Mahmud II and Ottoman Diplomacy in the context of the Mehmed Ali Problem (1832-1839): with special reference to the Ottoman Archives in İstanbul

by

Serkan Demirbaş

April 2015

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the School of History of the University of East Anglia

This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognize that its copyright rests with the author and that use of any information derived therefrom must be in accordance with the current UK copyright Law. In addition, any quotation or extract must include full attribution
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract........................................................................................................................................ 3
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... 4
Introduction................................................................................................................................. 6

Chapter One: ............................................................................................................................... 10
1.1. The Mehmed Ali Crisis ....................................................................................................... 10
1.2. The Beginning of the Reform Age ...................................................................................... 12
1.3. The First Mehmed Ali Crisis ............................................................................................ 24
1.4. Diplomatic Relations between the European Powers and the Ottoman Empire from the defeat of Konya to Unkiar Skelessi .......................................................... 30
1.5. The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi ......................................................................................... 40

Chapter Two: The Striking Effects of Russian Military Presence in Istanbul during the Mehmed Ali Problem ........................................................................................................... 48

Chapter Three: The vital importance of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi from the point of view of Mahmud II’s secret plan ................................................................................................ 70

Chapter Four: The Euphrates Project in the Context of the Mehmed Ali Crisis and Its Effects on Anglo-Ottoman Relations ................................................................. 87
4.1. The Projects to Reach India prior to the Euphrates Expedition ......................................... 88
4.2. How the Euphrates Project turned into an International Issue ........................................ 92

Chapter Five: Mahmud and his statesmen’s Diplomatic Harvest Season after all their efforts to win British cooperation ................................................................. 101
5.1. 1834-1835 developments ................................................................................................. 102
5.2. 1835-1836 developments ............................................................................................... 118
Chapter Six: British public opinion, change and Balta Limani .......................... 129
6.1. The diplomatic developments in 1837 .................................................. 130
6.2. The Treaty of Balta Limani in the Context of the Mehmed Ali Problem ........... 132

Chapter Seven: Anglo-Ottoman Cooperation to enhance
the Ottoman Empire in the New Era after Unkia Skelessi: ............................ 143
7.1. Anglo-Ottoman Cooperation to reform the Ottoman Empire ....................... 144
7.2 The second half of 1833 ........................................................................ 147
7.3. 1834 ................................................................................................. 149
7.4. 1835 ................................................................................................. 152
7.5. 1836 ................................................................................................. 155
7.6. 1837 ................................................................................................. 163
7.7. 1838 ................................................................................................. 168
7.8. 1839 ................................................................................................. 175

Final Chapter: The Culmination of Sultan Mahmud's
Diplomacy Prior to his Ultimate Critical Battle with Mehmed Ali .................... 179

Conclusion ................................................................................................. 192
Bibliography ............................................................................................... 195
Appendix ................................................................................................. 212
Abstract

Between 1833 and 1838 the diplomatic relationship between Britain and the Ottoman Empire underwent a radical change. The starting point for this transformation came when the army of the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II, suffered two consecutive heavy defeats at the hands of that of his rebel governor, Mehmed Ali Pasha; the first being in Syria, on 14 April 1832, and the second in Konya, on 21 December 1832. This last defeat of the Sultan rapidly escalated the matter into an international problem. All the very complicated diplomatic developments, which would continue right up to the Convention of London, 15 July 1840, started at the beginning of 1833.

All of these are well documented historical facts in both Turkish and English literature. However, the unknown side of the story is what role Mahmud and his finest diplomats played in the process of resolving the Mehmed Ali problem using diplomacy. This role has been overlooked by the vast majority of scholars. This neglect ensues from a lack of knowledge of the Ottoman diplomatic effort in this process. The most obvious way to overcome this problem is to depart from the orientalist perspective, and use the Ottoman documents, which bear witness to Mahmud’s instructions to his diplomats and their reports from various European capitals of their progress and observations. When examining this intensive diplomatic period from the point of view of the Ottomans, it becomes clear that in fact Mahmud was not a Sultan who merely sat back smoking his water pipe and watched incidents unfold in his Empire’s lands; On the contrary, he had his own diplomatic plan, courage, motivation, resourcefulness and some capable diplomats who did their utmost to faithfully implement their sovereign’s diplomatic orders. Therefore, the highest priority of this thesis is to reveal in every aspect this stupendous and dramatic diplomatic struggle made by the Ottomans in this period. Bearing in mind the above-stated points, this thesis attempts to contribute the academic literature on the Orientalism- which has been largely done in the field of cultural history- by looking at a specific example in the field of diplomatic history.
Acknowledgements

I have been a PhD student for more than four years. When I won my scholarship from the Turkish Government, my daughter had just been born. I have experienced a lot of things in the UK, far from my family. However, I can say that being in a foreign country is very interesting and stimulates personal development. In this context, I have to say that the best thing that ever happened to me in Britain was meeting with Prof. John Charmley. When he agreed to work with me on my PhD programme, no words can describe what I felt. My good feelings towards him have increased enormously the longer I have known him. I can honestly say that he is one of the most helpful and understanding people I have ever known. Whenever I have needed his help he was there. Moreover, I have learned much from him academically which developed my outlook and perspective. For all these reasons I would like to cordially and deeply thank Prof John Charmley for everything he has done for me throughout these four years.

I wish to also thank, first and foremost, my Grandfather, Sadettin Erbaş, who has been the most guidance in my life. He taught me much in both my intellectual and moral life. It is a fact I would have not been able to do anything of value in this life, if I had not known him. Thus, my deepest thanks are to him.

Of course, I also owe a lot to my altruistic wife and sweet daughter. They have been really supportive to me all through this tough process. Many times they have changed the country they lived in, for me. They bring peace and meaning into my life. I do always thank them when we are together but I want to take advantage here of the opportunity to thank them again with all my heart.

In my opinion, parents are vital for a person. My father and mother are amongst the most important people in my life. They have done their best to support me in this long process. I am very lucky to have parents like mine. I would like to thank them for all the sacrifices they have made for me. I would like to also thank my wife’s family; they have been very supportive and understanding during my PhD programme.
I have also a very good elder brother. I have learned from him a lot since my childhood. Everybody knows what a very good person he is. Also, he has a lovely family. I would like to thank my dear brother, his wife, and my handsome nephew and beautiful niece.

I would like to also thank my all very good friends. Friends are one of the most important things in my life. It is a privilege to know them.

Lastly, I would like to thank Sister Maryam, from whom I learnt many valuable things to improve my academic English.
Introduction

“The ‘Turks’ (as the Ottomans are usually called by western historians) have generally been presented in an unflattering light. Their Empire is seen as a ramshackle affair, ruled over by a series of half-mad Sultans, who, when not succumbing to the pleasures of the harem, liked nothing better than to slaughter their Christian subjects; its history in the nineteenth century has generally been seen through the prism of decline and fall.”

Although his period of reign, 1808-1839 (31 years), was very long, Mahmud II was one of the most ignored Sultans of the nineteenth century. His diplomatic abilities in particular are never taken into account when scholars examine the fevered diplomatic developments between 1831 and 1840; called ‘The Eastern Question’ by western historians. One of the main reasons for the phenomenon mentioned above by Prof. Charmley, is prejudice and preconceived ideas in the western scholar’s mind. Furthermore, it could be revealed that the cause of this biased point of view is repudiation of the Eastern World with views based only on their own western sources. These issues continue to be discussed under the umbrella of Orientalism, a concept originated by Edward Said. However, this has been conducted as a cultural history centred debate and therefore it seems that it might be useful to provide diplomatic examples in order to make some contribution to the Orientalism debate. In this context, although this thesis is not a theoretical study, it will attempt to convey the essence of the diplomatic story of Mahmud and his diplomats between 1833 and 1839.

In 1832, the Ottomans were confronted by the biggest problem they had ever encountered in their long history. Sultan Mahmud II, ruler of the Ottoman Empire, employed governors to administer various districts in his lands, and one of them; Mehmed Ali; had amassed an army and rebelled against his sovereign. He had been holding the governorship of one of the most important and fertile territories in the Ottoman Empire since 1805, almost from the beginning of the nineteenth century. Having resolved Egypt’s internal issues he then worked on improving his territory’s economy, military strength and administration, until they were superior in strength to the rest of the country. When he felt himself ready he instigated riots against the Sultan and the

Ottoman Central Government under some pretext of concocted ‘problems’, to be subsequently examined in the first chapter of this work. After a couple of unexpectedly rapid victories against Mahmud’s army (the first in Syria on 14 April 1832 and following that on 21 December 1832 in Konya, an Ottoman city in Middle Anatolia), this domestic issue within the Ottoman Empire suddenly attained the status of an international problem. At this stage, it should be acknowledged that the period of time from the battle of Konya to the resolution of the Mehmed Ali problem with the Convention of London, 15 July 1840, has already been extensively examined from the European perspective in English historical literature. According to the general attitude within this widely accepted account of events, Mahmud and his statesmen were passive actors in the process, and did almost nothing apart from watch the diplomatic developments in their territories unfold. Such a view, infused as it is with ‘Orientalist’ assumptions, represents the attitudes of the European statesmen of the time, and, in the absence of the view from the Turkish side of the hill, has tended to hold the field.

As a matter of fact, Mahmud and his statesmen’s diplomatic struggle is a neglected topic amongst Turkish historians too. For instance, although Muhammed H. Kutluoğlu examined the period of 1831-1841 in the context of Egyptian Question, he did not mention anything about Namık Pasha, Nuri Effendi, or Mustafa Reşid Pasha, or the Ottoman diplomats’ reports; nor did he discuss the significance of Mahmud’s orders to these diplomats. The question arises, how could we know what the Ottomans did to diplomatically resolve the problem, without examining these indispensable materials? Kutluoğlu also mentioned almost nothing about the vital events directly related to the Mehmet Ali Problem, such as the treaty of Unkюр Skelessi, the Euphrates Project, and the treaty of Balta Limani, all of which are examined chapter by chapter through the thesis. There are other Turkish historians, who studied the period; however, they too failed to scrutinize the Ottoman diplomatic struggle, such as Şinasi Altundağ, have confined their studies to the chronology of the historical events marking the struggle between the Sultan and his vassal governor, and reflected upon its impact in the international arena. Some of them, such as Sevim Ünal, have examined Palmerston’s and his ambassadors’ diplomatic efforts based on the Foreign Office documents, as has been done in the English literature, and yet others, such as Mühahat Kütükoğlu, have investigated the problem based on its economic effects on Anglo-Ottoman

---

economic relations. However, it could rightly be said that none of them have considered Mahmud and his statesmen’s intensive diplomatic endeavours between 1833 and 1839. As a result of this approach to the era, the Turkish scholars have looked at Mahmud’s relations with Russia, Britain, and the other European powers from an almost orientalist perspective, just as the European scholars have done. Consequently, the most important aim of this thesis is to examine the diplomatic events that occurred in the time span between the Central Government’s defeat against the Egyptian Army in Konya, right up to 1839, in every detail. This will be done from the point of view of Mahmud’s deliberate and purposeful diplomatic manoeuvres and through these, his self-evident plan, which was to change the diplomatic atmosphere in Europe with respect to Mehmed Ali problem to one that was in favour of assisting the Ottoman Empire. This includes the efforts of his most capable diplomats’ in various European cities, particularly London, to implement their sovereign’s plan. We have studied this period from this point of view because the story that unfolded upon examination of this topic with use of the original Ottoman documents, revealed that Mahmud and his diplomats made vigorous efforts to resolve their enormous problem, Mehmed Ali, by using diplomatic means, and this was clearly an historical fact which has never been examined in detail. Furthermore, the Turkish and English studies thus far have been surprisingly remiss, as seen in their neglect of the Ottoman diplomatic effort in this period. Thus this study is an attempt to read the period, particularly 1833-1839, from the much-neglected Ottoman perspective, based on the hitherto overlooked Ottoman documents.

The thesis provides an exhaustive account of what the ‘Mehmed Ali crisis’ looked like from the Ottoman perspective. To embrace that perspective, it is necessary to appreciate Mahmud II was a capable and even brilliant ruler who, seeing the dangers facing his realms, brought his talents to bear to solve them. Escaping the reports of the dragomans and the European ambassadors they served, we hear, again, the authentic voice of Ottoman diplomacy. That is not to say Ottoman ambassadors were any more (or less) talented than their European counterparts, but it is to say that their voice has not been heard. It also means we get some idea of the complexity of Mahmud’s thinking. The Mahmud who emerges from the Ottoman archives is an autocrat of great ability, but one who did not just act on instinct or caprice. His ambassadors provided a crucial network of information, but it was Mahmud who made the decisions. What we see here, it is contended, is a ruler grappling with complex problems, often with inadequate tools and incomplete information – the messiness of the past is not tidied up to provide a smooth narrative.
After an opening chapter dealing with the background, the study proceeds in a broadly chronological way, first tracing the initial Mehmed Ali crisis, then the Ottoman reaction to it. It then moves through a series of chapters which seek to illustrate how Mahmud and his advisers attempted to realise his original vision of an Anglo-Ottoman alliance despite the set-back of Unkiar Skelessi. In this respect, the second chapter examines Mahmud’s first diplomatic manoeuvre, which is seen in the present literature as an action borne of desperation, as his first diplomatic step taken deliberately to implement his plan. Closely following this, in the third chapter, Mahmud’s biggest diplomatic action, the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, is analysed in a manner contrary to that which the Turkish and Western Scholars have evaluated this treaty so far. After all these diplomatic developments, a significant opportunity appeared in terms of Mahmud’s diplomatic ambition to make an alliance with the British. This diplomatic development came in the form of a request from the British to the Sultan to use the Euphrates route, which passed through the Ottoman lands; this process is studied in the fourth chapter with a summarized background of the project. The positive diplomatic atmosphere between 1834 and 1837 resultant from all the mentioned diplomatic developments is scrutinized very carefully in the fifth chapter in the context of the enormous diplomatic effort of Mahmud and his diplomats. The sixth chapter is an attempt to discuss both topics together: the economic and diplomatic developments in the context of the Mehmed Ali problem. The one exception is chapter 7, which attempts, in episodic fashion, to show something of the burgeoning network of contacts between the Ottoman Empire and the British; much more work could be done on this area. The thesis finishes with an original account of the way in which Mahmud manoeuvred his resources to a final showdown with Mehmed Ali. But it was not enough, and he died just as his armies, upon which so much money and care had been lavished, crumbled in the face of Ibrahim Pasha’s assaults. However, or so it is contended here, his efforts left a legacy in the form of a British willingness to intervene which had not been there in 1832.

The reader is well-supplied with accounts of how these crises looked from the Chancelleries of Europe; this is a first attempt to show what it looked like from the Topkapi Palace, and it could be expected that this effort will be somewhat helpful to those who wish to understand the history of the Ottomans free from the customary prejudices and biases.
CHAPTER ONE

1.1. The Mehmed Ali Crisis

The famous Eastern Question defined itself in terms of which European Power or Powers would succeed to the position occupied by the Ottoman Empire when it finally fell apart. From the late eighteenth century it began to assume the form of a rivalry between the Empire of the Tsars and the British; but in the 1830s another dimension was added to it. In place of the possible partition of the Ottoman Empire by the European Great Powers, it now seemed as though it might be taken over by another Oriental rival – the Khedive of Egypt, Mehmed Ali.

Before the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi some of the British politicians, notably, Palmerston, George Canning, William Lamb, Charles Grant and Viscount Dudley, thought that the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of collapse and they did not want to offer any assistance because of their desire to cultivate a good relationship with Russia. They thought Russia was a more civilized country than the Ottoman Empire because it was a Christian state and would offer better opportunities for an economic relationship. One of these politicians, Richard Cobden, was a Radical M.P in the British Parliament. According to him, “the Ottoman Empire was a despotic Muslim State in decline and Russia was a peaceful, commercial, Christian Empire.” It could be said that this perspective reflects the influence of the Orientalist perspective of the time that the East was characterized as being backward and needing to be modernized by the West. Some Western politicians believed the East could never progress without their help. It may be concluded that these misconceptions affected the relationships between the Ottoman Empire and the European Powers. This can be seen clearly in their diplomatic relationships during the Mehmed Ali Crisis. This time however, in contrast with their support for the Greeks in the 1820s, British policy makers would eventually recognize the importance of the Ottomans and support them against Russia and Mehmed Ali after the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, on 8 July 1833.

After the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, British policy toward the Ottoman Empire, now managed by Palmerston, completely changed, because he had become more concerned about the danger

---

Russia posed to the strategic position of the Ottoman straits. Furthermore, according to Webster, Palmerston had already realized what danger Russia posed to the Ottoman Empire even before the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. However, he was unable to support the Ottomans at that time. Webster stated that:

“Palmerston was more prescient than his colleagues, but his own conviction was not sufficiently strong, his influence in the Cabinet not yet sufficiently powerful to obtain necessary action. From the weakness of these months came a whole series of difficult problems.”

Russia had desired to secure ports first on the Black Sea and then on the Mediterranean Sea for her own interests since the establishment of the Russian Empire. With the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, the Russian bureaucrats found an opportunity to implement their dreams as Russia and the Ottoman Empire agreed to protect each other. The Ottomans agreed that, in case of war, the Dardanelles would be closed to all other Powers. As Bailey mentioned,

“Britain did not fully awaken to the importance of the Ottoman Empire’s geographical, political, and economic position in Europe until 1833 when Russia threatened England’s position in the Near East by signing with Turkey the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.”

All of these reasons were enough to scare Palmerston about British interests in India because, if Russia could dominate in the Ottoman lands, this might damage British interest from India later on. Thus, as mentioned above, Palmerston and the British policymakers thought that they had to assist in the politics and economics of the Ottomans as much as possible, to defend British interests against the Russians. At the same time, other European Powers with interests in the Ottoman Empire, namely France and Austria, also interfered in the Mehmed Ali Problem.

In this context, the intervention of the European Powers over this domestic issue was a blow for the Ottomans. Although many scholars have said that the defeat of Mahmud II by his own governor was a great blow, this can be looked at differently. There is no doubt that this defeat can be seen as a shame for the Ottoman Empire. However, this military failure was converted into a diplomatic success by Mahmud II and his governments. It should be considered that at that time, Mehmed Ali Pasha had enough power to capture Istanbul, and even had a chance to declare

---

his independence, but due to the successful diplomatic policy of Mahmud II, Mehmed Ali could not properly utilise this opportunity. The reason for this is that Mahmud II was using the conflicting interests of the European Powers politically, to the Ottoman advantage, so the powerful Mehmed Ali Pasha could be stopped. Therefore, this period should not be considered simply as a military failure, there was a diplomatic advantage achieved by the Ottomans. In this chapter, in order to properly understand Mahmud II’s objectives, a different method will be followed from that of foreign scholars. They have used Foreign Office documents, and any state archives other than Ottoman, to examine this period. Predictably, although there are many serious British and American academic studies in this area, because they have failed to evaluate the Ottoman documents they have not fairly assessed the Sultan’s effort to solve the problem. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter will be to investigate Mahmud II’s struggle to prolong the Ottoman Empire’s life using diplomacy. This argument will be clearly examined in detail and with proofs, in the light of the Ottoman documents; in this and following chapters but first it would be useful for the readers to look more closely at the main character of the story, Mahmud II.

1.2. The Beginning of the Reform Age

This historical figure has endured as a matter of debate among historians. The reason for this controversy relates to point of view. It would be useful for the readers to be acquainted with the diverse aspects of these important characters before we start to examine Mahmud’s enormous diplomatic struggle during the Mehmet Ali Problem (1832-1839).

Abdul Hamid II is known as an Ottoman Sultan who in one sense laid the foundations for the Republic of Turkey with his significant reforms. However, Mahmud II, who acceded to the throne almost seven decades earlier than Abdul Hamid II, also established much of the modern government organisation we know today, and he too struggled in order to regenerate many beleaguered Ottoman State Institutions. Despite Mahmud’s reformist character, there are many different opinions about him. Therefore, before this examination, based on the primary sources, of Mahmud II’s and his politicians’ enormous diplomatic efforts to resolve the Mehmed Ali Problem, it would make the reader’s task of understanding this period easier to know some of the
different historians’ thoughts about Mahmud II, “the most amazing Sultan”. Furthermore, acquaintance with these opinions will help the reader appreciate the Sultan’s diplomatic manoeuvres as described in the thesis.

First of all, it should be understood that before he became the Sultan, Mahmud lived through some very hard times in his early twenties. His cousin, Selim III, was killed at the command of Mahmud’s brother, Mustafa IV, and the same order was issued for Mahmud himself. However, he escaped death at the last moment thanks to the sacrifices of some women of the Palace, particularly Cevri Kalfa. Therefore it should be considered that when Mahmud became Sultan, he knew that he would have to re-establish his authority but at the same time he knew well that it had to be done subtly. Zurcher explains that Mahmud had two plans. In his first fifteen years of power, the first plan was to assign the statesmen who supported him to key places within government agencies and the Army. The second of Mahmud’s aims was to weaken the local notables, who had put Mahmud into power. Findley describes Mahmud’s first years as a preparation period for strengthening his political power. It can be said that he was to show as much success with his shrewd domestic policies as he did in the very complicated diplomatic game played during the Mehmed Ali Crisis, which will be studied in every respect throughout the thesis.

Kutluoğlu summarises Mahmud’s struggle in his first years with local notables in the Balkans and Anatolia most succinctly:

“Soon after the conclusion of the war with Russia in 1812, Mahmud II set out to reestablish the authority of the central government in the provinces. In the Balkans, between 1814 and 1820, Thrace, Macedonia, the Danubian shores, and much of Wallachia were taken from the notables and put under the control of central authority, sometimes through the employment of military force, and sometimes through peaceful means: for example, when a local notable holding an official post died, it was not assigned to his heirs, but to new officers appointed from the capital, who compensated the deceased notable’s relatives with appointments elsewhere in the Empire. The same methods were applied in Anatolia. During the summers of 1812 and 1813 the principal notables along the Black Sea coast were eliminated. After the death of the powerful notable Çapanoğlu Süleyman Bey in 1814, the local governors, who took advantage of the divisions within his family, occupied his districts in north eastern and eastern Anatolia during the next

---

9 İ. Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı, (İstanbul, 2009), p.40, Palmer, Bir Çöküşün Yeni Tarihi, p.95
10 E.J. Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi, (İstanbul, 2009), p.55
11 C.V. Findley, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Bürokratik Reform, (İstanbul, 2014), p.132
two years. The death of the notable Karaosmanoğlu in 1816 and had the same effect around Aydın and Saruhan. Thus by the end of 1817, almost all of Anatolia was once again brought under the direct control of central authority.

After all mentioned preparations had been made, when Mahmud felt the conditions were ready he started to make the projects in his mind a reality. There are many different views on his reformist character. The question posed is whether he was a “gavur”\(^\text{13}\) (infidel) Sultan or a “cruel despot”\(^\text{14}\) or “his negative personality traits” such as “his impatience led to his headlong pursuance of his reform programme”\(^\text{15}\) or a successful reformist Sultan with his many reform projects in different fields\(^\text{16}\) or an absolutist modernist\(^\text{17}\) or even the co-founder of modern Turkish diplomacy with his cousin Selim III.\(^\text{18}\)

First of all, it should be considered that Mahmud lived in an age that had seen many negative developments. The lands of his Empire were like a circle of fire. Not only had many rebellions arisen against Istanbul, but also the economic and military conditions of the country were in disarray. Mahmud had to find some solutions to rescue his Empire from these disastrous problems. He was aware that this could be only via a strict reform programme. However, because of the negative conditions the Empire suffered, it is not possible to say that his reform programme solved all of its problems. As Berkes comments, Mahmud’s reform period was a beginning period for the reforms rather than an achievement one.\(^\text{19}\)

On the other hand Marufoğlu remarked upon the Western Countries’ effects on the Ottoman reform programme. He stated in his excellent book about Northern Iraq that one of the most

\(^\text{12}\) M.H. Kutluoğlu, *The Egyptian Question (1831-1841)*, (İstanbul, 1998), pp. 21-22
\(^\text{13}\) N. Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, (İstanbul, 2004), p.169 Because of Mahmud’s Western reforms he was called with this epithet by some.
\(^\text{14}\) Engelhardt, *Tanzimat ve Türkiye*, (İstanbul, 1999), p.26
\(^\text{16}\) To read his these reform projects see Stanford J. Shaw-Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye*, (İstanbul, 2000), pp. 25-85
\(^\text{17}\) Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, p.64
\(^\text{18}\) Findley, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Bürokratik Reform*, pp. 147-163, and Ortaylı mention that from Mahmud’s reign the administration of the Chamber of Translation was transferred to Muslims. Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, p.145
\(^\text{19}\) Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, p.203
important external factors related to the Ottoman Empire’s social, political, and financial reform programme were the Western Countries’ merchandise sales and raw material procurement in the Ottoman lands, and their desire to secure their commercial connections with Iran, India, and Far East Countries. In particular he pointed out the British influence on the Ottoman social and economic reform programme subsequent to the Mehmed Ali Problem.

According to Findley, the opinion of the Ottomans that reform was necessary was based on the frequent military defeats the Empire endured. Therefore, military reforms during Mahmud’s reign were considered preferable. However, until 1826 the army itself was the biggest barrier to an army reform programme. Thus Mahmud’s most significant reform, which was to clear the way for other reforms, was the abolishment of the Janissaries, also called the Yeniçeri Ordusu, in 1826.

Ședivý mentioned about two topics together: the external influence on Mahmud’s reforms and abolishment of the Janissaries. He stated in his book that

In the 1830s all the Great Powers desired the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, which was generally regarded as the necessary condition for the maintenance of the European balance of power. Mahmud II tried to satisfy this wish, and, having destroyed the main opposition to any attempts for the regeneration of the country he governed, the Janissaries, in 1826, he started a new phase of reforms.

This army had been one of the main obstacles to any kind of reform, particularly military, and none of the Ottoman Sultans had been able to set the seal on this important issue until Mahmud dealt with it. However, it was not easy to abolish the Janissaries. Mahmud had made his preparations very inconspicuously so he would have the necessary power for this dangerous aim. Uyar and Ericson express the opinion that Mahmud’s decisive stance and measured approach had begun to bear fruit ever since 1822. According to these historians, Mahmud discharged the conservative wing, which was averse to the reform programme, from the critical positions of power, and he appointed his own trusted statesmen there instead. In this respect, he started to make an effort to ally himself with politicians, military leaders, and particularly top-class ulema (scholars). According to Uyar and Ericson, Mahmud’s technique to reach this aim was by

---

21 Findley, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Bürokratik Reform*, pp. 133-134
22 Šedivý, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question*, p.625
23 The most serious attempt to establish a new Ottoman Army, Nizami Cedid, came from Mahmud’s cousin Selim III. However, he was killed because of this military plan.
making concessions and promises, and then if he could not win them over, he purged those who had not been persuaded from office.\(^{24}\)

When Mahmud felt the conditions were ready he started to make moves towards his overall strategy and in June 1826 declared he want to establish a new troop, the *Ekşinci Ocağı*, among the Janissaries. As expected the Janissaries mutinied against the Sultan but this time everything was different, since their rival, the Sultan, was ready for the struggle. As previously described, Mahmud had been making his preparations for this day, so they did not find the Sultan unready like Osman II\(^{25}\) or Selim III. As it will be seen, over the course of the entire thesis, in the very intensive diplomatic struggle during Mehmed Ali Problem, 1832-1839, Mahmud was a very shrewd and vigilant Sultan in internal as well as in external affairs. Uyar and Erickson even asserted that Mahmud and later important reformists were aware that this project, the establishment of the Ekşinci Ocağı, was to fail, however, they knew that when the Janissaries rejected this new troop, this rejection would be a reason, acceptable by everyone, to abolish this old Ottoman Army, the Janissaries.\(^{26}\)

It happened as Mahmud expected and when he declared that he was abolishing the Yeniçeri Ocağı on 17 June 1826, the Ottoman Ulemas, scholars, the folk of Istanbul and the statesmen and soldiers, who were loyal to Mahmud, united against the Janissaries. They were all very decisive and after a very bloody struggle Mahmud and his side won against the Janissaries.\(^{27}\) This was not sufficient for Mahmud and he also abolished the Bektashi Ocağı, which was a kind of religious group whose members had been supporting the Janissaries.

\(^{24}\) Uyar and Ericson, *Osmanlı Askeri Tarihi*, (İstanbul, 2014), pp. 236-237. Also, to see every detail of Mahmud’s preparations to abolish the Janissaries see V.H. Aksan, *Osmanlı Harpleri*, (İstanbul, 2010), pp. 328-343

\(^{25}\) Osman II was the first Sultan to seek to abolish the Janissaries in 1622. On account of this dangerous plan he was also the first Sultan to be killed by the Janissaries.

\(^{26}\) Uyar and Ericson, *Osmanlı Askeri Tarihi*, p.237

This abolishment was called “Vaka-i Hayriye”, which means auspicious event, by the reformist Ottomans. However, some historians have a different view with respect to this process. For instance, according to Uyar and Erickson the reformists did not consider the possible negative results of this military reform upon social, economic, and political life.\textsuperscript{28} Another criticism comes from Aksan. She indicates two problems; first, there was an immediate cash requirement for establishing a new army and it was a fact that the Ottoman Economy was not in a good condition; second, there was a shortage of officers to command the new army since many of the old Ottoman officers, from the Janissaries, were killed in June 1826.\textsuperscript{29} One of the most important Turkish historians, Ortaylı, criticises Mahmud’s methods in the abolishment process as ‘cruel’.\textsuperscript{30}

On the other hand the problems the Janissaries caused had been very serious. In Palmer’s opinion the Janissaries were the biggest obstacle to the Ottoman Empire’s reform programme. He also says that Istanbul had become a Janissary city by the beginning of the nineteenth century. He gives a very interesting example of this in that, according to rumours, even the majority of the fires in Istanbul had been set by the Janissaries for the purpose of taking fire extinguishing levies.\textsuperscript{31} Palmer’s words might be a slight exaggeration but it is a fact that Mahmud had to do something to start his real reform programme and this he accomplished in 1826.

Although the majority of Turkish historians now believe that Mahmud was a very significant reformist Sultan of the nineteenth century, some foreign representatives at the time did not, and reported negatively about Mahmud’s reform programme. Although there is a possibility that these opinions might have emanated from an orientalist perspective, which has many biases, even so it is useful to give these opinions in order to show a different perspective from those who examine Mahmud’s extensive reform programmes in detail.

\textsuperscript{28} Uyar and Erickson, \textit{Osmanlı Askeri Tarihi}, p.238.
\textsuperscript{29} Aksan, \textit{Osmanlı Harpleri}, pp. 343-344
\textsuperscript{30} Ortaylı, \textit{İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı}, p.45.
\textsuperscript{31} Palmer, \textit{Bir Çöküşün Yeni Tarihi}, p.114.
the Prussian Envoy in Constantinople, Count Hans Karl Albert von Königsmarck, his conviction that “all the innovations are superficial and do not get at the root of the problem in any way, and being more child’s play than real progress according to European civilisation, they are bound to collapse sooner or later.”

Despite these foreign representatives’ statements, Mahmud was still a reformist Sultan with both strengths and weaknesses. He initiated many reforms but the most important one with respect to this study concerns the developments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In order to understand the infrastructure of Mahmud’s and his diplomats’ diplomatic struggle during the Mehmed Ali Crisis, 1832-1839, to be examined in detail in this work, it is important to be aware of the improvements in this Ministry.

Modernist reforms in external affairs in the Ottoman Empire started with Mahmud’s cousin, Selim III. He initiated permanent diplomatic missions in some of the European Capitals. Selim was eager to improve Ottoman diplomacy, so before he opened the Ottoman Embassies in Europe, his statesmen, under his guidance, discussed some important diplomatic issues with British diplomats. One example of this was the organisation of matters of state between the Ottoman Empire and each European Power, such as; which Ottoman official would match with which European official, which diplomatic appellation would be the most suitable for each new Ottoman ambassador, and which mode of travel, sea or land, would be the most suitable for diplomatic travel.

Selim had some significant reasons to improve diplomatic relations with European Countries. Turan crystallizes these reasons when he says that it was an obligation to be well informed about developments in Europe since matters were very volatile after the French Revolution. Another of Selim’s reasons was that he was headed towards a policy of balance when it came to any developments in the Eastern Question, so it was necessary to get involved in the European decision process about the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, the first serious step came in 1793 when Yusuf Agah Effendi was sent to London as a first permanent Ottoman Ambassador.

---

32 Šedivý, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, pp. 637-638.
33 Findley, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Bürokratik Reform, p.148.
34 N.S. Turan, İmparatorluk ve Diplomasi, (İstanbul, 2014), p.286
35 Findley, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Bürokratik Reform, p.148. Also for detailed information about Yusuf Agah Effendi see Turan, İmparatorluk ve Demokrasi, pp. 288-290.
Despite this significant diplomatic effort of Selim’s, there were some negative circumstances which would hinder his diplomatic success. Findley summarises these conditions saying:

“In the long run, however, Selim's attempts to establish permanent diplomatic and consular representation had only limited success. Lack of qualification or interest among the vast majority of his subjects, the changeable diplomatic climate of the Napoleonic Era, the failure to create any central coordinating agency in Istanbul, and finally the period of reaction and uncertainty following Selim's own deposition and death, were so many obstacles to the continued development of his new systems.”

However, it is true to say that every diplomatic step Selim made was to positively affect Mahmud’s diplomatic innovations and struggle.

There was another important diplomatic reform in the reign of Selim III which contributed to Mahmud’s Foreign Ministry reforms. This was to reform a vital office under Reis Efendi, called *Amedi*.

According to Findley the reforms in this Office started with some regulations in 1797. Findley describes the duties of the Amedi Office’s staff that they would accompany Reis Efendi to meetings with foreign ambassadors and were responsible for correspondence with these foreign embassies. The Office’s importance rose after Selim sent permanent Ottoman ambassadors to various European Capitals, because the staff in this office was to establish a connection between Reis Efendi and the ambassadors in Europe. In addition to this, this office was to send coded messages to these ambassadors and decipher their secret reports as well. Clearly, this office was vital to the Ottoman Empire’s diplomatic effort. However, it was not working well in the time of Selim III. Examining the reform programme in the Foreign Office is important in the understanding of the scope of Ottoman diplomatic ability in the Mehmed Ali Problem, which is the main topic of the thesis; because Mahmud’s capable diplomats did not spontaneously appear in the 1830s. On the contrary, there was an effort, with successes and

---


37 Findley indicates that according to İnalıçik this office was established in 1777. Findley, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Bürokratik Reform*, p.92.

38 Ibid, p.92

failures, by some Sultans, particularly Selim III and Mahmud II, to reform the Ottoman Empire’s Foreign Affairs and the restructuring of the Amedi Office was one of these significant reforms.

In this respect, reports were presented to Selim concerning this Office. Two main problems were conspicuous in these reports. The first one was that the Office was overstaffed. Patronage was given as the reason for this problem. According to this report, the solution would be to ensure that nobody who was unqualified for the job or over middle age would be employed at the office. The second problem was one of lack of education of some of the staff at the Office. For this reason it was decided that the staff would be dismissed if they did not have the necessary educational background to fulfil the Office working conditions.

These instructions are significant because they are a sign of the Ottoman’s intent to reform the Empire according to modern political principles and this effort made prior to his accession to power was to ease Mahmud’s reform programme.

At this stage, we can start to examine what Mahmud did to improve his Empire’s diplomatic system. As mentioned above, knowledge of this process would be useful, to understand the background of Mahmud’s and his statesmen’s diplomatic struggle during the Mehmed Ali Crisis.

First of all it should be known that centralization was the driving force behind all Mahmud’s reform programmes. After the abolishment of the Janissaries, mentioned above, there was no longer any obstacle to Mahmud’s reforms. In particular, some of the Empire’s internal problems had become international problems during Mahmud’s reign, such as the Greeks, and the Mehmed Ali Problem, and something would have to be done about these matters. However, the Ottoman Empire had very serious economic and military problems at that time due to the establishment of the new army, Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye. The end of the Janissaries caused two problems; the first was that the Empire needed more financial resources to develop a new army, and the second was that the new army was so inexperienced. For these reasons there remained only one way forward, and that was diplomacy. It will be illustrated throughout the thesis that Mahmud was to use diplomacy very well to help his Empire escape from these serious problems.

---

40 Findley, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Bürokratik Reform*, pp. 140-141.
41 Ibid, pp. 144-145
problems. He had to make the Empire’s diplomatic institutions fit for the great diplomatic struggle to come.

The first attempt Mahmud made in this direction was to convert the official translators from non-Muslim to Muslim. In accordance with this purpose he officially established Tercüme Odası, the Translation Office in 1833. The Empire had naturally used many translators up to this date but a big problem related to the translators appeared in the 1820s. Since the eighteenth century the Rum Family members in Istanbul had served as the official translators of the Ottoman Empire. However, these translators had lost Mahmud’s trust after the Greek Problem, and as a result of this doubt harboured by Mahmud they were discharged from this critical position. Findley illustrates this situation thus;

“In the spring of 1821, Constantine Mourouzi, then Translator of the Imperial Divan, was dismissed and executed on suspicion of complicity in revolutionary intrigues. Stavraki Aristarchi, thought to be more reliable though still suspect as a Greek, was appointed on a temporary basis (vekâletan) to take his place. Within twelve months, however, he also had compromised himself sufficiently with both Patriarch and Porte that he was dismissed and sent into exile.”

As can be seen in Findley’s words, Stravraki Aristarchi was the last non-Muslim translator in the Empire. After Aristarchi’s exile there was an interregnum period, until the official establishment of the Translation Office in 1833. In this period some Muslim translators, who were in fact “convert”, had been assigned as the official ones. The first were Yahya Efendi and his son Ruhiddin. Yahya Efendi was to be the first Muslim official translator and this was the first sign of the Translation Office, which was to have only Muslim Ottoman statesmen. He and his son were responsible for the translation of French and Romaic languages. One of their most important missions, directly related to the main argument of the thesis, was that of following European public opinion closely via the European newspapers and informing Mahmud II about the latest developments at that time. This is evidence that Mahmud had, as early as 1823 - ten years earlier than Mehmed Ali Problem, - been keen on having knowledge about developments

---

42 Ortaylı, İmparatorluğu'nda En Uzun Yüzyıllı, p.145.  
43 Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi, p.75.  
44 Ibid, p.74.  
46 Ortaylı, İmparatorluğu'nda En Uzun Yüzyıllı, p. 145, Findley gives Ruhiddin’s name as Ruhu’l Din. Findley, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Bürokratik Reform, p.155.  
47 Ortaylı, İmparatorluğu'nda En Uzun Yüzyıllı, p. 145.
in Europe and determining his diplomatic policies according to those developments. As it will be seen in the following parts of the thesis he was to do the same thing during the Mehmed Ali problem through the instrument of one of his best men, Mustafa Reşid. Findley quoted very explanatory words from Strangford Canning about this:

“M. Chabert [one of the dragomans of the British Embassy] called upon him a few mornings ago, and found him (Yahya Effendi) surrounded by a number of the young Turks whom the Porte has lately formed into a sort of Collegiate Establishment for the purpose of instruction in the European languages. They had a prodigious pile of the Frankfort Gazettes before them, and were busily engaged in translating indiscriminately, by the sultan's positive order, every Article in which the name or the Affairs of Turkey were to be found. His Highness will, assuredly, be not a little astounded on reading some of the paragraphs dated from Odessa - Augsbourg - and Nuremberg."

Ultimately, after these ten years the Tercüme Odası, Translation Office, was officially established in 1833. This Office had a great importance to Mahmud’s reforms because many significant political characters had been educated by experience at the Office, such as Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Ali Pasha, Fuad Pasha and others. Also the establishment of this office shows that Mahmud was decisive in determining his own diplomatic policies based on his own loyal Muslim diplomats, who would naturally struggle to defend the benefits of their own Empire. As can be seen in the chapters of this study, Mahmud was to reap the fruits of this diplomatic reform during the Mehmed Ali Problem, particularly between 1834 and 1839, via his Muslim diplomats, who would endeavour to carry out the orders of their Sovereign in the European Capitals.

When considering both the diplomatic developments in the nineteenth century: the improvement of the Amedci Office and the establishment of Tercüme Odası, it can be said that the Ottoman Foreign Office had been gaining a more Muslim identity with every passing day.

After these positive developments Mahmud thought that it was the right time to reopen the permanent Ottoman diplomatic Embassies in the European Capitals. After Selim’s death the Ottoman Embassies, which had been opened in his time, lost their significance. Mahmud had many diplomatic plans. In fact, he was obliged to do so, since as mentioned the only remaining way to rescue the Empire was diplomacy, and therefore he needed to have far-reaching plans, which would be able to protect the Ottoman benefits in Europe. As a result of this opinion he reopened the Ottoman Embassies. The first significant diplomatic representatives were Mavroyeni, Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Namık Pasha, Fethi Pasha.\(^{50}\) All of them were to take an important place in Mahmud’s diplomatic game between 1832-1839.

Despite all of these positive developments in foreign affairs there was still need for reform in foreign affairs. As mentioned above Reis Effendi was responsible for the Empire’s foreign affairs, however the modus operandi was still almost the same at the beginning of the 1830s as it had been in the classical ages of the Ottoman Empire. Thus the modern foreign state organisation would have to be established as soon as possible to fulfil the conditions of this modern age.

Thereupon the expected step was taken by Mahmud and he turned Reis Effendi into the Foreign Ministry on 11 March 1836 and the last Reis Effendi, Akif Effendi, became the first Foreign Minister of the Ottoman Empire.\(^{51}\) As Turan mentioned, this step was not only a change in the name of this position in the government. Mahmud had also changed the structure of the old Office and the new structure of the Foreign Ministry had been prepared according to modern international conditions at that time.\(^{52}\) As İpşirli mentioned, the Foreign Ministry later on was combined with the Prime Ministry in 1838.\(^{53}\)

After looking at Mahmud’s mentioned reforms with regard to the main topics of this study, we can start now to examine in detail what Mahmud and his diplomats accomplished diplomatically to resolve one of the biggest problems the Ottoman Empire had faced up to that time, the Mehmed Ali Problem.

---


\(^{51}\) Turan, *İmparatorluk ve Diplomasi*, p.352.


1.3. The First Mehmed Ali Crisis

Although from the Ottoman point of view Mehmed Ali was a rebel khedive who had been implementing reforms in Egypt since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and who now hoped to challenge the authority of the Sultan; according to some historians he was the founder of Modern Egypt. Fahmy writes on this subject that the majority of Nationalist Egyptian historians evaluate Mehmed Ali’s period in Egypt as a period in which Egypt attempted to free herself from her pre-modern and feudal structure in the Ottoman Era, and started to rise in order to take part in a modern and capitalist Europe with Mehmed Ali’s Administration. These Egyptian historians assert that Mehmed Ali was a national hero, who struggled to save Egypt, which had long been under Ottoman control, from collapse, and carry it through to the modern age with his hard work and determination. However, as will be seen in the following chapters, Mahmud II and his statesmen thought differently about this Ottoman administrator and from Istanbul’s point of view he was just a rebel governor, one who was to bring a vast amount of strife to the Ottoman Empire. This led to difficulties not only for the Ottoman Empire but for the European powers. The trouble was not limited to one incident, but it erupted twice. The first began in 1831 and was finished by the Treaty of Kutahya on 14 May 1833. The second incident began in 1839 and was finished by the Convention of London on 15 July 1840. This chapter will examine the first Mehmed Ali crisis and consider its effect on European diplomacy.

First of all, Mehmed Ali’s occupation of Anatolia will be examined. However, the aim of this chapter is not only to define the story of Ibrahim Pasha’s battles in Anatolia, but to examine the influence of this problem on the relationships between the Ottoman Empire and the European Powers; particularly England.

“Whoever could have Egypt, he can have India as well” said Napoleon in one of his letters from 1798. These words clearly summarize Egypt’s importance. At that time, Mehmed Ali saw the difference between the Ottoman and French Armies during the French-Ottoman War in Egypt. Later, when he became the governor of Egypt, he brought some military experts from France, who helped to modernise his army in a very short time. The most famous of these was “Captain

---

55 Ibid. P.14
Seves” also known as Suleyman Pasha.\textsuperscript{57} He would later perform many beneficial services for Mehemed Ali during the war with the Ottomans. France had been giving assistance to Mehemed Ali and was pleased to see a strong army in Egypt, as France had been competing with England in the Mediterranean. France, knowing of the British interests in India, hoped to use Mehemed Ali against Britain.\textsuperscript{58} Mehemed Ali was aware of Britain’s interests as well, and aimed to use this knowledge to gain favour with England. As Vereté mentioned that Barker, the British Consul-General in Egypt, reminded Palmerston “the pasha had made to His Majesty’s government for intimate relations and protection, to which no clear reply was ever given.” However, Palmerston responded to this desire in a negative way. As Vereté indicated:

“Palmerston thought that the Turkish sovereign might raise the question of British aid against his revolted pasha. If this were to happen, the secretary of state allowed the ambassador “to say no more... than to assure him [the sultan]of our general wishes to maintain and uphold him as an ancient ally and old friend and as an important element in the balance of power in Europe.”\textsuperscript{59}

Although Palmerston would not support the Sultan against his rebel governor until the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was signed, he did not want to take the risk of opposing of the Sultan.

Because of Mehemed Ali’s desire for Egypt’s autonomy, he began to introduce modernization and westernization from the beginning of his administration there. Mehemed Ali implemented these reforms because he hoped to challenge the authority of the Sultan. From the threat of the French Army, he had learned that economic, political and military reforms were necessary. He was not satisfied with simply modernizing the army but acquired monopolies on important goods as well. Therefore, Egypt’s economic structure became very strong.\textsuperscript{60} Webster indicates Palmerston’s opinion on this topic:

“But Mehemet also established many state monopolies and fixed prices so as to secure huge profit to himself. “The fact is”, wrote Palmerston in 1838, “that Mehemet Ali has divided the population of Egypt into two classes the Rich and the Poor. The rich class consists of Mehemet Ali himself singly and alone: the poor class of all the other inhabitants of Egypt.”\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{57}Khaled Fahmy, \textit{Paşanın Adamları}, (İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), p.79.
\textsuperscript{61}Webster, \textit{The Foreign Policy of Palmerston}, p.275.
Furthermore, Webster added “this is of course a Palmerstonian exaggeration”. These words are an expression of Palmerston’s feelings against Mehmed Ali because from Palmerston’s perspective, Mehmed Ali could lead to many uncomfortable situations for Britain in the Middle East. On this point Temperley writes that Palmerston said:

“For my own part I hate Mehemet Ali, whom I consider as nothing but an ignorant barbarian, who by cunning and boldness and mother-wit, has been successful in rebellion; ... I look upon his boasted civilization of Egypt as the arrantest humbug; and I believe that he is as great a tyrant and oppressor as ever made a people wretched.”

On this subject there is an interesting passage in the Ottoman documents. According to this, as was well known, the poor citizens were suffering under Mehmed Ali’s administration. There is a complaint from the Ottoman administration about his arbitrary projects, his not listening to Central Government advice and his refusal to give up his selfish policies. The same opinion from Palmerston was shared by Barker. Some of his reports were quoted by Webster in his book. Barker reported about Mehmed Ali that:

“His downfall would be hailed as a blessing by all classes, by every individual, whether native or European except the few whose well being depends immediately on his successful usurpation.”

It can be understood that the dislike for Mehmed Ali was not only Palmerston’s opinion, it seems that some other British had the same thought with him.

The reforms made Egypt stronger; and when Mehmed Ali was certain of the power of his Army, he rebelled against the Sultan. It should not be forgotten that he was a khedive. According to Ottoman sources, the Sultan thought that if Britain pressed Mehmed Ali to abandon his plans, he could gracefully admit defeat without losing his position, as the Egyptian public would accept him not as threat to the Sultan but as a just governor. According to this Ottoman document, the public of Egypt began to see Mehmed Ali as a new Sultan, which worried the Ottoman

---

63 Başbakanlık Arşivi, (The Original Name of the Ottoman Archives which is in Istanbul and involves all the Ottoman Documents from 1299 to 1923, and the Turkish name will be used in the chapter) File No: 351 Document No: 19817.
64 Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, p.278.
65 BOA, File No: 2 Document No: 47.
governments. Mehmed Ali’s desire for independence had been to the Sultan clear since the 1810s. Mehmed Ali wanted Syria to be under his administration because he was planning to use it to establish his own Empire in the future. Altundağ in his book a report quoted from French ambassador Drovetti, he noted that, even in 1811, after Mehmed Ali had defeated his enemies, he began to dream of an independent Egypt. Barker also reported of Mehmed Ali that:

“he has at length thrown off the veil which has hitherto but half concealed his ultimate object and publicly declared that that object is to dethrone the Sultan Mahmoud and to put the son of the Sultan in his place.”

From this point of view, it can be seen that Mehmed Ali initiated rebellion in the Ottoman Empire. The relationship between him and the Sultan was strained. Neither side trusted the other, which led to war. This war would create a new phase in the Eastern Question, straining the sensitive balance of power in Europe as the Great Powers struggled to gain control over the Ottoman lands.

The Sultan had promised to give him the governorship of Syria and Crete as a reward for his support, during the Greek rebellion. Despite this, Mehmed Ali had not sent his army to help the Sultan in the Russian-Ottoman war at the end of the 1820s because he had wanted to be the Anatolian commander-in-chief, and had wanted his son Ibrahim Pasha to be the Rumelian commander-in-chief, and the Sultan refused to grant this. As a result, Mahmud did not want to make Mehmed Ali governor of Syria. Therefore, he only gave him the Crete governorship. Mahmud had also recognised that Syria was very close to Egypt and, therefore, it would give Mehmed Ali additional economic and military strength. There was another reason for this dispute between Mahmud and Mehmed Ali. Some Ottoman government officials did not like Mehmed Ali because of his successful reforms in Egypt. In other words, they were jealous of him. Because of this, they sometimes gave misinformation about him to the Sultan.

Mehmed Ali’s ambitions and his strained relationship with the Sultan led to open rebellion in 1831. Mehmed Ali assigned his son, Ibrahim Pasha, to attack Syria in the autumn 1831. Ibrahim

---

66 Altundağ, Misir Meselesi, p. 30.
67 Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, p. 278.
69 Ibid, p. 129.
was a clever and capable Commander. He had big ambitions like his father. His were slightly different from Mehmed Ali’s, however, Mehmed Ali had only wanted to establish an Egyptian Empire. Ibrahim Pasha hoped to establish an empire across the Arabic world. Nevertheless, he always obeyed his father’s orders because he was not as established a statesman as Mehmed Ali.

Ibrahim Pasha occupied Akka, on 27 May, Damascus, on 16 June, and Aleppo, 15 July 1832. These unexpected and quick occupations made Mahmud so angry and nervous that he sent the Ottoman Army against Ibrahim Pasha. The Ottoman Army had been one of the strongest armies of Europe for several centuries. It included the “yeniceri ocagi” or Janissaries. Yet, over time, the strength of the army had declined. So Mahmud decided to abolish the Janissaries because they were draining the government’s resources. This was difficult, but after gaining the Ottoman public’s support against them, he was able to abolish the Janissaries in 1826. This abolition was a major turning point in the history of the Ottoman Empire because the new army, the Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye, was established, which did not oppose reforms as the Janissaries had done. However, the new army was very inexperienced. When looking all battles of the Ottomans after 1826, this should be considered. Mahmud hoped that his new, and modernised army, would be a major source of renewed strength for his Empire; its first test had come.

The first battle between the Sultan’s army and Mehmed Ali’s army occurred on 14 April 1832. This battle did not last very long, but it was obvious that the Egyptian Army was better prepared than the Ottoman Army. After the Syrian public realised this difference, they began to support Ibrahim Pasha. Mahmud began to think that he should have taken more serious precautions. Therefore, he sent a new Army with Huseyin Pasha as its Commander. On 29 July 1832, this Army was also defeated by Ibrahim Pasha at Hums. In this battle, the Ottoman Army was almost destroyed. With this victory, the Egyptian Army moved toward Anatolia. At the same time, the Ottoman government decided to send the last and biggest army to Konya, a city in middle of Anatolia. There, Ibrahim Pasha announced that he was going to reintroduce the “yeniceri ocagi” (Janissaries). Perhaps Ibrahim Pasha began to make significant decisions such as this,

---

74 Ibid, p. 60.
76 BOA, File No: 72, Document No: 20117.
77 BOA, File No: 72, Document No: 20142.
because he believed that the establishment of his own noble family was certain. In addition, he began to persuade some of the Ottoman public to join his army, using propaganda which opposed the Sultan.\footnote{BOA, File No: 70, Document No: 19901A.} There was one last chance for the Ottomans to stop Ibrahim Pasha and his army. Mahmud prepared to send his last and biggest army against Ibrahim Pasha.\footnote{E. Engelhardt, \textit{Tanzimat ve Türkiye}, (Istanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 1999), p. 20, H. Temperley and L. Penson, \textit{Foundations of British Foreign Policy From Pitt (1792) To Salisbury (1902)}, (Cambridge: The University Press, 1938), p. 118.} This last and largest battle occurred at Konya on 21 December 1832. The Egyptian army defeated the Ottoman army in this battle.\footnote{Karal, \textit{Osmanlı Tarihi}, p. 131, Altundag, \textit{Misir Meselesi}, p. 64.} After this victory Ibrahim Pasha began to openly oppose Mahmud in public statements. According to his propaganda, “the Sultan, Mahmud II, was not a good Muslim” because he had made many reforms based on Western culture and Christian rules.\footnote{Altundağ, \textit{Misir Meselesi}, p. 69.} This propaganda is particularly interesting because Mehmed Ali had established similar reforms with the help of French advisors in Egypt; nevertheless this was the accusation that his son used against the Sultan. Even so, Ibrahim’s propaganda seems to have taken effect among some Ottomans in Istanbul. On this topic Šedivý quotes Martens, the Prussian Envoy in Istanbul, “Finally, the Ulemas start to say openly that it would be better to see and have Ibrahim here than the Sultan.”\footnote{Šedivý, \textit{Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question}, p.628}

This sudden and unexpected loss came as a surprise to the Sultan and caused panic in Istanbul. It also surprised Europe where, until now, the European Powers had been calmly watching the struggle. They assumed that this was a typical conflict between the Sultan and his governor. They also believed that the central army would certainly win. Nevertheless, the weakness of the Ottoman Army, particularly after the abolition of the “yeniceri ocagi”, was finally revealed to them after this last defeat. This transformed the problem into an international one because it attracted the attention of Europe. Where, before this, the Eastern Question had seemed to be about which of the European Powers would replace the Ottomans if their Empire collapsed; now it became apparent that there might be a non-European answer to it. Such a challenge to Ottoman power raised the possibility that the Empire might be in danger of imminent collapse. This was
turning point for the European diplomatic agenda and would remain a serious question in the following decades. It is particularly significant because the Mehmed Ali crisis had an important effect on the Anglo-Ottoman relationship, as seen through the Ottoman and British documents.

1.4. Diplomatic Relations between the European Powers and the Ottoman Empire from the defeat of Konya to Unkiar Skelessi

The lands of the Ottoman Empire had always been important to the Great Powers because of their strategic locations. Therefore, the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire became a significant issue for the European Powers. The victory of Mehmed Ali worried Europe, which became pessimistic about the Empire’s future and concerned about its possible collapse. As a result, they began to interfere even more in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire. As mentioned above these anxieties of the European Powers would be used by the Sultan to extend the life of the Empire.

To understand this complex period properly, one should understand the aims and interests of each of the Great Powers regarding the Ottoman lands. As previously mentioned, Russia had hoped to gain access to Ottoman waters for a long time, as it wanted to improve its commercial and military power. Ever since the reign of Peter the Great, Russia had been looking toward the Ottoman Empire for expansion, and from the reign of Catherine the Great it had actively pursued a policy of trying to annex Ottoman territory; most recently in 1774 in the famous treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji. From the 1790s onward, British policy had been wary of Russian designs, even if her policy-makers had not always been able to act against them. France was equally averse to Russia becoming the dominant power in the Mediterranean because it would threaten French interests in the region. Austria also did not want Russia to gain influence in the Ottoman lands because it was competing with Russia in the Balkans. Metternich was also scared of liberal movements and wary of revolutionary forces and so consequently disliked the Mehmed Ali Crisis. This meant that Austria and Russia were on one side of this question whilst Britain and France trended to be on the other: conditions in the East seemed to neatly divide the Great Powers. In addition to this, Istanbul was a major concern. It became the centre of European diplomacy after the Ottomans were defeated by Mehmed Ali’s army. This defeat led to strife
European powers because each either desired this great city, or at least wanted to keep it from anyone else.

Initially Russian governments wanted to divide the Ottoman Empire in order to reach the straits. However, after the fiasco of the Ottomans in Konya, they decided to protect the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, at least until a more convenient time when it would be able to dominate singly over this neighbour. The reason for this was that the Russian Tsar and his governments preferred a “weak” Ottoman Empire instead of the effective power represented by Mehmed Ali. In this topic Anderson stated that:

"Moreover Mohammed Ali, if he succeeded in creating a great ‘Arab Empire’ embracing Syria, Mesopotamia and parts of Asia Minor, might prove a much more dangerous neighbour to Russia than Mahmud II had ever been."  

At that time, the British through the diplomatic work of Stratford Canning provided the Ottoman Empire with a guarantee of help against Mehmed Ali. Canning went to Istanbul in an effort to help solve the Greek problem. He met Ottoman government officials, and also discussed the Mehmed Ali problem and he promised that the British Government would send 15 naval ships as long as the Ottomans would pay for the British crew. It was also mentioned in the document that this meeting was confidential, as the Sultan did not want the other European powers to become aware of this meeting. This demonstrates the Sultan’s determination to acquire the support his country needed because even when he was unable to obtain British support, he sought elsewhere. Therefore, it can be seen that the Sultan was actively addressing the problem by use of diplomacy. According to Canning, this contribution from Britain would be enough to defeat Mehmed Ali. Moreover, Canning recommended the Sultan should send an official to London to discuss this matter with British politicians. The Sultan was very pleased with this offer, especially because Ibrahim Pasha’s army was so close to Istanbul. When Canning arrived in

83 Sergey Goryanof, Rus Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Boğazlar ve Şark Meselesi, (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2006), p. 28.
London, he presented his opinions about this plan to help the Ottomans in a memorandum to Palmerston on 12 December 1832.\(^{87}\)

In his biography of Stratford Canning, Michael Warr has stated a different view:

“Stratford cast about in his mind for a way to persuade the Turks to yield more territory to the Greeks. He had discovered that Mehmed Ali and Ibrahim, baulked in Greece, were planning what seemed likely to be a direct attacked on Turkey from the Eastern Mediterranean. This important news was well calculated to subdue the Turks and render them more amenable”.\(^{88}\)

According to Warr, Canning’s primary goal was to solve the issue of Greece. In the rest of his book, Warr commented on Canning’s main mission in Istanbul more clearly:

“Stratford was a true genius in these matters. He knew how to handle the Turks and he took infinite trouble. Sir Robert Gordon had done neither and therefore failed. When Turks yield to pressure, it is never clear why they have done so. But in this case the decisive factor was the news of Mehmed Ali’s impending attack on Turkey. This was a piece of luck for Stratford”.\(^{89}\)

This situation can be seen in Webster’s book; The Foreign Policy of Palmerston. He states that,

“Stratford Canning had improved the position of the new Greece by using against the Sultan the ever-increasing threat from the South.”\(^{90}\)

Despite this, as mentioned above, when Canning returned to England, he informed Palmerston about the demand of the Sultan. Palmerston, however, replied that “there were no ships available”.\(^{91}\) At that time, most of Britain’s fleet was busy resolving the Belgian problem, and the rest was carefully watching events in Portugal. So instead, Britain just sent twenty cannonballs as a gift to the Ottomans, and did not provide any other assistance.\(^{92}\)

\(^{87}\) Rodkey, Lord Palmerston and Rejuvenation of Turkey, pp. 571-572, Temperley and Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy From Pitt (1792) To Salisbury (1902), p. 118, Also see whole this memorandum Bailey, British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement, pp. 237-246.


\(^{89}\) Ibid, p. 74.

\(^{90}\) Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, p. 273.

\(^{91}\) Ibid, p. 74.

\(^{92}\) BOA, File No: 1265, Document No: 48980 C.
Mahmud ordered Namık Pasha to London to determine the British attitude. If Namık Pasha found the British side to be in a positive mood, he was to tell them that, in remuneration for this assistance, the Ottoman Empire would be willing to offer commercial privileges to Britain. This hinted at the future big commercial treaty of Balta Limani, signed five years later in 1838. This treaty had both positive and negative results for the Ottomans, and marked a significant turning point in the Anglo-Turkish relationship. Namık Pasha arrived in London in December. While in London, he was welcomed by British politicians, even William IV. He was invited to the Palace for three days. However, there was not enough time for a long delay because Ibrahim Pasha was moving quickly in Anatolia. Therefore, the Sultan was impatient to learn the result of these meetings with Namık Pasha. As can be understood from this process and the tone and meaning within the Ottoman documents, Namık Pasha and the Sultan were optimistic about receiving British help. But when Namık Pasha met the Prime Minister Lord Grey, the Sultan’s requests were rejected. As a result of this, the Ottoman plan for British military help could not be realized. This decision, to refuse the Sultan, was partly the result of the naval situation, but it also reflected a Whig view that the Empire was doomed; the result was not what was expected, as the Sultan went to Russia for help. After the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833, British politicians regretted their negligence and sought to make amends for it. This is evidence that Palmerston, the leading British politician of the time then serving as Foreign Minister, was uninterested in the Ottomans. For most British policy makers, domestic issues were more important than the Eastern Question. As Bailey has commented, Palmerston later said on 28 August 1833:

“If England had thought fit to interfere, the progress of the invading army would have been stopped, and the Russian troops would not have been called in; but although it was easy to say, after events had happened, that they were to be expected, yet certainly no one could anticipate the rapidity with which they had succeeded each other in the East.”

---

93 G.H. Bolsover, 
95 BOA, File No: 1265, Document No: 48980 A.
98 Rodkey, Lord Palmerston and Rejuvenation of Turkey, p. 571.
99 Bailey, British Policy and the Turkish Refor Movement, p. 47.
At first, the Sultan expected that Britain would help the Ottomans. But when it became clear that British help was not forthcoming, he looked elsewhere for support against the Egyptian Army. Ibrahim Pasha had just begun to move toward Bursa and closer to Istanbul. Which country would help the Sultan? It could not be France because they had occupied Algeria in 1830. Also, the majority of French politicians and the public had been supporting Egypt for a long time. Moreover, Mehmed Ali had modernized his country with the help of French soldiers and advisors. There was only one country left which desired to get involved: Russia. Goryanof who wrote an entire book based on original Russian documents, stated that the Tsar, after understanding the benefits which would come from supporting the Ottoman Empire, sent Commander Muravyef to discuss the problem with both Mehmed Ali and the Sultan.\textsuperscript{100} Goryanof cites a prescription given to Commander Muravyef before he went to Istanbul. According to this document, the Tsar had made the decision to assist the Ottomans because he realized that if Mehmed Ali won against the Sultan, this situation would benefit France. Additionally, Istanbul would fall under the control of people who opposed Russia. Thus, it was necessary to stop Mehmed Ali.\textsuperscript{101} Although the Ottomans and the Russians had been enemies for almost two hundred years, after Palmerston’s rejection the Sultan chose to accept Russia’s support against Mehmed Ali.

In the meantime, Ibrahim Pasha, who wanted to continue to Istanbul, was ordered by his father to stop in Kutahya, the city next to Bursa.\textsuperscript{102} This was because, at the Sultan’s request, the Tsar had sent the Russian Fleet to Istanbul in February.\textsuperscript{103} This means, as mentioned before, the Sultan’s efforts to solve the problem with diplomacy were working. On the other hand, the Russians had been trying to implement their plan about the Straits for centuries and, with this military landing in Istanbul, they had turned their aims into reality. This situation startled British and French diplomats, frightening both sides. There were now eight Russian battleships in the Istanbul Straits.\textsuperscript{104} This made both the British and French displeased and nervous. Meanwhile, the Ottoman government carefully watched the actions of both sides. They realised that the French and British diplomats would work together to obstruct Russia.\textsuperscript{105} In addition to this, a negative

\textsuperscript{100} Goryanof, \textit{Boğazlar ve Şark Meselesi}, p. 85.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, pp. 85-86.
\textsuperscript{102} Bailey, \textit{British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement}, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{103} Karal, \textit{Osmanlı Tarihi}, p.135
\textsuperscript{104} Altundağ, \textit{Mısır Meselesi}, p. 120.
\textsuperscript{105} BOA, File No: 1171, Document No: 46344.
reaction arose in British public opinion. In this respect, Namik Pasha\textsuperscript{106}, still the Ottoman Ambassador in London, reported that some British military officers had registered to come and help the Ottoman Army. He also reported that the British and French press had turned against Mehmed Ali.\textsuperscript{107} Despite all this, British policy makers did not realise enough the danger of the Russian presence, as can be seen in one of the Ottoman documents.\textsuperscript{108} This Ottoman document indicates that Palmerston still did not completely realise the dangers of this situation until the signing of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi because his attention was focused on the Belgian problem. However, French diplomats more were alert to the Russian danger than Britain. Although they had supported Mehmed Ali since the beginning of the crisis, once the Russian Fleet was seen at the Porte they suddenly felt that they had to do something. Hereafter, France sent Baron Roussin as an ambassador to Istanbul in February.\textsuperscript{109} He was to meet Ibrahim Pasha and discourage him about returning to Egypt.\textsuperscript{110} However, he could not succeed in this mission. Instead Mehmed Ali sent an ultimatum, asking for the governorship of Syria and Adana.\textsuperscript{111} This demand made the Sultan very angry. The situation was negotiated in the Ottoman Government. Mustafa Reşid Pasha, who would be Foreign Minister in 1837, was sent to Kutahya to discuss the issue with Ibrahim Pasha. The instructions given to Resid Pasha were very important because, as stated above, the Sultan hoped to resolve the crisis through diplomacy. In these instructions, Resid Pasha was told to focus on keeping the administration of Adana in favour of the Sultan. If he could not achieve this, the conditions of the France and Britain would have to be carefully considered, and they would have persuaded to act against Mehmed Ali as a second plan.\textsuperscript{112} As can be seen from this ordinance of the Sultan, he was anxious to compensate for the weakness of Ottoman military power with diplomatic tactics. This aspect of Ottoman policy has usually been overlooked by Western historians who have written about it exclusively in terms of Ottoman weakness. Yet, as this account shows, the Ottoman Sultan was perfectly capable of using sophisticated balance of power diplomacy to compensate for what he hoped was temporary military weakness. But Mahmud did recognize the need for ‘hard’ power. He, in addition to the

\textsuperscript{106} The diplomatic process from the battle of Konya to the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and Namik Pasha’s reports from London in this period will be examined in detail in the second chapter in the context of Mahmud’s diplomatic plan.

\textsuperscript{107} BOA, File No: 1174, Document No: 46429 N.

\textsuperscript{108} BOA, File No:1040, Document No: 43047.

\textsuperscript{109} Karal, \textit{Osmanlı Tarihi}, p. 135.

\textsuperscript{110} Altundağ, \textit{Mısır Meselesi}, p. 193.

\textsuperscript{111} Karal, \textit{Osmanlı Tarihi}, p. 135.

\textsuperscript{112} BOA, File No: 368, Document No: 20345.
support from the Russian Fleet, wanted 30,000 soldiers, 6000 cavalry, and 110 troops of cannon from the Tsar\textsuperscript{113} but at first only 15,000 soldiers were sent.\textsuperscript{114} This was still an unexpected amount because both sides had been at war for almost three centuries, yet now, for the first time, Russian soldiers were to be seen in Istanbul. This move was not popular with public opinion or many officials in Istanbul, who were as surprised as the British by this sudden alliance with the old enemy.

As Altundağ indicated,\textsuperscript{115} Mahmud was able to keep his opinion about Russian assistance secret until Ibrahim Pasha came to Kutahya. The Sultan did not say anything about his plan to his governments when they could not do anything to solve the problem. Following this, Russian soldiers were seen in Istanbul, and French and British diplomats were in a state of panic. According to the Ottoman document, both sides sent their war ships to Strait and this situation made the Ottoman public restless.\textsuperscript{116} According to Goryanof, Roussin, the French Ambassador, was trying to pressure to the Sultan for a decision about the return of the Russian Army and fleet to Russia. These pressures made the Russian ambassador Butenev’s job more difficult. The Sultan mentioned in an official document that the Ottomans could not trust France, after the French made a guarantee to solve the problem and failed; Ibrahim Pasha had attacked Aydin and Saruhan, regions close to Izmir. Also the Sultan was aware that if he wanted the Russian army to go back to Russia, Istanbul would be unprotected and Ibrahim Pasha could attack Istanbul. If this happened there was no way to protect Istanbul.\textsuperscript{117} Therefore, the Sultan had to take the risk of keeping the Russians in Istanbul. Roussin’s demand that Russian army go home was rejected. In the light of this it can be said that although the Ottoman-France relationship had been good for centuries, it deteriorated after the French occupation of the Algeria in 1830. As mentioned, French diplomats supported Mehmed Ali until the Russian fleet appeared in the straits. At that time Roussin seemed angry and the Ottoman governments reported that they were worried that he might have acted rashly.\textsuperscript{118} In the same document it was indicated that Roussin had threatened the Ottoman governments over the Russian Army and fleet leaving Istanbul within twenty four

\textsuperscript{113} BOA, File No: 362, Document No: 20132.
\textsuperscript{115} Altundağ, \textit{Misr Meselesi}, p. 68.
\textsuperscript{116} BOA, File No: 359, Document No: 20047 D.
\textsuperscript{117} BOA, File No: 362, Document No: 20132.
\textsuperscript{118} BOA, File No: 365, Document No: 20198
hours. This situation was untenable diplomatically for the Ottomans and they informed the British Ambassador, Ponsonby, of this. After all Roussin’s pressuring, the Tsar appointed as a private officer one of his best men, Orlov, to solve the problem.\textsuperscript{119}

At the same time the French and British ambassador reported that Ibrahim Pasha stopped in Kutahya, thus it was not necessary for the Russian army to stay in Istanbul any more. However, the Ottoman governments stated that they did not want to hear just words about this problem, something had to be done, and until Ibrahim Pasha went back to Egypt, the Russian army would stay in Istanbul.\textsuperscript{120} They said this because as mentioned above they felt they could not trust the French when previously Mehmed Ali had still wanted the governorship of Adana contrary to the French guarantee about solving the problem. In addition to this, the Sultan suspected that France had been continuing to support Mehmed Ali despite Roussin seeming to be trying to solve the problem.\textsuperscript{121} Also at that time the Sultan and his bureaucrats complained about the French and British fleets which were seen around the Straits. The Sultan said that “I would prefer these fleets to threaten Egypt not me”\textsuperscript{122}

Despite the rejection of its wish for British support, the Ottoman government still had Namık Pasha in London, insisting on getting British help in this regard.\textsuperscript{123} In this context, although the Russian Fleet was in Istanbul, the Ottoman governments were still asking both the British and French, whether they had any solution in this problem or not.\textsuperscript{124} When we analyse this situation in the light of this correspondence, it shows that the Ottomans were unwilling to continue with the Russian Army in Istanbul and were trying to use the both French and British interests against Russia. It is clear that the Sultan was not willing to put all his eggs in the Russian basket, and we can see, even this early, evidence of why he would later seek to escape Russian control.

At that time Ibrahim Pasha occupied Izmir but the great powers, Britain, Russia, France, and the Austrian Ambassadors protested against this occupation and lowered their flags to half-mast.\textsuperscript{125} They also sent a letter of protest to Ibrahim Pasha.\textsuperscript{126} This protest worked and Ibrahim Pasha had

\textsuperscript{119} Goryanof, \textit{Boğazlar ve Şark Meselesi}, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{120} BOA, File No: 367, Document No: 20289.
\textsuperscript{121} BOA, File No: 366, Document No: 20238.
\textsuperscript{122} BOA, File No: 368, Document No: 20338.
\textsuperscript{123} BOA, File No: 368, Document No: 20339.
\textsuperscript{124} BOA, File No: 369, Document No: 20356.
\textsuperscript{125} BOA, File No: 365, Document No: 20198.
\textsuperscript{126} BOA, File No: 1199, Document No: 47061.
to recall his men. This event is another good example of the Sultan’s plan to use diplomacy to
solve the problem bringing benefits for the Ottomans.

Ibrahim Pasha wanted to attack to Istanbul but at that time French ambassador Roussin and
Russian officer Orlov were pressing Mehmed Ali to make a peace treaty with the Ottomans.
With this in mind French ambassador Roussin met Ibrahim Pasha in Kutahya. In this meeting
Ibrahim Pasha wanted control of Damascus, Aleppo and Adana, a big region in the south of the
Empire.\textsuperscript{127} In the same document it mentions that French Ambassador Roussin offered a
guarantee of forgiveness to Ibrahim Pasha from the Ottomans however, this was found
“inappropriate” and not accepted by the Sultan. This rejection is evidence in favour of the main
argument of this chapter. Although the Sultan wanted to solve the problem quickly, he rejected
the French promise which was given without his permission. It meant the Ottomans still were
trying to protect their interests despite the many obstacles. We should certainly not see Mahmud
as a tool of any foreign power. Another Ottoman document reported that Ibrahim Pasha sent a
letter pertaining to this at that time.\textsuperscript{128} In it he said that if he returned to Egypt, the European
powers, France, Britain, and Russia would attack Istanbul and also that Russia was only in
Istanbul because of their interests in the Straits and not to assist the Ottoman Empire. It is very
interesting because despite his occupation of Anatolia, Ibrahim Pasha could still assert that he
was defending the Ottoman interests. The Sultan replied that if he went back to Egypt, then all
problems would be solved.\textsuperscript{129} The British and French diplomats were insisting that the Ottoman
government should sign a treaty with Mehmed Ali,\textsuperscript{130} as otherwise they knew that the Russian
army and fleet would remain in Istanbul. Despite this pressure the Sultan did not give the
governorship of Adana to Ibrahim Pasha. He hoped to make a treaty without yielding Adana.\textsuperscript{131}
However, England and France wanted to solve the problem as soon as they could because of the
Russian danger, and as mentioned above Roussin had given a guarantee to Ibrahim Pasha
concerning his father Mehmed Ali’s requests. As a result of all these negotiations and pressures
the treaty of Kutahya was made on 14 May 1833 between Mehmed Ali and Mahmud II.\textsuperscript{132}

\begin{footnotes}
\item 127 BOA, File No: 357, Document No: 20220.
\item 128 BOA, File No: 357, Document No: 20020 A.
\item 129 BOA, File No: 357, Document No: 20020 A.
\item 130 Bailey, \textit{British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement}, p. 48.
\item 131 BOA, File No: 366, Document No: 20245.
\item 132 Karal, \textit{Osmanli Tarihi}, p. 136.
\end{footnotes}
Bailey shows the date of this Treaty on 3 May 1833, however, it is shown on the Turkish sources on 14 May 1833. With this treaty, despite the Sultan not wanting to yield the governorship of Adana to Ibrahim Pasha in addition to Jeddah, he could not prevent it. Also the governorship of Damascus was given to Mehmed Ali in addition to Egypt and Crete. Moreover, the Ottoman public who supported Ibrahim Pasha in Anatolia during occupation of Egyptian army would be forgiven by the Sultan. In this respect it can be said that neither side - either the Sultan or Mehmed Ali - were satisfied with this treaty. This was because the threat Mehmed Ali posed had not yet been completely eradicated by the Sultan and there was a chance he could rebel again in the future. Also Mehmed Ali had wanted to achieve independence since the beginning of his struggle. Despite this they made, or in other words they had to make, this peace treaty because of pressure from Britain and France. For these reasons, one might guess that the problem would rear its head again soon.

There are two very interesting documents in the Ottoman Archive. Although there is no discussion in the secondary sources about any secret alliance between Russia and Mehmed Ali in this period, these documents speculate about a possibility of such an alliance. According to one of them, if this alliance was true, the British and France war ships should have been increased in the Dardanelles. Another document reported that Britain should have been warned about the possibility of this alliance. Both these documents are fascinating because although the alliance was a possibility, it is not mentioned in either secondary or primary sources. The Orientalist argument should perhaps be reevaluated in the light of these documents. As mentioned above the orientalist perspective claims the Ottomans were not aware of what was going on around them. However, it can be seen from these documents that they considered every option for solving this problem with minimum damage. Also they were not dependent on Russian help, they had contingency plans. At this time, the Ottoman government had to utilize every weakness in the relationships between great powers. In fact, this was a common feature of the diplomacy of this period, as can be seen in the above story of the Ottoman Empire.

Only fifty days later, to Palmerston’s regret, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was signed on 8 July 1833 between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. This treaty changed most of the British politicians’ opinion about the Ottoman Empire. We shall see what the content of this Treaty was that frightened the British Government so much.

1.5. The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi

As described above, the Sultan had trusted the British so much for assistance against Mehmed Ali, but Palmerston was too preoccupied with dealing with the more immediate matter of the “Belgian and Portuguese problem”, to support the Ottomans. In addition to this, Webster stated on this subject that,

“absorbed in internal difficulties and in the struggle in Western Europe the British Government and British public opinion neglected this all-important problem until too late to influence events”

Also mentioned above, some British politicians thought of the Ottomans as being only barbarians and Muslims. For these reason they broke the Canning promise. As can be seen despite all the requests of the Ottomans, the British government rejected their appeal in favour of more important matters to them. After this rejection, the Sultan asked the Tsar for Russian help. The French and British sides were unhappy with Russian fleet and army remaining in Istanbul, as they were afraid of Russian dominance in the Ottoman Empire. The Russians continued to support the Ottomans because they did not want another Power in Istanbul, including Mehmed Ali.

After the Treaty of Kutahya, France and Britain was expecting that the Russian army would leave Istanbul. However, as it will be examined in detail in the following chapters, the Sultan did not want to lose his time by struggling to solve any kind of domestic problem, he wanted to improve the country militarily, economically and administratively. As he had seen from the Mehmed Ali Crisis, it was necessary for the country stand on its own two feet. Hence, the Sultan

---

139 The intensive diplomatic process with respect to the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi will be examined in every aspect in the context of Mahmud’s plan in the third chapter. This part of the chapter is only an introduction to this extensive topic.
140 Bailey is transversing from Hansard, British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement, p. 47.
141 Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, p. 273.
unexpectedly requested a treaty of friendship with Russia. Orlov, the Tsar’s private officer in Istanbul, reported that the Sultan wanted to make a secret treaty with Russia on 30 April.  

After that Ahmet Pasha, the Sultan’s private officer dealing with this secret treaty, met the Russian ambassador Butenev at that time and Ahmed Pasha said on behalf of the Sultan:

“The Sultan was displeased with the treaty of Kutahya because he was aware that it was not a peace treaty; it was a just temporary ceasefire. For that reason he was planning to form an alliance with Russia against Mehemet Ali. In addition, Ahmed Pasha indicated that this plan of the Sultan’s should not be mentioned to any other Ottoman government officials until the Sultan had made the public announcement. Furthermore, the Sultan suspected that France, maybe even Britain, was supporting Mehemet Ali.”

As can be understood from this meeting mentioned above the Sultan had clearly been utilizing diplomacy to deal with the Mehmed Ali problem. Indeed, he was successful in his aim because until this alliance became a reality with the Treaty of Unk iar Skelessi, Britain and France did not realize the importance of these negotiations.

Thereafter, the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Nesselrode, delegated full authority to Orlov to make this treaty and Nesselrode sent an ordinance to Orlov about it. In this ordinance some reasons for this treaty were explained. These reasons were important because in this ordinance the Russian’s actual aims can be clearly seen. Nesselrode stated that:

‘First of all, when a friendship treaty became a reality with the Ottomans, Mehemet Ali would understand that Russia was a big obstacle to his aims. Thereafter, peace would reign in the Ottoman lands because of Russia.

Secondly, as it was the Sultan who demanded this treaty, it would show Russia as innocent in this agreement to other European Powers.

Thirdly, when a danger appeared for the Ottomans, the Ottoman government had to accept the domination of the Tsar in its own lands and thanks to treaty the Ottoman Empire would be rescued from the pressure of France.

Finally, to make a friendship treaty with the Ottomans would be very beneficial for Russian interests. With this agreement Russia would be able to deploy some Russian soldiers in the Ottoman lands and if any problem happened in the Ottoman lands, Russia would intervene in the problem for the benefit of the Russia. As a result of this, whether the Ottoman Empire collapsed or not, Russia would be the dominant power in the Eastern Question.’

---

142 Goryanof, Boğazlar ve Şark Meselesi, p. 93.
143 Ibid. p. 93.
144 Ibid. p. 93.
This ordinance clearly expresses why the Tsar was struggling so much for an alliance with the Sultan. Also it adequately explains the reason of Palmerston’s fear and panic after the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.

The ordinance should be examined carefully. There are many important points in this report. One of them, Russia’s real intentions towards the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, can be understood from this Russian document. The Tsar did not want a strong neighbour instead of the Ottoman Empire which had many problems. Also it is well known the straits were very significant for Russia. Another important point of the report was Russia would support the Ottomans for a while, then at an opportune time Russia aimed to dominate on Ottoman lands.

After due process the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was signed between Russia and the Ottoman Empire on 8 July 1833 in Istanbul.\(^{145}\) The treaty contained 6 open articles and 1 secret article. The open articles were about the Ottoman-Russian alliance toward any dangers for both countries which meant that in any possibility of a war both sides would have helped each other. The treaty would initially be valid for eight years.\(^{146}\) Ponsonby, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, learned of the treaty just two days after its signature. Bailey indicated that when Palmerston learned of it on 10 July 1833, he sent a letter ordering Ponsonby to fight for an abrogation of the agreement. Unkiar Skelessi was officially objected to by Britain on 14 August 1833.\(^{147}\) At that time the French protested against the Treaty as well. At the same time Ahmet Fevzi Paşa, the Ottoman ambassador in Petersburg, sent a report to Istanbul. In this report he mentioned that he met with Orlov and the Prime Minister Teselrod, and they said that the French and British fleets would not dare to enter into the Straits. If they did venture to do this, they could see that it might cause war in Europe. Nevertheless, the Tsar ordered his army to be ready for war.\(^{148}\) With this order the Tsar showed his resolution, to France and Britain, to protect Russia’s interests. Austria did not like the treaty either, but owing to the conditions in Europe after the liberalist movements in 1830 Metternich, Austrian Foreign Minister, felt that he had to act in accordance with Russia.\(^{149}\) However, at least he made the treaty of Muchengratsz in September 1833 to thwart Russia’s big plans and he wanted to collaborate as much as he

\(^{145}\) Altundağ, Misir Meselesi, p.151.
\(^{147}\) BOA, File No: 1166, Document No: 46123 A.
\(^{148}\) BOA, File No: 1047, Document No: 43222.
could. According to this agreement, Prussia, Austria, and Russia would prevent Mehmed Ali fighting against the Ottoman Empire; otherwise if they could not hinder the collapse of the Ottomans they would collaborate over the Ottoman lands.

On the other hand, after the British and French protested against the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, the Ottoman government made a statement. They said that this agreement was not harmful to any other state, it was a beneficial treaty for the Ottoman Empire, and the Empire was free to make an agreement with any other country. In this respect, it can be surmised that the Ottomans were seeking some support for their policy. Although this is not stated in secondary sources, there is some evidence in the Ottoman document for it. According to this document, a previous ambassador “the Ottoman friendly” Istrankfort sent a letter to British translator Saper about the rightness and success of the Ottoman policy in this respect. However, Palmerston and British diplomats recognized the dangers of Unkiar Skelessi and Ponsonby demanded a meeting to discuss the situation. The reason for the treaty was explained to the British Ambassador by the Ottoman government.

In this part, it can be said that the secret article was extremely important. Despite the Sultan’s explanation to Ponsonby of the reasons for the treaty, Palmerston’s anxiety turned a dread after he learned the secret article of the treaty. The secret article was not made known for quite some time. However according to the Ottoman bureaucrats, the British and French diplomats sensed the possibility of the existence a secret article, and sent several diplomatic notes to find out about it. Eventually the Ottoman government had to make an announcement, and with this announcement Palmerston understood more clearly the great danger of Unkiar Skelessi. As Bailey pointed out about Palmerston’s appreciation of his policy until Unkiar Skelessi:

“Palmerston’s inactivity in Mediterranean affairs in the previous two years, due in part to the fact that he had not yet fully comprehended the magnitude of his tasks, made it possible for France to make extensive gains in Northern Africa, and Russia to extend her influence over the coveted Straits, gains which seriously threatened the new route to India.”

152 BOA, File No: 1166, Document No: 46123 J.
154 BOA, File No: 1169, Document No: 46234 B.
156 Bailey, British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement, p. 58.
In addition to this, the majority of the British public began to hate the Russians and Mehmed Ali. On this topic Anderson indicates:

“The crisis of 1832-33 and the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi did not immediately arouse as much attention in the British press and parliament as might have been expected. But from the summer of 1833 onwards it became increasingly common for British journalists and pamphleteers to denounce Russia as a threat to the independence and existence of the Ottoman Empire (as a few of them had been doing in the 1820s and even earlier); and there was now a large reservoir of Russophobe feeling in Britain to which writing of this kind could appeal. Russia by contrast was remote, strange and little-known; she was frightening in a way that no other European state could be. Hostility to Russia, moreover, carried with it hostility to Mohammed Ali, the man whose ambitions had brought a Russian army to the Straits and seemed to have established a Russian protectorate in Constantinople.”

As Anderson mentioned, at first the British Parliament was slow to react to the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. An example of this can be seen in Baker’s article on the subject. He states:

“Palmerston wrote to William Temple on 8 October 1833, “The Cabinet meet the 3rd November, and then we must consider this Eastern Question, and give instructions about it.” They are significant because they are the first expression of the government’s views on British interests in the Levant after the alarming events of 1833.”

The most alarming part for Britain and France was the secret article. In this article was mentioned that in the case of any threat against Russia, the Ottomans would close the straits against all other state’s fleet. It can be understood from this secret article that the Russian plans for domination in the straits had been realized with Unkiar Skelessi. However, according to Anderson, this comment of Palmerston’s was a misconception. Anderson writes this about it:

“But there was nothing in the terms of the treaty to which the western powers could legitimately object. Nevertheless there were widespread fears in Western Europe that, while barring other navies from the Straits it gave that of Russia free passage through them. Palmerston himself appears to have believed this; but the belief was false.”

In fact, Anderson’s opinion appears to be a misevaluation. The reason for this can be understood from Goryanof’s comment. He stated, based on the Russian documents that in case of any war

157 M.S. Anderson, the Eastern Question, p. 86.
159 Goryanof, Boğazlar ve Şark Meselesi, p. 97.
160 M.S. Anderson, the Eastern Question, p. 85.
the strait would be closed against all foreign fleets apart from the Russian fleets. This meant that when any battle happened the British Fleet could not attack Russia. However, the Russian policy makers wanted to be able to attack the British Fleet. The Russian Fleet in any war had the right to use the Straits to attack the British Fleet, due to the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.\textsuperscript{161}

Of course, both British and French sides were not unresponsive to the threat they perceived. After learning of the secret article, the French and British armies were seen around the Bozcaada, Tenedos, which was close the Dardanelles Strait, to threaten both states, Ottoman and Russia. Orlov sent a letter about this to Potnef, the Russian Ambassador. Russian support to the Ottomans would continue.\textsuperscript{162} In addition, Ponsonby sent a diplomatic note and asked the Ottoman governments on 30 January 1833, whether in the event of the outbreak of war between Britain and Russia, they would open the straits for Britain or not.\textsuperscript{163} When the British Ambassador did not receive an answer, he asked the same question again on 21 February 1834 and this time emphasized that this question was so simple that the Sultan should have given a clear answer to it bearing in mind the Anglo-Ottoman friendship.\textsuperscript{164} It can be understood in the light of these diplomatic notes that the Ottoman government was trying to evade answering this question. When analysing this situation in the light of the above events, it shows that although he had made the treaty with Russia, the Sultan probably wanted to avoid losing the friendship of Britain in the future because he was aware of the Tsar’s possible plans, and the treaty could be enough to acquire the friendship of the Britain because of the fear of the British politicians of the Russian danger in the Ottoman lands. As will be seen in the following chapters, after the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi a new term would begin in the Anglo-Ottoman relationship. This situation can be given as evidence of the diplomatic success of Mahmud. As mentioned above, the Ottomans wanted to ally with Britain at the beginning of the Mehmed Ali Crisis but Palmerston did not realize the importance of the Ottoman Empire in the early years of his career. In fact, as it will be seen in the next chapter, Palmerston soon noticed his grave error in leaving the Ottomans alone with Russia.

As a result of all above diplomatic processes Palmerston made a big decision. He understood well that the great hazards of Unkiar Skelessi would be a big problem, in terms of the British

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid, pp. 97-98.
\textsuperscript{162} BOA, File No:1169, Document No: 46237 A.
\textsuperscript{163} BOA, File No: 1172, Document No: 46380.
\textsuperscript{164} BOA, File No: 1175, Document No: 46438 H.
interest in the region. He believed this danger would continue until the treaty was abolished. Moreover, as will be seen in the next chapters, Mehmed Ali would begin to damage Britain’s economic interests. There were many evidences of this and they will be examined in detail in the following chapters but one example can be given here. In 1834, Mehmed Ali would prohibit Britain’s silk and cereals commerce.\(^{165}\) This situation would negatively affect Britain, which needed raw material for its developed industry. It seems likely that Britain wanted the abolition of the treaty not only for diplomatic and political reasons but also to promote its economic interests in the Ottoman Empire. As will be discussed in the next chapters this would lead to good relationship between Britain and the Ottoman Empire.

At the same time, Mahmud was trying to make some important reforms and Russian hegemony might have prevented these reforms.\(^{166}\) Also Palmerston realised that all these negative events were based on one factor: ‘the weakness’ of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the Ottomans must have economically, diplomatically, and military supported.\(^{167}\) Only with this reform programme, would the Ottomans be rescued from Russian domination. This British policy would continue until the Congrees of Berlin, 1878. After much effort the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was overruled with treaty of London in 1841. In this respect, the important question must be asked: which diplomatic events would have to have been seen in those 8 years to convert Palmerston’s failure in 1833 to a success in 1841? Other significant question should be asked that what was the role of Mahmud and his diplomats in this success story? After Unkiar Skelessi, the change of Palmerston’s viewpoint to favour the Ottomans would lead to a watershed in the Anglo-Ottoman relationship. In terms of their economy it took the Treaty of Balta Limani between both countries in 1838. This treaty would change the whole Ottoman economic structure completely. In respect of the political relation as mentioned above, Mahmud really wanted to extricate the country from these difficult conditions, as he realised that unless the Empire was strengthened in every way, it would be impossible for the Empire to continue its existence autonomously. Consequently, the big reform period of Westernization and modernization within the Empire would be initiated in

\(^{165}\) BOA, File No: 1172, Document No: 46369.
\(^{166}\) Rodkey, *Lord Palmerston and Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-1841*, p. 571.
\(^{167}\) The role of the British in the reform period of the Ottoman Empire will be examined in every detail in the Chapter Seven, which is named: Anglo-Ottoman Cooperation to enhance the Ottoman Empire in the New Era after Unkiar Skelessi: 1833-1839.
the 1830s. Thanks to this reform period, the Empire that was doomed to die because it was defeated by its own governor would maintain its life for almost one hundred years more. The Ottoman government used the contention between European Powers well in the following years. Of course, after the change in the British Policy, the influence of Britain would appear but this reform period cannot be defined just as a British success. As it will be examined in the next chapters, Mahmud had been striving to solve the problems of the Empire since the 1820s. In short, this period 1832–1839, has a long and interesting part to play in the Anglo-Ottoman relationship. All these exciting processes will be examined in detail in the following chapters in the light of the Ottoman documents.
CHAPTER TWO

The Striking Effects of Russian Military Presence in Istanbul during the Mehmed Ali Problem

There is an historical argument - widely accepted in literature by both Turkish and Western scholars as irrefutable truth - that when Mahmud II learned that the British Government had rejected his request for a military alliance to help combat his rebel governor, he had no other choice than to invite Russian military power to the Bosporus. Although this opinion has received wide acceptance, the Ottoman documents suggest a more complex story. We need to take into account Mahmud’s record as a ruler. The Sultan had confronted two of his Empire’s gravest issues; problems which had not been overcome by his predecessors for the past three centuries: firstly that fact that the rebel governors would not accept the central authority of the Sultan and the Janissaries, (part of the military power of the Ottomans); and secondly, that whenever these governors’ requests were rejected, they would damage the political authority of the Sultans by way of instigating rebellions. Mahmud II had succeeded in addressing these two vital concerns within less than twenty years. The argument which will be advanced here is that Mahmud also had a master-plan to deal with the third great problem confronting his Empire – the threat from Russia. That plan involved getting the British to conclude a military alliance with him. The intention here is not to contest the narrative which says that when this failed, he had to appeal to the Russians; it is, rather, to suggest that even when he did this, Mahmud saw it as another way of getting the British on to his side; the Russian alliance was a dangerous gamble by a man with a plan – not an act of desperation by a Sultan who had run out of ideas. This, it is argued, is much more in line with what we know of Mahmud as an energetic Sultan; when one route to his goal failed, he did not abandon the goal, he found another route to it.

As is well known, Mehmed Ali Pasha’s rebellion started when his army attacked the Ottoman Army in Syria in the autumn of 1831. The first serious battle between the Sultan’s army and
Mehmed Ali’s army occurred on 14 April 1832. This battle did not last very long, but it was clear that the Egyptian Army was better prepared than the Ottoman Army. After the Syrian public realised this difference between the armies’ strength, they began to support Ibrahim Pasha.\textsuperscript{168} Next, the Egyptian army marched swiftly into the Ottoman lands. It occupied Akka on 27 May; Damascus on 16 June; and Aleppo on 15 July 1832. This was most alarming for the Sultan and also for the European Powers. Mahmud II began to think that he should have taken the threat more seriously. So he sent a new army with Hussein Pasha as its Commander, but on 29 July 1832, this army also was defeated by Ibrahim Pasha at Hums, and almost destroyed.\textsuperscript{169}

With this victory, the Egyptian Army moved toward Anatolia, and the Ottoman government decided to send its last and biggest army to Konya, a city in middle of Anatolia.\textsuperscript{170} As Mahmud II prepared to send his military forces against Ibrahim Pasha, he knew this was the last chance the Ottomans had to stop Ibrahim Pasha and his army.\textsuperscript{171} This final battle, in which the Egyptian army defeated the Ottomans, occurred at Konya on 21 December 1832. However, before this vital battle, Mahmud II realised the weakness of his army, and started to seek a diplomatic solution to overcome the problem while incurring minimal damage to the Empire. One of the most significant signs that the Sultan was seeking a diplomatic solution to the Mehmed Ali problem was his sending of Namik Pasha to London, to negotiate for an Anglo-Ottoman military alliance before the last battle with Mehmed Ali’s army in Konya. This demarche is very important because it illustrates well that deciding to seek another power’s cooperation against the enemy before a battle is very different to asking in desperation as a last solution afterwards. On the contrary, this assignment of Namik Pasha’s shows that Sultan Mahmud II had already started to seek a way to overcome this crisis much earlier than the last battle in Konya.

Consequently, the mission and visit of Namik Pasha should be examined in detail to properly understand the Sultan’s diplomatic approach. A full airing of this material is vital since Namik Pasha’s mission, his reports, and the Sultan’s return instructions have been either ignored, or downplayed in all the English historical accounts. However, as an example of Ottoman

\begin{footnotes}
\item[170] Başbakanlık Arşivi, ( The Original Name of the Ottoman Archives which is in Istanbul and involves all the Ottoman Documents from 1299 to 1923, and the Turkish name will be used in the chapter) File No: 72, Document No: 20117
\end{footnotes}
diplomatic endeavours during hard times, this correspondence between the Sultan and the Pasha should be analyzed extensively. But such correspondence is only one component of the wider perspective. When all the pieces are assembled, the big picture becomes clear. This big picture is that of Ottoman diplomatic capability and it is in respect of this ability that this thesis, by using the Ottoman documents, will try to join the component parts together to reveal the entire perspective.

The narrative thus begins with the instructions given to the Pasha by the Sultan. As mentioned above, Mahmud II appointed Namık Pasha to his mission before the great battle in Konya on 21 December 1832. The most important thing to note here is the precise instructions given by the Sultan. These are important because they are based on the primary sources, which will help us to understand the diplomacy of the Ottomans at that time.

First of all, a significant feature is the instruction’s style of discourse. This style is not that of a powerless Empire. Mahmud II gave orders to Namık Pasha that if the Pasha was unsuccessful in his quest to form a military alliance with Britain, this failure would damage the Ottoman image in the diplomatic arena. Therefore, in the case of a British rejection of the military alliance against Mehmed Ali, the Pasha should at least negotiate for some British military support in the form of mariners, ammunition and military officers. This order shows very well that the Sultan was still concerned about the Ottoman’s diplomatic image, despite all the difficulties and defeats from Mehmed Ali. However, the importance of making a military alliance against Mehmed Ali was again impressed upon Namık Pasha, and the first and most important aim of this mission was the creation of the Anglo-Ottoman alliance. Despite acknowledging the possibility that the British might reject the Ottoman request, the document suggests that the Sultan was optimistic about the chances of an alliance; in this he turned out to be wrong. Mahmud was calculating the geo-politics of the Near East; what he had not taken into account was the internal politics of the Whig Government of Lord Grey.

Namık Pasha arrived in London in early December, 1832, and was accorded a warm welcome from senior politics and King William IV; he was even invited to the Palace for three days. Palmerston accompanied the Pasha to the Palace: the third day was the Queen’s birthday, but

---

173 BOA, File No: 1265, Document No: 48980 A.
174 BOA, File No: 833, Document No: 37560 K.
there was not enough time for a long delay because Ibrahim Pasha was moving quickly across Anatolia, and the Sultan was impatient to learn the outcome of Namik Pasha’s meetings. However, despite all Namik Pasha’s efforts, Britain had other problems, such as the Belgian and Portuguese problem, which required the full resources of the British navy; the Government was also fully-occupied with the Reform Bill debates; consequently the British Cabinet refused the Sultan’s request. At that time, the British public was insufficiently alert to the importance the Ottoman lands held for British interests. Although the Cabinet had turned down his proposal, Namik Pasha still had something important to indicate to the Sultan so he sent a critically important report from London in December. He therein opined that leaving London would be the most suitable course of action because there was nothing further he could do in London at that time. But, from his report on his final conversation with Palmerston, it was evident that the Foreign Secretary was not happy with the Cabinet’s decision. Palmerston had confided that he regretted that the British Cabinet could not lend military assistance to the Empire at that time. Namik Pasha had asked him to keep the Cabinet’s decision secret and not inform any other European Powers since news of this decision would spur the rebel governor and his supporters on in their destructive efforts against central government. Additionally, Namik Pasha requested that Palmerston conceal his departure from London for the same reason. It is clear that the Sultan was still hoping that bluff, and the possibility of a British alliance would have an effect of Mehmed Ali; it would only be when this hope, too, failed, that there would be a resort to Russia. What the Ottoman documents reveal is the lengths to which the Sultan was willing to go to try to try to secure a diplomatic resolution to the crisis. Even if the British would not lend immediate military aid, it was possible that their diplomatic assistance might be useful.

The Pasha, although disappointed with the British decision, still left the door open for future cooperation by emphasising that he appreciated the friendship and hospitality which he had been shown. It was clear that the British appreciated the importance of the Ottoman Empire, and that they saw Mehmed Ali as a threat to both Empires; but it would only be when the Ottomans had failed to deal with the threat that the British would realise that they had underestimated the size of the threat. The British expressed their support for the Sultan in his struggle and they agreed with Namik Pasha about coercing the other European Powers over hostilities against Mehmed

176 BOA, File No:833, Document No: 37560 M.
Ali.. Namık Pasha also stated that Palmerston expressed in reply that he was in agreement with the decision that the Pasha should go to Istanbul immediately and report to the Sultan about all his negotiations in London, and assured him that his departure from London would be kept secret. It seems that although the Foreign Minister was not yet strong enough to induce the Cabinet to send military support to the Sultan, he did want to show goodwill to Mahmud II through Namık Pasha in order to not to cut all ties with the Ottoman Empire. Within this context, Palmerston stressed that he considered the Ottoman Empire as an ally, and as such he desired the prosperity and smooth running of the country. At the same time he would like her enemies to despair and he would not allow any other European Powers to exacerbate the problem by assisting Mehmed Ali. He lastly stated that although the Cabinet had not made the decision to strike a military alliance with the Empire yet, it did not mean it would be impossible in any circumstance. An alliance might well be possible in the advent of more favourable circumstances. Palmerston clearly wanted to leave the road open for closer Anglo-Ottoman cooperation, and did not want the Cabinet’s decision to close it; but, like the Ottomans, he had under-estimated the military power of the Pasha of Egypt.

Although they had refused the alliance, three different official letters were sent to Istanbul by three different British authorities. The first one was written by the King William IV himself, in person. In this letter, William IV stated that “he and his public regarded the Sultan’s offer highly, but owing to some difficult problems which Britain had to contend with at that time, unfortunately, this offer could not currently be accepted”. The King continued by saying, “However, this unavoidable rejection did not mean that Britain did not care about this problem of the Ottomans”. Quite the contrary, he had appointed Colonel Campbell, who was on duty in Colombia as a diplomatic agent, to admonish Mehmed Ali rigorously if he were to break negotiations (which had started a short time ago in Kütahya after the battle of Konya) and dared to rebel again. Also, the King added that Namık Pasha had performed his mission admirably, but, as mentioned, conditions in Britain were currently unfavourable for supporting the Sultan against his rebel governor.

177 BOA, File No:73, Document No: 20392 B.
The second\textsuperscript{178} and the third\textsuperscript{179} letters were written by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. These letters were similar to the King’s letter. Just like his, they unfortunately had to convey that Britain was unable to help the Ottomans, however the Sultan could be sure that the British politicians were fully aware the importance of the Ottoman Empire for Britain and in the eventuality of any possibility of attack by Mehmed Ali’s army on Istanbul, they would not allow the Ottoman Empire to fall into decay. All of this suggested two things to Mahmud: that the British would do nothing at this juncture; but that they might yet be driven into the alliance – although that might take a dangerous, and difficult line of diplomacy, one which would astonish the Sultan’s own advisers with its audacity.

Sir Charles Webster summed up the Foreign Secretary’s position well:

\begin{quote}
“Palmerston was more prescient than his colleagues, but his own conviction was not sufficiently strong, his influence in the Cabinet not yet sufficiently powerful to obtain the necessary action. From the weakness of these months came a whole series of difficult problems.”\textsuperscript{180}
\end{quote}

These difficult problems appeared much earlier for Britain than Palmerston had expected, and were in two stages. The first one was the Sultan’s calling the Russian naval power to the Bosporus. Calling Russian military power to the Ottoman lands was a surprise development for all parties to the problem – even for the Ottoman politicians – since the last war and truce between these two regional powers had only just been made three years prior to this invitation to the Russian army. In fact, hostility between these two powers in the region had been going on for centuries. As Rodkey mentioned; \textit{“Russia, since the time of Peter the Great, had been the traditional enemy of Turkey”}.\textsuperscript{181} Although, because of this hostility, nobody was expecting this surprise move from the Sultan, from an analysis of the Ottoman documents, it can be understood that this call was Mahmud’s audacious way of forcing the hand of the British.

It is easy to see the move for a Russian intervention as a sign of Mahmud’s plight, and there is no denying that he needed help badly; but he never saw the resort to Russia as an end in itself, but rather as a means to his initial end – a British alliance. In order to fully understand the reason

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{178} BOA, File No:73, Document No: 20392.  \\
\textsuperscript{179} BOA, File No:73, Document No: 20392 A.  \\
\textsuperscript{180} Sir Charles Webster, \textit{The Foreign Policy of Palmerston: 1830-1841}, (London: 1951), p. 273.  \\
\end{flushright}
why the Sultan called the Russian army to Istanbul, the orders of the Sultan and the reports of the
Ottoman statesmen and also the historical developments of the period must be examined in
detail.

Mahmud never abandoned the idea of getting the British on his side, he simply tried to find a
better way of getting them there. He was extremely reluctant to accept Russian help.. Goryanof,\textsuperscript{182} showed that, when the Sultan agreed to talk to General Muravyef, the special
officer of the Tsar, about Russian military help, the Sultan was initially unwilling to accept it –
despite the news of Mehmed’s victory at Konya. At this point Mahmud II was still awaiting the
good news from Namık Pasha in London, and he was still hopeful of an Anglo-Ottoman military
alliance.. It would only be when it became clear that the British could not help him – either
militarily or diplomatically, that Mahmud would accept Russian help; and even then, only
because he thought it would force the British to revise their attitude. Mahmud saw the Russian
offer as a means to this end.

Mahmud’s plan, audacious as it was, caused a deal of opposition from his advisers. The Minister
of Defence spearheaded this opposition party.\textsuperscript{183} Namık Pasha, in his last meeting with
Palmerston in London, had given this opposition in the Empire as a reason for the necessity of an
immediate Anglo-Ottoman military alliance because, according to the Pasha, the Minister of
Defence openly opposed Russian military power in Istanbul, and in addition to this the other
ministers were extremely perturbed by it. General Muravyef was surprised at the request from
the Sultan, because his first offer of Russian military help against Mehmed Ali had just been
rejected.. As a matter of fact, when the Ottoman documents, which will be examined separately
in the following parts of the chapter, are analysed, it is clear that the Sultan’s opinion about an
alliance with Britain did not change but now his aim was to manoeuvre diplomatically to turn
anti-Ottoman Britain public and government in a pro-Ottoman direction. In order to do this, he
chose to remind them of the importance of the Ottoman Empire in terms of British self-interests.
Historical conditions left only one way for the Sultan to succeed in this reminding, and this was
to frighten the British Public about India, the biggest possession at that time for Britain, by using
Russia as a weapon. Thereupon, the Russian Navy, which contained nine warships under the

\textsuperscript{182} Sergey Goryanof, \textit{Rus Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Boğazlar ve Şark Meselesi}, (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2006), p. 87.
\textsuperscript{183} BOA, File No: 833, Document No: 37560 K.
command of Admiral Lazaref, arrived in the Bosporus on 8th of February 1833. As Mahmud had anticipated, the move produced immediate alarm in Britain.

Palmerston suddenly wanted to meet with Namık Pasha, who was about to leave London, to discuss this surprise development. Namık Pasha’s report informed the Sultan that they met in the second half of February, 1833. Palmerston stated that he had received an official letter from Istanbul which said that Orlov, who had just appointed by the Tsar to solve the problem on behalf of the Russians, had met with Ibrahim Pasha, who was in Konya with his army at that moment. When Orlov related his mission and the instructions of the Tsar about an immediate peace agreement, the Pasha said that he was under his father’s authority and awaiting for his orders. He also stated that he wanted to make peace with the Sultan and so did his father, a governor of the Sultan’s, so his army would be at the service of the Sultan. It was an interesting explanation which might be due to two reasons. Either he was trying to gain time, or the sight of the Russian warships in Istanbul worried Ibrahim Pasha as well. Since the situation turned out like this, it seems that Mahmud II was killing two birds with one stone by using the Russian navy in the Bosporus as a trump against both the British public and Mehmed Ali. Ibrahim Pasha added that he had just sent a letter to Istanbul for permission to move his army to Bursa, which was very close to Istanbul, since there was a food shortage in Konya so his soldiers were suffering difficult conditions there. After including all this information in the letter to Palmerston, this insolent behaviour from Ibrahim Pasha and the dangerous results for the Empire that could be anticipated if the army moved to Bursa, along with the refusal of the British Cabinet to co-operate were given as the reasons for calling the Russian Army to the Bosporus. This is compelling evidence revealing the Sultan’s plan, which still aimed to make an alliance with Britain by alarming them with the presence of Russian power in the region. Clearly, the Sultan was indicating to Palmerston that if Britain accepted the alliance he would not need to call the Russian Navy. Then, as if Namık Pasha had been waiting for this moment, after Palmerston’s words, he again put his request for joint military action against Ibrahim Pasha’s army. However, Palmerston only replied that they had sent Colonel Campbell to Alexandria to negotiate with Mehmed Ali and they were still waiting for his news. The problem was that despite realising the

---

185 BOA, File No: 833, Document No: 37560 K.
dangers to be apprehended from Russia getting a stranglehold on the Sultan, Palmerston still had no military forces he could use; he also wondered whether it would actually be necessary.

Palmerston’s views on Mehmed Ali were at one with those of the Sultan, and he clearly saw the dangers of an Ottoman/Russian alliance:

“I am convinced that it is for the general interest of Europe that Mehmed should derive as little benefit as possible from his conquest and the less he gets in Syria, the better & for this reason, because if he gets much then the Sultan is thrown permanently into the hands of Russia.”

However, nobody, including Palmerston, was aware that calling the Russian army was a part of an overall strategy and as described in the following chapter, the Sultan had already started to seek ways of getting rid of the Russians.

As a further repercussion, this arrival of the Russian Navy woke up the two sleeping giants, France and Britain. In response, Namık Pasha sent a report from London which indicated that Britain and France had started to cooperate over the removal of the Russian Navy from the Bosporus. It was an interesting development because up until the Russian Navy was seen in the Bosporus, Britain and France were rivals in the Mediterranean. The Sultan’s plan seems to transform the two competitors into two allies. Given the rivalry between France and Britain in the Near East, it would prove more difficult than Mahmud had anticipated to create an anti-Russian coalition, and this would not happen until long after his death; but his instinct was not wrong. This situation shows that calling the Russian Navy not only influenced Mehmed Ali but also caused some significant changes in the European diplomatic arena. Brown analysed the reasons for the transformation of Britain’s relations with France succinctly in his book about Palmerston. According to him Palmerston initially attempted to converge with Metternich of Austria, over the Mehmed Ali Problem. However, over time, he began to doubt the sincerity of Metternich’s intentions with regard to the Ottoman Empire.

In reality, the Sultan and the Ottoman statesmen disapproved of this cooperation, since France had been supporting Mehmed Ali for a long time. They also remembered the French occupation of Algeria in 1830. There was somebody else who did not like French cooperation with Britain

---

188 BOA, File No: 1171, Document No: 46344.
as well - Metternich, the famous Foreign Minister of the Austrian Empire. There is an interesting Ottoman document about this topic.\textsuperscript{190} It is interesting since it explains many details of Austrian-Ottoman relations related to the Mehmed Ali Problem. The document indicates that the chief translator of the Austrian Empire came to the Foreign Minister of the Ottoman Empire and explained that he had received a letter from Metternich. Metternich stated in the letter that a French official from the French Foreign Ministry, Taliran, met Palmerston and negotiated with him about the Anglo-French cooperation on the Mehmed Ali problem. However, Metternich ordered the ambassador in London to recommend Namık Pasha to be firm in insisting on only British military help. Metternich was suggesting to the Ottomans that France should not be incorporated in the problem and they should only trust Britain. He also even mentioned that he sent a Colonel, (the Ottoman document says his name was Birukes) just as Britain had sent Colonel Campbell, and he was to act with Campbell. But Palmerston, who did not trust the Austrian, could not be sure about Metternich’s good intentions. He was in a dilemma whether to join forces with Metternich to solve the Mehmed Ali problem. Part of him was optimistic and another part pessimistic. David Brown describes two different sides of Palmerston’s thinking well in his book about him. Part of him wanted very much to cooperate with the Austrian Empire to solve the Eastern problem. According to Brown, Palmerston was worried about the support the French were giving to Mehmed Ali and about the latest intimacy between the Ottomans and the Russians owing to the Sultan’s call.\textsuperscript{191} Therefore, primarily, the solution, to Palmerston, seemed to be to cooperate with Metternich. As mentioned above through the Ottoman document, Metternich at first responded in a positive way towards this desire of Palmerston’s and suggested to Namık Pasha that he insist upon British military help. Meanwhile, whilst this complicated diplomatic interaction was going on there was a surprise development. The French prime minister announced to the Austrian ambassador in Paris that they had a satisfactory solution for the Ottomans and he asked whether the Austrian Empire would like to join them or not.\textsuperscript{192} The ambassador responded that he did not have any instructions pertaining to this topic so he would need to write and ask the opinion of his government. This announcement of France’s has not been mentioned in the standard historical literature on this subject. Afterwards, Metternich indicated to France that he kept informed from his ambassador, and first he needed to learn what

\textsuperscript{190} BOA, File No: 1199, Document No: 47070.  
\textsuperscript{192} BOA, File No: 1199 Document No: 47070.
this solution of France’s was, and then he could make a decision. It seems that this was an attempt by Metternich to divert France, since at the same time he also suggested secretly to the Ottoman diplomats that they should not openly reject the French offer at first, and only after a while they should explain the negative answer to this offer.193

The British and the French had not expected the Sultan to call in the Russians. The Russians were the hereditary enemy of the Ottoman Empire, and the presence of the Russian Navy in the region was an extremely dangerous situation in terms of British interests in India and French power in the Mediterranean. In fact, neither were any Ottoman statesmen expecting it, as the Russians were the biggest enemy in the majority of Muslims’ view.

The British public was in a state of panic after the Russian Fleet was seen in the Bosporus. The Sultan’s plan seemed to be working. The most important indicator of this was William IV’s actions. When the Russian warships arrived, Namik Pasha was still in London. When the Pasha went to the Palace for the last time, the King told the Pasha that he did not approve of any Ottoman-Russian alliance because there was no benefit for the Ottomans in associating with the Russians and also the Russian Empire was an enemy both to the Ottoman Empire and to Britain. Moreover, according to the King, Russia’s only aim was to find a route to India, a British country.194 Interestingly, the King did not mention anything about India when he first met Namik Pasha. This shows that the Russian danger reminded the King of the vital importance of the Ottoman Empire to Britain and the British Public.

Namik Pasha was a shrewd ambassador. He replied to the King that he was very well aware that the Russian Empire had been a great enemy of the Ottoman Empire for a long time, but when the Tsar first offered the Sultan Russian help against Mehmed Ali, the Sultan had not accepted this offer and instead sent his ambassador to London for the Anglo-Ottoman military alliance. According to the Pasha, this was strong evidence of the Sultan’s enduring trust in Britain. Nevertheless, when Britain rejected this offer from the Sultan, only then was the proposal of the Tsar accepted.195 The Pasha was attempting to show the great mistake the British Cabinet made in their rejection, by using the Russian danger to illustrate British advantages. In fact, there could have been no better time than that one to play the trump card for the military alliance.

193 BOA, File No: 1199 Document No: 47070.
194 Şinasi Altundağ, Namik Paşa Makalesi, pp. 247-248.
195 Şinasi Altundağ, Namik Paşa makalesi, p. 248.
However, despite all the efforts of Britain and France, the Russian warships remained in the Bosporus for a further four months. After a while, the Sultan requested 30,000 soldiers, 6000 cavalry, and 110 troops of cannon from the Tsar,\(^\text{196}\) in addition to the Russian warships, because he was not pleased with Britain’s continuing position after his surprise diplomatic manoeuvre. From the Ottomans’ point of view, the only action of British politicians was merely to pontificate without taking any decisive action. The Ottoman government stated that they did not just want to hear words about this problem; something had to be done, and until Ibrahim Pasha went back to Egypt, the Russian army would stay in Istanbul.\(^\text{197}\) The reason for the Sultan’s dissatisfaction was that despite all the Ottoman politicians’ efforts to strike a military alliance with Britain using the Russian trump; it seems that Palmerston could not be convinced of the necessity for full support of the Ottomans in the time it took between the Russian military landing and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. This treaty was to be the biggest manoeuvre Mahmud II made in order to realise his goal of an Anglo-Ottoman military alliance. It would be only when the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was revealed that Palmerston would realise the depth of the defeat British interests had suffered; he would spend many years trying to put right what he later saw as his greatest mistake. As Baker put it:

“The truth seems to be that the swift succession of events in the Near East caught Palmerston preoccupied, unprepared, and belated. There is a thinly veiled admission of this in the sentence, ‘Preparations, however, have been made, and are still making, to enable H.M. Gov’t. to deal with future circumstances according to the view which may be taken of the exigencies of the moment’.”\(^\text{198}\)

Meanwhile, news of the Russian warships in the Bosporus had the same impact on the French public as it did upon the British public, so France retreated somewhat from supporting Mehmed Ali, as had been their practice since the beginning of his rebellion. This impact is seen in an Ottoman document wherein it was stated that the French Ambassador came to the Sultan and the Russian Ambassador to say how he was sorry about the French support to Mehmed Ali that had

\(^{196}\) BOA, File No: 362, Document No: 20132.

\(^{197}\) BOA, File No: 367, Document No: 20289.

been given from the outset. It was also stated in the same document that this apology from the French ambassador was natural because France would never dare to challenge to the Russian army which had 400,000 soldiers. As can be understood from this statement, the Sultan also was attempting to utilise his ‘Russian trump’ diplomatically against his other enemies.

In point of fact, the appearance of the Russian army in Istanbul did enhance the French and British efforts to induce Mehmed Ali to recall his army from Anatolia back to Egypt. Baron Roussin, who had been assigned to this mission in February, acted on behalf of France, and as mentioned above, Colonel Campbell acted on behalf of Britain, in prevailing upon Mehmed Ali. On this topic, The Foreign Minister of the Ottoman Empire met the British Ambassador, Ponsonby. Ponsonby from the outset indicated that Britain desired the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. He told him that in order to support this policy, Britain had assigned Colonel Campbell with only one mission; which was the persuasion of Mehmed Ali to re-acknowledge his subservience to the central government, Istanbul. After these words, Ponsonby asked whether the Russian warships would leave the Bosporus or not. In response to the question the Minister stated that it was certain that the Russian warships would leave Istanbul soon, however, they did not know if the weather conditions were suitable for their leaving at that moment or not. These words seem to indicate that the Minister was trying to gain some time. The Sultan was probably pursuing the progress of his plan and waiting for diplomatic conditions to take shape in favour of the Empire. Only then he would expel the Russian trump from Istanbul, if, of course, he could.

Moreover, the Minister mentioned to Ponsonby, in the same meeting, about how aggressively the French Ambassador, Roussin, had behaved over the Russian warships. Interestingly, he was stating that the Russian fleet staying in Istanbul any longer was a matter of dishonour for France; presumably this was the justification for his undiplomatic behaviour. Roussin’s rather aggressive attitude prompted the Minister to express his concerns over any possible action he might subsequently take, which might upset the diplomatic balance in the region. He was worried about

---

199 BOA, File No: 369 Document No: 20346.
French policies related to the Mehmed Ali problem because the French diplomats had gone so far as to make threats in a situation intended for negotiation. As can be seen in one Ottoman Document, the French diplomats threatened the Ottoman statesmen that they would continue to support Mehmed Ali and moreover encourage the expansion of the boundaries of Greece (which country had just gained independence from the Ottoman Empire) if the Ottoman Empire were to continue to allow the Russian warships to stay in the Bosporus. Concerning this, the Minister requested Ponsonby to talk to Roussin in order to discourage him from further aggressive behaviour which ran contrary to the rules of diplomacy. Ponsonby agreed to fulfil this request from the Minister. All these documents are evidence that the Ottoman statesmen were trying to resolve to problem in a diplomatic way by following the Sultan’s instructions. Sometimes they attempted to use Britain against France, as happened in this example, sometimes they tried to use Russia against all the powers in this diplomatic struggle including Mehmed Ali. In fact, they had to, since the Empire was in very difficult circumstances both economically and militarily and therefore the sole and exclusive remedy for the Empire seemed to be to use diplomacy.

Findley details admirably, in his masterful publication about administrative reform in the Ottoman Empire, this necessity of using diplomacy to solve the Empire’s problems. He stated that the idea was widely acknowledged daily in the Ottoman Empire, that the survival of the Empire was not only dependent on improving her military power but also, more importantly, in the long term, depended on success in reaching her diplomatic aims with respect to the other European Powers, through her diplomatic ability. He indicates Uriel Heyd’s opinion that the Ottoman statesmen realised the high importance of using diplomacy as early as 1829 and this was one of the results of Treaty of Adrianople. In conclusion Findley asserts that the joint intervention of the European Powers which saved the Ottoman Empire’s life was evidence of this realisation. These words of Findley’s elevate the importance of the thesis since this study is a very tangible and visible example of the Ottomans’ reliance upon diplomacy during the Mehmed Ali Crisis.

---

204 Findley, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Bürokratik Reform, p.70.
When considered from this point of view the Ottoman diplomats’ level of capability in using diplomacy would shape the Empire’s destiny. Indeed, the Ottomans had successfully coexisted with the other powers in the region since the second half of the fourteenth century, and this had increased their diplomatic skills but they only had not needed to use this ability because of their strong economic and military position. In other words they had used their strong economic and military system to maintain their position with other powers in the region for centuries but this time, in the nineteenth century, they were urgently in need of diplomacy to maintain the territorial integrity of the Empire. Diplomacy was needed to preclude the extravagances of the French diplomats. In spite of the assent of Ponsonby in warning Roussin, the Sultan was cautious and ordered to the Ottoman statesmen that,

“although it is clear that France would not do anything to the detriment of Ottoman interests, French diplomacy in Istanbul should be pursued very carefully to avoid the eventuality of the French acting in accordance with their stated policies.”

As well as these measures taken on account of France, the Sultan and his officials also sought to thoroughly consider every diplomatic angle. So the Foreign Minister gave orders to the other diplomats of the Empire that they should be careful to not to cut all ties with France.

Meanwhile, the Tsar mobilized against pressure from the French over the Ottomans. He appointed Orlov instead of Butenev to Istanbul as an ambassador. Orlov was endowed with massive authority. Mavroyeni, the Ottoman lieutenant ambassador to Vienna, reported from London that he met with Delyot, the Russian ambassador to London, in Buckingham Palace. The ambassador indicated that Butenev was very young to be directing the Russian Navy and army in Istanbul so the Tsar appointed Orlov, who departed from Petersburg on 9 April 1833, with special authority to set the things right in Istanbul. He also mentioned that this appointment was a goodwill gesture from the Tsar to the Sultan and so he hoped that the Sultan and the Ottoman statesmen would be pleased with this effort of the Tsar’s. Goryanof stated, on the instructions of the Tsar that Orlov had been charged with preventing the French from applying pressure in Istanbul. As has already been covered previously, the Sultan’s plan had started to work

---

208 Goryanof, *Rus Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Boğazlar ve Şark Meselesi*, p. 89.
because after the appearance of the Russian warships and soldiers, King William IV had begun to be more concerned about the Mehmed Ali Problem because of the British interests in the region. The King negotiated with Mavroyeni over this on the same day he met with the Russian ambassador in the Palace. William IV asked his opinions about whether there was a possibility of the Sultan and Mehmed Ali reaching an agreement. The lieutenant ambassador answered that he was sure that Mehmed Ali would accept the Sultan’s conditions since he had already yielded more than he had expected. Mavroyeni also informed the King that he would send a report to Istanbul about his negotiations in the Palace. When the King heard this, he wanted him to indicate to the Sultan that there was no need to continue Orlov’s mission any more. Furthermore, he appointed Admiral Malcolm as Commander to the British Navy presence in the Mediterranean and more importantly, gave orders that he was to act in favour of the Ottoman interests. In addition to this, the King stated that Colonel Campbell reported to him from Alexandria that he met with Mehmed Ali, and the Pasha had given him a warm welcome. He relayed to Mehmed Ali the King’s instructions about ending this rebellion against the Sultan immediately and reaccepting his sovereignty. In response the Pasha interestingly stated that as a matter of fact he had never thought to step outside of the sovereignty of the Sultan and had always accepted him as his patron.\footnote{BOA, File No: 350 Document No: 19814.} Mehmed Ali was either mocking both the King and the Sultan or was overcome with fear as a result of the Russian military presence in Istanbul and the British and French diplomatic pressure.

The same Britain which had done nothing except murmur some placatory words when Namık Pasha asked for a military alliance at the most critical juncture, was now volunteering to assist the Ottomans. When analysing this alteration of the British policies related to the Ottomans in the light of the main argument of this chapter, the reason for this change seems to be due to the emotions stirred in the British public about the British interests in the region by the Sultan with his risky plan of calling Russian military power to the Bosporus. Moreover, this alteration took place very rapidly, as the reversal of policy had taken only two months to occur, from February to April. The meeting in the Palace was an important sign, and serves as an excellent example of this transformation in British policies towards the Ottoman Empire because all the British politicians Mavroyeni had met in the Palace had changed their minds in respect to the Ottomans and now leaned towards sending military help. The most important of these were, William IV.,
The Prime Minister Lord Grey, and the Foreign Minister Palmerston. These people were now giving their positive opinions about aiding the Ottoman Empire against her enemies in the region and they were taking a position most emphatically in favour of the Ottomans, contrary to the February meetings with Namık Pasha. In this respect, the King announced that;

“when considering the words of Mehmed Ali, spoken to Colonel Campbell, there was no need for Russian military power to stay in Istanbul anymore and therefore it will be our auspicial decision to resend the Russians from the Ottoman lands because if the Sultan does not do it, this situation will be a point of contention among the powers in the region and this would damage the Ottoman interests.”

After these words, the King addressed a vital topic which was to be on the agenda of the Anglo-Ottoman relationship in the following decades. He expressed that;

“The Sultan should make required reforms in the finance and administration system immediately after making an agreement with Mehmed Ali. Otherwise, without these vital reforms, I am afraid to express that the Ottoman Empire will very soon be fragmentized by Russia and other enemies of the Empire.”

These words of the King are quite interesting because, as it is examined in the following chapters, the Sultan and his best statesman and diplomat Mustafa Reşid would determine their policies concerning the system’s finance and administration reforms. That means the door, which was opened by the Sultan’s Russian ‘trump’ against the British public to better facilitate a military alliance, had turned in time into an administrative and financial cooperation in order to maintain the Empire and also allow it to escape from Russian influence in Istanbul. This cooperation and reform program would be actualised with the Treaty of Balta Limani, 1838, for the finance system and with the rescript of Gülhane, 1839, for the administrative system. All these reforms were connected to the improvement in the Anglo-Ottoman relationship with the Sultan’s and his statesmen’s efforts to win over the King and his statesmen to their side in view of the Mehmed Ali Problem. Thus, it would be fair to say that these reform programmes, aimed at releasing the Empire from the difficulties with Western methods, could be viewed as being a further level of the Unkia Skelessi operation; this point of view will be examined in great depth in the following chapters.

The other important character among the British politicians, who had changed their opinions about the Ottoman Empire with the emergent Russian danger in Istanbul, was the Prime Minister, Lord Grey. He was in the palace on that day and he too talked to Mavroyeni about the Mehmed Ali problem. Like the King, he too stated that he was sure Mehmed Ali was content with his concessions from the Sultan in the Kütahya negotiations. Therefore, he would like to express in private that the Russian Navy, (which was, according to the Prime Minister, currently doing some research related to defence strategies in the Mediterranean Straits), should leave the Ottoman lands immediately, since any delay over this necessary decision would cause French hostility which was bound to damage the Empire. In this respect he added that he would like to assure the Sultan that the British government did not want any conflict between the Ottoman Empire and France since they would like to be beneficial to the Empire. Lord Grey was not satisfied with only these words to show his government’s inclination to aid the Ottomans against Mehmed Ali and the Russian danger in Istanbul and he added, in order to reassure the Sultan that the new commander to the British Navy Power in the Mediterranean, Admiral Malcolm, would depart from Malta tomorrow. This British Navy Power would act on behalf of Ottoman interests and wherever it needed to go for these interests, for example, to Alexandria or to anywhere in the Mediterranean it would go. When analysing the Prime Minister’s words, no evidence could be as strong as these to support the main argument of this chapter; that the Sultan’s plan had started to work since the head of the British government indicated that the British Navy power- which only fifty days ago had no time to be interested in Ottoman problems - would act on behalf of Ottoman interests. Moreover, Lord Grey relayed this development to Colonel Campbell, who was negotiating with Mehmed Ali in Alexandria at that time, and the Colonel reported from Egypt that Mehmed Ali did not expect the British government to support the Sultan. When he heard that the British government had decided in favour of the Ottoman central government, the Pasha was extremely surprised since he was aware of the rejection from the British government in February. On the other hand he was not aware of Mahmud II’s capacity for diplomacy. After all these declarations from the British, the Ottoman ambassador Mavroyeni, who could see the big change now in the political atmosphere in London concerning the Sultan’s request, stated to the Prime Minister that he agreed that there was no need for the Russian military power to stay in the Ottoman lands now. Russian departure would mean France would relax the pressure in

Istanbul, and when he witnessed that the final decision of the British Cabinet was in support the Sultan, Mehmed Ali would be content with the rights the Sultan conceded to him in the Kütahya Negotiations.\footnote{BOA, File No: 350 Document No: 19814.}

Meanwhile, Palmerston joined in the general disapprobation over the arrival of the Russian warships. As mentioned above, he had sent Campbell to the Egypt to negotiate with Mehmed Ali and induce him to recall his army to the Egypt. When the Sultan saw that his plan had started to work, he ordered to Foreign Minister to negotiate with the Russians diplomats to move the Russian warships to Süzebolu, away from the Bosporus.\footnote{BOA, File No: 362 Document No: 20132.} The Sultan’s plan was working because apprehension from both Britain and France about the Russian Power in Istanbul had been increasing daily. As a result of this they strengthened their cooperation to end the Mehmed Ali Problem with a minimum of damage to their benefits in the region. France stopped encouraging and supporting the Pasha and the British Public began to realise the real importance of the Ottoman Empire for British interests. When analysing this changeover in the policies of the both powers from the Ottoman perspective, all of these rapid developments were by virtue of the Sultan’s plan. In spite of the change in these two powers’ policies against Mehmed Ali, the Sultan had been keeping his eye on both the powers. He ordered his ministers to meet with both the ambassadors, Roussin and Ponsonby, to understand the background and the level of this cooperation.\footnote{BOA, File No: 362, Document No: 20109.} In addition to this, he heard from his officials that when the British translator, Pizani, met with the Foreign Minister, he mentioned two different arguments. According to one of them, Mehmed Ali was a rebel, but according to another one, if his struggle was for the Egyptian people it could not be considered as a rebellion.\footnote{BOA, File No: 362, Document No: 20109.} Pizani’s words made the Sultan very angry and he ordered that Ponsonby’s opinion should be sought about this statement. Mahmud II was also wondering what the reason for this explanation was, when Britain had formerly appeared to be completely opposed to the rebel Governor. On account of this statement, the foreign minister should ask quite frankly what the final position of both powers in the Anglo-French cooperation against Mehmed Ali was when he met with the ambassadors. The Sultan’s concern can be seen in how very careful he was about his plan and how no eventuality which might damage it, was overlooked even if it was only the statement of an ordinary translator.
At the same time, as mentioned above, the Sultan ordered his ministers to ask the Russian diplomats to move the Russian warships to Süzebolu. However, he was still extremely cautious over the diplomatic balance and so he suggested that they should use very tactful language in this negotiation with Russia. Thereupon, the Foreign Minister met with Orlov and General Muravyef at his house. First, the Minister made mention of how pleased the Sultan was to have the Tsar’s support by sending his warships and soldiers to Istanbul, then tactfully went on to ask if Orlov would move to the Russian warships to Süzebolu. The Minister made this request on the Sultan’s orders, because the political atmosphere in London related to his Empire had started to change and the Sultan was relying on these latest developments in the British political agenda. However, the Russian diplomats did not want to relinquish their presence in Istanbul that easily since they had been trying to reach this position for almost two centuries. In response, the ambassador stated that Mehmed Ali had not recalled his army to Egypt and therefore the problem had not yet been resolved. For this reason he was wondering why the Sultan wanted the Russian warships moved from the Bosporus. After these words, the Foreign Minister responded that there were many reasons for this demand. The first was that the Russian support had effectively intimidated Mehmed Ali and he had ordered his son to stop his army in Kütahya. The second was that all the efforts of General Muryanef, Colonel Campbell and Ambassador Roussin, all negotiating with Mehmed Ali face to face in Alexandria, seemed to have had an impact on the Pasha. When he had mentioned these points, the Minister concluded that as a result of all these factors the resolution of the problem seemed to be close at hand. He said this because even as he was speaking to the Russian Ambassador and General, Reshit Pasha, who had been assigned by the Sultan to resolve the problem as soon as possible, was negotiating with Ibrahim Pasha in Kütahya.

Meanwhile, negotiations had been proceeding in Kütahya. Mustafa Reşid, who would be vital character in the Anglo-Ottoman relationship in the following years, was conducting negotiations on behalf of the Sultan, with Ibrahim Pasha doing the same on behalf of his father, Mehmed Ali Pasha. After many heated debates about Adana, which was a critically important city for both sides, eventually, the treaty of Kutahya was made between the Sultan and his rebel governor Mehmed Ali, and signed on 14 May 1833. This treaty’s articles did not seem to satisfy either

---

side. The reason for this was that the Sultan did not want to give away the governorship of Adana but was forced to do so because of the diplomatic conditions. However, the Sultan mentioned in an Ottoman document that although the governorship of Adana was given to Mehmed Ali as the lesser of two evils; due to the possibility of a change in Russian policy over the Mehmed Ali problem and also the ‘apostate nature’ of France, this did not mean that the problem was over, far from it, this problem would present itself in a completely different way in the near future.\(^{219}\)

The reason for Mehmed Ali’s dissatisfaction was that he felt he was missing a big opportunity for his army to gain ground towards the capital city of the Empire, Istanbul. In fact, the Pasha was so close to reaching this goal since his army was in Kutahya (a city very close to Istanbul), when the treaty of Kutahya was signed, but the Sultan’s diplomatic manoeuvre of calling the Russian army to Istanbul had changed Mehmed Ali’s policies just as it had changed British and French policies. Because of all of these reasons, this treaty only remained in force temporarily, and it seemed the Sultan and the Pasha would again clash sometime soon.

In conclusion, the Mehmed Ali Problem led to a new era in Anglo-Ottoman relations in a positive way, something which would continue for the next four decades until the Congress of Berlin (1878). When the European historical literature has examined this period it views it as a result of the diplomatic struggle of the European powers in the Ottoman lands. However, the Ottoman diplomatic efforts in this struggle in her own lands have so far been neglected. In particular calling the Russian Army to the Bosporus and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi have never been examined either by European or Turkish scholars as Mahmud II’s diplomatic plan to solve the Mehmed Ali Problem, a problem which could have almost demolished his Empire. However, when analysing the Ottoman documents in detail, the main aim of the Sultan was to forge a military alliance with Britain, even at the moment he seemed to want an alliance with Russia. This chapter has endeavoured to reveal this risky plan of the Sultan’s based on the Ottoman documents. In fact, calling the Russian Army to Istanbul was only one part of the overall scheme. As a matter of fact, this new period in Anglo-Ottoman relations had just started with the appearance of the Russian Army in Istanbul. The following developments would take place in record time unprecedented in history, in only six years. These developments can be

\(^{219}\) BOA, File No: 369 Document No: 20346.
sorted historically thus: the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 1833; the Euphrates Project, which was to be vital for British politicians to understand alternative possibilities with regard to how to reach India via a different route other than the Cape of Good Hope; the treaty of Balta Limani, 1838, which would yield many profits and privileges for Britain in her treaty with the East; and lastly the Rescript of Gülhane, 1839, the biggest reform programme in the Empire up to that time, in conformity with Western, particularly British, principles. More importantly, all of these rapid developments will be examined in the light of the Sultan’s plan and his officials’ diplomatic endeavours in the following chapters.
CHAPTER THREE

The vital importance of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi from the point of view of Mahmud II’s secret plan

In the field of diplomatic relations, very few treaties have been more hazardous, whilst at the same time so crucially important, as was the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. The reason for the significance of this treaty was that it had resulted from Mahmud II’s secret plan to overcome his rebel governor, Mehmed Ali. When confronted with the biggest defeat that he had ever faced at the hands of this enemy, he realised that there was no alternative way to solve this politically fatal problem outside of using diplomacy. With this in mind, he sent his special official, Namık Pasha, to London to negotiate an Anglo-Ottoman military alliance against Mehmed Ali. However, at that time, the other great powers, Russia and France, had different kinds of plans for the Ottoman lands, such as occupation, as France had done in Algeria in 1830, or control of the Ottoman straits, as was Russia’s ambition. The only exception amongst these powers was Britain, which had no ulterior motive in its dealings with the Ottoman lands. Consequently, this military alliance was seen by Mahmud as a way of salvation for his Empire. As has been examined in detail in previous chapters, this request of the Sultan’s was rejected only because Lord Grey’s Cabinet had an agenda replete with other foreign and domestic issues. After a few more attempts by Namık Pasha in London, Mahmud realised that he needed something to remind the British about the great importance the Ottoman lands held in terms of British interests in that area. His plan was to make an alliance with the Russians, Britain’s biggest foe in the region.

As a matter of fact, as covered in the second chapter, at first, he simply called the Russian military power to the Bosporus in the first months of 1833 instead of straight away making an alliance with what was historically his Empire’s biggest enemy in the region. As could be guessed, this diplomatic manoeuvre came like a bombshell to the French and the British. Yet despite all the diplomatic negotiations between these powers’ diplomatic representatives and Mahmud’s statesmen between February and July, no worthwhile results had been achieved, from Mahmud’s point of view. The reason for the Sultan’s dissatisfaction was that the Mehmed Ali Question had not yet been overcome despite a provisional agreement, the treaty of Kutahya in
the May of 1833. Consequently, he decided to carry his risky plan a step further and on 8 July 1833 he negotiated an agreement with Nicholas I. Regarding this, in this chapter this treaty will be examined from a different perspective than that which other scholars have used so far, as has the previous chapter in respect to the calling of the Russian Army to the Bosporus. The Ottoman documents reveal that the Sultan did not make this treaty in a desperate mood or as a last solution with no alternative; on the contrary, he had his own diplomatic plan which was to attract British cooperation using this treaty to remind them he was an important ally. This had been his plan all along in calling the Russian Navy Power to Istanbul. With Russian guns near India, Britain’s largest sphere of interest in the East, Russia had started to look like a big danger in this region. It also seemed like a potential disturbance of the European peace, which had been successfully established in 1815 with the Congress of Vienna. As a result of this peaceful environment Britain had become the most important power in Europe, and did not want to lose this status. Pertaining to this, we will examine this treaty in detail from the point of view of Mahmud’s secret plan.

As has been extensively analysed, after Mahmud’s manoeuvre of calling the Russian military power to the Bosporus, all Britain’s and France’s diplomatic pressures upon Mehmed Ali brought about a cease fire agreement between the Sultan and Mehmed Ali. However, neither side was happy with the articles of the agreement. The reason for this was that on the one hand, ever since the beginning of his struggle against central government Mehmed Ali had wanted to gain his independence from the Sultan. However, he had had to accept Mahmud’s sovereignty with the treaty of Kutahya. On the other hand, the Sultan was unable to completely resolve the problem with the treaty and he strongly believed that Mehmed Ali would rebel again soon.\(^{220}\) When analysing Mahmud’s disposition towards this treaty from the point of view of his secret plan, he clearly felt that he needed a more serious gesture to win full British support against Mehmed Ali and the other great powers, Russia and France. This gesture was to be in the form of a treaty, called the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. After many diplomatic developments over the Treaty of Kutahya, 14 May 1833, and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 8 July 1833, the Sultan decided to step forward diplomatically to implement his secret plan. To this end, the Treaty of

Unkiar Skelessi was signed between the Ottomans and the Russians, at Mahmud’s own request, on 8 July 1833.\(^{221}\)

There is actually quite extensive literature which recounts in detail the political process before the treaty. Therefore, this process will not be examined here. Instead, Mahmud and his statesmen’s diplomatic campaign to solve the Mehmed Ali Question after the treaty will be examined properly based on the Ottoman documents as a narrative of the process from the Ottoman perspective.

As could be predicted, the French and British public reaction became very strong, particularly when they learned that there was a clause detailing that in the case of war in the region, the straits would be closed to all European war ships but not Russian ones. Brown encapsulated what the treaty really meant from the British perspective when he said;

“The treaty was ostensibly a defensive one- a commitment on both sides to support the other in the event of attack- but in effect what it meant was that Russia had gained an advantage over European rivals in dealing with the future of Ottoman territory by securing control over access to the Straits. It was obvious in London that this represented a threat to British influence in the area and to Britain’s access to its own empire.”\(^{222}\)

Only a few days after the treaty, the French ambassador to İstanbul, Admiral Roussin, sent a letter to the French ambassador in Austria. He suspected that there was a highly likely possibility that an attacking and defending treaty had just been made, or was on the point of being made, between the Sultan and the Tsar.\(^{223}\) He also wanted his letter to be immediately sent to Paris and he was going to try to send a copy of the treaty as soon as possible. Thereupon the French ambassador in Vienna went to meet with Prince Metternich to ask for a summary of this latest news from İstanbul. At first Metternich stated that there was no such information in Vienna at that moment, and then the ambassador asked his opinion as to whether this kind of treaty might be made between the two Empires. In response, Metternich said that he did not suppose that the Sultan wanted an attacking treaty with the Tsar under such circumstances, however, the Ottoman

\(^{221}\) Başbakanlık Arsivi, (The Original Name of the Ottoman Archives which is in Istanbul and involves all the Ottoman Documents from 1299 to 1923, and the Turkish name will be used in the chapter), File No: 1045, Document No: 43183 A. The treaty has been examined as a Russians request in the English literature. For example, Rodkey mentioned that; “... Russian diplomacy had exacted from the Porte the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi...” However, the Turkish documents reveal that Mahmud wanted to make the treaty with Nicholas. This is only one of the significant facts to show that the treaty was a part of Mahmud’s diplomatic plan.


\(^{223}\) BOA, File No: 1045, Document No: 43183 B.
statesmen might have asked the Russian ambassador Orlov whether, if as a result of the Russian army’s abandonment of Istanbul a state of distress appeared again, could the Russian war ships come to Istanbul once more or not. Interestingly, he added that if the ambassador’s answer had been given as an official letter, from Metternich’s point of view this letter might have been understood as a treaty. He also mentioned that if this was the case, Austria was supporting the Russian guardianship in terms of the Ottoman interests.

It could be said that the most prominent representative of these discontented statesmen was the British ambassador to Istanbul, Ponsonby, who began to display aggressive behaviour towards the Ottoman statesmen. In this context, his several protests about the treaty, particularly the article related to closure of the straits in the case of a war, came in August. Principally, he had been trying to learn what Mahmud and his statesmen meant by this article and he had several times officially asked the Ottoman government about its meaning. This article set the alarm bells ringing in London with respect to a Russian danger growing every passing day, in terms of British interests in the Ottoman lands, particularly the security of the Indian route. Reflections of this British anxiety could be seen in Ponsonby’s official letters, which were persistently questioning one after the other. Most galling of all for Ponsonby were the nebulous responses from the Ottoman statesmen. He would have liked to learn what was going on behind the scenes as soon as possible and then inform his government in detail. For instance, on 30 October 1833, he requested with two official letters to the Ottoman Foreign Minister an explanation of the article related to the straits. When he did not receive a clear answer he again asked for satisfactory reply, only 22 days after the last request. This letter of Ponsonby’s was very extensive this time and it was tendered to Mahmud with the comments of the Foreign Minister. In this letter Ponsonby asked his questions much more clearly than he had in the previous one. His inquiry was that if any European power waged war with Russia, and if the Ottoman Empire did not fight this power, what would the Ottomans choose to do based on the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi? Would they allow the Russians to pass their warships through the both straits, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, while they did not give the permission for passing to the other power’s warships? Or would they prohibit the other power to pass through the straits as well as Russia? Ponsonby was not content with the responses to his questions and directly

224 BOA, File No: 1166, Document No: 46123 A.
225 BOA, File No: 1175, Document No: 46438 G.
226 BOA, File No: 1175, Document No: 46438 H.
asked that if Russia fought with Britain and the Ottoman Empire was not at war with Britain, what would they do based on the treaty? Would they permit the Russian warships to pass through the straits and at the same time disallow the British warships from passing through? At the end of all his questions Ponsonby proposed that his questions only required clear responses such as confirmation or disaffirmation. According to him any suspended or shadowy reply would lead to misinterpretation of the debated clause and break down the good and longstanding Anglo-Ottoman relations. For these reasons, he argued, to gain Britain on his side, it would be very useful and of benefit to the Sultan and his people to implement the same straits passing rules for all sides. At the same time, Palmerston had been trying to dissuade Mahmud from the treaty. On this subject Bolsover commented;

“On December 6 Palmerston informed the Russian government that Great Britain would take steps to uphold the real independence of the Ottoman Empire. The same day he ordered Ponsonby to remind the Porte of the fate which Poland had suffered through dependence on Russia. He further urged Mahmud to reform the Turkish Empire by organizing his own resources for the suppression of revolt. Palmerston even promised to control Mehmet Ali if the Sultan acted as sultan and not as vassal of the tsar.”

The last comments from Ponsonby and Palmerston are very interesting since it shows that the British politicians had started to play their trump card against the Ottomans, just as Mahmud had done with his diplomatic manoeuvres against them. This could be seen by the Sultan as a positive development, because the same British politicians had previously not lifted a finger to help, apart from some placatory words and letters, when Mahmud sent Namık Pasha to London in March 1833 to enlist British military support in the Mehmed Ali crisis. However, only eight months later, there they were striving to get the Ottomans on the British side against their own Russian crisis. Mahmud was starting to see success in external issues; likewise he did in the internal ones too.

It is also necessary to look at this period from the point of view of the Russians, and in order to do this we have obtained an official Russian letter, fully translated into Turkish, informing Mahmud and explaining the Russian diplomatic policy and efforts after the period of the Unkia

---

227 BOA, File No: 1175, Document No: 46438 H.
Skelessi in detail. The main purpose of this policy was to overcome this diplomatic crisis by explaining the innocuousness of the treaty regarding the balance of European power. With this in mind, Nicholas charged the Prime Minister Nesselrode to assure the British that Russia would never do anything at the expense of European peace. Thereupon Nesselrode sent an instruction with respect to this mission to the Russian Charge d'affaires in London, Pavel Medem.\(^{229}\) The instruction arrived in London on 26 December 1834. When it arrived, the new British cabinet, Sir Robert Peel's first government, had been just established that same month and the new Foreign Minister was Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington. Nesselrode started to carry out his instructions by pointing out that one of the last operations of the former Foreign Minister Palmerston was to attempt to change, through Ponsonby, the article of the treaty related to the closing of the straits in the case of a war in the region. According to the Russian minister a question related to this article was asked ten months ago and therefore its repetition upset the Tsar and his servants. In fact, as mentioned above, the Ottoman statesmen had explained several times to Britain and France what they aimed to achieve with the treaty and Nesselrode began his message with these Ottoman explanations. He stated that the Ottoman diplomats had answered the question very well in the February of 1834, that the mentioned article had not brought any difference to the current rules about using the straits, which had been accepted by all European powers since time immemorial, and these rules were a sign of the Sultan’s domination in his lands and very beneficial and useful for the Ottoman public interests. In this regard, according to this Ottoman explanation the treaty did not grant any privileges to any European power. Nesselrode added that they were expecting that it would be enough for the British that there was no secret intention between the Ottomans and the Russians. However, he stated that they were disappointed in Ponsonby’s reaction since he had re-questioned them on the same issue ten months later. In his opinion, although it was an undeniable fact that the Ottomans had the right to avoid having to re-explain the situation since they had already clarified the issue extensively and transparently, they had still issued a new official letter (examined in detail below) to Ponsonby because they cared about European peace. He continued saying that despite the Ottoman diplomats having clarified the article in detail in the last letter, Ponsonby seemed to be discontent again, since he clearly did not regard waiting his government’s further instructions as necessary, having asked for a wider explanation about the article. In fact, the ambassador had made this

\(^{229}\) BOA, File No: 1040, Document No: 43061.
second request on 4 December, only twenty two days after his first. Istanbul had not answered this second request of the ambassador because of the extensive reply given to the first one. Nesselrode stated that the new British cabinet and its ministers had raised obstacles to continuing good Anglo-Russian relations. Nesselrode also congratulated himself and the Russians since they had been mediating between Britain and the Ottomans to solve the last problems as a result of the treaty. This Russian perspective is quite salient since Nesselrode must have been aware of the strong British reaction and the panic in London due to Unkiar Skelessi and its secret article. What could his motivation have been to say these words while London was on red alert about a Russian danger at British cost in the region? It could be said that in the light of Nesselrode’s instruction, he probably want to reassure the new Foreign Minister, Wellington, that the article did not contain any hazard for European peace. The reason to believe this was his aim is that he instructed Medem that he should give the summary of their explanations, to the new Foreign Minister.. Nesselrode also ordered that Medem should submit a previous instruction as well, the one which was given to the former Russian ambassador to London, Prince Christopher von Lieven. According to Nesselrode this instruction would be enough to convince Wellington, since it was a very clear explanation that Russia had never asserted, either before the treaty or after it, any privilege for right of passage through the straits if the Ottoman Empire closes them. He even took his daring words a step further and stated that the treaty was an official guarantee of this longstanding rule. He asserted that all these assurances would reassure Wellington about Russian policies and the treaty. Nesselrode wanted Medem to include a previous instruction, one which had been sent to the former ambassador Prince Lieven under the direction of the Tsar on 22 June 1834, to his communication for when he met with the Duke of Wellington. This instruction was to offer to the former minister Palmerston the opportunity to have these mentioned assurances about equality with other European Powers pertaining to the use of the straits (which had only been made verbally up to then) put into an official document. Nesselrode believed there could not be a more serious offer than this to show their sincerity over this issue. He further reported that they were unsure whether their offer had had an impact upon the former minister, as Ponsonby’s last acts in Istanbul had created room for doubt. However, he strongly believed that Wellington would be convinced about Russian’s amicable policy with regard to the straits after meeting and listening to Medem. From Nesselrode’s point of view, Medem’s mission was crucial because it would produce two important results. The first anticipated one was that there
were many false reports from the former Whig Government and its ministers about Russia’s objective with the treaty, and Medem would eliminate those prejudices and persuade the new government and its ministers about the innocent nature of the treaty. The second anticipated result of Medem’s mission was that explaining all the afore-mentioned Russian arguments to the new government would probably put an end to British pressures on the Sultan and his ministers in Istanbul. Nesselrode concluded his instruction saying that all of these diplomatic efforts would show the British ministers that the problems in the East could be resolved with solidarity between Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Britain.

At this stage, it is vital to examine the Ottoman diplomatic responses against all these reactions in order to look at the story from the point of view of the Ottomans. To better facilitate viewing the whole Ottoman diplomatic attitude, it is hereafter expressed in itemised responses.

The Sultan and his statesmen stated in their replies:

a) *The British and French ambassadors have much misinformation about the treaty and its debated clause and therefore suffer many misapprehensions relating to its real purport.*

b) *This treaty is absolutely not an assault treaty; on the contrary, it is a defence treaty concerning the security of the Ottoman lands.*

c) *The longstanding rules related to both the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would continue to remain in force for all the states, Russia no exception.*

d) *Nevertheless every independent country has the right to make any treaty with respect to its own issues as long as it does not encroach upon another country’s rights.*

e) *If the British and French ambassadors continue to propound their idle allegations about this clause after this explanation, this redundant insistence would impinge upon not only the Sultan’s right to determine his country’s internal policies but also his sovereignty in his own lands.*

f) *Since these matters have been repeatedly expounded in great detail to the British and French ambassadors, no further explanations will be forthcoming.*

While all this dialogue was being exchanged, an important development occurred in terms of Mahmud’s secret diplomatic plan. Mahmud sent Namik Pasha; the same emissary who had gone to London to make the Anglo-Ottoman military alliance before the treaty, to London to negotiate the Treaty of Unkia Skelessi and its results for the Anglo-Ottoman relationship. This assignment is quite interesting as it shows Mahmud’s real intent through the instructions he gave to the

---

231 BOA, File No: 1169, Document No: 46234 B.
232 BOA, File No: 1175, Document No: 46438 Ğ.
233 BOA, File No: 1166, Document No: 46123 J.
234 BOA, File No: 1175, Document No: 46438 H.
235 BOA, File No: 1169, Document No: 46234 B.
Pasha. Furthermore, Namık Pasha sent very extensive reports with regard to his negotiations in London and these fully reveal the Sultan’s real objective within his latest diplomatic manoeuvres.

Namık Pasha arrived in London on Sunday, 17 October 1834. He had three letters with him. The first one was for Palmerston from the Ottoman Foreign Minister, the second one was for the Prime Minister from the Ottoman Prime Minister and lastly the third one was for the King from the Sultan. These letters were extremely important since they were a testament to the Sultan’s strong desire for an Anglo-Ottoman alliance to solve all the problems. The Pasha met with Palmerston the day after his arrival; 18 October 1834. He was warmly welcomed by Palmerston, and after asking after each other and handing the letter from the Ottoman Foreign Minister to Palmerston, he stated to Palmerston that he would like to deliver the Sultan’s letter to the King. Palmerston answered that the King was not in London at that moment, but he would inform the King of the situation and then let the Pasha know what he said. After this, Palmerston asked the Pasha the purpose of his visit in London. Namık interestingly answered that he would have thought Palmerston knew his mission’s purpose in London since before his departure from Istanbul the exact copy of his instruction for this mission in London was given Ponsonby in Istanbul. A rebellion against Mehmed Ali had occurred in Damascus just before the Namık’s departure from Istanbul, by objectors to the treaty of Kutahya. In fact one of Namık’s missions was to discuss this rebellion. Mahmud was supporting the rebels since he was hoping to restart the conflict with the Pasha and win this time by taking advantage of the Damascus rebellion. Namık Pasha declared this as the Sultan’s intention and added that because of this internal conflict the Ottoman Army had started to make war preparations. Namık Pasha informed Mahmud in his report that Palmerston spoke briefly on this issue and although these words at first seemed to Pasha to be in Mehmed Ali’s favour, soon afterwards and for the rest of his negotiations in London this meaning changed. However, Palmerston’s only concern was to prevent any possible pretext Russia could have to intervene in Istanbul using her right stemming from Unkia Skelessi. He was meticulously anticipating every possibility in order to prevent it happening. Rodkey expressed extensively Palmerston’s this attitude that

236 BOA, File No: 1173, Document No: 46414 D 01-06
237 BOA, File No: 1173, Document No: 46414 D 01.
“Undoubtedly throughout the period from 1833 to 1839 Palmerston believed that peace must be preserved in the Near East if such a policy as he favoured for the rejuvenation of Turkey was to succeed. In 1834, when the first the reis effendi ((Turkish minister of foreign affairs), and later Vogorides revealed that the Sultan resolved to encounter all the risks of a new struggle with Mehmed Ali in order to remove the sword of the Pasha, “hanging always threatening over his head,” Ponsonby exerted his influence at the Turkish capital against a renewal of hostilities. Palmerston entirely approved the course followed by the ambassador on this occasion and directed the admiralty to have Vice-Admiral Rowley, the British naval commander in the Levant, maintain a watch for the Ottoman fleet in the neighbourhood of the Archipelago. If it appeared in those waters the British admiral was to get in touch with Turkish commander, to urge him to suspend any orders he might have to undertake hostile operations against the Egyptian fleet.”

This order shows that as Mahmud had expected, Palmerston started to approach the Eastern Question much more seriously after Unkjar Skelessi. After his meeting with Palmerston, Namik send a message to the Prime Minister, Lord Grey, asking for a meeting and he got a reply very quickly, on the same day, and they met on Tuesday, 19 October 1833. The Pasha submitted to him the letter from the Ottoman Prime Minister. Namik explained the Sultan’s opinion about the Damascus rebels and the preparation for armed conflict to the Prime Minister as well. Grey did not say much about this in the meeting but he did say that whenever the Pasha needed help during his mission in London, he was at his service.

At last Namik Pasha was to meet with the King: on Wednesday, 20 October 1833. This was a private meeting and there were only three people present; the Pasha, the Foreign Minister and the King. The most important feature of Namik’s report for us is that it contains his full explanation to the King with respect to the real aim of his mission in London. This explanation is vital since it is very strong evidence substantiating the main argument of the thesis. Considering that when Namik was in London, the treaty was in force, his declaration gains much more meaning in support of the main argument of this thesis. First, he submitted the Sultan’s letter to the King, and then he conveyed the real meaning of his mission. He stated that it was quite obvious that the Ottoman Empire had had close ties and a long lasting friendship with Britain for centuries. Because of this, his illustrious highness had sent him to London to cement this sincere friendship between the two countries and there was no other aim of his mission except this noble duty. It seems that after his two big diplomatic manoeuvres based on Russian military strength, (i.e.

---

239 BOA, File No: 1173, Document No: 46414 D 01.
calling Russians to the Bosporus and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi) Mahmud decided that now was the right time to persuade the King and Palmerston to join in an Anglo-Ottoman alliance against all enemies of both powers in the region. He was right, because William stated that he and his people were very well aware that the Turks were faithful to their word, people of wise and virtuous character, and there were even some adages about that in England. He continued that when Namık Pasha came to England for this alliance they were unable to help the Sultan and his people, despite really wanting to, because of some serious problems which Britain was encountering at the time. He also mentioned that he knew very well that their unpardonable neglect had obligated the Sultan first to call the Russian army to the Bosporus and eventually to make the treaty. Mahmud should have been satisfied to hear these words of William’s because they showed that his plan was working. The King continued his words in the same direction and stated that despite Russia’s domination in the Ottoman lands as a result of the treaty due to their disregard of the Sultan’s desire, he and his people really stood for the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and continuity the Sultan’s sovereignty in his own lands. He also mentioned that they want this not only for the Ottoman interests but also a strong Ottoman Empire would be most beneficial in terms of the British interests in the region. Interestingly, the king also stated that these opinions and British political strategies were not only the result of the strong fellowship between both countries, but also based upon sound political wisdom. According to the King, this British support was not a transient state of affairs and the Sultan could trust the King and his government. William, not content even with these words, added that the Sultan should have no doubts that they truly and wholeheartedly desire for the Ottoman Empire to maintain her existence as a strong and prosperous country and support of this was one of their state policies.

Namık Pasha described in his report how William repeatedly emphasized to him that a strong Ottoman Empire would be very beneficial for British interests in the region. The words of King William recorded in Namık’s report are vital, since Mahmud’s secret plan seems to have been successful in reminding the British of the political and strategic importance of the Ottoman Empire to their interests, especially India. Namık also stated in his report that he reported the King’s words verbatim: neither more nor less.
Namık met with Palmerston again and discussed William’s words. It seems that Namık appraised Palmerston in this meeting of William’s words. The first thing he mentioned was that the King had stated in the last meeting that he knew Muslims to be people who remain true to their word. And then Namık said to Palmerston that he could not understand the underlying meaning of these words because when he heard them he wondered what the King meant. He had a suspicion that he saw this as a flaw in the Muslims. In the light of Namık’s words he seems that he was extremely sensitive to nuance; he was suspicious of any negative attitude from the King and his government towards the Anglo-Ottoman alliance against Mehmed Ali. Therefore he had been careful to note each one of their words. Palmerston immediately responded that the King only meant that he wanted to praise Muslims’ steady character and to express that the enduring fellowship between both countries, which had been declared several times by the Sultan through Namık Pasha, would be enough assurance from King William’s point of view. After this response Namik pressed further to understand the true opinion of the British on this subject and criticized them that although they were always saying that they really wanted the Ottoman Empire’s territorial integrity, at the same time they still recognized Mehmed Ali as a political actor despite his rebellion against his sovereign and clearly did not want the Ottomans to fight Mehmed Ali by taking advantage of the Damascus rebellion. He even interestingly gave a metaphor of this - that this contradictory attitude resembled someone who was expected to wrestle with two people at the same time despite being tied hand and foot. In response Palmerston said that he acknowledged the truth of Namik Pasha’s reproach and he wanted to explain in detail what was their latest and fundamental policy relating to the Mehmed Ali Question.243

Palmerston began by explaining his and his government’s opinion about Mehmed Ali. He stated that they understood what kind of character Mehmed Ali was, so the Sultan could be sure that they certainly did not support him. However they did not support the Ottoman intervention in Damascus either because of potential Russian involvement. If such a conflict did not go well, the Tsar would send in his army under the right arising from the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. In such an eventuality, as might be expected, Britain would intervene in the matter in order to defend her benefits in the region and this situation could easily lead to war. Apart from this, of course they desired an Ottoman victory against Mehmed Ali Pasha, but as he explained, the situation had the

243 BOA, File No: 1173, Document No: 46414 D 03.
potential to backfire. Palmerston went on to say that in his view Mehmed Ali Pasha was an old man, and after his death, his son Ibrahim Pasha did not have the calibre to maintain the situation he would inherit from his father, so the Sultan would be able to assign a new governor in his stead. Another interesting dialogue that occurred between Palmerston and Namik in that meeting was that Palmerston intimated that he could not understand why the Sultan could not use Mehmed Ali for the Ottoman benefit. Namik replied that Mehmed Ali had not paid tax to the central government for two years and was also gradually taking over Rakka, an Ottoman City under the Sultan’s control, and had been plotting mischief for three years, how could they possibly use him for the benefit of central government?  

In addition, as Mahmud had expected, Palmerston led up to the treaty and Ottoman-Russian alliance resulting from Unkiar Skelessi. He began with a reproach about the treaty asking what possible reason was there to make this treaty with Russia? Of course they were not suggesting that the Sultan and his statesmen quarrel with Russia, but the only unacceptable article in the treaty was concerning the shutdown of the straits to all powers aside from Russian warships in the case of a war in Europe. He added that of course they could make a friend of whomsoever they wished but this ally should be turned into a unilateral one, whereas this situation gave the Russians an unfair superiority in Istanbul. Palmerston fully believed that although the Tsar and his statesmen gave the appearance of those who had good intentions towards the Ottomans, they were in fact secretly trying to set a trap for the Ottomans whilst appearing benign. In this context, he stated that if there was a salutary thing in the interest of the Sultan and his people, the Tsar would prevent it and Mahmud could be sure that the British could not tolerate this. Everything in London was working out as Mahmud planned with his diplomatic manoeuvres of calling Russians to the Bosporus and signing the treaty with the Russians. As a matter of fact, in his report, Namik was pointing out this change in political atmosphere in London by comparing with his last fruitless visit to London, in December 1832. He reported that previously, the British ambassadors to Istanbul, especially Canning, had been prejudicing British public opinion against the Ottoman Empire with their biased reports. He continued his descriptions of the new political atmosphere in London related to the Ottomans and stated that he found it quite different being in

---

244 BOA, File No: 1173, Document No: 46414 D.
London for these four days and people’s perspectives in England were very much more positive this time. Mahmud should have been delighted when he read these words from his emissary.

At this stage, it should be mentioned again, as was expressed in the first chapter, that it is not enough to examine the Mehmed Ali Question based only on the diplomatic reports since, as Namık Pasha pointed out, ambassadors’ accounts might well include some prejudice and bias. Rodkey expressed this change in British policy towards the Ottomans very well in his extensive article;

“Obviously, before the close of 1833 the moment of hesitation in British policy for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire had passed. Palmerston was resolved to revive and to extend the traditional policy of Great Britain in the Levant and was determined to defeat at all cost any attempt which Russia might make to intervene independently in the internal affairs of Turkey under the terms of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.”

Although Rodkey recounts the change in Britain towards the Ottoman Empire very well, something has been neglected in his account, as other foreign scholars have so far done. This is to show to what extent Mahmud had a role in this radical change in Palmerston’s policies. It is clear that without examining this role, the narration of the period would only be based on the other powers’ perspectives which would inevitably create a one sided narrative.

Despite all these efforts by Mahmud and the Ottoman statesmen, especially those of his official emissary Namık, Ponsonby had been insisting upon his request for an extensive explanation about the debated clause being answered again. He asked about this matter once more, via his translator Pizani, putting this enquiry to the Ottoman Foreign Minister as he had put the previous ones;

“If I accept the official explanation of the Foreign Minister, it would mean disobedience of the exact instructions given by my government to me. The reason for this is that the clause was incongruent to the Anglo-Ottoman contract, which had been a law in force for a long time, and I have articulated this fact several times in my official letters given to the Minister. I wanted the Minister to inform the Sultan about his official letter and to warn the Minister that if the Sultan’s answer was not satisfactory, he would ask the same questions again and again.”

245 BOA, File No: 1173, Document No: 46414 D 04.
246 F. S. Rodkey, Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-41, p. 573.
As a matter of fact Ponsonby’s threats started to push the limits of diplomatic usage. This was a matter of complaint that occurred in many Ottoman documents. The reason behind this overreaction was in his abhorrence of Russia and her designs on the region. Webster analysed this characteristic very well when he says;

"More serious are the charges against him of excessive hostility to Russia, and his desire to use force against her. It is true that Ponsonby became convinced that Russia was planning the disruption or at least control of the Ottoman Empire, and that he made it his principal object to defeat her. He certainly stated as facts what could only be conjectures and he wished Britain to display her maritime power to counteract the military position of Russia whose armies were in the Principalities. Above all he wished to convince both Russia and the Sultan that Britain would never again shew the same weakness she had displayed in 1832-1833."

Ponsonby had given as evidence to his words in one of his letters to the Foreign Minister about the debated clause of the Unkiar Skelessi that according to the eleventh clause of the treaty signed in 1809 between the Ottoman Empire and Britain, access by the other states’ warships to both the Dardanelles and the Bosporus was prohibited.

Nevertheless, there were some exceptions among British diplomats who thought about the treaty in a different way than that which was the general tendency in London at the time; such as Percy Clinton Sydney Smythe, who was the predecessor of the ambassador to Russia. He declared that he recognised that the Sultan was right to cooperate with Russia to solve the problem. He also commented that he believed the Sultan would find an opportunity to regenerate his Empire only when he solved the Mehmed Ali Question. In his opinion, therefore, the Sultan was right to look for another country’s support in dealing with the problem.

Mahmud would have liked this strong interest in the Ottoman Empire from all the British politicians that they showed ever since he declared a rescript and explained his real aims and underlying motives in forging a military alliance with Britain. This document is really vital to properly understand his secret plan. He itemised his orders in the rescript:

   a) If friendship was made with Britain, the economic and social problems could be solved, customs tariffs could be collected easily, the country would quickly prosper, and as a result of all these improvements the population would increase.

---

249 BOA, File No: 1175, Document No: 46438 Ğ.
251 BOA, File No: 2, Document No: 47.
b) If they were able to promote good relations with the British, the French would have to copy the British attitude and thereby the Ottomans would be able to rid themselves of French animosity.

c) If the British gave orders to Mehmed Ali, he would have to renounce the lands he had acquired after his rebellion and give up his insurrection and start to support central government with his army.

d) If Mehmed Ali saw an Anglo-Ottoman alliance, he would have to resign his warships to central government. As a result all of this the Egyptian public would understand that Mehmed Ali was an ordinary governor of the Sultan not a successor to him.

This document is really important not only because of the unfolding of Mahmud’s diplomatic plan but also because it shows how Mahmud was disposed to get British support, even in the previous years, in economic reforms, such as with the treaty of Balta Limani in 1838, and in social and administrative reforms, such as with the Tanzimat Reform Era in 1839.

There was another British statesman who held the same opinion as Mahmud. This was David Urquhart. He was present in the Ottoman lands in the 1830s. He wrote a book for the King about the resources of the Ottoman Empire. He presented in this book several potential advantages in favour of British interests to be gained by supporting the Sultan and his Empire against their enemies. On this topic Bolsover stated that;

“In it Urquhart argued that the destruction of the Janissaries had removed the chief source of decay from the Turkish administration and that the Ottoman Empire could now be made strong and vigorous by developing the principles of local self-government inherent in its institutions.”

Mahmud had British friends who supported him; however his aim was to get wholehearted backing from the British government and King William with the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Every passing day his plan was becoming a reality, since Palmerston had recently sent an instruction to the British naval commander to tell him to support the Ottomans against both Russia and Mehmed Ali. Baker spoke of this instruction saying:

“The Russian danger appeared so great at the time that Vice-Admiral Sir Josiah Rowley was secretly instructed on 31 January 1834 to sail up the Straits in order to assist in defending Constantinople against a Russian attack, if the Turkish government should request such aid through the ambassador, Lord Ponsonby. Yet Mehemet Ali, who was most likely to cause the Russians to return, was to be dissuaded from renewing the conflict by the remonstrances of Great Britain and France.”

Despite all these diplomatic developments in the Anglo-Ottoman relationship, the Sultan’s direct military support from Britain would be a few more years in coming. In this waiting period, Mahmud did not slacken in the implementation of his plan and made some more diplomatic manoeuvres in the following years with the aim of making an Anglo-Ottoman alliance against the other powers possible. As will be examined in detail in the following chapters, these manoeuvres, in order, were that in 1835, Mahmud using Britain’s request for use of the Euphrates route to reach India since it was the shortest and easiest route to further benefit his plan, in 1837-1838, Mahmud’s use of Palmerston and his diplomats’ attempts to use the Ottoman economic resources in favour of British interests to solve the Mehmed Ali problem. As it happened, in the Euphrates negotiations, and as a result of this process, the Treaty of Balta Limani came about in 1838. Because of all of these actions, not only Mahmud, but also his successor Abdulmecid, and Mahmud’s best statesman, Mustafa Reşid Pasha, would draw advantage from British support and guidance, to reclaim the Empire economically, administratively, socially, and militarily from 1835 onwards. As a matter of fact, as mentioned above, both of them, Mahmud and Palmerston, had a strong desire for this cooperation to be beneficial for the prosperity of the Ottoman Empire, each of them seeking to better their own interests.
CHAPTER FOUR

The Euphrates Project in the Context of the Mehmed Ali Crisis and Its Effects on Anglo-Ottoman Relations

The theme established in the last chapter, that the Ottomans were far from passive participants in the ‘Eastern Question’, can further be demonstrated by an examination of the response of the Sultan to British attempts to find a faster route to India via the Euphrates. This chapter will also show that the Ottomans were also able to resist Russian pressure, when Russia was insisting on the Ottomans rejecting the British project, by using the legal rights which appeared with the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.

As studied in the first chapter, in contrast to English literature on the topic, the main aim of the Sultan, by inviting the Russian army and by making the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, was to make a military alliance with Britain by arousing their fears about a Russian danger for India. Similarly, Britain’s need to use the Euphrates would be exploited by the Ottomans to gain England’s support against Mehmed Ali. Presentation of this argument with the Ottoman sources on this topic is helpful in understanding that the Ottomans were not merely playing a passive and ineffective part in the diplomatic game of the region at that time. However, before analysing the Ottoman diplomatic effort, it would be useful to examine in brief the earlier attempts to find the most suitable route to India prior to the Euphrates project, in order to apprehend the necessity and importance of the project itself.

Andrew and Chesney, who worked out a faster route to India, Britain’s most important possession, mentioned that “the problem of the age we live in is ‘how to save time’” and added, “to the oftquoted, though misquoted, saying that ‘knowledge is power’ must now be added the axiom that ‘time is power’.”254 Indeed, the time saved for Britain in reaching her colonies meant millions of pounds and also prestige around the world, because this met her needs for raw materials and markets to sell her products after the Industrial Revolution. Therefore, the importance to British merchants and statesmen of arriving at India by the easiest route is clearly

apparent. As a result of this significance, in order to find the easiest, cheapest and securest route, much fieldwork had been done throughout the second half of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

As is well known, India played an important role in the British economy and social life. Some historians assert that Britain captured the whole of South Africa in order to protect the seaways which were going to India, and this was also the main motivation when the British policy makers determined British policies in the Middle East and Near Asia. Despite this importance, the distance between Britain and India was still too great. For this reason, some British officers, statesmen and merchants suggested that a shorter and cheaper route must be found immediately in the event of the necessity of intervening in India for British interests, and also in order to give essential instructions to the British governors who were in charge in India.

After 1757 which was the date Britain gained more importance than France in India, these navigation projects were accelerated. However, before investigating these works, it should be mentioned that it was an important policy of British statesmen, when the political atmosphere was unsuitable in the region they wanted to implement a project, to try to change the conditions to benefit their interests.

4.1. The Projects to Reach India prior to the Euphrates Expedition

Navigating the way to India had been undertaken at first by the strong and enduring vessels of the East India Company, but the journey alone had been taking eight months and it is not difficult to guess the trials and tribulations of crew and passengers during these voyages. When considering these conditions, it is easy to understand the high importance of the Euphrates project. In addition to this, the company personnel who had relatives in Britain wanted the route between the two countries to be shorter.

---


In order to achieve this target, some British merchants led by George Baldwin, made the first attempt by passing Egypt and then travelling via the Red Sea.\(^{258}\) Employers of the East India Company wanted to use this Egyptian route and so it was used for a short time. However, political and geographical factors caused the route to be abandoned. The reasons for this were that the monsoons meant the route could not be used from July to September and also, interestingly, it was banned by the Ottoman Sultan because it was too close to the Holy Cities of Islam: Mecca and Medina.\(^{259}\)

Because of these reasons interest in the Egypt route subsided and instead another route was developed. First it went from Istanbul to Aleppo, then after passing the desert an expedition would be made from Basra to Bombay by ship.\(^{260}\) However, in common with other routes, this route was not used frequently until the 1830s.

Having above summarised the alternative routes, it is now necessary to examine the situation in the 1830s, a short time before the start of the Euphrates project.

At the beginning of the 1830s, the debate over whether to use the Egypt route or the Basra route to reach India, resumed. As mentioned above, British policy makers attempted to implement a strategy of turning the political atmosphere in favour of British interests. In this regard, strategies were implemented to make Anglo-Ottoman relations in the region better. The main ones were as follows: to strike up a friendship with the Pashas who had domination in the region, offer these Pashas aid in developing their armies by appointing British officers to them, rejuvenate commerce in the region with the help of British merchants, the “*transfer of civilisation*” to these regions by opening Christian schools, and most importantly, carrying out scientific research and studies on the routes with a view to improving communication and navigation within the region.\(^{261}\)

In this context, investigations were started on the routes in the region in 1829. The first serious one was the study by Thomas Love Peacock who was working in the Indian Office as an assistant. The first important characteristic of his work was that he summarised previous studies.

\(^{261}\) Khan, *British Policy in Iraq, 1828-43, With Special Reference to the Euphrates Expedition*, p. 113.
on seaways and sea trade, also the notes of travellers and visitors, from the past up until that
time. Then he prepared a report with this summarising information and submitted it to the British
Government on 10 November 1829. More importantly, for the first time, he mentioned the
possibility of using the Euphrates to reach India. In his view the only way this plan could be
implemented was to go from Mosul to Bagdad by raft and then big vessels could be worked
between Bagdad and Basra. To reach the Persian Gulf from the city of Basra would be very easy
because of the proximity of this city.\footnote{262} Nonetheless, no serious step towards using the Euphrates
was suggested in this navigation plan.

The first serious effort to use the Euphrates was made by Mr. Taylor and Davud Pasha, the
governor of Bagdad. In brief, one of their important aims was to build a canal to link the
Euphrates and the Tigris; another goal was to do some research to help make these rivers fit for
navigation. Taylor appointed two British officers, Elliot and Ormsby, who were able to speak
Arabic, to investigate the feasibility of these plans. Interestingly, Elliot was known as Dervish
Ali, and Ormsby was known as Halil Aga in the region, and they continued their investigation
under these identities.\footnote{263}

In 1831, these two officers met Chesney, who was to implement the Euphrates project a few
years later, in Bagdad. At that point, Chesney came down from Anah, a region in Iraq, to Faluja
via the Euphrates; the distance travelled was 260 km. These three officers studied together and
prepared maps and topographical drawings of the region.\footnote{264} With all of these works the part of
the investigation comprising the route from Mosul to Basra, had been completed. Afterwards,
Elliot and Ormsby left Bagdad and started out on the research for the route going towards
Damascus. They stopped at almost every harbour in Syria and additionally found a chance to
inspect the overland routes of the region in detail. Lastly, these two officers also prepared
another map of the region and Ormsby submitted this map to the authorities in Bombay in the
June of 1832.\footnote{265}

\footnote{262} For research about the navigation of the region at this time see: T. L. Peacock, \textit{The Letters of Thomas Love
\footnote{263} Khan, \textit{British Policy in Iraq, 1828-43, With Special Reference to the Euphrates Expedition}, p. 134.
\footnote{264} Despite all the difficulties from the geographical conditions and the rebellious Arabian tribes, these three officers
prepared a detailed map of the region.
\footnote{265} More detail may be found in the doctoral thesis of Khan.
After all these developments, Chesney started to come into prominence in the project to reach India via the easiest route. He first came to the Ottoman lands in 1829 to captain British war ships in the Black sea, to help the Ottomans who were at war with the Russians at that time.\textsuperscript{266} However, the Russian army won the war and Chesney did not have a chance to use his experience in the navy. Although it was the end of the war, he did not immediately leave the Ottoman lands but began his studies on the Indian route via Egypt.

Chesney arrived at Izmir on 5 April 1830 and from this city he travelled to Egypt. He met with Barker who had been studying the necessary elements for the applicability of the Egypt and Basra routes. This meeting was in Alexandria. Barker submitted his report which was related to both of these routes. The general aspects of the formation of Chesney’s project (which was to be implemented in 1835), had started to take shape as early as 1831. Indeed, Chesney seemed to be interested in both routes at the beginning. However, he began to take more interest in the Euphrates route on his return to England. Interestingly, Chesney met Ibrahim, the son of Mehmed Ali, during his journey to Egypt, in 1830, in Cairo. Even more interestingly, Chesney mentioned the possibility of the French opening the Suez Canal, which would connect the Red Sea with the Mediterranean, in 1869, 39 years earlier than the French project. Nevertheless, Chesney abandoned this plan when there was no progress made on it, and focused on the Euphrates project.\textsuperscript{267} It was for this reason he came to Jaffa. He started to investigate navigation via a route which at first included going to Alexandretta Port and then from there to Antioch and Aleppo; after these cities proceeding to Basra via the River Euphrates. In accordance with this purpose, he travelled three thousand two hundred kilometres on the Euphrates in open rafts, prepared drawings of the Euphrates, and wrote a report on the subject of river navigation for the House of Commons: subsequently he was selected for membership of the Royal Society in consideration of his services.\textsuperscript{268} Chesney’s reports were twelve articles which included the security of the route, his experiences during his journey from Aleppo to Basra, and a way for

\textsuperscript{266} Jones, Dorsey D. Jones, \textit{Chesney Chose the Euphrates Route}, Historian, 5:1, 1942, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{268} The Euphrates’ Expedition, \textit{Royal Cornwall Gazette, Falmouth Packet & Plymouth Journal}, November 01, 1834; Issue 1636.
Steamships to make the journey. Chesney’s first plan was to go Alexandretta from Jaffa, and then to down to Basra via the Euphrates River from “Bir”, near Urfa, a city in the Ottoman Empire. He did a lot of research in the region and returned to Britain with his data, and in order to present his findings to the Government he started to write up his opinions about the Euphrates project.\(^{269}\)

He first sent his report to Stratford Canning, a diplomat who had recently worked in the Ottoman Empire on a special mission, Greek Question, and who at that time was in Paris. Canning was impressed by the report and sent it directly to Palmerston, the Foreign Minister. Chesney’s report, after being found interesting by other naval officers and British statesmen, eventually came to the notice of King William IV who was himself a sailor. Chesney, having gained the support of British public opinion and the King, began to focus even more on the project.\(^{270}\)

### 4.2. How the Euphrates Project turned into an International Issue

Because of the ‘Eastern Question’, the Euphrates project was not simply an Anglo-Ottoman affairs; Mehmed Ali Pasha and the Russians both had interests in it which had to be addressed by the Ottomans. The rebellion of Mehmed Ali, and soon after the signing of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, led to irreversible changes in the diplomatic configuration of the region. When studying this change within the scope of the Euphrates project, the political and diplomatic circumstances become clear. First of all, the increasing British fear about a Russian danger for India as a result of Unkiar Skelessi caused them to take Chesney’s project on the Euphrates River, which was seen as the most important of the Indian routes up to that time, more seriously. As mentioned, the most important supporter for Chesney’s project was King William IV. The King negotiated face to face with Chesney in the atmosphere of the Unkiar Skelessi Treaty and referred to the effects of the possible threat of the Russians to India. He particularly suggested that Chesney properly investigate the political position of the Russian empire in the region.\(^{271}\) This meeting could indicate that the effects of the Unkiar Skelessi Treaty seemed to influence the King’s decision about the Euphrates Project. Moreover, according to a 1830s newspaper there was a strong public support for the Euphrates Project, not only to make the Indian route shorter but also to

\(^{269}\) This information can be found in; Captain, (Colonel) Chesney, *Reports on the Navigation of the Euphrates*, Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London, Vol. 4, (1834).

\(^{270}\) Jones, Dorsey D. *Chesney Chose the Euphrates Route*, pp. 12-15.

\(^{271}\) Jones, Dorsey D., *Chesney Chose the Euphrates Route*, p. 12
neutralise Russian strength by enhancing British presence in the region. Following these developments, the two ships Euphrates and Tigris, which were to be used on the Euphrates River, were built in Liverpool. These two ships would first be operated on the river from Bir to Basra, 1140 miles. If the river was found to be suitable for navigation, steam ship journeys would be undertaken more frequently. The information the statesmen gave to the British public about this was that a promise had been obtained from both Mehmed Ali and the Sultan that security on the route would be assured.

Although the British policy makers represented the situation as above, obtaining the required permission to use the Euphrates River was not as easy as they made out. Indeed, this was a complex diplomatic issue which took a long time to resolve. The British proposal to use the river to get to India was carefully considered by Mahmud II and his ministers, even though they planned and wished to make Anglo-Ottoman relations much better as soon as possible, to fortify themselves against Mehmed Ali. This situation can be understood from the insistent British questions to the Ottomans for a proper response about the river navigation because they had not responded since the first British demand. When the British statesmen could not elicit an answer, they attempted another way to obtain the relevant permission to navigate the River. This was to use the biggest problem influencing diplomatic relations in the region at that time; the Mehmed Ali Pasha Question. The British bluffed that they had already negotiated with Mehmed Ali about reaching India via the shortest and easiest route and if the Ottomans would not give their permission to use the Euphrates route, then they would have to cooperate with Mehmed Ali because the Pasha had assured them that Britain could use the Egyptian route to reach India via

---


274 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, (The Original Name of the Ottoman Archives which is in Istanbul and involves all the Ottoman Documents from 1299 to 1923, and it will be referred to as BOA in the rest of the chapter) File No: 1173 Document No: 46420.
the Red Sea and had promised that British Ships would be aided and secure.\textsuperscript{275} When British politicians propounded this point, they possibly wanted to use Mahmud II’s weakness, which was his hatred for Mehmed Ali. They probably thought that the Sultan would prefer to give his permission to use the Euphrates rather than see an alliance struck between Britain and his rebel governor, Mehmed Ali, based on the river usage.

However, the Ottomans stated that when they analysed the relationship between Mehmed Ali and England it seemed to them that the relationship between the two was not suitable for an application to use the Egyptian route.\textsuperscript{276} It can be deduced that the Ottomans’ statement meant that they were aware of the diplomatic situation and the British bluff about the support of Mehmed Ali on the Egyptian route. Clearly, the situation was not, as foreign scholars have portrayed, that the Ottomans were unaware of the diplomatic process and the games the European Powers played. On the contrary, they had full knowledge of the true intentions of the other powers. Moreover, Mehmed Ali Pasha monopolized Egyptian agricultural products and trade so it can be surmised that this situation was not one that Britain liked, because she had been seeking raw materials and markets since the Industrial Revolution. As a matter of fact, it was this kind of policy from Mehmed Ali that led Palmerston to hate him. Later on, Palmerston indicated that the Pasha was the one who succeeded in rebellion; furthermore, he said that the Pasha was “a tyrant and oppressor”.\textsuperscript{277} This successful analysis by the Ottomans of the true nature of the relationship between Britain and the Pasha enabled the Ottomans to realise that the British claim about negotiating support for the Indian route from Egypt was not true; on the contrary, it was a diversion. Thereupon, when the British policy makers saw their false claim designed to elicit the permission of the Sultan to use the Euphrates had not worked, they went a step further diplomatically - rather it appears to be a non-diplomatic attitude - and threatened the Ottomans that since the benefits of the route to the British Public living in both India and Britain were vital for the British government, then in order to protect these kinds of benefits they were prepared to do anything necessary within their powers.\textsuperscript{278}

\textsuperscript{275} BOA, File No: 1350 Document No: 52737.
\textsuperscript{276} BOA, File No:1171 Document No: 46332.
\textsuperscript{278} BOA, File No: 1174 Document No: 46430 N.
Thereupon, the Ottomans’ response became very severe and they stated that the request to use the Euphrates could only be made based upon the Anglo-Ottoman friendship since Mehmed Ali was merely a simple governor of the Empire. The implication was: “Who does he think he is, how dare Britain think to ask his permission for the Indian route!” and within this context the British ambassador was warned.\(^{279}\) This response of the Ottomans can be evaluated as more evidence that despite their need to strengthen a military alliance with Britain due to all the difficulties the Ottoman Empire was in, they still reacted negatively to Britain because of her attempt to threaten the Ottomans using Mehmed Ali; furthermore they were still seeking other ways which could be more beneficial for them. This severe response also showed that the Ottomans were still an active power in the diplomatic struggle in the region. It was also a message to the European powers that other powers could not carry out whatever policy they wished, but had to consider Ottoman policies before doing anything in the region. Nevertheless, the British stubbornly continued to implement the Euphrates project which had support right up as far as the King, and at the insistence of the British politicians, Sultan Mahmud, who had wanted all along to solve the Mehmed Ali problem by forming a military alliance with Britain, instructed his ministers to prepare a detailed report about the situation and the project. An important point to be mentioned at this stage is that according to the general narration of the development of events in English literature, whenever one of the great powers wanted the Ottomans to accept their offer about anything it seems that they immediately accepted without any investigation. In fact, what we have already seen from examining the Ottoman sources for the Mehmed Ali crisis applies here too, namely that the Ottomans were alive to the rivalries between the European Great Powers, and anxious to find ways of exploiting these in their own interests. The Sultan’s instruction to compile a report about the project was one of this kind of Ottoman strategy showing how active the Ottoman Empire was in the diplomatic struggle. In this respect, a while later, on 14 October 1835, this report was written and these subjects were raised:

- Britain had been taking a long route to reach India, her vital possession, in an eight month journey from the Atlantic Ocean via the Cape of Good Hope, travelling almost the half the world.
- This long journey had been a hardship for the British people in the late delivery of letters and also for the British public officers navigating between England and India.
- British politicians would like to solve all of these problems by using the Euphrates River, which would abbreviate the Indian route for them.

\(^{279}\text{BOA, File No: 1172 Document No: 46352.}\)
On the other hand, it could be stated that negotiating that kind of serious matter with a mere Ottoman Governor like Mehmed Ali was contrary to International Law. Nevertheless, applying this project would cause commerce to be rejuvenated in the region, and as a result of this, customs collected by the British merchants would increase. Furthermore, when the British economic and political benefits in the Ottoman lands increased, this situation would lead Britain to strengthen ties with the Ottoman Empire and this convergence could be used against Mehmed Ali and the Russians.280

All of these articles show that the Ottomans were well aware of the developments around them and the tough conditions Britain endured related to reaching India. More importantly, the Ottomans had their own plans, for instance, by making commercial relationships with Britain better, they could use this commercial commitment with Britain for making military alliance against Mehmed Ali and the Russians when the need arose.

These factors caused the Sultan to look favourably towards the Euphrates Project. However, there was also a Russian side to the diplomatic process of the project. As mentioned above, the Russian Empire was an ally of the Ottoman Empire even if it was just on paper. As such, the Russians wanted to get involved with the Euphrates Project. In the official letter which was sent from the Russian Ambassador in Paris to the Russian Ambassador in Istanbul in 17 December 1834, it was stated that if the British demand about the Euphrates River had been accepted and applied, this situation would lead to enormous problems for the Ottoman Empire, and Britain would post military stations in the Ottoman lands, alleging for an excuse the need to protect British Ships and Public Officers.281 Moreover, in the same letter the Russian Ambassador mentioned that if Mehmed Ali Pasha had given permission for the use of the Egyptian route, in such a case Britain could use only corner borders of Egypt and therefore Britain would not be able to establish domination there. However, if the Ottomans gave permission to use the Euphrates River, in contrast, Britain would probably achieve domination both in the Ottoman lands and on the Ottoman Coasts with the River project. It is also stated in the same letter that the Russian Ambassador reported that the meeting between himself and the Ottoman ministers was positive, because he inferred from this meeting that the Ottomans would reject the British request about the project. In the light of this statement it could be understood that the Ottoman politicians were diplomatically successful in diverting the Russians from getting involved in the

280 BOA, File No: 829 Document No: 37503 F.
281 BOA, File No: 1167 Document No: 46153 A.
project. The reason for this success was that the Ottoman statesmen were stalling the Russian ambassador, because at the same time, within this meeting, they were planning to accept the Euphrates project with the intention of improving Anglo-Ottoman relations. This diplomatic manoeuvre is another evidence for the main argument of the thesis; that the Ottomans made an alliance with the Russians, Unkiar Skelessi, to excite British fears about Russian plans in terms of India. It could be understood from this, that although the Russians were an ally of the Ottomans as a result of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, the Ottoman side was still seeking a way to reject Russian advice about the British demand to use the Euphrates River, and in addition to this the Ottomans were planning to make Britain their ally by accepting the project in spite of Russian opinion. All of these data show that Mahmud II’s plan, using Unkiar Skelessi, was only a diplomatic manoeuvre for the benefit of the Ottomans.

After all these developments the project was taken more seriously by Britain, and in the July of 1835, Palmerston demanded a meeting with Nuri Effendi who was the Ottoman formally commissioned to negotiate the Euphrates project and also an alliance between Britain and the Ottoman Empire.282 This development shows that the Sultan’s plan was working because the Euphrates project was the one vital matter that made the Anglo-Ottoman alliance possible, when, only two years ago it had been rejected by the same person, Palmerston. At the same time, the British Ambassador to Istanbul, Ponsonby, informed the British public that (as mentioned above on one of the Ottoman documents) the reason for the belated permission to implement the project was Russian pressure on the Ottomans.283 Interestingly, the Ottoman ambassadors were monitoring the British Press on the Anglo-Ottoman relationship in relation to the Euphrates project. In this context, in one Ottoman document it was mentioned that after reviewing the British newspapers’ it was seen that the British public saw the Russians as the most important difficulty for the Euphrates project because of the proximity of Russia to the Ottoman lands.284 It was mentioned on the same document that it was difficult to obtain permission to use the Euphrates; soon it was even mentioned in the British newspapers that the implementation of the project was probably impossible because of the Russians! Despite all of this negative news, the British Press was attempting to keep the project in the public eye by making up news about it.285

284 BOA, File No: 1186 Document No: 46759 B.
285 BOA, File No:1186 Document No: 46759 C.
It can be seen on the same document that the delay in permission from the Sultan was deemed normal according to the British Press because the British government was neglecting to support the Ottomans against the Russians. For this reason, according to the British Press, war ships should be sent to the Dardanelles and the Ottoman government informed that these British war ships would be a guarantee for the Ottomans in the case of a Russian attack after permission was granted for the project. All of these documents are vital, and provide a very good opportunity, for the proper understanding of the main argument of this chapter. The Ottomans, however, were beginning to convert British public opinion from a negative attitude about the political and diplomatic position of the Ottomans with the Russian Empire, to a positive one, using the Euphrates project. In addition to this point, the other important point that can be inferred from these documents is that it is clear the Ottomans were not unaware of the political and diplomatic conditions the other Powers were in, as shown in narratives by foreign scholars who were following these developments very closely.

On the other hand, there was opposition within the Ottoman Government to the project. The most important person with this view was the Sadrazam, the Prime minister. He warned the Sultan that if the Sultan gave permission for the project, Britain would make other demands of the Ottoman Empire, such as the combination of the rivers Euphrates and Tigris, and the establishment of British security lines along both sides of the rivers. Another member of this opposition was Nuri Effendi, who was on duty in London. He wrote a report about the current political atmosphere in London on the project. His report was quite interesting because it was more evidence that the Ottoman ministers had their own opinions about the diplomatic developments and they were not simply puppets in the international arena. He mentioned that the Sultan should not give permission for the project because from his point of view the British politicians seemed helpful and friendly initially but in fact were only considering their own benefits. In this respect, they wanted to use the project only for British interests and the Ottomans would suffer as a result. He also mentioned that Palmerston was hostile towards the Russians and he had wanted to declare war on them, and would include the Ottomans in this war and this situation would damage the Empire. Despite these opponents, there was an important support to the Euphrates project from Namık Pasha, the Ambassador to London. He thought that

---

286 BOA, File No: 1186 Document No: 46759 B.
the project would be very beneficial for both sides. According to him, the Ottomans would earn a lot of money by it, and if the route which was going to India passed through the Ottoman lands, customs revenue would quickly increase. Therefore, from his point of view the Sultan should give permission to Britain to use the Euphrates.\footnote{BOA, File No: 1174 Document No: 46429 H.}

After all these developments, Sultan Mahmud II evaluated the project in detail and lastly asked the opinion of the governor of Bagdad, Ali Pasha. He responded that the project would lead to the clearing and widening of the Euphrates and this would stimulate trade in the region.\footnote{BOA, File No: 1178 Document No: 46565 A.} Subsequently, the Sultan saw the project as an intermediate step which would lead to the Anglo-Ottoman alliance he needed to fortify against Mehmed Ali, and he decided to give permission to Britain for the Euphrates project in the autumn of 1835.\footnote{BOA, File No: 1173 Document No: 46422 A.}

In 1835 a large ship, named \textit{The George Canning}, departed from the Liverpool Harbour towards Alexandretta carrying two ships, The Euphrates and The Tigris, which were to be operated on the Euphrates. They weighed 300 tons. Some of the officers voyaging with the George Canning Ship recorded that,

\begin{quote}
"fifteen Officers, every one of them distinguished by eminent scientific, literary, or professional attainments; twenty picked artillerymen, chiefly artificers, six enginemen, seven Liverpool blacksmiths, and two interpreters, are engaged in the expedition, in all fifty persons, under the command of Colonel Chesney, of the Royal Artillery."
\end{quote}\footnote{The Expedition to the Euphrates, \textit{The Morning Post} (London, England), Saturday, February 07, 1835; Issue 20022.}

However, Chesney faced many difficulties when he arrived at the Ottoman lands. At first, the governor of Antakya, a city in the South, stopped Chesney and his convoy from landing at Antakya. They landed under favour of a British warship.\footnote{BOA, File No: 1186 Document No: 46759 B.} The reason for these kinds of problems was understood later on: that the Governor of Birecik reported to Istanbul that the British officials had tried to commandeer local supplies: some camels, carriages and hinnies in order to transfer the parts of the two ships, the Euphrates and the Tigris. After this report, the Ottoman government gave instruction to the governor that if the British officials did not stop...
behaving like this towards the Ottoman public soon, he would cancel permission for the project. After that he notified Chesney of this government order.

Another vital problem for the project was Mehmed Ali. In contrast to the promise given by Mehmed Ali about supporting Britain in the project to reach India, Pasha created some difficulties in the transfer of the pieces of both ships to Birecik, and this situation was complained about to Istanbul. In addition to this, many events did not go as planned and required. The most important of these were problems following the route, and with the water depth of the Euphrates River, and local tribes, called Aneze Arabs, attacked the British officers. These attacks were complained about to the Ottoman Government on the September of 1835. Just after this complaint, in the same months, the rescript was given by Mahmud II which ordered that necessary precautions should be taken against rebel tribes. Despite this command, attacks from the tribes continued. In spite of all of these problems the assembly of the pieces of the ships was successfully completed. Nevertheless, in a report which was drawn up by the governor of Bagdad, Ali Pasha, on 9 February 1837, it was stated that one of the ships, The Euphrates, had foundered on its first sailing and the other one, The Tigris, although it was able to reach Basra and return to Bagdad, could not be sailed on the rest of the route. As a result, this report was duly submitted to the British Ambassador in Bagdad by the mariners of the ship.

Consequently, it can be understood from this chapter in the light of the Ottoman documents relevant to the Euphrates Project, that the Ottomans were not passive players in the region during the process because despite all the difficult situations they were having at that time, they did not accept all British and Russian requests about the Euphrates Project without deliberating matters from the point of view of Ottoman benefits. More importantly, they played their own diplomatic games and produced their own policies, to work to turn the negative developments in terms of the Ottoman profits, into positive ones.

294 BOA, File No: 1173 Document No: 46422
297 BOA, File No: 451 Document No: 22357 A.
298 BOA, File No: 1172 Document No: 46413 A.
CHAPTER FIVE

Mahmud and his statesmen’s Diplomatic Harvest Season after all their efforts to win British cooperation

With the beginning of 1834 the new relative position of the parties in the Anglo-Ottoman relationship had started to become more apparent. When looking at this new position from the point of view of the Ottomans, the most significant factors to examine are Mahmud’s diplomatic manoeuvres, such as those of the summoning of the Russian Navy Power to the Bosporus and the much-disputed Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Another bold diplomatic move was to be added to these shrewd diplomatic tactics was with the British attempt in 1835, when she wanted to request permission for the use of the Euphrates Route, which entailed passing through the entire length of the Ottoman lands, to reach India, her biggest possession, much more quickly, via the shortest possible route. As could be guessed, this British desire was another chance for Mahmud to implement his real aim, which was to secure a military alliance with Britain to assist him in combatting his rebel governor, Mehmed Ali. After all these manoeuvres from Mahmud, British policy towards the Ottoman Empire seemed to undergo a radical change; this was particularly visible in the revised attitude of the famous British Foreign Minister, Palmerston. As a matter of fact, many international scholars of history have conducted detailed studies of this British policy change, but they have universally neglected to study the degree of Mahmud’s and his statesmen’s role in this change, owing to a failure to avail themselves of the Ottoman record of events. Naturally, this omission has brought about a one-sided narration of the period. This is the reason that the previous chapters of this thesis have been endeavouring to reveal this account of affairs and reveal the Sultan’s role in matters based on the Ottoman primary sources up to this point. This chapter will examine in detail both these issues: what were the effects of Mahmud’s diplomatic mentioned manoeuvres on the Anglo-Ottoman relationship in the period 1834 to 1836, and also what other policies did Mahmoud and his statesmen follow in those years in order to facilitate the forging of an Anglo-Ottoman military alliance so they would be better able to resist all their enemies in the region.
5.1. 1834-1835 developments

The most significant development in 1834-35 was the Euphrates project. Although all the details of this project are examined thoroughly in one of the thesis’s earlier chapters, it could be said with respect to this chapter that although the Ottoman statesmen had tried to not to show their true colours to the Russians at the beginning of the process because of the clauses in Unkiar Skelessi, Mahmud eventually gave his permission for this project despite all the opposition from Russia, which was trying to use all its privileges of presence in the Ottoman lands which had arisen from the Unkiar Skelessi treaty, to prevent the British from achieving their aim in this matter. As can be imagined, the Sultan’s permission in favour of the British negatively affected the Ottoman-Russian relationship. This permission given by the Sultan became a somewhat negative blueprint for future diplomatic relations between Mahmud and Nicholas. Another remarkable aspect of this process was that Mehmed Ali also tried to exploit this project for his own plans just as Mahmud had. In this respect, he played a double game. He indicated to Palmerston that he really wanted to cooperate with the British in this project but was tied hand and foot since he was only a simple governor, and it was the Sultan who was preventing him from helping the British with the project. At the same time, we also know from his statement to the Russian translator in Alexandria that he thought that the Euphrates project was totally unacceptable. The Ottoman diplomats reported this state of affairs to Mahmud and informed him that Mehmed Ali was expecting to profit in either event: whether Britain was going to triumph over Russia’s wishes in this competition over access to the Euphrates; or Russia had its way.

In 1835, the Ottoman documents indicated that relations between the Sultan and his rebel governor were getting more and more volatile with every passing day, and on both sides their open hostility was becoming daily more apparent. Mehmed Ali had planned for his ambitions in

299 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, (The Original Name of the Ottoman Archives which is in Istanbul and involves all the Ottoman Documents from 1299 to 1923, and it will be referred to as BOA in the rest of the chapter) File No: 1186 Document No: 46758 B.
300 Of course, despite Mahmud’s strong desire to implement an Anglo-Ottoman alliance, and some of his diplomats’ efforts in this process, on the other hand Mahmud and his men had been sometimes handling the Russians tactfully - many Ottoman documents reveal these Ottoman tactics - while at the same time striving to induce the British to enter into an alliance.
301 BOA, File No: 1171, Document No: 46349 01.
302 BOA, File No: 1171, Document No: 46349 01.
303 BOA, File No: 1171, Document No: 46349 01.
this direction – a complete independence from the Sultan – to come to fruition in this year. To make matters worse, Mahmud’s fears over the treaty of Kütahya had begun to come true. As a result of Mehmed Ali’s political attack, Mahmud thought that it would be wise to accelerate his diplomatic solution-seeking with the European powers, particularly Britain. In this context, he ordered his statesmen that they should obtain the opinions and attitudes of the British and French ambassadors about their opinion on Mehmed Ali’s latest attack by requesting an official letter from them. Upon receiving this instruction, the Foreign Minister replied that he intended to request this letter from Ponsonby. However, before he could do this, Ponsonby actually sent a letter by himself through his translator which spontaneously brought up the subject. He stated in his letter that Mehmed Ali’s demand for independence was a sheer fantasy and his government would neither accept it nor conform to it. In fact, the indications were that this attempt of Mehmed Ali’s had started to show his true colours since the last period of 1834. Rodkey indicated on this topic that:

“In October, 1834, after Campbell had warned the foreign office of serious intentions on the part of Mehmed Ali to declare himself independent, Palmerston warned the Pasha in no uncertain terms not to disturb the status quo.”

Right after that the French translator brought a letter from the French ambassador about the same issue, which stated that the French government did not accept the legitimacy of this demand. However, the Ottoman Foreign Minister was not as completely satisfied with the French communication as he was with the British one. He gave as a reason for this, that the French Ambassador also advised in his letter that the Ottoman Empire should not make any military advance towards Mehmed Ali. After this, the French Ambassador was told that the Ottoman Empire did not have any malevolent intentions and he was officially warned about his last letter. In response he stated that the sentiments he had expressed in the letter were merely a reflection of the instructions which he had been given by his government, however he strongly believed that the Ottoman Empire did not harbour ill-will against Egypt and therefore he apologised for any offence the letter may have caused. The hard-line warning obliged the French

304 BOA, File No: 360, Document No: 20064.
305 BOA, File No: 360, Document No: 20064.
Ambassador to concede his position and demur. To add to the opinions conveyed by these ambassadors, the Austrian Ambassador also presented a letter of the Austrian government’s views about the same issue, and just like the British and French Ambassadors he did it of his own accord.\textsuperscript{308} Mahmud was pleased with these explanations of the ambassadors since it meant he no longer felt so diplomatically isolated against his insubordinate governor, and with the help of this support, he could compensate for his army’s weakness and inexperience with his abilities in diplomacy and politics, as he had done in the past to combat the seemingly insurmountable domestic issues of the Empire.\textsuperscript{309} As a result of his endeavours, it seemed that the diplomatic developments of 1835 had started to take a turn for the better. One other example for this came from Prince Metternich’s instruction to the Austrian ambassador to London, Prince Esterhazy.

Namik Pasha was in London at that time, to negotiate the latest developments in Anglo-Ottoman relations after the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Esterhazy showed the instruction to Namik Pasha whereupon the Pasha reported to the Sultan and informed him about it immediately, on 3 May 1835.\textsuperscript{310} Metternich explained in the instruction that Austria had always stood up for the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and from this point of view Mehmed Ali’s real aim of independence from that empire, which had now come to light, should never be accepted. The most important information in the instruction was that Metternich had intercepted a secret document informing him that Mehmed Ali had organized a revolt in Albania, via the governor of Crete: Mustafa Pasha. Esterhazy told Namik Pasha that Metternich had already informed the British Foreign Minister of the situation and requested that the British and Austrian ambassadors to Alexandria, Albania, Crete, and Greece, should be kept abreast of all the latest developments and should not be allowed, under any circumstances, to contact Mehmed Ali about this dangerous attempt.\textsuperscript{311} When Namik Pasha learned of Metternich’s talking with the Minister with respect to defending the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan’s authority

\textsuperscript{308} BOA, File No: 360, Document No: 20064
\textsuperscript{309} Mahmud disbanded his old army the Janissaries (also called the Yeniçeri Ordusu) in 1826. The Janissaries had been a major feature in many military victories during the height of the Empire, but they would not adapt to changing warfare techniques and became outdated, and unwilling to adapt to any innovations. He established a modern army called the Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye, however this army was inexperienced and this was one of the main reasons for its easy and rapid defeat against Mehmed Ali’s army in 1832. Therefore, knowing his armies’ weakness, Mahmud was seeking an alternative solution to going to war alone once more against the Egyptian Army, like making a military alliance with Britain. Thus the best way to achieve this aim was through the use of diplomacy.
\textsuperscript{310} BOA, File No: 1174, Document No: 46430 C.
\textsuperscript{311} BOA, File No: 1174, Document No: 46430 C.
over it, he saw this situation as an opportunity to elucidate the Ottoman points of view once more. So he went to talk to the Foreign Minister about the subject. He explained that if Britain put pressure on Mehmed Ali and tried to ignite within him once again the desire to obey his sovereign and abandon his destructive rebellion against central government, he strongly believed that Mehmed Ali would not attempt to oppose Britain in the matter. This last diplomatic strategy was very likely to lead to another important development towards success, which was a thought that pleased Mahmud, since it seemed that diplomatic support from the European powers was in his favour now.

Despite all these positive developments, there was another major difficulty with which Mahmud had to contend. The problem was with the city of Damascus. Damascus was a critically important Ottoman city but it was now under Mehmed Ali’s control. Under Mahmud’s direction the Ottoman statesmen had undertaken some discreet activities to rescue Damascus, but the British government did not have a favourable attitude towards any forcible intervention in this city since they thought that any possible crisis in the Ottoman lands might give the Russians an opportunity to exploit the incident to their advantage using the new rights that had arisen from the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Consequently, because of the British sensitivity over Russian policy, Mahmud did not want the British to know about the Ottoman activities in the region, at least in the beginning. However, Britain came to hear of the Ottomans’ latest activities in Damascus, and Palmerston sent a despatch about it to both Ponsonby and Colonel Campbell. As a matter of fact, this was prepared after Mehmed Ali’s complaints to the British. This is interesting because Mehmed Ali appears to have made a decision to induce the British via diplomatic ways to agree with the rightfulness of his struggle, just as his sovereign Mahmud had done. This despatch contained some complaints about these latest Ottoman activities in the region, firstly conveying that the British government was aware of the Ottomans’ secret activities in Damascus to try to circumvent a revolution from Mehmed Ali, but the Ottoman power in this city was not currently sufficient to successfully achieve any such thing. Secondly, they were also well aware that the Sultan had ordered for preparations to start with a view to establishing an army (from the districts, which were under the control of the central government, and at Reşid

312 BOA, File No: 1174, Document No: 46430 C.
313 BOA, File No: 361, Document No: 20100 A.
Pasha’s command) for the purpose of attacking Mehmed Ali. The Ottoman statesmen responded immediately to the British claims. They said that firstly, the central government had not been provoking any kind of revolution in Damascus as had been asserted. The last revolution had occurred as a result of the cruelty and atrocities of Mehmed Ali and his son, Ibrahim Pasha, towards the public in Damascus. However, if there were any Ottoman soldiers in Damascus, it was to force the Egyptian soldiers to withdraw, back to their boundaries, because although Urfa and Rakka were Ottoman cities and not under the control of Mehmed Ali, they were under the occupation of his army at that moment. The Ottoman statesmen wanted the British statesmen to evaluate the Ottoman activities in Damascus in this way. As previously examined, they were trying to conceal their real purposes for being there and at least gain some time. They also stated clearly that they had legitimate reasons behind the recent increase in Ottoman activities against Mehmed Ali. One of them was that Mehmed Ali had stopped paying his taxes to the central government. Mahmud probably took this as a signal that Mehmed Ali had made a decision to accelerate the process of acquiring his independence. This Ottoman statement seems to have changed the British mind on the matter, since Colonel Campbell subsequently met with Mehmed Ali and impressed upon him, in the name of The British government, those exact points which Mahmud had hoped and wished would be suggested by the British. As a matter of fact, prior to this last situation, Palmerston felt that he himself, as a result of Mahmud’s risky manoeuvres, should have prevented the Sultan from being dominated in his own lands, since a Balkanised Ottoman Empire could have been dominated by Russia much more easily, an eventuality he wished to avoid. On October 1834, he communicated his opinion about this to Campbell, and explained to him about the kinds of cities which Mehmed Ali had been trying to enlarge his province by occupying. Rodkey explains this situation in more detail thus:

“To sever from the Ottoman Empire the vast and fertile provinces held by Mehemet Ali, the British foreign secretary maintained, "would not only trench deeply upon the integrity of the Turkish Empire, but would fatally impair its independence. "Instead of encouraging the Viceroy in his ambitions, Palmerston strongly recommended that he should evacuate Orfa and Diarbekir, and pay the tribute that he owed to the Sultan.”

314 BOA, File No: 361, Document No: 20100 A.
315 BOA, File No: 361, Document No: 20100 A.
316 BOA, File No: 361, Document No: 20100 A.
When Campbell spoke to Mehmed Ali on the matter he told him that his wisest course of action would be to become a submissive and capitulatory governor to his sovereign, Mahmud II. Campbell added that if he were to co-operate in this way, he would be safe from any possible attack or seizure. Most importantly, Campbell indicated that the King of Great Britain was a close friend and ally of the Sultan, and the King had been calling most emphatically for the continued territorial integrity and stability of the Ottoman Empire in every respect and had long considered this to be the key factor in European peace and security, hence, the King would never consent to the division or weakening of the Ottoman Empire. Campbell also mentioned that the King also would not allow the Ottomans to be hurt, nor would he allow Mehmed Ali to proclaim his independence since this ambition was irrational, inadvisable and detrimental to European stability. Campbell concluded his meeting with Mehmed Ali with three points: firstly, that he should have to calm down and try to be an obedient governor; secondly, he should pay the necessary taxes as agreed according to the treaty of Kutahya; and thirdly, he should immediately withdraw his army from Urfa and Rakka, where he had no right to be since these cities were not under his control.318 This advice from Britain would have been a stunning blow to Mehmed Ali because he had been striving to induce the European powers to accept his struggle’s legitimacy, just as Mahmud had been doing, to promote his own cause. Since this last negotiation with the British about Damascus had started badly following his rebel governor’s complaints to Britain about him, it is easy to see that Mahmud must have been extremely pleased with the way events were turning out. However, events had turned once again into an even more positive outlook for the Sultan. In their doing so, the Sultan, so to speak, ‘killed two birds with one stone’. The first benefit achieved was that Mehmed Ali in his approach had debased himself in the sight of the British. In one sense, it could be said that ‘the hunter had become the hunted’. The second benefit, it transpired, was that in contrasting with his governor, Mahmud actually reinforced his requests in the eyes of the British about collaboration with the English to solve the problem.

France, which had now started to act in tandem with Britain in the Eastern Question, wanted to get involved in the Damascus issue as well. Although France seemed to have acted as an ally of Britain in solving the Mehmed Ali problem after the Treaty of Unkisar Skelessi, it could not be expected from her to change her policies with respect to Mehmed Ali that easily, since she had been a source of strength and support for the governor ever since the beginning of his campaign.

318 BOA, File No: 361, Document No: 20100 A.
In France’s previous dealings in the matter, whenever she became involved with the problem, she ‘played a double game’, at one time in opposition to Mehmed Ali and at another time in his favour, and this approach had been most vexatious to the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{319}

The same thing happened in connection with the Damascus issue. France sent a motion to her ambassador to Alexandria, Bigos, and this motion was shown to Mavroyeni, the charge d'affaires of the Ottoman Empire to Vienna, by the French ambassador to Vienna.\textsuperscript{320} There were two aspects to it. The first one was saying to Mehmed Ali that the Egyptian soldiers should be immediately withdrawn from Urfa and Rakka and in addition to this; he pay the taxes of Egypt, Crete, and Damascus to the central government.

The second aspect of the message was of concern for the Ottoman Empire. It was saying that the central government should have lessened its preoccupation with Damascus and concentrated its efforts on achieving what was necessary with the treaty of Kütahya. As previously indicated, this approach annoyed the Ottomans once more. Mavroyeni declared that the allegations the French were making were nonsensical and had no basis in fact. Mavroyeni also said something uncomplimentary about Mehmed Ali in the light of the latest developments. He asserted that in his opinion the governor had destroyed his dignity in the eyes of the European powers because of his overambitious aspirations and blatant deceit.\textsuperscript{321}

Mavroyeni also went on to make further scathing comments on the subject of Mehmed Ali; that he was destitute of foresight and very inexperienced in terms of the European Powers’ policies. Mavroyeni also met with Metternich about this issue and mentioned his complaints to the British, and thereafter went on to discuss the comments of Britain and France about Damascus. Metternich stated on these issues that Mehmed Ali’s complaints were extremely inconvenient. He also said that he ordered his ambassador to go to Alexandria in order to protest and his ambassador warned the governor even more sternly than had the British and the French. He lastly said to Mavroyeni that Mehmed Ali had attempted to make some complaints about his sovereign as well but according to Metternich that was a grave error because the Austrians had to honour the sovereignty rights of the Sultan in compliance with their administrative principles.

\textsuperscript{319} BOA, File No: 1190, Document No: 46885.
\textsuperscript{320} BOA, File No: 361, Document No: 20100 A.
\textsuperscript{321} BOA, File No: 361, Document No: 20100 A.
Mavroyeni said that he sent a motion, indicating his rejection of Mehmed Ali’s complaints, to his ambassador to Istanbul.322

Following on from all of these developments, Mahmud found one more opportunity to develop increased intimacy with the British, which was prudent because he badly wanted to conclude this potentially disastrous matter within the shortest possible time. The opportunity was provided by the need to improve economic relations, and this was to culminate in theforging of the treaty of Balta Limani on 16 August 1838.323 Before these economic negotiations were made, an important economic incident had taken place between the Ottomans, the British and Mehmed Ali. The details of the matter were that, after the termination of the Levant Company in 1826, there was no obstacle arising within British legislation that limited their trading with the immense and fertile Ottoman lands. However, there was a negative side, which was called “7 Vahid”. The Ottoman economy had always been closed ever since the establishment of the Empire, which meant that the State had to grant permission regarding the import of all goods. At first, the exportation of goods was not so highly regulated, as the State did not have to give permission for every export. The majority of these items were salt, all kind of pulses, and gunpowder, flour, spices and sugar.324 However, in 1826 Mahmud banned seven goods from exportation. These forbidden items were called the “7 Vahid”. The British merchants were dismayed by this prohibition, and so they complained about this troublesome situation to their Ambassador.325 Mahmud realised that this demand from the British merchants could be used in solving the Mehmed Ali problem, and negotiations over this matter commenced in the 1830s. However, it seemed that Mehmed Ali would not relinquish his control over these monopolies in his region that easily. In 1835, Mehmed Ali took the step of prohibiting the British merchants from trading in silk in Damascus. Following this development, Ponsonby appealed to the Sultan for termination of Mehmed Ali’s monopoly on these items.326 The translator of the British Embassy, Pizani, visited the Reis Effendi, the Ottoman Foreign Minister, to negotiate this issue. In the meeting, the Reis Effendi asked about the reason for which the courier, who came to the British Embassy a few days ago, had been sent. Pizani responded that the Foreign Minister had

---

322 BOA, File No: 361, Document No: 20100 A.
323 This process is examined in detail in a separate chapter in the thesis.
325 Mubahat Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı-İngiliz İktisadi Münasebetleri II 1838-1850, (İstanbul: 1976), pp. 66-70.
sent an official letter, to communicate the fact that Mehmed Ali was denying any commerce involving Damascus silk to the British merchants based on 7 Vahid, and the Minister was demanding a rescript from the Sultan on this issue.327 Thereupon the Reis Effendi requested an official declaratory letter from Ponsonby. Subsequently, in response, Ponsonby presented two official letters, explaining the situation. Ponsonby stated in these letters that if these prohibitions were coming from the central government, Istanbul, although this decision’s meaning was contrary to the rapport between both countries, they could not deny that this was a right of the Ottoman government. However, if Mehmed Ali had made this decision without asking the central government, he did not have a right to act in contravention with the international treaties and principles; in fact, nor did he even have the power to make such a decision. Ponsonby added that if the situation was indeed as he suspected, he demanded that the Pasha be dismissed from his position for raising difficulties for the British merchants, and also that all the tariffs which had caused the merchants such difficulty and expense be revoked.328 In response, the Reis Effendi advocated to the Sultan that it would be a necessary course of action to submit a rescript, one which proclaimed that Mehmed Ali’s decisions and actions had been without the proper knowledge and permission of the central government, and they knew and accepted that these kinds of decisions were adverse to the friendship between the countries.329

This incident was appears to have been a good opportunity for Mahmud and his statesmen to seize in order to sharpen the unpleasant emotions and feelings of hostility between the British and Mehmed Ali. In this context, the Reis Effendi asked Pizani a critical question: what would happen if Mehmed Ali did not obey the Sultan’s orders? Would the British statesmen complain that the rescript was useless and think the Sultan’s orders impotent, or would they attempt to rescue British commerce in the region from Mehmed Ali’s arbitrary rulings, by enforcing the rescript and obligating the Pasha to fulfil what it instructed?330 This question was a roundabout way for the Sultan to pose his real enquiry; which was whether Britain would intervene with military force against Mehmed Ali when more and more conditions indicating the prudence of this intervention had been cropping up with every passing day.

328 BOA, File No: 1172, Document No: 46369.
The Reis Effendi’s question was found to be a significant question and Pizani said that he should let Ponsonby know about it. The following day, Pizani reported back that Ponsonby had said that the question was quite clear and to the point but he had also indicated that he needed more time to ponder upon it. He sent the response only four days later saying that if the governor toes the line they would indeed be indebted to the Sultan. Otherwise, if he were to oppose the order, there would be only one reason from Ponsonby’s point of view. In this respect, he touched upon a quite interesting and unimaginined aspect of the situation. According to Ponsonby the reason was Russia. He explained that diplomatic relations between the Pasha and the Russians were in very good shape. He also said on this topic that because of this he and his government were very well aware that the Pasha had been making concession eleven percent extra to the Russian merchants, and therefore, if he insisted on contravening the rescript, they would perceive it as disobedience to his Sovereign for the sake of the Russians. Ponsonby went on to say that in such a case we would have to think very carefully about what we could do to help against Mehmed Ali without adversely affecting the Ottoman interests. After Ponsonby’s response, it was decided that if the rescript were to be given to the British, then they would be the ones to contend with Mehmed Ali since it was obvious that his prohibitions made them very angry. In addition to this, when the British merchants obtained extra trading privileges in the region and so rose head and shoulders above the merchants of the other European powers, the British nation and state would feel the warmest appreciation of the Ottomans. At the end of his report Reis Effendi stated that this rescript was vital because by way of it, they would be able to provide the stimulus the British needed in order to exercise their power over the Pasha, and also it might even provide cause for Britain to wipe out his army and even his existence. Mahmud’s men seemed to be as enthusiastic to gain British cooperation against the renegade governor as was Mahmud.

In this regard, one of the most encouraging pieces of news with respect to this cooperation came from Nuri Effendi, the Ottoman ambassador at London. He had met with Palmerston on 14 July 1835, and reported that prior to this meeting with the Foreign Minister he was well aware that the debated article of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had deeply hurt the British and as a result of this situation, the Anglo-Ottoman alliance might be only possible with the Russian repulsion of the

---

331 BOA, File No: 1172, Document No: 46369.
British. He therefore said that he had seen fit to have a word with Palmerston about the Russians in order to lead up to discussing the Egypt problem. In this context, he stated that he had heard something about the Russians but he could not verify whether the information was true or false due to the fact that he had not received any news from Istanbul for two weeks. He had heard that there were a few articles in the newspapers to the effect that some Russian war ships in the Black Sea had started to make certain preparations. He asked Palmerston about whether he had any information concerning this news or not. Palmerston responded that he did not know about this situation; however he knew that twenty thousand Russian soldiers were on the road to the Castle of Silistria through Moldova and since the castle was under the control of the Russians this would potentially cause much harm. Palmerston then started to talk, in fact complain, about the Russians’ position in Istanbul and as one might expect, these complaints were a welcome sound to Mahmud’s ears, since Palmerston’s complaining like this was evidence that his manoeuvres had really started to properly bear fruit. Palmerston opened the dialogue by saying that the Russian ambassador had been playing a very active role in Istanbul and interfering with Ottoman administrative and diplomatic affairs. He also stated that in these circumstances, how could it be asserted that the Ottoman Empire was an independent country with this Russian penetration in the Ottoman lands? He also proffered that while the Russians were continuing with their influence in Istanbul, how were the British at the same time supposed to be aiding the Ottoman Empire? After this frank exchange of views Palmerston stated, just as Mahmud had expected, that if the Ottomans had been feigning to be an allied country with the Russians because of any feeling that they had no other source of help, Britain would be the guarantor for the Ottomans that neither the Russians nor Mehmed Ali would be able to damage the Ottoman Empire so long as the British Maritime power was in the Mediterranean Sea.

This offer of Palmerston’s shows an explicit change in the British policy in 1835 concerning the Eastern Question when compared to the period before 1833. Baker clearly expresses the main aims of the British policy after the Unkia Skelessi when he writes:

“The two chief aims of British policy in this quarter from 1833 to 1839 were, first, to prevent a renewal of Russian intervention in Turkish affairs, and eventually to destroy the Russian sole protector ship of Turkey acquired in the treaty of 8 July; and secondly, to maintain the peace

---

335 BOA, File No: 1190, Document No: 46879 001.
After Palmerston had spoken, Nuri’s response was that there was no indulgence of the Ottoman Empire or any other reason related to it concerning the Russian control of the Castle of Silistra. According to Nuri Effendi’s explanation of affairs, sometimes calamities happen and as a result of these the Russians captured the castle. However, he could also reassure him that the Ottoman statesmen had been making great efforts day and night under the guidance of the Sultan to reform and regenerate the Empire and it was manifestly clear that after these reforms had been enacted they would soon be able to recapture the Castle.

In fact, Palmerston had been taking the reform of the Ottoman Empire very seriously as it was the only way to rescue the Empire from her enemies, particularly the Russians, and he fully appreciated the efforts the Ottomans were putting in to enhance the Empire. Rodkey’s comments on this topic are:

“Henceforth until the renewal of war between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt in 1839 Palmerston consistently counselled the Turkish government to keep the peace in the Levant in order that it might succeed with its plans for military and administrative reorganisation, and on more than one occasion he took practical steps to further Ottoman Reform. Late in 1835 he instructed Ponsonby to exhort the Turkish ministers to pursue “with increasing energy and perseverance that wise system of organization – military, naval, financial, and administrative” which had already been so successfully begun.”

Nuri also said something useful about Palmerston’s words with regard to the Russian hegemony in Istanbul. He said that they had to make the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi as a result of Mehmed Ali’s rebellion because of the immediate necessity of an alliance with another power to fortify the Empire against the problem. At this stage of the meeting Nuri Effendi indicated – in accordance with the Sultan’s plan – that they had really desired to make an alliance with Britain. He added that if the British sponsored the Ottomans in every aspect, Mehmed Ali would have to

revert back his old position and accept the supremacy of the Sultan and thus the suspicions and
certainties arising from the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi would be laid to rest.340

It seems Palmerston in the meeting was much clearer this time with an Ottoman official on the
Russian issue, so much so that he replied to Nuri’s words by saying;

“We do not have anything further to say about Unkiar Skelessi for now; when we war with the
Russians we will ask Istanbul and get the answer, there is no problem with that. The problem is
what does Russian hegemony in Istanbul really mean? Even I have a proof in this matter. Although
the Ottoman Empire had an intention to acquire 30 Russian officers to use them in the training of
the Ottoman army, the Russian ambassador learned of this situation and restrained the Ottomans
from doing that. Instead of doing that, if some British officers went to Istanbul, they would be able
to reform the Ottoman Army very quickly and by this means the Ottoman Empire could gain an
edge over both Russia and Mehmed Ali. I am making this suggestion since Britain really only
desires for the Ottoman Empire to have power, strength, glory, and stateliness. In this respect, the
King only feels partiality and deep love to the Sultan.”341

Interestingly, after Palmerston had spoken thus he added that because of King William’s
sympathy with Mahmud, he would like to send five horses to the Sultan as a gift, via a ship
which was to take Lord Lambton to Petersburg, and Palmerston even intimated that he had
chosen the horses with his own hands. Most interestingly, he mentioned that these horses were
not so valuable themselves in financial terms but they would be a strong evidence to show
Mehmed Ali and the Russians that Britain would stand by the Ottomans’ side in all
circumstances.342 Mahmud was satisfied with the King’s gift and he sent a letter to William to
thank him for it. Mahmud also thanked William for his country’s hospitality and the
compliments to Nuri Effendi he had received.343 Mahmud was very pleased by this situation and
he saw it as another occasion which had further improved the Anglo-Ottoman relationship.

When Nuri Effendi was convinced that everything was going well in London, he reported that
they should use praising and encouraging language much more with the British and at the same
time more critical and adverse language with the Russians from then on. The reason for that was,
he continued, that Britain had always behaved with extreme favour to the Ottomans. For
example, the last serious attempt Mehmed Ali made to declare and announce his independence to all the European powers, as examined above in detail, had been prohibited by Britain’s actions and this support could not be forgotten. On the other hand, the Russians had always been an enemy and generally brought trouble on the Ottomans from Nuri Effendi’s point of view. Owing to these circumstances, he mentioned, how could they prefer the Russians to the British? He also recounted Palmerston’s words about the Russian ambassador’s penetration into Istanbul and said that it was as clear as day that all grace and respect shown to him so far had been simulation, as if the Ottomans were a friend nation to the Russians, according to the appearance of the existing conditions.  

Nuri mentioned another current and significant topic to Palmerston in their meeting: that when Mehmed Ali gave up all hope of British support, he had fallen back upon the Russians and therefore, he continued, if Britain took sides with the Ottoman Empire, Mehmed Ali would abandon Damascus and go back to his previous boundaries and as a result of this situation the Sultan would enhance the power of his rulership. Nuri was another Ottoman diplomat, who raised the Damascus Question. He added that if Mehmed Ali could be given a hard time in Damascus, the Damascus public would pay more attention to the prosperity and safety in the other Ottoman regions under the favour of the Sultan’s domination and this state of affairs would be conducive to establishing a volunteer army against Mehmed Ali from out of the Damascus public. In response, Palmerston said that they knew well that the Damascus public was complaining about the central government in the beginning, however, when they saw Mehmed Ali’s oppression, they would recognize and understand the value of the Sultan and decide to get rid of Mehmed Ali. After he had said this, when Nuri stated that it would be difficult to recapture Damascus from the Pasha at that moment, Palmerston responded that it would be very easy from the British point of view; however, first of all, the Ottoman statesmen should retire to ponder on the issue and later on they could reconvene to negotiate the topic further. It was another positive development for Mahmud because Palmerston had previously, at the outset, rejected the prospect of any Ottoman intervention in Damascus. However, just a moment ago, he had been talking about the ease of an operation in Damascus, despite the fact that he had been saying it

344 BOA, File No: 1190, Document No: 46879 001.  
345 BOA, File No: 1190, Document No: 46879 001.  
346 BOA, File No: 1190, Document No: 46879 001.
was not the right time at present. This was another change in the direction of British foreign policy and it could be taken as yet another success by Mahmud with his diplomatic policies.

After his many negotiations in London, Nuri Effendi was replaced by Mustafa Reşid Pasha, who was already in Paris in the capacity of the Ottoman ambassador. He was regularly sending detailed reports about the diplomatic atmosphere in Europe and the main character of these reports was that they were pro-British. Palmerston wrote a laudatory letter to the Sultan about both of the Ottoman diplomats. Palmerston was very happy with Reşid’s assignment to London because he knew very well how hard the Ottoman ambassador was trying to win acceptance for the Anglo-Ottoman cooperation in the region against their common enemies, Russia and Mehmed Ali. Palmerston stated about these assignments that:

“I would like to declare my pleasure with the letter of the Sultan with respect to the assignment of Mr. Reşid and also express my thanks about it to you, the Sultan. I would also like to express how very pleased I am with Mr. Reşid’s being sent to London vested as he is with extraordinary powers. All negotiations and correspondences with the Ottoman Empire, which are to be done through Mr Reşid, would be affected very positively, and are likely to develop the relationship between both friend countries daily. As a matter of fact, I want the Sultan to know that both the King and the British government are very sincere in their desire to improve and enhance this long standing friendship. For my part, I will do my best in order to maintain this historic relationship between the two countries. I also want to add a point about Nuri Effendi’s great efforts in London. He has done his utmost to increase the value of both his Sultan and his country in the eyes of the British Public. I would like to declare that I am sure he will strive as well to defend and protect his Sultan’s and his country’s rights in the presence of the French”.

It is interesting to compare these flowery words with Webster’s record:

“Nourri Pasha, had no French and Palmerston found him an “oaf” on whom he could make no impression.”

In best orientalist fashion, Palmerston wrote that:

“Nourri is a greasy stupid old Turk, without an idea in his head” “A perfect nullity with whom it is impossible to get on at all. He is like a Turk in a melodrama on the stage: one of Bluebeard’s attendants.”

---

347 BOA, File No: 1172, Document No: 46412 A.
348 As a matter of fact, Mehmed Ali was not an enemy of the British at the beginning of his rebellion. He even published some articles in the British newspapers, which showed him some support. However, when the British had started to see him as the reason for the trouble with the Russians in terms of upsetting the British over their interest in the region, as a result of Mahmud and his statesmen’s diplomatic efforts, they withdrew their support and began to oppose him as strongly as they opposed Russia.
349 BOA, File No: 1172, Document No: 46412 A.
We have here a perfect vignette of British orientalism in practice. On the one hand Palmerston uses the most effusive language possible when writing to the Ottomans, as he thought it what they liked, but in private he revealed the contemptuous attitude which marked his own attitude, and those of so many other Westerners to the ‘Turk’. Such attitudes all fed into an underestimation of the diplomacy and policy of the Sultan, which is why the story from the Ottoman archives needs to be told. It at least counters the view that ‘greasy Turks’ were too ‘stupid’ to have a policy. The British may just have been too arrogant to have seen what it was.

Webster also explained, with great expertise, about the vital importance of the Sultan in the diplomatic process in that the following;

“The representatives of all these states at Constantinople endeavoured by bribery and by the use of the favourites and indirect methods of approach to get past the official machinery to the source of power and decision, the Sultan himself.”

351 Ibid. p. 538
352 Ibid. p. 527
5.2. 1835-1836 developments

Since the beginning of 1835, the most prominent name in Anglo-Ottoman relations from amongst the Ottoman statesmen was that of Mustafa Reşid Pasha. He had taken a very active role in trying to solve the Mehmed Ali problem and because of this, he was consigned many times as an ambassador to London and Paris by Mahmud, and ultimately promoted to the rank of Foreign Minister of the Empire. He had made great efforts towards striking an alliance with Britain against Mehmed Ali, as had his highness Mahmud. When his efforts in this direction are properly appreciated, it is clear that from Mahmud’s point of view, he was just the right person, as, too, was Namık Pasha, to implement his diplomatic plan. In these years of intensive activity, Reşid Pasha negotiated with the most significant characters in European diplomacy, such as Palmerston and Metternich, to solve the problem using diplomatic channels. In his efforts to achieve this end, he sent many detailed reports to Mahmud and these reports are a vital part of the whole picture, for those who wish to examine the Ottoman diplomatic efforts in solving the problem in 1835 and 1836. One of his longer reports reveals very well that the supposedly close relationship with Russia in the 1833 and 1834 was only sham in order to get Britain on the Ottoman side. This hidden agenda was expounded upon after the diplomatic processes arising from Unkiaır Skelessi, once Mahmud was convinced that the British had sufficiently well grasped the great importance that the Ottomans held in relation to their interests, and felt alarmed that there might be a possible danger of Russian hegemony in the Ottoman lands. At this time, he decided that it was the right moment to desist from the appearance of wishing to cooperate with

---

353 Some summary information should be given about the Pasha for a better understanding of his position in this period. He had played an active role in the negotiations with Mehmed Ali after his army stopped in Kutahya in 1833. He was sent to deter Mehmed Ali from his rebellion and eventually he became the head of the Ottoman Committee for the Kutahya negotiations with Ibrahim Pasha and it was he who signed the treaty of Kutahya on May 1833. Mahmud liked the flowing and elaborate style in his reports and he started to award him significant diplomatic missions after this date. Another person who was charmed by Reşid Pasha was Mehmed Ali. He offered the Pasha the job of being his second-in-command but the Pasha did not want to do the same thing as Mehmed Ali and instead rejected the post rather than betray his sovereign, Mahmud II. Reşid Pasha was to become the most significant statesman in the reform period, Tanzimat Era, according to the standard of Western, particularly British, scientific and social developments. Even better, his apprentices, Ali and Fuat Pashas, would carry on this mission in the next fifty years. The most important feature of Reşid in terms of this thesis was that he was the chief assistant to Mahmud in implementing his diplomatic plan, to garner cooperation with Britain against their enemies in the region. Furthermore, he was sometimes even more pro-British than Mahmud. In fact, Mahmud was most fortunate to have found a diplomat like Reşid Pasha since Reşid had been doing whatever he needed him to do in order to change the British public opinion in favour of the Ottomans. For instance he was paying some British journalists to print some articles in an attempt to defend Turkish arguments in the British newspapers. Mahmud very much approved of these efforts since his main aim since the very beginning had been to get the British public on his side. In addition to this, as will be examined in the following chapter, he was the driving force in setting up the commercial treaty with Britain, Balta Limani, and the treaty was even signed at his waterside residence.
the Tsar and his Empire. This was the purpose for which he sent Reşid Pasha to Europe: to examine how suitable the diplomatic environment was for his desired Anglo-Ottoman alliance. In his report,\textsuperscript{354} on 24 January 1836, Reşid communicated after an extensive depiction of the diplomatic atmosphere in Europe that it was quite obvious that the British were an enemy of Russia. Their attitudes and policies as they had last professed with respect to the enduring continuity of the Ottoman territorial integrity, were above any suspicion. He also stated that they totally detested Mehmed Ali under the present circumstances, and the only reason they did not want an intervention against this “uncouth” governor at that particular conjuncture was that they did not want the Ottomans to be involved in any conflict in Egypt until possible developments in Anglo-Russian rivalry were more apparent.\textsuperscript{355} Otherwise, according to Reşid, it was certain that the British would never abandon the Ottomans to face their problem alone once they had conciliated the British friendship. As a matter of fact, he said, the only figure that had antagonized the whole of Europe, including Austria, was that of the British. He also mentioned that the British were the enforcers of French cooperation with other European powers in terms of the Russian question. Reşid Pasha interestingly analysed France’s position in this diplomatic process in detail, which shows the Ottoman opinion about the French attitudes in the Easter Question. From Reşid Pasha’s point of view, French statesmen were “\textit{renegade}” and “\textit{unreliable}” people. He did add, however, that despite the fact that it was very well understood by all European powers how much Mehmed Ali was “trickster, tyrant, and cruel” person, there were various groups of the French people who still continued to support him. Also, in some of their opinions, the Muslim people were not deemed worthy of supporting. Furthermore, these French people think that France should have sided with Russia in the region since the current problem in the region was a British problem in terms of the British interests in India. There was no profit or loss for France if they were to interfere in someone else’s problem with Britain. According to Reşid’s report, these people went so far as to declare these kinds of opinions in the French Parliament “\textit{worthless}” and also publish their views as articles in the French newspapers. Reşid added that there was a rumour that even the King, Charles X, was prone to be friendly with the Russians, however, as long as this dichotomy continued amongst the French public,

\textsuperscript{354} BOA, File No: 1190, Document No: 46885.
\textsuperscript{355} BOA, File No: 1190, Document No: 46885.
these political groups would not be able to succeed, and on the contrary, this kind of attitude to international affairs might even cause a revolution in France.\textsuperscript{356}

Having imparted this detailed description, Reşid Pasha then presented to the Sultan his analysis with regard to the then current situation pertaining to European diplomacy, together with his predictions about possible developments that might occur in the very near future. This analysis is vital to the understanding of the Ottoman diplomatic approach, Reşid’s considerable ability, and to appreciate how well aware, as an Ottoman diplomat, he was of the diplomatic arena in Europe at the time. He acted as Mahmud’s right hand, his ears and his eyes, helping to determine the Ottoman diplomatic policies.\textsuperscript{357} It is easier to itemise these analyses in order to see the whole picture in a condensed form. Reşid Pasha described the following in his extensive report:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a)] There was a serious issue in European diplomacy in the form of a reinstatement of the rights of the Polish, based on the treaty of Vienna. This issue was being discussed in the newspapers and in many other forums in Europe. It was even an issue that was raised by Charles X in his official speech. Despite all this discussion on the subject, it appears that the Russians refrained from even making a mention of the matter, perhaps due to an arrogance of character. It is a fact that this situation caused a day by day increase in tension in Europe. Within this context, there was also an on-going rumour that the Austrians were starting to keep their distance from the Russians. As a result of this, they had been making discreet and subtle diplomatic connections with the British and the French: there are many long articles to that effect on this topic in Europe.
  \item[b)] Nor were the Prussian-Russian relationships very strong either. Although there was a strong bond between the Prussian King and the Tsar due to a longstanding close affinity, conversely, the relations between each state’s military officials and civil servants were in a bad way.
  \item[c)] The Tsar was disappointed in the Austrian Kaiser since he did not attain the results or attitude he had expected to receive from the Kaiser, who had displayed an aggressive attitude towards the Tsar in their last meeting. This animosity might be used to the advantage of the Ottoman interests, with their problem.
  \item[d)] Britain had gained, for a while, a commitment from France to cooperate with the British so French statesmen would be unlikely to voluntarily break this alliance, and would continue to act in harmony with the British over the Eastern Question.
  \item[e)] Another vital item on the agenda concerning the Eastern Question was in that which was mentioned above: that the latest Austrian inclination seemed to have turned in favour of the side of the British and French. In parallel with this development, and as a matter of course, Austrian attitudes and policies with respect to Ottoman affairs had substantially changed. For this reason, it was crucial that the Austrian policies related to the East should be examined closely and in meticulous detail. Austria had a military strength both at sea and on land as had Britain. Because of this, all the European powers were keeping a careful eye on Austrian
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{356} BOA, File No: 1190, Document No: 46885.
\textsuperscript{357} Every year between 1830 and 1840 in the Eastern Question is vital, since any kind of development was within the bounds of possibility in the struggle amongst the various sides. Therefore, every piece of information was extremely important for each power in the struggle in order to enable them to pre-empt any move the other states might make.
policies since they knew well that whichever party could get Austria on their side would have procured a head start on this alliance.

f) The most significant aim in terms of the Ottoman benefits was that of gaining British support. Britain was far more important than the other powers for the Ottoman Empire and therefore it made sense to work all the harder to get the British on the Ottoman side. In order to implement this aim, Ponsonby, the British ambassador to Istanbul, and the Ottoman ambassador to London should be used. Obtainment was also important in terms of the position of the French in the Eastern Question. As mentioned above, France depended on Britain in the Eastern Question and there were many factions in France so it was impossible for all of them to unite in the same party on the side of the Ottoman Empire. However, if the Ottomans could make an alliance with Britain, in that case, France would have to agree with whatever the British determined.

g) Cooperation with Britain would be very useful and beneficial in solving the Mehemd Ali problem as well as the Greek Question, which would all be for the greater good of the Ottoman Empire.

h) As mentioned above, the Austrian policies in respect of Eastern affairs should be examined in detail to understand whether their position favoured the British and the French side or was on the Russian side as it had been in the past. However, this aim seems to be very difficult when the only conduit for this information was through the Austrian ambassador to Istanbul or the Charge D'affaires to Vienna, Mavroyeni. To join these two for talks, a new Ottoman ambassador would have to be assigned to Vienna. This person must be master of Ottoman diplomacy and well versed in the matter at hand. Also he should be charismatic and persuasive, to win Metternich over completely. The importance of this mission did not depend on the course of events since, even supposing that in spite of the fact that this ambassador would have done his duty by following his official instructions precisely, if the Austrian had taken his side with Russia, this situation does not detract from the significance of his duty. The reason for this was that Vienna was the centre of the Europe, so it is possible, via the ambassador’s reports, to keep abreast of all the latest developments in European affairs at that time. For instance, if the relations between the countries become more strained and there was an outbreak of war, when Austria engaged alongside of Britain and France, in this case, The Ottoman Empire would be in a position to act upon these conditions. If, On the other hand, Austria continued to act on the side of the Russians as she always had done in the past, in this case, the ambassador could inform, second by second, the major capitals of Istanbul, London, and Paris about the developments from Vienna. Lastly, if no war broke out, in this case, the ambassador could not only continue his endeavours to persuade Metternich to place his country’s allegiance with the Ottoman side, but also he could examine the Austrian industrial and education system as a model in order to help guide the reforms planned for the Ottoman’s industrial and education systems.358

As can be seen in this long and detailed report from Reşid Pasha, Mahmud and his top diplomat Reşid decided the time was right to disassociate themselves from all connections with the Russians and reveal the true extent of Mahmud’s real plan, which had been ongoing since the beginning of the Mehemd Ali problem. This report also comprehensively covers all the developments in the latest attitudes of the European powers in the Eastern Question at that time.

358 BOA, File No: 1190, Document No: 46885.
Reşid also alerted the Sultan at the end of his report to the fact that there was an item of news it would be pertinent to convey: that, even if it had not been printed prominently in the newspapers, Britain had started swiftly and avidly to prepare her navy. Furthermore, the French shipyards were also running at full capacity, very probably in preparation for the possible event of war.

As a matter of fact, Reşid was right about his words because Nuri Effendi reported from London that the French diplomat, Monsieur Dothraki, who had previously been on duty as a French Charge D'affaires in Istanbul, was appointed to London as a special and secret official.359 Nuri deduced that Dothraki must have had a secret mission since there was already a French Ambassador in London and there had have been a reason for his appointment there. When Nuri suspected that in all probability Dothraki’s secret mission might well be pertinent to the Ottomans, he started to investigate to find out everything he could about the real aim of his mission. After a thorough investigation, he learned that Dothraki had met with Palmerston to negotiate over the Ottoman affairs.360 According to Nuri’s informant, Dothraki had expressed to Palmerston that British support for the Ottomans might possibly result in backfiring on the British interests in the region. The French diplomat brought forward some reasons to reinforce his opinion about this topic. In this respect he said to Palmerston that although Mahmud had given permission for the Euphrates project, problems might well arise with respect to this privilege later on. He continued that the other thing was that since the British had favoured and supported to the Ottomans in every aspect, it was sure that this assisted power of the Ottomans was to go in the Russians’ favour. Dothraki interestingly offered Palmerston the idea that if the British abandoned its discountenance of Egypt and Mehmed Ali, France could promise to support them as a friendly an allied nation which would enhance commerce with Egypt and Damascus.361 This offer discloses how Reşid Pasha was right in his determinations about the existence of the division between different parties in France with regard to Eastern affairs, since although some of them seemed like they had been acting jointly with the British in supporting the Ottomans, some of them had been still trying to mould public opinion in Europe in favour of Mehmed Ali as they had done in the first days of his rebellion. It also shows a possibility that has already been covered and will continue to be discussed in the chapters ahead, Mehmed Ali had been endeavouring to play diplomatic games to get the British on his side as his sovereign

Mahmud had been doing, and there is a distinct possibility that he might previously have made a
deal with the French to induce the British to agree to this alliance against Mahmud and his
government’s interests and wishes.

There was somebody else, who had strong evidences and connections with regard to the newly
emerging anti-Russia atmosphere in Europe, which Reşid Pasha had detected. It was Fethi Pasha,
the Ottoman Ambassador to Vienna. He met with the British Ambassador to Vienna. Fethi
Pasha stated that he was instructed to ask the ambassador this question: whether, if Russia
showed its hand and declared war against the Ottoman Empire, in this case, would Austria
comply with Britain and take the Ottomans’ side, or she would continue to support the Russians?

After hearing this question, the British Ambassador responded that he had formally posed the
same question to Metternich in person only two days ago. Metternich stated that from his point
of view the good relations between the Ottomans and the Russians so far showed they had been
acting in favour the Ottoman Empire’s survival and prosperity. What is more, he also said that
from that day forward, if any hostile act was perpetrated by the Russians against the Ottoman
Empire, he officially promised that Austria was pledged to act jointly with Britain against Russia
by sending her soldiers and maritime power in support of the Ottoman Empire. The ambassador
said that he reported this answer to his government in London. In response, Fethi Pasha pressed
the Ambassador to respond whether or not there was any current preparation for a possible war
against Russia. The Ambassador replied that this kind of news about this topic was only
fraudulent rumour concocted by the newspapers and there was certainly not any preparation for a
war.

After conveying the Ambassador’s words to the Sultan, Fethi stated in his report that it was
obvious that if any kind of war broke out, Britain and her allied states would send their naval
power to the Black Sea through the Baltic Sea and they would land their troops there. After that,
Fethi stated the most welcome words that Mahmud could have wished to hear: that any possible
damage to the Ottoman Empire’s dignity and prestige would mean harm to the British policies
and interests in the region. He also added that Austria was not in favour of any kind of situation
like this developing either since Austria has very long borders between their country and the

---

362 BOA, File No: 1180, Document No: 46612 Ç.
363 BOA, File No: 1180, Document No: 46612 Ç.
Ottoman Empire. These last diplomatic negotiations show once more the European powers’ true attitudes and feelings about Russia and Mehmed Ali coming out with each passing day.

There was one person who had been acting in opposition to the Ottoman statesmen with respect to Anglo-Russian relations. It was Durham, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg between 1835 and 1837. He had been striving to persuade his government, particularly Palmerston, that the Russians did not have any plans to take over the Ottoman lands: this was in contradiction to all the Ottoman’s diplomatic attempts to create an impression in London with respect to Russian expansionism. Bolsover stated about this effort of Durham’s that

“Durham reported from St. Petersburg that Russia possessed neither the will nor the means to seize Constantinople”

Nevertheless, there was an anti-Russian coalition in place, in opposition to Durham’s views; it was in the form of the Ottoman diplomats’ efforts in London, such as those of Namık Pasha, Mustafa Reşid, Nuri Effendi, and the British diplomat’s work in favour of the Ottomans, such as Urquhart and Ponsonby. Bell has expounded upon this anti-Russian coalition from the point of view of the British in reporting:

“But the flirtation (Anglo-Russian based on Durham’s attempts) had to be exceedingly discreet, for many Englishmen, and some very influential ones, were bound to be censorious. The King, for example, and Lord Ponsonby, the British ambassador at the Porte, were violent Russophobes. The Tory opposition were inclined to treat any apparent complaisance to the Tsar as compromising England’s dignity: the merchants to regard it as betokening forgetfulness of their interests in the East. And, more to be considered still, there were the radicals, both in and out of parliament, with whom tsar-baiting was a favourite sport.”

All these positive developments with respect to the anti-Russian and anti-Mehmed Ali atmosphere in London were getting Mahmud and his statesmen’s hopes up about the possibility of an alliance with Britain against all their enemies. In this respect, he notified the Sultan from London that when he met with Palmerston, the Minister had smothered him with kindness. Nuri added that this kindness might be an indication that his thoughts about the Ottoman Empire were becoming more positive and amenable, and because of this he would not be surprised if

---

364 BOA, File No: 1180, Document No: 46612 Ç.  
Palmerston assisted them with full co-operation in every aspect thereafter. Nuri Effendi also interestingly suggested that if he and his colleagues could subtly indicate their expectation from Britain of an alliance to Palmerston and his colleagues, they would be able to complete the diplomatic process which had been instigated in order to get Britain in their side. He closed his message with the suggestion that if he had a rescript which contained negative sentiments towards the Russians, this would be very likely to strengthen his hand. All of these reports from various envoys show that Mahmud and his statesmen had been carrying on executing their diplomatic strategies with no small success, and Mahmud’s men seemed to be as eager to play their part in the game as much as was Mahmud. Meanwhile, a translation of an article which had been published in a British newspaper was presented to Mahmud on 15 February 1836. It showed that the Ottoman diplomats had been following very closely the trends of British public opinion in relation to the Eastern Question. This article is also useful to illustrate the change in the British public opinion in terms of the Ottomans after Unkiar Skelessi. It was expressed in the article that the latest news from the Ottoman lands indicated that Mehmed Ali Pasha had started to develop an intimacy with the Russians. This latest development showed that the balance of power in the region had started to shift. Nuri Effendi also reported from London on this subject that the British realised that Mehmed Ali had started gravitate towards the Russians and therefore, the British would never give any support to him upon any account. In fact, the British had been most averse to the possibility of an alliance in the region between Russia and Mehmed Ali. Rodkey explains this situation very clearly when he says:

“Englishmen insisted that Russia was pursuing an aggressive policy in Turkey, they were apprehensive of Russia-Egyptian co-operation for the partition of the Near East, and they seriously feared the extension of Russian influence in the direction of India.”

The article also mentioned that Britain had been mistaken in the formulation and implementation of its Eastern policies. These unsuccessful policies had vitiated the penetration of Britain in the East and they had also damaged Britain’s reputation in the international arena. Therefore, the reasons that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had been seen to be necessary should be negotiated

368 BOA, File No: 677, Document No: 33021 F.
370 F.S. Rodkey, Conversations on Anglo-Russian Relations in 1838, The English Historical Review, Vol. 50, No. 197 (Jan., 1935), p.120.
over with the Ottoman Empire as soon as possible. It was obvious that the errors committed on both sides would be made manifestly clear after the negotiations, and when they did, it was an obligation upon Britain that she strive to rectify these mistakes as soon as she could. The article also said that it was an absolute necessity that if Russia continued to insist on carrying out those policies in the Ottoman lands which had occurred as privileges of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, Britain should declare war on Russia. However, according to the article, the British government had been avoiding committing itself to any real action towards effectively solving the problem, and had been contenting itself with merely a set of meaningless negotiations and ineffectual words. The article also touched upon Mehmed Ali’s commercial prohibitions, and these have been mentioned above. From the point of view of the article, in order to re-establish the Sultan’s domination and influence in Damascus and Egypt, Britain had to help the Sultan as if the Ottoman Empire was indeed the long-time friend and ally that the British statesmen had been insisting was true for such a long time. In doing so, Britain would rescue the Ottoman public from the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi which could be used by Russia for the occupation of the Ottoman lands and subsequent oppression of the Muslim people. This article is quite interesting since it is telling the British public how Mahmud had been striving to impress his ideas upon them using his diplomatic manoeuvres. Clearly these diplomatic efforts had started to get noticed and prompt some advantageous responses.

After all the developments previously described, Eastern affairs came to be considered a much more serious topic by the British press, especially in the years that followed. In particular, some British diplomats were conducting a campaign in the press in an attempt to change public opinion to the detriment of the Russians and at the same time recommend the opportunities for Britain to build bridges with the Ottomans by supporting them against Mehmed Ali and Russia. They proposed that this course of action would bear results favourable to British interests; such as greatly improved British prestige in the East; Russian advances in the region would be thwarted and then British influence would be promoted in the Ottoman lands. As a result of these better Anglo-Ottoman relations, British merchants would be able to trade with much greater ease in the Ottoman lands than that which was now possible. It was a number of British ministers who were conducting this campaign: Lamb has indicated in his article that these people were not only ordinary people; there were also amongst them some pillars of British political life. Lamb has neatly summarised this topic in saying:
"It has long been recognized that the immense growth of hostility towards Russia displayed by the British press in the 1830s was largely the result of a deliberate campaign organized by a few ardent Russophobes. Contemporaries singled out David Urquhart as the main, if not the only, instigator, but historians have recognized that others were intimately involved; they have generally included Sir John McNeill and James Baillie Fraser as leading participants. The British ambassador at Constantinople, Viscount Ponsonby; the private secretary to the king, Sir Herbert Taylor; and the foreign secretary, Viscount Palmerston, have all been regarded as having some connection with the campaign, but there has not been agreement about the extent of their involvement."  

Mahmud, who saw that his plan was starting to work, on 19 May 1836 ordered his diplomats that an official notification should be made and sent via a secret letter to Ponsonby to the effect that Damascus should be liberated from Mehmed Ali and reverted back to the Ottoman’s domination, and in order to do that, British ministers should be persuaded to act. In response to this order, the Ottoman ambassador to Paris met with Palmerston. Palmerston said that he and his government were aware that Mehmed Ali had been damaging the Ottoman Empire and tyrannizing the Ottoman public in Damascus and for this reason it was an indispensable thing to disentangle Damascus from the rebel governor. The ambassador reported to Istanbul after he met with Palmerston that there were some the tell-tale signs that British ministers realised Mehmed Ali had endangered the British interests in the region, and their support to the Ottoman Empire could be expected against the governor. He also stated that despite all these developments in the British public in the Ottoman’s favour, he was afraid that the result may well end up consisting of only some palliative words and some empty negotiations instead of the military operation against Mehmed Ali that was needed, as had happened in the past. Thereupon Madmud gave orders to the ambassador that this situation should not be left in the hands of the British ministers since these days were absolutely critical to the survival of his country and last time they had done that it had damaged the Ottoman image in the eyes of the British government. Instead of this, he should watch the British ministers did very closely and when the right time came he should act according to circumstances. Mahmud’s warnings are quite interesting because as it is explained in previous chapters, he had previously not hold back from saying to the British that he wasn’t here just to listen to flowery speeches from them: he needed to see some action. That

372 BOA, File No: 833, Document No: 37560 G.
373 BOA, File No: 833, Document No: 37560 G.
374 BOA, File No: 833, Document No: 37560 G.
same person who heard these words before was now acting very responsibly this time, and because of this the Sultan believed that he was close to obtaining his goal, and thought that nothing and nobody could have ruined his plan.

In conclusion, it is fair to say that in the light of the all mentioned developments in 1834, 1835, and 1836, these three years were the most gratifying ones for Mahmud and his statesmen in that they receive the fruits of their labour after all their diplomatic efforts to turn the British public from an anti-Ottoman attitude to a pro-Ottoman one, stemming from the time when Palmerston and his government rejected Mahmud’s request for an alliance in the early months of 1833. It could be said, in the light of the conclusion of the earlier examination of this matter, that they had been successful in their quest to facilitate this alliance, particularly subsequent to the beginning of 1835. The reason for this was that the Eastern Question – the Ottomans, the Russians, and Mehmed Ali – had become a highly controversial topic on the agenda of the European Powers. The developments with respect to the problems faced by the Sultan did indeed appear to be for the good of the Ottomans, especially in Britain, Austria, and France, despite the fact that the French had been playing double game, falling in line with the policy set by the British when in fact their loyalties lay elsewhere. Above all other European powers, the majority of the British public realised the enormous danger and substantial damages, from the point of view of British interests in the region, that could potentially come from both the Russians and Mehmed Ali. Meanwhile, the negotiations about Anglo-Ottoman commercial issues had already started between both countries’ diplomats. As will be meticulously scrutinized in the following chapter, this process was to eventually give rise to the Treaty of Balta Limani, on 16 August 1838.
CHAPTER SIX

British public opinion, change and Balta Limani

From Mahmud’s point of view the diplomatic developments in 1837 and 1838 were a precursor to the last stage of the Mehmed Ali problem, even though there were many perturbing diplomatic incidents in this period to impede his plans. In 1838, Mahmud now had far more hope that he would be able to resolve the problem in its entirety solely through the cooperation of the British, than he had had when his envoy Namik Pasha reported from London in 1833 that the Sultan’s request to forge an alliance with the British had been rejected by Palmerston and the government. However, a lot of positive diplomatic developments had happened between 1833 and 1838 and the diplomatic conditions were completely different in 1838 from the way they had been in 1833. In the first days of Palmerston’s new position in the Foreign Office he was not well-disposed towards Eastern affairs because of some other domestic and overseas problems, and thus the British had been too preoccupied to help. Now, their attitude had completely changed with respect to Eastern affairs and Palmerston seemed to be very anxious to defend the Sultan’s sovereignty rights and assist with the reforming and enhancement process of the Ottoman Empire. In this context, which is examined in every aspect in a separate chapter, the number of British people who were assuming a role in the commercial, social, and military life of the Ottoman Empire, had increased, due to Palmerston’s encouragement through his work on Foreign Office policy. Despite these positive developments there were still some obstacles, for the British merchants to their trade in the Ottoman lands which arose from the economic structure of the Ottoman Empire. They had frequently petitioned their government through Ponsonby for the resolution of these problems, a fact which will be examined in the following parts of the chapter. All of these complaints led to a negotiation process between the Ottoman Empire and Britain over these economic issues. At this stage, an intersection point appeared for both Mahmud and Palmerston. It was the Mehmed Ali problem. From Palmerston’s point of view, this problem could have been used to induce Mahmud to enter into a commercial treaty, one which would solve the British merchants’ problems. In addition to this, Palmerston also had some diplomatic and political intentions, which will be indicated above, through this possible treaty. From Mahmud’s point of view, this demand of Palmerston’s was his opportunity, to play his last diplomatic card with the treaty of Balta Limani, which was the result of this negotiation
process, before he undertook the biggest battle with Mehmed Ali. This chapter first of all will look at the positive developments, from the point of view of Mahmud’s plan, in the British public with respect to the Ottoman Empire; subsequently the diplomatic process which occurred around the treaty of Balta Limani will be the main focus of study, including its economic results on the Ottoman economy.

6.1. The diplomatic developments in 1837

1837 was another hugely rewarding year, just as 1835 and 1836 had been, in terms of Mahmud and his statesmen’s reaping the fruits of their labour after all their diplomatic efforts to turn the tide of British public opinion from an anti-Ottoman feeling to pro-Ottoman one, following Palmerston’s and his government’s rejection of Mahmud’s request for help in the form of an alliance in the early months of 1833. As previously examined, it could be said that they had been successful in their efforts, particularly from the beginning of 1835. The reason for this was that the Eastern Question (the Ottomans, the Russians, and Mehmed Ali) had become a highly controversial topic on the European Power’s agenda. As mentioned above, overall the international developments with respect to the problem seemed to be for the good of the Ottomans, especially in Britain, Austria, and France. This was despite the fact that the French had merely been appearing to go along with the British policies whilst in reality they were playing a double game since, at the same time, they were actually continuing to actively support Mehmed Ali. However, the majority of the British public realised the enormous danger and substantial damages that could ensue from the activities of both the Russians and Mehmed Ali from the point of view of British interests in the region. There is an article from 1837 which can be given by way of an example of this, which prompted the British politicians to adopt a much more prudent attitude in handling Eastern affairs. This column was published in The Morning Post, a British newspaper. As a matter of fact, originally it was a letter, one which had been sent to London for publication in the British media. It was sent from Istanbul on 18 October 1837,

375 This dual attitude of the French was finally to be completely exposed and the French’s true loyalties in the matter shown up, when the four European Powers, Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, combined their forces against Mehmed Ali in the final phase of the resolution of the Mehmed Ali problem, 1839-40. Throughout this process, France stood completely behind Mehmed Ali just as it had done since the beginning of the nineteenth century.
376 Mahmud gave orders to his diplomats, primarily Mustafa Reşid Pasha, even in 1833 at the beginning of the Mehmed Ali problem, that some articles in favour of the Ottomans should be printed in the British press through
and was published on 14 November 1837. A translation of the article was even presented to the Sultan. The article was complaining about how slowly the British realisation with respect to the importance of the events in the East had dawned upon them. According to the article, Britain had only just grasped the true import of the developments in the East: much later than the other European powers had, even though Britain was the country that should have been much more aware, since British influence was so pertinent to Eastern affairs. As a result of this delayed realisation, in the beginning, Britain had even supported Mehmed Ali. Fortunately, the article says, Britain quickly desisted from this error of judgement. The article went on to give some background information about what the longstanding Russian aims and ambitions had been, with respect to occupancy of the Ottoman lands, ever since Peter the Great, and about French double-dealing in the Eastern Question. The most important message of the article was that Britain should have been more active and staunch allies to the Ottomans in the problem than the French and the Russians had been and should have supported the Ottomans in every respect to strengthen and enhance the Ottoman Empire much more readily. This would have been more appropriate coming from them, bearing in mind the longstanding amicable relationship between the two countries, not to mention the benefit such loyal action would have carried for the British interests. Furthermore, the article went on to say that they should have immediately made efforts to rescue Mahmud and his Empire from Mehmed Ali, and to save them from additional sources of “aggression” from other actors in the region.

some British journalists and in exchange for money. This situation is a good example of how Mahmud was considering his diplomatic plans from every angle, and it seems that with this order he was attempting to create an infrastructure for a more positive atmosphere in British public opinion with respect to his Empire. He knew that it would be useful, when he eventually dared to pitch the last battle against his rebel governor, to gain the support of the British politicians through the influence the British public had on them. See this order BOA, File No: 907 Document No: 39759. (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, is the original name of the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul, and they contain all the Ottoman Documents from 1299 to 1923. It will be referred to as BOA for the rest of the chapter.)


Of course a few British were still in favour of Mehmed Ali, and there was some news sympathetic to him to be found in the British media, such as an interview with Mehmed Ali, which was published in The Morning Post on 2 November 1837. However, the interviewer was in fact not British, he was a German nobleman, Prince Puckler Muskau, but his interview, which was published in a British newspaper, was presenting Mehmed Ali to the British public as a romantic and meek Eastern man. Nevertheless, as examined in detail in these chapters, the King, Palmerston, many British statesmen and many merchants who had been trading with the East, and their families first and foremost were thinking positively about the Ottomans and believed that there were many potential benefits in improved relations with Eastern society. What these possible benefits were, that the British had been expecting, could be summarily given like this: the protection of British interests in India; maintenance of the British prestige in the East; diplomatic, political, and strategic benefits and position in the region; prolongation of the long standing relationship.
In addition to this literature in the press, there were also some reports and letters which were written by some British residents in the East, based on their own observations. These had been coming in to Palmerston from the Eastern lands, and they were mostly concerning Mehmed Ali’s negative sides. Arthur T. Holroyd’s letter to Palmerston can be given as an example of this kind of information. Holroyd explained in detail the Pasha’s methods in military and administrative matters in his extensive letter. He took great pains to describe them thus:

“It is the opinion of most travellers who are conversant with Egypt that the country never was in such an unfortunate state as at present. The rich valley of the Nile, whose productions are amply sufficient for a much larger population than can now be found, is almost entirely monopolized by Mahomed Ali. His selfish and oppressive system of government has reduced his subjects to the most abject slavery. His exorbitant demands for replenishing his army, to satisfy his cruel and ambitious projects, have removed from their native soil most of the effective labourers; and many of the peasants, who were not serviceable for the army, have been torn from their homes, separated for ever from their wives and families, and compelled to drag on a miserable and toilsome existence in his arsenal. His governors or deputies pillage the Fellah of the little that should remain after the demands of the Pasha are satisfied, and he is driven to despair in answering the calls of him and his local authorities.”

With all these positive developments manifesting in the British public, Mahmud was to give, with a commercial treaty in 1838, what the British government had been expecting from the improved relations with the Ottoman Empire. He and his best diplomat Mustafa Reşid were hoping to use this commercial treaty to implement their diplomatic and political plans.

6.2. The Treaty of Balta Limani in the Context of the Mehmed Ali Problem

The treaty of Balta Limani was signed on 16 August 1838 between the Ottoman Empire and Britain at Mustafa Reşid Pasha’s villa. He was one of Mahmud’s biggest supporters in implementing the Anglo-Ottoman cooperation against his rebel governor. Before explaining what the treaty’s economic effects were on the Ottoman economy, the diplomatic reasons which led to the signing of the treaty need to be examined.

As mentioned earlier, in 1838 Mahmud started to feel that his army was ready for the last battle, especially after the improvements he had been able to make between 1833 and 1838 on his army...
with the European powers’ help. Moreover, at the same time, he and his diplomats had been doing their best to persuade the European powers, particularly Britain, that any action the Central Government took was rightful and just, because of the latest attacks of Mehmed Ali’s army on the lands which were meant to be the under the control of Mahmud, such as Urfa and Maras, the Ottoman cities in the East.\(^{380}\) As an even stronger reason than this, Mahmud had wanted to purge Mehmed Ali from Syria for a long time. Syria had been lost to Mehmed Ali’s control under the treaty of Kütahya, and in this respect, the Ottoman statesmen had been secretly carrying out, at the behest of the Sultan, some works in Syria to the detriment of the Pasha.\(^ {381}\) From Mahmud’s point of view, all of these were reasonable grounds for the operation against his rebel governor. Despite this strong desire of the Sultan, and Palmerston’s verbal assent, it still seemed that Palmerston’s heart was not really in favour of this course of action, as he kept advocating restraint. On the other hand, his ambassador in Istanbul, Ponsonby seemed to be fully in support of Mahmud in his purpose. Ridley succinctly explains, with respect to the differences between Palmerston and Ponsonby regarding this operation that:

> “Lord Ponsonby, the Ambassador at Constantinople, strongly supported the Sultan. He urged Palmerston to re-establish British influence at Constantinople by vying with the Russians in support of the Sultan, and to go the whole hog by offering him military assistance if he marched across the Euphrates and attacked Mehemet Ali in Syria. Palmerston rejected this advice, and adopted a policy of pro-Turkish neutrality. If Mehemet Ali attacked the Sultan, Britain would intervene on the Sultan’s side; if the Sultan attacked Mehemet Ali, Britain would remain neutral, but Palmerston strongly urged the Sultan to do no such thing.”\(^ {382}\)

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the main reason behind Palmerston’s decision was his strong apprehensions about any kind of war, and his fervent wish to prevent any upset of the European balance of peace. Therefore, Mahmud had started thinking up another diplomatic manoeuvre to try, as he had done for previous problems, to dissuade Palmerston from his strict opinion opposing Mahmud’s right to attack his rebel governor with military force. After a while, Mahmud realised that, it might be productive to use a ploy in an area which was significant in terms of British commercial profits. The British had been asking the Ottomans to decrease their tariffs and also to abolish the monopolies they held, as these were limiting the British merchants from increasing their profits in the Ottoman lands. Consequently, it was their fond ambition to

\(^{380}\) BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.
\(^{381}\) BOA, File No: 1187 Document No: 46768.
make a commercial treaty with the Ottomans in order to implement these aims. As a matter of fact, the Anglo-Ottoman negotiations on this issue had been ongoing at a brisk pace for a while and these negotiations were to culminate in a commercial treaty, called the treaty of Balta Limani, which was signed on 16 August 1838. Before examining the treaty’s effects, it will be useful to make some diplomatic and economic analyses of the period before the treaty. It was not only Mahmud who had some political and economical plans to realize through this commercial treaty, but also from Palmerston’s point of view, the treaty was clearly going to bring very positive results in terms of British interests in the region. Southgate evaluated in detail Palmerston’s primary political aims in signing the treaty of Balta Limani thus;

“By negotiating a commercial treaty with the Sultan which would bind Mehemet as his vassal, Britain could re-emphasize the subordination of the Pasha and (incidentally) liberate a vast area from Adana to the Yemen from Mehemet’s monopolies and obstructions to foreign commerce.”  

These aims of Palmerston’s bring to mind the goals which had been Mahmud’s main objective since the beginning. As a matter of fact, one of the most important aims of this work is to reveal to what extent Mahmud’s diplomatic manoeuvres were effective in turning Palmerston’s views against Mehmed Ali in the diplomatic process he was influencing between 1833 and 1838 because the same person, Palmerston, for a short while in 1833, had even thought to support Mehmed Ali as a ‘safety switch’ in the region in terms of the British interests against the Russians. Brown examines this transient favour that Palmerston felt towards Mehmed Ali and reports;

“Palmerston’s thoughts turned now not to opposing Mehemet Ali, therefore, but to backing him; to supporting him, indeed, as Turkey’s potential saviour. Britain and France he said, could back ‘a national resistance’ in Turkey to Russian aggression, and ‘in such a case, Mehemet Ali would come well into play’. With Franco-British support, Mehemet Ali might advance against Russia and, he concluded, ‘It is not then quite so chimerical as may at first appear, to suppose that England, France, & Mehemet would be a match for Austria & Russia in preventing those two powers from Polandizing Turkey’.”

Despite his previous thoughts on Mehmed Ali, he was thinking in a completely different way about the rebel governor now, after all the diplomatic developments described in these chapters that had occurred over the last five years.

Palmerston had not only been surmising that a commercial treaty with the Ottoman Empire would bring about some desired political results, he was also expecting it to bring with it some highly satisfactory economic results. These economic aims included some positive and some negative aspects. The positive ones he anticipated would benefit his own country and the negative ones would hamper Mehmed Ali. Southgate also examined these economic expectations of Palmerston’s, saying that;

“The treaty was important to British commerce with the whole of the Ottoman Empire and with Persia, and also a great diplomatic triumph. Lyons at Athens even said there had been nothing like it for British prestige since Canning had planted the flag on the heights of Lisbon...Better still, it was a challenge to Mehemet, who must either operate the treaty and thus weaken his resources as well as swallow his pride, or reveal himself a rebel.”385

At this stage, two different historical arguments on this topic need to be covered. Despite the argument that Palmerston and Mahmud’s common aim with the treaty was that it might destroy Mehmed Ali’s monopolies and so cut off the Pasha’s economic resources, on the other hand there are some historians who do not agree with this view, such as Bülent Özdemir. According to him, Mahmud did not make the treaty with the aim of destroying Mehmed Ali’s monopolies. He explained his argument like this;

“the Ottoman local authorities received no official information and instructions from the Porte regarding the new situation for six months, and on some regions up to one year after the conclusion of the treaty. For instance, in the case of Salonica, Consul Blunt reported in March 12, 1839: “The local authorities of Salonica have not yet received any instructions, or any kind of information from the Sublime Porte, relating to the Commercial Convention.” There are two fermans among the sicils of Salonica dated 1 March 1839, which was the date that the convention would be effective, and 30 April 1839, which specifically deal with the convention of 1838 and with the prospective changes in the administration of customs houses, but no specific information and instructions were given to the local authorities respecting the new convention until August 1839, other than merely informing the local government that they would charge 12 per cent for exports and 5 per cent for imports as customs duty. The above findings confirm that Consul Blunt was right in thinking that the required information regarding the new convention was not sent to the local authorities just after the signing of the treaty in 16 August 1838. Again, by the time of the effective date of the convention, which was 1 March 1839, the local authorities had not received full instructions from Istanbul, but only a little information respecting the customs duties. This delay

may be explained in terms of the reluctance of the Porte, whose interests were not the same as those of Britain. In this sense, if the purpose of depriving Mehmed Ali Pasha of his basic financial sources, such as the state monopolies, was taken into account as the only cause of the conclusion of the Trade Convention of 1838, the Ottoman government should have been acting more energetically than this for the more rapid execution of the treaty.  

Although this long explanation from Özdemir on the matter seems to well account for the situation, there is another Turkish historian, Mübahat Kütükoğlu, who has examined the treaty of Balta Limani from every angle based on both the Ottoman and British documents, and who explains differently the reason why the Central Government had waited for six months before sending the official instructions from Istanbul to the provinces. According to Kütükoğlu, after the signing of the Balta Limani in 1838, both sides had the Customs Tariff issue before them which was supposed to be renewed in 1834 but had not been done so until the date the Treaty was signed. Apparently, the instructions relating to the Customs Tariff were of vital importance for the trade between the two empires since they determined the prices of export and import items very precisely. The diplomatic process that was gone through to define the terms of the Customs Tariff witnessed very enthusiastic discussions between the diplomats of Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Particularly, as specified in Article 7, the criteria to designate the prices of export goods subject to 9% Amediyye and 3% Reftiyye tax, and other issues such as which item was to be exported from which port (Bursa Silk has to be mentioned here as the most contentious) caused controversy. The disputes only came to an end after intense discussions on April 23, 1839 with the signing of the new Customs Tariff, 8 months after the treat of Balta Limani was signed. But the particular issue of where Bursa Silk was to be exported from (Izmir or Istanbul) was discussed for somewhat longer. The Ottoman Government had informed British officials that instructions for ports and provinces to enforce the 1838 Treaty were not to be sent unless there was an agreement on the Customs Tariff as this was vitally important for the Ottoman economy whether before April 23 or after. It could, therefore, be concluded that the Ottoman government did not want to put the Treaty into effect before ensuring that there was no damage to the Ottoman treasury even though one of the reasons why the Government signed this Treaty was to put an end to Mehmed Ali’s economic power by finishing off his monopolies.

386 Bülent Özdemir Ottoman Reforms and Social Life, (İstanbul: 2003).
387 Mubahat Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı-İngiliz İktisadi Münasebetleri I 1838–1850, (İstanbul: 1974), p. 182
The main aim of this chapter, of showing the treaty’s position in the context of the Mehmed Ali problem, would now benefit from a brief discussion on the treaty’s economic aspects and their consequent effects on the Ottoman Empire’s economic life. This discussion section of the chapter will mainly be based on sources from Turkish experts in the field of this period’s economic aspects, pertaining to the Treaty of Balta Limani.

For the Ottoman economy, the treaty of Balta Limani was one of the most important developments of the nineteenth century, although it had both positive and negative effects. This commercial agreement was a landmark in Ottoman history, because before this convention, the Ottoman Empire had maintained a closed economic structure. This means that it was the policy of the Ottoman Sultans and their statesmen to attach a higher priority to supplying the Ottoman public’s needs before exporting Ottoman goods to other countries. This practice had been imposing severe restrictions on trade with foreign countries. In particular, Mahmud made lawful the long standing traditional practice whereby he and his predecessor banned seven goods from being exported. These forbidden items were called the “7 Vahid”. The majority of these items were salt, all kind of pulses, and gunpowder, flour, spices and sugar. Palmerston had been persistent, over a long period, through his Ambassador in Istanbul, Ponsonby, in dissuading Mahmud from retaining his monopolies on certain trading because the British merchants were dismayed by this prohibition, and complained vociferously to Ponsonby about this frustrating barrier to trade. In particular, following the termination of the Levant Company in 1826, British merchants wanted to trade with the Ottomans, but the “7 Vahid” remained a trenchant obstacle to commerce. To help resolve this problem, Palmerston had occasionally sent a persuasive message to Mahmud via Ponsonby and tried to talk the Sultan out of this prohibition by explaining the extensive damage it would inflict upon the Ottoman Economy.

When examining the commercial treaty in terms of its political results in the context of the main arguments of the thesis, one of Mahmud’s diplomatic manoeuvres was aimed at inducing the British to make the Anglo-Ottoman alliance against Mehmed Ali. However, when analysing the treaty in terms of its economic effect on the Ottoman Economy, it seems that the negative results of it were greater in number than the positive ones. Despite these adverse effects, when evaluating the process in the light of the political and diplomatic events, if Mahmud had not taken the diplomatic steps that he did, Mehmed Ali’s army might have taken the opportunity to march onwards to Istanbul and annihilated the Empire. As explained in these chapters, Mehmed Ali’s most significant aim for his rebellion was that of establishing his own Empire. So owing to this factor alone, there was a distinct possibility that if the Pasha had implemented his plan to conquer the capital, Mahmud would not even have had an economy to sacrifice in the treaty.

388 Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, (New York: 1987) p. 128
389 Mubahat Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı-İngiliz İktisadi Münasebetleri II 1838-1850, (İstanbul: 1976), p.66-70
In fact, this situation was a very good opportunity for Mahmud because Palmerston, for the second time, was in a position where he had to ask for something from Mahmud. (The first time had been when he needed to obtain the Sultan’s permission for the Euphrates Project.) Therefore, Mahmud assigned Nuri Effendi to negotiate the conditions of a possible commercial treaty in London.\textsuperscript{391} As might be expected, as Mahmud usually did whenever he sent one of his diplomats to London, he gave Nuri Effendi instructions that while he was negotiating with Palmerston about the treaty, he also was to try to induce the King, the British government and Palmerston to look favourably upon the Anglo-Ottoman alliance against Mehmed Ali.\textsuperscript{392} As comprehensively studied in the fifth chapter, Nuri Effendi had previously paid some official visits to London to negotiate the Mehmed Ali problem under the direction of his sovereign, as well as negotiating the commercial treaty.\textsuperscript{393} All of these factors show that Mahmud seemed to be determined to use Palmerston’s economic request as leverage, as he had done in the previous diplomatic and political events.

Furthermore, the commercial treaty had many effects upon the Ottoman economy and all of these are still discussed in themselves as a continued controversial topic in the Turkish literature on the treaty. One of these discussions about the treaty of Balta Limani is about its effects on the Ottoman Economy. Some of them have asserted that Balta Limani negatively affected the Ottoman economy. According to them, if it had not been signed, the country’s industry would have been able to improve.\textsuperscript{394} They have opined that the Ottoman industry was prevented from developing since British products were getting cheaper year by year because of the Industrial Revolution and developments in shipping. Although the majority of the European governments had made tax provisions to defend against the developed British Industry, the Ottoman government did not, as in this treaty it had actually reduced its customs duties. For this reason, they claim that Balta Limani damaged the Ottoman economy. Interestingly, after Balta Limani the customs process was implemented as the exact opposite of the practice in other countries. The European countries took some precautions to protect their national industries against the strong British economy, but the Ottomans did not. Bailey comments upon these measures saying;

\textsuperscript{391} BOA, File No: 1186 Document No: 46759.
\textsuperscript{392} BOA, File No: 1190 Document No: 46879 001.
\textsuperscript{393} BOA, File No: 1190 Document No: 46879 001
“In the second quarter of the nineteenth century England's trade with the European states was limited because of the barriers which these countries raised in order to foster their own industrial development. France, which began to realize the possibilities of industry and commerce after 1815, took the lead in this respect. Textiles were absolutely barred until 1834, when this unconditional prohibition was replaced by high duties. The German Zollverein, while not specifically prohibiting English goods, did tax foreign manufactures. Although its duties were not heavy at the start, there was a tendency to move upward. Trade channels with the Germanies existed, however, via Belgium, Holland, the Hanse towns, and states not members of this economic league, carrying goods across Europe to the Austrian and Russian frontiers. To keep these channels open was "the prime object of British commercial diplomacy." In the same way the Austrian lands were protected by high tariffs, one of which (1835) prohibited some sixty-nine articles and levied exorbitant duties on as many as sixteen hundred items. The Russian tariff of 1833, which replaced the absolute prohibition of all foreign manufactures established in 1810, proscribed more than three hundred articles; this became the basis of Russian tariff policy until 1844."

As can be seen from the above, Mahmud took every possible course of action and undertook any kind of economic risk to rescue his Empire from disintegration or even worse, depredation by Mehmed Ali. As a result of this political reasoning, despite all the other European states’ protecting themselves with very high tariffs levied upon British goods; after Balta Limani, British merchants only paid twelve per cent on exports and five per cent on imports. In addition, there was an eight per cent duty required from Ottomans who wanted to carry on domestic trade, but while Ottoman merchants had to pay this duty, foreign merchants did not have to pay any duty on domestic trade any more after Balta Limani. This clearly gave foreign merchants a distinct and unfair advantage over the native Ottoman merchants in domestic competition. As is examined in the chapter with respect to the Anglo-Ottoman cooperation to reform the Ottoman Empire, this latest economic development seemed to be one of the chief reasons for the increased number of British merchants engaging in the domestic commercial life of the Empire in the second half of 1838.

On the other hand, some Turkish historians do not fully agree with this point of view. These historians are proponents of the opinion that the reason Ottoman industry was not able to improve was not because of Balta Limani but because of the basic structure of the Ottoman economy. At the beginning of the 1830s, Ottoman industry was still founded on handicraft-

based manufacturing. Therefore, they argue, Balta Limani did not undermine Ottoman industry because Turkish producers had not yet started mass production.

Another important consequence of this commercial treaty on the Ottoman economy was its influence on Ottoman agricultural production. After the treaty this began to change. In effect, the majority of agricultural life remained the same, that is, small scale production for the farmer’s daily life. In the meantime, however, after the Treaty, some of the farmers began to produce their crops specifically for export. Also, within about twenty years (1838-1858), the Ottoman public, especially the people of Istanbul, had begun to demand foreign products such as British clothes because of their cheap price and good quality. As a result, most of the small Turkish suppliers could not compete with these products.\(^{398}\)

Another significant opinion about the Treaty of Balta Limani, put forward by Turkish researchers like Bülent Özdemir, is that if the treaty had been so very important in the relationship between England and the Ottoman Empire, then it would not have also been signed with eight other European Countries within three years.\(^{399}\) In fact, although this seems a sensible question, another Turkish researcher, Mubahat Kütükoğlu has answered it with the proposition that England had such faith in its own mass-production and cheaper goods over that of other European Countries, that the English politicians permitted the same agreement to be signed between the Ottomans and other European countries to avoid fostering jealousy in the other countries.\(^{400}\) Moreover, when considering the situation from the diplomatic aspect, Britain was seeking for a European consensus to resolve the problem and Queen Victoria did not see any harm in sharing her country’s privileges gained by Balta Limani with the other European countries. So it was permitted in order to promote the European Alliance against the Mehmed Ali problem.\(^{401}\)

In addition, even after the Treaty, the British and Ottoman governments continued to dispute certain issues regarding article two. When the Turkish officers signed the treaty, they thought that British merchants were going to trade as wholesalers. However, British officers intended that British merchants would be able to engage in retail trade within the Ottoman dominion.

\(^{399}\) Özdemir, *Ottoman Reforms and Social Life*. (İstanbul: 2003).
\(^{401}\) BOA, File No: 685 Document No: 33266 H.
According to the Ottoman point of view, when the treaty was translated into English, a mistake was made.\textsuperscript{402} Owing to this, a large influx of British retailers with an enormous tax advantage over the native Ottoman traders would have had a disastrous effect on the citizens’ livelihoods and the entire economy. In fact, as is mentioned above, Ottoman merchants were not pleased with the treaty and had it not been for the fact that relations between the two sides were in good condition, the wrong attitude of the British side in exploiting the situation might well have caused the complete destruction of Ottoman trade. Thus, on the one hand, the Ottoman side contested this article and struggled to have it cancelled, while on the other hand, the British side insisted on upholding it: consequently it could not be cancelled and the article stood.

There was a British man, Urquhart, who had more knowledge about the Ottoman economy than the other British, because he had been sent to the Ottoman lands much earlier, at the beginning of the 1830s, to investigate its economic potential in terms of British trade. He did not like the Russians and supported the Ottomans, as did Palmerston and Ponsonby. The only difference he had was that he also wrote some articles in the British press in support of the Ottoman Empire so he was a positive influence on the British public about the Ottomans as just Mahmud had intended. Lamb stated Urquhart’s and Ponsonby’s common opinion about the Russians that

\begin{quote}
"Urquhart had encouraged Ponsonby to believe that the Ottoman Empire, if protected from Russia, was capable of being reformed and strengthened..."\textsuperscript{403}
\end{quote}

As mentioned, Urquhart wrote some articles for the British newspapers and Ponsonby was his strongest supporter in this. Lamb said about this that

\begin{quote}
"Ponsonby had seen the possibility of using Urquhart’s facility as a writer to forward this publicity campaign, (Anti-Russian) and he urged him to revise some of his letters to make them suitable for publication, to write an article in a periodical, and to write a regular column for the Morning Chronicle."	extsuperscript{404}
\end{quote}

Urquhart also had some valid opinions on the treaty of Balta Limani. According to him, the substance of this important treaty was established at the beginning of 1833, when, despite there remaining certain disagreements, Bulwer and Ponsonby were able to successfully get it signed.

\textsuperscript{402} Kütükoğlu, \textit{Osmanlı-İngiliz İktisadi Münasebetleri I 1838–1850}, p. 98.
\textsuperscript{403} Margaret Lamb, \textit{The International History Review}, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May, 1993), p. 243
\textsuperscript{404} Ibid. p. 244.
After the convention, as indicated by Urquhart, Balta Limani was still viewed with distrust by the Ottomans, due to several disadvantages remaining within it, and some feared it might even be the destruction of the Ottoman Economy. So in this sense, as can be seen, Balta Limani did not seem like a beneficial commercial course for the Ottomans to have taken. As would be seen in the following decades of the Ottoman Empire’s economic life, in consequence of losing the right of assignment of the customs duties, the Ottoman administration would be forced to borrow at high interest from European powers over the Crimean War. Subsequently and tragically, in 1874, the Ottoman government had to declare its treasury bankrupt.

Despite all these negative effects of the treaty of Balta Limani, Mahmud took the possibly fatal risks he did on his Empire’s economic life with this process, for the sake of his Empire’s salvation. He certainly did not want to be beset with the same problem of being totally alone, as had happened at the end of 1832 in Konya because he could not find anybody to support him after his army was defeated there against his governor’s army. Therefore, he had made some very risky diplomatic manoeuvres and some significant sacrifices, such as the ones in this commercial treaty, for the purpose of winning European support, particularly from the British. So those who want to examine this economic process have to consider the diplomatic and political conditions in the period along with Mahmud and his diplomats’ true diplomatic aims as indicated in the Turkish documents. Otherwise, Mahmud could be seen as a powerless and foolish Sultan who ruined his Empire’s economy by his own hand. But if he had not attempted to tip the scales in his Empire’s favour by his diplomatic struggle of six long years, his successors possibly would not even have had an Empire left to govern.

---

405 Sevim Ünal, Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, (İstanbul: 1992), p. 1130
CHAPTER SEVEN

Anglo-Ottoman Cooperation to enhance the Ottoman Empire in the New Era after Unkiar Skelessi: 1833-1839

The Russians’ ambitions to enlarge their lands, reach the Aegean and Mediterranean and penetrate even further on the other side, plus Mehmed Ali’s ambitions to gain independence from his sovereign, remained as reasons for the Ottomans and the British to be encouraged to reform and strengthen the Ottoman Empire, starting in 1834. This was largely because, should either of these ambitions be realized, they would cause immense damage to both the Ottoman and the British interests in the region. In particular, the rash and perilous diplomatic manoeuvres Mahmud had made in order to get the British on his side, of calling the Russian warships to the Bosporus and ultimately forging the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, gave the British many concerns about the continuation of the Ottoman Empire. As Bailey put it;

“The conclusion between Russia and Turkey of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in July, 1833, brought the Foreign Office and the British trader to a realization of the dangers ahead, and a positive interest in the maintenance of the Ottoman state developed which really constituted a new policy on the part of England.”

Despite the prevalence of this newly-acquired positive attitude towards the Ottomans which had arisen within the British public, it was by no means unanimous. There was some opposition, in the form of the likes of Richard Cobden, a radical M.P in British Parliament who still viewed the Ottomans in a very negative light. However, this anti-Ottoman side was not to be as strong as was the pro-Ottoman side, at least in this period. As might be expected, this bloc was pro-Russian. Bolsover commented upon Cobden’s opinion about this conflict in London such that:

“Moreover, Richard Cobden published a striking pamphlet to show that the destruction of Turkey by Russia would be a triumph for civilization over barbarism and a much-needed stimulant to British trade.”

---

Cobden’s opinion was not only made up of positive feelings towards the Russians, but at the same time he harboured many prejudices against the Ottomans. According to him, “the Ottoman Empire was a despotic Muslim State in decline and Russia was a peaceful, commercial, Christian Empire.” Despite the presence of this kind of opinion amongst the British, the Ottomans had even now started to reform their Empire under Mahmud’s guidance. As this stage of the chapter these reform actions will be scrutinized, based on the Ottoman documents, under a separate section. This section will also be useful to help clarify the level of Anglo-Ottoman relations and how active a role Britain played in the modernisation of the Ottoman Empire.

7.1. Anglo-ottoman cooperation to reform the Ottoman Empire

As examined, Palmerston’s main aim, after the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, was to enhance the Ottoman Empire militarily, economically, and administratively against possible Russian attack. In fact, Mahmud, at first, wanted to make only a military alliance with the British against his rebel governor Mehmed Ali, but later on he also started to lean towards an Anglo-Ottoman cooperation to modernise his Empire. Mustafa Reşid Pasha, especially, with his diplomatic efforts, played a key role in encouraging the Sultan in this process.

As a matter of fact, Mahmud was not the first Sultan to want to improve his Empire in accordance with Western development. Before giving detailed descriptions of exemplary acts of Anglo-Ottoman cooperation showing their combined efforts (1833 – 1839) to reform the Empire, and in order to see the whole picture, it will be useful to give a brief summary of the background of the Ottoman Empire’s reform programme.

During the nineteenth century the European countries were successful in applying scientific developments to military tactics and weapons; unlike the Ottoman State, which failed to adopt new military innovations. This was not only because of a mistaken sense of superiority over the Europeans, but also because of its inability to keep up with European scientific progress. As a result, it suffered huge defeats at the hands of the European countries and even lost some of its territories to them. This led to the recognition that the Empire had fallen behind and led to the

introduction of a new era of political, military and economic reforms, initiated in the reign of Abdulhamid I (1774 – 1789). These reforms continued and even increased under the reign of Selim III (1789 – 1807) and reached their peak during the administration of Mahmud II (1808 - 1839).

During the rule of Abdulhamid I, “Mühendishane-i Bahr-i Humayun”, the Imperial School of Naval Engineering, today known as Istanbul Technical University, began to offer training modelled after a European-style military education.\textsuperscript{410} Abdulhamid’s successor, Selim III, set up the Nizam-i Cedid Army (New Order) in a totally European fashion and invited several French military staff to train the new army.\textsuperscript{411} Also during Selim III’s reign, the Ottoman Empire established its first permanent diplomatic missions in Europe. Unlike the other two sultans, Mahmud did not confine his reforms to the military, but engaged in reforms concerning social, economic and institutional areas. For example, he established the first modern medical school in Turkey, Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Sahane, as well as the postal and police reorganisation.\textsuperscript{412} Apart from these, the biggest reform he made was, with popular support, the abolition of the Janissaries (also called the Yeniçeri Ordusu) in 1826. The Janissaries had been the major factor in military victories during the height of the Empire, but they were unwilling to adapt to changing military circumstances and had come to be a significant obstacle which barred the way to progress in their field. Mahmud II subsequently established a modern army called the Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye.\textsuperscript{413}

This was the general picture of the Ottoman Empire up until 1833. The following parts of the chapter have a different approach than that seen in the other chapters. These are not a political and diplomatic analysis of Anglo-Ottoman relations, instead; they aim to closely examine every development, however small, between 1833 and 1839, in order to illustrate the extent of the

\textsuperscript{410} Ilber Ortaylı, \textit{Imparatorlugun En Uzun Yüzyılı}, (İstanbul: 2009), p.98.
\textsuperscript{411} In this period, the most important supporters of the Ottoman Empire with respect to its reform programme were the French. Selim even had close personal friends who were French. But this positive atmosphere changed with the French occupation of Algeria in 1830 and in light of the French support for the rebel governor, Mehmed Ali. After these developments Britain started to play a key role in the Ottoman’s relations with the West and Mahmud turned his attention from the French to the British for the purpose of cordial relations with the West. The attacks by Mehmed Ali in 1832 provided a trigger for Mahmud to activate his plan, an Anglo-Ottoman alliance to secure support against his all enemies in the region, into action.
\textsuperscript{412} Ilber Ortaylı, \textit{Imparatorlugun En Uzun Yüzyılı}, p.103
\textsuperscript{413} Ibid, p. 108.
British contribution to this reform process. It can be said that this chapter is an effort to write a social history, but at the same time it is necessary to put the new situation that came about after the treaty of Unkюр Skelessi, regarding the political and diplomatic relations between the two countries, into context. This will also be a very useful source for foreign researchers who do not have access to the Turkish language and are unable to use the Ottoman Archives. In order to attain this objective, all the Ottoman Archives with respect to British contribution to their developmental support, 1833-1839, have been examined in the context of the entire British assistance to the Ottoman reform programme. Of course, Britain was not the only Western country utilised to enhance the Empire. Prussia, Austria, Russia, and France were also amongst those countries who contributed assistance.

One of the most significant ones, who desired to protect European peace by strengthening the Ottoman Empire, was Metternich. However, Metternich had a different opinion about this reform programme than his contemporaries. He disapproved of reforming the Ottoman Empire by only using European methods since according to him the Ottoman Empire was a Muslim state and therefore the innovations should have been suited to the Ottoman society. Šedivý indicated, in his book, a very useful passage from Metternich about this:

"Base your government upon respect for your religious institutions which form the fundamental basis of your existence as a Power and which form the first link between the sultan and his Moslem subjects. Go with the times and consider the requirements that this will bring. Put your administration in order, reform it, but do not overthrow it to replace it with forms which are not useful to you and which expose the monarch to the criticism that he does not know the value of what he attacks nor of what he wants to replace it with . . . Do not borrow from European civilisation forms that are incompatible with your institutions because the Western institutions are based on principles different from those serving as fundamental to your Empire. The West is based on Christian law; you practice Islam, and you cannot found a Christian society . . . We in no way intend to hinder the Porte in the improvement of its administrative system but we advise it not to look for models for these improvements in examples which have nothing common with the conditions of the Turkish Empire; do not in any way imitate those countries whose fundamental legal systems are contrary to the traditions of the Levant;" 

414 In fact, Rodkey examined this reform process based on the British Foreign Office documents in his extensive articles but his work focused only on military relations, and he did not examine any other aspects of the Anglo-Ottoman cooperation to improve the Ottoman Empire. In addition to this, his work looks at the period solely from the British perspective. However, this chapter will try to examine every detail from the much-neglected Ottoman perspective and not only military developments or relations but also the other developments or relations in the reform process of the Ottoman Empire between 1833 and 1839. Also Rodkey approaches the results of this reform period in a very negative way based on Pamerston’s and Ponsonby’s evaluations, however, when looking at the reform period from the Ottoman perspective, this period was a beginning of the modernisation of the Ottoman Empire and resulted in the establishment of the modern Turkish state; the Republic of Turkey, almost eighty years later, on the 29th October 1923. Therefore every minor detail is vital to contribute to the generation of the big picture.
In particular, up to the beginning of 1830, France was the country with the most influence on the Ottomans. When the French occupied Algeria in 1830, however, they plummeted in the estimation of all the Ottomans, especially Mahmud. In fact, the personal friendships which Selim III, the predecessor Sultan to Mahmud II, had cemented with the French served to help maintain a French influence in Istanbul despite the French Army’s attack on Egypt in 1798 under the command of Napoleon, but this time, with Sultan Mahmud, there was no such private connection with the French. In addition to this, the developing relations with the British, occurring after the Mehmed Ali problem, had brought Britain into the forefront in Istanbul, and as a result of this they had started to take on a supportive role and step in to help reform and improve the Ottoman Empire. Before starting on the main body of this chapter, it needs to be understood that the improved Anglo-Ottoman relationship after the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had borne with it not only positive developments but also some problems. These problems appeared in the social and commercial life between the Ottoman people and the British, and will be propounded upon to clarify the whole picture, and include both the drawbacks and advantages. To separate each year in the light of the reform process would be easier and more useful, and work towards a better understanding of the whole period.

7.2. The second half of 1833

This year was a beginning in the utilization by the Ottomans of British support. In light of this fact there were not yet so many incidents to scrutinise in this year. However, the majority of the Ottoman requirements of the British seemed to come in the field of logistics support. For example, a contract was made with a British Jew to import a steamer from Britain. Two copies of this contract were presented to the Sultan and this situation was brought to the attention of the Ottoman Prime Minister by the Acting Minister of Artillery; Tahir Pasha. After a while, it was

---

415 Šedivý, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p.634
416 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, (The Original Name of the Ottoman Archives which is in Istanbul and involves all the Ottoman Documents from 1299 to 1923, and it will be referred to as BOA in the rest of the chapter) File No: 585 Document No: 28744.
ordered that one thousand pouches of Ottoman gold would have to be paid to the Jewish middleman since the production of the steamer was almost finished. It was also ordered that construction works for another steamer should be started immediately.417

There was another equipment request, which was also indicated as another problem of the Ottoman Empire at that time. The request was about a machine and wheel in order to perforate rifle irons. However, the Ammunition Minister of the Ottoman Army reported that the intended equipment was redundant because its capacity was too big. The machine was able to perforate two hundred and fifty irons in a day; however there was no master and not enough tools to produce the other components to make 250 rifles in a day.418 This is an interesting piece of information because it shows that in 1833, the Ottomans still lacked the technical competence to produce their own armaments and thus it seemed likely that British support would need to increase, in the following years, in this area as well.

Another notable thing related to this process in that year was that the Prime Minister strictly ordered that any gunpowder produced by the British should not be wasted. According to the Minister’s order this new premium gunpowder should be kept for a possible war and only the old gunpowder should be used in military drills and festivals and not the British type.419 The intended meaning of ‘war’ would have been a reference to the possibility of a battle with Mehmed Ali. This order shows that the inclination to engage Mehmed Ali in full armed combat in the second half of 1833 was actually very strong.

Lastly in this year, a purchase that is worthy of note is that one thousand seven hundred and seventy-seven swords with their belts, each of them costing fifty five Ottoman Kurus, were bought from a British merchant, (the documents record his name as Lionel) in order to use in the parade which was to take place in front of the Sultan.420

As mentioned, this year was only the beginning of the new climate of friendly collaboration in diplomatic relations following on from the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and this Anglo-Ottoman cooperation to improve the Ottoman Empire was to continue without cessation.

418 BOA, File No: 585 Document No: 28744 A.
7.3. 1834

As might be expected the process started to accelerate in this year. A number of Turkish students were sent to London in order to learn the Western techniques. For instance, fourteen military officers were sent to receive education in London. Namık Pasha presented the official letter with respect to these officers to the British Foreign Minister. The letter expressed a wish that not only should these students be sent but also that reports should be received from them regularly, in Istanbul, about the experience they were gaining in London and what they were learning.

Factory building and modernisation gathered speed in this year. For example, some machines were imported from Britain in order to establish a rifle factory in Dolmabahçe, a district in Istanbul. The middleman was a civil servant stationed in Ali Bey. The iron used in the factory was sent from Sofia, and from Samokov, another city close to Sofia. Two British engineers were employed to work on the construction process in the factory and the same engineers also built a steam powered factory for serial production in the same district, Dolmabahçe. The Ottoman records give the British Engineers’ names as Chris and Walker. All the expenses for what they did in the setting-up process were paid in full at the end of the construction as agreed.

Another significant incident about the factory improvement project was that the Ottomans did not only charge the British engineers with the task of building factories but they also sent some Ottoman officers to Britain to get an education in industrial science in order to be able to continue improving Ottoman industry into the future with the knowledge possessed by their own citizens. One of these officers was Colonel Bekir Bey. He was sent to England so that he might improve himself in this field.

Another support the Ottomans got from the British was in the field of British expertise. They did not only build, repair or establish technology in the Ottoman lands, but also more importantly, they tendered reports in whatever their specialty was. These kinds of reports would have been useful and beneficial for the Ottomans to help them continue to implement this progress in the

---

421 BOA, File No: 1181 Document No: 46662 G.
422 BOA, File No: 1179 Document No: 46582.
424 BOA C..SM, File No: 585 Document No: 30142
following decades. One example of this kind of helpful report-making from the British can be seen in how a British expert in construction was sent to Samokov in order to produce iron and fix the roads. As part of his job, after his task had been completed, this engineer prepared a report based on his experiences in the production and fixing process, and presented it to the Ottoman government. Another example of this conveying expertise by way of reports can be seen in how a British expert was sent to the Ottoman iron mines to examine how they were run, and after his investigation he prepared a report on the mines and he too presented his findings to the Ottoman government. In addition to all these British experts, a British locksmith was employed as a servant in the Ottoman shipyards and his salary was one thousand five hundred Kurus a month.

The British officials who supported the Ottomans to help enhance the Empire were not only from amongst the British experts or military officers. It seems that the British ambassador, Ponsonby, sometimes helped the Ottoman government with his knowledge as well. In 1834, an epidemic of plague was seen in Tarabya, a district in Istanbul. Thereupon, Ponsonby suggested that in future, as a precaution against such a thing happening again, preventative measures concerning cleanliness and hygiene would have to be implemented in the region.

Meanwhile, an interesting law was passed by the British government concerning all the British officers and civil servants who were on duty in foreign lands. The law banned all these kinds of military and civil officials from accepting any kind of gift given by any foreign state. These officials would probably not have liked this law since this was the prime time to receive valuable gifts from the Ottoman government in return for their services, although of course they would still continue to be paid their fees, however much the remuneration was that they had agreed upon with the Ottoman government when the contracts were made. Giving gifts to the foreign officers had been a common thing in the Ottoman Empire, and the records of the previous years show that gifts were regularly given to the British diplomats.
Another important influence the British had on the Ottomans was in weapon-making skills and methods. For this purpose, two British rifles were sent, at the request of the Ottoman government, from London to Istanbul as a model for the future production of Ottoman rifles.\textsuperscript{433} These British rifles were in (then) current use by the foot soldiers in the British army and these two rifles were submitted by Palmerston in person to the famous Ottoman Pasha, Namik.\textsuperscript{434} It seems the Sultan had made a decision to renew all the equipment for his new army, the Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye.

With this new period in the Anglo-Ottoman relations underway, the Ottoman government had started to charge some British diplomats in the Ottoman embassies of some of the cities in Europe. For example, a British man started to work as a diplomat in the Ottoman Embassy at Paris and after a while, he got into debt of five thousand Francs, in Paris. Thereupon, the French ambassador at Istanbul indicated this situation to the Ottoman Foreign Office and requested this amount should be paid by the Foreign Office.\textsuperscript{435}

As mentioned above, a British locksmith had been employed as a servant in the Ottoman shipyards. However, Mavroyeni, the Ottoman charge d'affaires at Vienna, reported that there was a British law in effect that made it illegal for a British subject to work in a foreign state’s military services as a servant.\textsuperscript{436}

At this stage, these examples can only be given as additional information, since it they are to be examined in detail in a separate chapter, which describes how the Anglo-Ottoman negotiations on the customs tariffs started to accelerate.

As is common knowledge, Ottoman carpets were famous in the European countries for their ornate patterns and extremely high quality. However, mass production had now begun in Europe with the advent of the industrial revolution. This faster production method naturally influenced the Ottoman’s hand-produced market. In this respect, an order was placed for a large quantity of British rugs costing a fair sum, to carpet some of the Ottoman state offices.\textsuperscript{437} Although their own carpets were the best in the world, the Ottomans were ordering mass produced British

\textsuperscript{433} BOA, File No: 738 Document No: 34986 C.
\textsuperscript{434} BOA, File No: 1181 Document No: 46662 Ğ.
\textsuperscript{435} BOA, File No: 1191 Document No: 46898 C.
\textsuperscript{436} BOA, File No: 1206 Document No: 47287 A.
\textsuperscript{437} BOA C.DH, File No: 224 Document No: 11186.
carpets! This order could be seen as an indication that with the beginning of the 1830s, because of the increasing relations with the European countries, imitation of European life had started amongst the Ottoman people. Some of the Ottoman people had started to prefer the European articles and styles to the Ottoman ones. This issue was discussed at length in Ottoman society then, and even today it is still a regular topic of debate. In this context, this preference for British carpets in 1834 can be considered as one illustrative starting point to a nationwide inclination to imitate European styles starting with the state’s example.

7.4. 1835

1835 was a year that the Ottoman diplomatic attempts to obtain Anglo-Ottoman cooperation against Mehmed Ali and Russia increased, on account of the efforts of skilful Ottoman diplomats such Namık Pasha, Nuri Effendi, and Mustafa Reşid. Of course, this situation positively affected Anglo-Ottoman cooperation in other areas, including the reformation of the Empire in line with Western scientific discoveries. In this respect, the most important strategy was that of sending students to Britain in order to witness first hand all the scientific developments in Europe which were ceaselessly advancing. The records are very detailed and indicate that there were four engineering students in Britain and their salaries were transferred to them once every three months. 438

At the same time, preparations within the Ottoman Army in the field of logistics reinforcement and the renewal process for a possible war with Mehmed Ali had continued and increased. As mentioned above, the Ottoman statesmen were so sensitive about economical gunpowder use that they had been very strict in their guidelines about not wasting it. Also, gunpowder making, based on the British and Dutch mode of manufacture, had begun in Azatlı Gunpowder Factory, in Istanbul. 439

Another feature of the construction process of the factories was that when the British engineers completed these factories, they did not remain in Istanbul but went back to Britain. In this

respect, any last checks of an armoury or factory had to be done before this British engineer returned his country.\textsuperscript{440}

Another significant development in the reform process according to the West was seen in the Ottoman press. Takvim-i Vekayi was the first Ottoman newspaper, and it was established in 1831 under Mahmud’s order by Alexandre Blacque, who was called Blak Bey amongst the Ottomans, for his defending of the Ottoman rights against the European powers. However, this newspaper was extremely unsophisticated in comparison with the European press. For this reason, Mahmud decided to get support from the European press to improve his one and only newspaper. Therefore, he ordered that collaboration should be made with the British and French press to learn how best to improve Takvimi-i Vekayi.\textsuperscript{441}

Continuing from the above; economic negotiations on customs tariffs had commenced in the previous years and they remained on the agenda in 1835 as well. Nuri Effendi, the Ottoman ambassador at London, was responsible for the management of the process. He had been regularly sending reports from London about these negotiations to keep the Sultan informed with respect the process which was so vital to the Empire’s economic life.\textsuperscript{442} Therefore, Nuri Effendi had been very active in London and it can be said that he left no stone unturned in this period. In these years, there were still French moneychangers in Istanbul and the Ottoman Government had been providing its needs for foreign currency from them. However, Nuri Effendi reported from London that the British moneychangers were not the same as the French ones and whenever it was necessary to get some money, the British ones supplied it immediately but the French ones did not. Thus, he mentioned that it would be more efficient if his expenses could be directly supplied from London instead of Istanbul.\textsuperscript{443}

As mentioned above, accepting gifts had been banned for all British civil servants and officers working abroad. Despite this, it seemed that Mustafa Reşid Pasha did not like this prohibition very much since, as he reported to the Ottoman Foreign Minister, decorating Ponsonby and British Embassy secretaries for their services and giving them some gifts would be very useful.

\bibliography{references.bib}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{440}{BOA, File No: 575 Document No: 28134 J.}
\footnotetext{441}{BOA, File No: 664 Document No: 32291 G.}
\footnotetext{442}{BOA, File No: 677 Document No: 33015., BOA, File No: 677 Document No: 33015 B.}
\footnotetext{443}{BOA, File No: 677 Document No: 33021 E.}
\end{footnotes}
for the service of Ottoman interests.\textsuperscript{444} The Ottomans had been doing everything possible to improve Anglo-Ottoman relations; for example, Mahmud even sent his portrait, as a gift, through Nuri Effendi to King William.\textsuperscript{445}

This gift issue seems to have been an interesting item on the agenda at that time. Esad Effendi was assigned as the Ottoman Ambassador to Iran and he was supposed to go there to start his mission shortly. Before he went, he met with some Iranian diplomats in Erzurum, an Ottoman city in the East. The Iranian diplomats mentioned that the British and the Russian ambassadors had brought some gifts with them to Iran and then they hinted that they were expecting the same reciprocal behaviour from Esad Effendi.\textsuperscript{446}

Then an interesting development happened in Istanbul. As is well known, the Greeks rebelled in 1821 and gained their independence in 1829. The Greeks had been Ottoman citizens since the second half of the fifteenth century. They had been conducting commerce with foreign countries in the name of the Sultan as the Armenians had done. However, after their independence, Mahmud decided to eliminate the Greeks, who were still present in Istanbul as Ottoman citizens, from the commercial life of the Empire. In this respect, he banned the Greeks from any kind of commerce, even small retail businesses.\textsuperscript{447} Palmerston was unhappy about this last development and he met and negotiated with Nuri Effendi in this issue.\textsuperscript{448} Nevertheless Mahmud was determined to stand behind his decision and he declared to Palmerston through Nuri Effendi that he was not going to change his prohibition, but yet, he conceded, he would give the Greeks permission that at least, they could visit Istanbul to purchase goods in order to take them back to their cities.\textsuperscript{449}

Meanwhile, building construction had been carrying on without a pause. Another rifle factory was in the process of construction in the charge of Abdulaziz Agah Effendi, the responsible officer for steam powered factories. In this project, some British experts and labourers were employed and their salaries paid regularly.\textsuperscript{450}

\textsuperscript{444} BOA, File No: 737 Document No: 34959 B.
\textsuperscript{445} BOA, File No: 677 Document No: 33020 B.
\textsuperscript{446} BOA, File No: 804 Document No: 37134 C.
\textsuperscript{447} BOA, File No: 1220 Document No: 47731 H.
\textsuperscript{448} BOA, File No: 1220 Document No: 47736.
\textsuperscript{449} BOA, File No: 1220 Document No: 47749.
\textsuperscript{450} BOA C..AS, File No: 828 Document No: 35276.
Mahmud would have been pleased when he saw the military ammunition that had started to be produced in Istanbul. For example, some artillery had been produced in the charge of Behri Bey and they had been tested with British and Russian cannonballs. It was a pleasing development for the Ottomans because the new army needed every kind of ammunition in case of a war with Mehmed Ali. Another reason for their satisfaction was that in Namik Pasha’s first mission in London, before the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, William had been reluctant to send just fifteen pieces of artillery in reply to Mahmud’s earlier request, when he had been in his most difficult position and seeking an Anglo-Ottoman military alliance but now, they had started to produce their own artillery in Istanbul! Another example of the Ottomans producing their own ammunition for themselves was when some artillery-stocks were brought from Britain in order to use in the Varna Castle but later on, artillery-stocks which had been produced in Sumnu, an Ottoman province in the Balkans, were purchased, in order to be used in Sumnu Castle.

Another important development in the reform process which occurred in these years was that a number of British officers began to come to Istanbul to drill the new Ottoman army according to British military techniques.

7.5. 1836

In this year, one of the important developments in the reform process was not only that British ammunition started to be imported directly to Istanbul, but also the process of learning how to make it continued. For example, the chief of gunpowder mills in the Ottoman Army, Ohannes, and his son Arakil, went to Britain and France in order to examine the British and French powder mills. They took notes based upon their observations and also investigated all machines used in the process of gunpowder production in the mill while they were there. At the end of their mission in Britain, the British Minister who was responsible for gunpowder factories in Britain, whose name is given as Thomas Modi, gave a testimonial saying that Ohannes and his son had learned how to produce gunpowder just like that produced by the British. Also Palmerston indicated to Ponsonby that Ohannes had completely encompassed the process of gunpowder

---

451 BOA, File No: 1251 Document No: 48379 B.
452 BOA, File No: 1255 Document No: 48567.
453 BOA, File No: 954 Document No: 40954.
manufacture.\textsuperscript{455} Ohannes bought from both countries the necessary implements for making gunpowder and brought them with him to Istanbul.\textsuperscript{456} When he returned to Istanbul he wrote a report about his experiences and explained in detail what was necessary to produce gunpowder like the British and French do and in accordance with this report, Azath Gunpowder Factory was modernised to encompass the European standards and methods.\textsuperscript{457} Also he requested that the directors of the powder mills in Britain and France should be decorated since they had so kindly facilitated his work whilst he had been learning the techniques of producing gunpowder.\textsuperscript{458}

Sending Ohannes and his son to Britain and France in order to learn gunpowder production is a very good example of how the Ottomans had decided to take their own initiative in the reform programme. There was another example of this in that the Ottoman government issued a directive that it would be much better to manufacture their own ships in order to use them on their coast instead of importing them from Europe. However, the directive said, it would be necessary to import the ship making equipment required for this purpose from Britain so that they had the means to manufacture ships.\textsuperscript{459}

The Ottoman Empire was not only making preparations for war against Mehmed Ali, but they were also preparing for a possible war against Russia in some regions after the latest diplomatic developments in Europe. For instance, fifty-one big cannons were imported from Britain, through a British merchant, in order to use them in the Castle of Varna. The payment was made in two parts and the Sultan gave the direction to the head of the financial department that the second part of the payment should be made to the British merchant.\textsuperscript{460} In addition to this, some round shots were ordered from Britain for use in defending Bagdad and Ponsonby sent a letter about this to the British Government.\textsuperscript{461} There was a reason for the measures concerning Bagdad to be taken. The Ottoman Government had received some recent news about Mehmed Ali’s designs upon Bagdad. Ponsonby had also received some similar information too. He indicated to the Ottoman Government that he had heard news that the Ottoman governor of Bagdad and an

\textsuperscript{455} BOA, File No: 588 Document No: 28921 A.
\textsuperscript{456} BOA, File No: 591 Document No: 29016 A.
\textsuperscript{457} BOA, File No: 591 Document No: 29016.
\textsuperscript{458} BOA, File No: 591 Document No: 29016 B.
\textsuperscript{459} BOA, File No: 1267 Document No: 49040 B.
\textsuperscript{460} BOA C..AS, File No: 137 Document No: 6086.
\textsuperscript{461} BOA, File No: 1264 Document No: 48951 C.
Iranian diplomat had met and talked about a rumour that Mehmed Ali had also been making preparations and at the first chance he got he intended to invade Bagdad.\textsuperscript{462}

Meanwhile, the construction of the mentioned rifle and armoury factories continued under the charge of Abdulaziz Agah Effendi. It had been decided that in order to facilitate arms manufacture, they needed to bring two qualified British engineers and also an ironmaster from Britain in addition to other British construction workers. The reserved budget for the construction expenses had been increased to include the salaries and the house rentals for these three British workers.\textsuperscript{463}

One of Mahmud’s most important aims in the reform process was to renew and improve his maritime fleet based on European techniques. In this context, one hundred thousand Okka (almost one hundred thousand and twenty five kilograms) of European sheet copper had been imported from Britain, through British merchants, for use in the Ottoman Fleet.\textsuperscript{464} Moreover, Mahmud ordered his diplomats that they should negotiate with the British government for some British officers to come to Istanbul to train the Ottoman officers and at the same time modernise the new Ottoman army. Nuri Effendi reported from London and informed Istanbul about the negotiation process over these British Officers.\textsuperscript{465} Palmerston indicated to Nuri Effendi they had been leaning towards sending British officers to Istanbul and when it was necessary, he added, they could send however many officers were required.\textsuperscript{466} After these negotiations some British officers were sent to Istanbul.\textsuperscript{467} Despite all these positive developments, this process was not problem-free. The aim of each side was different. As Rodkey examined in detail, Palmerston’s main aim in sending the British officers to Istanbul was that he had desired these officers to take command of the Ottoman Army.\textsuperscript{468} However, this was not suitable from the Ottoman perspective, and this point was explained to the British officers, who were a senior grade officer

\textsuperscript{462} BOA, File No: 1176 Document No: 46442 U.
\textsuperscript{463} BOA C..AS, File No: 509 Document No: 21254.
\textsuperscript{464} BOA C..BH, File No: 65 Document No: 3062.
\textsuperscript{465} BOA, File No: 1182 Document No: 46669 B.
\textsuperscript{466} BOA, File No: 1182 Document No: 46669 D.
\textsuperscript{467} BOA, File No: 677 Document No: 33016 B.
and a colonel. Mahmud also ordered the Foreign Office to inform Ponsonby about this situation.

Another interesting development in these years was that some British merchants started to trade in the Ottoman lands, just as the local Ottoman merchants were doing. For example, a British merchant had been selling European coffee for a while but then, later on, his license to sell was cancelled. In response, the British Embassy deputy and Ponsonby requested that the Merchant should have his privileges to sell European coffee in the Ottoman lands given back. Another example of this kind was that a British merchant had licence to harvest the acorns of 1836’s crop from Kızılcatuzla, an Ottoman province in the West. Later on, all of the figures pertaining to this trade were presented to the central government for scrutiny.

A remarkable incident happened in this year with respect to a British man. His name was William Churchill. He was to get a license from the Ottoman Government to buy olive oil in the Ottoman lands but before this permission was granted he was beset with a big problem. It was an ordinary situation but unexpectedly, it had had a big influence even though this influence lasted a very short time. Churchill was in Istanbul and one day he went hunting in Kadıköy where he had an accident. When he was shooting with a rifle, he accidentally wounded a little Turkish boy. This accident caused such indignation from the Turkish officers and people, who were there when the accident happened, that they beat Churchill up and the officers put him in prison by order of the Ottoman Foreign Minister, Akif Effendi. When Pizani, the translator of the British Embassy, learned of the situation he went to have him released from prison, however Akif Effendi was very strict over this incident and even though Pizani argued with Akif he still maintained he could not release Churchill. Thereupon, he communicated the situation to Ponsonby, and after he had explained the accident he stated that he could not even talk to Churchill. When he examined the injured Turkish boy, Pizani revealed that the boy’s medical condition was good and said that there was no serious problem with his health and therefore the

469 BOA, File No: 1174 Document No: 46427 C.
470 BOA C..HR, File No: 37 Document No: 1840.
472 BOA, File No: 1231 Document No: 47986 E.
473 BOA, File No: 1231 Document No: 47986 B.
judgement of the Kadıköy Muslim Judge had been most excessive. There was somebody else, who got very tough with Churchill. It was Ahmet Fevzi Pasha, who was soon to be the Ottoman Navy Minister. Akif and Ahmet Pashas were not to be easily persuaded on this issue. Ponsonby was indignant at the Pashas’ behaviours and told Pizani that beating Churchill and sending him to prison was an invective against Britain and the British dignity had been injured as a result. Then he ordered Pizani that he was responsible for this issue and he should demand from the Ottoman Prime Minister that this affront to British standing should be rectified as soon as possible. Ponsonby was not even happy with this retort and he carried the crisis a step further when he demanded the dismissal of both Pashas from the government. Palmerston was united with his ambassador on this issue and he too demanded that the Pashas be replaced. Meanwhile, the Russians also wanted a say in the matter. They already felt aggrieved over the positive Anglo-Ottoman relations which were developing of late, so they saw this acrimonious dispute as a way to gain a potential advantage for themselves. After this last situation had developed, the Russian Ambassador stated in his official letter to the Ottoman Government that the British Government had been using the Churchill issue to destroy the Russian-Ottoman friendship, since there was a rumour that Akif Effendi and Ahmet Fevzi Pasha were pro-Russian. According to the Russian ambassador, Palmerston did not have any right to request a dismissal of the Pashas, on the contrary, he continued, the Ottoman Government should have requested the withdrawal of the British ambassador, Ponsonby. Apparently the Russians were uncomfortable with the latest diplomatic developments in Anglo-Ottoman relations and the Churchill issue was a chance to eliminate one of the causes for the new improved Anglo-Ottoman relationship, which was Ponsonby. The incident did have a repercussion on diplomatic negotiations. First of all, Mustafa Resid Pasha was in London as the Ottoman Ambassador to Britain when the accident happened and he met with Palmerston to talk over the issue. He reported that Palmerston seemed that he was bent on ordering Ponsonby to insist upon the dismissal of the Pashas, Palmerston even, Resid continued, construed his visiting as an irony. There was more diplomatic communication with respect to the incident found in the Austrian Ambassador’s words. He sent a

---

474 BOA, File No: 1231 Document No: 47986 A.
475 BOA, File No: 1231 Document No: 47986 C.
476 BOA, File No: 1231 Document No: 47986 F.
477 BOA, File No: 1231 Document No: 47986 I.
478 BOA, File No: 1231 Document No: 47986 I.
479 BOA, File No: 1174 Document No: 46429 K.
letter through his translator to the Ottoman Foreign Office. He stated in his letter that in his view of the incident based on the news he received from Vienna that the British Ministers in the cabinet did not place as much importance upon the situation as much as Ponsonby obviously did.\footnote{BOA, File No: 1231 Document No: 47986 G.}

Nevertheless, the Sultan differed with the Russians because his first aim, as examined in great detail in previous chapters, which has already been made clear, was to get the British on his side, and he could not allow one small accident to destroy the perfectly composed Anglo-Ottoman relations after the enormous diplomatic effort it had taken Mahmud and his best men from since the beginning of the Mehmed Ali problem until that time, to achieve. Thus, he tried not to let the matter get blown out of proportion and found a middle way for both sides. Akif Effendi was dismissed from government, however Ahmet Fevzi Pasha remained in office, and was even sent to be inducted into the Ottoman Navy Minister five months after the incident. Mahmud probably meant to show with this appointment that he valued the Anglo-Ottoman cooperation which helped him against his enemies, however, he was still Sultan and he had to make his own decisions. After these positive actions from the Ottomans, Ponsonby, in spite of all his harsh and indignant statements since the beginning of the situation, stepped in to defuse the crisis. He secretly sent a letter to the Ottoman Foreign Office explaining that he felt no animosity towards Ahmet Fevzi Pasha, but Ponsonby’s angry responses to the incident had resulted from his opinion that a state’s officers should not have behaved as they did and should have found a different way instead of beating the suspect.\footnote{BOA, File No: 1231 Document No: 47986 H.} That said, Ponsonby informed his government that the problem with Ahmet Fevzi Pasha had been resolved.\footnote{BOA, File No: 1344 Document No: 52524.}

Another significant example of Mahmud’s caring for the British and smoothing over the crisis, was that he gave a license to the main character of the story, Churchill, to buy five hundred and sixty-four tons olive oil from different provinces in the Ottoman lands.\footnote{BOA, File No: 1172 Document No: 46398.} In fact, it was Churchill who first requested this license from the Ottoman Government in acknowledgment of the trials and tribulations he had suffered.\footnote{BOA, File No: 1175 Document No: 46438 I.} Thereupon the Ottoman statesmen examined the practicability of this request, prepared reports, and informed the Sultan about Churchill’s
demand. For example, Istefenaki Bey prepared a report on olive oil and its possible taxes and presented it to the Sultan. After examining this, Mahmud gave permission to Churchill to conduct this trade and ordered his civil servant to help him with all kinds of oil in Edremit, an Ottoman province, and indicated him about his permission for Churchill and his assistant. In conclusion, an ordinary accident turned into a big upset in the Anglo-Ottoman relations and even became an international diplomatic incident.

Relations between Mahmud and William had remained on a good footing during this year. Mahmud had sent his portrait and various gifts earlier, and in response, William had sent some gifts back to Mahmud as well. As Palmerston mentioned when he met with Nuri Effendi, the Ottoman Ambassador at London, these gifts were not so valuable in a material sense but, he continued, they were very strong evidence to show Mehmed Ali and the Russians that the British would continue to stand by the Ottomans against all their enemies, and Palmerston believed this message would intimidate both of them. Mahmud would have been very pleased when he heard these words because his aim, an Anglo-Ottoman alliance in the region, which had been in his agenda since Mehmed Ali’s army beat his army in Syria, was finally on the point of being achieved. These gifts were sent on separate occasions. They were five horses sent on one occasion, and on another occasion, fifteen horses and a British phaeton.

Another interesting incident with respect to British merchants in the Ottoman commercial life was that one of them, called Barker in the document, borrowed eight hundred and eighty eight thousand Ottoman Kurus from the İzmir City Council but then went bankrupt without paying his debt to the Ottoman treasury. The Mayor of İzmir reported that until the treasury had taken back the value of his loan from his goods and assets, nothing he owned while he was alive would be submitted to anybody else. The Ottoman Government confiscated all his property in lieu of the debt he owed.
Meanwhile, Mustafa Reşid Pasha in London found a medical book written by a British doctor about eye and ear diseases, and sent it to Istanbul. This incident is a good example of how the Ottomans were taking a keen interest in learning all kinds of European knowledge to enhance their Empire.

At the same time Mahmud was still determined to improve and renew his new army according to European military techniques. As a result of this intention the Ottomans continued to import European ammunition models and arrange for European officers to educate the Ottoman officers. In this respect, Reşid Pasha requested a howitzer model from Britain. Moreover, the Ottomans requested more British military teachers to educate and improve the Ottoman Army and in response to this request, a number of British officers and military teachers came to Istanbul.

While these many significant changes continued in many aspects of life in Istanbul, a similar change appeared in the Ottoman Embassies in other countries. For example, the Ottoman Embassy in London was completely refurnished in this year and all the furniture which was chosen was in the British style.

The reform progress had not only been in military or industrial matters, but had also manifested in the cultural life of the Turkish people. In particular, Reşid Pasha had attached particular importance to the transfer of European cultural developments to the Ottoman Empire. As mentioned above, sometimes he sent some specialised book or other written on different subjects. For example, he sent English and French Grammar books, written by a British man. Reşid Pasha also indicated that there was a French pamphlet that had been published in Paris which was inciting the French to view an alliance with the Russians favourably on account of the successes of the Ottoman Empire.

---

493 BOA, File No: 712 Document No: 34067 J.  
494 BOA, File No: 677 Document No: 33016 B.  
497 BOA, File No: 678 Document No: 33032 E.  
498 BOA, File No: 1185 Document No: 46740 C.  
499 BOA, File No: 1185 Document No: 46740 C.
7.6. 1837

On account of all these positive diplomatic developments in Anglo-Ottoman relations, the reform process had been accelerated in this year. As mentioned above, Mahmud not only wanted to transfer European techniques to his Empire, but he also wanted his statesmen to learn how to produce them on their own. In this respect, the practice of sending Ottomans to Europe for that purpose had increased. However, Britain was not the only European country he sent them to. Ottoman officers were sent to Austria as well. As examined in the preceding chapters, which describe the diplomatic process, Metternich had been supporting the Ottoman Empire to enhance its strength against Mehmed Ali, and in the new diplomatic atmosphere after the treaty of Unkiař Skelessi, Austria had become as close to the Ottoman Empire as Britain had become. For this reason, Mahmud sent some Ottomans to Austria to learn the European system just as he had sent them to Britain. First of all, it should be mentioned that references in the Ottoman records related to this year carry more detailed information than can be previously found, when relating events concerning those Ottomans who had been sent to Europe. For example, some Ottoman officers had been sent to Britain for the purpose of learning warfare science. They had different ranks, such as, a sapper Colonel, Bekir Bey, a sapper lieutenant colonel, Emin Bey, and some were engineers, İbrahim, Derviş, Enis, Arif, Mahmud, and Halil Effendis. These officers had their own salaries for their expenses during the education process. After the Anatolian commander-in-chief, Sait Pasha, reported that some privates should be sent to Europe in order to learn European style clothing design and manufacture, six privates from the first and fourth regiment of the first brigade were sent to Vienna for the purpose of studying the design and manufacture of garments and three thousand Kurus were paid to each of them for their living expenses, the same as was paid to those officers who were sent to Britain.

In this year, it seems that the number of British merchants trading in the Ottoman lands increased. As a result of this, the number of problems they encountered during their trading increased as well; problems with both the Ottoman people themselves, and also with the Ottoman trading authorities. For instance, a British citizen called Nicholas Garbin had been trading in the Mentese Province, in the west. An Ottoman civil servant in the region, Mehmed Aga, borrowed six thousand six hundred and fifty Kurus from Nicholas. However, Mehmed Aga

---

refused to pay the money back and even attacked and threatened Nicolas under some pretext or other, in order to avoid paying back what he owed to the merchant. Mehmed Aga even seized Nicholas’s six hundred and sixty-three Ottoman gold coins and also three hundred and ninety kilograms bee wax.\textsuperscript{502} Thereupon, Ponsonby applied to the Ottoman government with an official letter and explained the situation. He requested a fair trial in the district court, otherwise, he said, he would go for an appeal to the high court and request to take Mehmed Aga to Istanbul.\textsuperscript{503} Judging by his involvement in this incident, Ponsonby seemed to be closely connected with not only diplomatic issues in Istanbul but also the British merchants’ problems in the Ottoman lands.

This year was another significant year for Mahmud and his statesmen, striving as they were to implement the Anglo-Ottoman alliance plan, since the all developments had been most positive signs of good relations with the British. The Ottomans had started to benefit from the British techniques which did indeed seem to improve the Empire. As a matter of fact, the majority of this utilization of the various innovations had been, in the beginning stages, in the field of ameliorating the Ottoman army. It was a fact that the Ottoman economy had been having some difficulties in this period. An incident which can be given as an example of this is in how difficult it became to improve the Ottoman Army due to these economic conditions. As mentioned above, gunpowder was considered as a vital instrument by the Ottoman statesmen for a strong and self-sufficient army, and in light of this, Ottoman officers, such as Ohannes and his son, were sent to Britain and France in the previous years to learn how the quality gunpowder could be produced. In accordance with the same purpose, another Ottoman master, Evan, was sent to Britain. Moreover, as already touched upon, the main aim of the Ottomans was not only to import European ammunition into the Ottoman Lands but more importantly they wanted to learn to produce, with their own means, ammunition of as high a quality as that of the Europeans. For this reason, Master Evan was instructed to buy a machine in order to produce the Ottoman gunpowder. Evan reported from Britain that he needed one thousand two hundred pouches Ottoman Akçe, (Ottoman currency), for both his expenses and the machine.\textsuperscript{504} However, the Ottoman Ammunition Minister, Mehmed Emin, reported to the prime ministry that the budget of the Ottoman Powder Mill was insufficient to cover this payment.\textsuperscript{505} After a while, he informed

\textsuperscript{502} BOA C..AS, File No: 143 Document No 7120.
\textsuperscript{503} BOA C..AS, File No: 143 Document No 7120.
\textsuperscript{504} BOA, File No: 588 Document No 28920.
\textsuperscript{505} BOA, File No: 588 Document No 28920.
him that his department could only pay six hundred pouches; half of the requested amount. He also suggested that it might be possible to borrow the rest of the sum from the merchants, however, when the time to pay came, it would be a difficult bill to settle.\textsuperscript{506} Another example in this matter was though the previously mentioned preparations for a possible battle with the Egyptian Army had been ongoing, economic problems had negatively affected these preparations as well. According to a report about the latest measures taken in strengthening the army against a possible Egyptian attack, despite all the positive developments in administrative and financial reforms and the efforts to improve the army, still, eight thousand pouches of Akçe were needed to correct the ammunition deficiencies in the army. This situation might have caused some difficulties in mounting an immediate response to an unexpected assault from Mehmed Ali’s army.\textsuperscript{507} Although this report is an ominous sign of financial difficulties, at the same time it does show that administrative and financial reforms were on the agenda.

Nevertheless, positive developments in the process of renewing the Ottoman army were ongoing. The Ottoman officers, who had been sent to Britain to study the latest developments in the British army system in the beginning of this year, were now starting to send positive news to Istanbul about their experiences and progress. For example, Palmerston indicated that Sarım Effendi, a new Ottoman envoy in London with the British military committee, sent an official letter to Istanbul saying that the Ottoman officers studying in Britain had brought their education to a successful conclusion.\textsuperscript{508} In addition to this, some of the officers were continuing their education: – some engineers from the Ottoman Powder Mill and some from the Eastern Command of the Ottoman Army – and their salaries had been sent regularly despite the domestic economic difficulties encountered by the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{509} At the same time, European officers continued to take charge of enhancing the Ottoman Army in this year too. In honour of this valuable service rendered in the Ottoman Armoury, the Ottoman government decorated two British officers, one Prussian officer, and one Prussian translator.\textsuperscript{510} Machines were also imported in order to use in the newly-founded Ottoman factories, however, these machines’ instructions were in English and a translator was needed for their correct operation. For this

\textsuperscript{506} BOA, File No: 588 Document No 28920 B.
\textsuperscript{507} BOA, File No: 380 Document No 20558 C.
\textsuperscript{508} BOA, File No: 1175 Document No 46438.
\textsuperscript{509} BOA C..HR, File No: 80 Document No 3990.
\textsuperscript{510} BOA, File No: 55 Document No 2740.
purpose a British translator was employed in the factories and his salary was even raised in 1837 in acknowledgement of his valuable services.\textsuperscript{511}

Meanwhile, Palmerston met with an interesting request from Mehmed Ali. Mehmed Ali’s biggest supporter since the early years of the nineteenth century was France, and he sometimes sent his officers to France to be educated there, in order to keep his army up to date with the latest scientific developments in Europe. However, after all the positive developments in Anglo-Ottoman relations, he probably felt he needed to do something to get British support especially since France’s foreign policy was in accordance with Britain’s over Eastern affairs after the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. This might have been another reason for Mehmed Ali to feel the need to get closer to the British since his biggest supporter was now allied with them. So he requested, through Campbell, the British Consul in Egypt, to send fourteen Arab boys to Britain for the purpose of taking education in the British factories.\textsuperscript{512}

When looking at the commercial life of 1837 in the light of the Anglo-Ottoman relations it can be seen that the number of British merchants increased and this state of affairs carried with it both positive and negative developments. As mentioned above, some problems did crop up between the British and the Ottoman public as had happened in the Churchill issue. This small issue surprisingly enough, almost caused a rupture of Anglo-Ottoman relations. After this incident, the Ottoman Government learnt something from the experience and issued a directive on all future arraignment of the British. This directive stated that the witnesses of the problem, whatever it was, and the translator for the accused British should attend during the suspect’s questioning and the officers should be aware of this directive.\textsuperscript{513} Consequently, the increase in the British population in the Ottoman lands resulted in a new set of legal and social rights for the British in the Ottoman lands. Another example of this matter occurring this year was when a British merchant applied to the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior to request a license to operate a ferry for the sole use of the British and other European citizens living in Büyükdere and Tarabya, the districts in Istanbul, since according to this British merchant, these people had had some difficulties finding a ferry to take to them to the centre of Istanbul.\textsuperscript{514}

\textsuperscript{511} BOA, File No: 1611 Document No 99.
\textsuperscript{512} BOA, File No: 829 Document No 37497 E.
\textsuperscript{513} BOA, File No: 1175 Document No 46434.
\textsuperscript{514} BOA, File No: 837 Document No 37748.
At the same time, as mentioned above, Ponsonby continued to defend the British merchants’ rights. Two examples can be given of this happening in this year. An Ottoman citizen, Civanı Acı Ergiri, and his brother had been trading in Galata, the Ottoman district in Istanbul, and to do so they borrowed money from two British merchants. However, they ran away from Istanbul without paying the debt. Therefore Ponsonby applied to the Ottoman Government to help catch them and bring them to Istanbul for trial. The other example is that there was a lawsuit between an Armenian Ottoman and a British merchant in Bursa, a city in the Empire, and Ponsonby applied to the Ottoman Government to have this lawsuit moved to the high court in Istanbul.

Meanwhile, the works to improve the new Ottoman Army’s infrastructure in terms of military education had been carrying on with all speed in 1837 despite all the difficulties that the Ottoman Empire had encountered at that time. For example, some geometric equipment and books for the military school were ordered from Britain. Moreover, some necessary equipment for the steel furnace, which was in the Armoury, was ordered from Britain through Sarım Effendi. Other orders from Britain to improve ammunition production included a copper sieve, chemicals, a flask, and a thermometer for use in the Powder Mill. The Powder Mill Minister indicated to the Ottoman Army Commander the need for these materials and then they were bought from Britain through Sarım Effendi. At this time, an important request came from the Ottomans. Sarım Effendi was instructed to request of the House of Lords that whatever the Ottoman officers who had been taking military education in Britain, learned in theory, they should put into practice in the British Army, if the House of Lords accepted this suggestion. After a while the request was accepted.

On the other hand, not everything was progressing outstandingly well in the process. For instance, construction works by British engineers were continuing in Istanbul on a cannon factory and rifle factory. It was reported to the Prime Minister that because of some difficulties

---

518 BOA, File No: 586 Document No 28815.
519 BOA, File No: 588 Document No 28925.
520 BOA, File No: 588 Document No 28924.
521 BOA, File No: 588 Document No 28923.
522 BOA, File No: 827 Document No 37465 F.
raised by the British engineers, the construction works were moving too slowly and this was causing a waste of money. The Ottoman civil servant responsible for this construction proposed in his report that paying extra money to the engineers could accelerate the process. In response, the Prime Minister ordered that the payment determined in the contract with the engineers should be increased to fifty thousand Ottoman Kurus (Ottoman money) and the salaries would have to be paid without delay.523

Mahmud had also been following the European press very closely. The Ottoman diplomats, such as Nuri Effendi, Reşid Pasha, Namık Pasha, and Sarım Effendi, had been sending any articles they found from a European country which mentioned the Ottoman Empire.524

Sometimes, interesting offers would come to the Ottoman Government from the British: such as a British painter applied to the Ottoman Government to paint the Sultan’s portrait.525

7.7. 1838

From the point of view of cooperation, both in the diplomatic arena and the reform process, it seemed like the Anglo-Ottoman relations had reached its peak. It transpires that all Mahmud and his statesmen’s diplomatic efforts had brought relations to their best position thus far. Although William died on 20 June 1837, there was no change in British policies with respect to Eastern affairs, with Queen Victoria’s accession to the throne. Owing to the international relations between the Ottomans and the British being so cordial, this year was an active year for British support in the Ottoman’s reform progress.

In 1838, significant developments appeared following the efforts to reinforce the army in every possible way. The reason for this was that the imminent war between the Sultan and his governor seemed to be becoming more likely with each passing day. Therefore, Mahmud and his governments felt motivated to actively strengthen the Ottoman Army as soon as they could. The most urgent aspect of this matter was to improve and augment the army munitions, as had been happening in the previous years but now needed to happen much faster. For instance, the decision was made to buy some ammunition and cannonballs to increase the artillery fire power

525 BOA, File No: 1321 Document No 51608.
of some of the Castles to five hundred shots.\footnote{BOA, File No: 381 Document No 20579 L.} In addition to this the Department of War ordered that six hundred locks should be immediately produced for use with for the iron cannonballs imported from Britain and the bronze cannonballs produced in Istanbul.\footnote{BOA, File No: 373 Document No 20416 A.} The order was for the production should start immediately; Mahmud wanted a rapid victory against his rebel governor this time. Having good gunpowder was still very important during this year as well, so two hundred and eighty-two tons of gunpowder was ordered from Britain.\footnote{BOA, File No: 587 Document No 28870.} In addition to this, Hafiz Pasha, an Ottoman attendant in Sivas, had started to produce gunpowder there and he was able to inform central government that four kilograms gunpowder cost 18 Kurus. In response, they asked for the details of the costing such as whether the expenses of saltpetre, sulphur, and labourers were included in the price or not.\footnote{BOA, File No: 531 Document No 26180.} Hafiz Pasha had also begun to produce cannonballs. However, a warning came to the Ottoman Government from the British Embassy that these cannonballs might be of no use because of their size.\footnote{BOA, File No: 1089 Document No 48073.} In addition, the Ottoman War Office was able to report that one hundred and sixty-nine tons of gunpowder had been produced in the Ottoman Powder Mill.\footnote{BOA, File No: 110 Document No 5305.}

Despite these kinds of preparations, Mahmud and his statesmen had never seen the purchase of the necessary munitions from Europe as the only way to enhance the army; they also searched for a lasting solution better than foreign imports. The best way to achieve this aim was to produce their own munitions in their own country even if this production had to be made with the support of British experts and equipment. Consequently, the works to implement this plan continued throughout this year. For example, it was decided to bring an expert from Britain through Sarm Effendi in order to produce cannonballs in the ironworks under the British expert’s directorship.\footnote{BOA, File No: 20579 L.} Another example of this is found in the Pravişte iron foundry in Salonika, an Ottoman city in the Balkans, which was rented to the manager of the foundry, Haşim Bey, and they too decided to bring a British cannonball expert over to direct proceedings during the renewal process of the foundry.\footnote{BOA, File No: 20416 A.} To achieve the aim of independent manufacture, it had not only been beneficial to have British assistance to establish the factories in the short term,
but also, for the long term, some Ottomans had been sent to Europe to learn how to establish these types of factories for themselves. One such emissary was Colonel Bekir Bey. He was sent to Britain in 1834 to improve himself in the field of industrial science, and after his training the Ottoman government recalled him to Istanbul in 1838 to supervise the establishment of an ironworks in Istanbul for the production of equipment and machine tools to enable more factories to be set up in the Ottoman lands.\textsuperscript{534} Mahmud had successfully reaped the fruits of his labour in the field of his endeavours to comprehensively renew the Empire, by sending his subjects to Europe to learn the European system and bring the knowledge back to their country.

As well as these ongoing developments in the reform programme the British continued to visit Istanbul in this year for the purpose of educating the Ottoman officers. Quite interestingly, British tutors were not only brought for the instruction of the Ottoman officers, but also they were also even brought in for the Ottoman labourers. With the aid of this method it was possible to establish iron foundries in different regions in the Empire such as Samakofçuk, Praviște, and Samokov. Subsequently, a British tutor who was an expert in his field, a British engineer, and a British translator were brought to the Empire to train the labourers, to work in these iron foundries producing the cannonballs. For some time they were unable to receive their salaries, then the Ottoman government ordered that their accumulated salaries be paid to them in full.\textsuperscript{535} Mahmud, again not content with merely bringing British tutors to educate the Ottoman labourers, also sent some labourers to Britain in order to learn the new techniques in smelting and casting for use in the new iron foundry in Samakofçuk.\textsuperscript{536}

The British had not just come to the Ottoman lands to educate Ottoman officers and labourers or only for commerce with the Ottoman Empire; they also visited the Empire for scientific research, even though the real aim of that research was commercial. Likewise, in 1838, three British researchers came to the Empire sponsored by Britain in order to investigate the mines and vegetation in the Anatolian region. Ponsonby, who continued to play the role of advocate for British subjects’ rights, asked the Ottoman Government for their protection by the state officers wherever they went for their investigation.\textsuperscript{537} One of these cases was when a British citizen, who lived in Çesme an Ottoman county in the west died, and the Ottoman civil servant in the

\textsuperscript{534} BOA, File No: 587 Document No 28871.  
\textsuperscript{535} BOA, File No: 190 Document No 8221.  
\textsuperscript{536} BOA, File No: 16 Document No 1254 N.  
\textsuperscript{537} BOA, File No: 95 Document No 4745.
county, Ali Bey, seized possession of his field, which was two hundred and twenty acres. However; his inheritors had already sold the field to a man named Solomon. Despite this sale, the Foreign Minister ordered the expropriation of the field but Ponsonby put in a request to the Government to cancel this order.\textsuperscript{538} Thereupon, as a last resort, the problem was brought to the Ottoman Court in Istanbul, and the Judge of Çeşme was instructed that he should not make any ruling on this issue until after the result of the Court.\textsuperscript{539}

The much-debated issue of these years was that of the employment of the British officers. Many articles can be found in the UK records with respect to topic;\textsuperscript{540} however, something should be said from the Ottoman’ point of view of the matter. The perspective of Mahmud and his statesmen on these British Officers was completely different from that of Palmerston, whose main aim in sending these officers to Istanbul was that they should be employed in the Ottoman Army. However, the Ottomans’ aim was to use the British officers to provide training for the Ottoman Officers, and thereby, by extension, improve the whole army.\textsuperscript{541} Nevertheless, it transpires from the Ottoman records that when it came to 1838, the Ottoman statesmen were not so sure what they wanted to do with these officers and because of this, many secret negotiations took place amongst the Ottoman statesmen to determine this issue. First of all, it must be considered that although Mahmud and his statesmen’s main goal was to make an alliance with Britain, at the same time they had to consider keeping the balance of the diplomatic process in the region. They had to ensure that any action they embarked on would still appear to the Russians as if they were united allies. The majority of the documents reveal that whenever Mahmud made an order, or an Ottoman diplomat prepared a report in order to promote the benefits in making Anglo-Ottoman alliance, at the same time whoever was dealing with the diplomacy had warned that they should have to be very careful about how it would look to the Russians. For example, Mustafa Reşid prepared a secret report, and after explaining the benefits of employing British navy officers in the Ottoman Fleet, he warned that the Russians would have to be persuaded on this matter.\textsuperscript{542} The responsible diplomat for arranging the British officers’ employment in the Ottoman Fleet was Ahmet Fethi Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador in Paris.

\textsuperscript{538} BOA C..HR, File No: 119 Document No 5910.  
\textsuperscript{539} BOA, File No: 139 Document No 6930.  
\textsuperscript{540} For instance, Rodkey’s mentioned article is a nice example to look at the issue from the point of view of Foreign Office such as Palmerston and Ponsonby.  
\textsuperscript{541} BOA, File No: 1174 Document No 46427 C.  
\textsuperscript{542} BOA, File No: 628 Document No 31066.
opinion, stated in his report, was united with that of Reşid Pasha in that he thought to employ the British officers in the Fleet would be very beneficial for improvement but this situation would have to be implemented without upsetting the Russians and he also mentioned that he was in agreement with Kaptan Pasha, the Ottoman Foreign Minister, on this matter.\textsuperscript{543} Ahmet Fethi Pasha also met with the British ambassador to Paris and negotiated several times over this issue,\textsuperscript{544} also sending several encoded reports on it from Paris.\textsuperscript{545} Despite all these negotiations, in the end, Mahmud decided not to give his permission for the employment of these officers in the Ottoman Fleet. He gave a rescript on this issue which he ordered the Ottoman Navy Undersecretary to draught in the field, stating he would not be employing any foreign officers in the Ottoman Army and Navy. The Government responded that there was already a draft prepared for the British Officers for just such an eventuality, and it would be more useful to send it with the new one prepared by the Navy Undersecretary, to the Ministry of Justice.\textsuperscript{546}

Although there had been that clash of ideas about the employment of British officers in the Ottoman Army, Anglo-Ottoman relations still remained very positive, since the Russian danger motivated the British to seek the benefits of good Ottoman relations, and the Mehmed Ali problem for the Ottomans remained a motivating factor on the agenda. And so, in British public opinion also, a positive feeling had been engendered for the Ottomans. As a result of this, a British community interested in Eastern culture and morality was started in London.\textsuperscript{547} The Ottoman Envoy, Sarım Effendi, reported to Istanbul imparting some information about this group. He mentioned that this community regarded the Ottoman Empire as the biggest and most significant representative of the Eastern world, so it might be useful to send some handwriting books and printed Ottoman text and an appreciative letter from Istanbul.\textsuperscript{548} The same kind of warm affinity had manifested itself in British diplomacy as well. The Ottoman ambassador at Prussia, Kamil Pasha, reported from Berlin that the Russian ambassador to Prussia threw a ballroom party in Berlin and the British ambassador to Prussia came to the party wearing some

\textsuperscript{543} BOA, File No: 661 Document No 32268.
\textsuperscript{544} BOA, File No: 661 Document No 32268 D.
\textsuperscript{545} BOA, File No: 661 Document No 32268 F.
\textsuperscript{546} BOA, File No: 298 Document No 17701 D.
\textsuperscript{547} BOA, File No: 830 Document No 37506 F.
\textsuperscript{548} BOA, File No: 830 Document No 37506 F.
Ottoman clothes and a shawl. This is a prime example showing what good standing both countries’ relations were in at that moment.

Reşid Pasha was daily increasing the good impression he had upon Mahmud. First he was appointed as the Ottoman Ambassador to Paris in 1834, and then he was appointed as the Ottoman Ambassador to London in 1836. Eventually, Mahmud appointed him as head of the Foreign Office. As previously explained, he had sent many detailed reports from Europe to inform Mahmud about the latest developments in Europe, generally with respect to the European Powers’ current attitudes to the Mehmed Ali problem, and he did not like either the French or the Russians. As a matter of fact he was pro-British and had very much wanted to achieve this alliance with the British against all the Ottoman enemies: the first and foremost of these being Mehmed Ali, as his sovereign had wanted. Therefore Reşid Pasha’s appointment to the Foreign Office was perfectly suited to Mahmud’s plan and it was the reason behind the rapid increase in Ottoman diplomatic success. In this area, Reşid achieved many useful things, not only diplomatically and politically, but also he had embarked on some enterprises to establish close ties with eminent people in London to improve Anglo-Ottoman relations, such as to request from Mahmud permission to give some gifts to these kinds of people. For example, a medal studded with some precious stones was presented to Palmerston. Moreover, some gifts were given by Reşid Pasha to Queen Victoria and interestingly Palmerston’s mother. He also gave some gifts to the British ministers. Lastly, he gave some gifts to the Queen’s mother which Palmerston submitted to her and then informed Reşid Pasha he had done so. These things may have been just token gifts but they were given in an effort to improve Anglo-Ottoman relations, even if only slightly.

As mentioned, the employment of British Officers in the Ottoman Army was problematic; however, the same problem was not the rule for the other departments. On the contrary, employing British workers in other departments was seen as an advantage, to help improve the Empire in a positive way. For example, at the beginning of the 1830s, some councils on different subjects were established for the purpose of the enhancement of state and society. In order to

---

549 BOA, File No: 1209 Document No 47373 M.
550 BOA C..HR, File No: 185 Document No 9237.
551 BOA, File No: 1179 Document No 46569 E.
552 BOA, File No: 382 Document No 20584.
553 BOA, File No: 1179 Document No 46569 J.
improve these councils, a British man was employed. According to the records, he was an expert in agriculture and craft and it was considered beneficial to employ him on one of the Ottoman councils, such as farming, agriculture, handicraft, or industry.554

Moreover, the former British translator Sapper so called in the records, requested a license from the Sultan to build and run a bake house in Istanbul. After a while, Mahmud gave his permission and in addition to this he also gave him twenty thousand Kurus to repair his house.555 The Ottoman chamberlain, who was responsible for all bakery houses in Istanbul, was also notified of this.556

Ponsonby, as previously illustrated, sometimes stood in as advocate for the British merchants’ rights to the Ottoman Central Government. However, this time, interestingly enough, he advocated for an internal issue in favour of the Ottoman Empire. The British Consul at Erzurum, a city in the East, informed Ponsonby that the richest person in the city had been oppressing the public in the city and consequently, the public rose up against him.557 Thereupon, central government was informed of the incident by Ponsonby and it sent an official letter to warn the person involved.558 This situation shows how the British expanded their influence throughout the Empire from the second half of 1833.

The most significant development for the Ottomans in 1838 was the treaty of Balta Limani, a commercial treaty which was signed on 16 August 1838 between The Ottoman Empire and Britain. This chapter does not scrutinize this treaty since it is to be examined in a separate chapter in combination with the Mehmed Ali problem, Mahmud’s plan and his statesmen’s diplomatic efforts.

555 BOA, File No: 1211 Document No 47432 A.
556 BOA, File No: 951 Document No 40844 C.
557 BOA, File No: 702 Document No 33738 A.
558 BOA, File No: 695 Document No 33497.
This year’s most significant feature in terms of commercial life in the Empire was the increasing number of British merchants trading in the Ottoman lands as local merchants. The biggest reason for this was the treaty of Balta Limani. After this Treaty, British merchants only paid twelve percent on exports and five percent on imports. In addition to these tariffs, there was an eight percent duty required from Ottomans who carried on domestic trade. However, while the Ottoman merchants had to pay this duty, foreign merchants did not have to pay it any more after Balta Limani. So from every point of view, foreign merchants had been given an advantage over Ottoman merchants in domestic competition.

It is not goal of this chapter to examine this period from the point of view of the diplomatic and political developments, nor to discuss the various motives, aspects and repercussions of the Treaty of Balta Limani. The main aim of the chapter is to indicate, with examples of actual cases, large and small, the nature and tone of the improved Anglo-Ottoman relationships after the treaty of Unkiair Skelessi. Therefore, the rest of the chapter is given over to providing actual examples of developments in social and commercial life from this year in order to contribute to an informative illustration of this period in history.

The increasing number of British merchants in Ottoman life after the Treaty of Balta Limani brought many problems with it. For example, a British citizen, called Marcus in the document, emigrated and got married in Silivri, a district close to Istanbul, and began to trade there. However, he had some problems with the locals and the Ottoman authorities. The public in Silivri complained about Marcus’s inappropriate behaviour. According to them this kind of behaviour offended their sensibilities and the dignity of Islam. This man also had some problems with the authorities with respect to payment of the customs duties due on his imports of coffee and sugar, and had disputes with the Ottoman officials. For all these reasons, the Ottoman Foreign Office made a ruling on the matter, and gave notice to the British Embassy that Marcus was to be moved somewhere else in Istanbul or he would be sent back to his own country, Britain.

560 BOA C..HR, File No: 58 Document No 2870.
561 BOA C..HR, File No: 11 Document No 539.
Another interesting matter in the commercial life after the Balta Limani happened when the British and French Embassies’ translators brought some elephant's tusks and dates from Tripoli and also some bathrobes from Tunis for trading purposes. They wanted to take advantage of the privileges of the treaty of the Balta Limani regarding payment of the customs tariffs; however, this request was not accepted by the Ottoman Government.\textsuperscript{562}

Meanwhile, a conflict arose between the Ottoman authorities and the British Consul at Salonika. A Russian Merchant ship had an accident off the coast of Aynaroz, an Ottoman district in the Balkans. Some of the money and goods on the ship belonged to a British merchant. All the goods on the ship were under the governor and his officers’ supervision and then submitted to the shipmaster’s brother and agent and in return for a written document from the agent. After a while, the British Consul applied and indicated that the British merchant’s goods and money had been seized and therefore, he requested their return to the merchant. Following this request, the problem was investigated by the Central Government and the Ottoman Foreign Minister was able to inform Ponsonby that the money and goods had already been submitted earlier and thus the Consul’s application was in error.\textsuperscript{563}

Another interesting incident with respect to a British merchant was that he was dismissed from his coffee shop in Beyoğlu, which is a famous district in Istanbul, since he was mixing fake substances such as chickpea and so on with his coffee.\textsuperscript{564} This is a very clear example how, in the new atmosphere in Istanbul after Unkiar Skelessi, the British had taken their place in the Ottoman life with all their pluses and minuses. Another example of this matter was when an Arabic odalisque, or slave girl, was found in a British citizen’s house and was taken from the house and returned.\textsuperscript{565}

Meanwhile, the Ottoman government issued a decree that any civil trials needed for British and French citizens should be processed with their ambassadors and consuls or agents in attendance. This was in accordance with the treaties, which had been struck with these countries.\textsuperscript{566} It seems that the Ottoman politicians were trying to bring their procedures in line with the rest of European society.

\textsuperscript{562} BOA C..HR, File No: 169 Document No 8419.
\textsuperscript{563} BOA C..HR File No: 7 Document No 311.
\textsuperscript{564} BOA C..HR, File No: 103 Document No 5115.
\textsuperscript{565} BOA C..HR, File No: 104 Document No 5200.
\textsuperscript{566} BOA C..HR, File No: 12 Document No 586.
Increasing inter-Anglo-Ottoman trade triggered the significant issue of piracy. With increasing trade, pirates started to operate in the seas. There were many incidents of piracy on the seas but it will suffice to provide only a few to convey understanding of this new issue which was a feature of this period.

An Ottoman citizen, was called Yani Eksino, was carrying some goods in a Swedish ship towards Algeria. British pirates attacked the ship and seized all Yani’s goods saying they were French goods. The French were historically rivals of the British in the Mediterranean.\(^{567}\) Thereupon, the Ottoman civil servant Ali Pasha prepared a report and suggested that the value of the merchant’s assets should be requested from the British Embassy.\(^ {568}\) Another similar incident seen in this year was when a Muslim merchant was carrying his goods from Alexandria to Istanbul in a French ship and his goods were extorted from him after a British pirate ship attack. His assets’ value was requested from the British Embassy as well.\(^ {569}\) Nevertheless, it wasn’t only British pirates who had been attacking ships, but there were also some Ottoman pirates. Ibrahim Reis attacked a British ship and seized the goods of a British merchant and this time the British ambassador applied to the governor of Rumelia to get the merchant’s assets back.\(^ {570}\)

On the other hand, the positive contributions from the British had continued to improve the Ottoman Empire in this year as well. In this respect, a British engineer Mister Tyler was decorated for his valuable services in the Ottoman Armoury.\(^ {571}\) Also, another British engineer, Roberson, had prepared an explanatory document about the necessity to establish an iron foundry in the Keban Mine.\(^ {572}\)

There is a purchase record showing the Ottoman mentality in export operations. A British merchant bought twenty thousand barrel staves in order to take them to Malta, and Ponsonby requested permission for the ship to pass thorough the straits. However, at first, the head of the shipyard was asked whether these barrel staves were a needed in the shipyard or not. His reply was that there was no need for them in there, whereupon the ship was allowed to pass.\(^ {573}\) In the

\(^ {567}\) BOA C..HR, File No: 123 Document No 6149.
\(^ {568}\) BOA C..HR, File No: 9 Document No 448.
\(^ {569}\) BOA C..HR, File No: 23 Document No 1109.
\(^ {570}\) BOA, File No: 23 Document No 1108.
\(^ {571}\) BOA C..AS, File No: 1 Document No 1202.
\(^ {572}\) BOA C..DRB, File No: 31 Document No 1515.
\(^ {573}\) BOA C..HR, File No: 102 Document No 5080.
Empire the keynote principal before permission for an export had been to give priority for domestic use of the supplies.

There are many such incidents from this period but the most important thing to consider in the light of the main argument of the thesis is that Mahmud’s plan, to make an alliance with Britain against Mehmed Ali, was conducive to a new period in the Anglo-Ottoman cooperation to improve and enhance the Ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact, before the 1830s, Mahmud had already achieved the status of being one of the most significant reformer Sultans, maybe even the first. However, the gravity of the Mehmed Ali problem had impelled him to give priority to the British in modernising his Empire according to Western principles. All examined incidents in the chapter comprehensively reveal, not just in theory but in reality, the level of influence the British had in the Ottoman reform period in the new period that had been brought about after Unk iar Skelessi. It must be acknowledged that Mahmud was not alone in the task of getting British support in the reform process; he had the help of some skilled and determined diplomats, such as Mustafa Reşid, Namık Pasha, Nuri Effendi, Sarım Effendi etc. Mahmud’s and all these diplomats’ vigorous efforts irreversibly lead the Empire to totally a new age. This age came to be called the Tanzimat Era, and it was to make all the efforts mentioned inscriptive; more lasting and purposeful than spontaneous or haphazard decisions. By this means the reform period gained international recognition and a more organised atmosphere, even though Mahmud did not live long enough to see his top diplomat, Mustafa Reşid, make his announcement of the script, Imperial Edict of Reorganization, on 3 November 1839, to the Ottoman public and all the ambassadors, including Ponsonby.
FINAL CHAPTER
The Culmination of Sultan Mahmud's Diplomacy Prior to his Ultimate Critical Battle with Mehmed Ali

From Mahmud’s point of view, the right time had finally come for a particular move he had in mind which would put an end to all the trouble his rebel governor had caused. As a matter of fact, as has been analysed from every perspective, his every diplomatic manoeuvre and order since the defeat at Konya, at the end of 1832, had been aimed in the direction of gaining British support, and at the same time handling the international position with regard to the Russians with great care. Simultaneously he was laying the foundations to enhance and reform the Empire in every respect: militarily, economically, administratively, and socially, by drawing upon European support and experience, especially that of the British. It is in this context that this chapter will examine in detail not only the Sultan and his statesmen’s final preparations to enhance the army for the ultimate battle with Mehmed Ali’s army, but also Mahmud’s and his diplomats’ struggle to solve the problem with diplomatically negotiated support from the British, as they had been trying to do since the outset of these difficulties. Nevertheless, the aim of this chapter is not to describe the final battle between the Sultan and his governor since this has already been done in detail by Turkish and English scholars. Subsequently, the main goal of this final chapter is to examine Mahmud and his statesmen’s final diplomatic and military preparations, which involved the extensive use of diplomacy whilst at the same time enhancing the Empire with European support, particularly from the British, before the deciding battle with

574 As described in the previous chapters, Mahmud’s and his diplomats’ primary objective was always to make an alliance with Britain against Mehmed Ali, even when he called the Russians to the Bosporus and made the treaty of Unkia Skelessi with them. Many Ottoman documents confirm that the Russians were being used as a weapon to wake the British up to how important the Ottoman Empire was to the protection of British interests in the region. Of course, the Russians were, at the same time, a temporary solution enabling the Sultan to bring Ibrahim Pasha to a halt, as, until the implementation of the Anglo-Ottoman alliance against Mehmed Ali and the Russians, he had been rapidly advancing with his army towards the heart of the Empire, Istanbul. Despite this pro-British atmosphere in this entire period, 1833-39, the weapon, Russia, had to be tactfully in the event of any possible repercussions from the Russians finding out they were being used. However, when looking at the relevant diplomatic events in the light of the other chapters, it could safely be said that Mahmud and his statesmen had been successful in their efforts on this matter.

575 All detailed examples of British influence, between 1833 and 1839, upon the enhancement of the Empire in every aspect can be found in the seventh chapter of this work.
Mehmed Ali on 24 June 1839. For this reason this chapter will conclude this thesis’ attempt to uncover the true story of Mahmud and his statesmen’s diplomatic efforts, by recounting their final political manoeuvres of 1838 and in the first half of 1839. In this respect, this chapter will contribute, as have the other chapters aimed to do, to showing to what extent Mahmud and his government had had a role in bringing about in the European powers, particularly Britain, support for the Ottoman Empire in this fatal problem.

1838 was a crucial year for Mahmud to make the final provisions for his plans to win all the available diplomatic support to his side and at the same time, as far as possible to make ready his own army for the anticipated battle against his rebel governor’s forces. Concerning this, he ordered on 20 February 1838, that Mustafa Reşid Pasha, who was the Ottoman Foreign Minister at that time, should be sent to France as the Ottoman Ambassador; and Ahmed Pasha, the governor in Aydın, should also be sent to Britain as the Ottoman Ambassador. According to the instructions he gave, the main aim of these appointments was to negotiate with the British and the French about Mahmud’s final plan with respect to the Mehmed Ali problem. Mahmud was aggrieved that Mehmed Ali was violating the treaty of Kutahya every day by his army relentlessly advancing towards to the provinces which were not in his jurisdiction. However, by shrewdly registering his protest with these countries he was paving the way for their understanding and approval in the eventuality his own forces had to make the first strike against Mehmed. Mahmud was planning to attack Mehmed Ali’s army in Syria, Aleppo, in the autumn of 1838, and by ensuring the European Countries knew Mahmud was the injured party, he could feel more confident of their support when the critical time came. In this respect, these two Ottoman Ambassadors were instructed to strive to induce both these countries to pledge him their support and win their approval for the intervention of the Central Government should the situation demand. It seems that Mahmud did not want to wait any longer to see the fruits of his diplomatic labour; with which he had been carefully preparing the way ahead since the beginning of 1833. However, the Ottoman statesman responsible for these last preparations for the battle reported that although this plan was applicable, when the time came, with acceptance from both

576 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, (The Original Name of the Ottoman Archives which is in Istanbul and involves all the Ottoman Documents from 1299 to 1923, and it will be referred to as BOA in the rest of the chapter) File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.
577 BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.
578 BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.
countries, at the same time more work needed to be discreetly undertaken in order to augment the quantity of ammunition accessible by the army.

Mahmud also made known to the relevant parties that if Mehmed Ali did not content himself with the provinces that he had obtained with the treaty of Kütahya, and if he attempted to challenge the Central Government and requisition even more of the lands which were not currently under his control, such as Bagdad or any other province, then this act would mean that the first act of aggression had come from him not from the Sultan, in consequence of this provocative manoeuvre by the Pasha. Mahmud went on to tell his diplomats that Britain and France should be ready to acknowledge that the Sultan had the right of intervention when it came to restraint of his rebel governor. Mahmud’s persistence, it seemed, was continuing to win British favour to his side in 1838, just as much as it had done in 1833 and Mahmud knew very well that first and foremost, he would have to prepare Palmerston to support the eventuality of a possible intervention, since Palmerston had not previously been very supportive of the idea of Mahmud’s attacking Mehmed Ali without the Egyptian army making the first move against the Sultan’s army. In this context Rodkey recounts that Palmerston said Britain:

“would undoubtedly assist him to repel any attack on the part of Mehemet Ali, it would, on the other hand, be a different question if the war was begun by the Sultan”

Rodkey also has explained the reason for this opinion of Palmerston’s in that:

“until the renewal of war between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt in 1839 Palmerston consistently counselled the Turkish government to keep the peace in the Levant in order that it might succeed with its plans for military and administrative reorganization, and on more than one occasion he took practical steps to further Ottoman reform.”

For these reasons Mahmud was aware that he needed to find reasonable and acceptable grounds to attack to his rebel governor should the occasion arise; he seems, however, to have assumed that if he had such grounds, the British would come to his aid if needed, an assumption based on his hopes that his armies were superior to those of the rebel Pasha. It would take the failure of the second assumption – and an international crisis – to produce such intervention.

---

579 BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.
581 Ibid, p. 576-577
Mahmud also indicated in his rescript that all statesmen should make the utmost efforts to dispel and repel all hazard and damage from Mehmed Ali, however he took pains to reassure them that Mehmed Ali would not dare to attack to any district which was under the Central Government jurisdiction. Nonetheless, these precautionary preparations, he continued in his orders, should be calmly made by laying down the suggested defensive preparations. In response, the governor of Urfa requested from the Sultan that any ammunition from the other further out provinces should be immediately transferred to Baghdad and to the cities near to it, as this was the nearest populated area to his advancing troops. This was vital, he added, since he had received news from Egypt that Mehmed Ali had established nine new regiments in Egypt and also at the same time the Pasha had sent the troops he had in Damascus to Egypt as well, and lastly, on top of that he had dispatched his generals to Aleppo and nearby cities. Mahmud and his statesmen had been careful to follow all Mehmed Ali’s moves very closely. In this case, the report about the governor was extremely detailed in all the latest developments and the activities he made in the region. For obvious reasons was it very useful to Mahmud and his statesmen to be well informed about all Mehmed Ali’s recent activities and also extremely informative to the observer to be able to see such detailed troop movements and appreciate how the Sultan responded. According to this report, the Egyptian troops had recently been dispatched to Gülek, a district in the South Mediterranean, by Mehmed Ali. There they were defeated; a proportion of them were killed and the rest of them had to retreat from the region. Thereupon, Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Mehmed Ali, took along almost five regiments of troops from Aleppo and attacked Gülek again. There were several reasons for Ibrahim’s attack Gülek from the governor of Urfa’s point of view: one of them could have been that he wanted revenge for the previous defeat in Gülek, or perhaps one of them was that Mehmed Ali wanted to distract the European Powers from his latest secret military preparations in the region. A third possibility was that he might have had the intention to first withdraw to Damascus, regroup, and then move towards Basra or Bagdad.

On the occasions when Mehmed Ali was defeated, Mahmud was of course pleased. However, he warned his statesmen that they should not be deceived by Mehmed Ali’s latest protestations that

---

582 BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.
583 BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.
584 BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.
he only really wanted peace. Mahmud was not taken in by these claims, and warned his government that Mehmed Ali would not give up on his real aims so easily and the only reason for this temporary appearance of peace-making was to give him time to regroup after his army’s latest debacles in various locations.  

He also stated in his rescript that Mehmed Ali was obliged to appear to be conciliatory, since the European powers had changed their opinion about Mehmed Ali after they saw his defeats; but this façade was only one of Mehmed Ali’s tricks and was bound to be short-lived. Mahmud’s wording started to become sterner and more direct as he continued with the observation that now everybody could understand how Mehmed Ali had betrayed his religion, and was a traitor to his state, and therefore if anybody had ever trusted him, they could clearly no longer do so. Finally, Mahmud ordered that for all these reasons, all the preparations against Mehmed Ali that he had recommended should be made, but nevertheless, until the right time came no direct action should be taken against him.  

Mahmud seemed to be determined to completely resolve his biggest problem this time. In accordance with this purpose, he put all his efforts into optimizing both the diplomatic conditions, and his army’s readiness, for war.

After the Sultan’s order, the governor of Urfa reported that actually he had already been ceaselessly undertaking secret military preparations, even prior to the order. In this respect, he had established sixteen battalions of “redif” troops and six battalions of redif artillerymen from Sivas, Diyarbekir, Urfa, and some other cities, and dispatched them to the Bagdad region.

All of these reports show that both sides, Mahmud and Mehmed Ali, had been careering towards a confrontation in battle at a great pace, yet at the same time both sides were seeking to win diplomatic support to their side during this process.

On the Central Government’s side, preparations did not only involve the establishment of the new redif troops, but also a drive to increase the amount of available ammunition, and additionally, efforts to fulfil other deficiencies with respect to army equipment had also continued unrelentingly. In this respect, the governor indicated that the soldiers’ raincoats and clothing, made in white cloth because it was spring, should be supplied and also, he added, three

---

587 Redif means those Ottoman troops who had completed their mission in the army, after which they were on standby to be recalled to the army.
588 BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.
hundred dirhams, a kind of the Ottoman money, for food for the soldiers, and from ten to twenty para, another form of Ottoman currency, should be given to the soldiers as their salary.\textsuperscript{589}

As agreed in the Treaty of Kutahya, Mehmed Ali took on the responsibility of administering Syria and Adana as well as Egypt. However, after the signing of the treaty, he took the privileges the treaty offered and, disregarding its terms of restraint, started to attack to the cities which were under the Sultan’s control, such as Urfa, and Maras. Due to this aggression, the governor of Urfa stated in his report that because of the close proximity of Mehmed Ali’s troops to his city, he also had established three redif battalions, and five hundred Ottoman soldiers had been assigned to Urfa in order to drill these redif troops.\textsuperscript{590} In addition to these precautions, the governor stated that if Mehmed Ali’s army did attack Urfa, they would also need eight thousand pouches of Akçe, the Ottoman currency, in order to meet the army’s requirements for supplies.

Following on from these developments came an extensive report with respect to the latest situation of the Mehmed Ali problem, in terms of the diplomatic conditions. This was presented to Mahmud.\textsuperscript{591} According to the report, the European powers, most notably Britain, were beginning to manifest their true opinions about Mehmed Ali Pasha and they were clearly in favour of the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, Ponsonby sent a diplomatic note to the Pasha stating that it was his duty as a governor to pay his eighteen months accumulated tax liabilities to the central government, and not to keep them for his own purposes. This show of support for the Ottomans, and international condemnation of Mehmed Ali Pasha was very useful, the report said, in terms of political benefits and advantages.\textsuperscript{592}

The complex diplomatic situation between the Sultan and the Pasha had been developing rapidly, as the end of the problem approached. In this context, the Ottoman statesmen had started to watch Mehmed Ali’s actions very closely. In accordance with this purpose some Ottoman officials had been assigned to monitor the Egyptian Fleet’s movements in and out of the Egyptian harbour which enabled a detailed report to be prepared and presented to the Marine Minister. After this report, Central Government ordered that no concessions or assistance should be given to Mehmed Ali over any land occupation or harbouring his fleet and he would be most insistent

\textsuperscript{589} BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.
\textsuperscript{590} BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.
\textsuperscript{591} BOA, File No: 382 Document No: 20584.
\textsuperscript{592} BOA, File No: 382 Document No: 20584.
on this matter, because carrying out this order would effectively block any sedition.\textsuperscript{593} This order, following closely after monitoring the movements of Mehmed Ali’s vessels had not only been about curbing Mehmed Ali’s armada but also applied to the activities of sympathetic Ottoman officials, who had been secretly supporting Mehmed Ali. One of them was the Major General of Maras, a city in the East; Süleyman Pasha. It was understood that he was a supporter of the rebel governor and therefore it was imperative that he should be excluded from Maras forthwith. Hafız Pasha was appointed to carry out this mission.\textsuperscript{594} This time, Mahmud was being very cautious and rigorously scrutinising the problem from every possible angle, trying to pre-empt every possible mishap.

In addition to all these preparations Mahmud wanted to improve his army’s technical infrastructure by taking advantage of the expertise and availability of foreign army officers. As the chapter on the Ottoman Empire reform process describes, initially a lot of British officials were brought to the Empire to enhance and educate the new and inexperienced Ottoman Army. However, later on, Mahmud and Palmerston desisted from further usage of foreign army’s officers for training purposes Mahmud had only wanted these British Officers to educate the Ottoman officers in training techniques and improve the army in its ability to utilise technical equipment; but Palmerston, conversely, had wanted his officers to occupy permanent positions of command within the Ottoman Army. Therefore, Mahmud had turned to the Prussian officers as a more suitable source of the assistance he was looking for, and started to bring some of them over, in order to prepare the Ottoman Army for the last and biggest battle against Mehmed Ali.\textsuperscript{595}

Meanwhile, the practice of strengthening friendly British relations through private connections with the more influential members of society had increased, so that more British support could be mustered before the final battle. In line with this purpose, Mahmud sent a necklace studded with valuable precious stones to both the Queen Victoria and her mother. As an interesting aside about the necklace; there was an Ottoman coin, which was made from a valuable Turkish stone, called Akik Taşi, placed in the middle of the necklace. On this coin were written some Turkish words. This was done because Ottoman money was much in demand and highly respected in Europe at

\textsuperscript{593} BOA, File No: 382 Document No: 20584.  
\textsuperscript{594} BOA, File No: 382 Document No: 20584.  
\textsuperscript{595} BOA, File No: 382 Document No: 20584.
that time.\textsuperscript{596} In addition to this, some Turkish furs and tapestries were sent to the Queen and her mother and a number of British ministers were also sent some gifts.\textsuperscript{597} These gifts were only small tokens but as Palmerston had assured, when he sent five horses as a gift to the Sultan in the name of the King a few years ago that “\textit{these horses were not so valuable themselves in financial terms but they would be a strong evidence to show Mehmed Ali and the Russians that Britain would stand by the Ottomans’ side in all circumstances.”}\textsuperscript{598} Now it was the Ottoman’s turn to show Mehmed Ali and the other powers, with their token gifts that the British were with them to help resolve any problems.

Meantime, as a matter of course, diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and the other European powers had been ongoing in the context of the Mehmed Ali problem. One of the most significant parties on the diplomatic scene was Metternich. The Austrian Ambassador in Istanbul informed the Ottoman Government that Metternich sent a message to Mahmud suggesting that he decrease his latest military preparations against Mehmed Ali. Metternich also made a most surprising offer: to resolve the Ottoman’s problem without having to go to war\textsuperscript{599} It seems that Palmerston was not alone in feeling anxious about the prospect of disrupting European peace with a war between the Sultan and his governor. Interestingly, Mahmud responded to this offer saying that if Britain would join in with this possible attempt at an alternative solution as an allied country, he was inclined to accept this offer and told the Austrian Ambassador that he could indicate this response thus to Metternich.\textsuperscript{600} This response is more evidence demonstrating Mahmud’s strong desire for cooperation with Britain to solve the problem. Although all recent signs indicated that Mahmud was gearing up to eradicate his biggest problem with a final decisive battle, it seems that he had been weighing up the international balance of power and waiting until the time was right to employ an alternative solution.

At this stage, analysis of the latest diplomatic developments from the point of view of the Ottoman side shows that all Mahmud’s and his diplomats’, efforts since the beginning of the problem, as described in the previous chapters, had finally started to yield their results. By the time 1838 came around, it seems that there was no longer any feeling of hesitancy in the majority

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{596} BOA, File No: 382 Document No: 20584.
  \item \textsuperscript{597} BOA, File No: 1179 Document No: 46569 J.
  \item \textsuperscript{598} BOA, File No: 1190 Document No:46879 001
  \item \textsuperscript{599} BOA, File No: 381 Document No: 20567.
  \item \textsuperscript{600} BOA, File No: 381 Document No: 20567.
\end{itemize}
of the British with regards to supporting the Ottoman Empire. By way of example, when the
Ottoman Prime Minister and Ponsonby had a meeting, they decided to join the Ottoman and
British Armadas in the Lesbos and Chios to make a stronger force against Mehmed Ali. In this
meeting Ponsonby asked the Prime Minister if in the eventuality of a war occurring between
Central Government and the rebel governor, and if the Russians offered to help Central
Government by sending the Russian fleet and troops to the battlefield, what would the Ottoman
government do about this offer?601 The time had come for Palmerston and Ponsonby to find
out from Mahmud and his ministers their opinions on whether, in their minds, the conditions of
the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had lost their validity or not. In fact, the abolition of the treaty of
Unkiar Skelessi was Palmerston’s single most important aim in Eastern affairs.

At the same time, Britain had also started to make efforts to encourage the other powers in
Europe to approach the Ottoman Government with help to solve the problem in diplomatic ways.
In this respect, the British agreed to share their significant privileges, which had ensued from the
treaty of Balta Limani, 16 August 1838, with the other European Countries, in order to create an
alliance against Mehmed Ali. For example, the Ottoman Ambassador in Vienna, Mehmed Rifat
Bey, reported that Queen Victoria had stated in her speech on the opening day of the British
Parliament that a commercial treaty with the Austrians, much like the treaty of Balta Limani
would be very useful and beneficial for Austria, Britain and the Ottoman Empire.602 In the same
vein, the old rivals in the Levant, Britain and France, had celebrated a commercial treaty signed
together with the Ottoman Empire, with a banquet prepared by the Ottoman Government.603

Meanwhile, the Ottomans continued to prepare their Army for the imminent battle with the
Egyptian Army. In accordance with this purpose, they put in an order with Britain, France and
Russia for body armour/uniforms.604

As mentioned above, the Ottoman Fleet had started to act jointly with the British Fleet in the
Mediterranean Sea. Unsurprisingly, the Russians found this a most irksome state of affairs. By
way of example of this, the Prussian Ambassador in Istanbul communicated to the Ottoman
Foreign Minister that the latest manoeuvres of the Ottoman Fleet along with the British war ships

602 BOA, File No: 685 Document No: 33266 H.
603 BOA, File No: 737 Document No: 34965 E.
around Izmir, (an Ottoman city in the Mediterranean) was making the Russians anxious. It seems that Mahmud felt he could now gradually start to leave aside being careful not to offend the Russians, as he had had to do for so long when he was striving to make the Anglo-Ottoman Alliance possible. His real diplomatic plan’s true colours had begun to come out. Moreover, news had even started to appear in the British Press that if Mehmed Ali’s army started a war against the Central Government, it was planned that the British Fleet would go to Alexandria to prevent the Egyptian army from causing any harm to the Ottoman Empire. Such rumours abounded, and encouraged Mahmud to think that if he did act, the British would be on his side.

These feelings were increased by reports from the Ottoman ambassador in Prussia, Kamil Pasha, who informed Istanbul that Britain had given formal notice to Mehmed Ali that the British supported the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and not his anarchic endeavours. The British Government wanted to reassure Mahmud and his ministers and in this respect, they also indicated to the Ottoman Ambassador in London, Sarım Effendi that the British would always be on the Ottoman side and continue to support them in their struggle against the Egyptian problem. At the same time, Reşid Pasha, the Ottoman Foreign Minister, had been attempting to create a public opinion in Europe against Mehmed Ali; and in order to do that he had been getting in touch with the European Powers. From the Topkapi Palace, the view was looking favourable for a time of reckoning with the over-mighty governor of Egypt.

But Mehmed Ali had not been sitting by idly and watching Mahmud’s diplomatic manoeuvres; on the contrary, he continued to be diplomatically active as well. He started to openly declare that he would not desist from seeking to gain his independence. Palmerston, although he was out of London at that moment, sent a letter to Sarım Effendi about this bold announcement, saying that Mehmed Ali’s last declaration had been made in order to find out how the European Powers would react, and when he got back to London he would like to meet and negotiate about this topic in detail with Sarım Effendi. Sarım Effendi reported after completing his round with his contacts among the British politicians in London that the British had a good mind to resolve the
problem for the benefit of the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{611} Another diplomat aside from Sarım Effendi, who had been very active in this process, was Kamil Pasha in Prussia. He met with the British Charge D'Affaires in Prussia in order to find out what was happening with respect to the latest negotiations in the British Government about the Mehmed Ali problem.\textsuperscript{612} All of this active enquiry-making from the Ottoman diplomats show that they had been working hard under the Sultan’s direction to successfully achieve their objective of resolving the problem with the help of the British.

Ibrahim Pasha, had also been watching developments and preparing for war. He, too, had been determined to enhance his army in preparation for the last battle. In this context, he tried to gather some weapons from the Dürzi people, a kind of religious community in the Ottoman Empire, but they refused to give up their weapons to Ibrahim and fought against him.\textsuperscript{613}

The diplomatic complexities increased as events moved towards crisis. For instance, although Britain and France had sternly warned Ibrahim Pasha to not attempt any kind of attack upon the Central Government’s troops, at the same time these two powers gave notice to the Central Government that if the Russians assisted the Ottoman Government, then they would support the opposite side: Ibrahim Pasha.\textsuperscript{614} All players in the game seemed, as it were, to place their last diplomatic card. But if the Europeans thought that they had the power to prevent the actors in the East from pursuing their own plans they were, not for the first or last time, over estimating their influence. As this study has attempted to show, the Ottomans were seeking to use the Chancelleries of Europe as much as the latter were trying to us them.

The Ottoman Empire had been very sensitive to the diplomatic balance between all the countries in the region as well. Although Mahmud and his diplomats had been striving to gain British support, they had also been endeavouring not to cause the Russians to have misgivings about their true aims. This extreme sensitivity can be seen in the curious matter of an article containing positive points about the Sultan. It was printed by the Ottoman government, and would have been reproduced in the British newspapers but for the fact that when Mahmud saw the article he adjudged it to be unsuitable for republication in that form, in case the Russians might see the

\textsuperscript{611} BOA, File No: 830 Document No: 37506.
\textsuperscript{612} BOA, File No: 829 Document No: 37502 B.
\textsuperscript{613} BOA, File No: 381 Document No: 20579 H.
\textsuperscript{614} BOA, File No: 381 Document No: 20579 H
Sultan effectively being praised by Britain and be offended at the cordial relations the article implied. For this reason, Mahmud ordered his ministers to have the style of the article softened so as not to be so effusive. Consequently, a British official was assigned to submit the new version of the article to the British newspapers. In the light of this example it could be said that Mahmud and his skilful diplomats were not just basing their diplomatic policies on only one possibility, on the contrary, they were aware that they had to consider all possibilities in this diplomatic struggle, from all angles.

It was in this context that Mahmud ordered his ministers that they should be very careful about the latest diplomatic process in Europe and they should use the correct language when the right times came in order to ensure the European powers’ support of the Ottomans concerning the Mehmed Ali problem.

Meanwhile, Sarım Effendi delivered a secret report from London that he had met with Palmerston. This report stated that Britain was of one mind with the Sultan about the Mehmed Ali problem, and they would not in the least support Mehmed Ali in his struggle for independence. Sarım Effendi also indicated from London that after this meeting Palmerston sent a letter to Campbell, the British Ambassador in Alexandria, that Britain would not in any sense consent to, encourage or uphold Mehmed Ali’s separation from the Central Government. This was just the kind of unequivocal support the Sultan had been working towards, and a far cry from the initial lukewarm response he had received at the outset.

At the same time as these diplomatic developments, and as touched upon earlier in a separate chapter, there were two significant developments in the second half of the 1830s that had put the Anglo-Ottoman relationship on a very good footing. One of them was the Treaty of Balta Limani and the other was the Anglo-Ottoman cooperation to reform the Ottoman Empire and enhance its infrastructure. In particular, Mahmud wanted to use the Treaty of Balta Limani to completely win the British on his side, despite there being many negative features within the treaty which would straiten, somewhat, the Ottoman economic life. Moreover, the cooperation between the British and the Ottomans in the reform process to strengthen the Empire against Mehmed Ali and the

---

615 BOA, File No: 382 Document No: 20592.
616 BOA, File No: 452 Document No: 22409 C.
617 BOA, File No: 831 Document No: 37519 A.
618 BOA, File No: 831 Document No: 37519 B.
Russians, resulted in much-improved Anglo-Ottoman relations. Mahmud also took the advantage of the positive diplomatic atmosphere in his Empire's favour to reform his Empire by rallying European support in this process, which was one of Mahmud's most important goals.

With these last positive diplomatic developments, even though Palmerston and Metternich’s apprehension about preventing the shattering of European peace had been on the agenda; from Mahmud’s point of view the diplomatic atmosphere seemed to be ready for the last operation against Mehmed Ali. The two most significant figures in the European diplomacy had tacitly expressed that they were in favour of the Ottomans defending their territory with a retaliatory strike against the provocation of Mehmed Ali’s unchecked army advances, and that that they had a right to intervene against Mehmed Ali after he had so blatantly violated the conditions of the treaty of Kütahya by attacking to his sovereign’s territories. Furthermore, in reference to the previous section, since 1826 Mahmud and his statesmen had been applying their utmost endeavours to the improvement of the new and inexperienced Ottoman Army, Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye. Furthermore, now he had gained the European countries’ support, and in particular, as described in the chapter about the reform programme, with the efforts the British made after the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi to educate the Ottoman officers and enhance the ammunition of the Ottoman Army, Mahmud had started to think that his army was now perhaps strong enough to beat his governor’s army. His renewed opinion about his forces potency meant that in his mind’s eye, this time was going to be completely different from the battles he had lost in Syria and in Konya in 1832. As a matter of fact Mahmud was not altogether unreasonable in thinking like this, since this time, he not only had on his side the support of the majority of the European countries, but also a much better trained and equipped army, by the virtue of all his and his statesmen’s vigorous diplomatic efforts, played out between 1833 and 1839.
Conclusion

All Mahmud’s military and diplomatic preparations gave him the confidence to confront Mehmed about his continual breaches of the peace treaty. But in spite of Mahmud’s beliefs about his army’s strength and its capacity to beat his rebel governor’s army, the Ottoman army suffered a resounding defeat on 24 June 1839, in Nizip, an Ottoman district in the East. This was a devastating blow, and plunged the Empire into a major crisis; however, Mahmud did not live long enough to hear about this devastating turn of events since he died on 1 July 1839 only a few days before the news arrived in Istanbul. Despite the Sultan’s death and the defeat of his army, Mehmed Ali could not advance his army any further because of the diplomatic pressure on him from other European countries. At this stage, it should be mentioned that some foreign scholars, such as Webster, have attributed this diplomatic success over Mehmed Ali to Palmerston’s diplomatic ability. By way of illustration, Webster stated on this subject that;

“The triumph of Palmerston in 1840 was perhaps the greatest which he ever won in his long connection with foreign affairs... This result was obtained because Palmerston sought ends which in the long run even those who opposed him saw were necessary. The time was not ripe for a dissolution of the Ottoman Empire which would almost certainly have occurred if Palmerston had not had his way. This failure of Mahmud’s final fling at his vassal, so disastrous in its results, would have deprived the Porte permanently of the rule of all the Aran-speaking lands, including the Holy Places, unless it had been rescued by European, mainly British, action.”

These foreign scholars’ determinations and views do not show the whole picture from all aspects because according to the Ottoman records, Mahmud’s and his diplomats’ real role in this diplomatic success story has not been examined in detail. Their winning the European powers, particularly Britain, around to their side with their combined vigorous diplomatic efforts during the process, right up to the Egyptian army’s last decisive victory in Nizip, is a version of events that has hitherto been overlooked. It was, at least in part, those diplomatic and political efforts of previous decade which now bore fruit. The Ottoman Empire was thought to be reformable by Palmerston, and he no longer thought it was going to fall apart; he was also determined not to repeat the mistakes of 1832/3.

---

However, examination of this intensive diplomatic period, 1833-1839, from the point of view of the Ottoman side is vital. As it has been revealed in every aspect all through the thesis, the Ottoman influence, under the leadership of Mahmud, was in large part a strong factor determining the alteration of the attitude of the British, particularly Palmerston about this “Eastern Empire”. This mission was not easy since this very same person, Palmerston, and the very same British politicians, had been thinking the exact opposite at the beginning of the 1830s about the Ottoman Empire to the way they now thought about the Empire in the second half of the 1830s. Prof. Charmley summarised very well the British position in 1831 with respect to the Ottomans.

“Palmerston’s initial stance on the Ottoman Empire was what one might have expected from the self-proclaimed inheritor of Canning’s philhellenic policy; he was, initially, firmly on the side of those who believed that the Ottoman Empire was doomed. In a letter to his old friend (now ambassador to France) Lord Granville, in 1831, he wrote: “The fact is that Turkey is rapidly falling the pieces. This need not imply that he, personally, wanted the Ottoman Empire to collapse, but there were certainly those in the government who did.”

As it can be seen in these words of Prof. Charmley, although Palmerston was so pessimistic about the Ottoman Empire’s survivability or even worse, some British politicians in the Cabinet even desired the disappearance of the Empire, later on, the main British policy had been to support the maintenance of the territorial integrity of this Eastern country with their all might. It is a fact that that this sea change, in the British policy respecting the Eastern affairs which came about in only a few years, would have been too great to be spontaneous. For this reason, this thesis has attempted to put forward the Ottoman contribution to this remarkable process of change.

Because of the neglect of this contribution, the main aim of this thesis has been to read this intensive diplomatic process with an emphasis on use of resources from the Ottoman perspective, in contrast to the account gleaned from European sources found in English works. In addition to this, the thesis has also attempted to reveal, as has not been hitherto recounted in the present literature about him; Mahmud’s both subtle and bold diplomatic manoeuvres from 1833 to 1839.

designed for the purpose of solving the Mehmed Ali problem diplomatically and not with force, because of the limitations imposed by his Empire’s troubled economic, military and administrative conditions. It has been attempted to examine this diplomatic effort, in each different chapter from a different aspect, step by step in as much detail as possible, using the Ottoman documents.

It can be said that this thesis has reached its goal and propounded Mahmud’s and his diplomats’ diplomatic abilities, revealing a story which is contrary to the common understanding of the matter gained from the widely accepted accounts drawn from European records with respect to period. Because of this, it will not be necessary to study diplomatic events after Mahmud’s death since the present literature has covered this in much detail. However, it should be mentioned that the last words of the thesis, based on the arguments presented in the chapters, assert that Mahmud’s and his diplomats’ contribution was considerable, and just as significant as that of Palmerston and Metternich. The Sultan’s diplomatic efforts greatly assisted in bringing about the first result in 1839, stopping Mehmed Ali from going any further, and then the Convention of London, officially called the Convention for the Pacification of the Levant, signed in 1840 by the Ottoman Empire and the four European powers, Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Mehmed Ali. This convention was vital, and profitable for both the British and the Ottomans, because Mehmed Ali and the Russians lost almost everything that they had acquired between 1833 and 1839. This treaty would probably have evidenced to Mahmud that all his diplomatic efforts had been well worth all his trouble, had he lived long enough to see this positive final phase of the long and difficult diplomatic process he had instigated to free his Empire from two big troubles; Mehmed Ali and Russia.
Bibliography

I. Archival Sources

A. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Istanbul⁶²¹:

BOA, File No: 2 Document No: 47.
BOA, File No: 72, Document No: 20117.
BOA, File No: 72, Document No: 20142.
BOA, File No: 70, Document No: 19901 A.
BOA, File No: 1265, Document No: 48980 C.
BOA, File No: 1265, Document No: 48980 A.
BOA, File No: 1171, Document No: 46344.
BOA, File No: 1174, Document No: 46429 N.
BOA, File No:1040, Document No: 43047.
BOA, File No: 368, Document No: 20345.
BOA, File No: 359, Document No: 20047 D.
BOA, File No: 368, Document No: 20338.
BOA, File No: 368, Document No: 20339.
BOA, File No: 369, Document No: 20356.
BOA, File No: 1199, Document No: 47061.

⁶²¹ The file number and document number of each document used in the thesis are given in order of chapter (from Chapter 1 onwards). Those who wish to refer to these Ottoman Documents may find them in the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi in Istanbul.
BOA, File No: 357, Document No: 20220.
BOA, File No: 357, Document No: 20020 A.
BOA, File No: 1034, Document No: 42922.
BOA, File No: 1166, Document No: 46123 A.
BOA, File No: 1047, Document No: 43222.
BOA, File No: 1166, Document No: 46123 J.
BOA, File No: 1169, Document No: 46234 B.
BOA, File No: 1169, Document No: 46237 A.
BOA, File No: 1172, Document No: 46380.
BOA, File No: 1175, Document No: 46438 H.
BOA, File No: 72, Document No: 20117.
BOA, File No: 1265, Document No: 48980 A.
BOA, File No: 833, Document No: 37560 K.
BOA, File No: 833, Document No: 37560 M.
BOA, File No: 73, Document No: 20392 B.
BOA, File No: 73, Document No: 20392 A.
BOA, File No: 1199, Document No: 47070.
BOA, File No: 369 Document No: 20346.
BOA, File No: 1045, Document No: 43183 A.
BOA, File No: 1045, Document No: 43183 B.
BOA, File No: 1175, Document No: 46438 Ğ.
BOA, File No: 1175, Document No: 46438 H.
BOA, File No: 1040, Document No: 43061.
BOA, File No: 1166, Document No: 46123.
BOA, File No: 1169, Document No: 46234 B.
BOA, File No: 1173, Document No: 46414 D 01.
BOA, File No: 1173, Document No: 46414 D 02.
BOA, File No: 1173, Document No: 46414 D 03.
BOA, File No: 1173, Document No: 46414 D.
BOA, File No: 1173, Document No: 46414 D 04.
BOA, File No: 1181, Document No: 46653.
BOA, File No: 2, Document No: 47.
BOA, File No: 1173, Document No: 46420.
BOA, File No: 1174 Document No: 46430 N.
BOA, File No: 1172 Document No: 46352.
BOA, File No: 829 Document No: 37503 F.
BOA, File No: 1167 Document No: 46153 A.
BOA, File No: 1186 Document No: 46759 B.
BOA, File No: 1186 Document No: 46759 C.
BOA, File No: 1174 Document No: 46429 H.
BOA, File No: 1178 Document No: 46565 A.
BOA, File No: 1173 Document No: 46422 A.
BOA, File No: 1173 Document No: 46422.
BOA, File No: 1181 Document No: 46648.
BOA, File No: 451 Document No: 22357 A.
BOA, File No: 1172 Document No: 46413 A.
BOA, File No: 1186 Document No: 46758 B.
BOA, File No: 1171, Document No: 46349 01.
BOA, File No: 360, Document No: 20064.
BOA, File No: 1174, Document No: 46430 C.
BOA, File No: 361, Document No: 20100 A.
BOA, File No: 1190, Document No: 46885.
BOA, File No: 1172, Document No: 46412 A.
BOA, File No: 1180, Document No: 46612 Ç.
BOA, File No: 677, Document No: 33021 F.
BOA, File No: 833, Document No: 37560 G.
BOA, File No: 961 Document No: 41196 L.
BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.
BOA, File No: 685 Document No: 33266 H.
BOA, File No: 585 Document No: 28744 A.
BOA, File No: 1181 Document No: 46662 G.
BOA, File No: 1179 Document No: 46582.
BOA, File No: 593 Document No: 29044 B.
BOA, File No: 593 Document No: 29044 E.
BOA, File No: 1173 Document No: 46419 D.
BOA, File No: 1180 Document No: 46660.
BOA, File No: 712 Document No: 34067 J.
BOA, File No: 677 Document No: 33016 B.
BOA, File No: 677 Document No: 33021 A.
BOA, File No: 677 Document No: 33016 B.
BOA, File No: 678 Document No: 33032 E.
BOA, File No: 1185 Document No 46740 C.
BOA, File No: 588 Document No 28920.
BOA, File No: 588 Document No 28920 B.
BOA, File No: 380 Document No 20558 C.
BOA, File No: 1175 Document No 46438.
BOA C..HR, File No: 80 Document No 3990.
BOA, File No: 55 Document No 2740.
BOA, File No: 1611 Document No 99.
BOA, File No: 829 Document No 37497 E.
BOA, File No: 1175 Document No 46434.
BOA, File No: 837 Document No 37748.
BOA, File No: 1173 Document No 46425 A.
BOA, File No: 1173 Document No 46425 A.
BOA, File No: 586 Document No 28815.
BOA, File No: 588 Document No 28925.
BOA, File No: 588 Document No 28924.
BOA, File No: 588 Document No 28923.
BOA, File No: 827 Document No 37465 F.
BOA C..AS, File No: 302 Document No 12493
BOA, File No: 827 Document No 37465 E.
BOA, File No: 959 Document No 41180.
BOA, File No: 1190 Document No 46884.
BOA, File No: 1321 Document No 51608.
BOA, File No: 373 Document No 20416 A.
BOA, File No: 381 Document No 20579 L.
BOA, File No: 587 Document No 28870.
BOA, File No: 531 Document No 26180.
BOA, File No: 587 Document No 28871.
BOA, File No: 190 Document No 8221.
BOA, File No: 16 Document No 1254 N.
BOA, File No: 95 Document No 4745.
BOA C..HR, File No: 119 Document No 5910.
BOA, File No: 139 Document No 6930.
BOA, File No: 1174 Document No 46427 C.
BOA, File No: 628 Document No 31066.
BOA, File No: 661 Document No 32268.
BOA, File No: 661 Document No 32268 D.
BOA, File No: 661 Document No 32268 F.
BOA, File No: 298 Document No 17701 D.
BOA, File No: 830 Document No 37506 F.
BOA, File No: 1209 Document No 47373 M.
BOA C..HR, File No: 185 Document No 9237.
BOA, File No: 1179 Document No 46569 E.
BOA, File No: 382 Document No 20584.
BOA, File No: 1179 Document No 46569 J.
BOA, File No: 1211 Document No 47432 A.
BOA, File No: 951 Document No 40844 C.
BOA, File No: 702 Document No 33738 A.
BOA, File No: 695 Document No 33497.
BOA C..HR, File No: 58 Document No 2870.
BOA C..HR, File No: 11 Document No 539.
BOA C..HR, File No: 169 Document No 8419.
BOA C..HR File No: 7 Document No 311.
BOA C..HR, File No: 103 Document No 5115.
BOA C..HR, File No: 104 Document No 5200.
BOA C..HR, File No: 12 Document No 586.
BOA C..HR, File No: 123 Document No 6149.
BOA C..HR, File No: 9 Document No 448.
BOA C..HR, File No: 23 Document No 1109.
BOA, File No: 23 Document No 1108.
BOA C..HR, File No: 102 Document No 5080.
BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.
BOA, File No: 382 Document No: 20584.
BOA, File No: 1179 Document No: 46569 J.
BOA, File No: 1190, Document No: 46879 001.
BOA, File No: 381 Document No: 20567.
BOA, File No: 685 Document No: 33266 H.
BOA, File No: 737 Document No: 34965 E.
BOA, File No: 697 Document No: 33630.
BOA, File No: 737 Document No: 34969 G.
BOA, File No: 828 Document No: 37478 A.
BOA, File No: 828 Document No: 37482 A.
II. Published Primary Sources

A. Some Articles from the British Newspapers

The Euphrates’ Expedition, Royal Cornwall Gazette, Falmouth Packet & Plymouth Journal (Truro, England), Saturday, November 01, 1834; Issue 1636.

The Navigation of the Euphrates, Preston Chronicle, (Preston, England), Saturday, November 8, 1834; Issue 1158.


The Euphrates Scheme, The Morning Post (London, England), Tuesday, December 09, 1834; pg. [1]; Issue 19970.


**B. Some Pamphlets in English**


The Euphrates' Expedition, Royal Cornwall Gazette, Falmouth Packet & Plymouth Journal, November 01, 1834; Issue 1636.


### III. Secondary Sources in Turkish

#### A. Books

Aksan, V.H. *Osmanlı Harpleri*, (İstanbul, 2010).


Baharoğlu, Ö. *Oryantalizm, İslam ve Türkler*. (İstanbul: 2006).

Berkes, N. *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, (İstanbul, 2004).


Fahmy, K. *Pasanın Adamları: Kavalalı Mehemd Ali Paşa, Ordu ve Modern Mısır* (İstanbul: 2010).

Findley, C.V. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Bürokratik Reform*, (İstanbul, 2014).

Geyikdaği, V.N. *Osmanlı Devleti’nde Yabancı Sermaye 1854-1914*. (İstanbul: 2008).
Goryanof, S. *Rus Arşiv Belgelerine göre Boğazlar ve Şark Meselesi.* (İstanbul: 2006).


Kıray, E. *Osmanlı’da Ekonomik Yapı ve Dış Borçlar,* (İstanbul: 2008).


---------------------- *Osmanlı-İngiliz İktisadi Münasebetleri 1838-1850 Vol.II.* (İstanbul: 1976).

Marufoğlu, S. *Osmanlı Döneminde Kuzey Irak,* (İstanbul, 1998).

Ortaylı, İ. *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı.* (İstanbul: 2009).

Palmer, A. *Bir Çözüşün Yeni Tarihi,* (İstanbul, 2008).

Pamuk, Ş. *Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi 1500-1914.* (İstanbul: 2007).

---------------------- *Osmanlıdan Cumhuriyete Küreselleşme, İktisat Politikaları ve Büyüme.* (İstanbul: 2008).

Quataeat, D. *Sanayi Devrimi Çağında Osmanlı İmalat Sektörü.* (İstanbul: 2008).


Shaw, S and E.K. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye,* (İstanbul, 2000).

Turan, N.S. *İmparatorluk ve Diplomasi,* (İstanbul, 2014).

Zürcher, E.J. *Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi*, (İstanbul, 2009).

**IV. Secondary Sources in English**

**A. Articles**


------------ ‘Conversations on Anglo-Russian Relations in 1838’ in The English Historical Review, Vol. 50, No. 197 (Jan., 1935), pp.120-123.


B. Books


--------- *Palmerston: Artful Dodger or Babe of Grace*, in The Makers of British Foreign Policy, T.G. Otte (ed.), (London: 2002), pp. 75-97. (Chapter)


Özdemir, B. *Ottoman Reforms and Social Life*, (İstanbul: 2003).


--------------


A. Theses


APPENDIX

SOME SIGNIFICANT OTTOMAN ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS
HAT 362 / 20132

• This is Mahmud II’s request to the Russian military for help against Mehmed Ali. However, calling the Russians to Istanbul was one of Mahmud’s diplomatic manoeuvres because, as can be seen in the document as soon as the Russian troops arrived in Istanbul he started to look for ways of getting rid of them.
Benim vezirim,


Şevketli, kerâmetli, mehâbetli, kudretli veliü’n-ni’metim efendim,

Muktezâ-yı irâde-i seniyye-i şahaneleri üzere Reis Efendi kulları evvelki gün Rusya elçisiyle general ve amirali sahilhane-i acizanesine celib ile bi’l-mülukat icrâ-ı rûsûm-ı âdîyeden sonra elçi-i mersûm Petersburg’dan dünkü gün Hocabey tariktiyle baharen bir tüccar sefîneleri ve askeri geldiğinde sizi çokâz mûjâhid olana kadar karar-ı re’y ve mutalaatınızı taraf-ı hümayunuma arz ve iş’är eyleyesin.

Muktezâ-yı irâde-i seniyye-i şahaneleri üzere Reis Efendi kulları evvelki gün Rusya elçisiyle general ve amirali sahilhane-i acizanesine celib ile bi’l-mülukat icrâ-ı rûsûm-ı âdîyeden sonra elçi-i mersûm Petersburg’dan dünkü gün Hocabey tariktiyle baharen bir tüccar sefîneleri ve askeri geldiğinde sizi çokâz mûjâhid olana kadar karar-ı re’y ve mutalaatınızı taraf-ı hümayunuma arz ve iş’är eyleyesin.

Muktezâ-yı irâde-i seniyye-i şahaneleri üzere Reis Efendi kulları evvelki gün Rusya elçisiyle general ve amirali sahilhane-i acizanesine celib ile bi’l-mülukat icrâ-ı rûsûm-ı âdîyeden sonra elçi-i mersûm Petersburg’dan dünkü gün Hocabey tariktiyle baharen bir tüccar sefîneleri ve askeri geldiğinde sizi çokâz mûjâhid olana kadar karar-ı re’y ve mutalaatınızı taraf-ı hümayunuma arz ve iş’är eyleyesin.

Muktezâ-yı irâde-i seniyye-i şahaneleri üzere Reis Efendi kulları evvelki gün Rusya elçisiyle general ve amirali sahilhane-i acizanesine celib ile bi’l-mülukat icrâ-ı rûsûm-ı âdîyeden sonra elçi-i mersûm Petersburg’dan dünkü gün Hocabey tariktiyle baharen bir tüccar sefîneleri ve askeri geldiğinde sizi çokâz mûjâhid olana kadar karar-ı re’y ve mutalaatınızı taraf-ı hümayunuma arz ve iş’är eyleyesin.

Muktezâ-yı irâde-i seniyye-i şahaneleri üzere Reis Efendi kulları evvelki gün Rusya elçisiyle general ve amirali sahilhane-i acizanesine celib ile bi’l-mülukat icrâ-ı rûsûm-ı âdîyeden sonra elçi-i mersûm Petersburg’dan dünkü gün Hocabey tariktiyle baharen bir tüccar sefîneleri ve askeri geldiğinde sizi çokâz mûjâhid olana kadar karar-ı re’y ve mutalaatınızı taraf-ı hümayunuma arz ve iş’är eyleyesin.

Muktezâ-yı irâde-i seniyye-i şahaneleri üzere Reis Efendi kulları evvelki gün Rusya elçisiyle general ve amirali sahilhane-i acizanesine celib ile bi’l-mülukat icrâ-ı rûsûm-ı âdîyeden sonra elçi-i mersûm Petersburg’dan dünkü gün Hocabey tariktiyle baharen bir tüccar sefîneleri ve askeri geldiğinde sizi çokâz mûjâhid olana kadar karar-ı re’y ve mutalaatınızı taraf-ı hümayunuma arz ve iş’är eyleyesin.
eylediğinizde Tuna boyuna doğru gelmeleri taleb olunan askerden başka buraya gelecek donanma ile tezelden bir beş bin kadar asker cellini söylemiştiniz deyip beri taraftan ba’de’t-tasdik elçi-i mersüm vâr borsun ol vakit yazılmış olduğumdan ber-vech-i bala bugün Petersburg’dan vürûd eden tahrirâtın hülâsasını size getirdim deyir bir kt’a varaka ibrâz ve kirâate tercüme-i me’âli mukaddemâ kara askerine dair yazılan mektubun vusûlüyle Besarabaya tarafında ve Memleketteyn’de olan Rusya askerinden otuz bin piyade ve altı bin süvari askeriyle yüzden parça on kt’a top tehie olunanak Tuna’dan imrâr olunmak ve Hocabey’den dahi beş bin asker gönderilmek üzere taraf-ı imparatoriden mahallerine tenbih gönderilmiş olduğu ve General Moradif dahi kendisine bu tarihden taze tarih ile bahren gelen mektubda ber-vech-i meşrûh mahallerine tenbih olunan otuz altı bin askerin imrârı’ Ibrahim Paşa’nın Kütahya’da tevakkufu haberine binaen, tevkif ve Hocabey’den irdâl olunacak asker ol emirde on bin olmak üzere tertib olunmuş ise de kezâlik haber-i mezâkûra mebni beş bini tenzil olunanak beş bin neferi üç kt’a kapak sefine refâkatiley gelirken incimâd-ı bahr cihetiyle avdet etmiş olduklarını muharrer olduğunu ve bu defa Hocabey’den bir Nemçe tüccar sefinesi gelmiş olunanın vusûlüna nazaran incimâd münâdefi olmak ıktizâ eylediğinden sefâ-i hakki yine Hocabey’e gelmiş olmak lazım gelmek ve sani askerin dahi mu’ahharan tevkifî yazılımiş ise de mukaddemâ donanmanın haber-i sani yetişmeksizin evvelki haberle kalkıp geldiği misillû bunların dahi çıkmış bulunmaları ve bu takdirde iki üç güne kadar buraya gelmeleri melhûz idi bu iki ve askeri mezâkûr geldiği halde buradaki donanma ile avdet etmek ıktizâ edeceğinden bu tarafaya vürûduna veyahut tevkifî haberinin buraya vusûlüne kadar donanmanın burada tevakkufu lazım gelmiştir ve General Lazarof dahi mukaddemâ serasher Paşa ve ferik Paşa taraflarından biraz Rusya topçularının gelmesi mûcib-i mahzûziyet olacağığı borsun buyulmuş olduğundan bir nefer topçu haber ile birkaç yüz topçu ve biraz ofisiyelâr dahi mûrû’z-zikr beş bin askerle geleceğini ve imparator tarafından bu hüsuslar âğıyet ihtimâm ve iltizamî tutulduğu ifade etmeleriyle, beri taraftan öteden beri gâh edvâr-ı na’kiye? Ve gâh esbâb-ı saire-i kevniyeden nâşî devletler beyinde vákı‘ olan mübâyenet ve gerûdet müsâlem ve sauvete ber-taraf ola geldiğinden ve devletin beyinde ez-kaza vuku’t bulan ahvâl-i maziye dahi havâlât-ı kadîmenin iadesiyle mensî olmuş ise de doğrusu imparator cenâbının şu himmetleri mâ-sebk-i hâli bütün bütün unutтурmuş ve taraf-ı saltanat-ı seniyye ile başaca bir rabita-i mûhâdenet hâsil ettirmişir denilerek izhâr-ı mahzûziyet olundukta, elçi-i mersûm memuriyetinize ve zâtınıza kemal-i i’timâmî olmakla, imparator bey dostluğu bu vechle itiraf olunmasından pek memnun ve pek müteşekkür oldum deyu hoşnutluk
Mahmud had been very carefully scrutinizing all diplomatic possibilities in the diplomatic struggle over his Empire’s lands and this document is a very good example of this characteristic in him. He orders to his diplomats that “although it is clear that France would not do anything to the detriment of Ottoman interests, French diplomacy in Istanbul should be pursued very carefully to avoid the eventuality of the French acting in accordance with their stated policies.”
Kaymakam Paşa,


Şevketî, kerametî, mehabetî, kudretî velini’metim efendim,

imiş. Eğer bu böyle olur ise Fransa devleti dahi Mehmed Ali’ye iâne eder ve Yunan hükümeti
da ziyade tevsi’ olunur denilse hiç böyle şeylerin hatra bile geldiği yoktur cevabını verdikten
sonra bu lâkırdıyı Reis Efendi’ye söyledin mi deyu sualinde, söylemeye memuriyetim yoktur
diyerek yine kelam-ı mezkûr te’kid etmiş olmasına nazaran Fransalı bu maddede zanniyâta
düşececek yani mukaddemce Fransa maslahatguzarı merkûm Mehmed Ali’ye dair lâkırdıya
girişmek istediginde ö努 kesitirdiğinden şimdii İngiltereli ile rabita-i ittifâkîrî söyleşilip Rusya
elçisi dahi mahrem ittihâz olunduğuna vakf olmak lâzım gelir ise ol halde yalnız bigânelik
Fransalı’da kalacağî cihetle güçlerine gidecek gibi görüündügen emr u ferman keramet-unvan-
I şahaneleri tamam-ı hal ve maslahata muvâfîk olmak hasebiyle ol daire-i hikmet-i câmi’adan
çikilmayarak başı örtülü ta’birât ile Rusya elçisi mersûmun ağzı araştırlıp da devletinin
menviyâtı ve kendisinin re’y ve mutalaatı bilinerek icabına göre lisan kullanılmak sureti
beynlerinde tensîb olunmuş ve Kanpenik boğazından ısâl esnâ-yı mükâlemede kendilerine gelen
kağdı tercümesi dahi bu usule muvâfîk görünmesiyle mülâhazat-ı vákt’aya kuvvet vermiş
olduğundan Sîrplî maslahatının ve sair mevâdının müzakeresinden sonra geçende İskenderiye’dede
olan konsolos vekilinin kaldırılması ve bu husûsta olan hüs-n-i niyât-ı imparatorunun mukaddimesi
olmak cihetiyle bunun elbette devlet-i aliyanın saadet-ı hal ve ikbaline dair neticesi dahi
olmak iktizâ edeçinden elçi beyin bu babda bir âne malumatı veya neticenin usulü
malumu olması ve kendisi dahi hayırhâh adam bulunması cihetleriyle bu husûsda re’y ve
mülâhazatı var mıdır yollu ve sair türlü çerâmûnyalı lâkırdılar ile istikşaf-ı zamûrine ibtidâr
olundukta, mensûm mukaddem merkûm Mehmed Ali’ye dair verilen takrîr-i resmiye muvâfakat
cevabını devlete danışmakâsınız vererek mesuliyeti üzerine almış ise de Rusya devletinin saltanat-
I seniyye hakkında olan hülüs ve safveti mektezâsınca kendisi tasdik olunduğundan fazla olarak
derhal konsolos vekili mersûmun себli husûsuna dahi memur olunduğunu ve kendisinin konsolos
vekili mersûmun celline dair gönderdiği mektubuna hidmet-i riyâsetten yazılan cevabı dahi
Petersburg’a ısâl eylediğini ba’dde’l-beyan devletin bu maddede netâyic-i menviyâtına vukûfu
olduğunu ve şu kadar ki imparatorun devlet-i aliye hakkında olan efkâr-ı dostanesine vakf olup
bu Mehmed Ali gibi usât ve hünenin dahi kemâlîyle mebguzu olduğunu bildiğinden buna dair
her ne türlü şey teklif olunur ise bi’l-iftihâr istimâ’ ile devlete yâzıp tervic edeçini kemal-i
havâhiye irâd edip beri taraftan dahi imparatorun hüs-n-i niyet ve safveti nezd-i şahanelerinde
malum müsellem olunduğuna ve serbestiyet maddesi usul-i hükümünin külliyan muhalifi
olacağından imparator cenâblerinin manzûru olarak bu makûlelere bi’t-tabibi’ buğzî ve adâvet
Reis Effendi (the Ottoman Foreign Minister) met with Ponsonby at the behest of Mahmud II to negotiate the latest developments. This document reflects Mahmud’s and his diplomats’ diplomatic manoeuvres and their awareness that if they could use Britain against all the other diplomatic actors in the diplomatic game, this would help them resolve their serious problems.
Sene

Benim vezirim,

İşbu takrîrin manzûr ve me’âli malum-ı hümayunum olmuştur. Elçi-i mersûmula şu günlerde görüşülmnesi devlet-i aliyemizingunakanı usule göre pek münasib oldu. Ve elçi-i mersûmun istedi mektub dahi kaleme alındırap sureti manzûrumuz olduktan sonra mersûma ita olunsun.

Şevketî, kerametî, mehabetî, kudretî velini’metim efendim,

İrâde-i seniyye-i şahaneleri muktezâ-yı münifî üzere dünkû gün Reis Efendi kulları İngiltere elçisiyle bi’l-mülakat rûsûm-ı âdiye ve sual-i hal ve hatrîndan sonra berî taraftan devlet-i alying ile İngiltere devleti beyindey olan revâbît-ı mahsûsaya ve elçi beyle beynimizde olan üns ve ülfet ve husûsan Londra’da devlet-i alying memurları ikamat üzere olduğuna nazaran cümleden ziyade elçi bey dostumuzla muhabere ve mülakatımız olmak ıktizâ eder iken çoktan beri görüşülemeyip birbirimizi giácımızı geli denebilecek feth-i kelam olundukta, elçi-i mersûm izhâr-ı memnuniyetiyle kendisi dahi mülakata arzu-mend olmuş iduğununa ifade etmekle, berî taraftan evvelki gün İngiltere kuryeri gelmiş olduğundan elçi beyin malumat-ı cedidesi olmalıdır yollu lède’s-suâl mersûm elçi-i lâhikin bugünülerde Dersaadet’e gelmiş olmasi mülhazasıyla kuryerin hamîl olduğu tahrîratin cümlesi elçi-i lâhika hitab olarak elçi dahi karibinden gelmek üzere diger. Lakin te’min ve tevsik ederim ki İngiltere devleti devlet-i aliyenin tamamîyet-i müllikyesini isteyip ve geçende İskenderiye’den mahsus bir kolonel ırsâl olunarak Mehmed Ali Paşa’ya taraf-ı hazret-i şahanyeye itaat ve Halil Paşa hazretleriyle bi’l-müzakere kendiye ihsan buyrunan müsaadatta kanaat etmek üzere te’kîd olunmuştur diyerek devleti tarafından kendisinin başka malumat-ı cedidesi olmadığını beyan etmeğin, devlet-i müşîrûnîleyhâ mesleğinin usul-ı devlet-i alyinge tevâfukündan izhâr-ı mahzûziyet olunduktan sonra elçi beyin İskenderiye’den yeni haberî var mı deyu olunan suale altı haftadan berî hiçbir haberim yoktur deyu cevab etmekle, mukaddemce İzmir maddesi için Kütahya’ya gönderilen sefaret ser-kâtibi Küçük Pizani’yi elçi bey istintâk etmiştir. Şifâhen ifadeleri oluyor denildikte, mersûm Pizani’nin İbrahim Paşa’dan getirdiği mektub malumunuz oldu. Şifâhen ifadesi babamdın habere müterakkabım haber geldiği gibi avdet ederim demekten ibaret oluyor ve askerini sarftan muhafaza etmek ve bir de ahali-i
mübâderet edeceğini ve mukaddem dahi tez elden senedleşilmemiş olsa gitmeye hazırlanmış olduğunun ifade ve tekrar eyleldikte, beri taraftan İzmir’deki İngiltere ve Fransa konsoloslarının bandıralarını indirmeleri İzmir maslahatına müessir olmuş olduğuna göre tümce elçii beyler dahi İbrahim Paşa’ya katiyece bir haber gönderip Kütahya’dan avdet etti, sened-i mezkûrun hükmü istikmâl ve devlet-i aliyenin emniyet-i tâmmesi istisnası olunarak bir güzel şey olurdu denildikte, mersûm mukaddemâ yazdı, şunu ifade ve tekrar eyledikte, beri taraftan İzmir’deki İngiltere ve Fransa konsoloslarının bandıralarını indirmeleri İzmir maslahatına müessir olmuş olduğuna göre elçii beyler dahi İbrahim Paşa’ya katiyece bir haber gönderip Kütahya’dan avdet etti, sened-i mezkûrun hükmü istikmâl ve devlet-i aliyenin emniyet-i tâmmesi istisnası olunarak bir güzel şey olurdu denildikte, mersûm mukaddemâ yazdı. 

İzmir’deki İngiltere ve Fransa konsoloslarının bandıralarını indirmeleri İzmir maslahatına müessir olmuş olduğuna göre elçii beyler dahi İbrahim Paşa’ya katiyece bir haber gönderip Kütahya’dan avdet etti, sened-i mezkûrun hükmü istikmâl ve devlet-i aliyenin emniyet-i tâmmesi istisnası olunarak bir güzel şey olurdu denildikte, mersûm mukaddemâ yazdı. 

İzmir’deki İngiltere ve Fransa konsoloslarının bandıralarını indirmeleri İzmir maslahatına müessir olmuş olduğuna göre elçii beyler dahi İbrahim Paşa’ya katiyece bir haber gönderip Kütahya’dan avdet etti, sened-i mezkûrun hükmü istikmâl ve devlet-i aliyenin emniyet-i tâmmesi istisnası olunarak bir güzel şey olurdu denildikte, mersûm mukaddemâ yazdı.
This is about the French Ambassador Roussin’s meeting with Ibrahim Pasha in Kutahya. In this meeting Ibrahim Pasha wanted control of Damascus, Aleppo and Adana, a large region in the south of the Empire. The French Ambassador Roussin offered a guarantee of forgiveness to Ibrahim Pasha from the Ottomans however; this was found “inappropriate” and not accepted by Istanbul. This document contains all these developments and also the Sultan’s earnest desire to not leave Adana to Ibrahim Pasha’s administration.
Sene

Benim vezirim,


Şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû velini’metim efendim,

Muktezâ-ı irâde-i seniyye-i şahaneleri üzere Reis Efendi kulları bugün dahi Rusya elçisiyle mülakat ederek Amedci Efendi kullarının mukaddemâ suret-i memuriyeti elçi-i mersûma ifade olunmuş olduğundan bu defa İbrahim Paşa Şam ve Haleb eyaletlerine İcil ve Alaiye sancakları hariç kalmak üzere izhâr-ı riza gösterip, fakat pederinden mesulyet özrüyle Adana eyaletinin ilhaken tevcihinde ziyade-i istid’âsî ve bunun üzerine dünkü gün Fransa elçisiyle müzakere olunup Adana eyaletine bi’l-farz taraf-ı devlet-i aliyanın müsâade buyrulursa bile Fransa ve İngiltere devletlerinin tecvîz-gerdeleri olmayacağını şiş’ir maslahatgûzûra mektub yazacağı keyfiyetleri irâd ve ityân olundukta, elçi-i mersûm acaba İbrahim Paşa Adana’nnin verilmemesiyle razı olur mu deyu lede’s-sual berî tariftan Fransa elçisi öyle mektub yazdığı halde muhalefet etmemesi ağleb-i ihtimal idiğu ifade olunup eğerci Rusya devletinin böyle berren ve bahren i’âne-i fi’ilîyesini meydanda olarak İngiltere devleti tarafından dahi İskenderiye’ye mahsus kolonel irdâlîyle Mehmed Ali Paşa’nın taht-ı itaatı duhûlû tenbih olunmuş ve Fransa devleti dahi elçisinin mukaddem verdiği senedi kabul ile hükümünü icra etmek üzere İskenderiye’deki konsolosuna yazmış ve muhalefeti takdirinde icbâr için donanmalar âmade kılındığı hhab kilnmeş olduğu na zaman Şam ve Haleb eyaletlerinin ilhâki ağır şey ise de ne çare hasbe’l-vakt ve’l-hal böyle icab etmiş olduğu yâd ve tezkâr olduktan sonra elçi-i mersûm işbu maslahatta devlet-i aliyanın hoşnutiluk ve adem-i hoşnutiluğu kendi irâde-i seniyyesine menût olarak hoşnud
olduğu halde Rusya devleti dahi hoşnut olacağını ifade ve beri taraftan ızhar-ı mahzûziyet-birle bu hoşnutluş fakat iade-i asayiş zımında olup yoksa bundan maada hoşnut olacak mahalli olmadığı lede’l-ityân, elçi-i mersûm vakı‘â öyledir diyerek tasdik etmiş ve İbrahim Paşa afv-ı umumi için Fransa elçisinden sened metâlîbe etmiş ise de devlet-i aliye tecvîz buyurmadığından afv-ı umumi zımında evâmîr-i aliye neşrolunmak üzere müdafaa olunduğu lede’l-ifade elçi-i mersûm Fransa elçisinin teb’a-i devlet-i aliye için sened vermesi yakışıkşız olacağını madâfâası pek isabetli olduğunu ba’del-beyan bu maddede devlet-i aliye ile Rusya devletinin ve düvel-i sairenin dostlukları gereği gibi meydana çıktığına dair mahremâne bazı mücâvebât vâ ki‘ olarak İbrahim Paşa bu tanzimâta razı olmadığı halde Amedci Efendi avdet edecek midir dey u lede’s-sual beri taraftan bir kere keyfiyeti bu tarafa yazması ıktizâ edeceği cevabî verilip elçi-i mersûm Amedci Efendi kullarıyla İbrahim Paşa’nın beyinde vukû‘ bulan muamelat ve mücâvebâtı Petersburg’a yazmak üzere sormuş olduğundan iş’âri keyfiyeti ifade olmuş ve üç saat kadar müddet mülakatta Adana ve Şam ve Haleb hakkında pek çok müzakere ceryan etmiş ise de nihayet Adana eyaletinin ilhâkı tecvîz buyurulmamak üzere Şam ve Haleb eyaletleriyle bitirilmesi maslahata hayırlı olacağı tarafeeden irâd ve teslim olunup bu sohbetlerden sonra elçi-i mersûm bu defa gelen askerin bakıyesi olarak iki yüz neferle bazı çadır mahmûl bir gemileri geride kalıp zühür etmemiş olduğundan bir mahalde kazaya uğramış olması mülahazasiyla amiral tarafından taharisine mahsûs bir sefîne ırsâl olunduğu ifade etmekle, beri taraftan kâşki bir iki gün evvel haber verilmiş olaydı şimdiye kadar tahkik olunurdu. Şimdi dahi Anadolu ve Rumeli sevâhiyle çarçabuk tatarlar ihracıyla taharri ettirelim denildikte, elçi-i mersûm ızhar-ı kemal-i memnuniyet ederek amiral ile söyleşip ıktizâ eder ise tatar ırsâli için haber gönderceğini bi’l-ifade avdet etmiş olduğu muhât-ı ilm-i âlem-i ârâ-yi şehinsâhleri buyрудukta emr u ferman şeyketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû velini’metim efendim padişahım hazretlerinindir.
This order of Mahmud II’s shows he had been following the diplomatic developments in the process closely because in it he warns his statesmen that he suspected that France continued to support Mehmed Ali despite Roussin’s apparent efforts to solve the problem. This document gives the details about this matter.
HAT 366 / 20238

Sene

Benim vezirim,


Şevketî, kerametî, mehabetî, kudretî velin‘imetim efendim,

Muktezâ-yi irâde-i seniyye-i şahaneleri üzere bu kere Bâbiâli’lerinde akd olan meclis-i havâsda Amedi Bey bendelerinin váki‘ olan ifadatının üzerine maslahat-ı maliyeye dair hayli ehhâs ve müzakere ceryan edip fezlekesinde cümelâ Mehmed Ali’nin mağrûrâne kullandığı tavir ve lisanına göre müsted‘iyât-ı sâbîkâsından vaz geçirilmesi ve ta’dîl ve tesviyesi şimdiki halde imkânda görûnmeyip Fransa elçisine gelen tahrîrât meali dahi taraf-ı devlet-i aliyelerine kullandığı lisan-ı veçhle olması tercüman Labir’in elcisinden olarak meclisten evvelce hidmet-i riyâsete götürmüşt olduğu varakadan müstebân olarak fakat varaka-ı mezkure bir küskünsü surette yazilmiş olduğuna nazaran, elç-i mersûmun istikşâf-ı zamîri icab-ı halden olup mamafih bu surette nâzizk ve cesim bir şey olduğundan tam mutalaya mütevakkift olarak şöyle ki zîr ve bâlâsî bi’l-etraf düşündüükten sonra muharebe imkânda görûnür ise ol halde bundan a’lâ tedbîr olmayıp, fakat Rusya devletinin i’ânesi şimdîye kadar muhafaza suretinde tutulmaktaka olmakla, anlarla söyleşilip tecavüz muamelesi gösterilmek üzere ıktizâ eden i’ânet ana göre taleb ve icra olunmak ve bu surette Fransa ve İngiltere devletleri bi-taraf dururlar ise ne güzel durmayacakları halde maslahata ker càlacağından anlarla dahi peşin söyleşmek ve gelecek asâkirin irâde-i ta’yînât malzemeleri dahi istihzâr kîlînmak ve’l-hâsîl maslahatin cevânib-i erba’asından tutulmak icab-ı halden olduğu ve şu kadar ki İbrahim yakında bulunması cihetîyle bu veçhle tedâbîre teşebbüs olunmuşt surette ilerlemek isteyeceğinden ana dahi igafl edecek bir tedbîr icab edeceğî
suretleri ba’det-tezekkür bunların cümleleri tasavvur nev’inden olacağından ibtida Rusya ve Fransa sefaretleriyle görüşülüp Fransa elcisi ne diyecek yani verdiği senedin icrasına çabalayacağı ve Rusyalı bu vechle tecavüzü i’ânanye girişeceği bir iyice anlaşılıdıktan sonra tekrar müzakere oluşmak muvâfık-ı maslahat düşeceğini Rusya elcisi yarın kendiliğinden olarak ReisEfendi kullanıra gelmek üzere haber göndermiş olduğu fakat i’ânet-i tecavüz hususunda yalnız elçiyile olunacak müzakere kâfi olamayacağı cihetle efendi-i mümaileyh kulları tarafından haber ırsâliyle General Moradif dahi beraber olarak müzakere olunması ve ferdası dahi Fransa elçisi çelb ve mülakat kılınması hususları istisvâb olunmuş olsakla, ol vechle icrası hususu muvâfik-ı irade-i seniyye-i mülükâneleri buyrulur ise emr u ferman şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû velini’metim efendim padişahım hazretlerinindir.
This document shows that Mahmud was very optimistic about making a military alliance with Britain at the beginning of the Mehmet Ali Problem since he was looking forward to hearing the news from Namik Pasha, who was in London to negotiate the matter. He was impatient to learn the result of his Pasha’s negotiations with the British because Ibrahim Pasha was moving quickly across Anatolia and from Mahmud’s point of view the only solution for this fatal situation was to strike a military alliance with Britain so he could subdue his rebel governor with their help.
Kaymakam Paşa,

İşbu takrîrin manzûr ve malum-ı hümayunum olmuştur. Takrîrinizde beyan ol杜兰uzu üzerine elçi-i mersûma ol vechle cevab verilmesi münasibidir. Ancak İngiltere haylı boyu uzak mahal olduğundan bu on beş kita cem sefâini ne vakit gelebilir ve bu ittifâk husûsuna İngiltere kralı ve vükelsâmın muvafakat edeceğî henüz pek de tehayyûn etmediğinden kat’iyece şâfî cevabı gelinceye değin bizim donanmamız şöylele tahaffûzu suretinde durduğu halde Misr’daki habîs herifin istediği mahallerde sefine-i menhûsası serbest serbest gezmesi karada olan hûne-i Misriye’nin bir kat daheimarmalarını mûcib olacak ve ordu-yı hümayunumuzun dahe şimdiki hali malumunuz olmakla, artık ana göre bu taraftan lazım gelen tedâbir ve tertibât icrasına bakılmalıdır. Bu habîs herif ile oğlu olacak yarenlerin niyet-i fâsideleri bilinmek ve ana göre ordu-yı hümayunumuzu ne derece ihtimâm olunarak çıkârılmış ise de be-hikmetullahi teala [Devamı Çekilmemiş]

Şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû velini’metim efendim,

Malum-ı hümayun-ı mülükâneleri buyrulduğu üzere İngiltere elçisini Kanîn Mısîr maddesine dair bazı şeyler sual etmekte olduğundan bugün Reis Efendi kullanımla mülakatında dahi yine lakirdîyi açıp ibtidâ kendisi İngiltere’ye varıp da rabita-i ittifâkiyeye dair devleti tarafından haber gelinceye kadar devlet-i aliye memurları berren ve bahren tecavûzu hareket etmeyip daim-i tahaffûzu iltizâm olunmak suretini marzû’l-temasta beyan ile ba’dehu saltanat-ı seniyyenin şu Mısîr maddesinde ne mikdar berriye ve bahriye i’mâl edeceğî ve Mehmed Ali habîsi hakkında faraza tazyikât kavliye ve fi’iliye icra olunup da kendisi Mısîr’a çekilerek devlet-i aliyenin menâfi-i kadîmesini dahe kemâfi’s-sâbik i’tâ edecek olduğu halde afv-ı aliye şayan olup olmayacağına dair saltanat-ı seniyyenin mütehâ-ı nîyet-i câzîmesini istîfsâr eylemiş olmakla, bugün esnâ-ı meclistê ahar odaya çıkılıp seraker paşa ve müşîr paşa bendeleri ve memurîn kulları ile beynimizde vâkt‘ olan müzakerât-ı âcizanemizde habîs-i merkûmun böyle ilerleyen
tahattısı mücerred sefine-i menhûsenin Berr-i Şam sevâhilinde geçt u güzâr etmesinden neş’et edip yoksa be-havlu’lallah te’âla kuvve-i bahriyesi bir kere ibtal olunsa karada olan asâkir-i makhûresinin bir yerde dikiş tutamayacakları ve sâye-i şeyket-vâye-i kişver-keşâbilerinde hariçten i’âneye kat’a hâcet kalmayacağı bi-iştibâh ve sür’at husûl-i maslahat zimindıda İngiltereli’den matlûb on beş kadar cenk sefinesinden ibaret olacağı âzade-i tekellûf-gevâh olup hatta elçi-i mersûmun seraker-i müşarûnîleyh bendeleriyle mülakatında dahi mesârif-i vâkı’âsi taraf-ı saltanat-ı seniyyelerinden verilmek üzere donanma-yı hümâyûn-ı şahaneleri ma’iyetine on beş kitâ cenk sefinesi terfîki söylenmiş ve elçi-i mersûm dahi muvâfakat suretinde cevab vermiş olduğuna nazaran kara tertibatının kat’an lûzumı olmayıp donanma-yı hümâyûn-ı şahanelerin heyet-i mecmû’âsi dahi meydanda olmak hasebiyle ana göre bu babda olan sâylenin cevabı irâd olunan hareket-i bahriyelerinin keyfiyeti tekrar olunması ve hain-i merkûm hakkında İngiltereli’nin kadîmden gayz ve adâvetleri derkâr olmak cihetleriyle afvı suretini sualden muradları merkûmun nefisini iltizâm demek olmayıp mücerred ileride şayed afvı tarafına gidilip de kendilerinin mesârifî hebâ olmamak için maslahatın hakikatini anlamanı kazıyvesine mebni olması varîd-i ezhân ve her ne ise bu makûle afvı lakırdısına cihet gibi takımı karışırmak caiz olmayacağı váreste-i kay u beyan olmakla, merkûmun hurûc-i ale’s-sultan fazîhasıntı irtikâbi ve bu misillû hüne kendilerinin dahi olsa afvı mümkün olmayacağı keyfiyâti serd ve ityân olunan afvı muhâlattan olduğunu bildirilmesi suretleri münasib gibi mutalaa olunmağın bi-minhû teala bu husus için dahi yarın sabahleyin böylece cevab i’tâsi hususunda ne vechle irâde-i seniyye-i şehriyêrleri müte’allik buyurlur ise emr u ferman şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû veli-ni’metim efendi’nim padişahım hazretlerinindir.
This is the order to Mustafa Reşid Pasha was sending him to Kütahya to negotiate with Ibrahim Pasha. In this document, Reşid Pasha was told to focus on keeping the administration of Adana in favour of the Sultan. If he could not achieve this, the conditions of France and Britain would have to be carefully considered, and they would have to be persuaded to act against Mehmed Ali as a second plan. The instructions given to Reşid Pasha are very important because they show that the Sultan hoped to resolve the crisis through diplomacy.
Benim Vezirim,

Mecliste bi’l-müzakere arz olunan işbu takrîrin ve müzakkere ile kaleme alınan müsvedde manzûr ve tefsîl-i keyfiyet mümâileyh Vassaf Efendi’nin takrîr ve ifadesinden malum-ı hümayunum olmuştur. Çünkü bu babda hatır-ı hümayunu muza la yiîh olan tedâbir cümeleniz tarafından dahti tasvîb ve istihsân olunmak hemen bu veçhe icra ve mümâileyh Reşid Bey’in dahti icâleten harçırâhî ve yedine verilecek talimatnamenin i’tâsiyla içra ve i’zâmına mûbâderet olunsun.

Şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû veli-ni’metim efendim,

mülükâneleri muktezâ-yı münifî üzere bazı çarşumunaylı tâ'abbüdât ve teminat serdiyle herifi iknâ’ ve irzâya çalışıp husûlü takdirinde ann Kütahya’dan gerilere tahrîkiyle kendisi dahi binip Mısır’a gitmek ve şayet yine inad ve isrâr edecek olursa ol vakit keyfiyeti bu tarafă iş’âr ve istizân ile gidecek cevabına intizâren İbrahim’i orada oyalandırmak gibi şeyler derc ve tezkîr ve İbrahim’e dahi bir-kit’a sathîce mektub tahrîr ve tesâvır olunması ve mamâfîh mesâlihî haliye ve tertibât-ı harbiye gerîmîyetlice tutularak gece ve gündüz çalışırılmak ve ezher-i cihet tedarikli bulunmak lazım geleceğî misillû çünkü âmme-i alemyân indlerinde bedîhi ve ayân olduğu üzere bu Mehmed Ali’ye bu kadar memâlikin ihalesi mehâzîr-i kesîreyi müstelzîm olarak şimdiki halde gösterilecek müsaade mücerred def’-i mazarrat kazıyâninden ibaret olduğundan bundan ileride herifin icra-ı mefâsidine meydan verilmemek lazım geleceğine ve bu defa Fransa elçisi devletinin Mehmed Ali’den hoşnutsuzluğu resmen beyan edeçini söyleyip İngiltereli dahi elbette bu meslekte ve sair dünv-ı Avrupa dahi herife suret-i adâvette olacağını binaen, devlet-i aliyeleri bir taraftan inşâlahu teala tezyid-ı asâkir maddesine ve sair mevadd-ı mühimmeye ikdâm ve bir cânibden dahi Avrupa devletlerini ele alarak ve icab-ı hale göre birbirine tutuşturarak anları kuvve-i berriye ve bahriye hususlarında herife davaciâlık etmeye ve lede’l-hâce içlerinden hangisi münasib ise Mısır takımının aleyhine kullanmaya dair tadîbîr mezîd-i ihtimâm-birle süvey-ı mu’alla-vâye-i cihan-dârîlerinde telafi-i mâfât emr-i ehemmine çalışılması suretleri söyleşilmiş ve tafsîl-i halin hâk-i atebe-i felek-mertebel-ı padişahanelerine arz ve ifadesi mümâileyh Vassaf Efendi kullarının uhde-i istî’dâdına havale olmuş olmakla, hususat-ı merkûmede her ne vechle irâde-i seniyye-i şehînsâhîleri müte’allik buyrulur ise mahza hayyr ve meymenet anda olacağı rehin-i ilm-i âli-i hilafet-penâhîleri buyrulduktâ ol babda ve her halde emr-u ferman şeyketlü, kerametlû, mehabêtî, kudretlû veli-ni’metim efendim padişâhım hazretlerinindir.
Mahmud was very angry with the French because he mentions in this document that they broke their promise and caused Adana’s administration to be given to Ibrahim Pasha. It is easy to see Mahmud’s anger level in his words about the French when he says they had an “apostate nature”.
Sene

Benim vezirim,


Şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû veli-ni’metim efendim,

Nemçe elçisi min gayr-i resm Reis Efendi kullanılarla mülahat taleb etmekte olduğundan dünkü gün bi’l-mülahat elç-i mersûm Avusturya devleti, devlet-i aliyenin dost-i hem-civarı olmak hasebiyle hasbe’l-mevki‘ Fransa ve İngiltere devletlerinden ziyade ma’ârif-i hal ve kuvve-i ikbâlini mütemenni ve memâlik-i mahrûsanın intîdâd-ı ihtilalinden sairinden efzûn müte’essir ve mutazarrır olacağı zahir ve celifdir. Hatta bu usul-i mer’iyesini te’yîden Rusya devletiyle bi’l-ittihâd Mısır valisini itaat-i hazret-i padişahîye teşvik ve tahvîl için İskenderiye’ye mahsus memur göndermiş ve beynlerinde sebkat eden muhâtaba ve mücâvebe keyfiyetini geçenlerde teblîğ ve ifade olunmuş ve mesned-i riyâsetle Fransa elçisi beyinde bundan iki mâh mukaddem râbt olunan mu’aâhede iktızâsinca Mısır valisi Fransa sefâretinin tavassutuna münâbi’at etmek lazım iken hilafla hareketle, vermiş olduğu cevâbdır. Avusturya imparatorunun malumu olacak te’sîr ve infi’âlini mûcib olmuştur. Mu’aâhede-i mezkûrede Fransa elçisi Rusya imparatoruna su-i zaman ile sefâyîn-i Rusya’nın Dersaadet’ten iadesini şart kılmâsi imparator-i müşîrûnîleyhin namusuna dokunur bir kaziye olmakla, Fransa ile Rusya devleti beyinde haylice kil u kâl ve mubahere-i bâdire tevellüdüne bâ’is olup hâlbuki Fransa elçisi mu’aâhede-i mezkûrenin icrasına
Mahmud was very angry with the French because he mentions in this document that they broke their promise and caused Adana’s administration to be given to Ibrahim Pasha. It is easy to see Mahmud’s anger level in his words about the French when he says they had an “apostate nature”.
maslahat-ı teşebbühden kurtarılmak için sürat-i icraşi mühim ve münasibdir diyerek ve tarafneyden ibrâz-ı huluse dair ve sair bazı afaki sohbet cereyan ederek avdetetmiş ve bade İngiltere tercümanı Şayer gelip bu defa vürud eden elçileri henüz sefineden sefarethaneeye gelerek Bab-ı Ali ile muame-i resmiyeye inmemiş ise de evvelki gün bir tarafдан öz hakkında mütala a tevcihiyile idüğüne dair min-gayr-i resm mahremane vaki olan suvaline mebni devlet-i aliyye küzi şey için muharebe muhlikesine ihtiyar etmeyüp Adana’nın ihalesine müsade buyurulmasını münasib mülahaza ederim deyü söyledi ifade ettiği muhit-i ilm-i alem-şumul şehinşahileri buyuruldukdada emr ü ferman şevketlü kerametlü mehabetlü kudretlü veliyü’l-niam efendim padişahım hazretlerinindir.

This is the letter from the British Prime Minister, Lord Grey to Mahmud II in February 1833. He wrote it after negotiating with Namik Pasha about the Sultan’s desire for an Anglo-Ottoman military alliance against Mehmed Ali. Grey states in his letter that he unfortunately had to convey that Britain was unable to help the Ottomans at this time, however the Sultan could be sure that the British politicians were fully aware of the importance of the Ottoman Empire for Britain and that in the eventuality of any possibility of attack by Mehmed Ali’s army on Istanbul, they would not allow the Ottoman Empire to fall into decay.
HAT 372 / 20392

Sene

Makam-ı sadaret-uzmâ’ya şehir-i Şubatın yirmi üçü tarihiyle müverrah İngiltere devletinin Başvekili tarafından ırsâl olunan mektubun tercumesidir.

Ba’de’-elkâb,

This is the letter from the British Foreign Minister, Palmerston, to Mahmud II in February 1833, which he wrote after he met with Namik Pasha. Palmerston expresses in his letter that the King had always supported the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and therefore his majesty was assigning Colonel Campbell to Egypt to negotiate the latest developments with Mehmed Ali Pasha. If Mehmet Ali said he would not give up his rebellion against his Sovereign, Mahmud II, Campbell was to sternly warn the Pasha that in this case Britain absolutely would support the Sultan because they were aware of the high importance of the Ottoman Empire’s territorial integrity in terms of the European balance of peace.
HAT 372 / 20392 A

Sene

Makam-ı sadaret-uzmâya şehr-i Şubatın yirmi üçü tarihiyle müverras İngiltere devletinin umûr-ı ecnebiye naziri tarafından irsal olunan mektubun tercümesidir.

Ba’del elkâb,

بدأت

واتب كبرى- البترول- سهمه ودوره في إطلاع

البيئة لكونه مثلما بنيت فيها دولته

ابتسم ماذا تقوله وأينما أماكينه وعليه

حقه تعب على نفسه وطيره

برغم

HAT 380/20558-C
In February 1838, Mustafa Reşid, the Ottoman Foreign Minister at that time, was sent to Paris and Ahmed Pasha, the Governor in Aydın, was sent to London as Ottoman Ambassadors. Their missions were vital because Mahmud was making his last preparations to attack Mehmed Ali. He ordered them to persuade these countries’ public opinion to be in his favour so that in the event of any war with his governor’s army, they knew he was in the right because Mehmet Ali had broken the treaty of Kütahya by attacking the territories which were under the Sultan’s control. Mahmud was really determined to defeat his rebel governor this time and wanted to prepare the diplomatic atmosphere in the eventuality of such a battle. This document gives details about this topic.
HAT 380 / 20558 C

Sene 53

Maruz-ı kullarıdır ki,

vükü’ bulmadığı surette sırası gelmesine ta’lîkan a’mâl-i tedâbir-i lâzımeye dikkat olunacağı derkâr olup ancak beyandan müstağni olduğu vechle icabı takdirde bu makûle hain ile mukabeleye mübâşeret göz ardı kalmayacak derecede mühimmat-ı lâzımenin kâmilin hazırlık ve âmade bulunmasına muhtaç idin olunacağı taksirât-i bendegânemin afvı eyme-i kerimine hakkâniyet veliü’n-nî’melerine müvevvezdir. Bugünlerde ihtilâs olunan bazı havâdise göre güya hain-i merkûm Mısır’dan dokuz alay asker tırtîb ve tahrîr ve Berriyetü’ş-şam taraflarından tuttuğu asâkiri Mısır’a göndererek Mısır’da olan muallim asâkiri Haleb ve sair mevâkı’ye sevk ve tesyîr vadilerine sapmaya ve geçende Gülek’de üzerine sevk edilip ve birkaç yüz süvari-i Mısıryeyi maktülen rıhlet ve bu maddenin üzerine hain-i merkûm mubtelâ-1 hacâlet olduğu vechle giydirme-i seniyyeye devreden mürâzâ ve istid’âya cesaretim her ne kadar mugâyîr-ı adâb-ı ubûdiyetim ise de bu babda nâçâr ve ma’zûr olduğundan bu defa oğlu İbrahim haini Haleb’den dört beş alay asker alarak Gülek’de üzerine atf-1 veche-i nikbe? Eylediği rivayet olunmaksı, merkûmun bu veche harekât ve azimetleri ya fi’l-hakika ahz-i intikam mutalaasıyla mıdır? Yahut Berriyetü’ş-şam taraflarında vükü’ bulan taradarı pek yüzû’ bulduğundan encâmi bu madde kendi derecelerine muzır olur tasavvurâtıyla o taradarı kavme yedirmek için bir hile midır? Yoksa Şam’a çekilip de oradan Basra’ya veya veyahut Bağdad’a sarkmak mubahasasında mıdır? Her ne ise Mısır’ın şu aralık pek telaşları olduğu zâhir ve çâkerleri dahi bir taraftan ber-vech-i hafî levazimat-ı mukteziyeyi tehiye ve ihzâra çalmaktakar olduğum emr bâhir olarak akdemce şeref-sûnûh buyrulan emr ve irâde-i seniyye vechiyle Sivas ve Diyarbekir ve Urfa ve Maden-i Hümâyün kazalarından mürâyet on altı tabur asâkır-i redife ve altı bölük topçu asâkir-i redîfesi icra-ı münâvebe ve talimat şayyasıyla mevâkt‘-i münasibe celb ve cem’ olunmuş ve olunmaktakar bulunmuş olmakla, geçende işâr-ı âcizânem veche asâkır-i merkûmenin yağmurluklarıyla mevsim-i baharın takarrübüne mebni beyaz bezden elbise-i sayfiyeleri derdest-i i’ mal olarak bi-

kullarının mesârifât-ı vâkt’alarında ve sair hususlarda tasarruf ka’idesine ri’âyet ve envâl-i mezkûreyi teleften vikâyet ederek muhafaza sureti bi’l-iltizâm, el-hâlethü hâzihi uhd-i bendegiye muhavvel eyâlât ve elviyenin hâvi olduğu kazalar ahalisi zimme tlerindedir. Hüsn-i tahsil olan envâl- bakâyâ ve tayinat-ı askeriye sarf olunmak üzere anbarlara müdahale ederek muhafaza sureti bi’l-iltizâm, el-

Mahmud started to reap the rewards of his diplomatic efforts in sending Ahmed Pasha and Mustafa Reşid Pasha to Europe to win European public opinion to his favour in the case of a war with Mehmed Ali. This shows in this message sent by Metternich to the Sultan saying that they, Britain, Austria and The Ottoman Empire could resolve the problem without resorting to war. This document gives the details of Metternich’s surprise offer.
tahvifiyeden başka, terceüman-1 mersümun kendisi sözleri olmak üzere işte bu nize mahremâne söylerim diyerek vâki olan ifadesinde güya bu mu‘ahdedenin adem-i kabulüne dair izhâr olunmakta olan tereddüd Rusyali’nın ilkâsiyla olduğunda şüphe yoksa da asıl buna sebeb olan devletlu kapudan paşa hazretleriyle müsteşar-1 müşârirînîleyîh-i senâverlerinin re’y ve marifetleri olduğunu elçi bey duymuş ve anlaşılt olduğundan eğer bundan sonra yine tereddüd olunur ise müşârirînîleyîmâyî bi’t-tergibiye kadar çalâlayacak ve nihayeti devlet-i aliyeve mücib-i mazarât olacak deyi bir takım hezeyân etmiş ve eğerce beri taraftan dahi bu maddede Rusyali’nin kat’iyan medhalı ve hâniz mu‘ahdede-i mezkuze keyfiyetine haber ve agâhi olmayıp hususuya mu‘ahdede-i mezkuze devlet-i aliyênin işine elverir ve hatta mu‘ahdedeye bile benzer şey olmadağandan biz İngiltere devletiyle şöyle bir mu‘ahde yapacağımız demekle ve müsvededesisi göstermeye utandığımız cihetiyle buna dair hala ol tarafla bir şey açılmıştır. Kaldı ki elçi beyn bize sebêbiyet-i özr etmesi ve mazallahu teala hakkımızda ıgbîrî-1 hazret-i şahaneî davete çalışçığım demesi kendisinin iiddiasında olduğunu dostluk ve hayırlîhâtî sözü değildir zemininde mukabele olunmuş ise de mezkuze vararların birinde lakûrdar ve gerek terçüman-1 mersûmûn söylediği sözler doğrusu aârca kelamlar ve güce gider şeyler olduğuna ve bundan kat’ü’n-nazar kâffe-i meseâlîh-i saltanat-1 seniyyeveye büyük ve küçük cümle benedégân müttehîid ve yek-vücûd olarak ale’l-husus ki bu maddede ziminden elçi-i mümâleyîh taraçina her ne ifade olunmuş ise ittifak-1 arâ ve istihsâl-i ruhsat-1 seniyye-i hazret-i pađişâh-1 cihan-pîrâ vukû’t-yafte-i terêb ve tasvîb olunmuşken elçi-i mümâleyîhin bu gûne bazı bendêgân hakkında tahsis-i madda etmesi nâ-be-câ ve taraf-î saltanat-1 seniyyeveye halen ve istikbâlen zerre kadar bir gûne menfaati melhûz olmayan kaziye-i nâm-zarîyenin talib-i ahâ ve şehri ifràğını tecvîz etmemek mugâîr-i şidk ve ubûdiyet olmadiği mûsellem ve hüveydâ olup her ne ise elçi-i mümâleyîhin ibû ifadâtına dohî Nemçe elçisi mümâleyîh iibrâr ve tefhim buyrulan cevab kerâmêt-nisâb-1 hazret-i şehin-şahi vechle cevab-1 savâb i’tâsi lazım geleceğine ve fakât ol suret söylece lisânîn söylece ifade olunsa yine müşârûn-iylehûmîdân sûbhe ile kâ ni’ olmayarak şemâetî artracağına ve istîtildeğine göre Nemçe elçisi mümâleyîh Mabeyn-i Hümayün-1 Şahane’den avdeti akabinde bilcümle dûvel-i mütêháb Süferâ ve maslahatgûzarlarını sefeâthanesine davet ile bugun zat-î şuâvet-mê’âb-1 hazret-i şehin-şahi Misir meselesi hakkında bana şöyle buyurdu. Cenab-1 seniîl’-cevânîb-i hazret-i mülûkâneden böyle temin olundum diyerek ilan etmiş olduğundan suret-i irade-i seniyye-i cenab-1 şahane her ne kadar mesmâ’î olmuş ise de buna dahi bu taraftan cevab-1 âli irâesî kendisinin izâle-i sûhîyesine medâr olacağına mebni zikrolunan varakalar müşârûnîleyîh müsteşar efendi senâverleri tarafından sathîçe bir tezkire ile hâ-ki-pâ-yî âlice arz u takdim olunarak ol babda izbân buyrulacak cevab-1 âlide mesela hain-i mekûm aleyhine icra buyrulmakta olan tedarîkât-1 harbiyeden ferâgât olunmasına dair bu defa prens Metternik tarafından vâktî olan ihtıratî Nemçe elçisi Bâbiîli’ye ifade eylediğinden başka, şu gâilenin

Ma'rûz-ı bende-i müsted'îleridir ki,

This is Mahmud’s order to his statesmen that they should make final preparations for a possible war with Mehmed Ali’s army. According to him everybody understood how harmful Mehmed Ali was to his Empire and nobody in Europe objected to this decision. Despite this, he ordered his statesmen that they should tread very carefully until the right time came and no direct action should be taken against him yet. As can be seen in this document Mahmud appears to be determined to completely resolve his biggest problem this time. In accordance with this purpose, he put all his efforts into optimizing both the diplomatic conditions, and his army’s readiness, for war. This document also contains a very extensive report, which was to be presented to the Sultan, about the latest diplomatic and military conditions.
HAT 382 / 20584

Sene

Benim vezirim,

Bi’l-müzakere arz olan işbu takrîrin manzûr ve malum-ı hûmayunun olmuştur. Hususât-ı merkûmenin hepsi yolunda mutalaa olunmuş olduğundan tıbkî istizânı olunduğunu vechle icra-yı iktizâlara ibtidâr olunun. Ma‘teve herifin şu günlerde ağiz geveşetmesi bütün bütun niyet-i fâsidesinden geçmek suretinde olmayıp mücerred min tarafullah her ne malalde askeri var ise münfehim ve perişan olmakta ve bu hallerini Avrupa devletleri gördükçe merkûmun hakkında olan muamelelerini değiştirmekte olduklarından bi’z-zarûr bir müddet mülayemet suretinde görünmesi yine bir nev‘ hilesinden ibaredir. Bu herifin nasıl kıyâma ve hain-i din ve devlet olduğu bubsütün artık meydana çıkması ve kimsenin hiç artık şudur budur diyecek yeri kalmamış olduğundan hemen be-avnihi teala hakkında lazım gelen tedabirin bir taraftan icralarına bakılmak için taraf-i şahanemizden istizân olunarak iktizâlara bakılsın. Fakat bir müddetçik dahi açıktan olarak üzerine varilmayarak mevsim ve sırası gözetilsin. Hemen hak-ı teala hazretleri şer ve mazarratından cümleyi halâs eyleye. Âmin.

Şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû veli-ni‘metim efendim,

Malum-ı hûmayun-ı mülûkâneleri buyrulduğu üzere ahvâl-i Mısrıye‘ye dair Rusya sefâreti tarafından verilib manzûr-ı ma‘âlim-mevfür-ı şehriyârîleri buyrulmuş olan havadis kağidi evvelki gün sahilhane-i ubeydânemde havâs-ı me’murîn kullanıyla bi’l-ictímâ’ kıraat ile icab-ı hal-i maslahat üzerine deverân eden müzakerat-ı âcizânemizin fezlekesinde evrak-ı mezkûre meallerinde Beriyyeti‘ş-şam ihtilalinde Mehmed Ali haininin biraz galebesi gösterilmiş ise de mesmü‘ât-ı saire buna muvâfık olmayıp her ne ise merkûm dava-yı âltında yine devletlere mûracaat edeçeğini söylemiş olmasına göre ağzı gevşemis ve hod-be-hod hamsâne hareket ve ilan-i istikalı cesaret edemeyeceği tebeyyün etmiş olduğundan ve İngiltere ve Fransa ve Rusya devletleri her halde hukuk-ı devlet-i aliyeyi itiraf etmekte ve hususuya İngiltere devleti her ne mülahazaya mebni ise devlet-i aliyeî hakli tutarak arz-ı mu‘âvenet etmekte oldukları ve säye-i şevket-vâye-i şahanelerinde İngiltereli ile akd-i ittifak hususuna teşebbüs olunduğu cihettle bir
bucuk senelik müterâkim olan tekâsât akçesi şu esnada kendisinden taleb ve iddia olunması politikaca dahi faiđeli olacağandı ve hatta bu husus geçende İngiltere elçisi tarafından dahi ihtıt harunmuş iduğundan Kapı Kethüdaşı cells ile tekâsât akçesinin vakitleri hulûlünde vurduğu me’mül iken şimdide kadar zühûr etmesi bâđi-i ta’accüb ve istişrâb olmasıyla seri’an bi’t-tahrîr cevabını cells eylemesi tenbih ile evvel emirde bu veheh hafifçe sıkıştırılması ve bu kağıtların dahi sair havadis evräki birer sureti iar, ve iddiası ile Hacı İzzet Efendi kullarına teslimen Hafız Paşa bendelerine göndermesi ve süfün-i menhûse-i Mısriye’nin hurûcuna ve suret-i seyr ve hareketlerine dair evrak-ı mezkuredede muharrer olan keyfiyet dahi ber-tafsîl kapudan paşa bendelerine yazılıp habis herifin tezvîr ve fasâdına bir güne ser-rişte verilmek için cudud talimatını tecavüz ile donanma-yi hümayun-ı şahanelerini ilerletmesi te’kîd olunması ve Gavur dağında dahi ihtimal peyda olması ve Maraş feriki Süleyman Paşa’nın hain-i merkûm taraftarı olduğu gereği gibi tebeyyün ve tahakkuk etmesi cihetleriyle artık ba’de’zîn paşa-yı merkûmun Maraş tarafına ayak bastırılmaması caiz olmak hasebiyle hakkında musammem olan muamelenin kız gelir gelmez icrasına müşårûnîleyeh Hafiz Paşa bendeleri te’cî kılınması ve maiyetinde her ne kadar bazı oficiyaller var ise de toplu muallyım olmadığından Prusya’dan yeni getiren toplu oficiyallerinden iki çavuş ve bir yüzbaşı ve nümunen bölüğünden bazı güzide adamlar tayin ve irsâl olunarak gönderilecek toplar dahi anların istedikleri gibi olmak üzere bu tarafta marifetleriyle intihâb ve isrâ ve bu gidecek Prusyalı topluca yerine burada kullanılmak üzere bir yüzbaşı ile iki çavuş dahi cell olunmak mûnasib olacağandı bu hususun dahi Prusya’dan getirilecek piyade ve süvari oficiyallerinden dolayı derdest olan kontratoya dere ve imla olunması ve geçen ki meclist İngiltere kralıcesine irsâli tensîb olunan geändikan maada kendisine ve validesine kürk ve akmişe misllü tertîb kilnîn heidâyâ-yı seniyye-i şahaneleri karantina mûnasebetiyle zedelenerek zinet ve nûmâyişi gideceğinden o makûle eşya gönderilmekten ise kraliçe-i müşärûnîleyehâya yaptırılacak geändilik yine bin yüz bin iki yüz keselik olursa da yine topu bin beş yüz keselik olmak üzere validesine dahi üç dört yüz keselik bir aded murassa halhal imal olunup ortası beyza akik taşî olmasa ve çünkü Avrupa’da Osmanlı parasi mergûb ve mutesber olduğundan üzerine dahi makama mûvâfık Türkçe mûnasib beyt hak ettirilmesi ve muktezâ-yı irade- seniyye-i şahaneleri üzere olan-i sefaret maddesi Reşid Paşa bendelerinin hareketinden bir hafta evvel icra olunacak ise de Rusyalı birden bire ürkütülmemek için pek büyük tutulmayaqaran ilanından birkaç gün evvel iktîzâsî vechle Rusya sefaretine ifade-i keyfiyet olunarak evvelce mahremâne ifadesi dahi taraf-i esref-i şehinşahilerinden emr u ferman
buyluluğu ve bu vechle canib-i imparatoriye bildirilmesi matlûb-1 âli idiğû irâd ve beyan olunması ve zikr olunan hedâyâ-1 seniyye-i şahanelerinin ve gerek İngilvere umûr-i ecnebiyesi nazırı Lort Palmerston ile umûr-i politika kalemi müdürü mister Beggaveze şimdiden gidecek nişan-1 âli nişanların imal ve ikmali yırımı yırımı beş güne tevakkuf edeceğinden bu kadar müddet müşârünileyh Reşid Paşa bendelerinin bu tarafından tevakkuf ile teknimini beklemek ve ileride çıkaracağı karantinadan dolayı dahi vakit zayı etmek iktizâ etmeyip bir an evvel savb-1 maksûda vüsül için müşârünieleyh bendeleri hemen beş on gün zarında hareket ve azimete bunlar karantina mahallinde yetiştirilmek üzere verândan gönderilmesi ve icab eden mahfazaları beraber karantina çıkaracağından sonra ahar mahfazalar ile ûsul olunmak suretiyle asîl mahfazaları şimdiden yapırlılıp müşârünieleyh bendelerine verilmesi ve bu suretle müşârünieleyh bendelerinin hareket ve azimeti takarrûb etmeli olacagina binaen, keyfiyet mesela işbu Perşembe ve Cuma günlerinde Rusya sefaretine ifade olunup Pazar ve pazartesi günlerinden birinde ilan kilnmasi ve müşârünieleyh bendelerinin sâye-i ışevket-vâye-i mülükânelerinde râkib olacagi vapur sefinе-i hûmayunları iktizâ eden kömürünü Malta'ya ve malzeme-i sairesini Marsilya'ya kadar kifâyet edecek derecede olmak üzere ne maslahatla gideceği bilinmeyerek şimdiden tehîe-i ve istihzâr ettirilmesi hususları münasib gibi mülahaza ve mutalaa olunmuş ise de ber-vech-i muharrer icra-1 yı iktizâları hakkında ne vechle emr u irade-i keramet-âde-i cenab-1 cihanbânileri müte'allîk ve şereftünüh buyrulur ise ana göre harekete ibtidâr olunacağı muhât-1 ûlê-i âlem-i ârâ-1 yı tacdarileri buyrulduktu emr u ferman ışevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû veli-nilmetim efendim padişâhım hazretlerinindir.
The Ottoman Ambassador to Paris met with Palmerston at the behest of the Sultan in 1836. Mahmud placed particular importance on Damascus and so he ordered his ambassador to persuade Palmerston that Mehmed Ali was damaging the Ottoman Empire and tyrannizing the Ottoman public in Damascus. For this reason it was indispensable to disentangle Damascus from the rebel governor. This document is about this meeting with Palmerston.
Paris sefiri Amedi Bey bendelerine

politikalarının tervicini elden bırakmaya evvelki sözlerini iade ederek bu suret ise saltanat-ı seniyyeye dahi birguna züll ü şe’ni mucib olmakta iduçundan bu hususun bütün bütün bahsindenden geri durulmak saltanat-ı seniyyenin icabat-ı mülk-dârisine muvafîk olmadığı misillü bunların şu adem-i muvafakatleri cihetiyle tesir etmeyecek vakitte talebi muavenette inhimâk sureti gösterilmek dahi fi-l-hakika müناسip olmayacağından şimdilik bunun bahsi bu merkezde birâlara ol tarafların an be an müşahede olunan vakt-i politikalarına göre husus-i mezbura dair ifâdât-ı seniyye-i devlet-i aliyenin tesir edeceği anlaşıldığı halde hemen bahsine girislerek işn gelişine göre davranılmak lazımeden ve icab-ı irade-ı seniyye-i hazret-i şahen-şâhidin olmaga suret-i irade-i seniyye-mûmâ-ileyh Beylikçi efendi hazretlerine tahrir ve iş’ar olunmus olduğundan zat-ı samileri dahi bu usul vechle icra-yi levazim-i temşiyet-kâriye himem-i behiyyeleri der-kâr buyurulması mütemenna-yi hulûs-veri idûğu ve iș’ar buyurulan nişan hususunun dahi şimdilik tehiriyle ileride bir münasebet vukuunda icra-yi icabına bakılacağı ve tüccar taifesinden Hamlet nam kimesne Dersaadet’e azimet etmiş ve kendisi muteserbe adam bulunmuş ve taraf-ı Samilerinden atufetlu Namık Paşa hazretlerine ve sair bazı mahallere mektup gönderilmiş olduğu beyanıyla ahz u itaya dair mersum ile bazı maslahat vukuu takdirinde hakkında hüsn-i muamele olunması ihtar olunmuş olup henüz mersumun bu tarafı vürüduna dair bir mesmûât olmayıp vuruu takdirinde iṣ’âr-i samileri vechle hakkında muamele-i münasibe icra olunacağı beyanıyla .....

2 Safer 52
This is a report by Namik Pasha, who was in London to negotiate a possible alliance with Britain against Mehmed Ali Pasha. This report gives many details about his days and meetings in London.
Maruz-i kullarıdır ki

İseniz de devletlu Serasker paşa hazretleri muhalefet eylediklerini ve vökela-yi devlet-i aliye bu aralık mütelâşî olduklarını ifade eylemiş olmağla bu hususta harben şiddetli hareket etmelerini nazr-i mümâ-ileyhten iltimas eyledikimde memurlarının İskenderiye’ye vusûlünde harîfîn muhalefet edemeyeceğini ima ve beyan eyledi.

Bâlâda mestûr teşrifatın üçüncü günü krâliçenin dünyaya geldiği güne tesadüf eyledikinden teşrifat-i mezkurenin bir aynı dahi yevm-i mezkurda icra olunmak ve bu cem’iyette krâliçeye ve sair kibâr-i haremleri dahi bulunmak adet-i kadimededen ve süfera ve kübera dahi teşrifat-i evvel misillü krâliçeye ile görüşmek lazimed Olmağla sairleri gibi çakerleri dahi mahal-i cem’iyette azimet edip krâliçeye ile mülakatında tab-i mekârim-teba’-i şahaneşi sual eyledikinden iktizasına göre cevap verildiği malum-u devletleri buyurulmak üzere iş’a ıctisar kıldılı baki irade efendimindir.

8 Şevval 48 Mehmed Namîk
Another of Namık Pasha’s reports about his last meeting with Palmerston. He was to leave London because the British Cabinet rejected the Sultan’s offer of an Anglo-Ottoman military alliance and he met with Palmerston just before he left London. This report shows how Palmerston was dissatisfied with his cabinet’s decision.
Maruz-i kullarıdır ki

harben dahi muavenet etmeye karar verecekleri ihtimalidği ifade eylemiş olmada hemen kuryel çıkmak üzere olduğundan bu kadarcık iş’âr kılındı. ….. teala yola çıktığında her bir keyfiyet tefsilen iş’âr kılınacağı ve irade buyurulan tarikten azimet kılınacağı ve bugün Viyana tarikiyle vürüd eden havadise göre Mehmet Ali devlet-i aliyye’ye itaat edeceğini ve mersum Mavroyani’nin dahi bir kıta arızası leffen takdim kılındığı malum-u devletleri buyuruldu da emr ü ferman efendimindir.

10 Şevval 48 Mehmed Namık
This document is a reply from Istanbul to Ponsonby’s insistent demand for an explanation of the secret article of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. As can be seen in the document the reply was given in an abrupt manner. Istanbul says, in brief, ‘This treaty is absolutely not an assault treaty; on the contrary, it is a defence treaty concerning the security of the Ottoman lands’. At the end it clearly states: ‘Since these matters have been repeatedly expounded in great detail to the British and French ambassadors, no further explanations will be forthcoming’. 
İngiltere elçisine cevaben verilecek takrir-i resmin müsveddesidir

Geçen sene devlet-i aliye ile Rusya devleti beyinde akd olunan muahededen dolayı asalatli İngiltere devleti elçisi dostumuz bazı telâş ve iztirab izhar etmiş idi ki devlet-i aliye bunları elçi beyn hüsn-i hal-i saltanat-i seniyye hakkında kemal-i himmet ve iltizamına haml ile zikr olunan nâ-becâ iztirâbların teskini ziminda hüsn-i iradetiyele muahededen suret-i sahihasını elçi beye ite ve muahede-i mezkür eczasından olan madde-i münferidenin icmalen mealin beyan ve inha ederek bir şehadet-i muhadenet ve itimadın ibrâzını tensib buyurmuş bu vechele suret itasında muahede-i mezkürünün taarruz u taaddiye mail olmadığına ve mevzû’i mahza muhafaza maksadından ibaret idâguna dair ednâ şüpheyi def’ ve izâleye sahîh bazı izahat dahi terfik ve ilave kiâlınımsı idi. Devlet-i aliye bu vechele dostlarla olan devletler süfere-i layıkânın riayet ve safvetine dair delail ü berâhîn-i müselleme izhâr buyurarak süfere-yı muma-ileyhüm taraflarından krymeti takdir ü vüsûk u itimâllarıyla mashir bir mukabele-i layûka icra olunacağımı me’mûl buyurumakta ıken elçi beyn işbu şehir-i Nisan’ın yirmi birinde takdimini vazife-i zimmet add etmiş olduğu takriri me’mûl-i mezkürün hilaflı zuhurunda fevk-al-gaye müteessif olmuştar. Şöyle ki salif-üz-zikr takrîr bazı ibrâzı havi ve ima ve ilkaatı muhtevedir ki devlet-i aliye eger muahede-i mezkürünün akdinde derkâr olan maksâd-1 hayrîyyeye dair ednâ su-i zannın eserini bile imha ve izâleyi samimi iltizam buyurmasız olsa şan ve namusunu vikayeten bununun cevâbinden vâreste olurdu. İşte bu maksadı mebni vükela-yı devlet-i aliye İngiltere kralî cenab-1î hasmetmeabînîn sefrîne ilan ve beyana ibtidar eder ki elçi beyn mukaddemeces ahz eyledigi muahede mevad-1î celeyyesi sureti bi-l-külliye âslına mutabik olup ve elçi beyn farzetti misillî hicbîr sehîh vaki olmayıp ve Türkçesi Rusyacasına kamilen mutabik olarak elçi beyn takririnde beyan olunan tenakuzat bir taraftan mukaddem veyahut muhayhar olan ibare ve cümlelerle bilâ rabita ale-l-infîrâd ahz olunmus ıki fikra mütehâlîfeye ve diğer taraftan elçi beye ita olunan Türkçenin Fransızcaya tercümésinde olunan sehîh vaki azime hamîl olunmak lazım olup fi-l-hakika bir devlet hissesine müteterettib-ül-ita olan asakînî miktarî li-ecl-ül-tayîn evvelce devlet-i müsta‘îne ile müzakere etmek salahiyetini yalnız kayd u ihtiyat etmeksizin devlet-i mezküre-yeye talepetti oggi kadar kuvvetleri idaresine tefvîzi derhubde etmesi müstâgreb olurdu. Bu takdirce o misillü muhabere ve tevafûkun zarureti muahedede mezkür olmasa bile tabiat-ı ahvalden lazım gelir halbuki bilakis işbu muhabere ve tevâfuk hususu muahedede mûsûsen iş’âr olunmakla elçi bey dahi Rusyacasını Türkçe olan ibare-i atiyye ile bi-l-ıhtimam karşılaştıramak sehlen mülzam olur ki ibare-i mezkürdâ hasmetlu cemi’ Rusyaların impâradoru
This document is a reply from Istanbul to Ponsonby’s insistent demand for an explanation of the secret article of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. As can be seen in the document the reply was given in an abrupt manner. Istanbul says, in brief, ‘This treaty is absolutely not an assault treaty; on the contrary, it is a defence treaty concerning the security of the Ottoman lands’. At the end it clearly states: ‘Since these matters have been repeatedly expounded in great detail to the British and French ambassadors, no further explanations will be forthcoming’.

hareket ederek muahade-i mezkure hakkında muamelat-i cedideye teşebbüs-i terk eder ve o makule muamelat ancak maraz vukua ve hayz vucuda gelmiş bir fiil hakkında mukadder ve gayr-i müsemmer bir münazaa ve mübaheseye badi olur. Devlet-i Aliyye’nin her bir devlet-i müstakile ve mutlakaya aid istihkakat mucebince hareket ederek akd eylemiş olduğu bir muahede aleyhine meccanen ta’riz olunmakla tervic ve te’yidi samimi murad olunan istiklale münafi hareket murad olunmak misüllü muayene célb olunur ve şahr-i Temmuzun sekizi tarihiyle müverrah muahedeyi keyfiyet-i sahihası üzere irayeye salih olan muhakemat ve kiyaset biddefaat beyan olunmuş olduğundan devlet-i aliyye ilan buyurdu ki badezin iradi murad olunacak esile ve istifhamata bu güne kadar olunan ifadata havaleden gayri cevab veremeyecekdir deyu muharrerdir.
This is a very extensive report by Mustafa Reşid Pasha from Europe. This report is a very significant document because it shows how the Ottomans were aware of the diplomatic developments in Europe. Mustafa Reşid Pasha gives every detail of the diplomatic conditions in Europe at that time and evaluates how these conditions could be turned in favour of the Ottoman Empire.
Atebe-i bülend-merte-be-i veliyy-ül-niamilerine maruz-ı çakerkemineleridir ki

El-hâletü házihi Avrupa’da politika maslahatları sıkışmakta ve Lehlünün Beç muahedesi iktizasına intiyâz-ı kadîmesinin iadesi sureti herkesin lisanında ve her bir gazetelerde deveran etmekte olarak hatta parlemento kamarası açıldığı gün Fransa kralının ırad ettiği nutk-ı resmiyyesine cevaben aza-ya meclis taraflarından verilen cevab-ı resmîde dahi münveric olup Rusyalunun ise kibr ü gururu iktizasına bu teklifin lâkırdısına bile yanaşmayacağı ihtimaline ve Frengistan’ın meşhur olan istidad-ı …… nazaran beyinlerindeki münakaşasının gittikçe iştidadı melhuzattan görünüp bu evânda bu hususlara dair ve Nemçelünün Rusyaludun rû-gerdân olarak İngilere ve Fransa devletlerine ızhâr-ı meyl etmekte olduğu mütedair her taraftan tül ü derâz pek çok makalat istimâ’ olunmakta olduğu misillü geçen gün General Kelmino ile mülâkat olunmuş olduğundan ol dahi mahremâne vaki olan ifadesinde Rusya imparatoru’nun Prusya kralıyla karabet-i sihriyesinden naşı beyinlerinde muhabbet-i kaviyye der-kâr ise de bu keyfiyet ancak zâtlarına mahsus olarak tarafeynın vükelâ ve ve askeri rüesanîn birbirleriyle ziddiyetleri bu defa Kalbe cemiyetindeki muâmelâttan gereği gibi tebeyyün etmiş ve ba’da Tecic’e geldiklerinde Avusturya İmparatoru’ndan dahi Rusya İmparatoru’nun me’mûlül olan:hidden-i muamele zuhur etmeyip birbirlerinden vahset ve nefret emârâtı müsahehe kılınmış olup ıste bunların bu veçle uyuşamamaları devlet-i Aliyye’ye göre ayn-ı menfaat ve mevsim-i fırsat olmağa bundle istifade olunmak lazım ve mühimdir demesiyle taraf-ı çakerden dahi Lillah-ül-hamd zât-ı şeyvet-simât hazret-i şahen-şâhinin kemâl-i akl-ı Felatun-pesend-i mülükânelerinden naşı her bir hususât-ı dahiliye ve hariciyeye himmet-i âliye-i şahaneleri rütbe-i nihâyede ve vükelâ-yı devlet-i aliye hazeratının dahi mesâlih-i haliyye überine takayıyûd ve ikdam ve basiret ve ihtimamları şu surette bu surette olmağa bi-lutfi Teala az vakite derece-i matlûbeye vasil olacağımızda iştibah yoktur yollu bazı ecvibe irândından sonra Avusturya devleti bir vakitten beri Rusyalu tarafına mail ve İtalya kitasına Fransa’nın serbestiyeti sirayeti vâhimesinden dolayı daima bu tarafına mütevahhiş ıken çimdi birden bire tebdîl-i usûl ile Rusya İmparatoru tarafına ızhâr-ı nefret etmesi daha taaccübâtür denildik de vakta Fransa’nın bir vakitten beri aralık aralık zuhura gelen ihtilal-i dahilisi cihetiyle sirayet-i serbestiyet vâhimesi daima Avusturyalunun zihinlerinde bulunduğunun başka sabık Avusturya İmparatoru dahi sinn-i pîrîsi iktizasına her
iktiza etmez ve ehl-i İslam sahabet olunacak millet değildir hemen bu hususta Rusyalu ile uyuşulmak lazım dava-yi batılında ve bir gurhnu dahi memalik-i İslamiyyeyi Hud’a-negerde Rusyalunun istilasından Fransa devetine ne menfaat ne mazarrat mellebilir bu madde Hind memaliğinden ve muamelat-i bahriyesinin kesret ve kuvvetinden nasıl ancak İngiltere devletinin düşüneceği şey olmaça Fransa devetine göre lazım olan fakat kendi menâfi’ne bakmaktır hü-mu fâsidinde olarak bunlar bu lakırdıları bazen parlemento kamaralarında dahi televvüh etmekte ve neşr ettikleri ketb-i kerihe ve gazete evrakına dahi yazmaktadırlar ve Fransa kralının dahi Rusyaluya meyl-i hafisi söylenmektedir lakin bunlarda bu ihtilaf-ı arâ var iken başka baği başi başi kara kara bir şey yapmağa muktedir olamayacakları ve belki bu revişleri ileride kendi memleketlerinin envâ’-ı ihtilal teșevvûsata giriftarlığını intac edeceği mubahazadan ba’id deyilir. Şu kadar ki İngiltere devleti bir vakitten beri Fransa devletinin İngiltere devlet ve milletine irtibat-ı kalbiyyesini istihsal etmiş olduğundan Fransa rûesasının mecburen İngiltere ittifak ve politikasından ayrılamayacakları ve İngilterelü nasıl hareket ederler ise bunların dahi birlikteleri olacak görünür. Salisen Nemçe devlet, bir vakitten beri Rusyaluya mail iken şimdi beri taraflar meyl göstermesi sahip olduğu halde devlet-i aliyeye hakkında dahi bi-t-tabi nurazı değişim lazım geleceğinden ve İngilterelünün nüfuz-u bahrısı nasıl ise Nemçelünün dahi bulunduğu hal ve mevki ıktizasına beren nüfuzu öylece cari görüdüğündan yani Nemçelü tarafe-i muahrizeynden kavgasına meyl-i sahibi gösterir ise elbet ol tarafin işine kuvvet geleceği bedihi olması cihetiyile cümle devletler Nemçe devletinin politikasına kemal-i dikkat ile bakmakta olduklarından

Avusturya devletinin usul ü ahvalını tedkik etmek dahi devlet-i aliyeye göre ehem umurdandır. Hal böyle olunca saltanat-ı seniyye cümleden evvel ve akdem İngiltere devletini kemalileye temin edip isindirmak lazım geleceğinden bir taraftan Dersaadet’te olan İngiltere elçisi vesatatıyla ve bir canibden dahi Londra’da olan sefaret-i devlet-i aliyeye marifetiyle kemâ-yenbagi çalışılmak ve çünkü Fransa devletinin politikası müstakil olmayıp İngiltereye merbut olduğundan ve bu kadar firka-i muhtelifenin cümlesinicelb etmek hayyiz-i imkandaki olmayıp bi-l-farz mümkün olsa bile İngilterelü layıkıyla devlet-i aliyeye isnmadıkça yalnız bunlardan bir faide me’mül olmadığını burası şimdi kula hise idare olunarak asıl İngilterelü ile isığ geërme bağilmak mukteza-yi maslahattandır zira İngilterelü ile uyuşulur ise şayet bunların Rusyalu ile münafeseleri kizışı da muharebeyi netice verecek olur ise ol vakt İngilterelüyü devlet-i aliyeye maaz-Allah-u Teala bir guna zarar gelmeyecek suretlerde kullanmak ve beyinlerinde indifâ’i

imale için bunların şu aralık memalik-i saltanatı seniyyede ziyadece sıkıtılmayarak kendilerine bazı mertebe hüsn-i muamele gösterilmesi maslahatça nâfi’ gibi mülahaza olunur. İşbu ifâdâtı meşruha buraların ahvaline ve mesmüat-ı váki’ye tâbîkân hatıra makulesi şeyler olarak bunları uzun uzun yazmak had-i âğabeydanemden haric ve cümle ……… Umûr nezd-i vâlâ-yı veliyy-ülm-namilerinde tarîfen müstağni ise de her bir işîtiilen ve hatıra gelen şeyleri bildirmek dahi mukteza-yı şik u ubudiyetten olmâyla mücerred malum-u ali veliyy-ül-namileri buyurulmak için takdim-i arîza-i bendegâneme ibtidâr kılınmuş olduğu inşa-Allah-u Teala mukatâ ilm-i alileri buyuruldu da her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-û-emrindir.

El-hâletü hazîhi İngiltere devletinin kemal-i sürat ve germiyet ile donanma techiz etmekte olduğu ve Fransa’nın dahi Bahr-i Sefid ve bahr-ı muhit tarafında olan tersanelerinde kezalik aceleten külliyyetlî süfün-i harbiye hazırlanmâkta idûğu herkesin lisanında alenen söylenip gazetelerde dahi açıkta açığa yazılmakta olmâyla is’âra ictisar kîlîndi inşa-Allah-u Teala malum-u veliyy-ül-namileri buyuruldu da her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-û-emr efendimizindir.

5 Şevval 51 Mustafa Reşid