes that lie behind the emergence of a new Turkey.
6.2. The Empirical Findings: Reimagination of Turkey in the Post 9/11 Era

The detailed investigation the three case studies has confirmed a central claim of this thesis; namely, that there are different and context-determined narratives on the Turkish nation that highlight different interpretations of Turkey's common past, present, future and common territory. Turkish media discourse reveals the diversity of political discourses on the issues of Turkish national identity and foreign policy are based on people’s positions and perspectives on the world. The analysis undertaken reveals that the power struggle in Turkey has been more than the secular-Islamic dictomony (Somer 2011; Somer 2010a; Somer 2010b); it is the clash of different national imaginations. The discourse-historical approach makes it possible to highlight how each Turkish nationalism use constructive strategies to express specific narrative of the nation, to determine who belongs to the Turkish nation, and their understanding of common history and the future.

In this context, this thesis revealed that the two main pillars of Kemalist Turkish nation-state identity, secular Turkish nationalism and Europeanism, have been challenged by post-Kemalism under the AKP government. Secularism has been confronted by the normalisation of civil-military relations and the abolition of bans on Islamic symbols in public institutions in the universities, the hospitals and parliament. Moreover, Kemalist Turkey asserted that every citizen of the Republic is a Turk or a 'future Turk', in particular the Muslim peoples of Anatolia. This left Kurdish identity as not recognised in Kemalist politics. However, Islamists in power changed the state discourse on the Kurdish problem by acknowledging Kurdish rights. The dominant ideology is changing and Kemalist Turkey's definition of nation and citizenship is challenged by Kurdish and Islamist identities.

Within this context, this thesis has shown how the Turkish media has contributed to the AKP’s power and discussed its new interpretation of nation-state identity and foreign policy which is an imagination of a Muslim,
non-European Turkey in the formation of a new historical and geographical Ottomanism; in other words, the post-Kemalist narrative of the nation which academic literature has been hesitant to recognize. The Turkish media played a role in forming, constructing, and distributing new narrative of the nation and creating a general consent for new policies. This reformation in nation-state discourse has opened the way for economic, cultural and political good relationships with countries in the Middle East region and adapted Turkey’s Islamists to international cooperation. This brought about a new look for Islamists and empowered their soft power to convince different groups on decision making. Hence, liberal nationalist discourse has become allied with the AKP in the transformation of Kemalist nation-state identity. By focusing on this power struggle, it can be argued that his thesis developed an analytic and critical reading of the post-Kemalist Turkish politics and its challenges.

In this context, the empirical findings reported above gave important clues about selective, ideological readings of common political past directly played the role in definition of domestic and external others of Turkey. For instance, on one side Islamist nationalism constructs its discourse on Ottoman history and Islamic heritage, while on the other side secularists construct a national discourse on the Republican times, M. Kemal Ataturk’s principles and heritage. These insights also illuminated what shape these diverse discourses and their perspectives on the foreign policy issues, specifically in the cases of Turkey’s bid for EU membership and Iraq War. The analysis originally makes clear that Islamist discourse in the media construct Turkey as the ‘other’ of Europe and the West from a historical and cultural perspective. According to Kemalist secularist perspective, Turkish culture and nation is a part of the modern European family. However, in the terms of common political past with the European countries, the Sèvres Syndrome and the memory of Independence War against the European powers have played a role in the construction of their Euro-sceptic discourse. Therefore, beyond the official Kemalist discourse, the leftish tone of Kemalism (ulusalcılık) has
an anti-imperialist nationalist discourse. In the terms of the common political present and future with Europe, Kemalist discourse has not been able to adapt itself to democratisation and globalisation process due to the security concerns related with the Kurdish (Chapter 4) and non-Muslim (Chapter 3) identity politics, in particular the fear of Islamic reactionism and separation of the country. Secularism is a ‘must’ for the Kemalist nation-state imagination; it is the only way of modernisation, enlightenment, science and civilisation. Despite the fact that secular nation-state identity built in a top-down process by the Kemalist state, the case of the Presidential Election in 2007 showed that the secularist way of life has been accepted, internalised by the some circles and became a part of Turkish national identity. In the last decade, the media have witnessed and mirrored the Kemalist resistance to Islamic reformation in Turkey's identity.

Moreover, the results demonstrate that historical fear of Kemalism defines domestic others, untrustworthy citizens of the nation-state, non-Muslims such as Armenians and Greeks. During the nation-building era of the Republicanists, the new secular regime fought against an Islamist and Kurdish resistance; thus the Islamists and Kurds were defined as the domestic ‘others’ and as ‘threats’ to the regime and modern Turkish identity. In the last decade, European support for Islamist AKP’s policies and Kurdish demands contributed to darken the Euro-sceptic tone of the Kemalist discourse, as part of the domestic power struggle on the post-Kemalist reformation of Turkey’s identity. More significantly, by highlighting certain inter-textual themes such as Turkishness and Muslimhood in Turkey’s national identity and foreign policy discourse in the press, the findings of the thesis demonstrate the limitations and borders in mapping post-Kemalist Turkey both in the national and international contexts.

Furthermore, the data made it possible to see the slippery character of the link between these competing narratives. Especially, the ethnic-nationalist
understanding of nation and citizenship has been addressed instrumentally when it is required politically in other nationalist discourses. Even this tactical addressing produces a new concept in the Turkish politics as ‘MHPlesmek’ which means resembling, mimicking radical ethnic-nationalist party, the MHP. On the other hand, Kemalist secular nationalism, Islamist and liberal nationalisms and their reformations also appear within the selected timeframe.

Analysing language use in the data revealed an important result in identification of three main strategies used in discursive construction of national identity: constructive strategies, strategies of perpetuation or justification and strategies of transformation. According to the findings, the Kemalist nationalist perspective used the strategies of perpetuation to resist changes to the dominant narrative in the 2000s. Supporters of this perspective hold a secularist, modernist, enlightenmentalist approach to Turkey's identity and its place in the world. Based on their belief that AKP was backed by foreign powers, their foreign policy discourse had an Eurosceptic outlook and anti-imperialist leftish colouring against the West, particularly the USA.

Islamists at the beginning of the new millennium have succeeded in adapting themselves globally and economically by becoming allies with neo-liberal world politics. Islamists in the power have used the strategy of transformation to break the Kemalist status quo and hegemony in the nation-state discourse and bureaucracy. The analysis indicated that Zaman’s Islamic perspective of the nation is not ethnic-nationalist toward the Muslim nations, but it would be xenophobic to non-Muslims and discriminatory to secularists, non-believers and LGBTs. The instances from Hurriyet, Radikal and Taraf newspapers demonstrated that liberals tended to corroborate AKP’s pragmatist policies as it was seen in the case of the ‘axis shift’ debate in Turkish foreign policy. In general, there was the lack of social and ethical
perspective for promoting rights and civil liberties for the others. Looking at the representation of the core elements in discursive construction of Turkish identity in Turkish media, among the newspapers, *Radikal* was the only one which could have the pluralist perspective in three case studies.

6.2.1. The Nation and Identity: Being Turk and Muslim

In Chapter 3, the first case study on the assassination of journalist Hrant Dink and the Presidential elections in 2007 showed the perception of Turkish identity in an everyday context in both citizenship and religion-based elements. What explicitly occurs in the data of the Dink case is that members of religious minorities are addressed in contradictory definitions which underline the fluid perception of the Turkish people on the citizenship and core elements of the Kemalist nation-state identity. The Presidential Elections case contributed to a fruitful observation on contested conceptualisations of Turkish nation and the fact they contained culture and religion based elements.

In the case of Hrant Dink, on the one hand Kemalists blamed Islamists and argues that everyday racism was a result of AKP’s religious policies. On the other hand Islamists and liberals tended to see rising violence and racism as a result of Kemalist identity and citizenship politics. Islamists expressed an explicit rejection of Republican assertive secularist politics by directly indicating that it was responsible for present political problems. In the terms of common political past, the legacy of Turkish nation-state was represented negatively by the Islamists, liberal and leftist circles. Muslim conservative *Zaman*'s columnists referred to the multicultural Ottoman Period to justify their argumentation and oppositional perspective on Kemalist nation-state whenever they mention the Republican period and its secularist policies. They hold a victim thesis, according to which the Sunni majority are a victim of the Kemalist nation-state. They argued that the state suppressed lifestyles
and beliefs of religious Turks. The universities did not accept female students wearing headscarves, the courts regularly banned Islamist political parties, and the military constantly intervened to maintain suppression. This victim thesis points to the core element of Islamic perspective on Turkish national identity which constructs Kemalists as the ‘others’ of their identity.

The ‘blaming others strategy’ was also used in the terms of referring to the origins of Turkey’s Kurdish problem in the second case study. What was particularly remarkable in this debate was that Islamists and liberals highlighted the Kemalist denial of Kurdish culture and language in the public sphere. Like Islamists, Kurds were portrayed as the victims of Turkey’s Republican past and on the assessment of current political problems. Assertive secularist policies and military-state structure were directed to justify the demand of transformation in new constitution writing and consolidation of democracy in parallel with the EU reforms. Regarding this post-Kemalist transformation, the AKP used democracy discourse to change the laws introduced following the 1980 military coup and also had the support of left-wing and right-wing citizens in the Constitutional Referendum in September 2010. The liberals and the majority of Kurds have taken the side of the AKP in democratic transformation. However, the more challenges the AKP faced, the more it mimicked the Kemalist methods for suppression of the opposition. Under the AKP government, secular Turks and bureaucracy lost their privileged positions in the centre and had to take second place. But, the post-Kemalist nation-state under Sunni-Muslim conservative nationalism has defined new others and victims in the last decade.

6.2.2. The Construction of Non-Europeannes in Turkey’s New Identity
In order to have a full picture of the narrative of the Turkish nation, the second case looked at Turkish debates on Europe. This example suggested
various conceptions of Turkish national identity, the Kurdish question and Turkey’s place in the EU. In terms of imagining a common future, the debate about Turkey’s EU membership demonstrated that the future prospects of Turkish society depend on the domestic power relations. In this way, it challenged the argument that there was a common Europeanist perspective in Turkey and a constant attempt to be a part of Europe for fifty years in spite the Sisyphean story it turned out to be (Cakır 2011). In this research, discourse analysis revealed that Eurosceptism was the common discourse in Turkish nationalisms in the last decade and there has been a rising discourse emphasizing the separateness of Turkey from Europe in the media.

Beside the fact that the golden years of Turkey and EU relations (1999–2005) engendered wide democratisation reforms in Turkish identity politics, EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus in 2004 opened up the possibility of a ‘train crash’ on the way to the EU accession (Kadioglu 2012, p.43). That duly happened in 2006 with the rejection of the UN’s Annan Plan on the island. The ongoing dispute caused the EU Council to suspend accession negotiations with Turkey in December 2006. Inevitably, the discourse of ‘it is not a fair game’ and ‘they do not want us to integrate’ had popularity in the media. However, the main focus of the data discussed in Chapter 4 was the culture- and identity-based discussions, particularly on religion and group rights. On this point, Islamists’ frustration was shown regarding the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights decision in November 2005 which was that Turkey did not violate human rights by banning the wearing of religious headscarves in universities. These examples demonstrated that Islamists become pro-European as long as the EU integration process served to challenge the secularist nation-state identity and promoted religious freedom in the Turkish public sphere. Western, European Turkey discourse in the Kemalist perspective was replaced by the EU as a ‘threat’ to the unity of the nation-state and the secular system. The examples from the Cumhuriyet newspaper showed that Kemalist perspective has seen
the Kurdish problem as a security issue rooted within the external powers – the EU or the USA – that aim to divide Turkey. Islamists allied with the EU in the democratic solution of the Kurdish question and transformation of the military-state for the sake of the normalisation of civil-military relations. Due to the fact that Kemalists perceive the military as a guardian of secular system and democracy in Turkey, they have turned to be soft Euro-sceptics. The instances from leftist *Radikal* and liberal *Taraf* newspapers revealed that there has been a common will for Turkey’s democratic transformation to the post-Kemalist nation-state identity and the constitutional change in military coup legislations. On the other hand, the *Cumhuriyet* newspaper represented sceptic Kemalist views on the AKP’s intentions and strong expressions of secular Turkish resistance to a change in their status and identity in the process of EU integration.

This thesis took on the discursive analysis of Turkey’s identity between 2001 and 2011. However, since 2011 the dynamic domestic power relations and international relations have reconstructed the image of the AKP and Turkey. In particular, political transformations and challenges of Middle East uprisings contributed to the significance of Turkey’s Kurdish problem and European integration for the future of Turkey.

### 6.2.3. The New Turkey: Post-Kemalist Narrative and Its Challenges

In the post-9/11 area, the establishment of AKP in Turkey with a discourse on conservative democracy had strong implications at both national and international levels. In 2002, the reformist wing of Turkey’s Islamists departed from the anti-Western National Outlook movement and moved towards the US-based Fetullah Gulen’s liberal Islamist movement. This gave a moderate Islamic country image to Turkey or a democratic ‘model’ for a liberal political system able to incorporate an Islamic party. However, the discourse-historical approach revealed that anti-Americanism was common
In Turkish nationalist discourses in the last decade due to the perceptions on the events of 9/11 and Iraq War.

In the terms of democratic consolidation of identity politics, the AKP brought a paradigmic change in Kemalist nation-state discourse and its vision of Turkey’s self and other relationships. In fact, for Kemalists, being a part of the West or Europe meant being a member of ‘contemporary civilisation’. Nevertheless, the coverage of the Cumhuriyet newspaper demonstrated that the memory of the Independence War against the Western powers is still alive in the Kemalist minds. This means that, in principle, they are pro-Western but naturally they are also sceptical as to its outcome. In the last decade, domestic power struggles on redefinition of Turkey’s identity and influences on the global market economy enhanced this scepticism and caused them to be inward-looking. They believed that the newly emerging narrative of the nation and the dress of the state is Islamic and is a threat to Kemalist secular regime and lifestyles. In the third case study on Turkish foreign policy, the linguistic instances from Cumhuriyet point out the Kemalist belief that AKP follows the Islamic agenda in foreign policy as well. Improving relations with the Islamic countries in the Middle East called as Arabisation of Turkey. In addition, Muslim conservative Zaman's columnists contributed to reconstruct the new foreign policy discourse with the new geographic imagination of Turkey which addressed to the Ottoman legacy and constructed a responsibility discourse in related with Muslim peoples in the Ottoman territory. The conception of ‘Self’ in Turkey’s foreign policy widens its boundaries with this new imagination. Other newspapers' coverage represented a common support for AKP’s pragmatist and economy-based policies in the Middle East. Since 2011, it has been questioned whether the Turkish model offered by AKP is good for democracy and the future of Turkey (Taspinar 2014). Indeed, the new Turkish model, the so-called post-Kemalist Turkey, has the paradoxes of adopting the authoritarian legacy of its Kemalist predecessors and drawing new religious fault lines which constitute
illiberal models both for Turkish democracy and the countries in political transitions in the Arab world.

Since its third victory in the general elections in 2011, AKP has openly articulated a mission for social engineering in the pursuit of bringing up religious generations on the basis of a conservative Sunni view of social morality that privileges the Sunni Hanefi Turks (Yesilada and Rubin 2013). It also followed the same Sunni line in foreign policy (Ozkan 2014; Uzgel 2013). The main challenge Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East is facing is its relations with the USA, Israel, Iran and Syria. For instance, on one hand Turkey improved its relations with Iran due to its energy and security interests; while on the other hand, Turkey found itself in the opposition camp to Iran with regards to their approach to the Syrian uprising. Syrian regime’s brutal reaction to the demonstrators has damaged the AKP government’s ties with President Bashar al-Assad and their economic and cultural engagement with Syria. Turkey’s democracy discourse and soft power policy failed in the Syria test. These developments have realised the Islamisation fears of secular-Westernist people and confirmed the anxieties of Kemalist circles. It can be said that the domestic struggle has turned from the matter of who governs Turkey to who has the power of maintaining different lifestyles in highly polarised society (Keyman 2014). Unfortunately, Erdogan’s ‘new brave Turkey’ (Akkoynulu 2013) is mimicking the authoritarian methods of the old Kemalist nation-state. The state’s ideological apparatus such as the media, the educational institutions and jurisdiction have been restructured to strengthen the government’s power and its mission in every aspects of life. Illiberal anti-terrorism laws and routine imprisonments have been used for suppression on opposition voices coming from students, journalists, politicians and civil society activists alike (Ozbudun 2014). That means, government’s way of dealing with the social diversity and demands of plurality has become problematic and signals a democratic deficit both at home and abroad. Emerging challenges have made
AKP authoritarian against its opponents, which have caused losing its supporters from leftists and liberals. More recently, an open clash between Turkey's Islamists appeared in December 2013 as a major earthquake in the political agenda of Turkey which exhibited the difference between the perspectives of Islamists, their conservatism and their practice of power politics (Taspinar 2014b). As the national media and opposition have became dysfunctional for a powerful democracy, new power struggles of Islamists on the top of the power hill seem to have determined the country's future. Therefore, a further research arena would focus on an observation of different nationalist perspectives of Islamic discourses in Turkey. Moreover, this research can be inspiring for using Critical Discourse Analysis in identity politics in International Relations. In particular, Turkish experience in both with Islam and secularism with the clash of different narratives of the nation offers lessons for other countries in the Middle East and North Africa seeking to transform identity and power politics. In addition, the social media would be useful to broaden the understanding of the daily construction of national identities, renegotiation of definitions and perceptions on the self and other categories in politics. One of the aims of this study was to open a channel for more discussion on the political polarisations in Turkey rather than provide definitive answers. Hopefully, new studies and attempts would contribute to open the ways to break the fear wall and censorship that can lead Turkey to having free press and academia for construction of a common discourse of democracy and justice for everyone.
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Table I: The Thematic Key Word Search as the Example of Narrowing the Selection of the Data

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Source: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/index/ (accessed on 20.10.1014)
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Cumhuriyet, 20.01.2007, Türkiye'ye Kursun
Cumhuriyet, 20.01.2007, Orhan Bursalı: Darbeciler Yargılanmalı
Cumhuriyet, 30.01.2007, 'Türklüğü aşağılama' düzenlemesi 76 yılda 8 kez, 2002'den bugüne 4 kez değişti
Cumhuriyet, 23.04.2007, Hristiyanların vahşice öldürülmeleri münferit bir olay değil, Türkler bir yalanı yaşıyor
Cumhuriyet, 19.01.2007 Emine Kaplan: Yabancılar bir bölümunu aldıkları bankaların hisselerini satın alarak tam egemenlik kuruyor.
Cumhuriyet, 27.10.2005, Türban yasağı işlemiyor
Cumhuriyet, 20.10.2005, 'Başkent için kara leke'
Cumhuriyet, 13.10.2005, Dursun Atılgan: 'İhanet Cephesi' işbaşında
Cumhuriyet, 08.06.2006, Uğur Demir: 'Türkiye'de ılımlı İslam kazandı'
Cumhuriyet, 08.06.2006, Ali Sirmen: Yurtseverlik Ayıp Olurken...
Cumhuriyet, 14.04.2007, Teh likenin farkındayız
Cumhuriyet, 23.04.2007, Erdal Atabek: İki Ayrı Türkiye (mi Var?)...
Cumhuriyet, 30.01.2007, Usta yazar Ayla Kutlu, "Nasıl bir cumhurbaşkanı" istediği sorusuna şu yanıtı veriyor.
Cumhuriyet, 24.07.2007 p.7, Merkez Sağda Hasar Büyük
Cumhuriyet, 30.07.2007, AKP'nin seçim başarısı bir ölçüde merkez sağın côkışi üzerine sağlamıştır.
Cumhuriyet, 30.07.2007, Emre Kongar: Nasıl Oldu? Ne Yapmalı?
Hurriyet, 21.01.2007 p.1, Türkiye'yi Vurdular
Hurriyet, 20.02.2007, Utaç Verici Bir Suikasttır
Hurriyet, 20.02.2007, Radikal Ermeniler Türkiye'yi Suçladı

318
Hurriyet, 21.01.2007, Emin Çölaşan: Dink Soruları!!
Hurriyet, 21.01.2007, Ferai Tınç: Koruyamadık
Hurriyet, 28.01.2007, Turgut Özakman: ‘Hrant da Türktü’ demek doğru olurdu
Hurriyet, 25 .01.2007, Hürriyet’te dev anket: Hepimiz Ermeniyiz" sloganı atılmasını size doğru mu yanılış mı?” ve "Hrant Dink için Fatih okunur mu okunmaz mı?" ankетleri katılım sayısı olarak Türkiye rekoruna imza attı.
Hurriyet, 14.01.2007, Bülent Arınç: Dindar cumhurbaşkanı seçeceğiz.
Hurriyet, 25.04.2007, Bekir Coşkun: Demokrasiyi soytarılsınmak...
Hurriyet, 22.07.2007, Deniz Baykal: Biz değil merkez sağı çıkıldı.
Hurriyet, 24.072007, Bekir Coşkun: Utangaç Seçmen
Hurriyet, 22.07.2007, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: "Hepimizi birleştiren ortak değer ve hedeflerimiz var.
Hurriyet, 24.08.2007, Özdemir İnce: “‘Türban ve Göstergebilim”
Hurriyet, 26.08.2007, Özdemir İnce: Laikçilik ve Kalsamanlık
Hurriyet, 28.07.2007, Mehmet Barlas: Orada bir köy yok uzakta… O köy artık kente ve iktidara geldi
Hurriyet, 24.07.2007, Hadi Uluengin: Sivil Zafer
Hurriyet, 24.07 2007, Cengiz Çandar: Türkiye Yanılmadı, Yanıltmadı
Hurriyet, 15.04.2007, Bekir Coşkun: Güzel Günler Göreceğiz Çocuklar...
Hurriyet, 15.04.2007, Ahmet Hakan: Ey Tayyip Erdoğan!..Ey Deniz Baykal!..
Hurriyet, 29.08.2007, Cüneyt Ülsever: Ayrışan Türkiye
Radikal, 20.01.2007, Bir Ermeni olduğum için haddim bildirilmeliydi, tıpkı bir güvercin gibi, dikkatli ve ürkek...
Radikal, 20.01.2007 p.1, İrklıların hedefi Hrant Dink üç kurşunla katledildi, Eserinize durum duyun
Radikal, 20.01.2007, 'O vatansverdi, Türk bayrağını sarılmış!
Radikal, 20.01.2007, Perihan Magden: Hrant Dink Yazısı
Radikal, 20.01.2007, İsmet Berkcan: Hrant Dink'i öldürdük
Radikal, 28.01.2007, Meyda Yeşenoğlu: Buralıyım, ev sahibiyim
Radikal, 28.01.2007, Cem erciyes: Mahallemizden bir delikanlı
Radikal, 28.01.2007, Hasan Bülent Kahraman: Siradanlık, faşizm ve kültür
Radikal, 18.02.2007, Ahmet Gökçen: Kahramanyak, kimlikkeş, şiddetperest
Radikal, 04.02.2007, Murathan Mungan: Cinayetin arkaşındaki en büyük örgüt
Radikal, 13.01.2008, Hrant için, adalet için...
Radikal, 14.05.2007, Işık Üniversitesi Rektörü siyaset bilimci Prof. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu: Darbeden daha kötüsü olabilir
Radikal, 14.04.2007, Sezer: Rejim tehdit altında, Gül: Halk bunlara inanmıyor
Radikal, 08.09.2007, Murat Belge: Üçünce Millet
Radikal, 20.05.2007, Baskin Oran: Antiemperyalizm
Radikal, 23.07.2007 p.1, Bu da Halkın Muhtırası
Radikal, 23.07.2007 p.1, 'Orjinal Demokrasi'nin zaferi
Radikal, 23.07.2007, Mahfi Eğilmez :Başarının temel unsuru ekonomi
Radikal, 23.07.2007, Haluk Şahin: 'Demokrasime dokunma'
Radikal, 19.08.2007, Ismet Berkan: Fransız ordusu gibi mi olacak?
Radikal, 30.08.2007, Hasan Celal Güzel: 'Gül devri' ve yeni dönem
Radikal, 06.07.2010, Nuray Mert: II. Abdülhamid, AKP ve muhalefet
Zaman, 20.01.2007, Bu Kurşun Türkiye'ye Sıkıldı
Zaman, 21.01.2007, İhsan Dagi, Milliyetçiliği Yeniden Düşünmek
Zaman, 23.01.2007, “Ulusalcıların piri Türkiye'yi Bölmekte Kararlı “
Zaman, 22.01.2007, Ekrem Dumanlı: Hrant Dink Suikasti ya da Üslup için Bir Dönüm Noktası
Zaman, 22.01.2007, Ali Ünal: Hrant Dink
Zaman, 22.01.2007, Etyen Mahcupyan: Türkler
Zaman, 25.01.2007, Alev Alatlı: Mealin Hükümsüzleştirilmesi
Zaman, 14.01.2007, Halkin cogu Sezer’in dusuncelerini paylasiyor.
Zaman, 22.01.2007, Emine Dolmacı: Sezer’in cumhurbaskanlığı tanımı: devlete kalkan, içraate fren
Zaman, 23.04.2007, Malatyadaki cinayetler dini motivli değil
Zaman, 14.04.2007, Vahap Coskun: Şuna demokrasiyi sindirmek bize ağır geliyor desenize
Zaman, 22.04.2007, Mustafa Armağan: Atatürk Turkiyesinin Hitler Almanyasına ekonomik bagi
Zaman, 23.07.2007, Dünya sonuçtan memnun: demokrasi için büyük başarı

The Second Case Study
Cumhuriyet, 04.10.2005 p.1, Türkiye'nin 1959'da başlayan AB yolculuğu, zorlu ve sonu belirsiz bir süreçe girdi: Müzakereler başladı
Cumhuriyet, 04.10.2005 p.1, 'Laik Türkiye'yı tebrik ediyorum'
Cumhuriyet, 04.10.2005, Orhan Erinç: İstenilen ödünler
Cumhuriyet,13.10.2005, Başbakan kimi temsil ediyor
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Cumhuriyet, 22.11.2010, Erol Manisali: Keynes, Sistem ve Siyasal Partilerimiz
Cumhuriyet 23.07.2010, Suheyl Batum: 28 Şubat ve 27 Nisan

320

Cumhuriyet, 07.05.2011, Ali Sırımen: İpleri Geren Gerene

Hurriyet, 08.10.2004, DEHAP ve Aleviler: Azınlık değil, asli unsuru

Hurriyet, 26.09.2005, Baydemir: Bayrak tüm yurttaşların ortak değeri

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Zaman, 02.10.2005 p.12, AB üyesi bir Türkiye Ortadogu ülkeleri için de çıkış yolu olacak
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Zaman, 25.12.2010, Turan Alkan: Sizi Yaramazlara Sizi
Zaman, 01.01.2010, Mumtazer Turkone: Tarihın "acılm"i
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The Third Case Study
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Cumhuriyet, 17.04.2010 p.10, Devlet Bahçeli genişlemeysi şansetti
Cumhuriyet, 16.06.2010, Güray Öz: Bilinç Kayması
Cumhuriyet, 25.07.2010, Öztin Akgüç: Türkiye'nin Ekseni
Cumhuriyet, 12.06.2010, Emre Kongar: Çağdaş Demokrasiden Ortadogulu Otoriter-Totaliter Rejime Doğru
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Cumhuriyet, 31.01.2011, p.15, Hüner Tuncer: Diş Politikamızda Eksen Kayması
Cumhuriyet, 27.04.2011, p.15, Deniz Kavukçuoglu: Karanlıktan Aydınlığa
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Hurriyet, 13.09.2001, ABD insan avı başlattı
Hurriyet, 17.12.2002, ABD, Suudileri ve Pakistanlıları fişleyecek
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Hurriyet, 16.06.2010, Mehmet Ali Birand: Gerçek Eksen Kayması Öyle Değil Böyle Olur
Hurriyet, 16.01.2011, Cüneyt Ülsever, “Biz bize yeteriz!”
Hurriyet, 25.03.2011, Mehmet Ali Birand: Türkiye Orta Doğu’nun “Batılı ülkesi” olduğunu gösterdi
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Taraf, 13.06.2010, Eksen kayması kara propaganda
Taraf, 11.06.2010, Türkiye’nin ekseri insan
Taraf, 13.06.2010, Türkiye’nin Doğu’ya yaptığı tezi bir fantezİ
Taraf, 15.06.2010, Türkiye’nin ekserine AB onayı
Taraf, 15.06.2010, Gül: Biraz tartışılın
Taraf, 17.06.2010, Eksen yerinde hedef büyüdü
Taraf, 20.06.2010, Çin 10 yıl sonra büyük abi olarak
Taraf, 15.06.2010, Kazim Celiker, Eksen ticaretine doğru kaydı
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Taraf, 04.02.2011, Olaylar Türkiye’nin önemini gösterdi
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