Abstract

This thesis investigates the mobilization of sustainability discourses in environmental impact assessment (EIA) by looking at two cases, in the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands. EIA is a procedure used for predicting the sustainability impacts associated with project development. It is reasoned that, where adverse sustainability impacts are likely to occur, situated civil society stakeholders involved in deliberating these impacts will mobilize discourses on how the proposed development relates to achieving sustainability objectives. Yet a pertinent question is whether EIA accommodates sustainability discourse mobilization, not least when the mode of public engagement is taken into account. Premised on the differences in institutional design and political culture between the UK and the Netherlands, the thesis aims to investigate whether and how the external influence exerted by institutions and political culture on public engagement is manifested in the mobilization of sustainability discourses in EIA. By focusing on the large-scale infrastructure development projects of High-Speed rail 2 (HS2) in the UK and the A4 motorway connection between Delft and Schiedam (A4DS) in the Netherlands, it is found that institutional design and political culture have influenced sustainability discourse mobilization only to a very limited extent. This finding has been consistent across the two cases, despite institutional and cultural variance. Furthermore, it is found that EIA did not accommodate the mobilization of sustainability discourses, reflecting the absence of meaningful spaces for civil society engagement particularly with the scientific justification of why the projects are necessary. The thesis concludes that institutional design and political culture do not significantly influence sustainability discourse mobilization in cases where the use of science and expertise mediates public engagement, further compounded by the strict procedural aspects of EIA. It recommends that further research on sustainability discourses in infrastructure development focuses on the complex relationship between EIA and project justification.
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Chapter 1 Introduction to the thesis

This thesis concerns an appraisal of the mobilization of sustainability discourses in two infrastructure capacity expansion projects: (1) the first phase of a proposed high-speed rail network called High-Speed rail 2 (HS2) in the United Kingdom (UK), which entails the construction of a rail link between the cities of London and Birmingham (Phase 1\(^1\) of the project); and (2) the construction of a connecting part of the A4 motorway between the towns of Delft and Schiedam in the Netherlands (A4DS), which at the time of writing the thesis was being constructed. In the UK case the part of the proposed scheme crossing an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) known as the Chiltern Hills (henceforth: the Chelterns), situated approximately fifty kilometres northwest from London, is the focus of the thesis. Both cases are strongly linked to processes of democratic decision-making. The principle aim of the thesis is to investigate to what extent sustainability discourses in the HS2 and A4DS projects are shaped by democratic institutions and the political culture of civil society. This phenomenon is referred to as sustainability discourse mobilization. It will be argued that modes of public engagement with decision-making are considered instrumental in linking institutions and political culture to the mobilization of discourses.

Both HS2 and A4DS involve the expansion of infrastructure capacity. Projects proposing the construction of new infrastructures or expanding existing ones, in the UK and the Netherlands respectively, require that an environmental impact assessment (EIA) be carried out (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011; Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2011). This is compliant with EIA legislation of the European Union (EU) (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2011), which provides a supranational legal framework for the assessment of environmental impacts at the project level (as opposed to policies, plans and programmes). EIA is therefore a tool to assess proposed projects that are likely to have significant environmental impacts (Wood, 2003). It is conceived as a decision-support tool for making decisions in project planning better environmentally informed. The thesis perceives EIA as a decision-making arena where the mobilization of sustainability discourses is accommodated. Pursuant to this, EIA is strongly linked to theory on the role of public engagement in matters concerning the role of sustainability discourse in environmental decision-making (Palerm, 2000; Wilkins, 2003; Bond et al., 2011).

This thesis refers to sustainability discourse as the socially constructed nature of values related to environmental decision-making (Rydin, 1999; Wilkins, 2003). Such

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\(^1\) In the thesis the project is either named ‘HS2’ or ‘HS2 Phase 1’ and the usage of these names may alternate. The ‘Phase 1’ addition emphasizes that the main area of inquiry concerns the London-Birmingham rail link and the environmental impact assessment associated with it. Sometimes the project is titled ‘HS2 (Phase 1)’ to clarify that what is being discussed relates to both the high speed rail network as a whole and the first phase of the project. Phase 1 is the construction of the London-Birmingham link and Phase 2 is the construction of the lines from Birmingham going northbound (see also Chapter 4).
values may for instance reflect the views that people hold on the desired role of the environment in the face of economic growth and modernity (Mol et al., 2010). Conversely, social constructions of socio-economic or ecological values have the potential to incur changes in extant decision-making processes related to achieving sustainability objectives. They can thus be of particular importance for the formulation of these objectives (Bond et al., 2011) or, in the case of EIA, for the shaping of views on the purpose of impact assessment procedures (Cashmore, 2004; O’Faircheallaigh, 2010; Rozema et al., 2012). The thesis will argue that sustainability discourses can vary across different institutional and cultural contexts. Accordingly, it is investigated whether processes of discourse mobilization in the HS2 and A4DS projects, via public engagement, are mediated by institutions and the political culture of the democratic state.

Discourses associated with environmental assessment and the appraisal of sustainability principles have received ample attention in recent years (e.g. Wilkins, 2003; Runhaar et al., 2010; Runhaar and Van Nieuwaal, 2010; Bond et al., 2011; Hilding-Rydevik and Åkerskog, 2011). Attention for the role of discourse marks a wider trend in the academic literature to focus on the purpose and meaning of environmental assessment rather than to focus solely on the technicalities and architectures of assessment procedures (Cashmore, 2004). The thesis has gratefully borrowed theory from many of the scholarly works associated with this trend, most of which identify the need to take environmental values seriously in the conduct of environmental assessment. However, very limited scholarly attention has been directed to understanding which, when, why and in what way sustainability discourses are mobilized. The potential of external factors such as institutional design and political culture in mediating discourses and mobilization processes beckons further inquiry. Increased knowledge on the importance of external factors for sustainability discourse mobilization may further help emphasize the importance of value construction in the conduct of environmental assessment.

This introductory chapter contains six sections. The first section deals with the history of EIA legislation. The second section looks at the procedural aspects of EIA. Section 3 explores the relationship between EIA and sustainability. The fourth section explains the role of theory in sustainability discourse mobilization and EIA, thereby launching the theory associated with sustainability discourse mobilization. This theory will subsequently materialize in the empirical chapters of the thesis (Chapters 5 to 7). The fifth section introduces the research questions. It will also show the aims and practical relevance of the research. Section 6 outlines what can be expected in the remainder of the thesis.
1.1 A brief history of EIA legislation

The empirical research in the thesis is premised on the HS2 and A4DS projects in the UK and the Netherlands, both of which require an EIA prior to their implementation. The EIA for the A4DS project was completed in 2009 (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d); construction of the motorway connection started in 2012. During the writing of this thesis a full EIA for the HS2 Phase 1 project had not yet been carried out as construction of the proposed rail link is expected to start in or around 2017, with the expectation of completion ten years later. However, the publications of the *EIA Scope and Methodology Report* (Arup/URS, 2012a; submitted on behalf of HS2 Ltd), and the *Draft Environmental Statement* (HS2 Ltd, 2013) have provided valuable information regarding the scope of the environmental impacts to be considered in the next stages of the EIA (see Section 1.2).

EIA is currently adopted as a decision-support tool in over 120 states (Glasson et al., 2012). Many more states have legislation that strongly hints towards the requirement for impact assessment of projects, or are signatories to treaties and agreements that require the publication of environmental statements prior to decision consent (Morgan, 2012). EIA is furthermore adopted by other rule-competent authorities (Glasson et al., 2012), such as autonomous regions and devolved legislatures (e.g. Scotland, Flanders and North Rhine-Westphalia), intergovernmental organizations (e.g. the World Bank) and the EU, which is a supranational organization. Knowledge on the design and implementation of EIA legislation across the world has been generated through empirical research in recent years (Wood, 2003; Glasson et al., 2012), and through theoretical research on the contributing role of EIA towards sustainability objectives in a variety of political contexts (Cashmore et al., 2008; Kolhoff et al., 2009).

EIA was legally incepted in the late 1960s. Caldwell (1998) has argued that the idea to systematically assess environmental impacts can be related to the rise of public concern over the unintended adverse consequences of technological innovation. The 1969 *National Environmental Policy Act* (NEPA) in the United States (US) is widely viewed as the first legislation on EIA, thereby marking the inception of a legal imperative (Jay et al., 2007). NEPA is part of a wider development in environmental advocacy and political ecology. Its enactment roughly coincided with, amongst others, alarmist books such as *Silent Spring* by Rachel Carson in 1962 and *The Population Bomb* by Paul R. Ehrlich in 1968; the foundation of environmental advocacy organizations such as Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth; the establishment of environmental government departments and academic institutes focusing on environmental matters; and the electoral pioneering of green political parties (Carter, 2007). The argument is also made that NEPA responded to the Club of Rome’s 1972 influential report *Limits to Growth* (Meadows et al.,
1972), which addressed the issue of ecological destruction in the face of unbridled economic growth.

NEPA marks the beginning of a procedure designed to map the probable adverse environmental impacts of federal legislation and actions of government. Caldwell (1998: 10) has argued that NEPA “was intended to bring ecological rationality to the policy process”. This objective refers to the desire to improve the quality of decisions through the provision of information on adverse environmental impacts. Since the inception of NEPA formalized systems for assessing environmental impacts have gradually become embedded in the national legislation of many other states. In the late 1980s EIA legislation was adopted by virtually all of the Member States of the EU (Gilpin, 1995), which can be envisaged as the inception of EIA across the Atlantic. Being considered by some as the most emulated law in the history of environmental legislation (e.g. Eccleston, 2008), NEPA is sometimes referred to as the ‘environmental Magna Carta’.

The UK and the Netherlands have formally transposed EIA legislation in 1988 and 1986, respectively. In the UK separate EIA legislation is designed for the three devolved political regions: Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. England is governed by the UK parliament but, similar to the other three, it has its own EIA legislation. Since the HS2 project is to be implemented in England, it has to comply with English legislation on EIA (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011). The Netherlands is a unitary state and has adopted EIA legislation applicable to all projects eligible for assessment that are in its jurisdiction.

Since the UK and the Netherlands are both EU Member States, it is worth investigating supranational legislation on EIA. The supranational structure of the EU represents an overarching legal framework that makes it take precedence over national legislation, provided supranational legislation does not interfere with national security issues. As signatories to the 2008 Treaty on European Union (European Union, 2008a), the Member States have agreed to the prevalence of EU legislation over national legislation (based on the principle ‘lex superior derogat legi inferiori’, translated: ‘a law higher in the hierarchy repeals the lower one’). However, Member States have the freedom to choose how to transpose directives into national legislation as the EU “shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods” (European Union, 2008b: Article 288). Directives are the most prevalent form of supranational legislation.

EIA legislation in the EU started with Directive 85/337/EEC in 1985 (see European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2011 for a list of all the EIA directives referred to in the thesis). The directive is important since, for the first time, it was stated that an EIA is mandatory in project planning in the EU on the basis of certain project characteristics. The directive has been amended three times, beginning with Directive 97/11/EC in 1997. Amongst other things, this directive sought “to minimise the differences
of application (...)² and to harmonise implementation” between EU Member States (European Commission, 2003: 10). Concerns about the application and implementation of EIA in Member States have led to subsequent action being undertaken to address them. Arguably, this has proved critical in the shaping of a supranational EIA framework (Glasson and Bellanger, 2003).

A second amendment, Directive 2003/35/EC in 2003, has brought EIA legislation up-to-date with the objective to make information on environmental impacts, procedures for decision-making and justice accessible to public participants. This entailed the provision set forth in the 1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (henceforth: the ‘Aarhus Convention’) (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1998). The tripartite aim of the Aarhus Convention has been to improve public access to 1) information, 2) decision-making and 3) justice. The most recent amendment is Directive 2009/31/EC, which has rendered projects involving the transport and storage of carbon dioxide under the obligation to submit an environmental statement. When taking stock of the latest amendment to the original EIA legislation, Directive 85/337/EEC (as amended) is often referred to. In 2011 Directive 85/337/EEC and its three amendments have been consolidated into Directive 2011/92/EU, thereby repealing these directives.

1.2 The procedural stages of EIA

The local planning authority (LPA) is responsible for supervising the implementation of EIA for projects which fall within the remit of land use planning (Glasson et al., 2012). In EU EIA legislation, the LPA is referred to as the ‘competent authority’ (in Dutch: ‘bevoegd gezag’). Based on the subsidiarity principle, local government is responsible for supervising the implementation of an EIA procedure in most of the cases, or alternatively for assessing whether an EIA procedure is necessary (Wood and Becker, 2005). Because HS2 and A4DS are both public works and high-profile infrastructure projects that take place beyond the jurisdiction of local or regional government, the national governments in the UK and the Netherlands are directly responsible for the supervision and implementation of EIA.

In this thesis an EIA procedure is presented on the basis of references found in the academic literature (Therivel and Morris, 2009; Glasson et al., 2012), in EU guidance on EIA (European Commission, 2001a; 2001b; 2001c) and on some of the provisions set forth in Directive 2011/92/EU. It is important to acknowledge that the EIA procedure used in this thesis does not run parallel with the latest developments in EIA legislation. For

² The use of (...) in quotations indicates that the quotation has been constructed out of two excerpts of texts from the same source.
instance, the European Commission’s (2012) proposal for a new supranational EIA directive offers substantive changes to existing legislation. Furthermore, various stages of the EIA procedure used in this thesis are subject to reiteration. Not least, the ‘position’ of public engagement in the chronological order of the stages is a key focus for EIA scholars (e.g. Wood et al., 2006). Taking these limitations into consideration, Table 1.1 presents an overview of the procedural stages of EIA and the main purpose or question to be addressed in each stage. The remainder of this section briefly explains each stage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage in the EIA procedure</th>
<th>Description of the stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Screening</td>
<td>Is the project eligible for an EIA?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scoping</td>
<td>What impacts should be included in the EIA?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline study</td>
<td>What is the current situation in the impact area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact prediction</td>
<td>What are the predicted size, magnitude and severity of the impacts?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact evaluation</td>
<td>To what extent are the predicted impacts significant?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact mitigation</td>
<td>Which measures can be identified that are able to mitigate the predicted impacts?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of the environmental statement</td>
<td>Are the predicted impacts and identified mitigation measures documented?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public engagement</td>
<td>What do public stakeholders think of the environmental information received?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision consent</td>
<td>Should the proposed project be authorized to continue?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>How do the impacts and mitigation measures develop in time and space?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditing</td>
<td>Have the prediction of impacts and identification of mitigation measures been accurate?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1: The EIA procedure

**Screening** is the stage where eligibility for an EIA procedure is checked (Glasson et al., 2012). *Directive 2011/92/EU* subjects projects to an EIA when they meet the provisions stated in Annex I of the directive. Projects not listed in Annex I but which meet the provisions stated in Annex II are subject to a consideration of EU Member States, determined by the expected or likely significance of the environmental impacts. Member States have transposed the provisions stated in Annex I and Annex II of *Directive 2011/92/EU* and of previous directives into national EIA legislation, such as the *Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011* (T&CP 2011) in England (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011) and the *Besluit Milieueffectrapportage* (Environmental Impact Assessment Agreement) in the Netherlands (Ministere van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2011).

**Scoping** is the stage where the scope of the EIA is determined. It attempts to identify ‘what key receptors, impacts and proper alternatives to consider, what
methodologies to use, and whom to consult” (Therivel and Morris, 2009: 4-5). Adopted for the first time in Directive 97/11/EC (Article 5.2), scoping may facilitate consultation of, and engagement between, the stakeholders likely to be involved in the project (Wood et al., 2006). Arguably, scoping is the stage where the public should be involved, although this is not mandatory (IEMA, 2011). As the identified receptors, impacts and alternatives should be assessed on the basis of a reference situation – the so-called ‘do nothing’ or ‘do minimum’ scenarios – scoping is linked to a baseline study. In a baseline study the current situation in the impact area is described as well as a description of the (quasi-) autonomous development that will take place in the impact area when no project is implemented.

The stages of impact prediction, impact evaluation and impact mitigation represent the ‘technical core’ of the EIA procedure. Impact prediction is the stage where the impacts of a project are predicted by comparing it to the baseline study (Glasson et al., 2012). It aims to predict the impacts identified in the scoping stage. Impact evaluation is the stage where the significance of the predicted impacts is determined (Glasson et al., 2012). For example, one method for evaluating the predicted impacts is to compare them with recognized standards for environmental quality and legal criteria, where available. Impact mitigation is the stage where measures are identified to avoid, reduce, repair, restore or compensate the predicted adverse environmental impacts (Glasson et al., 2012). For instance, it may refer to the financial compensation to people that are affected by the project. However, impacts that cannot or will not be mitigated should be properly documented.

In the conduct of EIA, in all EU Member States the publication of an environmental statement is mandatory. The environmental statement summarizes the steps taken in the previous stages of the EIA. In reviewing the statement the quality of the previous stages in the EIA is reviewed (Glasson et al., 2012). In the EU guidance mentioned earlier checklists can be found to assist reviewers (European Commission, 2001a). In the public engagement stage everyone has a right to comment on the environmental statement (Glasson et al., 2012). Stakeholders can provide comments to the LPA prior to decision consent but public engagement may also take place at an earlier stage. For instance, the UK Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) (2006: 51) has noted that “opportunities taken earlier in the process to engage consultees (...) can provide beneficial results with few(er) concerns being raised”. In the decision consent stage the LPA decides either to authorize or refuse the planning proposal. When the proposal is to receive authorization, an ‘application for authorization’ has to be submitted to the LPA (Glasson et al., 2012).

Generally speaking, the stages of monitoring and auditing compare the outcomes with the predictions (Glasson et al., 2012). Representing the so-called ‘follow-up’ stages in
EIA (Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2004), it is important to acknowledge that monitoring and auditing are not an official part of the planning procedure. Furthermore, they are not made mandatory by Directive 2011/92/EU. Monitoring and auditing take place after the decision to implement the project has been made. In the monitoring stage the impacts are measured over time and across space (Glasson et al., 2012), with the objectives to discern the trends and patterns of the impacts during the implementation of the project and to identify further mitigation measures. In the auditing stage the predicted impacts and mitigation measures are compared with the measured impacts and effectiveness of the mitigation measures (Glasson et al., 2012).

1.3 Sustainability in the context of EIA

It has become clear in the previous two sections that EIA is a decision-support tool designed to assess the environmental impacts of proposed projects when this is mandatory to do so or, in the case of Annex II (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2011), when these impacts are likely to be significant (Wood, 2003). EIA is often conducted in a structured and standardized way, comprising various procedural stages, and it is an integral part of the legislation associated with project planning of many rule-competent authorities (Glasson et al., 2012). An interesting aspect of EIA relates to the purpose of assessing environmental impacts, particularly in light of which objectives to strive for. This section explores whether EIA contributes to sustainability and, if this can somehow be ascertained or measured, how this is being done. Whilst there has been considerable debate on the reciprocal influence of EIA and sustainability (e.g. Pope et al., 2004; Hacking and Guthrie, 2008; Weaver et al., 2008; Bond et al., 2013b), to understand the contribution of EIA towards achieving certain objectives in the field of sustainability requires a different kind of inquiry.

As will be shown in Chapter 5 of the thesis, the role and meaning of sustainability in the context of assessing the environmental impacts of the HS2 (Phase 1) and A4DS projects have by no means proved unambiguous. Indeed, one of the stakeholders in the A4DS project argued that “‘[s]ustainable’ is about the most abused word in recent years. (...) It doesn’t mean so much to me” (Mijn Partij, Interview). Whether this is a widespread sentiment or contained in certain echelons of civil society remains to be seen, but it does convey the problematic nature of sustainability. That is, the sustainability concept can mean different things to different people. Similarly, the role of EIA in mediating the attainment of certain objectives deemed desirable can be interpreted in a variety of ways.

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3 Quotations obtained from the interviews as well as paraphrases associated with them have been annotated by using the code ‘Interview’. The full references for the stakeholders that have been interviewed can be found in the References section at the end of the thesis.
It is therefore imperative that the relationship between sustainability and EIA be better understood.

As stated earlier, the immediate objective of NEPA was to embed the principle of ecological rationality into the conduct of project planning (Caldwell, 1998). The post-World War II construction era that preceded the enactment of NEPA can be characterized by an increased public concern over the role of new technologies in nature preservation and conservation issues (Tamiotti and Finger, 2001), which has been mainly vented at the local level. At the time sustainability has not been associated with resolving these issues. However, the transposition of EIA into the legislation of the EU and its Member States in the late 1980s has coincided with the report *Our Common Future*, also known as the ‘Brundtland Report’, which was published in 1987 by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). In aiming to align the objectives of sustainability and development related to economic growth, the WCED (1987: Article 27) has argued that a development is sustainable when it ensures “*that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs*”.

The concept of sustainable development has had a strong impact on environmental decision-making, thereby also marking the onset of transposing sustainability objectives into outlining the substantive purpose of EIA (Cashmore, 2004; Cashmore et al., 2007; Morrison-Saunders and Retief, 2012). In the thesis the concepts of sustainable development and sustainability are used interchangeably, although the latter term will often take precedence. Since the introduction of the definition for sustainable development as provided by the WCED other definitions have surfaced, for instance policy definitions expressed in terms of development that respects the limits set by the perceived carrying capacity of the earth (World Conservation Union et al., 1991) and of development that meets the demand for equity when catering for the needs of both present and future generations (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 1992), or definitions based on the formulation of a wide array of principles through which sustainable development may be harnessed (Gibson et al., 2005). Considerations on how EIA should be conducted have developed in tandem with these definitions (George, 1999). Analogous to the variance in defining sustainable development, the role of EIA in its approach to sustainability may be variously conceptualized.

Considerations on the scope and focus of sustainability as an object of study in its own right have incurred an ongoing transition from EIA as traditionally concerned with the immediate biophysical impacts of a proposed project towards a procedure which envelops concerns on broader project impacts (Hacking and Guthrie, 2008). It may as such be argued that EIA has become a tool principally to assess whether sustainability objectives are achieved in project planning. However, the broad scope and focus of sustainability
presents constraints on formulating a singular measure of the effectiveness of EIA and other assessment procedures in terms of it representing de facto sustainability assessment. Bond et al. (2013b) have identified as many as six standards for measuring the effectiveness of sustainability assessment: (1) whether the assessment follows certain procedures; (2) whether the assessment incurs certain changes in action or outcome; (3) whether the assessment satisfies those involved in its conduct; (4) whether the assessment satisfies the attainment of certain norms; (5) whether the assessment yields support from third parties; and (6) whether the assessment facilitates processes of learning and knowledge generation.

Whether purposefully or as a strategy to also encompass vested economic interests, sustainability is and remains a vague term (Mebratu, 1998). It often encompasses a fuzzy mix of various objectives ostensibly far removed from one another which, in adding insult to injury, may spark semantic riddles such as the ‘sustainability’ of the sustainability concept (Faber et al., 2005). As regards the vexed question of how to effectively harmonize EIA and principles of sustainability assessment and governance, debates in this realm have the propensity to revolve around formulating the substantive purpose of conducting impact assessment in project planning. The six standards set out by Bond et al. (2013b) may help formulate several purposes of sustainability assessment but continue to, albeit deliberately, envisage the scope and focus of sustainability as highly diverse. As will be shown in the remainder of the thesis, such diversity has been a prime source of debate amongst the HS2 and A4DS stakeholders.

1.4 The role of theory in sustainability discourse mobilization

The function of EIA in achieving sustainability objectives, however these may be defined, is an interesting object of study. Because of the ongoing renewal, adaptation or refinement of the sustainability concept, not to mention the rejection of conventional wisdom, it can be argued that the observed variance in formulating measures of the effectiveness of EIA in achieving sustainability objectives is much the result of variance in the formulation of such objectives (Bond et al., 2013b). What is more, it can be argued that perceptions towards the means for achieving sustainability objectives as held by the actors involved in the conduct of EIA often coincide with perceptions towards the purpose of the assessment, both as substance (e.g. Cashmore, 2004) and as procedure (e.g. O'Faircheallaigh, 2010). Conversely, the ways by which the roles and responsibilities for actors are assigned may be able to mediate the perceived utility of EIA in achieving certain objectives. This implies that, to use the semantic riddle presented by Faber et al. (2005), the sustainability of the sustainability context of EIA is much contingent on factors that influence the purpose of the assessment procedure.
In order to build a research agenda around this theme of inquiry, part of the focus in the EIA literature has shifted towards theory development (e.g. Lawrence, 1997; Bartlett and Kurian, 1999; Cashmore, 2004; Weston, 2010). These studies have often hinted towards the need to develop theory on the procedural characteristics of EIA or on the purpose of the assessment. For instance, in investigating theory on the purpose of making decisions better environmentally informed, Bartlett and Kurian (1999) have identified six theoretical models that range from the simple processing of environmental information to impacting on, and over time making substantive changes to, the institutional arrangement of EIA. Models of causation associated with the role of EIA and the purpose of assessment are thereby heavily indebted to values and sustainability appraisals (Bartlett and Kurian, 1999; Cashmore, 2004).

A relatively recent development concerns theory development on the broader political context of environmental assessment. For example, it can be investigated how the distribution of political power among actors involved in environmental assessment impacts on decision-making (Richardson, 2005; Richardson and Cashmore, 2011; Cashmore and Axelsson, 2012). Furthermore, efforts have been made to grasp the influence of external political factors in real-world impact assessment practices. In the Masters Thesis by Morgan Boyco (2010), for instance, for the first time there is an attempt to show how the political opportunity structures of states impact on the mode through which civil society actors may be able to influence decision-making processes within the remit of EIA. In investigating the knowledge base of environmental assessment, the potential conflict between civil perspectives and more traditional interpretations on the authority of science may also be reviewed (Cashmore, 2004; Owens et al., 2004).

Political theory specifically tailored to the case of physical planning and infrastructure projects has equally surfaced. For instance, it has been advanced that the prevalence of novel forms of deliberative decision-making have instilled a new culture of dialogue in the road infrastructure planning sector in Sweden (Isaksson et al., 2009). Furthermore, it has been advanced that institutional frameworks are able to mediate the degree to which projects intent on achieving sustainability objectives are publicly supported (Wolsink, 2010). In another Masters Thesis, this one written by Hans Heukels and entitled Building Freeways = Building Consensus (2005), valuable effort has been made to understand the institutional characteristics of large-scale road infrastructure planning. In comparing a motorway capacity expansion project in Australia with the A4DS project, and in particular with a focus on the extent to which consensus between local and national government has been reached, Heukels (2005) has argued that institutions matter a great deal for establishing dialogue between actors.

The next step in the analysis is to investigate the potential of institutions and political culture to mobilize sustainability discourses. The next chapter explicitly seeks to
explore the links between models of representative democracy (majoritarian versus consensual democracy), democratic satisfaction and political trust being two indicators of political culture, and the manifestation of thought and opinion on sustainability. Ultimately, the sustainability discourses discerned in the HS2 and A4DS cases are explained as the real-world outcome of this theoretical endeavour. As stated earlier, whilst research on sustainability discourses associated with EIA have been on the rise in recent years (e.g. Wilkins, 2003; Runhaar et al., 2010; Rozema et al., 2012), limited scholarly attention has been devoted to understanding how certain of these discourses came to be. By investigating their mobilization through institutional design and political culture, this thesis contributes to resolving this paucity in research.

The argument presented thus far has aimed to demonstrate the interplay between institutions, political culture, public engagement and sustainability discourse mobilization. This will be projected onto the conduct of EIA in the HS2 Phase 1 and A4DS projects. It is proposed that important areas of inquiry into the mobilization of sustainability discourses relate to both the potentially adverse impacts of a proposed project and the normative foundation of the project. Sustainability discourses can illuminate the values and beliefs that civil society actors privilege in these rail and road infrastructure projects. A vexed question therefore relates to how sustainability discourses come about and are articulated. The thesis will argue that a systemic inquiry into democratic institutions and political culture is pivotal for investigating the mobilization of sustainability discourses.

1.5 Research questions, aims and practical relevance

1.5.1 Research questions

- **Central research question:**

  *To what extent did institutional design and political culture influence the process of sustainability discourse mobilization in the EIAs of the HS2 (Phase 1) and A4DS infrastructure development projects in the United Kingdom in the Netherlands?*

The central research question is aimed towards understanding how institutional design and political culture exert influence on the process of sustainability discourse mobilization in the EIAs of the HS2 (either as Phase 1 or as a whole) and A4DS projects. Therefore, the question is whether institutions and political culture are two structural factors of influence in the mobilization of sustainability discourses in EIA. Public engagement serves to envisage how the influence exerted by institutions and political culture becomes manifest in the relationship between civil society and decision-makers.
Sub-questions:

The sub-questions are categorized on the basis of the concepts they relate to. Three concepts are believed to be at the core of the conceptualization: (1) sustainability discourse, (2) institutional design and (3) political culture. Each concept is linked to a pair of sub-questions. The sub-questions are meant to support the central research question. Chapters 5 to 7 of the thesis each contain detailed empirical inquiry into institutional design, political culture and sustainability discourse as examined in the two case studies.

| On sustainability discourse: | 1. Which sustainability discourses held by the civil society stakeholders can be identified? |
| On institutional design: | 2. To what extent are sustainability discourses in the projects accommodated by the different modes of public engagement? |
| 3. Which institutions and institutional design choices have played a central role in the projects? | 4. To what extent have the different institutional designs of the projects been able to influence the mode of public engagement? |
| On political culture: | 5. What are the survey results of certain criteria involved with democratic satisfaction and political trust in the UK and the Netherlands? |
| | 6. To what extent have democratic satisfaction and political trust been able to influence the interaction between decision-makers and civil society? |

Table 1.2: Sub-questions

1.5.2 Aims

This thesis aims to provide a novel theoretical perspective by linking EIA to institutions and political culture. Institutions are considered decisive in transposing the political preferences of citizens into valued decision outcomes (Goodin, 1996). The UK and the Netherlands each represent a distinct model of representative democracy. This is embodied in the distinction between majoritarian democracy (the ‘Westminster model’) and consensual democracy (the ‘Rhineland model’) (Lijphart, 2012). However, it will be debated whether representative democracy is able to reach out to modes of decision-making that advocate a more direct and reciprocal relationship between decision-makers and citizens. Political culture, on its part, designates the attitudes of citizens towards the conduct of politics and towards the democratic institutions of the democratic state. A rich and heterogeneous landscape of civil society actors may bolster concerted action and commitment to influencing decisions bearing a high degree of citizen interest. Almond and Verba (1963: 3), founding fathers of the political culture concept, have argued that a politically engaged citizenry is an essential element for the “democratic model of the participatory state”.

In linking institutions and political culture to the process of sustainability discourse mobilization, the thesis places heavy emphasis on the role of civil society. As Chapter 2
will demonstrate, civil manifestations in the conduct of politics are to a large extent shaped by democratic institutions. Institutions influence the performance of the democratic system, not least with regards to the liberty and equality of people (Foweraker and Krznaric, 2000). In the famous 1863 Gettysburg Address Abraham Lincoln advanced that freedom is analogous to a “government of the people, by the people, for the people” (cited in Schmidt, 2002: 147). This proposition certainly emphasizes the relationship between government and civil society but leaves ample room for interpretation on how this should best be anchored in the conduct of politics. Furthermore, the attitudes towards democracy that citizens hold shape the way with which ‘binding collective choices’ are made (Jasanoff, 2005). Civil society is endowed with considerable agency to exert influence on the tone of debate, thereby possibly mediating decision outcomes.

As discourse informs the values and beliefs that people privilege in certain decision-making arenas (Hajer, 1995), particularly those that can be characterized by matters relating to the public good, it is pertinent to know how such arenas mobilize discourses. Put differently, an explicit aim of the thesis is to know how the characteristics of a decision-making arena are partially or perhaps even directly proportional to discourse mobilization. By having singled out institutional design and political culture as two potent characteristics of EIA, consequently mediating public engagement with the conduct of impact assessment, valuable research can be conducted on the mobilization of sustainable discourses. For example, it is apt to shed light on claims such as those made by Dryzek et al. (2002), who have argued that the discourse of ecological modernization became popular in Norway, gained limited headway in Germany and was very difficult to achieve in the UK, states which have different institutional designs and political cultures.

Logically derived from the enlisted research question, as well as from what is stated above, three aims can be identified. The research questions can be read as some sort of a problem statement, i.e. a gap currently identified in the literature that this thesis aims to fill. Subsequently, the aims of the research transpose such a problem statement into a statement of ambition or motivation. The three aims are the following:

1. **To understand the ‘fit’ between the mobilization of sustainability discourses and EIA.**
   Whilst EIA is a tool aimed at making decisions better environmentally informed, this by no means suggests that this procedure is suitable for investigating sustainability discourse mobilization. It is possible that the influence exerted by institutional design and political culture cannot be reconciled with the legal context of EIA; conversely, the institutional and cultural shaping of sustainability discourses may take place wholly beyond the legal context.
2. To understand the relationship between sustainability discourses and their institutional and cultural contexts. The thesis conceptualizes discourse mobilization as being shaped by institutional design and political culture. Institutional and cultural differences result in diverse modes of public engagement and which subsequently may lead to different sustainability discourses. It is therefore interesting to see how any difference between majoritarian and consensual democracy, in conjunction with variance in democratic satisfaction and political trust, corresponds with the manifestation of sustainability considerations in discourse.

3. To understand the institutional and politico-cultural influences on public engagement in the cases. One underlying aim of the thesis is that it aims to illuminate the cross-linkages and relational fields between core concepts. This certainly applies to the influence on public engagement exerted by institutional design and political culture. Public engagement is a central tenet in sustainability discourse mobilization, linking institutional design and political culture to sustainability discourses (see also Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2). Considering that public engagement ‘does not fall from the sky’, so to speak, it is pertinent to investigate its institutional and cultural origins.

1.5.3 Practical relevance

A statement on practical relevance is intimately linked to the internal methodological logic of the thesis. To be able to make theoretical claims on how institutions and political culture shape sustainability discourses in the context of EIA is only half the story; for it to gain practical relevance they need to be brought into in the real world. This thesis certainly alludes to the energy and excitement currently displayed in (sustainability) discourse analysis in EIA (e.g. Runhaar et al., 2010), which is still relatively young and unruly. However, it attempts to do more than just that: in contrast to most discursive studies, it aims to understand why certain discourses are more popular than others bybedding them in the concepts of institutions and political culture.

For example, whilst the statement that ecological modernization has made considerable headway in the Netherlands in the 1990s but not in the UK is very valuable (Hajer, 1995; Dryzek et al., 2002). Subsequently this inspires critical inquiry into how such divergence has come about. Is it something in the system characteristics of the British democratic system that prevents ecological modernization from taking off? Have radicalism and protest-like forms of public engagement in the Netherlands been exchanged for one led by cooptation of the environmental movement? Or does the divergence between states coincide with different views as to what extent EIA is an effective decision-support tool for achieving sustainability objectives?
These questions place heavy emphasis on the role of civil society within the mobilization of sustainability discourses in EIA. It is by no means a certainty that democratic states treat citizens and civil society groups as dignified and respected interlocutors in decision-making processes. Conversely, being subjected to a political system which takes the due representation of the *vox populi* as its primary object, there can be wide convergence to the level of citizens’ satisfaction with democracy (e.g. Anderson and Guillory, 1997). When it is accepted that EIA and other sustainability arenas should not be regarded in isolation, but rather as a function of the political environment, then it becomes practically relevant to come to realize that the decisions made for making the world more sustainable are much the result of how people deal with each other – instead of finding a rational solution to an identifiable problem.

When people feel disgruntled and neglected in contentious arenas of decision-making – emphatically called the ‘politically embittered’ (Kaase, 1999) – then the democratic ideal shows its limitations. Or does it? Experiences from the two case studies suggest that very rich and heterogeneous forms of public engagement – within EIA or somewhere else – co-evolve with the institutional design choices of states, much transpiring beyond the confines of authority. It is the self-organizational capacity of civil society to cluster around and exercise voice in issues to which it ascribes a great deal of affinity that is relevant for reconsidering orthodox interpretations of the political identity of citizens, one which Lippmann (1927) coined ‘bystander’ a long time ago. Thinking about new configurations of the interfaces between political authority, civil society and the particular designs of the democratic state is therefore a useful explorative exercise.

The choice to compare the institutions and political cultures UK and the Netherlands has been far from arbitrary. Indeed, the difference between Westminster and Rhineland versions of representative democracy is now commonplace in the comparative politics literature (e.g. Huber and Bingham Powell Jr., 1994; Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Hendriks and Michels, 2010; Lockhart, 2011; Lijphart, 2012). Whereas the UK is the unofficial birthplace of simple majority rule, the Netherlands befits the broader tradition on the European continent that propagates consensus politics. This typology has proved a source of continued inspiration for comparative national research. Barring political scandals or other extraordinary events that have the potential to undermine democratic systems, the UK and the Netherlands showcase an enduring commitment to their own principles of making democracy work. *Ceteris paribus*, the thesis espouses the assumption that the democratic systems of the two states are stable, that their democratic traditions will endure, and that they therefore qualify for a valid comparison.

Taking into account all that is said above, it should be stressed that national comparative research on sustainability discourse mobilization aims to make insightful how and why discourses may thrive at the expense of others. Ultimately, this is where the
discursive orientation of civil society is levered. By making this statement, the thesis reaches out to a number of academic audiences. For physical planning theorists, the thesis articulates that planning disputes should not be disconnected from the broader democratic context. For democratic theorists, the thesis provides two exemplary case studies where the real-world value of talking about democratic contexts is manifested. For EIA scholars, the thesis shows that there is more than meets the eye when a project is ‘suddenly’ confronted with civil society opposition. And for those interested in public engagement, the thesis shows that modes for engagement can be both the result of the broader democratic context and the means to understanding discourse mobilization.

1.6 Outline

This thesis comprises nine chapters. Chapter 2 is the theoretical framework and investigates four core concepts: institutions, political culture, public engagement and sustainability discourses. It provides a conceptual scheme on sustainability discourse mobilization where these concepts are linked, and some ideas will be proffered on how this can be used to explain the mobilization of sustainability discourses in EIA. Thus, the orchestration of participatory mechanisms and institutions in the implementation of EIA is an important facet of the theoretical framework.

Chapter 3 provides the research design. As mentioned, the empirical chapters in this thesis will be scrutinizing the HS2 (Phase 1) and A4DS projects in the UK and the Netherlands. Whilst some of the methods for data collection and analysis broadly fall under the remit of established traditions in the social sciences, such as face-to-face interviewing and textual data coding, particularly the use of abductive inference – entrenched in a critical realist research approach to understanding social reality – will offer potentially new insights on processes of sustainability discourse mobilization.

In Chapter 4 the case studies are introduced. It will pay particular attention to the historical chronology of the project, a detailed description of the infrastructure schemes, the project objectives, extant sustainability considerations, the main strategic alternatives to the projects, and an overview of the actors involved in deliberating the proposed infrastructure capacity expansions – called ‘stakeholders’ by virtue of the project context.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are the empirical chapters of the thesis. Chapter 5 deals with the identification of sustainability discourses in the project; Chapter 6 investigates the role of institutional design in the projects; and Chapter 7 looks at the role of political culture. The empirical investigation dwells on over forty face-to-face interviews with stakeholders, as well as the exploration of a number of primary documents and newspaper articles reporting on the projects. The outputs will be collated, synthesized and presented as findings in these chapters.
Chapter 8 discusses the findings from the previous three chapters. In particular, it pays attention to a dominant challenger of the tripartite model of institutional design, political culture and sustainability discourses: the influence on sustainability discourse mobilization exerted by the role of science and counter-expertise. The observed prominence of the use of counter-expertise by civil society stakeholders in the two projects has beckoned further inquiry into how science has led to hot-headed disputes on the rights and wrongs of certain assumptions made in infrastructure project appraisal – despite the oft-heard claim on increased rationality in the decision-making process.

Finally, Chapter 9 concludes by formulating answers to the research questions. It will also attempt to convey whether the three formulated overarching aims have been achieved and what else can be done to take EIA out of its procedural confinements and placing it in the broader democratic context. As a final act, it will provide recommendations on future research on sustainability discourse mobilization through an *ex post* evaluation of the findings. It aims to renew interest in research on sustainability governance that grapples with the mobilization of new discursive horizons.
Chapter 2 Theoretical framework

This chapter sets out the theoretical framework of the thesis. The chapter attempts to link core concepts by means of drawing a coherent conceptual scheme that consists of democratic institutions, political culture, public engagement and sustainability discourses. Ultimately the scheme will represent a phenomenon that is referred to as ‘sustainability discourse mobilization’, taking place within the context of EIA and other domains of sustainability decision-support. As the introduction (Chapter 1) has already briefly touched upon, there is an enormous potential as well as a strong incentive to forge links between the various constitutive elements of the analysis in this thesis, particularly in light of the much needed extension and expansion of theory on the role of EIA in broader political and physical planning contexts (Lawrence, 1997; 2000; Cashmore, 2004; Weston, 2010).

Throughout the chapter – as well as through the empirical chapters – the concept of civil society is deployed. Civil society can be understood as a community consisting of individuals and organizations that are committed to political issues of high public interest. It can be defined either as a political community (Jasanoff, 2005) or civic community (Putnam, 1993), depending on whether the emphasis is placed on institutions or culture (see Sub-section 2.2.3). When civil society involvement is reframed in terms of exerting influence in decision-making, institutions and a form of culture specifically tailored to politics – ‘political culture’ – represent two dominant forms of influencing the modus operandi or even modus Vivendi of civil society in the face of political authority, not to mention the role and function of public engagement as an integral aspect of the policy process. An institutional form of influence broadly refers to the regulated and authority-sanctioned means through which civil society is able to exercise political voice (Fung and Wright, 2003). A cultural form of influence broadly refers to the satisfaction with democracy and political trust that may (or may not) be found amongst certain echelons of civil society (Inglehart, 1988).

The chapter aims to show that institutions and political culture represent two forms of influence shaping the political manifestation of civil society. Thus, the inclusion of institutions and political culture in this thesis serves the purpose of providing a structural basis for attempting to explain extant modes of public engagement in the democratic state. Whilst previous studies have attempted to show how institutional arrangements exert influence on public attitudes towards government performance (e.g. Anderson and Guillory, 1997), or conversely how the cultural fabric of society exerts influence on government performance (Putnam, 1993), explanations of the shape that public engagement takes remain understudied. Therefore, the shaping potential of institutions and political culture needs to become analytically anchored, thereby ultimately leading to the development of a functional relationship with public engagement.
However, the theoretical framework does not limit itself to analyzing this functional relationship. Questions remain as to how modes of public engagement influence processes of discourse mobilization. That is, once agreed that civil society actors engage with policy issues bearing a high degree of public interest, how do discursive engineers amongst them organize a regime of ‘think, speak and do’ within a set of institutional and cultural opportunities and constraints? The prime driver for taking this next step is the assumption that the promulgation of certain discourses is not premised on chance, happenstance, contingency or haphazardness; indeed, with regards to sustainability, ‘popular’ discourses seem to correspond well with dominant views on the tenets of democratic representation and deliberation in sustainability decision-making and the ascribed role of citizens herein (Hajer, 2003). It is from this perspective that discourses should be envisaged as much the result of institutional arrangements as it is a story of civil society actors trying to transmit certain values by means of thinking what they think, saying what they say, doing what they do and being what they are.

Conversely, discourses have in recent years become recognized as important for studying political manifestations of civil society. Static accounts of ‘civil society’, ‘the public’ or ‘citizens’ do not fare well with the formative role of discourse in shaping the public engagement landscape, irrespective of whether such engagement is within or beyond formal institutions. In referring to emergent discursive criticisms relating to traditional ways of analyzing manifestations of public contestation, for instance, Koopmans and Statham (1999) have argued that “for the analysis of political contention in democratic polities, we can no longer stick to the rigid dichotomies between challengers and members of the polity, or between (unconventional, disruptive) protest and other more institutional or conventional forms of collective claims-making”. Therefore, besides their rapid anchorage as objects of study, discourses reciprocate the political manifestation of civil society. Not only is such reciprocity reflected in conceptualizations of sustainability policy such as ecological modernization (Dryzek et al., 2002); reciprocity also exists between discourse and the institutional system characteristics of the democratic state (Hajer, 1995).

Notwithstanding the many links that have become visible so far, still more links describing patterns of reciprocity and interdependence need to be forged between the core concepts of the theoretical framework. Although institutions and political culture act independently from each other in influencing the mode of public engagement, the thesis has adopted the view that they are reciprocal. Various ways have been conceived to describe this kind of reciprocity, for example by using the concepts of co-evolution or co-production (Jasanoff, 2005). Furthermore, dominant sustainability discourses may be ‘game-changers’ in the longer term. When certain sustainability discourses have a broad support base and have proved to be able to endure, such as is the case with the
discourse of ecological modernization (Hajer, 1995; Mol et al., 2010), planning authorities may want to set up institutions that can be deployed to support them. Simultaneously, public attitudes towards planning and decision-making processes and towards those elected or appointed to represent are nurtured following the influence of sustainability discourses. In bringing it together in a model for sustainability discourse mobilization, Figure 2.1 sums up the assumed reciprocity and interdependence between institutions, political culture, public engagement and sustainability discourses.

This chapter comprises four sections. The first section introduces theory on institutions of the democratic state. Specifically, it uses the concept of institutional design, which designates the assemblage of political institutions in expressing values and reflecting public concern with public policy issues (Goodin, 1996; Peters, 2005). The second section introduces theory on political culture. In order to pin down this vast concept, the focus is on democratic satisfaction and political trust. The third section introduces theory on discourses in general and sustainability discourses in particular. By doing so it will put centre-stage important concepts in the analysis of (sustainability) discourses. The fourth section aims to combine these three theoretical strands by looking at the roles of institutional design and political culture in the mobilization of sustainability discourses in EIA. Therefore, it will further explore the conceptual scheme as presented in Figure 2.1. In
this section the multifaceted roles of public engagement in the conduct of environmental impact assessment will take centre-stage.

2.1 Institutions

This section comprises theory on institutions. By being able to set the tone for debate in democratic institutions, March and Olsen (1989: 18) have asserted that “political institutions define the framework within which politics take place”, thereby referring to institutions not only as formal organizations, such as the parliament, but also to informal organizational arrangements where rules, norms, routines and values permeate the conduct of political decision-making. The importance of institutions has also been recognized in specific realms of decision-making, such as planning (Healey, 1997; Moroni, 2010). It is from this assertion that the theoretical framework has focused on understanding norm-driven planning processes that take place within institutions. This is in contrast to the assumption of value neutrality in more ‘engineeristic’ approaches to decision-making in planning issues, which argues that there is shared agreement over the goals to be attained and the issues to be solved (Moroni, 2010).

The institutions that will be considered in the thesis are, on the one hand, the democratic institutions of the state, and on the other, the institutions which are used in decision-making processes, such as the use of citizen juries or adherence to expert advice in order to make decisions better informed. As will become clear, institutions are conceived as transcending their formal environments ascribed to them by the ‘Old Institutionalism’ (Peters, 2005), which argues that ‘institution’ and ‘organization’, are relatively similar concepts. Instead, from the viewpoint of looking at the process of the mobilization of shared perception, a more valuable perspective is forwarded by the ‘New Institutionalism’ (March and Olsen, 1984; 1989; for an application of new institutionalism in EIA, see Leknes, 2001), which alludes to the much more fluid conception of institutions as rules, norms, values, regulations or routines that shape the actions and behaviours of individuals. Therefore, state institutions and those institutions deployed in decision-making settings matter a great deal for shaping the political manifestation of civil society.

In their function as normative or regulatory frameworks in the democratic state, institutions can popularly be regarded as recognized nodes or hubs where interaction with citizens is accommodated. What ensues from the civil interaction with institutions may well culminate in new understandings of the political desires and ambitions of citizens that cannot simply have been the sum of individual preferences. Indeed, something changes in the actions and behaviours of the subscribers to institutions and in the fabric of society more broadly. Rather than conceptualizing democracy as a system of preference aggregation, the thesis has espoused the view that democracy is integrative and that its
institutions are heavily involved in creating or modifying ‘democratic citizens’ (March and Olsen, 1989). Integrative democracy, as opposed to aggregative democracy, therefore alludes to the political emancipation or liberation of citizens and to securing their influence in decision-making as a form of public entitlement.

Whilst institutions can be considered to unleash the democratic character of civil society, the specific nature of norms, rules and routines dealing with political conduct can impact substantively on how this will be done. Secondly, and greatly extending inquiry into democratic procedure, is whether and how citizens may shape their views on public goods issues in conformance with the normative premises of institutional frameworks. March and Olsen (1989) have argued that the influence of institutions on their human subjects follows a ‘logic of appropriateness’, which proposes that citizens act in accordance as well as accept the outcomes of their actions on the basis of what they view as the principles underlying the institutions they ascribe to. In the context of the thesis, institution-driven views on ‘appropriate’ behaviour that should be expected from democratic citizens exerts definitive influence on modes of public engagement

As has been argued earlier, institutions are active at two different levels: 1) the level at which democratic representation is put into practice; and 2) the level at which public engagement in arenas of decision-making is accommodated, the prominent arena to be discussed being EIA. Although seemingly dualistic, at closer inspection the difference between institutions governing at the state level and those in more local settings will become increasingly blurred. It is believed that the traditions and routines of representation in the democratic process reverberates in even the smallest political nucleus; conversely, institutions that form the cornerstone of the deliberation between decision-makers and civil society in the governance of public policy issues could well facilitate new best practices with regards to democratic representation.

In order to converge to such multi-level reciprocity, institutions can be assembled in the concept of institutional design (Goodin, 1996; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001). Following Goodin (1996: 31), institutional design is defined as “the creation of an actionable form to promote valued outcomes in a particular context”. Besides giving a manifestation of intention of shaping outcomes, possibly to strengthen normative institutional underpinnings, institutional design also alludes to a more holistic interpretation of the workings and dealings of the democratic system at multiple levels. This holds implications not only for a discussion of the conceptual premises of democracy, but also for roles and responsibilities ascribed to actors and, ultimately, the acceptance of decision outcomes. These implications will be made clear by looking at four aspects of institutional design: 1) the foundation of democracy; 2) systems of representative democracy; 3) democratic performance; and 4) the deliberative conduct of democracy.
2.1.1 The foundation of the democratic system

Democracy can be defined as a political system that is ruled by the people (Held, 2006). The idealistic undertone of this definition – *dēmos kratos* (in ancient Greek): *the people rule* – can be readily discerned. However, research has shown that it is decisively more difficult to put the democratic ideal into practice. The variety of democratic systems the world over attests to the complexity of letting the people rule (Held, 2006), not to mention the myriad democratic sub-types that can be identified. In the search for similarities among modern democratic states, virtually all of them adhere to a representative form of the people’s rule. In representative democracy people are represented in the legislative branch of the state, the latter of which is almost always elected. Most discussions relating to the functioning of the democratic system therefore pertain to the breath and width of representation (Dahl, 1971).

Representative democracy can be characterized as a system where the political role of citizens is by no means standardized (Skelcher *et al.*, 2011). The extent to which citizens can engage politically in representative democracy, whether as individuals or as a group, can be measured by identifying dimensions that deal with engagement. Set within this logic, Dahl (1971) has identified public contestation and participation as two dimensions imperative to representative democracy. The dimension of contestation deals with the opportunities provided to the public by the democratic system to contest governments as well as political decisions. The dimension of participation deals with the opportunities provided to become included in the political process. It is as such synonymous to the concept of inclusiveness (Coppe
dge *et al.*, 2008). When taken together, the dimensions represent a measure with which representative democratic systems can be compared. It is also argued that certain political and civil freedoms are vital for facilitating public contestation and participation, such as the freedoms of expression and association (Dahl, 1971). Without such freedoms the opportunities for citizens to contest and participate would be severely constrained.

Indicators for the extent of contestation and participation are invaluable for measuring the process of democratization. Indeed, reports that relate to the progress of states to transit from authoritarianism towards democracy are mainly based on indicators associated with contestation and participation (Coppe
dge *et al.*, 2008). However, democratization is subject to ongoing renewal, an observation which reflects the infinite character of improvements that can be made on the dimensions of contestation and participation (Dahl, 1971). Democratization may therefore also refer to the ‘never-ending quest’ of established democracies to improve their responsiveness towards citizen preferences (Diamond, 1999). Furthermore, following Tilly (2007), inherent in all
democracies is the ‘state-citizen struggle’ which designates the perpetual conflicting relationship between the actions of states and the political preferences of citizens.

Because of the time period in which Dahl (1971) conceptualized the foundation of democracy, contestation and participation have been mainly framed in terms of universal suffrage. This type of suffrage denotes the right to vote and the right to become elected. In more recent times a discussion has emerged that deals with the extent of citizen engagement with democracy, however. This discussion concerns the difference between what is coined as ‘electoral democracy’ and ‘liberal democracy’ (Diamond, 1999). Electoral democracy limits participation to voting and ascribes political power to the political elites of the legislative and executive branches of government (Schumpeter, 1954). However, the proposed role of voting as the single locus for citizen engagement with democracy has been challenged by proponents of liberal democracy. This perspective advocates opportunities for citizen engagement beyond suffrage (Diamond, 1999). Elections cease to be the sole expression of the nation’s political life. In liberal democracy the means to contest and participate are continuously available to citizens. As will be shown later, the current discussion on the breadth and width citizen engagement is in considerable momentum.

2.1.2 Majoritarian versus consensual democracy

Two systems can be discerned that propose distinct interpretations of representative democracy (Lijphart, 2012). The first system is majoritarian democracy which embraces simple majority rule. *Ipso facto*, in a majoritarian democracy the majority of the people makes the decisions. Majoritarian democracy is mainly practiced in Commonwealth states and can be traced back to British democratic rule. The second system is consensual democracy where decisions are made by “as many people as possible” (Lijphart, 2012: 2). It stipulates the desirability of a wide public mandate to make decisions (Skelcher et al., 2011). Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands are considered good examples of consensual democracy (Anderson and Guillery, 1997; Lockhart, 2011; Lijphart, 2012).

Lijphart (2012) has identified two dimensions where the difference between majoritarian and consensual democracy can be fleshed out: 1) the executives-parties dimension and 2) the federal-unitary dimension. The executive-parties dimension deals with the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government and the distribution of political power amongst political parties. The federal-unitary dimension deals with the concentration of political power in core political entities or its diffusion in sub-entities. Whilst the first dimension is concerned with the level to which political power and responsibility for decision-making are shared, the second dimension is concerned with the level to which such power and responsibility are divided (Goodin, 1996). As a
strong focus of the thesis is on institutions that facilitate a sharing of the decision-making mandate, the executives-parties dimension is used as a prime institutional theory.

The executives-parties dimension consists of five variables (Lijphart, 2012). In majoritarian democracies 1) the executive branch of government often consists of a single political party, 2) the executive branch dominates the legislative branch of government, 3) political debate in Parliament is basically made up of two dominant parties focusing on socio-economic issues, 4) voting is based on majority rule and the winner-takes-all principle, and 5) there is competition between government and interest groups in decision-making. In contrast, in consensual democracies 1) the executive branch of government is often a coalition of political parties, 2) the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government is balanced, 3) political debate in Parliament is made up of multiple political parties focusing on multiple issues, 4) voting is based on proportional representation and 5) there is coordination between government and interest groups in decision-making. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the five variables on the executive-parties dimension.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Majoritarian democracy</th>
<th>Consensual democracy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The executive branch of government consists of a single political party</td>
<td>1. The executive branch of government consists of multiple political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The executive branch dominates the legislative branch of government</td>
<td>2. There is balance between the executive and legislative branches of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Two-party system. Focus on socio-economic issues</td>
<td>3. Multiparty system. Focus on multiple issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Voting is based on majority rule and the winner-takes-all principle</td>
<td>4. Voting is based on proportional representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Competition between government and interest groups in decision-making</td>
<td>5. Coordination between government and interest groups in decision-making</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: The executives-parties dimension in representative democracy (based on Lijphart, 2012)

The electoral rules of the democratic system are directly related to the dimensions of public contestation and participation (Dahl, 1971). Electoral outcomes in majoritarian democracies are based on the results of individual, single-member parliamentary constituency in which the winner of the election ‘takes all’; that is, the single district seat in the national parliament (Lijphart, 2012). Two political parties in the majoritarian system usually win the preponderance of seats, for instance Labour and Conservatives in the UK. Supporters of small political parties may as such feel that voting is a waste of time (Banducci et al., 1999). Consequently, small political parties such as green parties are often unable to contest the incumbent political powers through their representation in parliament. In contrast, in consensual democracies electoral outcomes are proportionate to the votes cast by the population of the parliamentary constituency (Lijphart, 2012). The number of seats in parliament mirrors the number of votes of all parliamentary
constituencies, which together with a low legal threshold often yields a large number of political parties (Bingham Powell Jr. and Vanberg, 2000).

The nature of the relationships between and within the executive and legislative branches of government designates the institutional capacity of democratic systems to distribute political power. Institutional capacity may subsequently bear consequences for the interaction between states and civil society actors. The modality of such interaction essentially involves the anchorage of the ‘primacy-of-politics’ principle in the democratic system (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007). This principle grants political power to elected representatives much at the expense of civil society actors. Skelcher et al. (2011) have argued that in a majoritarian democracy power is concentrated in the representative institutions of the state. In contrast, the institutions of consensual democracy can be considered as better equipped to also devolving power to civil society actors (Skelcher et al., 2011). Majoritarian democracy is therefore closer to the primacy-of-politics principle than consensual democracy.

In order to design institutions that are able to accommodate political plurality in consensual democracies, corporatism has come to the advent of state-civil society interaction (Hendriks, 2011). Corporatism refers to the mode of institutionalized negotiation between states and interest groups taking place at regular intervals. It specifically refers to the fifth variable of Lijphart’s (2012) executives-parties dimension. In contrast to the confrontational tactics often deployed by both states and interest groups in majoritarian democracies, which is reportedly the case in the UK (Gallagher et al., 2005), corporatist structures facilitate dialogue, reciprocity of viewpoints and a piecemeal transmission of civil interests into the political process. This has been especially true in the tripartite negotiations between the state, employer organizations and labour unions. In highly dynamic decision arenas, such as sustainability management, corporatism continues to seek new spaces for consensual decision-making (De Vos and Van Tatenhove, 2011).

2.1.3 Democratic performance

It is important to consider whether the observed difference between majoritarian and consensual democracy has an effect on the quality of the democratic system. According to Dahl (1971: 1), the basic critical function of representative democracy is “the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens”. However, an unambiguous protocol of how to build a responsive democratic system seems to be lacking. Responsiveness can be contingent on the institutional capacity to include the preferences of all citizens by virtue of a broad landscape of political parties (Dahl, 1971; Lijphart, 2012), but the ‘overindulgence’ of partisan representation and the need to
establish coalition governments may conversely compromise the ability of citizens to incur a change of government (Kaiser et al., 2002). In having discussed the foundation of the democratic system, which is essentially based on the dimensions of public contestation and participation (Dahl, 1971), it can be argued that responsive decision-making involves a strong focus on procedure and public entitlements in the democratic debate. The concept of democratic performance is deployed to accommodate this focus.

Democratic performance refers to the ability of states to anchor democratic norms and rights in the political system. As regards norms, democratic performance is “the degree to which a system meets such democratic norms as representativeness, accountability, equality and participation” (Lijphart, 1993: 149). As regards rights, well-functioning democracies must be able to guarantee the anchorage of political rights, civil rights, property rights and minority rights (Foweraker and Krznaric, 2000). Norms and rights can become legally codified through the constitutional principles of the rule of law and the sovereignty of the people (Foweraker and Krznaric, 2000). The principle pertaining to the rule of law protects citizens from unlawful state action and safeguards essential citizens’ rights and freedoms. The principle pertaining to the sovereignty of the people deals with the quality of the democratic system to hold the incumbent government accountable to the citizenry (Foweraker and Krznaric, 2000).

Norms and rights are public entitlements that must ensure the inclusion of the virtues of liberty and equality in the decision-making process (Foweraker and Krznaric, 2000). Liberty corresponds to the idea that citizens must be able to develop their personal and political life spheres. Equality is premised on the political equality of all. The concept of democratic performance therefore involves measures of freedom and fairness in the conduct of democracy, which demarcates it from performance as measured by the effectiveness of democratic governments to make decisions (Foweraker and Krznaric, 2000; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001). Some governments may undoubtedly be performing better than others in delivering ‘political goods’ (Roller, 2005), yet such performance refers to the quantity rather than the quality of democracy.

The performance of democratic states can be measured quantitatively. Foweraker and Krznaric (2000) have enlisted a large number of quantitative studies that aim to measure democratic performance. Quantitative studies often compare states on the basis of certain indicators (e.g. Coppedge et al., 2008), such as the ‘Dahlian’ indicators of contestation and participation (the latter also being called ‘inclusiveness’). With regards to public engagement, however, the quantification of democratic performance fails to understand the subjective experience of citizens in the political realm. More specifically, it is unable to inquire into the civil legitimacy of democratic decision-making. Civil legitimacy involves a public appraisal of the fairness of democratic procedures and of the popular support for decision outcomes (Clark et al., 2006). An appraisal of fairness in the context
of public engagement can subsequently be linked to the perceived availability of opportunities for contestation and participation (Dahl, 1971).

Civil legitimacy is an integral aspect of democratic performance in the sense that it improves the scope for assessing the attainment of democratic norms and rights. Furthermore, the concept of civil legitimacy can be extended to discuss the demand for legitimacy on the input side and the output side of democracy (Scharpf, 1999). Whereas the input side deals with procedural fairness, the output side deals with the competence of governments to transpose the political preferences of citizens into real decisions. These forms of democratic legitimacy are interrelated as the transposition of political preferences is contingent on the democratic norms and rights of the political system, the latter of which will more likely be judged as adequate when citizen preferences become transposed. In linking the input and output sides to norms and rights, democratic performance may therefore be extended to also considering democratic legitimacy (Fung and Wright, 2003). Such considerations reflect the need for the inclusion of norms and rights in both democratic procedures and decision outcomes.

In returning to the difference between majoritarian and consensual democracy in the context of democratic performance, Kaiser et al. (2002) have argued that majoritarian systems are generally more responsive to citizen preferences than consensual systems. Majoritarian democracy is generally less capable of including citizen preferences due to a bare majority in the executive branch of government but its ability to incur a change of government through elections greatly improves its overall responsiveness (Kaiser et al., 2002). When related to democratic performance, particularly in terms of democratic norms, this system characteristic scores high on accountability. However, rebuttals to this argument have pointed out that winner-takes-all elections in majoritarian democracies limit the number of political parties with the potential to rule (Lijphart, 2012). A change of government therefore does not necessarily fully reflect the political preferences of the citizenry. Notwithstanding minor changes in the executive branch of government, political preferences of the median voter are better catered for in consensual democracies (Huber and Bingham Powell Jr., 1994; Birchfield and Crepaz, 1998). Consensual democracy therefore scores high on representation.

2.1.4 Deliberative forms of democracy

The conceptual foundation of democratic performance is based on the assumption that representation is the primary means through which citizens can exercise political voice. From a descriptive point of view it may also be argued that the institutional make-up of majoritarian and consensual democracy considers representation to be axiomatic. However, considerable momentum can be discerned in furthering the concept of
representation (Diamond, 1999; Mansbridge, 2003; Brown, 2006). As mentioned earlier, the discussion on electoral and liberal democracy denotes the extent to which citizens should become engaged within the system boundaries of democratic representation (Diamond, 1999). The existential basis of representation itself can furthermore be challenged in light of the changing attitude towards the relationship between elected representatives and citizens. Rather than democracy being based on either ‘mandate’ or ‘trustee’ (Mansbridge, 2003), both of which clearly designate a stark division of labour in decision-making, novel conceptions of democracy emphasize the more reciprocal relationship between elected representatives and citizens.

In recent decades a scholarly interest for models of post-representative democracy in the democratic theory literature has emerged. A popular concept in this literature concerns deliberation (Hendriks, 2011). Indeed, it has been asserted that a ‘deliberative turn’ has become apparent in democratic theory (Bohman, 1998; Chambers, 2003; Goodin, 2008). Deliberative democracy can be defined in a number of ways, of course, but it often refers to a form of democracy where decisions are made and outcomes are reached based on the engagement and acceptance of all (Bohman, 1998). Deliberation may be linked to public reasoning, mutual justification on the part of decision-makers and citizens, and collective action in the pursuit of socially optimal outcomes (Hendriks, 2011). Generally, those involved in and compliant with deliberative forms of decision-making aim to refrain from becoming engaged in adversarial politics, strife and interest advocacy. When deliberation is linked to democracy, decisions that have been made in a deliberative fashion are binding to all the actors involved (Mansbridge et al., 2010).

Deliberative democracy both deepens and broadens the scope of democratic decision-making. In deepening democracy, deliberative democracy is able to transcend voting as the ultimate and only means for citizens to exercise political voice (Fung and Wright, 2003). The classic recurring pattern of political promise, election and decision accountability espoused by representative democracy (Mansbridge, 2003) is supplanted with a system that facilitates the goals of continuous information-sharing, reciprocity of action and social learning between the actors engaged in decision-making. A number of institutions have been identified as able to facilitate these goals, such as public hearings (Bäckstrand, 2003), citizen panels (Brown, 2006), consensus conferences (Dryzek and Tucker, 2008) and citizen forums (Hendriks, 2011). Because of its focus on the political emancipation of citizens, deliberative democracy reinforces the discussion on the ‘primacy-of-politics’ principle mentioned earlier (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007).

In broadening democracy, deliberative democracy aims to accommodate interest advocacy in such a way so as to achieve socially optimal outcomes in decision-making (Mansbridge et al., 2010; Hendriks, 2011). Interest advocacy is inherently triggered by ‘vote-centric’ democracy (Kymlicka, 2002; Chambers, 2003), for instance the ‘free-for-all’
competitions between interest groups which is a characteristic of the majoritarian democratic system (Lijphart, 2012). Elections not only foster the pursuit of private interests (Bohman, 1998); they also prescribe interest divergence that becomes manifest through the electoral promises of rival political parties. Deliberative democracy argues that the institutions of representative democracy can be harmful for the civil legitimacy of decisions. Instead, it broadens the scope by shifting the emphasis from majority to consensus (Bohman, 1998). Decisions outcomes are based on the shared agreement of all who are committed to resolving the issue at stake.

Deliberative democratic practice raises interesting challenges for reconciling new modes of state-citizen interaction with public contestation (Dahl, 1971). Contestation is potentially problematic for the deliberative ideal as it considers political contest in the context of democracy to be virtuous. However, deliberative democrats are much aware of the potential divergence of interests and argue that contestation should feature prominently in deliberation (Hendriks, 2011). Mansbridge et al. (2010: 69), for example, have argued that “deliberative democracy must include self-interest and conflicts among interests in order to recognize and celebrate in the ideal itself the diversity of free and equal human beings”. It is therefore precisely within deliberative settings that citizens can engage freely and fairly (Bohman, 1998), without the distortive influence of partisan fragmentation and abuse of political power by elected representatives. Contestation is a key characteristic of political reasoning and conferring on the public good, both of which thrive on the virtues of liberty and equality.

2.2 Political culture

~ “[I]t is from political discussion, and collective political action, that one whose daily occupations concentrate his interests in a small circle round himself, learns to feel for and with his fellow citizens, and becomes consciously a member of a great community” ~ (John Stuart Mill, cited in Miller, 2000: 92)

The previous section has demonstrated that choices made within the institutional design of states entail consequences for the political orientation of civil society in the face of political authority. Such consequences may relate to, amongst others, the extent of public contestation and participation (Dahl, 1971), the electoral ‘rules of the game’ and the party system (Lijphart, 2012), democratic norms and rights (Foweraker and Krznaric, 2000), and the deliberative means and mechanisms by which decisions are reached (Bohman, 1998). Amongst others, theory on institutional design has demonstrated that the ‘actionable form’ created to induce ‘valued outcomes’ in the ‘particular context’ of decision-making transcends considerations based on effectiveness (Goodin, 1996), irrespective of how
effective government may be defined. Rather, institutional design relates to the civil legitimacy of decision-making, both on the input and output side of democracy (Scharpf, 1999), thereby stressing procedural aspects and responsiveness.

The political orientation of civil society is the next stage of the theoretical claim advanced in the thesis. Although Walter Lippmann asserted in his book *The Phantom Public* (1927) that the public is merely a latent recipient (‘bystander’) of the decisions made by a political elite (‘agent’), it can be argued that much has changed since this assertion has been made. Agency in decision-making may now increasingly be ascribed to civil society actors, both in their interaction with political authority through state-sanctioned modes of engagement as well as in the self-organizational capacity of such actors to mobilize resources and exercise political voice (Cornwall, 2004). The theoretical analysis in this section will argue that decision-making is influenced by dominant cultural attitudes of civil society towards the conduct of democracy. Furthermore, it is argued that cultural attitudes are imbued with the consequences of choice made in the institutional design of states. These attitudes can be embedded in the concept of political culture.

Drawing on Pye (1968: 218), the thesis defines political culture as "the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system". From the perspective of civil society, attitudes, beliefs and sentiments are the means through which citizens engage with the conduct of politics, for example by expressing feelings of satisfaction with the incumbent government. The definition provided makes clear that such means indirectly govern political behaviour. For instance, low voter turnout can be regarded as the consequence of a low level satisfaction with the incumbent government, or with the way democratic institutions work.

When talking about political culture, a useful distinction can be made between attitudes towards the ‘actually existing democracy’ (Dahl, 1971) – such as is established through the conduct of governments, political parties and elected representatives – and those made towards the democratic system, which can best be interpreted as an assemblage of democratic institutions. This distinction has been proposed by Easton (1975), who argued that satisfaction and trust in the actual form that democracy can take is a form of ‘specific support’ and that satisfaction and trust in the system characteristics of democracy adheres to ‘diffuse support’. Whereas the interpretation of satisfaction and trust in relation to the actual form of democracy is in many ways premised on the quantifiable performance of institutions or governments to deliver political goods (Roller, 2005), satisfaction and trust in relation to the democratic system focuses on principles of decision-making, rather than actual decision outcomes. As both interpretations make sense for understanding how citizens engage with decision-making, both of them will be used in the research.
Another convenient way of looking at political culture is by describing it as “the systematic means by which a political community makes binding collective choices” (Jasanoff, 2005). Based on the context in which it has been provided, this description could well have been thought of as linking institutions (‘systematic means’) to the members of civil society (‘political community’), both of which are included in the conceptual scheme of the thesis. Although it is more output-oriented (‘binding collective choices’) that the definition provided earlier, Jasanoff’s (2005) description of political culture is a valuable conceptual contribution to considering decision-making power as a shared good between elected representatives and civil society.

However, as will be shown later in this section, it can be discussed where civil society ‘fits’ in the concept of political culture or whether its cultural characteristics are determinants of the uniformity with which decisions are made. Similar to John Stuart Mills’ statement provided at the start of this section, Alexis de Tocqueville stated that, while investigating the role of community in the political life of 1830s America, “[n]othing (...) deserves more attention than the intellectual and moral associations” (cited in Putnam, 1997: 28), which are forming the fabric of civil society. Such statements may be interpreted as providing sole agency to civil society based on its cultural characteristics, such as its ability to confer ‘intellectually’ and ‘morally’ on public goods issues, thereby glossing over the political influence exerted by institutions. This thesis nuances this potential tension by stressing the reciprocity between institutions and civil society.

In order to distinguish political culture from more random observations on the orientation of citizens in political events, it is assumed that political culture is coherent, aggregative, durable and explanatory (Jackman and Miller, 1996). This means that there is coherence between, and a widely shared agreement over, certain attitudes associated with the political conduct, that these attitudes are resilient over time and that their proliferation in the public sphere can explain decision outcomes to a considerable extent. Attitudes towards decision-making seep into styles of reasoning and debate but also come to the fore in the interminable ways with which the bureaucracy accommodates or aims to mediate contestation in the face of issues bearing a high degree of public concern (Jasanoff, 2005). Similar to institutional design, political culture is an analytical concept in the sense that it investigates ‘attitudes, beliefs and sentiments’ (Pye, 1968) without reflecting a code of political conduct.

In this section three aspects of political culture will be analyzed: 1) democratic satisfaction; 2) political trust and 3) reciprocity between institutions and culture in political life. As democratic satisfaction and political trust represent public attitudes towards the conduct of politics (i.e. ways of representation), they are important aspects of political culture. As such they have often been used in research on political culture (e.g. Inglehart, 1988; Linde and Ekman, 2003). Satisfaction and trust are furthermore precursors to public
engagement. The reciprocity between institutions and cultural characteristics of civil society subsequently denotes the intimate relationship between top-down and bottom-up approaches to political culture, or alternatively between the formal and informal character of decision-making in the democratic state. More specifically, the assumed reciprocity denotes the endogenous entanglement of institutional design variables and public attitudes towards democratic satisfaction and trust (Mishler and Rose, 2001). As this inevitably raises questions on causality, in the form of so-called ‘chicken-versus-egg’ questions (Inglehart, 1988), the potential influence of exogenous cultural variables will also be pondered.

2.2.1 Democratic satisfaction

Satisfaction with democracy is an important element of political culture as it deals with the attitudes of citizens towards democracy (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Linde and Ekman, 2003). Under the pressures of many political crises and the sensed underperformance of governments in providing public services, it has often been asserted that citizens in many established democracies feel increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of the democratic state (Dahl, 2000). However, at the same time it has been noted that democracy proper, to be framed as end rather than means, remains the hegemonic political ideal in those states where it is now established practice (Dahl, 2000). This latter assertion may also be reversed in that broad support for democracy does not have a bearing on democratic satisfaction per se. Therefore, democratic satisfaction could be envisaged as an indicator of public support for the institutions that drive democratic performance (Anderson and Guillory, 1997). As it can be assumed that public support for the democratic ideal is ensured (Dahl, 2000), democratic satisfaction can be reframed in terms of the attitude of citizens towards the institutional foundation of democratic performance (Linde and Ekman, 2003).

Similar to the discussion on democratic performance, civil legitimacy is at the core of the discussion on democratic satisfaction (Linde and Ekman, 2003). With regards to the input side of representative democracy, the level of satisfaction of citizens after the occurrence of elections is of particular interest (Anderson and Guillory, 1997). Quite evidently, citizens that are represented by a party in government often show a high level of satisfaction. However, it is interesting to measure the level of satisfaction of citizens that are not represented by a party in government. In establishing high levels of democratic satisfaction it has become imperative for democratic governments to also be supported by the ‘losers’ of an electoral contest (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Norris, 2011). As theory on democracy prescribes the anchorage of certain norms and rights in the democratic conduct, satisfaction among citizens that find themselves on the losing side of elections
therefore mainly revolves around public perceptions on the fairness and impartiality of
democratic procedures.

With regards to the output side of representative democracy, democratic
satisfaction can be associated with the fulfilment of the political preferences of the
‘median’ citizen (Huber and Bingham Powell Jr., 1994; Birchfield and Crepaz, 1998). High
levels of citizen satisfaction may as such be achieved when decision outcomes are in
accordance with the median political preferences that can be identified, for example
through polling or in the form of electoral outcomes. In investigating decision-making on
reducing income inequality, Birchfield and Crepaz (1998) have shown that decision
outcomes in support of reducing income inequality are almost always supported by the
median citizen. It is in such a decision-making process in the interest of the median
citizen, whose income is virtually always below the median income (except in the
theoretical case of pure equality in income distribution), to vote for political parties that will
address income inequality when they are in government. The fulfilment of the political
preferences of the median citizen, and therefore of the median voter, corresponds to
responsiveness as the basic critical function of representative democracy (Dahl, 1971).

There has been surprisingly little research on the relationship between deliberative
democracy and satisfaction with democracy. Recent research on deliberative democracy
is mainly concerned with introducing the principle of making decisions based on the
engagement and acceptance of all, which deviates from the inherent dualism in interest
advocacy and the notion of electoral winners and losers (Mansbridge et al., 2010;
Hendriks, 2011). It could be argued that, as a rule of thumb, increased engagement and
the acceptance of decision outcomes by all is a virtue in its own right and that high levels
of citizen satisfaction would follow from deliberative democratic procedures. However,
dissatisfaction may be perceived to arise when the engagement of all those potentially
affected by a decision leads to suboptimal decision outcomes (Bohman, 1998). Such
outcomes are made and mandated by the ‘tyranny of the majority’, “the ill-informed mass,
the passionate and irrational mob” (Dryzek and Torgerson, 1993: 128).

Related to this point, it has been demonstrated that politically conscious citizens
are hesitant towards supporting the use of referenda (Anderson and Goodyear-Grant,
2010). These ‘critical citizens’ argue that referenda outcomes may pose a threat to the
liberty and equality of political minorities. A good example is the Swiss referendum in 2009
where it was agreed to ban the construction of minarets on mosques, something which
has sparked widespread dissatisfaction with democracy amongst the Muslim minority in
Switzerland. In exerting the political right to influence decisions the civil right of religious
freedom has been curtailed, in this specific case, on the basis of a double majority opinion
(of the people and in the cantons). A critique against the use of referenda therefore
extends to both procedural fairness and the optimality of decision outcomes as perceived
by parts of the citizenry. It has been furthermore argued that the ambition to reach consensus on controversial issues may conceal tacit power disparities between the actors involved in deliberation (Van den Hove, 2006). Although consensus assumes that satisfaction with the decision outcome has been reached, some actors may feel marginalized in the process leading up to the outcome (Dryzek and Tucker, 2008).

In finding a common denominator for accounting for citizen attitudes towards democracy, as well as to understand why some citizens can grow out to become ‘the politically embittered’ (Kaase, 1999), a low level of satisfaction can be explained in terms of a democratic deficit (Norris, 2011). A democratic deficit can be understood as the discrepancy between, on the one hand, expectations of procedural fairness and responsive government and, on the other hand, the level of fairness and responsiveness as perceived by citizens. Democratic dissatisfaction that follows from this discrepancy is therefore the result of unfulfilled expectations, aspirations and political ambitions, amongst others (Norris, 2011). A perceived lack of procedural fairness can prompt citizens to refrain from participating politically, for instance as expressed by low voter turnout (Birch, 2010) or the electoral success of fringe parties (notwithstanding the legitimacy of voting for these parties). Furthermore, the notion of perceived unresponsiveness can lead to widespread dissatisfaction with the quality of decision outcomes. In the discussion on political trust in the next sub-section it will be demonstrated that expectations also play an important role in building trustworthy relations between and amongst decision-makers and civil society.

2.2.2 Political trust

Political trust can be intimately linked to satisfaction with democracy. It stands to reason that a high level of citizen satisfaction with democracy induces high political trust; they are two sides of the same coin. Political trust is among the most salient features of political culture, having received widespread attention in theory associated with the relationship between and among institutions, decision-makers and citizens (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1988; Putnam, 1993). Dahl (1971) considers political trust to be an essential component of ‘true’ democracy, or what he has coined the Polyarchy. Political trust, together with democratic satisfaction, is also the focus of various surveys on the political values of citizens, such as conducted in the European Social Survey, the European Values Study and the World Values Survey, to name just a few. Evidently, the origins of political trust can be debated. This has culminated in research on the relationship between political trust and substantive changes in the institutional character of the political systems of states (Mishler and Rose, 2001). Sub-section 2.2.3 will elaborate on this relationship.
In common parlance the existence of trust between two individuals reflects a two-way relationship between the behaviour of one individual and the expectations of such behaviour by the other (Hardin, 1999). Trust does not necessarily imply that individuals interact on friendly terms or even share a common cause in a certain situation. Rather, trust refers to the fulfilment of expectations, the latter of which have been motivated through prior knowledge on what may be expected. It is therefore essentially relational (Kaase, 1999). A critical element within theory on trust is the degree of trustworthiness of the relationship between citizens that are unknown to one another (Uslaner, 2002). Expectations of behaviour are therefore formed on the basis of the perceived cultural characteristics of fellow citizens rather than individual characteristics. This type of trust is most commonly referred to as interpersonal trust (Inglehart, 1988; Kaase, 1999). Interpersonal trust is strongly linked to the social relations of individuals at the community level, which itself is contingent on the gradual socialization of norms and values.

Whilst interpersonal trust involves the relationships between individuals, regardless of whether they are reciprocal to one another or enmeshed in a power disparity, theory on political trust regards responsiveness of the democratic systems as its axiom. Transcending pertinent questions on trust as either ‘specific’ or ‘diffuse’ (Easton, 1975), at least for the time being, political trust can be defined as “[a] summary judgment that the system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny” (Miller and Listhaug, 1990: 381). As this definition internalizes the importance of responsiveness for establishing levels of civil trust in the conduct of politics, it is particularly suitable for navigating the influence of trust on citizens which ‘the system’ responds to.

When trust is extrapolated to the political realm, it is based on the integrity, responsiveness and competence of decision-makers (Denters, 2002). Such norms and values reflect the asymmetrical relationship between citizens and decision-makers. Political trust is different from interpersonal trust as the actors engaged in democratic decision-making hold various organizational affiliations, statutory backgrounds and political powers. Trust between actors in the political realm is therefore mediated by a reciprocal understanding on the division of the roles and responsibilities of the actors involved, including one’s own. A salient debate within theory on political trust concerns whether there is overlap between interpersonal trust and political trust (e.g. Inglehart, 1988; Jackman and Miller, 1996). Whilst this debate has the potential to remain unresolved, it has been advanced that high levels of interpersonal trust generate concerted civil action, such as direct action (Kaase, 1999).

In the observed difference between citizen satisfaction with democratic institutions and satisfaction with the broader democratic ideal (Dahl, 2000), it would stand to reason that political trust can also relate to institutions or the democratic ideal. Political trust may
be explained in terms of citizens either trusting institutions or elected representatives, those individuals populating the executive and legislative branches of government, in making good decisions (Easton, 1975). These sub-divisions are certainly interesting but fail to address the transposition of political trust into the social realm. Therefore, in extending the concept of political trust, it may also be explained in terms of trust between citizens on the basis of the political relations that are shaped by institutional and political system characteristics (Hardin, 1999). Conversely, the ‘spill-over’ between political trust and interpersonal trust may be conceptualized as starting from the community level. Reciprocity between individuals then seeps into the informal and formal institutional character of representative democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993).

Because of ongoing changes in the breadth and width of democratic decision-making, the research agenda on political trust has changed accordingly. Similar to the discussion on deliberative democracy and citizen satisfaction, political trust within a deliberative setting roughly meanders between input and output legitimacy of the democratic process (Grimes, 2006). More specifically, political trust can relate to both the fairness of democratic procedures and to decision outcomes based on the engagement and acceptance of all. In aiming to reconcile these two interpretations of trust, Grimes (2006) has argued that a procedure perceived by citizens to be fair can also facilitate the acceptance of the decision outcome. The focus is more on acceptance than on the fulfilment of preferences when it comes to political output. Therefore, political trust buoys the civil legitimacy of decision outcomes when the criterion of procedural fairness is met (see Kaiser et al., 2002 for a general critique on this reasoning).

In other research on political trust the focus has equally shifted towards adding more variables to the interaction between political authority and citizens. For instance, Denters (2002) has inquired into the relationship between the unit or size of government and trust in elected representatives. The inquiry is aimed towards envisaging the state as comprising various layers of government, which invariably triggers debate on the role of governmental proximity in building trustworthy relations. Political trust is also increasingly applied to specific decision-making areas, such as areas where political issues are enveloped in scientific uncertainty (Wilsdon and Willis, 2004). A focus on interaction at the executive level marks a shift away from the intellectual underpinnings of political trust, thereby making it relevant to issue-related contexts. Attempts to enhance trust in these contexts are directed towards creating acceptance for decision outcomes.

2.2.3 Reciprocity between institutions and political culture

In accounting for political culture, the underlying characteristics that mediate the orchestration of political life can be discussed. In particular, it can be discussed whether
political culture results from either social or institutional characteristics (Jackman and Miller, 1996; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001). Inglehart (1988) has argued that, amongst others, life satisfaction, interpersonal trust and acceptance of the social order provide fertile cultural soil for improving the quality of democracy. This parallels the main conclusions advanced in *The Civil Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Almond and Verba, 1963), one of the earliest accounts of political culture. Similarly, Putnam (1993) has argued that exogenous cultural characteristics shape the manifestation of civil society in decision-making, which subsequently reverberates in the performance of democratic government. In comparing the performance of various Italian regional governments, it is asserted that the political orientation of the ‘civic community’ determines the quality of democracy through making democracy perform better.

A salient viewpoint is that cultural values inform democratic practices and that they have been formed independently from institutions (Inglehart, 1988; Putnam, 1993). Furthermore, these values will continue to exert political influence. It is sometimes advanced that cultural values are highly resilient to change, irrespective of time and space. For instance, empirical investigation has shown that modern-day Americans from European descent cling to relatively similar civic attitudes as do contemporary Europeans (Rice and Feldman, 1997), notwithstanding the apparent differences in institutional settings across the Atlantic. From this perspective the breadth and width of civil manifestation in the conduct of politics is shaped by cultural values alone. The influence of civic culture may also be used to explain developments or phenomena in other realms of life, for instance economic growth. Such a statement confirms the famous hypothesis formulated by Max Weber, who more or less conducted research on political culture *avant la lettre*. Weber argued that values associated with a Protestant working ethos spurs economic growth within a capitalist system of production (see Inglehart, 1988 for a brief synopsis of this hypothesis).

Much of the debate on the relationship between the political culture of civil society and the institutional performance of government spins around the issue of causation. Similar to the debate on the influence of institutions and interpersonal trust on the anchorage of trust in the relations between political actors (Mishler and Rose, 2001), a debate representing rival hypotheses regarding the origins of political trust, the question on ‘what causes what’ can be mainly reframed in terms of cause and effect (Inglehart, 1988). For instance, it has been investigated how bonding within civil society exerts its influence in the conduct of politics. Tavits (2006) has argued that political culture bolsters the degree of the political organization of civil society but does not necessarily exert a positive influence on the ability of decision-makers to become more responsive. It has also been proposed that certain institutions prompt decision-makers to become more responsive and which subsequently impact positively on the civic culture (Banducci *et al.*, 2006).
1999). Notwithstanding the endogenous nature of the problem statement, institutions and culture seem to be intimately related.

Perhaps best expressed in terms of the ‘civic culture’ (Almond and Verba, 1963), the role of civil society in determining the institutional performance of governments is certainly worth inquiry. This means that the cultural identity of citizens influences how governments use institutions to further political goods. However, with reference to the pertinent issue of causation stated above, inquiry into the role of institutions in instilling certain civil attitudes towards democracy has equal worth (Mishler and Rose, 2001). That is, institutions are ascribed the transformative potential to impact on political culture, whether through the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1989) which is ascribed to them, the public attitudes directed towards them, or otherwise. This may consecutively be applied to research on democratic satisfaction and political trust, both of which have been at the core of this theoretical section.

With regards to democratic satisfaction, for instance, research has focused on the relationship between institutions and public attitudes towards voting (Banducci et al., 1999). It is advanced that electoral proportionality in consensual democracies invokes a ‘civic spirit’ among the electorate as it spills over into increased political engagement. This observation coincides with the notions of the primacy-of-politics and the dispersion of political power mentioned earlier (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007). Research on the relationship between the institutions and attitudes towards democracy could be used to inquire into the level of democratic satisfaction. Comparative research has shown that citizen satisfaction in consensual democracies is generally higher than in majoritarian democracies because coalition governments execute policies that are more lenient towards the interests of the median voter (Huber and Bingham Powell Jr., 1994; Anderson and Guillory, 1997). This observation may be of specific relevance as it can help explain how institutional design choices influence the performance of the democratic system.

With regards to political trust, a similar observation can be made. In a situation of electoral reform, for instance, political trust is understood to co-vary with citizens' perceptions towards a more prominent role in democratic decision-making (Banducci et al., 1999). Based on the assumption that political power is more dispersed in consensual democracies than in majoritarian democracies (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007), a move towards greater electoral proportionality increases political trust. This form of trust is furthermore present across the full length of the political spectrum, such as amongst supporters of political parties that are on the losing side of elections or those that support small and/or single-issue political parties. The link between institutions and political trust can also extend to the degree to which the former is able to mitigate polarization and antagonism between a diversity of political preferences (Banducci et al., 1999). Whilst majoritarian democracies can be characterized by adversarial politics and strife, consensual
democracies are often able to internalize trust in the political relations amongst citizens and decision-makers.

2.3 Sustainability discourses

The previous two sections have focused on institutions and political culture. As identified in the introductory note of this chapter, institutions and political culture represent the two modes through which citizens can engage with decision-making. It has been made clear that design choices in the type of representative democracy – largely reflecting either majoritarian or consensual systems – not only exert influence on the breadth and width of contestation and participation as forms of public entitlement (Dahl, 1971), for instance in the form of legislation or ‘invited’ public consultation, but also on a more qualitative and non-coerced approach to shaping the relationship between political authority and civil society in the context of decision-making in planning processes (Palerm, 2000). The discussions on corporatism, deliberation and the primacy of politics, amongst others, are illustrative of this point (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007; Hendriks, 2011). Democratic representativeness can as such be seen as a function of liberal democracy, the latter of which widens the scope for public engagement within the remit of representative democracy (Diamond, 1999). Furthermore, cultural attitudes in the conduct of decision-making effectively shape the relationship between political authority and civil society. Such attitudes, predominantly expressed in terms of satisfaction with democracy and trust in politics, designate the cultural attitudes of civil society towards the governing of sustainability issues.

As argued earlier, the research in the thesis develops theory related to the mobilization of sustainability discourses. This is currently understudied: institutions, political culture, public engagement and sustainability discourses are thus far predominantly looked at in isolation. Because of the increased prominence of a number of sustainability issues both as a political and public concern – climate change, biodiversity loss or pollution, to name just a few – a theoretical analysis of state-civil society interaction needs to be situated or primed in the context of emergent challenges, not least due to the potential for contestation arising from the use of science and technology as antidotes to democratic deliberation (Bäckstrand, 2003). Institutions and political culture therefore continue to play a dominant role in this strand of theory as they are understood to exert influence on the process of discourse mobilization in the domain of sustainability governance and decision-making. Or to put it differently, the process of sustainability discourse mobilization is understood to be a function of institutions and political culture.

The functional relationship between institutions and political culture, on the one hand, and sustainability discourses, on the other, dwells on a number of theories. To
some extent drawing on the conceptual research conducted by Koopmans and Statham (1999) on political claims-making, institutions and political culture are depicted as the mobilizing structures through which public-oriented claims in sustainability governance are vented in the public sphere. Many such claims adhere to broadly held public perceptions towards the governance of controversial sustainability issues, not least when far-reaching adverse impacts are considered likely. After having gathered knowledge on these two mobilizing structures, perhaps a logical follow-up area of inquiry relates to the, accommodation, facilitation and mediation of public perception. That is, are certain perceptions favoured by incumbent mobilizing structures? Particularly the proliferation of the ecological modernization agenda in some European states, whilst remaining largely absent in others (Dryzek et al., 2002), proffers tempting questions in this area of inquiry.

Before exploring the functional relationship mentioned before in full detail in the next section, where processes of sustainability discourse mobilization are inquired into, it is important to open up a strand of theory on sustainability discourses and on how best to analyze them. Sustainability is often being associated with the oft-cited concept of sustainable development; indeed, some scholars present sustainability and sustainable development as interchangeable concepts (e.g. Mebratu, 1998; Rydin, 1999). Whilst the thesis readily acknowledges that sustainability and sustainable development can mean different things to different people, thereby being in agreement with the observation made by Bond et al. (2011) that both concepts can have contested meanings, sustainability and sustainable development will be used interchangeably. Certain sustainability discourses may well share affinity with certain definitions of sustainable development, for example as set out by the WCED (1987), whilst other discourses reject the prime objectives that motivated its integration in policy-making.

Following this introduction to sustainability discourses, the section will move on to explore the theoretical foundation of sustainability discourses, theory on discourse analysis and theory on two concepts that are closely affiliated with research on discourse formation: discourse coalitions and storylines. Whilst remarks will be made on occasion as to how sustainability discourses may be reconciled with EIA, the decision-making arena around which this thesis is centred, a more thorough analysis of the interconnectedness between the two will be presented in section 2.4.

2.3.1 The theoretical foundation of discursive research

Definitions of sustainability and sustainable development provide impetus to the discussion on sustainability discourses. To start with, a discourse can be broadly defined as a “specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that is produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is
given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995: 44). Therefore, in putting the definition provided by Hajer (1995) into perspective, discourses can be framed as value-laden statements on how physical and social realities should look, how they should be looked at or how looking at them may impact the meaning given to these realities. A basic yet critical function of discourses is their ability to unify people through providing a discursive environment where these value-laden statements can be vented. A set of such meaning-giving and reality-shaping statements is what Hajer (1995) has referred to as ‘specific ensemble’. Discourses not only have the ability to formulate the meanings of reality but may also be active in creating them. That is, social action is likely to ensue from discourses which become dominant over time (Sharp and Richardson, 2001; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002), thereby putting into practice the ‘ideas, concepts and categorizations’ introduced in Hajer’s (1995) definition of discourse.

In recent years, the concept of discourse has received substantial attention from scholars working in various social science disciplines, particularly following seminal studies conducted by Hajer (1995), Healey (1997), Dryzek (1997) and others. These studies investigated the role of discourses in shaping global or national environmental and sustainability decision-making imperatives. In more specific areas of decision-making, such as EIA or other forms of environmental assessment, research on discourses has become centre-stage in investigations on the potential contestation arising from meanings given to the purpose of the assessment (e.g. Cashmore, 2004; Rozema et al., 2012), on competing claims of when the assessment can be considered effective (e.g. Bond et al., 2013a; Van Doren et al., 2013), as well as on the degree to which stakeholders involved in EIA have been able to deliberate the issues at stake (Wilkins, 2003).

What combines most applied research on discourses is the rejection of a single, unitary approach to understanding the meaning of the objects of study, such as how and what decisions in certain areas of governance are made. The characterization of a discourse as a knowledge regime, to short-cut the definition provided by Hajer (1995), provides to a variety of discourses the possibility to challenge important questions on the validity of conventional wisdom or the taken-for-granted nature of certain truth claims. Explicit in the rejection of unitary approaches in studying decision-making is a discussion on the norms underpinning rationality, such as has been done in relation to the assumed role of EIA in rational decision-making (Richardson, 2005; Elling, 2009; Weston, 2010). This discussion reinvigorates interest in the role assumptions play in steering towards decision outcomes presented as the result of a neutral, apolitical and objectively verifiable decision-making process.

As logic would suggest, it can be argued that sustainability discourses deal with the formulation of meanings of the physical and social reality of sustainability. However, it can be made clear that a wide variety in the formulation of sustainability discourses can
be observed. In the discourse map that can be used for environmental governance, provided by Bond and Morrison-Saunders (2009), it is shown that sustainability development is only a discourse amongst other discourses, a few of which have more to do with governance of human agency than with solving environmental or ecological sustainability issues. Therefore, sustainability discourses are not necessarily related to the environment or ecological sustainability. It will become clear in the empirical chapters of this thesis (Chapters 5 to 7) that the majority of identified discourses in the cases adhere to the role of sustainability in wider political and socio-economic settings.

2.3.2 Discourse analysis

The studying of discourses is generally known as the field of discourse analysis. In recent years a number of contributions have been made in this field (e.g. Hajer, 1995; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Hajer and Versteeg, 2005), focusing on, amongst others, the theoretical aspects of discourse analysis, the tools and methods that may be used in discourse analysis as well as the applicability of discourse analysis in research and practice. Thus, discourse analysis is both a theoretical and methodological object of inquiry. Discourse analysis presumes that the investigation of discourses can distil important understandings particularly of phenomena that are centre-stage in social research. It breaks radically from explanatory research traditions by accepting that social phenomena require understanding of their underlying meanings. Ultimately, discourse analysis has formulated the need to understand these meanings in broader social processes as its prime target. Therefore, in premising the field of discourse analysis on a certain doctrine or idea, Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 24) have contended that:

“The overall idea is that social phenomena are never finished or total. Meaning can never be ultimately fixed and this opens up the way for constant social struggles about definitions of society and identity with resulting social effects. The discourse analyst’s task is to plot the course of these struggles to fix all meaning at all levels of the social”.

Within the field of discourse analysis, a number of ways to analyze discourses can be identified. From a broad perspective, and in acknowledging that the relatively young discipline of discourse analysis is still much in momentum, two distinct ‘traditions’ can be discerned (Van Herten and Runhaar, 2012). The first tradition is linguistic discourse analysis, which seeks to elicit meaning from text by critically analyzing the use of language. Linguistic discourse analysis takes a semantic approach to discourses by means of conducting research on linking ideas and knowledge of the use of language. As such this analytical tradition is entrenched in the field of linguistics, and variations in
discourse analysis can stretch from describing the role of language in providing meaning to engage with the social processes that are mediated by the use of language.

The second tradition is argumentative discourse analysis, which has developed a much broader social research perspective and is more widely applied by discourse analysts across various disciplines (Van Herten and Runhaar, 2012). Argumentative discourse analysis investigates the relationship between discourses and how they have developed under the influence of, for example, institutions, processes, cultural practices or societal structures (Runhaar, 2009). The argumentative tradition privileges inquiry into the formation of argument, which can perhaps best be regarded as the result of the interplay between people and their social and physical environments. Such arguments however, reverberating Hajer’s (1995) definition of discourse, reciprocate patterns of influence and help transform their ‘building blocks’. This means that argumentative discourse analysis is primarily interested in the drivers and outcomes of social processes. As this thesis looks at the process of sustainability discourse mobilization, it stands to reason that the deployment of an argumentative form of discourse analysis prevails.

A third type of discourse analysis which is of much relevance for environmental assessment is premised on the reflection of discourses (e.g. Kørnøv and Thissen, 2000; Runhaar et al., 2010). Discourse reflection has become an interesting topic of research for understanding the dynamics of finding solutions to resolve conflict in the governance of controversial issues. Correspondingly, analysis of discourse reflection is of interest for understanding how discourses mobilize struggle between the actors involved in such decision-making processes (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Runhaar, 2009). This type of discourse analysis focuses on decision-making as a process of policy learning, for instance by providing actors with the means to articulate, self-assess or rediscover the constitutive basis of the discourses they adhere to, as well as to extend such practices of reflection to other extant discourses (Runhaar et al., 2010).

These reflective practices can be of decisive importance in resolving policy controversies where the meanings given to the issues at stake seem incompatible, not to say antagonistic. Practices related to discourse reflection often stress the role of frames, a concept which designates the constitutive ideas underlying discourses. Reflective practices facilitate critical engagement between actors involved in a policy controversy, many of which can be identified in sustainability policy areas (Rydin, 1999; Bond and Morrison-Saunders, 2009), thereby integrating the potential for discourse modification (Runhaar et al., 2010). If the role and function ascribed to these reflective practices is read in par with the description of the discourse analyst’s role (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002), especially with reference to plotting the course of social struggles, then it will become clear that discourse reflection is important for analyzing sustainability discourses.
2.3.3 Discourse coalitions and storylines

The assertion that decision-making and policy-making designates ‘struggle’ (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Runhaar, 2009) beckons further inquiry. This assertion is of particular interest when it is accepted at the same time that that discourses provide meaning to reality, something which enables the integration of discourse into policy-making. Indeed, the view has been proffered that “policy-making is a constant discursive struggle over the criteria of social classification, the boundaries of problem categories, the intersubjective interpretation of common experiences, the conceptual framing of problems, and the definition of ideas that guide the ways people create the shared meanings which motivate them to act” (Fischer and Forester, 1993b: 1-2).

From the view expressed above several messages can be integrated into the broader practice of discourse analysis. However, in focusing on one such message, a key aspect of discourses is its unifying character at the societal level, thus aggregating experiences, interpretations, problem framings and the definitions of ideas as held by individual actors. Critical inquiry can therefore be made into the ‘common’ or ‘shared’ character of discourses. What is more, Fischer and Forester and a number of other authors (1993a) have observed that, before discourses are formed, struggle between actors also exists in the formative stages of formulating norms and principles of conduct, values and ideas of how to position themselves within the remit of a certain policy issue. This means that struggle may not only exist between two or more potentially antagonistic groups of individual actors deeply entangled in a policy controversy, but that it may also come to the fore in in-group dynamics leading up to this discursive rivalry.

In considering ‘struggle’ to be a key aspect in discourse formation, the concepts of discourse coalitions and storylines can be used to provide new insights for the analysis of how discourses come about. These concepts have been central to Hajer’s (1995) research on the role of discourses in environmental decision-making in the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands. In discussing discourse coalitions and storylines, Hajer (1995) has ascribed a prominent role for power in leveraging the formation of discourses, set within a web of political, economic and legal constraints. The promulgation of discourses by means of discourse coalitions and the use of storylines are furthermore premised on ‘prevailing structures and interests’ (Rydin, 1999). Therefore, discourse coalitions and storylines can be important tools for protecting established interests but also for strengthening coordination of resistance against certain policies when this is in the interest of emergent challengers.

Discourse coalitions change the way actors engage with certain issues, mainly by virtue of a change in political claims-making (Koopmans and Statham, 1999). In sustainability decision-making (e.g. Van Herten and Runhaar, 2012), it has been shown
that civil society actors work together to make claims exerting to political and scientific authority for the purpose of strengthening their discourse. The use of such claims to support the discourse is often strategic and, as a consequence, claims opposing the discourse are apt to be ignored. This shows that, correspondent with the notion of ‘struggle’ into the formative stages of discourse (Fischer and Forester, 1993a), the ‘actor width’ of a discourse coalition can impact substantively on how a discourse is produced, reproduced and represented in the public sphere. A discourse coalition is intimately connected with the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) (Sabatier, 1988), which is a concept that informs the policy core beliefs of actors clustering around certain policy issues. Analogous to this, the values that are considered fundamental instruct the core beliefs of discourse coalitions, which with regards to sustainability often deal with pertinent questions on socio-economic or ecological policy imperatives.

For discourse coalitions to express their views effectively and to do this with one voice, storylines can be used to explain how certain words or phrases can be used to empower discourses (or to weaken other discourses), to strengthen the discourse coalition as well as to provide a benign discursive environment for the individual coalition actors (Hajer, 1995; Smith and Kern, 2009). Storylines can be understood as simplified, shorthand versions of discourses. By means of popularizing the use of certain words or phrases, such as slogans, much more complex views on how to organize discursive support around certain issues can be made comprehensible to a wide array of actors, and also function as a sort of ‘discursive denominator’. That is, storylines are able to assemble a variety of views on the policy issue, thus literally setting the tone of debate. Smith and Kern (2009: 79) have therefore contended that storylines “represent intentional mobilisations of discourse”.

However, the prominence of discourse coalitions and storylines in discourse formation should be approached with caution. For instance, a case study on sustainability transition management in the Netherlands has shown that powerful policy actors are able to mediate discourses by means of joining discourse coalitions and appropriating storylines (Smith and Kern, 2009). Situated and relatively weak-positioned actors or coalitions that seek support for their discourse run the risk of compromising the strength of their message through using a storyline when they are unable to resist the influence exerted on them. Within this process storylines may become the subject of appropriation by powerful actors, or they may be exchanged between actors holding various – and potentially antagonistic – discursive orientations in a policy issue. Discourse coalitions and storylines are in such situations rendered epiphenomena, deflecting an underlying power disparity in policy-making.
2.4 Bringing it all together: a research position

Thus far this chapter has comprised theory on institutions (Section 2.1), political culture (Section 2.2) and sustainability discourses (Section 2.3), each putting centre-stage a core concept of the conceptual scheme on sustainability discourse mobilization (see Figure 2.1). This section investigates how these core concepts relate to public engagement, which in the conceptual scheme functions as some sort of a conduit between institutions and political culture on the one hand and sustainability discourses on the other. More specifically, the conceptual scheme ascribes a great deal of importance to how different modes of public engagement resulting from institutions and political culture influence sustainability discourses. Therefore, by ‘bringing it all together’, this section details a systems analysis of sustainability discourse mobilization. The relationships between public engagement and the other concepts at play in sustainability discourse mobilization are subsequently linked to EIA or environmental assessment more broadly. It is argued that EIA represents an important arena in sustainability decision-making where discourses are mobilized.

Figure 2.2 illustrates a systems analysis of sustainability discourse mobilization. It is borrowed from Rozema et al. (2012: 88), who have conducted a discursive investigation of the purpose of environmental assessment. Within the context of this thesis, sustainability discourses are seen as the envisaged result from the implementation of environmental assessment practices. As can be seen in the figure, the practices themselves are dependent on broader decision-making layers, most notably those layers comprising environmental governance and democracy. Although the divergence between representative and deliberative models of democracy can be reconciled by bringing in the concept of ‘liberal democracy’ (Diamond, 1999), stark differences between the institutional designs of countries continue to exert their influence on environmental governance. If it is accepted that governance prescribes more reciprocity between state and civil society actors, then a focus on the primacy of elected representatives in conducting politics is worth investigating (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007). This also influences how science can be used to substantiate certain claims made in environmental assessment, thereby accommodating the articulation of sustainability discourses.
Besides portraying the mobilization of sustainability discourses as a systemic outcome, Figure 2.2 represents the research position of the thesis. That is to say, EIA is envisaged as an arena of decision-support where the interplay of core concepts is clearly manifested. Whilst this domain of research is nascent, particularly in relation to research on the procedural aspects of EIA (Cashmore, 2004), its relevance has reverberated amongst a dedicated group of scholars on environmental assessment. For instance, the need to investigate the political role of discourses in environmental assessment has been identified by Runhaar et al. (2013), who have argued that the apparent consensus on the role of environmental assessment in environmental protection in the Netherlands has likely been informed by a tradition of consensual politics. By suggesting that "in countries characterised by less consensual political cultures we may expect more extreme discourses on [environmental assessment]" (Runhaar et al., 2013: 13), the authors proffer the idea that there is valuable research to be done on the systemic relationship between consensual political culture and the formation of sustainability discourses in EIA. Needless to add, research on this relationship is at the core of the thesis, as well as the relationships that exist between discourses and other system components.

Figure 2.2: Systems analysis of sustainability discourse mobilization (Rozema et al., 2012: 88)
One new ‘player’ in the research position is science. Whilst science has not been dealt with in the preceding sections of this chapter, it plays a pivotal role in mediating public engagement. When this is tailored to the scientific background of EIA, public engagement can take the form of counter-expertise. Counter-expertise refers to a conduct of science which follows the same rules of scientific inquiry but questions the validity of the evidence that is presented, ultimately resulting “in a debate in which the various parties provide support for their own claims of truth” (Hommes et al., 2009: 148). In its capacity as a support tool for environmental decision-making, EIA dwells on a strong physical science basis when providing evidence to make decisions on project approval better environmentally informed. The evidence base of the project may be subject to discussion and is by no means blindly accepted by all stakeholders, however. When counter-expertise is conducted, it means that an engaged citizenry may question certain assumptions that are made in the impact assessment of projects. These assumptions can pertain to the feasibility of construction or, as will be shown in Chapter 8, they can pertain to the necessity to facilitate travel demand and to spur economic growth.

In the remainder of the section, the conceptual relationships hinted at in Figure 2.2 will be unpacked. Central to this endeavour is the focus on public engagement – called ‘public participation’ in the figure. Public engagement in sustainability discourse mobilization becomes particularly relevant when it is used to investigate the ‘opening up’ or ‘closing down’ of social appraisal. Drawing on Stirling (2008: 265), social appraisal “concerns the ways in which knowledges, understandings, and evaluations are constructed”. This statement reciprocates the view adopted in the thesis that public engagement informs the mobilization of discourses through social appraisal – often called ‘stakeholder appraisals’ in the empirical chapters. However, it is important to state that social appraisals may be mediated by rationales for engaging the public. In particular, the rationale for engaging the public with regard to creating commitment to science and evidence warrants further investigation (Stirling, 2006).

2.4.1 Public participation and environmental decision-making

Before looking at modes of public engagement in quality decision-making and their institutional and politico-cultural drivers, a formal account of public participation in EIA is provided. Although de facto provisions for public participation in EIA existed prior to its legal codification (Glasson et al., 2012), the Aarhus Convention marks a watershed in managing public participation with environmental decision-making. Adopted in 1998 by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and entered into force in 2001, the Aarhus Convention provides ‘access’ for members of the public to certain areas of decision-making which perhaps would have been inaccessible without the legal
provisions set forth. The convention entitles the public to access: 1) ‘environmental information’; 2) opportunities for public participation; and 3) justice.

Besides providing access, the Aarhus Convention has been instrumental in defining the public in environmental decision-making. The Aarhus Convention has defined the public as “one or more natural or legal persons, and, in accordance with national legislation or practice, their associations, organizations or groups” (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1998: Article 2.4). This definition reciprocates the definition of civil society consisting of individuals and groups, presented earlier in the chapter. The public therefore consists of both individuals and groups, although the recognition that they are entitled to public participation is left to the national legislation of the signatory to the convention (Palerm, 1999). The active role of the competent authority in guiding public participation has furthermore prevailed in the definition on the ‘public concerned. The Aarhus convention has defined this as:

“the public affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental decision-making; for the purposes of this definition, non-governmental organizations promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements under national law shall be deemed to have an interest” (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1998: Article 2.5).

In recent years some work in the public engagement literature has addressed the concept of ‘upstream participation’ (e.g. Wilsdon and Willis, 2004; Burgess and Chilvers, 2006). This has particularly been the case in the literature dealing with the trialling of innovative science and technologies, but it can also be applied to EIA. The question remains whether the Aarhus Convention is an adequate instrument for upstreaming public engagement, however. As regards early participation, Hartley and Wood (2005) have observed that the Aarhus Convention remains vague in terms of setting the terms of reference for the timely involvement of civil society in decision-making. In investigating the implementation of the Aarhus Convention in EIA, Hartley and Wood (2005) have identified a number of constraints for implementing public participation in a timely fashion. These constraints ranged from a poor timing of the participation process to a late disclosure and dissemination of environmental information to civil society actors, which prevented them from participating (more) effectively.

2.4.2 Modes of public engagement

The Aarhus Convention provides useful insight into the legal provisions of public engagement in EIA. Nevertheless, to understand how public engagement functions within
the conceptual scheme of sustainability discourses it is pertinent to also take modes of public engagement into consideration. By ‘mode’ it is meant the ways in which engagement is organized, the institutional spaces that accommodate engagement activities as well as the criteria used to select civil society actors for an ‘invited’ form of public engagement (Fung and Wright, 2003). Modes of public engagement can also be associated with the conduct of counter-expertise, alternative problem framings and attitudes on democratic satisfaction and political trust that instruct the degree of collaboration or conflict between decision-makers and civil society. Somewhat analogous to the definitional scopes of ‘modes of social appraisal’ (Stirling, 2006) and ‘modes of political action’ (Dalton et al., 2003), modes of public engagement designate a repository of various institutional and cultural pressures exerted on EIA.

The conduct of EIA beckons further inquiry into the role of counter-expertise as an expression of public engagement, as counter-expertise foregrounds analysis on the use of science and technology in various disciplines of environmental assessment (e.g. baseline study, impact prediction, identification of mitigation measures). In infrastructure projects, for example, technology is required to measure the environmental impacts of the reference situation, to predict the impacts of road or rail transport, and to trial measures that may be able to mitigate these impacts. Consequently, the science used in EIA may reverberate in the social appraisals of civil society actors. Whilst it is often assumed that facts and values are incommensurate to one another, it has also been argued that both are dependent on one’s worldview (e.g. Hommes et al., 2009). This gives rise to debate on the validity of certain scientific claims underlying the main conclusions of the environmental statement, thereby inspiring the mobilization of discourses.

In dealing explicitly with concepts akin to public engagement, institutional design and culture, Jasanoff (2005) has presented a comparative research on the use of biotechnologies in the US, the UK, Germany and the EU. Her focus has revolved around the intricacies of democracy, political culture and scientific authority in concocting ways to govern this technology. It has been shown in this comparative research that decision accountability in technology governance is related to public perceptions of legitimate democratic rule and national styles of regulation. The ‘opening up’ of the debate on biotechnology use in the public sphere has incited social appraisals of its applicability and desirability that stirred debate, and where discourses on valid political and scientific authority developed in tandem. Jasanoff has argued, therefore, that “the practices of science and of liberal democracy flourished together” (2005: 22).

Whereas institutional spaces represent the media through which modes of public engagement can be fostered, incentives for decision-makers to coalesce with civil society actors represent the rationales for public engagement. Put differently, why would decision-makers want to make any effort to engage the public? Although the ‘right answer’ would
be to state that seeking public input is part of the good governance agenda, however questionable that may seem for improving the quality of decision outcomes (Bond et al., 2011). Stirling (2006; 2008) has shown that decision-makers can have private rationales for doing so. A normative rationale considers public engagement an end in itself, a moral requirement in democratic decision-making. A substantive rationale perceives public engagement as a means to an end: decisions will become better when public engagement takes place. An instrumental rationale advocates the use of public engagement to justify decisions. Justification in the instrumental rationale underpins the public mandate for making decisions, as expressed in the concept of social appraisal.

When applied to expertise and counter-expertise, social appraisal can serve as the lens through which the public commitment to using science and technology can be assessed. Largely alluding to the substantive and instrumental rationales, public engagement can be a resource to convert public acceptance into discourse. By stating that “[b]oth participatory deliberation and technical analysis can be used alternatively to ‘open up’ or ‘close down’ wider policy discourses” (pp. 102), Stirling (2006) has acknowledged that deliberation does not only impose constraints upon the ‘width’ of the debate surrounding potentially controversial issues in the science and technology domain but also influences the formation of policy discourses. In environmental assessment, such policy discourses may revolve around the legitimate use of science and technology when adverse ecological consequences are prospected.

2.4.3 Public engagement and discourse mobilization

Implicit in the research position is that public engagement has the potential to form and transform sustainability discourses. It is assumed that the engagement of stakeholders in projects bearing a high degree of both public contestation and participation inserts new values into decision-making. Such values may affect the structures upon which stabilizing claims exerting to political and scientific authority are constructed (e.g. Fischer, 2003), thereby possibly influencing the quality of decision outcomes. As regards discourse and effectiveness, awareness of the predominating importance of values in environmental decision-making has been paired with the need for a deliberative conduct of environmental assessment (Saarikoski, 2000; Wilkins, 2003; Wiklund, 2005). It has been suggested that discourse facilitates the integration of environmental information into decision-making, provided the institutional requirements for public engagement are met.

As a concluding statement of this theoretical framework, the research position of this thesis ascribes value to investigating the interplay of public engagement with discourse mobilization. Such an investigation can be done by theorizing how it may impact on the quality of decision-support. EIA is a decision-support tool and invokes the use of
science and technology for providing evidence, subsequently to be socially appraised through the use of counter-expertise. Such a mode of public engagement is potentially antagonistic as it creates an ‘us/them’ dichotomy between the ‘insider’ experts and the ‘outsider’ counter-experts. In Figure 2.2, one so-called discourse area relates to the degree to which science is malleable to accept not only social appraisals on the conduct of science, but also to accept that there can be more than one scientific conclusion. A pertinent challenge that remains is whether some rules or principles for facilitating public engagement in EIA or other arenas of decision-support can be agreed upon.

In developing a framework for reconciling public engagement with EIA in the context of deliberative sustainability governance, Wiklund (2005) has proposed that assessment procedures adhere to four principles: 1) all those potentially or likely affected by proposed developments are included deliberating environmental impacts (‘generality’); 2) everyone involved in the deliberative process have equal opportunities to exercise voice (‘autonomy’); 3) power disparities should be neutralized and the “forceless force of the better argument” (pp. 286) should prevail (‘power neutrality’); and 4) those involved in deliberating the environmental impacts should adhere to the virtues of reciprocity and impartiality (‘ideal role-taking’). The latter principle refers to the objective of achieving an outcome that serves the common good. According to Wiklund (2005) the ill-defined spaces for public engagement in EIA could be a ‘blessing in disguise’ as this increases the flexibility of the procedural opportunities for civil society actors to exercise voice.

There is considerable debate as to whether, how and in what manner discourse can be used in EIA to make decisions better environmentally informed through public engagement. The potential for deliberative decision-making in EIA is believed to be strengthened by the inherent subjectivity of environmental assessment (Wilkins, 2003; Runhaar, 2009). That is to say, the diversity in priority-setting and value orientation that EIA is rife with helps identify and achieve particular sustainability objectives. Discourse plays an important role through its ability to build an all-encompassing argumentative framework, thereby promoting “the development of values that foster greater personal and social responsibility and has the capacity to increase the importance of long-term environmental considerations in decision making” (Wilkins, 2003: 402). Taking centre-stage in the virtue ascribed to discourse is the idea that these heuristic tools can pre-empt conflict and foster the greater good (however defined) by taking stock of different framings of EIA.

Debate on the substantive improvement of the quality of EIA within the context of public engagement – measured in terms of effectiveness, however defined (Bond et al., 2013a) – shows that the ability of civil society to advocate their concerns and interests is a core tenet. However, research on public engagement has to take political power seriously. For public engagement to deliver its potential for improving the quality of decision-support,
the issue of power asymmetry between decision-makers and civil society actors has to be better understood. It is important to acknowledge that power does not necessarily prescribe coercion, but instead prioritizes the integration of certain values and norms into decision-making often at the expense of other values and norms (Richardson, 2005). Power may as such be a productive force in the conduct of EIA and deploys public engagement to reinforce the structures upon which discourses are built.

To elaborate on the relational field between power and deliberation, from the perspective of discourse mobilization it is interesting to see how these two concepts taken together inform a discussion on institutions and political culture. Pellizzoni (2001) has argued that deliberation exists by virtue of power relations in the communicative realm (‘internal power’), arguing that the “deliberative approach admits that political preferences conflict, and that modern society is pluralist and cannot be viewed as a community with shared goals and principles” (pp. 66). The internal power dimension, akin to the observation made earlier that the pursuit of outcomes in decision-making is rife with values and multiple rationalities (Richardson, 2005), is by no means contradicting the deliberative goal of a consensus shared by all: rather, it attests to the argumentative leveraging in a plural and heterogeneous landscape of actors, objectives, expectations and incentives. Once the conditions of uninhibited dialogue between the participants of a discussion are realized, the cognitive virtue of deliberation will prevail, ultimately culminating in ‘negotiated knowledge’ (Owens et al., 2004). A productive power relation between actors is therefore a key requirement for successful decision deliberation.

From theory on the productive role of power in deliberation it can be deduced that institutional and cultural factors mediating public engagement in decision-making are of decisive importance. It can also be deduced that discourses are shaped by these factors, via modes of public engagement, considering that styles of reasoning are informed by the parameters of debate. By envisaging public engagement as sitting on a continuum between consensus and compromise (Van den Hove, 2006), institutions and political culture exert influence on whether situated deliberative practice is able to avoid or attenuate insurmountable differences that could arise between antagonistic sustainability discourses (e.g. ‘critical ecological conservation’ versus ‘unfettered economic growth’). This statement induces interest in linking theory on majority-oriented and consensus-oriented forms of politics to the political emancipation of civil society (Skelcher et al., 2011). Furthermore, theory on public attitudes towards decision-makers provides insight into the viability of governance arrangements, particularly where low levels of satisfaction and trust undermine the civil legitimacy of decisions.

Although ostensibly detached from its immediate project surroundings, ‘discursive’ EIA is imbued with the broader institutional structures of the democratic state. The nature and origin of institutional structures can be widely discussed within the remit of
sustainability governance, taking Lijphart’s (2012) distinction between majoritarian and consensual systems of representative democracy as a starting point in discourse mobilization. From this perspective it should come as no real surprise that sustainability discourses are the result of cooperation between political authority and civil society – most pertinently enshrined in the discourse of ecological modernization – has made headway in polities where cultures of consensus and trust prevail (Dryzek et al., 2002). Envisaging public engagement as a derivative of the institutional and political cultural anchorage of cooperation or conflict, sustainability discourse mobilization flirts with the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1989). This logic suggests that sustainability discourses are enmeshed in their institutional and cultural environments.

When theory on sustainability discourse mobilization is exported to empirical cases, the research position becomes invariably more complex. What prevails are questions on power relations between actors, how public engagement is accommodated and how actors appraise in different ways the objects, concepts and events that occur in the planning process. In the next chapter, more weight is given to how the research position this thesis has adopted can be used to formulate answers to these questions. As a theoretical exploration of the topic at hand can never be ‘finished’, critical realism and abduction are introduced to shed light on thorny ontological, epistemological and methodological challenges that need to be met. By doing so, it will become clear that the theoretical framework can be enriched by further insights from real-world practice.
Chapter 3 Research design

This chapter details the research design of the thesis. The research design is essential to a structured research effort as it is able to make a logical connection between theory and empirical investigation. That is, it aims to justify the theoretical propositions of the research in light of the conduct of empirical inquiry. From a theoretical perspective it aims to demonstrate how the use and selection of concepts may reverberate in, amongst others, the practical approach and strategy of the research as well as in the use and selection of methods for data collection and data analysis. Similarly, empirical inquiry may be envisaged as a tool to strengthen the theoretical foundation of the research.

A key requirement for good research is that it is coherent (Robson, 2002). Many research disciplines in the social sciences embrace particular traditions of thought in the realms of reality, knowledge and truth. They seep into the selection criteria and subsequent orchestration of research methods, which on its part is structured by what drives the main purpose of research, thereby alluding to what Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003: 679) have coined as the "dictatorship of the research question". In approaching the research question and its implications for conducting research coherently and purposefully, this chapter therefore plays a pivotal role.

A research design aims to answer questions related to ontology, epistemology and methodology (Corbetta, 2003). Arguably, the ontological and epistemological question mark the philosophical foundation of research in the social sciences, or what may be called its meta-theories (Danermark et al., 2002). The ontological question is concerned with the existence of social reality (Corbetta, 2003). For example, it may ask whether reality is an ‘autonomous state of being’ independent from how it is interpreted, or whether it is profoundly shaped by the way it is represented in the human mind. The epistemological question pertains to the ‘knowability’ of social reality (Corbetta, 2003). It deals with the kinds of knowledge on reality – e.g. objective, probabilistic or subjective knowledge, amongst others – that research may be able to elicit. Secondly, it perceives social research as a tension between knowledge, human observation and interpretation. The methodological question draws upon the ontological and epistemological position the research takes (Corbetta, 2003). Methods for data collection and analysis are selected according to the philosophical foundation of the research, which typifies inquiry into the existence of social reality and the kinds of knowledge through which it may be investigated.

The links between epistemology, ontology and methodology in the research design have been illustrated in Figure 3.1. As a starting point, the theoretical framework (see Chapter 2) provides the conceptual parameters upon which the empirical investigation is based. Consequently, the ontological and epistemological position the research takes is...
premised on these conceptual parameters, thereby constructing the philosophical foundation of the research design (Danermark et al., 2002). Methodological choices result from this foundation, covering the areas of data collection and data analysis. Ultimately, the methods that are used in the research aim to shed light on the process of sustainability discourse mobilization.

This chapter contains five sections. The first section introduces the critical realist approach to ontology and epistemology. Critical realism constitutes the philosophical foundation of the research and permeates all stages of the research design, thereby
answering pertinent questions on ontology, epistemology and methodology. Section 2 deals with the intricate relationship between critical realism, the role of theory in social science research and how this resonates in further theoretical development. In framing this relationship, Section 3 introduces the research strategy of abduction. Abduction is deployed as the preferred scheme of inference and fits comfortably within the critical realist approach adopted in this thesis. The fourth section exposes the tenets of case study research on the basis of its prospected benefits. These tenets become clearer when the criteria for selecting cases and decisions on the appropriate number of cases are elaborated. Section 5 enlists the methods for data collection (semi-structured interviews, primary documentation, newspaper articles, value surveys and studies, observations) and the methods for analysis (textual data coding, gap analysis, content analysis, news coverage and statistical analysis) that are used in the research, as well as how they can answer the research questions.

3.1 A critical realist approach to ontology and epistemology

The thesis deploys a critical realist approach to ontology and epistemology. Critical realism combines elements of positivism and constructivism and is situated somewhat between these approaches (for more information, see ‘Fig. 2.’ in Järvensivu and Törnroos, 2010). Its starting point relates to the notion of an independent social reality composed of concepts, entities and events. However, research in the social sciences is inherently limited in being able to readily observe and measure reality (Easton, 2010a). Critical realists believe that social science research is unable to make inferences explicit, although it does agree on the desirability of causal claims-making. As such it distances itself from ‘naive’ realism (i.e. positivism) and relativism (i.e. constructivism), respectively (Järvensivu and Törnroos, 2010). Danermark (2002) has labelled critical realism the ‘both-and’ perspective, contrasting the ‘either-or’ perspective typically espoused by positivism and constructivism. It is willing to converge to some of the virtues of both approaches and move beyond the often assumed incommensurability of research paradigms (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Whilst seemingly adopting a middle-of-the-road position, however, critical realism holds distinct views on, amongst others, knowledge, theory development, truth, explanation, empirical inquiry and research justification.

Critical realism argues that researchers should “construe rather than construct” social reality and the world around us (Easton, 2010a: 122). Critical realism adopts the premise that pre-existing structures steer the functioning of society. Because of these structures, a critical realist ontology argues that philosophical concepts such as truth and universal validity are ‘out there’ (Easton, 2010a). It therefore deviates from constructivism precisely because of this proposition. However, critical realism accepts that researchers
can only so much as gauge the drivers of social processes and phenomena. Reality cannot be readily observed due to the complexity of human relations (Danermark et al., 2002). A lack of scientific certainty in this respect has prompted Hunt (1990) to deploy the more cumbersome, or perhaps more realistic, notion of ‘fallibilistic realism’. Furthermore, the concepts and entities that govern the occurrence of events in the social realm have a strong subjectivist character (Easton, 2010a). This means that the representation of reality in social science research is intrinsically norm-driven. In condensing the ontological and epistemological premises of critical realism, Sayer (1992) has formulated eight assumptions of critical realism (see Table 3.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumption</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ”The world exists independently from our knowledge of it” (Sayer, 1992: 5).</td>
<td>Critical realism argues that social reality is shaped independently from the conduct of research;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ”Our knowledge of the world is fallible and theory-laden” (Sayer, 1992: 5).</td>
<td>Critical realism assumes incoherence between knowledge and its disposition in research;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Knowledge production is irregular and cannot be captured in a singular conceptual framework;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ”There is necessity in the world” (Sayer, 1992: 5).</td>
<td>Objects have powers, susceptibilities and inclinations that culminate in the course of events;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Social reality is built on structures that exert influence on events and objects. These structures are present also when their influence is exerted irregularly;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. ”Social phenomena such as actions, texts and institutions are concept dependent” (Sayer, 1992: 5).</td>
<td>Critical realists should interpret the conceptual meaning of these phenomena;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. ”Science or the production of any kind of knowledge is a social practice” (Sayer, 1992: 5).</td>
<td>The content of knowledge production is influenced by the structures of society;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. In the social sciences, researchers must critically approach their object of study, in order to be able to understand and explain them.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Eight assumptions of critical realism (adapted from Sayer, 1992)

The eight assumptions clearly hint towards the applicability of critical realism in understanding social reality, and hence social science research. However, it may be noted that the critical realist approach has a slightly different orientation than other approaches. Critical realism places strong emphasis on ontological questions that relate to the existence of social reality. It thereby shifts away from more epistemology-oriented approaches that inquire into the possibility of knowing social reality (‘logic of justification’) (Danermark et al., 2002). For instance, a fundamental critical realist question relates to identifying which characteristics of societies and people are objects for social science research and knowledge production (‘logic of discovery’) (Bhaskar, 1978). Such an objective articulates the distinction between the justification of research practice and the discovery of facts, respectively. Another defining attribute of critical realism is its focus on mechanisms (Danermark et al., 2002). A mechanism enables interaction between concepts, entities and materiality and therefore has the ability to cause, generate or precipitate certain events (Easton, 2010a). From these two premises it could be suggested that critical realism is strongly focused on the conceptual dimensions of social reality.
Arguably, critical realism is an underdeveloped research approach in sustainability governance. Although its origins can be traced back some four decades (Harré, 1970; Bhaskar, 1978), this has not spurred the publication of critical realist-oriented research in sustainability governance since then. Perhaps surprisingly, critical realism has surfaced quite prominently in business-oriented marketing research and consumer behaviour studies (e.g. Hunt, 1990; Easton, 2002; 2010a). It is furthermore salient in information and organization studies (e.g. Mingers, 2004; Longshore Smith, 2006), in social science teaching methods (Sayer, 1992; 2000; Danermark et al., 2002) as well as in a range of other disciplines (for an overview, see Easton, 2010a). It is an interesting topic to inquire into the observed reticence of deploying critical realism in sustainability governance, and not in the last place of deploying it to investigate the ascendency and withering of sustainability discourses over time. Most research approaches in this governance domain adhere to either positivism or constructivism. Nevertheless, the thesis aims to demonstrate that a critical realist approach can be deployed in research associated with sustainability governance.

One of the few examples of using critical realism in sustainability governance can be found in a study on the discursive biases of the Drivers-Pressures-State-Impacts-Responses (DPSIR) framework (Svarstad et al., 2008). This framework consists of causal mechanisms linking its various components. Socio-economic and environmental drivers (D) exert pressure (P) on the state (S) of the environment and of environmental change. Impacts (I) that ensue from here may subsequently trigger responses (R) to the problem at hand, thereby enforcing a new set of driving forces. In appraising the discursive biases of the DPSIR framework, Svarstad et al. (2008) have espoused epistemological relativism while rejecting ontological relativism. This could mean, for example, that conservation or biodiversity issues can be measured quantitatively but that stakeholders nonetheless widely diverge in framing the physical evidence provided. Although the research design dwells on a moderate constructivist approach, it can also be aligned with the premises set forth in critical realism. Indeed, Järvensivu and Törnroos (2010) have discerned only a subtle difference in emphasis between critical realism and a more moderate form of constructivism.

The similar philosophical backgrounds of critical realism and moderate constructivism warrant an analysis of sustainability discourses. Whilst discourse is often depicted as a constructivist concept par excellence (Hajer, 1995), the thesis perceives it to be in harmony with the critical realist approach. In investigating constructivism, realism and discourse analysis, Burr (1998) has fleshed out several positions in the debate concerned with their interrelationship. Arguably, it can be proposed that discourse has the
ability to instil or popularize certain ‘versions of reality’ without necessarily changing underlying structures of society. In order to resolve potential unease between critical realism and discourses, Sims-Schouten et al. (2007) have advocated a form of discourse analysis specifically tailored to the critical realist approach. They base their analysis on: (1) the choice of certain constructions of reality over others; (2) subjective manifestations of reality that are not confined to linguistic riddles; and most importantly (3) reciprocity between discourses and the material world. Discourses lose their ability to explain social processes and phenomena without material existence (Sims-Schouten et al., 2007). This can be effectively halted by linking discourse analysis to critical realism.

3.2 Use of theory in critical realism

As is shown in the previous chapter, theory is featured prominently in the thesis. Because of the critical realist approach to conducting research, the thesis concurs with Danermark et al. (2002) that theory and practice in social science research are inseparable. Representations of reality in research are continuously shaped and reshaped by theoretical insights. The major contribution of linking theory to the practices in specific case settings, as is done in the thesis, is to be able to make analytical generalizations (Yin, 2009). Such generalizations can be further specified to contingent or typological generalizations (George and Bennett, 2005), which differ in the number of cases under investigation. This contrasts with research aimed to provide statistical or quantitative generalizations. Analytical generalizations provide the necessary context to make claims about the generative mechanisms that underlie the structure of social reality. Pivotal in making analytical generalizations is the use of theory. Theory is able to elicit knowledge of the structural forces of reality, something which could otherwise remain concealed. In a critical realist context, Danermark et al. (2002: 10) have argued that “it is possible to gain knowledge of actually existing structures and generative mechanisms, albeit not in terms of a mirror image (...) but certainly in terms of theories, which are more or less truthlike”.

The thesis places heavy emphasis on the knowledge claims that can be proffered by using theory. However, it is important to stress that theory, as a major contributor to critical realism, generates hypotheses rather than explanations. Causal laws trigger social events through generative mechanisms, subsequently to be experienced by people. Yet they operate at different levels; they are stratified (Bhaskar, 1978; Mingers, 2004). Theory aiming to explain the regularity between these levels will hence prove unsatisfactorily. As such theory used in social science research for making causal claims is inherently flawed. Or to put differently, use of theory in critical realism is more a pragmatic effort to represent the concepts, entities and events which may be considered the structural factors exerting influence on the construction of social reality (Easton, 2010a).
In critical realism, structures and patterns of social reality may best be researched through a ‘triadic theory of science’ (Harré, 1986), referring to a tripartite theoretical framework. The framework is somewhat consistent with Mingers’ (2004) argument that empirical research in a critical realist approach involves a ‘double reduction’ from (assumed) causal laws to social events and finally to experiences of people. In applying the triadic theory of science to the conduct of research (Harré, 1986), three types of theory play a role:

1. Type 1 theories classify and explain things that are real. They relate to manifestations of reality that can be measured;
2. Type 2 theories are representations of reality, for instance through making models. It primarily deals with social events. The vast majority of scientific theories may be submerged into this category;
3. Type 3 theories are associated with cognitive concepts, entities, objects and structures, all considered “beings beyond all possible experience” (Harré, 1986: 273).

From this framework it can be deduced that social reality is layered. Concepts that operate at the structural level (in type 3 theories) have a strong metaphysical dimension, yet they exert real-world influence at the levels of representation (in type 2 theories) and observation of social reality (in type 1 theories). This proposed ‘division of labour’ in the use and applicability of theory is particularly valuable for investigating social reality by means of triangulating empirical observation (Järvensivu and Törnroos, 2010). Type 1 theories are useful data-generating instruments but are unable to probe beyond what is measurable. Type 2 theories are useful in making sense of ‘messy’ concepts but are nonetheless representations or facsimiles, i.e. not exact replicas, of social reality. Type 3 theories demonstrate that underlying concepts and structures are at work in constructing reality but are too elusive, or fallible (Hunt, 1990), to work with. Mechanisms enable interaction to take place between the three types of theory (Danermark et al., 2002).

The triadic theory of science as set forth by Harré (1986) is implicit in the theoretical framework of the thesis. In following the logic of this theoretical model, its application consists of three consecutive steps. Firstly, the institutional differences between the UK and the Netherlands as well as results from value surveys and studies (see also Sub-section 3.5.1) are observed. Secondly, the theoretical framework proceeds by reconstructing the sustainability discourses of the actors involved in the research, the institutional design choices made in the projects and cultural attitudes of the actors towards the conduct of politics. Such an investigation is a representation of reality as these structural factors are difficult to conceptualize (type 2 theory). Thirdly, linking discourse construction and articulation to institutional design and political culture is an
inherently cognitive endeavour. The structures that mediate influence of institutions and political culture on the mobilization of sustainability discourses are therefore “beings beyond all possible experience” (Harré, 1986: 273) (type 3 theory). The three types of theory are illustrated in Figure 3.2.

![Figure 3.2: Three types of theory (based on Harré, 1986)](image)

3.3 Resolving dualisms in the use of theory through abduction

The role of theory in research can vary greatly in relation to the use of research data. Two dualisms have by and large marked conventional wisdom in this domain. The first dualism relates to whether research is theory-building or theory-testing (De Vaus, 2011). This has led to an ongoing debate on the positioning of theory in the overall research design. For instance, a great deal of attention may be given to the virtue of theory in furnishing the researcher with testable hypotheses, or to what may be called the logic of justification (King et al., 1994). Theory is in this context considered a support tool for empirical inquiry. Within this goals-oriented strategy theory merely serves as a baseline with which hypotheses may be either confirmed or falsified. Such a viewpoint expresses a strong preference for conducting research for the purpose of theory-testing. However, it has also invited criticisms revolving around the ability of theory to stir that ‘other’ logic, the logic of
discovery (George and Bennett, 2005). It is proposed that theory has the inherent capacity to find new research trajectories which otherwise would have remained unexplored. Similarly, theory-building widens the scope of the research endeavour by challenging existing models of causation with alternative hypotheses.

A second dualism concerns the chronological order in which theory and research data are set. It is based on the difference between induction and deduction (George and Bennett, 2005). That is, theory can be induced from the data or theory can be used to deduce certain meanings from data. Induction argues that observable facts are the main focus of attention in research. Patterns or trends that may be distilled from them can consequently lead to the formulation of theoretical propositions (George and Bennett, 2005). Inductive research is often deployed in theory-building research, for instance by means of ‘grounding’ theory in the research data. Conversely, deduction uses theory as its starting point and applies it to the conduct of empirical inquiry. Whilst deduction may be associated with theory-building (George and Bennett, 2005), it lends itself more towards hypothesis-testing. King et al. (1994) have argued that to formulate testable hypotheses is ‘more art than science’. This statement hints towards a great amount of flexibility in the formulation of new theoretical propositions.

The thesis aims to transcend the assumed dualisms of theory-building versus theory-testing, on the one hand, and of induction versus deduction, on the other. It does so by selecting and combining the virtuous elements of both research strategies. Taking the induction/deduction dualism as its focus of analysis, a good starting point for bridging the divide is provided by Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007). They have argued that “inductive and deductive logics are mirrors of one another, with inductive theory building from cases producing new theory from data and deductive theory testing completing the cycle by using data to test theory” (2007: 25). The qualities of each strategy with respect to linking theory to data are thus complimentary. However, such a viewpoint continues to amplify the distinction and to perceive induction and deduction as separate research strategies, to be conducted in isolation from each other. Much in contrast, critical realism prescribes a harmonious and mutually reinforcing relationship between theory and empirical inquiry (Danermark et al., 2002; Easton, 2010a).

In the search for a better alternative to induction and deduction, the research strategy of abduction has surfaced as most appropriate. Abduction is different in that it does not support the logics with which induction and deduction make inferences (Danermark et al., 2002). Inference refers to the process of reaching conclusions or mapping consequences on the basis of a premise assumed to be true (King et al., 1994). This premise can be set in theory (deduction), or the conclusion is a theoretical proposition based on research data (induction). Central to inference is that research data are only a small sample of what is or may be ‘out there’. A discussion on inference
therefore bears an intrinsic epistemological tension. In induction a conclusion may be inferred after regularity or repetition in the research data can be observed. In deduction a theory can infer a conclusion or real-world consequence by virtue of its confirmation through observation. Albeit simplified, these are two either logically induced or deduced sets of premise and conclusion.

In abduction, however, neither logical sequence of premise and conclusion is followed. This research strategy infers without making an inductive generalization based on theory-building or a deductive conclusion based on theory-building (Danermark et al., 2002). It is a scheme of inference that can be used for making a premise look more plausible than would be the case without it. This is also why abduction is sometimes called ‘inference to the best explanation’ (Harman, 1965). A good example of an inductive research strategy, a deductive strategy and an abductive strategy applied to one of the hypotheses posited in the thesis is provided in Table 3.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Induction</th>
<th>Deduction</th>
<th>Abduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Premise (case):</strong> The Netherlands is a consensual democracy</td>
<td><strong>Premise (rule):</strong> Public engagement is fostered in consensual democracies</td>
<td><strong>Premise (rule):</strong> Public engagement is fostered in consensual democracies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phenomenon (result):</strong> Public engagement is fostered in the Netherlands</td>
<td><strong>Phenomenon (case):</strong> The Netherlands is a consensual democracy</td>
<td><strong>Phenomenon (result):</strong> Public engagement is fostered in the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conclusion (rule):</strong> Public engagement is fostered in consensual democracies</td>
<td><strong>Conclusion (result):</strong> Public engagement is fostered in the Netherlands</td>
<td><strong>Conclusion (case):</strong> The Netherlands is a consensual democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Induction, deduction and abduction in social science research (based on Peirce, 1932)

Drawing on Peirce (1932), the founding father of abduction, to derive a conclusion from a premise invariably involves an empirical component. He has argued that ‘rule’, ‘case’ and ‘result’ enable inference-making. Respectively these terms can be interchanged with ‘premise’, ‘phenomenon’ and ‘conclusion’, according to their position in the scheme of inference. The inductive strategy requires probability in order to make a causal claim, i.e. in order to be considered logical (Hacking, 1975). Therefore, the conclusion in the example provided holds when the Netherlands is representative for all consensual democracies. The deductive strategy advances causal inference when the phenomenon in question confirms the premise. In the example provided, the conclusion that the Netherlands fosters public engagement is logically derived from the consistency between theory and practice. The abductive strategy infers a conclusion that could quite possibly befit both premise and phenomenon (Danermark et al., 2002). To conclude that the Netherlands is a consensual democracy is a hypothesis and therefore not logically derived from the premise. Public engagement is fostered in consensual democracies, however the premise does not pre-empt other entities that may be able to foster public engagement. Or
to put it differently, the phenomenon fails to make a claim of necessity between premise and conclusion.

Table 3.2 demonstrates that abduction combines parts of the logical reasoning espoused by induction and deduction but to serve a wholly different research aim. Similar to deduction, it assumes that social reality is governed by rules that are assumed to be true. Shifting to induction, abduction then goes on to inquire empirically into something which is potentially premised on the rule. The position of rule and result in abduction corresponds with their position in deduction and induction, respectively. From this it can be derived that abduction is intimately linked to both theory-driven and data-driven forms of research. Such a stance resonates in the critical realist approach to conducting research. Järvensivu and Törnroos (2010) have therefore argued that abduction is a particularly valuable attribute to critical realism (and also to moderate constructivism).

The abductivist scheme of inference has a research aim which is different from those of its ‘rival’ research strategies. That is, induction and deduction aim to explain the rule which is based on empirical regularity or the empirical regularity which is based on the rule, each in its logic of inference. Abduction, in contrast, aims to explain what ensues from the interaction between rule and result (Danermark et al., 2002). It is designed to conclude on the plausibility of the occurrence or existence of concepts and entities, for example the conduct of consensual democratic practice in the Netherlands. As stated earlier, an important research aim in abduction is to gauge those mechanisms that may cause or mediate certain concepts and entities to exert influence on real-world events (Easton, 2010a).

In formulating a potential critique to abduction, it could be argued that it is built on inconclusiveness. Abduction refrains from envisaging research as a linear progression towards logically derived conclusions, either in theory or reality (Danermark et al., 2002). Indeed, it privileges the fallibility and uncertainty of research outcomes over the need to be able to confirm, corroborate or falsify a causality claim based on theory and data. As has been made clear, the epistemological positioning of abduction is contingent on a sense of realism. Psillos (1996), for example, has argued that abduction is founded on uncertain reasoning, approximate truth and a potentially low chance to infer in a meaningful way.

Because research strategies designed for logical inference are unable to prove causality, induction and deduction are intrinsically flawed. However, abduction is also contingent on a deliberate choice. It is aimed at identifying the best available explanation of social reality (Harman, 1965), but by no means an all-encompassing one. As the conclusion is not set in stone, abduction can always stimulate new research to uncover other plausible explanations (Danermark et al., 2002). This means that in an abductive scheme of inference (see Table 3.2) the theory and data, or what Peirce (1932) has called
rule and result, can be re-described and re-contextualized. Abduction is therefore a recursive research strategy.

3.4 Research involving cases

The thesis uses the cases of HS2 (Phase 1) and A4DS to inquire empirically into sustainability discourse mobilization in EIA. Case study research is deployed to tease out a deep exploration of the mechanisms that cause, mediate or accommodate sustainability discourse. As has been the situation with choosing abduction as most befitting a critical realist approach (Danermark et al., 2002), case study research is also intimately linked to critical realism (Easton, 2010a). An analysis of the course of events related to a certain case may be able to identify structural factors of influence. In critical realism such a research analysis serves the purpose of causal explanation, although it is argued that this is impossible (Easton, 2010a). It must be remembered that the intrinsic complexity of relations between events, concepts and entities in the social realm prohibits any such causal explanation. However, from studying a case thoroughly the occurrence and existence of events can be made more insightful. Furthermore, abduction can be linked to case study research (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). An abductivist research strategy aims to formulate plausible, but by no means certain, explanations for the course of events in a certain case. Adopting this strategy also means that theory plays an important role in linking concepts to the research premise and empirical reality of the case. Theory builds cohesion between the various components of a case.

Case study research can be defined as “a research method that involves investigating one or a small number of social entities or situations about which data are collected using multiple sources of data and developing a holistic description through an iterative research process” (Easton, 2010a: 119). It may be referred to as a method or methodology, although obviously there are many different ways to collect and analyze data within the cases to be studied (De Vaus, 2011). Two elements of case study research may be extracted from the definition provided which require further emphasis. Firstly, case study research is able to provide a holistic description. This can also be traced back to Yin’s observation that cases can be studied in their real-life, real-world context (Yin, 2009). Therefore, case study research contrasts sharply to other more reductionist forms of research, such as statistical analysis. Secondly, case study research is a reiterative research process. Within a research process involving cases the technique of reiterative abstraction can be consecutively applied (Yeung, 1997). Reiterative abstraction allows research on the characteristics of a case to be in alignment with research on structures. A case can be better understood when its peculiarities are explained as a structured outcome. The character and structure of a case correspond with
one another; they are iterative (Sayer, 1992; Easton, 2010a). Thus, combining a rich understanding of the case with knowledge on underlying structures is a prerequisite to case study research.

Research based on cases is different from research that is, for example, experimental or longitudinal (De Vaus, 2011). Case study research relates uneasily to other forms of research that necessarily involves a large number of cases or an expanded time frame. Cases are singular events, set in a certain place and time. However, there is a considerable freedom for researchers to adjust the parameters of case study research to fit their specific purposes. Various design choices can influence case study research. De Vaus (2011) has identified some of these choices, for example the selection of cases to either describe or explain social phenomena, the quantity of cases to be studied and whether the cases are set in the past, in the present or in the future. The design choices related to case selection and case numbers are of special interest. They are part of a wider debate on the competence of case study research to make its outcomes more relevant than mere anecdote or circumstantial evidence. In designing research upon an intelligent process of selecting which and how many cases to study, general research qualities such as the validity of research and the ability to generalize from the research outcomes may be developed (Healy and Perry, 2000).

3.4.1 Case selection

A crucial criterion for selecting cases in research relates to internal and external validity (De Vaus, 2011). Internal validity refers to the ability of case study research to separate key factors of influence from other non-explanatory factors. As stated earlier, the thesis compares a large-scale infrastructure project in the UK with one in the Netherlands. As both states are EU Member States, the same legal provisions on EIA are followed – either through Directive 2011/92/EU (for HS2 Phase 1) or through Directive 85/337/EEC (as amended) (for A4DS). An internally valid comparison is also aided by the fact that both projects involve the construction of new infrastructure. The selected cases in the thesis are therefore congruent with respect to supranational legislation and the content of the proposed development. Internal validity can furthermore be fostered by linking hypotheses to existing theory which can be found in the peer-reviewed literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). It is hypothesized that institutions and political culture perform a critical function for the mobilization of sustainability discourses in the selected cases. Therefore, prior theoretical knowledge has helped formulate this hypothesis by identifying institutions and political culture as external factors of influence. However, it is important to approach internal validity cautiously (Healy and Perry, 2000). Pervasive uncertainty in the ontological realm
(i.e. the ‘what is?’ question) may lead to distortion in the inference by external factors other than institutions and political culture (see also Chapter 8).

The point on prior theoretical knowledge seeps into the issue of external validity. This type of validity refers to the ability of case study research to export its conclusions to the outside world. External validity is by and large a claim to generalize research outcomes through the process of replication (Yin, 2009). Replication can be based on generating either similar research outcomes (‘literal replication’) or contrasting research outcomes (‘theoretical replication’). These two different forms of replication relate to a choice underlying case selection to construct either a ‘most similar’ or ‘most different’ case study design (Landman, 2008). Whilst a most similar case study design aims to investigate variation in only one factor of influence, a most different case study design investigates variation in multiple factors of influence. Thus, the selection of cases as part of the case study design is often strategically informed (De Vaus, 2011).

Perhaps ironically, the selection of the two cases adheres to both a most similar and a most different case study design. On the one hand, the design is most similar as a common legal framework for conducting EIA exists in both the UK and the Netherlands. On the other hand, it is proposed that the British and Dutch cases differ significantly from an institutional and cultural perspective, which conversely influence modes of public engagement, deliberation, the norms and virtues of democracy, and potentially also the articulation of sustainability discourses. Whilst using a common legal framework can be envisaged as being useful in the best traditions of comparative research, the proposition demonstrates a strong commitment to a plural theoretical replication of the institutional and cultural factors that shape the real-world conduct of EIA in project planning in the UK and the Netherlands.

3.4.2 Case numbers

~ "What is the general? The single case. What is the specific? Millions of cases." ~
(Goethe, cited in Easton, 2010b)

The thesis applies the theoretical framework to two cases. Research based on two cases requires justification as it may be generally considered a low number. Goethe’s statement (see above) refers to research based on a single case but its underlying message is equally apt for research based on two cases. At first glance it may seem paradoxical, not to say provocative, to attach the virtue of generalization to the conduct of research based on a single or few case studies (small-N research). Indeed, criticasters of this form of research have been claiming the exact opposite. They have been salient in purporting that small-N research is unable to produce reliable outcomes that may consecutively be
applied elsewhere (Flyvbjerg, 2006). It is from this perspective that proponents of research based on many cases (large-N research) invariably adhere to the research strategies of induction and deduction. The larger the number, it is advanced, the better theories can be built or tested. However, both induction and deduction can be made compatible with small-N research. A single or few case studies have an equal ability to generate novel theoretical propositions or to test hypotheses, for example on the basis of the falsification criterion (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Abduction can be furthermore applied to small-N research within the central aim to generalize research outcomes (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). It builds synthesis between theory-building and theory-testing research traditions through a systematic combination between, and ongoing reorientation of, theory and the case or cases to be studied. This transcends ‘the specific’ objective to build from or test on ‘millions of cases’.

Small-N research is typically espoused by the critical realist approach (Easton, 2010b). It is a core objective of critical realism to attempt to explain the effects of deeply embedded structures on the societal level (Harré, 1986). Because of its focus on rigorous analysis of a particular case, small-N research may facilitate rich inquiry into potential structural factors of influence. Similar to critical realism, it thereby investigates the layered relationship between structures, entities, concepts and events. Although not necessarily embedded in the critical realist approach, a clear example of the ability of small-N research to unearth complex relationships can be found in Flyvbjerg’s (1998) study of rationality and power in the case of the ‘Aalborg Project’. The project consisted of several spatial planning interventions in the 1970s in Aalborg, Denmark, including the landmark project of a new bus terminal. A detailed and context-rich analysis of this single case has demonstrated that the interaction between powerful actors in decision-making impacts substantially on the rationality and evidence base of decisions. Spatial planning in the Aalborg Project has been informed by structural, organizational and individual factors of influence (Flyvbjerg, 1998). The power dimensions observed have thus provided knowledge on the social engineering of rational decision-making. Such insights would most likely have been lacking from large-N research.

Choosing an appropriate number of cases for analysis can contribute decisively to the generalization of research outcomes. Analogous to the link between case selection and internal and external validity, the strategy of the research associated with causal claims-making may help determine the number of cases (Flyvbjerg, 2006; De Vaus, 2011). The starting point for the comparative case study undertaken in the thesis is that states can adhere to different forms of democratic representation. It is hypothesized that this difference tailors institutions for public engagement and mediates the cultural orientation of civil society towards the conduct of politics and its commitment to the public good. Consecutively, sustainability discourses are imbued with these specific institutional
and cultural circumstances. From this analytical perspective, the comparison of an EIA case in the UK with one in the Netherlands can be expected to yield interesting results. By and large adhering to an ideal type of representative democracy, and with a noted difference in political trust and democratic satisfaction, the UK and the Netherlands can be representative for sustainability discourse mobilization in many other majoritarian and consensual democracies. Inquiry into the British and Dutch EIA case is therefore a strategic choice for shedding light on two separate models of causation.

3.5 Methods

Methods for data collection and data analysis are needed to conduct empirical research. They are at the core of the ‘methodological question’ in the research design (Corbetta, 2003), following the questions related to ontology and epistemology. The methods used should therefore correspond to other parts of the research design. Similar to the critical realist approach and the abductive research strategy, the thesis has used methods that facilitate a thorough understanding of the link between structures, concepts and events. In doing so, the use of a variety of methods to collect and analyze data is strongly favoured over the use of a single method. Danermark et al. (2002) therefore advocate that methodological plurality should be the guiding framework in critical realist research. This refers to the deployment of a wide array of methods for data collection and data analysis. Critical realism does not hold a monopoly over the use of certain methods (Yeung, 1997). It allows freedom in choosing appropriate methods for data collection and analysis. Nevertheless, methods capable of collecting and analyzing data which otherwise would remain unexplored best serve an abductive scheme of inference (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). They should therefore strongly be focused on the logic of discovery, a quality typically espoused by the ontological premise of critical realism.

Plurality in the use of methods in critical realism is furthermore related to triangulation (Sobh and Perry, 2006). Triangulation prescribes the deployment of multiple methods in order to increase the validity of the research outcomes. Implicit in triangulation is the epistemological viewpoint that reality is structured by social laws (Sobh and Perry, 2006). This means that its main objective is to find out the ‘truth of the matter’. In its objective to find out the truth, triangulation consists of both repeating and mixing methods. For example, interview outcomes become more reliable when multiple respondents are asked the same question. When mixing methods, triangulation privileges a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods within the case studies (Yeung, 1997). As such it is able both to observe general trends and to understand why they occur.
3.5.1 Methods for data collection

In order to investigate the two selected cases, data have to be collected. A wide variety of methods can be deployed to collect the data, of course to a considerable degree dependent on the accessibility and availability of data sources. As cases are set in a specific time and place, methods for data collection may be selected according to their ability to investigate these situational characteristics (Yin, 2009). Although not deployed in the thesis, ethnography is often described as a data collection method typically espoused by case study research. However, De Vaus (2011) has argued that a case study does not predetermine the methods that can be used in case study research. Thus, there exists flexibility in choosing the methods for data collection. The thesis uses five methods:

1. Conducting semi-structured interviews;
2. Retrieving primary documents;
3. Retrieving newspaper articles;
4. Retrieving value surveys and studies;
5. Observing.

(1) Semi-structured interviews

A prime instrument for data collection in the thesis is interviewing. In each case study around twenty interviews with stakeholders have been conducted. Interviewees have signed an implied consent form prior to their participation in the research (see Appendix 1). Almost all of the interviews have been recorded – unless the circumstances of the interview prevented this from happening – and subsequently transcribed. A semi-structured interview technique is chosen. Semi-structured interviews have the ability to acquire a rich understanding of the research matter. A questionnaire is typically used to conduct them (Rubin and Rubin, 2012).

Semi-structured interviews are better equipped to elicit information from respondents for the purpose of this research than structured or unstructured interview methods. Structured interviews allow very limited flexibility for respondents to elaborate a question. Respondents are considered research objects rather than research subjects in this form of interviewing. Conversely, unstructured interviews yield a very rich understanding of the research matter but neglect structure. A semi-structured interview avoids both limitations since its questionnaire is both open and ‘thematized’ (Kvale, 1996). Another advantage of semi-structuredness is that interaction may be established between the interviewer and the respondent (Kvale, 1996). It fosters a ‘guided conversation’ between both sides involved in the interview process. Two questionnaires, one for
interviewing decision-makers and the other for interviewing civil society actors, have been used in the thesis. They are enclosed as Appendix 2 and Appendix 3, respectively.

(2) Primary documentation

In the thesis primary documentation refers to written data sources. Primary documentation entails, amongst others, government reports, project documentation, statistical records, manuals, pamphlets, brochures, flyers, press releases, memoranda, letters and e-mails (for an overview, see Finnegan, 1996). The method uses ‘primary’ as a defining attribute to ascribe this type of documentation to the actors which play a prominent role in the EIA cases. It is distinctly different from secondary written sources, for example academic literature or newspaper articles. Thus, primary documents emanate from the actor environment. In considering the proper use of documents in research, Prior (2003: 2) has asserted that “we must consider them in terms of fields, frames and networks of action. In fact, the status of things as ‘documents’ depends precisely on the ways in which such objects are integrated into field of action, and documents can only be defined in terms of such fields”. A document is therefore not only a medium that contains information, a ‘container of content’ (Prior, 2003), but can be seen in direct ratio to the actions and behaviours of its author(s).

Appendix 4 provides a list of the documents that have been consulted as part of the data collection. Three criteria have been used to find the documents:

- Documents that were mentioned during the interviews, for example the formal written responses of civil society groups to the *EIA Scope and Methodology Report* in the HS2 Phase 1 project (e.g. Chiltern Countryside Group, 2012);
- Documents that were mentioned in other documents, for instance cross-references made in the documentation of the A4DS project (e.g. to the 'deelrapporten' in Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d);
- Online retrieval of documents by delimitation using a number of key words (e.g. sustainability, protest, HS2/A4, satisfaction, trust).

(3) Newspaper articles

In conjunction with the collection of primary documentation, the thesis will collect a number of newspaper articles that report on the projects. It is anticipated that newspaper articles provide general oversight of the events that have taken place in each case. Furthermore, actors involved in the two cases may feel susceptible to speaking to

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4 In the HS2 Phase 1 project, no decision-makers have been interviewed. This has been caused by their unwillingness to become involved in the research.
journalists in order to become more widely known amongst the readers of the newspapers. The newspaper articles may therefore generate additional data. In order to systematically navigate the news coverage associated with the cases, online searches based on key words (e.g. EIA, sustainability, A4, HS2) have been carried out. The online newspaper database Nexis® (part of LexisNexis®) has been used to retrieve the newspaper articles.

(4) Value surveys and studies

The thesis uses value surveys to inquire into the political culture of the UK and the Netherlands. These surveys can be used to inquire into the political cultural values of the populations of these two states. Value survey databases can be found and accessed online. The values expressed in the selected opinion areas (e.g. politics, human values) are aggregated at the state level. They are therefore useful for comparing the value orientation in the UK and the Netherlands. Whilst Appendix 5 shows the original outputs of the value surveys which are accessed online, Chapter 7 shows the 'processed' outcomes of the surveys. Three value survey databases were consulted:

1. European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS conducts research on values in the social domain. A survey across a large number of European states is carried out at two-year intervals;
2. World Value Survey (WVS). The WVS proclaims to be the “world's most comprehensive investigation of political and sociocultural change” (WVS, 2012a);
3. European Values Study (EVS). The EVS is similar to the WVS in its research on value orientation but specifically looks at the values held by the populations of European states.

In addition to these value studies, which largely designate a quantitative assessment of extant values relating to political culture, qualitative studies have been consulted to inquire more thoroughly into individual aspects of democratic satisfaction and political trust as experienced in the UK and the Netherlands. These value studies benefit the analysis of political culture where some uncertainties in the interpretation of the value surveys exist or when the data are unclear. Furthermore, the studies provide insight into the merit of interpersonal trust and trust across civil society networks for the gestation of a public sphere (Habermas, 1989), particularly with regards to looking at the potential for collaboration or conflict between decision-makers and citizens. This additional focus on trust befits the theoretical insights of Sub-section 2.2.3 that there is a possible spill-over between democratic satisfaction, political trust and a politically engaged citizenry.
(5) Observations

During the fieldwork the researcher has observed the behaviour and actions of research subjects that were engaged in events relating to the cases. For example, in the Netherlands the researcher has witnessed protest against the proposed development of additional infrastructure around Rotterdam (intricately linked to the A4DS project); in the UK the researcher has visited information centres where many of the protest activities against HS2 (Phase 1) were organized. A highly valuable observation in the HS2 project concerns sitting through a meeting of the Central Chilterns Community Forum (CCCF), which as a public engagement mechanism fulfils a pivotal role in the empirical chapters. In the Netherlands the researcher has attended a meeting of Stichting Stop RW19/A4, an important stakeholder in the A4DS case. These observations of the social practice of political culture have helped develop a deeper understanding of this core concept.

3.5.2 Methods for data analysis

Data analysis is an important stage in the research design. It may appear from the structure of this chapter that data analysis succeeds previous phases of the research design, for example case study design or data collection. However, analyzing data is highly recursive, permeates most other design phases and the process of analytical inquiry is independent of a chronological order (Basit, 2003). Methods for data analysis have increasingly become dependent on the use of computer programmes in recent years. It is certainly safe to suggest that computer programmes have increased the capacity, consistency and rigour of processing sets of data. Specialized software has also considerably mitigated the labour intensity of processing qualitative data manually.

Analytical inquiry however continues to be driven by the intellectual capabilities of the researcher. Thus, the adage “computers don’t analyze data; people do” (Weitzman and Miles, 1995: 3) holds true. It is imperative from this perspective that the choice for a particular method is justified in terms of its ability to support the researcher in grasping the objects of study. The thesis uses five methods for data analysis:

(1) Coding textual data;
(2) Gap analysis;
(3) Content analysis;
(4) News coverage;
(5) Statistical analysis.
Coding textual data

The thesis deploys a method to code the interview transcripts. Following Tesch (1990), coding makes texts more manageable in the sense that it condenses or distils meaning through systematic analysis. It makes a substantial effort in organizing an otherwise non-uniform catalogue of texts and in interpreting and assessing their contribution to the research. Several techniques related to identifying the value of texts for the research can be discerned, for instance by analyzing the volume of key words, the use of metaphors or juxtapositions, or the use of words that hint towards explanation (Ryan and Bernard, 2003). As the method of coding textual data enables inquiry and cross-linkages among a number of texts, it may shed light on certain features shared among them. These can subsequently be used to build new theories or to test existing theories. Coding textual data furthermore aims to identify certain themes for the purpose of answering one or more research questions (Ryan and Bernard, 2003).

Drawing on Saldaña (2009), the coding of textual data in this research has consisted of two cycles. As a necessary and preliminary stage in the coding process, codes need to be created. These codes can be words, fragments of sentences, whole sentences or even whole paragraphs. The first cycle, then, is to group these codes into what the coding software used in the thesis, NVivo®, refers to as nodes. These nodes serve as repositories or meeting points for the selected codes. The second cycle is to refine the grouping of codes into categories. Categories are therefore composed of several sets of codes and they can be linked to the dominant themes in the research.

Two broad traditions in coding textual data can be discerned, often referred to as free coding and tree coding (Basit, 2003). On the one hand, free coding can be associated with an inductive research strategy as the nodes are based on the content of the texts; they are formulated in vivo (‘within the living’). On the other, tree coding codes the texts on the basis of preconception. In tree coding the creation of nodes precede the creation of codes. It is called tree coding as codes are grouped into nodes that may subsequently branch out to several sub-nodes (Basit, 2003). Tree coding is heavily indebted to prior theoretical knowledge. It is therefore more appropriate to use it in an abductive scheme of inference than free coding. Whilst the latter is data-driven, the former is concept-driven (Saldaña, 2009). Appendix 6 provides an example of an interview – in its transcribed form, of course – has been coded by using a ‘tree’.

Gap analysis

Central to the thesis is an investigation of whether the modes of sustainability discourse mobilization, principally based on institutional design and political culture and mediated
through different modes of public engagement in the UK and the Netherlands, are
different in the two projects selected. As a British case is compared with a Dutch one, the
research may reveal a difference or striking similarity between the governance of
sustainability issues in these two states. Gap analysis therefore embeds choices made
between ‘most different’ or ‘most similar’ case studies (Landman, 2008), respectively,
pertaining to the analytical materialization of external validity in the research design. From
this perspective, similarities or differences both designate the extent to which a gap
between two objects of study can be observed. This gap may be both
quantitative/numerical and qualitative/conceptual. In the analysis of data, then, attention
will be focused on fleshing out these gaps.

(3) Content analysis

Drawing on Krippendorff (2012), content analysis deals with the interpretation of texts. As
such it focuses its analysis on the meaning of the text as well as the underlying message
the author of the text aims to convey. In the thesis it is used to analyze the primary
documents – thus corresponding with the data collection method of primary
documentation – as content analysis is ideally suited to take stock of the heterogeneity of
texts for the purpose of analysis. Content analysis is therefore sensitive to understanding
the context of the text, especially when it is interpreted as the result of time and space in
which it has been written. Therefore, researchers conducting content analysis should be
able to forge links between texts and the broader discursive and power arenas in which
they are set (Krippendorff, 2012). Such a description of content analysis in practice
endows researchers with a considerable amount of interpretative freedom as to how
content can (better) be understood.

(4) News coverage

News coverage is used to analyze newspaper articles with respect to their coverage of the
two projects. Newspaper articles are written data sources and, similar to the interviews
and primary documentation, they could therefore be coded or analyzed on content.
However, as the newspaper articles are written by journalists a different kind of analysis is
needed. The method of news coverage is therefore used to analyze whether certain
concepts (e.g. democratic satisfaction, public engagement or sustainability advocacy) are
covered in the reporting of project-related events. When applied to the current research,
news coverage is concerned with understanding the practices of, and interfaces between,
discourses, institutions, political culture and public engagement in the events associated
with the HS2 and A4DS projects. Particularly with respect to public engagement, it is
anticipated that the method may increase understanding of the dynamics involved with the interaction between decision-makers and civil society.

(5) Statistical analysis

Statistical analysis is used to ‘process’ the value surveys. In taking the UK and the Netherlands as the central units of analysis in this method of analysis, averages of the scores of certain socio-political values can be compared. As chapter 7 will show, these questions generally allude to citizens’ attitudes towards the conduct of politics that is played out at the national level. For example, average scores on values framed as ‘I trust the political parties of this country’ or ‘I think democracy is the best political system’ show how citizens feel about, in these two examples, trust and satisfaction. Therefore, statistical analysis is particularly useful for providing a quantitative base on which a qualitative inquiry into political culture in the UK and the Netherlands can further be expanded.

3.5.3 Using methods to answer the research questions

Methods for data collection and data analysis can be used strategically to answer the research questions. As the central research question is supported by six sub-questions (see Section 3.1), it will be answered indirectly through linking the methods to the sub-questions (see Table 1.2). Table 3.3 shows the interrelationship between the sub-questions, the methods for data collection and the methods for data analysis. It also links each combination to the type of theory set forth by Harré (1986; see also Figure 3.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-question</th>
<th>Theme of question</th>
<th>Type of theory</th>
<th>Methods for data collection</th>
<th>Methods for data analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sustainability discourse</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews, primary documentation, newspaper articles</td>
<td>Coding textual data, content analysis, news coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Discourse/public engagement</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews, primary documentation, observations</td>
<td>Coding textual data, gap analysis, content analysis, news coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Institutional design</td>
<td>1 + 2</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews, primary documentation, newspaper articles</td>
<td>Coding textual data, content analysis, news coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Institutional design/public engagement</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews, primary documentation, newspaper articles</td>
<td>Coding textual data, gap analysis, content analysis, news coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Value surveys and studies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Value surveys and studies</td>
<td>Statistical analysis, gap analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Political culture/public engagement</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews, primary documentation, newspaper articles, observations</td>
<td>Coding textual data, gap analysis, content analysis, news coverage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: Sub-questions, methods and types of theory
Chapter 4  Introduction to the cases: HS2 and A4DS

This chapter introduces the HS2 and A4DS cases, thereby providing the necessary background for the forthcoming empirical analyses. In the context of environmental impact assessment (EIA) the cases will be referred to as projects, reflecting impact assessment at the project level. The terms ‘case’ and ‘project’ may at times be used interchangeably. The chapter aims to provide valuable background information in order to support the empirical analyses of sustainability discourse, institutional design and political culture which will be conducted in the subsequent chapters of the thesis (Chapters 5 to 7). In doing so, as well as to adhere to the characteristics of case study research set forth in the previous chapter, the projects first need to be thoroughly introduced.

Although the processes of sustainability discourse mobilization in the HS2 and A4DS projects will be compared, some differences in the structures of the two projects can be observed. HS2 entails the construction of a new high-speed rail network, which is considered by some, not least by the project developer itself (HS2 Ltd, 2011a), to present a viable ‘green’ alternative to the adverse environmental impacts of passenger car and air travel. In contrast, A4DS entails the construction of a motorway connection, or what is branded a ‘missing link’ (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d) which, irrespective of the answer to the question whether the expressed need for the connection is justified or not, makes this project somewhat ‘guilty by association’. That is, it is aimed at facilitating car travel. The proposed London-Birmingham rail link is furthermore longer and vastly more expensive than the motorway connection. Most importantly, at the time of writing the thesis HS2 (Phase 1) was in the design phase, thereby still required to implement an EIA and to “seek the powers to construct and operate the Proposed Scheme” (Arup/URS, 2012a). Much in contrast, the decision to construct the A4DS has been given consent in 2011. These differences could impact on the roles of institutional design and political culture in shaping public engagement and, ultimately, in the mobilization of sustainability discourses.

Notwithstanding these observed differences, the projects are similar in many respects. Both projects are justified by the project developers on the basis of the expected need for additional infrastructure in the longer term, as well as the inability of current infrastructures to cope with rising demand (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004; HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011). This justification has been built on evidence provided by traffic and rail passenger models intended to forecast demand growth, which on their part have played a significant role in the debate between proponents and opponents of the projects. Furthermore, the plans to construct new infrastructure have sparked opposition from many different stakeholders, including academics, rail or road construction action groups, residents and housing organizations,
environmental protection groups as well as representatives from local government (e.g. Dialogue by Design, 2011 in the HS2 Phase 1 project). And not least, both projects engage with the field of sustainability, to which various documents commissioned by the respective project planners attest (e.g. Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d; HS2 Ltd, 2011a).

As argued in the previous chapter, the projects will be compared to inquire into the roles of institutions and political culture in mobilizing sustainability discourses. The implementation of EIA in both projects is premised on the latest EIA legislation from the EU, which is Directive 2011/92/EU for HS2 Phase 1 and which has been Directive 85/337/EEC (as amended) for A4DS (but, as has been shown in Section 1.1, they are exactly the same). After having identified the role of EIA as the cornerstone of the sustainability policy environment in both projects, after having assumed the influence of external structures or constraints is infinitesimal, and after having assessed that the difference in some of the project characteristics will not distort lessons that can be learned, it can therefore be argued that the projects can be usefully compared in terms of investigating the potentially varying influence of (the co-production of) institutions and political culture, via public engagement, on the process of sustainability discourse mobilization.

Before the empirical analyses are conducted in Chapters 5 to 7, the two projects need to be introduced. To this end, the chapter contains two broad sections. The first section introduces Phase 1 of the HS2 project. The second section introduces the A4DS project. Each section includes six sub-sections on the following aspects: (1) the history of the project; (2) the (proposed) scheme of the project; (3) the core objectives of the project; (4) the sustainability considerations of the project (including a brief description of the impact area); (5) the main alternatives to the projects; and (6) an overview of the stakeholders.

4.1 HS2

HS2 Phase 1 designates the first phase of a proposed nationwide high-speed rail network - High-Speed rail 2 (HS2) – in the UK which is to be completed in the early 2030s. The first phase of this network entails the construction of a rail link between the cities of London and Birmingham, respectively the first and second largest cities of England. In early 2012 the government decided to continue giving support to HS2 (HS2 Ltd, 2012c). The decision has followed a public consultation process and is also shaped by the recommendations made in a series of reports by the House of Commons Transport Committee, most notably the Tenth Report of Session 2010-12 (e.g. House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011a) where the necessity for a firm governmental commitment to high-speed rail has been expressed. HS2 is the second high-speed rail project in the UK,
following High-Speed rail 1 (HS1) which links London to continental Europe through Paris and Brussels. Experiences drawn and lessons learned from HS1 have played an important role in shaping public and expert opinion on HS2 (e.g. 51m, 2011c; Aizlewood and Wellings, 2011).

As could be inferred from usage of the name ‘HS2 Phase 1’ in official project documentation (e.g. HS2 Ltd, 2013), plans for the construction of new high-speed rail infrastructure in the UK consist of multiple phases. Currently two phases have been identified (but see also Heathrow Hub, 2012 for plans of a third phase): (1) a phase which links London to Birmingham (located in the West Midlands); and (2) a subsequent phase which links Birmingham to the northern English cities of Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield and Leeds, and possibly further north to Newcastle and to Edinburgh and Glasgow in Scotland (Department for Transport, 2010). Upon completion the two phases will constitute a ‘Y-shaped’ rail network. The thesis has specifically focused on decision-making processes associated with the environmental impacts likely to occur in HS2 Phase 1. However, many issues particularly related to the costs and benefits of the project take the wider Y-shaped network into account (see also Footnote 1 in Chapter 1). Map 4.1 shows this network and the main cities that will be included in the scheme.
4.1.1 A brief history of the project

It can be debated when and where the idea for constructing a high-speed rail network between London and the North of the UK was first mentioned (e.g. Greengauge 21, 2006; see Table 1 in HS2 Ltd, 2013 for an overview of the ‘main milestones’). The 2007 white paper *Delivering a Sustainable Railway* (Department for Transport, 2007) serves as a
good starting point, however. A white paper is an authoritative statement issued by the government to inform the public on a specific topic or to announce plans for a new policy initiative in a specific policy sector in the years or decades to come. The white paper has stressed the importance of making longer term investments in rail infrastructure so as to be able to increase the volume of freight and rail passengers, improve the reliability and safety of rail transport as well as its environmental performance, and reduce the ‘carbon footprint’ of the overall transport sector in the UK (Department for Transport, 2007). However, it has been somewhat ambivalent about the prospects of a national high-speed rail network to achieve these objectives, particularly those objectives pertaining to socio-economic and sustainability performance improvements of rail transport.

Two years later the government’s position had changed significantly. In early 2009 it was announced in an admission statement by the Department for Transport (DfT) (2009), which is the governmental department involved with the implementation of infrastructure schemes and transport policies, that it would go forward with the plan to construct new high-speed rail infrastructure in the UK. In order to do so it has created the company HS2 Ltd – then chaired by Sir David Rowlands – to conduct research on the business case and the environmental impacts of a high-speed rail link between London and Birmingham (HS2 Ltd, 2011a; 2012f). The DfT furthermore contracted engineering firm Atkins to carry out feasibility studies for high-speed rail in the UK (Atkins, 2007). In 2010 Atkins also started carrying out studies on potential strategic alternatives to HS2 (for an overview of its studies on strategic alternatives, see Atkins, 2012). In the same year the idea for a Y-shaped high-speed rail network across Great Britain was formally presented to Parliament (Department for Transport, 2010).

Political support for high-speed rail by the Labour Government (2007-2010) has more or less continued after a change of government following the General Election of 2010. In the 2010 Coalition Agreement, which set forth the ambitions of the coalition government, consisting of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats political parties, it is stated that the aim is to “establish a high speed rail network as part of our programme of measures to fulfil our joint ambitions for creating a low carbon economy. Our vision is of a truly national high speed rail network for the whole of Britain” (Cabinet Office, 2010: 31). Under the auspices of transport minister Andrew Adonis (in power between June 2009 and May 2010) in the Labour Government and which continued under the Conservative Philip Hammond (May 2010-October 2011), HS2 has increasingly been presented as an investment for the whole nation in the longer term. For example, it has been argued that

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5 Author’s note: whilst the official name of the country is United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (in short: United Kingdom; abbreviated: UK), government documents and stakeholders alike often simply refer to it as Great Britain or Britain (and the adjective: British). Throughout the thesis these terms will be used interchangeably. However, as HS2 will not directly affect Northern Ireland, sometimes it is warranted to use (Great) Britain instead of the UK.
HS2 would enable northern cities to benefit from the "global magnet effect of London"[1]. Similar to the envisaged link between HS2 and the benefits that it will generate, the DfT has set up the working title High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future to bring all government publications and communications relating to HS2 under the same roof.

In putting the political ambitions for constructing HS2 into practice, in 2011 several important steps were made towards its realization. A public consultation was carried out to poll the views of citizens and stakeholders on HS2, which yielded around 55,000 responses (HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011). In order to gauge the contribution of the project towards achieving sustainability objectives, compliant with UK environmental legislation (United Kingdom Parliament, 2004; 2009), in the same year an Appraisal of Sustainability was published (HS2 Ltd, 2011a). Furthermore, as part of the EIA an (updated) scope and methodology report on the project and draft environmental statement were published in 2012 and 2013, respectively (Arup/URS, 2012a; HS2 Ltd, 2012d; 2013). Later in 2013, after an environmental statement has been issued (which should happen after the submission date of this thesis), HS2 will be passed on to Parliament in the form of the passage of a hybrid bill (Department for Transport, 2011). A hybrid bill is able to affect privately held interests by changing national (‘public’) legislation.

4.1.2 The proposed scheme

The proposed scheme of HS2 Phase 1 entails the construction of railway stations and infrastructure along the line of route (e.g. bridges, tracks, tunnels, viaducts) and changes to the landscape (e.g. embankments and cuttings). Furthermore, special purpose high-speed trains (popularly branded 'off-the-shelf' trains by e.g. Chiltern Countryside Group, Interview) will run at a minimum speed of 360 kilometres per hour (kph), but so-called classic-compatible trains that can be used on both high-speed rail and conventional rail will also be procured (HS2 Ltd, 2012f). The proposed scheme encompasses the construction of a line of route with new rail tracks for the length of over 220 kilometres between London and Birmingham (HS2 Ltd, 2011a). Of the total length of the rail link around ninety kilometres will be in cutting (i.e. underneath ground level at varying depths), around forty kilometres will be tunnelled, around sixty kilometres will be on embankments or viaducts (i.e. above ground level) and the remaining thirty kilometres or so will be constructed at surface level (HS2 Ltd, 2012j).

In order to facilitate the forecasted demand growth of rail passengers (e.g. HS2 Ltd, 2012a), it is deemed necessary to redevelop and expand Euston railway station in the

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[1] This reference is a newspaper article. Since ‘news coverage’ is identified as a method for data analysis (see Chapter 3), as part of methodological justification the newspaper articles consulted are put in a separate section in the References Section at the end of the thesis. To further separate newspaper article references from other references, in the chapters the newspaper articles will be numbered and placed between parentheses [1, 2, x].
Borough of Camden in London city centre as the southern terminus of the rail link. HS2 Phase 1 furthermore requires the construction of a new interchange railway station in the outskirts of Birmingham (in Lichfield) to be able to connect the high-speed railway to Birmingham Airport and the National Exhibition Centre and to destinations further on the existing West Coast Main Line (WCML). It also requires the construction of a new northern terminus station at Curzon Street, somewhat northeast of Birmingham city centre (HS2 Ltd, 2011a). From the interchange railway station it is also possible to link Phase 1 of HS2 to the construction of the future northbound infrastructure needed for Phase 2 of the overall project, which entails the two arms of the Y-shaped rail network.

The proposed scheme also considers links between HS2 and existing conventional rail infrastructure, such as the Great Western Main Line (GWML), HS1 and the Crossrail rail link currently under construction (connecting Buckinghamshire and Berkshire with Essex and planned to be in operation by 2018), which is believed to improve connectivity between Birmingham, continental Europe and the southwest and southeast of England (Department for Transport, 2010; HS2 Ltd, 2012h). HS2 has also been linked to London Heathrow Airport, which is the largest airport in the UK and situated west of London city centre. The airport was originally intended to become an interchange station, branded ‘Heathrow Hub’ by engineering firm Arup and endorsed as such in the Rail Review of the Conservatives (2009) before the 2010 General Election. However, the proposed scheme has replaced the Heathrow Hub with a spur from the interchange railway station currently placed in Old Oak Commons in the Greater London area, northwest of the city centre. Nevertheless, the choice to bend the line of route to the West to serve Heathrow holds important consequences for the Chilterns as it is now crossed as its widest point (House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011b).

Within the HS2 Phase 1 project framework, several route options for the proposed scheme were proposed (HS2 Ltd, 2012h). The option appraisal process was based on, amongst others, the technical feasibility of constructing the rail link, the construction costs, sustainability considerations and the cost-benefit ratio in terms of passenger demand capacity and journey time savings (HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011). However, all options considered ‘feasible’ crossed the Chilterns as to avoid the area it would have scored poorly on the construction costs as well as on considerations pertaining to journey time savings. Furthermore, the proposed line of route has been considered unable to follow existing infrastructure (such as the M40 motorway), a wish repeatedly expressed by civil society stakeholders in the Chilterns (e.g. Potter Row Action Group, Interview), as this would cause a significant reduction of blight in this and other areas along the line of route. This inability has been caused by the curving of existing motorways, which would require trains to operate at lower speeds and increase journey time. At the time of writing the thesis the DfT (2011) preferred Option 3 of the various
proposed schemes (henceforth: the ‘preferred scheme’). As will be shown, the preferred scheme based on Option 3 has been slightly amended as an outcome of the public consultation (see also HS2 Ltd, 2012d; HS2 Ltd, 2012i).

The preferred scheme crosses the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Beauty (AONB) for approximately twenty kilometres (HS2 Ltd, 2011a), roughly covering the distance between the Chalfonts (e.g. Chalfont St. Giles) and Wendover. The Chilterns AONB is largely coterminous with the choice made by HS2 Ltd to identify the line of route between Wendover and the M25 motorway as part of the same ‘study area’ (HS2 Ltd, 2012i). Approximately three fifths of the line of route crossing the Chilterns will be tunnelled, either underground (through a bored hole) or at ground level (either through a ‘green tunnel’, covered with soil on three sides, or what is called ‘cut & cover’, a tunnel with a soil roof), and around six kilometres will be in deep or half-deep cuttings (HS2 Ltd, 2012j). This leaves between two and three kilometres of the line of route to be constructed at or above ground level. As will be shown in the empirical chapters of the thesis, much debate on the line of route crossing the Chilterns has revolved around the issue of tunnelling (e.g. HS2 Ltd, 2012g). However, opposition against HS2 in the northwest of the Chilterns (Wendover area) have very different concerns, for instance concerns associated with the impact of viaducts on local accessibility, roads closures and visual impairment.

At the time when the government made the decision to go ahead with HS2, in January 2012, changes to the preferred scheme in Phase 1 of the project had been ongoing (compare for instance Department for Transport, 2012a; and HS2 Ltd, 2012i). However, at the time of writing the thesis the line of route crossing the Chilterns was as follows. Starting from the southeast, the rail link enters the Chilterns in a bored tunnel (having started east of the M25) and exits this tunnel at a place called Mantle’s Wood. This ‘Amersham tunnel’ is then followed by, consecutively, deep and wide cuttings, a green tunnel between Great Missenden and South Heath, and half-deep cuttings. The line continues its route on an embankment and towards a viaduct, thereby crossing the A413 road corridor and the existing Chiltern Railways railway line overhead. This viaduct is followed by another embankment, another green tunnel (the ‘Wendover tunnel’) and more half-deep cuttings before it exits the study area. Map 4.2 provides a graphical illustration of the line of route crossing the Chilterns.

When considered appropriate, the suffix ‘AONB’ is added to ‘the Chilterns’ when specific reference is made to the natural resources of the area or when the AONB status of the Chilterns is important to understand concerns with regards to the expected adverse impacts of the HS2 line of route (see also Sub-section 4.1.4).
4.1.3 Project objectives

Various leading project documents have listed the objectives of HS2, either focusing on the line of route between London and Birmingham or on the merits of the ‘Y’ (Department for Transport, 2009; HS2 Ltd, 2009; Department for Transport, 2010; HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011). Although various objectives have been formulated, they will each contribute to the overarching objective of HS2 as “the fast track to prosperity” (HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011: 9). The five core objectives that have been identified are as follows:

1. Increasing economic growth;
2. Linking the urban conurbations of Great Britain;
3. Tackling the North-South divide;
4. Reducing carbon dioxide (CO$_2$) emissions;
5. Reducing congestion.

The five core objectives of HS2 are envisaged to be achieved in the longer term. However, underpinning these objectives are two immediate objectives of HS2 Phase 1: (1) new rail infrastructure to provide additional capacity required to meet a forecasted growth in rail passengers and (2) shorter journey times in rail travel between London and Birmingham (Dialogue by Design, 2011; HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011). In
one of the first formal parliamentary communications of the DfT regarding its intention to construct HS2, through a document simply titled *High Speed Rail* (command paper) published in 2010 (Department for Transport, 2010), the principles for constructing high-speed rail in the UK have stressed both additional capacity and a reduction of travel time as the immediate cause for the necessity to construct a high-speed rail network between the North and South of the country. This can be reframed as a solution to the problem of crowding. Indeed, it is estimated that total passenger miles have nearly doubled between the mid-1990s and around 2010 and this number will further increase by a further sixty percent by 2024 (HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011). HS2 is therefore expected to facilitate future rail passenger growth.

There is an intimate relationship between the objectives of additional capacity and shorter journey times, notwithstanding slight differences in the terms or technicalities of debate. The 2007 *White Paper* (Department for Transport, 2007: 62) has argued that “[t]he debate tends to conflate two very different issues – the need for additional capacity to accommodate demand growth, and the case for shorter journey times”. This statement implies that the debate on additional capacity should be detached from the debate on shorter journey times. However, the DfT (2010: 81) has argued that “high speed lines should only be used by high speed trains. Adding slower trains reduces capacity”, thereby linking the need for additional capacity to the need for high speeds (i.e. shorter journey times). In linking the two objectives it is therefore implicitly argued that additional capacity can only be realized by using high-speed trains to reduce journey times, a scheme which subsequently requires the rail construction without interference from trains running at conventional speeds (up to 200 kph).

4.1.4 Sustainability considerations and objectives

Proponents of HS2 have stressed the positive impact that high-speed rail will have on achieving sustainability objectives. The *HS2 London to the West Midlands Appraisal of Sustainability* (HS2 Ltd, 2011a) has summed up the sustainability objectives of the project. This appraisal of sustainability has broadly encompassed the core objective of the HS2 Phase 1 project to reduce current CO$_2$ emissions. Amongst others, this objective has referred to the prospect of reducing emissions through enabling a ‘modal split’, which entails the shift of travellers towards choosing rail instead of road or air transport as the preferred mode of transport for long-distance travel. Furthermore, the pro-HS2 advocacy group Greengauge 21 has been particularly vocal in supporting HS2 in terms of its potential to achieve sustainability objectives and address the ‘carbon challenge’ more effectively (e.g. 2006).
However, opponents of HS2 have pointed out that the proposed scheme of Phase 1 entails a considerable number of sustainability issues. Many of the issues pointed out can be classified as concerns over ecological destruction due to land use change. Regarding ancient woodlands, which are areas continuously wooded since the 1600s or earlier, the Woodland Trust (2011) has estimated that 21 ancient woodlands will directly be affected by the preferred scheme; another seventy woodland areas will indirectly be affected. Regarding other designated areas, such as wildlife sites, sites for biological notification and Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI), altogether seven such sites will be affected (The Wildlife Trusts, 2012). Indirectly, the fragmentation of ecosystems is expected to have adverse consequences for the functioning of ecosystems.

As stated earlier, a considerable part of the Chilterns is an AONB, the latter of which have been coined ‘natural treasures’ by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (2011), and of which there are currently 34 in England. AONBs have a protected status and can only be affected by planning in case of an overriding national interest. In the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011 (T&CP 2011) they are marked ‘sensitive area’ (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011), which further confirms its special position in planning. Because of its proximity to London, the Chilterns play an important role in providing a green space in the Greater London area. According to one of the stakeholders involved in the campaign against HS2 Phase 1, the Chilterns are sometimes referred to as the “green lung of London” (Chiltern Society, Interview). Consequently, it has been widely argued that the impacts of HS2 will be to the detriment of the ‘outstanding natural beauty’ in the area.

Besides ecological concerns relating to land use change, other ecological issues in the Chilterns have been identified. A dominant concern has been the location of the dump site of the large amount of spoil generated during construction (e.g. Chilterns Conservation Board, Interview). Whilst it is currently proposed to dump the spoil outside the Chilterns, adjacent to the M25, spoil transport from the tunnelled area to the dump site will include continuous lorry movements during the 10-year period of construction (2017-2027). Civil society stakeholders have also raised concerns about the impacts of the bored tunnel on an aquifer underneath Amersham and on chalk streams and rivers, such as the River Misbourne, River Chess, particularly stressing the potential danger of these water bodies drying out (e.g. Chesham Society, Interview).

Other than these ‘ecological’ concerns, a wide array of other sustainability concerns in the Chilterns has been expressed. A basic critical concern along the line of route has been the issue of property destruction, the lack of financial compensation for property owners living outside the ‘safeguarded zone’ (where compensation is arranged), or the inability to sell their blighted property. Other concerns have been more
geographically defined, for instance: the location of the ventilation shafts and a construction camp for the bored tunnel (e.g. the Chalfonts and Amersham); an increase of ‘heavy’ construction traffic in the village centre (e.g. Chesham); lack of access for local businesses, for instance a family-owned garden centre (e.g. South Heath); and visual impairment caused by the embankment and viaduct (Wendover).

4.1.5 Main alternative to the project

Because a full EIA had not yet been carried out at the time of writing the thesis, alternatives to HS2 Phase 1 have not been formalized. However, several rail packages have been identified as strategic alternatives to HS2 Phase 1 (Atkins, 2012). The packages consist of improvements of future passenger capacity on the existing rail infrastructure between London and Birmingham, most notably improvements on the WCML and the Chiltern Line. Consistent with the studies conducted for HS2 Phase 1 in terms of forecasted demand growth (HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011), the packages are compared with ‘do-minimum’ scenarios, which take only relatively minor and incremental (and therefore ‘natural’) adjustments to the existing infrastructure into account (such as the Chiltern ‘Evergreen’ projects). Such scenarios have been deployed to compare major adjustments to the existing infrastructure in the future with a baseline situation.

Most support from civil society actors opposed to HS2 has been for Rail Package 2 (RP2). Generally speaking, RP2 proposes an incremental increase of rail passenger capacity on the WCML (Atkins, 2012). An improvement of future capacity to meet forecasted demand growth in RP2 has revolved around a series of relatively minor changes to the WCML infrastructure (e.g. creating by-passes, extra platforms and extra tracks) and relatively major changes to the ‘rolling stock’, which designates changes made to the trains that are currently in use (HS2 Action Alliance, 2011c). The latter category includes, amongst others, an increase of the number of cars per train, an increase of the average number of trains per hour by increasing travel speeds and a rearrangement of the number of coaches used for standard and first class seating so that the supply and demand for standard seating ‘fits’.

Those opposed to HS2 have used many conclusions of a government-sanctioned study published before the 2007 White Paper was published, to bolster its claims against the proposed rail link and in emphasizing their support for strategic alternatives to HS2 (e.g. AGAHST Federation, 2011). In the 2006 The Eddington Transport Study, carried out by Sir Rod Eddington, doubts on the viability and usefulness of high-speed rail in the UK have been raised. These doubts have mainly referred to short inter-city distances and the overall dense geography of the UK, the socio-economic importance of linking urban
conurbations in the north and south of the UK, the low potential to reduce CO$_2$ emissions from air travel or the danger of the exponential increase of CO$_2$ emissions from rail travel due to very high speeds (Eddington, 2006). The study has generally advocated more efficient use of existing infrastructure to meet the envisaged growth in rail travel demand, thereby concluding that “the principle task of the UK transport system is not (...) to put in place very high-speed networks to bring distant cities and regions closer together”, but instead its task is to “deal with the resulting density of transport demand” (Eddington, 2006: 22).

4.1.6 The project stakeholders

In identifying the project stakeholders in the Chilterns, the exact location of the line of route of HS2 Phase 1 crossing this area has played an important role. Based on the location, all of the fieldwork in the Chilterns has been carried out in Buckinghamshire. This county consists of four local government districts but most ‘location-specific’ stakeholders, such as anti-HS2 action groups, were based in the Chiltern District (part of Chesham and Amersham parliamentary constituency). A few others were based in the Aylesbury Vale District (part of Aylesbury parliamentary constituency). The other two districts in Buckinghamshire (Wycombe District and South Bucks District) also ‘host’ parts of the preferred scheme but these either are outside the Chilterns or are entirely tunnelled. Evidently, many of the issues described earlier will be shared by everyone involved but has not led to the same degree of opposition as recorded in the more ‘exposed’ districts in the Chilterns.

As will be shown in Chapter 6 of the thesis, the community forum (CF) has been the most important institution for stakeholders to raise local concerns associated with the proposed scheme. HS2 Ltd has set up around 25 community forums along the line of route; two of these were originally situated in the Chilterns (in Amersham and Wendover, respectively). However, according to many of the stakeholders situated in between these two towns, a CF specifically focusing on this part of the line of route was necessary (e.g. South Heath Action Group, Interview). These stakeholders have therefore successfully lobbied for a third CF, this one branded the Central Chilterns Community Forum (CCCF). This forum has been particularly useful for identifying relevant civil society stakeholders.

Table 4.1 lists the stakeholders that were interviewed in the research (alphabetically ordered). The stakeholders range from organizations advocating the interests of a specific location, representatives of these locations, organizations advocating the interests of the Chilterns as a whole, regional organizations advocating

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8 The citations used from the interviews with civil society stakeholders in the HS2 Phase 1 case primarily express the opinion of the interviewees and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the organizations with which they are affiliated with, a member of, or working for.
specific interests such as wildlife conservation, national advocacy organizations (e.g. Campaign to Protect Rural England), an independent rail consultant and one local pro-HS2 advocacy group (Go-HS2).

Table 4.1: Overview of the stakeholders involved in the HS2 Phase 1 project (listed alphabetically)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Type of organization/affiliation</th>
<th>Role in the HS2 (Phase 1) project**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amersham Action Group</td>
<td>Local anti-HS2 action group</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A’ham &amp; Distr. Residents Ass.</td>
<td>Amersham advocacy organization</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amersham Society</td>
<td>Amersham advocacy organization</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBOWT</td>
<td>Environmental advocacy organization</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chesham Society</td>
<td>Chesham advocacy organization</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chesham Town Councillor</td>
<td>Local politician in Chesham</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiltern Countryside Group</td>
<td>Local environmental organization</td>
<td>Advocacy, counter-expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiltern Ridges Action Group</td>
<td>Local anti-HS2 action group</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiltern Society</td>
<td>Chilterns advocacy organization</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chilterns Conservation Board</td>
<td>AONB protection/conservation</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cholesbury Action Group</td>
<td>Local anti-HS2 action group</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRE</td>
<td>National conservation organization</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunsmore Society</td>
<td>Dunsmore advocacy organization</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go-HS2</td>
<td>Local pro-HS2 organization</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missenden Action Groups*</td>
<td>Local anti-HS2 action group</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potter Row Action Group</td>
<td>Local anti-HS2 action group</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Rail Consultant</td>
<td>Expert in rail infrastructure</td>
<td>Expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Heath Action Group</td>
<td>Local anti-HS2 action group</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Speen Area Action Group</td>
<td>Local anti-HS2 action group</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wendover HS2</td>
<td>Local anti-HS2 action group</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendover Society</td>
<td>Wendover advocacy organization</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendover Parish Councillor</td>
<td>Representative of Wendover Parish</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodland Trust</td>
<td>National environmental organization</td>
<td>Advocacy, counter-expertise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Referring to the action groups Little Missenden Action Group and Great Missenden Action Group
** Explanation of the roles:
- Advocacy = advocating a certain interest in the HS2 Phase 1 planning context
- Counter-expertise = using science to provide counter-evidence
- Expertise = using science to provide evidence
4.2 A4DS

The A4DS project entails the construction of the connecting part, or ‘missing link’ (‘ontbrekende schakel’, see Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d) of the A4 motorway between Delft and Schiedam in Zuid-Holland Province, the Netherlands. For the purpose of the thesis an inquiry into the decision-making process of the A4DS is delimited to the time period from 2001 until 2011. The report Kansen benutten, Impasses doorbreken (Achieving Objectives, Breaking through the Impasses) (IODS, 2001), which was published in 2001, can be perceived as the onset of a decision-making and public engagement process spanning the length of approximately ten years, ending over forty years of deadlock between proponents and opponents of the A4DS. These processes have ultimately led to the decision made in 2010 to construct the motorway connection (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010c) as well as the judicial review of 2011 and the following verdict from the Raad van State (the highest administrative court in the Netherlands) to clear any further judicial obstacles for its construction (Raad van State, 2011a). From this perspective the year 2001 marks a logical time delimitation for the inquiry in the thesis (for a justification of this choice, see also Heukels, 2005).

As will be made clear in this chapter and the following empirical chapters (Chapters 5 to 7), the A4DS is an integral part of a larger proposal for infrastructure and industrial developments in what is called the study area, defined by Rijkswaterstaat (2009d) as the area where the potential or likely impacts of motorway infrastructure planning will occur (and often referred to as the 'Ruit van Rotterdam', see also Rotterdam Vooruit, 2009). These developments are largely considered to take place around the city of Rotterdam, for which an SEA has been conducted (Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2012). From 2004, which marks the impetus provided by the Dutch government to construct the A4DS (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004), the need for a second tunnel west of the existing Beneluxtunnel underneath the Nieuwe Waterweg waterway has been considered (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004). The need for a more westbound tunnel has been informed to a great extent by the construction of the Tweede Maasvlakte, a land reclamation project in the North Sea for the expansion of the industrial port of Rotterdam. It is also proposed to construct another ‘missing link’ of the A4 motorway between the Beneluxtunnel and areas further South (the ‘A4 Zuid’ project) (Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2012). Generating insights in these concomitant

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9 There is one exception to the 2001-2011 period of investigation: the interview with Stichting Batavier – a monitoring group – is used to illuminate how civil society has continued to engage with the A4DS after the decision to construct has been made.

10 To protect the authenticity of documents or legislation that have been used or mentioned in the A4DS case study, the titles of these sources will not be translated into English. Instead, an English translation will be inserted in the text afterwards.
projects is important as they have influenced expert and public opinion on the planning context of the A4DS project to varying degrees.

Map 4.3 shows the location of the A4 in the Dutch motorway system, with the middle interruption of the red bold line designating the missing link between Delft and Schiedam. Because of its prominence as a major infrastructure axis in the western part of the country (informally called Randstad), the Dutch government has classified the A4 as a ‘triple-A’ connection in the national motorway system (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 2004). In this capacity, the A4 has been “positioned as a quick international connection, of particular relevance for the underlying connection of Schiphol Airport (...) with the big seaports in the Rijn-Schelde delta (Rotterdam and Antwerpen)” (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 2004: 37). As such, the rationale for constructing the A4DS can be perceived as being inherently systemic. From this it can also be deduced that broad economic incentives underlie the need for construction.
4.2.1 A brief history of the project

Ever since the 1960s it has been regularly proposed that a second major traffic connection is necessary between The Hague and Rotterdam (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d). These two cities, respectively the third and second city of the Netherlands when measured in population size, are currently connected by a single motorway, the A13. Various concomitant developments leading to the enormous increase in car traffic in the post-World War II reconstruction era (e.g. income growth, increase in car ownership and fuel efficiency, urban sprawling) have prompted many decision-makers over the course of decades to consider a new major traffic connection (for some of these developments, see Geels, 2007). To most of them the preferred scheme was to connect two existing parts of the A4 motorway, an important North/South infrastructural axis in the Netherlands which is currently interrupted between the towns of Delft and Schiedam. Currently, traffic going southbound is diverted onto the A13 at the Prins Clausplein and Ypenburg junctions (near Rijswijk).

The history of the A4DS project planning can be characterized by a strong interplay between proponents and opponents of the motorway, resulting in deadlock. The Trajectnota (route proposal) published in 1965 was the first formal attempt to propose a scheme for the connecting part of the A4 motorway (then called Rijksweg 19, and before that: Zoomweg) (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d), but this proposal never resulted in actual construction. At a later stage, between 1968 and 1972 an embankment was created upon which the motorway connection would be constructed. Whilst the construction at the time was postponed indefinitely, because of strong political and civil opposition against the proposed scheme, the embankment has not been removed until construction began in 2012. In the political desire to protect the rural area between Delft and Schiedam known as Midden-Delfland, The 1977 Reconstructiewet Midden-Delfland (Reconstruction Act Midden-Delfland) (Rijksoverheid, 1977), a national law focusing on a specific area, was enacted after the adoption of a parliamentary motion in 1976 which urged the government to look for alternatives to the proposed scheme. The act has effectively stopped construction of the A4DS for a number of decades.

New developments in the A4DS project took place in the 1990s. In 1993 a second formal attempt was undertaken to propose a scheme for the motorway connection. Because of the adoption of EIA legislation in the intermittent years (in September 1987), a Trajectnota/Milieu-effectrapportage (TN/MER) (Route Proposal/Environmental Impact Assessment) was published in 1996 with the proposal to construct the A4DS on surface level (‘maaiveld’) (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d). However, after the adoption of a parliamentary motion in 1998 the budget for the proposed scheme was used instead for the construction of a railway tunnel in Delft. In 2001, three years later, the programme bureau Integrale
Ontwikkeling tussen Delft en Schiedam (Integral Development between Delft and Schiedam) (IODS) was founded under the auspices of Zuid-Holland Province to ‘break through the impasse’ in decision-making surrounding the A4DS controversy (IODS, 2001).

In 2004 the third formal attempt to construct the A4DS was started with the Startnotitie (Start Note) (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004). The Startnotitie re-emphasized the need for a second major traffic connection but, contrary to its predecessors, argued that the A4DS should facilitate a ‘quality injection’ and ‘integral approach’ to embedding the road in the impact area. The TN/MER Part 1 of 2007 has initially compared the A4DS with three other alternatives (‘Alternatives-EIA’) (Rijkswaterstaat, 2007), however part 2 of the TN/MER in 2009 has reduced the alternatives to improving the traffic capacity of the A13 and constructing the A13/16 motorway (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d). One year later, in 2010, the scheme was first proposed in the Ontwerp Tracébesluit (Proposed Route Decision) (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010b), then presented as final in the Tracébesluit (Route Decision) (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010c). In 2011 all legal ploys developed by opponents to prevent the A4DS scheme from implementation were brought to a halt after a verdict from the Raad van State (2011a). Construction began in 2012 and is expected to be completed by 2015.

4.2.2 The scheme

The A4DS is a motorway connection (‘missing link’) for the length of approximately seven kilometres and will connect the northern part of the A4 motorway, which currently stops south of Delft (at Kruithuisweg), with the southern part in Schiedam (at Kethelplein junction). It will consist of five lanes with space reserved for a third lane in southbound direction (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010c), thereby making it a dual carriageway with the potential of three lanes on each side. Besides the space reserved for the actual motorway, the A4DS will entail the construction of an eco-duct, aqua-duct, viaduct, land tunnel and the redevelopment and expansion of Kethelplein junction. The line of route between Delft and Schiedam follows the embankment which was already created between 1968 and 1972. Map 4.4 shows the line of route of the A4DS as it was proposed in 2009 and which has become official in the Tracébesluit one year later (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010c).
Important design choices in the scheme related to the construction height of the A4DS (see the terms of reference of Map 4.4). Starting from Delft, the A4DS departs from Kruithuisweg at surface level for the length of one kilometre. After this the motorway will be in half-deep cuttings for the length of over approximately 2.5 kilometres, after which it
will continue in deep cuttings for approximately 1.5 kilometres. The last two kilometres or so will be in a land tunnel, which will be constructed at surface level. Upon exiting the tunnel traffic will arrive at Kethelplein junction.

Much debate on the design of the A4DS, particularly on the southern side of the line of route shared between the cities of Vlaardingen and Schiedam, has revolved around the length of the green tunnel and the location of the tunnel mouth (e.g. Groenlinks Schiedam, Interview; Stichting Waterweg Wonen, Interview). The length of the tunnel and the location of the tunnel mouth influence the level of traffic noise experienced by residents living along the line of route. It was suggested by advocacy groups in Vlaardingen and Schiedam that the tunnel mouth should connect to Kethelplein junction and the green tunnel itself should be long enough to fully bypass the apartments in the residential areas of Holy (Vlaardingen) and Woudhoek and Groenoord (Schiedam). However, because traffic from the A20 and local traffic from Schiedam will be ‘homogenized’ with northbound traffic on the A4, the tunnel design needs to be compliant with legislation regarding tunnel safety (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009a). As the tunnel mouth can only begin approximately 300 metres from the point where the lanes will be homogenized (the so-called ‘10-seconds rule’), this exposes some of the residents to unabated noise.

4.2.3 Project objectives

The five core objectives of the A4DS are formulated in the 2009 Trajectnota/Milieu-effectrapportage (TN/MER) (Route Proposal/Environmental impact assessment) (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d), which has predicted the environmental impacts likely to ensue from the proposed scheme. The objectives are formulated by Rijkswaterstaat, which is the project planner of the A4DS in its role as the executive agency of the Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu (MI&M) (Department for Infrastructure and Environment). The five objectives are as follows:

1. Improvement of a reliable and adequate traffic connection between The Hague and Rotterdam;
2. Improvement of livelihood alongside the A13 and A20;
3. Improvement of external security (relating to the transport of hazardous substances);
4. Improvement of traffic security on the A13 and part of the A20;
5. Improvement of local accessibility in the study area.

The prime objective, improving the reliability and adequacy of the traffic connection between The Hague and Rotterdam, has been framed in terms of improving the ratio between the intensity (I) and capacity (C) of the A13 (hence, the ‘IC-ratio’). As a rule of
thumb, a high IC-ratio (>0.8) refers to high levels of congestion and is understood to compromise the reliability and adequacy of traffic connections. Rijkswaterstaat (2009c) has therefore argued that an acceptable IC-ratio of the A13 at all times is at 0.8 or lower than that, a ratio which should be achieved through constructing the A4DS. In addition to this, the overriding objective for any road infrastructure improvement in the Netherlands is to improve access (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 2004). This refers to the ambition of the government to limit journey times during peak hours to 1.5 times of the time spent in traffic during off-peak hours (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 2004). As the A13 is heavily congested during peak hours and thereby extends journey time to ‘unacceptable’ proportions, the A4DS has been deemed necessary.

The objective of improving the traffic connection between The Hague and Rotterdam also reinforces another objective, which is to improve the road infrastructure around Rotterdam (Rotterdam Vooruit, 2009; Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2012). Rotterdam is enclosed by four major motorways (see ‘Kaart 2.1’ in Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d): the A20 in the North; the A16 in the West, the A15 in the South; and the A4 in East, which resumes its southbound direction from Kethelplein junction through the Beneluxtunnel. Furthermore, the study area can be characterized by many junctions such as, turning clockwise: Klein Polderplein (A13/A20), Terbregseplein (A16/A20), Knooppunt Ridderkerk (A15/A16), Vaanplein (A15/A29), Beneluxplein (A4/A15) and Kethelplein (A4/A20). Junctions are earmarked by the government as notorious bottlenecks in the national motorway system and are estimated to account for approximately 80% of the increase in average journey times (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 2004). The A4DS would enable southbound traffic to avoid two of these junctions (Klein Polderplein and Kethelplein), which is expected by the project planner to improve access in the study area (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d).

4.2.4 Sustainability considerations and objectives

The A4DS is a road infrastructure project primarily designed to expand existing capacity. As stated in the introductory note of this chapter, it is therefore somewhat ‘guilty by association’ as it involves the facilitation of motorized transport. Expanding road infrastructure capacity certainly does not contribute to the objective of incurring what is called a modal split, something which is often associated with a move towards more sustainable forms of transport. However, proponents of the project have argued that additional road infrastructure capacity helps reduce the overall amount of time spent on the road by means of congestion reduction. Congestion causes an increase of CO₂ emissions because of engine inefficiency due to low speeds or the wide variance in speeds. During the decision-making process of the A4DS preceding the decision to go
ahead with the proposed scheme this argument was repeatedly stressed, for instance by Camiel Eurlings, who was the Infrastructure and Environment Secretary11 at the time. The description of the A4DS as “the greenest piece of asphalt in the Netherlands” (cited in Stichting Batavier, 2012) has been attributed to him, particularly from the rationale to reduce congestion and the pollution associated with it.

Nearly the entire length of the line of route will cross an area called Midden-Delfland, which is largely coterminous with Midden-Delfland municipality. The area is widely appreciated for its biodiversity and is considered a refuge for those who are looking for solitude and silence in the densely populated and car-clogged study area. It is furthermore appreciated for its colourful assemblage of green and blue, alternately provided by meadows and water (Provincie Zuid-Holland, 2012). Given the ecological and social functions of Midden-Delfland, the environmental statement of the project has identified a wide range of impacts (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d). These impacts have related to, amongst others, land use, water infrastructure, noise and nature tourism in the impact area. The stakeholders that were interviewed for this thesis have furthermore stressed the critical ecological importance of reed wells in the area as bird nesting sites and the aesthetical value of a landscape where ditches dominate the subsided peat soil (the ‘reversed landscape’) (e.g. Midden-Delfland Vereniging, Interview).

Stakeholders that were involved in the project generally stressed the potentially irreversible impacts of the A4DS on the ecological, sustainability and social functions of Midden-Delfland. Whilst Midden-Delfland is not a Natura 2000 site, a status which would entitle it to protection at the EU level, it is part of the Ecologische Hoofdstructuur (EHS) (Key Ecological Infrastructure) at both the national and provincial levels (Recreatieschap Midden-Delfland, 2009). The EHS designates a grid consisting of nature areas and of vectors linking these areas. Areas and vectors are as such important for providing space to existing stocks of flora and fauna. Interestingly, the embankment originally intended for the A4DS in the early 1970s has become an important area for many birds and bats species (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d), some of which are on endangered species lists.

4.2.5 Main alternative to the project

Throughout the decades many plans for expanding infrastructure capacity in the study area have been formulated. Many ‘unofficial’ alternatives emerged from within civil society, reaching out to both changes in the design of the proposed scheme and changes in route location. For instance, in the alternative ‘A4 Met Vaart’ it was proposed to tunnel

11 Informal titles are often used for describing the position of some political leaders, particularly in the British context. For example, the ‘Secretary of State for Transport’ is informally rebranded as ‘Transport Secretary’. The author has opted to use the latter format consistently throughout the thesis and to apply it to both the Dutch and the British case.
the entire length of the A4DS infrastructure and construct a canal (‘vaart’) on the tunnel roof (see also Box 5.2). Other alternatives have stressed the construction of road infrastructure in other parts of the study area, such as proposals to construct the A54 (‘Veilingroute’) or the A14 (e.g. Van Wee and Immers, 2009; Hansen, 2010), both of which would circumvent Midden-Delfland. In looking for solutions beyond expanding existing road infrastructure capacity, it was furthermore proposed to make substantive improvements to the public transport network between The Hague and Rotterdam (Milieudefensie, 2011). However, all of these proposals were either ignored or considered ineligible by Rijkswaterstaat as a strategic alternative to the A4DS.

In complying with Dutch EIA legislation related to road infrastructure planning, which states that a comparison of alternatives is mandatory (see Rijksoverheid, 2012b on the Tracéwet), the A4DS has been compared with an alternative. The main alternative to the project concerned the expansion of the existing A13 in combination with the construction of the A13/16 motorway (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009b). The ‘A13+A13/16 project’ therefore consisted of expanding the capacity of existing infrastructure and constructing new infrastructure. The A13/16 was intended to link the A13 with the A16 motorway at the Terbregseplein junction, north-east of Rotterdam. This would ultimately divert a substantial part of the North/South traffic to the A16 west of Rotterdam, away from Midden-Delfland and towards the semi-industrial area north and east of Rotterdam The Hague Airport, which itself is north of Rotterdam. However, the potential of the A13+A13/16 project to achieve the project objectives was deemed inferior to that of the A4DS (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009a).

4.2.6 The project stakeholders

Ever since the inception in the 1960s of the plan to construct the A4DS, many civil society groups and organizations have become engaged in protesting against its construction. This has continued throughout the decades until in 2010 the decision was finally made to implement the scheme (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010c). Protest intended to prevent the A4DS from being constructed or to mitigate adverse impacts comprised a diverse array of civil society stakeholders. As a consequence, the stakeholders that were interviewed have reflected this diversity. They comprised ecological and sustainability advocacy organizations, housing organizations and local action groups, amongst others. Many of the stakeholders have been identified by looking at the verdict from the Raad van State (2011a), where all the plaintiffs were listed. Another strategy used to identify stakeholders has been by information obtained from other stakeholders.

The fieldwork has been mainly carried out along the Delft-Schiedam corridor, comprising the municipalities of Delft, Midden-Delfland, Vlaardingen and Schiedam, which
are host to location-specific stakeholders (e.g. Midden-Delfland Vereniging). Such stakeholders were mainly involved in advocacy activities, for instance environmental advocacy (e.g. KNNV Delfland), defending the interests of residents living along the A4DS (e.g. Stichting Overleg Bewonersorganisaties (SOBO) or political parties (e.g. the Socialist Party (SP) in Delft). Stakeholders with a regional focus on environmental advocacy were mainly concentrated in Rotterdam (e.g. Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland), the largest city in the study area. One stakeholder was based outside the study area (Milieudefensie, in Amsterdam). In addition to these stakeholders, two traffic experts that provided counter-expertise on the justification of the A4DS were interviewed.

The stakeholders that were interviewed\(^\text{12}\) in the A4DS project are listed in Table 4.2 (alphabetically ordered). As can be derived from many of the names, most of the stakeholders are either associations (‘verenigingen’), such as the Koninklijke Nederlandse Natuurhistorische Vereniging (KNNV), or charitable organizations (‘stichtingen’), such as Stichting Stop RW19/A4. Throughout Chapters 5 to 7, where appropriate, the stakeholders interviewed will be further introduced on the basis of their role in the decision-making process of the A4DS project.

\(^\text{12}\) The citations used from the interviews with civil society stakeholders in the HS2 Phase 1 case primarily express the opinion of the interviewees and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the organizations with which they are affiliated with, a member of, or working for. As two interviewees have not agreed to be cited in this article (‘agreement’ is defined by signing an ‘implied consent form’), the interviews with them have not been used.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of stakeholder</th>
<th>Type of organization/affiliation</th>
<th>Role in the A4DS project**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Founder of IODS*</td>
<td>Initiating engagement in A4DS</td>
<td>Deliberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groenlinks Schiedam</td>
<td>Political party (in Schiedam)</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Traffic Expert</td>
<td>Civil society/non-affiliated</td>
<td>Counter-expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IODS*</td>
<td>Programme for engagement in A4DS</td>
<td>Deliberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNNV Waterweg-Noord &amp; KNNV Delfland</td>
<td>Local branches of a national environmental organization</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midden-Delfland Vereniging</td>
<td>Advocacy group for Midden-Delfland</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mijn Partij</td>
<td>Political party (in Midden-Delfand)</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milieudefensie</td>
<td>National environmental organization</td>
<td>Advocacy, counter-expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natuurmonumenten</td>
<td>National environmental organization</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rijkswaterstaat*</td>
<td>Infrastructure development agency</td>
<td>Expertise, Deliberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOBO</td>
<td>Housing organization in Schiedam</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP Delft</td>
<td>Political party (in Delft)</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stichting A4 Met Vaart</td>
<td>Alternative to the A4DS</td>
<td>Advocacy, counter-expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stichting Batavier</td>
<td>Local A4DS monitoring group</td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stichting Stop RW19/A4</td>
<td>Local anti-A4DS action group</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stichting Waterweg Wonen</td>
<td>Housing organization in Vlaardingen</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Expert</td>
<td>Delft University of Technology</td>
<td>Counter-expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vereniging Tegen Milieubederf</td>
<td>Regional environmental organization</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Overview of the stakeholders involved in the A4DS project (listed alphabetically)

* Not a civil society actor

** Explanation of the roles:
- **Deliberation** = involvement in setting up the IODS deliberation
- **Advocacy** = advocating a certain interest in the A4DS planning context
- **Counter-expertise** = using science to provide counter-evidence
- **Expertise** = using science to provide evidence
- **Monitoring** = navigating post-decision developments in the A4DS project
Chapter 5 On sustainability discourses

This chapter is the first of three empirical chapters and charts the sustainability discourses in the HS2 and A4DS projects. As introduced in Chapter 1 and elaborated in Chapter 2, this thesis envisages sustainability discourses as social narratives which manifest certain values in environmental decision-making (e.g. Hajer, 1995; Rydin, 1999). In planning, and more specifically in the conduct of environmental impact assessment (EIA), such values may for instance relate to the expressed need for ecological preservation, to dispositions on how socio-economic and ecological objectives should be reconciled, or to why it would be a good or bad thing whether the development in question should go ahead or be cancelled. It will become quickly apparent that multiple values have informed sustainability discourse in the cases. Consecutively, in each case study the three most dominant discourses have been filtered out for thorough analysis. The structure of the chapter will be similar to that of Chapter 6, in that the first sub-section deals with the HS2 project and the second sub-section deals with the A4DS project. The third sub-section will summarize the main findings.

Throughout the chapter it will become apparent that EIA exerts influence only to a limited extent on the discourses of stakeholders. Whilst EIA can be perceived as a decision-support tool to make decisions that better contribute to sustainable development, however defined, the sustainability discourses in this chapter are multivalent and at times ambiguous in their relationship with this concept. Indeed, Bond and Morrison-Saunders (2009: 322) have contended that, “given the broad scope of the sustainable development concept, (...) both its framing and its use can be manipulated by actors favouring other discourses (which may or may not relate to sustainable development)”. Thus, it could well be possible that the construction and articulation of sustainability discourses in an environmental problem setting has – seemingly – little to do with sustainable development. Furthermore, it will become apparent that the discourses are largely played out beyond the remit of EIA. This is an interesting observation as it shows that stakeholders may mobilize discourses around other domains in the planning process.

5.1 HS2

Ever since the initial idea for a high-speed rail network was made by the Department for Transport (DfT) in 2009 (Department for Transport, 2009) and consolidated into a route proposal in that same year (HS2 Ltd, 2009), heavy protest against it emerged in the Chilterns. Local action groups along the line of route affecting the area have been formed in the aftermath of the route proposal, such as the Chiltern Ridges Action Group. These groups have campaigned against HS2 side-by-side with already existing groups
advocating the interests of the Chilterns, such as the Chiltern Countryside Group, for which “preserving the character and peace of the Chilterns” (2011: 2) is one of its primary aims. The collected data has revealed that there are a variety of viewpoints of the stakeholders that can explain their involvement in, or affinity with, the anti-HS2 campaign. By having grouped these viewpoints based on a relative similarity that was discerned between them in the data analysis, three discourses have been identified: 1) justification; 2) party politics; and 3) conservation. Table 5.1 lists the three discourses, briefly tells what they are about and lists some of the nodes that have been used in the textual coding of the interviews with relevant civil society stakeholders (see Sub-section 3.5.2). Chapter 9 further discusses the results from applying textual coding to analyzing the sustainability discourses. The remainder of this section will explain the discourses in full detail.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>What is the discourse about?</th>
<th>Nodes used for interview coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>HS2 has a flawed business case, which impacts adversely on its cost-benefit ratio. HS2 is not ‘green’.</td>
<td>e.g. ‘Costs and benefits’, ‘Economic rationale’, ‘Evidence base’, ‘Journey time savings’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party politics</td>
<td>HS2 is used for political objectives by the major political parties in the UK Parliament.</td>
<td>‘Party politics’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation</td>
<td>The Chilterns should remain unaffected by infrastructure development.</td>
<td>e.g. ‘Chilterns AONB’, ‘Natural resource’, ‘Ecological destruction and blight’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: The discourses in the HS2 case

5.1.1. Justification

~ “The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie - deliberate, contrived and dishonest - but the myth - persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic” ~ (John F. Kennedy, cited in HS2 Action Alliance, 2010; a quote used extensively in the anti-HS2 campaign)

The justification discourse has centred on the allegedly false argumentation on which the case for HS2 has been built. Generally speaking, as argued by some of the stakeholders (e.g. Missenden Action Groups, Interview), the campaign against HS2 (Phase 1) centred on three points: 1) its underlying justification in terms of necessity; 2) the location of the line of route (i.e. the ‘preferred scheme’); and 3) the proposed design of the rail infrastructure, involving discussion on tunnels and other mitigation measures. Whilst points 2) and 3) directly impact on the way HS2 Phase 1 will affect the Chilterns, thus invoking questions on the justification of why and how new infrastructures should cross an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) instead of being located in an existing transport corridor, such as those of the M1 or M40 motorways (e.g. Potter Row Action Group, Interview), it does not condemn HS2 per se. Much in contrast, point 1) addresses the underlying justification for the general concept of high-speed rail and of having this in
Great Britain. Stakeholders’ framing of justification is tailored to the specific case of HS2. Box 5.1 and Figure 5.1 present an illustrative example of such framing, after which the justification discourse is looked at in more detail.

In the anti-HS2 campaign, the proposal for a high-speed rail network in the UK was often labelled a ‘white elephant’ (e.g. Cholesbury Action Group, Interview). The white elephant metaphor can be used in projects where large costs are involved, primarily to construct them but also to keep them in operation. The story goes that when the king of Siam (current-day Thailand) wanted to burden someone who was disloyal or disobedient, he gave this person a white elephant. These elephants could not be disposed of as they were (and are) considered sacred. It is therefore prestigious to have one. However, white elephants could not be used for labour and required a lot of money for their maintenance. Thus, a white elephant did not only lack utility but also presented its owner with a financial burden. When this story is exported to the case of HS2, it has been argued that the proposal for high-speed rail is a ‘white elephant’, “a constant drain on your resources, whilst it doesn’t do anything for you” (Interview). During protests against HS2 in the Chilterns, an inflatable white elephant was often used to enforce this message.

Box 5.1: HS2 and its flawed justification: the white elephant metaphor

The national action platform Stop HS2, which has described itself as the ‘national campaign against HS2’, has summed up the flawed justification for HS2 in three interrelated points (2013a): 1) no business case; 2) no environmental case; and 3) no money to pay for it. As will be shown later, argumentation on the business case has formed the backbone in the protests against HS2. The argument that there is no environmental case for HS2 has mainly focused on its inability to contribute to the
government's objectives to reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO$_2$) and other greenhouse gases – this in contrast to the environmental destruction that will result from the lines of route. The argument that there is 'no money to pay for it' has stressed the substantial government subsidies that are needed to finance HS2 [2]$,^{13}$ used for both its construction and to keep it in operation. Although this latter point remains somewhat understated in the justification discourse, it has been spearheaded in alternative economic appraisals of the project by economic think tanks (Adam Smith Institute, 2011; Aizlewood and Wellings, 2011) as well as The Tax Payer’s Alliance (2011), which campaigns against what they envisage as the frivolous spending of public money.

It was reported that documentation on the flawed justification for HS2 (Phase 1) was widely circulated amongst civil society groups that were active along the line of route (e.g. Chilterns Conservation Board, Interview). Another national action group, HS2 Action Alliance, has repeatedly claimed that the purported justification of HS2 is based on six myths (e.g. HS2 Action Alliance, 2010; 2011a; 2011d). These myths have subsequently provoked a strong counter-reaction from civil society, reactions which are correspondent with the nodes used in the textual coding. They have been countered as follows (the myths are italicized and placed between single inverted commas; the corresponding nodes are placed between brackets):

1. ‘*HS2 is a green mode of transport*’. High-speed rail is unsustainable due to the high levels of energy needed to make very high speeds possible. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the ‘modal split’ will not occur (Node: ‘Evidence base’);

2. ‘*HS2 will bolster the economy of the North*’. HS2 will not bring economic prosperity to the North of the country as economic growth will mainly occur in the Greater London area (see also [2]; Nodes: ‘Economic rationale’ and ‘HS2 national importance’);

3. ‘*HS2 is a sound investment*’. HS2 is not value for money as the construction and operation costs of the high-speed rail network outweighs the benefits it will generate (Node: ‘Costs and benefits’);

4. ‘*HS2 is necessary to relieve crowding*’. HS2 is not a necessary investment in rail infrastructure as there is no rail capacity problem. It is therefore a “solution looking for a problem” (Stop HS2, 2013b; Node: ‘Evidence base’);

5. ‘*HS2 is necessary to compete with domestic air travel*’. High-speed rail is not necessary to reduce air travel in Great Britain as demand for this latter mode of transport is already in decline and will be even more so when the ‘Y’ is ready by the early 2030s (Node: ‘Evidence base’);

$^{13}$ This reference (where parentheses are used) is a newspaper article. To see how newspaper articles are referenced, please refer to the second footnote of Chapter 4.
6. ‘HS2 is necessary to save journey times’. HS2 is not necessary to save journey times as the UK performs better on journey times between its major urban conurbations than many other large European states (Node: ‘Journey time savings’).

The first and fifth myth represent a direct and indirect response to the sustainability objectives of HS2 (see Sub-section 4.1.4 and the fourth project objective in Sub-section 4.1.3), thus perceived by stakeholders to be premised on false argumentation. HS2 Action Alliance (2010) has argued that speed, by its very nature, is not sustainable. The Chilterns Conservation Board noted that “a high-speed train uses a lot of energy. Lots of energy. And there is an equation that if you double the speed, you quadruple the amount of energy needs. (...) There is a relationship between the energy you use and the emissions created at the power stations” (Interview). Stakeholders furthermore argued that most rail passengers on HS2 will have transferred from the West Coast Main Line (WCML) but not from other transport modalities. Air travel, one of the most unsustainable modes of transport, will not yield large savings in the emission of CO$_2$ as it shows a decline in passenger demand to future HS2 destinations.

As regards the sixth myth on journey time savings, this invariably involves the issue of speed of travel and subsequently sparked debate on the definition of high-speed rail. A number of definitions are used and vary according to the minimum speed required for modes of rail transport to be classified as ‘high-speed’ (House of Commons Library, 2011b), although the European Union (EU) classifies trains operating at 250 kph as high-speed rail. This has prompted the Chiltern Society to classify HS2 as ‘ultra high-speed’ since its minimum commercial speed will be around 360 kph. The observed ambiguity of the definition of high-speed rail has furthermore led Stop HS2 to conclude that building a high-speed rail network in the UK is based on an erroneous assumption that the speed to be attained by HS2 is necessary to adhere to the incumbent definition of high-speed travel. That is, with having speeds of over 200 kph between its major cities, the UK already has an ‘extensive fast railway network’ (Stop HS2, 2012).

Subsequently, part of the justification discourse was shaped by the flawed scheme of HS2. This led the Amersham Action Group to comment that “if you look at the scheme, the only sensible thing is to oppose it entirely” (Interview). As such the preferred scheme was considered incapable of catering for the present and future transport needs in the UK. This ineptitude was assumed by stakeholders not least due to the absence of a national transport strategy (e.g. Amersham Society, Interview), which would advance a long-term vision of the transport needs of the country and which, according to the Amersham & District Residents Association, “encompasses a genuine commercial requirement” (Interview). Another scheme-oriented account of flawed justification corresponds with the observation made in the *The Eddington Transport Study* (2006) that the principle task for
rail infrastructure is to facilitate the tightly connected network of urban conurbations. This is reflected in the Missenden Action Groups’ assertion that “in a small country we don’t need ultra high speed in the way that they’re doing it in France” (Interview), bearing in mind the long distances between the North (e.g. Lille) and South (e.g. Marseille) of France compared to half the distance of that between the North and South in the UK.

However, the preponderance of criticisms targeted the underlying economic justification of HS2, or what has been widely called the business case of the project. This is reflected in myths 2 to 5 (in the fifth myth, it is in regard to the volume of air travel reflecting a potential rail passenger demand for HS2). Within the business case the ratio between the costs and benefits (‘cost-benefit ratio’) has been the guiding principle, as can be abstracted from a number of the project documents supporting the decision to construct (e.g. HS2 Ltd, 2012a; 2012b). The cost-benefit ratio reflects the expected financial returns that can be accrued from making an investment. As this ratio has prominently featured in the project documentation, it is safe to suggest that it has been an important evidence base for justifying the government’s decision on HS2 [3]. Mirroring this focus on costs and benefits, opponents of HS2 have expanded on providing counter-evidence suggesting the project is not a sound investment (AGHAST Federation, 2011; HS2 Action Alliance, 2011b; 2013). Whilst in Chapter 8 the evidence base of the economics deployed in the HS2 project is discussed in more detail, it can be argued that the relationships between costs and benefits on the one hand and certain project components on the other (e.g. rail passenger demand forecasts, journey time savings) have permeated the planning process at the pre-decision stage.

Counter-evidence on the ‘real’ cost-benefit ratio for HS2 has mainly been provided by the HS2 Action Alliance (e.g. 2013)\(^\text{14}\). Stakeholders in the Chilterns developed a clear sense of an ‘acceptable’ cost-benefit ratio. With respect to HS2, this sense became transposed into an assessment of whether proposed infrastructure schemes are economically sound. Missenden Action Groups argued that “road projects in this country have, are supposed to have a benefit-cost ratio of 5 or 6. The HS2’s cost-benefit ratio is, when properly looked at, under 1” (Interview). This comparison between road projects and HS2 illustrates that, according to some of the stakeholders, the project is founded on a poorly contrived business case. A ‘proper look’ mainly entailed a readjustment of certain assumptions made in the business case. Wendover HS2 argued that “we’ve caught the Department for Transport on quite serious errors” (Interview), particularly with respect to rail passenger demand forecasts and the value of time (VOT) of the journey time that is saved as a consequence of having shorter train journeys. Generally speaking,

\(^{14}\) For the most recent update of the cost-benefit ratio for HS2 (Phase 1) can be found on the website of HS2 Action Alliance (http://hs2actionalliance.org/). Note that new updates are published on a regular basis and that cost-benefit ratios can vary as a result of that.
stakeholders judged passenger numbers much too optimistic and the VOT much too high (see also Chapter 8).

Journey time savings is an interesting case study within the justification discourse, as over half the benefits (55%) of HS2, once in operation, hinge upon it (HS2 Ltd, 2012a). The VOT has played an important role in discussions on which value should be ascribed to journey time savings. As the VOT is principally premised on “the individual’s gross wage” (HS2 Ltd, 2011b: 4), reflecting the resource cost of travelling in working time, the average annual salary used to determine the benefits of journey time savings has been a prime matter of concern (HS2 Action Alliance, 2013; Chiltern Ridges Action Group, Interview). The value of the VOT as a concept is embedded in what is known as the cost-savings approach (Department for Transport Strategy Unit, 2012), as travelling in working time reflects a cost. However, issues on certain assumptions made on journey time savings have equally prevailed in the anti-HS2 campaign. A number of these issues have been filtered out:

- **The hegemonic role of HS2 in saving journey time.** The DfT (2010) has stated that HS2 will be able to save 35 minutes on the journey from Birmingham to London to a journey time of 49 minutes. When Phase 2 is completed, journeys from Manchester or Leeds to Birmingham will be nearly halved to just over an hour. Whilst these savings are not disputed, stakeholders (e.g. Chiltern Society, Interview) stressed that an upgrade of the existing rail infrastructure can substantiate similar savings, such as the upgrades included in Rail Package 2 (RP2) (Atkins, 2012) and the ‘Optimised Alternative’ of action group 51M (see e.g. 51m, 2011a to get insight into the core tenets of the alternative).

- **The relative value of time savings in door-to-door journeys.** Stakeholders have focused on time saved on the full length of a journey – e.g. home-to-office or office-to-office – rather than on station-to-station journeys within the HS2 network. It was argued that the Birmingham terminus at Curzon Street will be outside the city centre and that Euston railway station is the ‘wrong station’ in terms of its connection with the High-Speed rail 1 (HS1) connection to continental Europe (Chilterns Conservation Board), as well as of the passenger jams the ‘bottleneck’ Euston will cause in certain parts of the public transport network in London. With explicit reference to Phase 1 of HS2, South Heath Action Group argued that the relative value of journey time savings is infinitesimal by stating that the “first part of the journey can be blown away completely if you look at the percentage of time saving on the overall journey. (...) It’s just so small. It’s just not worth thinking about” (Interview).
• **The ability to be productive whilst travelling in working time.** In contrast to the assumption of zero productivity when business people travel during working time (Department for Transport Strategy Unit, 2012), which is the key rationale for saving journey time within the cost-savings approach, trains were judged by stakeholders to provide an ideal working environment in their ability to cater for a moment of quiet on a busy day at the office (e.g. Wendover Parish Councillor, Interview). The Amersham & District Residents Association stated that, when “you are on the train, you open your laptop, you’re working. That’s what you’re doing” (Interview). Besides this anecdotal evidence, some stakeholders (e.g. Chiltern Society, Interview) referred to studies such as the *Study of the Productive Use of Rail Travel Time* (SPURT), which argued that “some 80% of rail business travellers in the UK” work on trains (Mott MacDonald Ltd., 2009: S-1).

• **The future need for long-distance business travel.** Most of the stakeholders that were interviewed challenged the need to implement schemes for long-distance business travel. It was widely argued that the share of business travellers in the passenger demand forecasting for HS2 is based on a false premise because of expected technological advancements in the future (e.g. South Heath Action Group; Chesham Town Councillor). Particularly the ability to work remotely by virtue of the Internet and clever software (e.g. Skype, Face Time) was stressed. Chiltns Countryside Group admitted that there was a shared consensus amongst stakeholders in the anti-HS2 campaign on this issue, consisting of “very strong opinions that broadband is what is needed and what will be used in the future” (Interview).

5.1.2 Party politics

~ ‘*Our Member of Parliament is a poodle*’ ~ (adapted from one of the interviews, referring to the relationship between the Member of Parliament (MP) and the Prime Minister as one of puppet and puppeteer)

The party politics discourse has put centre-stage the perception that discussions on the justification of HS2 are premised on the private interests of the major political parties\(^\text{15}\). Moreover, prevalent inefficiencies or uncertainties in the evidence base of the project were directly linked to extant partisan interests. The party politics discourse has clearly

\(^{15}\) For the first time since the Second World War there is a coalition government in the UK, consisting of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats. It’s been installed since 2010 and has therefore possibly influenced the party political discourse of stakeholders. However, as the Conservative Party is the dominant coalition partner (and, allegedly, the Liberal Democrats are in the coalition to complement a majority of seats), between the lines ‘government’ can be read as ‘Conservative Party’, unless explicit references are made to the coalition.
emphasized that the political deliberations on HS2 were confined to backroom negotiations and realms of secrecy, which made these deliberations ineligible for public scrutiny. This is an interesting observation and, arguably, somewhat un-British when Lijphart’s (2012) assertion is accepted of the prevalence of interest advocacy and ‘tit for tat’ politics in the Westminster model of democracy. Also unlike Lijphart, an apparent consensus between political parties has been stressed as a key factor of success for HS2. This has been acknowledged and clearly articulated by David Rowlands (2009), chairman in the formative days of HS2 Ltd. He has stated that:

“Britain built only one new transport network in the twentieth century, the motorway system. Its origins lie in a report prepared for the war time Cabinet and one which attracted all party agreement. (...) [Building a network of high-speed rail] will need real ambition and consistency of purpose across a succession of Governments. It will require support across the political divide of a kind our forebears showed more than half a century ago. (...) In the end, a truly national network can only be built by national endeavour”.

When read in the context of HS2 and its justification, the quotation above seems to suggest that partisan divergence must be overstepped when a serious restructuring of the economy must be made. It implicitly argues that political issues bearing overriding national importance should be stripped from any private interests, thereby imprinting the idea that heroic political figures in times of crisis (such as the likes of Sir Winston Churchill) have unified the country in a similar way. The ‘national interest’ in HS2 has indeed been covered extensively by the collected data, for instance by the interviews (e.g. Chiltern Society; Chilterns Conservation Board; Speen Area Action Group), and documents that were used in the campaign against HS2 (e.g. AGHAST Federation, 2011; HS2 Action Alliance, 2013).

Whilst it was acknowledged by stakeholders in the Chilterns that HS2 was supported by both the Conservative Party (i.e. the coalition) and the Labour Party, the two largest parties in the country, this by no means suggested that the support was perceived to contribute to an overriding national interest, in terms of economic growth or otherwise. Rather, stakeholders argued that these two political parties used HS2 as a vehicle for electoral success, the logic of which was bluntly expressed by the Chiltern Ridges Action Group as one of “screw your locals and benefit somebody that doesn’t normally vote for you” (Interview). As the first formal proposal for an extensive high-speed rail network in Britain was made under a Labour government, with Andrew Adonis as the Transport Secretary, stakeholders sensed that the Labour Party has a vested interest in creating HS2 (e.g. Wendover Parish Councillor, Interview). However, extant interests in HS2 were also linked to the Conservatives. As the project documentation of HS2 Ltd (e.g. 2012a)
explicitly sought to emphasize how high-speed rail would benefit the North, it was argued that future electoral gains for the Conservatives are concentrated there. The Chiltern Ridges Action Group perceived HS2 as a “political ploy from the Conservative Party, trying to wiggle votes in the North and the Midlands” (Interview), areas which traditionally vote Labour.

With the coalition partners and the Labour Party in support of HS2, the feeling of being disenfranchised as a result of party politics featured prominently in the interviews (e.g. Chesham Town Councillor; Speen Area Action Group). The Councillor from Chesham Town argued that “in some ways as a protester you feel that you have nowhere to go when the three major parties support it at the national level. You know, you feel you have almost been disenfranchised” (Interview). The disenfranchisement argument therefore alludes to the impossibility to support anything different from the political parties in support of HS2: the Conservatives, the Labour Party and, to a lesser extent, the Liberal Democrats. A report from the All-party Parliamentary Group for High Speed Rail (2012), consisting of MPs belonging to these parties, has explicitly manifested the broad consensus on HS2. It was reported that in areas that traditionally vote conservative, such as the Chilterns, residents did not feel listened to [4].

The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), a populist right-wing party and a declared challenger to HS2, was identified by some of the stakeholders as a viable voting option in future elections. For the majority of the electorate in the Chilterns, by bringing into prospect the conservative background of the area, perhaps “the only way to vote against it would be to vote for UKIP” (Amersham Action Group, Interview). Indeed, support for UKIP could be seen displayed behind kitchen windows and on garage doors in many of the population centres across the Chilterns (e.g. Amersham, Chesham, Great Missenden, Wendover). However, the prominence of HS2 as a contested issue did not surface in previous elections. Reminiscent of the need for economic growth which permeated the 2010 General Election, the Amersham Action Group contended that “voting for somebody because they didn’t approve of HS2 would have been a bit of a luxury” (Interview). As UKIP has never won a seat in the House of Commons as of yet, arguably a vote on this party could have been considered by some as a vote lost.

For some stakeholders (but certainly not all) the electoral rules of the British democratic system were pinpointed as the main cause of the interest competition between the Conservatives and Labour. Arguably, elections based on the ‘first past the post’ principle were identified as an important obstacle for smaller political parties to become a factor of importance in political life. The Chesham Town Councillor did “not agree on ‘first past the post’, I do not think it is a good system. It means that small groups of people or people without support just don’t get represented, just don’t get representation (...). The Conservatives have a lot of money (...) and the Labour Party have support from the trade
unions. So it's difficult to get representation and get people elected [from smaller political parties]” (Interview). The councillor went on to argue that political agendas are set by the dominant political forces, becoming inadvertently narrow as a consequence of a bias towards vested interests in parliamentary representation.

Divided loyalty? Cabinet responsibilities versus local interests

Unlike in democratic systems where there is a strict separation between the legislative and executive branch of government (such as in the Netherlands; see Lijphart’s (2012) second variable in Table 2.1), MPs can fulfil the role of Secretary of State or Minister at the same time. This led the Chesham Town Councillor to assert in the interview that these MPs generally have a ‘divided loyalty’, their political responsibility hovering between representing the interests of the constituents and of the cabinet. Responsibilities may subsequently veer to either the electorate or the cabinet, depending on affinities or loyalties that are circumscribed to the geographical dimension. The Councillor referred in particular to the Transport Secretary Patrick McLoughlin (in office since September 2012), MP for Derbyshire Dales parliamentary constituency. As this constituency is not affected by HS2, it was asserted that in his capacity as the principle advocate of HS2 “the man doesn’t have to look at his electorate” (Chesham Town Councillor, Interview).

Following this train of thought, it was argued that the existence of parliamentary constituencies posed a twofold problem for local interest advocacy. The first problem was that MPs from ‘far away’ parliamentary constituencies (such as Derbyshire Dales) were reported to not care about HS2, as it will neither affect their constituents’ interests nor divide their loyalty. For instance, the Dunsmore Society asserted that “MPs in Suffolk, Norfolk, they don’t care. They are not going to upset their Tory Party or Labour Party bosses by saying I don’t agree with it” (Interview). As one of the project objectives of HS2 has revolved around spurring economic growth in the north of the UK (see Sub-section 4.1.3), it was also feared by some stakeholders that the anti-HS2 campaign could not count on the sympathy of MPs in northern counties. The Amersham & District Residents Association reasoned in the interview that, “until we get Labour MPs in the North who are being asked questions by constituents” on the real benefits of HS2, support from these MPs in the House of Commons seems unlikely.

The second problem was that the MPs of the affected constituencies were considered not doing enough to challenge HS2. This was purported to be caused by the cabinet responsibility of these MPs (e.g. South Heath Action Group, Interview; see also Table 2.1), as well as the reinforcement of party discipline through what is called the whip system [5]. A whip in the British political context is a party official that aims to enforce party discipline. Political inertia in advocating the local interest was directly attributed to
the determinant of cabinet responsibility. The Amersham & District Residents Association firmly argued that this is “the rule of parliamentary democracy: if you are in the government, you tell the government line” (Interview). Furthermore, since Patrick McLoughlin was the Chief Whip before becoming Transport Secretary, the Chilterns Conservation Board thought it very unlikely that he would oppose the Prime Minister. By referring to the ‘whip’ background of McLoughlin, it reasoned that “you can’t imagine somebody whose political career has depended on that for the last couple of years, then letting down the Prime Minister if he wants this railway to happen?” (Interview).

In the Chilterns the MPs of Chesham and Amersham parliamentary constituency and Aylesbury parliamentary constituency (for Wendover, amongst others) – which in area coverage are largely coterminous with the boundaries of the AONB – fulfilled the cabinet responsibilities of Welsh Secretary (Cheryl Gillan) and Minister for Europe (David Lidington), respectively. Subsequently, when Cheryl Gillan left the cabinet in September 2012 during a major mid-term reshuffle, whether willingly or unwillingly [6], it was reported that she undertook more efforts to mitigate the adverse impacts of HS2 on her constituency. The Speen Area Action Group illustrated the tension between local interest advocacy and cabinet responsibility by envisioning a discussion between one such MP with cabinet responsibilities and David Cameron, who was the Prime Minister when the interview was held:

‘[MP]: ‘My constituents are not very happy about this high-speed railway’.
[David Cameron]: ‘Well, they wouldn’t, would they, because it goes through their back garden’.
[MP]: ‘Well, no, but obviously I have to represent their views’.
[David Cameron]: ‘Don’t worry about that, [first name of MP]. Who’re they gonna vote for next time? They’re all conservatives, they’re not gonna vote Labour. Don’t worry, you’re gonna get in’” (Interview).

Cabinet responsibility could well work the other way around, however. Arguably, the combination of a position in the cabinet and affiliation with a specific location (i.e. the parliamentary constituency) can influence decisions that would not have been made otherwise. That is, the ability for MPs to negotiate location-specific issues with the relevant decision-makers could lead to altered decisions [5]. It has for instance been strongly suspected that the ‘loop’ around Tatton parliamentary constituency in Phase 2 of HS2 has been advocated by George Osborne, who was its MP as well as the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the cabinet [7]. In the Chilterns, the choice to exit the ‘Amersham tunnel’ at Mantle’s Wood instead of Old Amersham was ascribed to the ‘short-circuit line’ that existed between Cheryl Gillan as the Welsh Secretary and her colleague from the DfT.
Hence, by some the new tunnel was described as the ‘Gillan tunnel’ (e.g. Missenden Action Groups, Interview). In leveraging the local interest of Amersham and Chesham against cabinet responsibility in the HS2 project, Cheryl Gillan was quoted as saying “I would defy the party whip – be very, very sure of that” (cited in [8]).

Altogether it is safe to suggest that the political leverage that stakeholders attributed to MPs in advocating the local interest vis-à-vis party politics was substantial. Generally speaking, and in accordance with the notion of ‘divided loyalty’ between the official party line and local interest advocacy, it was noted that the campaign against HS2 has been considerably influenced by a divergence between party politics and local interests. The Amersham Action Group argued that “in the HS2 campaign at least some of the ones would be campaigning for UKIP, which puts the ones who are in the Conservatives Party in an awkward position because they are not allowed to do it” (Interview). Electoral campaigns are an interesting point to take forward, as these are events where party politics takes precedence in defining the local interest. To illustrate this point, in the weeks leading up to a by-election for a seat in the Amersham Town Council, UKIP leader Nigel Farage argued that this event “really is the first referendum on the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition’s decision to press ahead with HS2” (cited in [9]).

5.1.3 Conservation

The conservation discourse has synthesized comments, statements and social appraisals that stressed the ecological and sustainability consequences of HS2 crossing the Chilterns. Of the three discourses presented, it is the only ‘local’ discourse. The local dimension of the conservation discourse is that the status of the Chilterns as an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) has often been referred to. Indeed, stakeholders in the Chilterns have been quite active in stressing that HS2 jeopardizes a number of local interests, so much so that Andrew Adonis declared in 2011 that any stagnation in the HS2 planning process was likely to be caused by those ‘Nimbys in the Chilterns’ [6, 10]. Besides the orientation towards the Chilterns in this discourse, the regional and national stakeholders that were interviewed – Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire Wildlife Trust (BBOWT), the Woodland Trust and the Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE) – have contributed to views on conservation, without having strong opinions on other fronts. The Woodland Trust, for instance, is involved with HS2 simply for the reason of “trying to get the best deal for your local environment” (Interview).

For most of the stakeholders that advocated the interest of the Chilterns, in the situation where HS2 becomes irreversible, the best deal would undoubtedly be a long tunnel across the AONB. The South Heath Action Group contended that “the best
possible mitigation for this area should be achieved, and that should be a tunnel under the Chilterns AONB” (Interview). This view has been strengthened by the Chiltern Countryside Group, who asserted that “we must not forget that the AONB is a national park” (Interview) and that on-the-ground ecological destruction and blight must be avoided at all cost. However, stakeholders argued that the AONB played an inferior role in the sustainability appraisal of HS2 and in the EIA, thus far principally expressed through its scope and methodology (see Arup/URS, 2012a for the reporting on this). It was furthermore asserted that the project documentation downgraded the AONB status of the Chilterns to that of ‘arable farmland’ (e.g. Amersham Action Group, Interview; [11]), a development which does not support the claim that it is necessary to protect the value of the area from future infrastructure expansions.

Although bored tunnels were welcomed as a means to conserve the Chilterns AONB – in contrast to green tunnels or ‘cut & cover’ tunnels which are on the surface – the specific geology of the area raised doubts on their sustainability as well as their safety. The Amersham & District Residents Association commented that “Amersham sits on chalk rock aquifers” and that “nobody knows what will happen when you bore through those aquifers” (Interview). As regards surface-level concerns, the future quality and availability of natural resources has prominently featured within the conservation discourse. At the vanguard of expressing concern has been the Chilterns Conversation Board, as it has “a legal duty to oppose anything which is going to damage the Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty” (Interview). It was anticipated that major damage will be done to tranquillity in the area and the ability for people to use public footpaths and bridleways. The network of hedgerows will furthermore be fragmented, which affects the habitat of many insect species. In accordance with the general concern of the Woodland Trust, the bisection of ancient woodlands has been eyed by stakeholders as particularly damaging. No real mitigation measures to this could be foreseen, as “you can’t replace a tree which is 400 hundred years old” (Missenden Action Groups, Interview).

Conservation was perceived as severely impeded by assumptions and preconceptions made in the project documentation. The Chiltern Ridges Action Group noted that the project documentation preconceived that a decision was already made, prior to its passing in parliament (see for instance the wording used in HS2 Ltd, 2012e). With regards to environmental assessment, this stakeholder contested its role as a decision-support tool by arguing that “the purpose of defending the environment with EIAs and SEAs and the rest of it would never work because you wait until the government has done something, and then you try to get under it” (Chiltern Ridges Action Group, Interview). Therefore, environmental assessment did not provide a viable realm for public contestation. The evidence used in the 2012 EIA Scope and Methodology Report (Arup/URS, 2012a) was furthermore considered biased because habitat surveys were
based on small samples and collected in only one season, “from a very odd year” (Chilterns Conservation Board, Interview). As many landowners in the Chilterns denied access to the surveyors to do their work, the Amersham & District Residents Association suspected that assumptions had to be made which “have probably been to the benefit of them, not to the benefit of the AONB” (Interview).

Furthermore, the assumptions on journey time savings in the business case prevented a discussion on the line of route crossing the Chilterns. As the current scheme is preferred because of its time savings, the area will be crossed at its widest point (from the Chalfonts to Wendover). Embarking from the viewpoint that “drawing a straight line virtually between London and Birmingham perhaps was not the most sensible thing to do” (Wendover Parish Councillor, Interview), it was sensed that the assumptions made in the business case affected the likelihood of taking certain mitigation measures. In its aim to mitigate the noise impacts as much as possible, Chiltern Countryside Group wanted to discuss ‘on-track’ mitigation with HS2 Ltd. As this particular mitigation measure would entail a loss of speed in the operation of high-speed trains, HS2 Ltd was reportedly unwilling to discuss it on the grounds that it would compromise the cost-benefit ratio of the project. The Chiltern Countryside Group pictured this ‘non-discussion’ through the following short dialogue:

‘[HS2 Ltd]: ‘No’.
[Stakeholder]: ‘Why? It is only a delay of a few seconds on your journey time through the Chilterns.’
[HS2 Ltd]: ‘No. It will affect the business case’” (Interview).

5.2 A4DS

Civil society protest against the A4DS has been going on for over forty years, more or less coinciding with the creation of the embankment in the period 1968-1972. Since 2001 until 2011, the time period under investigation, sustainability discourses were principally informed by a new momentum in the planning process. The role of Rijkswaterstaat as the project planner in the A4DS project was determined by its mandate from the Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu (MI&M)17. Much in contrast to HS2, party politics in the A4DS project has played only a marginal role. Arguably, this has been a consequence of the long project history of the A4DS and the mounting necessity for Rijkswaterstaat to improve the functioning of the motorway system in the study area. Definitive agency was

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17 Before the cabinet Rutte-I was installed, in 2010, the Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu was called Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat (Department of Transport, Public Works and Water Management). Although some of documents are authored by the latter, the thesis always uses the name of the former, or its acronym.
ascribed to the various Infrastructure and Environment Secretaries (since 2001: Tineke Netelenbos, Roelf de Boer, Karla Peijs and Camiel Eurlings), transcending partisan swings. The Traffic Expert that was interviewed contended that Eurlings, under whose leadership the decision to construct was made, had an assertive ‘spade-in-the-ground’ attitude towards resolving the deadlock.

Within the period under investigation, three sustainability discourses have been identified: 1) justification; 2) ecological modernization; and 3) conservation. Whilst the justification discourse principally focused on questions of necessity and utility of the A4DS, the ecological modernization was aimed at reconciling ecological and sustainability concerns with the idea that the construction of the A4DS was a ‘fait accompli’ (e.g. Groenlinks Schiedam) and which offered opportunities for Midden-Delfland, the impact area. In contrast to these two discourses, both of which more or less embarked from the idea that the rationales for infrastructure capacity expansion are things that “one cannot change” (SP Delft, Interview), the conservation discourse put centre-stage the irrevocable and irreparable damage that will be done to Midden-Delfland. Table 5.2 lists the three discourses in order of salience and briefly tells what they are about and lists some of the nodes that have been used in the textual coding of the interviews with relevant civil society stakeholders (see Sub-section 3.5.2). Chapter 9 further discusses the results from applying textual coding to analyzing the sustainability discourses. The remainder of this section will explain the discourses in full detail.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>What is the discourse about?</th>
<th>Nodes used for interview coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>The A4DS is neither necessary nor useful for improving traffic access and reducing congestion in the study area.</td>
<td>e.g. ‘Evidence base’, ‘Systemic importance’, ‘Utility and necessity’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological modernization</td>
<td>The A4DS can be made more sustainable by mitigating the impacts on the impact area.</td>
<td>e.g. ‘Economic growth’, ‘Impact mitigation’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation</td>
<td>The A4DS impacts irreversibly on the impact area and its construction should therefore be halted.</td>
<td>e.g. ‘Midden-Delfland’, ‘Ecological destruction and blight’ ‘Natural resource’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2: The discourses in the A4DS project

5.2.1 Justification

The justification discourse focused on the underlying claims for the utility and necessity of constructing the A4DS. It was dominated by the storyline ‘no utility and necessity’ (e.g. Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland), which has been premised on the perceived absence of legitimate claims on the utility and necessity for constructing the A4DS in the project documentation. In the Dutch planning context, criticisms on the lack or absence of justification are grouped under the oft-heard alliteration ‘nut en noodzaak’; in the A4DS case, specifically, the ‘no utility and necessity’ storyline was not only adopted by a diverse
coalition of stakeholders but it was also considered worthy to comment on by decision-makers (e.g. IODS, 2001). Whilst the construction costs – estimated to be just under 900 million Euros – for seven kilometres of new infrastructure were sporadically referred to, the key element of the justification discourse entailed the inability of the A4DS to achieve the project objectives (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d; see also Sub-section 4.2.3). Put bluntly, it was from this sensed inability that SOBO labelled the A4DS as “one of the biggest farces in the history of motorways” (Interview).

Classified as a poorly contrived ‘emergency bandage’ (SOBO) in the motorway system, according to a considerable number of the stakeholders the A4DS is unable to relief congestion, which has been the backbone for the argumentation on the need for construction (e.g. Rijkswaterstaat, 2009c). In spite of – or rather because of – the expansion of the existing infrastructure capacity, Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland foresaw that “traffic will grow and the junctions remain pinch points” (Interview). Thus, it was prospected that congestion will be in equilibrium, either with or without the A4DS. With reference to the stated importance of the A4DS for the motorway system in the study area to be better able to facilitate traffic flow (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d), traffic experts from Delft University of Technology (TU Delft) have argued that a reversed situation will be the case (e.g. Hansen, 2009; 2010). SOBO argued that southbound traffic will invariably get ‘stuck’ after using the A4DS: “on the one side you get stuck on the A15 and on the other you get stuck on the A20” (Interview). In countering the underlying justification for additional motorway infrastructure between The Hague and Rotterdam, the justification discourse therefore emphasized the absence of utility and necessity for the A4DS.

According to a number of the stakeholders, the A4DS is not independent from other large-scale road infrastructure developments in the study area. It was purported that previous infrastructure developments have created the ‘inevitability’ to construct. Midden-Delfland Vereniging saw a clear link between the A4DS and the historical momentum in broader infrastructure developments in the past by asking the – rhetorical – question: “why would you extend the Beneluxtunnel when you are not going to construct the A4DS? What’s the use of that?” (Interview). It was similarly argued that Kethelplein junction will be unable to cater for the hefty increase in traffic, which will eventually create necessity for further infrastructure developments so as to alleviate this newly formed pinch point. Furthermore, the formal disposition of the alternative ‘A13+A13/16’ in the TN/MER was considered unjustified by Stichting Stop RW19/A4 (2009: 4), which argued that “The A4 cannot function without the A13/16/20 and which has been confirmed by the authors of the TN/MER!” With regards to the (fears of a) reiterating claim of necessity for additional

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18 Author’s note: The Beneluxtunnel has been widened in 2002 by means of boring a second hole. As such, it is commonly referred to as the Second Beneluxtunnel, albeit technically incorrect.
19 Author’s note: the alternative A13+A13/16 has sometimes been branded ‘A13/16/20’ as it involves these three motorways (i.e. the widening of the A13; the construction of the A13/16 and its connection with the A20 at Terbregseplein junction).
infrastructure, some of the stakeholders branded the continual expansion of the motorway system ‘salami tactics’ (e.g. Groenlinks Schiedam, Interview). Milieudefensie argued that such tactics reflect strategic conduct, as “people will look at it very differently when it [the broader development] is presented as a number of loose projects” (Interview).

Figure 5.2 shows in an abstract way how projects like the A4DS interlink with other infrastructure capacity expansion projects. Inherent in this abstract scheme of infrastructure capacity expansion is the occurrence of traffic growth, as this increases pressure on the demand for infrastructure as well as the performance of motorway networks. Traffic growth is presented as both natural occurrence (‘natural traffic growth’) and as induced by infrastructure capacity expansion (‘induced traffic growth’). The remainder of this sub-section will illustrate the tenets of the justification discourse by charting the debate on these two sources of traffic growth.

Figure 5.2: The continuous expansion of motorway capacity

**Natural traffic growth**

The natural growth of traffic indicates that the growth of motorized vehicle movements is independent from the influence exerted by traffic or transport policies. It is often intricately linked to economic growth, for instance in the statement made by the Founder of IODS that “every percentage of economic growth also causes a percentage of automotive growth. This is a one-on-one relationship, almost a law” (Interview). Thus, traffic growth is depicted as an unavoidable side-effect of economic growth. It is furthermore anticipated that road infrastructure either facilitates or restrains traffic flow – in contrast to traffic growth, although traffic flow and growth are intimately related. Thus, when Rijkswaterstaat
(2009c: 27) noted that “traffic growth on the A13 (...) is infinitesimal”, from the perspective of infrastructure development it was then able to conclude that “[t]his demonstrates a lack of capacity” (pp.27). The assumption of natural traffic growth is not uncontested, however. Whereas the Traffic Expert argued that natural traffic growth is a “simplification of doing nothing” (Interview), Milieudefensie contended that “we don’t make any effort to ensure that people will not travel on those moments when it is busy” (Interview). In Chapter 8 the assumption of natural traffic growth will be discussed in more detail.

According to some of the stakeholders, the key rationale for the need to construct the A4DS was suspected to be the assumption of natural traffic growth. Correspondent with the prime objective of the A4DS (‘improvement of a reliable and adequate traffic connection between The Hague and Rotterdam’; see Sub-section 4.2.3), Rijkswaterstaat (2009c) has argued that virtually all congestion on the A13 to date is caused by the combination of traffic growth and capacity shortage, particularly around Klein Polderplein junction where the A13 and the A20 adjoin. It furthermore expects the traffic volume to grow by around forty percent by 2020 compared with the volume in 2000, a growth which itself is caused by “an assumed growth of the population, economy, number of households, car ownership, etc.” (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009c: 27). This reasoning stipulates that traffic growth is not circumscribed to the world of transport and infrastructure but that it is a natural occurrence, intricately linked to broader socio-economic and demographic drivers. The Traffic Expert from TU Delft argued that natural traffic growth “is an assumption that informs the optimistic prognosis of mobility and which is welcomed by the government to state the necessity for [improving] accessibility” (Interview).

Natural traffic growth becomes particularly manifest when it is linked to norms of traffic accessibility, measured in terms of the relationship between motorway capacity and user intensity on the one hand and travel time on the other. The first norm pertains to the Intensity/Capacity Ratio (IC-ratio), a quantification of congestion, which according to the project documentation (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009c; 2009d) is above the threshold of 0.8 on the A13 and therefore unacceptable (see also Sub-section 4.2.3). This legitimates the construction of the A4DS, assuming it will lower the IC-ratio. However, Professor Ingo Hansen (2009), who works at the Design of Transport & Traffic Facilities Department at TU Delft, has contended that: 1) the traffic volume on the A13 only decreases by around two percent when the A4DS is constructed and does not significantly influence the IC-ratio on the A13 (based on the TN/MER, see Rijkswaterstaat, 2009c); and 2) intensity (I) is measured during peak hours and does not internalize the capacity (C) available during non-peak hours in the IC-ratio. As regards travel time, the government has formulated the target that travelling during peak hours may only take fifty percent longer than during non-peak hours (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 2004). Given that travel
time is influenced by congestion and that congestion is quantified on the basis of the IC-ratio, this norm further legitimates the construction of the A4DS.

**Induced traffic growth**

Induced traffic growth indicates that traffic grows as a result of infrastructure capacity expansion. As suggested by Figure 5.2, traffic growth can be induced by additional (large-scale) road infrastructure capacity expansion projects. A rule-like link between these two components has been observed by some of the stakeholders. For instance, Stichting Stop RW19/A4 argued that "every millimetre of additional asphalt means an increase in car mobility" (Interview). Figure 5.2 also suggests that induced traffic is a prime catalyst for the natural growth of traffic (the left ‘cycle’). This means that the ‘naturalness’ of traffic growth is propelled by man-made interventions in the motorway system.

The occurrence of induced traffic was – rather subtly – mentioned in the A4DS project documentation, as one of a number of bullet points that addressed the increase in traffic volume as a consequence of the A4DS. Rijkswaterstaat (2009c: iv) stated that “as a result of better (car) mobility and other choices made for travel destination and transport modality that result from this, the volume of car movements will increase in the Rotterdam-The Hague corridor”. When this statement is reinterpreted from the perspective of induced traffic, it can be read that traffic will grow when it is better facilitated by the existing motorway infrastructure. Similar to the discussion on natural traffic growth, in Chapter 8 the concept of induced traffic will be discussed in more detail.

According to some of the stakeholders, an imminent consequence of the A4DS is that people will use cars more often as their preferred mode of transport (e.g. Groenlinks Schiedam, Interview; Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland, Interview). When a new motorway is constructed, it will therefore attract people who would otherwise travel differently or not travel at all. A change in the ease of motorway access is also a pertinient issue. Whilst a portion of the expected traffic on the A4DS is generated from the adjacent A13, which has been the prime objective of the project (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d; but see Stichting Stop RW19/A4, 2009 for a rebuttal on its ability to achieve this objective), traffic volumes on this motorway before and after the construction of the A4DS are forecasted to stay roughly the same. Induced traffic results from additional capacity, yet places congestion in equilibrium. The induced increase of traffic could furthermore thwart the attainment of norms on congestion relief and travel time. In spite of this, it has been argued that the A4DS is needed to facilitate traffic flow. As regards travel time, Hansen (2009) has suspected that this norm comes in handy to state necessity for the A4DS, thereby arguing that:
“The ambition of the cabinet to reduce travel time during peak hours to a maximum of 150% of the journey time during off-peak hours is a fiction which can be commonly used to demonstrate the necessity for more motorways (...). The construction of the A4 Delft-Schiedam induces traffic and increases misery at the bottlenecks”.

5.2.2 Ecological modernization

The ecological modernization discourse has stressed that the construction of the A4DS should be as much as possible in accordance with the ecological characteristics of the impact area, Midden-Delfland. The Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland argued that, “if it [i.e. the A4DS] really has to come, then it should be a motorway that cannot be seen, cannot be heard and cannot be smelled” (Interview), which sums up the need for a holistic mitigation package. Arguably, in sharp contrast to the ‘no utility and necessity’ storyline in the justification discourse, the ecological modernization discourse (tacitly) accepts that the construction of the A4DS can be rhymed with criteria on ecological and social sustainability (e.g. Stichting Waterweg Wonen, Interview). Besides the use of the ‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’ storyline, the ecological modernization discourse can be characterized by the popularization of certain alternatives to the A4DS amongst stakeholders. These alternatives reified the idea that infrastructure capacity expansion is necessary, but they detailed different routes or infrastructure designs as an attempt to attenuate the adverse impacts on Midden-Delfland.

A pertinent aspect within the ecological modernization discourse is a shift of focus from the A4DS as a function of the motorway system in the study area towards one where its role in the impact area is put centre-stage. Specifically, it is advanced that the adverse impacts on Midden-Delfland can be mitigated provided certain measures are taken. Central to this shift of focus has been negotiations on a budget for doing all sorts of things that contribute to mitigating the adverse impacts of the A4DS. For instance, Midden-Delfland municipality will be receiving financial compensation that is to be used for sustaining agricultural practices and for keeping the impact area green [12]. Sound barriers in Vlaardingen and Schiedam are aimed at reducing the noise impacts from traffic and new sports facilities will be created on the tunnel roof so as to compensate for the loss of existing ones. In the covenant _IODS-Convenant_ (IODS, 2006), various stakeholders have agreed to these mitigation measures, instructed by earlier deliberation on mitigation (e.g. IODS, 2001). Principally, the covenant can be read as a ‘quality programme’ for Midden-Delfland.

Although stakeholders argued that the mitigation measures deliberated in the _Integrale Ontwikkeling tussen Delft en Schiedam_ (IODS; see also Chapter 6) are undoubtedly better than having no mitigation at all put into effect, some perceived them
only as a ‘creative solution’ to make civil society protest more reticent (e.g. Milieudelfensie, Interview). As such, it can be argued whether ecological modernization – to be understood as the integration of sustainability considerations into existing socio-economic structures and systems – is preferred over other discourses. This can be clearly illustrated by the comment of Stichting Waterweg Wonen, who reasoned that “we were aware that this motorway would be constructed, of course. (...) This has prompted us to choose for our own interest” (Interview), which in the case of this particular stakeholder – a housing association – is to negotiate the best possible deal for residents living along the alignment.

Arguably, ecological modernization has also been informed by its moderated view on the necessity to construct the A4DS. For some stakeholders that did not have a clear anti-A4DS mandate, it was easier to accept a package of mitigation measures rather than to protest against the A4DS as such. Midden-Delfland Vereniging indicated that many of its members would probably be dissatisfied with such protest. To meet the expectations of those members, it argued that “we have never explicitly stated: ‘we don’t want that road’. Instead we’ve advocated ‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’” (Interview). As a consequence, the willingness of certain stakeholders to listen to proposals for mitigation reciprocated the willingness of Rijkswaterstaat to offer a wide range of mitigation measures. The role of Rijkswaterstaat was described by KNNV Delfland in the interview as one of being ‘Santa Claus’, in the sense that it was generous towards stakeholders that accepted mitigation in exchange for their decision assent.

One of the striking features of the ecological modernization discourse is that for many stakeholders, impact mitigation was the highest attainable outcome of deliberating the A4DS. While reciting the names of four other stakeholders, the interviewee from Midden-Delfland Vereniging argued that “they all have thought: this is the most feasible solution and the best infrastructural design” (Interview). Others suspected foul play in the interaction between Rijkswaterstaat and such stakeholders, however. By calling the financial compensation measures “some sort of a bribe” (Interview), the Vereniging Tegen Milieubeding argued that Rijkswaterstaat and certain stakeholders conspired against the anti-A4DS campaign. In order to not become co-opted by the ‘establishment’, it consciously did not participate in deliberating mitigation measures.

As mentioned in Chapter 4, alternatives such as constructing the A54 or A14 motorway instead of the A4DS would avoid the thorny issue of bisecting Midden-Delfland. It can be argued that such alternatives reconfirm the need for new motorway infrastructures linking The Hague with Rotterdam, something which coincides with the broader socio-economic foundation of infrastructure capacity expansion and mobility. Other alternatives reconfirmed the need to facilitate travel, such as the ‘A4 met vaart’ alternative (see Box 5.2 and Figure 5.3), yet they proposed a different strategy on how to do that. This different strategy was the premise of a plan made by Milieudefensie for a
In countering the perpetual need for large-scale road infrastructure capacity expansion between The Hague and Rotterdam, Milieudefensie has argued that the conurbations of these two cities are already densely connected with each other. As such, the need for more enhanced travel options can therefore be better facilitated by expanding the network of public transport. The Green Metropole plan would secure the environmental value of the region, or what has been coined the ‘oxygen lungs’ function of the green areas between The Hague and Rotterdam [13, 14].

One alternative which has emerged from within civil society is the ‘A4 met vaart’. The project title is a play with words: in Dutch the word ‘vaart’ can mean both ‘speed’ and ‘canal’. Basically, the ‘A4 met vaart’ attempted to reconcile the need for additional infrastructure with the landscape characteristics of Midden-Delfland by first building a tunnel between Delft and Schiedam spanning the entire length of the A4, then placing this tunnel in a canal. This alternative was conceived to have the same construction costs as the A4DS (but see [15]). Originally conceived by a civil engineer, the feasibility of the alternative has a strong technical component. Amongst those in support of the ‘A4 met vaart’, knowledge on the appropriate techniques to use could be obtained. For instance, KNNV Midden-Delfland argued “we are very known with the technique of building a tunnel with water on top of it, so that it can float with the water functioning both as upwards and downwards force” (Interview). The combination of tunnel and canal would minimize the adverse impacts that the A4DS has on Midden-Delfland. Unfortunately for the advocates of this alternative, Rijkswaterstaat (2009d) has never included it as an official alternative to the incumbent A4DS scheme in the TN/MER, as it concluded that “the added value for environmental quality is limited and does not weigh up against the high costs” (pp.38). Therefore, legally speaking, the ‘A4 met vaart’ remained “just an idea” (IODS, Interview).

Box 5.2: The ‘A4 met vaart’

Figure 5.3: Illustration of the ‘A4 met vaart’ alternative (A4 met Vaart, 2013)
5.2.3 Conservation

The conservation discourse has stressed the irrevocable and irreparable harm that the A4DS will inflict upon the impact area. All stakeholders that were interviewed for this research admitted the value of Midden-Delfland, irrespective of how ‘value’ is defined. It was asserted that the critical importance of Midden-Delfland was also known amongst the political establishment. The Midden-Delfland Vereniging argued that “all political parties concerned, including the city councils of Rotterdam and The Hague and the Province [of Zuid-Holland] appreciate the value of this area” (Interview). The bisection of Midden-Delfland was perceived to contradict this apparent consciousness amongst decision-makers, however. A comparison was made between the A4DS and plans which surfaced in the 1960s to construct large-scale road infrastructures through historical city centres. Whilst most of these plans were eventually stalled – and allegedly, nowadays someone in support of them “would be sent to an institution as a total nutcase” (KNNV Delfland, Interview) – the plan to bisect Midden-Delfland has obtained approval in 2011.

Advocating the critical importance of Midden-Delfland was hampered by the lack of a protected status. KNNV Delfland was aware that Midden-Delfland “is not a Natura 2000 area. So, on legal grounds there was no case [against the A4DS], so to speak” (Interview). As such, it was advanced that the importance of Midden-Delfland is mainly to be found in providing an authentic (Dutch) landscape in an otherwise congested and urbanized environment (see also Provincie Zuid-Holland, 2012). The historical natural development of the area was portrayed to be characterized by the subsided soil consisting of peat and clay (e.g. Midden-Delfland Vereniging, Interview). Moreover, as has been confirmed by the Trajectnota/Milieu-effectrapportage (TN/MER; the environmental statement of the project) (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d), particular relevance was ascribed to the capacity of Midden-Delfland as a habitat for meadow birds (KNNV Waterweg-Noord, Interview).

By perceiving the impact area to be of critical importance, the conservation discourse has distinguished itself from the other two discourses simply by advancing ‘Midden-Delfland’ as a new problem framing. The Midden-Delfland Vereniging contended that “even if a new motorway would be necessary, then it should not cross Midden-Delfland. The destruction will be enormous” (Interview). Thus, transcending the question on whether the A4DS has merit, for instance for the performance of the motorway system in the study area, the conservation discourse stressed the disastrous consequences of its construction on Midden-Delfland. It was hoped that expressing concern on the adverse impacts of the A4DS would lead to the decision not to construct it.

However, stakeholders argued that the need to conserve Midden-Delfland could not properly be advocated. With its orientation towards impacts, EIA was considered
inadequate to formulate a judgement on the expressed need for a new infrastructure bisecting Midden-Delfland. Somewhat veering towards the justification discourse, The Stichting Stop RW19/A4 argued that “an EIA looks specifically at the impacts on certain flora and fauna species, at the influence of emissions on air pollution and at noise impacts, but it doesn’t look at whether the construction of a motorway is legitimate” (Interview). A midterm review of the Trajectnota/Milieu-effectrapportage (TN/MER) by a research institute called Commissie voor de Milieueffectrapportage (Commission for Environmental Impact Assessment) (2006), which assesses the quality of EIAs when requested by the competent authority, revealed a number of inadequacies in the TN/MER but did not comment on the critical ecological and sustainability function of Midden-Delfland. Perhaps this is no surprise when the procedural role of EIA is taken into account, in contrast to a more substantive one.

An important shortfall in EIA has been attributed to its inability in drawing hard-binding conclusions from the available evidence on impacts. In the A4DS project it was noted by stakeholders that the TN/MER did not adequately internalize evidence on impact magnitude. For instance, Vereniging Tegen Milieubedarf commented that “expensive researches have been conducted, but they have not been included in the TN/MER and the decision-making process” (Interview). This comment has been strengthened by the observation made by the Stichting Natuurmonumenten that EIA does not enforce the ‘right’ decision. It noted that “from the TN/MER it became apparent that the A4 [Delft-Schiedam] was worse than widening the A13, but they have simply shoved that aside” (Interview).

It is safe to suggest that the conservation discourse is entangled in a complex relationship with impacts, particularly when it comes to mitigating them. As mentioned in the ecological modernization discourse, compensation has played a central role in the A4DS planning process [16, 17]. When discussed in terms of conservation, the Vereniging Tegen Milieubedarf thought of compensation as a financial crumb (‘fooi’) when compared to the budget of around 900 million Euros necessary to construct the A4DS (Interview). Although the justification discourse borrows from a different set of arguments than from the one advanced in the conservation discourse, this latter point shows that ecological and sustainability advocates could well have benefited from addressing questions on utility and necessity. That is to say, compensation was conceived by some as a clever way to prevent a discussion on the need for motorway capacity expansion. Other mitigation measures reconfirmed the view that motorway capacity expansion and sustainability considerations could be reconciled, such as the use of cuttings or a land tunnel in the design of the infrastructure.
5.3 Summary

In the HS2 project, three sustainability discourses amongst stakeholders in the Chilterns have been identified: 1) a discourse on the justification of constructing HS2; 2) a discourse on the party politics of HS2; and 3) a discourse on protecting the Chilterns AONB against HS2 (i.e. conservation). In the ‘justification discourse’, the sense and nonsense of claims used by the government to support its decision to go ahead with HS2 was discussed. Premised on the formulation of a number of myths, the cost-benefit ratio of HS2 as foresighted in the project documentation was considered seriously flawed. In the ‘party politics’ discourse, the role of partisan cleavages and private political interests in the British political landscape were identified as a cause for the formulated need for HS2. The divided loyalty of MPs of the affected constituencies that have cabinet responsibility was advanced as a major impediment to more successful political opposition at the local level. In the ‘conservation discourse’, the AONB status of the Chilterns helped support the claim that the area should by all means remain unaffected by HS2. The irreversible damage that HS2 will do to the Chilterns AONB logically followed as a core discursive aspect.

In the A4DS project, three sustainability discourses have been identified: 1) a discourse on the justification of constructing the A4DS; 2) a discourse on the ability to reconcile motorway capacity expansion with ecological and sustainability objectives in Midden-Delfland (‘ecological modernization’); and 3) a discourse on the conservation of Midden-Delfland. In the ‘justification discourse’, the evidence base leading up to the expressed need for a second major traffic connection between Rotterdam and The Hague was contested. This contestation principally revolved around issues of traffic growth (natural and induced) in relation to the capacity of the motorway system in the study area. In the ‘ecological modernization discourse’, the need to reconcile the motorway capacity expansion with ecological and sustainability principles was espoused by the stakeholders. Reconciliation could amongst others be reached by extensive mitigation of the adverse impacts of the A4DS or by choosing for alternative infrastructure schemes. In the ‘conservation discourse’, the assumption that Midden-Delfland fulfilled a critical ecological function in the study area was used by stakeholders to try and prevent the A4DS from being constructed.

Throughout the chapter it has become apparent that EIA has played only a marginal role in the sustainability discourses of stakeholders. Whilst the role of environmental assessment in major infrastructure schemes such as HS2 and A4DS will become the subject of debate in the concluding chapter of this thesis, Chapter 9, at the moment it is suffice to note that stakeholders have moved beyond the remit of EIA to enforce their message. In campaigning against HS2, making claims pertaining to counter-expertise and lobbying the local MP were considered critical activities. Correspondingly, in
the A4DS case counter-claims were produced by stakeholders so as to weaken the
evidence base of utility and necessity. In the conservation discourses of both the projects,
it was precisely a lack of substance in EIA that was noted by stakeholders. This
observation could suggest that the prime motivation of stakeholders to have become
involved in protesting HS2 and the A4DS is not reciprocated by the conduct of
environmental assessment.
Chapter 6 On institutional design

This chapter maps the institutional designs of the HS2 and A4DS projects, thereby putting the mode of public engagement centre-stage. In the case of HS2, specific attention has been paid to national and local institutions for public engagement. As is shown most notably in the justification discourse (see Sub-section 5.1.1), stakeholders have privileged a lot of their time and efforts to criticizing the evidence base of the project. However, it can be debated whether the institutional design of HS2 (Phase 1) has been an adequate ‘fit’ to what stakeholders felt were critical topics of discussion. Similarly, it is worth investigating whether the institutions in the A4DS project have been able to accommodate the ‘no utility and necessity’ storyline as espoused by stakeholders in the justification discourse (see Sub-section 5.2.1). For instance, this could entail an institutional design where the justification of the A4DS is discussed. In both the HS2 and A4DS, the role of environmental impact assessment (EIA) in mediating public engagement should furthermore be examined – regardless of whether such engagement has been on the grounds of environmental protest. It could well turn out that EIA must be assigned only a marginal role where debate on the allegedly flawed project justification is concerned.

The UK and the Netherlands have often been depicted as democratic opposites (e.g. Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Lockhart, 2011; Lijphart, 2012). More specifically, they are conceived of as representing the majoritarian and consensual model of representative democracy, respectively. Although there seems to be some convergence in this respect in recent years (Hendriks and Michels, 2011), both states continue to provide a distinct interpretation of democratic representation. In a national referendum in the UK in 2011 on the ‘alternative vote’, a relatively small shift away from strict majority rule where voters would be allowed to rank electoral candidates according to preference, the overwhelming majority of British voters (67.9%) opposed the electoral reform (House of Commons Library, 2011a). In the Netherlands, it can be pondered whether the consensus politics so fervently celebrated by Lijphart (1968) is still in effect. A large number of recent cabinets (in the period 2002-2012) have not been able to fulfil their four-year governing term (e.g. the cabinets Balkenende-I, -II and -IV, and Rutte-I) due to continued struggle between the partners in coalition. Nonetheless, the institutions that are to nurture consensus amongst the parties involved have remained in place and continue to exert their influence on democratic practice.

Notwithstanding these extant changes, the thesis has inquired into the projects of HS2 and A4DS, two instances of what may perhaps be coined ‘executive-level politics’. Although it is argued throughout the thesis that institutional design differences in the broader political realm impact on micro political processes, such as the planning of new rail and road infrastructure, this by no means precludes project-specific institutions that...
deviate from the established British and Dutch ‘constitutional’ institutions as we know them. Furthermore, compressed within the logic of infrastructure projects writ large, HS2 and A4DS could show similarities that do not easily compare with the constitutional differences in democratic representation. For instance, informed by the perceived exhaustion of other avenues, both projects have been marred by court battles between the state and the ‘anti-campaign’ on the underlying project justification (Raad van State, 2011a; Royal Courts of Justice, 2013). This seems to suggest that political authority and civil society stakeholders have been unable to find common cause during the bargaining, negotiations and deliberations in the project, irrespective of the difference between majoritarianism and consensualism.

In following up what is stated above, this chapter will navigate the institutional designs of the projects. Modes of public engagement play a key role in doing so, as it has been argued earlier (in Chapter 2) that institutions mediate the degree of involvement of civil society in issues bearing strong public interest. Extant dimensions of public engagement in the two projects will first be identified and then elaborated upon. This is particularly valuable when the difference between a ‘justification-oriented’ and ‘impacts-oriented’ form of public engagement needs to be emphasized, something which has also become apparent in the discourses of the projects. The chapter will summarize the various orientations of civil society in project planning contexts and draw out the main differences or commonalities that have been observed in the institutional designs of HS2 and A4DS.

6.1 HS2

During the HS2 (Phase 1) planning process, ‘public engagement’ – designating the interplay between political authority and civil society and the capacity of the anti-HS2 campaign to organize protest – was specifically tailored to the national scope and geographic characteristics of the project. This means that the rationale for public engagement wavered between discussing claims on HS2 and the national interest, on the one hand, and discussing how adverse impacts caused by infrastructure construction could best be mitigated. Pursuant to this difference, two dimensions in the institutional design of the HS2 (Phase 1) project can be identified. In the national dimension, a public consultation process has shaped the mode of discussion between government and civil society on the national importance of HS2 and, albeit to a lesser extent, also on the scope and methodology when assessing the environmental impacts. Civil society may perhaps best be rebranded as ‘the public’ in the context of the institutional opportunities granted to citizens to voice their opinion on HS2. In the community dimension, public engagement
with the project has been accommodated by institutions where the local impacts and mitigation measures associated with the line of route were centralized.

6.1.1 The national dimension: public consultation

As a result of the envisaged scope of the project in terms of its likely impacts at the national level, largely reflecting the economic justification as espoused in key parts of the project documentation (e.g. HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011; HS2 Ltd, 2012a; HS2 Ltd, 2012b), the costs and benefits have been the core characteristics of HS2 in the national dimension. Engagement with these characteristics have not been restricted to stakeholders in the Chilterns but can be found in areas along all the prospective lines of route of HS2 (Phase 1 and Phase 2), as well as among broader civil society (e.g. HS2 Action Alliance, 2013), think tanks (e.g. Adam Smith Institute, 2011; RAC Foundation, 2011) and research or academic institutes (e.g. Aizlewood and Wellings, 2011). Debate on the economic justification of HS2 has revolved around various interrelated issues, the most prominent of which have been rail passenger demand forecasting and journey time savings (HS2 Action Alliance, 2013; see also the ‘Justification’ discourse).

The national dimension has been most prominently reflected in the public consultation on the need for HS2 and the ‘Y network’ that the government undertook in January 2012 (hence, the ‘preferred option’ was sometimes termed ‘post consultation route’. See e.g. HS2 Ltd, 2012d). There was also public consultation on the scope and methodology that were to be used in the EIA, but this has not been of decisive importance in the reflections of stakeholders. Notwithstanding stakeholders’ observations of a strong partisan undercurrent in the decision-making process (see Sub-section 5.1.2), HS2 was framed by the government as a ‘British’ issue – rather than as a ‘Conservative’ or ‘Labour’ issue, for instance. When introducing the public consultation on HS2, then Transport Secretary Philip Hammond (2011) exemplified this type of framing by arguing that “[o]ur competitors already recognise the huge benefits high speed rail can bring and are pressing ahead with ambitious plans. Britain cannot afford to be left behind”. The competitors are other countries like France and Germany which constructed high-speed rail schemes in recent times. As such, the national dimension has been played out in institutions that were tailored to the idea that HS2 is an issue of national interest [18].

In the public consultation process on HS2, spanning the length of a couple of months in 2011, over 55,000 responses from the general public were compiled and analyzed by a consultancy firm called Dialogue by Design (2011) and subsequently

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20 This reference (where parentheses are used) is a newspaper article. To see how newspaper articles are referenced, please refer to the second footnote of Chapter 4.
submitted to HS2 Ltd21. Leading in the public consultation were seven questions. To varying degrees these questions related to the role and function of a high-speed rail network in the UK, predominantly focusing on the future state of transport and long-distance connectivity within the perspective of economic growth. The consultation was by and large aimed at uncovering the potential for HS2 by canvassing public support for high-speed rail infrastructure development in the UK and also whether a rail infrastructure capacity expansion project such as HS2 is an issue of national interest. Table 6.1 shows the seven questions used in the public consultation (adapted from HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question number</th>
<th>Full or abridged transcriptions of the questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Do you agree that there is a strong case for enhancing the capacity and performance of Britain’s intercity rail network to support economic growth over the coming decades?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Do you agree that a national high speed rail network from London to Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester (the Y network) would provide the best value for money solution (...)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Do you agree with the Government’s proposals for the phased roll-out of a national high speed rail network, and for links to Heathrow Airport and the (...) Channel Tunnel?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Do you agree with the principles and specification used by HS2 Ltd to underpin its proposals for new high speed rail lines and the route selection process (...)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Do you agree that the Government’s proposed route including the approach proposed for mitigating its impacts is the best option for a new high speed rail line (...)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Do you wish to comment on the Appraisal of Sustainability of the Government’s proposed route (...) that has been published to inform this consultation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Do you agree with the options set out to assist those whose properties lose a significant amount of value as a result of any new high speed line?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1: The seven questions used in the public consultation on HS2

*Note: the full transcriptions can be found in (HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011: 25-26)*

Reciprocating the scope and focus of the public consultation on HS2 and the national interest, HS2 Action Alliance (2011a) drafted a comprehensive response to the seven questions that were advanced. This response referred explicitly to the link between the assumed benefits of HS2 and its ‘mythical proportions’ (see Sub-section 5.1.1). For adherents of the justification discourse, for example, debate on HS2 has been largely reduced to a discussion of the cost-benefit ratio of the project. In the Chilterns, stakeholders demonstrated an eager interest in discussing the cost-benefit ratio of the London-Birmingham rail link (e.g. Chiltern Society, Interview). However, some of them admitted that it has been a conscious choice by the anti-HS2 phase 1 campaign to also

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21 After the public consultation had been completed it transpired that a number of responses were omitted in the consultation analysis (see e.g. Dialogue by Design, 2012; [19]). Arguably, this omission has impacted on the trust relationship between the advocates of HS2 and those campaigning against it (see also Chapter 7).
discuss the cost-benefit ratio of the project in its entirety (e.g. Wendover HS2, Interview). After all, Phase 1 and Phase 2 together constitute the full ‘Y’ and are therefore intimately linked.

Because the public consultation was the first serious form of communication between the government and the public, a considerable number of reflections on the seven questions could be obtained from the stakeholders in the Chilterns. One such reflection amounted to the instrumental use of public consultation to justify the HS2 project, notwithstanding all the counter-evidence that contradicts its justification (e.g. Wendover HS2, 2010; and the interview with the same stakeholder). The Amersham & District Residents Association noted that the project convenors “spent the best part of a billion pounds already on nonsense like these consultations to keep alive a project that by any rational measurement should have died some time ago” (Interview). Furthermore, analogous to the observations made by HS2 Action Alliance (2011a), it was suggested that the questions were putting words in the mouths of those providing the responses. The MP for Chesham and Amersham parliamentary constituency, Cheryl Gillan, responded to the public consultation by stating that “there has been a strong feeling that the questions themselves have been drafted in a leading fashion to obtain positive responses for the scheme” (2011: 2).

As may furthermore be abstracted from the leading questions in the public consultation, particularly the first two, emphasis was placed on economic growth and whether a high-speed rail network represents good value for money. Some of the stakeholders reasoned that other issues were largely ignored as a consequence. For instance, the stakeholder from the Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire Wildlife Trust (BBOWT) argued that, “in relation to the public consultation, I don’t think that nature conservation issues were taken on at all” (Interview). Due to this perceived one-dimensionality of the issue framing in the public consultation on the need for HS2 and on what such a rail network should look like, BBOWT went on to suggest that “the public appear less satisfied with the project after the consultation than they were before – presumably because they largely feel their issues have been ignored” (Interview).

BBOWT’s observation that public satisfaction with the planning process of HS2 has diminished because of serious flaws in the public consultation is at odds with the view espoused by the competent authority that the outcomes of public consultation exert considerable influence (HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011). For instance, the Department for Transport (DfT) has indicated that public consultation has played an important role in determining the location of the proposed line of route and certain design choices (e.g. with or without tunnel), something which has also impacted on the line of route crossing the Chilterns. In response to the recommendation of the HCTC in late 2011, the Transport Secretary at the time, Justine Greening, argued that:
"Due to concerns and suggestions raised in consultation, the Government has decided to amend the line of route in a number of respects. These changes will help to mitigate the impacts of the line on the natural environment and on communities near the line, including in Ruislip and the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty" (cited in House of Commons Transport Committee, 2012: 1).

Besides the seven questions used in the public consultation, the House of Commons Transport Committee (HCTC) has provided a platform for those wanting to further engage in discussing HS2. As the prime objective of the HCTC is to scrutinize transport policies and to evaluate the work carried out by the DfT, it has been willing to collate evidence (both written and oral) from a diverse array of civil society stakeholders as well as scientists and academics (see e.g. House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011b; 2011c). Many stakeholders from the Chilterns seized the opportunity to provide evidence, such as the Chiltern Society who admitted that it was “drawn into this debate because (...) an HSR route through the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) is proposed” (cited in House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011c: w215), but which nevertheless went on to discuss the flawed justification of HS2. However, as the HCTC consists of Members of Parliament (MPs), it is not apolitical but has adopted a firm standpoint in the HS2 debate. For example, it has shown commitment to HS2 by stating that “we support a high-speed rail network for Britain, developed as part of a comprehensive transport strategy also including the classic rail network, road, aviation and shipping” (House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011a: 3).

Whilst the public consultation on HS2, best to be interpreted as an idea or proposal for action, has been supported by a project document which set out its rationales (HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011), such a document has remained absent in the public consultation on the scope and methodology to be used in the EIA. However, at the time of writing the thesis, the draft environmental statement has been advanced by HS2 Ltd (2013) as the main consultative document for the environmental statement, due in late 2013 or 2014. Many stakeholders have made their views on the EIA scope and methodology known to HS2 Ltd by submitting written responses and comments (e.g. Chiltern Countryside Group, 2012; Chilterns Conservation Board, 2012a). It is fair to suggest that for most of the stakeholders the public consultation on EIA scope and methodology has been of less importance than the public consultation on the very idea for HS2. Whilst the latter provoked stakeholders to comment on justification, the former did not facilitate such comments to be voiced.

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22 HSR = High Speed Rail
Stakeholders noted that the absence of a leading document to accommodate public consultation on the scope and methodology of the EIA has violated the principle of access to information in environmental decision-making (e.g. Cholesbury Action Group, Interview), set forth in the Aarhus Convention (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1998). According to them, the lack of information prevented a discussion on the impacts of HS2 compared to alternatives, such as Rail Package 2 (RP2). The Chilterns Conservation Board argued that “they [i.e. HS2 Ltd] have never given enough information about the alternatives which the Aarhus Convention requires, that it should be presented with alternatives at an early-enough stage to influence the decision. We were never given that opportunity” (Interview). Although one of the five judicial reviews submitted to the court by HS2 Action Alliance dealt with the lack of public participation (see Royal Courts of Justice, 2013 for the full judicial review), the verdict has not been in favour of the anti-HS2 campaign. As a consequence, the public consultation on the scope and methodology of the EIA – as well as the implementation of a strategic environmental assessment (SEA) procedure – has not changed as a result of protest.

6.1.2 The local dimension: community engagement

“Seeking the best, if it comes to the worst” (A view espoused by Buckinghamshire County Council when HS2 will be constructed. Cited in [20])

The second dimension in the public engagement refers to the community engagement of national government, represented by HS2 Ltd, with those affected by the line of route. As a direct consequence of this, a different momentum in the civil society campaign against HS2 can be observed. The stakeholder from the Missenden Action Groups admitted that “I have been campaigning against as much about the waste of money as about the destruction of the countryside” (Interview). This admission has certainly reverberated in the views of many of the stakeholders. The institutions that were tailored towards accommodating discussions on local adverse impacts are different from the national public consultation in that access to them was restricted to local stakeholders. At the local level, opportunities for public engagement with HS2 Ltd existed mainly in the form of bilateral meetings and the community forum (CF). Whilst bilateral meetings designated one-on-one meetings between local stakeholders and HS2 Ltd, the CF was intended to bring several stakeholders together, based on distance or a shared affinity with geographical characteristics.

This sub-section focuses explicitly on the CF. In correspondence with the difference between the two dominant forms of protest described earlier, i.e. justification-oriented versus impacts-oriented forms of protest, it was asserted that “the community
forums are focused more on mitigating: ways in which mitigation can be and should be effected, rather than the economic argument” (Missenden Action Groups, Interview). This has meant that the CF invigorated interest in impacts as outcomes of development, thereby separating localized ‘line of route’ protest in Phase 1 from other forms of protest. As the CF institutionalized forms of communication between HS2 Ltd and local stakeholders, protest based on the underlying necessity claim for a large high-speed rail network could not be debated. Maps of the area where the line of route would cross and that were distributed by HS2 Ltd amongst the stakeholders participating in the CF is a good case in point, as they were more or less circumscribed to the villages and towns where these members lived.

The civil society stakeholders that could become a member of the CF were selected by HS2 Ltd; as such, the forums were not open to the general public. Although there was no strict protocol on who should be considered for membership of the CF, members were generally considered to be directly affected by HS2 based on geographic proximity to the line of route. Under these conditions some of the stakeholders experienced difficulty in getting access to the CF. This difficulty was for instance experienced by stakeholders in Chesham, which is two miles off the line of route (Chesham Society, Interview; Chesham Town Councillor, Interview). However, local stakeholders stressed that Chesham will severely be affected by road closures and construction traffic, particularly on the B485 ending on Church Street. For some stakeholders the inability of the DfT to properly understand or assess local impacts came as no real surprise. The South Heath Action Group argued that the HS2 infrastructure “is just a straight line and drawn by somebody on the map that never left the office” (Interview).

Two CFs initially covered the Chilterns AONB in the original set-up of the community engagement, located in the Chalfonts and Wendover. However, the stakeholders commented that the CFs became ineffective as a consequence of too wide a diversity of opinions and sentiments. This did not facilitate a productive dialogue with HS2 Ltd, nor between stakeholders themselves. To illustrate, the Wendover Society – which advocates the interests of Wendover – argued that “one of the problems was that Wendover was linked with Great Missenden in the original community forum. But the first meeting was dominated by people from action groups (...) from miles away, places I’ve not heard of” (Interview). The geographic scope of the CF led to a sensed disparity between some of the forum participants, the interests of which were sometimes denounced as parochial to indicate that they were privately driven (and, thus, not necessarily in the interest of the Chilterns AONB as a whole). To resolve this divergence in interest advocacy, stakeholders requested and got accepted the Central Chilterns
Community Forum (CCCF), roughly defined as the distance between Shardeloes and Leather Lane along the A413.

Stakeholders’ views on the CF were generally negative. From a more fundamental point of view, transcending the scope of the CF, stakeholders were unable to stress their dissatisfaction with HS2. Perhaps as a way to document evidence on local resistance, stakeholders in the Chilterns wanted to have their protest against HS2 on the record alongside their participation in the CF. In anticipation of a CF meeting later in the evening, the South Heath Action Group noted it is likely that “at the community forum tonight, somebody will say hopefully that we totally disagree with HS2, full stop. And we want that minuted” (Interview). Whilst the CF was considered unsuitable as an institution to discuss the very concept of high-speed rail, it was the logical action environment for stakeholders in the Chilterns in which to develop their engagement activities. That is to say, for stakeholders the participation in the CF and the minutes associated with it “allows us an opportunity to make our points, ask our questions and to record them” (South Heath Action Group, Interview), notwithstanding the widely shared feeling that the CF was an ineffective institution.

This feeling of ineffectiveness largely revolved around the suspicion that HS2 Ltd facilitated the CF only to comply with certain legal requirements on public participation. In referring to HS2 Ltd, the Chiltern Society asserted that by facilitating the CF “they want to be able to say they ticked the box. They want to be able to say: ‘we have met the community’” (Interview). Requests that were made regarding a number of things, for instance requests to put the minutes online or to add legends to the maps that were distributed in the CF meetings, were not followed up according to the stakeholders. Furthermore, HS2 Ltd was considered unresponsive to the ecological and sustainability concerns of stakeholders in the Chilterns. This unresponsiveness adversely affected the manner of dialogue during CF meetings. The South Heath Action Group sensed that the HS2 Ltd staff involved with setting up the community engagement “want to tell you what they want to tell you and they don’t want you to answer back. This is the overall feeling” (Interview). It argued that dialogue between HS2 Ltd and the stakeholders could often be described as adversarial.

Amidst the many negative remarks that addressed the CF, very few remarks addressed the potential for stakeholders to make substantive changes through public engagement. As stated earlier, these changes are to be found within the remit of impact mitigation such as changes made to the infrastructure design. In Wendover the extension of a green tunnel – which will mainly mitigate noise pollution – was celebrated as a ‘victory of dialogue’. The Wendover Society (2012) argued that “[t]he announcement in October 2012 that HS2 Ltd had accepted the case was a considerable relief and demonstrated that HS2 managers will listen and can react to strong representations”. Similarly, the
Wendover Parish Councillor reasoned that the extended green tunnel is “a piece of mitigation that I think has been done by the efforts of the community here. It wouldn’t have been offered free and gratis by the government, if we hadn’t had the opposition to the railway” (Interview).

Successes in stakeholder advocacy such as the one described above have been more exception than rule, according to a number of the stakeholders. Described as ‘pretty miserable affairs’ by the Chilterns Conservation Board, ill feelings towards the advocates of HS2 – the Prime Minister, MPs, the Environment Secretary, the DfT and HS2 Ltd – have persisted amongst the large majority of civil society groups opposing the rail link crossing the Chilterns. From the perspective of institutional design, a lack of democratic norms such as public contestation and participation was identified as the main barrier towards better public engagement. Not only has this flaw been recorded in the local dimension; indeed, the Campaign to Protest Rural England (CPRE), a nationwide non-governmental organization (NGO), argued that “there’s a culture problem in HS2 Ltd” in terms of providing opportunities for debate and responding to queries and questions from the public (Interview). The Speen Area Action Group summed up this generic feeling of disappointment with the institutions for public engagement by stating that “we have the local community planning forums, the community forums and the national forums they should be feeding into. That was the framework we were presented to by HS2 Ltd. This is how it developed: without a dialogue, without any, if you like, reciprocal communication” (Interview).

As has been clearly expressed throughout this sub-section, a general feeling of discontent has permeated the stakeholders in their dealings with HS2 Ltd. That is to say, it was argued that crucial information was not available, withheld from public scrutiny or ambiguous [21], and consequently adversely affected the efforts of the stakeholders to formulate appropriate response strategies. In returning to the traffic-related impacts that may occur in Chesham, for example, there was little or no information available as to how this problem was going to be dealt with. In spite of the “spirit of engagement” that HS2 Ltd has associated with the CF (cited in Chesham & Amersham Conservative Association, 2012), sometimes it took the efforts of a political heavyweight such as a MP to obtain the necessary information on how certain impacts were mitigated. In Chapter 7 this ‘spirit of engagement’ will be further elaborated when democratic satisfaction and political trust in the HS2 planning process are put centre-stage.

6.2 A4DS

The A4DS is a motorway capacity expansion project with national proportions. This is evidenced not least by the status of the A4 motorway as a ‘triple-A’ connection, accorded
by the Dutch government (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 2004). The need to expand capacity for the national motorway system as a whole has furthermore been underlined by Rijkswaterstaat (Rijkswaterstaat, 2012b: 4), which has stated that its “goal is a robust and coherent mobility system with enough capacity”. In contrast to the HS2 case, however, the relation between the national and the local dimension does not fare well with the institutional design of the A4DS planning process. Although the A4DS has been considered pivotal for the smooth operation of the motorway system in the study area and beyond (see more on this point in Chapter 8), the institutional opportunities and constraints within public engagement have been tailored to the local dimension.

Notwithstanding the absence of a nationwide public consultation, two dimensions within the institutional design of the A4DS project have been identified: (1) a consultative dimension where those eligible to do so could react to key stages in the project; and (2) a deliberative dimension where the ecological and sustainability concerns of the A4DS could be discussed. Strong resemblance with the HS2 project becomes apparent when it is taken into account that the freedom to deliberate was confined to an expressed need for motorway capacity expansion (e.g. IODS, 2001). That is, the parameters of ‘true’ deliberation as an enhanced form of public engagement (see Chapter 2) restricted those adherents of the justification discourse from expressing their views on the ‘utility and necessity’ of the A4DS.

6.2.1 The consultative dimension

Consultation in the A4DS project has generally meant that stakeholders – groups as well as citizens – could make their viewpoints (‘zienswijzen’) known to the competent authority (e.g. Stichting Natuurmonumenten, 2010). Such a procedure of ex post consultation is usually applied in projects where the construction of large-scale infrastructures is concerned. Typically, Rijkswaterstaat gives notice of these viewpoints in a Nota van Antwoord (Note of Response) (e.g. Rijkswaterstaat, 2010a; 2010d), which is a project document where the viewpoints of those eligible (‘ontvankelijk’) to express them are collated and subsequently responded to. Eligibility is determined by the Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht, the law that regulates the relationship between citizens and the national government (to be interpreted as the bureaucracy, not the cabinet) (Rijksoverheid, 2013). Roughly speaking, stakeholders are considered eligible when their interest is directly at stake in the planning process, such as individuals or organizations (e.g. Midden-Delfland Vereniging, a group specific to the impact area), or of organizations whose interest is indirectly affected (e.g. Stichting Natuurmonumenten, a national environmental advocacy group).
In the A4DS project a *Nota van Antwoord* has been published for both the *Trajectnota/Milieu-effectrapportage* (TN/MER) (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010a) and the *Ontwerp Tracébesluit*, which is the proposed route decision (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010d). The majority of viewpoints on the proposed route decision (two thirds) stressed the assumed utility and necessity of the A4DS in terms of traffic management [22]. Furthermore, a considerable number of viewpoints (one third) expressed the feeling that economic growth prevailed over ecological and sustainability criteria in the goals hierarchy of the project [22]. It is therefore safe to suggest that consultation on the route decision facilitated, if not favoured, contestation against the overarching rationale of the project. As regards the *TN/MER*, which is the environmental statement of the project, Rijkswaterstaat has made a distinction between viewpoints addressing the alternatives (i.e. ‘A4DS’ and ‘A13+A13/16’), the scope of the environmental statement as well as the preferred ways to mitigate the expected adverse impacts.

Although the specific focus of the *TN/MER* is to provide information on how the impacts of the two alternatives have been compared on the criteria of EIA (e.g. scoping, impact prediction, mitigation, et cetera), the justification for expanding the motorway capacity remained a salient theme of contestation. A substantial number of viewpoints have stressed that additional infrastructure is not sustainable and that it attests to the prevalence of economic growth over building a sustainable future. Furthermore, it was argued that additional infrastructure induces traffic both in the shorter and longer term and adversely affects levels of livelihood and nature. These viewpoints share resemblance with the conservation discourse and the justification discourse, thus combining elements of sustainability advocacy and the utility and necessity of additional infrastructure to facilitate traffic flow. Rijkswaterstaat (2010a: 61) has responded to these viewpoints by stating the following:

> “The policies of this cabinet aim to parallel or reciprocate economic growth and a sustainable society. The construction of new roads, which accommodates an increase in traffic, contributes to these policies. A prerequisite is that the effects for nature, environment and livelihood are internalized in the design. This prerequisite has been met satisfactorily in the chosen alternative A4DS”.

People’s use of the consultation on the *TN/MER* as a springboard for putting the flawed justification of the A4DS centre-stage is interesting in that it may change the scope of protest against large-scale infrastructure projects. That is, consultation on a *prima facie* environmental document such as the *TN/MER* yields comments that do not reciprocate the scope of impact assessment. Instead, those with an interest in such projects prefer to focus on fundamental aspects (e.g. ‘no utility and necessity’) rather than to stress the
adverse impacts that they entail. As such it can be debated whether EIA is suitable for providing an adequate institutional milieu for civil society engagement with the justification of infrastructure projects – even though the initial engagement has emanated from a concern over ecological and sustainability impacts. The Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland claimed that “in the first instance EIA should provide evidence on: ‘is this motorway useful and necessary?’ That has never happened” (Interview). According to SOBO, the TN/MER does not promote a reciprocal dialogue between the project planners and stakeholders. It argued that debate on justification could be done only “to a limited extent. That extent was: the location of the infrastructure was already decided upon, so it was impossible to locate it to somewhere else” (Interview).

Two external legislative interventions

Opportunities for public engagement in the A4DS project have to some extent been influenced by two developments in legislation. These developments can be rightly called interventions, as they have been external to the legislation of major infrastructure projects (e.g. EIA, Tracéwet). The most pertinent change in the legal basis of the A4DS has been incurred by the enactment of a new law in 2010, the Crisis- en Herstelwet (Crisis and Recovery Act) (CHW). The CHW is meant to speed up, amongst others, infrastructural projects, housing projects and renewable energy projects by limiting opportunities for judicial review of these projects on administrative grounds (Rijksoverheid, 2012a). It is designed as a measure to avoid lengthy delays prior to the implementation of the aforementioned project categories in times of economic crisis. Indeed, when in 2012 construction of the A4DS began, the Infrastructure and Environment Secretary at the time, Melanie Schultz van Haagen, commented that:

“This small piece of motorway went head down in the quicksand due to slow political decision-making, ambivalent regulations and lingering procedures. The history of the A4 Delft-Schiedam is a lesson for all of us; the example of how it should not be done anymore” (cited in Rijkswaterstaat, 2012a).

The rationale for motorway construction projects to overcome crisis and spur economic recovery has furthermore been clearly articulated by Schultz van Haagen’s predecessor in the cabinet Balkenende-IV (2006-2010), Camiel Eurlings. By referring to the deadlock that existed in the planning process, he argued that the A4DS has been “an icon of delay. It will become an icon of progress, once the motorway will be there. The Crisis- en Herstelwet contributes to that objective” (cited in Rijksoverheid, 2009). One way to interpret progress within the perspective of the CHW is the pace with which decisions to
go ahead with projects can be made without too much deliberation going on. Thus, part of the CHW intends to construct new infrastructures without the need for piles of paperwork (‘millions of A4s’, see [23]).

The CHW has incurred three changes in the interaction between the stakeholders and the planner of projects that are placed within its remit: 1) local and regional government have lost the right to judicially review the decision on the scheme and the environmental statement of the A4DS based on administrative grounds at the Raad van State, which is the highest administrative court in the Netherlands [24, 25]; 2) civil society stakeholders have lost the right to judicially review the decision on the scheme and the environmental statement of the A4DS based on administrative grounds at the Raad van State when they have failed to respond to the route decision when it was still in the proposal stage (Ontwerp Tracébesluit); and 3) charitable civil society stakeholders such environmental protection organizations that are located far away from the impact area have become ineligible to voice complaints against projects [23]. The new law has therefore limited opportunities for judicial review for local and regional government, as well as for civil society stakeholders.

As a consequence of the CHW, both government actors at the sub-national level and civil society stakeholders were pessimistic about their (future) role in major infrastructure project planning. By referring to its position within the debate on the length of the land tunnel and local air quality, Groenlink’s Schiedam (a local political party) felt that it was ‘muzzled’ by the CHW and therefore associated protest against the A4DS with “fighting against windmills” (Interview). Under the aegis of the CHW the A4DS planning process was subsequently influenced by “external factors that cannot be influenced” (Groenlink’s Schiedam, Interview), at least not by the efforts of local government actors. Similarly, the Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland – an environmental advocacy organization – argued that “the enactment of the Crisis- en Herstelwet is a sad thing (...) as more things can be pushed through” (Interview). As local government resistance in particularly Vlaardingen and Schiedam against the A4DS was sidelined, it became more difficult for civil society stakeholders to form a protest alliance.

The second development in legislation concerns the Nederlandse Samenwerking Luchtkwaliteit (NSL) (loosely translated: Netherlands Collaboration on Air Quality). The NSL has been adopted to ease compliance with the air quality targets of the European Union (EU). Because the Netherlands have a dense population as well as a high number of air polluting industries, variables which impact significantly on air quality, the NSL allows the Dutch government to comply with these targets by 2015 at the latest. The NSL furthermore permits the Netherlands to compensate transgressions of the EU air quality targets in certain areas with positive results in other areas. Thus, it has been concluded that “[t]he NSL is a sort of ‘balance’ that is aimed towards meeting the threshold values of
air quality” (Busscher, 2010: 6). As the NSL presents more flexibility to decision-makers to comply with air quality targets where and when, it facilitates large construction projects which are likely to have caused a spatial transgression of the air quality targets without the ability to compensate [26].

Stakeholders sensed that the A4DS and other major infrastructure developments in the study area (for an overview, see Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2012) were made possible by the NSL. The Vereniging Tegen Milieubedertf noted that “if you look at the NSL, it encompasses the construction of all these new roads. (...) [Taking measures against] air pollution is discounted towards the future by deploying a certain method of measurement” (Interview). Thus, the adverse impacts on the A4DS were discounted towards the future. In conjunction with this, it was argued that the NSL sought to offset air pollution caused by infrastructure development with improvements in air quality elsewhere. Areas of heavy infrastructure development already experience a high level of air pollution, however. This led the Stichting Batavier to conclude that the NSL is intended to “make infrastructure possible, not to protect health” (Interview). Similar to the CHW, the NSL has been an external aid to the advocates of the A4DS.

6.2.2 The deliberative dimension

~ “The worst that can happen to them is that you don’t talk to them. Then they can’t control you. Then you become annoying” ~ (Stichting Natuurmonumenten, Interview)

The deliberative dimension of public engagement in the A4DS project can be associated with the setting up of a dialogue between Rijkswaterstaat and the stakeholders. Arguably, it is a face-to-face approach to public engagement as some sort of communicative reciprocity has been strived for. As a preliminary step, Rijkswaterstaat has canvassed where the stakes lie in the planning process through a process which it described as ‘ambience management’ (‘omgevingsmanagement’) (Interview). These stakes have mainly been concentrated in ‘institutional’ stakeholders, such as the municipalities involved [27], but also amongst nationally operating NGOs such as the Stichting Natuurmonumenten or Milieudefensie as well as amongst local action groups. After the stakes have been identified, in ambience management lines of communication are established between Rijkswaterstaat and the most prominent stakeholders.

Within the effort to entrench the planning process in a deliberative setting, a number of institutions have been deployed. These institutions have been mainly deployed to bring anti-A4DS protest or concerns over adverse impacts to the negotiation table, such as bilateral meetings with stakeholders or discussion evenings in the local library or theatre. Of all the deliberative institutions used in the A4DS project, the Integrale
Ontwikkeling tussen Delft en Schiedam (Integral Development between Delft and Schiedam) (IODS) has been the most prominent. The stakeholder from IODS described its organization “a sort of plan for the area, a sort of vision of how this area can become future proof" (Interview). In practice this meant that stakeholders were invited to think together with Rijkswaterstaat about how the A4DS should look in terms of its design and how this should be streamlined into Midden-Delfland, the impact area. The A4DS is one amongst five other projects that take place between Delft and Schiedam, thereby aiming to give a 'quality injection' to Midden-Delfland (IODS, 2001; 2010).

As has been described in the doctoral thesis by Van der Arend (2007) on process managers in Dutch planning cases such as the A4DS, the IODS has emanated from the zeal of someone quite willing to resolve the long-standing deadlock between proponents and opponents of the motorway expansion. In the A4DS case this someone has been Marnix Norder, an elected representative from the regional government of Zuid-Holland Province. According to many stakeholders, the 2001 report Kansen benutten, Impasses doorbreken (Achieving Objectives, Breaking through the Impasses), which marks the onset of the deliberative aspect of the planning process, is equal to ‘Plan Norder’, thus bearing the name of its very creator. The IODS worked with the assumption that the A4DS was necessary, yet simultaneously ascribed considerable freedom to how it should be integrated into the landscape of Midden-Delfland. The Founder of IODS, interviewed for this research, added a spatial dimension to the A4DS when he argued that the planning proposal “does not concern 7 kilometres, but it concerns 49 kilometres. Thus, I think in 7 times 7 kilometres instead of 7 kilometres”(Interview).

As this quotation attests to, the deliberative dimension of public engagement has been predominantly spatial in scope and focus. Since the IODS is a bundle of six spatial projects between Delft and Schiedam, considerable impetus has been given to this spatial component in public engagement (IODS, 2001). Of course, to most stakeholders the A4DS was not just the primus inter pares of the IODS projects; it was the only one that was controversial enough to warrant a campaign against it. To mitigate the anti-campaign, advocates of the A4DS therefore argued that it was necessary to further expand the spatial component of the project. The objective of giving the area a quality injection was furthermore consciously targeted. The public engagement manager of Rijkswaterstaat who was interviewed for this research reminisced that:

“The Infrastructure Secretary at the time [Tineke Netelenbos] asked Norder, or perhaps it was Norder himself that said: ‘we have to shift our concentration away from that road. We have to perceive it as area development’. The secretary then said: ‘go and see what’s possible’. Well, then the first Plan Norder was developed and, with that, much broader agendas of spatial development, stimulation of the recreation sector, a new future for
farmers, nature development as well as an improvement of the area in terms of urban development between Vlaardingen and Schiedam. Thus, it became a much bigger pie” (Interview).

Besides this spatialization of the A4DS, the IODS intended to offer each participant an equal opportunity to engage. Rijkswaterstaat argued that the IODS activities dedicated to the A4DS were ‘very open’. Some stakeholders agreed in principle with this opinion, thereby more or less alluding to the inherent fairness of the IODS as a procedure. KNNV Delfland commented that “if you look at the facts then you can’t say that it has not been fair. I think all the various aspects have been included in the IODS as well as many groups (...) You can’t say, looking back, that one of the parties did not feel represented” (Interview). In addition to being represented, the IODS intended to create a spirit of engagement where stakeholders could talk freely and without restraint on how they would like to see the impact area develop in the future. The Founder of IODS reasoned that:

“You had to look different at that motorway. We’ve organized a session that consisted partially of talking, (...) and the rest was drawing. Draw how it should look like. Draw what you would like to see changed. Draw what your dream scenario of Midden-Delfland is in ten, twenty, thirty years. Because everybody had to draw, (...) the farmer was equal to the graduate biologist” (Interview).

Interactive and innovative practices such as something as simple as drawing may to some indicate the openness of the IODS to suggestions emanating from civil society. However, some of the stakeholders argued that the strategy to reach out to all echelons of civil society was concocted by savvy decision-makers who wanted to silence the opposition. This may perhaps best be summed up by the observation that, for decision-makers to become successful, it is vital “to create your own opposition” (Mijn Partij, Interview). Indeed, an invited form of engagement was institutionalized through the use of, amongst others, a steering group, advisory committee and feedback group. Particularly the feedback group (‘klankbordgroep’) of the IODS was considered an important platform as it invited a plurality of stakeholders to become formally engaged in the planning process (e.g. IODS; KNNV Delfland).

As the ‘drawing example’ may indicate, stakeholders could seize considerable agency in steering debate within the feedback group of the IODS towards particular ends. This became particularly manifest in an impacts-oriented form of public engagement with the project. For example, those actors holding stakes in Midden-Delfland would advocate investments in, say, the cycling infrastructure or the appropriation of land for the creation of new nature. However, participation in the IODS also created commitments. To the
Stichting Natuurmonumenten, which is one of the oldest and largest environmental advocacy organizations in the Netherlands, its participation in the IODS at the strategic level (in the so-called ‘advisory council’) led to a serious dilemma. Although it wanted to contest the A4DS by comparing it with the A13+A13/16, “everyone could have witnessed that we agreed with the construction of the A4 [Delft-Schiedam]. So we could not advocate that [comparison], we couldn’t do that anymore” (Interview).

This latter point beckons further inquiry. IODS has stated that questions on ‘utility and necessity’ should not permeate the deliberations, as “this is a matter for the cabinet and the parliament” (IODS, 2001: 5). As a consequence, many stakeholders argued that the spatial focus of the IODS limited possibilities to address the underlying claim of necessity. The Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland lamented the lack of such possibilities by stating that “one should only want to construct the motorway when utility and necessity is proven, and not to use design choices and sustainability as an excuse to construct it” (Interview). It was furthermore perceived that the purpose of providing a quality injection to the impact area had come to prevail during the mediating influence of the IODS. This has led to debate amongst stakeholders as to whether this purpose should be strived for. Particularly statements on the problem-solving character and spatial ‘two-dimensionality’ of the A4DS have been sceptically received by some stakeholders (e.g. Stichting Stop RW19/A4, 2009). Furthermore, the ‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’ storyline addressed the local impacts of the A4DS related to noise (‘do not hear’), visibility (‘do not see’) and stench (‘do not smell’), thereby incurring a shift away from other impacts. The Stichting Stop RW19/A4 noted that “climate change is not mentioned anywhere. It doesn’t exist. Apparently it’s not important for the decision-makers” (Interview).

It has been argued before that some stakeholders felt that the purpose of providing a quality injection was deployed to shift attention away from the utility and necessity of the A4DS. It was subsequently experienced that the new purpose was deployed as a sort of ‘divide and rule’ policy. This was experienced first-hand by local politicians in Vlaardingen and Schiedam, as the mitigation packages for these municipalities differed substantially (e.g. the height of sound barriers). According to Groenlinks Schiedam (Interview), this difference was premised on the degree to which negotiations with Rijkswaterstaat were successful. The negotiations themselves were heavily influenced by whether politicians were willing to stop their local protest. Whilst cooperation between the stakeholders could generally be considered well (see also Chapter 7), they were strongly divided on the issue of accepting the purpose of providing a quality injection as the shared cause in deliberating the A4DS. For instance, in motivating its unwillingness to participate in the feedback group of the IODS, the Vereniging Tegen Milieubedreft (the ‘association against environmental destruction’) stated that “we have not really participated (...) because we were against the deal that [another stakeholder] would get 200 hectares of agricultural
land to convert into nature (...) to say ‘yes’ to the construction of the A4” (Interview). The proposed objective of a quality injection entailed considerable benefits to some of the stakeholders, yet it held no benefits for others.

6.3 Summary

This chapter has focused on the institutional designs of the HS2 and A4DS projects. The concept of institutional design represents the assemblage of institutions that fulfil a key role in mediating public engagement in the project. The mode of public engagement in large-scale infrastructure projects is important for stakeholders to exercise voice, such as shown by many of the stakeholder appraisals. What follows from this is that an analysis of the mechanisms that either open up or close down public engagement is pivotal for understanding the manifestation of extant ideas about cooperation and collaboration with decision-makers in environmental problem settings. Putting one and one together, institutional design has as such been identified as an external factor in the mobilization of sustainability discourses. Table 6.2 presents an overview of the formal institutional designs in the two projects. A brief explanation on these findings will follow, after which they will be linked to EIA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional design of the projects</th>
<th>HS2</th>
<th>A4DS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions at the macro level</td>
<td>Public consultation on the idea of HS2 and public consultation on the scope and methodology of the EIA</td>
<td>Public consultation on the proposed route decision and public consultation on the TN/MER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions at the micro level</td>
<td>Impacts-oriented deliberation in the CF. Focus on impact prediction and the identification of mitigation measures</td>
<td>Impacts-oriented deliberation in the IODS. Focus on impact prediction and the identification of mitigation measures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2: Overview of the formal institutional designs of HS2 and A4DS

However, to rightfully summarize this chapter, it is pertinent to also show the shortcomings of the formal institutional designs with respect to their ability to accommodate the sustainability discourses (see Chapter 5). The institutional designs of both projects were considered seriously flawed. It was reported to represent a poorly contrived means to express interests. The public consultation in the HS2 project did not accommodate those critical reflections that lamented the absence of a genuine national cause for a high-speed rail network. In the local dimension, the ‘spirit of engagement’ of the CF was not reciprocated by stakeholders due to the sensed unresponsiveness to pleas for more advanced mitigation measures if the plan for HS2 would go ahead. A similar judgement of stakeholders on the adequacy of macro institutions to accommodate the ‘no utility and necessity’ storyline has been observed in the A4DS case. Debate on utility and necessity
was hampered in particular by the enactment of the CHW and the NSL. Whilst stakeholders embracing the ‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’ found solace in the impacts-oriented form of public engagement of the IODS, as well as the proposed quality injection in Midden-Delfland, those lingering on the underlying justification of the A4DS remained dissatisfied. Table 6.3 has summarized these findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional design of the projects</th>
<th>HS2</th>
<th>A4DS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions at the macro level</td>
<td>The public consultation did not provide a means to express the absence for a national cause for HS2</td>
<td>The public consultation on (on route decision and the TN/MER) did not accommodate ‘no utility and necessity’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions at the micro level</td>
<td>The CF proved unresponsive to pleas for far-reaching mitigation measures to offset impacts in the Chilterns AONB</td>
<td>The IODS was lenient towards mitigating impacts (‘hear’, ‘see’ and ‘smell’) but did not facilitate ‘justification-oriented’ protest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3: Overview of stakeholders’ views on the flawed institutional designs

Basic critical functions of democracy were considered absent in the institutional design of HS2. For instance, throughout Section 5.1 it could be sensed that stakeholders did not feel listened to and that the DfT and HS2 Ltd were envisaged as being unresponsive. The Speen Area Action Group captured this understanding of unresponsiveness by stating that “the assumption that there is a willingness to have a democratic process... that is best practice, that’s the ideal practice. What we’ve seen to experience is: somewhere, this idea has been created and there is a dogma and therefore from the onset the commitment and the aim has been: ‘we have to get this through’” (Interview). When the Potter Row Action Group furthermore claimed, from its experience in the HS2 project, that “this is not a democracy” (Interview), this opens up an important avenue for investigating democratic satisfaction and political trust.

In the A4DS project, the institutional design consisted of a consultative dimension and a deliberative dimension. The consultative dimension entailed the opportunity for stakeholders to react to the content and provisions set forth in key project documentation, such as the TN/MER and the proposed route decision. This ex post public consultation predominantly yielded viewpoints on the utility and necessity of the A4DS, both as an intervention in the motorway system and as a barrier to a more sustainable future. The deliberative dimension transpired within the confinement of the IODS, which positioned itself as a spatial plan for the impact area. Although the IODS provided a deliberative environment where privately held visions of the future of Midden-Delfland could be made known to decision-makers, a discussion on the utility and necessity of the A4DS was sidelined at the expense of impact mitigation. This orientation on impacts – rather than the merits of the A4DS for achieving the project objectives – changed the form of protest against the motorway capacity expansion.
When the observation made by Bond and Morrison-Saunders (2009) is taken into account that the sustainable development concept can be used, misused and manipulated by actors, a twofold proposition can be made. Firstly, the localization and spatialization of public engagement in the HS2 and A4DS projects by the competent authority has privileged debate on impact mitigation. The EIAs of both projects could serve as useful guidance within this endeavour, as environmental statements sum up the main environmental impacts. However, a second proposition is that the extant modes of public engagement have related uncomfortably to the wishes and desires of civil society actors to discuss the heart of the matter: the ‘why’ of the infrastructure developments, rather than the ‘how’ of impact mitigation. Sustainable development can thus also be interpreted as a plea for development that is premised on a clear evidence base, free from what certain stakeholders perceive as dubious assumptions and political motives. Whether EIA continues to be ill-fitted to a mode of public engagement where questions on necessity are put centre-stage is of equal importance to the role of political culture. This will be investigated in the forthcoming chapter.
Chapter 7 On political culture

This chapter deals with political culture, the second external factor which is thought to shape the mobilization of sustainability discourses (see Figure 2.1). Throughout the previous chapter it has become apparent that political culture is reciprocal to institutional design, the other external factor. Indeed, the statement made earlier by BBOWT that, with regard to the public consultation of HS2, “the public appear less satisfied with the project after the consultation than they were before” (Interview), triggers pertinent questions on how institutions mediate political culture, and vice versa. That is to say, as Figure 2.1 has also shown, co-production is assumed to exist between institutional design and political culture. For the latter, this means that its focus on the cultural orientation of civil society in the conduct of politics is an active contributor both to explaining certain modes of engagement and the institutions that encompass them.

Before delving into the case studies, the chapter starts with an investigation of value surveys and studies. Surveys are often used in comparative political science research (see Inglehart, 1988; Skelcher et al., 2011 for an example). Pursuant to Section 2.2 in the theoretical framework of the thesis, the values that are investigated in the surveys broadly relate to democratic satisfaction and political trust as well as to interpersonal trust. These values are subsequently used to investigate the political culture in the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands. As stated, satisfaction and trust are conceptualized in this thesis as reflecting the public ‘attitudes, beliefs and sentiments’ (Pye, 1968) towards liberal democracy. It has as such been argued that democratic satisfaction and political trust influence the mode of public engagement, thereby mediating the practices of ‘democratic citizens’ (Kymlicka, 2002). If the preconception holds true that positive attitudes towards democracy attenuate the adversarial and competitive character of discourse, as is assumed in the formation of sustainability discourses, then the results from value surveys shed light on the mobilization of ideas and perceptions towards decision-making with a high degree of public interest.

When prompted to comment on their attitudes towards the democratic systems in the UK, some of the stakeholders in the HS2 project argued that proportional representation in the electoral system has the propensity to support fringe political parties or to cause ‘hung’ cabinets (e.g. Chiltern Ridges Action Group). This assumption seems to express satisfaction with, and trust, in the incumbent system of strict majority rule to ensure the effectiveness of single-party governments, allegedly at the expense of (more) procedural fairness. At the same time, resonating the ‘voice’ option as depicted by Hirschman (1970), a lack of democratic satisfaction and political trust is theorized to cause perturbations in the electoral preferences of citizens. If relatively low levels of satisfaction and trust are reported in majoritarian democracies, this would then result in a decline of
the traditional hegemony of the two dominant political parties (usually on the left and the right). When these two points of input side and output side legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999) are extrapolated to the present case study, it will be interesting to analyze how stakeholder perceptions are formed on the basis of extant political cultural characteristics.

Simultaneously, it has been argued that in consensual democracies the primacy-of-politics principle, so typical for the conduct of politics in majoritarian democracies, has been exchanged for a ‘displacement of politics’ (Skelcher et al., 2011). When framed within the context of political culture, the most pressing question is whether citizens really want more opportunities to become involved in making political decisions. The shift from ‘vote-centric’ to ‘talk-centric’ institutions (Chambers, 2003) gives rise to an enhanced agency amongst citizens and civil society actors, yet in itself it does not answer whether they are more satisfied or trustworthy of politicians and other citizens than in electoral democracy. However, on some occasions it has been theorized that exposure to more rather than less democracy is conducive to positive civic attitudes towards the democratic conduct (e.g. Banducci et al., 1999; Bowler and Donovan, 2002). In this vein, public engagement can be considered an all-important ingredient for ‘good’ political culture, expressing high scores on democratic satisfaction and political trust.

Section 7.1, which presents the results from value surveys and studies, will show the variance in democratic satisfaction and political trust between the UK and the Netherlands. This comparison can be perceived as linking up with the broader tradition of measuring political culture, one way or the other (e.g. Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1988). Whilst quantitative value surveys containing large data sets are proxies of democratic satisfaction and political trust (‘broad but shallow’), qualitative studies usually contain less data but are more in-depth (‘deep but narrow’). When taken together, they can provide an all-round picture of political culture in the two states where the research is set. Subsequently, Sections 7.2 and 7.3 deal with the political cultural orientation of stakeholders in the HS2 and A4DS projects, respectively. Although part of the projects is played out at the national level, perhaps this may prove to impact only marginally in situations where stakeholders deal with executive agencies (such as HS2 Ltd and Rijkswaterstaat). Section 7.4 will summarize the main findings.

7.1 Results from value surveys and studies

7.1.1 Surveys on political values

As stated earlier, value surveys have been consulted to provide a broad overview of the values of citizens that indicate their attitudes towards democracy and the conduct of politics more generally. Value surveys are particularly useful in either showing patterns in
citizen attitudes over time or to compare one population with another. The value surveys in this sub-section have been selected since they explicitly focus on the attitudes of citizens towards the domestic political situation. From the perspective of drawing a comparison between the UK and the Netherlands, this is an invaluable characteristic. As a consequence, value surveys that focus on attitudes not related to the nation-state have been considered ineligible. That has for instance been the case with the Eurobarometer value survey of the European Union (EU), which is more useful for conducting research on attitudes towards supranational politics. Data have been obtained from three surveys:

- European Social Survey (ESS) Round 5 – 2010 (European Social Survey, 2012);
- World Value Survey (WVS) 2005-2008 (WVS, 2012b) (World Value Survey, 2012);
- European Values Study (EVS) EVS 2008 - 4th Wave (European Values Study, 2012).

In accordance with the theory on political culture (see Chapter 2), democratic satisfaction and political trust represent the main themes of value inquiry. The term ‘confidence’, often applied in value surveys (most notably in the WVS and the EVS) can be read as synonymous to the concept of trust. In Tables 7.1 to 7.4, where the values are ‘processed’, it can be read that personalized statements have been used to measure attitudes and value orientation – as opposed to the use of questions which can be found in the value surveys. As can be distilled from the tables, two types of statements prevail. Talking about democracy or the conduct of democracy can either relate to democracy as a system (i.e. a regime of institutions) or to democracy as an incumbent political authority. This has been clearly reflected in the statements. For instance, the statements “I am satisfied with the democratic system” (EVS) and “I am satisfied with the government of this country” (ESS) relate to ‘system’ and ‘authority’, respectively.

Seventeen values have altogether been examined: five from the ESS; five from the WVS; and seven from the EVS. Because three different Likert scales have been used in the surveys – are used to present the outcomes. The values with 11 and 10 response options are ‘processed’ in Tables 7.1 and 7.2, respectively. Because of the number of values using 4-points Likert scales, two tables (7.3 and 7.4) have been constructed. The statements that are formulated are stated below the tables. The choice for formulating these statements rather than to use the original questions posed in the value surveys is methodological: a low frequency disagrees with the statement and a high frequency agrees with it. Thus, all the statements have been drafted in such a way that high frequencies (in %) indicate high levels of satisfaction and trust.
<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>11 (Yes)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1: Frequencies of values using 11-points Likert scales (in %)

1 “I am satisfied with the way democracy works in this country” (ESS, B27)
2 “I am satisfied with the government of this country” (ESS, B26)
3 “I trust the politicians of this country” (ESS, B4-10)
4 “I trust the political parties of this country” (ESS, B4-10)
5 “I trust the parliament of this country” (ESS, B4-10)

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<th>The Netherlands</th>
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<td>9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 (Yes)</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2: Frequencies of values using 10-points Likert scales (in %)

6 “I think that my country is democratic” (WVS, V163)
7 “I think the government of this country is good” (EVS, Q65)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (Yes)</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3: First table on the frequencies of values using 4-points Likert scales (in %)

8 “I think that it is good to have democracy in this country” (WVS, V151)
9 “I have confidence in the government of this country” (WVS, V138)
10 “I have confidence in the political parties in this country” (WVS, V139)
11 “I have confidence in the parliament of this country” (WVS, V140)
12 “I am satisfied with democracy” (EVS, Q64)

23 The WVS and EVS hold data from Great Britain instead of the UK. Because ‘Great Britain’ and ‘UK’ largely overlap (the difference is Northern Ireland), the data are considered representative. This applies to all the output tables (7.1 to 7.4).
24 For all the three value surveys design weight has been applied. According to the European Social Survey (2013), “Weighting European Social Survey Data”, (available at http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/doc/weighting.pdf, last accessed 6 August 2013), “the design weight corrects for these slightly different probabilities of selection, thereby making the sample more representative”. Design weight controls for different population sizes.
25 After every statement a code has been added (e.g. B27, preceded by the value survey which has been consulted). These are the original codes used by the value surveys.
Table 7.4: Second table on the frequencies of values using 4-points Likert scales (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13 14 15 16 17</td>
<td>13 14 15 16 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 (No)</td>
<td>4.2 1.0 35.1 25.8 32.4</td>
<td>1.5 0.6 7.2 8.4 10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.6 11.1 45.6 51.0 54.1</td>
<td>6.6 6.6 43.3 42.9 55.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>39.7 52.8 17.0 20.0 12.6</td>
<td>55.0 53.1 47.8 45.4 32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (Yes)</td>
<td>46.4 35.2 2.3 3.1 1.0</td>
<td>36.9 39.7 1.6 3.3 1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4: Second table on the frequencies of values using 4-points Likert scales (in %)

The tables show that for 16 out of 17 statements, the frequency in the 0 category (‘No’, i.e. in full disagreement with the statement) is higher in the UK than in the Netherlands. This indicates that the part of the population that is completely dissatisfied and distrustful is much larger in the UK than in the Netherlands. When results on the other extreme of the Likert scales are looked at, thus reflecting the answers which express full satisfaction and trust (i.e. all responses which are ‘Yes’), then the frequency is higher in the UK for 11 out of 17 statements. These outcomes suggest that the difference between full disagreement and full agreement on the statements is larger in the UK and the Netherlands. It is plausible to hypothesize that this results from the relationships between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that exist in majoritarian democracy. Conversely, then, the concentration of frequencies in the middle categories in the Netherlands is a consequence of consensus politics.

Of course, a pertinent question is whether individuals that have mobilized into civil society groups opposing a government planning proposal are to be found in either one of the extreme response categories. The willingness to oppose such proposals already hints at a commitment to issues of public interest, which can be assumed to prevail amongst those who are (to some extent) satisfied and trustful. Yet simultaneously it demonstrates that these individuals have found something to protest against, which is a clear sign of dissatisfaction and possibly also of distrust. It is therefore quite likely that the scores in the mid-response categories are most useful for getting insight into the political cultures of the stakeholders involved in the HS2 and A4DS projects. These scores are relatively similar in the UK and the Netherlands.

As stated, the scores in the tables signify the attitudes of the British and Dutch population towards the political vestibule of the state – the government, the parliament and the political parties – and the political system which accommodates the citizens’ role in the conduct of democracy. They are inherent in Easton’s (1975) definition of political support as having positive attitudes towards ‘political objects’, of course to be interpreted in the metaphysical sense. However, more can be said about what constitutes political support and the attitudes which can be associated with it. Although Mishler and Rose
(2001) have argued that explanations for political trust should firmly stay within the realm of politics, rival theories have stressed that there is more than meets the eye. In particular, the fabric of civil society – social capital – has been identified as having strong explanatory potential for the extant differences in democratic satisfaction and political trust across societies (e.g. Inglehart, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Newton, 1997). The following subsection will take a closer look at this potential by focusing on studies of interpersonal trust in the UK and the Netherlands, which is a key concept within the theory on social capital.

7.1.2 Studies on interpersonal trust

Unfortunately, there is surprisingly little comparative research carried out on interpersonal trust in the UK and the Netherlands. As such, it is fruitful to construct a broad picture of this form of trust in these two countries by using country-specific analyses. For both the UK and the Netherlands, one ‘mini-case study’ will be used to explore the notion of interpersonal trust. What is important within this endeavour is to stress that the concept of interpersonal trust can be adapted to situations where micro political processes occur. That is, lines of trust between people also exist in projects or organizational settings. This will prove a vital aspect in the analysis of political culture in the HS2 and A4DS projects. What should particularly be stressed is that interpersonal trust can be a functional element in the actions and strategies of stakeholders. In the community forums (CF) and the Integrale Ontwikkeling tussen Delft and Schiedam (IODS) in the HS2 and A4DS projects, respectively, stakeholders may well have internalized interpersonal trust for goal maximization, driven by private interests. This could be as true as considering interpersonal trust in public engagement an intrinsic feature of the broader political culture.

In the UK, projects with a community dimension (such as HS2) have been associated with interpersonal trust. Whilst it is perhaps safer to leave the concept of community undefined, it can be argued that some sort of homogeneity amongst its members can be discerned. By taking this as a point of departure, the principle questions for Walker et al. (2010) have been whether interpersonal trust is part of the community, whether it can be built within the community, whether it can be used to achieve particular ends and whether demonstrated levels of interpersonal trust in one particular community can be exported to other communities. When looking at projects in the UK involving community renewable energy (abbreviated as ‘RE’ by the authors), they have found that whilst close-knit communities exhibit levels of trust, interpersonal trust can be used by some in the community for personal gain. Purely seen from an analytical point of view, Walker et al. (2010: 2662) have concluded that their “research shows that [interpersonal] trust does have a necessary part to play in the contingencies and dynamics of community RE projects and in the outcomes they can achieve.”
As regards the situation in the Netherlands, Kickert (2003) has argued that trust is one among other variables that govern the relationships between people in society, but also in firms or other organizations. In his point of view, the Dutch seem to have a rather pragmatic tolerant view towards others, regardless of whether they look or behave the same. This pragmatism is premised on self-interest: it is expected that personal gains are higher under cooperation than under conflict. According to Kickert (2003), the historical cultural heterogeneity of the Netherlands, where various societal ‘pillars’ (e.g. Protestants, Catholics, socialists) existed side by side, has been decisive in determining political relations and traditions of consensus and tolerance. From this point of view it can be reasoned that interpersonal trust has become a side-product of the efforts by decision-makers to accommodate political struggle between these pillars (Lijphart, 1968).

Although comparative research between the UK and the Netherlands is scant, as stated earlier, it is certainly true that levels of interpersonal trust differ from state to state. In The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2011), it has been strongly argued that most of the Anglophone states in the Western hemisphere exhibit low levels of interpersonal trust. In contrast, particularly the Scandinavian states but also other countries having consensual democracy perform much better in this respect. Wilkinson and Pickett (2011) have identified inequality as the prime determinant of low interpersonal trust, but the apparent link between the type of democracy and levels of trust gives food for thought. Following the introduction of Chapter 6, this latter point has to be approached cautiously as ‘executive-level politics’ may not be conducted in the same fashion as is the politics in the state institutions. In the remainder of this chapter, interpersonal trust will feature alongside accounts of democratic satisfaction and political trust in two instances of politics at the executive level: HS2 and A4DS.

7.2 HS2

Public satisfaction with the HS2 project arguably has been a key imperative for HS2 Ltd. The same thing can be said about trust in the competent authority to implement it adequately. Indeed, one of the bosses of HS2 Ltd was quoted saying that he wants to win the “hearts and minds” (cited in [28]) of the British population and the protest movement in particular. As this section will demonstrate, such things are more easily said than done. The section will first canvass the ideas of stakeholders on the subjects of democratic satisfaction and political trust. Subsequently, it will relate these two concepts of political culture to the mode of public engagement in the HS2 project, particularly with respect to the institutional environment of the CF. Interpersonal trust – trust between different

26 This reference (where parentheses are used) is a newspaper article. To see how newspaper articles are referenced, please refer to the second footnote of Chapter 4.
stakeholders – is also discussed. It is important to integrate a broad overview of ideas about extant political cultural values into an examination of the on-the-ground levels of satisfaction with and trust in HS2 Ltd. This is for at least two reasons: 1) a vital link will be forged with Section 7.1 (on the value surveys); and 2) social appraisals of satisfaction and trust in the HS2 project can be better put into perspective.

7.2.1 Stakeholder appraisals of satisfaction and trust

Many of the stakeholders supported democracy on the principle that it was the best – or alternatively the least worst – political system. However, as a general remark it can be argued that stakeholders were aware of potential shortcomings in the conduct of democracy. It was commented that certain trade-offs made under majority rule could result in unfair or disadvantageous outcomes for the minority. Some stakeholders have perceived it as difficult to agree on the democratic principle ‘the majority makes the decisions’ when much is at stake, such as the planning of major infrastructure development. The stakeholder from the Amersham Action Group reasoned that “I wouldn’t advocate violent revolution; on the other hand I’d say I’m not always happy with the way things turn out either” (Interview). Such a revolution is unlikely to occur in the present-day democratic system, however. According to the Chiltern Ridges Action Group, it is because of a “very strong network of institutions that we’re protected from violent change” (Interview). These institutions serve to ‘check and balance’ ideas before they can get a chance to mature politically.

Although some stakeholders expressed dissatisfaction with the rules of majoritarian democracy (most notably Chesham Town Councillor; see also Section 5.1), many other stakeholders preferred keeping the ‘first past the post’ principle as the way to practice democracy. Besides the fear of a ‘hung’ cabinet (CRAG, Interview), which would be a cabinet where two or more parties join forces simply to constitute a majority of seats in the parliament, albeit a difference in political ideology, another concern related to the ascendancy of fringe parties on the political left and right that could distort political stability. As a consequence of that, specific issues could lose their political momentum when there are (too) many voices in the room. In debating consensual democracy as a potentially viable alternative to majoritarian democracy, the stakeholder affiliated with the Woodland Trust claimed that proportional representation would “actually make it harder because it [the political landscape] will come diverse. The more diverse, the more people you need to speak to. I think the environmental issue-making will be sidelined (...), the focus will move away” (Interview).

When moving from the democratic system to the potentially thorny issue of political authority, gaining its relevance as it has been precisely politicians that continue to support
the proposal for HS2, stakeholders did express dissatisfaction with the current coalition government consisting of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. The Amersham & District Residents Association commented that, on the one hand, the Liberal Democrats “are terrified because they’re in power”, and on the other, the Conservatives “have the ‘dinosaurs’ and don’t know why to compromise” (Interview). According to other stakeholders, this imbalance has distorted the traditional ways of democratic decision-making in the UK. At the same time, it was contended that the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) has recently risen in popularity amongst the electorate. This led Amersham Action Group to conclude that casting a vote on this party “is more attractive now than it was” (Interview).

In the literature on political culture, most notably the work by Inglehart (e.g. 1988), it has been asserted that democratic satisfaction spurs economic development (but see Jackman and Miller, 1996 for a rebuttal). Correspondingly, poor economic performance is likely to impact on feelings of satisfaction amongst citizens. The interview respondent from the Speen Area Action Group belaboured this point, arguing that “I imagined the Conservative Party had more experience and more common sense to do business and how to run an economy [than Labour], that they wouldn’t get us into the debt they got us into. And now, as far as I’m concerned, to me it’s [one and the same] political class and that has made me openly cynical” (Interview). From this it can be deduced that, at least for this particular stakeholder, the attainment of ‘political goods’ such as economic growth has greatly influenced its satisfaction with one of the political parties in the incumbent coalition.

As regards trust in political parties, a shift in party loyalty has been observed. The Amersham & District Residents Association argued that traditional affinities have eroded in recent years, commenting that “people are past the point where they will trust a single party, that’s quite possible” (Interview). In the Chilterns, which is a stronghold of the Conservative Party, this observation is important because of the increased prominence of UKIP as a credible political alternative. As UKIP targets the same electorate as do the Conservatives but is also outspoken anti-HS2, this is especially true in the matter at hand. Furthermore, low levels of trust have been linked to a wavering willingness of the citizenry to hold politicians responsible for their deeds. The Dunsmore Society asserted that “there’s a very low level of trust in politicians in this country and a very low level of interest in politics in this country” (Interview). This could either mean that citizens lose political interest as a result of low trust in politicians, or that low trust emanates from an ingrained indifference of the British public towards political decision-making.

Perhaps one explanation for the low level of political interest is the rather ‘uncompromissory’ way of every-day democratic practice. Various stakeholders have stated that the two main political parties in the country, Conservatives and Labour, are miles away from a consensual manner of dialogue. The Dunsmore Society argued that
this partisan strife halts any progress. It stated that “Cameron loves to be able to sort of shout ‘ruderisms’ to Miliband\textsuperscript{27}, who wants to shout ‘ruderisms’ at Cameron. We’re going nowhere” (Interview). CPRE went one step further in claiming that binary relationships such as between political parties are also manifested in other realms where rule competence is exhibited. It stated that “we don’t have a consensual approach in this country; we have an adversarial approach. In politics, but also in the public inquiry process and the court system where there’s one side against the other” (Interview). It was generally perceived that the two sides involved in a political dispute kept themselves busy with one another, much at the expense of the public interest.

7.2.2 Democratic satisfaction and political trust in the project

~ “The bottom line is: we don’t trust the government. Or HS2 Ltd” ~ (Chilterns Conservation Board, Interview)

Stakeholder appraisals are important for establishing some sort of baseline regarding extant levels of democratic satisfaction and trust. As it can be suggested that in a country marred by political cynicism those involved in a spatial planning dispute with national proportions – such as is HS2 – are likely to be hostile towards political authority, it is evident that such cynicism must be embedded in a broader context. Although it can be expected that stakeholders fulminating against a project proposal espoused by the incumbent government may find it difficult to support these same politicians in other decision-making arenas, almost all of them embraced the system characteristics of majoritarian democracy. A lack of opportunities to exercise voice or to publicly contest HS2 on its evidence base was attributed to the hostile attitudes of the key political figures towards civil society. Stakeholders in the Chilterns sensed this hostility. The Potter Row Action Group commented that the only objective of the political establishment is “to drive this thing through and as soon as possible, and quash any rebellion” (Interview).

A lack of such opportunities clearly hints towards democratic dissatisfaction. In its response to the public consultation, Stop HS2 (2011) went one step further in claiming that “a key democratic deficit, was the failure to adequately inform and consult with the public and businesses on the Y route” (pp.1). Another ‘democratic deficit’ was purported to be the usage of a hybrid bill to pass HS2 through parliament. The hybrid bill has been described by someone from Wormleighton, Warwickshire, who lives along the line of the route of Phase 1 of the project, as a ‘device’, “used by the Georgians and Victorians to push through canals and railways” and “throws the Town and Country Planning Act out of the window” (cited in [29]). Although HS2 is expected to cause ‘pain, misery and

\textsuperscript{27} Author’s note: Ed Miliband was the leader of the Labour Party at the time of writing the thesis.
disappointment’ according to a planning minister of the Conservative Party (in [30]), Members of Parliament (MP) representing the affected parliamentary constituencies have not been able to express their views to the House of Commons Transport Committee (HCTC), which accommodated the preparation of the hybrid bill prior.

When turning to the CF, HS2 Ltd was widely criticized for its unresponsiveness to the desires and expectations of civil society stakeholders that were involved. First and foremost, to some it proved difficult to access the CF. The Potter Row Action Group sensed that the CF “was very much presented as an invitees-only” (Interview), something which the Chesham-based stakeholders have experienced first-hand (see Chapter 6). Moving beyond the issue of access, a number of malpractices were summed up in relation to the CF: the minutes or maps of the blighted areas were either absent, incorrect or not distributed on time; the CF was rather a monologue by HS2 Ltd than a dialogue between HS2 Ltd and the stakeholders; and when a dialogue would start, it quickly ended with a ‘Pavlovian’ reaction to stakeholders’ requests, the most pertinent of which was whether it would be feasible to build a tunnel under the entire length of the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB).

The majority of stakeholders expressed frustration with the people working for HS2 Ltd. By furthering the statement made earlier by the Chiltern Society that the CF was not much more than a ‘ticking-the-box exercise’, from the perspective of democratic satisfaction this predominantly related to the degree to which HS2 Ltd staff showed responsiveness towards stakeholders’ comments and grievances. Part of the frustration can simply be explained by an apparent sense of non-response, “because you write and ask them something, and you get this letter [back] that tells you nothing” (Potter Row Action Group, Interview). It furthermore took a long time for stakeholders to obtain responses from HS2 Ltd. The Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE) argued that “the government is kind of proud it is working forward in recent consultations, but it takes us half a year on something simple from HS2 Ltd” (Interview).

With regards to the attitude and behaviour of the HS2 Ltd staff during the CF meetings, Missenden Action Groups argued that “they haven’t really listened to our local reaction or asked what the locals would choose to solve a particular problem. They haven’t said: ‘these are our ideas, what are your ideas? What would you do?’” (Interview). Some of the staff were classified as arrogant and brazen, going about in the CF without showing due consideration for the concerns of stakeholders. The Potter Row Action Group ‘addressed’ HS2 Ltd in the interview by asking “if you won’t listen to us, how can we give you knowledge?”, then stating that “they seem (...) not actually interested in what’s happening on the ground” (Interview). The Chilterns Conservation Board concurred with this opinion, asking the – perhaps now rhetorical – question: “what is the point of engaging the public if you don’t listen?” (Interview).
However, some (passive) sympathy for the facilitators of the community engagement could be discerned. Put specifically, it was argued that the quality of public engagement was shaped to a large extent by factors beyond the reach of HS2 Ltd. The respondent from the Woodland Trust, which as a nationally operating non-governmental organization (NGO) participated in the Environmental Forums set up to discuss broader ecological and sustainability issues, stated that “I believe that people that work in the Department for Transport and HS2 Ltd are working within a very sort of restrictive mandate in terms of cost and time and they’re doing the best they can (...), but that due to the time and cost of the consultations I think certain elements of the process may suffer in quality” (Interview). Although this belief did only marginally resonate in the Chilterns, it could be noted amongst the views of some stakeholders. For instance, the Wendover Parish Councillor argued that “there’s no point in being abusive to these people [organizing the CFs]; they’re only doing their job. They’re doing what their political masters have told them” (Interview).

The unresponsiveness from HS2 Ltd, as perceived by the majority of stakeholders, has equally seeped into social appraisals of trust. These appraisals often permeated political authority in its entirety, for instance exemplified by the statement that “there is a complete lack of trust in HS2 Ltd, a lack of confidence in the Department for Transport and, well, we were quite disillusioned with our MP” (Amersham Action Group, Interview). A lot of the distrust can be explained by the perceived unwillingness of the Department for Transport (DfT) to disclose key pieces of evidence, for instance information on the loading factor of trains (i.e. the passenger/seat ratio on any given train). Of course, the loss of 500 responses or so to the public consultation has not helped build confidence in the good intentions of the DfT (see Dialogue by Design, 2012 for the addendum). The Speen Area Action Group reasoned that “if you don’t play with an open deck, people are going to suspect. And of course the more lies and deceit that happens, like not publishing the number of people that are using the West Coast Main Line, the more people suspect” (Interview). Thus, according to this stakeholder, it has been a strategic choice by the competent authority which information should be available to the available public and which information should remain concealed. According to the Potter Row Action Group, such selective use of the available data “just breeds distrust” (Interview).

With the reported levels of democratic satisfaction and political trust held by stakeholders in the Chilterns, which can be regarded to be relatively low in comparison with the data surveys and generic appraisals of political trust, it is interesting to observe that levels of interpersonal trust can be considered relatively high. Whilst this may be a reaction to the poor working relation between the competent authority and civil society, as expressed in collective outbursts of protest [31, 32], it may equally be explained by pointing out that the campaign against HS2 is a common ‘rallying cause’ for these groups.
(Chilterns Conservation Board, Interview). In the Chilterns, civil protest against HS2 has been explained as emanating from the cultural tradition of “taking on the big guy” (Chilterns Conservation Board, Interview). This tradition alludes to a kind of civil disobedience on the part of those whose (negative) freedoms are jeopardized by political authority. By specifically focusing on HS2, the Chiltern Society has argued that when proposed developments lack a clear justification, the ‘fuck-it factor’ comes into play. What results from this factor is that civil society groups cluster around certain issues and contest them vehemently.

Interpersonal trust materialized into various forms. The person behind the Cholesbury Action Group, a one-person grassroots initiative in Cholesbury & St. Leonards Parish, contended that “my modus operandi is to work with the other groups in the area and give them some of my time, my expertise or whatever” (Interview). For the purposes of having a consistent approach to the community engagement and obtain state-of-the-art information on proposed mitigation measures, stakeholders involved in the CF collaborated as much as possible. The South Heath Action Group noted that “there’s two people from each of those forums [in the Chilterns] who meet after the round of meetings and exchange experiences, et cetera” (Interview). On the Internet, so-called Google Groups and mailing lists have served as a lubricant for stakeholders to exchange further information and items on the ‘action agenda’. The South Heath Action Group went on to argue that “the email is very powerful in terms of the tactics, in terms of what’s going on and there is an awful lot of chat along the line of who’s doing what” (Interview).

It is important to note that stakeholders were heavily affiliated with one another. The Chilterns Conservation Board commented that “there is a tremendous affinity between the groups from London all the way to Birmingham” (Interview). This is most clearly manifested in the gestation of Stop HS2 and the HS2 Action Alliance, both of which are networks or federations comprising many anti-HS2 advocacy organizations. A central feature of these networks is that their members contribute to the protest campaign without necessarily being known to each other. The Chilterns Conservation Board illustrated this latter point by stating that “when a message comes from a certain person in Camden, with whom I normally do not have any working relationship, I will read it because I know that person knows what he’s talking about, when they’ve got something worth reading. And so you build a relationship” (Interview).

7.3 A4DS

As has been summarily stated in Sub-section 4.2.1, the planning process of the A4DS spans over forty years. This has been marred by a long-standing deadlock between the proponents and opponents of the motorway. Aside from a variety of protest activities
organized by the anti-A4DS campaign, such as a picnic on the embankment and the ‘symbolic burial’ of Midden-Delfland [33], this deadlock has largely transpired within a decision-making context. This can for instance be exemplified by the parliamentary motions of 1976 and 1998, both of which at the time postponed the decision to go ahead with the A4DS indefinitely. However, in recent years a change in the decision-making context has been noted. In the AD/Rotterdams Dagblad, a regional newspaper, this point was fervently expressed by one of its readers. Submitted to the ‘Opinions’ section in 2009, after the publication of the Trajectnota/Milieu-effectrapportage (TN/MER) but before the Tracébesluit (Route Decision), not to mention the enactment of the Crisis- en Herstelwet (Crisis and Recovery Act) (CHW), this particular reader wrote that:

“Brave men such as Secretary of State Eurlings and Prime Minister Balkenende (...) argue that the spade must go into the soil without any further discussion. The nice thing about the Netherlands so far is that arguments often prevail over muscle talk and demagogy. It is a sign of mature democracy and rational decision-making that the A4 is not yet constructed. It would be good for the Netherlands if it would stay this way” (cited in [34]).

The quotation above is clearly indicating a feeling of dissatisfaction with the way democracy in the A4DS project has been practiced. Whilst at first glance it may appear that the political vestibule of the A4DS has been reticent in making a quick decision [e.g. 35], it may also be understood as a healthy yet lengthy discussion on the merits and demerits of this motorway capacity expansion. However, some are inclined to think that certain features of the political culture in the Netherlands, for instance the claim that sound argumentation has so far prevailed over who shouts the loudest, have eroded during the cabinet-Balkenende IV (2007-2010), in the governing period of which the decision to go ahead with the A4DS has been taken. In the remainder of this section, it will be shown that also within the confines of the IODS – representing the deliberative setting of the planning process – feelings of democratic satisfaction and political trust have been expressed. Similar to the previous section, this will be introduced by stakeholder appraisals on satisfaction and trust in the general conduct of politics.

7.3.1 Stakeholder appraisals of satisfaction and trust

In answering the question on whether democracy is thought of to be the best political system (Question 3 in the questionnaire used for civil society stakeholders, see Appendix 1), the majority of stakeholders started off by saying that democracy is either the ‘least worst’ (e.g. Mijn Partij) or “the best that we have invented so far” (KNNV Delfland, Interview). However, certain reservations were voiced as to what should be the core
principle of democracy. The stakeholder from the Stichting Stop RW19/A4 admitted that “I think that the interpretation of democracy as ‘the majority governs’ is an unsuitable form of democracy as the minority will not be heard” (Interview). As a panacea, the ‘Rhineland’ tradition of conducting democracy was espoused by this stakeholder as it is considered suitable for sharing power and building consensus in the democratic process. The Stichting Stop RW19/A4 deployed the term ‘polderen’ to describe this tradition, which is particularly powerful in ascribing power-sharing to the Dutch way of conducting politics.

Discussion on the democratic principle of power-sharing is seamlessly connected to attitudes towards democratic satisfaction. Stakeholders often equated this type of satisfaction with the notion of good conduct. The Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland commented that “good governance is only possible when there is the possibility for stakeholder participation” (Interview). In relation to the context of physical and spatial planning, it furthermore reasoned that “the government, in its role as the competent authority, has a great responsibility to make decisions at the highest level, but also to build a process where equity on the negotiation table is ensured” (Interview). This means that the competent authority is proactive in engaging citizens and civil groups with policy-making. Ideally speaking, court battles and other forms of adversarial politics will prove unnecessary when interest groups engage with the issues that affect them (KNNV Midden-Delfland, Interview). When seen from this perspective, the influence of the CHW on the planning of large-scale infrastructure and, subsequently, democratic satisfaction merits special attention in the next sub-section.

With regards to another aspect of democratic satisfaction, the difference between democracy as ‘system’ and democracy as the manifestation of political authority at one particular moment in time has been articulated. The democratic system was generally regarded as a good thing to have. For example, whilst the Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland admitted that “all systems have their downside”, it continued stating that “if democracy works the way it should work, then it is probably the best what is possible or feasible to have” (Interview). It has furthermore been argued by some of the stakeholders that the democratic system as such is not necessarily the reason that poor decisions (at least, in the eye of the beholder) are sometimes made. The stakeholder from the KNNV Delfland concurred with this argument by stating that “I could be dissatisfied with decision outcomes but if I take a look at the system then I can’t be dissatisfied. I think that the multi-party system and the necessity for majorities mitigate all extreme viewpoints and make decision-making acceptable for the majority” (Interview).

Conversely, when democracy was interpreted as real-world practice, other appraisals were vented. Mirroring the opinion of the reader of the AD/Rotterdams Dagblad

28 Author’s note: Rhineland democracy is often considered synonymous with consensual democracy. Conversely, Westminster democracy (a concept used in Sub-section 7.2.2) is synonymous to majoritarian democracy. See also Sub-section 1.5.2.
[34], the Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland commented that, “apparently, it is possible that in a democracy decisions are made not on rational grounds but, well, on prestige and ego” (Interview). This could be the outcome of the short-term thinking that, according to a considerable number of the stakeholders, prevails in democratic decision-making. The Stichting Natuurmonumenten thought it was ‘tricky’ that new politicians emerge at four-year intervals, after every General Election. According to this stakeholder, politicians “want to score, not do something which lacks public support”, adding in a rather cynical tone that “to show signs of perseverance and real inquiry are often not the things that we [the electorate] are all waiting for” (Interview). In conjunction with this, the constant influx of new politicians may impact on the quality of decision-making. By referring to politicians, the Vereniging Tegen Milieubederf argued that “they are quite often ‘non-factual’, which means they don’t know anything because they have no knowledge of what is in the documents. Or, they’re not intelligent enough” (Interview).

Some sort of discrepancy in attitudes towards democratic satisfaction can be discerned between stakeholder appraisals of democracy as ‘system’ and democracy as ‘practice’. However, stakeholders were generally more uniform in their attitudes towards political trust. The statement made by the Vereniging Tegen Milieubederf that “the state is manipulative and you can’t trust it” (Interview), made with reference to situations where the government is pitted against civil society in public policy issues, was an oddity; most stakeholders appraised the trustworthiness of the political establishment as high. There was a widely shared belief in the ability of prudent decision-makers to play with an open deck of cards. When such openness would not be demonstrated, perhaps this was to achieve a particular (higher) end. The KNNV Delfland argued that, “of course, there is an ‘information differential’ which an administration can use (...). The government has enormous resources in the fields of expertise and experience than when compared to the resources on the other side [i.e. civil society]. So there is no equity in the process, but the question is whether this should be the case” (Interview).

Stakeholders expressed sympathy with the role of politicians both as an elected representative and a maker of good decisions. For example, the Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland reasoned that “as a politician you have a broad public support base, and you are a representative of the people (...), so there will always be conflict that you can’t prevent because of the different positions fulfilled by different players” (Interview). For civil society stakeholders this reasoning would imply that the inability of politicians to please all parties involved, at least within the context of liberal democracy, was intrinsic to democratic representation. The Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland continued by stating that “things will always hurt, somewhere. But, when you look at the [decision-making] process: is the process good? Are all of us following the rules of the game that we have agreed to? Are
we doing well in this respect?” (Interview). According to this stakeholder these are fundamental questions of political trust.

7.3.2 Democratic satisfaction and political trust in the A4DS project

~ “Rijkswaterstaat is a state within a state” ~ (an oft-used slogan amongst stakeholders involved in the A4DS project)

It has been stated that stakeholder appraisals were by and large positive towards democracy as ‘system’. As it is the executive agency of the Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu (MI&M), and as such the competent authority in planning the A4DS, Rijkswaterstaat is not a systemic feature of democracy. Clearly, it has been a prime source of suspicion and of distrust, something which the quotation above suggests. With regards to democratic satisfaction, both Rijkswaterstaat and its employer, the MI&M, have been accused of poor governance. For instance, one viewpoint (‘zienswijze’) that was submitted to assess the proposed route decision stated that “we have demonstrated that the Ontwerp Tracébesluit conflicts with the written and unwritten principles of good governance, in particular the motivation principle, the precautionary principle, the fair-play principle and the proportionality principle” (MOBilisation for the Environment, 2010: 30; submitted on behalf of Milieuvereniging Zuid-Holland).

Besides the formal communications of the A4DS project to the general public, for instance through the TN/MER and the Tracébesluit, the mode of public engagement was also scrutinized in light of democratic satisfaction. Being more of a spatial plan for reconfiguring the future of Midden-Delfland than a discussion platform of the utility and necessity for constructing the A4DS (IODS, 2001), the IODS was considered unresponsive to those stakeholders mostly adhering to the justification discourse. For instance, SOBO argued that its pleas for such a discussion “were left unanswered because they told us: your reason for being here is livelihood and that’s the responsibility of someone else” (Interview). Who that ‘someone else’ may be is unclear, although, as has been mentioned in Chapter 6, the IODS (2001) has claimed that the justification of the A4DS is a matter for the cabinet and the parliament.

The executive and legislative branches of government can indeed be seen as the locus where ‘justification-oriented’ protest can become manifest. However, the enactment of the CHW has been generally appraised as an instrument to stifle citizen opposition against major infrastructure projects. The Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland has issued a rather cynical commentary when referring explicitly to the political motive behind enacting the CHW. It has argued that “the government does not like debate, dialogue and protest. To clear any obstacles for implementation as soon as possible, that is the ‘key’”
(Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland, 2009: 4). When turning to the IODS for ‘mitigation-oriented protest’, a similar disillusionment with political authority can be discerned. Explaining its reason for being disillusioned with the IODS, Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland (2010, no page numbers provided) commented it felt that it had “not been involved as an equitable partner in the fulfilment of the quality projects” undertaken in the IODS, something which led to the marginalization of its role as “co-producer of policy” and which “pushed us back in the traditional role of policy consumer”.

It is perhaps safe to categorize SOBO and Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland’s remarks, however different they may be, as a critique on the mandate of decision-makers to discuss certain things with civil society. However, as regards attitudes towards the degree of democratic representation it can be noted that complaints were virtually absent. The KNNV Delfland reasoned that “there are many different parties in the feedback group of the IODS: residents, residents associations, the KNNV, Vereniging Midden-Delfland... You can’t say, looking back, that one of the parties didn’t feel represented” (Interview). Similarly, the Midden-Delfland Vereniging – protecting the interests of Midden-Delfland – thought that decision-makers treated it as a ‘serious partner’ in deliberating the potential adverse consequences of developments in Midden-Delfland (Interview). To some the IODS was understood as rapprochement between decision-makers and civil society, ultimately rendering the prospect of deliberative democracy a viable future scenario. The KNNV Delfland contended that when “consultation of the relevant residents and organizations will become better and more frequent, the promise of using judicial procedures to obstruct will decrease in necessity” (Interview).

A highly salient theme within political trust revolved around the widely held perception of the existence of a concealed agenda in large-scale infrastructure capacity expansion. The Stichting Natuurmonumenten argued that Rijkswaterstaat has “secret missions or plans, invisible agendas” (Interview). In the A4DS planning process the infrastructure development agenda of Rijkswaterstaat was noted to bring “manipulation and disinformation” (Stichting Stop RW19/A4, Interview) to the fore, thereby blindfolding the protest movement and effectively resulting in an unfair process of public engagement. The perception of a manipulative and misinforming project planner resulted in a strong feeling of distrust. Indeed, the Stichting Stop RW19/A4 remembered the wording of a guiding principle for those most fervently opposed to the A4DS: “The text is from Rijkswaterstaat. It does not state what it states” (Interview). The assumption that secret agendas guided the A4DS project furthermore informed views on the prime interest of Rijkswaterstaat. In voicing a widely shared belief amongst stakeholders, the Stichting

29 Author’s note: The Dutch translation is a play of words. It reads as follows: “De tekst is van Rijkswaterstaat. Er staat niet wat er staat”.

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Waterweg Wonen asserted that Rijkswaterstaat has “one interest and that is the construction of that motorway” (Interview).

Although decision-makers and politicians were generally considered prudent and responsible in the conduct of politics, perhaps the project nature of the A4DS has been an impediment to that. Due to the strong scientific component in the decision-making context of the planning process, stakeholders have become aware that some of the scientific data could have been used for strategic purposes. A blatant miscalculation of the capacity on the A13 in 2006 – thereby impacting the Intensity/Capacity ratio (IC-ratio) of this motorway – certainly did not encourage trust in scientific accuracy [36]. The traffic expert claimed that the scientists involved in providing the traffic models steered towards creating necessity for the A4DS, thereby glossing over potentially valuable counter-evidence. Both accounts of scientific inaccuracy could be understood as a genuine lack of knowledge. However, trust may also have been impeded by the absolute willingness of decision-makers to push through projects such as the A4DS, perhaps at the expense of the truth.

KNNV Delfland told a story about a colleague-protester of the A4DS, who lost his faith in the political and scientific establishment of major infrastructure projects. He said that:

“[Name of individual] has minimal trust in the state, because [she/he] experienced in court that the State Attorney lied about something. Intentionally. It was argued that the asphalt used [in one or other infrastructure project] was silent and that concerns over noise pollution lost their relevance as a consequence of this. At this stage the court tends to trust the state. In fact, you should be able to trust it. Later on it proved that the claim made by the State Attorney was incorrect and which was well-known before the court meeting. So, this is some form of trickery which in some instances is used by the state. It does not encourage citizen trust” (Interview).

A practical consequence of a (tacit) feeling of distrust is the existence of Stichting Batavier, which was founded after the decision to construct the A4DS had been made. Stichting Batavier monitors whether the provisions (e.g. the height of a viaduct, the cutting or planting of trees) made in the Tracébesluit will be carried out by Rijkswaterstaat and the developer, which is an infrastructure construction consortium (called ‘A4all’). Whilst monitoring has partly become necessary according to the Stichting Batavier due the expected difficulty to convert these provisions from paper into reality, it is also necessary due to a sensed lack of transparency in the communication between Rijkswaterstaat and citizens, particularly in reaching out to those living in close proximity to the alignment. As an outcome of this latter point, as well as being the ‘last man standing’, the Stichting Batavier fulfils a function as the watchdog of the project. In describing its functionality, it argued that “people can go straight to Rijkswaterstaat with their questions, which has an
email address and a customer centre, but apparently they turn to us instead because they expect some sort of a non-response from Rijkswaterstaat. So they ask questions: ‘hey, Batavier, is this and this correct?’” (Interview).

There was a considerable degree of interpersonal trust amongst stakeholders involved in the A4DS project. Interpersonal trust became manifest in collective action and information exchange. The platform Hoezo Midden-Delfland Snelweg?30 assembled a number of civil society stakeholders whose main interest in becoming involved in protest was to protect Midden-Delfland, the impact area. Its News Letter (e.g. hoezomiddendelflandsnelweg.nl, 2011) served to provide the latest update on developments in the planning process or on the location and date of future protest activities. Initiatives such as this platform, in conjunction with the collaborative space provided by the feedback group of the IODS, helped build alliances between stakeholders. The KNNV Delfland argued that stakeholders worked together in a harmonious relationship by stressing that “there was no distrust, none at all. All of us were really on the same page” (Interview). Stakeholders were aware that collaboration could benefit the success of their protest. For example, the Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland argued that “if you step into a process [of campaigning together], then you have to work together to build trust and to work on the best solution” (Interview).

The question what is the ‘best solution’ has been a pertinent one. As a result of the multiple ways of answering it, opinions diverge on whether to collaborate or not. This could have been instructed by instrumental reasons, such as has been the case with the Stichting Waterweg Wonen. This housing association became involved in discussing impact mitigation in the planning process because its properties, concentrated west of the alignment in Vlaardingen, could be adversely affected by increased noise levels. Since it did not necessarily want to dispense with the idea of an additional motorway connection between The Hague and Rotterdam, it saw no reason for involvement in a more fundamental discussion on the traffic-related merits of the A4DS. It stated that “it is not in our interest that this motorway will not be constructed, simply because we don’t have an opinion about it. They [the environmental groups] had a pure interest in stopping this motorway, something we absolutely didn’t want to be associated with” (Stichting Waterweg Wonen, Interview). This conveys a strategic consideration of this particular stakeholder to not choose sides in the deadlock between Rijkswaterstaat and civil society groups that became engaged in protesting the A4DS for environmental reasons.

Analogous to the observed divergence between protest based on the storylines of ‘no utility and necessity’ and ‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’, some distrust could be discerned between civil society stakeholders advocating either one of these protest avenues. Similar to the resentment of the Vereniging Tegen Milieubedreven against a

30 The official name of this network is a web address: http://www.hoezomiddendelflandsnelweg.nl.
stakeholder that supported the A4DS in exchange for additional hectares of new nature (see Chapter 6), the Stichting Stop RW19/A4 argued that its collaboration with another stakeholder ceased after the latter opted out from protesting against the construction of the A4DS. The collaboration did not end in good terms, however, since it suspected that the other party opted out in order to realize privately held goals. According to the Stichting Stop RW19/A4, this “is the antidote of [interpersonal] trust: they are ‘bullshitted over’” by Rijkwaterstaat, for instance in exchange for certain mitigation measures (Interview). For this particular stakeholder, this has come as no surprise. It continued by stating that “this has always been the preferred tactic. Of course you start to invest in trust, but you have to be constantly aware and keep in mind the agendas” (Interview).

When a common goal was agreed, for instance the goal to put the ‘why’ rather than the ‘how’ of the A4DS centre-stage as has been done in Hoezo Midden-Delfland Snelweg?, the network of which has been described by the Stichting Stop RW19/A4 as a ‘denominator’ all could agree to, interpersonal trust was an inherent feature of stakeholder collaboration. One way interpersonal trust could be illustrated is by mapping stakeholder appraisals of the creation of a collaborative environment. The respondent from the KNNV Waterweg-Noord stated that “I think it is really fantastic that they [the NGOs] bring these groups together, because that is quite a tough job. I think they do good work” (Interview). Another way to illustrate interpersonal trust is by looking at the division of labour between the stakeholders involved. For Milieudefensie – a national environmental advocacy organization – there was no need to meddle with other civil society stakeholders. With respect to its relationship with local stakeholders, it argued that “those people are there on the ground, and they know what's best. We have our national contacts and our national media attention, so with these we can lift the protest to a higher ground” (Interview).

7.4 Summary

When political culture is premised on democratic satisfaction and political trust, a difference between the UK and the Netherlands in these two respects can be discerned in the value surveys. The Netherlands generally score higher on indicators of democratic satisfaction and political trust. However, it can be assumed that the stakeholders considered in this research can be found in the mid-segment of the value spectrum; the UK and the Netherlands are relatively comparable in this respect. Although there is a lack of comparative research on (levels of) interpersonal trust in the UK and the Netherlands, in both countries social science research has considered it important for the organizational self-capacity of civil society. This is not to suggest that interpersonal trust is based on faith in others, as trust can be principally motivated by self-interest.
In the HS2 project, stakeholder appraisals of democratic satisfaction hover between satisfaction with democracy as ‘system’ and satisfaction with the incumbent coalition government, to be interpreted as political authority. Whilst stakeholders were generally satisfied with the majoritarian system, they are dissatisfied with the coalition government. Political trust is somewhat wavering, principally caused by the partisan strife and the ineptitude of politicians to cater for the public good. In the HS2 project, stakeholders exhibited low levels of democratic satisfaction and political trust. In organizing the CF, HS2 Ltd did not fulfil stakeholders’ expectations of what should be a conduct of good governance. For instance, key information on the loading factor of the West Coast Main Line (WCML) was not distributed on time, thought to be motivated by strategic reasons. Interpersonal trust between the stakeholders was high. It was commented that friendly relations existed between civil society groups all along the line of route, as well as in the Chilterns.

In the A4DS project, stakeholders were very positive about the democratic system, arguing that there is not a better system at hand. There was substantial critique against politicians, however, as they primarily focus on the short term and do not possess a sufficient amount of factual knowledge. When the good intentions of politicians were made the subject of inquiry, political trust was generally high. In the A4DS project, these positive views went largely overboard. There was a substantial lack of consensus-building in the project, particularly when stakeholders wanted to discuss the flawed claim of necessity of expanding the motorway capacity. Political trust was low: it was assumed that secret agendas of infrastructure development dominated the discussions between them and Rijkswaterstaat; blatant mistakes and lies did not add to the feeling of trust. Similar to the HS2 case, interpersonal trust could generally be considered high. Although some incongruence existed between those adhering to ‘utility and necessity’ and to ‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’, stakeholders united in a platform to try to get the best possible outcome, thereby exchanging information and sharing responsibilities.

It should have become apparent that environmental impact assessment (EIA) has played a less than minor role in this chapter. Stakeholder reflections were premised on the actions of politicians or the quality of the community engagement, but not so much on whether the EIA had been conducted in a satisfying and trustworthy way. Arguably, EIA has had no influence whatsoever in shaping the politico-cultural orientations of stakeholders in the Chilterns that were involved in the HS2 project. In the A4DS project, only marginal influence can be ascribed to the TN/MER in determining such orientations. An underlying question that is indirectly associated with the research question is: to what extent does EIA prove an adequate policy environment for investigating the mobilization of sustainability discourses? Whilst the ‘harvest’ of sustainability discourses that explicitly relate to EIA (Chapter 5) has been reduced to those that have stressed the need to
conserve the impact areas in the projects, and whilst the institutional designs of the projects can be reduced to community engagement when discussing impacts, political culture has not been manifested in EIA. This conclusion opens up important debate on the role of EIA in accommodating discourse mobilization where large-scale infrastructure projects are concerned, something already briefly touched upon in Chapter 6. The following two chapters will elaborate on this debate.
Chapter 8  Discussion on counter-expertise and discourse

This chapter discusses the empirical findings obtained in the previous three chapters. It does so by linking new theoretical insights to these findings, thereby challenging the theoretical framework. In particular, it will provide an analysis which can potentially rival the model on sustainability discourse mobilization as laid bare in Figure 2.1, perhaps at this advanced stage in the thesis to be considered the ‘conventional’ model for guiding theory on this topic. The analysis privileges stakeholder reflections on the versatile use of science in making up the evidence base of the HS2 and A4DS projects. This is first of all necessary because public engagement with science – coined counter-expertise in this chapter – is quite different from modes of public engagement that are structured by institutions or the cultural orientation of civil society. Furthermore, the analysis is necessary because science has played its dominant part in (non-institutionalized) forms of protest in both projects.

The chapter consists of two parts and a summary section (Section 8.3). In the first part, the roles of science and civil counter-expertise in large-scale infrastructure are discussed. Manifested throughout the previous chapters, most prominently expressed through the narrative dealing with the justification discourses in Chapter 5, casual reference is made to a polemic debate between the advocates of the proposed developments, i.e. HS2 and A4DS, and the ‘anti-campaigns’ on the evidence base of the projects. The different viewpoints between the formal policy discourses and the justification discourses in each project are teased out. Since these latter discourses have been instrumental in organizing protest around certain themes, it is worth looking at the ways in which protest has revolved around the scientific validity of the evidence presented. Particular attention is devoted to the role of potential scientific biases in strategies of formal project appraisal and how this role has been envisaged by those stakeholders that engaged in debating the underlying justification of the projects. As will be shown, stakeholders did not eschew from teasing out assumptions that are often easily taken for granted.

The second part returns to environmental impact assessment (EIA). It does so by focusing on the complex relationship between EIA, science, and counter-expertise, and whether the latter can be considered a valuable protest strategy in the procedural context of EIA. By making explicit reference to discourse, from an abductivist scheme of inference (see Chapter 3) it can and, indeed, should be discussed whether protest based on counter-expertise is more of an influential external factor to the mobilization of sustainability discourses within the procedural surroundings of EIA than are institutional design and political culture. Abduction aims to conclude whether the HS2 and A4DS projects exemplify cases where sustainability discourses are accommodated (see Table
3.2). As Chapter 6 and 7 have demonstrated, respectively, stakeholder reflections on institutional design and political culture have been formulated in relative isolation from EIA. Without drawing premature conclusions in this chapter, which of course is the principal task of Chapter 9, the prominence of the justification discourses in both projects beckons further inquiry into EIA and the influence exerted by counter-expertise. As this chapter shows, this source of influence should be seen as another potentially potent variable for steering the mobilization of sustainability discourses.

8.1 Science and civil counter-expertise in infrastructure projects

8.1.1 HS2

An obvious locus of protest in the Chilterns has proved to be the location of the proposed line of route of Phase 1, which has mainly revolved around the perceived inadequacy of the preferred scheme to place it in an already existing transport corridor (e.g. Potter Row Action Group, Interview). Whilst it was rebutted by the Independent Rail Consultant that a line of route for example following the M1 motorway corridor (London-Birmingham) would cause much more property blight by bisecting larger population centres (e.g. Luton) than would the current line of route, or that the existing West Coast Main Line (WCML) train corridor is simply too narrow (Interview), such a locus of protest should hardly come as a surprise. The Chesham Society claimed that HS2 has “zero in the use for anybody in the Chilterns (...), it serves us no useful purpose at all” (Interview). However, interestingly, this stakeholder referred to the lack of broader benefits for commuters or local businesses rather than to the expected adverse ecological and sustainability impacts. Following the narrative set out in the justification discourse, civil counter-expertise has equally targeted the business rationale of HS2.

Notwithstanding the many facets where scientific evidence is used, and subsequently contested, the cost-benefit ratio of HS2 has been most prominently manifested in debate surrounding the project. Either in anticipation or in reaction to the economic justification set forth by HS2 Ltd (e.g. 2012a; 2012b), there has been a true maelstrom of counter-evidence presented by civil society stakeholders on what is presumed to be a more accurate cost-benefit ratio. Besides the ‘usual suspects’ in conducting counter-expertise, such as the HS2 Action Alliance (2013), described by the Dunsmore Society as the “intellectual side of the campaign” (Interview), economic think tanks (e.g. Adam Smith Institute, 2011) or research institutes (e.g. Aizlewood and Wellings, 2011), organizations affiliated with government have also become involved. The National Audit Office (2013), for instance, has challenged what they perceive as an over-optimistic appraisal of HS2’s economic benefits. This has been confirmed by the Major
Projects Authority of the Cabinet Office as well as by the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2013), adding that the “estimated costs of High Speed 2 have increased substantially” (pp.10).

The claim made by HS2 Ltd (HS2 Ltd, 2012a: 39) that “around 148,000 passengers would use HS2 each day on the section between Birmingham Interchange and Old Oak Common” was heavily contested. The Potter Row Action Group ascribed words such as ‘laughable’ and ‘just madness’ to this claim (Interview); the Dunsmore Society argued that with this expected passenger demand, “we could empty Birmingham in two days!” (Interview). The stakeholder affiliated with the Amersham & District Residents Association argued that “I don’t know of a single study of any high-speed rail projects anywhere in Europe where the actual take-up of the demand met the expectations and justification documents. It just doesn’t happen” (Interview). The relatively recent British experience with High-Speed rail 1 (HS1) has probably been most known to stakeholders, where the expected passenger demand was three times higher than the actual demand (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2012).

With regards to journey time savings, Sub-section 5.1.1 has provided a number of reasons why a case for HS2 based on this benefits category is flawed. These ranged from ‘hard’ science (e.g. North/South train services using conventional rail can be made faster), via empirical evidence (e.g. business people do work on trains) to ‘soft’ science (the need for long-distance business travel in the future is expected to be low). The statement that HS2 does not affect the length of door-to-door journeys (e.g. Chesham Society, Interview) is interesting as it counters both the immediate objectives of providing additional seating capacity and saving journey time. According to Go-HS2 (Interview), a Birmingham-based pro-HS2 group affiliated with the regional public transport operator Centro, HS2 offers unparalleled opportunities to the West Midlands in becoming the most important hub in the national North/South transport artery. An important reason is that Phase 1 and Phase 2 will become physically connected in the outskirts of Birmingham. However, it has been argued that conventional rail services to regional stations not included in the proposed HS2 scheme (e.g. Coventry) will become less frequent and will have more intermediate stops (51m, 2011b), both of which increase journey times in the ‘periphery’.

Hovering over the argumentation on journey time savings and an increase in business travellers is the cost-benefit ratio, arguably the life blood of the HS2 project. HS2 Ltd (2012a) has argued that the value of time (VOT) for business trips is at the heart of the project’s cost-benefit ratio and has therefore received widespread attention (e.g. Batley et al., 2012; Department for Transport Strategy Unit, 2012; HS2 Action Alliance, 2013). This is not surprising given the fact that time saved on business journeys accounts for roughly three quarters (£7.4 billion) of the benefits of journey time savings (HS2 Ltd, 2012a), the latter accounting for roughly 55% of the overall benefits. The VOT is based on an
estimation of the ‘resource cost’ for employers to let their employees travel during working time (Department for Transport, 2012b). The resource cost is predominantly based on the average salary of business passengers expected to use HS2. It is currently estimated to be around £80,000 and will steadily increase when price levels increase. Wendover HS2 noted that, if an increase of about 2% continues during HS2’s appraisal period of sixty years, “you end up with a salary in real terms of about £300,000. So basically every business passenger is going to be earning a second rate footballers’ salary” (Interview). According to this stakeholder, the VOT is a ‘trick’ to boost the cost-benefit ratio since its growth rate is higher than the project’s discount rate of 1%.

8.1.2 A4DS

Inquiry into the assumed necessity for large-scale infrastructure capacity expansion requires a focus on the rationale for such developments. Sub-section 5.2.1 has suggested that the assumption of the natural growth of traffic has proved to be a particularly dominant rationale in the A4DS project. Project advocates could argue that the drivers of natural traffic growth are beyond the sphere of influence of infrastructure or transport policy, such as socio-economic and demographic drivers (e.g. Zimmermann et al., 1974; Owens and Cowell, 2011). Goodwin (2001: 21) has furthermore argued that natural traffic growth is traditionally assumed by traffic planners to be “an autonomous and inevitable trend, driven primarily by the choices of free individuals, and enabled by the steady growth of real income that all countries sought to provide”. From this point of view it can be asserted that concerted efforts to stop traffic from growing naturally are inherently unable to yield success.

As mentioned earlier, Rijkswaterstaat is the executive agency of the Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu (MI&M) and therefore responsible for developing the A4DS. However, the remark made by SOBO that “Rijkswaterstaat is only the developer, full stop” (Interview) has not been reciprocated by many of the other stakeholders. In particular, stakeholders claimed that Rijkswaterstaat is driven by a concealed agenda of infrastructure development, irrespective of which way the political wind blows (e.g. Stichting Natuurmonumenten, Interview). Rijkswaterstaat (2012b: 4) itself admitted that its goal is to establish “a robust and coherent mobility system with enough capacity to handle the demand expected in the medium (2008) and long term (2040)”. Arguably, the assumption of natural traffic growth plays a pivotal role in the repeatedly expressed need for additional infrastructure capacity. From this perspective it is perhaps good to remember that Rijkswaterstaat (2009c: 27) claimed the need for the A4DS is caused by traffic growth, based on “an assumed growth of the population, economy, number of households, car ownership, etc.”.
If it is accepted that traffic growth and infrastructure capacity expansion are intimately related, as has been suggested in Figure 5.3, then logic suggests that advocates of infrastructure development such as Rijkswaterstaat benefit from accepting modelled forecasts of traffic growth. Such forecasts provide a recurring justification for realizing the agenda items associated with infrastructure development, which according to some stakeholders makes them ‘inevitable’ (e.g. SP Delft, Interview). Part of the same group of stakeholders however has argued that this justification is not only built on a shaky foundation, but that the underlying assumption of natural traffic growth is wrong to begin with. The Traffic Expert from TU Delft claimed that “the assumption of autonomous traffic growth is blindness, it is the limited judgement. ‘Growth is autonomous?’ No, it is not autonomous!” (Interview). What is more, the very concept of perpetual traffic growth has been the subject of contestation. Milieudefensie argued that “there is no-one who forecasts that traffic will grow indefinitely. Even the real experts agree that in 2040 growth will cease, and probably earlier” (Interview).

Through carefully analyzing the core tenets of the rationale for the A4DS, which subsequently forms the basis of the justification discourse, it should become apparent that these so-called ‘real experts’ are not employed by the MI&M. In the 2004 Nota Mobiliteit (Mobility Note), the equivalent of a white paper in the Dutch government context, mobility is identified as a “precondition for economic growth and social development in the Netherlands” (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 2004: 15). By embracing the a priori view that more mobility (i.e. traffic growth) can be expected in the future, the government has intricately linked the economy, mobility and the target of accessibility improvement by deploying the following reasoning (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 2004):

- Areas of economic importance need to remain accessible;
- More mobility leads to less accessibility;
- Mobility reduction is not an option;
- Infrastructure as a guiding principle.

Whilst the government has realized that ‘unnecessary’ traffic needs to be avoided, for instance through improving information technology and communication infrastructures (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 2004), ongoing plans for infrastructure development in the A4DS study area have led stakeholders to fear for such unnecessary traffic to become induced (e.g. Vereniging Tegen Milieubedrft, Interview). By concurring with Litman (2010) that congestion maintains equilibrium when motorway capacity is expanded, the Traffic Expert argued that the A4DS will simultaneously consolidate the current pinch points in the study area (e.g. Klein Polderplein junction) and create new...
ones (e.g. Kethelplein Junction) due to the co-evolution of newly generated traffic and bottlenecks (Interview). Many other stakeholders implicitly referred to the A4DS as both the cause and effect of a self-fulfilling prophecy in infrastructure development.

8.1.3 Reflections on prominent scientific biases

In both the HS2 and A4DS projects, what could be coined the formal science-policy discourse of the competent authority have been vehemently challenged by civil counter-expertise. Debate on the validity of scientific claims and their subsequent transposition into policy has been principally led by questions on the quality of the evidence presented. However, in furthering the discussion on the roles of science and counter-expertise in the two projects, stakeholder reflections on prominent scientific biases have surfaced. Such reflections stressed the manipulative character of scientific assumptions underlying the very evidence base of the projects. For instance, in the A4DS project the influence of a stringent road pricing scheme has not been evaluated (Traffic Expert, Interview), simply because the scientific traffic model used to forecast future traffic volumes has not considered this particular policy instrument. Because of this lack of consideration, alternatives to the proposed development could not come into full maturity. The HS2 case has also been rife with similar examples which attest to the role of scientific biases in setting some order of preference in the project documentation.

The claim made by the stakeholders that the evidence base of both the projects is manipulated in favour of the incumbent development resonates in the literature on infrastructure development. Næss (2011) has argued that the advocates of a development may ‘filter knowledge’ where alternative infrastructure developments are compared with the incumbent policy option. In the case of road infrastructure development, such filtering consists of ignoring adverse impacts associated with the incumbent option, for instance the occurrence of induced traffic. Where the reference situation (the ‘no-build’ alternative) is concerned, the evidence base suffers from a ‘pessimism bias’ (Næss, 2011). Premised on the assumption that adverse autonomous developments in the reference situation will inevitably occur, such as increased demand pressure through natural traffic growth (Goodwin, 2011), the pessimism bias sustains the assumption that the reference situation is intrinsically incapable of facilitating future traffic volumes.

By associating the pessimism bias with the unrealistic appraisal of the reference situation in infrastructure planning, Næss (2011) has paraphrased the ‘optimism bias’. This latter bias, on its part, is identified to often be a factor of influence in infrastructure project planning (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005). Whilst an incumbent project proposal may make the reference situation seem incapable of accommodating traffic and passenger volumes, the optimism bias prohibits the taking of a cautionary approach to what benefits can be
expected from the proposed development. Thus, in contrast to the pessimism bias, the optimism bias ascribes benefits to the incumbent option which are far from realistic. It has been asserted that either wishful thinking (‘the wish is father to the thought’) or the political motives of planners and decision-makers instruct the optimism bias (Flyvbjerg, 2007). When the procedural stage of comparing viable alternatives in EIA is over, or when assumptions on traffic and passenger growth have been promoted to statements, using modelled outcomes as their underlying justification, the optimism bias could take a lead role in stakeholders’ reflection on the flawed rationale for the development.

Evidence on the expected traffic volume is important for justifying proposed developments. However, the relationship between infrastructure and the evidence base of proposed developments is complex. Within the manifestation of optimism bias this becomes particularly manifest through induced traffic (or induced travel in rail infrastructure), the occurrence of which marks the difference between ‘autonomous’ growth and growth that results from the development. Flyvbjerg et al. (2005) and Welde and Odeck (2011) have argued that road infrastructure projects systematically undervalue the influence of induced traffic. Amongst others, induced traffic impacts adversely on the objective to relieve congestion (Noland and Lem, 2002), identified as the prime incentive for construction in the A4DS project. Whilst Rijkswaterstaat (2009c) has acknowledged the occurrence of induced traffic, it has not linked induced traffic to sustained levels of congestion. In rail infrastructure projects, in contrast, induced travel is systematically overvalued as it is often used as proof for the public utility of the proposed development (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005). Competent authorities want to demonstrate that passengers are faced with a number of constraints in the rail infrastructure, such as (over)crowding (e.g. HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011), but that the proposed development will make the option of travelling by train more attractive.

Pessimism and optimism biases based on induced traffic or travel growth are two sides of the same coin. That is, the incumbent proposal benefits from downgrading the reference situation and upgrading the proposed development based on expected demand. Costs are also a prominent cause for optimism bias, however. This is particularly true for construction costs, as it is often this figure that captures people’s imagination. HS2 Ltd (2012b) has acknowledged that it needs to approach its cost estimation cautiously precisely for the danger of succumbing to an over-optimistic appraisal. Stakeholders in the Chilterns have criticized the cost estimation of HS2 (Wendover HS2, 2010), and not without good reason. Whilst the construction costs for HS2 were estimated to be around £32 billion in the January 2012 project documentation (e.g. HS2 Ltd, 2012f), estimated cost increases since then have been a topic worthy of focus by the popular press (e.g. in
as well as, for example, a number of concerned Members of Parliament (MP) in the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2013). And, of course, stakeholders have used estimated cost increases to their advantage. Hillary Wharf, an economist of the HS2 Action Alliance, asked the rhetorical and also sarcastic question: "How much longer do they think the tax payer will listen to their bleatings about this £50 billion white elephant being vital to the future of the UK’s economy?" (cited in [37]).

The claim has been made by Flyvbjerg et al. (2005) and Næss (2011) that strategic-political considerations contribute to the inaccuracy of infrastructure demand forecasts and their associated costs and benefits, seen from a multi-criteria perspective. These considerations have also been a contributory cause to both the pessimism and optimism bias. Stakeholders in the HS2 and A4DS cases generally agreed that these biases were politically motivated. For instance, the HS2 Action Alliance (2012) has asserted that the DfT deliberately used 11-year old data to bolster the VOT of every working hour spent travelling in order to justify HS2 as being a cost-saving attribute. These data stemmed from the era when the train was still an elite way of travelling. However, stakeholders made the important observation that an apparent power asymmetry exists between the competent authority and the consultancy or research institute which has been commissioned to forecast future demand or calculate the cost-benefit ratio of projects. This power asymmetry prevented an objective evaluation by a third party of either the data input, the modelled outcomes or the actual model used. By referring implicitly to the A4DS case, Milieudefensie asserted that:

“all the consultancies, all of them, depend on the assignments of Rijkswaterstaat. So, if you apply for an assignment, then you will not contest the outcomes [obtained from using Rijkswaterstaat’s own model] by fear of being left out of receiving future assignments. Rijkswaterstaat commissions the same calculations to be carried out five times and will take over the outcomes they find most interesting” (Interview).

The model that Milieudefensie alluded to is the Nieuw Regionaal Model (New Regional Model) (NRM), which is used by Rijkswaterstaat (2009c) to model the impacts on traffic resulting from broader demographic and socio-economic scenarios provided by government planning bureaus. A prognosis of population growth in the middle and longer term is particularly important for predicting future traffic volumes, although in a publication issued by Rijkswaterstaat it has been cautioned that paying sole attention to prognoses associated with population size is too simplistic (Van der Waard, 2012). Nevertheless, it has been claimed that the justification of large-scale infrastructure projects relies heavily on population growth, because if “more inhabitants are brought into a traffic model, then

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31 This reference (where parentheses are used) is a newspaper article. To see how newspaper articles are referenced, please refer to the second footnote of Chapter 4.
the model generates more traffic. In this way, utility and necessity can be better justified” (Sambell, 2009: II). The relevance of the NRM for agreeing on the need for new infrastructures is therefore considerably influenced by assumptions on population growth.

According to Milieudefensie (Interview), the outcomes that Rijkswaterstaat will eventually select for the evidence base of their projects are the outcomes that best justify their preferred development option. A parallel can be drawn between the A4DS project and the HS2 project with regards to the related assumptions of power asymmetry and the formulation of policy preferences. The Cholesbury Action Group argued that the government “made the decision [to proceed with HS2] and then they, as it were, told the DfT: ‘go in the corner and play with bricks, but make sure you come back with the answer that says high-speed rail is the right solution’” (Interview). This seems to indicate that civil society stakeholders suspected that the project evidence was politically biased, or that the role of evidence in the project was driven by political motivation. Similar to observations made in Chapter 6 that HS2 Ltd was confined to the political milieu in which it had to operate, the same observation was made regarding the scientists that engaged with determining the cost-benefit ratio of HS2. The stakeholder from the Amersham Action Group argued that:

“I think the models were developed by people who were trying to do a good scientific job of it. The people who then applied them later tended to tweak them to get the answers they want. (...) Whilst basically the model underlying it can be good, they don’t model everything that you need for the particular calculation. If you want you can take a good scientific model and get out results according to where you’re lying” (Interview).

8.2 The complex relationship between EIA and counter-expert protest

Thus far this chapter has shown that the formal project appraisals have used science to support the claim that HS2 and A4DS are necessary infrastructure developments. In order to support such a claim, science has furnished the advocates of both projects with seemingly compelling decision-supporting evidence hinting at the mismatch between a rising public demand for new infrastructure, on the one hand, and the limited available capacity in the reference situation, on the other. Science has quantified such a demand in terms of the public utility for development, expressing the necessity to alleviate pressure on the existing infrastructure capacity (i.e. crowding relief and congestion relief). Conversely, civil society stakeholders in both of the projects have asserted that the evidence used to claim necessity is flawed and that certain biases are intrinsic to how the incumbent development option is compared with alternative options, including the reference situation. The justification discourses in both projects illuminate these
assertions, as well as doubts amongst civil society stakeholders about the validity of the evidence base that have arisen in tandem with the proliferation of the scientific justification of the projects.

The use of ‘justification science’, to frame it as such, may have multiple uses in infrastructure projects. A government think tank on mobility issues in the Netherlands has argued that the outcomes of traffic models can be used for multiple decision-support tools, such as “societal cost-benefit analyses, environmental impact assessments and for deciding on mitigating measures in a route decision” (Martens et al., 2010: 9). This clearly attests to the versatile use of science in various areas of a proposed infrastructure development, a statement which can be made more meaningful by looking at a case. For instance, the aforementioned NRM traffic model used by Rijkswaterstaat has played a key role in the evidence base of the environmental statement of the A4DS project, the Trajectnota/Milieu-effectrapportage (TN/MER) (Route Proposal/Environmental Impact Assessment). In EIA, the outcomes of the NRM model have been especially important for demonstrating the difference in Intensity/Capacity ratios (IC-ratio) when choosing for either the A4DS or its main competitor, the ‘A13+A13/16’ (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009c). The IC-ratio is a quantification of congestion and therefore leading in demonstrating the merit for any of the proposed alternatives.

As part of a carefully delineated list of the procedural stages of EIA (see also Table 1.1), public engagement (or public participation) is an important aspect of EIA. Arguably, stakeholder engagement with EIA may not only buoy the formulation of sustainability discourses (Wilkins, 2003), but it may equally help define what people can expect from it (e.g. Rozema et al., 2012). O’Faircheallaigh (2010) has furthermore demonstrated that a wide variety of purposes can be attributed to EIA. However, as a consequence of this wide variety, for citizens and civil society groups to actually be able to influence a decision is only one amongst many other purposes. It is by no means guaranteed that public engagement will make a profound change to the incumbent project proposal. In particular, the ‘worth’ of public engagement with EIA is levered to a considerable extent by whether science is open to public scrutiny (Cashmore, 2004). The debate on the ‘civicness’ of science in EIA is indeed important for navigating the role of civil society stakeholders herein. This is especially so when civil contention is driven by the perception that there are flaws in the evidence base of the proposed project in question.

It is fair to say that the conduct of counter-expertise has been of strategic importance for most of the stakeholders that have vehemently protested against the proposed developments. The Cholesbury Action Group illustrated this quite clearly by stating that, “okay, I’m an activist and I’m trying to stop this thing. But I’m stopping it on the basis of actual solid evidence-based analysis. To me that’s the only thing that matters” (Interview). However, interviews with the stakeholders in both projects (with e.g. Chiltern
Ridges Action Group and Stichting Stop RW19/A4, see also Chapter 5) have revealed that stakeholders did not consider EIA to represent a space where protest based on evidence-based decision-making could easily be vented. Quite the contrary, stakeholders noted that the procedural requirements of EIA which privileged a focus on the impacts of the projects related uncomfortably to forms of counter-expert protest associated with the project justification.

Because of its focus on impact prediction and the identification of mitigation measures, the procedural requirements of EIA did not adequately correspond with what stakeholders preferred to discuss. During the sparse moments in the interviews where the role of EIA was pondered over, stakeholders mainly lamented the poor integration of alternatives into the project documentation. As mentioned earlier, Stichting Stop RW19/A4 (2009) asserted that the ‘A13+A13/16’ is not really an alternative after all, as the ability of the A4DS to facilitate traffic flow is dependent on additional infrastructure. This stakeholder could well have based its assertion on a rather puzzling footnote in the TN/MER (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d: see footnote 11 on pp.46) where the ‘A13+A13/16’ is presented as a bypass, necessary for taking out ‘unnecessary’ traffic bound for the A4DS. In conjunction with Rijkswaterstaat’s (2009c) own estimation made in the TN/MER on traffic-related aspects that the A4DS will singlehandedly increase motorway traffic between The Hague and Rotterdam by 64 percent by 2020 compared with the reference situation, for Stichting Stop RW/19 and others (e.g. Hansen, 2009) this served as proof that the construction of the A4DS does everything but achieve what it is intended to do.

At the time of writing the thesis, the EIA Scope and Methodology Report (Arup/URS, 2012a) for HS2 Phase 1 was the principal EIA document yet available to the public. In the public consultation following the draft publication of this document, virtually all of the written responses submitted have remarked that virtually no alternatives have been included or that these alternatives have been poorly or only marginally represented (e.g. Chiltern Countryside Group, 2012; Chilterns Conservation Board, 2012a). What is more, the draft version on the EIA scope and methodology had initially pre-empted any chance for alternatives to become a potent challenger to HS2 and to be taken at face value, stating that “[t]he Environmental Statement (ES) will provide an outline of the main alternatives studied by HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport (DfT) and the reasons for their rejection” (Arup/URS, 2012b: 18). The final (i.e. post-consultation) report on scope and methodology published later in 2012 has considerably mitigated the tone of its message, now stating that strategic alternatives will be given due consideration. However, stakeholders continued to show concerns over the pertinence of these strategic alternatives in the project documentation (e.g. Chilterns Conservation Board, Interview).

Following all that is stated above, a topic worth discussing is to what extent EIA is important for mobilizing sustainability discourses, if indeed at all. The justification
discourses in both projects are clear manifestations of the role of science in discourse mobilization. If it is accepted that ‘justification science’ from e.g. traffic models or rail passenger demand forecasts is at the core of formal project appraisal, then further logical reasoning could suggest that such science represents a space in EIA where discourses are mobilized. However, what requires investigating is whether the conduct of counter-expertise is able to make EIA ‘discursively’ accessible to civil society stakeholders. Yet is EIA more accessible than the institutional spaces for public engagement? The Central Chilterns Community Forum (CCCF) for HS2 and the Integrale Ontwikkeling tussen Delft and Schiedam (IODS) for the A4DS have at best skirted around the edges of what civil society stakeholders have really tried to say or contest (see also Table 6.3). Arguably, these modes of community engagement have poorly accommodated the sustainability discourses identified.

Is counter-expertise a viable protest strategy in the context of EIA?

In Chapter 5 it is shown that a handful of stakeholders’ reflections in both the HS2 and A4DS projects can be directly attributed to the conduct of EIA. In addition to those addressing the unfair treatment of alternatives, some of the reflections addressed the quality of the data upon which the environmental information was based (e.g. Chilterns Conservation Board, Interview; Vereniging Tegen Milieubedreft, Interview). However, all told, they remained scarce. When EIA was discussed in relation to the project justification, the predominant argument was that EIA did not represent an appropriate mechanism with which counter claims could be vented. In the HS2 case, all three discourses (justification, party politics and conservation) have pointed their arrows at project characteristics for which EIA is not legally required\(^{32}\). In the A4DS case, until the verdict by the Raad van State (2011b) made the decision for the A4DS irreversible, stakeholders continued to challenge the justification of this particular motorway capacity expansion.

A verdict by the Raad van State, the highest administrative court in the Netherlands, often takes the shape of a “grande finale” (Stichting Waterweg Wonen, Interview), indicating that a planning decision reviewed by the Raad van State can either repeal the decision or make it irreversible. In a press release following its verdict in the A4DS case, the Raad van State stated that “it is not the task of the judicial planning review to give its own interpretation to the societal value of interests. Its task is to assess whether a governmental decision is just. To assess that a decision is unjust, it is not sufficient for appellants to advance potential alternatives. Instead they should prove that the minister’s decision choice lacks a ‘certain level of justification’” (Raad van State,

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\(^{32}\) Author’s note: there is one notable exception: part of the judicial review of HS2 (see also the Chapter 6) has dealt with the absence of a strategic environmental assessment (SEA), upon instigation by 51m and the HS2 Action Alliance.
However, the Traffic Expert has argued that this interpretation of justification is led by principles of good governance not decision quality, stating that “the Raad van State only looks at the procedural and juridical aspects and not at content” (Interview). When applied to EIA, the Raad van State’s verdict deals with its implementation and not with the scientific evidence therein to justify the route decision (for more information on such reasoning, see Craig and Jeffery, 2013).

EIA arguably presents a key opportunity to stakeholders to discuss the destruction and ecological blight which the project in question could cause at the local level. Of course, one might argue that EIA is set up to justify decisions that are already made (e.g. Shepherd and Bowler, 1997). At any rate, the willingness to discuss questions on justification instead therefore triggers an interesting question. That is, is counter-expertise a viable protest strategy in the context of EIA? Or to put it differently, is protest based on making counter-claims to oppose the incumbent policy discourse a ‘good’ form of protest? Whilst it is perhaps easy to interpret this question as an implicit advice to stakeholders to become more successful in their protest activities, in essence it deals with the apparent mismatch between the ‘legal’ space provided by EIA and the conduct of counter-expertise.

It is safe to state that the initial spark for civil society protest in both projects has been ignited by concerns over the expected detriment to the environment. Therefore, it is intriguing to see how protest has transformed in the face of the dominant problem perceptions.

As the Chilterns is an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB), it would have been a logical choice for situated civil society stakeholders to stress the ecological and sustainability impacts of HS2. However, protest in the Chilterns was by and large detached from any spatial connotation. The strategic choice was made to avoid the stigma of being driven by ‘not in my backyard’ (NIMBY) argumentation (e.g. Wendover Parish Councillor, Interview). This choice was compounded by the fact that the Chilterns is a disproportionately affluent area in the national context, particularly when compared to the Birmingham area. As a consequence, stakeholders were aware that their protest could be reproached from an economic point of view. Indeed, HS2 supporters up North have not refrained from using slogans such as ‘your gardens, our jobs’ or something to that effect, aiming to discredit the NIMBY argumentation alleged to be deployed in the Chilterns.

Reflecting on the strategic choice not to have milked the AONB status of the area, the Amersham & District Residents Association argued that:

“You don’t lead with that one because that’s when the NIMBY-ism just leaps to the fore. That’s when people say: ‘don’t listen to those people, all they care about is their own property and they don’t give a stuff about the economic benefits for the country (...)’: So
the decision was made to attempt to undermine the flawed justification and the flawed business case rather than dwell on the fact that it’s gonna trash a lot” (Interview).

In aiming to find to what extent the protest strategy deployed by civil society stakeholders has been different between the two projects, this statement has been matched with a statement that gives an ‘iconic’ description of the strategic choice made in the anti-A4DS campaign or the failure to have done so. There is good reason to do this: whilst the passage of the HS2 hybrid bill through Parliament is scheduled at the end of 2013, prior to the interviews conducted, all the interviews in the A4DS case have been arranged after the decision to construct the A4DS has been made. And although the period of investigation in the A4DS case has been 2001-2011 (see also Heukels, 2005 for a justification), ending with the decision to construct having become irreversible, it is by no means unreasonable to think that the A4DS stakeholders have had the benefit of hindsight knowledge. Indeed, the stakeholder from the KNNV Delfland argued the A4DS campaign:

“had to deploy a double strategy. Therefore, on the one hand [it should have been] the arguments against the motorway and traffic-related aspects (...), and a double strategy means that it should take into account that in the end the MI&M would push through the motorway (...). Then we would have had a much bigger chance” (Interview).

The reflections are similar in that both refer to clear choices made in a unifying protest, thereby presenting the ‘anti-campaign’ as a unified front. The difference between these two reflections is that the stakeholders involved in the HS2 case continue to fervently attack the project’s justification, whereas their Dutch counterparts acknowledged that protest based on environmental grounds stood a better chance of being successful. In practice, this meant a reinforcement of the ecological and sustainability functions of Midden-Delfland, the impact area of the A4DS. The IODS Founder acknowledged, in all honesty, that the project advocates were quite willing to make far-reaching concessions to stakeholders that put a premium on an ecological and sustainability ‘quality injection’ in Midden-Delfland (Interview). Furthermore, the IODS Founder argued that the investment of all these millions of Euros in the infrastructural design of the A4DS has proved to be “sub-optimal for everyone involved (...). From a societal point of view, [the current design] is an extremely unprofitable investment. It would have been much better to inject all this money in quality improvement” (Interview).

Although stakeholders in the Chilterns have argued that a bored tunnel spanning the entire length of the AONB would be the “best possible mitigation for this area” (South Heath Action Group, Interview), such a ‘tunnel lobby’ would probably only be put in
practice when all options have been exhausted to prevent construction from happening. However, also during the interviews in the HS2 case, concerns were vented whether the right strategy had been chosen. The Wendover Parish Councillor reasoned that the categorical rejection of any new North/South infrastructure development by the stakeholders, to strengthen the claim that the conventional rail services using the WCML could be upgraded in capacity and speed, could cost them dearly (Interview). Arguably, this is a direct consequence of conducting counter-expertise at the expense of advocating alternative line of route locations. Specifically, a rigid focus on proving flawed justification prohibited support for HS2 provided it is aligned in an existing transport corridor. The Wendover Parish Councillor reflected this dilemma particularly well, stating that:

“There is a view developing now that with hindsight we were perhaps wrong to take that approach. For example, the Labour party (…), their preferred route now is that this railway is going to Heathrow and then up the M40 to Birmingham. We may have got more political support to oppose this railway by saying: ‘No, don’t go through Wendover or on the present line’, go to Heathrow or go up the M1 corridor” (Interview).

For the time being, at least until the passage of the hybrid bill, a widely carried change of strategy seems unlikely. The current momentum in protest veers towards HS2 as such, not to mention the concept of high-speed rail in Great Britain. This becomes especially evident in the nationwide visibility of networks such as Stop HS2 and the HS2 Action Alliance as the vestibule of a unified national front against the government’s plans. The HS2 Action Alliance, in particular, uses its leadership to find fault in these plans and not to propose a different route. According to the Chiltern Ridges Action Group, “their position is not to be a local supporter. Their position is to be a national action group against this project. So they’re not looking at tunnels or no tunnels, that kind of thing, that’s not an issue. They’re looking at the economic case, the environmental case. ‘Is it good for the economy? Is it good for travellers?’” (Interview).

Since the opportunity still exists that the hybrid bill will be opposed in Parliament, stakeholders in the Chilterns continue to ‘play the national card’, expressed mainly through the conduct of counter-expertise. Local support for a holistic approach to HS2, instead of one where the Chilterns AONB is put centre-stage, seems to suggest that stakeholders think that their alliance with the national action networks is beneficial. The decision made by the stakeholders to “not go down the route of choosing a different route” (Wendover Parish Councillor, Interview) clearly suggests this, although the underlying logic of this decision is debatable within the context of EIA. That is, it is precisely the provision of environmental information that could place the choice for a different line of route between London and Birmingham in a more favourable light than what is currently
proposed. However, a more direct form of engagement with the procedural tenets of EIA seems unlikely, as some may be inclined to feel that is a way of giving up protest against the flawed justification of HS2.

8.3 Summary

In both the HS2 and A4DS projects, the use of science and expertise has proved pivotal to evidence the underlying justification for construction. The cost-benefit ratio of the HS2 project depends heavily on forecasts of the rail passenger demand in the future and, in conjunction with this, the level of the VOT. It has been argued that the forecasted business passenger volume using HS2 during working time offsets the costs, particularly since journey time savings are expressed in monetary terms through the cost-savings approach. The necessity for constructing the A4DS was expressed through the assumption that traffic grows naturally – beyond the grasp of infrastructure planners and transport managers. By using the IC-ratio, which quantifies congestion and sets thresholds on ‘acceptable’ traffic volumes, it was shown that the motorway capacity between The Hague and Rotterdam needs to expand in order to facilitate future volumes.

Stakeholders in both projects have become entangled in feuds over the evidence base, thereby disputing what they perceived as assumptions rather than facts. The concepts of optimism bias and pessimism bias were tacitly reflected in stakeholders’ appraisals on the projects. For instance, stakeholders in the Chilterns were convinced that the WCML is capable of facilitating future rail infrastructure demands by making incremental improvements of its passenger capacity. Furthermore, the forecasted passenger volumes using HS2 (e.g. on the London-Birmingham rail link) and the VOT were considered overly optimistic. In the A4DS case, similar observations were made. For example, the assumption of natural traffic growth was considered prohibitive towards traffic management measures which would be able to counter the unbridled growth of traffic in the study area. The proposed motorway capacity expansion between Delft and Schiedam is furthermore expected to incur a hefty increase in traffic, causing congestion to occur, thus undermining its objective to ensure a ‘reliable and adequate’ traffic connection.

The concerns and comments of stakeholders associated with science and expert knowledge have been amalgamated in the justification discourses. However, as EIA presents the dominant means of formal communication between the competent authority and stakeholders, a mismatch has been discerned between the legal mandate of EIA and the prevailing debate on justification. The focus of EIA on impact prediction and mitigation does not correspond with the desire of stakeholders to discuss the fundamental aspects of project planning. As such, no discursive spaces or spaces for meaningful civil society
engagement between the competent authority and stakeholders could be found in the EIAs of the projects. This will be further elaborated in the conclusions, in the next chapter. Time will tell whether stakeholders in the Chilterns will shift their protest emphasis towards impact mitigation, for instance after the hybrid bill has been approved by Parliament. Although to some this will undoubtedly signify a controversial step in the anti-HS2 campaign, it may yield more success in the impacts-oriented context of EIA.
Chapter 9 Conclusions

This chapter will conclude the thesis by answering the central research question and the six sub-questions. It will also evaluate whether the research aims have been achieved and it will evaluate the process of sustainability discourse mobilization. The chapter consists of two sections. In Section 9.1 the research questions will be answered (Sub-sections 9.1.1 and 9.1.2) and it will be commented whether the aims have been achieved (Sub-section 9.1.3). In Section 9.2 a pertinent new question will be asked, particularly in light of the empirical findings (Chapters 5 to 7) and the discussion (Chapter 8): does the model of sustainability discourse mobilization in EIA need to be revised? The chapter – and therefore also the thesis – will end with a brief summary of the main lessons learnt.

9.1 Answering the research questions

As announced, this section consists of three sub-sections. As a preamble to them and to properly answer the research questions, the methods for data analysis need to be brought in. As stipulated in Chapter 3, the methods for data analysis concerned: textual data coding, gap analysis, content analysis, news coverage and statistical analysis. The roles these analytical methods have played have been explicated in the conclusions, where appropriate. With regard to textual data coding, a node structure has been used to group the codes. Insight into the node structure helps explain how conclusions have been derived from the textual coding.

Figure 9.1 shows the node structures – or ‘trees’ – used in NVivo® to code the interviews. It has been possible to amalgamate the code structures of both the HS2 and A4DS cases: the only difference in the structure between the HS2 and A4DS case comprises the second discourse (party politics versus ecological modernization). In conformity with the research questions, the parent nodes are 1) sustainability discourses, 2) institutional design and 3) political culture. Each of these parent nodes subsequently branch out into three ‘child’ nodes. A number of coding examples are provided below the sub-nodes (placed between quotation marks. Although there are also sub-child nodes (see for instance Figure A6.1 on HS2, in Appendix 6), these have been omitted from this figure for the reason of keeping oversight. Furthermore, the parent node ‘Miscellaneous’ has been used in both cases (see also Figure A6.1), to cluster the codes that could not be reconciled with the themes of the other parent nodes but which were nonetheless important in the empirical analysis. Nodes that were considered miscellaneous concerned, amongst others, ‘political authority’, ‘civil society’ and ‘environmental assessment’.
9.1.1 The central research question

The central research question was formulated as follows:

*To what extent did institutional design and political culture influence the process of sustainability discourse mobilization in the EIAs of the HS2 (Phase 1) and A4DS infrastructure development projects in the United Kingdom in the Netherlands?*

In both the British and the Dutch case the influence of institutional design and political culture has been very limited. Institutions and culture have proved unable to accommodate debate on justification, leading up to the most important discourse. Furthermore, the EIA procedure itself did not accommodate the dominant views on sustainability. As a consequence of this, sustainability discourses mobilized outside EIA. The strict focus of EIA on impacts – their prediction, evaluation and mitigation, for example – prevented any meaningful debate on the existential aspects of the projects. In addition, public engagement was organized beyond the remit of EIA, where project approval was taken as an axiom. The gravity in the community engagement revolved around a discussion on impacts (mitigation), instead of the assumed necessity for additional infrastructure or the critical ecological functions of the respective impact areas.
Consequently, in its capacity as a ‘conduit’ for discourse mobilization, state-sanctioned modes of public engagement and deliberation did not meet the expectations of the civil society stakeholders involved. Whilst a portion of the stakeholders had a strategic interest in impact mitigation, plausibly given in by their statutory role (e.g. the Woodland Trust or Stichting Waterweg Wonen), the overwhelming majority felt alienated from it.

This conclusion leaves room for interpretation and further research, the impetus of which will be given in Section 9.2 as an extension of the debate on civil counter-expertise. Essentially two explanations can be provided for the limited influence observed. On the one hand, it can be argued that institutional design and political culture have had no chance to make much of an influence in EIA because of their distance from the project level. Notwithstanding the fact that the state has been the competent authority in both the HS2 and A4DS project, high-profile projects of national significance remain entrenched within ‘executive-level politics’. The difference between majoritarian and consensual forms of representative democracy has had little to do with how EIA works and is operationalized; conversely, in both projects the community engagement and deliberative procedures were used to discuss how impacts could be mitigated rather than avoided.

Similarly, democratic satisfaction and political trust – designating attitudes mainly towards the democratic system or the ‘regime’ – are at a considerable distance from the procedural stages of EIA, such as scoping, impact prediction and the identification of mitigation measures. The political cultures of the project stakeholders therefore did not mobilize sustainability discourses in EIA.

On the other hand, it is safe to argue that the legal requirements of EIA limited meaningful public engagement and that discourses therefore mobilized beyond these limits. This does not rule out the mobilizing influence of institutions and/or political culture. A clear example is provided by the party politics discourse in the HS2 case. Stakeholders in the Chilterns considered the electoral rules of the British majoritarian system to be adversely impacting on local interest advocacy. Members of Parliament (MP) who held cabinet responsibility had to forsake the interests of their electorate in favour of respecting the party line. Indeed, ‘government’ has dominated in the textual coding of the party politics discourse. The prevalence of ecological modernization in the A4DS case serves as another example, where the Integrale Ontwikkeling tussen Delft en Schiedam (Integral Development between Delft and Schiedam) (IODS) took the form of a neo-corporatist structure typically espoused by the consensual democratic system. The storyline ‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’ could be regarded as a product of Dutch consensus politics. That being said, both discourses did not find the space to gestate within the institutional surroundings of EIA.

While investigating the process of sustainability discourse mobilization, an underlying research objective has been to compare the UK with the Netherlands within the
chosen objects of study. The deployment of the ‘gap analysis’ method attests to this. After having analyzed the findings, it can be concluded that limited difference could be observed between the two states. This conclusion falsifies the idea that institutional design differences and the expected variance in political culture would impact substantively on the mobilization of sustainability discourses in the projects. As justification and conservation issues were of equal importance in both cases, the main difference pertained to the discourses of party politics and ecological modernization. Yet although the party politics discourse in the HS2 case is directly attributable to dissatisfaction with the due representation of the local interest in the House of Commons, its mobilization may also be caused by the geographic scale of HS2. Similarly, whilst ecological modernization may seem a Dutch ‘invention’, its proliferation may be caused by to the imminence of the decision to construct (see more on scale and time in Section 8.2). That is, a new discourse coalition was formed when feelings of defeat started to creep in. This leads to uncertainty as to what extent other external factors have helped mobilize discourses.

9.1.2 The sub-questions

In the introduction six sub-questions were formulated (see Table 1.2). In Table 3.3 these questions have been linked to the typology on theory (Harré, 1986), where a distinction has been made between theory for either observation, representation or cognition (see Figure 3.2). The difference between these three types will become manifest in answering the questions: the answers of the 5th question on the value surveys and part of the 3rd question on institutional design have been observed; the sustainability discourses and the prominence of institutions are represented in the data; and, whilst helped by these methods, the assumed reciprocity between institutional design, political culture, public engagement and sustainability discourses is a case of more cognitive research.

1. Which sustainability discourses held by the civil society stakeholders can be identified?

In the HS2 case, three discourses were identified:

1. The justification discourse, which clusters all the reflections and social appraisals of stakeholders that questioned the underlying necessity for the high-speed rail network to be constructed, as well as the evidence base of the necessity claim, for instance evidence based on rail passenger demand forecasts and journey time
savings. Stop HS2’s slogan ‘No business case, No environmental case, No money to pay for it’ has functioned as an important storyline in the discourse;

2. The party politics discourse, which clusters all comments relating to the role of national politicians in the HS2 case, most notably the role played by the local MPs. Amongst others, stakeholders questioned the representation of local interests in Parliament due to the strict party discipline throughout the rank-and-file and the difficulty of changing the electoral landscape. The ‘Conservatives’ filled a dominant position in the discourse;

3. The conservation discourse, which clusters everything related to the status of the Chilterns as an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB). The Chilterns AONB was often referred to as ‘national heritage’ or ‘natural treasure’ and as such should not be adversely affected. If HS2 were to go ahead, the line of route should be entirely tunnelled to counter ecological destruction and property blight.

In the A4DS case, three discourses were identified:

1. The justification discourse, which clusters all the questions and comments revolving around the ‘utility and necessity’ for constructing the A4DS. The objective of a reliable and adequate system of traffic handling between The Hague and Rotterdam was aimed to be achieved by constructing the A4DS. Stakeholders not only disputed the claim of necessity by reference to the ‘do-nothing’ alternative, but they also debated the assumption of natural traffic growth and the induced traffic that would result from construction;

2. The ecological modernization discourse, which clusters all ideas which subscribe to the need for additional motorway capacity between The Hague and Rotterdam but which supported alternatives to the A4DS. All alternatives proposed the construction of new infrastructure outside Midden-Delfland, the A4DS impact area. The storyline ‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’ supported the discourse;

3. The conservation discourse, which clusters all appraisals on the critical ecological and sustainability function of Midden-Delfland. Stakeholders asserted that the area provides refuge to people looking for silence and solitude amidst the heavily urbanized conurbations of The Hague and Rotterdam. Midden-Delfland was furthermore considered critical for preserving important flora and fauna.

The methods for data analysis (coding textual data, content analysis and news coverage) have revealed that the justification discourse was the most salient discourse in both cases. In the textual coding, words like ‘necessary’, ‘need’, ‘evidence’ but also ‘bogus argument’ or ‘nonsense’ in addition to case-specific words accommodated this discourse.
In addition to this, UK (regional) newspapers regularly reported on anti-HS2 protest, for instance in the running-up to the judicial reviews or to convince politicians to vote against the project. Dutch newspapers similarly reported on protest activities, but they also reported on project alternatives in which the impact area would remain unaffected. From the content analysis – i.e. consulting primary documents – a constellation of all three discourses emerged in both cases, although the party politics discourse in the HS2 case mainly existed in the interviews.

2. To what extent are sustainability discourses in the projects accommodated by the different modes of public engagement?

All the identified discourses developed and matured outside the ‘formal’ spaces of public engagement, except for the ecological modernization discourse in the A4DS project. The formal space in the HS2 case was the community forum (CF), where the local impacts of HS2 Phase 1 were discussed. It did not accommodate on either the project justification, the political mandate of the project or the vital necessity to save the AONB from becoming affected. Whilst participating in one of the sessions of the Central Chilterns Community Forum (CCCF), the author observed that the more fundamental mitigation issues (such as a Chilterns-wide bored tunnel) could not be debated. In the A4DS case, the IODS did not accommodate debate on justification and conservation. For instance, the IODS argued that the issue of justification “is a matter for the cabinet and the parliament” (IODS, 2001: 5), although this directly affects conservation issues as well. However, the IODS did accommodate ecological modernization principally by advocating the message that the A4DS could be constructed within ecological and sustainability limits.

To answer this sub-question, the methods used for analysis were textual coding, gap analysis, content analysis and news coverage. The interviews, primary documents and newspaper articles revealed little consideration from stakeholders as to how public opinion was formed. This is no real surprise, however, as it has been concluded that five out of six discourses mobilized in isolation from either the CCCF or the IODS. That is, it is difficult to find evidence for something that has not happened. But there is one exception: the storyline ‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’ featured prominently alongside the IODS. Chapter 8 has furthermore shown that civil counter-expertise has prevailed as the mode of public engagement in both projects, in order to satisfy the demand for discussing necessity. This means that no gap between the UK and the Netherlands could be discerned.
3. Which institutions and institutional design choices have played a central role in the projects?

In the HS2 case, the majoritarian system of the UK has impacted on the mobilization of the party politics discourse, although this system has not necessarily impacted on the project itself. In general, in both cases the institutions for community engagement – the CF in the HS2 case, the IODS in the A4DS case – have had a decisive impact on the projects. They are very comparable insofar as they have accommodated the focus on impacts rather than other contentious project areas that stakeholders were willing to discuss. In the methods for analysis (coding textual data, content analysis and news coverage) the institutions have been prominently manifested. Stakeholders recognized that the role of the CF/IODS in the project deliberation was the only direct means for them to engage with the competent authority. However, it also served the purpose of meeting other likeminded stakeholders and to mobilize collective action.

4. To what extent have the different institutional designs of the projects been able to influence the mode of public engagement?

In the HS2 case, stakeholders have by and large commented negatively on the CF. In the interviews stakeholders referred it as ‘pretty miserable’ and argued that it did not create any space for anything other than impact mitigation. It was also sensed that HS2 Ltd considered the CF a good platform to justify the government’s decision to construct and to take away locally carried concerns over the expected adverse impacts. If the sustainability discourses are to be considered a reflection of what stakeholders wanted to talk about, then it can be concluded that the CF did not influence the mode of public engagement. A similar conclusion can be drawn in the A4DS case with regards to discussing issues on justification and conservation. However, the IODS mobilized debate on ecological modernization, particularly associated with the question on how the physical infrastructure of the A4DS could be embedded in the impact area as sustainable as possible.

5. What are the survey results of certain criteria involved with democratic satisfaction and political trust in the UK and the Netherlands?

The survey results obtained from the European Social Survey (ESS), the World Value Survey (WVS) and the European Values Study (EVS) show that there are notable value differences between the UK and the Netherlands. More respondents have positioned themselves in the extreme categories (i.e. full satisfaction/full dissatisfaction) in the UK than in the Netherlands, although the ‘fully dissatisfied’ greatly outnumber those with full
satisfaction. From this it can also be expected that the standard deviation, which reveals variation from the average of a population, in the UK is higher than in the Netherlands. A question that naturally follows is whether this variation and subsequent divergence in value orientation results from the adversarial character of majoritarian democracy, as suggested by the literature (see also Section 2.2). It is hypothesized that political value orientation is strongly accentuated by winning or losing in the electoral context.

However, it is assumed that the stakeholders in both the projects do not hold extreme values. When looking at the scores in the mid-segment in the value surveys (categories such as ‘rather satisfied’ or ‘not very satisfied’), the UK and the Netherlands are relatively comparable. The author has become aware throughout the fieldwork that additional quantitative research is needed to bolster this claim. There is an apparent incongruence between the quantitative data in the survey results and the qualitative data obtained from the fieldwork. The added value of this sub-question could have been considerably strengthened by asking stakeholders to reflect on the 17 values abstracted from the value surveys.

6. To what extent have democratic satisfaction and political trust been able to influence the interaction between decision-makers and civil society stakeholders?

In the HS2 case, it has proved difficult to compare levels of democratic satisfaction and political trust relating to national politics (e.g. the Prime Minister, MPs or the deliberations in Parliament) with levels of satisfaction and trust at the project level. The incongruence has mainly been caused by the role of HS2 Ltd as the executive agency of the Department for Transport (DfT). However, it is safe to state that stakeholders in the Chilterns were not very satisfied with HS2 Ltd members of staff that were in charge of the CCCF. If ‘decision-makers’ is expanded to also include MPs and other national politicians, then dissatisfaction and distrust seeped into stakeholders’ appraisals of the poor representation of local interests at the national level. Indeed, the answer of sub-question 5 may suggest that the influence of political culture has played a rather marginal role in the research. However, textual codes on the ‘divided loyalty’ of MPs or on the feeling of ‘being disenfranchised’ (used in Chapter 6) hint at a distorted relation between decision-makers and civil society stakeholders.

In the A4DS case, the same difficulty has been registered on the difference between perceptions towards national politics and those specific to the project context. Yet whilst Rijkswaterstaat is the executive agency of the Ministerie voor Infrastructuur en Milieu (MI&M), stakeholders expressed dissatisfaction with the largely autonomous role of Rijkswaterstaat in infrastructure development. This role was considered political in that Rijkswaterstaat actively supported the assumption that infrastructure development is
necessary, irrespective of the support for development in government or Parliament. Furthermore, stakeholders expressed distrust with the quality and accuracy of the information received from Rijkswaterstaat and the ways in which it dealt with stakeholder advocacy of alternatives to the A4DS. Reflections on the representation of stakeholder interests in the IODS were mixed. On the one hand, the ‘open’ character of the IODS feedback group led to the inclusion of a diverse group of stakeholders. On the other, it was argued that the IODS closed down debate (on ‘utility and necessity’) when the planning process neared its conclusion.

9.1.3 Aims achievement

The introduction has set out three research aims. In light of the drawn conclusions, it can now be assessed whether these aims have been achieved. The first aim was to understand the ‘fit’ between the mobilization of sustainability discourses and EIA. Uncertainty arises as to whether this aim has been achieved. It has been concluded that there was no such thing as a ‘fit’ between EIA and sustainability discourse mobilization. Whereas institutional design and political culture did mobilize sustainability discourses only to a limited extent, the strict procedural interpretation of the EIAs in the selected cases did not mobilize sustainability discourse mobilization to begin with. Whilst the absence of fit between discourse mobilization and EIA could be framed as the negative way to finding truth, alluding to ‘trial and error’ and the falsification criterion (Popper, 2002), a more pessimistic view would be to regard the conclusions as evidence for the conceptual mismatch between EIA and sustainability discourse mobilization. The following section will elaborate on this debate through the application of the abductivist approach to conducting research.

The second aim was to understand the relationship between sustainability discourses and its institutional and cultural contexts. This aim has been achieved. If the party politics discourse in the HS2 case is closely examined, the idea has been proffered that dissatisfaction with the observed ‘divided loyalty’ of MPs and therefore also distrust in their intentions to duly represent the local interest is a function of the majoritarian system (Lijphart, 2012). Conversely, whilst the discourse of ecological modernization has become popular the world over in recent decades, the neo-corporatist negotiation structure between states and interest groups in certain sectors is reported to be particularly strong in the Netherlands (see e.g. De Vos and Van Tatenhove, 2011 on one such sector). Thus, the manifestation of these discourses provides understanding on the case-specific institutional and cultural contexts. However, this particular aim achievement will benefit substantially from applying institutional design and culture to science, expertise and evidence-based decision-making. It is safe to argue that the scientific ‘dissensus’ in both
projects is caused by the absence of the institutions and cultures necessary for a more civic-oriented conduct of science.

Somewhat related to the second aim, the third research aim has been to understand the institutional and politico-cultural influences on public engagement in the cases. Yet correspondent with the first aim, uncertainty remains as to whether this aim has been achieved. In comparative research which comprises cases from the UK and the Netherlands, an assessment of whether this aim is achieved invariably involves an evaluation of whether their institutional and politico-cultural differences have influenced a difference in public engagement. Stakeholders have resorted to conducting counter-expertise (e.g. science-led debate on the adequacy of the existing infrastructure capacity or on future passenger/traffic demand), which concerns a mode of public engagement that is not circumscribed to institutions and political culture per se. As the conclusions attribute the proliferation of counter-expertise amongst stakeholders to the use of science so typically to be found in planning proposals for new infrastructures, this dominant mode has not been influenced by anything institutionally or culturally predetermined.

9.2 Sustainability discourse mobilization revisited?

The conclusions seem to leave no doubt: institutional design and political culture have influenced sustainability discourse mobilization in the two cases only to a limited extent; and, on top of that, the sustainability discourses have mobilized in isolation from EIA. It has been concluded that the main discourse – the justification discourse – has matured within non-institutionalized spaces used by civil society groups conducting scientific counter-expertise. A relevant question that follows these conclusions is whether or not the concepts intrinsic to sustainability discourse mobilization can be linked to one another in any meaningful way. Furthermore, the function of EIA as a test bed for sustainability discourse mobilization should be evaluated. In sum, should the answers to these questions be sought in revising the incumbent conceptualization of sustainability discourse mobilizing, thus reconfiguring the roles of institutional design and political culture in EIA, or should cases be sought that are not ‘hijacked’ by controversial science?

As will be shown in this section, debate on the presumed interplay and potential (yet impossible-to-prove) causality between the core concepts in sustainability discourse mobilization is shaped to no small extent by the philosophical foundation of the thesis. That is to say, the choice to use the critical realist approach and to combine this with an abductive scheme of inference influences debate on the very process of sustainability discourse mobilization. It is in this context important to note that critical realists, who thus assimilate a positivist ontology with a constructivist epistemology (see also Chapter 3), want to believe in the existence of a ‘world out there’ independent from human
representation. But, as the name already suggests, they are critical about whether this belief is realistic (e.g. Easton, 2010a). In order to manage the uncertainty that ensues from applying critical realism, the thesis has elected to use abduction rather than induction or deduction as the preferred scheme of reference. The role of abduction will become clearly manifest in this *ex post* evaluation.

The conclusions this thesis has presented have shown that institutions and the attitudes of stakeholders towards politics – i.e. political culture – have not mobilized discourses in the EIAs of the projects. The expected gap between the UK and the Netherlands has furthermore turned out to be narrow, at least in the cases under investigation. Such ‘negative’ conclusions, if framed as such, may lead some to argue that the process of sustainability discourse mobilization as suggested in Figure 2.1 is not correct. As a minimum, it is uncertain whether sustainability discourses can be mobilized within the context of EIA. However, it can also be argued that the great virtue of abduction is its flexible approach to dealing with uncertainty (Danermark *et al.*, 2002).

In this thesis, for example, the first uncertainty has arisen over the extent to which institutional design and political culture mobilize sustainability discourses in infrastructure development projects. The second uncertainty relates to the procedural limitations of EIA for discourse mobilization. However, this might a good basis for considering the role of strategic environmental assessment (SEA) in discourse mobilization (e.g. Runhaar, 2009). Arguably, proposed strategic developments may be characterized by relatively open futures where a wider range of alternatives is subject to negotiation. It is hence different from EIA, which in some way represents the ‘dirty end-politics’ at the project level.

Uncertainty that arises in research using an abductivist scheme of inference results either from a misconceived premise or from the mismatch between the premise and the results obtained from studying the selected cases. In the former, a new premise should be sought. In the latter, the premise is not rejected when it is concluded that the wrong cases have been selected. When this latter situation is looked at more closely, it is still possible to hold onto the premise that institutional design and political culture mobilize discourse, principally by shaping public engagement in the context of EIA.

By using the same structure as has been used in Table 3.2, Table 9.1 compares abduction with induction and deduction, both of which have been the hegemonic schemes of inference in social science research thus far. As can be read in the table, an inductivist is able to clearly state that the premise is incorrect. It is quite possible that inductivist researchers would not arrive at the premise to begin with, as it would not be supported by the results obtained in the empirical investigation. A deductivist is able to conclude that institutional design and political culture have not been able to do what they were expected to do – that is, in this research, providing spaces for discourse mobilization in EIA. Provided no mistake has been made in obtaining the results, the premise should be
revised or rejected altogether. Much in contrast, in abduction it can be concluded that the case under investigation has not proved suitable for testing the premise. This conclusion does not reject the truth claims of the premise, but instead invites for further investigation through choosing a different case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Induction</th>
<th>Deduction</th>
<th>Abduction</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Premise (case):</strong> The EIAs of the projects accommodate the process of sustainability discourse mobilization</td>
<td><strong>Premise (rule):</strong> Institutional design and political culture mobilize sustainability discourses in EIA</td>
<td><strong>Premise (rule):</strong> Institutional design and political culture mobilize sustainability discourses in EIA</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Phenomenon (result):</strong> Institutional design and political culture did not mobilize sustainability discourses in the EIAs of the projects</td>
<td><strong>Phenomenon (case):</strong> The EIAs of the projects did not accommodate the process of sustainability discourse mobilization</td>
<td><strong>Phenomenon (result):</strong> Institutional design and political culture did not mobilize sustainability discourses in the EIAs of the projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conclusion (rule):</strong> Institutional design and political culture do not mobilize sustainability discourses in EIA</td>
<td><strong>Conclusion (result):</strong> Institutional design and political culture did not mobilize sustainability discourses in the EIAs of the projects</td>
<td><strong>Conclusion (case):</strong> The EIAs of the projects did not accommodate the process of sustainability discourse mobilization</td>
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Table 9.1: Induction, deduction, abduction and discourse mobilization

The flexible approach of abduction to uncertainty is principally manifested in the ‘both-and’ perspective (Danermark et al., 2002), which proposes change either at the beginning (premise) or ending (case) of the process of inference. Where the selection of a different case is proposed, this thesis could have selected cases where science and expertise are much less articulated than in the HS2 and A4DS projects. Projects where public engagement is led by concerns over, say, landscape aesthetics or the cultural-historical value of the impact area are potentially good examples. Perhaps the premise needs minor tweaking, for instance by broadening the scope of ‘in EIA’ to ‘in environmental assessment’ or even ‘in environmental policy’. This broadened scope would not affect the intellectual argument made in the thesis, however, as the assumed interplay between institutions, culture and sustainability discourses remains at the heart of the matter.

However, a pertinent consequence of the ‘both-and’ perspective of critical realism is that the premise could also be wrong. For instance, in the context of EIA it could have been considered unrealistic to assume that institutional designs and political cultures are able to mediate a procedure which is essentially driven by procedural requirements. The stages of EIA – e.g. scoping, impact prediction or the identification of mitigation measures – relate uncomfortably to discursive orientations that are brought about by external influence. Furthermore, civil society stakeholders whose forms of protest revolve around the more fundamental aspects of project planning are likely to become dissatisfied with EIA. In its verdict on whether or not to authorize the A4DS project, the Raad van State (2011a) illustrated this point by stating that “it is not the task of the judicial planning review
to give its own interpretation to the societal value of interests” (see also Chapter 8). With regards to the role of EIA in the planning process, this effectively means that the plans of government are shielded against interest advocacy and concerted civil action provided the right procedural requirements are met.

In both the HS2 and the A4DS cases debate on the justification of the proposed projects prevailed. The discourse area on justification has been instructive in shaping the opinions and ideas of those directly campaigning against the projects. This has become particularly apparent in the HS2 (Phase 1) project, where virtually all stakeholders opted to oppose rather than to deliberate the impact mitigation. At the same time it has been shown that EIA has not provided space for any meaningful civil society engagement with the science, expertise and evidence base of the projects. Such engagement took the form of non-institutionalized counter-expertise, which effectively meant that the debate on justification was played out beyond the remit of EIA. In the HS2 case, the HS2 Action Alliance (e.g. 2013) put the flawed justification of the business case centre-stage in its protest. In the A4DS case, traffic experts from Delft University of Technology (TU Delft) argued that the construction of this presumed ‘missing link’ would cause traffic problems rather than solve them (e.g. Hansen, 2009; Van Wee and Immers, 2009). In both EIAs, however, these ‘dissident’ counter-scientific voices in the room were sidelined.

Following this line of reasoning, the abductivist approach encourages the original premise (rule) to be revised when it proves inadequate. Much in the style of Figure 2.1, Figure 9.2 provides an alternative model of sustainability discourse mobilization, specified to the justification discourse. The revised premise is that the conduct of science, the production of expert knowledge and evidence mediate the manifestation of civil society engagement with large-scale rail and road infrastructure development. Institutional design and political culture have not impacted significantly on the modes of public engagement, particularly since the expected variance between these modes in the UK and the Netherlands has been marginal. This suggests that institutional and cultural differences lose their prominence in the face of large-scale infrastructure development. Furthermore, the scientific claims in the project documentation have proved more important in shaping debate than have the incumbent institutions and extant cultural orientation towards politics. Indeed, civil counter-expertise in its capacity as the hegemonic mode of public engagement indicates the prominence of science and expertise at the expense of institutional design and political culture.
In order to pin down how ‘science, expertise & evidence’ impacts on the mode of civil counter-expertise in large-scale rail or road infrastructure development, a number of mediating factors need to be taken into account. These mediating factors have been identified in the empirical investigation and the discussion of the findings. As Chapter 8 has demonstrated, time will tell whether certain themes of contestation will linger. It is quite likely that stakeholders in the Chilterns will adopt a storyline somewhat equivalent to ‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’ when efforts to halt construction have failed (e.g. Dunsmore Society, Interview). Whilst debate on ‘utility and necessity’ in the A4DS project prevailed until the very end, the ascendancy of the ecological modernization discourse in the period 2001-2011 gave attestation to the shifting momentum towards impact mitigation and quality improvement. Some stakeholders sensed that advocating the interests of the impact area would be most successful. Therefore, strategic considerations instruct the choice of which aspects of the project to address.

Both projects have been central government initiatives and have therefore been played out on the highest political stage. However, a pertinent issue that requires further inquiry is how the project scale impacts on civil counter-expertise. Scale can be interpreted in a physical sense but also in the political sense (Dikeç, 2012), for instance by referring to the degree and spread of public interest in the project development. As it has been argued that emotive situated protest can be bolstered by what is called
‘disinterested’ centres of counter-scientific claims-making (Holifield, 2009), thus without any spatial connotation, scale may influence the extent to which this endures. Repeated usage of the notions of ‘regional development’ or ‘the national interest’ in the HS2 case, such as by prominent advocates of the project (e.g. Hammond, 2011), may well have buoyed the mobilization of ‘scientized’ protest at the expense of impacts-oriented protest. Furthermore, when local stakeholders become submerged in broader protest networks, the project scale may lead them to up-scale or re-spatialize (or even de-spatialize) their protest to avoid possible accusations of ‘NIMBY-ism’.

The interpretation of scale presented above is seamlessly connected to civil society, a third mediating factor. In both projects the disinterested centres of counter-science, or what Holifield (2009) has called ‘outsiders’, have coalesced with situated civil society actors. In the HS2 project for example these outsiders were the rail experts of the HS2 Action Alliance; the traffic experts from TU Delft fulfilled that particular role in the A4DS project. Whilst situated actors have campaigned against the respective projects because of the likely adverse local impacts, the prevalence of the justification discourse attests to the strength of their cross-linkages with the outside world. In both projects the relatively open borders of the problem framing permitted the mobilization of a scientific counter-public (Hess, 2011). Scientific counter-publics emanate from a subordinate position when compared to incumbent project stakeholders (e.g. DfT, HS2 Ltd, Rijkswaterstaat) and propose alternative socio-technological trajectories.

A plausible fourth mediating factor resides in the manifestation of authority as a source of trust or distrust. This factor borrows the element of trust from the literature on political culture but links these specifically to the conduct of science, expertise and evidence-making. Perhaps the most intriguing aspect here is how non-elected representatives can shape and manage relations of trust. In the A4DS project, terms such as ‘manipulation’ or ‘concealed agendas’ were attributed to Rijkswaterstaat by a substantial number of stakeholders. A similar orientation amongst stakeholders could be discerned in the HS2 project, where every fact advanced by the DfT and HS2 Ltd was rigorously checked by the HS2 Action Alliance (e.g. 2013). Arguably, civil counter-expertise is premised on a lack of trust and counter-experts become the new scientific authority where this lack is most emphatic. This may then lead to the conclusion that project developers can induce public support by making their science more trustworthy.

So, what have we learned from this thesis?

The conclusions and the subsequent discussion on the process of sustainability discourse mobilization may lead us to evaluate what we have learned from the research conducted in this thesis. A principal finding is that the evidence base of infrastructure projects is
strongly associated with the expert use of science. Such evidence is subsequently deployed to claim necessity for infrastructure development. Either willingly or unwillingly, civil society stakeholders have organized their protest around pertinent themes of contestation – for example around journey time savings or induced traffic. Situated stakeholders, designating those having an affinity with particular localities (i.e. the impact areas: the Chilterns and Midden-Delfland), join the professionals that hold a leadership position in a counter-scientific lobby against the development in question. These stakeholders ‘jump on the bandwagon’, so to speak. The proliferation of science in infrastructure projects has culminated in a discourse where concern over the justification of the development has prevailed.

EIA has proved a robust deliberative procedure and relatively immune to outside influences. From time to time critique was voiced by stakeholders that the scope of the EIA was too narrow, that the baseline study was conducted improperly or that only a limited range of mitigation options were proposed by the competent authority. However, when compared to the – according to the stakeholders – lamentable state of the evidence base, this critique was a drop in the ocean. The immunity of EIA showed itself in the absence of spaces for meaningful engagement with the issues on which stakeholders felt further debating would be appropriate. Public engagement in EIA was not mediated by institutional design and political culture, as previously thought. Instead, the civil society campaigns transpired in ‘non-lieux’, non-institutionalized spaces for engagement with science and expertise. Given that the project advocates wanted to discuss impact mitigation, this led to a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ (Van Eeten, 1999).

This finding does not necessarily invalidate the potential influence exerted by institutional design and political culture on sustainability discourse mobilization. However, what it does do is to invalidate the claim that they permeate issues of public contention everywhere and all the time. It is without a doubt that representative democracy continues to infiltrate the life-worlds of civil society stakeholders, to which the party politics discourse in the HS2 gives clear attestation. Yet it seems to skirt around the edges of the fundamental debate on the legitimacy of project development in light of the latest scientific evidence. Similarly, democratic satisfaction and political trust are useful for navigating citizens’ attitudes towards national political leaders (regime) and democratic institutions (system), or perhaps even the very principle of democracy, but it does not grasp the tenets of ‘executive-level politics’. HS2 Ltd (i.e. DfT) and Rijkswaterstaat have represented the state in the two cases under investigation, but they are specialized agencies inhabited by unelected representatives.

That being said, the pertinence of satisfaction and trust as two lubricants for building amicable relations between authority and civil society persists. Arguably, the willingness of stakeholders to become immersed in counter-expertise was fed by the
categorical yet unarticulated denial of the specialist agencies in the national administration to make their science more open and plural in character. This denial did not only breed dissatisfaction with the legitimacy of the project evidence base, but also led stakeholders to distrust the agencies responsible for providing the evidence. Scientific distrust adversely affected the working relationship between HS2 Ltd and the stakeholders in the Chilterns under the remit of the CCCF, further compounded by factors of time, physical and political scale, and the ‘scientization’ of organized civil society.

The most important take-home message of this thesis is that sustainability discourses do not just ‘happen’. They are mobilized, either through things (events, concepts, principles, processes, \textit{et cetera}) specific to a certain place and time or through more universalistic developments. The thesis has investigated whether the external factors of institutional design and political culture were able to influence the mobilization of discourses in the EIAs of two purposefully selected cases. Whilst this did not happen, the attempt was not in vain. Other external factors drove the discourse mobilization, such as the conduct of science and the use of expert knowledge. This is a relevant observation, as it gives impetus to further valuable research on the promulgation of ideas about sustainability.
Appendix 1 Original declaration of informed consent as used in the fieldwork

+++ 

Declaration of Informed Consent by Interviewee to participate in the research ‘Public consultation process of the proposed HS2 railway line crossing the Chilterns’

Purpose of this declaration: In order to protect the human right to privacy of interviewees, their right to be informed, and right to be protected from any harm that might occur. It is also intended to encourage transparency and accountability for this research project.

Please answer the questions below to indicate what it is that you are prepared to consent to, and then sign at the bottom. The interview can then be conducted on the basis you have specified, and the interviewer can countersign prior to the interview taking place.

I confirm that: (please tick boxes)Yes No

I have read the introduction to this research and I understand the reasons why the research is being conducted.

I agree to give the face-to-face interview to the researcher.

I understand that there is no payment for participation in this study.

I understand that my anonymity will be protected.

I agree to the interview being recorded (subject to no comments being attributed or used in any way without my prior agreement).

I would like to know the findings and results of this study.

On the basis of the answers given above, I willingly agree to participate in this research study.

Signed (interviewee): ………………………………………………….. Date: ……………

Signed (interviewer): ………………………………………………….. Date: ……………

If there are any queries or if there is need for clarification, please contact Jaap Rozema (Tel. 01603 591340, email: j.rozema@uea.ac.uk).
Introduction to the research ‘Public consultation process of the proposed HS2 railway line crossing the Chilterns’

As part of my PhD (doctor of philosophy) at the University of East Anglia (UEA) in Norwich, I will conduct research public engagement related to sustainability decision-making in two cases involving public consultation and environmental impact assessment (EIA), in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK). In the Netherlands I have conducted research on a case related to the construction of a connecting part of the A4 motorway, which is currently interrupted for the length of seven kilometres. In the UK I will conduct research on HS2 Phase 1, the proposed railway line between London and Birmingham (West Midlands). I will focus on the proposed line of route (the ‘Preferred Option’) crossing the Chilterns, which is an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB).

My research focuses on a comparison between the democratic institutions of the UK (and/or England) and the Netherlands. I envisage an institution as a ‘rule of the game’ which informs the decision-making process. Institutions therefore play a very significant role in the research. Furthermore, I think that institutions are shaped by the ‘political environment’ of the country. With regards to the institutions of representative democracy, I think that they are very different in the UK than from those in the Netherlands. I assume that the observed institutional differences at the national level also seep into the ‘institutional character’ of the two cases.

A second aspect of the research relates to the interdependence of the political norms and rights which are supported and respected by the stakeholders involved in democratic decision-making. I have called this aspect ‘political culture’. Political culture means that participants in decision-making are part of, and influenced by, the political norms and rights as well as the dominant views on participation in public decision-making. Satisfaction with democracy and trust in the conduct of politics are expected to impact significantly on political culture. However, such impacts are not easily measurable and may best be investigated through qualitative inquiry, for example through interviewing.

I would also like to know how the institutional character and political culture of a country, which play a part in the case of the proposed HS2 line of route crossing the Chilterns, influence views on sustainability. Sustainability may mean different things to different people; it is an abstract concept. I hypothesize that different stakeholders in a process of public consultation, with or without engagement in the EIA, develop a range of views on sustainability and how it must be anchored in decision outcomes. I hypothesize that institutions and political culture can shape how certain views on sustainability are formed and vented publicly.

I am predominantly interested in institutions that are able to facilitate public engagement in the public consultation process and the EIA. Part of the interview questions are therefore based on public engagement. I am also interested in views on democratic practice and functioning, democratic satisfaction and trust in politics, and whether the decision-making and public consultation processes have been fair. Finally, I am interested in views on sustainability in the case of the HS2 line of route that will cross the Chilterns.
Appendix 2 Original questionnaire used for decision-makers

+++ 

Interview questions for decision-makers involved in the A4DS project 

(To be filled in by interviewer):

- Name of interviewee:
- Name of organization:
- Location of organization
- Location of interview:
- Date of interview:
- Organizational level: national / regional (county) / local
- Type of organization: executive agency / planning authority / national political party

- General information:

1. What does your organization do? 
   Answer: 

2. What was your organization's role in the EIA? 
   Answer: 

- Public participation in the EIA:

3. To what extent does your organization think there were opportunities for public participation in the EIA? 
   Answer: 

4. To what extent did your organization get involved in developing opportunities for public participation? 
   Answer: 

5. To what extent does your organization think the opportunities for public participation were fair? 
   Answer: 

6. To what extent did your organization trust the other authorities involved in the EIA? 
   Answer: 

7. To what extent did your organization trust the public participants involved in the EIA? 
   Answer: 

8. To what extent does your organization think decision consensus is reached in the EIA? 
   Answer: 

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. How would your organization define the concept of sustainable development?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. How does your organization think about a trade-off between objectives in sustainable development?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. To what extent does your organization think EIA is a tool to promote sustainable development?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. To what extent does your organization think the current project is sustainable?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. To what extent has your organizations’ perception of sustainable development changed during the EIA?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 3 Original questionnaire used for civil society stakeholders

+++ 

Interview questions for civil society stakeholders involved in the HS2 Phase 1 project

(To be filled in by interviewer):

- Name of interviewee:
- Name organization (if applicable):
- Location of organization:
- Location of interview:
- Date of interview:
- Type of organization: individual / association / charitable organization / company
- Government funded: yes / no

- General information:

1. Generally speaking, what do you or does your organization do?  
   Answer:

2. What was your or your organizations’ statutory role in the public participation and the EIA thus far?  
   Answer:

- PART 1 – Political culture:

3. To what extent do you or your organization believe in democracy as a political system to be desired?  
   Answer:

4. To what extent are you or your organization satisfied with the democratic system in your country?  
   Answer:

5. To what extent do you or your organization think it is possible to influence the decision-making process?  
   Answer:

6. To what extent do you or does your organization trust other people or organizations in the decision-making process?  
   Answer:

7. To what extent do you or does your organization think norms are shared between and among decision-makers and civil society?  
   Answer:
### Part 2 – Public Engagement in the Public Consultation and the EIA (Thus Far):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. To what extent do you or does your organization think there have been opportunities for public engagement in the public consultation and the EIA (thus far)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. To what extent do you or your organization think the available opportunities for public engagement in the public consultation and the EIA (thus far) have been fair?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. To what extent do you or does your organization trust the relevant rule-competent organizations and agencies involved in the public consultation and the EIA (thus far)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>11. To what extent does you or your organization trust the other civil society stakeholders involved in the public consultation and the EIA (thus far)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. To what extent do you or your organization think consensus in the project is reached in the public consultation and the EIA (thus far)?</td>
<td></td>
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### Part 3 – Perceptions Towards Sustainability:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13. How would you or your organization define sustainability?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. How do you or your organization think about the possibility of trading off between various objectives within sustainability?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. To what extent do you or does your organization think public consultation and EIA are decision-support tools that can promote sustainability?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. To what extent do you or your organization think the project is sustainable?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. To what extent has your perception or your organization’s perception towards sustainability changed during the public consultation and the EIA (thus far)?</td>
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### Appendix 4 List of primary documents used for analysis

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Document title</th>
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<tr>
<td>51M</td>
<td>Two documents as part of the 51m Submission to the Transport Select Committee: 1) Appendix 1: Optimised Alternative to HS2 – The Scope for Growth on the Existing Network; 2) Chapter 8: Capacity and Service Disbenefits</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGHAST Federation</td>
<td>A Better Railway for Britain</td>
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<td>All-Party Parliamentary Group for High-Speed Rail</td>
<td>Report of the Inquiry into Britain’s Rail Capacity</td>
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<td>Arup/URS</td>
<td>HS2 London to West Midlands EIA Scope and Methodology Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>Atkins</td>
<td>Because Transport Matters: High Speed Rail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atkins</td>
<td>High Speed Rail Strategic Alternatives Study – Update Following Consultation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chesham &amp; Amersham Conservative Association</td>
<td>&quot;HS2 Ltd confirm to Cheryl that Chesham Road will Not be used as Main Route for Construction Traffic&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chiltern Countryside Group</td>
<td>Written Response from the Chiltern Countryside Group to the Department for Transport Public Consultation on ‘High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future’, February 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chiltern Countryside Group</td>
<td>Written Response from the Chiltern Countryside Group to the HS2 London to West Midlands Environmental Impact Assessment Scope and Methodology Consultation, May 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chilterns Conservation Board</td>
<td>Comments on Draft EIA Scope and Methodology Report for High Speed 2 (London to West Midlands)</td>
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<td>Chilterns Conservation Board</td>
<td>&quot;HS2 in the Chilterns Route Revisions January 2012&quot;</td>
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<td>Department for Transport</td>
<td>Britain’s Transport Infrastructure: High Speed Two</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department for Transport</td>
<td>Delivering a Sustainable Railway</td>
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<td>Department for Transport</td>
<td>High Speed Rail</td>
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<td>Department for Transport</td>
<td>&quot;HS2 Revised Line of Route Maps&quot;</td>
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<td>Department for Transport</td>
<td>Scheme Development High Speed Rail Consultation: Government Hybrid Bills</td>
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<td>Department for Transport</td>
<td>TAG UNIT 3.5.6: Values of Time and Vehicle Operating Costs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department for Transport Strategy Unit</td>
<td>Review of the Value of Time Assumptions for Business Travellers on HS2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dialogue by Design</td>
<td>High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future. Consultation Summary Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dialogue by Design</td>
<td>High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future. Addendum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gillan, C</td>
<td>Submission to the Consultation on HS2 on Behalf of the Constituency of Chesham and Amersham</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hammond, P</td>
<td>&quot;Foreword&quot;, in HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport (editors), High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future. Consultation</td>
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<td>Hansen, I A</td>
<td>&quot;Besluit tot Aanleg A4 Delft-Schiedam (Geachte minister</td>
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<td>hoezomiddendelflandsnelweg.nl</td>
<td>&quot;Nieuwsbrief 21 Juni 2011&quot;</td>
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<td>House of Commons Transport Committee</td>
<td>High Speed Rail: Government Response to the Committee’s</td>
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<td>Tenth Report of Session 2010–12</td>
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<td>Consultation on High Speed 2: Submission by HS2 Action Alliance</td>
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<td>High Speed Rail (HS2). Justifying HS2: A Case of Myths not Reality</td>
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<td>HS2 Action Alliance</td>
<td>More Capacity on WCML: An Alternative to HS2</td>
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<td>Overestimation of Value of Business Travellers Time – The Facts</td>
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<td>Rebutting the Six Myths about HS2</td>
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<td>HS2 Ltd</td>
<td>Draft Environmental Statement London-West Midlands</td>
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<td>Economic Case for HS2: Updated Appraisal of Transport User Benefits and Wider Economic Benefits</td>
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<td>High Speed Rail London to the West Midlands and Beyond: A Report to Government by High Speed Two Limited</td>
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<td>High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future. The Government’s Decisions</td>
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<td>Options for Additional Tunnelling through the Chilterns</td>
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<td>Review of HS2 London to West Midlands Route Selection and Speed</td>
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<td>Valuing the Benefits of HS2 (London – West Midlands)</td>
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<td>HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport</td>
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<td>IODS</td>
<td>De Schop in de Grond, We gaan beginnen...</td>
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| Stop HS2 | "HS2 expected to have an Effect on Local Elections."
| Stop HS2 | "HS2 Facts"
| Stop HS2 | "Is There an Alternative to High Speed 2?"
| Stop HS2 | Stop HS2 Consultation Response July 11 - Final |
| The Wildlife Trusts | HS2 EIA Scope and Methodology Consultation: Response from The Wildlife Trusts (England) |
| Wendover HS2 | Financial Analysis of HS2: Multiplying an Unknown by an Uncertainty for 75 Years |
| Wendover Society | "HS2 Update"
| Woodland Trust | Woodland Trust Response to the High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future - Consultation |
Appendix 5  Original outputs of the value surveys

This appendix contains the original outputs of the values that are used in Chapter 7. The outputs are grouped on the basis of the value survey they belong to.

- European Social Survey (ESS)

Statement: “I am satisfied with the way democracy works in this country” (B27)

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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extremely satisfied</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>2,244.7</td>
<td>1,796.1</td>
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Weight: Design weight
Statement: “I am satisfied with the government of this country” (B26)

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</tr>
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Weight: Design weight

Statement: “I trust the politicians of this country” (B4-10)

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<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
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<td>13.6</td>
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<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete trust</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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Weight: Design weight
### Statement: “I trust the political parties of this country” (B4-10)

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<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>12.5</td>
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<td>17.8</td>
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<td>6.7</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Complete trust</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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Weight: Design weight

### Statement: “I trust the parliament of this country” (B4-10)

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
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<td>7.1</td>
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<td>10.2</td>
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<td>11.2</td>
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<td>11.0</td>
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<td>15.9</td>
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<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete trust</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
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Weight: Design weight
- World Value Survey (WVS)

Statement: “I think that it is good to have democracy in this country” (V151)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political system: Having a democratic political system</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>51.00%</td>
<td>58.40%</td>
<td>43.90%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly good</td>
<td>40.10%</td>
<td>32.20%</td>
<td>47.80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly bad</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
<td>5.80%</td>
<td>6.20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very bad</td>
<td>2.90%</td>
<td>3.60%</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1922 (100%)</td>
<td>944 (100%)</td>
<td>978 (100%)</td>
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</table>

Statement: “I have confidence in the government of this country” (V138)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confidence: The Government</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A great deal</td>
<td>2.80%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>27.50%</td>
<td>28.70%</td>
<td>26.30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>49.20%</td>
<td>45.40%</td>
<td>52.80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>20.50%</td>
<td>20.80%</td>
<td>20.10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2033 (100%)</td>
<td>999 (100%)</td>
<td>1034 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statement: “I have confidence in the political parties in this country” (V139)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confidence: The Political Parties</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A great deal</td>
<td>1.30%</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>19.30%</td>
<td>15.90%</td>
<td>22.60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>57.70%</td>
<td>57.20%</td>
<td>58.20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>21.70%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>18.50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1986 (100%)</td>
<td>973 (100%)</td>
<td>1013 (100%)</td>
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</table>

Statement: “I have confidence in the parliament of this country” (V140)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confidence: Parliament</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A great deal</td>
<td>2.90%</td>
<td>4.90%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>30.00%</td>
<td>31.30%</td>
<td>28.70%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>49.80%</td>
<td>46.90%</td>
<td>52.70%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>17.20%</td>
<td>16.90%</td>
<td>17.60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1992 (100%)</td>
<td>987 (100%)</td>
<td>1005 (100%)</td>
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</table>
Statement: “I think that my country is democratic” (V163)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Democraticness in own country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all democratic</td>
<td>2.30%</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
<td>1.90%</td>
<td>1.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.80%</td>
<td>4.80%</td>
<td>4.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.60%</td>
<td>6.60%</td>
<td>6.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.40%</td>
<td>13.30%</td>
<td>11.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.20%</td>
<td>14.50%</td>
<td>17.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>23.80%</td>
<td>22.30%</td>
<td>25.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>18.30%</td>
<td>19.30%</td>
<td>17.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.60%</td>
<td>7.40%</td>
<td>7.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely democratic</td>
<td>6.20%</td>
<td>6.60%</td>
<td>5.60%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Scores for Great Britain:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>are you satisfied with democracy (Q64)</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of all</th>
<th>% of valid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
<td>38.8</td>
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<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rather satisfied</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>416.8</td>
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<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not very satisfied</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>736.4</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not at all satisfied</td>
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<td>227.8</td>
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<td>16.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>na</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dk</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>111.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>
Scores for the Netherlands:

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<th>Frequency</th>
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<th>% of valid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>784.3</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>605.3</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>40.3</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>54.8</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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Weight: weight

Statement: “I think the government of this country is good” (Q65)

Scores for Great Britain:

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<th>Frequency</th>
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<th>% of valid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>11.7</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>249.8</td>
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<td>16.6</td>
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<td>307.2</td>
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<td>54.5</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
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<td>12.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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</table>

Weight: weight
Scores for the Netherlands:

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<th>Code</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
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<th>% of valid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<td>97.2</td>
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<td>6.3</td>
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<td>186.6</td>
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<td>12.1</td>
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<td>7.9</td>
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<td>9.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>dk</td>
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<td>9.9</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Weight: weight

Statement: “I think that it is good to have democracy” (Q66D)

Great Britain:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>political system: democratic (Q66D)</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of all</th>
<th>% of valid</th>
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<tr>
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<td>653.4</td>
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<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>559.3</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fairly bad</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>135.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>very bad</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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Appendix 6 Coding example

This appendix shows how the transcripts of the interviews have been coded. In Chapter 3 it has been explained that the thesis has used tree coding to code the transcripts of the interviews. Figure A6.1 shows the ‘coding tree’ which has been used to code the interviews in the HS2 case. A similar coding tree has been used for the A4DS case, of course tailored to its specific context (e.g. ‘Chilterns AONB’ is replaced with ‘Midden-Delfland’).

![Figure A6.1: Example of the coding tree used in the HS2 case](image)

Below is a full transcript interview, selected from one the interviews conducted in the HS2 case. The highlighted pieces of text indicate that this is a code. To a number of these codes nodes have been added (put between parentheses, printed bold and in fully capitalized) to show to which (parent) nodes they belong to. All the nodes from Figure A6.1 have been used.

+++  

Transcript Interview with the Chilterns Conservation Board

“You want me to say something about me and my organization?”

Interviewer: Yes.
“So, my job is the chief officer of the Chilterns Conservation Board. I’ve been working here for nearly 20 years now and the Board was set up by government [POLITICAL AUTHORITY] to promote the conservation and enjoyment of the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty [CHILTERNS AONB]. So we have a statutory duty to promote conservation.”

Interviewer: Since ’65, right?

“Well, the AONB designation was created in ’65. The Board was only created in 2004 and before that we were listed as a local organization for a very long time. But we’re only given the legal duties in 2004. We have a Board of Members, several of them are appointed by the Secretary of State to represent the national interest [INTEREST ADVOCACY] and then the remainder are local representatives from the Councils. So it’s a Board of all local people but we are charged with that dual responsibility of maintaining the national importance of the area and reflecting local opinion [INTEREST ADVOCACY]. It’s a key issue I think for HS2, and, whatever the role is of civil society, because (...) as a local civil series of organizations that reflect our interests. Government will say it has to reflect the national interest. So it’s a different civil society voice [CIVIL SOCIETY]. Normally you will expect that the national interest overrides the local interest. The difference here is that this is national heritage, it has a national designation so we can do both: we’re reflecting the national interest and...”

Interviewer: You’re wearing two hats.

“Exactly. So, we can’t get dismissed as just a local opinion [DEMOCRATIC SATISFACTION]. This is national heritage and it is the duty not just of us as the Board but of the government to care for it. And that’s a problem for it, because it looks like it’s undermining its own designations. Which it is. Let me get back to the Conservation Board’s role: we are set up by government [POLITICAL AUTHORITY], we have government money, we have local authority money and we are supposed to advice government. Which we do. So it gives us a difficulty when we are therefore opposing what the government wants [PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT], and rather more difficulty for using government money to oppose what the government wants. So there is a limit to how involved we can become.”

Interviewer: And what kind of language you may want to use, for instance.

\(^{33}\) When a ‘(...)’ is used, it indicates that the recording at that particular moment proved inaudible.
“Yes, we use very careful language. Which is why the network of several organizations is so important [CIVIL SOCIETY]. Because some have more freedom to speak up than others. On the other hand, they don’t have an influence necessarily and we do. So we have to decide where best to put our emphasis and our resources, and in so doing to know where the others can put their money. So for example, HS2 Action Alliance is extremely effective at lobbying [INTEREST ADVOCACY] in all kinds of ways which would be quite unacceptable for us to do. It can generate money from private individuals, from lawyers, lobbyists, which we could not do. And so it makes it easier in some way for us to know where to put our efforts.”

Interviewer: Also because I think [name of individual], she had a contact prior to her life with Action Alliance. I think she was a consultant of some sort.

“That’s right. One of the roles that we have to play is to give reassurance to all of these groups that they’re doing the right things and doing it the right way, that they’re doing a good job. So a lot of them are small and working in isolation, that they haven’t done this kind of thing before. So apart of, if you like, the technical job we have to do, we have to do the networking, give people comfort and confidence to keep ... to carry on, it’s easy to get disheartened. Especially when it’s us against the government [POLITICAL TRUST] with all their money and their power. So this is why we like to get out and about and to work with [name of individual] and [name of individual] who runs the Stop HS2 campaign and [name of individual] in the Chiltern Society. So we appear at a lot of events, we endorse a lot of literature, we do a lot of press releases. Because it does a statement that this government body [POLITICAL AUTHORITY] is with them. It believes it has a case and is willing to stand its grounds. It would be easy for government-funded bodies to push the sign (...) the politicians, told to shut up. So for example in this great debate about what is the right thing or wrong thing to do, you don’t find the Department of Environment, it's called DEFRA in this country, the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [POLITICAL AUTHORITY].”

Interviewer: And also the Environment Agency?

“Yes, well the government department’s top level has a number of agencies which deliver work for it, one of which is the Environment Agency, Forestry Commission, Natural England, some others. DEFRA has been silenced, it says nothing. The government agencies [POLITICAL AUTHORITY] so called, some of them have been told not to say very much, so in public they’ll say virtually nothing. Behind the scenes they’ll be doing a bit of technical work, but in terms of policy or politics or lobbying they’re not doing anything
..., which has made our job rather more difficult, because some will say, ‘well, the Conservation Board says X, but that is not supported by Natural England’. And it looks as (...) makes us look weak and that has been a constant problem.”

Interviewer: And the Campaign to Protect Rural England? Is that a farmer’s organization?

“No, oh no. No. CPRE is very much people that are concerned about the quality of the environment [SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT] in rural areas. Maybe a few are landowners, but a lot of its support is actually people live in towns.”

Interviewer: It’s not necessarily a conservative party’s ...?

“No, no it’s not political, but you might argue that its membership probably more likely votes conservative than liberal. No, it certainly doesn’t represent landowners or farming interests, no. So the CPRE has been pretty vocal and it has a different agenda [INTEREST ADVOCACY] from the rest of us. It’s a national organization, so inevitably it sees life differently. I think it’s fair to say that the national spokespeople in London have not seen eye to eye with the branch network in the counties, in Oxfordshire, in Buckinghamshire, in Northamptonshire, they’ve been pretty upset that some of the things that have been said nationally [INTEREST ADVOCACY] are their CPRE colleagues in London, who probably have a sneaky sympathy for railway development, as we all have to a certain extent.”

Interviewer: As opposed to cars.

“Yeah. But they have not been decipherous enough in opposing High-Speed 2 specifically. That’s been a problem. In terms of other national civic bodies [CIVIL SOCIETY], probably no. National Trust has been involved at the margins, because not many of its properties are affected but one very important property is at Hartwell near Aylesbury.”

Interviewer: They look at the archaeological value?

“Their concerns are twofold: one is direct impact on their properties, it so happens the one at Hartwell is a hotel which has been given to the National Trust and the profits are given to the National Trust and the railway goes through the grounds of this hotel. So its earning power will be much diminished, it’s a very expensive [COSTS AND BENEFITS], 400 or 500 Euros per night and upwards. But you can’t charge 500 Euros a night if there’s a
railway next door, so its reputation is severely damaged and the setting of the hotel, it goes through a registered park and garden, the (...) fabric of the park is damaged as well. And its wider concern is that the Chilterns has been damaged [ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION AND BLIGHT], and that undermines the designation. And it’s weary that further North where the route is announced, north of Birmingham, more of its properties will be affected, perhaps more directly than here. So it’s preparing itself for a bigger campaign, possibly. There are other national organizations, notable national organizations. Woodland Trust, very very against this because this railway will destroy ancient woodland [ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION AND BLIGHT]. Are you familiar with the definition of ancient woodland? Well, for the record: (...) ancient woodland is very little bit left in Britain and England and ancient woodland is defined as woodland that has existed continuously since at least 1600. So there is not very much left."

Interviewer: Pine oak?

“Oh, all sorts of woodland. Ancient woodland [NATURAL RESOURCE] in the South you would expect oak to be a major component, but not necessarily. In this part of the world there is no ancient pine woodlands. So it can destroy some ancient woodland. In some other places it will divide it so you get fragmentation of woodland, which is a bad thing. And in other places it will affect their setting. In order words, it will for example stop colonization of adjacent areas by species that survive currently only in ancient woodlands. So if you do more planting on the other side of the railway, some species can’t migrate and get across, so they are isolated. For that reason the Woodland Trust is very much against it. You’ve then got the network of Wildlife Trusts [CIVIL SOCIETY]. These are all membership organizations, as you probably know. National Trust has got 3 and a half million members, Woodland Trust I guess several hundred thousands, and you then have the network of county-based Wildlife Trusts, and collectively they’ve got a million members and all Wildlife Trusts affected are against the railway for the same reasons I guess as the Woodland Trust. It’s very bad for nature conservation, it damages habitats [ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION AND BLIGHT]. It’s a sense of also: we don’t care about wildlife and our environment because we are prepared to destroy it for the sake of this railway, which we don’t believe has a good case. It would be different (...) the railway was needed, that there is no alternative, that it was affordable, that there is a good business case for it [EVIDENCE BASE]. In which case our argument might look quite weak, but none of those things exist. We don’t believe it’s needed, it’s certainly not affordable, the business case is extremely weak. So we don’t feel we should sacrifice the environment, that’s very much the Wildlife Trust’s line. So there’s a representation of public concern [INTEREST ADVOCACY], if you like through the organizations that they’ve chosen to
support. All the big players are against it, all of them. Because it’s the nation’s debate, isn’t it, to what extent does the government represent the public opinion [DEMOCRATIC SATISFACTION]? Or does it, is it better represented through organizations locally, or those organizations that people choose to support? (...) membership of political parties is very small. It’s tiny. Tiny. The RSPB has got five times more members than a political party and therefore passes (...).”

Interviewer: *Probably the biggest organization, civil organization is the car drivers’ organization, it’s the biggest in Germany, it’s the biggest in the Netherlands, probably one of the biggest in the UK.*

“Here we’ve got, well there is the Royal Automobile Club. It’s a rescue organization (...), but there, I think it’s called the RAC Foundation. There’s one side which rescues and another side which represents the interests of motorists. They’re very against the railway, not because they are necessarily pro-car. What they’re saying is there is no national transport strategy; this railway does not fit with all the other needs, other transport needs. So they’re saying the roads need a lot of investment, they’re not getting it, because it’s all going to High-Speed 2. An equal message which we’re all giving the government, there may be a case for high-speed rail but you have got to map out all the transport needs first and then decide where this is the priority [EVIDENCE BASE]. We have never done that. If you base this on public opinion, base it on user groups, high speed rail has no place at all. But we do want money spent on the roads. The railway priorities are short-distance commuting networks, the railways we use every day to get to work. And to put more money into infrastructure that reduces our need to travel. That’s the broadband or to enable home-working, or to have the jobs where people live rather than having to commute long distances. All kinds of things you can do to reduce the need to travel and to reduce the need to travel long distances. So we don’t have a national transport strategy. So in terms of the articulation of public opinion [INTEREST ADVOCACY], I would say it, wouldn’t I, all of it is saying this railway is not (...), which is why it’s so frustrating the government carries on. Which rather suggests there’s another part of civil society which is at work, which is those who firmly believe that railways is a good thing and have a vested interest, the big construction companies for example, or the Chambers of Commerce in Manchester or Leeds. But they’re looking after their own interests, but we all have to pay the price, literally pay the price. (...) we’ll lose the environment [SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT] that we currently have.”

Interviewer: *Would you say that, (...), do you feel it’s even possible to oppose a plan which is advanced by the government, rather than it is a split decision perhaps between*
opposition and government within the House of Commons. Would you say that civil society opposition in general is fruitful...?

“Yes. Well we, in the case of the Conservation Board we have a legal duty to oppose anything which is going to damage the Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty [CHILTERN'S AONB]. So we have to oppose it. Is it constructive and fruitful? I think there is a tradition in the history of Britain. Fighting, taking on the big guy. It’s not so long ago that the Third Runway Heathrow, which has had many parallels, of course, was thrown out. There was a difference in party political interest [PARTY POLITICS]. But nonetheless, there was a sense of government wanting this to happen, it would have happened. But through civil-based opposition [PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT], including court action and direct action and lobbying and so on, that was stopped. Whether or not it’s going to come back again is another question. But there is another part of the railway story of course. One of the reasons for having this high-speed railway was because you would no longer need a third runway on Heathrow because you could take the train rather than fly. Which was an argument that was put forward by politicians because it sounded good. In practice, it was completely misleading. The number of people flying internally in Britain [HS2 NATIONAL IMPORTANCE] is tiny. Very few of those flights using the third runway would ever switch to a railway. So it’s a bogus argument used to support what was a contentious proposition. But all parties went for it. They realized that argument didn’t stack up so they don’t refer to it anymore. The argument then became: this was going to transform the economy of the north of England [ECONOMIC RATIONALE]. But there is no evidence as far as we are aware anywhere in the world that high-speed rail generates economic activity. And if there is any evidence is that the economic activity moves to the rich area. People go in our case to London, not the other way around.”

Interviewer: Which is counter-productive.

“It’s the opposite of what people want [DEMOCRATIC SATISFACTION], because what it will turn into is a commuter line for people in Birmingham going to work in London. The similar argument is that if you generate a network like this, when we go back to the experience in Germany and France is that where it did generate economic activity, it was by displacement. Because a lot of the German and French high-speed railway stations are not in the city centres. They are in the outskirts. So it creates jobs around the railway but they all come from the city centre. That’s probably counter to job creation, economic generation. But in fact there is zero sum [ECONOMIC RATIONALE].”

Interviewer: It is either gentrification or displacement.
"Yes, it's a pure displacement. Which is almost certainly what will happen in Birmingham. So for example, if they run a high-speed railway from London to Birmingham that will stop at the airport, in the outskirts, there will be regeneration around the airport, but a lot of that will have moved out of central Birmingham. Or would have gone to central Birmingham (...). So it's counter-productive [EVIDENCE BASE]. So that became the argument for the high-speed railway, but that has been resisted and shown to be bogus. The next strand of the argument was that it is better for the environment: fewer emissions, particularly emissions around the airport, fewer people driving. But then again there is absolutely no basis for that and if you, as we have done ... A high-speed train uses a lot of energy. Lots of energy. And there is an equation that if you double the speed, you quadruple the amount of energy needs [EVIDENCE BASE]. So until we have an entirely green renewable energy network, there is a relationship between the energy you use and the emissions created at the power stations. As you will you know, we have a lot of gas, a lot of coal and by 2027 it will have changed, but not a lot."

Interviewer: The question is obviously where does the electricity comes from. If you have to build coal-fired power plants now to feed HS2, rather than to get it from windmills, which is highly unlikely because you need lots of capacity, ultimately this is much worse for the environment.

"The other thing is about railways it needs lots of infrastructure. You need new stations, you need power to run it and you need the track and tunnels and all the rest of it. There is a lot of embedded carbon in the infrastructure and there is a lot of energy needed for the stations, for the power plants, for the offices, for the trains themselves [EVIDENCE BASE]."

Interviewer: And for the one million lorries with spoil.

"So there is a lot of embedded carbon already. But there was a study done, I'm sure it was in (...) North-West America that had suggested the amount of energy needed to create a running railway is probably in excess of running an aircraft between the same destinations. So the runway already exists, once you get off the runway you don't need any more infrastructure until the other end. So aviation is doing quite a good job of getting emissions down. A long way to go, but it's quite going to get it down. And part of the debate here is: what are the emissions per passenger mile? And car emissions are going way down as you probably know. It's an EU priority to get emissions down to a 110 grams per passenger kilometre by 2015. So over long distances the cars tend to have multiple
occupancy and they have very efficient engines. The emissions per kilometre are lower or comparable with high-speed trains. And the way aircrafts are going, they will still be worse than trains but they are not that much worse. Because they’re going to (...) bigger aircraft. Because the other thing with the train is: to keep your passenger kilometre emissions down, you need a very high loading factor. And they won’t have, they won’t be full. They’ll be running half-empty trains, so it’s conceivable, and this is not unrealistic, that the emissions per passenger kilometre from a half-empty high-speed train are worse than going by car and comparable with flying in twenty or thirty years’ time, and much worse than by coach [EVIDENCE BASE]. So, that argument is thrown to people.

The other facet to that is: how do you value the natural environment into the business case [ECONOMIC RATIONALE]? How are you going to value on wildlife, on the landscape, on historic heritage? Very difficult. But there are ways of doing it.”

Interviewer: *Willingness-to-pay, for instance.*

“Willingness-to-pay is a slightly dodgy one.”

Interviewer: *Hedonic pricing as well? House prices?*

“Well, you can do it, actually you can do that around here. You can say: ‘why do you live here and not somewhere else?’ Because it’s more expensive here and there is a difference in the prices because it was nice here and (...). You certainly can do that. There are methodologies for it but they are not applying it to High-Speed 2, because it will undermine the business case. So the actual monetization of environmental impacts is not in the business case [COSTS AND BENEFITS], although they have monetized things like convenience, time saved, things that are not real monetary values, but they assigned one to it. So they are only choosing those qualitative characteristics which suit their case. And then, I think it was over fifty percent of the benefits of high-speed rail are notional, they’re not real. As you’ll probably know, the bulk of that is time saved. The argument is: every minute on a train you cannot be productive. Well, I’m sure today you’ll work on the train when you go back [EVIDENCE BASE]. We all do it. And this is no 2012 but 2027; technology will be even better. It’s fantastic now; it will be even better. There is an argument, bizarre as it may seem, that the time on the train for many people is more productive than being in an office or a meeting, because you can concentrate, you can read, for example a report. In my case I can’t sit in an office and read a report for an hour: too many interruptions. In a train I can sit down and concentrate on that report. So it’s very valuable time to me. It’s a completely ridiculous argument.”
Interviewer: *Again, it’s counter-productive? [name of an individual] told me everything within forty minutes is not worth the hassle to take out the laptop and actually opening it.*

“There is a psychology about this. We talked to a chap from one of the local railway companies, I can’t mention it because it’s going on the record [laughs], who is responsible for passenger services and he has to know where this cut-off is between what’s a short journey, what’s a slightly longer journey because he has to decide whether to put a buffet car on a train. Or a drinks trolley. Because if is a short journey he doesn’t need to bother. The longer he does. He reckons that cut-off point was around 45 to 50 minutes. In other words, you’re quite right above that you settle down, you take your time, you get stuck into whatever it is you want to do. Shorter than that you stare out of the window, you fiddle with your phone and you daydream. So in fact we may be denying a lot people what would have been productive time on the train, (...) from one hour and ten minutes to fifty minutes [EVIDENCE BASE]. Strange as that may seem.”

Interviewer: *The government would say: “you can still choose existing infrastructure”? But if too many people that, then that may run counter to the justification of building the railway.*

“Is that not the experience in the Netherlands, that you do have a high-speed train between, I don’t know, Brussels and Amsterdam, but you have an older service which runs on the existing tracks? The same is true of the high-speed services in Kent. The international one to Paris and Brussels. HS1. It’s expensive [COSTS AND BENEFITS], going to the wrong station in London. Which is annoying because it means everybody has got a twenty minute walk extra to where they want to be. One way of forcing people onto these trains is that they make the existing services slower and more expensive. But it still doesn’t change. The other interesting thing of course for the railway is: the business passengers for long distances aren’t really more than 20, 25 percent of the travellers. So 75 percent are leisure travellers who don’t want to pay anymore than they have to [ECONOMIC RATIONALE]. 5 Euros would make a difference. Because business travellers (…), related to their work or their employers paying their fare. So 75% of passengers, at least, are price-sensitive and will go for the cheaper option. And of the time differences as it is with High-Speed 2 is so small, it’s twenty minutes or less, less probably. You probably know the West Coast Main Line franchise, the big squabble between Virgin and FirstGroup. Both of them have promised faster services. So at the moment the services is one hour and ten minutes, really. The timetable says one hour twenty, but actually you probably know, if you say the journey is one hour and twenty
minutes and a sudden percentage of your trains are later than that, you get fined. So they build ten minutes into the timetable to avoid the fine. In practice they can do it in 1 hour and ten, but they say one hour and twenty. They’re never late. So it’s one hour and ten for most of them. In fifteen years from now it will be an hour.”

Interviewer: Because they want to increase it to a 140 miles per hour, I read.

“That’s right, Virgin wants to knock ten minutes off I think, FirstGroup said it will at least five, but anyway the point is it’s just over an hour. And the stations that you can go to or where you want to be: have you been to Birmingham? New Street is right next to the shopping centre. Curzon Street, ten or fifteen minutes walk away. Down the hill, far, some of these trains are four hundred metres long, so if you go towards the back end of the train, 400 metres.... If you’re leaving for example, if you’ve arrived in Birmingham, to get where you wanted to go, which I guess is the city centre, you’ve got to walk 400 metres, go to the barriers, 8 or 9-minute walk up the hill, so you’re 10-15 minutes ... But that’s the 10 or 15 minutes that you just paid to use a high-speed train to get you there more quickly [EVIDENCE BASE].”

Interviewer: Would you say a train passenger, the average leisure train passenger, there is a huge price elasticity? If the price goes by thirty percent you would lose more than thirty percent of your passengers.

“Well, the other thing is (...), is that you have to persuade people to get on the train who would not otherwise have travelled at all. The ticket has to be really cheap. So every percentage of demand you want to grow has to be even more price-sensitive. So you might only put a pound or two on the price, but you would lose a disproportionate number of passengers, because they will just say ‘I’m not going to do the journey at all’. So it stops when they’ll say ‘I’ll get the bus or car or walk, or they’ll just wouldn’t do the journey at all’.”

Interviewer: And people use the car for many other reasons than price.

“I think there’s a lot in that. Because what has not been done? It’s either to conduct a survey of passengers. Nobody has ever said to passengers: ‘do you want to high-speed trains or trains with this particular route?’ That’s how in a way a company works who wants to find out if people will buy a certain car or soap, you know. You do consumer surveys. Never been done for high-speed rail. The other part they have never asked the public what are the price thresholds: at what point would you say ‘of course I will get to London for this price’? So they don’t know where these thresholds lie, but they have built
an entire business plan based on X number of people travelling for a certain price, and there is no evidence to support that reasoning. We keep saying: in Holland, in the Netherlands, it's the best example where they had this choice, they didn’t choose the choice they were supposed to. And the Dutch behave like the British [EVIDENCE BASE].

I’m going off the track there, but there was an interesting article in a magazine recently, it was about economic growth is not based on countries, it’s based on the new series of city-states."

Interviewer: Back to Italy.

“Amsterdam was a very good example, or Venice or Dubrovnik. The city, where the economy of the city is different from the economy of the country. So London is a very good example, Paris probably. And they will grow at the expense of the rest of the country. And their economic infrastructure needs are fit first because it’s argued that that’s in the country’s best interest. In practice, it’s only in the interest of the city, it’s counter-productive for the rest of the country [ECONOMIC RATIONALE]. HS2 is a good example of that. It’s all London-centric, London will get a disproportionate amount of the expenditure and the jobs, everywhere else will suffer relative to that. And then they argue ‘we will have got to feed London because that’s where all the money and the jobs are’. It’s a cycle and you can’t break it."

Interviewer: Is there a strong ‘London lobby’ behind HS2?

“No, no. The argument [EVIDENCE BASE] is from the northern cities who are worried their prosperity relies on good links with London. There’s an argument they prosper more if they weren’t linked [laughs cynically]. Because all the evidence is that if you join a poor city and a rich city, the rich city will benefit. And there is another argument that: why would twenty minutes on a rail journey trigger economic development [ECONOMIC RATIONALE]? What is it in the mind of a business that says ‘if I can save twenty minutes on a particular journey, I can create more wealth, more jobs?’ I can’t understand that relationship.

If people say: ‘well phase 1 is just to make sure.... there’s also phase 2. In order to make the Y, we need the first leg as well’. So let’s say, well it may seem it doesn’t pay off, but believe us you can get to Manchester or to Leeds. Then you definitely see the whole picture.
This is the argument from politicians [POLITICAL AUTHORITY], is that the national prospect is better if you’ve got a high-speed network and therefore you have to have as many cities connected as possible. There is no evidence of that. Even in Japan where they have these trains for nearly forty years, there is no evidence for ... The other interesting part is that ... You’ll probably know the high-speed alignment going to Birmingham and in due course to Manchester and Leeds, but beyond that there won’t be high-speed trains, they have to run on the existing track. But the classic-compatible trains can’t go as fast on the existing track as the existing trains. The journey time to Scotland, from Manchester and Leeds, will be slower than that. This is bizarre [EVIDENCE BASE].”

Interviewer: Because the trains used for high-speed rail after Birmingham, they have to slow to such a certain speed that the original on the West Coast Main Line goes faster.

“They can’t go around a sharp corner. Where you go very fast, you have very rigid trains.”

Interviewer: I think this is often called path dependency: you’re so much dependent on decisions taken in the past that the future is kind of blurred. Because of the legacy of the past you have to make certain steps in the future.

“That’s our fear: that once you start you can’t stop. Which is what the Spanish experience is to a great extent. Look what happened: they spent a hundred and twenty billion Euros on a network, half of which a net that no-one ever uses. But the argument of all the cities in the second phase was: what about us, when is it our turn? We’ll be building more and more high-speed railways. The reality was it was only about Madrid-Barcelona, Madrid-Seville. The same will happen here: Glasgow and Edinburgh and Cardiff and Bristol will say ‘why haven’t we got...?’ Or Norwich. But there is a very good example of: Norwich is not particularly well-connected; Edinburgh is not particularly well-connected; Cambridge isn’t brilliantly connected. But those are three of the most successful cities in Britain. Other things made them successful. Birmingham, Manchester have got fantastic transport networks, so if they’re suffering it’s not due to transport infrastructure but other reasons. Twenty minutes on a railway is not a panacea for that [EVIDENCE BASE].”

Interviewer: I wanted to know, could you tell me the difference between Stop HS2 and the Action Alliance? To me they’re relatively comparable.

“They have different starting points. I suppose in an ideal world they might have been one organization but there are in fact four. 51M are local authorities. There is something called AGAHST, which is an acronym for all local groups: Action Groups Against High Speed
Trains [CIVIL SOCIETY], something like that. I don’t think they’ve got a website, but it’s a federation of all small groups that are sceptic, including the one here in Great Missenden. Then there is the Stop HS2 campaign, which is [name of individual] and [name of individual], who are, they too have supporters and members. And HS2 Action Alliance. You would expect the local parties to have their own grouping (...), and that makes a lot of sense and politically they have to do it that way. I suppose there was an argument that all the community groups [CIVIL SOCIETY] should come together under one banner. In Britain we don’t do things like that, it’s far too sensible [laughs]. Lots of different starting points, too many personalities. And actually it’s a good thing, because you have to be driven, you have to want to do this. Of course it means big personalities. But it works, or we made it work. So there are lots of small action groups, based on villages or communities.”

Interviewer: Amersham Action Group...

“Amersham Action Group. And they meet under the AGAHST banner, and they agree on sort of a agenda, sort of a direction. Then the Stop HS2 campaign is very much about lobbying [INTEREST ADVOCACY]; the websites; briefing; nudging here, poking there, you know: find little ways of making [PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT]... and therefore making a much louder noise than a number of people would suggest. That’s absolutely fantastic. Very good in searching things and quotes and such. Then you’ve got the HS2 Action Alliance, which is a, I think is a company of [name of individual], and they are real experts on the railway industry. [name of individual] and [name of individual] [CIVIL SOCIETY] know the railway industry and they have tremendous influence and access to money. They work hard to get it, but they’ve got access to rich people. And so they are able to employ professional lobbying companies and so on. And they’re the ones who’ve probably made the biggest impact, but with the least public profile. They tend to work from behind the scenes: direct lobbying of MPs; briefing of journalists; it’s very effective stuff indeed. But it’s expensive. And [name of individual] is just superb in orchestrating that. So all have their different niche. It’s a debatable point whether as a sort of reflection of civic desire [INTEREST ADVOCACY] whether we would be more effective as one organization or is it better having several organizations coming at different angles. We’ll never know.”

Interviewer: Is there trust between local-based organizations and national-based organizations and do you think that the interests involved in the networks are well-represented and divided along all those local groups? The Ruislip folks and then the Chilterns folks and then the Kenilworth folks, do they all feel...?
“There is a tremendous affinity between the groups from London all the way to Birmingham [CIVIL SOCIETY]. I think it is hardly because we’ve been doing this a long time, we’ve got to know each other. Since three or four years now, I guess. It seems like forever, but probably three years. So when a message comes from a certain person in Camden, with whom I normally not have any working relationship with before, I will read it because I know that person knows what he’s talking about when they’ve got something worth reading. And so you build a relationship, and some of these people I’ve never met, but I’ve written to a hundred times. But it’s been quite an effective (...) And that’s, I suppose it takes slightly longer to get to know people and to build up trust and there are a lot of people whom I’ve met around here, in the Chilterns, through so many events, and I have worked closely with them and we have all worked with each other and that accelerates that degree of trust [INTERPERSONAL TRUST]. I would go as far as to say that a lot of friendships have been built. Such is the degree of trust, interdependence. So that’s been a very good thing, actually. It gives us a rallying cause.”

Interviewer: Besides the formal public engagement based on the seven questions, is there also informal public engagement? And how does this relate to trust between civil society groups and the government?

“It’s an interesting question. Well, the bottom line is we don’t trust the government [POLITICAL TRUST], or HS2 Ltd. There’s been too much ill feeling about the way the process has been managed and some things that politicians have said about us, we have heard (...). So the trust is certainly not there. One of the interesting dilemmas, confusions, is: what is the difference between government as represented by the Department for Transport and government as represented by HS2 Ltd as a company? Because there should be a big difference between the government and a developer. HS2 Ltd is a developer, like a big company. And we can’t see the difference sometimes, we don’t know what is a political statement, we don’t know what the reporting lines are. We don’t know very clearly, at least: what is the Board of Directors of HS2 Ltd? How does it report to the Secretary of State? What is their mandate? How transparent is it? What degree of authority have they got to act independently? We don’t know. So sometimes when we’re dealing with HS2 Ltd we don’t know whether we’re dealing with the government or with HS2. Sometimes when the answer from HS2 Ltd it is very obvious that actually it’s the officials of the Department of Transport who have crafted the response. When, for example, we go ... we have done several times is meet government ministers: HS2 Ltd officials sitting on the meeting, and they speak with one voice. In fact, they should be separated [POLITICAL TRUST].”
Interviewer: *Because they’re not elected representatives?*

“Yes. So in HS2 Ltd some of the staff are civil servants working for the government [POLITICAL AUTHORITY], paid for by the government. Some are employees of HS2 Ltd, we don’t know which are which. So we don’t know which ones are government employees and which ones are not. Very complicated, they shouldn’t be like that. So there’s no trust [POLITICAL TRUST]. It’s also very obvious that HS2 Ltd has not been given enough time to do the job properly. This is a massive project. You would expect several years of planning, environmental surveys, design options, consultation, all what the Aarhus Convention requires. They’ve done it so fast that they can’t do that properly. So the consultation process is too short; not enough information is provided; they’ve never given enough information about the alternatives which the Aarhus Convention requires, that it should be presented with alternatives at an early-enough stage to influence the decision. We were never given that opportunity. All these things, you see, we were given a lot of information about the preferred option, very little information about the alternatives. You couldn’t do a proper comparison, that’s right. Very complicated. And I think it’s also fair to say that the nature of the consultation process we had last year was a fix, was more of a presentation, a promotional exercise than it was a listening exercise [PUBLIC CONSULTATION].”

Interviewer: *Like pseudo-participation?*

“Yes. So they asked questions: they didn’t really care what the answer was, because as you may know there were tens of thousands of responses. So you could ask what is the point of engaging the public if you don’t listen? Which is why we have no trust. If 90% of the responses were negative you would think the government would say: ‘well, we perhaps don’t have this right’. But they didn’t, they just ignored it. And as we now know the responses were even more heavily weighted against. It made no difference. It was a waste of time [PUBLIC CONSULTATION].”

Interviewer: *Is HS2 Ltd a technocratic agency in the sense that they understand their profession very well, construction or civil engineers for instance, but they’re not really facilitating when it comes to engagement?*

“I think it’s fair to say that it was a very small group of people, surprisingly small. And they were not really experts in anything. Managers. So over time they have brought in more experts, more technocrats, more technically-based people and they have now got to the stage where they are employing consultants. Big international consultants to provide civil
engineering support. And as part of the process internally they have brought in a hired people to do the consultation with communities [PUBLIC CONSULTATION]. You would think they were experts of community engagement. Certainly the experience so far is that they’re not. They just wanted a job, a bit unkind slightly, but they are plainly not experts. So all the community forums meetings we’ve had, there are I think it’s between (...), I think there are 25, 26, something like that, all the way along the line. And there are three here in the Chilterns. There were two, there are now three. They have all been pretty miserable affairs. A lot of acrimony, a lot of argument both over how ... I think it’s fair to say that actually we’ve become experts, literally, in understanding about ways, about visual impact assessment, environmental assessment [PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT]. We know quite a lot.

The other interesting thing is: this is about a reflection of civil society. Because this railway has annoyed so many people, a lot of experts living locally have volunteered to help. Like [name of individual]. We have not far from here a professor of acoustics who is helping out. So he’s as good as anybody HS2’s got. Actually locally we have a tremendous technical resource to draw on. In some cases better than the people that are hired by HS2. So when we have these debates, these formal meetings and they are trying to say ‘this is how things look’, we then say: ‘well, it could look like that’. And we know this because we have experts [PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT]. Which has made them, the meetings very adversarial and they have assumed little knowledge on our part which is immensely irritating. As you can imagine.”

Interviewer: It’s belittling as well.

“It’s very belittling, and we are upset about courtesy and politeness and they have made some terrible mistakes. So the personal relationships are not good. We don’t trust them as individuals, they don’t like us. So that makes these meetings very difficult [POLITICAL TRUST], and the way working now of course is lots of emails and lots of websites stuff and reports, electronic versions. So in theory there should be a lot of information floating about that we can use for the meetings. But they won’t give them to us. And that has compounded the degree of the lack of trust. For example, they draw up agendas for the meetings that generally last two hours. Their agendas involve one and a half hours of presentations, and a half a hour for us. So we have said: ‘enough! We want one and a half hour, you can have thirty minutes’. If they circulated the presentations in advance, as you would do for any meeting: papers first; you read them; you understand them; you discuss them... We would have saved so much time. They know that, but they won’t do it. Because it means that there is more time for us to discuss matters at the meetings, and they obviously want to waste our time. They want to tick the box [PUBLIC CONSULTATION]. Exactly. So it’s the degree of distrust is continuous and continuous
Interviewer: Justine Greening, the previous Transport Secretary has left a few weeks ago. Has the situation changed?

"Justine Greening was OK as an individual but she knew nothing about transport. And wasn't a very experienced politician, I think that wasn’t helpful. The new Secretary of State we don’t know but he has spent the last two and a half years being Chief Whip for the government, which means he has his job was to make sure the Prime Minister’s wishes were fulfilled."

Interviewer: Like making coffee?

“Well, he might well have done. I couldn’t possibly comment [laughs]. You can’t imagine somebody whose political career has depended on that for the last couple of years, then letting down the Prime Minister if he wants this railway to happen? The Secretary of State will try and make it happen. The indication we’re getting is that the Prime Minister is not as keen as he once was and we know the Treasury is becoming really very annoyed. It’s so expensive for such a poor case [COSTS AND BENEFITS], but politically is quite hard to get themselves out of the position they’ve got themselves into.”

Interviewer: [Name of individual] told me high-speed rail has been Lord Adonis’ idea, who is from Labour. Apparently, this is a conservative heartland. Could the line change the electoral map of Britain?

“This is such a strong conservative area, it’s inconceivable that it will not return conservative politicians [PARTY POLITICS]. Certainly Westminster. And the local councils we may get, as we have here, we have an anti-HS2 councillor now. I don’t think that will translate into changes to the national government. But there may be more larger constituencies in London and other parts of the line where it makes a difference. And the next election is very close. As it will be, losing a few seats may make the difference. So they will be worried. I think there is also a worry amongst the Conservative Party, I’m going off briefly here, really, but that (...) The Conservatives [PARTY POLITICS] are generally being seen as the pro-countryside. Lots of them are landowners, and lots of them live in the countryside. Labour tends to have, all the socialist parties have their power based in the cities, it tends to be the way. But the government has got a reputation for being anti-countryside, anti-environment, that it is alienating its own voters and HS2 is
a good example of that. Where it seems not to care that it is destroying a lot of
countryside, it damages a lot of farms, it can damage a lot of places that people enjoy, like
the Chilterns [ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION AND BLIGHT]. So it’s a vote-loser rather
than vote-winner. We think. So, just finishing your point is that: the trust, the degree to
which we can work with national institutions, government institutions, is very weak. There
is a low base. I can’t see that changing. We don’t trust them, they don’t like us
[POLITICAL TRUST], we are undermining their case. And they know we have a very
good case so they can’t ridicule us, they can’t make us look stupid. We have a very good
case. Our relationship with other national institutions, like I was saying earlier ones like the
National Trust, the CPRE, the Woodland Trust, is very good. There is a huge degree of
sympathy between us and this is the sort of area where these organizations get their
members from. So they’re in tune with us. So that degree of national and local working is
extremely good and is getting stronger [CIVIL SOCIETY]. No doubt.”

Interviewer: What do you expect from the EIA? Would you expect the EIA to be another
perfunctory tick-the-box exercise or do you think there’s intelligently looked at, for instance
at the alternatives to HS2?

“Well, the interesting thing is, as you may know, because it was one of the legal avenues,
is that they pursued an EIA which looks at the environmental impacts of this route. You
don’t have to look at alternatives [EVIDENCE BASE]. The strategic environmental
assessment [ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT], at a higher level, you have to look at
alternatives. And you have to consult on the alternatives. But they’re not doing that. There
is no SEA. They’re arguing the Appraisal of Sustainability, which they did in 2011, offered
the same thing. Obviously it does not. Nowhere near the same. We have made a formal
complaint to the EU. I say ‘we’ the campaigner groups, not the Board. And we are in
sympathy, we’ve helped but it’s not in our name. The position is that the European Union
has said: ‘you may have a case, but the process is not finished. When the process is
finished we’re in a better position to know whether there is complied with the EU
regulations’. They have come to the view that they have complied with it so far. So maybe
through what is to come, and the hybrid bill, they ultimately can fulfil the SEA regulations
[ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT]. Our argument is today they haven’t, and therefore
there are potential grounds for legal action. What I think is more likely in the short term is
that the EIA, which has been ill-founded, it’s not the way they’re proposing to do it is not
good enough, certainly for a project with that scale. There is no alternative and even when
they’re just looking at this one route they’re not doing it thoroughly enough. For example,
they’re only using one season’s field data. When they go out into the field to gather data
about certain species they’re basing it on one season. And we’ve had a very odd year,
you know. There is not enough data [EVIDENCE BASE]. And we know a lot of landowners who have refused permission for them to go on their land. So it’s just small samples. So we’ve said that’s not enough data. You would normally for a project of this size do two or three year’s data gathering. That’s a good example of how poor the EIA is. So the environmental statement which follows will itself be weak. It won’t be having enough data to substantiate the statements they will make. I could well foresee a legal challenge saying the environmental statement [ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT] is unsound."

Interviewer: There should be an alternative in an EIA, right?

“I’m not sure it’s a requirement. I don’t think it is. In an SEA, it is a requirement. You have to show why, and an SEA, you have got to identify some of the impacts and show how you would avoid them, which inevitably means some of the impacts can only be avoided by not building it, or building it somewhere else. So some of the impacts will be: ‘you’re affecting outstanding natural beauty [CHILTERN AONB], how are you going to avoid that?’ Don’t build it, or put a tunnel underneath it. But all these alternatives have not been assessed."

Interview: Often there’s a hidden alternative, which is the reference situation. But project planners often use the notion of autonomous growth to show the justification of the project.

“That’s what they’ve done. They’ve said we can do that and the train would be full and we can build a high-speed railway line. We will build another railway line and it should be high speed. We all say, particularly through 51M, you can upgrade what we’ve got. And you can do it incrementally, so you’ve always got a match between demand and supply. Which is much more sensible as economic investment [ECONOMIC RATIONALE]. And now we know that those trains on the existing lines are pretty empty anyway. So there’s plenty of scope to grow business on the existing line and speed it up and make it a better quality.”
Acronyms

All the acronyms used in the thesis are listed hereunder. In every chapter the acronym will be introduced, irrespective of whether it has appeared at an earlier stage.

A4DS – A4 Delft-Schiedam
ACF – Advocacy Coalition Framework
AONB – Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty
BBOWT – Berks, Bucks & Oxon Wildlife Trust
CCCF – Central Chilterns Community Forum
CHW – Crisis- en Herstelwet
CF – community forum
CO₂ – carbon dioxide
DCLG – Department for Communities and Local Government
DEFRA – Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DfT – Department for Transport
EHS – Ecologische Hoofdstructuur
EIA – environmental impact assessment
ESS – European Social Survey
EU – European Union
EVS – European Values Study
GWML – Great Western Main Line
HCTC – House of Commons Transport Committee
HS1 – High-Speed Rail 1
HS2 – High-Speed Rail 2
I/C ratio – Intensity/Capacity ratio
IODS – Integrale Ontwikkeling tussen Delft en Schiedam
KNNV – Koninklijke Nederlandse Natuurhistorische Vereniging
kph – kilometres per hour
LPA – local planning authority
MI&M – Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu
MP – Member of Parliament
NEPA – National Environmental Policy Act
NGO – non-governmental organization
NIMBY – ‘not in my backyard’
NRM – Nieuw Regionaal Model
NSL – Nederlandse Samenwerking Luchtkwaliteit
RP2 – Rail Package 2
SEA – strategic environmental assessment
SSI – Sites of Special Scientific Interesys
SOBO – Stichting Overleg Bewonersorganisaties
SP – Socialist Party (in the Netherlands)
T&CP – Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations
TN/MER – Trajectnota/Milieu-effectrapportage
TU Delft – Delft University of Technology
UK – United Kingdom
UKIP – United Kingdom Independence Party
UNECE – United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
US – United States (of America)
VOT – Value of Time
WCED – World Commission on Environment and Development
WCML – West Coast Main Line
WVS – World Value Survey
Definitions

The definitions presented here correspond with a number of concepts which appear in the thesis. Although many of the definitions of the concepts can be traced back in Chapters 1 to 3 and in the conclusion, the empirical chapters of the thesis (Chapters 5 to 7) deal with the concepts more implicitly. As the type of research conducted in this thesis prohibits an all too strict interpretation of the definitions set forth in this glossary (or because it is undesirable), it is advised by the author to allow for some contextual freedom when deploying them.

Note: The references provided serve as suggestions for further reading.

- Abduction – A scheme of inference to inquire into the plausibility of a theory or theoretical premise (Danermark et al., 2002)

- Case study research – Investigating a social entity for the purpose of making analytical generalizations (Yin, 2009)

- Civil society – a community consisting of individuals and organizations that are committed to political issues of high public interest (Putnam, 1993)

- Counter-expertise – a conduct of science which follows the same rules of scientific inquiry but questions the validity of the evidence that is presented by the competent authority (Hommes et al., 2009)

- Critical realism – A research approach which believes in a social reality which independent from human observations but accepts that causality between events, entities and concepts cannot be proven (Sayer, 1992)

- Deliberation – A system of social interaction where decisions are reached based on the acceptance of all (Bohman, 1998)

- Democracy – A political system in which the people rule (Held, 2006)

- Democratic performance – Qualitative measure of performance based on the norms and rights inherent in liberal democracy (Foweraker and Krznaric, 2000)
• Democratic satisfaction – Qualitative indicator of the public attitude towards
democratic institutions (Anderson and Guillory, 1997)

• Discourse – A “specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that is
produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through
which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995: 44)

• Discourse analysis – Analysis of discourses, premised on the idea that “that social
phenomena are never finished or total” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 24) and that the
ideas that underlie social reality need to be examined

• Discourse coalition – Civil society actors that work together to make claims exerting to
political and scientific authority for the purpose of strengthening their discourse

• Epistemology – A concept which deals with the question ‘how can we know social
reality?’ (Corbetta, 2003)

• Inference – Reaching conclusions or mapping consequences within a certain level of
causal uncertainty (King et al., 1994)

• Institutional design – “the creation of an actionable form to promote valued outcomes
in a particular context” (Goodin, 1996: 31)

• Interpersonal trust – The degree of trustworthiness of the relationship between citizens
that are unknown to one another (Uslaner, 2002)

• Mechanism – A concept which denotes the interaction and reciprocity between
concepts, entities and events in social reality (Easton, 2010a)

• Methodology – A concept which details the methods for data collection and analysis
(Corbetta, 2003)

• Ontology – A concept which deals with the question ‘what is social reality?’ (Corbetta,
2003)

• Political culture – “the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order and
meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and
rules that govern behavior in the political system” (Pye, 1968: 218)
• Political trust – Public attitude towards democracy as expressed through the degree of trust between decision-makers and civil society (Inglehart, 1988)

• Public – “one or more natural or legal persons, and, in accordance with national legislation or practice, their associations, organizations or groups” (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1998: Article 2.4).

• Public engagement (mode of) – The ways in which engagement is organized, the institutional spaces that accommodate engagement activities as well as the criteria used to select civil society actors for an ‘invited’ form of public engagement (Fung and Wright, 2003).

• Social appraisal (mostly referred to as ‘stakeholder appraisal’ in the empirical chapters) – “concerns the ways in which knowledges, understandings, and evaluations are constructed” (Stirling, 2008: 265)

• Storyline – A semantic tool (such as a slogan, motto, message or symbol) which unifies a discourse coalition (Hajer, 1995)

• Sustainability – Interchangeable with sustainable development. Note that both sustainability and sustainable development can mean different things to different people

• Sustainable development - a development is sustainable when it ensures “that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987: Article 27)
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