Arrow's theorem and theory choice

Rizza, Davide ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1375-371X (2014) Arrow's theorem and theory choice. Synthese, 191 (8). pp. 1847-1856. ISSN 0039-7857

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Abstract

In a recent paper (Okasha 2011), Samir Okasha uses Arrow's theorem to raise a challenge for the rationality of theory choice. He argues that, as soon as one accepts the plausibility of the assumptions leading to Arrow's theorem, one is compelled to conclude that there are no adequate theory choice algorithms. Okasha offers a partial way out of this predicament by diagnosing the source of Arrow's theorem and using his diagnosis to deploy an approach that circumvents it. In this paper I explain why, although Okasha is right to emphasise that Arrow's theorem is due to an informational problem, he is not right to locate this problem at the level of the informational input of a theory choice rule. Once the informational problem is correctly located, Arrow's theorem may be dismissed as a problem.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	25 Nov 2014 15:16
Last Modified:	10 Aug 2023 11:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/51255
DOI:	10.1007/s11229-013-0372-3

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