Co-operation, Co-optation, Competition?

Understanding how Britain and Germany interact with the EU’s Common Foreign Security Policy, and why they employ the strategies they do.

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Abstract

The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is a highly significant arena for the production of foreign and security policy for all member states and has been the focus of extensive academic examination since its establishment. An important body of literature in this regard has been that which utilises supranationalist theoretical frameworks to understand its development. This seeks to move beyond instrumental or utilitarian understandings of how and why states engage with the CFSP, looking instead at its impact on member states. Their central insight is that the consequence of extended cooperation and interaction is a transformation not only in how states make foreign policy, but in their underlying interests and preferences that underpin their involvement in it.

To make this argument, many such analyses have sought to apply the range of conceptual tools offered by constructivism. How they apply constructivism is problematic, however. While the CFSP has facilitated common approaches towards a wide range of policy issues, the supranationalist theoretical literature fails to account adequately either for what is taking place at the national level, or to consider the full range of drivers of interest and preference formation such as history, geopolitics, etc. This thesis argues, therefore, that the application of constructivism within supranationalist theoretical examinations of the CFSP cannot provide a satisfactory framework to explain how and why states interact with the CFSP in the manner that they do.

To demonstrate this, the thesis examines how Britain and Germany, representative of two alternative standpoints on the EU and integration, have engaged with the CFSP. Analysing the national traditions, structures and processes that provide the basis for their foreign policy-making, it argues that while constructivism generates important insights into the processes by which policy is made, particularly through the concept of socialization, insufficient attention is paid within supranationalist theoretical analyses to the role of domestic foreign policy regimes as generators of their national interests and preferences. Instead, it contends that we need to employ rationalist interpretations of interest formation and how states organise to pursue these interests if we are to generate an accurate picture of how and why they interact with the CFSP in the way that they do.
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Introduction

“Is there no chance for the European Community? Is it condemned to be, at best, a success in the economic realm but a fiasco in “high politics”…?”
Stanley Hoffmann, The Fate of the Nation-State (1966: 901)

In his seminal 1966 article in the journal Daedalus, Stanley Hoffmann, the original progenitor of what is now termed intergovernmentalist theory, examined at length the development of cooperation among the then six nation states that made up the European Economic Community. In the preceding years, there had been significant progress in the development of economic integration between the six, underpinned and supported by both the European Commission and the European Court of Justice. However, and as Hoffmann discusses at considerable length, the emergence of alternative centres of influence at the supranational level, and the very success of economic integration, together brought into sharp relief a dilemma in the ‘European Project’ that has remained to this day: the extent, first, to which the national sovereignty of the member states can be usefully ceded to the European level; and second, the degree to which these same states can retain the capacity to act autonomously within the structures they have created. As Hoffmann puts it, it is not simply the legal capacity of a sovereign state that must be considered, “but the de facto capacity at its disposal…how much of it can be used, and with what results?” (1966: 911).

Today, the tensions between the ability of supranational actors to act on behalf of all, and the member states to do so on behalf of themselves remain apparent to varying degrees across all policy areas and in all the EU’s policy- and decision-making arenas. However, arguably they are most apparent in the ‘high politics’ realms of foreign and security policy, among the most sensitive areas for any nation state. It is how the member states approach cooperation in the arena of foreign
and security policy – specifically the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – which is the focus of this thesis. In particular, a pair of questions provides the starting point for its inquiry: how do member states interact with the CFSP, and why do they employ the strategies that they do?

**Explaining the CFSP**

The CFSP is a highly significant component in the foreign policy making of all EU member states. It is also unique in terms of the degree, intensity and longevity of the cooperation between them that it represents. Given this, it is not surprising that it has been the subject of extensive academic examination since cooperation first began through European Political Cooperation in the 1970s, and then since the establishment of the CFSP itself in the 1991 *Treaty on European Union*.¹ In recent years,

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one influential body of literature that has emerged in this regard is that inspired by or drawing from constructivism, and a number of scholars have sought to apply its insights to the development of approaches that offer a supranational theoretical explanation of how the CFSP has evolved and operates (e.g. Glarbo, 1999; Manners, 2002; 2006; Sjursen, 2005; 2006; Smith, 2004). In particular, these studies have examined the impact of the CFSP on member states both in terms of the systems and processes by which they make policy, and in the extent to which they identify and relate national interests to a broader sense of shared or common European interests. The underlying assumption in much of this scholarship is that participation in the CFSP implies change. Crucially, such change is not only organisational and functional, in terms of policy-making structures and processes, but occurs more fundamentally in how the member states – and specifically the politicians and the officials who populate their administrations – determine and articulate the interests they pursue through these structures and processes. In other words, the supranationalist theoretical interpretation of the development of the CFSP is that it has resulted in a decrease in the power and influence member states are ultimately able to exercise over foreign policy-making.

Such constructivist-based analyses have therefore sought to move beyond merely instrumental or utilitarian understandings of how and why states engage with the CFSP. Indeed, a major element of this literature has been built on a critique of what might be considered the more ‘traditional’ rationalist theoretical frameworks applied to integration, notably neofunctionalism (e.g. Haas, 1958) and (liberal) intergovernmentalism (e.g. Hoffmann, 1966; Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). The thesis is that constructivism offers important additional insights into how we theorise integration, given the importance it bestows on

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understanding how norms and ideas impact on the creation of member state identities and behaviours, and as a consequence of the “deeper and broader ontology” constructivism embodies (Christiansen et al., 1999: 532-3). This, in turn, enables a richer account to be offered of how and why integration takes place, and its impact on the range of actors involved, by identifying a further dimension of agency to existing accounts.

Certainly, constructivism provides us with an important and useful ontological lens through which we can conceptualise, think about and explain integration and change in the context of CFSP. Indeed, its influence can be seen across a range of CFSP-related sub-literatures. For example, scholarship examining the nature of the EU as an international actor includes an influential component addressing the concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ (e.g. Manners, 2002, 2006; Sjursen, 2005, 2006). It also makes a significant contribution to the Europeanization literature which is concerned with the EU’s impact on member states and the degree to which Europe ‘matters’ as a factor in domestic change. Here, research into the CFSP highlights in particular the impact of socialization and learning on the behaviour and interactions of officials (e.g. Glarbo, 1999; Major, 2005; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006, 2008; Wong, 2007; Wong and Hill, 2011), two key concepts emphasised in much of the broader constructivist literature. Furthermore, this is often linked to discussions inspired by the new institutionalist literature on the development of logics of appropriateness in how member states act towards one another (e.g. March and Olsen, 1989; Wagnsson, 2010). The influence of constructivism on the analytical frameworks used to understand the impact of integration on member states has thus been extensive. Moreover there is an obvious appeal to its demand that we question and test continually the predominant theoretical approaches to integration to escape what Risse (2004: 159) considers their “narrow focus and sterility”. More generally, a consideration of the fundamental
question of ‘what makes the world hang together’ (Ruggie, 1998; Checkel, 2004) should lie at the heart of all aspects of social inquiry.

This notwithstanding, however, there remain significant problems with how constructivism has been employed in supranationalist theoretical analyses of the CFSP that frame it in terms of an aggregate loss of member state power in foreign and security policy. Of particular importance to this thesis is what such analyses claim in terms of how we understand the nature and pursuit of national interests within this arena, and the extent to which these have actually changed as a consequence of extended and extensive cooperation. A prime example of this literature is Michael E Smith’s important 2004 study of the CFSP, *Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: the Institutionalization of Cooperation*. One of Smith’s central claims is that the CFSP has “fundamentally changed the way...Member States define and pursue their interests” (2004: 8). To support this, he offers a detailed account of the development of CFSP, and particularly the treaties, declarations and legal agreements that form the basis of the *acquis politique*, arguing that this formalisation and institutionalisation of the conduct and content of EU external relations has in turn created a system which increasingly determines not only *how* member states pursue their foreign policy, but *what* they perceive to be the underlying interests that it is designed to achieve, protect etc.² However, the fact remains that while common approaches have been agreed for a range of situations – and in some cases have been institutionalised – Smith seems to overlook the crucial fact that the national persists. It is nation states that ultimately make decisions, and these in turn are highly complex institutional forms, tenacious in terms of their durability and continued significance within the international system. As this thesis argues, far from dissipating or homogenising, national interests are as present and strong as ever within the CFSP, suggesting that member state power is far more significant than supranationalist theoretical interpretations allow.

² A detailed discussion and analysis of Smith is offered in Chapter 1.
This fact makes Smith’s contention highly problematic, something that becomes clear when we examine Germany and the UK, the subjects of this study. Delineating the CFSP’s place in their strategic calculations is not straightforward. While both acknowledge its importance to their national foreign policy-making, the degree of significance they attach to it varies. For example, for the UK, which maintains an ambition towards a global level of international engagement, it represents just one of several venues through which to pursue foreign policy objectives (alongside the UN Security Council, NATO, etc). Consequently, British engagement with and within CFSP is highly instrumental and pragmatic, representing a range of strategic calculations dependent in turn on a number of factors including: the nature of the issue/problem under discussion; the relative importance/salience assigned to it; whether there is an existing policy in place; the time and resources they are willing and able to invest in pursuing a particular outcome; and the extent to which the CFSP is considered the most appropriate venue through which to pursue their particular aims (e.g. Bulmer and Burch, 1998; Chafer and Cumming, 2010; Clarke, 2000; Dryburgh, 2010a; Howorth, 2005; Irondelle, 2008; Matlary, 2009). For Germany, although many of the factors above are of similar importance, the CFSP creates an additional set of concerns and calculations. These come as a consequence of what it implies in terms of Germany’s place within ‘Europe’ and the EU. It is seen as fundamental to how it conducts its foreign policy, representing the arena through which it frames and shapes its engagement with partner states but also the wider world (e.g. Bulmer, Jeffrey and Paterson, 2000; Bulmer and Paterson, 2010; Harnisch 2001; Hyde-Price, 2001; Miskimmon, 2008; Wittlinger, 2010). Given this, both states engage with the CFSP with particular and nationally-derived perspectives. Moreover, they do so with their own specific geopolitical concerns which continue to be a significant driver of their national interests. Consequently, EU member states such as Germany and Britain retain (sometimes very) differing views as to the utility, purpose and meaning of the CFSP.
At the heart of this thesis, therefore, is an attempt to demonstrate that although constructivism may indeed offer important insights, the way it has been employed so far, especially in analyses of the CFSP, has been to assume the truth of a particular set of supranationalist theoretical assumptions rather than to test them. The constructivist approach has been used to privilege the role of one set of institutional actors – i.e. the central processes and actors that can be loosely characterised as the ‘Brussels foreign policy system’ – over another – i.e. the member states – in terms of understanding the extent and nature of change and transformation, and therefore the extent and nature of member state power within the CFSP, rather than to problematise the effects of the latter on the outlook, attitudes and values of national officials. The research question it sets out to answer, therefore, is whether constructivism, as employed, for example by Smith (2004), with a supranationalist casting, offers a satisfactory framework through which to explain how and why Germany and Britain interact with the CFSP in the manner that they do.

The argument that will be made is that constructivism does provide important insights into the processes by which policy is made and how officials conduct themselves, particularly through concepts such as socialization. However, where it has been employed to support an essentially supranationalist account of CFSP that emphasises the role of the latter at the expense of the former, it fails to account adequately either for how these particular states engage with and approach the CFSP; or for the persistence of national interests. Instead, the thesis argues that more rationalist interpretations remain important to our understanding of how these states interact with the CFSP. It is important to make clear from the start, though, that this thesis is not arguing that constructivism cannot help us understand what is taking place in CFSP. Rather, as will be shown, it can be used to support the development of such rationalist-based analyses. Thus, the insights constructivism can offer are far better employed when examining how member states determine and pursue
their interests; why they favour particular forms of institutional engagement (e.g. intergovernmentalism); the traditions and conventions within foreign policy-making that underpin these, etc. What is offered, therefore, is not a critique of constructivism, but of the manner in which it has been applied within literature that presumes a supranationalist theoretical interpretation of the CFSP and its effects.

To achieve this, the thesis draws on arguments made in a range of other literatures. These include intergovernmentalist critiques of constructivism (e.g. Moravcsik, 1998, 1999 etc); the literature on policy coordination (e.g. Harmsen, 1999; Kassim et al., 2000; 2001), and studies of different institutional structures within Brussels (e.g. Lewis, 2000; 2005; 2006). From this, it seeks to show why national interests persist and why the notion of what is ‘common’ in the CFSP cannot be defined in purely ideational, constructivist terms. Ultimately, cooperation in foreign and security policy-making happens because the member states choose to do so. This thesis will show, therefore, that an examination of the basis for how Britain and Germany make these choices – in particular, looking at national foreign policy-making structures, processes, traditions, etc – challenges those who employ constructivist-based analyses to support claims about the transformative impact of cooperation in the CFSP.
Original Contribution

The thesis seeks to make an original contribution in a number of ways. First, in the critique it offers of how constructivism has been applied to studies of the CFSP, it contributes to debates on the broader application of constructivism in IR and European integration, and particularly how we understand the place and role of nation states within that. In particular it seeks to highlight the paucity of discussion about domestic foreign policy regimes as important generators of norms and values in their own right, and how these then impact at the EU-level.

By providing a detailed examination of the foreign policy-making structures and processes of Britain and Germany, it seeks to add to the existing policy coordination literature, and to broader understandings of the foreign policy-making processes in each state. It also contributes to the literature on German foreign policy and policy-making by positing a new conceptualisation of Germany as ‘leader’, a role that it has not previously been comfortable with but which it is increasingly playing.

Furthermore, it contributes to the two literatures related to Iran and the EEAS. In the case of the former, it provides a detailed examination of Britain and Germany’s specific national policies, their origins and how they have developed since 2002. For the latter, it contributes to the emerging literature on the EEAS since its establishment by providing country studies to support scholarship focusing on the institutional development of the EEAS itself.
**Thesis Structure**

The first chapter examines the literature on constructivism, focusing particularly on that related to constructivist-based studies of European integration and the CFSP. It includes an analysis of Michael E Smith’s study, considered here as an excellent example of how constructivism has been employed to support a supranationalist understanding of CFSP and its impact on member states. From this, the second chapter develops a critique of some of the key assumptions made in this literature, drawing particularly on the literature on policy coordination and Europeanization. Chapter 3 presents the research design and method, outlining the central research question and four main sub-questions. Chapter 4 offers a historical and organisational examination of the evolution of the CFSP, focusing particularly on how and where member states have contributed to its development. This provides the basis for the two country study chapters. The first of these focuses on the UK, examining the historical context and bases of its foreign policy, and the place of the CFSP within that. It then examines the domestic foreign policy-making regime in London, and considers some of the key policy areas it has prioritised within the CFSP. Chapter 6 offers a similarly-structured analysis of Germany and its foreign policy-making structures, processes and priorities. Chapter 7 then provides a detailed comparative analysis of how both states have engaged with the CFSP in the context of two particular policy issues – the Iranian nuclear crisis and the establishment of the *European External Action Service*. The final chapter offers conclusions based on these, including a discussion of key empirical findings, some of the theoretical contributions the thesis seeks to make, and possible avenues for future research.
1.1 Introduction:

This chapter analyses the constructivist ‘turn’ in the literature on international relations, reviewing in particular its application to studies of European integration and member state cooperation in foreign and security policy in the context of CFSP. Of primary interest are constructivist claims about the social construction of ideas and interests, and how these have been applied to supranationalist theoretical analyses of the transformative power on member states of cooperation in international institutions such as the EU, and policy arenas such as the CFSP. Developing these themes, the chapter analyses in detail Michael E. Smith’s important contribution to our understanding of the CFSP and its impact on member states – *Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation* (2004). Providing a good example of how constructivism can be applied to a supranationalist theoretical analysis of CFSP, Smith’s work examines the impact of long-term cooperation on the national interests and preferences of states, positing a transformation not only in how member states make policy, but in the underlying aims and outcomes of those policies – i.e. the what of policy-making. While accepting that Smith’s research provides important insights into the effect of long-term, institutionalised cooperation, the chapter identifies an important weakness in his underlying assumptions, particularly regarding notions of transformation and the consequent downplaying of member state power. Crucially, Smith’s and other similarly derived analyses pay scant attention to the national – to the systems of foreign policy-making, diplomatic traditions, geopolitical perspectives etc, upon which national foreign policies are based. If we are to understand how states such as Britain and Germany interact and engage with the CFSP, this is an important omission.
1.2 The constructivist ‘turn’ in international relations

Constructivism emerged within the context of international relations theory in the late 1980s/early 1990s through the work of scholars such as John Gerrard Ruggie (e.g. 1986 with Friedrich Kratochwil; 1995; 1997), Alexander Wendt (e.g. 1992, 1994, 1999), Peter Katzenstein (1996) etc. 3 Partly as a response to what Parsons describes as the “perceived failure” of classic theories such as realism to explain the end of the Cold War (2010: 82), constructivism – although not a theoretical approach rather than a theory in much the same way that March and Olsen (1984) qualify the new institutionalism – has now achieved such a degree of prominence and influence within IR theory-building that it has even been described as a “new orthodoxy” in this field (Kurki and Sinclair, 2010: 2). 4 As Valerie Hudson characterises it, the end of Cold War enabled this constructivist turn because suddenly it was “apparent that you could get meaningful change in the system absent any material change” – thus, something ideational “had to be going on” (2007: 12). However, it was not until the 1999 publication of a special edition of the Journal of European Public Policy edited by Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener that it began to be seriously and comprehensively applied to questions of European integration. The significance of this publication as the catalyst for a “constructivist turn” within European studies is highlighted by a number of scholars. Risse, for example, considers it “a turning point” in terms of


the application of constructivist approaches to the study of integration (2004: 159), while Checkel notes that since this time constructivism has "acquired buzzword status" within this field (2004: 229).\(^5\) It is not surprising, therefore, that it has also been applied to studies of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, for example in Michael E Smith’s 2004 analysis, discussed in detail below.

As Kurki and Sinclair note in their discussion of constructivism within the context of international law, internal divisions between different forms or types of constructivist thinking make it hard to consider it a ‘school of thought’ (2010: 3). Indeed, Risse is careful to describe it as an approach in order to distinguish it from what he implies are the more rigid theories that constructivism seeks to engage with and critique, as outlined below (2004: 159); similarly, Christiansen et al. declare that it is not a “substantive theory” (1999: 530). Risse makes a similar argument, maintaining that although treated as “yet another substantive theory”, constructivism (particularly social constructivism) “does not make any substantive claims” (2004: 159).\(^6\) Before embarking on a brief discussion of the core ideas within constructivist thinking, therefore, it is worth noting some of its different and clearly identifiable forms. For example, Checkel delineates three main types: a conventional constructivism, focusing primarily on norms, and predominant in the US; and interpretative and critical/radical variants, which are more popular in Europe and draw particularly from work on linguistics by Wittgenstein, Derrida, etc (2004: 231). In their analysis, Christiansen et al. (1999) also seek to show the variety of approaches it encapsulates. However, rather

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than trying to place it on a spectrum between the two traditional analytical poles of rationalism and reflectivism (which they suggest many constructivists do), they see it instead as either the third point in the triangle, or as the space in a semi-circle demarcated by rationalism and reflectivism, with different constructivist approaches relating to these two points to varying extents.\(^7\) Within this range, though, they do identify two main camps as emerging from the wider literature which echo Checkel’s distinctions. These are the sociological constructivists, who focus on the study of norms; and Wittgensteinian constructivists, who seek “to explore the constructive power of language”, and particularly how it “constitutes meaning within specific contexts” (1999: 535). (As a further refinement of this, Kaiser (1966, cited in Christiansen et al., 1999) makes the argument that scholars and researchers contribute to the “creation” of the very object they are engaged in studying and observing, because they are so “deeply embedded” in the environment in which they conduct their work.)

For the purposes of this research, the insights that constructivism provides and the approach it encapsulates can be reduced or simplified to two inter-linked aims. First, it seeks to address, analyse and understand the role and influence of ideas, norms and identity within the theoretical debates relating to IR and integration, with these concepts representing the essential “interpretive fillers” through which we perceive and understand the world (Parsons, 2010: 80). These concepts are particularly important in terms of understanding social change, a major focus of constructivism (e.g. Kurki and Sinclair, 2010). Second, and following directly from this, constructivism sets out to provide an extensive critique of what many of its exponents see as the essentially bipolar and binary nature of theoretical discussion in both these fields. Within IR theory, this takes the form of the ongoing (neo) realist versus (neo) institutionalist debate, while its equivalent (if not analogue) within

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\(^7\) See the Figures 1 and 2 on p.532 and p.536 respectively of Christiansen et al. (1999).
studies of European integration can be found in the “narrow focus and sterility” of the debate between (liberal) intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism (Risse, 2004: 159).

The importance of the former aim emphasises the latter. Within constructivist thinking, the parameters of these existing debates are such that although dominant and long-standing, their approaches fail on a fundamental as well as theoretical level. It is not merely that they pay little or insufficient attention to the role of ideas, norms and identity; their very ontologies do not allow for their existence as meaningful subjects of analysis beyond the purely instrumental. Consequently they are unable to incorporate them into their analysis – and therefore neither do they consider what they imply in terms of the way national interests are formed, the nature of power relations between states, the purpose and functioning of institutions etc. As a result, they are unable to engage with or account for constructivism’s key insight – that reality is “socially constructed” (Searle, 1995; Christiansen et al., 1999: 530). Nor, therefore, are they able to address what this means in terms of how we change that reality, a key driver of politics at both the domestic and international levels, and something which constructivists place the “onus upon explaining” (Kurki and Sinclair, 2010: 4).

The constructivist critique of the IR theoretical debates begins, therefore, by questioning the essentially materialist, rationalist and functional basis of their analyses. For Wendt (1999: 370), for example, because the “dominant ontology” of these theories is materialist and individualist, this leads them – but particularly neorealism – to produce “problematic conclusions” about international politics. Ruggie starts off from a similar basis. In examining how these theories consider the relations between states, he identifies a strong degree of similarity between the perspectives of both neorealism and neoliberal

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8 Wendt suggests that political realism has become so dominant in how we think about states and the international system that “IR scholars sometimes assume states systemic theorizing is by definition Realist” (1998: 194).
institutionalism. Thus, states’ identities are seen as “assumed, given and fixed” while their actions are guided by and respond to interests that are purely materialist in nature and “stipulated by assumption” (1998: 3-4). Indeed, for Ruggie the two dominant theories are so close in this regard that for the remainder of his analysis he lumps them together under the single label of “neo-utilitarianism” (ibid).\(^9\) Turning to institutions, meanwhile, he argues that these are understood in “strictly instrumental terms” based on the degree to which they support and facilitate the achievement of particular – and “typically material” – interests (ibid). Likewise, although noting that neoliberals and neorealists might disagree as to their “relative weight”, Wendt suggests that both theories reduce institutions – and particularly international institutions – to “material factors”, alongside power and interest, in terms of understanding international outcomes (1998: 92). Consequently, the task for constructivism as Ruggie defines it, is to counter the inherent “blind spots and silences” in these theories (1998: 3).

\(^9\) The key difference between the two hinges “on judgements concerning the utility of force and institutionalised constraints on power” (Ruggie, 1998: 6).
1.2.1 The importance of ideas

For constructivists, the starting point for accomplishing this lies in understanding the importance of what Ruggie among others identifies as “ideational factors” (ibid: 4). These are ideas, cultures and norms which he argues provide the “building blocks of international reality” and possess dimensions or characteristics that are both normative as well as instrumental (ibid: 33). Most importantly, these ideational factors are essential in accounting for precisely those things that neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalism take for granted: “the identity and/or interests” of state actors (ibid: 4). Thus, whereas these theories have at best only a “narrowly circumscribed view” on the place and significance of ideas, constructivists seek to understand “the full array of systemic roles” they play in world politics, looking beyond their mere functional utility in terms of how states “define their identity and interests in the first place” (ibid: 16, 4).

The fundamental importance of ideas – and ideational factors – is reiterated throughout constructivist scholarship on IR. Alexander Wendt, whose work was crucial in opening up the field to constructivist thinking, provides a clear statement of what this implies. He argues that the notions of ‘power’ and ‘interest’ “are constituted by ideas” which provide the basis through which states are able to relate to one another, simultaneously defining and determining who and what they are (1998: 371-2). Consequently, the central purpose of constructivism is “to reclaim power and interest from materialism” by demonstrating that their content and meaning are “constituted by ideas and culture” (ibid). In other words, it is only by understanding this, and therefore the centrality of ideas to how we construct social reality, that is it possible to determine the relationship between interests and power. For constructivism, this is the crucial gap that these existing theories have failed to fill.

In making these arguments, Ruggie, Wendt and other scholars are quick to acknowledge their debt to the pioneering sociological work of
Emile Durkheim and Max Weber (e.g. Parsons, 2010). For example, Ruggie notes not only that both emphasised the essentially ideational nature of the ties that bind us together within society – or “social collectivities” – but also that from their work we have developed the notion of “social facts”. These emerge from what he calls “the realm of intersubjective beliefs”, whereby such facts are based on shared understandings or interpretations (1998: 20). This, in turn, builds on Durkheim’s discussion of “la conscience collective” and “représentations collective” and Weber’s characterisation of people as “cultural beings” able “to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and lend it significance” (ibid: 33, 29). The meanings we develop to “interpret and organize” our identities, relationships, environment etc, then provide the structure for the actions we take (Parsons, 2010: 80). These meanings lead on to a key concern of constructivism – the nature, malleability and interpretative quality of facts.

Constructivist scholarship provides us with a loose but nonetheless useful typology with which to identify and understand facts. In The Construction of Social Reality (1995), John Searle distinguishes between what he calls “brute facts”, i.e. those which require “no human institutions” for their existence (the example he offers is that there is snow and ice at the summit of Mount Everest) and what he terms “institutional facts” (another name for social facts), which do. The example Searle gives for a social or institutional fact is the “human institution” of money, which makes it possible for a piece of paper to be a $5 bill (1995: 2). Or, to borrow from Christiansen et al, money is a fact within a social reality that exists “only by human agreement” and our shared understanding (1999: 530). Perhaps the most pertinent example for this study, however, is provided by Ruggie, who notes that the state

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10 For example, both reference Durkheim’s 1953 work Sociology and Philosophy, (London: Cohen and West), and Weber’s The Methodology of the Social Sciences, (Glencoe IL: Free Press, 1949). Parsons makes a similar point, noting that the basic ideas underpinning constructivism emerged at the same time as sociology, particularly in the work of Durkheim (2010: 81).

11 Ruggie is quoting from Weber’s 1941 essay “Objectivity” (p.81), emphasis in the original.
and its collective institutional practices represent the most important social fact of all (1998: 12). Indeed, Dobbin et al. (2007: 451) argue that “[d]efining the nation-state as the appropriate collective actor had been the first major project of social construction of foreign policy” (2007: 451). This is not to suggest that social facts such as the nature of the state or the concept of national sovereignty cannot be so deeply-rooted or so strongly held that they might appear to be “brute” facts. The point Ruggie and others are making is that from a constructivist perspective, however strongly or even unconsciously held they may be, they are still based on a shared agreement or acceptance that such facts are facts. In other words, they are the product or result of our “collective intentionality” as members of society, and it is this collective intentionality which imbues facts such as “the state”, “the national interest” and “sovereignty” with meaning and validity (ibid: 20-21; Searle, 1995). It also makes them eminently changeable.

From the perspective of IR and European studies – and particularly in this context, the CFSP – collective intentionality and the social facts that emerge from it matter most obviously in terms of the nature, origin and changeability of national interests, and are thus a central focus of constructivist-based enquiry in these fields. Whereas realism and liberal institutionalism regard interests as exogenously given, with their pursuit, promotion and defence conducted by individual states in terms of rational choice and utility maximisation, constructivism challenges this. Constructivists wish to know where these interests came from in the first place – what Ruggie describes as the “foundational question” (1998: 14) – and how states subsequently acquired their particular national identities. Following directly from this, the question that must then be posed is how the specific identities of particular states impact on or shape what they perceive as their interests (ibid: 9, 14). In

12 Ruggie also identifies a third type, the “subjective” fact, whose existence “depends on being experienced” by an individual actor (1998: 13).
considering how states relate to and interact with one another, Wendt makes a similar point, declaring that the ideas held by an individual state “are given content or meaning by the ideas which they share” with others (1998: 372).

A useful illustration of what this line of inquiry entails is provided by Ruggie who asks us to consider the circumstances that followed the end of the Second World War. For realists and liberal institutionalists, the central role of American hegemony in facilitating the emergence of the international system as we now recognise it – including as an element of that system European integration – is obvious. However, for constructivists, as important as American hegemony has been to this process, of equal and perhaps more importance is the fact that it has been an American hegemony (as opposed to Russian or British, etc) (ibid) (emphasis in original). It is the meaning of “American” in this context – the ideas held by the state itself, held by other states when perceiving it, and the way such ideas impact on determinations of interests and identity – that matter to constructivism. By understanding these, we can start to understand the social reality represented by the international system, including questions about how power operates within it. Moreover, and as will be discussed below, these issues become particularly important when considering the nature of the structures and institutions that constitute this system, and how state actors construct and then behave in them.
1.3 Constructivism and the study of European integration

The potential benefits from applying constructivist thinking to studies of European integration would seem obvious, not least in terms of opening up or broadening out this research field beyond the restricted parameters noted above.\(^\text{14}\) However, as noted, a constructivist ‘turn’ in the literature did not take place until 1999. Indeed, Christiansen et al. (1999) argue that the absence until that point of any serious attempt to apply constructivist approaches to the study of the EU, despite the increasingly significant impact constructivism was having on IR theory, was more than a significant gap – it was a ‘paradox’.\(^\text{15}\) By their analysis, integration was resulting in the construction of a new polity – and a new type of polity at that; but more importantly, the process by which it was taking place was *transforming* the states involved. With its emphasis on and interest in social change and transformation, therefore, constructivism could not only offer important insights into that process; it could establish entirely new ways of thinking about it. In seeking to do this, they locate a possible integration-focused constructivist research agenda in a “middle ground”, juxtaposed between rationalist and reflectivist approaches more broadly, and neofunctionalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism more specifically (1999: 535-7).

The ‘Constructivist Turn’ was building on another, earlier shift in how integration was being theorized. This was the emergence of a “new supranationalist literature” which began to supersede neofunctionalism as the main alternative to intergovernmentalism from the mid-1990s onwards (Kassim and Menon, 2010: 2, 5). This literature was based on a new assessment of the power of EU institutions – most notably the European Commission which had become resurgent under the Presidency of Jacques Delors and following the launch of the Single Market during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Supranationalist theorists such as Pollack

\(^\text{14}\) A point made by Andrew Moravcsik in his contribution to the 1999 collection.

\(^\text{15}\) “[I]t is odd that a process so explicitly concerned with the construction of a novel polity has largely escaped the attention of constructivist thinking” (Christiansen *et al.*, 1999: 528).
Pierson (1996) and Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1997, 1998) contended that the power of the EU’s supranational institutions was now such that “even collectively…[member states were] constrained in their ability to control” them (Kassim and Menon, 2010: 5-6). State power was increasingly limited in the face of the “decisive influence” these institutions were able to exercise at all levels and in all contexts of EU policy-making (ibid), and the “considerable discretion” they enjoyed regardless of member state preferences (Pollack, 1996: 433). Consequently, over time the power of member states within the EU has become “increasingly constrained” and “their influence is increasingly circumscribed” (Pierson, 1996: 158). In essence, while classical neofunctionalism had posited a narrow view of policy ‘spillover’ that saw the economic logic of integration in one policy area driving its extension to another, the new ‘supranationalists’ saw this process as much bigger and all-consuming.

From this new supranationalist perspective, integration involved the emergence and development of institutional actors with “their own interests” and – as important – sufficient resources, particularly in terms of information, to pursue these – and to do so, when necessary, independently of the member states (Kassim and Menon, 2010: 5). For example, Pollack (1996: 432) argued that the EU’s institutional actors “cause member states to lose control…through lock-ins” – i.e. both the institutions themselves and the policies they produce “become entrenched, and…difficult or even impossible to alter” (ibid). Similarly, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997: 306) maintain that national governments “do not drive…or fully control [integration]”; indeed, they see the creation of a supranational institution as leading to a “new dynamic” that results in “changes in social expectations and behaviour” (p.300) (my italics). The potential links to constructivism are clear, and it is notable that when Christiansen et al. set out to apply constructivism to how integration was being theorized, they saw this in terms of “go[ing] beyond” what the insights supranationalist theorizing could offer (1999: 22).
In other words, they argued that constructivist tools could ensure that “a crucial part of the process” related to ideas, identity and “social context” that the supranationalists had thus far neglected would also be captured (ibid). In short, the application of constructivism could enrich the supranationalist analysis, not least by building on claims made by Haas, among others, about the effects of socialization.

Taking their cue from constructivist approaches to IR, Christiansen et al.’s starting point is to highlight the importance for integration (both as a process and in how we understand it) of ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘social context’. They contend that these are vital elements of the integration process which cannot be ignored, particularly given the “transformative impact” it has had and continues to have both on Europe’s system of states and on its constituent parts (ibid: 528-9). Thus, they critique the rationalist analyses of scholars such as Hix or Moravcsik for seeking to “normalize the politics of the EU” and, although such analyses may reduce and simplify the range of phenomena to be investigated, for ultimately being too narrow as they side-line the role of “identity, community and collective intentionality” within integration (ibid: 533) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, having argued that integration as a process has itself undergone significant change, they extrapolate from this that the identity, interests and behaviour of agents “have equally changed”, but that such change remains “largely invisible” to approaches – i.e. neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism – that “neglect processes of identity formation” or which argue that interests are “given exogenously” (ibid: 529). Their thesis, therefore, is that it is here that constructivist approaches are able to offer important additional insights into how we theorise integration, given the significance they place on understanding how norms and ideas impact on the “construction of identities and behaviours”, and as a consequence of the “deeper and broader ontology” constructivism embodies (ibid: 532-3).
Risse (e.g. 2004) offers a similar argument in his analysis of constructivism and its contribution to the study of integration. Seeking to refine the central constructivist concept that reality is socially constructed, he describes its ontology as being one in which human agents do not exist separately from either their social environment or “its collectively shared systems of meanings” (2004: 160). Thus, agents and structures are mutually constituted – i.e. our environment “defines (‘constitutes’)” both who we are and our identities as social beings, but at the same time is itself created, reproduced and changed by our daily practices (ibid: 161). ¹⁶ Constructivism therefore equips us to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the effects of institutions – in this case specifically the EU – on both the identities and interests of actors, something that the “prevailing” theoretical approaches of liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism fail to do, given the agency-centred nature of their ontological starting point (ibid.). Constructivism refutes their analysis whereby actors’ preferences are “a given”, while governments in essence behave as “calculating machines”, clear about what they want and “never uncertain about the future” (ibid: 161-2). Instead, Risse argues, whereas such rationalist approaches¹⁷ view social institutions such as the EU as serving first and foremost to constrain actors who possess “given identities and preferences” and seek to pursue the latter through strategic behaviour (the ‘logic of consequentialism’), constructivism emphasises the alternative ‘logic of appropriateness’ (ibid: 163). This maintains that actors endeavour to “do the right thing” rather than simply seeking to “optimize” their particular preferences (ibid) (see also March and Olsen, 1989). In this context, this means that rather than being an “external” entity, the EU must instead be recognised as a rich and layered social environment which governments (and other actors) are “deeply embedded in and affected by” (ibid). This, in turn, would imbue it with transformative power.

¹⁶ He thus locates social constructivism in a sometimes uneasy “ontological middleground between individualism and structuralism” (2004: 161).
¹⁷ He refers here specifically to rationalist institutionalism, which IR theory labels ‘neo-liberal’ institutionalism – e.g. Keohane, 1989 (2004: 162-3).
1.3.1 Rules, norms and socialization

From this, we can identify the influence of constructivism on how integration is analysed and understood in a number of ways. First, and of particular interest, is the significance of rules and norms, given how central these are to both the identity and behaviour of actors. Smith (2004: 250) sees norms as “part of the liberal tradition” of IR theory, focusing on factors such as “ideas, beliefs, learning, lessons of history”, etc. Stone Sweet et al. (2001: 4-6) highlight the importance of rules – both formal and informal – in defining who an actor is in a particular set of circumstances, how they can then express or pursue particular interests, and what is considered appropriate behaviour for doing so. To illustrate this, Risse offers the example of the “norm of sovereignty”. This not only regulates how states interact; it also “defines what a state is in the first place” (2004: 163) (emphasis in original). More broadly, collective norms and understandings “define” the rules of the game: thus, membership of the EU involves the “voluntary acceptance” that it constitutes a certain, legitimate political order, and a recognition that its rules and obligations are binding – for example the *acquis communautaire*, etc (ibid: 163-4).

A prime example of this in recent years has been enlargement. Its all-encompassing nature, the degree of institutional penetration it involves and the centrality of conditionality all highlight the leverage the EU can exercise over prospective member states. For Meunier and Nicolaïdis (2006: 913), the totality of the “accession sweep”, in which every aspect of a state’s activity is targeted, is aimed at changing the “logic of behaviour” in the state in question, not simply altering specific actions. Moreover, as Lavenex (2004) argues, such influence extends even to those states with little or no short-term prospect of membership as they are drawn into a sphere of “external governance” through the extension of certain areas of the *acquis*.18 Renner and Trauner (2009: 449)

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18 She offers several examples including the extension of aspects of the then JHA Pillar through co-operation agreements between Europol and Morocco and Russia;
make a similar argument in their examination of the Western Balkans. Suggesting that the EU has adopted a two-track approach that reflects recognition that many member states are experiencing ‘fatigue de l’élargissement’, they argue nonetheless that the prospect of membership remains the most potent policy tool available to achieve long-term reform in this region. In the absence of a clear membership timetable, therefore, the EU has instead offered short-term incentives, such as financial support for sectoral integration or visa liberalisation, as a means of achieving adoption of EU rules in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs, and the creation of an Energy Community for South-east Europe (ibid: 462). These examples are interesting, moreover, as they highlight what can be seen as normative judgements as to what is considered the ‘right’ sort of change.

Christiansen et al. argue along similar lines to Risse, meanwhile. While accepting the importance placed by so much scholarship (particularly legal) on the role of laws in driving integration, they contend that it needs to go much further to recognise the “paramount significance” of rules and norms, of which laws, treaties and legislation are merely one formal or codified component (1999: 539). Thus, they are calling for the analytical net to be cast much wider, appealing to scholars to “come to grips” with the notion of the European community as an “increasingly rule-bound arena for social interaction” (ibid):

“[W]e also need to consider the often unwritten administrative procedures of the EU policy process, as well as a multitude of common understandings, inter-institutional agreements and informal modes of behaviour which are reproduced every day in the political and administrative practice of the EU.” (ibid)

Certainly, the existence and impact of such a rule-bound policy-making environment has been an important concern in much of the scholarship on the operation of the different EU institutions and their component environmental policy; and energy policy, particularly in terms of EU energy relations with its Eastern and Southern neighbours.
parts in recent years (e.g. Bátor, 2005; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006; Heisenberg, 2005; Lewis, 2000, Naurin and Wallace, 2010). A good illustration of this is the identification in a range of studies of a ‘consensus bias’ in decision-making, particularly within the different formations of the Council of Ministers. For example, Heisenberg (2005) argues that consensus has become the “decision-making norm” for much EU business, a point supported by Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace who note that while only 30% of decisions are technically subject to unanimity, compromise and consensus continue to “characterise negotiations” in the Council (2006: 306). Michael Smith highlights it within the context of EPC and subsequently CFSP (discussed in more detail in the next section) (2004: 122). Similarly, Lewis (2000) emphasises the importance of consensus in his examination of the work of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), the chief preparatory body for Council. Suggesting that, in theoretical terms, this should be the “intergovernmental bargaining forum par excellence”, he argues that the way it conducts business means that its participants behave in more complex and communitarian ways than intergovernmentalist perspectives would allow (2000: 262, 266). Consequently, this has created an environment for decision-making that is both iterative and richly normative, and where the search for consensus


20 This was also highlighted during the interviews conducted for this study, discussed in later chapters.
has become instinctive.\footnote{This can be seen in the negotiations over the Working Time Directive which, despite the existence of a qualified majority in the Council, continued for a further two years in an effort to find a compromise acceptable to Britain (Lewis, 2000: 271).} Given the significant role played by Permanent Representations in contributing to the formation of policy positions in national capitals (discussed in later chapters), not least in terms of how national interests are represented in Brussels, constructivist approaches would therefore seem to offer an alternative framework to explain what Bulmer and Lequesne (2002: 4) describe as the “explicitly interactive” relationship between the EU and its members. By this account, Permanent Representations do not merely articulate national interests: they also play an important role in establishing and shaping them in the first place, doing so, moreover, on the basis of their own extensive and intensive interactions with the other national delegations and the officials operating in the various Community institutions.

This discussion leads us to another significant concept considered in constructivist treatments both of IR more broadly and European integration more specifically: the role and impact of socialization (e.g. Christiansen et al., 1999: 530; Risse, 2004: 164). For Zürn and Checkel (2005: 1045) socialization is defined as actors “internaliz[ing] norms and standards of behavior by acting in social structures”, and there is a broad literature examining this in the European context, focusing on the process and effects of repeated and intense interaction between diplomats and national officials operating in Brussels (e.g. Batora, 2005; Egeberg, 1999; Lewis, 1998, 2000, 2005; Quaglia et al., 2008). Meanwhile, a range of scholarship has emphasised the importance of socialization within the CFSP specifically (e.g. Juncos and Pomorska, 2006, 2008), with one of the most notable contributions being Kenneth Glarbo’s examination of the impact of diplomatic interaction within CFSP and its precursor, EPC. Perhaps the most significant conclusion to come from this is what he characterises as a “co-ordination reflex” (1999: 643; see also Michael Smith, 2004: 94), whereby, at the most basic level, member states avoid unilateral démarches, instead informing and consulting with partners.
prior to any foreign policy declarations. Locating his argument within a constructivist logic, Glarbo contends that the habitualisation of the coordination reflex first within EPC and then subsequently CFSP highlights a “permanent inclination” among diplomats which is not captured by rationalist theories that focus on a utilitarian assumption of costs and benefits: i.e. rather than being a deliberate choice, co-ordination is simply the “naturally ‘done thing’” (ibid: 644). In the process, it has become “one of the most important rules and terms” used in discussions of European foreign policy (Smith, 2004: 94).

Such a reflex, which has now become a “familiar part” of national policy-making according to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 160), can be clearly identified in the interactions between officials at the different levels in the Council’s structures. For example, in examining the identity and role perceptions of national officials involved in working groups, Egeberg (1999: 470-1) argues that important secondary loyalties complementary to those evoked at national level are created here, underpinned by a sense of collective and mutual responsibility for reaching workable outcomes, a theme developed by Trondhal and Veggeland who argue that participants in EU-level committees have several institutional affiliations and draw their cues for action from different sources (2003). Lewis (1998) reaches similar conclusions in his analysis of Coreper, while Juncos and Pomorska (2008: 500) have highlighted the importance of socialization in preventing deadlock in CFSP committees following enlargement, arguing that they provide crucial “arenas of learning” for both the formal and informal practices that facilitate decision-making. The effect, argue Quaglia et al. (2008: 150), has been to change the EU committees and working groups into “hybrid” bodies representing both formal, “intergovernmental” decision-making arenas and informal fora for deliberation and socialization. For Batora, meanwhile, the impact of this has been to emphasise the “Janus-faced” character of member state diplomats, whereby they are at the same time guardians and promoters of the national interest, but also
members of a “transnational group of professionals” – an epistemic
community that shares a corporate culture, language, code of behaviour etc (2005: 45).

The consequence of these day-to-day practices of political co-
operation, which have developed since the creation of EPC, has been the
increasing institutionalization and ‘Brusselisation’ of foreign policy co-
operation (Allen, 1998). A process of natural social integration has taken
place – what Glarbo (1999: 650) terms the “institutionalised imperative
of concertation”. Thus, the co-ordination reflex, and the practices and
norms of behaviour among the member states and their officials that it
implies, demonstrate the weakness in assuming that decision-making
results only in outcomes that reflect the relative power of member states,
the formal decision rule and a utilitarian calculation of national interests
(Lewis, 2000: 265). Instead, the possibility of the veto needs to be balanced against the shared desire to find common positions that all will
endorse and implement (Galloway, 1999: 227). Moreover, the search for
such agreements is taking place continuously, iteratively, and within
increasingly institutionalized and socialized arenas (e.g. PSC, Coreper,
etc), resulting in a process through which national interests are
continually defined, mediated and redefined, and not simply exported
from national capitals. However, the fact remains that national capitals
remain the arbiters of what is articulated in Brussels, particularly in the
context of the CFSP, the implications of which are considered in more
detail below.
1.3.2 Europeanization and ‘Normative Power Europe’

Leading directly from the conceptual discussions of norms, socialization, etc, we can observe the influence of constructivism in some of the different subsets of literature dealing with integration. Two examples are offered here. The first is the literature on Europeanization which is concerned with the impact of the EU on politics, policy and policy-making within member states, and with understanding the nature and extent of any change that occurs within national administrations as a consequence of integration: in other words, the degree to which “Europe matters” as a factor in domestic change (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2002: 16). From the detailed definition provided by Radaelli, we can identify clearly some of the key constructivist concepts emphasised by Christiansen et al., Risse and others. Thus, Europeanization embodies

“[p]rocesses of a) construction, b) diffusion, and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.” (2003:30)

There is considerable debate within the literature over what Europeanization means in practice, however, and whether it represents a useful theory of, or approach to, integration, or is better considered a phenomenon that “a range of approaches have sought to explain” (Bulmer, 2007: 47; see also Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004; Major, 2005; Bache and Jordan, 2008; Moumoutzis, 2011). While a detailed discussion of this debate is neither within the scope of nor necessarily

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22 Radaelli’s definition is considerably broader and more detailed than the earlier and oft-quoted one provided by Ladrech (1994: 69) which characterises Europeanization as an “incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of [national] politics” whereby the dynamics of EU policy and policy-making become part of the “organizational logic” of national administrations.

23 A flavour of the debate can be seen in argument put forward by both Claudia Major (2005: 175) and Ian Bache and Andrew Jordan (2008: 17) among others that Europeanization is a “contested” concept. Reuben Wong (2005: 135) considers it “ill-defined” while for Radaelli and Pasquier (2005: 35) it is “a set of contested discourses and narratives about the impact of European integration on domestic political change”.
pertinent to this research, it is necessary to identify some of its parameters in terms of its applicability to the CFSP.

To date, much of the literature on Europeanization has focused predominantly on policy areas that have been dealt with under the auspices of the Community Pillar, with much less consideration being given to Europeanization within ostensibly intergovernmental arenas such as CFSP or Justice and Home Affairs (formerly the Third Pillar established by the Maastricht Treaty). This balance has been redressed somewhat in recent years, with important studies by Tonra (2001), Wong (2005; 2007), Major (2005), Gross (2009) and most recently Wong and Hill (2012). To some extent, this lag reflects the difficulty of applying to the CFSP what was for some considerable time the dominant discourse within the literature. This has explained Europeanization as a ‘top-down’ (or downloading) process whereby the analytical priority has been to capture the level of penetration of the European level into the domestic, and based on the premise that the EU is the principal cause of domestic change (Major, 2005: 176).

However, the CFSP poses a range of challenges to this approach. For example, while integration in the mainly economic and social policy areas has a clear driver or “entrepreneur” in the form of the European Commission, and while directives and regulatory frameworks established within the supranational environment can be enforced – and hence their impact more clearly measured – there is no equivalent formal and institutional catalyst for co-operation apparent within the CFSP. Instead, the member states remain the primary drivers of co-operation, aided,

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particularly prior to *Lisbon*, by their 6-monthly rotating Presidencies, and conceivably representing 27 potential alternative policy entrepreneurs (with a possible 28th in the person of the High Representative) (e.g. Pomorska and Wright, forthcoming).\(^\text{25}\) At the same time, as Major (2005: 183) and Wong (2007: 333) amongst others have emphasised, the CFSP is governed by treaties rather than legislation. It is therefore much more difficult to pinpoint EU influences that may be the cause of changes in national policy or policy-making structures. Moreover, given that the EU does not prescribe a particular CFSP model to which member states must adapt, notions of fit/misfit, key to the ‘top-down’ framework, are harder to apply.\(^\text{26}\)

Two alternative frameworks for understanding Europeanization in the context of CFSP have been proposed instead. The first is a ‘bottom-up’ or uploading pattern (Börzel, 2002), whereby member states seek to upload particular preferences or objectives from the national to the European level (e.g. Wong and Hill, 2011; Pomorska, 2011; Pomorska and Wright, forthcoming). The second is a ‘horizontal’ (or crossloading) pattern as set out, for example, by Radaelli (2003: 41), and it is arguably here that we can identify the influence of constructivism most clearly. Thus, crossloading does not involve the pressure to conform to set models but occurs due to “patterns of socialization” which Wong (2007: 333), amongst others, argues is a more apt basis for understanding change.\(^\text{27}\)

\(^\text{25}\) This is not to dismiss the role of the High Representative for the CFSP. However, the High Representative was given neither the power to initiate policies nor the resources in terms of staff etc that the Commission has enjoyed in the 1st Pillar (see Michael Smith, 2004: 228-230). Thus, prior to *Lisbon*, the significance of the High Representative as an actor and “policy entrepreneur” owed as much to the personal qualities of Javier Solana, the holder of the office, as to the formal powers bestowed upon him.

\(^\text{26}\) This concept explains change at the national level as being dependent on the degree of pressure on Member States to adapt to European rules or policies, presented in terms of the “goodness-of-fit” or “misfit” between the two: the greater the degree of misfit, the greater the pressure to adapt (see, for example, Risse et al., 2001: 7).

\(^\text{27}\) See also Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004.
The significance of socialization has been noted already, particularly in the context of the ‘consensus bias’ in decision-making. For Major (2005: 180), a crucial component of such socialization is learning, which she suggests is the predominant “carrier of change” in the context of the CFSP. Two forms of learning are highlighted within the Europeanization literature – “single-loop”, which occurs when actors adjust only the means or strategies they employ to achieve their goals or preferences; and “double-loop” or “complex” learning, when situations lead actors to re-evaluate and change their goals or preferences, with the latter occurring more rarely and usually only following a crisis or critical policy failure (Risse et al., 2001:12). For example, in their research into the effects of enlargement on the CFSP committee network, Juncos and Pomorska note that socialization and key norms such as consensus in decision-making not only remain prevalent, but have also been essential in preventing deadlock in these expanded bodies. In particular, the working groups – and CFSP committees more generally – have provided important “arenas for learning” for the representatives of new member states (2008: 494, 497). For example, interviews with officials representing states which joined in 2004 learnt that adopting radical national positions in such committees would result in ostracism, which was “a losing strategy” (ibid: 503).

In this context, therefore, Europeanization can perhaps better be understood as a process of exchange of good or best practice between governments, which is “voluntary and non-hierarchical” in nature, and facilitated by the arena CFSP provides (Major, 2005: 186). In this sense, it might be compared to the processes that occur through the ‘Open Method of Co-ordination’. Through this, adaptation is not a reaction to the imposition of a particular structure or approach by Brussels, but rather is a consequence of benchmarking, networking and exchange of best practice that produces guidelines rather than legislation, and in which the EU acts as a facilitator – or “bourse for policy transfer”
The impact is therefore more subtle, involving “ideational convergence” (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007: 38).

The second example of how constructivism has informed the study of the EU can be seen in analyses of its engagement with the wider world, specifically the extent to which we can understand the EU as an international actor in normative terms. There is a range of literature that considers this, with Manners’ concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) particularly relevant (e.g. 2002; 2006; 2008). NPE engages with and seeks to counter the more state-centric analyses provided by realists who critique the EU for its lack of ‘hard power’ capabilities (e.g. Bull, 1982; Gordon, 1997; Kagan, 2004; Waltz, 2000); and those who espouse the ‘Civilian Power Europe’ thesis, first articulated by Duchêne (1973), which argues that the EU is actually most effective internationally when deploying its considerable soft power assets, or for example through the expansion of its governance or regulatory regimes (e.g. Hill, 1983; Maull, 1990; Smith, 2003; Twitchett, 1976; Wright, 2011). There is certainly common ground between the NPE and civilian power theses in terms of their belief in the effectiveness of the EU as a ‘soft power’ actor, as well as the importance both place on the European historical experience as a source for its identity and approach to international relations. However, what sets the NPE analysis apart is its contention that the EU impacts on the international system simply by virtue of its existence – the symbolism of what it is is as important as what it does – and, more importantly, that this “pre-disposes” it to act normatively (Manners, 2002). Underpinning this is the impact of the integration process itself which Manners (2008: 65) contends has actually changed what is considered “normal” in international relations: “[s]imply by existing as different…the European Union changes the normality of ‘international relations’”, and it is this that gives the EU such influence: the ability to define what is “normal” in world politics is where the EU’s true power resides (2002: 253).

Central to this claim, then, is the role of norms and principles in European foreign policy. While realist and civilian power analyses
maintain a focus on capabilities, the normative approach has a different starting point, being more concerned with the principles underlying action. For Manners (2002: 242), five “core norms” form the ideational foundation of the EU and how it behaves: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. While by no means exclusive to Europe or the EU, these are crucial to how it functions, providing the mainstay of its inter-state relations, not least the peaceful resolution of disputes through diplomatic means. At the same time, they are the basis and source of legitimacy for its external actions (ibid: 241), and as such are reflected throughout the EU’s treaties and declarations. For example, the preamble to the **Treaty on European Union** refers to the “attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights”, while the 2001 Laeken Declaration speaks of Europe as a “continent of humane values” whose “one boundary is democracy and human rights” (Consilium, 2001). These are powerful normative statements, representing the aggregate of Europe’s collective historical experience, the hybrid nature of the EU as a polity, and its legal construction. Moreover, they provide the “crucial constitutive factors” in its international identity, determining the nature of its relations with the rest of the world (Manners, 2002: 241). In this regard, Smith (2004: 165, quoting Nuttall, 1990: 144) has suggested that external perceptions of the EC/EU are such that it is often seen as standing apart from the policies its own member states pursue in other fora such as NATO, a consequence of its particular “institutional and normative structure”.

The argument, therefore, is that the significance of norms to our understanding of how the EU engages with the wider world – something it does on behalf of, in conjunction with and with the agreement or acceptance of its member states – is twofold. First, these norms

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28 Ginsberg defines them as “democracy, soft-edged capitalism, a zone of peace among members, and diplomatic mediation between third parties to undercut the causes of major conflict” (1999: 436). Manners later expands his list, identifying nine normative principles: (i) sustainable peace; (ii) social freedom; (iii) consensual democracy; (iv) associative human rights; (v) supranational rule of law; (vi) inclusive equality; (vii) social solidarity; (viii) sustainable development; (ix) good governance (2008: 68-74).
contribute to the notion that the EU performs a “particular role” within the international system, distinguishing it from other actors (Sjursen, 2005: 12). This can be seen, for example, in how it seeks to transfer or “diffuse” its norms. Manners (2002: 245) identifies a number of ways in which this takes place, including the institutionalisation of relationships between the EU and 3rd parties, for example during the enlargement process (procedural diffusion), and in the specifics of trade and aid agreements (transference), both of which involve conditionality. 29 Furthermore, such diffusion occurs across the whole range of international activity it carries out: membership applicants must be practising democracies (Ginsberg, 1998: 17); clauses on human rights have been included in trade agreements with third countries since 1992 (Sjursen, 2005: 23); and even the strategic rationale of ESDP/CSDP is presented in idealistic terms, with missions designed to protect democracy, human rights or minorities (Tojé, 2008a: 210). Finally, EU efforts to achieve a global moratorium on the death penalty provide arguably the most symbolic example (Manners, 2002).

Second, these norms offer insights into the nature of internal relations between member states on the one hand, and between member states and EU institutions on the other. Ginsberg (1999: 439) argues that many areas of EU foreign policy, such as special partnerships or the use of conditionality to promote human rights, are unique and have developed as the result of the “dynamic of co-operation” that exists between the states and the Union’s common institutions. He goes on to suggest that this is because the habits and procedures of political co-operation that have developed, not least the consultation reflex discussed above, have not only become institutionalised – they have evolved into European norms and values which are crucial in conditioning how the

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29 He lists six forms of norm “diffusion”: (i) contagion – the unintentional diffusion of ideas to other actors, e.g. Mercosur; (ii) informational – through strategic communication; (iii) procedural – through the institutionalisation of relationships between the EU and 3rd parties, e.g. enlargement; (iv) transference – e.g. trade and aid agreements; (v) overt – through the physical presence of the EU in 3rd states or international organisations; (vi) cultural – e.g. of democratic norms in China, etc (Manners, 2002: 245).
EU acts collectively (ibid: 444). Kagan (2004), a leading exponent of neo-realist analysis and highly sceptical about Europe’s global power, is critical of how such norms have coalesced around a particular notion of legitimacy, however. Indeed, he dismisses this as an attempt by Europeans to create an alternative source of power in which they enjoy a comparative advantage over the US through their commitment to multilateralism. Smith (2004: 261) suggests, though, that the EU enjoys a “positive image” in the world on account of its status as a civilian power, something which gives it a “rhetorical edge” over the US.30

In arguing that European foreign policy is essentially ‘rights-based’, Helene Sjursen (2005: 13) makes a similar point to Ginsberg, proposing that the member states and common actors should be seen as “communicatively rational” and “understanding-oriented”, and thus able to change perspectives and preferences as well as strategy. Although acknowledging that bargaining remains a key part of policy- and decision-making, she maintains that by regarding EU foreign policy as essentially “problem-solving” – i.e. that co-operation only occurs where there are clearly discernible benefits – there is a tendency to focus only on structural and institutional limitations, and the relative power of the actors involved (ibid: 6). This risks ignoring the realities of the day-to-day management of foreign policy or the possibility of incremental or even transformational change, with member states’ perceptions of the types of problems or issues to be addressed altering over time, not simply their strategies for dealing with them (ibid: 9).

This brief discussion has shown some of the variety of ways in which constructivism has been applied to and has influenced studies of European integration in recent years, particularly in terms of understanding change and transformation, key concerns within constructivist thinking. It has highlighted in particular how it has been used in developing our understanding of key concepts such as norms, 

30 He goes on to suggest that the EU may become more influential if it “celebrates its differences” with the US and NATO (Smith, 2004: 261).
socialization and learning and how these can be applied to decision-making. More broadly, it has looked at the application of constructivist ideas within the literatures on Europeanization and the idea of the EU as a normative power. As suggested at the start, constructivism offers a range of insights that can inform our understanding of the impact of integration on states and vice versa. Having established its key principles and bases, the next question to consider is the more particular one of how constructivist thinking has been applied to and has contributed to our understanding of the CFSP.
Having previously discussed the emergence of a constructivist ‘turn’ within the wider literature on IR, and then some of the subsequent impacts on studies of European integration, particularly its links to supranationalist theorizing, this section concentrates on some of the ways in which scholars have sought to use constructivism to inform analyses of the CFSP. That the manner in which member states behave towards one another in this arena is governed by a particular set of rules and norms (both formal and informal) seems obvious and uncontroversial. This, after all, is an environment dominated by diplomats who have a clear set of norms and practices developed over a considerable period of time (see particularly Bátora, 2005). The *sui generis* nature of the EU, of which the CFSP is a significant institutional component, implies more than this however. Thus, we can identify important constructivist concepts relating particularly to behavioural norms, logics of appropriateness, and socialization that have a particularly “European” flavour – for example, the emergence of a coordination reflex and the consensus bias in decision-making noted above.

However, as has been demonstrated, constructivism posits much more than this. It seeks, first and foremost, to understand how actors – be they people, officials, governments or states – continually construct and reconstruct, interpret and reinterpret their social environment in a process that is mutually constitutive. In this sense, therefore, the CFSP should be understood as a highly dynamic arena in and with which member states continually interact. More importantly, the result or outcome of this interaction is change, not merely in policy terms, but in *how* they view the world, and in how they identify, define and communicate their national interests. Above all, the expectation from a constructivist-based analysis of the CFSP would be for the emergence of shared or common interests and values that permeate the national as well as the Brussels
levels – in essence that this environment not only generates norms, but also the interests and preferences of the member states.

One of the clearest articulations of this argument is provided by Michael Smith in his 2004 book ‘Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy – The Institutionalization of Cooperation’. A detailed study of the evolution of foreign policy co-operation from its beginnings as European Political Cooperation (EPC) through to the creation of the CFSP, Smith is offering a supranationalist theoretical analysis of how CFSP has developed, and the resulting shift in power from member states to this new institutional construct. His starting point is to critique the oft-stated view that both EPC and CFSP are best understood as intergovernmental arenas – i.e. places where negotiations are conducted and agreements reached on the basis of bargaining between member states whose preferences are given; where traditional power differentials (e.g. economic, diplomatic, military) matter; and where governments dominate and control the process (e.g. Hoffmann, 1966; Moravcsik, 1993, 1998).

In essence, he contends that while intergovernmentalism might have been an appropriate framework through which to understand cooperation and its outcomes in the earliest days of EPC, it has become increasingly irrelevant as a means of explaining member state interactions. Instead, he applies an institutionalist approach to understanding the development of EPC/CFSP, which incorporates a range of constructivist concepts and which sees traditional measures of power, although significant, as being of far less importance than is assumed by realist-intergovernmentalist analyses (2004: 32). Instead, and as has been contended in supranationalist analyses of other EU institutions (and particularly the Commission), a transformation has occurred in which member states are increasingly constrained or ‘locked in’ by their participation in long-term co-operation in the CFSP.

Smith is one of a number of scholars who have adopted a critical approach to intergovernmentalism and believe it is inadequate to explain the CFSP (e.g. Glarbo, 1999; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002; Sjursen,
In general, the argument made is that while the CFSP retains some of the key features of an intergovernmental regime, particularly in terms of formal decision-making, the continuing power of the veto and a minimal role for supranational actors, the reality is significantly more complex. This complexity consists first in what can be characterised as the fundamental compromise which member states have been forced to make since the beginning of foreign and security policy co-operation, and upon which all subsequent developments have been based. This has involved a continuing trade-off between the wish to retain national control over the process and outcomes of cooperation and the desire for greater efficiency if meaningful and effective outputs are to be achieved. Related to this are two additional complications. The first is the ongoing tension between member states over the ends and means of cooperation, which Nuttall (1992: 2) describes as being:

“[A] tension between those who wanted a concert of sovereign nations expressing coordinated views on foreign policy…and those who wanted a common foreign policy as the expression of the European Union”.

The second has been the problematic relationship and delineation between EPC/CFSP and the Community, which has seen considerable anxiety on the part of those states such as France and Britain on the one hand who have sought traditionally to prevent any “contamination” of the foreign policy environment by supranational elements; and on the other, an equal concern particularly among the smaller states that the intergovernmentalism of EPC and then CFSP might dilute the degree of integration already achieved within Community policy areas (Smith, 2004: 7).31

This range of tensions and complications, exemplified in terms of the compromise noted above, are evident in the frequent references in the literature to how the CFSP has changed. For example, Nuttall (2000: 275)

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31 Smith describes the agreement that resulted in the launch of EPC as being a *quid pro quo* between French acceptance of the 1973 enlargement in return for a clear path to political union on the one hand, and the demands of smaller states that EPC not lead to the “intergovernmentalization” of the EC on the other (2004: 76).
describes it as a “halfway house”, no longer purely intergovernmental but nor a “fully-fledged policy arm” of the EU. In the context of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, Wessels (2001: 77) talks of it in terms of “rationalized intergovernmentalism” which has gone on to become ever more “refined” since Lisbon (Wessels and Bopp, 2008: 4). For Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 278), the CFSP has “at no time” been exclusively intergovernmental, while Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006: 181) characterize it as a form of “modified intergovernmentalism”. Finally, Sjursen (2011: 1091) talks about CFSP now as being “something beyond intergovernmentalism”. What Smith sets out to do, therefore, is to tell the story of this shift within foreign policy cooperation away from intergovernmentalism towards a more institutionalised system. He argues that this evolution has involved a move away from a defensive or passive approach to cooperation to a more positive or proactive one – or, to put it another way, a change “from negative to positive integration”, with negative cooperation merely representing those occasions “when states fail to act in selfish ways” (2004: 5, 49) (emphasis in original). Crucially, this has taken place as a consequence of the ability of first EPC and subsequently CFSP to “moderate” areas of potential disagreement between states, not only by framing these in terms of “collective interests and rules”, but by “promoting collective European responses” to major international issues (ibid: 5-6).

The basis of Smith’s thesis, therefore, is that together EPC and CFSP represent far more than passive frameworks within which member states transact the business of foreign and security policy cooperation, as intergovernmentalism would imply. Rather, they have a dynamic and impact of their own, the most important consequence of which is how participation within them affects the participants themselves. A two-way relationship exists between how these institutions have developed and their impact on the behaviour of the member states whereby they are encouraged to create institutions to facilitate their cooperation, but these institutions in turn influence the process of institutional development as a
consequence of fostering cooperative outcomes (ibid: 17). Thus, the “informal gentlemen’s agreement” that characterised EPC at its launch has become a system of both formal and informal legal obligations (ibid: 11). At the same time, the impact of EPC/CFSP on member states cannot be overstated. Smith suggests that states are “fundamentally changed by virtue of their participation” in this policy arena, and their interests and preferences are “susceptible” to the range of influences that both EPC and CFSP have facilitated and enhanced (ibid: 8). Moreover, he suggests not only that national interests are essentially malleable as a consequence of foreign policy cooperation but that the emergence of common interests in turn results ultimately in the creation of a common European identity:

“[I]f common actions reflect common interests, and common interests reflect a common identity, then loyalties or even a distinct European identity can be forged…it is possible to discern some persistent features of the EU’s external identity from the way it behaves in world politics, and to see evidence of changes of policy within individual states by virtue of their participation in the system.” (ibid: 8-9)

This is a powerful argument for what Smith himself identifies as a sociological institutionalist understanding of both how foreign policy cooperation functions and its long-term impact on states and their interests. As such it draws heavily from a number of the constructivist insights discussed above, the most important of which is the role of rules and norms. For Smith, these are essential if what can be seen as the more general common aims and aspirations of member states are to be transformed into specific, pursuable policies (ibid: 9).

In line with the approach taken by many other institutionalist theorists (e.g. Campbell, 2004; Peters, 2005; Scott, 2008), Smith defines an institution as being a particular set of rules and norms which provide the “rules of the game” and so shape actor behaviour within the particular space they govern or mediate (2004: 26). At the heart of his analysis, therefore, is an attempt to determine the nature of such rules and norms within EPC/CFSP, the manner in which they have exerted influence on the member states – specifically their interests and preferences – and how
previous behaviour “conditions” future interactions (ibid: 11). Smith frames this in terms of a move away from a bargaining style of cooperation, focused on self-interest, to a problem-solving style which enables appeals to common interests, with the interactions within the increasingly institutionalised environment of EPC/CFSP having facilitated this (ibid). Essentially, he is claiming that the impact of cooperation within EPC/CFSP is discernible both in terms of changes to process – i.e. how cooperation takes place – and to substance – i.e. what that cooperation ultimately produces.

To explain the process of institutionalisation, and thus the rules and norms which shape interactions within EPC/CFSP, Smith identifies three underlying logics. The first is a functional logic which we should understand in terms of how far a particular member state believes this policy environment can help it achieve a particular goal or goals. The second is a normative logic of appropriateness, which sees new institutional norms or rules defined in terms of previous or pre-existing ones – the emergence of unwritten rules or ways of behaving, their later codification, etc. The third is a socialization logic whereby states, and particularly their officials and representatives, consider how their peers behave, and change or adapt accordingly (ibid: 33). Taken together, Smith argues that these logics explain why states engage in cooperation, the rules they construct to facilitate this, and how officials become key to the process of change. Thus, institutionalisation began “as soon as skilled national officials began meeting…on a regular basis” (ibid: 82), while this regular communication supported the development of increasingly complex transnational and transgovernmental links between diplomats and officials of the different member states. This in turn facilitated the emergence of one of the most important elements of international cooperation – the ability of the member states to predict the behaviour of their partners (ibid: 90).

At the time of its launch, EPC represented a unique experiment in inter-state cooperation. Indeed, following on from several failed
initiatives, initially there was not a great deal of optimism that this latest iteration was any more likely to succeed.\textsuperscript{32} The fact that it was restricted to a relatively narrow range of issues (particularly the Middle East and the development, through the CSCE,\textsuperscript{33} of East-West relations), combined with the initial focus placed by member states on familiarising themselves with each other’s foreign policies, meant that while it may have seemed unambitious and inward-looking, it was precisely these characteristics that supported the greater harmonisation of views emphasised in the 1971 \textit{Luxembourg Report}, and the emergence within just a few years of the “coordination reflex” mentioned above (ibid: 94).\textsuperscript{34} Smith notes that just two years after \textit{Luxembourg}, the 1973 \textit{Copenhagen Report} on the functioning of EPC highlighted how “this habit of working together has enabled the procedure for concerted action to become more widespread” (ibid: 94-5). Harmonisation of views and concerted action were also promoted by the development of mechanisms for communication within EPC which were deliberately intended to support the achievement of consensus, but crucially these were not developed according to specifications provided by national governments, but “based on the habits and customs of EPC diplomats themselves” (ibid: 92).

This is an important point for Smith, for he sees state officials as playing a much more significant role than merely representing monolithic, unitary states who “single-mindedly devise and pursue” their interests and preferences (ibid: 91). Instead, he suggests that through their regular involvement in this policy-making environment, national officials not only make it tangible and permanent, but can mobilise – and be

\textsuperscript{32} These previous attempts included the \textit{European Defence Community} and \textit{European Political Community} in the 1950s, and the \textit{Fouchet Plans} in the 1960s.

\textsuperscript{33} The CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) was the predecessor to the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe). The latter officially came into existence on 1 January 1995.

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Luxembourg} highlighted several goals for EPC including the development of greater solidarity through the harmonization of views and greater cooperation, and regular exchanges of information and consultation to improve mutual understanding between partner states (see \textit{The Luxembourg Report, Part II, section I}, quoted in Smith, 2004: 94).
mobilised – to pursue common European goals (ibid). The consequence of this interaction – involving a culture of information-sharing, the reflex of coordination and pursuit of consensus – encouraged “a unique culture of EU foreign policy cooperation”, with culture defined in terms of the “collective ideas, values and beliefs” pertaining to foreign policy, and which are subsequently translated into collective action through the norms and rules that have developed to facilitate this cooperation (ibid: 100). Cooperation, coordination and the importance of officials are further underlined by the establishment within each foreign ministry of the post of European Correspondent, an official dedicated exclusively to EPC (and subsequently CFSP), and the creation of the COREU secure communications network through which officials consult and coordinate, and which has become the practical expression of the coordination reflex (ibid: 101-3) (see also Bicchi and Carta, 2010; Bicchi, 2011). Furthermore, the esprit de corps that developed between the European Correspondents, and between their superiors, the Political Directors, who prior to 2000 met monthly in the Political Committee, led to a change in how participants viewed their peers: they now saw themselves “as partners or colleagues in a common enterprise”, while EPC enabled states to escape the restrictions of intergovernmental bargaining in order to form collective positions (ibid: 104).

It was the idea of a specifically European foreign policy, underpinned by the emergence of rules and norms, which Smith believes saw EPC evolve from “a passive forum” to become a more active mechanism (ibid: 117). He identifies a four-stage process for norm development – the emergence, first, of informal customs and ways of doing things; the codification of these into explicit, written norms; the transition of these written norms into specific rules which were reflected in the various EPC reports; and a final transition to legal rules which

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35 The Political Committee was replaced in 2000 by the Political and Security Committee. This and other innovations are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

36 A key development in this regard was the Danish initiative in 1976 to compile all the formal and informal working procedures of EPC into a single ‘bible’ or coutumier which was the precursor to the acquis politique (Smith, 2004: 124).
place a range of formal obligations on member states (ibid). This process can be explained using the context of the three logics noted above. These provide a way of understanding the dense transgovernmental network of continually interacting officials which has served as the crucible in which the majority of norm creation or innovation takes place, and which, Smith argues, was focused on problem-solving as opposed to bargaining from the outset (ibid). EPC *in totem* should thus be seen as a system of soft law, prior to its codification in the *Single European Act* of 1986, with the period 1977-1986 being the most important in terms of producing the procedural norms which were, in its early days at least, its real substance (ibid: 119, 121).

One of the most important elements in Smith’s discussion of norms is the manner in which they place clear and obvious constraints on the behaviour of member states. In particular, he identifies three important customs which have become the normative foundation of EPC/CFSP: consultation, confidentiality and consensus. Taken together these establish very clearly the terms of state interactions and at the very least a baseline for their expected outcomes (ibid: 122). Consultation and confidentiality were – and remain – essential for the creation and maintenance of confidence between states. The achievement of consensus, meanwhile, is arguably even more interesting, as this sets a clear goal for member states that remains the cornerstone of European foreign policy cooperation today. However, whilst a clear norm in its own right, it also potentially precludes the development of the kind of strong, specific collective action that remains the intention of this policy environment, demonstrating the inherent tension between efficiency and control noted above.

In addition, Smith goes on to identify two further substantive norms: a prohibition on hard bargaining, and respect for *domaines réservés* (ibid: 123). While the former means that states and their officials would not and will not haggle or seek to “purchase support”, for example in working groups, the latter has focused on those particular
issue- or geographical areas where certain member states have a special concern or relationship, such as a state’s neutrality, or the relationship between France and Francophone Africa (ibid). Smith argues that both of these have made it much easier to achieve consensus within EPC/CFSP (ibid: 123), with a clear demarcation between what can be considered and what is off-limits. Where consensus has been achieved, and the states have been able to articulate a joint position, this has “helped define and orient ‘Europe’ as a collective entity” internationally (ibid: 134). For Smith, this represents an important challenge to realist and intergovernmental notions of power, interest and how states interact: EPC and CFSP represent a “constant process of collective interest definition” (ibid: 135). Moreover, he argues that the expansion of EPC into new areas – and the comprehensive ambition represented by CFSP in terms of the issues and regions it seeks to address – demonstrates that the number of domaines réservés has diminished with a consequent impact on national (as opposed to common) positions (ibid). Indeed, this expansion of EPC, particularly into subjects previously considered taboo, came about as officials “simply wore each other down with arguments”, the prime example being the gradual acceptance that security, so long a domaine réservés was an appropriate topic for discussion (ibid: 144, 142).  

Thus, it is the transgovernmental environment which is pushing the boundaries of foreign policy cooperation.

Smith sees the expansion of the EPC agenda during the 1970s and 80s as a product of its norm and rule generation, which resulted in a “more comprehensive” ambition in the coming years (ibid: 145). This also served to heighten the tension between it and the Community, and particularly the Commission, which had been present from the earliest days of EPC, but which he argues was essentially an “artificial, ideological distinction” (ibid: 148). As the guardian of the treaties and therefore responsible for all aspects of Community policy, the

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37 Such discussions did not include military deployments, however (Smith, 2004: 142).
Commission is a significant actor in external relations in its own right, and there was a growing desire on the part of member states to “share the burden” of administering EPC, meaning barriers between EPC and the Community inevitably broke down (ibid: 145). In particular, there was a recognition of the impact its instruments could have: not only could it dispose of significant informational capabilities and resources, it also had a range of instruments for the implementation and enforcement of policies, for example in dealing with crises or putting together “complex politico-economic package deals” with other regions (ibid: 148). This meant that if their own cooperation was to be successful and consistent without recourse to unnecessary and costly institutional duplication, the member states needed the involvement of the Commission (ibid). For its part, the Commission saw its involvement not as a way of extending its influence into EPC, but rather in defensive terms as a means of “protecting its place in Community affairs” (ibid: 147). This defensive ‘mind-set’ has continued throughout the CFSP-period, and has been evident most recently in how the Commission has reacted to the creation of the European External Action Service (see Chapter 6).

For Smith, one of the most important characteristics of the EPC/CFSP period has been the strengthening of Commission’s position as an independent actor within European foreign policy, which has included an increasing influence over member states. It has generally enjoyed significant advantages in information, resources and instruments, particularly over smaller states that have often relied on its support during their 6-month presidencies. Its “most fundamental and widely recognised role” has been as a source of information and expertise, particularly in terms of the potential economic impact of EPC decisions (ibid: 160). However, it has also acted as an informal policy entrepreneur, able to use its role to define “external political issues in economic terms”, for example preventing EPC sanctions against Iran in 1979 from “adversely affecting” the Common Market (ibid; 161, 164). The significant increase in status it has consequently enjoyed was underlined
first by the codification of its role when foreign policy cooperation was legalised and EPC and the Community were “tied together and made legally binding” for the first time in the SEA (ibid: 146, 152); and then by the potentially substantial expansion of its power in the 1991 Treaty on European Union (TEU), when it was given the right of joint initiative within CFSP. This has ensured that it is increasingly difficult for the member states – and particularly larger ones such as France who over the years have “preferred to minimize” its influence – to shut it out of foreign policy-making (ibid: 146, 160). Indeed, for Smith the fact that the Commission could “no longer be excluded” from a CFSP matter represented “the most important reorganization” in the history of European foreign policy (ibid: 187). It is interesting to note, as will be discussed in later chapters, how the Treaty of Lisbon seeks to roll-back its power somewhat.

Alongside this, Smith emphasises the normative role the Commission has been able to play. It is both an exemplar of successful regional cooperation – “one of EPC’s most important substantive norms” – and has enabled the EC/EU to be seen as separate from its individual member states, thereby highlighting its “cooperative ideals” (ibid: 165). Thus, the Commission as a normative actor in its own right, alongside the norm generation taking place within EPC – further underlined and enhanced by the establishment of a permanent secretariat for EPC in the SEA (see chapter 4 below) – combined to create a powerful dynamic towards norms and rules which reached critical mass in the treaty-making of 1986, 1991 and subsequently. Not only did these treaties turn informal or unwritten norms into a set of legal obligations on member states, they also provided the basis for a new stage in the process of norm development, leading to the emergence of the “formal system of governance” represented by CFSP (ibid: 175). This in turn represented a qualitative step up from EPC, marking the moment when foreign policy cooperation changed from the negative to the positive, with CFSP representing a “more proactive cooperative mechanism” rather than the
“passive, decentralised forum” that had characterised EPC (ibid: 178, 176). Consequently, while the exogenous shocks of the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR and the unification of Germany may have been the catalyst for the reforms that resulted in the CFSP, Smith argues that the shape it took represented the “endogenous, path-dependent processes” that evolved from EPC (ibid: 176).

The two-way relationship between the member states and their foreign policy-making arena is even starker when considering the institutional structures of the CFSP. As noted, Smith characterises this as a system of foreign policy governance which he presents as resting on four main elements: a greater coherence and rationalisation in terms of policy and process; its legally binding nature; “authoritative” decision-making rules, such as the possibility of QMV in certain circumstances; and greater autonomy for actors such as the Commission (ibid: 177). While these all indicate both a higher degree of institutionalisation and a greater degree of constraint on member state behaviour, at the same time he suggests that the TEU still reflects the dominance of ‘big states’ (i.e. France, Germany and Britain) in determining the new structure of cooperation, particularly in terms of a greater focus on crisis management, considered a deficiency of EPC (ibid: 179).

Furthermore, while the fault line between control and efficiency remained, certain instrumental innovations sought to finesse this. Thus, common actions and joint positions were intended to emphasise the purpose of the CFSP to “produce regular foreign policy outputs” (ibid: 182). Certainly there was a significant and rapid expansion of foreign policy activity following the launch of CFSP, however much of this remained declaratory in nature (ibid: 194). For Smith, though, the expansion of issue areas under CFSP indicates the decrease “or even disappearance” of domaines réservés (ibid). At the same time, the TEU turned the customary practices implied by the coordination reflex into legal obligations on member states to inform and consult each other, and not only refrain from actions which might undermine the CFSP, but to
actively support it (ibid: 185). Indeed, whilst the CFSP was being established during a particularly turbulent period in history, with EU solidarity being challenged particularly by the break-up of Yugoslavia and the wars that followed, Smith believes CFSP “generated a great deal more cooperative activity” than under EPC, with the clearest evidence provided by enormous growth in COREUs during this period (from 7548 in 1990 to 12699 in 1994) (ibid: 190-1). However, he notes that although the negotiators of the TEU had been unable to agree a set of “essential European interests”, at the subsequent European Council in June 1992, “factors determining important common interests” (including geographical proximity, important economic interests etc) were identified (ibid: 191). Taken together, these developments reflect what Smith argues is the most important implication of the CFSP – describing foreign and security policy as “common” entails a “higher-order obligation” than mere cooperation (ibid).

Running throughout Smith’s analysis, therefore, is a clear rejection of what he describes as “realist assumptions” about state power, material interests, and how we explain state behaviour (ibid: 250). Although not entirely dismissing these, they remain only “a starting point” (ibid: 240). He maintains, instead, that a range of other factors comes into play when seeking to understand both the development of foreign policy cooperation in the EU, and the outputs of that cooperation. In particular, he is arguing that the evolution of EPC and CFSP represent a gradual but steady process of institutionalisation that has both driven and been driven by the emergence and ultimately codification of a particular set of norms. These have determined both how cooperation and policy-making take place, and what types of policy outcomes are produced. At the same time, the sequential nature of the change implicit in institutionalisation has led to the creation of a “stable, rule-based system”. This in turn has resulted in the gradual but steady internalisation of EPC/CFSP policies and procedures in the member states – a process otherwise known as Europeanization (ibid: 243).
For Smith, the stability inherent within the CFSP system is vital to understanding why problem-solving rather than bargaining has been the dominant approach to policy-making. Indeed, it is the most important consequence of the level of predictability of behaviour that member states are able to rely upon. Thus, even though exogenous events may pose challenging questions to the system of foreign policy-cooperation, how that system reacts (and changes) will have much more to do with endogenous factors, and particularly pre-existing norms and path dependencies (ibid: 243). Furthermore, Smith argues that there is in fact “no consistent relationship” between external threats and common action within the EU context, something that realist theories might assume (ibid: 245). This implies that something more interesting and complex is taking place: that common approaches have developed as a result of shared ideas, and not merely the recognition of a shared mutual interest in a particular situation, and that these can have both policy and behavioural consequences if institutionalised as “specific behavioural norm[s]” (ibid: 251). When these are accepted by and guide the behaviour of a transnational, transgovernmental network of officials dedicated to cooperation and the achievement of consensus, this becomes a powerful normative tool. Not only can it shape specific policies and actions, it encourages the emergence of a shared sense of how to understand and approach the world. It also opens up the possibility that identity may change as well. Given the lack of a dominant central authority, a prominent external threat, or an actor able to act as a catalyst, identity comes instead from within the EU. CFSP actions thus provide “a point of reference” in how member states determine their values, indicating that their identity has also changed (ibid: 257).
1.5 Conclusion

While Smith may not characterise himself as a constructivist *per se*, by his own admission these arguments owe a great deal to constructivist understandings of how identity is created and the importance of ideas. He has utilised these to support a supranationalist interpretation of how a system of foreign policy cooperation intended essentially to protect the gains of economic integration and support the achievement of internal cohesion has become so much more, representing an instrument for the projection of “European” values, norms and aspirations onto the international stage, whilst constraining the states participating within it. However, while his application of constructivism certainly contributes to a deeper understanding of how foreign policy cooperation has developed through EPC and CFSP, and what it means for those participating in it, a number of significant questions remain, not least around the role and behaviour of the member states. As the next chapter will show, Smith’s ultimate claim – that the EU “has fundamentally changed the ways its member states define and pursue their interests” (ibid: 263) – remains highly problematic, and this in turn indicates a more fundamental problem with supranationalist assumptions about the CFSP.

While what Smith, and constructivism more broadly, can tell us about the *how* of foreign policy-making within the CFSP is of great interest, legitimate questions can be posed regarding his explanations of the *what*. In particular, we need to ask why the nation state seems largely absent from consideration, and whether this is due to mistaken assumptions within supranationalist theorizing about the inevitability of limitations on state power as a consequence of cooperation. For example, Smith’s thesis ignores the importance not only of states themselves as powerful sources of ideas and identity, but also of the individual ministries which make up governments, and which themselves are important generators of norms. A constructivist-informed analysis could equally be applied at this level, helping us not only to understand more
about the role of these smaller institutional actors in national preference formation, but in the tenacity of the ‘national’ in multi-/supranational arenas. In essence, and as the next chapter will show, not only are scholars such as Smith who privilege one particular institution (or set of institutions) – i.e. the CFSP – whilst paying insufficient attention to another – i.e. the member states – misapplying constructivism, they are also highlighting a significant weakness in supranationalist theorizing more broadly.
Chapter 2: Escaping the middle ground? Why rationalism still matters in the CFSP

2.1. Introduction

This chapter provides a critique of some of the claims outlined above. It is important to state from the outset that it is not critiquing constructivism *per se*. Indeed, part of the argument that will be offered is that constructivism actually offers a useful set of tools with which to examine and understand what is going on at state level within the CFSP. Rather, this thesis seeks to challenge how constructivism has been applied within the body of EU scholarship focused on the CFSP which adopts a supranationalist theoretical approach. In particular, developing the idea that the ‘national’ demands more attention than a supranationalist account of CFSP can offer, it suggests that rationalist understandings of how states define and pursue interests and preferences remain important to our explanations of what is taking place in CFSP. In their critique of supranationalist theorizing as applied to the power of the Commission vis-à-vis the member states, Kassim and Menon (2010) provide a useful starting point for this. Firstly, they highlight the “mismeasure of the respective powers” of governments and the EU’s institutions in supranationalist analyses, reminding us of the dominance of the states over treaty reform processes, the formal prerogatives they possess, the importance of the Council in legislative outcomes, control over budgets, etc (2010: 23). Second, they dispute the so-called informational advantage enjoyed particularly by the Commission; and thirdly they remind us that however great the resources available to the EU’s institutions, those available to member states are “far broader and far more formidable”, not the least of which is the fact that states are “repositories of sovereignty” (2010: 27). Given that however much the CFSP has developed, it has achieved nowhere near the institutional
sophistication or complexity of either the Community pillar or the Commission, not only can we therefore apply each of these points of criticism to how supranationalists analyse it – we can argue that they are even more pertinent and significant.

Furthermore, the insights offered by constructivism are not exclusive to supranationalist theorizing. Rather, they can usefully be applied to help us develop an alternative analysis. Thus, while considerations of norms, logics of appropriateness and socialization are important, the argument here is that these are far better at explaining the how of foreign policy cooperation as opposed to the what, in terms of its outputs. State power still matters, and has a significant impact on what is agreed within the CFSP. Equally, how states and their governments perceive their place in the world is also important. These perceptions will certainly be influenced and shaped by interactions within the CFSP, but the argument here is that such interactions are not as transformational as Smith’s and other analyses imply. In short, wider issues such as geopolitics, national systems of foreign policy-making, diplomatic systems and traditions, etc still matter. Thus, while there is no doubt that the CFSP is very important in how Britain and Germany understand and approach the wider world, it represents just one of a number of elements through which they act. Moreover, as will be discussed now, the way they organise and approach the CFSP indicates a much more rationalist and interest-driven conception of its utility than supranationalist approaches imply. In particular, it highlights how claims over the emergence of shared ideas and common interests in CFSP are challenged by the stubborn persistence of the ‘national’ in this policy arena. This can be seen by examining, amongst others, the literatures on policy coordination, Europeanization and socialization. To frame this discussion, this chapter problematizes 5 key issues: (i) whether some ideas are ‘more important’ than others (ii) the time and resources states devote to policy coordination; (iii) states’ efforts to upload national preferences to CFSP; (iv) the continuing ‘Capabilities-Expectations
Gap’; and (v) how the impact of socialization can really be judged. Together, these allow us to critique how constructivism has been misapplied in supranationalist analyses of CFSP and forms the basis for the research questions set out in Chapter 3.
2.2 Problem 1: Are some ideas ‘more important’ than others?

One of the most consistent critiques of constructivist-based analyses of integration more broadly, and particularly the source and function of ideas, has come from Andrew Moravcsik, the leading exponent of liberal intergovernmentalism (e.g. 1993, 1998). His conception of how states approach international arenas such as the EU, first set out in 1993, is that their behaviour “reflects the rational action of governments constrained at home by domestic societal pressures and abroad by their strategic environment” (1993: 474). Thus, when member states engage with one another, they are actually involved in a “two-level” game (see Putnam, 1988) taking place at both the national and European levels. Central to his thesis is an understanding of the relationship between governments and the process whereby national interests and preferences are formed. These, he argues, emerge neither from the “black box” of central government, nor are they based on questions of geopolitics in terms of the state’s analysis of its “relative position” in the international system in comparison to others (Rosamond, 2000: 137). Rather, they are developed and articulated through the debate and competition for resources and influence that takes place between different domestic societal groups (amongst whom it is those who are strongest economically who normally prevail). Thus, it is the role of national governments not to formulate these interests but instead to aggregate them. Then, as rational actors with a focus on maximising gains – not the least of which is maintaining power which Moravcsik describes as their “primary interest” (ibid: 483) – they represent, promote and defend these domestically-created interests at the European level through a series of intergovernmental negotiations. Such negotiations are aimed at achieving the optimum degree of policy co-ordination to support these interests, with the particular “configuration” of national preferences defining the “bargaining space” available within which any viable agreement might be reached (ibid: 496).
As a bargaining environment, Moravcsik contends that the European-level is “relatively benign” and can facilitate agreement through the high availability of information, and the ability of actors to table offers and counter-offers, and make linkages and side-payments to promote agreement (ibid: 498-9). Despite this, he argues that “relative power” continues to matter, particularly in a decision-making environment that requires the creation of coalitions of states in order to achieve agreements. Inevitably, this privileges the larger states whose participation is deemed essential to the successful creation of such coalitions (ibid: 503). Within this environment, supranational institutions such as the Commission are important because they increase the efficiency of this process of interstate bargaining, and because they structure the “two-level game” which in turn “enhances the autonomy and initiative” of national political leaders at the domestic level (ibid: 507). Perhaps most importantly, they provide “neutral enforcement” of agreements to enable Member States to make “credible commitments” to one another. This provides the chief rationale for the delegation of authority or sovereignty to the supranational level (ibid: 512; 1998: 9).

Such a strongly state-centric analysis would therefore seem inevitably to place Moravcsik at odds with constructivist approaches to the study of integration, and indeed he contends that they suffer from several weaknesses. First is his broader critique of the testability of the claims made by constructivists. He suggests that these suffer from a “paucity of distinctive testable hypotheses” (2001: 226) and that because they cannot be proved wrong, they therefore cannot be proved right (1999: 679). A focus on ontology rather than theory means constructivism offers no “distinctive predictions” about when the range of phenomena existent in world politics are likely to occur, concentrating instead on why only constructivism is best able to explain them (2001: 226-7). The second more specific constructivist claim which he critiques is, as he puts it, that government elites determine national interests and preferences “on the basis of consistency with collective ideas or
discourses irreducible to material interests” (1999: 671) – i.e. that essentially particular ideas are privileged above other factors. This hints at the argument made above that national-level institutions – e.g. government ministries – are at least as important as supranational institutions (e.g. the CFSP) as sources or generators of ideas, norms and perceptions of what the ‘national’ means in a particular context, and consequently what the ‘national interest’ could and should be.

While Moravcsik is clear on the importance of ideas – “[c]ollective ideas are like air; it is essentially impossible for humans to function without them” (ibid: 674; 2001: 229) – he is far less convinced by the claims made by constructivists as to their overall significance. Thus, rationalist-based theories “claim only something far more modest” in their treatment of ideas – that they are “causally epiphenomenal” to the “more fundamental” influences on how states behave (1999: 674). Given his view of national governments as aggregators of the range of interests that emerge from different social actors, it is unsurprising, therefore, that he sees ideas as representing first and foremost the “transmission belts” for such interests, and are thus likely to be endogenous. In other words, while the CFSP might represent an important source of ideas, so too do the member states, and perhaps more so. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the CFSP would exercise such a transformational impact on what member states might identify as their national interests.

In general, Moravcsik is not suggesting that he sees no value in the insights that constructivism can offer. Indeed, he repeatedly makes the argument that it has a valuable contribution to make in terms of the “causal role of ideational socialization” (1999: 669). Rather, he is arguing that instead of seeking to explain everything, a better objective for constructivists would be to develop a “more and nuanced qualified” theory of socialization which could be of great utility in understanding international politics (2001: 240). Until they are able to offer this, however, constructivism’s ability to engage with and challenge what he
considers more theoretically robust rationalist approaches will remain insufficient.

Moravcsik could be accused of reductionism in how he sets ‘constructivism’ in opposition to ‘rationalism’. In doing so, his charge that constructivist theorists are ignoring the insights offered by their rationalist counterparts could equally apply the other way. More broadly, the intergovernmentalism he espouses faces its own criticisms in terms of its failure to understand the “full range of member state capacities” (Kassim and Menon, 2010: 1). However, underpinning his critique is a fundamental point that should not be ignored: he is reminding us, first and foremost, of the crucial importance of nation states in our understanding of what is taking place in multilateral arenas such as the CFSP. In thinking about the power and importance of ideas in identity and interest formation, therefore, we cannot assume the national is being subsumed by the supranational.

38 It is important to acknowledge that Moravcsik’s theoretical approaches have also been the subject of a range of critiques. These include general criticism of his approach to theory-building – for example, Schimmelfennig (2004: 81) suggests that the cases he has chosen for analysis “may appear biased in favour of” liberal intergovernmentalism (LI); the fact that LI seems predominantly interested in an analysis of economic integration; that its focus is largely on the outcome of large-scale treaty negotiations rather than on day-to-day decision-making, with the latter only considered in the context of decision-making within the Council of Ministers (a criticism which is levelled at intergovernmentalism more generally) – Garrett and Tsebelis see this as analysing only “the tip of the iceberg”, whilst ignoring “the everyday reality of European integration” (1996: 293); and for his view of the place and role of supranational institutions, and particularly his categorisation of the relationship between Member States and these institutions as one based purely on delegation (Cini, 2010: 100).
2.3 Problem 2: Why do states continue to devote so much time and resources to policy coordination?

Alongside the broader theoretical challenges Moravcsik poses to constructivism, there are other more specific questions we can ask about how it has been used in theoretical explanations of the CFSP. This is highlighted by a number of areas of research. The first of these is the literature on policy coordination. The effective co-ordination of domestic policy is a recurring theme in research on public management (e.g. Peters and Pierre, 2003), addressing as it does one of the key challenges facing all governments: how to achieve the most efficient and effective use of increasingly scarce public resources across multiple departments and multiple sectors. The assumption is that if a government is generally well-coordinated, it is likely to be more efficient – and therefore more effective at achieving its policy goals (Scharpf, 1988; Spence, 1999; Menon and Wright, 1998; Kassim, Peters and Wright, 2000).

For EU member states, however, the situation is considerably more complex. Indeed, Kassim et al. (2000: 10) describe it as “unique”. They are operating within a “multi-level political system” (Kassim, 2000b: 235) that, particularly since the SEA and TEU, has had increasing influence over, or regulatory control of, a vast array of policy areas (Beyers and Dierickx, 1998: 290). Moreover, it is a system characterised by what Vincent Wright (1996: 149) calls a “continuous policy-making process”, thus placing a premium on effective co-ordination. In the context of Community policy, on the one hand it requires member states to balance, and ensure the compatibility of, national policy programmes and goals with those of the wider Union; on the other it incentivises them to make the most coherent case possible, across a united front, in order to benefit from the potential political and economic resources available from Brussels (Kassim, Peters and Wright, 2000:1). In addition, it is argued that the ability of supranational EU institutions to function effectively depends on the coordinational arrangements put in place by the member states (Kassim and Peters, 2001: 297), who thereby provide
the vital “administrative substructure” for the implementation of EU policy (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2002: 3).

An important additional question that this literature considers is the extent to which the member states’ co-ordinational effectiveness translates into effectiveness in terms of policy outcomes in the context of the EU. Wright (1996: 165) warns against automatically equating the two, arguing that the latter must be judged according to the issue, and the type, requirements and objectives of the policy in question. Indeed, Germany is often cited as an example of a member state with an apparently weak capacity to co-ordinate, but that is nevertheless highly-effective at securing positive outcomes (Derlien, 2000; Sepos, 2005a). Sepos (2005a: 186) claims that although EU membership has clearly increased the pressure on governments to co-ordinate effectively, the evidence linking organisational efficiency and outcomes at the European level is weak, while Derlien (2000: 56) suggests that it is Germany’s very lack of a centralized policy co-ordinating function that has made it apparently so successful. By contrast, despite demonstrating a considerable degree of administrative efficiency, the UK is perceived as being ineffective in this regard (Kassim, 2000a: 23). When considering the role and significance of co-ordination, it is important, therefore, to link questions regarding effectiveness with the ambitions and aims of the member states (Wright, 1996: 164). Furthermore, examining their co-ordinational structures can assist us in understanding why and to what extent EU governments are successful in defending and promoting their national interests (Kassim and Peters, 2001: 297).

39 As Derlien characterises it, Germany ‘fails successfully’ (2000).
40 It should be noted, however, that Derlien’s assessment of Germany’s lack of effective central co-ordination is disputed. Indeed, Paterson (forthcoming) contends that the governments of Angela Merkel have seen a significant centralisation of European policy-making and coordination within the Chancellery, while the Finance Ministry has increasingly superseded the Foreign Ministry in terms of influencing the overall direction of policy (see Chapter 6).
41 As he states later: “Merely to examine the machinery of co-ordination is to confuse the means and the outcomes.” (Wright, 1996: 165)
These questions are especially interesting and relevant in the context of the CFSP. For example, in all its interactions with the EU, Britain demonstrates a coordination ambition that goes consistently beyond that of other member states, and the CFSP is no exception. Indeed, Kassim (2000a: 22) highlights an apparent paradox in its approach to policy coordination. This lies in the contrast between its administrative efficiency in formulating and implementing EU policy, something many partner states – including Germany (see Chapter 6) – seek to emulate, and its perceived lack of success in securing its desired outcomes at the European level. The roots of this dichotomy lie in a combination of “cultural scepticism” towards integration and the logic of centralisation and unity of purpose that have long characterised Whitehall’s bureaucratic and administrative arrangements (ibid: 50). What cannot be denied, however, is Britain’s willingness to commit both time and resources to ensuring its positions are clearly and coherently articulated, something that is clearly in evidence in how it approaches the CFSP. Moreover, and as will be discussed in Chapter 5, it has demonstrated considerable effectiveness in influencing CFSP policy.

While seeking to exercise influence is an aim of all British inputs, whatever the policy area, it is vital in CFSP given its status as one of the EU’s two leading foreign and security actors, and its insistence that member states remain in control of this arena. Thus, for example, across the network of working groups and committees that form the CFSP infrastructure, the idea that Britain would not have a clear position on a given issue is unthinkable. Moreover, and as will be discussed, smaller states often look to it for leadership. Similarly, although Germany might not be able to boast the same level of success in policy coordination, it too remains committed to exercising as much influence as it can within the CFSP, and indeed has increased its coordination ambition in this regard in recent years (see Chapter 6).

The importance of the coordination literature, therefore, lies in what it tells us about how states approach the CFSP. Thus, while the
analyses offered by Smith, Glarbo and others make a great deal of the impact of socialization on the generation of norms and the nature of national preferences, they seem unable to answer the question posed by studies of member states’ coordination machinery. Put simply, why do states continue to invest so much in seeking to influence outcomes if not to achieve a set of nationally-held objectives, whether they are to promote or prevent a particular outcome? The argument that will be made here is that both Britain and Germany exhibit what is an essentially instrumental approach to the CFSP, even if there are variations between them, designed to achieve outcomes that reflect their particular interests and concerns. Consequently, while the CFSP provides an important arena in which to pursue and achieve these, such interests remain a national concern. Therefore, while constructivist concepts like socialization may help us explain changes, for example, in national co-ordination structures in terms of the how of policy-making, the what remains very much a national question, open to influence from a whole range of factors, including geo-political concerns, domestic considerations, etc. Member states expend the time and resources they do on seeking to influence outcomes because they see this as having an impact in terms of their national objectives. This suggests that the power of the CFSP as a norm-generating arena able to transform the interests and identities of the member states is not necessarily as clear-cut as Smith and others argue, and nor is the characterisation of the CFSP as an arena for problem-solving rather than bargaining as straightforward as suggested.

This can be seen in some of the literature which examines the Council of Ministers, for example. In their detailed analysis, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace have highlighted the likelihood of bargaining occurring particularly over issues relating to budgets and expenditure (2006: 209). This is not surprising given the potentially very large amounts of money at stake in other policy areas such as agriculture or structural funds. However, in CFSP and particularly ESDP/CSDP, its crisis management arm, questions of budgets and expenditure have also
been hugely problematic on occasion, with discussions much more akin to bargaining rather than the problem-solving approach that Smith and Helene Sjursen (e.g. 2005) see as characteristic of this arena. It is worth mentioning two examples to illustrate this, both of which will be discussed in more detail later.\textsuperscript{42} The first relates to a review conducted in 2006 into the Athena mechanism which administers common costs for any CSDP operations with defence or military implications (EEAS, 2010a). At the time in question, France was seeking to have intelligence added to the list of items covered by automaticity, which led to significant concerns for Germany that this would mean the costs of satellite imagery would also be included. Given that this would potentially lead to the doubling of the then €60bn budget and because common costs are paid by member states according to their Gross National Income, not surprisingly Germany rejected as unacceptable the possibility that they would be expected to make the most significant contribution.

The second example concerns the establishment of the new European External Action Service (EEAS). Again, issues over costs have caused tensions, particularly between Britain and Germany. These have been exacerbated, moreover, by the stances adopted since 2010 by a more overtly Euro-sceptical government in London. Thus, for Britain one of the most important issues has been to ensure that the creation of the EEAS should remain “budget-neutral” as far as possible – i.e. that the efficiency savings for what London characterises as essentially a reorganisation of the EU’s external representation should balance any other costs involved. However, this has led to continuing disagreements, not least with Germany, which sees as obstructionist many of the positions adopted subsequently by the UK towards proposals designed to facilitate the EEAS’ development. In both cases, bargaining, trade-offs and the sometimes hard-nosed pursuit of particular national interests have remained important components of how these states have conducted

\textsuperscript{42} See Chapters 5 and 6 respectively.
business in the CFSP. Thus, when it comes to questions of expenditure, for example, however broad the consensus may be on an issue, significant tensions can arise between states as a consequence of the rationalist and often pragmatic approaches they take in order to achieve satisfactory outcomes. The policy co-ordination literature thus highlights that a consideration of the actual mechanics of how states make policy at the national and supranational level can be revealing in terms of how national interests are defined, articulated and pursued. Most importantly, it again throws doubt on analyses that pay insufficient attention to what is happening at state level.
2.4 Problem 3: Why do member states seek to upload their national preferences to CFSP?

The literature on Europeanization also emphasises how the ‘national’ challenges the way constructivist assumptions have been applied in supranationalist analyses of the CFSP. As noted earlier, when seeking to understand the impact of the EU in the context of the CFSP, an alternative approach to the predominant top-down paradigm of Europeanization is required. Consequently, this aspect of the literature demonstrates a much stronger emphasis on uploading, whereby member states seek on the one hand either to collectivise or mutualise national preferences and positions, or on the other to prevent important areas of national concern from coming under pressure at the European level. As we have seen, in this context we can identify clear examples of Europeanization in terms of organisational adaptation, for example in the reorganisation of ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) to ensure they have a European Correspondent. Indeed, in a number of the states which joined in the 2004 enlargement, organisational change has been considerable. For example, Kajnč (2011) notes that the internal organisation of the Slovenian MFA “changed dramatically” following accession, with re-structuring designed to reflect the frameworks of the EU both in terms of CFSP and its wider external relations. Meanwhile, in Poland, Pomorska (2011: 170) notes that adaptation has involved decentralisation and greater information-sharing in the Polish MFA, as well as the recognition that the EU needs “to be present throughout” its structures and policies if Poland is to engage effectively both with the CFSP and the EU more broadly.

However, a characterisation of Europeanization in this environment in terms of formal adaptation in response to pressures from the supranational level is neither adequate nor appropriate to account for what is actually taking place in the CFSP. This is a policy-making arena that is dynamic and multi-directional, operates on multiple levels and, crucially, lacks a single, supranational policy entrepreneur or
mechanisms to enforce decisions. Moreover, the continuing power of the veto is more than just a symbolic nod towards intergovernmentalism. It remains the clearest indicator that however strong the cooperation, the national cannot be ignored. Indeed, the national remains very much a core component of what is taking place in CFSP, and we can identify a range of issue areas where Europeanization has occurred as a consequence of the national projection – or uploading – of policy preferences by member states (e.g. Wong, 2005; Pomorska and Wright, forthcoming). For example, Charillon and Wong (2011) note how many of the EU positions on the Arab-Israeli dispute originate in Paris and London, while Daehnhardt (2011) highlights how Germany achieved a change in wording in the European Security Strategy to talk about “preventive” as opposed to “pre-emptive” engagement, thus ensuring the use of military force would remain a last resort. Perhaps the clearest example of “negative” uploading is the continuing refusal of Cyprus to allow discussion of any issue that it feels would undermine its position vis-à-vis its ongoing dispute with Turkey. By illustrating that member states view the CFSP as an important arena for the pursuit of national interests, such examples challenge a supranationalist interpretation of the CFSP and its transformative impact on states. Thus, while adaptation to the demands placed on member states by participation in the CFSP has clearly occurred – as noted in terms of organisational structures – this cannot be equated to the convergence that a is implied by Smith and others.
2.5 Problem 4: Why does the Capabilities-Expectations Gap continue to exist?

A fourth challenge to constructivist claims about the CFSP can be found in Christopher Hill’s conceptualisation of the ‘Capabilities-Expectations Gap’ (1993) in which he identified a significant disparity between the stated aims of the CFSP as first set out in Article 11 of the TEU,\(^{43}\) and actual policy outcomes. The crux of his original thesis is that the EU’s ability to fulfil either its existing roles in the international system or potential future ones match neither its own expectations nor those of external third parties.\(^{44}\) To illustrate this, he sought to categorize the capabilities available to achieve the goals set for the CFSP in terms of resources, policy instruments, and the ability of member states to agree policy (1993: 315). These would provide what he later termed a “yardstick” against which progress could be measured, the purpose being to highlight the problematic relationship within European foreign policy between ends and means, where the former have been neither clearly defined nor agreed by the member states (1998: 18).

Hill’s concept has since become one of the dominant paradigms in assessments of the CFSP, and has been utilized in many of the subsequent critiques of the EU’s claims to international actorness.\(^{45}\)

\(^{43}\) Article 11 (TEU) states: “The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy.” Its objectives include: safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union; preserving peace and strengthening international security; promoting international co-operation; and developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law.

\(^{44}\) He saw the EU’s key roles in 1993 as: (i) stabilizing Western Europe; (ii) managing world trade; (iii) being the principal voice of the developed world in relations with the nations of the South; and (iv) providing a second western voice in international diplomacy. The future roles he believed the EU might, or might be expected to, fulfill included: (i) replacing the USSR in the global balance of power; (ii) acting as a regional pacifier; (iii) being a mediator in conflicts; and (iv) and acting as a bridge between rich and poor (1993: 310-314).

\(^{45}\) For example, Philip Gordon (1997: 75): “Those who had hoped in 1991 that the EU’s CFSP would be worthy of such a name…have been largely disappointed” (1997: 75); Michael E Smith (2004: 190): “…the CFSP clearly has a mixed record of successes and setbacks and thus did not live up to its promise…”; and Roy Ginsberg (2001: 3): “…if one measures outcomes solely against the overly ambitious objectives of the CFSP negotiated in 1991-92 at Maastricht, the EU clearly falls short of expectations.”
These contend that the EU still lacks the ability to mount meaningful responses to international crises, despite, first, the institutional and processual reforms introduced in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, for example, which created a set of permanent common actors to develop, implement, and sustain foreign policy initiatives, most notably the office of High Representative (see Chapter 4); or second, the Franco-British ‘St Malo Declaration’ (see Chapter 5) that led to the development of ESDP/CSDP, which in turn equipped the EU with new instruments for crisis management, and which “significantly upgraded” the EU’s operational foreign policy capacity (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 165).

The reasons most commonly identified for this failing, by Hill in his original thesis (1993: 318), and in many subsequent analyses (e.g. Menon, 2008; Toje, 2008a,b), lie in the nature of decision-making within the CFSP. This in turn reflects the determination of member states to retain the maximum degree of control over policy in this area. Thus, while subsequent treaty reforms have sought to introduce some degree of flexibility into decision-making, in practice this has remained consensual. For example, Amsterdam included provisions for constructive abstention, designed to enable states to step back from a particular decision whilst recognising that it committed the entire Union and therefore they could not act to inhibit or prevent action based upon it (Smith, 2004: 228).

The treaty also introduced some measure of qualified majority voting on the implementation of policy, if not the policies themselves. To date, however, neither innovation has been utilised. Thus, while the continuing consensus-bias ensures the views of all member states continue to be accommodated provided goals remain general, the more precise or specific they become, the harder it is to ensure agreement, particularly given the Council of Ministers’ lack of enforcement mechanisms, or indeed even formal recording of which states have or have not

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46 Where abstaining Member States represent more than one third of votes in the Council, the measure would not be adopted, however (Smith, 2004: 228).
implemented an agreed policy (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 151). The risk, therefore, is of lowest common denominator policies, while the agile leadership that is so crucial for effective crisis management, for example, is sacrificed (Howorth, 2009: 18; see also, Menon, 2008).

The crucial gap is therefore one between stated collective aims and what member states will actually permit. Indeed, Tojé (2008a) argues that Hill’s concept should now be reformulated as a ‘Consensus-Expectations Gap’ to reflect the fact that, despite attempts to upgrade the resources and policy instruments available to it, the CFSP is essentially a hostage to process. Identifying the need for consensus as the “single most important factor” that has weakened European foreign and security policy (ibid: 122), he argues that the need for unanimity leads to an inherent conservatism as member states “cherry-pick” those issues where consensus for action of whatever kind can be achieved and ignore the rest, thereby ensuring that European policy agreed through the CFSP remains largely declaratory and uncontroversial (ibid: 132).47

From a rationalist/realist perspective, these difficulties are neither surprising nor unexpected (Menon, 2008), and illustrate some of the weaknesses in how constructivism has been applied in supranationalist analyses. Thus, even allowing for their similarities, the member states still represent 28 individual perspectives based on sometimes sharply differing determinations of national interest, differing capabilities and resources, and, indeed, differing forms of involvement in the international system. As noted earlier, these range from the historic preparedness to intervene of Britain and France, to the neutrality of Ireland and Austria.48 At the same time, they show us how the system of decision-making has also at times fallen victim to fundamental

47 Tojé cites Darfur as an example of where the inability to achieve a favourable consensus (in this case due to French refusal) trumped the need for action. He quotes one Commission official who stated that it was “difficult to imagine a more suitable mission for the EU” (2008a: 135).

48 See Manners and Whitman (2000) for a detailed discussion of this, particularly pp. 266-268.
differences between member states over the extent of integration into the foreign policy arena, the international role of the EU, and the nature and purpose of any security identity it might seek to develop (e.g. Kagan, 2004; Tojé, 2008b; Howorth, 2009). Indeed, arguably the most important dividing line in this context has been between those who have traditionally supported a ‘European’ agenda (e.g. France) and those who adopt a more ‘Atlanticist’ stance (e.g. the UK, Central and Eastern European states).

The ‘Capabilities-Expectations Gap’ thesis does not (and cannot) in and of itself explain why member states choose to support, oppose or refrain from actively pursuing particular policy options. It does, however, highlight the point at which ideas and aspirations must be transformed into actionable policy if they are to be achieved. The fact that there remains such a noticeable discrepancy between the two once again demands the question as to why. The presence of the ‘national’ provides the most obvious and logical explanation, therefore calling into question the extent to which CFSP has actually ‘transformed’ how member states determine their interests and make and pursue foreign policy choices.
2.6 Problem 5: How important is socialization in understanding the impact of the CFSP? Learning the lessons of COREPER

The final aspect of the critique provided here draws from Jeffrey Lewis’ extensive work on decision-making within the Council of Ministers (1998; 2000; 2005; 2010). Lewis’ research has examined the processes of decision-making, concepts of identity, and socialization, with a particular focus on how senior officials in bodies such as COREPER operate, interact and view their roles. His most important conclusions contest rationalist assumptions that the various formations of the Council, and particular COREPER, should be seen as arenas for hard-bargaining. Instead, he argues for a more nuanced understanding that sees communicative rationality and logics of appropriateness between participants as being of at least equal importance to instrumental rationality (1998: 480). This clearly supports some of the constructivist-based explanations for the process of integration, particularly the role of socialization, and indeed Lewis sets out quite deliberately to see whether a “constructivist line of questioning” can add to rationalist assumptions (2005: 938). His analysis of COREPER reveals the evolution of a clear style of interaction that is “rooted in a collective culture” (ibid), based on a “distinct culture of compromise” (1998: 479) and forms “an identifiable ‘nucleus of community’” (2000: 261). However, of equal importance is the fact that this environment has not resulted in the development of an “overarching supranational identity” on the part of officials; rather, members of COREPER talk in terms of possessing “dual personalities” or being “Janus-faced” (2005: 939-40). More broadly, he highlights the difficulty of characterising precisely what the Council represents, being neither “a typical intergovernmental bargaining table…[nor] a Gemeinschaft based on a European identity” (2010: 165). A brief discussion of his studies of COREPER can therefore provide useful lessons in how we understand the CFSP.

COREPER serves as the unofficial hub of the collective decision-making structures of the EU, bringing together the Permanent
Representatives (or their Deputies) from all member states with the task of preparing the agendas for the meetings of the different Council formations, as well as those for the European Council and Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs). Its importance to the management and accomplishment of Union business cannot be overstated. It enjoys a “unique institutional vantage point” within the EU system (ibid: 945) and, with the exception of agricultural issues which are handled by the Special Committee for Agriculture (SCA), deals with virtually all items on the Council agenda (Bostock, 2002: 216). It should be noted, though, that its relationship with the Political Committee/PSC has not been without tension and while COREPER retains the formal right to determine agenda items for the Foreign Affairs Council, in practice it rarely interferes in what the PSC has agreed. However, in general COREPER’s agenda-setting role, along with its unique position as the “interface” between the Community and member states, has been central to its ability to accrue “de facto decision-making authority” across a large area of EU affairs since it was first established (Lewis, 2000: 281, 261).

Lewis (ibid: 264) sees the process by which COREPER transacts business as critical to the Council’s performance. Its ability to carry out its tasks effectively is underpinned by three factors. First, its position within the Council’s institutional architecture enables it control the flow of business by acting as a “collective bottleneck” (ibid: 263). Second, its decision-making is governed by the principle of collective responsibility which gives members a stake in the successful functioning of the system – engrenage – helping them solve problems and ensure the coherent performance of the Council (ibid: 281). It is also reflected in the sense of “dual-loyalty” noted above and in the preference of members to reach accommodation with dissenters rather than forcing a vote (Bostock, 2002: 220). Finally and directly related to this, it enjoys a reputation for making agreements that stick (Lewis, 2000: 281). Consequently, the Permanent Representatives exercise considerable formal and informal
influence over Council business through their exchanges and the advice they offer. Taken together, these factors ensure their opinions carry great weight in domestic discussions (Bostock, 2002: 217). Thus, Lewis emphasises their importance not only in how the views and interests of member states are represented in Brussels, but also in how these are determined in the first place, with many Permanent Representatives playing an important role in the formulation of policy in their national capitals (2000: 266).

As noted, the environment in which COREPER ambassadors interact is central to how it processes Council business. With members all facing the same “Janus-like” task of having to deliver results domestically and collectively, the socialization process that takes place within COREPER has created what Lewis considers a “secondary allegiance” to the collective arena (ibid: 274). Members of COREPER spend more than 100 days per year together, meaning that negotiation becomes “a way of life” (ibid: 264). At the same time, the shared recognition that decision-making is most effective when done collectively has created a context in which the norms of compromise and consensus govern how COREPER functions, and which support the belief that all will profit in the long-run (ibid: 268). Alongside these, Lewis identifies three other critical “performance norms” or “methods of community” which underpin COREPER’s ability to function collectively (ibid). These are diffuse reciprocity; thick trust; and mutual responsiveness (ibid: 268). Together, they make a virtue out of the long-term nature of members’ relationships by encouraging self-restraint in the articulation and pursuit of national interests or objectives, promising future recognition for acts of compromise (notably the use of abstentions rather than vetoes), and instilling a sense of “shared mutual purpose” that helps in the building of consensus (ibid.). They also ensure that strength of argument and power of persuasion matter – and can, in some cases, be an important “equalizer” between large and small states (ibid: 266). In their analysis of COREPER, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006: 80)
also highlight the intense nature of the working relationships, arguing that they provide the Permanent Representatives with an in-depth education into the needs and interests of their peers making them in turn “predisposed” to finding solutions acceptable to as many as possible.

To be sure, Lewis is not arguing that as a consequence of these intensive and continuous interactions, national interests are being redefined or that divergent interests do not exist (2000: 274). What he is suggesting, though, is that the manner in which policy is agreed – the how – contradicts an instrumental notion based on hard-bargaining. Decision-making is not driven by member states purely on the basis of narrowly-defined interests, and nor is it “unidirectional” (ibid: 262). Rather, the effect of socialization means that members of COREPER become “like-minded” and share a collective interest in the success of the system (ibid: 274). Central to this is a redefinition of self-interest, enabling COREPER ambassadors to play a function that is dialectical but “not contradictory” (1998: 484). In a view that remains the case today (see chapters 5 and 6), one official described their role as follows:

“We all understand that we must manage and co-operate for the long term…[T]here is a confidence that I will deliver the goods at home and a confidence to deliver the goods collectively. I must find a way to synthesize the two.” (ibid.)

What is important to note is that this synthesis does not take place at the expense of either the national or the supranational. Rather, they become “complexly intertwined”, with the Permanent Representatives having “operationalized the concept of ‘double-hatting’” (2005: 967). Thus, it is entirely possible to have two ostensibly contradictory identities co-existing, with national identities – and loyalties – remaining as important as ever, but interpenetrated by a loyalty to the European level and this particular epistemic community (ibid). Thus, while constructions of identity may not be driven purely by notions of the national, nor are they subsumed by the development of alternative allegiances. What Lewis is arguing is that something more complex has emerged from the
interactions and socialization taking place in COREPER which may blur boundaries, but is not necessarily as transformational as a more supranational interpretation might imply. As the accounts of German and British officials in chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate, a similar judgement can be made in how we understand the impact of socialization within CFSP. It is a vital component in ‘oiling the machine’ of decision-making, and indeed many of the diplomats interviewed talk in terms of ‘dual loyalties’ or of a commitment to reaching agreement. However, this does not diminish the importance of pursuing nationally-derived interests and preferences. Rather, it provides a framework in which this can be done – the behaviour implied by participation in the CFSP is what is needed to ensure states can cooperate over the long term. The key insight we can take from Lewis, therefore, is that constructivism provides a means of understanding how states perform the process of pursuing or defending national interests. In other words, it enables us equally to develop a more sophisticated understanding of ‘rationalist/realist’ state activity in CFSP, without assuming that the CFSP is transforming either how states behave, or the interests and preferences they set out to achieve through their behaviour.
2.7 Conclusion

In their analysis of how constructivism can be applied to studies of European integration, Christiansen et al. (1999) suggest that it can help find a “middle ground” between the two poles of rationalist and reflectivism. The discussion here has sought to demonstrate two things. First, constructivism can and does bring important insights and conceptual tools to studies not only of the CFSP, but of integration more broadly. As Ginsberg (2001: 36-7) argues, the insights it provides can “complement and round-out” other explanations of decision-making. The concepts it offers and the emphasis it places on the role of ideas are valuable, enriching how we think about cooperation and what it means in practice. However, the second point is the danger of relegating rationalist/realist understandings of interest formation and pursuit to the periphery, as supranationalist interpretations that draw on constructivism in their analysis of CFSP seem to do. As useful as they are, constructivist tools – such as socialization and logics of appropriateness – can only take us so far. As this thesis will argue, the key idea underpinning supranationalist analyses of CFSP – i.e. that long-term co-operation in this arena is resulting in a transformation not only in how member states make foreign and security policy but in what they identify as their interests and preferences – is not borne out by a closer examination of their actual behaviour. The argument that will be made in the rest of this thesis, therefore, is that national interests remain alive and well, and continue to act as a major element at all levels and in all the negotiations that lead ultimately to the policy outputs of CFSP. To that extent, therefore, it is necessary to escape this middle ground. The next chapter suggests an approach to achieve this.
“Great powers are still subject to socializing influence as members of a system, but...maintain their status in the system due to their innovations in internal organization that allow them to fully develop and exploit their capabilities.”
(Cameron G. Thies, 2012: 33) (emphasis added)

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapters examined and critiqued how constructivism has been applied in supranationalist explanations of the effect of long-term co-operation in CFSP on member states. It is important to re-iterate that this thesis is not trying to deny the insights constructivism brings to the study of international relations, or to argue that there is no merit in applying it to the range of questions considered in the study of the EU, including the CFSP. As has been noted, constructivism challenges scholars to think in different ways about how both states and institutional actors perceive themselves and their place in the world; about questions of identity and the significance of ideas; and about the emergence, development and spread of values and norms in the range of institutional and institutionalised contexts that constitute the international “system”. As Roy Ginsberg (2001: 37) argues – and as chapter 1 sought to demonstrate – constructivism “gets us to ask hard questions” about the common norms and values that inform CFSP, and indeed European foreign policy more broadly. What this thesis is seeking to do, though, is to examine the efficacy of some of the claims made in the supranationalist theoretical approach to CFSP.

What is at issue is captured in the argument made at the end of the previous chapter that while constructivist-based analyses of the CFSP are important in explaining the how of policy- and decision-making – for example, with the insights provided by the concept of socialization etc – they are less convincing when considering the what – the outputs of that process, and what these tell us about how member states approach and engage with the CFSP. In particular, claims that interaction and
cooperation within the CFSP have led to a fundamental transformation in how member states define and pursue their national interests are problematic, as is the implication that in the context of the CFSP at least, the ‘national’ has been relegated to a position of secondary importance. Thus, the argument being made here is that an examination of the policies member states pursue, the objectives these entail, and the processes states employ to achieve them, together reveal that while member states engage with one another in a manner that is underpinned and facilitated by key norms including compromise, consensus and cooperation, their interaction with and within this policy arena continues to be driven by a broader range of factors. These include different national interests; different national perspectives on and understandings of the place of the CFSP in the international system; and differing expectations of and approaches to its utility in terms of achieving their particular goals. In this sense, we must focus on the national as an essential element in understanding the CFSP.

Two important points emerge from this. First, we are reminded of the value of incorporating rationalism into how we understand national systems of foreign policy-making and their outputs. Second, we must also recognise that in the environment represented by CFSP, there are a number of loci from which norms emerge, not least the governmental and especially foreign ministry structures of the member states themselves. Thus, significant though Brussels is in the context of the CFSP, it is problematic to assign to it the role of dominant “giver or shaper” of norms and values across all areas of foreign policy, as is implied in Smith’s analysis, for example. A renewed focus on the ‘national’ thus provides a useful starting point to test the critique of how constructivism has been applied in supranationalist analyses of CFSP presented in Chapter 2.

The purpose of this chapter is to present the research framework within which these arguments – and therefore this critique – can be operationalised and tested. To do this, it is divided into two sections. The
first sets out the research objectives of the thesis, including the central research question and sub-questions it generates, and the framework within which these can be investigated. The second explains how the research has been conducted, discussing the rationale for a methodology based on semi-structured elite interviews and bibliographical research, within the context of a 2-country study of Germany and the United Kingdom, and which incorporates two policy case studies. These examine efforts to prevent Iranian nuclear proliferation, and the development of the new European External Action Service.
3.2 Research framework and design

3.2.1 Central research question

The central research question of this thesis is:

*Does constructivism as applied in supranationalist analyses provide a satisfactory framework through which to explain how and why member states interact with the CFSP in the manner that they do?*

The research framework presented here seeks to answer this question by focusing on the interaction of two member states – Germany and the United Kingdom – with the CFSP. (The choice of states is discussed in the following section.) The argument that will be made is that as applied in supranationalist analyses, constructivism does not provide an adequate explanation of how they interact with the CFSP because such analyses neglect or underestimate the extent to which the ‘national’ is an important – or even dominant – factor in how they understand and approach policy-making.

The supranationalist claim as made by Smith, Glarbo etc is that notions of identity, and shared or common ideas and values have grown as a consequence of cooperation in the CFSP (and its predecessor EPC) to such an extent that a transformation has taken place within these states that goes to the very essence of how they view the world. The argument that will be made here, however, is that while both states view the CFSP as a highly important – indeed essential – factor in their foreign policy-making, they continue to approach it in predominantly, although not exclusively, instrumental terms. Meanwhile, the degree of transformation that is implied is not borne out by closer examination of how they go about the policy-making process. Consequently, it is suggested instead that more rationalist interpretations of interest formation and how states organise to pursue these remain important to our understanding of member state activity in the CFSP.

This is not to exclude the application of constructivist insights to how we understand what is taking place or deny the value of constructivist thinking. Rather it is to recognise that supranationalist
analyses privilege the European level over the national level, and in doing so mis-apply the tools constructivism can offer. Thus, the ideational definition that constructivist-based analyses place on the notion of what is ‘common’ in the CFSP is insufficient, as this implies a greater or deeper sense of convergence among states than is actually the case. In other words, agreement over common policies emerges from a policy-making process that while intensive, sophisticated and norm- and value-laden, especially in terms of how member states interact, continues to recognise, take account of, and ultimately be driven by, those same member states’ national interests and preferences. Thus, while constructivist scholarship has legitimately called for analysis to move beyond the narrow theoretical debates within IR, and particularly understandings of the world that rest wholly on rationalist or realist assumptions, equally we cannot ignore the contribution these theoretical approaches can continue to make to how we understand state interactions.

In the foreign policy arena represented by the CFSP, member states, and especially Germany and the United Kingdom, still organise for the exercise of national power and influence, and not necessarily always in support of a ‘European’ foreign policy goal. From this premise, and drawing particularly from the literatures on policy coordination and Europeanization, we can identify 4 important sub-questions that will provide the indicators to test these arguments. These relate to: policy coordination machinery; convergence; national policy projection; and official discourse.
3.2.2 Research sub-questions and indicators

Question 1: Does a member state’s national policy-making and coordination machinery demonstrate the rationally-driven pursuit of national interests or preferences?

Given that it is being argued here that rationalism deserves greater attention in our analysis, it is legitimate to ask what we understand by rationality, particularly in the context of policy-making and the state. Clarke (1989: 45) argues that as a concept rationality is actually quite “ambiguous” given that it is often confused or conflated with ideas of what is the ‘right’ decision in a particular context. Better, he suggests, that we consider it in the sense of “purposeful, analytical decision-making” (ibid), which strips the concept of normative or value-based content in terms of what might have been the right (or wrong) course of action in a given situation. At the same time, the notion of the state as a unitary, rational actor has also been the subject of frequent criticism for its over-simplification (see, for example, White, 1999). Rather, if we are to better understand what is occurring, for example in the context of foreign policy-making, it is necessary to “unravel” domestic policy-making processes, as well as to identify the key decision-makers involved in these (White, 1999: 42). This is important when we consider what is arguably the most significant challenge modern governments face: how to manage the inherent complexity of modern public policy administration, caused by the enormous range of issues to be addressed, the size of the administrative structures required to do so, and for EU member states, the additional level of complexity that results from interaction at the Brussels level. In this sense, therefore, if we define rationality as purposeful, analytical decision-making, an important measure can be said to be how governments organise their structures and processes to achieve this in response to the complexity they face.

Ekengren and Sundelius (2004: 110) suggest that national foreign policy coordination in support of member states’ vital interests is “still very much in evidence”, even if the context within which this is taking
place is being transformed by the EU. Consequently, the literature on policy coordination by EU member states discussed in the previous chapter provides useful insights into how we can think about the twin questions of rationality and complexity in decision-making in the context of foreign policy. In particular, the studies by Kassim et al. (2000, 2001) reveal two key points in this regard. The first is how EU member states respond to the challenge of complexity, especially in terms of the difficulty of achieving unity of policy and position at both the domestic and Brussels levels. Within any particular government there will be a range of sometimes very different calculations of what the national interest is, or what policy priorities should be depending on where the question is posed. Thus, an official or minister sitting in the Ministry of Finance may have a very different perspective to their peer in the Ministry of Agriculture or Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Equally, perspectives may vary depending on whether you sit in the national capital or in the Permanent Representation in Brussels. At the same time, the impact of organisational and bureaucratic politics, particular national policy traditions, and even the methods by which decision-making is conducted – what Major (2005: 3) characterises as “historically-embedded factors” – can all come into play. The second point is that all these essentially ‘internal’ or ‘national’ questions underpin the broader fact that coordination is “one way of more efficiently pursuing interests in Brussels” (Kassim, Peters and Wright, 2000: 3). In short, why organise in such a way if not to defend, promote and pursue national interests? Consequently, as an organised and rational set of structures that demonstrate a clear intent – or ambition – to achieve particular national preferences, the coordination machinery that these member states have put in place in the context of the CFSP provides our first indicator:

**Indicator 1:** if the constructivist analysis is valid, it should be possible to detect a diminishing coordination ambition among member states in the context of the CFSP, which will be reflected in the extent and complexity of their policy coordination machinery.
Question 2: Is there convergence in the structures and outputs of policy-making that supports constructivist-based analyses of the impact of CFSP?

One of the most important implications of how constructivism has been used in analysis of CFSP is that there will be convergence among member states not only in terms of the appropriate foreign policy action to take in a given set of circumstances, but that such actions will be framed in terms of an increasingly shared understanding of the world and their identity within that that is generated by participation in the CFSP. An example of this, as discussed in the previous chapter, could be efforts at the EU-level to achieve a global moratorium on the death penalty. This in turn is supported by a consensus among the member states against this practice and by the requirement placed on accession states to agree to this as one of the conditions of membership. The significance of this claim should not be underestimated. Foreign and security policy represent areas of huge sensitivity for all member states, not least the two under consideration here. As Major (2005: 183) has noted, they are “directly and insolubly linked” to the preservation of national sovereignty.

Debates over convergence have formed a major part of the broader literature on European integration, and particularly within studies of Europeanization. For example, Mény et al. (1996: 8) have argued that a “convergence process” is underway, whereby “common norms of action” have developed that are beyond the control of individual member states and yet have huge influence on how public policy actors behave. Similarly, Wessels and Rometsch (1996: 239) offer a theory of “institutional fusion” that assumes that the interaction between national and supranational actors at EU level will result in mutual interdependence and eventually the convergence of member states around an “optimal” approach to reacting and adapting to the institutional set up of the Union. In the context of the CFSP, Wong (2005: 149) suggests that one of the ways Europeanization can be understood is as “a process of foreign policy convergence”.

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In terms of institutional convergence at the national level, this hypothesis has been strongly disputed, however. Kassim (2000b: 253) cites March and Olsen’s argument that institutions have a “preservative tendency”, Jordan (2003: 264) describes national administrative structures as being “relatively resilient”, while Bulmer and Burch (1998: 603), again citing Olsen, posit that diversity in national administration co-exists with increasing political integration, and there is no overarching principle of European organisation. This argument is echoed by Laffan (2007: 133) who notes the “differential impact” of the EU on national core executives, and by Harmsen (1999) in his study of Europeanization in the French and Dutch administrations. Although accepting, for example, that a Europeanization of national administrations may be taking place in terms of the great increase in the range and frequency of contacts between national and supranational levels, and that some diffusion of common norms may be occurring, he sees no link to any systematic process of domestic institutional change (1999: 84). Indeed, he claims that far from diminishing, distinctive characteristics in national administrations persist, and there is an “intractable logic of differentiation” between member states (ibid: 106). Similarly, Cowles et al. (2001: 232, 236) see convergence as “largely confined” to policy and that Europeanization does not cause the “homogenization” of domestic structures.

If convergence is contested within national policy-making structures, the question then is whether convergence of member states around policy can be identified within CFSP. We can think about this in two levels: in terms of the overall response of member states to the demands of the CFSP, reflected in how they organise and coordinate policy; and the more specific issues facing the ‘component parts’ of that response – i.e. the ministries involved. Obviously each time member

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states have agreed on a CFSP policy, be it a declaration, joint action, etc, the consensus supporting this represents a convergence in this specific case. What is of interest here is whether something deeper and ideationally driven is at work, as the constructivist analysis contends.

Once again, the coordination literature is instructive in this regard. In his study of French policy coordination, Menon (2001: 75) argues that France’s approach to the EU is based on the notion of the predominance of member states, and consequently effective co-ordination serves as a bulwark against encroachment from supranational institutions, from the sub-national level, or from alternative policy approaches promoted by fellow member states that threaten its particular notion of “l’État”. This can be seen, for example, in long-standing French opposition to “Anglo-Saxon” economic models and practices. In the French case, therefore, its institutional adaptation can be said to have followed a “broadly preservative” path, contradicting the convergence theories outlined above (ibid: 105). Equally, however, although the French approach is defensive and perhaps also resistant, it can also be seen to support the promotion of a clear set of French preferences and interests – not the least of which is French national sovereignty. Similarly, in Britain the system for coordination is also highly-centralised, broad and inherently defensive, and is equally focused on the protection of national interests and sovereignty (Kassim, 2000a: 26). Britain’s co-ordination ambition is explicit and well-defined, aiming at “the overall steering of policy” (ibid: 23), and being almost “uniquely concerned” with the full spectrum of EU action and policy (Kassim, 2000b: 256). In both cases, this suggests that convergence on a particular policy issue will only take place where a clear benefit has been identified, pursued and/or promoted, with the policy coordination machinery designed to underpin this process.

At the same time, and repeating the earlier point that governments are not unitary actors, we also need to consider the significant role played by individual departments. Jordan (2003: 263) has emphasised this in his analysis of the Europeanization of policy and politics in member states,
describing government ministries in general as being “deeply implicated” as they are the “main channel of communication” between the EU and national level. At the same time, as Smith (1999: 131) notes, they are not “blank sheets” but rather “[t]hrough their history, institutional biases and cultures, departments have long term policy preferences.” For Jordan (2003: 264), therefore, to understand the effect of the EU at the national level requires us to examine the “cultural software” of individual ministries – their organisational culture, values, operating or taken-for-granted assumptions and dominant beliefs (ibid: 267). Consequently, if a transformation of national structures is taking place, it is here that Europeanization should be detectable (ibid: 268). For our purposes, and while reiterating the point that Europeanization is not synonymous with convergence, if the ideational transformation that CFSP is assumed to have caused has taken place, it is reasonable to assume that it should be identifiable within the structures, outputs and culture of governments more broadly and foreign ministries specifically. Therefore, the second indicator is as follows:

**Indicator 2: if constructivist-based analyses are valid, it should be possible to identify a clear convergence in how member states organise their foreign policy structures and the policies they pursue within the CFSP.**
Question 3: why do member states seek to project their national preferences to the CFSP?

Wong (2005: 146) has argued that the CFSP today is “an essential component” of how member states formulate their foreign policy, a point with which many of those interviewed for this study concur. That the states view it as an arena within which to pursue national preferences or interests is demonstrated most clearly by their efforts to project – or ‘upload’ (e.g. Börzel, 2002) – these to the EU level. Indeed, as discussed in the previous chapter, this idea of projection by member states is a key element of the sub-section of Europeanization literature that deals with the CFSP and for which the conventional wisdom of the ‘top-down’ analysis is difficult to apply (e.g. Major, 2005).

Wong’s analysis is instructive as although he is arguing that Europeanization in the context of the CFSP is best understood as “a process of foreign policy convergence”, he is also clear that it can be seen as well as national policy “amplified as EU policy” (ibid: 149). Thus, the national projection of particular national preferences and interests, particularly by the larger member states which can command greater resources, means than any convergence is “negotiated”, with Europeanization a “bi-directional process” (ibid: 151). At the same time, Wong and Hill (2011: 3) note that “persistent national foreign policies” operate alongside and “sometimes at variance with” EU foreign policies. For example, member states may engage with each other in the CFSP from an ‘Atlanticist’ or ‘Europeanist’ perspective, and with the particularities of their own national strategic culture (for example, their views on the use of force or their role in the world) informing their perspectives on a particular situation (Major, 2005: 183). All these factors feed into both what they seek to project to the EU level, and how they respond when others seek to do so.

This poses a challenge first to contentions that there is a reconfiguring of national interests and preferences towards a more ‘European’ construction of interest, and second that such interests cannot
be seen as exogenous to the strategic diplomatic interactions taking place within the CFSP, as Ginsberg (2001: 37) has argued. The states being considered here both have long-standing interests and relationships that exist outside or beyond the EU (and they are not alone in this). Consequently, while cooperation in the CFSP clearly impacts on member states, this cannot be judged solely in terms of their reaction to the EU level. Rather, we are reminded that, as Wong (2005: 137) states, this is an environment in which states are “pro-active” and seek to utilise or instrumentalise the CFSP to achieve particular outcomes, that may in turn be influenced by other exogenous factors. Thus, while it may represent a “collective endeavour” (Hill and Wallace, 1996: 6), the CFSP is an endeavour in which anyone of the 27 can in theory act as a policy entrepreneur, advocating, promoting or even blocking a particular course of action. As Major (2005: 183) reminds us, states remain the main actors in European foreign and security policy.

Constructivism suggests that socialization and the emergence of logics of appropriateness change not only the rules of the game to ensure they support the collective endeavour, but also how the participants define their own interests within that. What the literature on Europeanization in the CFSP suggests, though, is that member states continue to approach the CFSP in rationalist, instrumental terms, as indicated by their continuing efforts to project particular interests or preferences. No single member state, however powerful, can force the other 26 to adopt or acquiesce in its favoured course of action. Consequently, their ability to do this rests on learning how to play the game to best effect, including how they marshal their resources, practice their diplomacy, present their arguments etc. Thus, as important as the culture of compromise and consultation which characterise the CFSP are, the fact that states respect and abide by these cannot automatically be equated to a deeper level of change or transformation. Rather, these define the parameters under which all states must operate.
Indicator 3: if the constructivist-based analysis of CFSP is valid, a transformation of how states view the world, including a reconstruction of their national interests towards a common ‘European’ interest, should be clearly identifiable in what they seek to project to the European level.

Question 4: does the language and discourse employed by member state governments and officials in the context of the CFSP reflect ‘European’ conceptions of interest and identity?

The final sub-question focuses on the language and discourse used by the officials actually involved in the process of policy- and decision-making in national capitals and Brussels, and in the official statements and documents produced by the governments they represent. The primary responsibility of national officials is to carry out the policy of their government. For example, paragraph 2 of the British Civil Service Code (Civil Service, 2010) declares that the Civil Service “supports the Government of the day in developing and implementing its policies”. However, as the earlier discussion of the literature on socialization indicates, many national officials, and particularly those operating predominantly in Brussels, develop secondary or parallel loyalties to the committee or working group they participate in (the implications of this are discussed in more detail in the next chapter). A commitment to the successful functioning of these entities is clearly essential if they are to produce agreement across 27 member states, as are the norms that underpin their cooperation (including reciprocity, thick trust, mutual responsiveness and a commitment to consensus as outlined above). That officials recognise themselves as possessing an institutional or group loyalty that exists alongside that associated with their being national representatives seems clear. The question, though, is whether this additional loyalty and the commitment of officials to the successful functioning of their committee or working group supersedes or even supplants their commitment to supporting, promoting or defending national objectives. This seems far less certain.
The way that constructivism has been applied to analyses of the CFSP suggests that the development of these additional allegiances is part of a broader process of change. As a consequence of the continued and continuous interactions throughout the structures that embody CFSP, officials and the member states they represent reconfigure both national interest and identity. To paraphrase John Searle (1995), they reconstruct their social reality, creating new ‘social facts’ that emphasise shared or collective understandings, interests and identity which, in the context of the CFSP, place the emphasis on the ‘European’ as opposed to the national. Such change can be expected to manifest itself in a number of ways, but perhaps most visibly in the discourse employed by member states in ministerial speeches, official policy documents, Council Conclusions and other declarations. Perhaps more interesting, though, is the discourse and language used by officials in national capitals and in Brussels. It is reasonable to assume two things: first, that a process of gradual change reflecting this ‘reconstruction’ will be detectable in official documents when examined over an extended period of time; and second, that this will also be indicated in how officials talk about the national foreign policy in the context of the CFSP. Therefore:

**Indicator 4: if the constructivist-based analysis is valid, it will be possible to identify a clear change in the how member states and their officials talk about national identity and interest in the context of the CFSP.**
The indicators are summarised in Table 1 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Assumption Based on Constructivist-Based Analysis</th>
<th>Assumption Based on Rationalist Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complexity of Policy Coordination Machinery</td>
<td>Likely to be less complex reflecting a decreasing coordination ambition.</td>
<td>Likely to remain more complex for states that still approach the CFSP in instrumental terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convergence in Foreign Policy Structures and Outputs</td>
<td>Convergence likely to be visible in the policy priorities of the member states.</td>
<td>Some convergence in structures representing the functional requirements of the CFSP, but outputs will remain mixed depending on how the member state views them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projection of Interests and Preferences</td>
<td>Should represent a ‘European’ rather than a national objective.</td>
<td>Will support a national preference, even if presented in ‘European’ terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in National Discourse</td>
<td>Visible in official statements and speeches, policy documents, and individual comments by officials</td>
<td>Language and discourse will reflect the ‘national’ as well as the ‘European’, particularly by individuals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3 Research methodology

A qualitative research methodology is employed in this study involving a comparative study of how Germany and the United Kingdom interact with the CFSP. Incorporated within this are two policy case studies. These focus on the role of both states in the development of the EU’s policy response to Iran’s nuclear programme, and their involvement in the establishment of the new European External Action Service. As Bryman (2004: 27) has noted, a case study is both a research methodology and a research design, and therefore requires a range of additional methods to support data collection. These are provided by the use of content analysis of official documents, statements, declarations and speeches; and elite interviewing. This section presents the rationale for adopting this approach, discussing each choice in turn.

3.3.1 Employing case studies, expert interviews and content analysis

The use of case study-based research is common within the social sciences and is most frequently associated with qualitative research, although it is important to note that they are not and should not be seen as synonymous (e.g. Bryman, 2004: 49; Lewis, 2003: 51). As a research methodology, the case study approach was initially developed to “study historical experience” in a manner that would generate “useful generic knowledge” about foreign policy problems (George and Bennett, 2005: 67). The case study allows the researcher to focus on the investigation of a particular context – for example, a process or organisation – and at the same time incorporate a “multiplicity of perspectives” (Lewis, 2003: 52). These can be drawn from a range of data collection methods, or from multiple accounts, but crucially they are appropriate in situations, such as the decision-making process underpinning a particular foreign policy action, where a single perspective is unable to provide a sufficiently full account or explanation of what is being researched.
The potential for richness and depth in terms of the data they generate allows the researcher to identify causal relationships, but within the broader context. Within the CFSP, for example, it enables a determination not only of what happened (e.g. a particular policy outcome), but how and why (e.g. the perspectives of the different national officials involved, the level at which a decision was reached, etc). The answers that emerge can then be compared to the expectations generated by the theoretical approach adopted in the research design.

As with any research strategy, there are both advantages and limitations. George and Bennett (2005: 31) argue that case studies involve an inevitable trade-off between theoretical parsimony, explanatory richness and keeping the number of cases manageable. In addition, case studies also raise concerns over potential bias in selection. These risks can be mitigated through transparency of analysis and the use of triangulation which prevents the researcher relying on one particular data source by allowing the cross-checking of findings (Bryman, 2004: 275). In the context of this research, this is facilitated by combining the transcripts from elite interviews with content analysis of official documents, statements, declarations and speeches.

Elite or expert interviewing enables the researcher to conduct a “detailed investigation” of the interviewee’s personal perspective, provides “in-depth understanding of the personal context within which the research phenomenon is located” and detailed coverage of the subject (Lewis, 2003: 58). As Bryman (2004: 320) notes, qualitative, semi-structured (as opposed to structured) interviewing can generate rich and detailed answers. Moreover, such interviews are a much better way to consider “complex systems, processes or experiences” (Lewis, 2003: 58), such as those pertaining to government policy-making. They are particularly useful for researching activities that occur “behind closed doors” as they can provide “immense amounts of information” that is not available from official documents or media sources (Lilleker, 2003: 208). While Dexter (2006: 18) has questioned the efficacy of the term elite
with its “connotations of superiority”, he goes on to admit his inability to find a satisfactory alternative term. For Lilliker (2003: 207), elites are defined as those “with close proximity to power or policymaking”. In the context of this research, this is an appropriate term to employ.

A total of thirty eight interviews were conducted between April 2010 and May 2012. These included interviews with officials in the Foreign Ministries in London and Berlin, including current and former European Correspondents; with representatives in their Permanent Representations in Brussels, including delegates to the PSC and a number of the working groups that support it; and with officials in the Secretariat-General of the Council of Ministers, the European Commission and the European External Action Service. Additional interviews were conducted with representatives of France and Sweden to assist in the process of corroboration. Several academic and policy experts in the field were also interviewed, as were a number of politicians, including two MEPs with a particular interest in foreign policy. The majority of these interviews were recorded and transcribed, enabling detailed content analysis. On six occasions the interviews were not recorded either at the request of the individual concerned or due to the security arrangements in place at the institution where the individual worked. In these cases, detailed notes were taken during the interviews and were written up immediately afterwards.

The elite interviews both support and are supported by content analysis as noted. An extensive range of primary and secondary sources has been analysed for this study. Primary sources include speeches by Heads of State or Government, Foreign Ministers and other junior ministers within each state’s MFA; official government documents, reports and statements; Council Conclusions and other Council statements and declarations; reports to national Parliaments and the European Parliament; and reports, statements and other documents produced by the European Commission and European External Action Service. Secondary sources include a wide range of academic
publications, reports and briefings produced by think tanks and research institutes, and media outputs including newspaper articles and television and radio reporting. These relate to the broad range of theoretical and conceptual questions pertaining to the study of the CFSP itself, and the national foreign and security policy and policy-making of the countries in question.

3.3.2 The country studies

The member states chosen for this project are Germany and the United Kingdom which, as Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 124) amongst others have noted, play a “special role” in EU foreign policy – although this should not be taken to mean that other states do not also make significant contributions to the CFSP. Both can reasonably claim to be central to the EU’s foreign and security policy as they possess the greatest ability to project power and pursue diplomacy at the global level and, as well as being leading EU states, are also important members of NATO. Alongside this, Britain is also a permanent member of the UN Security Council, while at the time of writing Germany has just completed a two-year term on this body. At the same time, they share both significant exposure to but also the ability to respond robustly to common security threats caused, for example, by regional neighbourhood crises, terrorism, energy security etc. Each can legitimately argue that they are vital to the successful development and implementation of a foreign and security policy at the EU level.

Alongside this, each state also represents a different experience of the EU and European integration. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, despite having an often troubled relationship with aspects of the EU, Britain’s status as one of Europe’s two leading military powers makes it essential if EU diplomacy is to have recourse to more robust instruments, particularly in the context of ESDP/CSDP missions. Moreover, as the Anglo-French St Malo initiative and subsequent developments have
shown, CFSP and ESDP/CSDP are areas where the British have deliberately sought to exercise a degree of leadership that has not been possible in other policy areas. Obviously, and as will be discussed, no secret has been made of Britain’s determination to ensure that developments in the CFSP and particularly ESDP/CSDP do not undermine NATO’s status as the primary institution in Europe’s defence architecture. Equally, it also indicates a recognition on the part of the UK that the EU can be an important force-multiplier in the achievement of its own foreign policy goals.

Germany (see Chapter 6) is arguably the more interesting of the two states under consideration. Following the end of the Second World War, it has sought to re-integrate itself into the international community, most notably under the auspices of the EU and NATO. It could reasonably be claimed that its development could be seen to fit most closely within a constructivist framework, with its post-war identity lying very much within the process of European integration specifically, and multilateralist engagement more broadly. However, since unification in 1990, and particularly under the chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder, it has demonstrated a willingness to become more assertive in its foreign policy, even deploying troops overseas for the first time since 1945. Thus, although highlighting a close identification between national and collective European interests, and apparently less sensitive over national sovereignty than Britain, interesting questions emerge from how it interacts with the CFSP.

Overall, although similar in many respects, both states bring a unique set of historical experiences and perspectives, along with different organisational and administrative systems and structures. As Carlnaes (1992: 267) has argued, while states may demonstrate many analogous characteristics, “they are nevertheless always constituted by different real-world structures” (italics in original). In short, these states are similar enough in a range of ways to make a comparative exercise of
great interest. Equally, they are different enough to hope that such a comparison will generate some useful conclusions.

3.3.3 The policy case studies

The two policy case studies selected for this thesis are the EU’s response to the Iranian nuclear programme, and the establishment of the European External Action Service, with the role of each state the main focus of interest in each. The cases were among a number of policy areas identified at the start of the research as of potential interest, and emerged during the course of the interviews as being particularly relevant. In each case, both states have demonstrated a close interest in how the policy has developed and a determination to influence the ultimate outcome. At the same time, the cases illustrate different aspects of the CFSP as a whole, with the Iranian nuclear programme representing a major security dilemma for member states, while the EEAS presents a broader institutional challenge in terms of the long-term direction of policymaking in the CFSP, and encompassing a range of differences over the strategic direction of EU foreign policy. They therefore provide two useful lenses through which to consider the central research question. In particular, within the research framework set out above we can consider how they articulated their national interest in this context, the extent to which they were successful in projecting this to the European level, and how they have sought to instrumentalise the CFSP to achieve nationally-based goals. (A detailed background for each is provided in Chapter 7.)
Chapter 4: Equivocation, Circumvention and Accommodation? The CFSP in Historical and Organisational Perspective

“[R]espect for national sovereignty and the collective effectiveness of the Union…do not necessarily go together. Flexibility, hard core, constructive abstention, leadership, enhanced cooperation, Foreign Minister: all are ways for states to try to equivocate, circumvent and accommodate the principle of the veto, while refusing categorically to take the plunge towards a merging of sovereignty...”
(Gnesotto, 2004: 20)

4.1 Introduction

The question being posed by this thesis is whether constructivism provides a satisfactory framework through which to understand how and why member states interact in the way that they do with the CFSP. The central argument is that while constructivist analyses provide important insights into the how of policy- and decision-making within the CFSP context, they are less useful when considering the what, particularly in terms of outcomes. Moreover, constructivist-based arguments of a transformation in how member states define and pursue their national interests are contradicted by the evidence of their on-going efforts at both the national and Brussels levels to influence the policy-making process in order to achieve outcomes that, although set within a ‘European’ context or rubric, demonstrate rationalist and instrumentalist understandings of the CFSP and its place in their national foreign policy calculations. This reminds us that the CFSP is a supplementary structure, sitting atop robust national institutions. It does not replace or supplant these but is better understood as an institutional umbrella within which a wide range of national institutional actors can interact. As a precursor to the more detailed studies of Britain and Germany, it is therefore useful to look at how CFSP has evolved historically and organisationally to highlight the impact the member states have had – and continue to have – on it.
In many ways, and as the Gnesotto quote above suggests, the history of foreign and security policy cooperation within the EU has been characterised – and arguably overshadowed – by the continuous tension between the national sovereignty of the member states on the one hand, and on the other their efforts to harness the potential of the EU and its structures to act for their individual and collective benefit. Missiroli (2007: 9) characterises this tension in terms of an “intrinsic dualism” between the Community and intergovernmental aspects of foreign and security cooperation. This is a useful description as it reminds us that for much of its existence, the CFSP has been quite deliberately placed at an institutional arm’s length from the EU’s Community structures. This reflects, as noted in Chapter 1, the desire of the more integration-minded states that its ‘intergovernmentalism’ would not dilute the integration that had already taken place, and the equal determination of their more sovereignty-minded partners that foreign and security policy would not be communitarised. This notwithstanding, the other side of this coin is the story of the effectiveness – some might prefer to emphasise the ineffectiveness – of CFSP outputs, which is intricately related to the structures created by the member states to support their cooperation.

Unsurprisingly, this idea of dualism underpins the wide-ranging and on-going academic debates on the CFSP. These are taking place in a broad and ever-growing body of literature concerned with its development, structures and institutionalisation, policy-making processes, and policies and outputs, and ultimately its effectiveness and efficiency. Of particular interest here, and as noted in Chapter 1, is the considerable debate over the usefulness or adequacy of the concept of intergovernmentalism to explain the policy- and decision-making processes at work within the CFSP, the institutional arrangements that have developed and evolved to service and manage it, and the relationships between the actors engaging under its auspices. Jorgensen (1997), Galloway (1999), Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006) amongst others all argue that while the term ‘intergovernmental’ may be a
technically accurate description of the formal, institutional reality of the CFSP, particularly as expressed through the Treaty on European Union (1991) and its subsequent augmentations at Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000), and most recently through the 2008 Treaty of Lisbon, the term no longer captures the reality of the processes and interactions taking place within the CFSP.\(^{50}\) Equally, however, it cannot be argued that the CFSP has become an extension of the supranationalised policies and institutions that represent the Community component of the EU. But if neither intergovernmental, nor supranational, what does the CFSP represent, and more importantly what does this tell us about how the member states interact and engage with it?

Howorth and Le Gloannec suggest that characterising the development of the CFSP in terms of a continuous competition between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism is not useful. Instead, they counsel that it is more productive to consider it and its relationship to the Community institutions and instruments upon which it has so often relied in terms of finding “the most practical way to make them work in harmony” (2007: 32). There is much to be said for this, particularly in terms of understanding the many and varied changes to foreign and security cooperation since it first began under EPC. As the subsequent discussion will show, CFSP has certainly come a long way from the “informal gentlemen’s agreement” represented by EPC (Smith, 2004: 11). However, it should also be noted that while this binary division may be limiting and restrictive in academic terms, it encapsulates to a considerable extent how the member states – and their representatives – view the development of the CFSP, as well as their participation in it, as will be shown in the country studies.

From the perspective of this thesis, though, in terms of understanding the relationship between the CFSP and the member states, Nuttall’s description of it as a “halfway house” (2000: 275) provides the

\(^{50}\) Galloway (1999: 226) contends that the term is in fact “misleading”
most useful starting point. Such a characterisation enables us to understand the CFSP as a policy environment that draws on many of the structures, processes and behavioural norms that are characteristic of other, communitarised policy areas – for example the working groups and preparatory committees, behavioural norms of trust and reciprocity etc – whilst retaining important features that underpin the continuing dominance of the member states, not the least of which is the power of the veto. This reminds us that whatever changes have taken place, the *sine qua non* of policy-making within the CFSP is that it remains “predicated on national control” (Tonra, 2000: 145). This chapter discusses this from two standpoints. First a historical perspective tracks the development of foreign and security policy cooperation from the establishment of EPC through to the creation of the CFSP in the 1991 TEU and its augmentation in subsequent treaties. The second develops some of the issues this raises by examining in more detail some of the key organisational and institutional developments, with particular reference to the concept of ‘Brusselisation’, first articulated by Allen (1998). Taken together, these allow us to map out the CFSP’s evolving relationship with the member states, and so contextualise the subsequent argument that German and British interactions with it are based on rationalist and instrumentalist calculations that challenge constructivist assumptions about the impact of cooperation.
4.2 The development of the CFSP in historical perspective

Glarbo (1999: 634) contends that the realist/rationalist argument that foreign policy cooperation in the EU has been and remains intergovernmental in character lies in the institutional framework created for it by the member states. This framework was initially constructed in the 1991 Treaty on European Union (TEU) which formally established the CFSP, was amended and augmented at Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000), and substantially revised and upgraded by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008. Certainly, it can be argued that the TEU and subsequent treaties have embedded certain intergovernmental features, particularly through the ‘pillar system’. However, it is equally fair to say that they also created the space for the formalisation and strengthening of institutions and processes that have diluted these, some of which first emerged during the pre-CFSP era of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s and 80s. A useful starting point, therefore, is to trace the development of the CFSP from its origins in EPC through these key treaty changes.


European Political Cooperation (EPC) was launched following the 1970 Luxembourg Report, establishing for the first time a political track running parallel to – but crucially remaining separate from – the ongoing economic cooperation between the then six member states of the EEC. In the two decades of its existence, EPC developed from Smith’s “informal, intergovernmental gentlemen’s agreement” into what Wallace (1978) described as an “accepted and indispensable” aspect of member states’ national foreign policies. Indeed, in 1981 Douglas Hurd, then a Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, stated that “in some areas of diplomacy our policy is formed wholly within a European context; and in no area is the European influence
completely absent” (1981: 383).\textsuperscript{51} Cooperation – or at least “the attempt to achieve it” – was thus a key driver of national policy (Hurd, 1994: 421).

At the time of its establishment expectations for the success of EPC were not high, however. Previous attempts by the member states in the 1950s and 60s to coordinate their political as opposed to economic relations through the \textit{European Political Community} and \textit{Fouchet Plans} had foundered as a consequence of disagreements over the “means and ends” of foreign policy cooperation, and thus it began surrounded by a “legacy of failure” (Smith, 2004: 2). Moreover, EPC faced a host of problems, both internal and external, not least the lack of institutional support and the “entrenched” foreign policy traditions of the member states themselves, along with Cold War tensions, hostility from the USA and the challenge of producing a meaningful response to the situation in the Middle East. Together, these lead Smith to declare that by rights it “should never have left the planning stage” (ibid.). However, it is within these problems that both EPC’s rationale and the reason for its unanticipated success can be discerned.

The primary objective of the member states in creating EPC was the achievement of important internal rather than external goals – a theme which recurred in the establishment of the CFSP in the TEU (Allen, 1998: 46) (discussed below). Thus, while the desire for a more effective and coherent approach to the outside world was, and indeed continues to be, a significant element in their calculations – what Meunier and Nicolaïdis (1999: 478) have characterized as Europe “speaking with one voice” – this was secondary to the aim of preventing external crises from disrupting European integration (Smith, 2004: 4; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 148). EPC’s success, meanwhile, lay in its initially limited focus on East-West relations and the Middle East. For Glarbo (1999: 643), the “exclusive dedication” of EPC first to

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\textsuperscript{51} Hurd subsequently served as Foreign Secretary from 1989 to 1995, under Margaret Thatcher and then John Major.
East-West relations through the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and second to the Middle East through the facilitation of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, demonstrated that these were policy areas felt to be “appropriate” for EPC, and ones where it might have “reasonable chances” of playing a role. At the same time, though, he suggests that this agenda was both “arbitrary and restricted”, while Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet criticises this attempt at the coordination of West European foreign policies as being “timid and selective” (2002: 257).

While such criticism may be valid, it is important to keep in mind, particularly in light of the failure of previous initiatives, that these were issues where sufficient common ground existed for the co-ordination of policy to take place. Consequently, they provided what was in effect a laboratory within which the first efforts at cooperation could be developed. At the same time, these policy areas enabled EPC to acquire an autonomous identity which Glarbo argues enabled it to be largely set beyond narrower questions of national interest (1999: 643). In a similar vein, Nuttall (2000: 272) suggests that the fact that EPC was “self-contained” was an important element in its success. The restricted number of issues it dealt with reflected the fact that it was managed by a small group of diplomats who controlled its agenda and, unless an external event demanded their attention, could therefore avoid subjects where consensus might prove difficult. Indeed, he describes EPC in its early days as “a club run by diplomats, for diplomats” (ibid). This also contributed to the fact that for much of its existence, the development of EPC went “largely unnoticed” by either national parliaments or the media (Hill and Wallace, 1996: 6).  

One of EPC’s most striking features was the novelty of the processes and procedures that evolved within it to facilitate and

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52 They note, for example, that the House of Commons in the UK only had a committee to deal with foreign affairs from 1979, while in France primacy in foreign and defence policy was reserved to the President under the constitution of the Fifth Republic (Hill and Wallace, 1996: 6).
strengthen co-operation. Prior to 1970 any kind of regularized interaction between Western Europe’s diplomats was “practically absent” and where it did occur was framed within traditionally bilateral patterns (Glarbo, 1999: 639). However, the Luxembourg Report had not laid down any particular provisions on the mechanics of how co-operation was to function, and consequently these developed in a largely heuristic fashion emphasising simultaneously both their practical and symbolic importance (ibid: 641).

Thus, between 1970 and the 1973 Copenhagen Report which codified EPC formalities for the first time, the rules for co-operation at ministerial level were constructed “virtually from scratch” (ibid.). Meanwhile, innovations that would prove so important later, particularly the use of Working Groups, twenty of which were established following Luxembourg (Smith, 2004: 79), the so-called Gymnich formula for running meetings of Foreign Ministers and the creation of the European Council, represented attempts by presiding member states to find new ways to solve the problems posed by co-ordination.

Each of these innovations represents determinedly intergovernmentalist solutions to these challenges, and arguably none more so than the European Council. More significantly, they are clearly indicative of the ongoing tensions inherent within political co-operation between the member states’ wish to maintain political control and the potentially integrative dynamics that this co-operation was creating, and which have posed an ongoing challenge throughout the evolution of EPC and CFSP. Thus, the Working Group formula was developed by the French Presidency in 1971 as a mechanism to enable the involvement of the European Community in EPC without compromising the latter’s autonomy. Meanwhile, the Gymnich formula for Foreign Ministers’ meetings sought to create an informal and relaxed environment for face-

53 Glarbo notes that a similar process was underway at the same time within NATO (1996: 639).
to-face discussions, absent either fixed agendas or diplomats.\textsuperscript{54} Initially intended as a short-term way of solving disagreements, for example over policy towards the Middle East, it has proved a highly successful and durable means for resolving internal problems. Finally, the “institutional novelty” of the European Council in 1974 was intended to establish a supreme decision-making body that was clearly \textit{political} in nature, and would preserve member states’ prerogatives in foreign policy (Glarbo, 1999: 642). In Smith’s words, it was to be the “dominant intergovernmental ‘umbrella’ under which all EC/EPC business” would be conducted and directed (2004: 98).\textsuperscript{55} Indeed, he goes on to suggest that with its establishment, governments had “consolidated their authority” over both the EC and EPC (ibid: 99).

EPC’s intergovernmental environment ensured that its weak institutional arrangements came under constant and growing strain, however, a fact thrown into sharp relief during the 1980s first by enlargement and later by the end of the Cold War and the resultant foreign policy demands this placed on member states individually and collectively. Thus, participating diplomats and officials were primarily nationally-based, while prior to the establishment of a dedicated (if small) EPC secretariat in the \textit{Single European Act} (1986)\textsuperscript{56} – a proposal first made by the Germans in 1971, but which continued to be the subject of much debate and dispute between the member states (Smith, 2004: 166) – these services were provided \textit{in situ} by the state holding the rotating Presidency to ensure that it remained “rigidly divided” from the

\textsuperscript{54} The first \textit{Gymnich} meeting was held in April 1974 and one of its outcomes was the breaking of the stalemate between France and its 8 European partners over relations with the US. See Michael Smith (2004: 115) for a detailed discussion of this.

\textsuperscript{55} Although not part of the EC’s original legal structures, the role of the European Council in European foreign policy was ultimately formalised in the Treaty on European Union (see Smith, 2004: 98).

\textsuperscript{56} Dijkstra (2008: 153) notes that this was a watered-down version of President Mitterand’s original proposal to create a high-level Secretary-General in charge of foreign policy co-ordination. Its establishment was also made possible by the dropping by the French of long-standing demands that the Secretariat be based in Paris rather than Brussels and would serve EPC rather than the European Council (Smith, 2004: 167).
Community (Ginsberg, 1999: 430; Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 170). Echoing the earlier point, Duke and Vanhoonacker (ibid) note that this was to avoid any impression either that EPC was being communitarised by locating the secretariat in Brussels, or was being “overly intergovernmentalized” by placing it in a single government capital.

The growing inadequacy of these arrangements soon became obvious, however. Firstly, there was the problem of the growing number of participants at meetings, meaning that a tour de table became increasingly time-consuming, ensuring that discussions became “interventions not conversations” (Nuttall, 2000: 272) – an issue that a number of officials interviewed for this research have said remains a problem today. Meanwhile public opinion also became a factor that could not be ignored in responding to issues such as the crisis in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. As these demanded greater involvement by senior ministers and even heads of government, the room for manoeuvre available to the diplomats consequently decreased (ibid: 273).

More generally, as Allen (1998: 50) notes, the SEA ended the fiction that foreign policy could be kept separate from the Community, upon whose instruments its decisions relied for implementation, and remain the “exclusive property” of national foreign ministries without creating central institutions to support it. Similarly, Smith notes that the treaty ensured EPC and the Community “were tied together and made legally binding” on member states for the first time (2004: 152). Thus, he argues, although it may not have been formally ‘communitarised’, existing practices within EPC were codified and stronger legal obligations were put in place than had been the case previously (ibid: 153).

Overall, EPC represented an unprecedented breakthrough in terms of the willingness of sovereign states to cooperate in pursuit of collective responses to international issues and crises. Its most important

57 The SEA also made it a requirement that any prospective member states would also have to accept all the obligations placed on them by both EC and EPC membership – there could be no “differentiated participation” (Smith, 2004: 153).
legacy, and one which has underpinned foreign and security policy cooperation ever since, has been the development and prevalence of the ‘consultation reflex’ (discussed in Chapter 1), whereby policy proposals or responses would be co-ordinated with partner states before any ensuing action was implemented (Glarbo, 1999: 644; Smith, 2004: 94-5). More specifically, it is the fact that this reflex has, as Glarbo (1999: 644) argues, become “habitual” – something done naturally rather than as a “deliberately chosen means”. However, despite all the procedural innovations and changes it brought to the nature of diplomatic and political interaction, EPC was essentially designed as a ‘passive’ means of preventing disruption to the integration project. As Galloway (1999: 212) puts it, it was seen to “follow” rather than make or shape events. Moreover, it was neither equipped nor structured to provide the kind of robust and comprehensive responses demanded by the post-Cold War environment of the early 1990s.
4.2.2 The Treaty on European Union

In seeking to address these shortcomings, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) set out to introduce a far more comprehensive and proactive approach to foreign policy cooperation. EPC was replaced by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the second of three separate pillars alongside one for Community policy (pillar one) and one for the newly-established cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (pillar three). However, although foreign policy was brought into the newly-created single institutional framework of the European Union, thus upgrading the legal status it had first acquired under the SEA, the pillar system ensured that in strictly legal and institutional terms, the divide would be maintained between the supranational Community policies and institutions on the one hand, and the intergovernmental arenas of CFSP (and JHA) on the other.  

At the same time, the TEU set out an impressive set of goals and objectives for CFSP, including safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union; preserving peace and strengthening international security; and developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law (Art. 11, TEU). It also equipped it with a new set of legally-binding and innovative policy instruments – common positions, common actions and joint actions – with which to achieve them. Meanwhile, the new Article 228A provided for the first time a proper legal basis for EU sanctions (White, 1999: 45),

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58 This institutional separation means that the European Court of Justice is essentially excluded from CFSP. The only exceptions to this are the ECJ’s role in maintaining the boundaries between CFSP and other EU external action, and hearing appeals against EU sanctions (House of Commons, 2007a,b).

59 Article 11, TEU states: “The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, with the objective of safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union...” The objectives listed under Article 11 are as follows: (i) to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union; (ii) to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; (iii) to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, and the objectives of the Paris Charter; (iv) to promote international cooperation; (v) to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
creating a “bridge” between pillars one and two (Hill, 1998: 27), a development that is particularly relevant in light of the EU sanctions regime constructed in response to Iran’s nuclear programme (see Chapter 7). The CFSP components of the TEU also boosted the institutional support for foreign policy cooperation by incorporating the previously independent EPC Secretariat into the larger and better-resourced Council Secretariat. For Smith (2004: 5), these changes represented an apparently ambitious step-change from the passive prevention of disruption noted above to the proactive assertion of the EU’s values and beliefs beyond its borders.

However, the expectations thus raised for a collective European diplomacy that would be more than merely declaratory were to be disappointed by the weak responses to a series of crises in the 1990s in Bosnia (1991-95), Albania (1997), and Kosovo and Iraq (1998) (Ginsberg, 1999: 430). Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 258) argues that the deficiencies in CFSP were already apparent before the TEU came into effect on 1 November 1993, and that this reflected the fact that member states were not prepared to accept a genuine common policy, and so instead had created a decision regime that continued to place the emphasis on intergovernmental co-operation. Moreover, the failure to equip CFSP with the common institutional actors or budget necessary to ensure its success meant that there was little qualitative difference between it and the ‘co-operation’ it had supposedly superseded (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 149). The consequence, therefore, was what Hill (1993, 1998) framed as the “Capabilities-Expectations Gap” (discussed in Chapter 2). Nowhere was the divide between the rhetoric of the Treaty and the institutional capacity, resources and political will necessary to conduct policy in practice more clearly illustrated than in the response to the wars in Bosnia. Indeed, action was co-ordinated not

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60 Spence and Spence (1998: 47) argued that the budgetary arrangements for CFSP set out in the TEU actually negated its intergovernmental nature, a point which is discussed below.
through CFSP but instead under the auspices of the *ad hoc* Contact Group and with American leadership.

These weaknesses and the CFSP’s subsequent performance reveal a great deal about the rationale for creating it, and consequently the tensions between the member states at the time. As was the case with EPC, CFSP was designed first and foremost to achieve important internal goals – which Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 148) define as “interrelational, integration and identity objectives” – and again predicated on the need to prevent the external environment from disrupting integration. The Cold War had generated an important “cohesion-inducing” effect that had served as a driver of integration; with this gone, a vacuum was created and thus, as Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 257) argues, there was a need for new initiatives that could promote co-operation. Linked to this was the question of how to manage the EU’s inter-state and inter-institutional dynamics (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 148), with the necessity of anchoring the newly-unified Germany firmly within Europe thus providing a crucial catalyst for CFSP (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 257) (discussed in greater detail in chapter 6).

At the same time, CFSP also represented a compromise between the more-integrationist and more-intergovernmentalist member states (Sjursen, 2001: 191). Thus, in contrast to the detailed provisions on EMU in the TEU, those on CFSP were “necessarily vague” in order to secure agreement (Ginsberg, 1998: 14). The Treaty thus reflected the “uneasy balance” between the more- and less-integrationist member states, as well as that between large and small. For instance, although agreement on key issues such as decision-making reflected the interests and role in the negotiations of Britain, France and Germany, the smaller states were crucial in brokering compromises on specific details (Smith, 2004: 179). Meanwhile, the creation of a distinct and separate pillar for CFSP satisfied those states concerned that existing areas of communitarised policy would somehow be diluted by its
intergovernmental procedures, while the less-integrationist could be confident that CFSP itself would be protected from communitarisation (ibid: 7).

Spence and Spence (1998: 45) argue with merit, therefore, that CFSP was a “fudge”, a fact perhaps best demonstrated by the unwillingness of member states to support it with the necessary financial provision, and by the creation of a pillar system which was not reflective of the reality of how CFSP was implemented, and had a serious impact on its overall effectiveness. However, the design of the CFSP ultimately reflected both the concerns of the member states at the time, and their ability to negotiate an agreement that satisfied these sufficiently. Thus, it was a broad framework rather than a blueprint, intended to provide a set of general principles for them to subscribe to without requiring agreement on the courses of action to be taken to achieve them (Smith, 2004: 180; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 152). More importantly, it resulted in significant changes in both the “ambience” and processes of foreign policy coordination, particularly in terms of bureaucratization and legalization, as with the establishment of CFSP this became a “definitively” Brussels-based activity (Nuttall, 2000: 273).
4.2.3 Amsterdam and Nice

Smith (2004: 226) notes that by the time of the 1996-7 Intergovernmental Conference, many Member States had expressed disappointment with the EU’s external relations in general, and “CFSP in particular”. Indeed, a number of the legal, conceptual and institutional weaknesses in the CFSP had become clear since the implementation of the TEU, including an insufficient planning capability, the lack of real substance behind decisions, the low profile of the CFSP’s external representation, and the problem of financing (Regelsberger and Schmalz, 2001: 250). Consequently, in the late 1990s there were two major efforts to resolve these, culminating in the Treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000). Their particular significance, as will be discussed later, lay in the fact that taken together these changes confirmed and accelerated the ‘Brusselisation’ of foreign policy (Allen, 1998), thus, ostensibly at least, further diluting the intergovernmental character of political cooperation.

Some have suggested that Amsterdam in fact had only a limited impact. For example, Cameron (1998: 74) declares that its changes to the CFSP “may best be described as marginal or modest”. However, an examination of the record since then suggests otherwise. Indeed, Wessels (2001: 77) goes so far as to argue that after Amsterdam the CFSP was almost a “completely new formulation”. Reforms were made to its decision-making structures and processes, its financing, and the parameters of its objectives. However, and perhaps most important for its long-term evolution, for the first time a set of permanent institutional actors was established that would operate under the auspices of the Council, advising on, developing, implementing and sustaining foreign

61 They identify 8 weaknesses in all: (i) insufficient forward planning and analytical capacity; (ii) unsatisfying vertical or horizontal coherence; (iii) an incapability for speedy reactions; (iv) the declaratory nature of decisions which lack real substance; (v) the highly disputed financing of joint actions; (vi) the low profile of external representation; (vii) the lack of a legal personality or treaty-making capacity; and (viii) inadequate co-operation in security and defence policy as well as an incapacity for military action (Regelsberger and Schmalz, 2001: 250).
policy initiatives at the European level. According to Regelsberger and Schmalz (2001: 250), Amsterdam thus reflected the growing perception among member states that the EU was now the “relevant level” for dealing with external challenges and threats that exceeded their capacities for action.

Amsterdam reformed decision-making in a number of ways. It incorporated the Petersberg Tasks (Art. 17, 2) relating to humanitarian, peace-keeping and civilian and military crisis management, so creating a clear set of objectives around which policy could be framed. This in turn paved the way for the subsequent operationalisation of the CFSP (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 177). Indeed, Regelsberger and Schmalz (2001: 259) suggest that this constituted “considerable progress” towards defining the fundamentals of a possible future European defence policy. Meanwhile, in terms of functionality – and in a clear signal by member states of their determination to maintain control over the CFSP – the role of the European Council was enhanced, and now clearly framed as “initiator” for CFSP’s development, with the aim of defining the “fundamental long-term substance” of European foreign policy. Furthermore, Amsterdam “reasserted” the key role of the Foreign Ministers within the daily policy- and decision-making process (ibid: 254).

Arguably the most noteworthy innovations in decision-making, however, were the introduction of a degree of qualified majority voting and the device of “constructive abstention” (Art. 23, 2). Both of these opened up the possibility that unanimity, the governing principle of decision-making within the CFSP, even if not set aside, could certainly be “nuanced” (Cameron, 1998: 71). Thus, while QMV could not be used in decisions on policy, it could be applied to decisions concerned with the implementation of policy, provided these were of a non-military nature. Again, this can be seen as representing a compromise between the member states. For Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 155), the agreement to apply QMV only at the “lower” level of implementation
was an “essential device” to bridge the gap between those who wished to introduce unfettered QMV into CFSP and those vigorously opposed to its application in any form. For Regelsberger and Schmalz (2001: 258), meanwhile, this development represented an “important milestone” in the evolution of foreign policy co-operation away from the consensual basis that had governed it since EPC and introducing the potential for “flexibility”. Under constructive abstention, meanwhile, a member state might abstain from a policy it did not support and would not therefore be expected to play any part in its implementation. At the same time this would not prevent the other states from proceeding, with the abstaining state agreeing not to hinder implementation (Cameron, 1998: 71).

To date, though, these reforms have had little practical effect beyond certain votes on key personnel decisions – for example, appointments to the position of Deputy Secretary-General of the Council Secretariat or EU Special Representatives (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 268). However, their significance lies arguably more in their potential in the future, and what they say about the practice of policy-making within the CFSP. On a practical level, agreeing common foreign policy, or at least on its implementation, between 27 Member States may require some room for manoeuvre which devices such as QMV and constructive abstention may provide. Diedrich and Jopps (2003: 16), among others, maintain that an effective and credible CFSP will be difficult without flexibility and QMV, while Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 270) observes that they might best be seen as decisions “held in reserve” ahead of the impact of enlargement. Meanwhile, it can also be argued that the availability of QMV can improve the efficiency of decision-making. As Wagner (2003: 589) notes, this has been the experience within the 1st pillar, and he offers the 1999 German

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62 It was accompanied by a “safety clause” permitting a Member State to block a decision by QMV for “important and stated reasons of national policy” in a ‘modified version’ of the Luxemburg Compromise (Regelsberger and Schmalz, 2001: 258).

63 Wagner (2003: 589) describes them as “by and large…a dead letter”.

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Presidency’s ability to speed up decision-making through the threat of a vote as an example of how this might take place within CFSP.

Perhaps more important, though, is the symbolism of these procedural devices. Galloway (1999: 226) argues that the possibility of QMV means it is now “misleading” to describe the CFSP as intergovernmental. Moreover, the decision to introduce them sets an important precedent that foreign policy, even to a minimal extent, may be agreed and implemented by some rather than all. This then raises a number of important questions concerning the circumstances under which such layered co-operation might take place; the role of possible lead nations in determining how policy is to be implemented; and, given that some states may choose not to be involved, how far and how easily flexibility can coexist within a ‘common’ policy environment. It is also worth noting here the potential repercussions of trying to extend QMV to security and particularly defence-related matters. Riccardi (2004: 230) notes that neither Jacques Delors nor Valery Giscard d’Estaing were in favour of such a development during the Convention on the Future of Europe, with Giscard d’Estaing, the convention president, arguing that had a majority vote taken place over the Iraq War, whether supporting intervention or opposing it, it would very likely “have wrecked the future prospects of the CFSP and ESDP”.

In the short-term, though, the key changes at Amsterdam were institutional. The creation of the new post of High Representative for the CFSP, supported by a dedicated Policy Planning and Early-Warning Unit (PU) (Official Journal of the European Communities, 1997), created a new Brussels-based locus of influence over foreign policy, thereby contributing, according to Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 270), to a clear “denationalizing” of the CFSP. However, the office of High Representative, which would be combined with that of Secretary-General

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64 Duke (2005: 33) goes so far as to suggest that with so many member states now involved, some form of UN-style Security Council should be established within the EU to steer the CFSP and help in the management and implementation of policy decisions.
of the Council Secretariat and therefore located at the heart of the Council’s institutional structures, was to have no resources of its own and nor were particular competences made over to it (ibid). Indeed, the position as defined in Amsterdam was “distinctly modest” compared to France’s unsuccessful efforts to have it directly responsible to the European Council (Regelsberger and Schmalz, 2001: 256), something which was ultimately to happen under Lisbon (see below).

Despite this, Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006: 168) argue that the role of High Representative has become the “most important institutional innovation” to emerge from Amsterdam. Crucially, while prior to Lisbon the High Representative had no formal right of policy initiative, the position has enjoyed significant agenda-shaping potential which, as Rieker (2009: 709) notes, can be just as important as actual decision-making power. A key way for this to be exercised is through the duty assigned to the PU in the Treaty to present strategy and policy-option papers either at the request of the Presidency or on its own initiative, which could thus encourage both the Presidency and member states to put particular items on the agenda (ibid.).

As Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 84) contend, therefore, policy options and analysis could be developed at the centre and based around “common European interests” and a problem-solving approach.

That the position of High Representative has become so significant in such a relatively short space of time is also a consequence of the member states’ decision to appoint Javier Solana to the role. In doing this, they sent a powerful signal that they wanted the job to be done effectively. It is worth noting that Solana was appointed in the autumn of 1999, against the backdrop of the war in Kosovo. Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 271) suggests that this is an example of external events forcing member states into a decision that might otherwise have been

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65 The Treaty tasks the PU with “producing at the request of either the Council of the Presidency or on its own initiative, argued policy option papers to be presented under the responsibility of the Presidency”. 123
different, as the need for efficiency outweighed concerns over sovereignty. Moreover, the argument made by Regelsberger and Schmalz (2001: 255) that the “weight” of the new position would “depend heavily on the personality chosen” (see also Cameron, 1998: 65) seems borne out by Solana’s ability to exploit the office’s agenda-shaping potential, and to embed this as a recognised and accepted institutional function. Thus, as the first and only holder of the post, he ensured that it became the external face of the EU, and achieved “unique stature” in the diplomatic world (Rieker, 2009: 708).

The Treaty of Nice (2000), meanwhile, represented a continuation and enhancement of the Amsterdam reforms. Indeed, Smith (2004: 233) describes it as attempting to deal with the “unfinished business” of Amsterdam. Its most notable outcome was the institutionalization of the recently launched European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 258). ESDP developed out of the agreement between France and Britain in December 1998 in St Malo that the EU should be equipped with the kind of functionality necessary to engage in meaningful crisis management interventions – i.e. the Petersberg Tasks noted above – and their willingness to support and promote this (see Chapter 5). Amsterdam had provided the legal parameters for this agreement (Duke, 2005: 14), while discussions at subsequent European Councils in 1999 and 2000 fleshed out the plan to include the integration of the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU, co-operation over armaments, and the establishment of a European Rapid Reaction Force by 2002 (Smith, 2004: 233). At Nice the rules on decision-making were formalised, based around unanimity for all military and defence-related operations (Art 23, 2).

Two important institutional reforms were also agreed. The first saw the Political Committee, one of the key preparatory committees for the CFSP within the Council, upgraded to become the Political and Security Committee (PSC). It was reorganised to give it far-reaching co-ordination functions and permanent representation in Brussels, something
that had first been mooted during negotiations for the SEA in 1986 but was rejected (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 266; Smith, 2004: 152) (see below). The second was the development of the principle of ‘flexibility’ into the far more sophisticated concept of ‘enhanced cooperation’. However, although this implied an effort to improve the functionality and efficiency of the CFSP, the provisions regarding when and how it might be implemented were so limiting as to render it virtually unemployable (Smith, 2004: 235). Thus it was restricted to the implementation of Joint Actions and Common Positions; moreover, it could not be applied in matters with military or defence implications, thereby prohibiting its use in the one situation where it might be most effective – the creation of “coalitions of the willing” (ibid.). Overall, therefore, Nice represented further tentative progress towards improving the effectiveness and functionality of the CFSP, particularly through the ESDP. However, the essential tension between the desire for efficiency and the desire to protect national sovereignty remained.

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66 Smith notes that it was the Political Directors who voiced most concern over any such move: “they did not want the press to invade their privacy and they wanted to maintain their separation from the EC” (2004: 152).
4.2.4 The Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon represents the most comprehensive – and arguably ambitious – effort to address the problems of lack of coherence and efficiency within EU foreign policy. Signed on 13 December 2007, Lisbon came into force on 1 December 2009 following ratification by all member states.\textsuperscript{67} It represents the end product of a long drawn-out – and indeed “particularly arduous” (Brady and Barysch, 2007: 3) – process of constitutional reform that began with the Laeken Declaration at the December 2001 European Council (Consilium, 2001).\textsuperscript{68} This established the Convention on the Future of Europe which was assigned the task of considering “the key issues arising for the Union’s future development and try[ing] to identify the various possible responses” (ibid). This, in turn, produced a draft Constitutional Treaty which was agreed at the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference but was subsequently abandoned following difficulties during the ratification process.

As its replacement, Lisbon was deliberately intended to be less ambitious than its defunct predecessor.\textsuperscript{69} Despite this, it has had major implications for the organisation and production of foreign and security policy. Although the mandate given by the 2007 IGC which resulted in Lisbon involved “next to no change” to the foreign policy provisions as originally presented in the Constitutional Treaty beyond a “reaffirmation

\textsuperscript{67} Its full name is the Treaty Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community.

\textsuperscript{68} Laeken in turn had grown out of discussions at the Nice European Council which had identified four key issues for discussion: “(i) A more precise delimitation of competences between the EU and the Member States in accordance with subsidiarity; (ii) the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was ‘proclaimed’ at Nice; (iii) a simplification of the Treaties to make them clearer and more accessible without affecting their meaning; and (iv) the role of national Parliaments in the European architecture” (Miller, 2002: 9). In addition, Laeken set out a further set of issues for consideration: better division of competences; resolving the EU’s democratic deficit; institutional changes to the Council of Ministers, European Parliament and European Commission; how to bring the EU closer to its citizens; how to define the EU’s role in an increasingly global environment; the simplification of the EU’s political instruments; and the integration of the treaties into a constitution for the EU (ibid: 13).

\textsuperscript{69} Reflected in the fact that a number of politicians insisted on referring to it simply as the Reform Treaty, with no mention of the word constitution (Brady and Barysch, 2007: 1).
of the distinctive nature” of the CFSP, and the decision not to retitle the High Representative ‘Foreign Minister’ (Avery and Missiroli, 2007: 7; see also Dagand, 2008), they are very important when compared to the pre-*Lisbon* dispensation. Thus, the new treaty involved a total of 62 amendments to the *TEU*, of which 25 related directly to the CFSP and ESDP (which was renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy or CSDP) (Whitman, 2008: 2).70 Indeed, for Wessels and Bopp (2008: 1), the changes to CFSP and ESDP were so significant that they consider them “the cornerstone” of *Lisbon*. Despite their importance, though, according to Avery and Missiroli (2007: 6) the fact that the foreign policy components of the original treaty were among its “least contentious aspects” reflects the considerable level of public support for reforms that would strengthen the role of the EU internationally, as well as a broadly favourable consensus among the main political actors, ensuring that these aspects of the treaty would not need to be renegotiated.

*Lisbon* introduces a changed institutional architecture in foreign and security policy, but one which, according to Dagand (2008: 9), does not challenge the essentially intergovernmental character of the CFSP, and which Wessels and Bopp (2008: 4) suggest could be considered “an ever-refined type” of rationalised intergovernmentalism. Whitman (2008: 8) notes that the member states have made a clear effort to protect their prerogatives, whereby those that wish to may still “convey the impression” that nothing in *Lisbon* will prevent them defining or implementing their own national foreign policy. Thus, two of the *Declarations on the Common Foreign and Security Policy* state:

“[T]he provisions in the [TEU] covering the [CFSP], including the creation of the office of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the establishment of an External Action Service, do not affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist, for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy

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70 It should be noted that unlike the original Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty did not replace the existing founding treaties or the TEU (Whitman, 2008: 2).
nor of their national representation in third countries and international organisations.” (emphasis added)

and:

“[T]he provisions covering the [CFSP] including in relation to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the External Action Service will not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and participation in international organisations, including a Member State's membership of the Security Council of the UN. …The Conference also recalls that the provisions governing the [CSDP] do not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of the Member States.” (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007) (emphasis added)

Balancing these statements, though, are a number of institutional innovations that build on the structures established at Amsterdam and Nice. The two most notable are the upgrading of the High Representative role to High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) “to support the High Representative in fulfilling her mandate” (Consilium, 2010).

Under Lisbon, the former position of High Representative for CFSP merges with that of European Commissioner for External Relations, creating a so-called ‘double-hat’ post designed to encourage synergies and greater consistency and coherence across the previously separate elements of European foreign policy (Lieb and Maurer, 2010: 1) (see Chapter 7). The High Representative also becomes the permanent chair of the newly-created Foreign Affairs Council, while representatives of the High Representative will chair its supporting bodies and working groups, in particular the PSC. The High Representative also becomes a Vice-President of the Commission to ensure “the consistency of the Union’s external action” (Consilium, 2009), although Duke reminds us that unlike other vice-presidents, the

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71 Lisbon split the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) into the Foreign Affairs Council and General Affairs Council, although in practice the two bodies continue to meet consecutively on the same day.
European Council rather than the Commission President appoints him or her, under QMV (2008: 14). It is also worth noting that while Lisbon does not increase the formal powers or prerogatives of the European Parliament over CFSP – Dagand (2008: 6) notes that they have been “strictly delimited”, as have those of the Commission – the Parliament does extend its role over the High Representative as its consent is required on the appointment of the Commission as a whole, and equally in dismissing him/her through its censure procedure over the whole body (Quille, 2008: 4). In terms of the division of responsibilities within formal ministerial structures, Lisbon sets out the High Representative’s role as conducting the CFSP by implementing decisions adopted by the European Council – which defines the Union’s strategic interests and objectives – and which will then have been framed by the Foreign Affairs Council (Miller and Taylor, 2007: 63). In particular, the new position will have “enhanced representative and participatory roles” within CFSP, including a new right of initiative, and responsibility for “facilitating the harmonisation of member states’ views” (Dagand, 2008: 6).

On 19 November 2009, the EU heads of state or government agreed to appoint Baroness Catherine Ashton of Britain to the position. One of her primary tasks since taking up her new post has been to establish the EEAS, the body that will support her and her successors in carrying out the ambitious range of tasks assigned to her. As Dagand (2008: 6) notes, the EEAS brings together officials from within the Council Secretariat, the Commission and the member states’ diplomatic services, although it is worth noting that the term ‘service’ reflects to some extent the considerable debate over its institutional location.

72 The Parliament may also put questions to the Council and make recommendations to the High Representative, and will hold debates twice-yearly on the implementation of the CFSP and CSDP (Quille, 2008: 10). In interviews for this thesis, Sir Graham Watson MEP and Andrew Duff MEP, both members of the Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Relations, expressed their desire that their body would conduct a vigorous US-style confirmation hearing for the appointment of the High Representative, and seek the full participation of the High Representative and her staff in the debates in order to formalise and extend their right of scrutiny as far as possible. (Interviews conducted on 10 and 11 November, 2010, Brussels.)
affiliation and composition that first emerged during the Convention (Duke, 2008: 15). (As Chapter 7 demonstrates, there was also considerable discussion regarding what services the EEAS would be providing.) The lack of detail on the EEAS’s shape and precise role within the new treaty, along with the difficulties surrounding its establishment, has been discussed. It is important to re-iterate, though, that the issue of “turf sensitivities” identified by Duke (2008: 15) amongst others is very much a current concern, as a number of those interviewed for this study also noted.

Alongside these institutional developments, Lisbon also introduced a number of other important changes that will be summarised briefly here. The creation of a new post of President of the European Council was intended to “respond to the lack of continuity” within the six-month rotating presidency system, and to bring better visibility and stability to the Council’s work (Dagand, 2008: 5). While some concern was expressed that this could create tension over the division of labour between the Council President and the High Representative in terms of how the EU is represented internationally (e.g. Quille, 2008: 4), a considerable proportion of the Council President’s time to date has been taken up with coordinating the EU’s response to the global financial and Eurozone crises (European Council, 2012). As noted, ESDP, the crisis management arm of CFSP, becomes CSDP, with the treaty also codifying already-established notions such as “coalitions of the willing” and lead nations in the form of permanent structured cooperation (Duke, 2008: 17). Unlike enhanced cooperation – which under Lisbon is also extended to defence matters for the first time but which requires a threshold of 9 states to make a proposal to the Council for its use – permanent structured cooperation does not have a minimum threshold of participants, and allows the EU’s leading military member states to develop their cooperation (Dagand, 2008: 8). As Quille (2008: 7) notes, such cooperation would be particularly relevant in the context of military equipment programmes and the development of the European Defence
Agency. Significantly, Lisbon also introduces mutual defence and solidarity clauses for the first time, with the latter intended to facilitate mutual support following a natural or man-made disaster or terrorist attack, and the former to deal with armed aggression, although without prejudicing NATO (Dagand, 2008: 8).

Finally, Lisbon makes some important changes in the processes of decision-making. Decisions adopted by the European Council relating to CFSP and CSDP will continue to be agreed on the basis of unanimity, as will those taken by the Council of Ministers (Miller and Taylor, 2007: 64). However, there are four exceptions where QMV may be used. Three were in place pre-Lisbon: in the appointment of a special representative with a mandate on a particular policy issue; when deciding on the implementation of a previous decision on an EU action or position; and when agreeing an action or position on the basis of a decision agreed unanimously at European Council level (i.e. the constructive abstention provision) (ibid). The additional exception relates to the adoption of a decision relating to a proposal presented by the High Representative either acting on his/her own behalf, or with the support of the Commission (Dagand, 2008: 7). Collectively, therefore, the provisions within Lisbon, although not removing altogether the problem of “intrinsic dualism” (Missioli, 2007: 9), represent the most comprehensive attempt to date by member states to balance their desire to maintain their national prerogatives within CFSP with a simultaneous wish to ensure a more effective and joined-up system of foreign and security policy-making. Drawing on some of the developments and innovations set out so far, the next section looks in more detail at how the organisational aspects of CFSP have developed, and what these can reveal in terms of how member states interact and engage with it.
4.3 The development of the CFSP in organisational perspective

A central argument against the notion that the CFSP is genuinely intergovernmental and has instead been the key source of norm-transfer to and transformation of member states’ foreign policy and policy-making is the growth in importance of Brussels as a hub for EU foreign policy-making. This was outlined above in terms of treaty reforms, and in the impact these have had on the nature and process of decision-making. Allen characterizes this as ‘Brusselisation’, a process he defines as “a gradual transfer, in the name of consistency, of foreign policy-making authority away from national capitals to Brussels” (1998: 54). While Allen is not claiming that the CFSP has been communitarised, the impact of this process, he is arguing, has been to leave national foreign ministries increasingly side-lined and even marginalised.

‘Brusselisation’ provides a useful means of thinking about what has been taking place within the context of the CFSP, particularly in terms of its institutional evolution, and the formal developments that have occurred as a consequence of the treaty-making outlined above. For example, Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 278) sees this process as having resulted in a “third way” between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, while Wessels, as noted, explains it in terms of a “rationalized intergovernmentalism” (2001: 77). Applying it specifically to the analysis of decision-making within the ESDP, Breuer (2010) locates it between intergovernmentalism and socialization. To understand it, and the impact it might have had on how states such as Britain and Germany interact with the CFSP, it is necessary to examine the set of common and centralising institutional actors created to support and facilitate the CFSP, and the processes by which they do this.
4.3.1 The organisation of decision-making within the former Second Pillar

Figure 1 below presents a simplified version of the hierarchy of decision-making within the CFSP pre-Lisbon. At the institutional pinnacle sits the European Council which represents the symbolic locus of foreign policy-making. Meeting only four times a year at the level of heads of state or government, and despite the strategic role assigned to it in the treaties, it is unable to provide permanent strategic leadership across all foreign policy-related dossiers. As Smith notes, with such a large membership, a tour de table – whereby everyone’s view on a particular issue is heard – can take a substantial amount of time, significantly limiting discussion (2004: 99). It therefore acts as an ‘organ d’impulsion’ rather than a real decision-making actor (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 68). Instead, pre-Lisbon formal decision-making power lay at the level below with the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), the “most senior” formation within the Council of Ministers (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006: 36) and the forum for the “most direct” expression of the interests and power of the member states (Lewis, 2000: 261). The TEU (Art. 13, Para 2) defined its role as reaching “decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy”, and under the leadership of the rotating Presidency, GAERC has thus been described as the “supreme manager” of CFSP (Müller-Brandec-Bocquet, 2002: 264).

73 It “welcomes” or “endorses” decisions and documents that have already been agreed by GAERC (now the FAC) or the High Representative (ibid.).
Sitting below GAERC/FAC and the Presidency are several layers of supporting formations which can be divided into three categories. First, there are the two key preparatory committees, COREPER II (Comité des Représentants Permanents) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC). These oversee and co-ordinate the work of the large number of specialist working groups and parties within which much of the detailed policy- and decision-making is prepared and negotiated, and which draw in national-level experts, as well as representatives from the relevant Council and Commission formations and units. Second are the centralised structures within the Council itself. Pre-Lisbon, these were the Office of the High Representative and the PU, and the Council Secretariat. Since Lisbon these have been brought together under the auspices of the EEAS. Finally, the European Commission provides advice, guidance, information and support at all levels, particularly when 1st Pillar instruments are required for the implementation of CFSP.

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74 Coreper II meets at ambassadorial level and deals with what pre-Lisbon were termed 1st (Community) and 2nd (CFSP) Pillar issues, while its junior counterpart, Coreper I, meets at the level of deputy ambassador and deals with more (but not exclusively) technical 1st Pillar issues only (see Lewis, 2000; Bostock, 2002).
policies (for example, the imposition of economic sanctions). However, it remains institutionally separate from the CFSP (as represented by the broken line), with its right to initiate policy removed under Lisbon, and in any case not utilised under the previous arrangements.

What the diagram cannot communicate, though, is the extent to which formal decision-making is now impeded both by the volume and complexity of business handled within the CFSP, the EU’s size following successive enlargements, and the impossibility of separating foreign and security policy from wider issues, such as trade, aid and development. Indeed, Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 264) considered GAERC increasingly unable to deal with the “multitudinous tasks” confronting it, while Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 71) describe the agendas facing foreign ministers today as “impossibly overloaded” and argue that GAERC actually decided little. As a consequence, there is an emphasis on reaching decisions at the lowest level possible, and in increasingly informal settings, with GAERC/FAC’s agenda reserved for only the most contentious issues (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 169). It is within this context that the preparatory committees, their networks of working groups and the Council Secretariat have been so crucial. Indeed, for Duke and Vanhoonacker (ibid: 164), these bodies represented the “core network” for CFSP. Thus, their ability to process business not only relieves the burden on ministers and the Presidency, but has also given them very significant agenda-shaping power. Meanwhile the manner in which they conduct business has enhanced both the socialization process and their “mutual influence” on one another (ibid.). Consequently, this core network could be seen as a potentially powerful counterveiling dynamic to the formal intergovernmentalism of the CFSP, and one which is potentially recreated and augmented by the EEAS.

75 Cameron (1998: 65) describes the CFSP machinery as “slow and cumbersome”.
4.3.2 COREPER II and the Political and Security Committee

Within the CFSP’s policy- and decision-making structures, COREPER II and the PSC sit at the crucial interface between the technical, detailed negotiations taking place at working group level, and the more strategically- and politically-focused encounters in GAERC/FAC. All decisions reached in the working groups are discussed by them before being passed up for ministerial consideration or approval (Galloway, 1999: 216; Duke and Vanhooonacker, 2006: 173). COREPER II has technically been the more senior body, “straddling” both first and second pillar policy areas with the objective of ensuring cross-pillar consistency and coherence in the handling of foreign affairs, while the PSC has focused exclusively on the CFSP and ESDP/CSDP (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 85). However, in recent years the PSC has emerged as the key formation within CFSP, and the occasional tensions between the two reflect the manner in which they have evolved, the difficulty of establishing a clear demarcation between the tasks allotted to them, and what Lewis (2000: 262) has characterized as the “robust level of administrative rivalry” within the Council’s infrastructure more generally.

Their relationship has been marked by the “inherent ambiguity” (Duke, 2005: 9) in the original division between economic and trade elements of Community external relations and the competence over ‘political’ issues the member states reserved to themselves under EPC. At the same time, COREPER’s prerogative as the Council’s lead preparatory body was challenged by the fact that the members of the Political Committee (PoCo), the predecessor to the PSC, were Political Directors in national foreign ministries, and therefore senior to the Permanent Representatives. A *modus operandi* was reached in 1993 whereby PoCo formally accepted its subordinate status, while COREPER would refrain from editing or altering PoCo’s opinions to the Council,

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76 Although this is certainly not to claim that decisions agreed at the lower levels are politically neutral (see below).
unless it felt that they infringed on legal, financial or institutional matters (ibid: 12). However, in more recent years the establishment of the PSC has raised new issues, particularly surrounding personality and seniority:

“The problem…starts as always with people and personalities and egos. …[T]he ambassadors in COREPER II are the senior ambassadors. They are the head of the Permanent Representation of each country. The PSC is a junior ambassador…so it’s very difficult for a senior ambassador to accept that a junior ambassador is doing what they like best, which is foreign policy. …That’s their bread and butter, and that’s the only [thing] that they really, really understand and…like. So, having all the nitty-gritty and important being decided in PSC and then being served in COREPER just for a simple endorsement irritates many of them” (EU3).77

In practice, the extent of COREPER’s agenda leaves it little time to deal extensively with the CFSP, and such issues are frequently finalised in PSC meetings (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 174; Ginsberg, 1998: 25), although if a “really political, sensitive, difficult issue emerges”, this will ultimately be resolved at COREPER II (EU3). Despite these issues, Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006: 173) maintain that together COREPER II and the PSC function as important mediators between the intergovernmental and communitarian aspects of the EU’s external relations.

Lewis (2006: 281) considers COREPER a “pivotal actor” within the Council’s structures, whose members function as de facto decision-makers with their agreements routinely endorsed by ministers. Responsible for preparing the work of the 20+ formations that make up the Council, COREPER works behind the scenes to find agreement and forge compromises across the whole range of EU policy issues. Indeed, Bostock (2002: 225) argues that maximising agreement, both at its level and within Council meetings more generally, is COREPER’s “dominant objective”. Within the context of foreign policy, meanwhile, its particular concern has been to achieve cross-pillar consistency and coherence (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 265).

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77 EU3, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 11 November 2010.
COREPER’s ability to perform this role effectively has been based on two important factors. First is its position as “collective bottleneck” through which all Council business must pass. This means it enjoys what Lewis (2000: 262) describes as a “unique institutional vantage point”, and is able to facilitate the cross-issue bargaining and “log-rolling” that characterises much of the decision-making within the Council (Heisenberg, 2005: 69). Second, its decision-making style has been shaped by the development of the five key “performance norms” (including a consensus reflex, mutual responsiveness and diffuse reciprocity) discussed in chapter 2 (Lewis, 2000: 267). In an environment of intense and almost ceaseless negotiation, these underpin COREPER’s ability to maintain the output and overall performance of the Council. They also contribute to what members of COREPER themselves describe as a “dual loyalty” not only to represent the interests of their Member States, but also to the overall success of the Council (Bostock, 2002: 217; Lewis, 2000: 265). Moreover, the environment that has emerged serves to some extent as a leveller of large and small states, with relative power to some extent off-set by the power of argument and persuasion, meaning COREPER is far more complex and communitarian than its intergovernmental carapace might suggest (Lewis, 2000: 266).

Meanwhile, the evolution of the PSC into the key formation within the CFSP represents a clear example of what Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 267) identifies as the “Brusselizing principle” at work within CFSP and latterly ESDP/CSDP. Its centrality has come about as a consequence of its narrower focus compared to COREPER’s necessarily more horizontal, cross-pillar perspective; the seniority of its personnel within their respective national administrations; and the tasks assigned to it in the Treaty. Under the mandate it received in the TEU and later expanded at Amsterdam and Nice, PoCo was given responsibility for

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78 Lewis notes that members of Coreper I and II will spend over 100 days per year together (2000: 262).
79 Lewis quotes from an interview with a COREPER ambassador in 1997: “Coreper operates as a consensus-seeking system – this penetrates, in my mind, everything we do.” (2000: 270)
dealing with all matters falling under the purview of the CFSP by contributing to the “definition of policies” through the provision of opinions to the Council either at the latter’s request or on its own initiative:

“[A] Political Committee consisting of Political Directors shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by [CFSP] and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative” (Title V, Art. J8, Para 5). (Official Journal of the European Communities, 1992).

This endowed PoCo with significant agenda-shaping and agenda-setting influence, and put it in a powerful position to determine the nature and direction of ministerial discussions (Galloway, 1999: 222). For example, it has played a key role in supporting the work of the rotating Presidencies which have been the primary source of new initiatives within the CFSP, and yet were hampered by their short-term nature, the large amount of ongoing business that is carried over, and the constant risk that external events will “hijack” the agenda, something that the changes under Lisbon have sought to address (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 166).

The establishment of the ESDP/CSDP has made this influence even more notable. Indeed, Duke (2005: 24) contends that with the addition of crisis management responsibilities under Amsterdam and Nice, the committee “came into its own” as a “decision-shaper”. The latter treaty replaced PoCo with the PSC, giving it more extensive co-ordination functions and a new, permanent presence in Brussels as part of its responsibility to exercise political and strategic control of crisis operations (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 267). The result has been

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80 Duke and Vanhoonacker note that while all member states and, prior to Lisbon, the European Commission have had the right of initiative, in practice the majority have come from the Presidency (2006: 166).

81 This was followed by the establishment of several supporting bodies including the Politico-Military Party and CIVCOM (discussed below), and the Nicolaidis Group which functions in a similar way to the Antici Group by “pre-preparing” agendas to enable meetings to focus on the main issues of concern (Duke, 2005: 21)
both to heighten the profile and increase the overall visibility of the body, and to facilitate greater coherence and consistency in both CFSP and ESDP/CSDP, not least by creating an important and permanent institutional interlocutor for the High Representative (Duke, 2005: 22). It has also had a significant impact on its membership. Noting that PSC ambassadors feel themselves to be “pioneers” in a vital policy area, Howorth (2007: 72) argues that it is an unusually cohesive committee with high levels of personal trust, and driven by a common commitment to promote cooperation in this new field. For Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 74), the PSC is therefore the “linchpin” of the CFSP, while Duke (2005: 5) describes it as its “critical committee”.

This importance is demonstrated most obviously in its day-to-day management of key matters of foreign and security policy. However, it is also apparent in how it has contributed to the development of the consultation reflex through its conditioning of the Political Directors in member states’ foreign ministries into working together, a significant point for the discussion here. As noted, prior to Nice, the PoCo had no permanent presence in Brussels. Instead, having been established under the institutionally separate EPC, it brought together capital-based officials with national perspectives on foreign and later security issues, but whose level of seniority gave them considerable decision-making authority and ensured them direct access to the Council through their committee (Duke, 2005: 7; Müller-Brandec-Bocquet, 2002: 266). While it might be assumed that this would reinforce the intergovernmental character of the CFSP, Duke (2005: 34) argues that such an impression is only “superficial”, noting instead that as it has developed, and particularly since the launch of the ESDP, the PoCo/PSC has served to safeguard common interests in the opinions it gives to the Council. Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006: 176) contend that this reflects the power of the socialization process at work in these national representatives’ dealings

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82 Duke suggests that the relationship with the High Representative is the PSC’s most important (2005: 28).
with one another, something that has only grown with the ongoing institutionalisation of CFSP. The caveat to this is that in times of acute crisis there remains the possibility that member states – particularly the larger ones – may seek to short-circuit the PSC and Coreper, as occurred in the Iraq War crisis in 2003 (Howorth, 2007: 68). However, such situations seem to be the exception. Consequently, and as discussed in previous chapters, it has been argued that a gradual Europeanization of national foreign policies has been underway that has seen national interests increasingly shaped in the European context and resulted in the steady “denationalization” of the CFSP (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 180; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 270). While a strong argument can be made as to the Europeanization of certain foreign policy-making processes, the extent to which such a ‘denationalisation’ has in fact occurred is less certain, as is shown in the country studies.
4.3.3 The CFSP Working Groups

Below the preparatory committees sits a network of working groups and working parties that forms the engine-room of policy- and decision-making in the CFSP. The importance of these formations to the functioning of the EU in general has been noted across the literature (e.g. Quaglia et al., 2008; Fouilleux et al., 2005; Galloway, 1999; Beyers and Dierickx, 1998). Often bringing together technical experts and specialists in an atmosphere of “mutual understanding” of a particular field or issue, they process the majority of Council business, with many decisions negotiated and agreed at this level before being endorsed higher up (Beyers and Dierickx, 1998: 292). Within the CFSP there are 36 such formations whose work is divided up thematically, geographically or by specialist area (Duke and Vanhonoacker, 2006: 171), and whose memberships are generally composed of national representatives based in the Permanent Representations in Brussels (Juncos and Pomorska, 2008: 496). Overall, their work is considered “fundamental” to the performance of the CFSP and it is on their recommendations that the PSC’s opinions to GAERC/FAC are based (Duke and Vanhonoacker, 2006: 170; Galloway, 1999: 219).

A key part of their activity consists in information sharing, consultation and reaching common assessments of situations and issues (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 76). Thus, the technical preparation that forms the basis of any diplomatic action will be carried out at this level, including the development of recommendations from the

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83 Beyers and Dierickx (1998: 290) estimated that 90% of all Council business was dealt with at the working group level.
84 The CFSP working parties include: the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors, established in 1994 to facilitate the COREPER-PSC working relationship, and which performs an important bridging function between the two (Galloway, 1999: 221); the Network of European Correspondents, which coordinates daily CFSP/ESDP matters within the national foreign ministries and plays a central role in shaping the CFSP-related aspects of GAERC/FAC’s agendas (Duke and Vanhonoacker, 2006: 172); the Politico-Military Party, created in 2001, which deals with the Berlin+ arrangements with NATO and the operational details of CSFP operations, and the Civilian Committee for Crisis Management (CIVCOM), its civilian equivalent; and the Nicolaidis Group which performs an ‘Antici’-like function in the CFSP (Duke, 2005: 21).
PSC on specific Council initiatives (Galloway, 1999: 217). The meetings frequently include representatives from the relevant Commission directorates-general, while officials from the Council Secretariat will also be in attendance to offer legal advice and discuss technical questions (Djikstra, 2008: 150). However, the assumption that working groups deal only with technical matters while questions of ‘politics’ are settled higher up is questioned by Fouilleux et al. (2005: 612) amongst others. Rather, their research indicates that a dossier will be passed up the chain when agreement has not been possible, and thus some political issues may well be dealt with at this level, indicating considerable ambiguity over where the “technical-political” divide actually lies. Consequently, they characterize the separation in terms of the “de-politicization versus politicization” of issues as this captures the dynamism inherent in the process, arguing that the flexibility inherent in “blurred boundaries” has been crucial in facilitating decision-making across all areas of Council business (ibid: 610).

This feeds into a wider debate over the nature of the working groups as actors in the CFSP. Their communicative function fits in with rationalist assumptions that they are predominantly “channels” for the expression of national interests. Indeed, Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 266) argues that the PU was created within the Council Secretariat primarily because the viewpoints of Member States were too dominant in the working groups to produce analysis of the quality and objectivity required for an effective CFSP. This notwithstanding, to see these actors as purely communicative denies the possibility that they might also contribute to how such interests and viewpoints are shaped and mediated as a consequence of the interaction occurring within them, and the socialization of the participants (Fouilleux et al., 2005: 610). For example, Trondhal and Veggeland (2003: 60) note that EU committees have been shown to create the potential for the role perceptions of participants to be altered, and that civil servants consequently act on the basis of multiple roles and allegiances, a concept termed ‘ambiguous
representation’. Thus, while the representation of national or government interests remains a central purpose and cue for action, they argue that it can be supplemented by the role perceptions evoked by membership of their professional or epistemic community and the supranational interests of the EU (ibid).

For Glarbo (1999: 646) the working groups of the CFSP provide important venues for such socialization as, together with GAERC/FAC and the PSC, they form part of a “stable arena” for interaction between national officials that is governed by both formal and informal rules and norms of behaviour. Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006: 170), meanwhile, argue that the strength of this socialization process is demonstrated by the negotiations Brussels-based officials conduct not only with each other but also with their national capitals, occasionally to the extent that they will defend a ‘European’ position there. At the same time, in their research into the effects of enlargement on the CFSP committee network, Juncos and Pomorska have noted that socialization and key norms such as consensus in decision-making not only remain prevalent, but have also been essential in preventing deadlock in these expanded bodies (2008: 494). In particular, as noted previously, the working groups – and CFSP committees more generally – have provided important arenas for learning for the representatives of new member states (ibid: 497).

The effects of socialization can also be seen in the attitude of working group participants to those above them. Following on from Trondhal and Veggeland, Quaglia et al. (2008: 157) argue that working groups are often fora where the logic of argumentation and technical knowledge are accorded considerable weight. This accords with Beyers and Dierickx (1998: 308), who note that while the status of negotiating partners may initially be ‘ascribed’ through nationality, it can be transformed into an ‘achieved’ one particularly as a consequence of personal expertise which is considered a ‘precious commodity’ at this level. Thus, in an environment that “privileges expertise” (Quaglia et al., 2008: 157), power is more evenly spread and the smaller member states
thus prefer agreements to be reached as far as possible at this level, rather than higher up where the relative power of individual states might come more into play (Fouilleux et al., 2005: 614). More generally, they argue that members of working groups exhibit an almost proprietary interest in the issues they deal with. Indeed, they “live in fear” that their work will be undone by “under-informed” ambassadors in COREPER or the PSC, and so seek to minimize the number of unresolved issues that are passed up to them (ibid.).

The working groups thus offer strong evidence of two key processes – socialization and Brusselisation – that together challenge the notion of the CFSP as a purely intergovernmental forum. Indeed, Fouilleux et al. (2005: 610) characterise them not as “intergovernmental battlegrounds” but rather as arenas for mediation between Member States, institutions and even ideology. Consequently, while national interests and positions are expressed, this takes place within the context of the swift and efficient pursuit of solutions and compromise, and where informal rules including consensus-building and the avoidance of isolation are crucial to success (Galloway, 1999: 217; Juncos and Pomorska, 2008: 501). Finally, the ever-broadening CFSP agenda and the resulting growth in working groups created to handle it appears to have contributed significantly to the Brusselisation of national foreign policies as Brussels-based officials, to some extent at least, appear to be supplanting their capital-based counterparts. Again, though, this provides support for a change in the how of policy-making, but not for the what.

85 For example, they suggest that small member states tend to be especially ‘anti-COREPER’ because they believe its ‘proximity’ to the relative voting power of ministers inevitably returns power to the larger states. The Belgian Permanent Representative is quoted thus: “COREPER is where the big countries can come to the fore…we are small. In the working groups we are more equal” (Fouilleux, et al., 2005: 614).
4.3.4 The Council Secretariat and the High Representative

As noted above, Amsterdam had a significant impact on the CFSP, “transforming” its institutional architecture by creating new actors that have driven and accelerated both the centralisation and Brusselisation of policy- and decision-making (Christiansen, 2006: 89). Of these, it is the post of High Representative that has had the greatest institutional significance, becoming arguably the most influential individual actor within this arena. Moreover, prior to Lisbon, as a direct consequence of this the Council Secretariat, of which the High Representative was also the Secretary-General, took on a new centrality and importance. While playing an influential but largely behind-the-scenes role in first pillar Community matters, in the second it became an “entirely different animal”, having developed into a “quasi-executive agency” with the ability to make policy in its own right (ibid). Together, these actors could be said to provide the strongest challenge to the formal intergovernmentalism of the CFSP.

Although the Council Secretariat is nominally at the service of member states, as Allen (1998: 48) notes it has always had the potential to do much more than co-ordinate. Responsible for providing the Council and particularly the Presidency with administrative services, and legal and policy advice, it became increasingly involved in foreign policy co-operation once the EPC Secretariat was incorporated into it with the creation of the CFSP (Christiansen, 2006: 82). Along with the establishment later of the High Representative and the PU, this represented efforts by the member states to improve the institutional underpinnings of foreign policy co-operation without delegating additional powers to the Commission (ibid: 89). Their determination to “exert firm control” over the Commission’s input into this policy area

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86 Its supporting role is particularly important during the periodic Intergovernmental Conferences during which, as a consequence of its ongoing role in day-to-day EU policy-making and its material and informational resources, it has been able to demonstrate significant leadership both in terms of agenda-shaping and brokering agreements (see Beach, 2004).
essentially created an institutional vacuum that the Secretariat was ideally placed to fill (Allen, 1998: 55), with the crises in the former Yugoslavia serving as a catalyst for swift institutional expansion (Christiansen, 2006: 89). This was demonstrated by the establishment of a dedicated CFSP unit within the Secretariat’s External Relations directorate (DG E) which has provided amongst other things a “central memory” for the CFSP, as well as the Secretariat’s assumption of responsibility for managing the “multiplicity” of dialogues with 3rd countries that are conducted under the auspices of the CFSP (Cameron, 1998: 64). Moreover, as a result of its key function of assisting the Presidency through the drafting of policy papers and agendas, the unit has been able to exercise influence over substantive issues of policy, particularly as it often has the advantage of having followed a particular issue over an extended time period (Djikstra, 2008: 154; Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 175).

However, the most far-reaching institutional developments occurred as a consequence of the establishment of the High Representative post, and subsequently ESDP. Thus, for the first time military structures were created within the Secretariat, including the EU Military Staff and the Military Committee, while important elements of the WEU Secretariat were also incorporated into it (Christiansen, 2006: 90). Moreover, the previously distinct areas of trade and development policy and CFSP were brought together within DG E, significantly strengthening it as a result (Djikstra, 2008: 157). At the same time, the creation of a dedicated Planning Unit to support the High Representative provided an important channel of potential long-term influence over the Presidency and member states. Although lacking the right of initiative, they could encourage and persuade them to put or keep particular issues on the agenda, for example by regularly tabling papers so these were not forgotten when the Presidency changed (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006:

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87 Cameron notes that when the Presidency was held by a smaller state, the Secretariat enjoyed even greater potential influence as such states have traditionally lacked the diplomatic resources of their larger partners and therefore had to rely to a much greater extent on its support (1998: 62).
168). This did, though, create potential internal tensions in the Secretariat. As Duke (2005: 28) notes, the PU was initially created to “circumvent” the Secretariat. Meanwhile both he (ibid.) and Dijkstra (2008: 156) argue that because the PU was staffed by seconded national officials, and was reliant on the (not always forthcoming) willingness of member states and the Commission to share diplomatic memoranda, the quality of its outputs showed “great variation”.

Overall, however, despite the lack of formal decision-making authority – although Nice did give the High Representative the authority to chair the PSC during crisis situations (Duke, 2005: 29) – and the dependence on the goodwill of member states, the position of the High Representative and the office’s ability to shape and influence policy was consolidated and significantly augmented following its inception (Rieker, 2009: 709). This was made possible – indeed, was necessitated – by the growing demands and workload resulting from an ever-expanding CFSP agenda. Equally, however, the “decidedly proactive” leadership of Javier Solana was a crucial factor (Christiansen, 2006: 89). This enabled these institutional actors to capitalize on their visibility and permanence to “operationalize” the CFSP by providing GAERC, the preparatory committees and the working groups with analysis and policy options built around common EU interests and perspectives (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 83). For Christiansen (2006: 94), the impact of this has been to “redefine” intergovernmentalism away from the idea of interaction between governments to the notion that executive responsibility increasingly resides with the Council.

The final stage (currently) in the development of the roles of the High Representative and the Council Secretariat has been the changes following Lisbon, outlined above. These have formalised the position of High Representative not only as titular head of EU foreign policy, but in organisational terms have equipped him/her with significant institutional tools to both set and enact the policy agenda. The establishment of the EEAS brings together the foreign and security policy functions
previously carried out within the Secretariat and the Commission, particularly the latter’s network of overseas missions. In theory, at least, it gives the High Representative the mandate to pursue a genuinely ‘joined-up’ CFSP, and equips him/her with the levers with which to make this a reality. As the case studies and the country study chapters will show, however, this process has faced considerable difficulties, not least due to the differing standpoints of the states under examination.
In organisational terms, the other crucial element in the CFSP jigsaw has been the role of the European Commission. As has been noted throughout, a great deal of the institutional development within the CFSP has sought to “square the circle” of improving its efficiency and effectiveness while limiting as far as possible the influence of the Commission (Christiansen, 2006: 89). While in practice, the Commission has had limited input and no formal competence in this area, its relationship with the member states has been very complex, representing the desire of the latter to ‘protect’ their prerogatives in foreign policy cooperation whilst at the same time being heavily reliant particularly on the economic instruments at the Commission’s disposal to make their foreign policy aims reality.

At the same time, the Commission has also been concerned about what cooperation in foreign and security policy might mean for it. For example, Smith (2004:155) notes that the Commission has often been concerned about preserving its power, reputation and resources and so has sought not to extend its influence into areas where it lacked “real legal authority”. At the same time, during the early days of EPC, the relationship between member states and the Commission was often quite strained. Concerns among some governments that the Commission represented the “virus of integration” ensured that even when a Commission official was present at meetings, they would often only be permitted to speak if the Presidency agreed, and sometimes were only permitted to be in the room for discussion points relevant specifically to the EC and would then be “quickly ushered out” (ibid). Furthermore, they only gained formal access to the COREU communications network from 1982, and prior to that had to rely on “friendly” diplomats to pass on information. The French seemed to show particular opposition to greater Commission involvement during the first decade-or-so of EPC, a stance which only began to change after 1981 (ibid: 156-7).
A common factor throughout the development of EPC and CFSP has been the essential role played by the Commission in the successful implementation of policy. As Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 85) note, pre-\textit{Lisbon}, the High Representative and his staff lacked either the competences, instruments or bureaucratic reach of the Commission (which had delegations in 120+ countries), while the latter has enjoyed considerable influence over the CFSP in terms of its administration of the Community’s budget, and its considerable expertise in external relations. Consequently, effective cross-pillar decision-making and co-ordination were essential where funds were required from that budget, or the implementation of joint actions or common positions was to be carried out by the Commission (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 178). Indeed, Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 275) argues that in this sense, the two pillars were much more integrated than is commonly perceived. Even following \textit{Lisbon} and the creation of the EEAS, the fact that the High Representative now ‘double-hats’ as Vice-President of the Commission and is ostensibly responsible for ensuring consistency and coherence across all aspects of EU external relations demonstrates the significant influence the Commission will continue to enjoy in this policy field.

It is worth noting briefly, though, how the Council has sought with considerable success to sideline the Commission in the key area of crisis management, conducted under the auspices of the ESDP/CSDP (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 92). Gourlay (2004: 404) and Schroeder (2006: 4) both argue that the deliberate development of policy instruments separate from those developed under the external relations ‘\textit{acquis}’ of the first pillar resulted in an “institutional divorce” between the two. The trend has been very much in favour of greater Council control over both military and civilian operations, despite the vital financial support the Commission has provided for the latter (Gourlay, 2004: 413). The result, though, has often been an inefficient and even fragmented approach to planning and implementation, with neither the Council nor the Commission having “strategic oversight” over all
available instruments (Rieker, 2009: 716). Indeed, Rieker (ibid.) argues that where successful co-ordination has occurred, it happened “in spite of” the EU’s institutional structures, and has tended to be characterized by informal co-operation between the Commission and the member states and actors working within the Council’s various sub-structures.
4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a brief survey of the historical and organisational development of the CFSP since its inception as EPC in the 1970s. In particular, it has emphasised the continuing tension between the desire of member states to retain their control over foreign and security policy-making on the one hand, and the need to make the best use of the instruments and resources available through the EU, and particularly through its so-called Community pillar. In essence, this is the on-going issue of sovereignty versus efficiency/effectiveness. This has revealed a number of issues. The first is the difficulty of seeing EPC/CFSP as a purely intergovernmental entity. Whilst it certainly began life as such, cooperation – and the institutionalisation of cooperation, to borrow from Michael Smith (2004) – challenges this idea. Equally, however, the CFSP has certainly not been communitarised, and the changes enacted under Lisbon seem, superficially at least, to have consolidated the control exercised by the member states through the Council’s structures. The EEAS in particular could be said to represent a significant ‘land-grab’ as different structures and actors have been brought together within one new institution.

Of particular interest to this study, though, is what these developments tell us about how member states act within this foreign policy environment and whether we can identify change not only in how foreign policy-making takes place, but in what is agreed. The interactions within the structure of working groups, preparatory committees and ultimately the Council itself are as intense and continuous as in other policy areas. The purpose of these is not only the projection and promotion of national interests, particularly at the levels below the Council. Epistemic communities exist, knowledge and expertise matters, regular and frequent interactions generate norms of behaviour, officials develop supplementary identities to the bodies they serve on, etc. All of these fit in with what constructivism tells us about socialization and its impact on the how of policy-making. But the question remains as to
whether this really impacts on the substance of policy-making, and on the interests that are protected and promoted by the states involved. This is the question that will be addressed in the country study chapters that follow.
Chapter 5: Britain and the CFSP: The assumption of leadership?

“Our history and the inescapable demographic legacy of our Empire, status, trading interests, geography, transatlantic ties and responsibilities as a P5, G8, NATO and Commonwealth member have hard-wired international activism into our political and national DNA.”
(Sir Richard Dannatt, 2010: 450)

“Britain has absolutely no global system impact. It only has impact through the European Union and through alliances – through Brussels…or NATO. That is the extent of Britain’s systemic relevance.”
(Parag Khanna, 2012: 22)

5.1 Introduction

The central argument of this thesis is that the insights provided by constructivism help explain the how of European-level foreign and security policy-making, particularly the impact of socialization on processes of negotiation and interaction, but less about the what, especially the impact of this cooperative policy-making on the national interests and preference formation of member states. As argued previously, the national remains as vital as ever in understanding the CFSP as a policy-making arena, and yet receives scant attention in the constructivist-based analyses provided by Smith (2004) and others.

Systems of foreign policy-making, diplomatic traditions and perspectives on geopolitics are nationally-based and derived, and while ‘Europe’ is obviously an important factor in how these have developed, in many cases these pre-date the existence of the EU and the institutions and structures it encompasses. This is not to say that EU membership has not had some impact on national structures, systems and traditions. Rather, it is to argue that this must be placed in a broader context that recognises the EU and CFSP as just one element, however important, in the foreign policy calculations taking place in London, Berlin and elsewhere across the Union.
Whilst obvious, it is worth stating at the outset that both states examined here have their own sets of priorities and preoccupations, their own views of how ‘Europe’ should ‘work’, and their own definitions or senses of the EU’s purpose. This underlines the point that the CFSP coexists with – but does not replace, supplant or supersede – the range of other relationships and linkages that constitute these states’ international engagement. Key bilateral relationships such as those between London and Washington or Berlin and Moscow, not to mention those with other international organisations such as the UN or NATO, all impact on how they interact with the CFSP in a given situation. For example, one Foreign Office official argued that it makes sense when dealing with Russia for member states to cooperate through the strategic relationship currently being developed by the EEAS, given the significance of Russia to their collective energy security. However, given its closeness to Moscow, Germany has felt less constrained in pursuing a bilateral path rather than relying on the EU level (see Chapter 6). The idea, then, of a CFSP that both sits alongside and can at the same time be penetrated by national structures and interests offers an important challenge to constructivist claims, particularly as regards its transformative power. Put another way, if the CFSP is a producer of norms and values, so too are the institutions that exist at national level, and it cannot be assumed that what pertains nationally will simply be overwhelmed or subsumed by what emerges from Brussels.

Britain provides an interesting object of study in this regard. Domestically, perhaps the least controversial thing that can be said about its relationship with the EU is that it is controversial. The “ardent nationalism” and pro-American bias of the Thatcher years (Hill, 1996: 70), followed by the relative isolation under Major, and the rhetoric-heavy but ultimately ‘outcome-lite’ pro-Europeanism of Blair certainly provide a colourful political backdrop to Britain’s recent relationship with the EU. However, they belie or disguise a more subtle and nuanced

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engagement with the EU – and particularly the CFSP – behind the closed
doors of the Foreign Affairs Council, and at the various levels within the
Council structures where policy is negotiated and agreed. If, as will be
discussed, the key features of UK foreign policy over recent decades
have been pragmatism and continuity, within the sphere of EU foreign
and security policy these have found expression through rationalism,
instrumentalism and an assumption of leadership. From this perspective,
CFSP is merely one element in a wider ‘toolkit’ which Britain seeks to
instrumentalise for the promotion and pursuit of its foreign policy
objectives.

Crucially, these objectives have been generated and shaped by
domestic perceptions and concerns across a range of interlinked historical
and geopolitical issues. These include the legacy of its historic role in the
major wars of the 20th Century, and particularly its status as one of the
victors in the Second World War, institutionalised by its permanent
membership of the UN Security Council; its position as Europe’s leading
military power (alongside France); its global network of post-imperial
relationships and interests; and above all its defence relationship with the
US and the transatlantic security alliance, institutionalised through
NATO. Together, these feed into a sense of Britain’s place and
importance in the international system and provide the basis for an
assumption or expectation within both Westminster and Whitehall that in
questions of foreign and security policy within Europe, UK involvement
will be predicated on an expectation of leadership. An FCO official
formerly responsible for the CFSP within the UK Permanent
Representation in Brussels (UKREP) articulated this instrumentalist view
thus:

“I think when it works at its best, it’s a multiplier and an amplifier of
what the UK wants to achieve…our frustrations with CFSP tend to be
when we would have liked it to do more, quicker and weren’t able to
wind the machine up.”89

Similarly, former Foreign Secretary David Miliband characterised it thus:

“I came into office committed to the idea that Britain had an interest in a strong European foreign policy, not least because I thought we could have significant influence over it.”

This chapter explores how Britain’s instrumentalisation of the CFSP, and the leadership assumption that accompanies it, have gained practical expression and how they challenge the constructivist thesis set out in Chapter 1. In particular, it is interested in how change has been driven by practical, functional and pragmatic considerations – for example organisational adaptation to better engage with and utilise the structures of the CFSP – rather than the deeper transformation constructivism implies. It begins with a survey of British foreign policy since Maastricht, looking in particular at how the range of global interests and national traditions outlined above impacted on this. It then examines in detail Britain’s domestic foreign policy regime and its structures and mechanics of policy-making. Finally, it discusses its engagement with the CFSP since 2001, with a particular focus on key relationships and its involvement in ESDP/CSDP.

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90 Interview, London, 6 December 2010.
5.2. UK foreign policy since Maastricht

5.2.1 Features, themes and priorities

A notable feature of the relationship between British foreign policy and the EU since Maastricht has been the remarkable degree of continuity in terms of underlying principles and more specific outcomes pursued by both Conservative and Labour governments. Indeed, Dryburgh (2010: 259) declares that the UK’s preferences under each have remained “remarkably consistent”. Thus, despite perceptions that John Major’s governments were “semi-detached”, while those of Tony Blair were far more positive and engaged (James and Oppermann, 2009: 286-7), the differences have been more about the style and manner of Britain’s engagement, and its responses to the pressures of adaptation, rather than the objectives to be achieved. Consequently, while 1997 brought the promise of a “step change” in the UK’s relationship with its European partners, Bache and Nugent (2007: 532) contend that not only did Blair’s government face the same dilemmas and challenges as its predecessors, more often than not its responses were similar in style and substance. Meanwhile, even though the Conservative majority within the current coalition government is strongly Eurosceptic, pragmatic engagement has (thus far) remained the order of the day, certainly in the FCO. 91 Thus, Foreign Secretary William Hague, himself an acknowledged Eurosceptic, promised an “activist, positive and energetic” engagement with the EU (Hague, 2010d), repeating a pattern of positive intent shown by all incoming governments going back at least as far as 1979 (Wallace, 2005: 54). 92 In other words, the objectives are consistent

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92 This is not to deny the clear change in style domestically to reflect the open Euroscepticism of many Conservative MPs. Thus, William Hague declared in June 2010 in the House of Commons that “[i]t is our intention that this Government will be far more open to scrutiny from this House for all its actions at the European level” (Hague, 2010d). He then announced the introduction of a “sovereignty clause” in the forthcoming EU bill to emphasise that the UK Parliament has the final say over the introduction into law of EU directives (BBC News, 2010). More recently, the internal party debate has become more visceral. For example, Michael Gove a senior member of the Government and close ally of the Prime Minister, was
for all governments: a strong British presence at the heart of Europe and, where appropriate, a strong voice for the EU internationally, both of which serve to protect and promote British interests.  

Several important contextual factors underlie this continuity, providing a framework for understanding how Britain relates to the EU, its place within British foreign policy calculations, and the position the UK perceives itself to hold within the international community. First, Britain’s approach in terms of its role in and contribution to common European foreign policy has remained essentially pragmatic and, broader debates over integration notwithstanding, largely non-ideological (e.g. Forster, 2000). Thus, since the inception of EPC and latterly under CFSP the primary focus has been on practical outputs rather than institutional development (Williams, 2005: 57), with CFSP seen as an important supplement to a declining national capacity to act (Forster, 2000: 45). Second, co-operation at the European level is just one element in a broader strategy designed to maintain British influence globally through its wide range of memberships of international organisations (particularly its permanent Security Council seat), its willingness to back up its diplomacy with the use of military force, and its commitment to NATO and the transatlantic alliance (Wallace, 2005: 53).  

Both of these feed into a third factor. The high level of continuity reflects what is, essentially, an elite political consensus regarding Britain’s place in the world in general, and the aims, purposes, costs and benefits of British participation in European foreign policy co-operation more specifically (Bache and Jordan, 2008: 5). Thus, the relationship

reported to have suggested that the UK might threaten to leave the EU unless “they give us back our sovereignty” (Walters, S. (2012) “We’re ready to walk out on Europe: Prime Minister’s closest ally Michael Gove sparks EU furore with dramatic admission”, Mail on Sunday, 13 October).

It is worth noting the efforts in this regard under William Hague to re-institute the European fast-track recruitment scheme to increase the number of British civil servants working within the Commission and other Brussels institutions as a means to improve British influence (see Kassim et al., 2010).

Wallace notes that over the last half century troops have been more actively deployed overseas by Britain than any other European power, including France (2005: 53).
with the CFSP is judged in terms of Britain’s determination to maintain the primacy of NATO within Europe’s security architecture, and its transatlantic security relationship with the US. At the same time, it is evaluated according to Britain’s ability to exercise leadership and influence in foreign and security policy by virtue of its power (military, diplomatic and economic) and global reach. This is frequently emphasised in official discourse. For example, following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, then Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd wrote:

“With our record of making and effecting a global foreign policy, Britain is now well placed to play a leading role in making [CFSP] work: setting the European foreign policy agenda…” (1994: 421)

Six years later, Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair declared: “Britain’s place has always been at the centre of Europe. …I hold to my view that Britain’s destiny is to be a leading partner in Europe”. 97

Obviously Britain is not alone in seeking to use EU membership to help mitigate and adapt to the upheavals in the international environment that have occurred since 1989 (Forster, 2000: 58). However, it is important to note that although dramatic, in terms of the pressures these geopolitical changes have imposed on the UK and its EU partners for political and institutional adaptation, they represent not so much a new phenomenon as an upping of the tempo, albeit a significant one.

95 As Wallace points out, though, none of the other major European powers would accept the UK’s claim for a privileged position vis-à-vis the US (2005: 56).
96 That said, Parag Kharma (2012: 22) argues that a medium-sized country such as the UK can only “focus on a maximum of 10 countries and try to have a meaningful impact…That’s very small”.
97 From ‘Committed to Europe, Reforming Europe’ (2000). There are numerous other examples. In 2001, when discussing security and defence cooperation, Blair stated: “[W]e must get in on the ground floor of decision-making so that the decisions are ones we are happy with. That is why when I saw the debate over Europe’s common defence policy developing, I decided Britain should not hang back but step up front and shape it…” (Blair, 2001b). In 2007, then Foreign Secretary David Miliband emphasised the UK’s “leading role within the European Union and NATO” (Miliband, 2007). More recently, current Foreign Secretary William Hague highlighted how Britain had been “instrumental in strong EU leadership on Iran and the Balkans” (Hague, 2010b), while in a speech on CSDP, David Lidington, the Coalition’s Minister for Europe, declared that “ever since St Malo, the UK has been at the heart of developing CSDP” and that Britain’s contribution along with that of France had been “indispensable” (Lidington, 2012b).
Instead, the key change in foreign policy priorities actually occurred much earlier, at the beginning of the 1970s with the decision by member states to participate in foreign policy co-operation within EPC. This represented a clear recognition on the part of states like Britain and France that their ability to act uni- and bilaterally was no longer sufficient, something that had already been demonstrated in defence terms with the establishment of NATO. Consequently, what has altered over the last two decades are not British foreign policy priorities, but rather the methods and means of achieving them, hence the identification of first EPC and later CFSP in terms of the multiplier/amplifier effect quoted above.

What is interesting, therefore, is the extent to which determinations of CFSP’s utility in achieving British foreign policy goals may have altered. An institutional expression of this has been the significant shift in focus in recent years within the FCO. This has seen it retrench, pulling back from EU policies where it has no direct or strategic interest, and “from the day-to-day monitoring” of UKREP’s work (Kassim 2011; Kassim et al., 2010). Instead, it has focused on foreign and security policy and institutional/constitutional policy, issues the FCO “owns” (UK02) (see below). In part this is explained by the greater control exercised by line ministries over the European components of their policy areas and particularly over the instructions sent to UKREP, thereby greatly reducing FCO involvement in broader European policy formulation (Kassim 2011; see also Forster, 2000: 44). It also reflects, in no small part, the effects of long-term pressure from the Treasury on the resources provided to the FCO, which the Coalition government’s deficit-reduction plans have only exacerbated. Thus, the trend over at least the second half of the last decade has seen the FCO continuously having to achieve more with less. The result, according to a senior FCO

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98 UKO2, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 18 November 2010
99 The FCO’s annual budget for each financial year from 2004-5 to 2009-10 is as follows: 2004-5 – £1.797bn (£1.762bn); 2005-6 – £2.019bn (£1.901bn); 2006-7 – £1.983bn (£1.926bn); 2007-8 – £2.076bn (£1.957bn); 2008-9 – £2.194bn
official, has been a “conscious decision to shift resources” in recent years away from Europe and towards the Middle East and the world’s emerging economies.\textsuperscript{100}

However, a third factor is also important. The power of domestic line ministries and reduced resources notwithstanding, the shift also reflects a deeper belief (and sense of pessimism even) that has emerged over the last decade as to how far the EU has actually delivered on its promise to develop into a genuinely effective foreign and security actor. One official involved in negotiating the Anglo-French St Malo agreement in 1998, and afterwards closely involved in Britain’s CFSP policy, suggested that the EU had “never really taken off” as a foreign policy actor subsequently. Rather, it had “reached a certain threshold” and had actually been less effective than other actors, such as NATO, which seemed to have more to offer when dealing with the problems and crises of recent years.\textsuperscript{101}

This highlights several things. First is the clear and obvious sense of pragmatism underpinning British foreign policy. Thus, Britain seeks to instrumentalise the CFSP and the foreign policy instruments it incorporates, while also utilising alternative multilateral venues as required, and prioritising these ahead of the EU/CFSP as necessary. Second, and more importantly, however great its contribution to the development of CFSP, Britain’s priority has always been to ensure that cooperation at EU level does not reduce the effectiveness of other actors, particularly NATO. This highlights a sense almost of British semi-

\textsuperscript{100} UKO1, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 22 September 2010.
\textsuperscript{101} UKO6, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 13 January 2012.
detachment towards foreign policy cooperation or, at the very least that “ambiguity with regard to [its] wholehearted commitment remains” (Oliver and Allen, 2006: 187).
5.2.2 Declinism or realignment? The ‘turn to Europe’ (1945-1990)

The apparent lack of a “wholehearted commitment” to integration has been a prime feature of Britain’s relationship with her European partners both before and since accession in 1973. Its origins lie in the UK’s changing fortunes in the decades following the Second World War, which have impacted on its foreign policy, particularly vis-à-vis the EU. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the entire post-war period in depth, a brief discussion of some key themes is a necessary precursor to the examination of British policy since Maastricht. In a very real sense, Britain’s semi-detachment from many of the developments on the continent reflects the wider question British policymakers have struggled with since 1945, encapsulated in US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s oft-quoted observation that she had “lost an empire and has not yet found a role”. Indeed, Acheson’s remark provides a useful short-hand to describe Britain’s on-going dilemma throughout this period, and helps us understand why the relationship with Europe has been so problematic.

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At the heart of the dilemma are two competing but related ideas. The first is of a deep decline in Britain’s power and influence, captured especially in the discourse of ‘declinism’ (Tomlinson, 2003: 202) and symbolised by traumatic events such as the Suez Crisis (1956) and the 1976 IMF loan request. The second is the notion of a post-war realignment, whereby the locus of British influence and interest changed, with Europe becoming more important. While not denying that decline occurred, this allows it to be set in context and treated with greater circumspection. In a basic sense, the power and implications of the idea of steep and absolute decline have often predominated, particularly in political discourse, thereby eclipsing the reality of the latter, and creating a significant tension and dissonance between the pragmatic advantages of moving closer to Europe, and what this means in terms of how Britain’s position in the world is understood.

In the decades following 1945, Britain did experience a significant but relative economic and geopolitical decline. It was engaged in a steady retreat from empire, was rapidly eclipsed by the two Cold War superpowers, and was forced to adjust to a new strategic reality wherein large-scale independent action was all but impossible (as evidenced by Suez). However, Britain was not alone in this – France, for example, was also struggling with the impact of the war and decolonisation. Moreover, however straitened her circumstances, Britain continued to operate from a position of relative strength, remaining a major financial centre and militarily the most powerful European member of NATO (Self, 2010: 2). The discourse accompanying this period of change and readjustment was deeply pessimistic, however, seeing it in terms of absolute decline, especially economically, and

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Self notes that in the early 1950s, Britain was producing one third of the industrial output of non-Communist Europe (2010: 2).
resulting in a ‘what’s wrong with Britain?’ canon that propagated the culture of ‘declinism’ (Tomlinson, 2003: 202).

Alongside this, though, was a view shared by both Conservative and Labour governments that Britain would and should remain an influential global power, a belief that continues to the present. Thus, even after Suez, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan denounced suggestions that Britain was no longer a power of the first rank, while in 1964 Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson declared that Britain had no intention of relinquishing its world role (Self, 2010: 4). It was no surprise, therefore, that Margaret Thatcher saw victory in the Falklands War in 1982 as demonstrating beyond doubt that the British decline, so apparent in the 1970s, had ended. Writing after her departure from office, she suggested that upon coming to power in 1979 she felt there was a “tacit assumption” both in the UK and abroad that Britain’s world role was “doomed to diminish” (1993: 173). The implication is that following victory in the South Atlantic, her government had somehow ‘stopped the rot’ and that “Britain’s name meant something more than it had” (ibid.). Similarly, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron have all emphasised Britain’s global role and influence, even if, as Self (2010: 5) notes, the rhetoric has changed.

The assumptions underlying ‘declinism’ – and the idea of a subsequent ‘resurrection’ in the 1980s and late 1990s – are difficult to sustain, however, and obscure the more complex set of changes that was occurring. Although Britain’s post-war international economic position was certainly “reduced”, particularly as pressure grew on sterling as an international reserve currency (Schenk, 2010: 1), the broader economic basis of declinism was unsound (Tomlinson, 2003: 204; see also 1996).

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104 Tomlinson identifies a number of works that form part of the “What’s wrong with Britain?” literature. These include Andrew Shonfield’s British Economic Policy since the War (1958); Michael Shanks’ The Stagnant Society (1961) and Anthony Sampson’s Anatomy of Britain (1962). See Tomlinson (2003: 203-4) for a detailed discussion of this literature.

105 For example, Self notes that Gordon Brown and David Miliband, his Foreign Secretary, talked in terms of Britain being a ‘global hub’ (2010: 4).
The reality was that the 1950s and 1960s were a relatively “golden age” for Britain’s economy, and serious questions can be posed as to precisely how much decline “actually occurred” during this period (ibid: 202).

Likewise, Turner is critical of the assumption of a steep decline in British power and influence. Whilst not disputing a reduction in Britain’s international position, he maintains that it was neither as sharp, nor the apparent resurgence following the Falklands’ War in 1982 as dramatic as often assumed (2010: 1-2). Rather, throughout the 1970s all the advanced industrial economies were suffering the consequences of a range of negative factors, most notably rising oil prices, and although Britain was affected particularly badly, in official circles there remained a sense that the “problems would pass” (ibid: 25-26). What this emphasises, therefore, is the considerable dissonance between how Britain’s place and position in the world were understood and articulated – particularly through the narrative of decline – and what was actually happening.

The source of this dissonance was not decline so much as change and realignment, particularly in Britain’s myriad of bilateral and multilateral relationships, and its reduced capacity for independent strategic action. Again, this was something all advanced economies faced as they struggled to deal with the “impact of interdependence and transnationalism” (Smith et al., 1988: xiv). To understand Britain’s response and particularly the perpetuation of the notion of decline, though, Hill (1988: 26, 28) contends that two factors are important: the first is the “immense power of traditions of thought about policy”; and the second, the “longevity of established images and belief systems” within the UK’s political and foreign policy-making establishment. In this context, therefore, applying for an IMF loan was a humiliation, even if economic reality meant Britain had little alternative, and indeed may have benefited from the structural changes the loan conditions demanded.

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106 Catherine Schenk makes a similar point, noting that Britain benefited considerably from the so-called ‘long boom’ from 1950-73 (2010: 430).
(Schenk, 2010: 6). However pragmatic the decision, though, it was the symbolism of seeking such a loan that mattered.

Beliefs and traditions were (and remain) crucial to notions surrounding Britain’s international status and role as a global actor, and these have been especially salient in its attitudes towards Europe. Europe represented one of what Churchill characterised as Britain’s three circles of international influence (e.g. Allen, 1988: 169; Daddow, 2010; Self, 2010: 2), the others being the ‘special relationship’ with the US, and the links to the Commonwealth. Arguably the most significant change in terms of interdependence and transnationalism was that which took place in Britain’s relationship with Europe during the 1950s and 1960s, whereby Britain could no longer remain separate while being a “closely-related ally and friend” (Self, 2010: 2). This change challenged directly British traditions and established beliefs, however, particularly regarding its status as an independent power, with the “turn to Europe” being seen as evidence that Britain “counted for less” in the world (Turner, 2010: 26). Consequently, while greater economic integration with the continent, and particularly the advantages more recently of membership of the Single Market, can be considered sensible and pragmatic choices, politically their implications were and remain highly problematic.

Perhaps the clearest example of this is the resignation of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1990. Although undoubtedly an influential international leader, having played a significant role in facilitating the détente between US President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that led to the end of the Cold War, barely a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall she was forced from office because of a split with senior colleagues over policy towards Europe. 108 Meanwhile the

107 Schenk notes that sterling was “embedded in broader global and regional economic and political relations” and consequently the options available to the British government were “more complex than is usually acknowledged” (2010: 6).
108 Although Thatcher had enthusiastically endorsed Britain’s 1961 membership application, she lacked Edward Heath’s “instinctive sympathy for the European ideal” and was deeply suspicious of the ‘Euro idealism’ of some of her more federalist-inclined partners, seeing them increasingly as having “a grandiose but
government of her successor, John Major, was increasingly paralysed by
disputes over the direction and extent of integration, and even Tony Blair,
despite enormous levels of popularity, never felt strong enough to settle
the ‘issue of Europe’ (e.g. Mandelson, 2011: 382-3). Thus, however
important Europe has become to Britain, it has created a continuous and
at times intolerable tension with notions of the position Britain should
(and does) occupy in the world. At the same time, it is extremely difficult
now to separate discussion of the two. For example, in describing Blair’s
views on Britain’s international role, former Cabinet minister Charles
Clarke declared: “I think he would say that he couldn’t make a holistic
speech about Britain’s international position without…addressing Britain
in Europe”. 109 Relative post-war decline thus necessitated a British
realignment towards Europe. However, strongly-held national beliefs
about and perspectives on Britain’s place in the world have made highly
problematic the implication that such a realignment would further
constrain or curtail its room for manoeuvre. This is particularly pertinent
in the context of Britain’s participation in foreign and security policy
cooperation.

muddled vision of Europe…interventionist, protectionist, ultimately federalist and
profoundly anti-British” (Self, 2010: 129). Her deep mistrust of the direction of
integration ultimately led to splits with senior members of her government over
British participation in European Monetary Union. In particular, it was the
resignation in autumn 1990 of her deputy, Sir Geoffrey Howe, and his stinging
criticism of her in his resignation statement in the House of Commons, which
precipitated her own departure a few weeks later. Howe strongly criticised her
position on Europe, declaring famously: “It is rather like sending your opening
batsmen to the crease only for them to find the moment that the first balls are
bowed that their bats have been broken before the game by the team captain”.
However, his subsequent comments were even more excoriating as to the potential
impact of her stance: “The tragedy is…that the Prime Minister’s perceived attitude
towards Europe is running increasingly serious risks for the future of our nation. It
risks minimising our influence and maximising our chances of being once again
shut out. We have paid heavily in the past for late starts and squandered
opportunities in Europe…If we detach ourselves completely, as a party or a nation,
from the middle ground of Europe, the effects will be incalculable and very hard
ever to correct” (Hansard, HC Deb 13 November 1990 vol 180 cc464-5).
109 Interview, Norwich, 20 June 2011.
5.2.3 ‘Pusillanimous realism’ – Britain and the CFSP (1991-1997)

Compared to other aspects of integration, the idea of foreign and security policy cooperation, if not always the practice, proved relatively uncontroversial for Britain during the 1990s. It had already been very supportive of EPC, with officials and politicians “enthusiastic” about the possibilities this offered (Allen, 1988: 187), while the Thatcher government produced a paper in 1985 that “wholeheartedly endorsed” it (Self, 2010: 132). Indeed, Britain was considered the prime mover in terms of EPC outputs and institutional developments, particularly during its first decade (Hill, 1996: 77). This support reflected two key points of principle that remain central to how the UK approaches foreign policy cooperation. The first was that EPC remain institutionally separate from the EEC, and the second that cooperation would always be intergovernmental, with the “traditional instruments of foreign policy…[and] the right to make decisions…the property of the member states” (Hurd, 1981: 386).

These principles formed the basis for how Britain negotiated the CFSP elements of the TEU, and subsequent treaties. Moreover they were and continue to be pursued and defended by governments of all parties. This implicit consensus notwithstanding, however, the handling by the Major government (1990-97) of cooperation on specific issues, particularly Bosnia, was problematic, demonstrating an inability or unwillingness to understand the ramifications of the end of the Cold War and what these would mean for the recently established CFSP. Along with high profile disputes over the ERM, the safety of British beef and the government’s opposition to the Social Chapter, this left Britain increasingly marginalised until the election of Labour in 1997, thereby

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110 This was despite the bruising and bitter dispute over the British budget rebate which had only been settled a few months earlier.
111 Hill suggests that in part this was because the other member states gave the UK more space in this field in an effort to help it acclimatise to the “idea of Europe” following accession (1996: 77).
weakening its claims to leadership (e.g. Bache and Nugent, 2007: 530-1; James and Oppermann, 2009: 286).

Alongside France and Germany, Britain dominated negotiations over what became the CFSP in 1990-91 (Smith, 2004: 179). Initially it had not welcomed the discussions, considering them “a negotiation before its time” (Dryburgh, 2010b: 259). However with the end of the Cold War, the need to anchor a newly-unified and potentially dominant Germany within the structures of Europe had propelled political union onto the IGC’s agenda, meaning Britain had little choice but to participate fully to ensure the predominant position of member states vis-à-vis control over foreign policy cooperation was not threatened or diluted. The Major Government was ultimately “delighted” by the 3-pillar system that emerged which, from its perspective, institutionalised the two preferences outlined above (Dryburgh, 2010b: 260). The question, though, was whether they had any longer-term objectives for CFSP beyond the desire to consolidate and protect member states’ prerogatives and ensure cooperation did not impact negatively on NATO (e.g. Hill, 1996: 82). Hill’s analysis in the mid-1990s suggests not, with apparently “little willingness in London” to look too far into the future (ibid: 85).

The limitations of London’s view of the purpose of the newly-established CFSP came quickly and tragically to light with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, however. As noted previously, Yugoslavia disappointed wider expectations that CFSP would enhance and improve European actorness in foreign and security policy. However, the reality is that it was never designed to provide the kind of immediate crisis management needed in the Balkans.112 This in turn reflects the essential weakness in what the member states had themselves created – i.e. an intergovernmental system that risked lowest common denominator policy and inaction as the price of consensus (e.g. Regelsberger and Schmalz,

112 It is worth remembering that Yugoslavia also presented enormous challenges to the UN, OSCE and NATO, and not merely the EU and its CFSP (Smith, 2004: 196).
For Britain specifically, Bosnia reveals its lack of ambition for the CFSP, and a ‘*realpolitik*’ perspective on how national power should be exercised in the post-Cold War period.

For Britain, CFSP was a forum for intergovernmental cooperation between sovereign states. This was made especially clear by Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd who maintained that it was not the job of the member states operating through CFSP to end the Bosnian conflict – ultimately only “those doing the fighting” could make that decision (1994: 424). Rather, the CFSP’s role had been to prevent rivalries between the then 12 member states over policy towards Bosnia, and to help them develop a framework through which a negotiated settlement could be achieved (ibid). In other words, for the UK CFSP was continuing from where EPC had left off – it was a “modification” rather than a fundamental transformation of the existing arrangements (Oliver and Allen, 2006: 192). In Bosnia, the outcome Britain was pursuing was a solution that would avoid the use of force if at all possible, an ambition many of its partners shared (Gow, 1996: 87). The role of the CFSP was thus limited to facilitating the intergovernmental cooperation necessary to achieve this. This narrow view of its utility was further underlined by the creation of an *ad hoc* contact group consisting of the UK, France, Germany, Italy and the US and Russia which provided the principal arena for diplomatic discussions on Bosnia. For Britain, whatever role CFSP played, the important decision-making would take place elsewhere, a similar attitude to that displayed in its response to Iran’s nuclear programme (see Chapter 7).

The Major Government’s approach to Bosnia was inherently conservative, rooted in a realist and highly pragmatic analysis of the international system and the ability of states to deploy power within it. This identified no British national interest as being at stake in Bosnia and so “the instinct of the realist was to stay out” (Hurd, 1997: 130). Instead, London advocated a policy of non-intervention, seeking to use sanctions and an arms embargo to contain the conflict within the collapsing
Yugoslav state. Whatever the rationale for such narrowly-focused British pragmatism,\textsuperscript{113} it exposed a lack of understanding of the implications of ethnic violence for the integrity of states, of the need for a robust European response to avoid potential regional destabilisation, or of the obvious national interest in ensuring this did not occur. Moreover, not only did Britain suffer considerable and sustained criticism on a number of levels, being accused variously of indifference, of being pro-Serbian and even of supporting appeasement (Gow, 1996: 87),\textsuperscript{114} its strategy also resulted in splits with key allies, particularly Washington. Indeed, so stark were the disagreements between London and the new Clinton Administration that relations were soon strained “almost to breaking point” (Self, 2010: 94; see also Simms, 2001).\textsuperscript{115} With the government struggling across a range of issues, particularly economic, its handling of Bosnia only undermined further its credibility and claim to leadership. Far from being pragmatic, British realism instead seemed “pusillanimous” (Gow, 1996: 97), with efforts to protect national prerogatives in foreign and security policy of limited value given the lack of strategic direction.

\textsuperscript{113} It should be noted that at this time, the Ministry of Defence was in the midst of the ‘Options for Change’ defence review, intended to capitalise on any post-Cold War peace dividend by reducing the size and cost of the UK’s armed forces. Thus, a priority was to avoid costly deployments as far as possible (Gow, 1996: 90).

\textsuperscript{114} Gow argues that while London recognised the Serbian leadership as being “the source of the war”, it tended to emphasise the “inter-communal aspect” of the violence (1996: 89). Thus, although supportive of sanctions, it resisted strongly efforts to provide meaningful assistance to the Bosnian-Muslims, particularly by lifting the arms embargo, a policy strongly advocated by the Americans. Both Simms and Gow also emphasise the importance of historical experience in how Britain viewed the conflict in Bosnia. Simms (2001: 12-13) suggests that Britain was historically ‘pro-Serb’, whilst its support for the maintenance of a Yugoslav entity would in any case inevitably favour the Serbs as the largest component of that state. Meanwhile, Gow (1996: 90) notes concern in London over the similarities between events in Bosnia and recent experience in Northern Ireland, both in terms of the potential military commitment, but also anxiety that support for an externally imposed solution would create a precedent in Northern Ireland.

\textsuperscript{115} Self (2010: 94) notes that even before Clinton’s election there was considerable tension with London following the Major Government’s attempts to expose him as a potential draft-dodger to support George H W Bush’s re-election. Robin Cook, Foreign Secretary from 1997-2001, makes a similar observation in his diaries and then continues: “[T]he State Department had been frustrated by the infuriating caution of the Conservatives on Bosnia and their unwillingness to get tough with Milosevic. At our first meeting, Madeline Albright very tentatively asked, ‘Can I be frank about your Conservative predecessors?’ When I responded that she could be as rude as she liked about them, she turned to her advisers and said, ‘This is going to be fun.’” (2004: 103).
from London. Arguably the only positive longer-term outcome was the development of closer defence and security links with France which bore fruit in 1998 at St Malo (Oliver and Allen, 2006: 192) (see below).

Addressing the deficiencies in CFSP exposed by Yugoslavia was a priority of the foreign policy negotiations at the 1996 IGC which produced the Treaty of Amsterdam (see Chapter 4). Britain supported many of the proposed changes, including establishing the post of High Representative provided he/she remain clearly within the institutional structures of the Council (ibid). However, so divisive had Europe become within the governing Conservative Party, and consequently so heated the domestic debate around all aspects of integration, that far from providing any kind of leadership, the contribution of the moribund government to the IGC was essentially obstructionist. 116 For their part, Britain’s European partners were happy to delay the final negotiations until the general election when they hoped and expected a more pro-European Labour government would take office (Wallace, 2005: 54). Thus, when the new Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, addressed the House of Commons on 9 June 1997, he was able to declare that “New Labour goes to the Amsterdam summit in a constructive spirit of partnership, not the sterile spirit of oppositionalism” 117

116 For example, it blocked proposals to incorporate the Schengen Agreements into the EU (James and Oppermann, 2009: 286).
117 Hansard, HC Deb 9 June 1997, Col. 804.
The assumption of leadership was a central and explicit element in British foreign policy under Tony Blair’s governments. Moreover, even though Blair’s premiership was ultimately overshadowed by the consequences of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq War – not the least of which was the ultimate confounding of his hopes for a sea-change in the relationship between Britain and the EU – few recent prime ministers have so dominated its formulation and implementation. In part this reflected the almost unprecedented authority over domestic policy exercised by his Chancellor, Gordon Brown. Even so, Dyson (2009: 237) considers Blair “unusually proactive” in foreign affairs, while Bulmer-Thomas (2006: 2) believes he was so dominant that it is “not unreasonable” to consider British foreign policy during this time as “Blair’s foreign policy”. Moreover, this dominance was achieved despite his office lacking clear prerogatives in this area (O’Malley, 2007: 1). What is striking, therefore, is that despite this, Blair’s attempts to effect long-term change in the relationship between Britain and Europe, and ensure for Britain the kind of leadership role in the EU he desired, ultimately failed. Moreover, it is Blair himself who must shoulder much of the blame for this. As will be discussed, his determination to support the Bush Administration in Iraq, and his inability to overcome the domestic dominance of Brown, who effectively vetoed British membership of the single currency through his five economic tests, meant that by the end of his time in office, Blair’s European policy was largely defunct. Indeed, in the view

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118 The Iraq War, and particularly Tony Blair’s involvement in it, remains controversial to this day. See for example, Helm, T. (2012) ‘Tony Blair should face trial over Iraq war, says Desmond Tutu’. The Observer (London: Guardian News and Media Ltd). Indeed, Robin Cook contended in his memoirs that even as soon after the war as 2004 it was “becoming hard to find any [ministers] who do not resignedly accept that the war has been an unmitigated disaster for Labour in domestic politics” (2004: 269).

119 O’Malley highlights Blair’s ability to structure the choices facing those whose support he needed to achieve the outcomes he wished. He notes in particular how he was able to garner support for the war in Iraq by defining the choice facing Cabinet, Parliament and even the public as one of either liberation or appeasement (2007: 10). Julie Smith, meanwhile, suggests that the fact neither of Blair’s first two foreign secretaries, Robin Cook and Jack Straw, were especially Europhile in outlook may have contributed to his ability to lead on European affairs (2005: 711).
of his former Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, “his stewardship was, if not a failure [then] very close to failure in relation to Europe given what his ambitions [were]” (my emphasis). To understand New Labour foreign policy, therefore, one must examine the role of Blair in framing and driving it, and the restrictions he faced.

Blair’s starting point was that Britain could and should be a force for good in the world (Williams, 2005: 31). Thus, it needed to be willing to intervene, militarily when required, something reflected strongly in the interventionist positions he frequently adopted. As Clarke put it, he repudiated the “walk passed on the other side school”; rather

“he believed absolutely…that Britain can and should, and therefore Europe can and should, influence what’s going on in the rest of the world, including militarily”.

To achieve this, Britain needed to play a “stronger global role”, looking beyond Europe and the Atlantic Alliance (Oliver and Allen, 2006: 193), but only on the basis that these two essential pillars of British foreign policy were strong and engaged. It was to achieve this that so much of his energy was devoted, based on the premise that while Britain might not be materially or economically dominant, the force of its moral argument combined with material action – for example, overseas development aid increased substantially during Labour’s time in office (Williams, 2005) – and a heavy dose of pragmatism would enable it to cajole and lead its allies in the direction wanted. This was reflected in how the UK approached both Europe and the world under Blair, which he himself characterised in terms of “pragmatic vision” (1999b). Two elements of this ‘vision’ stand out, and were constants throughout the period. The first was his efforts to re-invigorate Britain’s relationship with the EU and reposition it the heart of decision-making. As he himself

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120 Interview, Norwich, 20 June 2011.
121 Interview, Norwich, 20 June 2011. Clarke stated: “He absolutely believed that the ‘walk passed on the other side’ school, the ‘it’s a small, faraway country of which we know little’ school, is something which he completely repudiates…that’s absolutely core to his set of beliefs.”
122 Blair declares in his memoirs: “[t]here is no challenge facing the world today that would be met more easily if the US and [EU] stood apart” (2010: 676).
declared in 1997, “we cannot shape Europe unless we matter in Europe” (Kassim, 2008: 172). The second element was a broader articulation of how Britain should engage with the world, for which its relationship with the EU and US were crucial. Both will be discussed next.

Re-positioning Britain

The idea of Britain as a “bridge” between the USA and Europe has been a central facet of British foreign policy for at least six decades (Paterson, 2007; Sherrington, 2006; Stephens, 2005). Consequently, a central principle of Blair’s foreign policy was a desire to redefine and re-energise Britain’s relations with Europe whilst enhancing its role as a “bridge” between the EU and US. Blair saw the relationship between the two as crucial to ensuring a stable international system. Moreover, a Britain at the heart of EU decision-making would be stronger in the eyes of the US, in turn making Britain more influential in Europe (Williams, 2005: 29). As Blair put it:

“Britain is stronger with the US by reason of being in Europe…we are stronger in Europe if strong with the US. Stronger together. Influential with both. And a bridge between the two” (1999c).

He elaborates further on the underlying pragmatism of this position in his memoirs:

“[F]or me, Europe was a simple issue. It was to do with the modern world. I supported the Europe ideal, but even if I hadn’t, it was utterly straightforward: in a world of new emerging powers, Britain needed Europe in order to exert influence and advance interests. It wasn’t complicated…It was a practical question of realpolitik.” (Blair, 2010: 533)

Blair invested considerable personal time and attention in trying to achieve this, particularly prior to 2001, and his efforts were not without success. The party he took over in 1994 was arguably more at ease with Europe, and Britain’s relationship with it, than it had been in
decades. Much of the credit for this should go to Neil Kinnock, leader from 1983-1992, who worked hard to persuade Labour of the merits of a more positive attitude to Europe as part of wider attempts to make it more electable following the election defeat of 1983 (Kassim, 2008: 169; see also Smith, 2005: 706). Labour’s pro-Europeanism continued under John Smith, Kinnock’s successor, and from 1994 onwards became “a key element of New Labour’s modernizing project”, with support for “constructive engagement” with Europe “a mainstream [party] view” by the time of the 1997 general election (Kassim, 2008: 170, 171; see also Kassim, 2010).

As part of this, Blair demanded a more strategic approach to relations with European partners. For example, sustained efforts were made to improve the links between Labour and its European sister parties (Smith, 2005: 706; Kassim, 2008: 170). Meanwhile, even before his election victory in 1997, Blair met with senior figures from the governments of other member states to emphasise that whatever the Conservative positions at the soon-to-convene Amsterdam IGC, they could expect much more positive engagement from the Labour government that would likely be representing Britain by the end (Kassim, 2008: 170). Once in office, Blair also sought to generate support within partner states for his ‘Third Way’, resulting in a high-profile joint initiative with German Chancellor and SPD leader, Gerhard Schröder (Schröder, 2007: 275-6; Kassim, 2008: 172). At the administrative level, meanwhile, a concerted effort was made at Blair’s initiative to launch a “step change” plan designed to “upgrade relations” between the Civil Service, Ministers and MPs and their peers in “like-minded partners” across Europe with a view to “promot[ing] the UK to the status of core

123 According to Julie Smith, Europe had “divided the British Labour party for most of the past 60 years” (2005: 705).
124 In the 1994 European Parliamentary elections, for example, Labour ended up with more MEPs than any other party within the Party of European Socialists (PES), the umbrella group for left and centre-left parties within the parliament. As a consequence, it was a Labour MEP, Pauline Green, who was elected Group leader (Kassim, 2008: 170).
insider” (Kassim, 2008: 172; Paterson, 2010c: 317; Smith 2005: 709). Ultimately these efforts “petered out” (Kassim, 2008: 173). However, they contributed to a sense that Britain was behaving as an “essentially constructive” partner (Smith, 2005: 709). Moreover, they made possible future British initiatives, not least plans to develop the EU’s foreign and security policies.

In was in foreign and security policy were Britain’s claim to leadership was most realistic and achievable. The Anglo-French agreement at St Malo in December 1998, which made possible the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (see Chapter 4), was arguably the most eye-catching ‘European’ success of Blair’s first term in office (see, for example, Menon, 2004). Indeed, it was probably the most significant British contribution to EU foreign and security policy since the launch of CFSP. Crucially, the agreement between the EU’s two major military powers (and frequent rivals) seemed to have resolved the perennial question over the relationship between NATO (and thus the US) and an autonomous European crisis management capability. In paving the way for ESDP, it allowed Britain to restate its European leadership credentials even as it held back from participating in the single currency. This was certainly the view of Jacques Chirac, French President at the time, who declared that the launch of the “European defense policy alongside us was for Blair a way of accomplishing a useful task without taking too many electoral risks” (2012: 216).

Although one senior diplomat suggested “there weren’t many other areas we could easily come to”, it is too simplistic to characterise ESDP simply as the Blair government casting around for a European role,

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125 Paterson characterises these efforts as being about “exchang[ing] an emphasis on tactics for one of strategy and adopt[ing] a policy of strategic alliances in pursuit of a leading position in the EU” (2010c: 317). He notes as well the important role played by Robert Cooper in pursuing this. Cooper went on to be a senior adviser to both Javier Solana and Catherine Ashton.
126 UK04, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (retired), telephone interview, 22 September 2011.
however (Howorth, 2007: 38). Rather, ESDP was borne out of the growing Anglo-French convergence around the idea that, following Yugoslavia, Europe needed greater autonomy in crisis management and less reliance on the US (e.g. House of Lords, 2012: 10). While sustaining the transatlantic alliance remained central to Blair’s foreign policy, he saw a more capable Europe acting to complement NATO, sharing the security burden and thereby strengthening the alliance. Indeed, this latter view remains central to British policy, as will be discussed below. In essence, while NATO continues to do “the heavy-lifting”, the EU can act autonomously when the situation demands, but always on the understanding that “CSDP is the junior partner to NATO in terms of military capabilities” (UKO8).

What made St Malo so important was the setting aside by Europe’s two leading military powers of long-standing differences over European security and defence – and especially whether NATO should be exclusively responsible for this (Howorth, 2007: 37). This in turn started a process resulting first in the creation of ESDP, followed by initiatives to improve member states’ military capabilities and coordination, and the launch of a number of crisis management missions. For Britain, these developments – particularly improved capabilities among NATO’s EU members – could only be positive (Gross, 2009: 5). Moreover, in the years following Britain played “a leading role in all the EU’s major security initiatives” (Williams, 2005: 60). In foreign and security policy, at least, Blair’s ‘pragmatic vision’ seemed initially to bear fruit.

128 That said, as recently as 31 December 2012, the US Ambassador to NATO was calling on the UK and other European NATO members to spend more on defence and assume a greater share of the security burden. (See, for example: Hopkins, N. (2012) ‘UK urged to spend Afghan withdrawal savings on defence’, The Guardian, 31 December.)
129 Two examples are British support for the development of Battlegroups and the provision of an integrated headquarters for Operation Atalanta off the Somali coast (discussed in detail below).
The desire to return Britain to ‘the heart of Europe’ suffered major set-backs following 9/11, however. Indeed, the generally “proactive” approach to the EU in Labour’s first term, encompassing the launch of ESDP, opting-in to the Social Chapter, and economic agenda-setting at Lisbon in 2000, can be contrasted with the more “reactive” nature of the second, and “defensive engagement” of the third (Menon, 2004; Smith, 2005: 704; Sherrington, 2006: 72). The global shift in priorities following 9/11 and the war in Iraq, which split the EU’s leading powers, are often cited as crucial in upsetting Blair’s plans to “re-anchor” Britain in Europe (Paterson, 2007: 4). In his unqualified support for the Americans over Iraq, Blair demonstrated to Britain’s EU partners that however constructive it sought to be, his government remained fundamentally Atlanticist in inclination, despite the obvious and increasing difficulties this created (Dorman, 2003: 75-6; Smith, 2005: 703; Sherrington, 2006: 72). However, this does not tell the whole story. Although 9/11 and Iraq contributed to the significant loss of momentum in Blair’s European ambitions from 2001 until his departure from office in 2007, domestic politics – indeed, internal Labour party politics – also played a major role.

Despite being considered the most Europhile British Prime Minister since Heath (Smith, 2005: 707; Cook, 2004: 130), the reality was that the pro-European credentials of both Blair and his government were never unambiguous. For example, New Labour’s 1997 manifesto pledge to “lead a campaign for reform in Europe [because] Europe isn’t working in the way this country and Europe needs,” was a clear indication of the terms by which Britain’s ‘constructive engagement’ would take place (Smith, 2005: 707). ‘Reform’ and ‘leadership’ were the mantras in how Blair approached the EU throughout his premiership. In

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131 Jack Straw believed that “9/11 defined our foreign policy (and much of our home policy) for years after that, and in many ways still does” (2012: 336).  
132 Philip Stephens notes that Gerhard Schröder suggested that “the traffic on Mr Blair’s bridge is too often one way” (2005: 20).
effect, Labour’s domestic electoral message was being transposed onto the European stage, with Blair seeking to portray Britain as rescuing Europe from itself in “unapologetically populist terms” (Kassim, 2008: 171). That Blair needed to characterise the relationship between Britain and Europe in such terms reflected more deep-rooted problems in how the British electorate viewed its membership of the EU. The challenge which Blair never really confronted (or felt able to confront) was how to engage with the electorate on this question.

This was arguably the the greatest failing of Blair’s European policy. Throughout his premiership, he remained unwilling or unable to ‘sell’ Europe to an increasingly sceptical domestic audience, despite overwhelming majorities in his first two terms (Kassim, 2008; Smith, 2005). Indeed, Kassim argues that his choice not to engage in a conversation with the British electorate about the greater benefits of integration, particularly during the relative honeymoon period of his first term in office, wasted a “once-in-a-generation opportunity” to settle this question (2008: 183). Rather, throughout this period Blair and his government showed an “unwillingness to confront the [predominantly Eurosceptic] print media” (Paterson, 2010c: 317), particularly on the question of membership of the single currency which became emblematic of this weakness. Indeed, Stephens argues that on the Euro Blair’s government “lived in the shadow of the Eurosceptic media” (2001: 67). At the same time, Blair himself lived in the shadow of his chancellor on this issue. Brown’s decision to veto British membership – taken with little or no input from the Prime Minister (Kassim, 2008: 174) – was revealing in terms of the real extent of Blair’s power as head of

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133 This is particularly important as the case for British membership of the EU “was, and continues to be, framed in overwhelmingly economic terms” (see Paterson, 2007: 4).

134 Blair is not alone in pursuing such themes. For example, in the introduction to his recent and long-awaited speech on Britain’s relationship with the EU, David Cameron declared: “I want to speak to you today with urgency and frankness about the European Union and how it must change – both to deliver prosperity and to retain the support of its peoples” (Cameron, 2013) (my emphasis).
government. While in theory Blair could have replaced Brown with someone willing to pursue British membership of the single currency, he felt unable to do so, refusing either to openly challenge or over-rule his chancellor (e.g. Stephens, 2001: 74). This reflected the reality that Brown was “invulnerable and immovable” as a result of Britain’s economic success (Paterson, 2010c: 314). It also suggests that despite his electoral success, Blair was unwilling to risk his position by taking on both his most influential minister and a broadly hostile media over the Euro (ibid: 317). More than Iraq or his close support of the Bush Administration, it was ultimately his refusal not to join battle domestically on the question of Europe that thwarted the first aspect of Blair’s vision, his ambition to re-position Britain in Europe.

Engaging with the world

The second constant in Blair’s ‘pragmatic vision’ was his articulation of how Britain would engage with, and seek to influence, a dramatically changing world. This he set out most clearly in his Chicago speech on the ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ (Blair, 1999a), which made an intellectual and moral case for intervention in states deemed to pose a risk to international stability through their potential to spread chaos and disorder across borders (Atkins, 2006: 277). Early manifestations of these ideas came in Robin Cook’s 1997 call for an “ethical dimension” to UK foreign policy, and the establishment of a new Department for International Development (DfID), now a key component

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135 The decision on the Euro was “[f]rom all accounts…taken by the chancellor within input from his advisers, without the prime minister’s participation” (Kassim, 2008: 174). Moreover, the disagreement between Prime Minister and Chancellor on this and Europe more broadly was such that not only did the government refuse to engage in a meaningful debate with the electorate on the subject, within Cabinet there was almost no discussion either, effectively leaving the field open to the sceptics to make the running (Kassim, 2008: 174).

136 Some have argued that although Brown was more cautious about membership of the Euro, he was “personally more positive about the possibility of eventual membership than was widely acknowledged” (Smith, 2005: 719).

137 For a detailed analysis of the speech and its implications, see Atkins (2006).
in foreign policy-making in Whitehall (see below). However, in Chicago Blair was espousing something much more radical by suggesting that when necessary the principle of non-intervention – fundamental in international relations – “must be qualified” (1999a). His analysis saw globalisation as having political and security ramifications, not merely economic, meaning traditional distinctions between domestic and foreign policy no longer applied. Furthermore, such was the level of interdependence that in the case of disasters, atrocities or even failed states, liberal democracies were obliged to intervene both morally and for their own security, albeit on the basis of international co-operation (ibid).

Made against the backdrop of NATO’s Kosovo campaign, of which he had been a strong advocate, Blair’s speech can be seen as a justification for military actions not sanctioned by the UN. However, for him the justice of the cause was beyond question, based as it was on “values” and “not on any territorial ambitions” (Blair, 1999a). Crucially, if those international institutions, particularly the UN, responsible for maintaining peace and security were unable or unwilling to act, they risked being side-lined by those who would – i.e. coalitions of like-minded liberal democracies, particularly the US and EU (ibid). Williams (2005: 23) sees considerable continuity between these ideas and Labour’s long tradition of liberal internationalism. There is, moreover, a clear connection between Blair’s thinking on foreign and domestic policy. In essence, he was endeavouring to apply his ‘Third Way’ philosophy to the problems of the international community by ‘marrying’ realism and idealism in a new iteration of enlightened self-interest (Atkins, 2006: 275).

138 Thus, Blair declared: “[m]any of our domestic problems are caused on the other side of the world” (1999a).

139 For example, Blair stated: “our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self-interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish” (1999a). Similarly, in a speech in 2006, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw declared that “the strongly activist foreign policy we have pursued since 1997 has been as much about values as interests. And the values which we promote abroad are those that guide us at home” (Straw, 2006).
Perhaps more significantly, his moral discourse was intended to bridge the fault line between Britain’s relationship with Europe and its ‘special relationship’ with the US. For Blair, the language of shared values was a ‘moral glue’, enabling him to emphasise unifying factors at a time when events risked forcing the two apart. Implicit in this was the recognition that Europe could not rely on the US indefinitely for its protection and so needed to make a security contribution commensurate with its economic power.\textsuperscript{140} Equally, the US needed to remain involved in the maintenance of international stability, but in partnership with its European allies. To achieve this, the EU needed to develop foreign and security policies that complemented NATO, strengthening EU/US ties rather than weakening them, or even setting the EU up as a rival (Paterson, 2007: 28).\textsuperscript{141} A language which emphasised shared liberal, democratic values and the need for the US and EU to work together to protect and promote these, was therefore essential.

These were influential ideas. The language was echoed, for example, in the 2003 \textit{European Security Strategy}, reflecting the considerable British influence on the document (Consilium, 2003a).\textsuperscript{142} However, a policy based around bridging transatlantic differences could not be “an end in itself” (Niblett, 2007: 627). Blair’s closeness to the Bush Administration, particularly over Iraq, ensured that in his twin aims of bringing Europe and the US closer together, and in the process putting Britain back at the heart of Europe, he failed. Part of this was due to the “exaggerated view” Blair had of his own influence over US policy under

\textsuperscript{140} Robin Niblett argues that the EU can no longer expect to act simply as a regional security power or even a global civilian power. States such as China and India expect it to be a “full partner” – i.e. contribute effectively at the international diplomatic level, including standing up to the US if necessary (2007: 633).

\textsuperscript{141} Alister Miskimmon gives the example of the creation of the \textit{European Rapid Reaction Force}, where Blair’s arguments in favour of British involvement were “almost exclusively centred around the idea that European capabilities will strengthen the transatlantic link” (2004: 290).

\textsuperscript{142} This declared that “distant threats may be as much concern as those that are near at hand” (Consilium, 2003a: 6). Similar ideas also inform the UN’s ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P). See Evans, G. and Sahnoun, M. (2002) ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ in which the authors conclude that “[t]here is a developing consensus around the idea that sovereignty must be qualified by the responsibility to protect.”
Clinton but especially Bush (Williams, 2005: 65). Equally, though, the unsettled domestic questions discussed above, particularly around economic integration, always overshadowed his efforts.

Ultimately, Britain’s ability to claim leadership in European foreign and security policy made sense, but would always be contingent on building support among partner states. To some extent it was successful, particularly in creating the ESDP, promoting initiatives such as Battlegroups, etc. However, these could never compensate for the failure to participate in the key European integration project – the single currency. Thus, when the split occurred with France and Germany over Iraq – in essence, when Britain chose the US over its EU partners – it was marginalised in the two most important debates taking place within Europe. Thus, Blair’s sometimes “grandiose and vague” foreign policy objectives (ibid: 207) never squared the circle of how to be at the heart of Europe whilst remaining close to the US.

As argued above, the most significant differences between the Blair Governments and those of his immediate predecessor lay less in the substance and underlying direction of travel, than in the tactics employed to get there and the personality of the leader pursuing them. Both Blair and Major saw Britain as having an important international role, although Blair made far greater efforts to instrumentalise the EU and CFSP to support this. Equally, the key to this instrumentalisation – the agreement between Britain and France at St Malo – was the result of several years of convergence that began during Major’s premiership. This was based on a pragmatic recognition of the need for greater collaboration within Europe to give it more autonomy in security, whilst simultaneously

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143 Again, Robin Cook offers an interesting perspective on this in his commentary on his diary entries during the build-up to the Iraq conflict. “Tony Blair deserves credit for persuading President Bush that he must take Iraq to the United Nations for multilateral agreement. It is the only point in the whole saga where it is possible to pinpoint a clear instance where British influence made any difference to US policy on Iraq” (2004: 205) (emphasis added). Blair would doubtless demur.

144 Battlegroups were a joint initiative to create small rapid reaction forces capable of quick deployment in crisis management operations (Consilium, 2009c) (see Chapter 6).
making it a more effective partner to the US. In this we can see significant continuity not only between Major and Blair, but between Blair and his successors, including David Cameron.
5.2.5 ‘Defensive engagement’ – Britain and the CFSP since 2007

Blair’s ‘pragmatic vision’ continued to some extent under Gordon Brown’s administration, while it has given way to what can essentially be considered ‘defensive engagement’ under David Cameron. In an early pronouncement after becoming Brown’s Foreign Secretary, David Miliband declared that Britain needed to use its strengths “so that we are a force for good for Britain by being a force for good in the world” (2007d). Again, though, the pragmatism is clear in the wish to instrumentalise the EU to support this objective, with Miliband calling for the EU “to be a greater asset in foreign policy” (ibid). At the same time, under Miliband’s leadership, a major re-organisation of the FCO was initiated which saw a significant re-focusing of attention and resources towards the wider world at the expense of the EU. Miliband characterised this re-organisation as follows:

“[We] refocused ourselves within the Foreign Office on our strategic priorities. We had a more rigorous approach to what we were trying to achieve… We went through a strategy refresher in the first six months and really asked some rather searching questions about what the Foreign office was for, and we concluded …it was a global network, it was there to provide services to business and citizens.”

As will be discussed in the next section, though, this has led not only to a major down-grading of Europe as an area of FCO concern (something that has not been reversed under the coalition), but has also impacted on the capacity of the FCO to provide long-term strategic thinking on the relationship with the EU.

Under the current Conservative-led coalition in office since 2010, meanwhile, ‘pragmatic vision’ has been replaced by defensive engagement. Thus, although involvement in the EU is recognised as having value – it “extends the impact and weight we bring to bear in foreign affairs” (Hague, 2010a) – the Government has emphasised that it remains only one option:

“Co-operation within the EU on the great global issues has allowed us to advance our shared interests and values with effect. But that does not mean we should try to forge a single European position and voice on everything. …The EU is part of but far from all of the solution to the fundamental challenges we face.” (Hague, 2012).\footnote{Menon (2010: 16) warns, though, that “the road towards [British] collaboration with Paris may run through Brussels”, given the French commitment to developing European defence and security initiatives through ESDP.}

While such rhetoric is perhaps unsurprising given the government’s more Euro-sceptical positioning, this is not the whole picture. As suggested above, a broader frustration is emerging within the FCO over the failure of the CFSP to live up to previous ambitions. One diplomat involved with the PSC after St Malo suggested:

“[T]he EU has kind of bumped up against the limits of its ambition and its resources…if we, Britain, really want to lever wider change then investing more and more in the EU is not necessarily going to deliver those results. What we ought to be investing in is the Americans, the Chinese, Brazilians, Indians, etc. because a little bit of influence there is going to have more impact than a lot of influence in Brussels… [T]he bigger debate at the moment [is] about whether the EU, even if we got it working the way we want it to, is ever really going to amount to as much as…these other big powers…”\footnote{UKO3, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 24 January 2011.}

Unsurprisingly, therefore, (and as will be discussed below), increased effort has been put into alternative options, perhaps most notably bilateral cooperation such as the Anglo-French defence agreement of 2 November 2010 (e.g. Lindley-French, 2010; Menon, 2010), although it is too soon to judge the likely impact of this on the development of CSDP. What is clear, though, is that British engagement in and enthusiasm for the CFSP has fluctuated since Maastricht and is likely to continue to do so. What has not is the view that the CFSP (and the EU more broadly) remain only one element in Britain’s foreign policy toolkit, or that when Britain actively engages with it, it expects to do so from a position of leadership.
5.3 Britain’s domestic foreign policy regime: political leadership, structures and processes

5.3.1 Political leadership and strategic management

The political leadership and strategic management of British foreign policy are formally exercised by the Foreign Secretary as head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). However, as implied in the previous discussion, the power and authority of the Foreign Secretary over the strategic direction of UK foreign policy depend very much on his/her relationship with the Prime Minister, and particularly the interest taken by the latter in foreign affairs (e.g. Allen and Oliver, 2008). As one official noted, “strength of personality” matters (UKO2). Poguntke and Webb (2007) argue that this reflects a wider trend in recent years that has seen a growing concentration of power around the head of government, a process they characterise as the ‘presidentialization’ of democratic politics. While this might be contested, in the context of foreign policy it is certainly the case that some prime ministers – for example Tony Blair – do at times operate very much as their own foreign minister, particularly when it comes to the ‘history-making’ decisions, while the actual foreign minister is left to deal with more routine or day-to-day questions (e.g. House of Commons, 2009a).148 (This is also a feature of the German system, discussed in Chapter 6). Membership of the EU seems to have contributed to this. In particular, the creation of the European Council has to some extent institutionalised and formalised this development, bringing together European heads of state and government in quarterly meetings which amongst other things set the strategic direction of European foreign policy and the priorities for the CFSP.149

148 In evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Sir Peter Ricketts – a former Political Director and Permanent Secretary at the FCO as well as the first National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister – disputes this somewhat, arguing that “the Prime Minister has had a leading role in foreign policy for generations” (House of Commons, 2009: 117)

149 Although first established in 1974, the European Council only became a formal EU institution under the Treaty of Lisbon (Official Journal of the European Union, 2009).
The current government notwithstanding, coalitions are generally rare in the British system so, unlike the German system where traditionally the junior coalition party holds the foreign ministry, in Britain it is normally reserved for a senior political ally of the Prime Minister (or occasionally a potential leadership rival). The relationship between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary is necessarily close, however dominant the former may be. For example, Robin Cook noted at the time of his departure from the FCO in 2001 that it was pointless seeking to stay once Blair had resolved to replace him: “[They] work so closely together…that I knew it was impossible to do the job with authority if I did not have Tony’s backing” (2004: 7). This is not to argue, though, that Foreign Secretaries are always constrained or lack autonomy. Despite, for example, the significant role played by Blair, the volume of work and sheer number of issues requiring attention make it impossible for any Prime Minister to devote all his/her attention to foreign affairs. David Miliband notes, for example, that he enjoyed “a pretty free hand” throughout his time in office despite tension with the “No. 10 briefing machine” over one speech he gave touching on defence issues. More importantly, as the formal and institutional centre of foreign policy-making and implementation, the FCO – and therefore any Foreign Secretary – enjoys advantages in terms of information, expertise and human resources significantly beyond those available to Downing Street. The key point is that on the major strategic questions, which in turn often dominate the frequent bilateral and summit meetings that appear

150 For example, John Major’s first Foreign Secretary was Douglas Hurd, a senior minister under Thatcher and rival for the Conservative party leadership in 1990. He served in the post from 1989-1995, becoming an important ally and advisor to Major. Blair’s first Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook (1997-2001), was a highly respected senior member of the Labour frontbench in Opposition. His successor, Jack Straw (2001-6), was equally senior, moved to the FCO from the Home Office and played a crucial role in trying to gain support for the additional UN resolution Blair sought ahead of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Straw was very surprised at being offered the position, noting that his initial response to the Prime Minister involved an expletive (2012: 326). David Miliband, Gordon Brown’s Foreign Secretary, was seen as a likely future Labour leader and in the latter days of the Brown government there was frequent media speculation that he would mount a leadership challenge to Brown. Currently, the post is held by William Hague, himself a former Conservative leader and now party ‘grandee’.  

regularly on the Prime Minister’s schedule, s/he will expect – and need – the agreement and support (or at least acquiescence) of the Foreign Secretary in terms of the outcomes to be pursued, the tactics to achieve them, etc.\footnote{152}

Although lacking the resources of the FCO, the Prime Minister’s ability to provide strategic and political direction to UK foreign policy, including, ultimately, on issues relating to British input into CFSP, is supported in a number of ways. Within Downing Street, s/he has a small civil service team consisting of a Principal Private Secretary and four to five private secretaries, one of whom is seconded from the FCO and responsible for foreign affairs.\footnote{153} This official acts as “the Prime Minister’s voice”, working with the Cabinet Secretary and feeding into the Cabinet Office (CO) in any foreign policy-related discussion.\footnote{154} The role of the Cabinet Office and Cabinet Secretary, meanwhile, is “intergovernmental coordination”, and the servicing of the numerous Cabinet committees in which policy is determined, such as the \textit{European Affairs Committee} (UKO2). Within the CO, meanwhile, there are two secretariats dealing with EU policy. The first is the \textit{European and Global Issues Secretariat} (EGIS), which has a staff of approximately 30, and focuses primarily (but not entirely) on the coordination of policy which is “internal-to-the-EU” (UKO2). CFSP, however, has remained largely separate and “owned by” the FCO (UKO2, UKO3). Where there is a cross-over, for example relating to CSDP policy, it is more likely to be

\footnote{152} The comments of Jack Straw are again interesting here. Having determined that he was interested in becoming Foreign Secretary, Blair said: “‘There’s just one thing we do need to get clear...The euro. If the Cabinet recommends that we go in, I have to know that you’ll be onside.’ ‘The man’s not daft,’ I thought to myself. Close though we were, Tony knew that we came at the issues of the EU, and the euro, from different positions” (2012: 326). Knowing Straw to be Eurosceptic – Straw describes himself as ‘a practical European, not an enthusiast’ (ibid) – Blair wanted to avoid being ‘boxed-in’ over any decision on the Euro, something which ultimately came to pass once his political capital was lost on Iraq. Indeed, Charles Clarke found it very surprising that Blair had replaced Cook, a Euro-enthusiast, with Straw, meaning that 3 of his most senior Cabinet colleagues – Straw, Gordon Brown and Deputy PM John Prescott – were all against the Euro (Interview, Norwich, 20 June 2011).
\footnote{153} Charles Clarke, Interview, Norwich, 20 June 2011.
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discussed in the *Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat* (FDPS), which is responsible for “driving the coherent quality and delivery of foreign and defence policy across departments” (Cabinet Office, 2012b).

As part of its role, the FDPS also supports the recently established *National Security Council*. An innovation of the current coalition government, the Council was created in 2010 specifically to provide political leadership in wider questions of foreign and security policy, with the objective of achieving “a strategic and tightly coordinated approach across…government to the risks and opportunities the country faces” (Cabinet Office, 2010: 9). Meeting weekly, it brings together the Prime Minister and all senior ministers with security responsibilities, including Foreign, Defence and International Development Secretaries (Cabinet Office, 2012a,c). The FCO normally raises “particularly high profile or sensitive or difficult” issues with the FDPS and National Security Council to ensure that the FCO and Downing Street “are joined up” (UKO2).

The political leadership exercised by Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary is also supported by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and DfID, which both have significant interests in and make important contributions to the direction of foreign policy-making (discussed below). In this context, it is worth noting the publication in 2010 of a British *National Security Strategy* “for the first time in [the] country’s history” (Cabinet Office, 2010: 5). This is intended to provide a framework for coordinated government decision-making, based around an appraisal of national priorities, the capabilities required to achieve them, and the resources available to do so (ibid). While certainly an innovation, it is perhaps most revealing in terms of the desire to address what UKO5 considers the long-standing British problem of a “lack of strategic consistency” by

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155 It sought to do this by providing “a hard-headed reappraisal of our foreign policy and security objectives and the role we wish our country to play” (Cabinet Office, 2010: 9)
encouraging more ‘joined-up’ strategic-level political thinking in British foreign and security policy.\textsuperscript{156}

Finally, in terms of the political management of European policy, it is important to highlight the significant shift in the centre of gravity within Whitehall in recent years. The Foreign Secretary serves as the Prime Minister’s most senior adviser on all aspects of foreign policy, with the FCO his/her primary source for that advice. Historically, the FCO, UKREP and CO have formed the triangle or 3 pillars upon which all British policy inputs into the EU have been based and controlled. However, as noted above, the direct control exercised by line ministries over their policy inputs into Brussels and their communications with UKREP has increased in recent years – as UKO1 notes, “every lead department has a direct link to UKREP”. At the same time, the FCO has faced a significant resources squeeze under successive governments over at least the last decade which, combined with (or justifying post hoc) a belief that “sufficient expertise” existed within other ministries to deal with EU issues, has consequently significantly reduced its staffing allocation on European policy (Kassim, 2011; Kassim \textit{et al}, 2010).\textsuperscript{157}

This has created an interesting contradiction in terms of responsibility for and management of policy-making. Thus, while the influence and need for oversight by the FCO over internal EU policy issues and coordination has reduced, the Foreign Secretary and Minister for Europe retain formal responsibility for “all aspects of European

\textsuperscript{156} UK05, Ministry of Defence (retired), telephone interview, 10 November 2011. The criticism of government lacking strategic direction more generally remains an issue. Conservative MP Bernard Jenkin, chair of the House of Commons’ Public Administration Select Committee, recently commented: “It is a problem of coalition: all the evidence we have received is that there is no national strategy, there is a lack of coherence at the centre” (see Gentleman, A. (2012) “Sir Jeremy Heywood: the civil servant propping up the government”, \textit{The Guardian}, London, 6 November.)

\textsuperscript{157} UKO1 notes that 200+ FCO officials were dedicated to EU policy at the time of the British EU Presidency in 2005. In 2010 that number had fallen to around 90. He also notes that posts in UKREP and the EU institutions are less popular among FCO staff that in the past with many preferring to go “abroad-abroad” rather than spend 3–4 years in Brussels.
Moreover, the CO now plays a far greater role, with the “policy neutral” EGIS responsible for policy coordination across Whitehall since 2005 (UKO2), while the FCO simply has an interest “as any other department” (UKO1), and no longer plays “the role it did 10-12 years ago” (UKO9). Thus, while formal e-grams (through which instructions to UKREP and reports back to London are communicated) still come from the FCO, it “[doesn’t] pretend to be a filter or channel which others must come through” (UKO1). The consequence has been a strategic decision by the FCO to reallocate resources out of Europe and towards the Middle East and emerging economies, with the aim of having “more foreign, less office” (UKO1). UKO1 argues, though, that the FCO remains a key player in broader European policy by virtue of its ownership of the bilateral diplomatic network, and its involvement in a range of regional diplomatic networks within Europe, including the Iberia, Benelux and Nordic-Baltic networks. The picture that emerges, though, is of an FCO that has been under continuous pressure in recent years, and has seen its overall role decrease, while its influence has fluctuated depending on the strength of the Foreign Secretary within government, and his/her relationship with the Prime Minister (UKO2; see also Kassim et al, 2010).

An illustration of the nuance of this separation can be seen in the Foreign Secretary’s chairmanship of the European Affairs Committee (EAC). This he does as a senior minister rather than as Foreign Secretary per se, with the committee serviced by the CO and not the FCO (UKO2). Under the coalition, an additional committee, the Sub-Committee on European Affairs, has also been established. Currently chaired by David Lidington, Minister for Europe, it brings together junior ministers and “sits between the EAC and Cabinet Office meetings”. The EAC will task it to deal with certain issues, either to provide more information or broker agreement (UKO2, UKO1).

UKO9, United Kingdom Permanent Representation, Brussels, telephone interview, 22 November 2010.

The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee reached a similar conclusion in their FCO Annual Report for 2008-9, declaring that this approach “represents a sensible—and potentially beneficial—way of maintaining the global network while reducing costs, as long as it does not come to act as “cover” for the downgrading or closure of British Embassies” (House of Commons, 2010a: 46).

UKO2 suggests that under the current government, the balance has been better between the FCO and CO because William Hague is a “strong Foreign Secretary”, while the current UK Permanent Representative, Jon Cunliffe, was previously the Prime Minister’s adviser on Europe.

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5.3.2 FCO structures and processes

Below the ministerial level is a dense network of formal and informal interactions through which British foreign policy-making and implementation take place, and inputs into CFSP are managed. At the centre of this sits the FCO for which CFSP has become “an exclusive area of competence” since cooperation first began in the 1970s (Aktipis and Oliver, 2011: 79). Although the FCO “takes the lead” in determining what the government’s position will be in CFSP, it “works closely” with those other ministries which need to feed into the policy-making process (UKO2). In particular, the MoD and DfID as the two other core ministries involved in CFSP make regular policy inputs, particularly – but not only – in the context of military and/or civilian crisis management situations (UKO8, UKO10). The fourth key actor is UKREP which is responsible for negotiating outcomes in Brussels based on the instructions agreed in London, but which also shapes those instructions by determining “what is desirable and achievable” in the Brussels context (UKO9). The expectation, therefore, is that coordination and consultation will take place as and when required, with the FCO leading the process. An illustration of this would be policy on the CFSP budget. Thus, while the FCO would take the lead in establishing the government’s position, it could not, for example, instruct UKREP to negotiate a budget increase without first liaising with the CO to ensure consistency with the overall UK position on EU budget changes, something which would necessarily also involve input from the Treasury (UKO3).

163 UKO3 described the CO as “the kind of gear-box” through which such policy coordination will go.
The European Correspondent and the Political Director

Following accession in 1973, British participation in EPC required important organisational changes within the FCO (e.g. Allen and Oliver, 2008). Most notable was the establishment of the key posts of European Correspondent and Political Director. As head of the CFSP department, it is the job of the Correspondent to “make CFSP work” (UKO6). Thus, s/he leads on all CFSP policy-making and coordination, and is responsible for “pull[ing] together the advice” that will go up to ministers when addressing a CFSP question (UKO3). It is interesting to note that while each member state has a Correspondent, their specific job description tends to vary, meaning they “have similar jobs but … [with] slightly different components to them” (UKO2). Thus, the French Correspondent is also closely involved in the Western Balkans, and so will often deal directly with the FCO’s Western Balkans expert as well. The German Correspondent, unlike his British counterpart, is not responsible for the EEAS as an institution, thus the latter will speak to a different official on these issues (UKO2). There are also different views within EU foreign ministries about where the Correspondent should be based, with some sitting closer to the Political Director than others (UKO2). In the FCO, the Correspondent reports and works to the Political Director (UKO2, UKO3).

Within EU circles, the position of Political Director is regarded as the “key job” (UKO4). Today styled as Director-General Political within the FCO, the post had to be created to enable UK participation in the preparatory sessions for EPC ministerial meetings, which were formalised with the creation of the Political Committee after Maastricht (Duke, 2005: 7) (see Chapter 3). The Political Director deals with “hard foreign policy issues, including negotiating EU policy”, and serves essentially as the “number 2” at the FCO, and is generally regarded as “the right-hand man” to foreign ministers across the EU (UKO4). For example, the UK Political Director was a central figure in the St. Malo
negotiations (UKO4).\textsuperscript{164} S/he is the “most senior advisor” to the Foreign Secretary on the types of issues being discussed within the CFSP (UKO2), particularly on crisis areas such as Iran (UKO3), and “the hard stuff” with the US and Russia (UKO4).

While the Correspondent and the CFSP department manage CFSP policy, within the FCO ownership of specific policy dossiers remains with the desk officers in the respective geographical directorates or departments. The CFSP department will coordinate briefings, for example for the PSC, “but with the component brief” coming from the geographical department, whose “job [it is] to lead and put that policy together” (UKO2). Thus, these departments will either develop instructions and send these directly to UKREP, or work on these in conjunction with the CFSP department officials who are developing the broader British approach on a particular policy, but always in consultation with the relevant stakeholders across Whitehall (UKO2). (As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the creation of the EEAS has introduced a new actor into this process, adding an additional set of relationships to be developed and managed (UKO7).)\textsuperscript{165} An example of how the stakeholder network on a particular issue can spread beyond the FCO can be seen in British policy towards Sudan and China. In the case of the former, there is a dedicated Sudan Unit which, although based in the FCO, includes officials seconded from DfID to ensure that the development and coordination of policy is sufficiently close (UKO2). Moreover, these officials will also be dealing with their respective counterparts in other major EU capitals and more broadly. Similarly, there is a specific FCO department responsible for policy towards China but which works within a wider Whitehall group to ensure coordination across departments (UKO2). As will be discussed, UKREP also plays an important role in this process.

\textsuperscript{164} UKO4 described how in 1998 the then Political Director worked through the night drafting what became the St Malo agreement.

\textsuperscript{165} UKO7, United Kingdom Permanent Representation, Brussels, telephone interview, 30 April 2012.
The domestic CFSP stakeholder network

The interaction with the broader stakeholder network is perhaps most apparent in the interactions between the FCO, MoD and DfID, particularly in relation to ESDP/CSDP. Thus, while CSDP policy is led by the FCO’s Security Policy Department (UKO8), the relationship with the MoD is very close.\textsuperscript{166} UKO2 noted the importance of informal relationships between officials and emphasised the “good understanding” he had established with both MoD and DfID colleagues. Another official described the FCO/MoD relationship as “hand-in-glove…they [FCO] write the cheques and we [MoD] have the money” (UKO8). This can in part be explained by the relatively small size of the British ‘Pol-Mil’ community, with many officials often having worked in both departments. UKO5 considers this a positive aspect of the system as it has ensured that their mutual briefing is “actually quite good” and the “policy-generation process is efficient”. UKO8 suggests that in part this is helped by virtue of geography as, unlike many other EU capitals, in London foreign and defence ministries are located close together. Furthermore, there are regular meetings between FCO and MoD officials. For example, UKO8 would normally meet his FCO opposite number 3-4 times per week “and vice versa”, and the MoD also has officials in UKREP able to feed directly into CSDP policy-making in Brussels.

The close cooperation has also resulted in the development of a model of CIVMIL cooperation based around an “integrated campaign planning process” (or Comprehensive Approach)\textsuperscript{167} that is almost unique among member states. Many of Britain’s partners struggle with the role and place of the military within their political structures for both cultural and historical reasons and so it is generally “extraordinarily difficult” to get meetings involving both foreign and defence ministries (UKO8).

\textsuperscript{166} This contradicts a statement by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee that the “Ministry of Defence, not the FCO, is also the lead UK department for ESDP matters” (House of Commons, 2008c: 71).

despite this being the *modus operandi* in London. Meanwhile, FCO/MoD/DfID cooperation has been facilitated and enhanced with the creation of the *Joint Stabilisation Unit*.\(^{168}\) Located in DfID, it brings together officials from all three ministries to respond to failing or “conflict-afflicted states” (Stabilisation Unit, 2012).\(^{169}\) As such it has become a key actor in the development of CIVMIL approaches and is the “object of deep scrutiny” among Britain’s EU partners (UKO8).\(^{170}\) Finally, when a CSDP decision is required at the political level, a paper will be drafted jointly by the three ministries for the National Security Council to consider and approve (UKO8).\(^{171}\)

The impact on the FCO of the creation of DfID in May 1997 should briefly be mentioned. Along with the growing role of the Prime Minister, DfID’s establishment has been considered a significant challenge to the FCO’s primacy in foreign policy, not least because the provision of development aid has been one of the FCO’s most important foreign policy instruments.\(^{172}\) For example, Jack Straw (Foreign Secretary, 2001-6) argues that a government’s aid policies inevitably have consequences for its foreign policy as “development aid *is* foreign policy” (2012: 394) (emphasis in original). Indeed, in Tony Blair’s own words the decision to create DfID was “not popular with the Foreign Office” (2010: 24), not least as by separating aid from the FCO, it was

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\(^{168}\) First set up in 2004 as the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit, it became the Stabilisation Unit in 2007 to “reflect its role in supporting the management of the MoD’s Stabilisation Aid fund” (House of Commons, 2010b: 30).

\(^{169}\) The House of Commons Defence Committee recommended in 2010 that the Unit should be relocated to the Cabinet Office “to ensure it has sufficient political clout with other departments” (House of Commons, 2010b: 4).

\(^{170}\) The French Strategic Affairs Unit (*Direction des Affaires Stratégiques*), which brings together officials from the Foreign and Defence Ministries in the Quai d’Orsay, is similar to this although not as developed.

\(^{171}\) Such papers are never more than 4 pages long (UKO8).

\(^{172}\) The creation of DfID was one of the first acts of the Blair Government and followed a historical pattern. This has seen Labour governments tending to separate the management of aid from the FCO – for example, Harold Wilson established the first Ministry of Overseas Development in 1964 – while under Conservative governments, responsibility for aid and development policy have normally been “subsumed” into the FCO under the “semi-autonomous” Overseas Development Agency (Williams, 2005: 144).
losing a major part of its budget.\textsuperscript{173} More broadly, this decision has contributed to a sense that the FCO’s place as the “pre-eminence foreign policy-making body” is under threat (House of Commons, 2010a: 116).

Moreover, there are indications that DfID’s interaction with the FCO and MoD is not without difficulties. Despite initiatives like the Stabilisation Unit, UKO5 suggests that while the FCO/MoD relationship is strong, DfID “remains the problematic area”. Thus, although it may produce strong policy statements, cooperation and coordination is hampered by a culture of “moral superiority” over both diplomats and military officials, while its policy of outsourcing implementation, for example to NGOs, has created problems at the operational level (UKO5). Indications of tension are also apparent from DfID’s side. Suggesting that the FCO, CO and Treasury can often behave like a “clique”, UKO10 emphasises the importance of DfID having a secondee in the FCO who can “report back to us when they feel DfID has an interest”.\textsuperscript{174} In light of these, it is worth noting the Foreign Affairs Committee’s recommendation in 2010 that the government should instigate a “comprehensive, foreign policy-led review” of the structures, processes and priorities of the three departments with a view to improving the ability of the FCO to perform its primary functions (House of Commons, 2010a: 119).\textsuperscript{175} This indicates a concern that the FCO is increasingly

\textsuperscript{173} The House of Commons Annual Report on the FCO for 2008-9 (2010a: 117) notes that among OECD member states, only Germany has a similar arrangement. That said, in evidence to the same committee on 9 December 2009, David Miliband said that “it would not be healthy or right for the Foreign Office to see DfID as its enemy”

\textsuperscript{174} These comments are backed up by the conclusions of the House of Commons Defence Committee’s report in 2010 on the Comprehensive Approach which noted that the 3 departments had “made efforts to reduce cultural and operational differences but all acknowledge that more needs to be done” (House of Commons, 2010b: 4-5).

\textsuperscript{175} Noting the reduction by 2 of the number of Minister of State portfolios since 1997, the Committee also recommended that whichever party took power in 2010, the new government should restore at least one of these posts (House of Commons, 2010a: 14). Under the current government, the FCO now has 4 Ministers of State supporting the Secretary of State, up from an average of three under the previous administration.
struggling in the face of organisational change as well as financial strictures.176

‘Mainstreaming’ CFSP

Within the FCO, one of the key responsibilities of the European Correspondent is the management of the department’s particular method of CFSP policy-making, known as ‘mainstreaming’ (UKO6). In essence, this involves ensuring that country or area specialists, who may or may not have experience of EU foreign policy-making processes, understand what CFSP is, and what it might mean for areas under their purview – for example, it is the responsibility of the Africa Director to determine “what they want EU policy on Africa to be” (UKO2). The role of the Correspondent and CFSP department is then to ensure that policy made by other departments is “consistent” with the UK’s broader EU policy, and that UKREP receives appropriate instructions (UKO3). A key element of the Correspondent’s job is therefore “to lubricate the communication” around the FCO (UKO2) to ensure that the CFSP component of a policy is properly understood and incorporated into the policy-making process. Thus, if a particular geographical department complains that “Europe doesn’t get it…[our job] is to explain, well there’s a reason they don’t” and offer alternative approaches (UKO2). The intention, therefore, is to ensure that CFSP is not merely an add-on or afterthought.

There has, though, been a debate in recent years within the FCO over the merits of mainstreaming as opposed to the system preferred in many other EU member states, particularly France, of having a strong

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176 The report is particularly critical of the Treasury’s treatment of the FCO, and acting as if it were “just another department”. It continued: “it is clear from international experience that foreign ministries are not like other departments. We further conclude that it is incongruous that the position of the only government department with a global reach is threatened with erosion at a time when globalisation is acknowledged as the key phenomenon of our times” (House of Commons, 2010a: 18).
centre – i.e. “a big, powerful CFSP department which basically makes the policy and checks that the geographical departments are okay with it” (UKO3). One advantage of mainstreaming is that it should mean that the policy pursued is better attuned to the needs of the respective geographic departments; equally, however, there is the danger these only pay lip-service to the EU aspects of their policy, without seriously attending to them (UKO3). The challenge with mainstreaming, moreover, is to be able to manage it given the potentially large number of issues and officials involved, and not merely encourage it (UKO2). Therein lies some of the attraction of the strong centre, meanwhile, as this can generate much more consistency and coherence in a state’s overall CFSP policy, although the danger remains of the “tail wagging the dog” in policy terms (UKO3). 177 This has been observed in how the French have sometimes pushed for CSDP missions not necessarily because a particular country requires one but because “[they] think it’s about time [they] had another…and it will be good for the CFSP” (UKO3). 178

Communication networks

Both the European Correspondent and Political Director are also members of important networks within the wider membership community (UKO2, UKO3), meeting regularly with their opposite numbers. Correspondents deal with “lighter and easier” points while any unresolved or more political issues will normally be referred up to Political Director level (UKO6). Both will accompany the Foreign Secretary to meetings of the FAC, with the Political Director meeting

177 UKO3 goes on to suggest that French CFSP policy has therefore been overly influence by ESDP, stating that: “their default setting for almost any given problem in the world is to send an ESDP mission, and it’s really frustrating. We spend huge amounts of time talking them off…”

178 UKO5 makes a similar point, arguing that the French were keen primarily to operationalise the ESDP “by showing what it could do” and, particularly before rejoining NATO’s military structures, because they viewed the relationship between the EU and NATO as “a straight competition”.

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his/her peers formally at 27 at the beginning of a Presidency, in parallel to the Council (UKO2). Outside this, they will meet regularly and informally, often with their American counterparts, for “a bit of horizon-scanning” to identify likely future areas of crisis (UKO2).

Following the creation of the PSC in 2000 and the appointment of permanent ambassadors to coordinate CFSP, Political Directors have become more removed from this process, however. In part this reflects the reality that with Political Directors increasingly “pulled off in so many different directions” nationally, there was a real need for a body that would exercise ownership over CFSP (UKO3). However, “an architecture of informal meetings” remains, with Political Directors from other member states often “coming in [to the FCO] just to check-in and catch-up” (UKO2). Despite this, there is a sense that the control exercised by the Political Director in London may have weakened somewhat, although it depends to some extent on the individual in post and whether they are “on top” of their subject (UKO4). One former Political Director emphasised that he made a point of calling his opposite numbers regularly so there was “no hiding place from the Brits”, with the aim of ensuring that no-one felt “ignored, condescended to and only picked up when somebody thinks you can be useful” (UKO4). Finally, all these contacts are supported by formal monthly FCO briefings for the other member states on Britain’s approach on the full range of European issues (UKO2).

For the European Correspondent, communication with his/her European counterparts is even more regular. Much is done by email or phone with the aim, for example, of determining what other governments are thinking on particular issues, what their priorities will be in Council meetings, etc (UKO2).\textsuperscript{179} Mirroring UKO4’s comments, UKO6 notes

\textsuperscript{179} The scale of the undertaking such intense communication involves was made clear by UKO6. Recalling a time when there were only 19 member states, he noted that a Political Directors meeting with an agenda of 10 items could entail up to 190 conversations. These in turn would have to be conducted over a very short time period of 24-48 hours.
that the European Correspondent normally makes “a big effort…to talk to everybody”. Moreover, such interactions are “classic [FCO] diplomacy” and are conducted not only by the CFSP department but by other department heads and directors, with the aim of “trying to understand…so that when there are differences, let’s understand what [they] are” (UKO2). The European Correspondent is thus in regular one-to-one communication with his/her opposite numbers. For example, conversations with “the larger, more active member states” would take place once or twice a week, as would those with the Commission, Secretariat and, latterly, the EEAS (UKO2). UKO6, meanwhile, recalls conversations with his peers in Paris and Berlin taking place “pretty much every day”. However, Correspondents will rarely meet at the same time as their Political Directors prior to Council sessions, or have formalised monthly meetings as they are often “busy running around re-writing drafts”. Instead, most of the interaction in Brussels occurs over “coffees in the margins” (UKO2).

The role of UKREP

UKREP is the other key actor involved in organising and making British inputs into the CFSP. It is not merely the vehicle through which instructions generated by the capital are pursued, however. Rather, it is “integral…the deliverer of policy” (UKO2) and “very closely plugged

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180 An interesting addition to this was the British ‘CFSP Twinning Programme’ run prior to the 2004 enlargement. In the late 1990s, the FCO looked at the formal twinning programme being run predominantly by the Commission and, seeing that nothing was being done on CFSP, established an equivalent programme whereby FCO officials would advise the Political Directors or European Correspondents in accession states about the changes they would need to make to participate in CFSP and how to go about doing this. The programme, lasting 1-3 days, focused predominantly on process, including timings, procedures, the nature of documents, etc. By the end of 2000, they had visited all the accession states and were able not only to build relationships with the top diplomatic cadre in each, but also promote a British vision of European co-operation, particularly in security and defence (UKO6).

181 David Miliband also noted the importance of these informal encounters: “I always found the meetings…there were always boring enough parts of them so you’d want to go and just have a gossip with people…” (Interview, London, 6 December 2010).
in”, playing “a significant role in policy-making” (UKO3). Thus, for UKO8, “policy is not made in Brussels or in London but somewhere between the two”. It should be noted, though, that whilst UKREP and the process within Brussels are obviously important, they are just part of a wider policy-making machine. For the UK, traditional bilateral relationships and the information transmitted from and via national embassies remain essential, with the latter remaining the “key source of permanent understanding” of how a particular country views a particular issue (UKO2).\(^{182}\) UKREP is just one aspect of a broader relationship with each individual state. Thus, its work should be seen as complementing and building on the communication taking place between London and Paris, London and Berlin,\(^{183}\) London and Madrid, etc. As UKO2 argues, “forg[ing] an agreement on a policy…can’t just be done by bureaucrats in Brussels”.

UKREP fulfils a number of functions in this regard. Particularly important is its ability to provide the FCO with “intelligence on the ground” on developments within Brussels (UKO2, UKO9). Of more significance, perhaps, it also makes judgements as to what is “doable and not doable” in negotiations (UKO9). This is reflected in the process by which instructions are generated. These will normally focus on the outcomes London is seeking, with “quite a lot of leeway” given to UKREP in terms of achieving them, something that differentiates the UK from most other member states (UKO9). In the case of the negotiations to establish the EEAS, for example, UKREP provided a great deal of advice which was subsequently incorporated into its instructions (UKO2). In essence, therefore, UKREP’s role is to “make the Brussels machine turn in the direction we want” (UKO2), meaning it is an important element in

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\(^{182}\) UKO2 identifies 3 essential sources of information about where, for example, France or another member state might be on an FAC agenda item: what UKREP is telling the FCO; reports from the UK embassy in Paris; and a direct channel via the European Correspondent to the French foreign ministry.

\(^{183}\) One example of such communication at the ministerial level is the annual *deutsch-britische Europakonsultationen* (German-British European Consultation meeting) at Minister of State level between David Lidington and his opposite number at the German Foreign Ministry, Michael Link (AA, 2013a).
how London makes and coordinates policy. The aim is to “try and…influence people and their thinking upstream” and ensure that when a policy or action comes up for decision, “you’ve already got your fingerprints on them as much as possible” (UKO3). The flexibility allowed UKREP to achieve this means that on CFSP questions, British officials are widely regarded within Brussels as effective and efficient, and frequently in a position to craft compromises. This is not to argue that there are not differences between London and UKREP in terms of understanding “what the market will bear” (UKO5). As UKO3 notes, “we often underestimate just how much other people are having to compromise.”

The desire for efficiency and continuity is also reflected in the UK’s military representation in Brussels. Britain is one of 19 states to have the same official act as Military Representative (Mil Rep) both to NATO and the EU, something which UKO5 felt was “pretty essential” in ensuring effective policy-making. The Mil-Rep normally attends 1-2 NATO Military Committee meetings per week, plus North Atlantic Council meetings as required, and the weekly EU Military Committee meeting, as well as occasional meetings of the PSC. The instructions given to the UK’s Mil-Rep vis-à-vis the EU meetings have tended to be to avoid “sign[ing] us up to anything or get[ting] us into any trouble while we’re engaged in the real business in Iraq and Afghanistan”, reflecting what UKO5 described as the EU’s status as “a bit of an optional extra” in the eyes of the MoD, and a “cultural view” that serious, large-scale operations would remain the domain of NATO. That said, UKO5 contrasted positively the more “unstructured” and “free-thinking” nature of PSC meetings which is “normally disposed to make progress” with NATO meetings which always face the possibility of Greco-Turkish

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184 UKO5 provides a more colourful description: “Brussels works on meals, not on the Council meetings, so you see a problem and then you decide who you are going to invite to dinner to thrash it out”.
185 OMS1, Swedish Permanent Representation, Brussels, telephone interview, 22 May 2012.
186 UKO8 makes a similar point, stating that often there is “insufficient awareness in London of what other capitals want”.
tensions causing problems. (UKO3 made a similar point, suggesting that there was a greater sense of “complicity” in PSC meetings compared to NATO.) For UKO5, perhaps the most important effect of the “double-hatting” has been to help prevent duplication and unnecessary competition between the two organisations, a symbol of which has been the ongoing tension between Britain and France and Germany over an Operational Headquarters for the EU. (UKO7 also highlighted the tensions over the OHQ.)

The process of interaction between London and UKREP is constant. UKREP officials normally report to London on the day a meeting is held, although this is “not a hard-and-fast rule” (UKO1). At the working group level the channels of communication will go directly from desk officers in the FCO to officials in UKREP, and officials “up to head of department level” may go to Brussels to attend particular working group sessions (UKO2). At the same time, UKREP can often act as the initiator of a policy-making process in CFSP. Thus, it may identify a particular issue that “is going to happen” in the coming months, will draw London’s attention to this and suggest an approach or course of action which, in turn, will often form the basis of London’s formal response (UKO3). Similarly, in a fast-moving crisis situation such as Georgia in 2008, or if there is an important issue under consideration within the PSC, UKREP can often drive the British response (UKO3). This ability to provide leadership is facilitated by the comparative efficiency of the British system which makes a swift response from London possible, despite the range of people who may need to be consulted. UKO3 identifies the “speed and openness of communication” between UKREP and the key domestic ministries as one of the strengths of the British system. In this he draws a favourable comparison

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187 As of 12 November 2010, UKREP’s CFSP team consisted of 14 diplomats (UKREP, 2010)
188 UKO3 described occasions during the 2008 Georgia crisis when, whilst sitting in PSC meetings, he would be copied into emails from London providing an account of a discussion that had taken place with the foreign minister just an hour earlier which he was then able to feed into the PSC discussions.
between UKREP and other states, particularly Germany, which are “normally quite a lot slower” whereas Britain is “consistently the…most responsive and the quickest moving”.\textsuperscript{189} Indeed, one German official also contrasted his own system unfavourably with the flexibility and efficiency of British structures.\textsuperscript{190}

There are some differences in how UKREP organises for and approaches the CFSP compared to other states. For example, in contrast to states such as Germany, France and Italy, Britain sends only a relatively junior official to the \textit{Nicolaides} group, which prepares meetings of the PSC as the \textit{Antici} group in the Council Secretariat does for meetings of Coreper I and II (GO1, GO2).\textsuperscript{191} Although not criticising this approach, GO1 does note that by not sending a more senior official, Britain is not always able to provide an immediate response, particularly on major issues, needing instead to consult with more senior diplomats or with London.

A second important difference is the role played by Britain’s Deputy PSC Ambassador. The position is not unique to the UK – France, Sweden and Germany each send one, for example. However, the brief given to Britain’s deputy is, and “doesn’t really exist” in other permanent representations (UKO3). In most cases, the Deputy PSC Ambassador will act as their state’s PSC coordinator, “sitting in the PSC, coordinating instructions” (UKO3), and participating in working groups such as the POLMIL or CIVCOM groups. While the British Deputy PSC Ambassador does a certain amount of this, his/her brief tends to focus on looking more effectively “at the big picture” and especially “get[t]ing more upstream influence over what was coming out of the Secretariat and the Commission” (UKO3). In particular, ensuring consistency between

\textsuperscript{189} UKO3 notes that the Swedes are also “pretty good” as are the French “when they’ve got their mind to it”.
\textsuperscript{190} GO1, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 10 November 2010. He reflected that in Germany “we have a less flexible and less perhaps, if I can be self-critical, a less-operative structure as for instance the Brits have”.
\textsuperscript{191} GO2, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 10 November 2010.
the issues being dealt with in the PSC, and the wider external relations business dealt with by Coreper – such as the preparation of trade negotiations with 3rd countries, for example – has been a priority for Britain. Thus, for UKO3, the fact that the Ambassador was regularly involved in PSC meetings allowed him the flexibility to carry out this more roving role. Moreover, it is an approach admired by others. For example, GO1 sees great advantages in having two senior diplomats doing “behind-the-scenes dealing and wheeling”, describing it as an “interesting concept” that contributes to the UK’s greater flexibility.

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This discussion of the structures and processes supporting British participation in CFSP policy-making suggests a number of things. First, it demonstrates that in foreign policy as in all other areas of EU policy-making, Whitehall places a premium on effective coordination. Britain will always seek to have a position on a given CFSP issue and this will represent the settled view of all the relevant stakeholders. Moreover, the process by which this is achieved demonstrates a strong and obvious coordination ambition (Kassim et al. 2000; 2001). Second, this coordination ambition in CFSP is supported by intensive and continuous interaction involving capital-based officials, officials in UKREP, and also their counterparts in Brussels and other national capitals. This is intended to ensure that London is fully aware of the perspectives and viewpoints of partner states on a given issue, but also to enable it to deploy influence as necessary at multiple points within its diplomatic network. Taken together, these reveal a sophisticated machinery designed to manage and instrumentalise the CFSP for the pursuit of particular objectives, whether ‘positively’ – i.e. by the promotion of particular aims – or ‘negatively’ by preventing or blocking certain policies or initiatives deemed as damaging to British interests. How the UK does this – i.e. how it engages with the CFSP – is considered next.
5.4 How the UK engages with the CFSP

As noted, Britain’s coordination ambition in CFSP is comprehensive and very much geared to the exercise of influence. Moreover, as a bigger member state it is “expected to intervene” in discussions and decision-making (EU4). The previous section highlighted how positions are agreed among all relevant stakeholders on the full range of policy issues as quickly as possible, before being pursued at EU level, with UKREP playing a crucial role, especially in terms of determining ‘what the market will bear’. This section examines how Britain engages with the CFSP, considering its relationships with partner states, the ways it seeks to exercise influence and examples of policy issues where it has sought to do so. It argues that UK officials are very effective at the process of CFSP, demonstrating an ability to operate within an environment governed by norms of consensus and the avoidance (as far as possible) of vetoes, reflecting the theoretical argument here that constructivist approaches can contribute to our understanding of the how of policy-making. However, when talking about CFSP, their language is pragmatic rather than ‘ideal-‘ or ‘value-based’ – i.e. they emphasise the practical and instrumental importance of the CFSP. This supports the argument that while British officials are socialised to the ‘rules of the game’ and norms of behaviour, these matter only in terms of how they help achieve British objectives. Strategically, in terms of the what, Britain continues to view and engage with the CFSP in rationalist and instrumental terms that are designed to achieve predominantly nationally-based preferences and objectives.

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192 EU4, DG RELEX, European Commission, Brussels, 12 November 2010
5.4.1 Managing relationships with partners

The requirement to find consensus among 27 member states makes the building of coalitions and partnerships essential to exercise influence or achieve a particular outcome within CFSP.\[^{193}\] For the UK, this process is a pragmatic exercise carried out on an issue-by-issue basis (UKO8), and something at which it is considered highly effective (FO1, OMS1, EU1).\[^{194}\] No British interviewees identified particular states or groups of states as constant or natural allies. For David Miliband, it was important that “you try and be an ally to everybody. Ally towards all, enemy towards none.”\[^{195}\] However, several suggested that the northern European and Nordic states often shared similar views or outlooks to the UK. Sweden, Denmark, The Netherlands and Finland were identified as being the states Britain most commonly forms alliances with (UKO3) or who would be most likely to support British positions on CSDP (UKO5). A Swedish official (OMS1) concurred, indicating that her country was often close to Britain, but also emphasising that, like Britain, Sweden did not have ‘natural allies’ within CFSP.

Britain’s key relationship in CFSP, particularly on ESDP/CSDP questions, is with France, regardless of whether they are in agreement (and they may often not be). UKO3 describes this as Britain’s “most important” EU relationship, echoing Downing Street’s reference to France as “natural partners” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2012a). For Britain, the bilateral defence and security relationship it has developed with Paris over the last 15+ years has become fundamental to how it views European security, and this importance manifests itself regularly at EU level, most obviously in how it seeks to instrumentalise CFSP and CSDP.

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\[^{193}\] The “honourable exception” remains Cyprus which “defines any given issue through the prism of ‘what does this mean for our dispute with Turkey?’ and then just ruthless pursues that, no matter what the wider circumstances” (UKO3).

\[^{194}\] FO1, French Permanent Representation, Brussels, 9 November 2010. OMS1, Swedish Permanent Representation, Brussels, telephone interview, 22 May 2012. EU1, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 8 November 2010.

\[^{195}\] Interview, London, 6 December 2010. He continued: “there are political links…geographic links…interest links…personal links…there are some who end up being more tricky than others, and you hope…they’re not the influential ones.”
Unsurprisingly, the French have a similar view of Britain’s importance. FO1 in the French Permanent Representation described consultation with his British counterparts as “the first reflex” in order to determine “whether there will be space for decisions and for agreement”. Another French official, closely involved in CSDP in the foreign ministry, also highlighted France’s close cooperation with Britain, describing them as “a unique interlocutor and partner” as a consequence of their range of diplomatic and military assets. 196 For UKO8, the Anglo-French relationship is so important because as well as possessing such capabilities, both are also “ready to use them”, as evidenced by their leadership of and participation in NATO’s operations in Libya in 2011.

A consideration of capabilities and a readiness to use them, although significant, only provides a partial explanation as to their mutual importance, however. Rather, Anglo-French cooperation reflects the fact that they share what Simón (2013: 21) calls “an ‘extrovert’ strategic culture and global vocation” and so their developing partnership “transcends European matters”. 197 UKO8 suggests, therefore, that although in their political rhetoric the French are much more explicitly and “viscerally attached” than the British to an idea of European defence and to having “a European fingerprint on any crisis situation”, the reality is that their objectives vis-à-vis the EU/CFSP are “not that different”. Both want the EU to play a more significant security role and seek more

196 FO3, French Foreign Ministry, Paris, 1 February 2011. On 10 February 2011, in evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union focusing on British-French defence relations, outgoing French Ambassador, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, stated: “the UK and France are natural partners in security and defence for the reasons that we are similar in size, similar in our capabilities and similar in the budgetary allocation that we make for defence. Internationally, we have the same kind of responsibilities; we are permanent members of the UN Security Council; we are NATO allies; European members; and nuclear weapons states, so we share common interests and responsibilities” (House of Lords, 2011: 2).

197 The House of Lords European Union Committee makes a similar point: “The UK and France are the two major European military players. These two countries share a global approach…and a willingness to deploy forces” (2012: 22). In this context, it is worth noting the arguments of Kempin, Mawdsley and Steinicke (2010) that the recent Anglo-French bilateral treaties represent a challenge to other EU member states to improve and increase their commitment to CSDP.
in terms of capabilities and investment by their partners to support this. Despite disagreements over other aspects of integration, therefore, their relationship is built around a strong sense of pragmatism,\textsuperscript{198} as evidenced by the two bilateral defence treaties signed on 2 November 2010, and additional agreements made subsequently in Paris in February 2012.\textsuperscript{199} For the moment, this bilateral relationship provides the foundation for any significant CSDP mission.\textsuperscript{200}

A vital component of any CFSP decision, therefore, is whether the two can find the space for some degree of bilateral agreement or consensus. Achieving this is something both will always seek to do prior to any formal discussion in Brussels. The constant interactions between their officials at multiple points in the system, for example between the different ministries or between diplomats in Brussels, facilitate this, ensuring that their mutual awareness and understanding of each other’s priorities and concerns will usually be strong. For example, in UKO4’s experience, where they have been able to reach a prior agreement or consensus on a particular point, it “always went straight through” in Brussels; however, if agreement was not secured beforehand, for example if the Presidency tabled an issue unexpectedly, “then metaphorically the other[s]…would sit back…and watch the Exocets being exchanged” (UKO4). Of course, this is not to argue that the two

\textsuperscript{198}The same term was used by the French Ambassador: “Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy decided to give a significant impulse to a pragmatic approach to foster our bilateral co-operation. I insisted on the word “pragmatic” and that is what we got from the British side. We were told, “Don’t be hyperbolic, be pragmatic”, and we tried to be pragmatic” (House of Lords, 2011: 4).

\textsuperscript{199}These outlined more concrete steps for their cooperation, including the development of the Combined Joint Expeditionary force, the establishment of a Joint Force Headquarters, and a programme to develop unmanned aerial vehicles (Prime Minister’s Office, 2012a). Following this meeting, Foreign Secretary William Hague stated in the House of Commons that “France and the UK are co-operating more closely on foreign and security policy issues than at any time since the second world war” (Hansard, HC Deb 20 February 2012, Col. 65WS).

\textsuperscript{200}For example, the House of Lords European Union Committee report on European Defence Capabilities states: “The Libya operation also gives an advance marker that European military capability relies substantially on UK-French involvement. There is a danger that…a disproportionate burden for European defence will rest on these two nations at a time when Europe’s near abroad remains unstable” (House of Lords, 2012: 9).
can together dictate to their EU partners or that an agreement between them guarantees an agreement at 27. Rather it is to recognise, given their resources, capabilities and status, that any potential disagreement represents a major obstacle to CFSP decision-making.

In contrast, and although obviously still important, Britain’s relationship with Germany is different and, in security and defence terms at least, less a partnership of equals. On major diplomatic issues, for example the negotiations over Iran’s enrichment programme (see Chapter 7), Germany’s voice always matters. And as noted above, the FCO’s CFSP officials will normally speak with both their French and German opposite numbers daily on a wide range of issues (UKO2, UKO3, UKO4, UKO5, UKO6, UKO8). However, it is interesting to note that while German officials highlight the importance of both France and Britain as their primary interlocutors in CFSP (see Chapter 6), the UK seems to regard Germany as having less to offer, certainly in terms of security capabilities. Having the Germans involved remains important but they have tended to be “less active on ESDP” (UKO4) and although having a significant interest on certain issues, “are less consistently involved” (UKO3). Indeed, in the context of security Britain “would like them to do more” (UKO8). It is interesting to note, moreover, that the Germans were unhappy about the Anglo-French Lancaster House agreements, and as a consequence an additional “structured dialogue” has been established between Britain and Germany (UKO8) (see also House of Lords, 2012: 23).201 This reflects the reality that as Europe’s biggest and economically most powerful state, Germany will always be a key partner. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 6, where Britain can make common cause with both France and Germany, they constitute a formidable bloc. Indeed, the FCO’s White Paper Active Diplomacy for a Changing World states that it

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201 UKO8 describes the Germans as being “pissed off” about the Lancaster House treaties, but notes that both London and Paris would like Germany to become involved in this, but only with a commitment to better capabilities and a willingness to use them. Similarly, in evidence to the House of Lords European Union Committee, Gerald Howarth MP, then a Minister of State at the MoD, suggested that the agreement had “put a few noses out of joint, in particular the Italians and Germans” (House of Lords, 2012: 23).
is Britain’s interests “as a global player…to work with our EU partners, in particular France and Germany” (FCO, 2006c).

A final and important point regards Britain’s interactions with those where a meeting of minds is less easily assumed. As UKO3 puts it, diplomacy is “not just about talking to your mates”. Thus, in the context of CFSP UK officials often spend more time trying to resolve the differences it has with others (UKO3) or ensuring that smaller states do not feel that a directoire of larger states is trying to dictate policy (UKO5).

Similarly, there may be occasions where officials from a partner state find themselves in a difficult situation as a consequence of domestic politics or the policy being pursued by their capitals. UKO4 highlights the case of Austria in 2000, when the far-right Freedom Party entered government with the mainstream People’s Party and as a consequence the other 14 member states broke off official diplomatic contacts for several months. UKO4 recalls going “out of my way” to talk to his Austrian counterparts at meetings, however, on the basis that government policy was “not their fault” and eventually there would come a time in the future when their support might be required. Maintaining relationships across the board is vital and consequently “you’ve got to deal with what you’ve got” (UKO4). Pragmatism is therefore a key aspect of how Britain deals with its partners in CFSP.

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202 UKO5 described being “very conscious” of this fear and therefore “tried to form relationships with as many as possible”. As discussed in Chapter 6, this is also a major preoccupation among German officials.
The channels of communication outlined above are vital to the process by which Britain (and indeed all member states) makes inputs into CFSP policy-making. While important, size and resources do not automatically bestow influence. Rather, being able to operate effectively within the CFSP environment matters and is something at which the UK is considered very effective (EU1, EU4, FO1, GO1, GO3, OMS1). For David Miliband, the basis for this is straightforward: “leadership is about persuasion – you can’t lead if you can’t persuade”. UKO4 identifies two important elements to this ability to persuade – the quality of the papers Britain tables, and the degree of preparation ahead of any decision. As he sees it, the objective of any British contribution, whether a paper or in a meeting, must always be that “we were listened to because we were authoritative”. UKO3 echoes this: “expertise and knowing what you’re talking about is (sic) a big thing and something we normally do quite well”. OMS1 concurs, describing British officials as “very effective, efficient and well-organised”. UKO3 also highlights “moral weight” as an important factor. Thus, states with a demonstrable knowledge about and experience in a particular issue, country or region can expect their views to carry weight, such as Poland when discussing Belarus as they “probably have thought about it a lot and they’re well informed” (UKO3). Britain would expect its voice to be heard, for example, on questions relating to South Asia, its former colonial territories and defence and security questions (e.g. EU4, GO4). Meanwhile, David Miliband highlighted Zimbabwe – “for obvious reasons” – Iran and especially Pakistan – “the EU-Pakistan relationship was really started thanks to Britain”.

204 Interview, London, 6 December 2010. In this regard, it worth noting the support being given by the EU, and particularly Germany and the UK, to France, the former colonial power, in the recent operations against Islamist militants in Mali (e.g. Traynor, I. (2013) ‘EU set to back French war in Mali’, The Guardian, 17 January).
If knowledge and expertise are to make a difference, though, they must be deployed in support of a good argument, underscoring the importance assigned above to the quality and extent of preparation. As part of this and relating directly to the previous discussion of relationships, papers and proposals must take account of the views, interests and concerns of others, something to which British officials devote considerable time (UKO3, UKO4). A successful proposal will be “carefully balanced…[and] take account of as many as possible of the…reasonable interests of others” (UKO4). For example, in the context of the PSC a successful argument is “strong in its underlying basis” but also recognises the interests of other member states, “find[ing] ways in which they will need to be reflected in the policy, and that can make quite a difference” (UKO3). Britain enjoys an important linguistic advantage in this regard. With Council Conclusions being drafted in English, British officials are very well placed to craft compromise wordings or come up with alternative language (OMS1). Timing also matters. It is much easier to find ways of incorporating the views of others earlier on in the process, rather than having “to re-jig” later (UKO3), hence the time and effort devoted to conferring with partners in advance of any decision. UKO8 emphasises this in the context of CSDP. Discussions, compromises and trade-offs take place “informally and bilaterally”, with British officials occasionally even meeting their opposite numbers and “sharing instructions” as a means of finding agreement. The key point is not to “negotiate in meetings to the extent possible” (UKO8).

Finally, the willingness to commit resources – financial, military, diplomatic, etc – as well as time and energy all bring influence in the input process. Being “willing to put your money where your mouth is” (UKO3) sends an important signal of intent. For example, Britain chose not to participate in the 2008-9 EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission (Consilium, 2009g). As a consequence, although asking occasional questions in the PSC and making clear their ‘red lines’ over the long-term future of the
mission, Britain “more or less stayed quiet”, allowing those who had committed resources or troops, such as France and Poland, to lead the discussion. The drafting of the first Common Strategy on Russia following the Treaty of Amsterdam provides a different example. Here, Britain was concerned that if it did not participate in the drafting process, what would be designed “would be horrible” (UKO6). Consequently, it cooperated with France and Germany to create the strategy, even though the process was difficult, and from there was able to build a wider consensus around it (UKO6). All these different elements contribute to Britain’s effectiveness – and being regarded as such – in terms of the process of CFSP. But it is how it relates to partner states that is perhaps most significant. Thus, according to OMS1, in this British officials enjoy a certain advantage, even over France and Germany, as “even though they strive for their policy, they’re also flexible…there is a sense they’re being humble and not pushy”.

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205 It is worth noting the opinion of UKO5 on the extent to which member states are learning from participation in such missions. In his view, practical experience means that it “has got better and each operation people get a bit more realistic and a bit more serious, and begin to look at their own resources”. He cited the example of Chad as being a case where important lessons were learned over the problems caused by availability of air-lift resources, particularly when the Americans were not involved.

206 See Annex II, Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, June 3 and 4 1999 (150/99 REV 1).
5.4.3 Policies and ‘red lines’

While Britain seeks to articulate a clear and agreed position across the full range of issues dealt with in CFSP and CSDP, an important point to emerge from the interviews is that unlike Germany or France, there is no over-arching British ‘European vision’ providing a narrative for the policies pursued. Rather, British engagement is pragmatic and conducted on an issue-by-issue basis. It is perhaps a fair criticism that this contributes to an ongoing absence of strategic direction, discussed above. Certainly, UKO5 believes Britain lacks “strategic consistency” despite being effective at the level of specific policies. On the whole, therefore, it is possible to characterise British engagement with the CFSP and CSDP as predominantly defensive in nature – it can be said to be more about preventing certain developments than initiating new forms of cooperation. The main exception to this, as will be discussed, is its championing of ESDP/CSDP, although even here the momentum and interest has dropped off as the strong focus on civilian crisis management is not necessarily what Britain (or France) had initially envisaged. If there is a British ‘narrative of CFSP’, therefore, it is based around a small but specific set of ‘red lines’. The most important of these remains the general principle that foreign and security policy cooperation will remain intergovernmental (e.g. FCO, 2008b, para 5), but there are a number of specific policy examples as well.

The first example of this defensive approach is how Britain has approached the EU’s continuing embargo on arms’ sales to China. Instituted following the suppression of demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, the embargo was announced in a European Council declaration the same month (European Council, 1989). Because of this, it is only politically binding, unlike similar embargoes adopted since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. These are normally adopted as

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207 This states: “The Lisbon Treaty’s assertion of the Member States’ responsibility for setting the strategic direction of EU external action through the European Council…underlines the Government’s success in ensuring that foreign policy will remain an intergovernmental area of activity controlled by Member States…”
Common Positions through the CFSP, and are legally-binding on member states (Hellström, 2010: 22). Moreover, member states have interpreted the precise terms of the Chinese embargo differently (ibid). For example, France considers it as applying only to lethal equipment, Britain to lethal equipment that could be used for “internal repression”, while Germany places tight restrictions on any military equipment (ibid). The lack of clarity and differences in interpretation have resulted in disagreements between member states over whether to lift it, something China has sought consistently since 2000 (ibid). For example, in April 2004 there was a “heated” debate within the PSC over whether to end it, with the French demanding its removal, the Danes opposing this without clear links to progress in Chinese human rights, and Britain among those broadly in the middle (Rettman, 2011).208 That said, Britain remains sensitive to the strong US opposition to its lifting (ibid). Thus, at present the ending of the embargo as Britain interprets it represents a ‘red line’ issue, much to the frustration of what UKO3 calls the “panda-hugging” member states who are keen for it to be ended.209

What is particularly interesting, though, is the extent to which Britain’s position provides diplomatic cover for other, smaller states who support the ban. Thus, UKO3 contends that were Britain suddenly to advocate its end, Sweden, Denmark and others would likely follow suit quite swiftly. As it stands, these states are happy to allow Britain to be seen as the one “holding out against the Chinese” and be “punished” for doing so, enabling them to avoid this while still remaining popular in Washington. It remains to be seen, however, whether Britain can continue to balance its position of maintaining the ban, something the US wishes,210 with the growing desire within the Council and other EU

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208 It is interesting to note that the account of this PSC debate came from a leaked US diplomatic cable. The embargo has been such a sensitive subject among member states that they have generally avoided placing it on the political agenda (Hellström, 2010: 8).

209 UKO3 identifies particularly France, Spain and Greece.

210 For example, having advocated a lifting of the embargo at the end of 2004, Tony Blair subsequently changed his stance the following year following pressure from the US (Hellström, 2010: 18).
institutions that it should be ended. In 2010, Catherine Ashton, the High
Representative, described the embargo as “a major impediment” to
stronger EU-China cooperation on foreign and security policy matters
(Rettman, 2010). At the same time, one of the areas of EEAS policy that
the UK has supported is its development of the strategic relationship with
China (UKO2). As it seeks to strengthen its own bilateral ties with China,
the tensions in these contradictory positions can only increase.

The second example of the defensive approach is in British policy
towards the ESDP/CSDP, arguably its most important area of policy
engagement in CFSP. As discussed, alongside France, Britain was the
prime mover in initiating security and defence cooperation following the
St Malo agreement. Since then, three consistent positions have provided
the basis for Britain’s subsequent engagement. First, whatever
coopération takes place, the primacy of NATO in European defence must
be maintained. Second, the relationship of ESDP/CSDP to NATO must
be one of complementarity, and ESDP/CSDP cannot be allowed to either
duplicate or undermine NATO. Finally, a primary purpose of
ESDP/CSDP must be to encourage not only increased but also ‘smarter’
investment in defence and security capabilities by EU member states,
something that will ultimately also have a beneficial impact on NATO. In
the 14+ years since St Malo, there has been no significant change in any
of these positions, with the first two in particular representing ‘red lines’
for the UK. This is notable particularly as, despite their unease when in
opposition, the current Conservative-led coalition has adopted the same
positions in government, articulating them as clearly and stridently as
their predecessors, thereby emphasising the continuity between
governments identified at the start of this chapter (and also noted by
UKO8).

The primacy of NATO in Europe’s security architecture has been
a regular aspect of government comments on ESDP/CSDP. For example,
Tony Blair told the House of Commons in December 2000 following the
Nice Council that “[c]ollective defence will remain the responsibility of
NATO” (Oakes, 2001: 44) and in evidence to the House’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Robin Cook stated clearly that “nothing that has happened in European security is going to undermine that central role of NATO” (House of Commons, 2000b). Similarly, when asked if NATO would remain the “cornerstone of European defence”, Jack Straw declared: “We are determined that it should do so” (House of Commons, 2003a). In the Commons, NATO was referred to in precisely those terms by David Miliband (2008) and William Hague (2011), with Hague adding that CSDP could provide “a range of security tools” in areas where NATO would not be engaged.211 Similarly, in a letter to Baroness Ashton, Hague and Phillip Hammond, the Defence Secretary, described NATO as “the UK’s primary defensive alliance” (2011). Finally, a recent Lords report noted that the Government continued to view NATO as “the cornerstone” of European security and defence, with CSDP playing only a “complementary role” (2012: 21).

Likewise, the official position that ESDP/CSDP must complement NATO, and not be permitted either to duplicate or undermine it, has been clear, unequivocal and consistent. Thus, Cook stated that: “we have quite explicit statements…that we will only launch a European-led [ESDP] operation where NATO as a whole is not involved” (House of Commons, 2000b). In 2002, meanwhile, the FCO Political Director, Peter Ricketts, emphasised British opposition to any idea that ESDP/CSDP could develop down the path of collective defence:

“We have always said that ESDP should not undermine or duplicate NATO…[T]here are different views amongst different member states…our position has been that it is best to keep collective defence guarantees with the integrated military structure to deal with them, which is NATO” (House of Commons, 2002).

Similar points were made by Jack Straw (House of Commons, 2003; 2004) and were central to a working paper on ESDP entitled ‘Food For

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211 Hansard, HC Deb 9 December 2008, Col 419; HC Deb 5 December 2011, Col 5WS.
Thought’, presented to the Italian EU Presidency in August 2003 (House of Commons, 2003b). This declared UK opposition to any proposals “which would imply competition, rather that complementarity, with NATO” (ibid). In 2006, Margaret Beckett described being “very mindful of the dangers of duplication” and of the need to have “a set of complementary strands” (House of Commons, 2006b). The need to avoid duplication along with the Government’s efforts in Brussels to ensure this were both stressed in its official response to a Defence Committee report on NATO and European defence (House of Commons, 2008b: 17); meanwhile, the original report quoted the MoD’s view on the complementarity of ESDP/CSDP and NATO:

“NATO has a far greater capability than ESDP. But the range of security instruments that the EU can deploy allows it to add value in different ways.” (House of Commons, 2008a: 84) (emphasis added)

That this view had also prevailed at EU level is apparent in the December 2008 Presidency Conclusions which called for a “strengthening” of the EU/NATO partnership “in a spirit of mutual enhancement and respect” (Consilium, 2008a: 17). In their letter to Baroness Ashton, Hague and Hammond also emphasised the “unique and complementary role” that CSDP can play, declaring, moreover, that “complementarity is vital” (2011). Finally, in December the same year, Hague stated in the Commons that the government “will never agree to” duplicating institutions (Hansard, 2011d). Again, the consistency in official pronouncements is clear.

Capabilities represent Britain’s third key objective and concern. From the outset, an important British objective of security and defence cooperation has been to provide a catalyst for a Europe-wide improvement in capabilities. These, in turn, would strengthen Europe’s contribution to NATO, thereby also reinforcing their complementarity. A key component of this has been the refusal to countenance unnecessary institution-building which again has been a consistent red line. In 2000, for example, Cook talks about the “stress” Britain placed on capabilities
and that these forces “are not available only” to the EU (House of Commons, 2000b). Similarly, a specific British goal at Nice was that member states “meet capability requirements” (ibid), while Straw argued that ESDP was “a very important means by which Member States…will be required” to improve capabilities (House of Commons, 2001). Ricketts described how ESDP would put “further pressure” on partner states to spend more on capabilities, noting that this important British aim had been incorporated into a key EU working group report on defence (House of Commons, 2002). Britain’s *Food for Thought* paper focused primarily on the need for improved capabilities, whilst also demanding that any institutional development be judged against “whether it would increase the EU’s capacity for rapid and effective action” (House of Commons, 2003b). Meanwhile, both the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees have concurred with the Government’s position that improved capabilities must be at the forefront of cooperation (House of Commons, 2008a,b,c). Indeed, the last of these quoted David Miliband who stated: “improved capability development amongst Member States is a key UK objective” and that “the European problem is not an institutional one, it is to do with capabilities…” (House of Commons, 2008c: 75). British support for the development of EU *Battlegroups* (see Chapter 6) and Permanent Structured Cooperation also reflect these aims. More importantly, they again emphasise the highly instrumental view Britain takes of the value of ESDP/CSDP.

The importance of these 3 positions is confirmed by the interviews. For UKO8, the overall British position on CSDP has remained essentially unchanged since 1998 – i.e. the achievement of “complementary burden-sharing with NATO”. UKO2 described both institution-building and the possibility that CSDP might be a “challenge to NATO” quite explicitly as ‘red lines’, something that “has been a long-standing British position for years”. Moreover, he describes the view of CSDP missions as being “part of our toolkit which we can use when it’s the right time and…place”, provided they are focused, provide
value for money and are time-limited. UKO3 concurs with much of this. Arguing that within the PSC the UK has “generally wanted to make things happen”, he accepts that at times “we’ve had a more defensive agenda…[on] institutional development”. UKO5 noted Britain’s desire to transform not only European capabilities, but also the philosophy under which they would be used. Thus, a key aim – and one it sought to promote through the development of Battlegroups – was to make European forces “more expeditionary” whilst avoiding duplication with NATO, for example in relation to French, German and Polish plans to develop a permanent Operational Headquarters (OHQ). He admitted, though, that to an extent Britain has become distracted by its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and thus one reason it provided an OHQ for Operation Atalanta, the anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, was to refute accusations by France and Germany, amongst others, that Britain was “not pulling our weight in the EU”. UKO5 was adamant, though, that in terms of developing capabilities, Britain has been highly influential, with states such as Denmark and Sweden keen to hear British ideas on force transformation.  

It is also interesting to note his view that British engagement in ESDP/CSDP has to some extent relied on “temporary enthusiasms…driven by Number 10”. This suggests that more positive and particularly consistent engagement from the top of government might have helped achieve British aims, whereas instead “we’ve missed opportunities to show leadership and develop CSDP” (UKO5).

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212 Citing former Defence Secretary Des Browne, the Defence Committee note, for example, that the “Nordic Battlegroup…has been a particular success and has been “a very effective vehicle for the transformation of the Swedish military”. (House of Commons, 2008a: 75)
5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that Britain engages with the CFSP based on an assumption of leadership and seeks to instrumentalise it in the pragmatic pursuit of particular objectives. It has briefly outlined the historical origins of this leadership assumption, arguing that while Britain may today find itself in reduced circumstances in terms of its global power, it maintains both a capacity and desire to exercise influence internationally to promote and protect its interests. Moreover, while there may be differences in emphasis, there is a broad consensus on this between governments of left and right. Participation in CFSP is thus regarded as an important component in the foreign policy toolkit, but forms only one aspect of this. Moreover, an important proviso of participation is that cooperation in CFSP remains intergovernmental. Britain’s global perspective, meanwhile, is reflected in its interest in a broad range of policy issues and in its extensive coordination ambition. This is backed up by complex and extensive policy coordination machinery at the domestic and Brussels levels, and supported by its extensive network of bilateral diplomatic relationships. While able to deploy considerable economic, diplomatic and military power in pursuit of its aims, it does not rely exclusively on these. Rather, it seeks to lead in CFSP through the power of persuasion and effective argument, but to lead nonetheless. Its effectiveness in this regard is acknowledged by its EU partners.

This enables us to draw several conclusions. The most important relates to the assumptions within constructivist analyses that participation in the CFSP would lead to a transformation not only in how British officials might behave, but in how the interests and goals they pursue and protect are calculated and articulated. The evidence here suggests no such transformation. Despite long-term involvement in foreign and security policy cooperation, British positions in key areas of policy – for example, how it has engaged with ESDP/CSDP – have remained unchanged. Moreover, expectations of British leadership
suggest instead that in the CFSP it is well placed to influence the nature and direction of EU responses to particular issues. Second, while there have been specific changes to the internal organisation of the FCO, and its domestic influence over wider EU policy has diminished as other Whitehall departments have taken control of their policy areas, fundamental practices have not altered. The importance of certain Brussels structures – particularly the role of the PSC – has increased, but the effect has been to make UKREP’s voice more important only insofar as navigating the centre is concerned. Bilateral links between national capitals remain as vital as before. Third and directly following this, the effectiveness of British officials in CFSP reflects their ability to “play the game” well. However, while this demonstrates their socialisation in the context of CFSP, there is no evidence that this goes beyond their need to be able to operate appropriately within this sphere. Understanding the difficulties of peers and being able to forge compromise provides evidence only of standard diplomatic practice within a multilateral environment, not of some deeper transformation. Thus, when considering how Britain engages with the CFSP, constructivist ideas may help us understand the how (i.e. the process), but do not explain the what (i.e. policy, outcomes, etc).
“German foreign policy has been marked by continuity during the last few decades. It is reliable and calculable. It is guided by our values and interests... However, German foreign policy is not static. It always reflects the world around us.”
(Guido Westerwelle, 2010a)

6.1 Introduction

These remarks encapsulate both the nature and ambition of German foreign policy in the two decades since unification, communicating a combination of apparent continuity and dramatic if not always obvious change. Moreover, they go to the heart of the debate within this thesis over the extent to which the CFSP has been responsible for a transformation not only in how member states make foreign and security policy, but in whether it transforms how they conceive of and identify their preferences and interests. Germany would seem to be the perfect exemplar of such a transformation, having embedded its international identity within a European frame of reference, and anchored itself to the common values and norms of behaviours underpinning this. However, its development since 1990 suggests something different and more subtle. Thus, while rhetorically it places its foreign and security policy within the multilateral context provided by the CFSP (as well as NATO, the UN etc), it is increasingly comfortable using the CFSP as a venue to pursue its own particular preferences and objectives. Indeed, not only do German policy-makers seek to use the CFSP’s system and structures to promote German influence, their national systems of policy-making are intended to give clear direction over where and how such influence is to be exercised. This chapter examines how and why this has happened.
Germany’s evolution as a foreign and security policy actor is of particular interest given the historical sensitivity surrounding its behaviour in these contexts. Having initially been anxious to reassure its neighbours and partners that unification would not threaten Europe’s peace and stability, the trajectory of change within Germany has been dramatic in the post-unification period. It has not been alone in seeking to wrestle with the security challenges thrown up first by the collapse of Yugoslavia, then the War on Terror, and more recently by the need for coherent and effective crisis management to respond to instability in the EU’s near-abroad. However, these have posed for it an additional and unique set of political and moral dilemmas, as Harnisch (2001: 51) notes:

“[Kosovo] confronted the German foreign policy elite and the wider public with a conflict between key norms of its post-Second World War foreign policy: multilateralism (never alone), observance of the law (never again), and human rights (never again concentration camps). The tension between these core values and between their protagonists in the German public debate was much more serious than in any of Germany’s allies...the Kosovo War in particular struck right at the heart of Germany’s post-Second World War role as a civilian (if not pacifist) power.”

German involvement particularly in NATO and the EU and CFSP has been crucial to its ability to address these dilemmas, with these constituting the “two pathways” through which its security is conceived and pursued (Aggestam, 2000: 64). They have created the space within which it has been able to play an increasingly significant role as an international actor, often under pressure from partner states, whilst addressing some of the most difficult moral questions thrown up by its 20th Century history. They have also enabled it to balance two ostensibly competing internal narratives: its position as the civilian power (Zivilmacht) par excellence; and a determination to move beyond its history, key to which has been a willingness to countenance the deployment of military force abroad. Together, these highlight what is perhaps the most interesting aspect of Germany’s foreign policy evolution over the last two decades: while its default position remains rooted in multilateralist and partnership-based approaches to foreign
policy, it seems far more willing to assert itself, even if this results in public splits with key allies, as witnessed in its decision not to participate in NATO’s implementation of a No-Fly Zone over Libya in 2011, or its current separation from Britain and France over policy towards Syria (e.g. Speck, 2013).

To explore this, the chapter is divided into three sections. The first analyses briefly the trajectory of change in German foreign and security policy from unification to the present. The second examines the structures and processes established in Berlin and Brussels for the development and pursuit of German foreign policy. The final part considers how Germany acts in practice, examining its interactions in terms of four different but interlinked leadership roles – shared leadership, leadership by example, leadership through mediation, and direct or overt leadership. These highlight the key theme of this chapter: that German foreign policy – and its interaction with the CFSP – has now reached a point of emergent or “accidental” leadership which challenges constructivist claims about the transformative power of the CFSP.
6.2 The trajectory of change in post-unification German foreign and security policy

A decade plus since Hanns Maull (2000) asked whether Germany remained a civilian power in the aftermath of the Kosovo War (see also Kundnani, 2011 and Tewes, 2002), it is possible to identify this crisis as a watershed moment not only in the development of European foreign and security policy more widely, but also in the evolution of German foreign policy in the post-unification period. In a very real sense, the reaction to Kosovo of the newly-elected Red-Green coalition government under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer represented the culmination of the pressures brought to bear by the combination of events and changing expectations that had accompanied Germany’s first decade as a unified state. Indeed, it forms part of a clear and unmistakeable trajectory of change in the last 20 years that has seen Germany exchange its status as “political dwarf”, first for reluctant participant (Wittlinger, 2010: 118), but now more recently for one as an important initiator of policy in the CFSP. While the CFSP remains just one facet of Germany’s engagement with the EU and the wider international community, it is nonetheless highly significant having formed a key part of German efforts to build trust and confidence with its partners, and maintain stability and predictability in its foreign relations (Aggestam, 2000: 69). One German Foreign Ministry official described it as “the essential part…this is the forum where we actually can express our foreign policy”. Another stated that he “could not imagine” conducting foreign and security policy without it. He continued:

“[T]his is the framework in which…in the Bundesrepublik Deutschland, security and defence policy happens. Everything else is…a complete non-starter. It’s not imaginable, quite simply.”

Such statements highlight the unique nature of Germany’s relationship with the CFSP and its importance in German conceptions of its foreign policy role today.

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213 GO3, Federal Foreign Ministry, Berlin, January 2011. (Interviewee’s emphasis.)
214 GO2, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, November 2010.
As discussed, the CFSP was one part of the solution that Europe’s policy-makers devised to address the challenges the member states faced at the beginning of the 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, a political vacuum was created in Europe and new initiatives were needed to promote co-operation (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 257), and ensure that external pressures would not interfere with or further disrupt integration. At the same time, and linked to this, was the question of how to manage the EU’s inter-state and inter-institutional dynamics (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 148), and particularly the necessity of anchoring the newly-unified Germany firmly within Europe, something the Kohl government was as anxious to achieve as Germany’s partners. Together, these pressures provided the crucial catalyst for the establishment of the CFSP (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 257), and the backdrop against which the trajectory of change since unification should be viewed.

6.2.1 The Kohl years: Restraint and ‘Leadership Avoidance’

Within the literature, much of the analysis of the nature and degree of change in Germany’s role and role conception within both the EU and wider international community has been based around the concept of normalization (e.g. Katzenstein, 1997; Paterson 2003, 2010; Bulmer and Paterson, 2010; Hyde-Price, 2003; Rummel, 1996; Wittlinger, 2010). This is concerned with the extent to which a post-unification Germany could, should or would seek to become a “normal” nation-state, and what this would mean in practice when dealing with foreign policy. Throughout its existence, the basis of the Bonn Republic’s foreign policy consisted of a renunciation of power politics and the rejection of any form of nationalism within the international arena, coupled with a strong commitment to multilateralism (Rummel, 1996: 42; Katzenstein, 1997: 2; Wittlinger, 2010: 116). Indeed, from this perspective the CFSP represents an ideal expression of this ‘European
vocation’, characterized by a “reflexive multilateralism” through which German actoriness could be “veiled by multilateral process and discourse” (Paterson, 2010: 42; see also Heisenberg, 2006: 109). More generally, in its membership of NATO and the EC/EU Germany sought, largely successfully, to balance its loyalties to the European and Atlantic alliances as the two key components in its international identity, consciously avoiding situations where it would have to choose between them (Wittlinger, 2010: 116). The chief characteristics of its foreign policy could therefore be encapsulated as modesty, self-limitation and a ‘culture of restraint’ – or, in Paterson’s words, a “leadership avoidance reflex” (2003: 211).

Following unification, however, the sustainability of this role conception soon came into question. Domestically, the Maastricht Treaty represented the apogee of Chancellor Kohl’s Europeanist policies. From then on, “Euro-idealism” in Germany – or Germany’s ‘Euro-vocation’ (Paterson, 2010; 2011) – began to decline significantly, particularly as the economic costs of unification and possible impacts of future eastern enlargement became clearer (Wittlinger, 2010: 95). At the same time, unified Germany faced growing pressure from its international partners to live up to the ‘international responsibilities’ its new status entailed, particularly in light of its decision not to participate in the first Gulf War coalition where it was criticised for its “cheque-book diplomacy”, and then its apparent “assertiveness” in its unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (Hyde-Price, 2003: 188, 190). Consequently, Germany’s political and foreign policy elite faced the challenge of trying to balance their Zivilmacht role conception with the need to demonstrate to their allies that Germany was a stable and reliable partner, willing to share the burdens of maintaining international peace and security (Wittlinger, 2010: 118).

Paterson (2003: 206) frames this dilemma in terms of realist or Westphalian versus post-Westphalian analyses. He argues that in the period immediately following unification the prevailing post-
Westphalian orthodoxy saw Germany as a “post-national state”, tied in to both Europe and the wider international system through “ever higher degrees” of integration and interdependence (ibid). In Germany’s case, such “post-nationalism” had a number of characteristics, including an exaggerated multilateralism, a readiness to pool sovereignty at the European level, a reliance on ‘soft power’, and the avoidance of explicit leadership, except in conjunction with France (ibid: 207). Countering this, the Westphalian analysis saw in the post-unification period an opportunity for Germany to escape from the “constraints of semi-sovereignty” and “pursue a normalization course” enabling it to talk more confidently in terms of national interests – and therefore making it no different from either France or Britain (ibid: 207). Moreover, by following an approach based consciously and unashamedly around self- and national interest, Germany would be able to secure for itself the position of “central balancer” in key decisions (ibid.), an important point given the subsequent change in its approach to European integration generally, and foreign and security policy more specifically discussed below.

Rejecting the notion that Germany would return “to realist ‘normalcy’”, however, in 1997 Katzenstein argued that following unification it was a version of this post-Westphalian state that had come to pass. Noting that German political leaders spoke in terms of political responsibility rather than power, and consciously avoided either a high profile or an explicit leadership role, he contended that these were indicative of a “deeper transformation” whereby Germany had been “tamed” by the institutionalization of power at the European level (1997: 3). The German focus on ‘soft power’ reflected its considerable similarities with the EU in terms of institutions and practices, meaning a milieu had been created at EU level in which German policy-makers and politicians felt “at home” and that helped “anchor” Germany in Europe (ibid: 40-41). This, in turn, demonstrated Germany’s “indirect institutional power” – the ability to “shape the rules of the game” at the
European level in ways that would favour its policy in the long term (ibid: 25). In their analysis of indirect institutional power, Bulmer et al. (2000: 135) set out how such power ‘pays back’ through subsequent systemic empowerment, for example through Germany’s ability to ensure that the European Central Bank, when created, reflected the concerns and priorities of the Bundesbank. Overall, Germany and the EU had evolved in “mutually supportive ways” (Katzenstein, 1997: 44). Thus, while Germany remained “semi-sovereign” and more internationalized in both the European and Atlantic institutions than either France or Britain who took more instrumentalist and realist approaches to the exercise of power at the European level, German political elites were well-placed to “exploit the fortuitous institutional fit” (ibid: 41).

A decade later, however, and the notion of Germany as a ‘tamed power’ no longer seems to hold. For Harnisch and Schieder (2006), Germany’s European policy had become weaker, leaner and meaner over the previous decade, a point with which Bulmer and Paterson (2010: 1052) concur, arguing that Germany has become more assertive and willing, if necessary, to proceed alone. Moreover, domestically the previously permissive consensus that supported ‘tamed power’ has become far more conditional (ibid.). Thus, even though it will remain a key participant in the EU’s core groups, not least the Eurozone, Germany’s European diplomacy is becoming more calculating with it likely to be a far more robust negotiating partner, particularly regarding the EU’s finances (ibid: 1073). This latter concern has become increasingly important within the CFSP (see below). Overall, therefore, for Bulmer and Paterson (2010: 1052), this willingness to be more robust and assertive reflects the reality of Germany as an increasingly ‘normalized’ power.

Such robustness and assertiveness is clearly reflected within the field of foreign and security policy. For Wittlinger (2010: 135), it is this aspect of German policy that has undergone the most change since unification, while Hyde-Price (2003: 184) notes the “quiet revolution”
that has been underway throughout this period, particularly regarding the use of force as an “instrument of statecraft”. Wagener (2006: 79) makes a similar point, noting that Germany in the mid-2000s was using military instruments to achieve foreign and security goals “much more intensively” than in the previous decade. The pressure on unified Germany to assume a greater burden in relation to international security (noted above) became particularly acute in relation to the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, which challenged the utility of Germany’s Zivilmacht role conception (ibid: 188). For the Kohl Government, and indeed for the Bonn Republic more generally, the historic memory of German militarism meant that the explicit exercise of power was to be avoided. However, this seemed increasingly incompatible with the need to preserve stability in Europe, one corner of which was engaged in a particular brutal conflict, aspects of which seemed dangerously reminiscent of Germany’s own troubled history (Paterson, 2010: 45). The decision by the Federal Constitutional Court on 12 July 1994 that out-of-area operations by Germany’s armed forces were permissible if conducted under a clear UN mandate was therefore momentous (Miskimmon and Paterson, 2003: 333). While not denying the principle that armed force only be used under exceptional circumstances, it did not preclude its use altogether. Thus, while non-violent conflict resolution would remain the guiding principle of German foreign policy, the way was open for more robust action, particularly in partnership with allies, and based on the central objective of securing and promoting international peace (Hyde-Price, 2003: 185).
6.2.2 The Schröder years: ‘Quiet Revolution’ and the end of ‘Equidistance’

The implications of this “quiet revolution” became clear in the response of the SPD-Green government’s response to the Kosovo crisis. Indeed, the arrival of the new Gerhard Schröder-led coalition, which took office in October 1998, proved highly significant to Germany’s foreign and security policy in a number of ways. The generational change meant that in Schröder and his deputy Joschka Fischer, Foreign Minister and Green Party leader, Germany was now led by politicians with no memory of the Second World War and for whom German history provided the justification for action rather than inaction. In this context, Kosovo challenged the three key norms in the country’s post war foreign policy identified by Harnisch (2001: 51) and noted above. The role of Fischer in persuading both his own party and the wider public to support German participation was particularly striking. Just a few years before he had been highly critical of German military participation in out-of-area operations, but his position changed following Serbian attacks on UN ‘safe havens’ in Gorazde and Srebrenica. As Hyde-Price and Jeffrey note, for Fischer, Schröder and their generation, human rights have become “central to their political beliefs” giving “political coherence, direction and legitimacy to their foreign policy objectives” (2001: 706). Thus, Fischer contended that in the face of genocide, pacifism – however moral its basis – was simply not an acceptable response (Harnsich, 2001: 51) while Schröder, in a televised address on 24 March 1999, declared: “We defend freedom, democracy and human rights. We cannot allow that only one hour away from here by air, these values are treated with contempt” (quoted in Schweiger, 2004: 38). The decision to send 4,000 military personnel to participate in IFOR was thus momentous in the evolution of Germany’s post-unification foreign policy, representing what Wittlinger (2010: 123) characterises as a conscious effort to move from “rehabilitation to emancipation”. This was further underlined by Germany’s championing of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, a post-conflict strategy designed to stabilize the region through economic
investment, democratization and improved relations with the EU (Hyde-Price, 2003: 193).

However, whilst the normative argument was a key part of the Red-Green decision to become militarily involved in the NATO campaign in Kosovo, it also reflected a more pragmatic set of calculations. Kosovo was the first major foreign crisis the new coalition government had faced. Untried and untested, it needed to prove itself domestically by dealing with the very real problem of large numbers of refugees potentially arriving in Germany as a consequence of the fighting; and internationally, by demonstrating to the US and others that it was a reliable ally and genuine strategic partner (Harnisch, 2001: 52; Wittlinger, 2010: 123). Taken together, Schröder was not seeking to abandon the key tenets of four decades-worth of German foreign policy; he was, however, seeking to ‘re-tool’ it for a Germany that was finally emerging as an equal partner. Thus, in a speech in November 2001 he declared:

“[A]fter the epochal changes since autumn 1989 Germany has regained its full sovereignty. With that it has also taken on new duties which our allies remind us of. We have no right to complain about that. Rather we should be pleased…we have become equal partners in the community of nations.” (Schröder, 2006: 180)

However, although participation in the Kosovo campaign may have reflected a more “self-confident” Germany, it had also stretched the Zivilmacht concept to “breaking point” (Hyde-Price, 2003: 205).

Following Kosovo, Germany was in forefront of efforts to improve the EU’s crisis management capabilities. Throughout the 1990s, the German government had made the case for common European defence, but had faced opposition particularly from Britain which was concerned about the deleterious effect this might have on NATO (Miskimmon and Paterson, 2003: 337). However, Kosovo demonstrated all too clearly that despite huge investments in national defence, Europe’s states collectively remained unable to mount substantial military operations without the leadership or support of the US. A direct
consequence of this was the decision, discussed previously, to develop the ESDP as the crisis management arm of the CFSP. Building on the Anglo-French St Malo Agreement, in 1999 Germany used its concurrent presidencies of the EU and WEU to drive the project forward, seeing in this an opportunity to further the cause of European defence co-operation, but in a way complementary to NATO (Hyde-Price, 2003: 196). This aim was also boosted at the latter’s annual summit in Washington in the same year, where agreement was reached on ‘Berlin Plus’, paving the way for future EU use of NATO capabilities for crisis management tasks (Miskimmon and Paterson, 2003: 331). Thus, as Hyde-Price and Jeffrey (2001: 706) argue, while the creation of ESDP demonstrated an increasing convergence between the formerly opposing positions held by France and Britain on European defence co-operation, it also signalled an acceptance by Germany of both the “utility and legitimacy of military crisis management”, further underlining the change taking place within German foreign and security policy.

Germany’s response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent war in Afghanistan further demonstrated its “increasingly participatory approach” and “greater assertiveness” in foreign policy under the Red-Green coalition (Wittlinger, 2010: 118). As Hyde-Price (2003: 200) notes, the Schröder government played a major role in consolidating the international alliance that had been created to conduct the war on terror, underlining its commitment by deploying 3,900 Bundeswehr troops to Afghanistan, the largest combat deployment undertaken since 1945. Indeed, Foreign Minister Fischer even threatened to resign if the Bundestag failed to support the mission (Schweiger, 2004: 38). Thus, while the German government maintained the position that military measures were first and foremost about deterrence, such deterrence would now also include major offensive

215 Despite the significance of such deployments, Wolfgang Ischinger is critical of the Bundeswehr’s approach to Afghanistan, noting that it “has only grudgingly and belatedly engaged in [the] counterinsurgency operations” which have been a key element in UK and particularly US strategy (2012: 47).
operations, ensuring the Bundeswehr became “an army in action” and not merely a standing defensive force (Verteidigungsarmee) (Wagener, 2006: 84-6). However, when Washington’s attention turned to Iraq, it became impossible to hide the growing split between the still avowedly multilateralist Germany, and a US that had lost faith in the ability of existing international institutions and alliance structures to support it in its prosecution of the war on terror (e.g. Overhaus, 2006). Moreover, Schröder did not simply refuse German participation; he made his nation’s vociferous opposition to the Iraq conflict an article of faith to such an extent that it became a key element of the 2002 German federal election campaign, one of the few times foreign policy has taken centre stage in this way (Paterson, 2010: 47).

Although Schröder’s coalition secured re-election, however, victory came at the expense of growing isolation within the EU. The consequent German dependence on the Franco-German alliance within the EU, and Germany’s reduced ability to have a positive impact on the key debates surrounding enlargement and constitutional change (over which Fischer had been especially influential during the first Red-Green government), demonstrated the essentially tactical nature of Schröder’s stance on Iraq (Paterson, 2010b: 501). In terms of Germany’s relationship with its two largest EU partners, Iraq did result in a renewal of its partnership with France that had previously been in a serious state of decline, but the possibility for a new axis of cooperation between Berlin and London disappeared, while the UK also struggled to maintain influence (Schweiger, 2004: 35). As Wittlinger (2010: 132) notes,

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216 Overhaus argues that the Iraq War served to highlight a deeper structural crisis within transatlantic relations, caused by an end to what he terms the “benign American hegemony” which underpinned post-1945 multilateralism. This manifested itself principally in an unwillingness on the part of the Americans to allow their European partners a greater say over policy-making, which was itself a consequence of a repeated European inability to provide political and military leadership when the situation has required (2006). See also: Valasek, T. (ed.) (2012) All Alone? What US retrenchment means for Europe and NATO (London: Centre for European Reform).

217 Schweiger sees this as a failure on the part of both London and Berlin who “failed to take advantage of the promising correspondences in their positions on the
ultimately Schröder’s ‘No’ to Iraq – and his willingness to create an alliance of opposition that included Paris, Moscow and Beijing – suggests not only that the ‘leadership avoidance reflex’ was no longer an appropriate descriptor, but also that the Berlin Republic had finally been “freed from the constraints” of its Bonn predecessor. However, German foreign policy emancipation came at the price of severely damaging the bilateral relationship with Washington, whilst Schröder’s rhetoric served to create unease amongst his European allies over German “unilateralism” (Hyde-Price, 2003: 202). The policy of equidistance between the European and transatlantic alliance structures, a key element in the Bonn Republic’s foreign policy, seemed to have been abandoned, and with it, in the short term at least, went an important part of Germany’s ability to exercise a ‘balancing’ influence.

future” of the EU which had been emerging, and instead found themselves pushed into “two opposing camps” (2004: 35).
6.2.3 The Merkel years: the emergence of a ‘reluctant hegemon’?

To date, Angela Merkel has led two coalition governments – the so-called Grand Coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD (2005-9) and its CDU/CSU-FDP successor (2009-13).\(^{218}\) German foreign policy since 2005 has been marked by a striking activism in responding to the need to rescue and revitalise the EU’s constitutional reform process, culminating in the agreement of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008; and latterly in addressing the Eurozone crisis (although the initial response was somewhat lacklustre). In contrast, her governments have demonstrated a marked reluctance to become involved in any kind of international military action, whether in Libya in 2011 or more recently in Syria, and even German participation in the International Stabilisation Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan has increasingly been called into question domestically, amid concerns that what began as a stabilisation mission now looks more and more like a war (e.g. Kundnani, 2011: 31).\(^{219}\) Despite this contrast, German foreign policy has remained assertive and robust, and Kundnani (2011: 35) argues that its previously reflexive multilateralism has now become much more “contingent”. Whatever the changes in style and tone from the Schröder years, therefore, there is a strong continuity between Merkel’s governments and those of her predecessor in terms of a willingness to pursue what are considered Germany’s ‘national interests’, and to do so when necessary overtly and explicitly. This reflects the continuing trajectory of change since unification, with Germany prepared to accept a greater leadership role, particularly in foreign economic policy, and with the potential to do so in terms of its approach to security and crisis management (see below).

A foreign policy priority of the first Merkel government was to repair the damage done by her predecessor to relations with key

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\(^{218}\) At the time of writing, Mrs Merkel was predicted to win a third term as Bundeskanzlerin (Federal Chancellor) in the parliamentary elections to be held on 22 September 2013.

\(^{219}\) Opinion poll data published by the Bundeswehr shows an increase in opposition to German involvement in Afghanistan from 34% in 2008 to 55% this year (Bundeswehr, 2013).
European partners and Washington. In this regard, she “made an enormous effort” (Dempsey, 2013: 9), although as Paterson argues “simply not being Gerhard Schröder was enough to guarantee a positive impact” in Washington (2011: 63). Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Foreign Minister from 2005 to 2009, suggested that German foreign policy was characterised by a “confident modesty” during this time, and a sense of mission in which the focus on human rights has remained central (Wittlinger, 2010: 133). While this may be true, it was also characterised by the dominance of the Chancellor herself (e.g. Crawford and Czuczka, 2013), something that was perhaps “unexpected” given that it is usually the foreign minister who leads in foreign policy, at least in the early years of any coalition (Paterson, 2011: 63) (see below). Merkel, though, was able to assert herself quickly in this area. In part, this reflected the difficulties she faced in driving her programme for domestic economic reform. Her consequent willingness to allow her SPD Finance Minister, Peer Steinbrück, to do “the heavy lifting” here enabled her to focus instead on foreign affairs (Paterson, 2011: 63). Thus, Dempsey (2013: 3) notes that she took “a lively interest in foreign policy” from her first day as Chancellor and was helped by the fact she took office just as Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac were about to leave, and by Germany’s 2007 presidencies of the EU and G8 (Paterson, 2010b: 513; 2011: 63). The result was that Merkel very quickly became the “pre-eminent European leader” and its “uncontested leading figure” (Paterson, forthcoming), and “Europe’s star politician” (Barysch, 2007).

Crucial to this was her successful and deft resuscitation of the apparently moribund European constitutional reform process that resulted

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220 Despite disagreements with the US over action to address climate change and regulate hedge funds, George W Bush and Angela Merkel quickly established a warm personal relationship. Merkel hosted the President and his wife to a “folksy summer barbecue” at a village in her home state in the former East Germany, and Bush later described Merkel in his memoirs as “trustworthy, engaging, and warm” and “one of my closest friends on the world stage” (Crawford and Czuczka, 2013: 104-5).

221 Paterson goes on to note that she was supported in this by her appointment of Christoph Heusgen, the former Chief of Staff to the CFSP High Representative Javier Solana, as her chief foreign policy advisor.
in the *Treaty of Lisbon.* There is little doubt that both the actions of the Merkel government, and Merkel herself, were essential to the eventual agreement. Paterson (2011: 64) considers Germany’s intervention, particularly during its 2007 EU Presidency, as a “successful salvage operation” while Bulmer, describing it in similar terms, considers the German government’s actions as “vital”, and that more broadly Germany’s “contribution to the whole constitutional debate leading to [Lisbon]…[had] been fundamental” (2010: 62, 56). Laursen characterises it as a “rescuing mission with German leadership” (2012: 19), highlighting Merkel’s personal involvement in key negotiations, while Dempsey considers that her efforts in this regard demonstrated “her formidable energy” (2013: 4). The importance to Germany of achieving agreement on the new treaty should not be under-estimated. Having pressed for a mandate during the 2006 Austrian Presidency to resume negotiations during the German Presidency the following year (Bulmer, 2010: 61), it was then prioritised by Berlin (Laursen, 2012: 20), with the subsequent negotiations “conducted in a highly centralised manner” from the Chancellery (Paterson, forthcoming). Indeed, an official in the *Auswärtiges Amt,* (Federal Foreign Ministry) emphasised the importance of this, noting the involvement of key officials in the Chancellery and Merkel herself in driving the process forward:

“The gentleman who was sitting at this desk [in the Chancellery]…had a clear vision of what is essential and what isn’t…and it was basically our Chancellor, Mrs Merkel, who then said, this is our chance – let’s make use of it.”

As part of this, Merkel suggested a negotiation format based around ‘focal points’, with each government appointing two special representatives and with government leaders dealing directly with one another (Paterson, forthcoming). The result was an “unusually

222 For a detailed discussion of Germany and the development of the Constitutional Treaty, see Bulmer (2010).
223 See Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of Germany’s contribution to the constitutional reform process with particular reference to the establishment of the European External Action Service.
224 GO6, Federal Foreign Ministry, Berlin, April 2012.
disciplined” negotiation in which Merkel’s own negotiating skills were “an important ingredient of the success” (Laursen, 2012: 28). The final outcome was considered a triumph for the German government “and Chancellor Merkel personally”, leaving her Europe’s “pre-eminent” leader (Paterson, 2011: 65).

If Merkel’s handling of the Lisbon Treaty process was ‘sure-footed’, her initial response to the issue that has dominated her second government, the Eurozone crisis, has been far less certain (although she has hardly been alone in that). Thus, even as Germany has emerged as a “reluctant hegemon” as a consequence of Europe’s economic and financial travails and its own economic predominance (Paterson, 2011: 57; see also: Soros, 2012; Bulmer and Paterson, forthcoming), Merkel has been criticised for being focused on problem-solving while lacking an overall strategic ‘European vision’ (Paterson, 2010b: 513; 2011: 66; Dempsey, 2013: 7). For Paterson (forthcoming), Merkel’s inability to set an agenda beyond saving the Euro and retaining power has meant “extreme caution” has predominated. Thus, even though Germany has become increasingly important within Europe and beyond, her second administration has been marked at times by a sense of drift and “a loss of focus” (ibid). In part, Crawford and Czuczka (2013) argue, this reflects her own natural caution. At the same time, Merkel has been careful to recognise the limitations placed on her by domestic public opinion. This has provided a powerful back-stop in terms of how she has dealt with negotiations over bail-outs to struggling Eurozone countries (Paterson, forthcoming; see also Crawford and Czuczka, 2013). Thus, she has worked hard to persuade the electorate and Bundestag deputies that providing such support should not be equated to the creation of a “transfer union” (Kundnani, 2011). Rather, she has argued that Germany,

225 Soros declared that “As the strongest creditor country, Germany is emerging as the hegemon”.
226 See also Paterson ‘Germany in the European Union’ in Developments in German Politics 4 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) (forthcoming). Dempsey suggests that this lack of vision is not restricted to Europe, but also extends to Germany’s relationship with the US (2013: 9).
as “Europe’s largest economy, has a particular responsibility for our continent”; equally, she has been forthright in demanding that Germany’s partners accept their share of the burden (Merkel, 2010). Her approach has been to present these as “two sides of the same coin – Germany’s interests were Europe’s interests” (Dempsey, 2013: 5).

The significance and all-consuming nature of the Eurozone crisis should not be underestimated. However, the consequence of Merkel’s need (and preference) to focus on this has meant that other aspects of foreign policy, particularly security and defence, have been neglected at a time when important strategic questions have arisen, not least regarding Europe’s Southern and Eastern neighbours (Dempsey, 2013: 4). Indeed, Dempsey argues that she has “very little interest” in security and defence policy (ibid). Certainly, the agreement of Lisbon which she worked so hard to achieve had, among other results, an important impact on the foreign policy role of the EU, not least through the establishment of the European External Action Service (see Chapter 7). Moreover, domestically there have been significant reforms to the German army (Bundeswehr) under her administrations (e.g. Dyson, 2013). However, beyond this any larger, more coherent strategy seems to have been lacking. Indeed, outside of economics, Germany’s foreign policy seems to have been based on a determination – robustly expressed at times – to keep Germany from becoming embroiled in military action of any kind overseas. The result, argues Dyson (2013), is that Germany’s “record as an alliance partner” has been “significantly tarnished” by the current

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227 Indeed, Merkel’s willingness to be assertive in this regard led to accusations recently that Germany – and she in particular – applied “nasty pressure” to other Member States, including Ireland and Hungary, in order to postpone debate on new regulations intended to further reduce car emissions (EurActiv, 2013). The report contends that Germany raised the prospect of risks to future bail-out funds for Ireland and the closure of car plants in Hungary unless they supported its wishes, leading one anonymous EU source to describe its behaviour as “rogue” (ibid).
government. The clearest example of this came with Germany’s high profile opposition to military intervention in Libya in 2011.

German opposition to the NATO-led operations in Libya was not the first occasion the Merkel government had demonstrated a willingness to pursue a policy path at odds with that of key partners or a more equivocal attitude to multilateralism. In 2010, for example, Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle called publicly for the US to remove its nuclear weapons from Germany, rather than seeking to negotiate this through NATO structures as might have been expected (Kundnani, 2011: 35). The decision to oppose the Libyan intervention, meanwhile, placed it at odds with its two key European defence and security partners, Britain and France. Moreover, while Westerwelle may have believed that the German decision was “understood and respected” (2011a), the fact that Britain and France have recently been developing far closer bilateral defence and security ties can in part be explained by Germany’s unwillingness to use force, and the consequent impact of this on the utility of the EU’s crisis management policy, the CSDP (see Chapter 5). And while domestic public opinion may certainly have played a role in the decision regarding Libya, it was not without its critics at home and even in government. For example, Wolfgang Ischinger, a former German ambassador to both the UK and US, suggested that 12 months on, Germany’s behaviour during the UNSC Libya vote crisis was viewed within government with embarrassment, and notes that Westerwelle has

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228 Indeed, Dyson notes that the Opposition SPD’s party programme sets out much more ambitious aims in defence and security, viewing the current government’s time in charge of the Defence Ministry as ‘wasted years’ and making clear the need for ‘stronger German leadership’ in CSDP (2013).
229 In a statement to the Bundestag on 18 March 2011, Westerwelle stated: “During the last few days, we’ve talked over and weighed up the potential benefits and the risks of a military operation in Libya… We respect and understand those partners in the [UNSC], in the [EU] and in the Arab League…However, in view of the considerable foreign policy and military risks involved, the German Government came to a different conclusion…That’s why we were unable to agree on this part of the Resolution…Our partners indicated…that they understood and respected our decision. Germany’s international commitment is appreciated” (Westerwelle, 2011a).
230 As UKO8 put it, “France was enormously embarrassed by Germany’s UN vote against Libya intervention”.
been criticised both by Chancellor Merkel and his own party (2012: 51-2). Moreover, although Ischinger suggests that fears Germany is embarking once again on a ‘sonderweg’ (lit. ‘special way’) are misplaced, he does warn of the danger of the country being perceived as an unstable or unreliable ally in the future (ibid: 46). Twenty years on from unification, therefore, it is possible to argue that even if there remains substantial continuity in terms of the ongoing attachment to Zivilmacht, multilateralism and maintaining key bilateral relationships, German foreign policy – and its role conception as an international actor – has changed considerably.

Kundnani (2011) suggests that a better way of understanding German foreign policy today, therefore, is by conceptualising the country as a “geo-economic power”. For Kundnani, Germany’s emergence as an economic hegemon within Europe represents a move away from its ‘civilian power’ identity, meaning that while it may avoid the use of military force as a foreign policy tool, this should not be equated with a rejection of other instruments, particularly economic, that enable it to project power internationally. This it has done most obviously in its response to the Eurozone crisis where it has become “more willing to impose its economic preferences” on others (2011: 41). Such an analysis highlights the considerable continuity between the governments of Angela Merkel and those of her predecessor, Gerhard Schröder. However, while Kundnani sees a contradiction between Germany’s more assertive economic stance and the ‘no’ vote in Libya, such a public and high-profile rejection of military intervention does demonstrate a willingness to be robust in broader issues of foreign policy. Moreover, it seems likely that German governments will remain fully prepared to say ‘no’ to their NATO, EU and UN partners, even if they choose to do so with less rhetorical vehemence and a greater awareness of the need to maintain unity of purpose within these organisations. What the Merkel years show,

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231 Ischinger notes that Germany’s abstention from the action in Libya was also the subject of considerable criticism from several former Chancellors, foreign and defence ministers, and members of the Bundestag (2012: 45-6).
therefore, is not only how important Germany continues to be to its partners, but also that it has become an increasingly “complicated” partner (Ischinger, 2012: 57). How this complexity manifests itself in terms of its policy-making for, and involvement and engagement in, the CFSP will be discussed next.
6.3 Germany’s domestic foreign policy regime: political leadership, structures and processes

6.3.1 Political leadership and strategic management

Day-to-day management of German foreign policy is the responsibility of the Foreign Minister and the Federal Foreign Ministry, the Auswärtiges Amt (AA). However, as in Britain where the Prime Minister predominates as head of government, in Germany the overall strategic direction of foreign policy rests with the Chancellor (Bundeskanzler/in) through the principle of Richtlinienkompetenz or ‘overall coordination and guidance’, as set out in Article 65 of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 2012a). The nature of Germany’s proportional electoral system, meanwhile, means that coalition governments are the norm, with the long-standing convention that the junior coalition partner takes the Foreign Ministry. This makes the relationship between Chancellor and Foreign Minister, a key element of any government, of particular interest as having them come from separate parties would seem to add additional complexity to the political management of foreign policy. It is further complicated by the fact that the Foreign Minister leads a large, permanent bureaucracy while a new Chancellor upon taking office will need to reconstruct their foreign policy staff within the Federal Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt). This means that historically the Foreign Minister has frequently dominated foreign policy, at least during the early years of a coalition (Paterson, 2011: 63). This can be seen, for example, in the influence exercised by Joschka Fischer during the first SPD-Green coalition, although this subsequently tailed off during the second. The exception to this, however, has been Angela Merkel, as discussed (ibid.).

One of the characteristics of post-war German foreign policy has been the relative longevity in office of its foreign ministers, leading to a
strong level of continuity and political stability. Consequently, how the relationship between Chancellor and Foreign Minister works, depends on the degree of interest taken by the former in foreign policy and particularly EU-related issues. For example, Helmut Schmidt (1974-82) was particularly concerned with European Monetary Policy, but far less so with institutional issues and so left those to Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Similarly, Schröder (1998-2005) left institutional matters to Fischer (Bulmer and Paterson, 2010: 1060), while Helmut Kohl by contrast was completely dominant “in defining what Germany should do in Europe” (Hyde-Price and Jeffrey, 2001: 697). To some extent, Chancellor Merkel has been able to emulate her predecessor and mentor in this regard, exercising considerable dominance over German policy towards Europe. Indeed, the significance of the Eurozone crisis has seen the Foreign Ministry lose influence over broader European policy in favour of the Finance Ministry and the “centralisation” of European policy-making within the Merkel’s Chancellery (Paterson, forthcoming). At the same time, so dominant has Mrs Merkel become that her Foreign Minister has been described as “missing in action” (Paterson, forthcoming).

This highlights the extent to which Chancellors are now interested in the “high politics” aspects of foreign policy – not least the continuous high-level summitry that is a hallmark of modern international relations (e.g. Dunn, 2004). As noted, this has partly been driven by the regular

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232 Frank-Walter Steinmeier held the post in the CDU-led ‘Grand Coalition’ from 2005 to 2009. His predecessor, Joschka Fischer, served for seven years during both of Gerhard Schröder’s SDP-led coalitions (1998-2005). Germany’s longest-serving post-war foreign minister was Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Free Democrats (FDP), who led the ministry from 1974 until 1992. Genscher served under both Social Democrat Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974-82) and from 1982 his Christian Democrat successor Helmut Kohl, with the exception of a two-week period from 17 September to 1 October 1982. During this time Schmidt served as his own caretaker foreign minister after Genscher’s FDP switched their support to Kohl’s CDU, enabling the latter to form a new coalition government.

233 Schmidt also suggested that he was free to devote only 10% of his time to foreign affairs because of the other demands on his time (Paterson, forthcoming).

234 Dunn states: “The growth of executive power in both general terms and in foreign policy in particular is a feature of modern politics in many countries, which
European Council meetings, along with frequent G8 and NATO summits, which together have ensured that Chancellors (and their prime ministerial and presidential peers) are seen to be taking the ‘history-making’ decisions. It also demonstrates how Chancellors – like most heads of government – will usually grow into the international aspects of their role as their administration progresses and they understand better the most important issues and relationships that impact on the state. For example, Fischer was far less influential in the second Red-Green Coalition (2002-5) largely because Chancellor Schröder had by then “learned the ropes” and deliberately taken charge of key relationships with Paris, Washington, Moscow, etc (Grant, 2005: 3). How successful he was is another question. For example, his unsuccessful efforts with President Chirac of France to have the EU arms embargo on China lifted succeeded in creating anger across the US political divide, leaving the impression that “commerce not principle” was driving EU foreign policy (ibid), and further undermining his position in Washington. By contrast, and as noted, upon taking office Angela Merkel was immediately thrust into the centre of German foreign policy with the Presidencies of the European Council and G8, although this seemed to suit her. One AA official declared that she “loves dealing with international affairs…she loves dealings and wheelings (sic)…she knows she’s good at it. She gets good marks in the press for that and where does that leave the Foreign Minister?” (GO3)

Beyond this central ministerial relationship, there have been two other elements to the relative continuity and stability within German foreign policy since unification. The first has been a significant degree of cross-party consensus in favour of European integration and the CFSP on the one hand (e.g. Derlien, 2000), and a transatlantic security relationship based around NATO on the other. The second has been the generally pro-integration attitude of the public which Bulmer and Paterson (2010:

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235 For example, in a speech in 2009, Chancellor Merkel declared that NATO “is and will continue to be the crucial corner-stone of our collective defense” (Merkel, 2009).
describe as a “permissive consensus”, although they also note that this has become increasingly fragile in recent years, even if it does remain above average for the EU-27. And even if the German ‘love affair’ with Europe may be waning among the citizenry, an elite consensus, particularly among politicians and officials, remains broadly supportive of integration, and the CFSP and NATO as the key components of Germany’s foreign policy. This is reflected in how the wider political goals of German foreign policy are set out, for example in official government documents and discourse, as well as in the comments of the officials involved. One, GO4, stated that:

“German foreign policy is based on a large, domestic consensus on the EU politically, [creating] a very high degree of continuity and predictability if governments change. German foreign policy is always defined through Europe.”

The centrality of Europe to German foreign policy is explicit in official discourse. The AA declares that Europe “is the foundation of Germany’s foreign policy” (AA, 2012e), while the Federal Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung) (BMVg) 2006 White Book declares that Germany’s concept of security is “comprehensive… forward-looking and multilateral” with its political goal being to “strengthen the [EU] as the core area of European security” (BMVg, 2006: 6, 33). Similarly, the Defence Policy Guidelines of May 2011 declare that the UN, NATO and the EU together form the “international framework of our security and defence policy” (BMVg, 2011: 5). In describing the different elements of German foreign policy, one AA official located them clearly within its European and international commitments, using the analogy of concentric circles. Thus, a first EU/CFSP circle sits inside a second, wider NATO circle inside a third representing other multilateral institutions including the UN and the Security Council. This he contrasts with the efforts by the French and British to compartmentalise and separate their different commitments,

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particularly to the UN Security Council and the EU (GO3). Such comments echo those quoted at the start of the chapter who emphasise the centrality of the EU and especially the CFSP to German foreign policy. For some, though, grandiloquent sentiments regarding German multilateralism need to be contrasted with the resources it is willing to commit in support of its goals. Thus, Ischinger (2012: 47) is highly critical of the “modest” level of ambition expressed in the Defence Policy Guidelines and the general lack of attention he believes the government and officials pay to military issues.
6.3.2 Structures and processes

Domestically, the Chancellery, AA and BMVg form the core network of ministries involved with foreign policy and particularly the CFSP and ESDP/CSDP. Increasingly, efforts are also being made to improve the ability of the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Economic Cooperation and Development to make inputs into the policy process. Reflecting the growing “nexus” between security and development, this implies recognition in Berlin that improved coordination is required, even if in practice there still remains “less of a need” for this in foreign and security policy because fewer ministries are involved (GO1). At the same time, the Finance Ministry has become an increasingly important interlocutor given the on-going ‘resources crunch’ and the centrality of funding to foreign policy (GO3). All this reflects what GO4 sees as a constant effort “to improve things”. Prior to the CFSP, such coordination structures barely existed between the different German ministries whereas today, “even if it looks slow from the outside”, structures within the AA, BMVg, as well as the Interior and Justice ministries, have been changed. One example of this, GO4 notes the increased “need for lawyers and judges for legal missions”. More striking, as noted above, has been the increasing centralisation of decision-making over foreign policy – particularly foreign economic policy – within the Chancellery (Paterson, forthcoming). Not only does this reflect the significance attached by the current Chancellor to resolving the Eurozone crisis, but more broadly it suggests that Derlien’s thesis of Germany ‘failing successfully’ in terms of European policy coordination is no longer appropriate (if, indeed, it ever was). As shown in the discussion above, Chancellor Merkel’s determination to rescue the constitutional treaty process as well as the ongoing need for action to stabilise the Eurozone has resulted in the emergence of a new, central coordination machinery better able to support these aims.

238 GO1, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, November 2010.
Within the AA, responsibility for EU policy is divided between two Directorates-General. The European Directorate-General is the “hub for cultivating Germany’s bilateral relations with all other EU member states” and devises, shapes and coordinates German policy on Europe (AA, 2012b). Meanwhile, the Political Directorate-General 2 is responsible for analysing, planning, shaping and coordinating German foreign policy within the EU and more broadly, with a particular focus on European and transatlantic security (AA, 2012c). It is from here that German policy-making for the CFSP and CSDP is managed and directed. Within the Chancellery, oversight of EU foreign policy takes place within Abteilung 2 – Außen-, Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik, and Abteilung 5 – Europapolitik (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 2012b). 239 Foreign policy specialists in these departments are generally seconded from the AA for a finite time period, with the official likely to have an interest in ensuring a smooth relationship between the two ministries as he/she usually returns once the secondment is completed (GO3, GO6). 240

While the AA is significantly larger in terms of the resources and numbers of officials it dedicates to the CFSP (and foreign policy in general), the relationship with the Chancellery is not as asymmetric as might first appear. The latter is still able to deploy significant influence, particularly at the highest echelons of government as noted above, although often the Chancellor will need to make strategic choices regarding the issues to prioritise, such as Iran or policy towards China (GO5). 241 The relationship between the two is perhaps best characterised as both cooperative and competitive. GO3 described it as follows:

“[T]he Chancellery has a tiny apparatus, but they do have people concerned with foreign policy. …There is a certain competition. The

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239 These are: Department 2 – Foreign, Security and Development Policy, and Department 5, European Policy.
240 GO6, Federal Foreign Ministry, Berlin, April 2012. For example, the current head of Außen- and Sicherheitspolitik in Abteilung 2 was formerly European Correspondent within the AA.
Chancellor meeting with Medvedev or Putin or, say, Obama, obviously that’s a different level with which we cannot compete. But we prepare all the paperwork for the Chancellor’s office. What they make of it, we don’t see. They usually shorten it and make terrible speaking notes or something like that out of it, but the political line should be the same. And of course there’s much (sic) interaction. We telephone when we have a new idea about something, or when we do a change of direction we ask them. And of course also on their level you have telephone conferences with Paris and London: Downing Street and not the FCO; and Elysee and not the Quai d’Orsay.” (GO3)

Meanwhile, GO5 emphasised the need for the Chancellery to focus on strategic issues rather than more detailed policy:

“[P]olicy formulation honestly is a matter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs… Obviously we have to harmonize our views, particularly with the Chancellery. But again the Chancellery, in spite of what is said sometimes, doesn’t have the capacity, I mean the work capacity and the filtering capacity, of really looking into the details of foreign policy…[W]hat they do and what the Chancellor herself does is to pick certain important strategic points and issues, and to decide on their direction… I would say, to a certain extent the Iran dossier is one…and perhaps policy towards Russia…and certain aspects of our policy towards China.”

The Chancellery may also become involved if an issue agreed at the highest political level, for example between the Chancellor and another head of government, subsequently reappears as a problem at the working group or Council level (GO1). However, there remains the possibility of tensions between the Chancellery and AA on substantive issues of policy which can be exacerbated by the different outlooks the two may have. For example, on the issue of policy towards Iran (see Chapter 7), one senior Brussels diplomat noted a “split”, with the AA taking a far broader or flexible perspective:

“[T]his is not surprising because the psychological thing is if you work in a foreign ministry and you know that you have to cooperate with other countries on many things, you cannot isolate one thing. You are always inclined to be more cooperative than if you are in the Chancellery and you don’t have so many foreign policy issues and most of the cooperation is on economic issues or other things.” (EU6)

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242 EU6, European External Action Service, Brussels, April 2012.
Like Britain, the AA officials central to policy-making are the Political Director, who is the overall head of PDG2 as well as being the chief advisor to the Foreign Minister, and the European Correspondent who is the “accessory” to the Political Director (GO3). The Correspondent directs work on the CFSP in Berlin and in Brussels, and is the focal point for coordination within the broader national foreign policy structures dealing with CFSP. As such, he/she passes CFSP–related instructions to Germany’s Permanent Representation in Brussels, including to the PSC Ambassador, and prepares for the Foreign Affairs Council (GO1, GO4), demonstrating that since Maastricht the AA has been “substantively in charge of” German inputs into the CFSP (Derlien, 2000: 70). Within the AA, the division of labour is clearly expressed, with the staff in the Permanent Representation the negotiators, while Berlin determines the parameters of what they can negotiate, including where any ‘red lines’ may be (GO3, GO4). However, during the 2008 German Presidency, this separation was relaxed somewhat, with Berlin providing framework instructions but leaving it up to the officials in Brussels to work out the details. Normally, however, they are given “a line to take, points to make and background” (GO4), although some Brussels-based officials see the boundary as less clear-cut (see below).

For the PSC, as the key CFSP arena in Brussels, a formalised, routinised process of agreeing and communicating instructions exists. The guiding principle for policy-making in Berlin is to always have a position on any given issue, thus emulating both Britain and France. As GO3 put it “with our economic connections to all corners of the world, we are always concerned”, and this they try to reflect in the instructions transmitted to Brussels. With the PSC meeting twice per week, this requires instructions to have been agreed in the capital among the

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243 The current Political Director, appointed in June 2011, served previously as Germany’s Ambassador to the PSC (AA, 2011f).
244 He contrasts this with the Italians, for example, whom he suggests are more inclined to “follow the stream” with solid instructions provided on important issues but with the Italian Permanent Representation left to work out which way the stream is going.
relevant ministries, signed off by the Political Director and then transmitted the night before a meeting (GO1, GO3). Following each PSC session, a report is then received in Berlin usually by midnight the same day. This gives feedback on how particular German positions were received by partner states, and the direction of travel in the discussions and is made available to all those in Berlin responsible for formulating the original instructions (GO3). If the matter relates to a CSDP crisis management mission, instructions must also be agreed with the BMVg first, as well as the Ministry of Finance if there are cost implications, and more widely as required. In such situations, the policy lead is usually taken by the relevant desk or regional officer, with the CSDP unit in the AA providing technical details. Once a formal request has been made by the PSC for a crisis management concept, following a recommendation from a particular PSC working group, the domestic lead in Berlin then transfers from the desk/regional officer to the CSDP unit who advise accordingly (GO4).

While the process of instructing the PSC is “very strictly formalised”, at the level of working groups it is less so, with individual country/thematic desks working more directly on their respective dossiers with their PermRep colleagues. These in turn provide Berlin with feedback in a permanent and continuous reporting procedure, and can recommend a change in policy if and when necessary (GO4). Being informed about and able to comment on papers that come from other states is a crucial aspect of this. Thus, GO4 emphasises the importance of a speedy response time: “We will always read a paper and give instructions…whenever it comes in – even if it is 7pm the evening before”. An example of the close working relationships between Berlin and Brussels is the AA’s Africa division which feeds the relevant CFSP working groups with instructions as required. This means that officials in Berlin are able to establish “close and direct links” to their colleagues in

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245 GO4 contrasted the dynamism of EU processes with those of NATO. While similar, the latter are much more formalised, reflecting in his view the “much more advanced” dynamics at work between EU members.
Brussels, with “immediate desk-to-desk communication, or even session-to-desk communication” (GO5). At the same time, where officials report regularly, there is an expectation that instructions will be “along those lines” suggested, while PermRep desk officers are encouraged to communicate with Berlin as soon as they have an agenda for a meeting in order to “impress our ideas” on the consequent instructions (GO1). The same official noted that despite the injunction that Berlin has a position on everything, however, there were many occasions when he had none for his particular working group, in which case he “had to go [his] own way” (GO1).

Finally, where an issue or region requires it, a dedicated task force can be created to support inter-ministry policy-making and coordination, although one senior official noted that creating such a group is “reasonably rare” (GO5). For example, in August 2012 Task Force Syria was established by the AA to coordinate all measures being taken across the government in relation to the Syrian crisis (AA, 2012g). A similar task force was created to coordinate policy towards Sudan prior to the country’s division in 2011, in particular to enable more effective participation by the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, which GO5 noted had been somewhat laggard in contributing up to that point. The creation of the Sudan Task Force went some way to resolving this, in turn removing the need to formally involve the Chancellery and thereby providing “a polite and face-saving” way forward (GO5). It also indicates a desire on the part of the AA to maintain its central role in coordinating CFSP inputs and avoid involving the Chancellery as far as possible.

The domestic coordination of policy-making and agreeing of instructions can be onerous and places considerable demands on all national systems, and Berlin is no exception. GO2 suggests that the process has become more complicated, particularly since the establishment of the PSC in 2001, although he notes that complexity “has
always been there”. However, as he goes on to explain, the key point is that the whole system is geared to one, clear purpose:

“[T]here is just one official position… This is, I think, the answer that our system gives to all this complexity… the strength of it only becomes evident when you think about the complexity and the very many different layers involved. The good thing about the instruction is if, on the basis of that, you decide something, then nobody at home can complain anymore. They’ve all agreed to it.” (GO2)

Consequently, the Permanent Representation plays a central role in how Germany coordinates and pursues policy in Brussels. As Kassim and Peters (2001: 298) have argued, governments in general will respond to initiatives in Brussels in the context of what is negotiable; the role of the Permanent Representation is therefore to make sure domestic ministries understand what is realistic in this context. In the German system, which is characterised by more autonomous line ministries than in France or Britain, and both horizontal and vertical fragmentation within the administrative system more broadly, the PermRep’s role in the formation of policy becomes even more important (ibid: 334).

For example, GO1 noted that the PermRep can be in a position to identify stakeholders in a particular issue that may not yet be recognised as such in Berlin. An illustration is the greater focus on internal security since Lisbon, which has included the creation of a new standing committee in Justice and Home Affairs to be the equivalent of the PSC.246 The increasing linkage between internal and external security has meant that ahead of their Berlin colleagues, PermRep officials have begun discussing security matters internally with their Interior Ministry colleagues with a view, for example, to future policing missions that would be decided initially within the PSC (GO1). Close cooperation with officials seconded to the PermRep from other ministries is also important. For example, discussions with BMVg officials working in Brussels can identify issues that may not have been raised between the two ministries in Berlin, and the AA can then be quietly made aware of the need to

246 The Committee of Internal Security or COSI.
coordinate better domestically before issuing instructions (GO1). Finally, GO2 argues that the PermRep has the advantage of being able to bring together officials within a “PSC team” with operational, financial, legal and regional expertise who are able to work together to develop policy comprehensively and “in a sound way”.

The policy-making process is also underpinned by the interaction between the member states. There are frequent formal and informal contacts between the national capitals at foreign, defence and chancellery level, and particularly between Germany, Britain and France (GO1, GO3, GO4, GO6). For example, a *Franco-German Security Policy Council* meets twice a year at ministerial and political director level and a Security Policy Directors meeting involving all three states meets 1-2 times per year (GO4). More generally, as well as the regular *Gymnich* sessions and meetings on the fringes at the UN each September, within the AA it is considered “a necessity” for the European Correspondent to speak regularly to French and British colleagues (GO3). The establishment of these personal relationships can prove very important, enabling the Correspondent to “just pick up the phone” if confronting difficulties on a particular issue (GO3). Consultation also takes place using ‘non-papers’. This technique is commonly employed within German administrations to float policy ideas or place issues on the agenda while circumventing strict rules on legislative scrutiny. There is a legal requirement on all ministries to inform the *Bundestag* about any official papers or opinions (GO6), including the agreement of agendas for the Foreign Affairs Council (EU3), and as such it is a time-consuming process that also makes it harder to have policy discussions before arriving at a formal position. Instead, therefore, the AA will produce a non-paper on an issue it wishes to discuss before circulating this domestically or among partner states to gauge opinion or move the policy discussion forward (discussed below). Indeed, OMS1 recalled having

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247 Such requirements also exist in Denmark and The Netherlands.
received a number of non-papers from German officials on a range of issues within her working group.

The network of contacts established by PermRep officials is also a vital source of informal interaction, information gathering, testing of ideas etc. GO2 emphasised the importance of this “informal track” to decision-making, noting that “the more people you talk with the better, in all directions – other member states, inside the PermRep, with capitals, also with other ministries”. For example, within the RELEX group, responsible for drafting the legal instruments for sanctions once the PSC has taken the political decision, formal meetings can take place regularly – in the case of Iran they were held five days a week at times – and are supplemented by frequent telephone and email contacts.\(^{248}\) The officials involved thus get to know and understand each other’s positions extremely well (echoing Lewis’s findings on COREPER) – and indeed, on the more complex issues it is impossible for them to rely purely on using formal meetings to find agreement. Rather, it is in the informal exchanges where movement can be made and agreement reached, with ideas often floated here before being formally proposed to capitals (GO2).

Although there may be those in the AA who would contest the assertion that “most matter-of-fact foreign policy” is now being made in Brussels (GO1), the fact remains that the PSC and its supporting structures have become crucial arenas for decision-making and therefore place German PermRep officials at the heart of their national policy discussions.

There are, though, some criticisms of how the German system functions. For example, GO1 suggested that “despite prejudice we are badly organised and we don’t prepare things properly”. He also contrasted the relative lack of flexibility in the German system with that in Britain. Thus, while UKREP, as noted, has relatively senior and

\(^{248}\) While the PSC can task the PMG or CIVCOM to focus on particular issues, it can only invite RELEX to draft a mandate on sanctions as the latter remains answerable to COREPER II rather than the PSC – “a nuance but it is nonetheless important”. EU4, DG RELEX, European Commission, Brussels, 12 November 2010.
experienced diplomats dedicated specifically to trouble-shooting rather than having a specific working group responsibility, the German PermRep lacks such freedom over where to focus its expertise. At the same time, GO1 believes that Germany does not take leadership positions commensurate with the country’s size and foreign policy importance, something he feels is particularly problematic given that other countries often expect it to lead (see below). Indeed, although German PermRep officials may well receive instructions on nearly every issue, he is critical of what they demand – or fail to demand:

“[W]hat we usually do is, we sit in the meeting and our instructions say “listen carefully to the others and what they want”, and then we decide what we want, which is completely absurd…we are one of the very few delegations who get instructions on every and each point but very often our instructions are dilatory. They are null…I’m not sure whether the Brits receive instructions on each and every point. Probably not. But they don’t say anything. I mean, embarrassingly enough we actually say what we have in the instructions, which is sometimes null.” (GO1) (interviewee’s emphasis)

There can also be significant differences in perspective depending on whether an official is capital- or Brussels-based, something that affects all member states. Thus while many AA officials, particularly younger ones, will have had direct experience during their career of working in the Brussels environment, this is not always the case. And even for those who have, there may be different understandings of the priorities or approaches to take. For example, EU1, a German official seconded to the Council Secretariat, contrasted the understanding of its role among PermRep officials with the lack of awareness of its existence in Berlin. In describing the 2008 Presidency, she noted how few officials were aware of what it did or of how policy-making in Brussels functioned:

“I had the impression that when we started the Presidency for example, nobody…had a clue what the Secretariat is…[F]or the people here in the Permanent Representation, of course it’s normal. They know that the Secretariat exists … But this also gives you an example on how much capitals know what’s really going on in Brussels. Because they get the reports of course, but if these people have never been to Brussels, then they don’t know how Brussels is working…If you don’t have this background, then you don’t know…and then it’s really difficult sometimes to judge what’s going on, because there is a special
dynamic here, and if you don’t know about it, then in capital you just write down your instructions. But I don’t think everybody’s always aware that this is maybe unrealistic.” (EU1)

She makes the point that this can often be down to the age of many of the heads of unit involved. Usually they are 45-50 years old and will not have been to Brussels in the early parts of their career in contrast to their peers in the UK, for example. Efforts are being made to change the German system, though, with it now being normal for younger AA officials to have a posting to Brussels (EU1).

The picture that emerges is of a system attempting to achieve a policy-making and coordination ambition commensurate with the country’s size and potential influence. Policy-making is dominated by the AA on the basis of its extensive expertise and the detailed and exclusive focus it is able to give to the CFSP. However, this does not prevent the Chancellor from intervening in more strategic issues, or dominating ‘history-making’ encounters at European Council meetings and summits. Other ministries are also being encouraged to feed into the policy-making process more effectively, and the creation of ad hoc task groups implies an understanding of the need for flexibility in the system to facilitate this, but also a determination on the part of the AA to retain overall control of the policy-making and coordination process as far as possible. Within the AA there is a hierarchy not dissimilar to that in Britain, with clear lines and formal processes of reporting. This is underpinned by a less formalised network of continuous interactions between Berlin-based desk officers and their Brussels colleagues which suggests a more flexible and fluid approach to the day-to-day business of feeding into the CFSP, particularly at working group level. Overall, both internally and among partner states, there is an expectation that Germany will be in a position to respond in any given situation. However, in practice the fact that instructions received by the PermRep in Brussels are on occasion vague or lacking in detail indicates that the system in Berlin is unable to react as quickly to the demands placed on it as it might hope.

EU1, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 8 November 2010.

249 EU1, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 8 November 2010.
6.4 How Germany engages with the CFSP: Emergent or “Accidental” Leadership

Under the Bonn Republic, Germany avoided either an explicit leadership role in foreign and security policy or, perhaps more importantly, the risk of isolation. However, its ‘emancipation’ as a consequence particularly of Kosovo and Afghanistan, along with its refusal to participate in the Iraq War or campaign in Libya, has brought it to a point where, although not explicitly seeking a leadership role, neither will it avoid one. It therefore finds itself increasingly in a position of emergent or “accidental” leadership in foreign and security policy (to some extent mirroring its more natural leadership in economic matters), with this being the logical next step in the trajectory of change mapped out above. Indeed, it seems to be a response to what one official identified in 1997 as the need for a normalised German foreign policy to be less reliant on partners and “more self-confident in the formulation of German interests” (Aggestam, 2000: 71). More than a decade on, while emphasis continues to be placed on the need for partners, it is also displaying a greater self-confidence in foreign and security policy.

This represents an interesting challenge to the idea of Germany as a state uncomfortable or unwilling to pursue national interests in a policy area that has historically been very sensitive both domestically and to its neighbours. The constructivist analysis outlined above would seem very well-suited to explaining how Germany approaches the CFSP (and foreign policy-making more broadly), locating its positions and interests in the language of common and shared values and emphasising the transformation that has taken place since 1945 – as very much a state that was reconstructed and reconstructed itself around a new, multilateral and civilian identity and role conception. Equally as much as the EU was historically intended to ‘contain’ any dangerous future expression of

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250 This is one of four aspects of a normalised German foreign policy identified. The others were: the need to take on greater international responsibilities; assure neighbours of good relations; and affirm that there would be no repeat of the past (Aggestam, 2000: 71).
German ambition, equally it is a system – as Bulmer et al. (2000) have argued – which reflects German concerns and priorities. Indeed, upon closer inspection we can discern a far more rationalist approach within German foreign policy-making in the CFSP than is often assumed. It is perfectly willing to pursue national preferences, and determinedly so. Moreover, in doing so its younger diplomats feel it is acting no differently from either the UK or France:

“…France and the UK view the EU as a vehicle to follow their political goals…and that’s what we get now criticised for, that now reunification is fulfilled and Germany has a prime weight inside the [EU], is Germany now following its own interests? Hey, we’re just doing what France and the UK have been doing all along… The younger generation now…[they] say, ‘well we’re all here to follow our interests and become basically as France and the UK have been…”.” (GO3)

The difference, therefore, lies in how it goes about this – i.e. multilateralist, never isolated, prioritising civilian means, emphasising human rights, etc.251

German leadership within the CFSP manifests itself through four inter-linked and co-existing forms and it is through these that its behaviour within the CFSP is examined here. The first is the notion of shared leadership, whereby Germany works in conjunction with others to achieve or promote particular objectives. The second is leadership through example, whereby Germany behaves as a focal point or hub, particularly (but not exclusively) for smaller states seeking to align their foreign policy positions with it, often as an alternative to France or Britain. The third is leadership through mediation, whereby it acts as a bridge, again primarily between France and Britain. The final form is direct leadership, whereby when there is no other choice Germany will act explicitly in defence of its own foreign and security policy interests. It is important to note, though, that the Zivilmacht role conception and preference for multilateralist approaches remain central to its foreign

251 It should be emphasised that no member state likes or seeks to be isolated – “this is a ‘red line’ for all”. EU5, DG RELEX, European Commission, Brussels, 31 March 2010.
policy-making, particularly for crisis management operations in the CSDP which may involve the use of military instruments.
6.4.1 Shared Leadership

An important practical aspect of EU foreign and security policy, referenced by interviewees from both states, is the obvious need for members to cooperate if they are to make their voices heard and protect and promote their interests globally. GO3, for example, stated that “all European partners know full well that by themselves they’re not strong enough”. The question, therefore, is the degree to which an individual member state is able to set the direction of travel on a particular issue. For Germany, shared leadership is the preferred approach (as it is to the achievement of its EU policy goals more generally). Thus, GO4 reflects what remains an instinctive multilateralism: “No initiative can be successful if Germany alone presents it – we need partners”. GO6, meanwhile, suggests that “it’s always better if there are two big countries making a proposal”.

The bilateral relationship with France is the clearest exemplar of this and for many years has been one of the primary drivers of integration. Indeed, under Chancellors Schmidt and then Kohl, the development of this relationship enabled Germany to progress from “follower to co-leader” in action if not in name (Paterson, 2010: 44). (An interesting corollary to this is the suggestion by Hans Stark (2006: 120) that the French have traditionally tended to over-estimate German power, while Germany has underestimated theirs, and as a consequence the French “attach greater importance” to the relationship than their neighbours.) But although the Franco-German relationship has involved close cooperation in the economic field, it has been less close in security and defence. In part, this comes from a different basic attitude towards the purpose of the EU and CFSP, characterised as follows:

“France wants Europe as a vehicle for their own national interest and…glory, and we want Europe as a safe haven and a stable and prosperous community which gives us the chance to do our business with all these countries and make money. So, that’s basically a different outlook.” (GO3)
As Aggestam (2000: 76) notes, a number of more specific factors have contributed to this, including France’s withdrawal in 1966 from NATO’s military structures. Most notable, though, has been the opening up of a clear division in their strategic priorities since the end of the Cold War. Thus, while for France the Mediterranean and Francophone Africa have been of principal interest, Germany has prioritised relations with its eastern neighbours and the stabilisation of the European neighbourhood (ibid). GO1 believes, for example, that Eastern European states would be more likely to gravitate towards Germany: “A lot of Eastern Europe, of new member states, they would seek our advice and they would come to us. I assume more so than to France or to [the] UK.” Similarly, EU1 emphasised Germany’s interest in Eastern Europe. Thus, while France remains “for historic reasons our major partner” (GO3), there is clear evidence of Germany’s more eastward focus. A good example is in how it has traditionally approached the state holding the rotating Council Presidency:

“We would always try to find out where does the Presidency sit…for instance with the Czech Presidency it was an easy half-year for us because in so many topics we are very close. Swedish, less so, but nevertheless. And then you have the Spanish, where there is a sort of traditional coalition perhaps with Mediterranean or Southern countries…you knew there would be differences… Whereas with the Czechs or with the Belgians, Hungarian, Poles coming up, that’s close to us so we would always try to be close and we did jointly things with them now before we come into the Presidency in order to build on that for later on.” (GO1) (emphasis added)

One of the most important eastern channels of ‘shared leadership’ is the relationship with Poland. For Germany, Poland’s role in the East is “analogous” to that of France in the West (Frasch, 2009: 2), a sentiment also expressed by Foreign Minister Westerwelle: “I’d like to see relations with Poland reaching the level achieved between Germans and the French…That’s why my very first trip as Foreign Minister took me to Warsaw” (2010a). As with France, German-Polish relations have great historical significance, placing them in a much broader context that the CFSP. This is emphasised, for example, by symbolic events such as the joint cabinet meeting chaired by Chancellor Merkel and Polish Prime
Minister Donald Tusk on the 20th anniversary of the 1991 German-Polish Treaty, and by the joint interview given by Westerwelle and his Polish counterpart Radek Sikorski to the Tagesspiegel on 5 November 2010 (AA, 2012i; 2010d). Equally, again as with France, when Germany and Poland disagree this can have a deleterious effect on EU policy-making, as has occurred in budget negotiations for example (Bendiek 2008: 3).

These bilateral links have been augmented by the so-called Weimar Triangle, which brings together Germany, Poland and France in a regular ‘trialogue’ to create “a forum of equal partners at the heart of Europe” (AA, 2012e). This illustrates Bendiek’s argument that both countries are “of the utmost importance” to how Germany formulates its foreign and security policy (2008: 1). Consequently, while its remit takes in a range of matters, including economics, the Weimar Triangle has enabled Germany to share leadership with Poland on a number of foreign policy initiatives intended to end what it sees as historic east-west divisions, for example through the Eastern Partnership, the eastern component of the European Neighbourhood Programme (ENP) (ibid). More broadly, trilateral cooperation and coordination through the Weimar grouping also supports the promotion of their respective national interests at EU level, and the setting of policy agendas (Bendiek, 2008: 3). Together, they can form an influential ‘core’ group which Bendiek believes is “indispensable” to finding solutions to the range of issues currently on the EU’s security policy agenda (ibid).

The importance of Poland and the Weimar format to Germany’s ability to lead in the CFSP was highlighted by several officials. For 252 Jutta Frasch emphasises the particular importance to German-Polish relations of “symbols, gestures and serious expressions of commitment” (2009: 3). Westerwelle and Sikorski (2012) also wrote a joint article in the New York Times entitled ‘A New Vision of Europe’ and published on 17 September 2012. 253 First established in 1991 by German Foreign Minister Genscher and his French and Polish counterparts, Roland Dumas and Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the Weimar Triangle format is designed to facilitate annual consultations between the three states on issues of European policy, although it has been hampered at various times by tensions between them (Bendiek, 2008).
example, GO3 emphasised the positive impact the grouping has had in terms of policy inputs:

“[It] actually has been quite fruitful... One such initiative just recently has been the CSDP where we make suggestions as to how to increase the capabilities of the EU. This was born inside the Weimar Triangle, and from there it was presented to the wider forum of the EU partners, but not as a fait accompli... as a proposal.”

Similarly, GO1 suggests that Germany and Poland are quite close “in a lot of topics”. In seeking to explain this, GO4 suggests that a shift in recent years in Warsaw’s traditionally Atlanticist alignment to a more “European” perspective has been important – as a result, Poland “has triggered some ideas”, particularly regarding the CSDP. These have involved proposals to strengthen the CSDP through the creation of a permanent civil-military EU headquarters for crisis management (GO1, GO4) (Major, 2010). They have also formed part of an ambitious agenda presented by Poland for its 2011 Council Presidency, where it prioritised the development of CSDP in order to improve the EU’s crisis response capabilities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011: 14). As Major and Wassenberg (2011: 1) note, the agenda was drawn up “in close consultation with France and Germany”, and set out in a letter from the Weimar group which was subsequently accepted by the Foreign Affairs Council in January 2011 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011: 14).

The most influential leadership partners for Germany remain Britain and France, and where Germany has been able to cooperate with both it has arguably been able to demonstrate shared leadership – and therefore exercised influence – most effectively. As noted, the three have launched a number of joint initiatives that have been significant in shaping the direction of both the CFSP and ESDP/CSDP from the outset. For example, using its Council Presidency in the first semester of 1999, Germany was instrumental in the establishment of the ESDP following St Malo – although, as GO4 notes, it was operating somewhat in “reactive mode” to this initial impetus. Perhaps the most high-profile cooperation currently is the E3+3 negotiation process with Iran (discussed in Chapter
Several officials made the point that where they are able to act in concert, their ability to achieve particular policy outcomes is greatly enhanced. GO3 stressed that “if the three decided on something, and really want badly to have it, then there’s quite a leverage…[to] push something through”. Similarly, GO4 declared that “if the Big 3 can agree the chances of success are very high”. However, fears they might create a so-called Directoire that would dominate the CFSP are somewhat misplaced:

“It’s easier to agree with one partner than with two partners at the same time, especially if it’s partners of the same big level. I think it’s easier to find agreement with Luxembourg on some issue, but France and Britain is rare, actually.” (GO3)

OMS1 supported this, suggesting that where the three are able to agree, they work well together, noting in particular their cooperation on Iran.

Underpinning this cooperation is the intense and frequent contact that has become the norm across their foreign and defence ministries, as well as at the highest government levels. As noted earlier, there are institutionalised and semi-institutionalised formats for their interaction, including the Franco-German Security Policy Council, and the security policy directors meeting involving all three (GO4). Moreover, GO4 noted that when a CSDP issue is particularly urgent, he can be in contact with his French and British counterparts several times a day. More generally, he suggests that while “the geometry is mixed” depending on the issue – for example, Italy, Poland and Spain may also be important actors – Britain and France are “constant partners”. Perhaps the most obvious expression of this can be seen in how they have supported each other’s Presidencies. For example, GO1 noted the intense efforts between the three prior to the French Presidency in the 2\(^{nd}\) semester of 2008:

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254 For example, Westerwelle and Defence Minister Thomas de Maizière met their French counterparts on 1 October 2012 to discuss a range of issues including the situation in the Middle East, the ‘Arab Spring’, and the future development of the CFSP (see AA, 2012q).
“[I]n CFSP in general, we would be close to France and the UK and you could see that during the French Presidency or before... The French had a strong interest in being successful, obviously. Therefore a lot [of] things were prepared among the three at foreign ministry, at chancellery level, between capitals, before the French Presidency in order to try to guarantee success…”

The ESDP/CSDP provides a number of instances of how the three have cooperated successfully to provide leadership on a particular issue or initiative. For example, the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the creation of EU battlegroups were two important steps in its initial operationalisation, while more recently they cooperated on the inclusion of a mechanism for Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (PSCD) within Lisbon (see Chapter 3). The battlegroup concept came about as a consequence of the successful deployment of a small EU force in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 (Operation Artemis). This joint initiative was designed to create relatively small but easily deployable and autonomous rapid reaction forces for use in crisis management operations (Consilium, 2009d). Underlying this aim was the shared belief that the EU needed to improve its effectiveness in this area, so the development of battlegroups was considered essential both to increase the numbers of deployable troops available for such operations, but also as a tool for the broader goal of national force transformation as the key to greater overall European capabilities, something Britain was particularly keen to achieve (UKO5). It was these objectives that lay at the heart of the original paper submitted jointly by the three in 2004 which was subsequently adopted by all member states and incorporated into the EU’s ‘Headline Goal 2010’ (Consilium, 2009d).255 Similarly, the initiatives that led to the launching of the EDA and the PSCD mechanism reflected positions shared and then agreed by the three.

Taken together, these examples illustrate how Germany enacts its preference for working with partners when promoting particular initiatives or policy goals within CFSP and ESDP/CSDP. As well as

255 Interview with Dr Claudia Major, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, January 2011.
reflecting the practicalities of operating in a consensual system – i.e. the need to develop alliances with like-minded states etc – this also sits well within a German role conception based around multilateral approaches to foreign policy-making. But while the strategy and methods employed place a premium on sharing leadership, the goal is to use that leadership to achieve outcomes that satisfy German interests and upload these to the European level.
6.4.2 Leadership by example

This second type sees Germany acting – or seeking to act as – a “hub” around which other states, normally but not exclusively smaller, will coalesce with an expectation of and desire for German leadership on a particular issue or policy area. GO1 described this expectation as follows:

“You will find easily, and that’s really easily, fifteen or a dozen member states who come up to us in every meeting basically and ask: “what do you think about it because we would like to think the same way you do.” They’re looking for leadership, and we don’t provide this necessarily all the time…For instance our PSC ambassador at the moment, he’s a great Russia expert… Whatever he says in the PSC on Russia, you will find easily a lot of people, also from bigger member states who say, “that’s correct”.” (GO1’s emphasis)

This reflects some interesting features both about the structural reality of operating within the CFSP, and of the role conception German officials assign their country in this arena. As discussed above, for many states, and particularly the smaller, there are clear resource issues inhibiting their ability to participate fully in the CFSP and CSDP’s numerous working groups and committees (see also Dryburgh, 2010: 70). Being comparatively resource-rich particularly in terms of personnel and access to information, Germany, like France and Britain, seeks to ensure its views and perspectives are fully represented and articulated across all policy and issue areas.

That Germany may sometimes be less effective at this than the other two has been noted. At the same time, it is viewed – and perhaps more importantly seems to view itself – as representing an alternative centre of gravity to the others, holding positions that are generally considered as more mainstream and less extreme (GO3), thereby making them easier for other states to align with. This is allied with a sense of responsibility to protect the interests of smaller states, something that it also sets out to do in other policy areas, and which GO3 considers a “trademark” of German foreign policy. As Bulmer and Paterson (2010: 1058) have noted, in its European policy more broadly Germany’s
“strong pro-European credentials” have been important in enabling it to upload its preferences in other policy areas because it has been perceived as less threatening by its fellow member states. This reflection of its more mainstream positioning was highlighted as follows:

“[A]t the beginning of the Belgian Presidency the Belgians came to us and said, “well, like it or not but we tend to follow rather your lead than the UK or French...because they have extreme positions and you, Germany, are more mainstream and you’re also taking into consideration the positions of smaller countries, so we’re very much leaning on you...” [T]hat comes through as a motive for many, especially the Eastern Europeans who wouldn’t say “oh, Germany is the greatest”, but they tend to discover and state for themselves “…basically we can sort of align our foreign policy positions rather with the German position”...for pragmatic reasons...[T]hey recognise there are possibly three centres of gravity inside the EU, [so] which is the one that actually takes on board our national interests as a Baltic state or as Slovakia, or something like that?” (GO3)

A recent example was Germany’s promotion of a ‘non-paper’ on progress in developing the new EEAS sent to the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, in December 2011. The AA’s intention was to raise a number of issues upon which Germany had concerns prior to the High Representative’s publication of her own official report, but also to demonstrate how widely shared these anxieties were. Consequently, the final document was co-signed by 11 other foreign ministers although there was disappointment later that the High Representative “did not make one single concrete suggestion...on how to improve the functioning” of the EEAS in her own report (GO6) (see Chapter 7).

A higher profile version of such leadership can be seen in the recent publication of the ‘Final Report’ by the so-called Future of Europe Group, convened by Guido Westerwelle in early 2012 as “part of the strategic debate on the future of European integration” (AA, 2012n; Reynders, 2012). The report offers recommendations on a range of issues, including “decisive steps” to be taken to augment the EU’s power

256 The other signatories were the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden.

257 The other states involved were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain (see Reynders, 2012).
as a global actor. These include strengthening the High Representative’s coordinating powers vis-à-vis other Commissioners with external action responsibilities; the operationalisation of PSCD; and the introduction of more majority voting within CFSP to “prevent one single member state from being able to obstruct initiatives” (AA, 2012m: 6-7). While the Polish Foreign Minister took a high profile in announcing the group’s conclusions, they reflect strongly views expressed at both official and ministerial level within the AA. For example, in a speech in August 2012, Westerwelle (2012d) made a number of declarations that are represented in the final report:

“[W]e need Europe to be a stronger global player. We need more cooperation, for example in external relations and with respect to the Defence and Security Policy. I know full well…that not everyone in Europe wants to go down this path. But it is absolutely obvious that we are a continent with common security interests. We are a security community. And it is therefore a matter of simple logic that greater cooperation in the ESDP could be the next tangible step…”

Similarly, the Final Report stated:

“There is a need to strengthen the [CSDP]. Our defence policy should have more ambitious goals which go beyond “pooling and sharing”. The possibilities for the Lisbon Treaty, in particular the establishment of Permanent Structured Cooperation should be implemented.” (AA, 2012m: 6)

More specifically, GO6 emphasised the German unhappiness with, and desire to reduce the disconnect between, the financial instruments the Commission has at its disposal, and the role of the High Representative and EEAS in deploying these:

“[T]here’s an Annex [in Lisbon] which states very clearly which units from which institution will be merged together to form the EAS and one of the decisive factors was financial aid, financial instruments. There’s a long Article – Article 9 – which…will tell you how difficult negotiations were and that we reached a compromise, and that we member states aren’t really happy with it. We want a revision of that in 2013 because still it’s the Commission that has the money and the

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258 This has been taken to mean the UK. See, for example, Traynor, I. (2012) ‘EU heavyweights call for radical foreign and defence policy overhaul’, The Guardian, 18 September.
Again, the *Final Report* emphasises the need to expand the authority of the High Representative and EEAS in this regard (ibid). Consequently, Germany has positioned itself as a ‘hub’ around which others can coalesce in order to promote this particular change agenda.

A final example can be seen in the approach taken by Germany since the start in 2011 of its two-year term on the UN Security Council, a role it describes as “a special responsibility it has to live up to” (AA, 2012e). This has involved adopting a very different strategy to Britain and France, which actively seek to avoid any perception of a formal linkage between their roles as P5 members and members of the EU. Instead, Germany is making a conscious effort to act as a hub for, and representative of, its European partners, declaring its role to be “self-evidently as a representative of all UN members and particularly EU member states” (AA, 2011c). GO3 described the aim thus:

“[Britain and France] do not want to be appearing to coordinate a European position...[T]hey do not want to inform partners in Brussels to the extent that these partners should not get the wrong idea that...France and the UK are obliged to take back this feedback into their work in New York, whereas we see our task differently. We actually want to play this European perspective and regularly tell our partners what we are doing, why we are doing it, and thus basically living up to a sort of a European seat.”

In this they are assisted to some extent by the fact that on certain issues the EU and Security Council agendas complement one another, for example in advancing peace and security in Africa, and particularly in Sudan (Schöndorf and Kaim, 2011: 4). Germany has also sought to promote the position of the EU itself within the UN, for example by sponsoring a 2011 resolution to give it independent speaking rights within the General Assembly (AA: 2012p: 11). However, Germany’s ability to play this role is hampered as it lacks the structural advantages of permanent Security Council membership, and by how its own efforts to secure a permanent seat may be perceived (AA, 2009b). Moreover, as
discussed, its refusal to support UN resolutions on Libya left it isolated, breaking its own long-standing rule.

Together, these examples indicate how Germany works to promote and articulate its interests and objectives by working with partners and endeavouring never to be isolated. It is also revealing as to the role conception it assigns itself, although it is important to recognise that it has not always been successful at exercising this kind of leadership. The Schröder Government was criticised, for example, for having “betrayed its role as a champion” of the smaller member states during the Iraq crisis (Overhaus, 2006: 74). Overall, though, the role of hub or ‘example state’ allows Germany to operate in a way that distinguishes it from France or Britain, and act as an alternative pole of influence. A further question is the extent to which it may see increasing opportunities for this kind of leadership. Given that the Foreign Affairs Council will from now on be chaired by the High Representative and all its supporting bodies by his/her representative, this could create even greater impetus for the smaller states in particular to seek to align themselves with a bigger ‘champion’ when seeking to push for action or change on a particular issue.
6.4.3 Leadership through mediation

While leadership through mediation might legitimately be considered as underpinning both previous forms – and indeed be seen as a subset of both – it does merit individual consideration as it highlights how for Germany acting as a mediator sits well within a role conception based around multilateralism and protecting the interests of smaller states. Germany as mediator has been explored in other contexts, for example by Adomeit (2000) in his examination of German-Russian relations. The concept of mediator – or ‘bridge’ – is particularly useful here given that EU decision-making is designed around achieving consensus, particularly in questions of foreign and security policy. Moreover, this is a policy area where two states, France and Britain, have traditionally predominated, but have also often had cause to disagree over the direction and purpose of cooperation, not least in terms of its impact on NATO and the transatlantic security alliance. As the other ‘big’ state, therefore, Germany feels itself ideally placed to play the part of balancer.

Such a role conception is reflected in several interviewee comments about how Germany acts in the CFSP. First, GO2 sets out how it prefers to be viewed by partner states, and rejects especially the idea of big states imposing their views or preferences onto smaller partners: “This is not the position that traditionally Germany would like to be seen in. This is not the picture we have – I have – of ourselves”. Similarly, GO3 declares that “we always respect the interests of smaller partners, and defend their interests, and that’s what makes us a natural mediator”. Indeed, he is clear of the centrality of the mediation role to how Germany operates in this environment: “we need to bridge gaps, we need to be mediators to play our role”. Moreover, in his opinion the manner in which policy is made in the CFSP actually facilitates and encourages this:

“[I]t brings very often into the situation where we are the mediator, where we are actually trying to be in the centre of it. …I think it’s fair to say that up until 1989 we basically followed the mainstream and we were needed sometimes to bridge gaps between extreme positions of
partners. But we’ve never been extreme in our positions at any time.” (GO3)

A refusal to adopt extreme positions again reflects the historical desire to avoid isolation and a determination to build coalitions to achieve particular outcomes. Moreover, it is a role that German representatives have played at the highest level:

“[O]bviously if you have a foreign minister who is a bully, or...who is a weakling, who never speaks up in any circumstance, you have two extremes there. And if you are somebody who is perceived as being a mediator with a good cause then obviously your position is stronger. …we have been lucky with our foreign ministers...Genscher…with a big competence and so his word really counted…[and] Fischer…” (GO3)

Two examples of leadership through mediation are offered here. The first is Germany’s role with regards to policy towards Iran. Mediation here has taken place at two levels. The first is at the strategic level within the E3+3 format by facilitating agreement between France and Britain, but with the additional complication of dealing with the United States. This has not always been straightforward:

“[W]henever we meet...we have a pre-consultation format. That is the Americans with the 3 Europeans. So there’s a 2 layer thing. So beforehand we know exactly how the others feel...and usually Germany had sort of kept the middle ground and was often able to bridge gaps or bridge differences between partners. Now, this is possibly sometimes more difficult. There’s France even harder than the US. The UK in between and it’s more difficult.” (GO3)

The other level, meanwhile, has involved German efforts at maintaining the EU-wide consensus on the sanctions regime (discussed in Chapter 7). The second example relates to the negotiations between the ‘big 3’ states in 2005 over plans for the creation of an operations centre, HQ and military staff for the ESDP. In this case, the key to any agreement lay in the ability to find a compromise between the French and British positions, and Germany found itself holding the balance. It required 18 months of negotiation “à trois” to reduce the gap between the two. Ultimately the disagreement came down to a difference in the manning levels for the HQ each considered acceptable, with France and Germany wanting a
figure of 89 and Britain 87. The French had initially wanted significantly more, while the British significantly less – although after agreement was reached, manning levels eventually rose to 130+ (GO4).

Germany has a unique position at the centre of Europe, both geographically and in terms of the integration process. Along with the financial weight it can bring to bear when necessary (discussed below), this means that its voice cannot be ignored in situations where it may hold the balance, particularly between France and Britain. What is less clear, however, is whether the ‘mediator’ role conception is so readily recognised and accepted by its partners, particularly Britain and France. For example, when asked which member states he would most often discuss CSDP-related issues with, FO1, a senior French official in Brussels highlighted his close interactions with UK officials and with others from Spain, Poland and Hungary, but made no mention of Germany. That Germany could play such a role seems clear, though.
Direct Leadership

Direct or overt leadership is the least common form and arguably the approach German foreign policy makers remain least comfortable with, particularly if it risks isolation. As noted, for Germany the natural approach involves working with partners and sharing leadership on particular initiatives. Traditionally, the Council Presidency has provided member states with a formal route for the exercise of leadership within the CFSP, although the strategic parameters set by the European Council, the need to operate within the Troika system, and latterly the changes instituted under Lisbon have all restricted the freedom to plan and set agendas. Crisis management, and particularly the need for rapid response, is one area which by its nature challenges efforts to achieve longer-term continuity, demanding (but not always getting) immediate reactions from the member states (e.g. Menon, 2008). It is perhaps unsurprising therefore that the handful of situations where Germany has been willing to give an explicit lead to achieve a particular outcome has usually involved either a specific crisis management situation or the structures created to respond in such circumstances.

In general, these situations have involved ‘red line’ issues for Germany, of which two stand out. The first is a pragmatic concern over budgets, particularly in the context of military-based CSDP missions, reflecting a greater assertiveness on the issue of expenditure more generally across the full range of EU policy areas in recent years (e.g. Grant, 2005). The second is Germany’s normative preference for civilian-based over military-based crisis response. Together, these reflect what GO4 identifies as the three key principles upon which German participation in the CFSP and CSDP is guided: the primacy of the Bundestag regarding decisions over military deployments; the separation of police from military command, and civilian and military components in crisis management; and clear rules over funding. While the defence of ‘red line’ issues can be characterised as essentially negative, necessarily involving the rejection or prevention of initiatives or proposals deemed to
cross them, Germany has demonstrated a willingness to take a stand that may isolate it when this is felt to be in the national interest. GO1 puts it as follows:

“I think if something is important for us, basically the only thing that counts is our red lines, and we would strongly fight for our position without…trying to accommodate others’ positions in those areas. I mean, you might have a main aspect and you might have a side aspect where you would be willing to give in…from the beginning, but I think our red lines would be so important…that we would stick to them.”

As an example he notes the determination of Germany to stick to the EU’s agreed policy towards Cuba, based on the 1996 Common Position which places progress towards improved human rights and greater political freedoms at the heart of EU-Cuba relations. More than a decade on, and even though unclear as to why his government maintains such a tough stance on this issue, he noted Germany’s continuing unwillingness to sanction any weakening of EU demands:

“I don’t know why it is Cuba, why we stand there so strongly, but there’s a strong red line. We have gone through from working group to PSC to Minister in Council, where the Minister says “no, no way” and where the Chancellor says “no way, we’re not moving on that”, which is interesting.” (GO1)

Similarly, the security of Israel has been non-negotiable for Germany, to the extent that Council Conclusions will be “on the comma” – i.e. the minister will defend a particular formula in Council down to the tiniest detail, something that happens very rarely given how much will have been agreed in the working groups and at the PSC (GO1).

For GO4, the operational funding of crisis management is an issue of regular concern for Germany, and one where officials “are not willing to be in a position of having to react”. Thus, while Germany remains strongly committed to the CFSP, this does not entail providing a blank cheque for its execution: “German foreign policy is always defined

through Europe...[but] because of budgetary constraints we don’t accept everything automatically”. The 2006 review during the Finnish Presidency of the Athena funding mechanism which administers common costs relating to EU military operations under ESDP/CSDP provides a prime example of this (EEAS, 2010a). Proposals were made to include intelligence in the list of items covered by common funding automaticity, which Germany feared would mean adding the cost of satellite imagery, with the potential of doubling the existing €60bn budget. Having known about what was essentially a French plan in advance, German officials promised to block them throughout the remainder of the six months, and even to raise them in the Council under their own subsequent Presidency where they could face a veto. They then tabled a counter-proposal that had been pre-negotiated with like-minded member states and which formed the basis of the ultimate agreement predicated on “cost efficiency and operational needs” (GO4).260

A second example relates to proposals to send a military mission to Côte d’Ivoire. In this case, the German preference for civilian-based crisis responses provided the impetus. Following Laurent Gbagbo’s refusal to accept the outcome of the 2010 presidential election that had seen his rival, Alassane Ouattara, victorious, a civil war had broken out. Strong statements from the High Representative’s office at the time highlighted the need for an orderly transition and respect for human rights, while detailing the EU’s initial response which was based around sanctions on senior ex-regime figures (EEAS, 2010c). France in particular had strongly advocated a military response but for Germany, however, although the French interest in its former colony was understandable, the resort to a military solution raised significant concerns, going against their red line that the military option should only be considered after all civilian options had been explored. Moreover,

260 GO4 went on to note that the UK had acceded to the French request to ensure the French would not block a British proposal in NATO over the development of its rapid reaction capability. However, the UK “was happy that we blocked it!”
there was some concern regarding how France viewed the CSDP and the military instruments at its disposal:

“[France] wants to use the EU to protect French interests in places like Côte d’Ivoire. We understand but it depends on the means. France very quickly looks to military means – for us, these are only as the last resort – the preventive action in the [European Security Strategy].” (GO4)

GO3 made a similar point, highlighting a general anxiety in Berlin over the possibility of being dragged into an overseas conflict that might be “disastrous and bloody”:

“Côte d’Ivoire is far away. It could, in the end, if there was an international engagement, be disastrous and bloody. So what we rather want is for the Africans to settle this problem by themselves, foremost and not appear as sort of colonial interventionists. So, we made a policy of saying okay, we can make all kinds of offers to Gbago…to leave. We make all kinds of financial offers and offers of engagement for the new elected President Ouattara. Red line: we don’t want a CSDP operation going on.”

GO4 also noted a general concern that having the EU engage in an area where the UN was involved would undermine the latter. Ultimately, the French acted instead in conjunction with the UN to bring about a resolution to the fighting.

A final example where pursuit of a far clearer national interest seems in evidence was the agreement between Germany and Russia to construct the Nordstream gas pipeline. Creating a direct link between the two across the Baltic, the pipeline bypassed a number of states, including EU members such as Poland, whose relations with Moscow were becoming increasingly fractious (e.g. BBC, 2011c). Although technically more an issue of economic policy, German pursuit of greater energy security – and the development of stronger ties with Russia – had significant foreign policy implications, as EU1 argued:

“[T]his pipeline with Russia…has nothing really to do with foreign policy, it’s an economic question, but still…They should have known and they knew that this would create major trouble with Poland at least and others…but then they just wanted to do it, so they still did it. Taking into account probably what would happen…I hope! Maybe not.”
These examples demonstrate both the willingness and ability to pursue particular national interests within the CFSP. In the first two cases, Germany felt it had no choice but to take a proactive stance in support of particular objectives regarding the management of resources and use of military instruments within the CSDP. The final example emphasises a preparedness to ruffle the feathers of EU partners in the development of a bilateral relationship with a major external trading partner. Overall, while instances of direct leadership remain the exception, the increasing ‘emancipation’ in German foreign policy noted above means there are likely to occur more often in the future.
6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that since 1991, a unified Germany has become increasingly normalized in terms of its willingness to pursue its preferences in foreign and security policy. Crucial to this have been the structure provided by the CFSP, which has allowed it to achieve stability and predictability in its relations with its neighbours and partners, its reflexive multilateralism, and its *Zivilmacht* role conception. However, at the same time, Germany has shown an increasing willingness to use military means as a policy instrument, albeit within the confines of CSDP crisis management frameworks, and on the basis that it has a moral duty to intervene militarily to protect human rights. Moreover, although the avoidance of isolation has long been a *sine qua non* of its diplomacy, it has also been willing to stand alone, even in the face of criticism from partners. As a consequence, it has been argued here that within the context of the CFSP it has moved first from rehabilitation to emancipation, and now to new stage of emergent or “accidental” leadership.

Underpinning this has been German success in operating within the ‘CFSP milieu’. Thus, while it pursues and promotes policy objectives primarily by seeking partners and building alliances, this represents an understanding of *how* to act successfully within the CFSP rather than an apparent reticence over using it to achieve particular national goals. Moreover, the structures created in both Berlin and the Permanent Representation in Brussels indicate a clear ambition to identify, coordinate and pursue such goals, even if the execution of this ambition is not always so successful. As the comments by the officials indicate, Germany is increasingly comfortable behaving like France and the UK – i.e. ‘normally’. Thus while its strategy and tactics fit within constructivist conceptions of *how* the CFSP operates – in particular the socialization of its officials – the rational calculation of national interests and objectives in a given situation determines how decisions are made in Berlin, and then pursued in Brussels. Rationalist understandings of how states
interact therefore remain important in determining how Germany operates within the CFSP. They also challenge the idea that the CFSP has transformed Germany’s national interests and preferences.
Chapter 7: Iran and the EEAS: Two Case Studies of British and German engagement with the CFSP

“We launched our diplomatic initiative because we wanted to offer an opportunity to Iran to address international concerns... Iran’s decision to restart enrichment activity is a clear rejection of the process the E3/EU and Iran have been engaged in for over two years with the support of the international community” – Statement by Germany, United Kingdom, France and the EU High Representative on the Iran nuclear issue, January 2006 (Consilium, 2006a).

“The [EEAS] will mark a new beginning for European foreign and security policy...which will enhance our ability to act more creatively and decisively in an increasingly challenging world” – Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, December 2010 (EEAS, 2010b).

7.1 Introduction

Chapters Five and Six examined the underlying principles and drivers of British and German foreign policy, as well as the structures and processes by which they interact with and make inputs into the CFSP. In doing so, they identified definite if individual approaches to pursue nationally-derived objectives, based around clear structures and processes of coordination. In the UK these are more comprehensive, ambitious and perhaps successful than those in Germany, but the latter is nonetheless seeking to improve its performance in this regard. This suggests that in terms of the first indicator identified in Chapter Three – complexity of policy coordination machinery – both states are seeking to instrumentalise the CFSP to achieve national objectives. However, although this examination of coordination demonstrates a strong, nationally-driven impetus in how they engage with the CFSP, as would be expected in a policy arena that remains highly intergovernmental, on its own it is not enough to demonstrate that constructivist-based, supranationalist assumptions about the transformative impact of the CFSP on their national interests and preferences are inaccurate.
To do this, this chapter provides a more detailed and comparative analysis of British and German interaction with the CFSP in two specific cases. The first is their response to Iranian plans to develop its nuclear programme and the second their involvement in negotiating and establishing the European External Action Service, and latterly in how it has developed since its official launch. The two cases are interesting in that they represent two very different aspects of the CFSP, the first relating to a classic security issue while the second concerns institutional change impacting on the fabric of the CFSP environment. Britain and Germany have been closely involved in how both these policies have developed, and have expressed and pursued clear national preferences in terms of their final outcomes.

As discussed above, constructivism has been utilised in supranationalist scholarship to support the claim that participation in the CFSP has a significant transformative effect on member states. This thesis has argued, however, that this represents a mis-application of constructivism as it ignores the tenacity of states not only as independent political actors within the CFSP, but as significant generators of ideas, identities and norms in their own right. The failure of supranationalist analyses of CFSP to acknowledge this is therefore a significant omission that undermines their theoretical approach. The two cases chosen for this thesis provide a clear illustration of this theoretical weakness. Analyses that regard the CFSP as having a transformative impact would assume a number of things in the context of how Britain and Germany approach Iran and its nuclear programme, and the establishment of the EEAS. First, in both cases, British and German preferences would be assumed to reflect either pre-existing ‘European’/EU norms, or that during the period under examination their national positions would have converged around such a ‘common’ point. Second, a significant impetus for policy-making and agenda-setting would be expected to come from the centre, for example from the office of the High Representative for CFSP and its supporting structures in the Council Secretariat, while policy and
agreements at the Brussels level could be expected to constrain both states at the national level. Third, how both states conceive of these two issues in political discourse would either reflect a European/‘EU’-defined norm from the outset, or evolve towards such a norm. Taken together, these would suggest the dominance of the supranational level over the national level, and the ability of the former to transform the latter.

What will be argued here, however, is that the opposite is true. In each case the two states engaged with the CFSP on the basis of a clear, pre-existing national preference. Rather than transforming these, the CFSP instead provided the basis for projecting them to the European level and represented for each an instrumental means to pursue and achieve their desired policy outcomes. Moreover, not only have their preferences remained constant, they have to some extent been reinforced. Furthermore, in line with the types of leadership ambition both states exhibit, each has sought to ensure not only that policy on these two issues remains as close to their national preferences as possible, but that they are providing leadership to achieve these preferences. Finally, and as will be shown, political discourse in the UK reflects strongly national preferences in each case, with the EU characterised as an instrument to achieve certain nationally-framed goals, while in Germany although political discourse is more reflexively ‘pro-European’, it nonetheless reflects clear German preferences for what a ‘European’ position should be. The chapter examines each case in turn, offering a short chronological summary of the background before considering the respective British and German approaches and looking at key points of comparison.
7.2 Case study 1: Britain, Germany and the EU response to Iran’s nuclear programme

7.2.1 Iran’s nuclear programme as policy issue

There is an extensive and ever-growing literature on the development of Iran’s nuclear programme and the challenge it poses to international non-proliferation efforts. This focuses particularly on its deeply troubled relationship with the US, and the attempts by Britain, Germany and France as the E3 to lead an effective European (and international) response. This brief discussion offers some context for these efforts as the basis of the case study. The foundation of international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which came into force in 1970 and provides the “basic legal instrument” for the international non-proliferation regime (Denza, 2005: 290). Britain was one of the original signatories in 1968 and was strongly committed to it “from the outset” (ibid: 289), while Germany signed the following year, ratifying the treaty in 1975 (AA, 2006). These commitments therefore pre-date EU efforts through EPC and then CFSP to address proliferation and, indeed, for Britain pre-date even its membership of the European Community.

Both states therefore demonstrate pre-existing and long-standing national preferences for non-proliferation. These commitments are also reflected in their membership of other multilateral organisations such as NATO, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and, in Britain’s case as a P-5 member of the Security Council. For example, responding to a House of Commons’ report on Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2000, the UK government agreed that:

“Britain as a nuclear weapon state, a permanent member of the Security Council, a leading member of NATO, and a member of the G8 and EU has a key role and a key responsibility in trying to put all [WMD] under international arms control regimes…” (FCO, 2000: 9).

The German government made a similar statement in its 2006 defence policy Weissbuch:

“[T]he Federal Government is strongly engaged in the pertinent international institutions and forums, in particular in the [UN], the Disarmament Conference…and the G8. Given the threat emanating from [WMD], special importance has to be attached to the universalisation and reinforcement of the treaties on the prohibition and non-proliferation of [WMD]…particularly the [NPT]… In the EU, Germany supports arms control policy efforts within the scope of the EU strategy against the proliferation of [WMD].” (BVMg, 2006: 45)

Thus, whilst commitment to non-proliferation can be characterised as a significant international norm, it is not one that can be attributed to the EU either in terms of its origins or its place as a clear and unambiguous national interest for these two states. Rather, it is the NPT which provides the basis for how non-proliferation is approached in the EU and CFSP. This is shown in the EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction which declares that the NPT regime is a key element in the broader system of “existing disarmament and non-proliferation norms” (Consilium, 2003b: 6).

A better characterisation of the CFSP in this context, therefore, is as a tool or instrument through which member states can pursue and promote non-proliferation. The CFSP provides an appropriate and effective forum through which to pool their efforts in achieving this
shared national interest. This can be seen, for example, in the unambiguous language with which the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) addresses WMD proliferation. Identifying this as one of the five key threats to European security, it declares it to be “potentially the greatest threat to our security” (Consilium, 2003a: 3). The ESS’s sister document, the EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Consilium 2003b), agreed at the same December 2003 European Council, re-iterates this point, stating that the

“EU must act with resolve, using all instruments and policies at its disposal. Our objective is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of concern worldwide” (Consilium, 2003b: 2).

It went on to emphasise the “collective responsibility” shared by member states and EU institutions in meeting these risks (ibid: 4) before detailing a range of measures to be adopted by the Union.

Two important points emerge from these documents. First, they are setting out very clearly a framework through which member states should – and agree to – address potential proliferation, thereby necessitating action where it is identified. This is reflected in the nature of the EU sanctions regime imposed on Iran which has been more punitive than that imposed at UN level (GO2; see also House of Commons, 2008d: 43). Second, any EU action must also take account of the “real and legitimate security concerns” many third countries have (Consilium, 2003b: 7). This foreshadows the ‘twin-track’ approach adopted by the E3/E3+3 towards Iran, whereby incentives for cooperation have been as important as penalties for non-cooperation (e.g. House of Commons, 2008d: 44). It is also interesting to note that the initial concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme first emerged in the 18 months prior to these strategies being agreed, with the E3 démarche to Tehran taking place just two months before. The timing suggests there were already long-standing concerns over Iranian plans – and indeed over the nuclear ambitions of other states such as North Korea – which
necessitated an agreed and codified EU-level approach to non-proliferation. The EU strategy documents can therefore be seen as part of wider efforts to address the Iranian challenge.

Iran was also one the original signatories of the NPT but has never hidden its desire to develop its nuclear programme, although always maintaining it is for civilian purposes only. The origins of the current tensions – which Joshi (2013: 1) characterises as a “permanent crisis” – lie in the IAEA’s failure in the early 1990s to detect clandestine efforts to develop nuclear weapons programmes, particularly in North Korea. As a consequence, the IAEA agreed a strengthened control regime in 1997 (Jones, 2009: 109). However, although Iran signed the protocol introducing these stricter controls, it had yet to ratify this by August 2002 when an Iranian opposition group made public information regarding two undeclared nuclear facilities, strengthening “long-held suspicions” in the international community about Iran’s ultimate nuclear ambitions (ICG, 2006: 1; Ansari, 2006: 198; Bowen and Brewer, 2011). EU6, an official involved in EU Iran policy, was blunter, declaring that “in 2003, Iran was caught red-handed”. Its subsequent failure or refusal to “provide assurance to those who doubt its intentions” (House of Commons, 2004b: 19) thus lies at the heart of the problem. Achieving such assurances has been a primary objective of the E3/E3+3 process, and the sanctions agreed within the CFSP.

The diplomatic crisis that developed over Iran’s nuclear programme coincided with the build-up to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Kienzle (2009) highlights the stark contrasts in the approaches pursued by the so-called ‘big 3’ EU states towards the two countries. Iraq was the cause of the most serious foreign policy division to date among

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262 The opposition group was The National Council of Resistance for Iran, which the ICG describes as “a front group for the Mojahedin-e Khalq, MKO or MEK” (2006: 1). Ansari notes that the MKO/MEK opposition is not uncontroversial, having been “banned as a terrorist organization” by several European states as well as the US. He goes on to note that the revelations about the Iranian nuclear programme were also “as much an embarrassment to Western intelligence agencies” who failed to detect them as they were for the Iranians (2006: 198, 200).
EU states, with France and Germany on one side opposing a US-led intervention, while Britain was among those, including a number of soon-to-accede Eastern European states, siding with Washington. While the divisions came about as a consequence of clear US leadership in favour of a policy of invasion, they were exacerbated by the decision of the three to “push their Iraq policies towards opposing extremes”, making consensus impossible (ibid: 15). EU5, an official in DG RELEX at the time, noted that prior to the invasion of Iraq the chief problem was “not enough discussion”. Thus, at the European Council in Barcelona in March 2002, for example, Iraq was discussed for “approximately 1½ minutes” because the member states “did not want to talk about it” (EU5). By contrast, the absence of any kind of US leadership towards Iran by the Bush Administration made the same kind of European divisions “virtually impossible” (Kienzle, 2009: 15). Indeed, on Iran a leadership vacuum existed, with Washington having apparently little to offer beyond the perpetuation of the “tough rhetoric and economic sanctions” that had represented US policy for so long, but which had produced few if any concessions (Takeyh and Maloney, 2011: 1297).

The origins of this vacuum lie in the nature of US strategy towards Iran. This Ansari characterises as essentially “one of neglect” whereby Iran could do what it wished “as long as it didn’t bother anyone else” (2006: 136). However, he goes on to argue that it was ideologically driven rather than either rational or realist, and increasingly placed Washington at odds with its European allies (although the continuing absence of US competition to European companies in Iran was not something they were anxious to change) (ibid: 137). By contrast, the EU

263 Iran did in fact make a secret proposal to the US in May 2003 which was rejected by neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration despite some interest from within the US State Department (Sauer, 2007: 8). Hooman Majd identifies former Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi as the “principal author of the infamous Iranian ‘proposal’ to the White House” which set out the steps Iran was prepared to take to normalise relations but which was “rejected by George Bush out of hand” (2008: 186). See also David Patrikarakos (2012: 22-25) who argues that “[t]o dismiss the offer out of hand must go down as a colossal act of short sightedness bordering on the negligent” and who quotes the response of Vice President Dick Cheney’s office to the offer: “We don’t negotiate with evil”.

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The approach towards Iran has emphasised engagement, albeit conditional on political and economic reform (e.g. Commission, 2001; Consilium 2002a; 2002b; 2009b). Thus, although approaching questions of proliferation with no less seriousness, the EU has sought to highlight its support for multilateral solutions. Thus, it emphasises its efforts since 1998 to “seek possibilities for co-operation” with Iran, underlined by the launch in 2002 of negotiations for a Trade and Cooperation Agreement and for a Political Dialogue Agreement (Consilium, 2009b: 1; see also, Consilium, 2012b). Overall, the EU’s objective “remains to develop a durable and positive relationship” with Iran, even as it seeks a solution to the issue of nuclear proliferation (Consilium, 2012b: 1).

When the crisis developed, there was “a clear decision” between Britain, France and Germany that the E3 format was the most appropriate way to respond to Iran (UKO6) and that they felt “it was natural…that the three of us should be doing something together” on the issue (UKO4; also GO3). This consensus – or at least apparent lack of division – was demonstrated most strikingly on 21 October 2003 when the E3 foreign ministers, Dominique de Villepin, Joschka Fischer and Jack Straw, seized the diplomatic initiative. Flying to Tehran, they agreed an accord that would see the Iranians re-engage in co-operation with the IAEA, ratify the additional NPT protocols and suspend voluntarily its enrichment activity (IAEA, 2003; ICG, 2006: 1). In return, the way was open to dialogue “as the basis for longer-term co-operation” (ICG, 2006: 1). This was a high-risk strategy necessitated by the lack of a meaningful US response to the revelations about Iran’s nuclear programme, but which at the same time presented Europe with an opportunity. As Ansari

264 The Council Conclusions of May 2002 stated: “The Council, reiterating its continued support for the process of reform and its willingness to strengthen relations…evaluated progress in EU-Iran relations…[It] noted that broad agreement existed on…the overall approach for developing relations with Iran…these should include a serious dialogue on questions such as terrorism, proliferation and regional stability” (Consilium, 2002a); those of June declared: "The Council restates its continued support for the process of reforms in Iran and…reaffirms its willingness to strengthen relations between the EU and Iran…[It] wishes to see an intensified political dialogue…leading to better understanding…as well as to significant positive developments in the areas of concern to the EU…” (Consilium, 2002b).
(2006: 202) notes, the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in neighbouring Iraq in February 2003 and an IAEA report critical of Iran for violating its NPT obligations increased significantly the pressure on Tehran. The E3 states could therefore “prove the merits and efficacy of diplomacy, bring Iran to heal, restrain the United States, and heal trans-Atlantic wounds” (ibid). In short, this was a diplomatic opportunity too good to miss.

However, despite initial success, the negotiating process quickly became bogged down, with the IAEA claiming aspects of Iranian declarations on its nuclear programme were missing, while Iran in turn was “unhappy with the ‘carrots’ obtained from the EU” (Sauer, 2007: 10). This has led to criticism of the value of the E3 process. Harnisch (2007) argues, for example, that it was in essence a “buffer”, serving as a tool by which the three could resolve domestic disputes that had emerged in the post-Iraq setting (2007: 2). He goes on to suggest, though, that anyone who believes that the E3 demonstrates these states had overcome their differences following Iraq and “finally got their act together” is misguided or “in a state of denial” (ibid). Rather, he contends that the diplomatic démarche of October 2003 relied on implicit recognition by the Bush Administration, the IAEA, fellow EU member states and ultimately the Iranian government to have any validity. Such criticism is perhaps over-stated, though. For example, UKO4 disagrees with this analysis, suggesting that while it “may have had that effect…it wasn’t the primary purpose”. Certainly the apparent failure of the E3 process was demonstrated when it was superseded by the E3+3 in 2006, when Russia, China and the US formally joined the group. However, the fact remains that in October 2003 the US was not in a position to act, therefore negating the possibility of a meaningful Security Council response. Meanwhile as important members of the UN and IAEA as well as the EU, the E3 states could legitimately claim to be acting to support their principles and objectives.

Questions can be asked about the relationship between the E3 and their fellow member states over the longer term. Although the E3
received support from their EU partners, the other states nonetheless asked Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP, to act as a go-between to ensure they were not left out of the process (Sauer, 2007: 10). Furthermore, EU6 notes that the E3 format “was extremely antagonising for some”, notably Italy, while for smaller states there was the feeling that they “are always in the hands of the bigger”. UKO4 and UKO6 concur, noting that the Italians were always uncomfortable with the concept of the E3. This is an interesting observation given that both British and German officials made clear their desire not to be seen as dominating their smaller partners (e.g. GO2, GO3, UKO3). That said, EU6 believes that apart from their involvement in decision-making on sanctions, the other 24 member states have made “very little positive contribution” to the process. That EU sanctions have been consistently tougher than those imposed by the UN (GO2, EU6; House of Commons, 2008d), indicates, moreover, that the E3 have been able to maintain a consensus in support of strong action, however unhappy some member states may have been.265

One further point of interest is the evolving role of the High Representative in the E3/E3+3 process. Prior to 2006, the High Representative’s function – and that of the Council Secretariat – was primarily to provide support to the E3 (e.g. Consilium, 2004a). Indeed, at first it was essentially “a kind of postman assignment” (EU6). However, once the E3 had expanded to become the E3+3 in 2006, the High Representative’s role “completely changed” (EU6). He became in essence their joint representative, a role formally recognised in Security Council Resolution 1929 (UN, 2010).266 It is unsurprising that the importance of the E3 states has been eclipsed with the involvement of the

265 EU6 notes, for example, the difficulties in persuading Greece to support the recent round of EU sanctions against Iranian oil exports. At that time it was importing more than 60% of its oil from Iran, and so “made a big fuss” even though it was actually losing money exporting the refined oil to the Balkans.
266 Paragraph 33 states that the Security Council “[e]ncourages the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution…” (UN, 2010).
US, Russia and China.\textsuperscript{267} What is perhaps more so is that the High Representative has not only remained involved, but has become such an important actor in the process, and that the non-EU ‘+3’ are willing to be represented in this way, rather than asking, for example, the UN Secretary-General to perform this task. For EU6, the change in 2006 reflected the fact that none of the six states wanted to take the lead – Solana “basically was just the only person who was ready to go to Tehran”. Furthermore, he suggests that one of the big achievements of Solana’s successor, Catherine Ashton, has been to maintain the unity of the E3+3 in dealing with Iran.\textsuperscript{268}

The overall success of the E3 process and the engagement with Iran that it initiated is certainly questionable. (EU6 contends that the E3 essentially failed.) The complexity of the negotiations has been matched only by the repeated impasses and delays, and David Miliband suggests the process has spent “more time in stasis…than in action” over the whole period.\textsuperscript{269} However, of interest here is what this tells us about how Britain and Germany interacted with the CFSP on the question of Iranian nuclear proliferation. They decided to create, with France, what was essentially a 3-state contact group – or directoire – and through this have sought to lead the EU response to Iran, even after the ‘+3’ states became involved. Moreover, whilst there have been sometimes strong disagreements between member states over the extent and severity of EU sanctions (GO2, EU6, OMS1), sanctions have not only been maintained, they have even been strengthened. This demonstrates a determination on behalf of Britain and Germany (as well as France) to utilise the CFSP first to achieve nationally-based security goals in the absence of meaningful action by the UN Security Council, and then to ensure their objectives remain the basis of EU policy in the longer-term. This is not

\textsuperscript{267} EU6 suggests that the E3 remain involved simply for “historical reasons. But in practical terms…if the exercise would be starting now, I’m not so sure the E3 would be involved. But this is almost a heretical thing [to say]”.

\textsuperscript{268} GO7 also praises her contribution, declaring she “is doing a very good job”. Interview, Federal Foreign Ministry, Berlin, April 2012.

\textsuperscript{269} Interview, London, 6 December 2010.
unusual for Britain, given what has already been said about its pragmatic and instrumentalist view of the CFSP; what is perhaps more interesting is the willingness of Germany, which identifies itself as much more *communautaire*, to do the same.
7.2.2 British policy towards Iran

British policy towards Iran over the last decade reflects the importance of the domestic foreign policy regime in London in formulating and pursuing national preferences, and the pragmatism with which it does so, as outlined in Chapter 5. The FCO has led on Britain’s response to the Iranian nuclear programme, but with input from other departments with an interest, particularly Number 10, the MoD and the Security Services (UKO4). Two national preferences have remained central to British policy throughout: first, the desire for an improvement in bilateral relations with Iran; second, the demand that Iran recognise and live up to its international responsibilities and obligations under the NPT and other WMD treaties (e.g. FCO, 2004a, 2005b). Successive governments have seen in the achievement of the former a means of promoting the latter, which is reflected in the two key principles which have formed the basis of British policy: “constructive engagement” (e.g. House of Commons, 2000d; FCO, 2004a,b), and “conditionality” (e.g. FCO, 2004: 1). Both have been crucial components in how Britain has engaged in all multilateral contexts dealing with Iran, including the E3/E3+3 process and the CFSP, and so provide a useful framework to analyse this engagement.

Historically, Britain’s bilateral relationship with Iran, like that of the US, has been complex and at times difficult. Following a period of significantly increased tension immediately after the 1979 revolution, there were signs of a gradual rapprochement from 1985 onwards, and particularly during the late 1990s (House of Commons, 2004b: 7). The policy of “constructive engagement” pursued over the last 15 years reflects the strategic importance British governments continue to assign to Iran, and the guarded optimism with which the election in 1997 of the reformist Mohammed Khatami as President was viewed. In 2000, for example, the government highlighted the advantages for Britain not only

\[\text{\footnote{For a detailed examination of Anglo-Iranian relations since the 19th Century, see Ansari, A. (2006) Confronting Iran, chapters 1 and 2.}}\]
from improved economic relations, but also as a consequence of Iran’s “central strategic position, and its key role in regional security”, giving it the potential to support efforts to address threats such as narcotics trafficking and international terrorism, as well as the possibility it could play a positive role in the Middle East Peace Process (House of Commons, 2000d). For example, in 2004, Jack Straw stated:

“Iran is a crucial player in a region central to the challenges which the UK and the international community face: the fight against terrorism, the proliferation of [WMD], international crime and illegal migration…” (FCO, 2004a: iii).

Moreover, even after the 2003 revelations about Iran’s nuclear programme, London remained positive about the possibilities for bilateral relations. Thus, the government concurred with the Foreign Affairs Committee’s conclusion that “the prospects for longer-term improvements in the [Anglo-Iranian] relationship remain good” (House of Commons, 2004b: 13), even if they remained difficult in the short term (FCO, 2004a). In other words, the policy of constructive engagement would remain the basis for interaction with Iran.

Conditionality, the second principle, is directly linked to Britain’s support for the international non-proliferation regime which, as noted, has been a long-standing British interest pursued though a range of multilateral structures such as the UN, IAEA, etc. Indeed, the government makes clear that anti-proliferation measures “require a collective international response” (FCO, 2004b: 23). For the UK, maintaining the integrity of this regime therefore requires Iran to satisfy the concerns of the international community about its nuclear programme. As successive governments have been at pains to emphasise, Britain is not seeking to prevent Iran exercising its right to develop a civilian nuclear programme – even if some question whether it actually needs to, given its oil reserves (e.g. House of Commons, 2006a).²⁷¹ Rather, they

²⁷¹ The Foreign Affairs Committee’s 2004 Report on Iran stated that “the arguments as to whether Iran has a genuine requirement for domestically-produced nuclear electricity are not all, or even predominantly, on one side. …[However] we do not
are demanding that Iran follow the same rules as any other member of the international community. In other words, it must observe what is arguably the key norm of international relations, *pacta sunt servanda* ('treaties must be observed') (e.g. Rittberger and Zangl, 2006: 63), in this case by responding appropriately to the IAEA’s questions and concerns (e.g. FCO, 2003a; 2004a; 2005b).

Conditionality should not be understood only in terms of Britain’s bilateral response, however. It has also been important in how this response has been internationalised, something Britain has consistently sought and encouraged (e.g. FCO, 2003a; 2004a; 2005b; 2006e; 2008f). In particular, it has provided an essential means of attaining and maintaining consensus first with Britain’s E3 and EU partners, but also in the E3+3 format and at the UN and IAEA. Thus, while Britain has followed a policy of constructive engagement, it has been with the proviso that such engagement is contingent on Iran recognising and living up to its international responsibilities and obligations (e.g. FCO, 2003a; 2004a; 2005b). It should be noted that there was disagreement between Britain and the US over the constructive engagement policy, particularly once President Bush identified Iran as part of the “axis of evil” in his 2002 State of the Union speech (Bush, 2002). Jack Straw played this down as an “honest disagreement” (House of Commons, 2003a), but on 2 April 2003 made clear to the Foreign Affairs Committee that Britain would have “nothing whatsoever” to do with any military action against Iran (FCO, 2003a: 14). In so doing, he reiterated Britain’s preference for a diplomatic approach, an important point of consensus with Germany, France and other EU states.

The focus on engagement and conditionality does not mean British policy has been monolithic. The key change, though, has not been
of substance but of emphasis, with a shift away from engagement towards conditionality as negotiations with Iran became progressively harder, particularly following the election in 2005 of the conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President. This shift can be seen in official government pronouncements during this period. In 2000 although expressing wariness over Iran’s nuclear intentions, including “reports of Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capability” with Russian assistance, the government emphasised that it recognised Iran’s “legitimate security concerns” (House of Commons, 2000c). Consequently, improved bilateral links, facilitated by domestic political reform, represented “the best means” of ensuring Iran lived up to its NPT responsibilities (FCO, 2000: 3). Following Iranian agreement to suspend uranium enrichment after the E3 visit to Tehran in October 2003, Jack Straw reported to Parliament that this “represents a good start to the process of resolving international concerns…but the real test will be full and early implementation of the [Iranian] commitments” (Hansard, 2003).

In 2004, the tone started to change. The government emphasised that engagement “should remain our policy” but that Iran would “need to address our political concerns” (FCO, 2004a: 3-4). Later that year, however, it was talking of “critical” rather than constructive engagement (FCO, 2004b: 14). In 2005, it again emphasised that Iran needed to “fulfil its international obligations” (FCO 2005b, 31). Meanwhile, in 2006 Jack Straw observed that while no-one was certain Iran was seeking to develop nuclear weapons, “we are absolutely sure…Iran [has] failed to meet its very clear obligations” under the NPT (House of Commons, 2006a), and an FCO report declared that Iran was “failing to cooperate adequately with the IAEA” (FCO, 2006e). In 2007, although accepting that it had “every right” to develop a civil nuclear

273 Similarly, in a memo to the Foreign Affairs Committee, the FCO stated: “Ultimately…we believe the best means of ensuring Iran abides by its treaty commitments lies in the continuation of the political reform and rapprochement with the West begun under President Khatami…Hence our policy of engagement with Iran on non-proliferation and other issues” (House of Commons, 2000f).

274 In December 2003, when asked by the Foreign Affairs Committee about progress since the Tehran agreement, Straw responded by saying “so far, so good” (House of Commons, 2004b: 40).
programme, David Miliband chastised Iran, demanding “it accept that it has responsibilities to the…international community. It cannot violate the [NPT]” (Hansard, 2007). Finally, in 2008 an FCO report was even more explicit, declaring that Iran “must not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon. This is the primary goal of UK, and E3+3, policy” (FCO, 2008f: 5).

Engagement and conditionality have been the basis of British policy towards Iran. At the same time, it has focused on the necessity for a collective international response to Iran to uphold the integrity of the NPT regime. Consequently, for Britain the UN and IAEA as the source of authority for the NPT regime are the primary institutions, while the role of the EU and CFSP is to support them. For UK02, the CFSP has been “essential” in this sense, while he believes that the fact that a European consensus around a tough sanctions regime has been maintained for so long suggests that Britain has “successfully Europeanized” its policies. For Britain, the CFSP thus has an important instrumental role to play vis-à-vis Iran and as will be discussed, Britain sees the E3 as a means of galvanising the other member states and ensuring their response to Iran remains suitably robust.

\[275\]Currently the British government “does not encourage trade with or investment in Iran” (FCO, 2012c).
7.2.3 German policy towards Iran

The comments of two Foreign Ministry officials encompass how German policy towards Iran’s nuclear programme has been constructed. GO3 declared: “we can’t allow Iran to escape nuclear control. They can’t just go about and create an atomic weapon”; meanwhile, GO7 described it as “unthinkable” that Germany and its E3 partners would do anything on Iran “without the backing of the other member states”. It is within these parameters that German policy has developed since the crisis began in 2002. In many ways the basis for German policy is the analogue of Britain’s. It focuses on political, economic and social engagement (e.g. Bundesregierung, 2001; Bundestag, 2004) while employing diplomatic pressure and sanctions to prevent Iran developing nuclear weapons – i.e. the same ‘dual approach’ as its partners (e.g. AA, 2007a; 2011b). This policy in turn fits into a wider objective of preventing WMD proliferation, with a clear, long-standing and vital national interest identified as preventing either state or non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons (e.g. AA and BVMg, 2009: 10; BMVg, 2011: 2-3). Again, like Britain, Germany considers this objective achievable only multilaterally and in partnership with other states (e.g. AA, 2000; Bundestag, 2005b; BMVg, 2011: 5). There are, though, some important ideational differences, discussed below, in terms of how Germany conceptualises the problem of proliferation itself, and how it identifies itself within the multilateral environment it believes essential to resolving this. However, it is as committed as Britain to achieving an effective, comprehensive and sustained European response as an essential part of how the international community deals with Iran.

As noted, Germany has strongly supported the international non-proliferation regime from the outset. It is committed to the “values and objectives” of a system that is “treaty-based, transparent and verifiable” (AA, 2006: v). The NPT represents the “cornerstone” of this system and a “key task” of the international community is to uphold and strengthen it (AA, 2011e). Indeed, it has often called for the “legal and political
instruments” underpinning it “to be strengthened” (AA, 2000: 69), something requiring the “universalisation and reinforcement” of the treaties (BMVg, 2006: 45). Non-proliferation and disarmament represent important components of a German security policy geared first and foremost to conflict prevention (BMVg, 2006: 45), and the emphasis it places on linking these agendas represents a small but important area of difference from Britain. Germany sees them as mutually supportive or mutually undermining: nuclear disarmament requires “an efficient non-proliferation regime” but this is unsustainable in the absence of nuclear disarmament, making them “two sides of the same coin” (Westerwelle, 2012b). This emphasis on the inter-linkage of disarmament and non-proliferation indicates a different ideational basis to how Germany approaches proliferation compared to London, which in turn reflects Germany’s status as a non-nuclear weapons state. This is not to suggest that Britain does not also pursue nuclear disarmament – rather, that for German this aim is more explicit and fits into its role conception as a civilian or ‘pacifist’ power.

Like Britain, Germany considers an effective international response essential to the achievement of non-proliferation. Crucial to regional and global security and stability, non-proliferation can only be achieved through a “co-operative security policy” (AA, 2000: 69). In this, the UN is the key actor – it must “play a central role” in the framework of broader security cooperation (Bundesregierung, 2002: 4) and be the “central institution if multilateralism is to be effective” (Bundesregierung, 2007c: 23). Germany has also called for a “new strategic consensus” on international measures to combat proliferation (Bundesregierung, 2004b: 5) and has pursued this within the UN system. For example, it was a founder member in 2010 of the ‘Friends of the NPT’, a group of states which wishes to advance the non-proliferation and disarmament agendas as “mutually reinforcing processes” (AA, 2010e).276 Germany has also

276 As well as Germany, this group consists of Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (AA, 2010e).
promoted both objectives through its 2011-12 membership of the Security Council (AA, 2011c; Permanent Mission, 2012). Beyond the UN, Germany used its 2007 Presidencies of the G8 and European Council to prioritise non-proliferation. Thus, it led its G8 partners in committing to “counter[ing] the global proliferation challenge” and to supporting the UN and Security Council in achieving this (Bundesregierung, 2007a,b), while pushing its EU partners to do the same (Bundesregierung, 2008).

Compared to Britain, there are small if significant differences in how Germany approaches the international structures, particularly in how it views the role of the EU and CFSP. Both states obviously recognise their instrumental importance. However, whereas Britain takes a more pragmatic view, Germany’s stance could be characterised as more ideational and absolutist in the sense that Germany foreign and security policy are “largely defined” through the EU and CFSP (AA and BVMg, 2009: 11). Indeed, it describes itself as being “committed to serving world peace” by being a strong partner in Europe (BMVg, 2011: 3). Consequently, while for Britain the CFSP may have become an essential channel in resolving the Iranian crisis, for Germany it was always so. One explanation for this is Germany not having P-5 status in the Security Council. Consequently, while it may be influential in the UN, the EU represents an important formal international framework through which it can pursue its objectives vis-à-vis Iran. (UKO7 argues that this is a reason Germany is in favour of a stronger EU role in other international organisations more generally.)

German-Iranian relations over the last decade have followed a similar path to those of Britain, with a focus on engagement and negotiation giving way to growing frustration and support for stricter international sanctions. Prior to 2002, Germany’s primary concerns were Iran’s human rights record, which the government considered “catastrophic” (Bundesregierung, 2001: 1), and efforts to develop political and economic relations with Tehran. As in Britain, Iran was also
seen as a potentially important strategic partner in addressing drug-trafficking (ibid: 10). From 2002 onwards, however, Iran is mentioned in the official retrospective government assessments of global disarmament (Jahresabrüstungsbericht). Initially concerns focus on its links to importation and exportation of rocket technology (Bundesregierung, 2002: 19). However, in 2004, following the visit in 2003 of the E3 foreign ministers to Tehran, more detailed analyses highlight its failure to comply with IAEA demands for full and transparent declarations about its nuclear programme (Bundesregierung, 2004b), while there is increased “concern” over the impact of its nuclear intentions on regional security (ibid: 21-22). As a consequence, Iran is listed alongside Libya and North Korea as being at the centre of “international non-proliferation efforts” (ibid: 5). The same year, Foreign Minister Fischer declared that while Germany was not trying to infringe on the “sovereign right” of states to develop civilian nuclear programmes, a nuclear-armed Iran would be “a dangerous development in…one of the most dangerous regions” (Bundestag, 2004).

Assessments in subsequent years paint a similar picture, but demonstrate growing concern and frustration at perceived Iranian intransigence. For example, the 2004 document uses almost identical wording, again bracketing Iran with North Korea, although highlighting progress following the E3 visit (Bundesregierung, 2005: 4). In 2005, as the negotiations become difficult, the government demands that Iran act in good faith and build trust if it wants cooperation from the E3 and their EU partners (Bundesregierung, 2006: 4). In 2006, the government refers explicitly to a “secret” weapons programme (Bundesregierung, 2007: 4), and to the growing risk to Iran of “self-isolation and confrontation” (ibid: 15). It also notes that, despite lacking Security Council membership, Germany will remain active and engaged in the E3+3 process to achieve a “diplomatic solution” (ibid). The 2007 assessment focuses particularly on the efforts of Germany’s EU Presidency to promote support for Security Council Resolution 1737 which strongly censured Iran
(Bundesregierung, 2008: 15). It also noted its efforts with France and Britain to promote another resolution, 1803, against Iran, and re-iterated the risks to Iran of “self-isolation” and “confrontation” (ibid). In 2008, the government notes the EU agreement to implement autonomous sanctions against Iranian banks in addition to ongoing efforts at the UN (Bundesregierung, 2009: 18). Finally, in 2010, the government re-states its objective that Iran return to negotiations, noting that sanctions are just one part of the “double-track” strategy (Doppelstrategie), with the possibility of resolving the crisis remaining in Iranian hands (Bundesregierung, 2010b: 2-3).

This brief discussion illustrates a number of key points. First, like Britain, the German government has pursued a consistent policy of demanding cooperation and transparency from Iran over its nuclear programme, in return for which it will enjoy improved political and economic relations. Second, German remains entirely committed to achieving a diplomatic solution to the crisis, for which the UN and EU are vital and mutually supportive. Thus, while it does not enjoy Security Council membership, it has nonetheless sought to support and promote UN efforts to compel Iran to comply with Security Council Resolutions. To do this, it has operated individually, but also through its Presidencies of the EU and G8. Of particular importance, then, have been Germany’s efforts through the E3 to set the policy direction on Iran within the EU and CFSP.
7.2.4 British and German engagement with the CFSP on Iran

Of interest here is how Britain and Germany have conceptualised the E3/E3+3 and sought to use it to operationalise the CFSP (and EU) in the international response to Iran. Both wish to employ it as one of several instruments to ensure Iran lives up to its international responsibilities, something that can only be achieved in a multilateral context – a “multifaceted system and architecture” (UKO2). In this architecture, the international institutions that matter most are the UN – particularly the Security Council – and IAEA as these provide the legal basis and authority for any international action against Iran over its nuclear programme. For Britain, therefore, the function of the CFSP and EU has been to contribute to the enforcement of these resolutions, not to achieve a particular EU objective per se (although this may be an additional outcome), or act according to an EU-generated norm. Germany takes the same view of the importance of upholding and even strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. Moreover, while it may be more comfortable in identifying its foreign policy within a European framework, the desire to instrumentalise the CFSP is as strong as it is for Britain, and perhaps even stronger. For Germany, the E3/E3+3 format has been an important instrument for achieving this, and can be seen as the most notable example of its shared leadership with France and Britain discussed previously.

For both states the role of the EU is to operate within this larger international framework. This is not to suggest that the EU is not an important actor in its own right, but rather to remember that it is part of a wider picture, and that ensuring Iranian non-proliferation has far greater ramifications, involving as it does the enforcement of UN and IAEA resolutions. The EU matters in terms of its ability to deploy foreign policy instruments (legal, economic, etc) in pursuit of this objective. EU sanctions, as well as their corollary in terms of potential political, economic and trade links – the “carrot for Iran” (UKO4) – give the organisation weight and influence. Moreover, not only do these
instruments enable it to play a meaningful role, their availability requires it to do so. Along with the consensus among member states in support of non-proliferation, they have provided the basis for the sanctions regime constructed over the last ten years. Equally that consensus, exemplified by the EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, as well as the interdependence and membership cross-over between the EU, UN and IAEA, mean that the E3 expect nothing less than the maintenance of a robust sanctions regime and, moreover, one that will be tougher than that of the UN. For example, GO2 declared that with the sanctions package, Germany’s “national objective, together with the E3 partners, was…to make sure that the EU sends a very clear and strong message to Iran”. Similarly, UKO2 suggested that having “worked very closely” to develop the sanctions package, they “want all member states to respect [it]…and do what they can to make sure they’re implemented”.

The E3 format has served two important functions in this process. It has been a tool for Britain, Germany and France to galvanise action at European level and ensure the EU continues to live up to its commitments vis-à-vis support for non-proliferation. It has also provided a means of engaging with global partners, as well as Iran, and in the absence of meaningful US involvement in the initial stages of the crisis, to provide leadership in the international response. As a consequence, the E3 is thus both part of and also separate from the EU. Its authority (as well as that of the High Representative as the E3+3 envoy) is underpinned and reinforced by the EU by virtue of the sanctions the latter can deploy or improved economic links it can offer. But equally, E3 diplomacy operates beyond the EU, engaging with the ‘+3’ at the global level and in other multilateral contexts. In support of this function, the intention of all E3 states has been to instrumentalise the EU to achieve a very particular goal as part of the wider non-proliferation architecture.

This is demonstrated by the manner in which E3 leadership was presented by Britain, Germany and France to their EU partners – i.e. as a
fait accompli. Although GO7 notes that achieving E3 policy on Iran “would be unthinkable” without the backing of the other member states, no agreement was ever formally negotiated among the whole membership delegating power to them. Indeed, the other states “didn’t have any choice” (UKO6). Despite this, according to UKO4 and GO3 they were generally willing to accept – or at least acquiesce in – E3 leadership. What is interesting, though, is that despite their anxiety to avoid being seen as one of “the big ones trying to bully the small ones” (GO2), Germany had no objection to creating this European mini-contact group or directoire. Indeed, as one senior official demonstrated, there is a definite realism in the German stance towards its shared leadership role on Iran:

“[I]t has to do with…economic weight and the weight we can throw in when it comes to sanctions, because most of the business with Iran inside the EU is done by Germany, the UK and France… And the other aspect obviously was the set-up in the Security Council which has less to do with the [EU]. That’s why we could convince our partners…to hold still and let the Directorium lead the way…And it’s too serious and threatening a situation that we can just bicker about who has better mediating qualities…[T]hat was fairly quickly accepted.” (GO3)

It is also shown by the fact that key decisions on Iran are taken within the E3+3 or UN Security Council (plus Germany),277 not by the EU. Perhaps the clearest evidence for this is the fact that Iran policy has remained predominantly a matter for Political Directors (UKO3, UKO6). Within the FCO, for example, the Political Director deals directly with the department’s Iran experts, with the CFSP department only becoming involved in terms of briefing other states and “handling Italy” (UKO6) which, as noted above, has had difficulties in accepting the predominance of the E3. Similarly, EU6 notes that in a real sense the E3+3 process is not “a Brussels-driven exercise” despite the importance of the High Representative, with the key meetings and discussions, particularly with the ‘+3’ going through capitals.

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277 This is depending on whether or not Germany has had a seat on the Council as one of the 9 non-permanent members which it did for example from 2011-12.
The role of the CFSP, then, has been to perform a number of important functions to facilitate E3 leadership. First, it is the arena in which the political agreements are made to institute and strengthen sanctions on Iran. Thus, although their legal and financial frameworks are negotiated and finalised in the RELEX working group, the political mandate comes from the PSC (AA, 2008: 32). The process for turning this mandate into an agreed set of measures requires, in turn, often intense negotiations that can involve meetings lasting 12+ hours a day, three to four times per week (GO2).²⁷⁸ Beyond this, the CFSP has also facilitated the diplomatic interactions between the E3 and their EU partners. Thus, it provides a vital framework within which the E3 communicate with the other member states about the status of the negotiation process with Iran, the thinking of the ‘+3’ states, etc. As part of this, within the PSC the efforts of the E3 have been aimed at ensuring a level of transparency in their briefings that is sufficient to "reduce the level of discomfort" for their partners caused by their leadership (UKO6). In general, the FAC and PSC will receive formal briefings prior to and de-briefings following meetings of the E3+3, although these do not take place at working group level (OMS1).

Meanwhile, the decision quite early on to involve Javier Solana, the High Representative, was also made with the aim of making the management of this dynamic easier. Not only did it serve the practical purpose of ensuring that the Council Secretariat was closely involved in drafting the relevant papers relating to the offer of a strategic relationship between the EU and Iran – a key element in any solution;²⁷⁹ it also meant

²⁷⁸ GO2 offered an interesting insight into how such negotiations can proceed: “you spend more time with these people that with your family, definitely…[I]n general this kind of personal relationship is absolutely necessary. And it also has to do very much with the drama…There are situations in which before a decisive meeting there is an informal pre-meeting in which people discuss the choreography of how it’s going to go…so as to create the drama that can help everybody in the end to go back showing ‘I fought like a lion and this here is the best thing we could get, and nobody could possibly get anything better than this’.”

²⁷⁹ EU6 notes that the Council Secretariat was “basically the supporting structure” when it came to Iran – a role now taken on by the EEAS – with the team of officials involved remaining very small to this day.
that to some extent the other member states were represented. For UKO4, Solana’s role in this sense has been to act almost as the “conscience” of the other states. OMS1 also notes the importance of the High Representative in “balancing” the process as the other member states “don’t have to turn to the EU3” to find out what is happening vis-à-vis Iran.

Although not always straightforward, it has been the achievement and maintenance of agreement at 27 on the policy towards Iran that has been the E3 states’ chief concern and objective within CFSP. There is a “basic agreement” on the need for the two-track approach of negotiations and sanctions, but beyond that there are “different views” (OMS1). One of the most significant challenges has been to maintain the consensus on the robustness of the sanctions currently in place. For Britain and France as P-5 states especially, it has been vital that the EU’s response has not only remained in lock-step with that of the Security Council, but that its sanctions regime has been even more stringent – or, as a senior Iranian diplomat put it, “more Catholic than the pope” (Mousavian et al., 2013). However, there are a range of attitudes towards sanctions among the member states, with some less convinced about their effectiveness, and others of the need for them to be so tough (GO2). EU6 offers the examples of Greece, which is strongly influenced by its commercial relationship with Iran, and Sweden which is “more idealistic”, preferring engagement and cooperation to sanctions. The challenge of achieving unanimity is not limited to the PSC, moreover, but

280 Seyed Mousavian, senior nuclear negotiator for Iran (2003-05), believes that because of this the EU has lost its position as a “relatively impartial arbiter” able to balance Washington (Mousavian et al., 2013).

281 There was anxiety among some, for example, that tough EU sanctions on Iranian oil would be undercut by other states such as India, Japan and China keen to take advantage of the availability of cheaper oil. EU6 argues that the opposite has actually happened, and that in many ways the EU has become a “trend-setter” as other states have also reduced their oil imports. Despite this, other countries including China, India and South Korea have contributed to a “20% increase in non-oil exports, such as cement, iron ore, petrochemicals, pistachios and Persian rugs” (Hanke and Iradian, 2013). This led the authors to declare that the “inconvenient truth about economic sanctions is that they do not shut down global trade with the target nation” (ibid).
also extends to decisions taken in the RELEX group. Although technically the regulations on Iran could be agreed by QMV, GO2 declares that “I think very many colleagues would rather be shot than to allow for that, because it would absolutely change the way that the game works”.

Overall, therefore, while the E3/E3+3 format may have produced few tangible results in terms of action by the Iranians, it has been an important device for all three states in terms of developing a meaningful European response to Iran. This is something they deem vital for the maintenance of the international non-proliferation regime. Thus, its most important achievement has been to enable them to maintain agreement among their European partners both over the policy approach Europe should take and in then implementing this.
7.3 Case Study 2: Britain, Germany and the European External Action Service

7.3.1 The EEAS as policy issue

The European External Action Service (EEAS) represents part of the institutional response to the perennial problems of inefficiency and incoherence that have affected the CFSP (outlined in Chapter 4). For Hemra et al. (2011: 3), it is the “institutional embodiment” of the member states’ “somewhat ambivalent ambition that the EU should be a diplomatic heavyweight”. The challenge policy-makers have faced since the creation of the CFSP, encapsulated in Hill’s concept of the “Capabilities-Expectations Gap” discussed previously, is of achieving that coherence and efficiency by making more effective use of all the instruments and resources available to the Union. In particular, this involves better use of the significant economic, trade and aid instruments traditionally deployed by the Commission to support the foreign and security policy goals determined by the Council through the CFSP. As discussed, while attempts were made in Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000) to improve the ability of the EU to agree and then implement particular CFSP objectives, these did not address the key issue relating to the institutional division between EU external relations as practised by the Commission on the one hand, and the CFSP as an entity controlled and administered through the Council’s structures on the other. The Lisbon Treaty, in sum, was an attempt to turn the “rather accidental arrangements” that had existed up to that point into “something more sensible and coherent” (Crowe, 2008: 13). As part of this, the EEAS is one of Lisbon’s “more eye-catching innovations” (Whitman, 2008: 6) – the show-piece of a new joined-up approach to EU external relations.

In brief, the idea for a European diplomatic service first emerged from the Convention on the Future of Europe launched in 2002. It envisaged an entity that would support the work of the High Representative by bringing together the policy advice provided by the Council Secretariat, the Commission’s relevant directorates-general and
its global network of overseas missions (Miller, 2003: 50). The process by which the EEAS formally came into being began with the signing of the Draft Constitutional Treaty in October 2004. However, it went into abeyance twice – first, following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by French and Dutch voters in referenda in 2005, and then in 2008 when the revised treaty was also rejected, this time by the Irish (Behr et al., 2010: 4). It was only with the final ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 that the serious work of constructing the EEAS could begin in earnest. Lisbon defined the role of the EEAS as follows:

“The scope of the EEAS should allow the HR to fully carry out his/her mandate as defined in the Treaty. To ensure the consistency and better coordination of the Union’s external action, the EEAS should also assist the President of the European Council and the…Commission in their respective functions in the area of external relations as well as closely cooperate with the Member States.” (Consilium, 2009d: 2)

However, since its inception the development of the EEAS has been notable for a considerable vagueness over its design, structure and ultimately its purpose beyond the fairly general outline provided above. Lieb and Maurer (2008: 2) note the “considerable leeway” in the treaty text over interpreting the EEAS’s actual role, while Crowe (2008: 7) notes that Lisbon is “thin on detail” beyond its role in assisting the High Representative. A number of observers have argued that the reforms introduced by Lisbon have the potential to bring considerable benefits to the development and exercise of EU foreign and security policy. For example, Behr et al. (2010: 5) highlight the potential for far greater coherence among the different institutional actors involved, consistency in pursuing particular agendas and pushing policies through to their conclusion, better use of existing resources and capabilities, and a far higher overall visibility for the EU as a foreign policy actor. Duke (2008) and Lieb and Maurer (2008) make similar points.

Despite the EEAS’s considerable potential, however, a significant proportion of the analysis since it formally came into operation on 1st December 2010 has been critical. In particular, this has emphasised the
challenge faced by the new High Representative, Catherine Ashton, in terms of building up institutional capabilities, delivering immediately an expanded and more coherent foreign policy, and recruiting the staff to deliver it (Burke, 2012: 2). For example, Hemra et al. describe it as suffering from an “institutional and political malaise” and lacking “a vision and clear strategy to make the most of its capabilities” (2010: vi, 23). Similarly, Lehne (2011: 18) suggests there is a danger the new service could “drift into irrelevance” without this. More recently, he has suggested that the EEAS suffers from a “weak institutional identity” (Lehne, 2013). Arguably of far greater concern for the High Representative, though, are the anxieties expressed by member states over the extent and direction of the EEAS’s development. For example, in a letter to Baroness Ashton of 8 December 2011, 12 foreign ministers, including those from France, Germany, Poland and Sweden, stated that:

“The [EEAS] has the potential to significantly enhance the effectiveness and coherence of the EU’s external action. From the start we have strongly backed the view and have a major interest in a strong and efficient EEAS. …We would like to join efforts to further enhance the effectiveness of the EEAS and to help it develop its full potential. In this context we would like to offer some suggestions on how the functioning of the Service could be further improved…” (emphasis added)282

Although expressed in diplomatic language, this is a clear statement by the signatories of their concerns over what they feel is the slow pace of development, and the need for the High Representative to take a firmer grip of the process. Similarly, an Austrian foreign ministry non-paper of April 2011 noted that cooperation in the field in terms of EU delegations to third countries was “not very homogenous”. 283 In particular, it identified coordination, information-sharing within delegations, and

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282 Joint letter from the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, Catherine Ashton, 8 December 2011.
283 Austrian non-paper, “European External Action Service – Cooperation between EU Delegations and EU Member State Embassies on the ground”, 12 April 2011. The use of non-papers as a policy tool is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
between EU delegations and member state embassies, and crisis management as areas of concern (see also Stefan Lehne, 2011). GO7 also identified these as problems.

The establishment of so important an institution was always going to be complex and difficult, particularly as the EEAS was seeking to absorb long-standing components of both the Council Secretariat and the Commission, raising what Duke (2008: 15) calls “a multitude of turf sensitivities”. However, the problems it has faced are illustrative of a deeper issue, which is the role of the member states in its inception and construction. Crowe argues that the creation of such an institution with “so little guidance” in the Treaty would obviously be contentious (2008: 7). In this regard, it is interesting to note the similar paucity of detail in the original TEU regarding the CFSP, which stands in stark contrast to the detailed proposals set out for the path to Economic and Monetary Union. As Ginsberg (1998: 14) notes, the provisions on the CFSP were “necessarily vague” in order to secure agreement. Most obviously, this highlights the similar challenge in this case of putting flesh on the bones of a policy that touches on issues of national sovereignty and consequently remains hugely sensitive for some member states.

It is this that makes the establishment of the EEAS so relevant for this research given the important role Germany and Britain have played and continue to play not only in the negotiations that led to its creation, but in the subsequent debates over its strategic direction, management and staffing. In particular, it encapsulates the on-going dilemma they have faced since cooperation first began in foreign and security policy. On the one hand, with the EEAS they have sought to create an institution able not only to play a strong diplomatic role for the EU and be of benefit to their overall foreign policy aims, but also to reduce the power of the Commission by accruing the main instruments of foreign policy-making.

More recently, Lehne noted that while the EEAS occasionally “displays the leadership role of a collective EU foreign ministry”, more often than not it “amounts to little more than a secretariat for foreign policy co-ordination” (Lehne, 2013).
and implementation to the Council. On the other hand, whilst doing this, they have also sought to maintain their own national diplomatic networks and relationships (Furness, 2011: 13). Or, to put it another way, “[e]verybody supports coordination in principle, yet at the same time nobody wishes to be co-ordinated” (Lehne, 2013).

Once again, therefore, we must consider what their particular national interests were as regards the EEAS, how these were articulated, and the extent to which there was any convergence between these. The argument here is that far from representing a transformation in how the member states conceive of and conduct the CFSP as a constructivist analysis would imply, the EEAS is a pragmatic and functional attempt by member states to create an institutional counter-balance to the power of the Commission in foreign affairs. At the same time, rather than provide a new ideational or normative centre for genuinely ‘common’ foreign and security policy, it has instead become a new arena for competition between the member states in terms of their ability to exercise influence over the EEAS’s strategic direction, staffing etc, as well as the broader direction of the CFSP.
7.3.2 British policy towards the EEAS

British policy towards the EEAS has been based around three core principles: the maintenance of intergovernmentalism within foreign and security policy-making at the Brussels level; a general scepticism towards institution building, expansion or development; and a determination to ensure value for money. Each has informed how Britain has viewed the EEAS and its potential impact on the CFSP, and again emphasise the pragmatism inherent in UK foreign policy. Initially, Britain was ambivalent towards proposals to create a European-level foreign service (UKO4). The government was particularly concerned about the much more communautaire approach advocated initially by Germany (e.g. House of Commons, 2003e; 2004a; Crum, 2004), which amongst other things suggested that the Commission become more integral to EU external relations decision-making.

As the process of negotiating the Draft Constitutional Treaty progressed in the early 2000s, however, the government's position altered. The reforms that would bring the EEAS into existence were seen as offering the chance to streamline the Union’s external relations capacity, bringing more of this under the Council’s ambit, strengthening the intergovernmental character of the CFSP and in turn achieving greater accountability to member states. These pragmatic and functional justifications have been used consistently by governments ever since, including by the current coalition, even though in opposition the Conservatives opposed the establishment of the EEAS and have more recently raised hurdles to its functioning (UKO2) (see below). For example, William Hague stated in the House of Commons on 3 June 2010:

“[M]y party did not support the creation of the External Action Service, but it is now a fact… It is our task now to ensure that the service is both

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285 UKO4 says that “when it came [we] weren’t the most enthusiastic in the club”
useful to the nations of Europe and respects the role of national
diplomatic services” (Hansard, 2010c). 286

For Britain, therefore, the appeal of the EEAS lies first and foremost in
its ability to complement national foreign policy objectives, while the
idea of establishing a rival or competitor to member state predominance
in foreign and security policy is unacceptable. This approach is consistent
with previous British positions supporting the establishment of CFSP
within a separate pillar at Maastricht, the appointment of a High
Representative for CFSP operating from within the Council, and the
creation of the PSC.

The evolution of the British position revolves principally around
British understandings of what the EEAS is, and what it is not. Britain
does not consider it a diplomatic service in the classic sense, so a first
priority has been to ensure it does not encroach on traditional national
responsibilities, particularly the provision of full consular services. For
example, in a written Parliamentary answer in June 2002 outlining the
Government’s view about the creation of a “common European
diplomatic service”, Jack Straw declared that “it is for EU member states
to organise their respective diplomatic services at the national level”
(Hansard, 2002). Similarly, Peter Hain, as Leader of the House, noted
that Britain had “argued against” Convention proposals for a “fully-
fledged diplomatic service” (House of Commons, 2003e). 287 In 2006,
Geoff Hoon, Minister for Europe, declared that the government was
“sceptical” about the advantages of having a “quasi-diplomatic service”,
arguing that “[w]e still believe that this kind of external representation is
best done through the Member States, and indeed most…are of that
opinion” (House of Lords, 2006: 38). In 2009, Chris Bryant, Minister of

286 That said, former Labour Foreign Secretary David Miliband criticised this
position, declaring: “[T]he current government…don’t seem to have much of an
agenda and they’re particularly conflicted when it comes to Europe because they
don’t know if they want a stronger European foreign policy or not, but that’s for
them to work through.” (Interview, House of Commons, London, 6 December,
2010).

287 Hain was the British government’s representative to the Convention.
Europe, again dismissed suggestions the EEAS might assume a consular role on behalf of member states:

“I disagree with...[the] characterisation of the [EEAS] as a diplomatic service in all but name. ...we are determined that [it] should not move down that route. It is important that we retain our own consular services...we believe that we provide those services in an exceptional way...” (House of Commons, 2009b)

British opposition to any provision of consular services at European level was re-iterated by UKO6 and UKO7. UKO6 noted the government’s opinion that no European-level body could be trusted to provide the same level of service to British citizens:

“[W]e had no faith whatsoever that a European function could ever provide the level of service to British nationals that we felt that they expected, so no politician would ever take the risk.”

Meanwhile, UKO7 highlighted the political sensitivity, particularly for the coalition government, about any “perception that the EAS was taking on work that properly belonged to national foreign offices”. A determination to prevent the EEAS from ‘encroaching’ on the diplomatic prerogatives of member states thus represents a clear ‘red line’ for the UK. The EEAS “supplements and complements, but does not replace, the UK diplomatic service” (Hansard, 2012).

The second British priority has been to ensure that the EEAS does not dilute the CFSP’s intergovernmental character. This is something which it interprets “strictly”, according to Balfour and Raik (2013: 6), and the question of the precise role to be played by the High Representative as head of the EEAS is illustrative of this. As discussed, Britain supported the creation of this post, but when the idea first emerged from the Convention that the High Representative would ‘double-hat’ as head of the CFSP but also as the Commissioner responsible for external relations, this was highly problematic for London. In particular, there were questions over what such double-hatting would mean in terms of the Commission’s relationship to the CFSP. In 2003, for example, Peter Hain highlighted government concerns that as a
consequence the Commission might in effect gain “a back door into the [CFSP] in areas where it does not have a competence” and while there might be “tight linkages” between the two posts, declared the government “not satisfied with the position as it currently stands” (House of Commons, 2003e). The government position, articulated subsequently by Peter Ricketts, was therefore against the new post being “a full member” of the Commission (House of Commons, 2003d).

Equally, there was determination to ensure that both the High Representative and EEAS would be subject to control by national governments through the Council of Ministers. In this, Ricketts was confident in 2003 that the British view was prevailing among EU partners:

“[T]he debate is moving in the direction that our Government has set out…the idea that we should strengthen the High Representative and…his attachment to the Council as the deliverer of decisions adopted in the Council is gaining ground…we need to gather as many as we can around our approach.” (ibid.)

In 2004, Jack Straw reiterated this, noting Britain’s view of the basis for the High Representative’s authority:

“[Their] responsibility is to carry out the common foreign policy agreed…by Ministers. …The overwhelming responsibility on him or her is very clear, it is the mandate of the Council – full stop. …he cannot possibly give us orders. This is a union of Nation States.” (House of Commons, 2004a)

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289 Straw went on to stress British efforts to address the problems the draft Treaty represented in this regard: “I was concerned…that this person could not be tripped up by responsibilities to the College of Commissioners, in particular…that: "…Commissioners shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or other body." I felt that that statement…was quite inappropriate for the European Foreign Minister, which is why…one morning [I] went through this in very great detail with colleagues. Most of them…had not thought about this but…considered what I was saying and agreed it had to be changed; so it has been changed” (House of Commons, 2004a).
He then emphasised the increased control member states would enjoy over the external relations functions exercised by the Commission, particularly the overseas missions, as a consequence of the strengthened role of the High Representative and the creation of the EEAS (ibid). In 2007 Kim Darroch, the UK Permanent Representative to the EU, made a similar argument:

“Our view is that…the High Representative representing both the Council and the Commission and [EEAS]…does increase the Council’s role. It gives us more influence over how the Commission spends its external affairs budget…the opportunity to put diplomats from Member States into…joint missions overseas and…enhances the role of the Council overall, so we see this as a good thing without wanting to caricature it as a Council takeover.” (House of Lords, 2007: 26)

Following the agreement of Lisbon, in 2008 the government stressed its success in ensuring that the CFSP remained “in the hands of the Member States based on consensus” (FCO, 2008b). Under the new arrangements, the role of the High Representative would be to “enact agreed foreign policy” which in turn would “remain an intergovernmental area of activity controlled by the Member States and strengthening [their] authority over other areas of EU external action” (ibid) (emphasis added). The Government also re-iterated the possible advantages for Britain of the new dispensation. Thus, Chris Bryant stated in October 2009:

“[I]n a country where all the Member States of the EU have a significant interest we would want the High Representative to be able to use all the different levers that are available through from pre-conflict to conflict to post-conflict to peace-building, and at the moment those are spread differently around the various different elements of the Council and the Commission and we believe that it is important to have much better co-ordination.” (House of Commons, 2009b)

That said, while Parliament encouraged the government to “engage positively” (House of Lords, 2008b: 197) with partner states in developing the EEAS following Lisbon, it noted the lack of detail in either the treaty or the government’s responses to questions as to what structures would ultimately emerge (House of Commons, 2008c; House of Lords, 2008b).
The third British priority, linked to both of these, is to ensure complementarity and value for money. British opposition to unnecessary institution-building has been discussed above in the context of the ESDP/CSDP, and similar concerns pertain here. The benefits of the EEAS are in bringing the EU’s disparate range of external relations functions as far as possible under one institutional roof. It is therefore imperative to prevent expensive and unnecessary duplication of functions or bureaucratic growth. For example, in 2006 Geoff Hoon emphasised the need not to “duplicate existing services provided very effectively already by Member States” (House of Lords, 2006: 39). Similarly, following Lisbon the FCO made clear that the purpose of the High Representative and EEAS should be to “reduce bureaucratic duplication and improve the coherence and effectiveness of policy implementation” (FCO, 2008b; see also House of Commons, 2009b).\(^\text{290}\) As UKO7 notes, these were objectives established originally by Labour but have also been pursued by the Coalition since 2010.

An important aspect of this since 2010 has been the principle of ‘budget neutrality’. In essence, this demands that the EEAS should require no more expenditure than that spent by the institutional elements it is replacing/combining. For UKO2, the EEAS must “create savings” and that the British government were “committed to cost and budget neutrality overall”, a position with which UKO7 concurred. This aim is repeated regularly in official government statements. For example, David Lidington, Minister for Europe, declared that the establishment of the EEAS “should be guided by the principle of cost-efficiency aiming towards budget neutrality” (Hansard, 2010a) and must provide “value for money” (Hansard, 2010b; see also Hansard, 2011a; 2011b; 2011c).\(^\text{291}\) That said, UKO7 noted that in practice “we [have] had to tolerate a

\(^{290}\) Regarding consular services, it is worth noting that some smaller states have seen in the establishment of the EEAS “opportunities to reduce their own diplomatic networks and in so doing to save a bit of money” (UKO7).

\(^{291}\) That said, UKO7 notes that in practice “we had to tolerate a certain amount of growth in the EAS budget and from the perspective of our ministers, that’s something we’re not very happy about”.
certain amount of growth in the EAS budget and from the perspective of our ministers, that’s something we’re not very happy about”.

Overall, therefore, Britain’s view of the EEAS remains guarded. UKO7 articulated the main British attitude as being to cooperate with the new institution “where it has a clear added value on issues that matter” to Britain, for example in achieving stability in the European neighbourhood, conflicts in Africa, Iran and the Middle East Peace Process. The unspoken inference, though, is that where it does not do so, Britain will remain wary of engagement with it, at least under the present government. This guardedness can be seen in the three core principles which underpin British policy set out above. As will be shown in section 7.3.4, these have determined how Britain has engaged with the establishment and subsequent development of the EEAS.
7.3.3 German policy towards the EEAS

In contrast, German policy towards the EEAS has always been more favourable. However significant the potential functional or instrumental benefits of the EEAS in terms of streamlining foreign policy-making (e.g. AA, 2007b), for Germany it is as important for the emphasis it places on what is common in CFSP. This fits very much into its broader ideational view of how the CFSP should function, particularly that it should provide “the famous telephone number that Mr Kissinger mentioned” and enable Europe “to speak with one voice” (GO6; Merkel, 2010; Bundesregierung, 2010d: 2).\(^{292}\) UKO7 also notes that Germany has arguably “a more genuine commitment to a real EU foreign policy”. Consequently, Germany was always “very much in favour of it and pushed it from the start, and we’re still doing that” (GO6). Historically, Germany has favoured bringing the CFSP closer to the Community’s frameworks, and was unhappy with the separation institutionalised by the pillar system at Maastricht (Aggestam, 2000: 73). More broadly, it has sought a better linkage and coordination between the policy produced by the CFSP, and the financial and economic instruments available through the first pillar to implement this. It has also favoured the extension of majority voting within the CFSP and allowing the European Parliament greater scrutiny over it (ibid).

This would suggest there is little common ground between Germany’s more communautaire vision and Britain’s championing of intergovernmentalism. However, it is interesting to note that while both apparently come from opposite sides in terms of the direction of travel they favour for the CFSP, there are areas of commonality. In particular, both see an effective High Representative supported by an efficient EEAS as important to strengthening the EU’s global voice (albeit only in certain circumstances for Britain), and Germany is also anxious to ensure

\(^{292}\) In a recent article examining the attitudes of EEAS officials towards their new service, Juncos and Pomorska found that despite differing views on how best to organise it, one important shared idea was “support for…a stronger European voice in the world to be achieved with the help of the new service” (2013: 15).
that institutional development delivers coherence and efficiency, not unnecessary bureaucracy or expense. The difference is that Germany has presented these ‘macro’-objectives in terms of achieving broader ‘European’ goals, whereas Britain’s approach has been more functional, focusing on how the EEAS can support the achievement of national objectives. That said, Germany nonetheless views the EEAS (and High Representative) as contributing to the accomplishment of German foreign policy objectives as pursued through the CFSP.

At the root of German policy has been a frustration at how the CFSP interacts with other areas of EU external relations. The EU suffers from a “disconnect between money and politics” (GO6) in terms of how it delivers foreign policy, and a key aim of Lisbon from the German perspective is to develop a genuinely “comprehensive approach [on] all aspects of the [EU’s] external action” (GO1; see also Bundesregierung, 2010d: 2). Indeed, the “philosophical idea” behind the role of the High Representative, supported by the EEAS, is to “guarantee” this (GO2). Greater coherence, coordination and continuity in foreign policy are essential, but can only be delivered centrally (GO6, GO7; Bundesregierung, 2010d: 3) through what is referred to as the “single-desk principle” (Bundesregierung, 2010d: 8). While Germany and particularly its foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, advocated a more federalist approach at the Convention (e.g. Fischer, 2000; see also Menon, 2003), what ultimately emerged were proposals for a High Representative who would be independent, both of the Commission and of the European Council, and supported by the EEAS.

The German government has repeatedly emphasised the importance of this independence if the High Representative and EEAS are to deliver on the three objectives required of them. It was referred to, for example, in the 2009 coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU and FDP which suggested that the “interlinkage of EU foreign policy with the individual foreign policies of member states is best achieved by an independent EEAS” (Bundesregierung, 2009b: 118; see also AA, 2008:
Other official statements have made similar points (e.g. Bundesregierung, 2009c; 2010b: 2; Bundestag, 2010a: 1; AA, 2012q). From the German perspective, indeed, if the problems of “lowest common denominator” policy and “conflicting interests [among] member states” (GO6) are to be resolved, achieving independence from the Council is just as important as independence from the Commission. Policy should rather be driven by a “neutral person” (GO3), with the achievement of a coherent CFSP “in the interests of all member states” (Bundesregierung, 2010d: 3). (The views of German officials on how far this aim has actually been achieved are considered below.)

As noted, an important area of commonality with Britain is to avoid the creation of unnecessary additional bureaucracy and ensure value for money. For example, GO7 notes that one expected advantage of the EEAS will be the “institutional memory” it provides now that the High Representative and her staff have replaced the rotating presidency in chairing meetings of the FAC, PSC and various working groups (GO7; see also, AA, 2008: 10). However, if the new structures are to be justified, such streamlining must also be accompanied by a concomitant improvement in the “interconnectedness” of EU-level foreign policy-making (Bundesregierung, 2009c). Equally, the principle of ‘cost neutrality’ must apply (Bundesregierung, 2010d: 5; Bundestag, 2010a: 2).

At the same time, there are a number of significant differences. First, Germany officially welcomes the additional power of scrutiny the European Parliament now enjoys through the budgetary responsibilities the High Representative exercises as a Commission Vice-President (Bundesregierung, 2009c; 2010d: 3). It is interesting to note, though, that while this may be seen as increasing transparency and accountability (e.g. Bundesregierung, 2010d: 4), some German officials are less convinced. For example, GO6 suggests that it would not be a good idea for MEPs to have any further involvement as they “don’t really know much about foreign policy”. Furthermore, the Government has reassured the Bundestag that its rights of scrutiny over Germany foreign policy are in
no way changed by Lisbon (Bundesregierung, 2010d: 3). A second important difference comes in the German position vis-à-vis the provision of consular services by the EEAS. Whilst accepting that this remains a possibility only in the long-term, the government is open to the possibility provided the relevant legal questions are resolved (e.g. Bundesregierung, 2010e: 7). GO6 makes the same point, noting that the first priority is for “the EAS to do its job properly” but that in a few years “we can talk about [it] taking over consular affairs”. A third difference comes in German attitudes to EU representation in 3rd countries and in international organisations. Again, an emphasis is placed on the EU being able to “speak with a single voice” (AA, 2008: 108), with the EEAS having a vital role to play through the EU delegations, but this is an issue upon which there has been considerable disagreement with Britain’s current government (GO6, UKO7) (see below).

Overall, it is important to note that while the federalist vision outlined by Joschka Fischer in 2000 may not be representative of Germany’s overall objective for EU foreign and security policy, the achievement of further integration is. For Germany, strengthening the roles of the High Representative and EEAS is an important component of this. For GO7, the aim is to create “a stronger Europe…in this situation we need more Europe, so this is our approach”. While this contradicts the principles of British policy towards the EEAS, it is interesting that both see it as an instrument able to accomplish their particular aims. This indicates not only that there is much still to resolve in terms of how the EEAS will develop and the role(s) it can play, but that determining these will continue to be an area of disagreement and competition between member states.
7.3.4 German and British engagement on the EEAS

While the establishment of the EEAS represents a major institutional reform, it is not yet clear whether it will prove to be “one of the most meaningful innovations” of Lisbon (Bundestag, 2010b). Although it has the potential to transform both the output and implementation of the CFSP, the vagueness in the treaty provisions concerning its creation noted above reflect the ambivalence of member states identified by Hemra et al. (2011). Moreover, they demonstrate the stalemate in negotiations between those preferring a more centrally managed, ‘European’ foreign policy machine – especially the smaller states (UKO7) – and those (e.g. France and Britain) concerned with the maintenance of intergovernmentalism and preservation of national sovereignty. UKO7 summarised this division as follows:

“[T]here is some pragmatism but…the approach does also reflect relatively deep-seated views…I think Germany has traditionally wanted more Europe across the board, and that includes more Europe on foreign policy, whereas…the UK and France have a stronger tradition of independent diplomacy and are perhaps…more cautious.”

In this sense, the EEAS is a microcosm of the central tension that has always overshadowed foreign policy cooperation.

Britain and Germany are excellent exemplars of these competing approaches. The arrangements that led to the creation of the EEAS demonstrate that neither has achieved an ascendancy, but also that there is no over-riding norm for greater integration in CFSP that is leading to a transformation at the national level. Moreover, the fact that both see the EEAS (and High Representative) as important to the achievement of national foreign policy objectives again underscores the instrumentalist approach both take towards the new institution, regardless of the ‘European’ language that Germany may use in describing its long-term benefits. Consequently, the EEAS and the negotiations that brought it into being represent first and foremost an arena of competition between the states. Moreover, now that it has been established, this competition continues, the focus being on the policies the EEAS should prioritise and
the allocation of key portfolios within its Brussels structures and in its overseas missions. For example, GO6 notes that “it’s a bit of a competition” to get national diplomats into key posts, with the French “ahead there”.\(^{293}\) How Britain and Germany engage in this competition has and continues to be driven by national interest.

For the purposes of this analysis the period can be divided into two halves – pre- and post-\textit{Lisbon}. As noted, the pre-\textit{Lisbon} period was punctuated by periods of intense diplomatic activity beginning with the \textit{Convention} itself and followed by the two IGCs in 2004 and 2007. In between these was the so-called ‘period of reflection’ (e.g. House of Lords, 2005: 18; AA, 2007b), during which time the discussions “went off the boil” (UKO7). Prior to the 2007 IGC, however, the UK government sought to re-open the decisions on the revised role of the High Representative and the establishment of the EEAS to seek further ‘clarifications’ of what the new arrangements would entail, which Avery and Missiroli suggest came as “a surprise to many” (2007: 6).

More broadly, British engagement has followed the path outlined in Chapter 5. Input into the negotiations on the EEAS was led by the FCO’s Europe Directorate, which ensured consultation with ministers and drafted the instructions for UKREP (UKO7). However, other parts of Whitehall were consulted as appropriate, particularly, for example, the Treasury on the issue of budget neutrality and there was “a lot of interaction with DfID” on the question of development programming (UKO7). UKREP, meanwhile, played an important information gathering role, particularly from the Commission, Council Secretariat and European Parliament (UKO2). One key issue for Britain was the place of ESDP/CSDP within the new structures. As UKO7 notes, part of the rationale for the EEAS was “to better integrate the soft power instruments…with the more hard power instruments like CSDP”. French

\(^{293}\) GO6 notes some of the problems in recruiting German diplomats to EEAS postings overseas: “If you’re looking for somebody for Abuja…then you have to knock on doors. If you’re looking for someone for New York, you’ll have a lot of applicants.
determination not to dismantle or rebuild the existing structures or change reporting lines meant that much “was left unchanged” and the current structures “are not as joined-up” as Britain would like (UKO7). Ministerial involvement was also significant, with David Miliband, and then William Hague and David Lidington having been closely involved and “very interested” pre- and post- Lisbon respectively (UKO2). Thus, despite initial concerns or misgivings following the Convention, Britain did become fully engaged in the process of establishing the EEAS.

Germany by contrast was always strongly supportive of the concept of an EEAS, as noted. An initial proponent of the service, it cooperated with France in presenting the initiative, thus demonstrating its preference for working in partnership when making policy proposals.294 As GO6 notes, however, some member states needed to be convinced:

“I think we hand to convince a couple of them. The first idea that came to many people’s minds was: foreign policy, now done by Brussels? No way. This is national sovereignty. So we had to explain what we want[ed] and how it’s supposed to work and by and by I think more people understood that it’s basically a good idea and we should give it a try.”

During the ‘period of reflection’, German commitment in the longer-term to achieving treaty change remained strong, although discussions remained “behind closed doors”, involving the highest official and ministerial levels in the AA and Chancellery (GO6). Indeed, GO6 is very clear of the importance of Germany in getting the treaty process back on track. Noting that the input for the 2007 IGC “was set by Germany”, he argues that “it was basically our Chancellor, Mrs Merkel, who…said, this is our chance, let’s make use of it”. The German approach can therefore be seen as much more positive and proactive than Britain’s.

294 Germany had also consulted closely with France ahead of the 2000 Nice Summit which initiated the treaty reform process that led to the Convention and ultimately to Lisbon (Fischer, 2008: 345). In his memoirs, meanwhile, Jacques Chirac is quick to claim the credit for the idea of a European constitution: “In the speech I gave to the Berlin Bundestag in June 2000, I was the first head of state officially to launch the idea of a European constitution”; he goes on to acknowledge, though, that “it could not have seen the light of day if there had not been a Franco-German agreement to develop it” (2012: 307-8).
Post-Lisbon, meanwhile, Britain and Germany have demonstrated similar preoccupations in terms of ensuring the efficiency and cost effectiveness of the EEAS. The formation of Britain’s coalition government in 2010 changed the underlying political view of the EEAS as noted. Thus, while philosophically opposed to its establishment, the government has taken a pragmatic decision to engage with the EEAS “as something which was an established fact and to then manage the risk” (UKO7). UKO2 notes that it is very important for FCO officials to remember that the “bottom line was that the Tories opposed [its] establishment… which is our backstop on the policy”. This has been reflected in a determination to ensure the EEAS and High Representative “[k]eep their political focus” on issues where Britain sees them as adding value (UKO7), such as the development of strategic partnerships. These were an idea that Britain “signed up to…from the start” and which will be “a really important bit of European policy” (UKO2) given the potential impact of bringing the EU’s collective weight to bear on relations with the US, Russia, China etc. For Britain, this is an area where the EU can add genuine value through the strategic continuity the High Representative and EEAS can provide. For example, David Lidington stated in July 2011 that Britain was

“keen that the EU identifies concrete goals [for strategic partnerships], preferably using its trade levers, with each country. And that the EU places an equally high priority on its relations with India.” (Hansard, 2011e)

However, UKO7 suggested there was some “frustration...about the EAS’s inability to really grip” the strategic partnerships policy. Indeed, in the foreign policy component of the British Government’s recent Balance of Competences review exercise, concern has been expressed that in the case of the EU and China, the strategic partnership “has never equalled the sum of its parts” (FCO, 2013: 51).

British pragmatism is also clear in the focus on budget neutrality and in the considerable sensitivity it exhibits over the EEAS and external
representation. For example, in a written statement in 2011, David Lidington emphasised that “the EAS should limit its representation of the member states to agreed areas” (Hansard, 2011b). In particular, there are concerns over how far the EEAS would seek to “assert the right to make greater statements on behalf of the EU”, something which is a “red line” for Britain (UKO7). British opposition on this question has led to tensions with Germany and other member states, however. GO6 was particularly critical of Britain’s refusal to allow the EEAS to speak in international organisations unless it was “in the name of the EU and its 27 member states”, something he described as being “almost sabotage” given the large number of international declarations this had affected.295 He went on to suggest that FCO officials were actually “very uncomfortable” with this position, but were operating on “strict and direct orders” from William Hague. UKO7 suggested, however, that the German view “probably” reflected the fact that they were not on the Security Council and so the alternative was “the most promising for a bigger German role”. However, he entirely accepted that Germany was “on the opposite side of the argument”.

This indicates a number of things. First, Britain has shown a clear willingness to reject any proposals that it feels threaten the prerogatives of member states in CFSP. It also suggests it has adopted an essentially defensive stance, as outlined in Chapter 5. Equally, though, the EEAS is encouraging some potentially interesting changes in the processes by which Britain makes inputs into the CFSP. While previously it would have prioritised engagement with incoming presidencies, because this work is now carried out by the EAS the FCO in particular is now paying more attention to the new body (UKO7). For example, UKO7 suggested that whereas previously the FCO’s Africa Director might not have engaged especially with the Brussels’ institutions, under the new dispensation he/she will need to get to know and communicate more regularly and effectively with the EEAS’s Africa Director, and so on.

295 At the time of the interview, GO6 put the figure at over 100.
This in turn could re-energise the FCO’s ‘mainstreaming’ policy. Similarly, the PSC may now become “a more important place for brokering compromises” (UKO7). It is interesting to note the differing views about the longer term prospects for co-operation between London and the EEAS. Thus, while UKO7 suggested there had been a “greater alignment” of UK and EEAS interests, UKO6 was less optimistic, however, concluding that while Britain would work with it, “they don’t really add a lot”. Finally, it is interesting to note that the High Representative being British is not considered especially significant and the current government has certainly not deemed it a reason to be supportive of her. As UKO7 put it, “I think that if ministers had felt that there were wider issues for the UK interest that meant that we had to publicly oppose the EAS…they would have been quite happy to do that.”

Rather, where Britain has been satisfied with what the EEAS has done, it is “not necessarily because Ashton’s British, but [because] their policy instincts are similar to our policy instincts” (UKO7).

Despite Germany’s more positive and proactive stance towards the EEAS, it demonstrates some similar preoccupations, particularly with body’s functioning and organisation. 296 In part these reflect an organisation that is not yet functioning “at full speed” (Consilium, 2009d: 10). Thus, GO4 criticises the EAS for being slow to provide documents on CSDP questions, doing so “only at the very last minute”, but then demanding an immediate comment or policy response from national capitals. 297 Of more serious concern, however, has been the manner in which the High Representative has managed the EEAS in its first months of operation. GO3, for example, suggests that the EAS lacks “political clout” and that the High Representative’s lack of a foreign policy

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296 See also Pomorska and Vanhoonacker (2013) in which the authors identified similar concerns among officials in the EEAS and other Permanent Representations.

297 OMS1 makes a similar comment, suggesting she was “totally shocked that papers, documents were not sent out. You had to look for things. And I thought…this [is] Brussels, this well-organised…capital of the EU, so I was very much shocked…[But] it’s still quite a young organisation and it’s getting better.”
background means she struggles to “live up to” her predecessor. 298 Similarly, GO5 questions the ability of either the EEAS or High Representative to deal with policy in crisis areas such as Sudan. For GO3, part of the explanation lies in the difference with the rotating presidency system. Previously, when a member state had only six months, “you put all your energy in it”; with four years, the High Representative seems to think “why should you rush?” especially if you are meeting lots of resistance (GO3). 299

These concerns form part of a wider series of issues Germany has with the current structure and set up of the EEAS. It is, for example, seeking a number of revisions to Article 9 of the 2010 Council Decision which set out how the EEAS would function (Consilium, 2010) relating to financial aid and financial instruments. In particular, it is concerned the Commission has retained too much financial control, leaving the EEAS merely “involved in programming” (GO6). This and related concerns about how the EEAS is being organised led to a significant intervention in the form of the ‘Non-Paper of the 12 Foreign Ministers’ sent to the High Representative in December 2011 (discussed in Chapter 5). A “German initiative” intended to offer “constructive” input (GO6), the non-paper was intended to further enhance the effectiveness of the EEAS and to help it develop its full potential”. To do this, it highlighted 5 areas of concern: preparation for the FAC; coordination with the Commission; internal EEAS procedures; the building up of overseas delegations; and the full involvement of member states. From the German perspective, the value of the EEAS lies in its ability to provide a coherent and global approach. This non-paper encapsulates, therefore, the

298 GO7 notes that when Solana was High Representative, even though he was not chairing the FAC, “still, you had the impression he was chairing”.
299 EU3 suggests part of the problem is the High Representative’s difficulty in asserting her authority, particularly in the FAC: “we had a Foreign Affairs Council and one of the agenda items was the Middle East Peace Process...we had an exchange of views on where things are and how things are happening. What did you have? …11 of the 27 ministers taking the floor to describe their own personal visit to Gaza... How could Ashton shut some up? She just said, well I take note of all your experiences and all your contributions, and we’ll move on.”
wish for a more effective linkage between the EEAS, Commission and member states (GO7), something which needs to be addressed both in Brussels but also in the EU’s many overseas delegations (GO6). The comprehensive nature of what it covers suggests a maximalist approach that contrasts with the almost ‘hands-off’ British view of the EEAS, and is designed to fulfil its potential as set out in the original treaty. While the ideas may have been presented in partnership with other states, they represent a clear effort by Germany to influence the long-term direction of the EEAS. Moreover, GO6 suggests that Germany is already looking to the new Commission and the next High Representative “to see if there will be more dynamism in the EEAS after that”.

This discussion demonstrates that there remains a great deal to resolve as far as the EEAS is concerned. Moreover, differences between Germany and Britain seem more pronounced now than previously and based around long-standing preoccupations over the degree of integration they wish to see in CFSP. The conclusion, therefore, is that in the short term at least, the EEAS will represent an arena for continuing disagreement and competition over the direction and nature of foreign and security policy cooperation.
Conclusion

Introduction

This thesis has set out to answer two interlinked questions: how do Britain and Germany interact with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, and why do they employ the strategies that they do? It took as its starting point the constructivist turn in the literature examining European integration, and particularly how this has been applied within supranationalist theoretical explanations of the development of CFSP. This posits a transformation in how member states approach the CFSP both in practice and ideationally (e.g. Glarbo, 1999; Manners, 2002; 2006; Risse, 2004; Sjursen, 2001; 2005; Smith 2004). In particular, this literature argues that continuous interaction and engagement over the long-term by member states in the CFSP results in changes not only in how they pursue, articulate and defend their national preferences and interests, but in how they formulate these in the first place. These are powerful claims implying that the CFSP has evolved into a major giver and shaper of norms and identity, not merely sitting atop a structure created by the member states, but penetrating every aspect of that structure, including the institutions and processes of the member states themselves. Consequently, the impacts and effects of long-term cooperation and interaction are likely to be profound, with the logical conclusion being changes not merely to the processes by which EU member states make and conduct foreign and security policy, but a transformation in how they view the world and their place in it.

The question, therefore, is whether supranationalist analyses drawing from constructivist explanations of our reality can adequately explain what has and is taking place in the CFSP, particularly in
reference to these two states. The answer offered by this thesis is that while constructivism can provide important insights in terms of the how of policy-making through important concepts such as socialization, its utility in accounting for the what, specifically the policy outcomes that member states seek and which reflect their national interests and preferences – the pursuit of which explains their decision to engage in the CFSP in the first place – is much more open to question and critique when employed in support of a supranationalist theoretical explanation. Indeed, the apparent absence of any serious consideration of what is taking place at the national level – including in terms of the norms, values and identities that are being generated by national institutions such as foreign ministries and diplomatic systems – in the supranationalist literature is an important omission. This thesis has therefore sought to look at what is taking place at the national level, and the traditions, structures and processes represented there, in order to better understand how these states interact with and within the CFSP. This final chapter summarises the findings from the country and case studies to support the main argument, and offer some ideas in answer to the logical follow-up question: if constructivism has been mis-applied in supranationalist theoretical analyses, can it be useful in alternative theoretical approaches?
Empirical findings

The research question this thesis set out to answer is: *Does constructivism as applied in supranationalist analyses provide a satisfactory framework through which to explain how and why member states interact with the CFSP in the manner that they do?* It has examined two member states, Britain and Germany, considering the historical backgrounds and traditions of their foreign policies; the structures and processes by which they make foreign and security policy; and how they have approached a range of policy issues. It then provided a more in-depth analysis of two specific policy cases: their responses to the crisis surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme; and the establishment and development of the European External Action Service. Guiding the analysis have been four indicators. These are: (i) the complexity of policy coordination machinery; (ii) the degree of convergence in policy structures and outputs; (iii) the projection of national interests and preferences; and (iv), change in national discourse. The findings as they relate to each indicator are summarised here followed by some conclusions that can be drawn.

(i) The complexity of policy coordination machinery

The argument made in the coordination literature (e.g. Kassim *et al.*, 2000; 2001; Derlien 2000) is that how member states organise can make a difference in terms of their ability to exercise influence over policy-making in Brussels. Moreover, where a state such as Britain exhibits a strong coordination ambition, this is likely to be reflected in complex and sophisticated administrative machinery at both the national and Brussels levels. The application of this literature to the question of how these states interact with the CFSP is important because *how* they organise is indicative both of the degree to which they seek to project national preferences in foreign and security policy to the CFSP, and then instrumentalise it to accomplish them. In short, why devote time and
resources to effective coordination if not to accomplish nationally-derived interests and goals?

Both states demonstrate a determination to achieve effective coordination in foreign and security policy in order to be best placed to exercise influence. Both consider it a *sine qua non* that they will have an agreed position on whatever policy issue or question is under consideration. Britain has well-established institutional mechanisms in place in the FCO to ensure effective internal policy coordination; and more broadly to bring together other stakeholders such as the MoD, DfID and the Prime Minister’s office. This reflects a broader coordination ambition, regardless of whether the issue in question relates specifically to the CFSP or another multilateral setting. This coordination is supported by the FCO’s internal policy of ‘mainstreaming’ designed to highlight the significance of the CFSP for all areas of Britain’s foreign policy. A number of those interviewed also emphasised the importance of regular meetings and less formal discussions with colleagues in-house and in other departments. This is particularly important, for example, in matters relating to CSDP which involve particularly the MoD but also DfID. The evidence here is that the FCO and MoD work particularly closely, supported by the relatively small size of and familiarity within the ‘Pol-Mil’ community which is seen as facilitating efficient policy-making. While political and policy leadership comes largely from the FCO, the Prime Minister also plays an important role in setting the strategic policy direction. UKREP is also a key actor in this policy-making process, providing vital information and contributing significantly in terms of the strategy and tactics needed to accomplish a particular outcome in Brussels. Finally, the importance of bilateral diplomatic networks should not be ignored, reminding us that although significant, for the UK the CFSP represents just one component in a broader matrix of engagement and foreign policy coordination.

While German officials have openly acknowledged that their success in achieving effective coordination is not as great as Britain’s,
Germany nonetheless demonstrates a significant coordination ambition in foreign and security policy. This reflects the fact that while it locates the accomplishment of its foreign policy within a range of multilateral contexts, of which the EU is possibly the most important, it nevertheless has a clear set of national preferences and goals. Again, coordination is achieved through a combination of formal and informal structures and processes. These seek to ensure good linkages between the AA and other key foreign and security policy stakeholders such as the Chancellery and BMVg. This is supported, for example, by the secondment of senior AA officials to act as advisors to the Chancellor (something that also happens in the UK). Moreover, efforts are also being made to improve broader coordination of foreign and security policy within the German system, and particularly to involve other departments, such as the Ministry of the Interior, more effectively. As in the UK, the German Permanent Representation is also a key actor. Important differences remain in terms of the degree of efficiency and flexibility in the German system overall, echoing previous findings (e.g. Derlien, 2000) in other policy areas. Meanwhile, although the objective of German policy coordination is to ensure a clear and agreed position on all issues, the evidence is that this is not always achieved.

Regardless of their effectiveness, what is perhaps most significant, though, is the intent these efforts at coordination represent for both states. However important the CFSP to both, they have clear foreign policy agendas that look beyond the European level and thus CFSP forms just one part of the wider ‘toolkit’ available to pursue these. This requires, though, that their domestic foreign policy-making regimes are appropriately organised and prepared in order to defend and promote their preferences and objectives. This also feeds into the leadership role both play within the CFSP. Again, there are important differences – for Britain, such leadership is assumed but not necessarily always successful, whereas for Germany it is a role it plays reluctantly, but is increasingly playing (and is expected to play). Nevertheless, both states expect their
policy positions to carry weight in CFSP. It is interesting to note the potentially different trajectories they are on, however. For Britain, there is a growing sense of frustration with the ability of the CFSP as a whole to deliver what it wishes, while Germany is becoming more comfortable acting ‘normally’ in articulating and pursuing its national objectives. This would seem to contradict constructivist notions of a CFSP-generated transformation in British and German national preferences or interests.

(ii) Convergence in policy structures and outputs

The Europeanization literature (e.g. Cowles et al., 2003; Jordan, 2003; Laffan, 2007; Radaelli, 2003; Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007) has frequently wrestled with the question of convergence as a consequence of EU membership. While complex to define, for simplicity convergence is considered here in terms of foreign policy structures and policy outputs. As has been demonstrated elsewhere (e.g. Allen and Oliver, 2008; Pomorska, 2011; Wong and Hill, 2011), participation in CFSP places certain organisational demands on foreign ministries, one of the most notable at national level being the need to have a European Correspondent, while in Brussels to be able to participate in structures such as the PSC and its network of working groups. Britain and Germany have both organised their national and Brussels-level structures in order to engage effectively with the CFSP. However, whilst there are parallels between the two, as indicated in the country studies, there are small but important differences in terms of the roles assigned to particular officials, the dossiers they cover, the working groups or committees they participate in, etc. The FCO has also reduced its broader coverage of EU policy, and now focuses primarily on CFSP. This reflects both the greater ability of the wider Whitehall network to handle the European components of its policy areas, and the need for the FCO to target increasingly scarce resources on areas of increased diplomatic importance, particularly the emerging economies in Asia and Latin America. For both countries, convergence towards particular forms of
organisation reflects the practical demands of participation in CFSP. However, as implied in the previous discussion on coordination, organising their foreign ministries to facilitate this participation seems first and foremost a matter of functional effectiveness.

The picture in terms of convergence in policy priorities is more complex. A strong argument can be made that through the *acquis politique* the CFSP represents a significant body of pre-existing commitments, repeated cooperation and agreed policy positions on a range of issues. This in turn is supported by a range of shared practices, the most notable of which is the consultation reflex, which are captured under the broader concept of socialization. However, the evidence presented indicates that Britain and Germany both continue to focus on their own policy priorities and *domaines réservés* as well. For example, Germany has a particular interest in developing the *Eastern Partnership* and the links to former Soviet-bloc states; Britain, meanwhile, has promoted EU relations with Pakistan and former colonies in Africa. These priorities may or may not be shared by the majority of other members. Equally, they – and the outputs they generate – represent national interests that pre-date both the EU and foreign policy cooperation in CFSP.

As noted, there has been some convergence on a range of important policy issues. These include the principle of developing the EU’s crisis management response capability and responding to Iran’s nuclear programme. However, while these are shared as priorities, again either their origin pre-dates CFSP – for example a commitment to the NPT regime in the response to Iran; or their importance is derived from an external source – for example, for Britain the desire to improve European military capabilities through CSDP to achieve a broader improvement in capabilities available to NATO, something Germany also shares, if perhaps to a lesser extent. Moreover, in the case of CSDP, Germany has a clear preference for civilian over military crisis management responses, indicating an important difference with Britain.
This perhaps says more about the commonality of problems and challenges facing these (and other) states, rather than any transformation of underlying interests. It also supports the conclusion that both states seek to instrumentalise the CFSP to achieve particular policy goals. While these may be shared, and the arena provided by the CFSP may have been important in helping states reach a consensus on a policy action, this does not suggest that these particular national interests have been changed or transformed via involvement in it. This leads directly to the third indicator.

(iii) The projection of national interests and preferences

In considering the projection of national interests and preferences, we can again draw on the Europeanization literature, particularly in terms of policy uploading (e.g. Börzel, 2002; Major, 2005; Wong, 2005). Here, there are some interesting outcomes. Given the largely instrumental perspective its takes towards CFSP, it is unsurprising that Britain seeks to upload particular national preferences to the EU level which, as noted, represents an important component in its wider foreign policy ‘toolkit’.

Thus, we have seen British-inspired initiatives to develop EU relations with its former colonies, to develop an EU military capability complementary to NATO, and to ensure a robust EU-level response to Iran to underpin wider international efforts at the UN and IAEA. From the British perspective, these are areas where the CFSP and EU can ‘add value’ to its broader foreign policy. Equally, however, where it has less interest in the policy in question, for example its decision not to become involved in the ESDP mission to Chad, it remains semi-detached, allowing those who have promoted the policy to lead. It will then only intervene if particular red lines are crossed relating, for example, to the financial implications of policies or missions. This can be characterised as a pragmatic and essentially defensive approach. Thus, while the British system will certainly be taking on board the perspectives of its
partner states through UKREP and bilateral links, these may have only a limited impact on broader foreign policy making domestically.

Germany, however, adopts a slightly different stance. As discussed, its engagement with the CFSP can be characterised in terms of four varying approaches to leadership, with its preferred choice being to operate in partnership when promoting a particular policy preference – such as the joint proposal with France for the EEAS. However, while avoiding unilateral action wherever possible, it has nevertheless sought to upload its particular preferences in terms of developing the Eastern Partnership, responding to the Iran crisis etc. It is more comfortable than the UK in articulating these preferences in ‘European’ or even broader terms – for example, in its stance on Iran and the need for robust European action. Indeed, the close identification of German foreign and security policy with the frameworks provided by the EU (and NATO) certainly make such an articulation easier and more natural than it would perhaps be for Britain. However, as has been shown this should not disguise the fact that Germany is nonetheless pursuing policy objectives and preferences determined at the national level as being of national importance. Moreover, like the UK it is equally prepared to adopt a defensive stance to prevent a particular policy, whether it relates to expenditure, relations with Cuba, or decisions (not) to deploy ESDP/CSDP missions.

One final point concerns the ability of both states to work with partners, whether in presenting policy proposals or crafting compromise etc. The evidence suggests that both are effective and regarded by their partners as such. The UK seems to enjoy an advantage in terms of its ability to persuade partner states, partly linguistic but also due to the effectiveness of its arguments, its preparation, and its flexibility, all of which are founded upon a generally efficient domestic policy-making process. Germany, meanwhile, represents an important counterbalance to both the UK and France, with the former sometimes seen as an outlier in policy terms. According to German accounts, at least, smaller states are
often eager to coalesce around the German position, while Germany seeks to position itself as a champion or defender of the interests of its smaller partners. What this indicates most clearly is that both are effective at the process of policy-making – the *how* of CFSP – although British officials could perhaps be considered as enjoying a slight advantage over their German peers. The important point, though, is that being good at the process cannot be equated to a change in the *what* – i.e. it does not indicate a change or transformation in national preferences or interests as a consequence of what is taking place within the CFSP. Indeed, the opposite might be a more plausible explanation: what better way, after all, to pursue and promote a national preference at European level than by ensuring you are effective at the *process* itself? Such a conclusion echoes the findings of Juncos and Pomorska (2008), for example, about how new member states have ‘learnt’ within CFSP committees.

(iv) Change in national discourse

The final indicator concerns the national discourse used in connection with the CFSP, reflected in official government statements, declarations and speeches, but also in the language used by officials. Perhaps unsurprisingly, how officials from each state talk about the CFSP reflects to a reasonable extent their country’s broader perspective on integration: thus, German officials were generally more positive, happier to locate German policy within this framework, while British officials were more pragmatic, underscoring the more functional and instrumental perspective Britain adopts towards the CFSP. These positions were also reflected in official government statements, speeches and policy documents. German politicians such as Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Ministers Fischer and Westerwelle reiterate the importance of the CFSP and EU both to the enactment of German national foreign and security policy but also to how it is conceptualised in the first place. Meanwhile, official British documents and speeches emphasise, where appropriate, the benefits of cooperation, but always as part of a wider
context that incorporates NATO, the UN etc. The tone of political statements differs somewhat between Labour ministers – who have been generally (but not universally) more supportive of the EU dimension to British foreign and security policy – and their Conservative counterparts who have been more sceptical, placing a much greater emphasis on NATO etc. Overall, if German official discourse reflects perhaps a more normatively-derived or ‘idealistic’ view of the CFSP, its British counterpart remains essentially pragmatic.

That said there are some potentially interesting undercurrents for both. In the case of Britain, there is a sense from some of those interviewed of an increasing frustration with the inability of the European-level to deliver meaningfully in the areas of foreign and security policy it prioritises – e.g. improved security capabilities, etc. The causes of this deficiency, though, are seen as primarily relating to continuing preoccupations with institution-building; there is never any questioning, for example, as to whether the intergovernmental character of CFSP might contribute to this. On the German side, meanwhile, a legitimate question can be posed about whether repeated official statements emphasising German commitment to multilateral structures and locating German national policy within these is increasingly about reassuring partners – that Germany “doth protest too much”. A Germany that has become markedly more assertive in foreign and security policy over the last decade may feel an increased need to reiterate its commitment to multilateralism, even while being more willing to ‘flex its muscles’. Taken on their own, the national discourses do not seem to reflect any dramatic alternation from what might be expected from a state that is broadly pro-integration and one that is broadly sceptical. Equally, however, neither do they indicate the kind of ideational alteration that constructivists might assume. Indeed, if anything, the underlying trends may suggest the opposite to be true. On this question, though, further research is necessary in order to draw firm conclusions.
Theoretical contribution

This thesis has examined the application of constructivism in supranationalist theoretical analyses of CFSP. It has questioned assumptions that long-term cooperation and interaction within the CFSP results in a transformation in how member states identify and conceive of their national interests and preferences. This is not to say that the CFSP has not had an impact on member states, or that there has been no change or adaptation as a consequence of their participation in its structures. However, if we are to avoid falling into the “trap” of taking a state’s identity or interests “for granted” (Ruggie, 1998: 4), equally we must avoid making the same mistake from the other side by assuming that the CFSP has more of an impact on member states than it actually does. We cannot assume the national will be changed or transformed by the international or multilateral. More specifically, in the cases of Britain and Germany, we cannot assume that it is the CFSP that is the source of any change, if such change can be identified.

Following directly from this, a significant omission in the analyses provided by Smith and others is a consideration of the enduring importance of the national level in CFSP. As the chapters on Britain and Germany demonstrate, their domestic foreign policy-making regimes are dense and complex with the institutions and networks they comprise placing their own demands on the CFSP. Moreover, there are important and deeply-embedded traditions, behaviours and assumptions about the world and their place in it that feed into the processes by which they determine their preferences and interests, and then how these are pursued in CFSP. This can be seen clearly in the case studies on Iran and the EEAS. Certainly, Brussels makes an important contribution to these processes. However, it is by no means clear in either country that their national institutions, which are important sources of norms, values and preferences in their own right, are being subsumed or supplanted by what is taking place in the CFSP. Indeed, the policy case studies indicate that
the opposite may be true as both have promoted national interests based on long-standing national preferences to the Brussels level.

A further illustration of this is the preference within the FCO for ‘mainstreaming’ that places the onus on individual desk and departments to engage with the CFSP rather than having a strong centre setting the direction of policy which is then followed. This suggests a significant potential barrier to transmission from the EU to the national level where officials may only ‘pay lip service’ to mainstreaming. Similarly, the importance of the MoD in formulating British policy on CSDP has been made clear. However, defence ministries remain far more detached from EU-level interaction, so greatly reducing the likelihood and impact of ‘EU-generated’ norms penetrating the MoD and its thinking. Indeed, the evidence suggests a far more pragmatic understanding of the utility of the CSDP, based on a wish to ensure any CSDP-based commitments do not impinge on other ‘more significant’ commitments. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of inter-ministerial rivalries – for example between the Chancellery and AA over Iran – in this process of interest and preference formation. None of this is to argue that British and German national identities or interests “are given or fixed” (ibid) – rather that their domestic institutions remain robust and resilient sources of identity and interest, demanding of attention as well.

The value of applying constructivism in analyses of the CFSP thus seems to lie more in what it can tell us about the how of policy-making at the Brussels level but also at the national level. As Moravcsik (2001) argues, for example, constructivism can contribute greatly to developing our understanding of the impact of processes of socialization. The research of Lewis (1998; 2000; 2005; 2006), Fouilleux et al. (2006), Quaglia et al. (2008), Juncos and Pomorska (2008) etc, has demonstrated the potential significance of socialization. Regular interaction between national officials over the long-term has resulted in the emergence of accepted norms that regulate the behaviour of participants and can result in the development of secondary loyalties (Egeberg, 1999). The evidence
offered here also confirms this. British and German officials based in Brussels recognise a responsibility to reach agreements, “make the room work” etc, while among European Correspondents there is a definite *ésprit de corps* that helps to facilitate their work. But we must be wary of equating the impacts of socialization with a deeper transformation in how national officials involved in CFSP conceive the interests and preferences it is their job to protect, promote and pursue. Being effective and efficient at the *process* is essential if a state is to achieve its goals in CFSP.
Future research

There are several potentially interesting paths for future research that emerge from this thesis. First, we need to consider how our understanding of the socialization process impacts on our theoretical understanding of the CFSP as decision-making environment. The debate over whether or not the CFSP is an intergovernmental arena and, if so, what type has been considered in Chapter 4. Certainly, while CFSP retains many of the facets of formal intergovernmentalism, particularly the member states’ power of veto, developments that centralise or ‘Brusselize’ – such as the expanded role and responsibility of the High Representative and the creation of the EEAS – have undermined more traditional intergovernmental explanations that consider it in terms of bargaining. Perhaps, therefore, a more pragmatic intergovernmentalism is required that seeks to better incorporate the concepts of socialization, communicative rationality and problem-solving discussed above. Whether this intergovernmentalism is ‘rationalised’ (Wessels, 2001), ‘modified’ (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006) or ‘refined’ (Wessels and Bopp, 2008), in order to understand how states interact, it would be useful to understand more about what makes a member state’s argument persuasive when they are promoting a particular policy or outcome. Research that can develop our understanding of what socialization means in the context of the CFSP – for example, the different norms of behaviour and how these are enacted – would therefore provide insights into the particular nature of intergovernmentalism within CFSP.

Related to this is a second avenue, this time focused on the national level. If, as is argued here, the national matters more than supranationalist theorizing acknowledges, then we need to understand better the institutions that comprise a state’s domestic foreign policy-making regime, the ideas and identities, norms and values that they themselves generate, and how these contribute to the process of national interest and preference formation. The issue of how political life is organised is a central concern of the literature on new institutionalism
That is, the nature, role, behaviour, structure, etc of the institutions created to facilitate and manage it, and particularly the role of collective action within it (March and Olsen, 1989; Olsen, 2010). This provides the basis for understanding how political systems function, how and why certain decisions are taken and certain policy directions pursued. It is here that constructivist tools, particularly socialization, could be deployed to enable a more nuanced and sophisticated analysis that recognises the importance of governments as political actors, but sees them as more than merely Moravcsik’s ‘aggregators of interests’. For example, socialization can offer insights into domestic foreign policy-making processes, allowing us to understand how institutions such as the FCO or AA operate and interact with other ministries; the way they generate particular ideas, values and identities; how these feed into their articulation of national interests and preferences; and how these are then expressed and pursued beyond the national level. If the CFSP does not transform the national level, then it is important to understand what is taking place in the domestic institutions that are such important alternative sources of norms and values. Applying the insights constructivism offers to this question would add significantly to our theoretical understanding of how national interests and preferences are identified and pursued.

A third area of research relates to the impact of the EEAS on national systems of foreign policy-making. As noted in Chapter 7, the EEAS raises the possibility of organisational change within foreign ministries – for example, the need for department directors, desk officers etc to be aware of a new and potentially significant institutional actor within their area of responsibility. The possibility is that the EEAS will lead to new connections and increased levels of interaction directly with foreign ministries – and particularly with officials who might not previously have taken great interest in the EU level. The impact of these lines of communication on policy-making and on existing structures such
as CFSP departments and Permanent Representations will be an important area for future research, particularly given the argument made here about the importance of taking the national into account.

Finally, a fourth potentially productive direction for future research would be to re-examine how we understand ‘supranationalism’ in the context of today’s EU. As has discussed, scholars have invested considerable time and effort in analysing, critiquing and re-interpreting the application of intergovernmentalism as a framework for understanding the CFSP. This is an entirely reasonable undertaking given the considerable changes to the foreign and security policy landscape in recent years, most noticeably since Lisbon. It would seem equally valid, therefore, to re-visit the other ‘mountain’ on this theoretical landscape: supranationalism. At the most basic level, supranationalism offers a particular view and understanding of the EU’s central institutions which sees them as having accrued – and, indeed, continuing to accrue – greater power, largely at the expense of the member states, along with the ability to act with increasing autonomy. What developments such as the growing power of the European Council and broader efforts by member states to reduce the influence of the Commission tell us, however, is that such a classic understanding of supranationalism may no longer be valid. For instance, we could usefully focus on how both the Council of Ministers and European Council have – and will – become increasingly influential ‘agents’ of member state power, counter-balancing the power and influence exercised by the Commission and European Court of Justice. Similarly, a consideration of what the development of the European Parliament as an institutional actor means in terms of how we understand the EU’s institutional landscape would be worthwhile. Such investigations, in turn, could encourage new definitions of and ways of understanding supranationalism, and its applicability to analyses of all aspects of the EU.

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The extent, complexity and degree of co-operation in foreign and security policy-making and that EU member states have achieved through EPC and CFSP are unique. As has been shown, this is reflected in a variety of ways, most notably in the level of sophistication in their diplomatic and official interactions, something that cannot be found among any other grouping of states. More fundamentally, it is demonstrated in the fact that the CFSP today represents a system of international relations unrivalled in its stability, a consequence of the degree of trust between states and of predictability in how they will behave towards one another. That there will be tensions in a system that has to continually balance concerns over national sovereignty with the desire for greater efficiency in its policy-making and greater impact from those policies is inevitable. But it is in these tensions that we are reminded time and again of the basic truth of CFSP: however close the co-operation and however great the levels of trust, it remains first and foremost a system of nation states. This will not change any time soon.
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