Early Settlement in European Merger Control

Garrod, Luke and Lyons, Bruce (2016) Early Settlement in European Merger Control. Journal of Industrial Economics, 64 (1). pp. 27-63. ISSN 1467-6451

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    Abstract

    We analyse the determinants of early settlement between merging parties and the European Commission over remedies that remove concerns of anticompetitive effects. This extends the previously narrow range of econometric literature on early settlement. Consistent with the theory of early settlement, our results confirm the importance of delay costs and of uncertainty, measured by the complexity of the economic analysis required for each merger. We also find a non-monotonic effect of agency resourcing, which raises questions about the Commission's efficiency in times of high case load. Econometrically, we select a sample of merger decisions in which the European Commission intervened due to concerns of anticompetitive effects, and our selection model provides estimates of the factors determining intervention by the Commission. Conclusions are drawn for public policy.

    Item Type: Article
    Additional Information: . © 2016 The Authors Journal of Industrial Economics published by Editorial Board and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
    Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
    Depositing User: Pure Connector
    Date Deposited: 24 Jul 2015 22:35
    Last Modified: 07 Dec 2018 01:00
    URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/53536
    DOI: 10.1111/joie.12093

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