Negotiating Gender And Bureaucracy: Female Managers in Indonesia’s Ministry Of Finance

Paramita Muljono

A thesis submitted to the School of International Development, University of East Anglia, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

January 2013

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Abstract

There is global recognition of the need for more women in decision-making positions within bureaucracies to ensure gender-equitable policies and outcomes. Article 7 of the Convention of the Elimination of the Discrimination against Women commits states to ensure equality between women and men in political and public life, including participation in formulating government policy. In Indonesian government agencies, women now are employed in almost equal numbers to men. This thesis considers whether these changes represent genuine empowerment for these women, focussing on the gendered processes within the Ministry of Finance (MOF).

There is a small but growing literature on female managers in developing country government agencies. However, no studies systematically combine an analysis of gendered processes within these organisations with an exploration of women’s work/family balance. This thesis develops such a combined approach. It draws on a range of data sources including interviews with 121 MOF employees, personal observation and documents. The analysis compares gendered practice within three different ministerial departments.

Drawing on Goetz’s concept of the “gendered archaeology of organisation”, this thesis reveals a high degree of gender inequality in the daily practices. This includes overt discrimination in recruitment, as well as more indirect forms of discrimination in promotion and training. The thesis considers how employment in the MOF shapes the identities of female managers, and how these women balance their domestic lives with their careers. Among other things, this considers the effects of corruption, Islamic conservatism, Javanese culture, a bureaucratic reform programme and a gender mainstreaming initiative. The thesis observes how these women exercise agency within and outside the MOF, and the extent to which their education and professional status empower them in their working lives. The thesis also examines how gendered processes within the MOF affect its external policies.
# Table of Contents

**LIST OF ABBREVIATION** 12

1 **INTRODUCTION** 13

1.1 ASSESSING WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 13

1.2 LOCATING THE INDONESIAN CIVIL SERVICE IN A WIDER CONTEXT 16

1.2.1. The Javanese as the culturally and politically dominant ethnic group 16

1.2.2. Islam as the predominant religion 18

1.2.3. The lingering effects of civil service politicisation during the Suharto regime (1966-1998) 19

1.2.4. Corruption and public perception 20

1.2.5. Female civil servants in the context of the Indonesian labour market 21

1.3 WHY THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE? 23

1.4 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 26

1.5 A WORD ON METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 28

1.6 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 28

Chapter 2: The Gendered archaeology of the Indonesian MOF 28

Chapter 3: Research Methodology 29

Chapter 4: MOF as a subsystem of the Indonesian bureaucracy 29

Chapter 5: The gendered cognitive context of Indonesian bureaucracy 29

Chapter 6: Gender discrimination as a formal policy in MOF’s recruitment process 29

Chapter 7: Diploma Disease: To what extent does education empower women at MOF? 30

Chapter 8: ‘Would you mind if we promote your wife?’ Gendered Discretion in Promotion 30

Chapter 9: Money talks: Disentangling gender from the knot of corruption 30

Chapter 10: Locating the identities of MOF women in relation to MOF’s gendered space and time 31

Chapter 11: Gender Mainstreaming at MOF 31

Chapter 12: Conclusion 31

2 **THE GENDERED ARCHAEOLOGY OF MOF, A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK** 33

2.1 INTRODUCTION 33

2.2 FORMULATION OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND IDENTIFICATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 34

2.3 GENDERED ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE ORGANISATION 37

2.3.1 Gendered institutional and organisational history 37

2.3.2 The gendered cognitive context of the organisation 38

2.3.3 Gendered organisational culture 39

2.3.4 Gendered participants 42

2.3.5 Sexuality of the organisation 46

2.3.6 Gendered authority structures 47

2.3.7 Gendered space and time 49

2.3.8 Gendered incentive and accountability systems 51

2.4 OTHER APPROACHES TO THE GENDERED ORGANISATION 51

2.5 POWER AND EMPOWERMENT 54

3 **METHODOLOGY** 58

3.1 INTRODUCTION 58

3.2 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 59

3.2.1 Formulating the research questions 62

3.2.2 Research timeframe 63

3.2.3 Choice of fieldwork site 63
3.2.4 Design and sampling 63
3.3 Interpretation and Analysis 79
3.4 Reflections on Positionality and the Effectiveness of the Strategies 79
  3.4.1 Researching in a familiar setting 79
  3.4.2 Ease of Access 79
  3.4.3 Establishing Trust and Rapport 80
  3.4.4 Reduced resource requirements and reduced problems with translation 81
  3.4.5 Triangulation 81
  3.4.6 Keeping in touch after the fieldwork had finished 83
  3.4.7 Lack of critical distance 84
  3.4.8 Conflicting roles? 84
  3.4.9 Asking ‘obvious’ things 84
  3.4.10 Ethical issues 85
3.5 Limitations 86
4 MOF as a Subsystem of the Indonesian Bureaucracy 87
  4.1 Introduction 87
  4.2 The Civil Service System in Indonesia: An Overview 87
  4.3 The Development of Indonesia’s Civil Service 88
  4.4 Characteristics of Indonesian Bureaucracy 89
    4.4.1 Political influence in the Indonesian Civil Service 89
    4.4.2 A role model for society 90
    4.4.3 Military influence 91
    4.4.4 Corruption and public perception 92
  4.5 Hierarchy in the Indonesian Bureaucracy 93
    4.5.1 Organisational structure and job hierarchy 93
    4.5.2 The grade and rank system 94
    4.5.3 The link between the grade and echelon systems 96
    4.5.4 Functional Positions 99
  4.6 Female Participation in the Civil Service 99
  4.7 The Future of Women in the Indonesian Bureaucracy 104
  4.8 The History and Structure of Indonesia’s MOF 108
    4.8.1 History 108
    4.8.2 Structure 108
  4.9 MOF HR Statistics 110
    4.9.1 Overview 110
    4.9.2 Structural Positions 110
    4.9.3 Functional Positions 112
  4.10 Bureaucratic Reform 113
  4.11 Conclusion 115
5 The Gendered Cognitive Context of Indonesia’s Bureaucracy 117
  5.1 Introduction 117
  5.2 Indonesian Gender Ideology 118
    5.2.1 The Suharto Era 118
    5.2.2 President Bhararuddin Jusuf Habibie (1998-1999) 129
    5.2.3 President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) 130
    5.2.4 President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004) 131
    5.2.5 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-present) 132
  5.3 Gender Mainstreaming in the Indonesian Government 137
    5.3.1 Gender mainstreaming and the Ministry of Religious Affairs 139
    5.3.2 Evaluation of gender mainstreaming implementation in selected government ministries/agencies 143
    5.3.3 The National Plan of Action for Gender Mainstreaming 147
9.3.8 Gifts for the bosses 238
9.4 Are women less corrupt? 239
9.5 A question of opportunity? 243
9.6 Is women’s lack of engagement in corrupt behaviour the cause or the consequence of their marginalisation? 244
9.7 Conclusion 246

10 Locating the identities of MOF women in relation to MOF’s gendered space and time 249

10.1 Introduction 249
10.2 Child- and husband-care 251
10.3 Leave of absence, working hours and overtime 255
  10.3.1 Annual leave 255
  10.3.2 Maternity leave 257
  10.3.3 Unpaid leave 257
  10.3.4 Working hours 259
  10.3.5 Overtime 260
10.4 Behind every successful woman there is a pembanantu 263
10.5 Family arrangements when women have to be away from home 265
10.6 Behind every successful man there is a woman? Being the wife of another civil servant 273
  10.6.1 Dharma Wanita activities to support husbands’ careers 273
  10.6.2 When a woman’s position is higher than her husband’s 274
  10.6.3 ‘I will follow him wherever he may go’: When the husband relocates 275
10.7 Work and the gendered life course 278
  10.7.1 Sulastri 278
  10.7.2 Aisyah 279
  10.7.3 Ratna 281
10.8 Conclusion 284

11 Practicing what you preach? Internal organisational processes and external outcomes of gender mainstreaming in MOF 287

11.1 Introduction 287
11.2 Establishing GM in MOF 290
  11.2.1. A MOF GM seminar 290
  11.2.2. Putting the team together 293
  11.2.3. Terms of Reference 295
  11.2.4. Budget 298
11.3 External and internal policy changes 299
  11.3.1. Revision of the Draft of Income Tax Law 299
  11.3.2. Gender-responsive Budgeting 302
  11.3.3. STAN’s intake of women 304
11.4 Mainstreaming activities 307
  11.4.1. Advocacy for top-level management 308
  11.4.2. Training of Trainers 310
  11.4.3. Dissemination to regional offices 313
11.5 Factors constraining GM implementation at MOF 318
  11.5.1. Power dynamics between the different actors: MOF, MOWE and Bappenas staff versus NGOs and academics 318
  11.5.2. Religion and GM at MOF 320
11.6 GM in relation to other reforms 321
11.6.2. The National Plan of Action for GM: can it work under MOF’s current bureaucratic structure? 323

11.7 CONCLUSION 326

12 CONCLUSION 329

12.1 OVERVIEW 329

12.2 REFLECTIONS ON THE OVERALL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 329

12.3 THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN THE MOF 334

12.4 ON GOETZ’S GENDERED ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE ORGANISATION 335

12.5 THE MOF AS A GENDERED ORGANISATION AND WIDER ISSUES OF INDOONESIAN GOVERNANCE 339

12.6 WOMEN’S AGENCY IN THE MOF 342
Index of Tables

TABLE 1-1 FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN THE FORMAL LABOUR MARKET AND THE CIVIL SERVICE ................. 23
TABLE 2-1 GÖETZ’S FRAMEWORK AND THIS THESIS’ RESEARCH QUESTIONS........................................... 36
TABLE 3-1 STRUCTURE OF MOF............................................................................................................ 65
TABLE 3-3 INTERVIEWS .......................................................................................................................... 68
TABLE 3-4 FEMALE MANAGERS .......................................................................................................... 73
TABLE 3-5 AGE AT TIME OF INTERVIEW ................................................................................................ 73
TABLE 3-6 MARITAL STATUS .................................................................................................................... 73
TABLE 4-1 RATIO OF CIVIL SERVANTS TO TOTAL POPULATION ............................................................. 88
TABLE 4-2 ENTRY AND MAXIMUM GRADE BASED ON EDUCATION LEVEL ........................................... 96
TABLE 4-3 GRADE SPAN OF STRUCTURAL LEVELS.................................................................................. 97
TABLE 4-4 SEX COMPOSITION OF THE INDONESIAN CIVIL SERVICE ACCORDING TO GRADE ........... 101
TABLE 4-5 SEX COMPOSITION OF INDONESIAN CIVIL SERVANTS ACCORDING TO EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................................... 102
TABLE 4-6 PERCENTAGE OF MANAGERS WHO ARE FEMALE BY ECHELON ...................................... 107
TABLE 4-7 MOF EMPLOYEES AND INDONESIAN CIVIL SERVANTS ACCORDING TO GRADE .......... 111
TABLE 4-8 MANAGERIAL LEVELS IN MOF AND NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE ........................................ 112
TABLE 4-9 FUNCTIONAL POSITIONS IN MOF .......................................................................................... 113
TABLE 4-10 GRADING SYSTEM UNDER MOF BUREAUCRATIC REFORM ............................................. 114
TABLE 5-1 MOWE’S ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE .............................................................................. 135
TABLE 5-2 DIFFERENT ACTORS IN MAINSTREAMING GENDER IN INDONESIA .................................... 138
TABLE 5-3 MINISTRY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, PERSONNEL STATISTICS ........................................... 142
TABLE 6-1 HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES AND UNIVERSITY EXAMINATION PARTICIPANTS ............ 157
TABLE 6-2 STAN ADMISSION RATE ....................................................................................................... 158
TABLE 6-3 STATE UNIVERSITY EXAMINATION ADMISSION ................................................................ 159
TABLE 6-4 NUMBERS OF STAN APPLICANTS ......................................................................................... 160
TABLE 6-5 NUMBER OF POSTS TRANSFERRED TO MEN ....................................................................... 162
TABLE 6-6 UNIVERSITY FRESH GRADUATE RECRUITMENT 2002 ............................................................ 166
TABLE 7-1 SELECTION FOR A SCHOLARSHIP IN 2007 .......................................................................... 179
TABLE 7-2 WOMEN’S DECISION IN TERM OF OVERSEAS STUDY ....................................................... 182
TABLE 7-3 EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF MOF EMPLOYEES .......................................................... 187
TABLE 7-4 EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF MIDDLE MANAGERS IN THE DGTX, DGTR AND TA ...... 188
TABLE 10-1 NUMBER OF CHILDREN OF FEMALE MANAGERS ............................................................... 253
TABLE 10-2 CIVIL SERVICE ANNUAL LEAVE DAYS 2005-2012 ............................................................. 257
TABLE 10-3 STRATEGIES DURING OVERSEAS STUDY ........................................................................... 266
Index of Figures

FIGURE 1-1 MAP OF INDONESIA ........................................................................................................ 16

FIGURE 4-2: SEX COMPOSITION IN THE INDOONESIAN CIVIL SERVICE ............................... 100
To Humphrey, without whom this thesis would have been finished in half the time, but with much less joy.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank several people for their contribution to this thesis:

Professors Cecile Jackson and Nitya Rao for supervising my research.

Friends and ex-colleagues in the Indonesian Ministry of Finance, for showing enthusiasm in sharing ideas and providing information which made this research enjoyable. I am deeply saddened by the passing of Ibu Aida Purwaningsih in 2011. Throughout my working time in the MOF, she was a walking case-study of justice and compassion, and later I would learn that these two aspects play an important role in incorporating gender in personnel management. I miss you, Bu Ida.

My research assistants Gita Soerjoatmodjo and Muhammad Zuhdi, both of whom are highly organised and efficient. Working with you both when I was in Indonesia and back in the UK made this research a much more pleasant experience.

My special thanks go to Penny Plowman for interesting discussions about gender and organisation and Kathrin Forstner for reading the second draft. I would also like to thank Sally Sutton for proofreading this thesis, and Patrik Oskarsson who came to my rescue at the eleventh hour when I had a crisis in formatting this thesis.

Another person who has been instrumental in the research process is my dear friend and neighbour Lucy Cullumbine who happily looked after my son whenever I needed to work outside nursery hours. I could not have finished this journey without you.

I would also of course like to thank my family and friends- you know who you are- for ongoing support and understanding when I could not spend as much time with you as I would have liked to do during this research, and when I was grumpy under pressure.
LIST OF ABBREVIATION

BKN  Civil Service Agency
BPK  State Audit Agency
BPKP Government Financial Audit Board
BPS  Central Statistics Bureau
DGTX Directorate General of Tax
DGTR Directorate General of Treasury
FP   Focal Point
GAD  Gender and Development
GBHN State Development Guidelines
GEM  Gender Empowerment Measure
GM   Gender Mainstreaming
HR   Human Resource
LAN  National Administration Agency
MenPAN Ministry of Civil Service Empowerment
MOF  Ministry of Finance
MORA Ministry of Religious Affairs
MOWE Ministry of Women’s Empowerment
SD   Sekolah Dasar, Primary School
SMP  Sekolah Menengah Pertama, Middle School
SMA  Sekolah Menengah Atas, High School
SPMB State University Entry Exam
STAN State Accounting College
TA   Training Agency
WID  Women in Development
1 Introduction

In the Indonesian civil service, as is the case in many developing countries, women are underrepresented particularly at more senior levels. This is especially apparent in the country’s Ministry of Finance (MOF). Yet in recent years there has been a rise in the proportion of civil servants who are women, including those in managerial posts. Taking the MOF as a case study, this thesis explores what this change means for these women, as well as for the Ministry itself and for Indonesian society (both via MOF policies and inasmuch as the MOF reflects wider changes in the status of women). It recognises that female empowerment is not just about numerical representation. Instead, it argues that empowerment is affected by gendered processes operating at different levels both within organisations and across wider society.

This chapter begins with a brief review of the main tools that have been used to assess the status of women by global development agencies, and identifies a number of limitations of existing approaches. It then provides some contextual information to locate and justify the selection of the case study. The final part of the chapter sets out the study’s aims and objectives and the organisation of the remaining chapters.

1.1 Assessing women’s empowerment in developing countries

At the international level, there have been efforts to integrate women’s interests in development processes for nearly 40 years, beginning with the International Decade for Women in 1975-1985. Many strategies have been adopted to ensure that women’s receive an equal share of the fruits of development. These include Women in Development (WID), Women and Development (WAD), Gender and Development (GAD) and the latest approach, used for the past 15 years, Gender Mainstreaming (GM) in development processes.
Ministries of Women’s Empowerment have been set up around the world and GM has become a common concept in the development arenas. To date, however, progress has been very slow and at best has only marginally improved women’s conditions in areas such as basic services (Clisby, 2005, Goetz, 1992, Standing, 2004). These strategies still fail to advance women’s participation in decision making, whether in the family, the community, bureaucratic institutions or the state (Goetz, 1992, Mukhopadhyay et al., 2006). Around the world, the number of women in decision-making positions is still much lower than that of men, as is evident in the proportion of Indonesian civil servants who are women.

Since the 1990s international agencies, notably UNDP, have taken a growing interest in this aspect of women’s empowerment. One of the main tools that UNDP has developed to compare levels of women’s empowerment across countries is the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), which from 1995 to 2010 featured prominently in UNDP Human Development Reports along with the related Gender Development Index (GDI), which is the Human Development Index (HDI) adjusted for gender disparities in its basic components. The GEM seeks to capture the level of women’s empowerment by measuring three indicators: the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments, the percentage of women in economic decision-making positions (including administrative, managerial, professional and technical occupations) and the female share of earned income compared to that of males. However, its conceptual and methodological limitations have been criticised (Bardhan and Klasen, 1999, Charmes and Wieringa, 2003, Dijkstra, 2006). The main criticism is that level of income tends to dominate the indices and so low-income countries (even with high levels of gender equality in the distribution of earnings and other components of the indices) are unable to achieve a high score. Another criticism is that it represents an elite bias, as the chosen indicators are better suited to measuring inequality among the most educated and economically advantaged women, and in the higher echelons of society (Cueva
Beteta, 2006, Klasen, 2006). GEM’s domination by income and its elite bias make it more relevant for developed countries and urban areas of developing countries than for rural areas of developing countries (UNDP, 2011).

If female representation in parliament and managerial positions can be seen as a means of enhancing decision making that benefits other women, the GEM may be relevant to the wider empowerment of women. This, however, is premised on the assumption that women in a position to make influential decisions will make decisions that benefit other women. Yet this simple relationship between female representation in high-level positions and gender-sensitive decision making cannot be taken for granted, and empirical evidence for this effect is still debated (Alolo, 2005, Swamy et al., 2001, Dollar et al., 2001, Roberts, 2006, Mukherjee and Gokcekus, 2004, Goetz, 2007).

Even when the focus is on elite women, official statistics can still give a misleading impression of their experience. The extent of gender equality/empowerment cannot be assessed simply by referring to the number of women holding managerial jobs and comparing it to the number of men in similar positions. This approach does not take into account the barriers that women may encounter in pursuing their careers, and does not compare their present position with what they might have achieved in the absence of discrimination. Also, women who theoretically have the same level of seniority as men may in fact have fewer opportunities to exercise power due to informal gender bias mechanisms.

In 2010 GEM was replaced by the Gender Inequality Index (GII), which measures inequality in men and women’s achievements in three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market. Empowerment is measured using two indicators: the share of parliamentary seats held by each sex and secondary and higher education attainment. GII excludes participation in local government, but, unlike GEM, it also excludes senior positions in
the civil service and private sector. The rationale for excluding representation in management was the data limitations in some developing countries rather than the view that this aspect of empowerment is unimportant. Partly in recognition of this important gap in the GII, this thesis focuses exclusively on women in civil service management positions.

1.2 Locating the Indonesian civil service in a wider context

As in other developing countries, gender issues in Indonesia are often conflated with other development issues ranging from poverty to corruption. This section describes the MOF as part of the Indonesian civil service and in its national context.

Figure 1-1 Map of Indonesia

Source: WorldAtlas

1.2.1. The Javanese as the culturally and politically dominant ethnic group

Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world, with a total population of more than 238 million. It consists of 300 distinct
ethnic groups speaking over 700 different languages and dialects. The largest and culturally and politically dominant ethnic group is the Javanese, which comprises around 42% of the population (Kingsbury and Aveling, 2002). This high proportion of Javanese people is reflected in my interviewees’ backgrounds, and therefore the literature on Javanese households is used as reference for this thesis.

As well as cultural and political diversity there is considerable socio-economic diversity across Indonesia, especially between Java and some of the remote parts of the country. In 2008 the Human Development Index (HDI) for Indonesia as a whole was 0.712, but it reached 0.77 in Jakarta and was as low as 0.64 in Papua (HDI, 2008).

Many anthropologists have commented on the gender equality of Javanese households. Observations that Javanese women can move about in public without restrictions and can own land (Hull, 1982), that they tend to play a dominant role in running the household including managing the household finances (Geertz, 1961b, Jay, 1969, Koentjaraningrat, 1985, Magnis-Suseno, 1991, Papanek and Schwede, 1988), and that they make actual and potential economic contributions to the household (Geertz, 1961b) are used by these authors to indicate that Javanese women enjoy an equal relationship with their husbands. Hull (1982) even argues that the status of women in Java appears to be ahead of that of women in neighbouring countries. Feminist scholars, however, do not agree; the fact that women manage the household has been linked to the Javanese view that household matters are mundane and earthly (Nieuwenhuis-Djajadiningrat, 1987), and that Javanese men know that their wives will run the household according to their husbands’ interests (Sullivan, 1994, White and Hastuti, 1980) even if they have to sacrifice their personal benefit (Berninghausen et al., 1992). Sullivan (1994) concludes that the relationship between husband and wife in domestic budgeting is like one of master and manager.
The importance of respect and harmony and of avoiding personal and social conflict at all costs is a dominant characteristic of Javanese culture (Geertz, 1961b). Extending Geertz’s argument into public life, Koentjaraningrat (1985) argues that it is possible that this prioritisation of harmony may have proven costly to Indonesian bureaucracy, encouraging civil servants to over-rely on seniors and superiors and leaving subordinates unwilling to take risks due to their fear of acting without the support of someone who will share responsibility. This is similar to (Madhu Ranjan, 2007) research findings for the Indian bureaucracy, although higher-level managers there tend to be less dependent than lower managers on their superiors.

Javanese culture also has a very strong notion of refinement (alus) and coarseness (kasar) and a concern about whether certain behaviour is considered proper according to these notions (Anderson, 1990). As such, the Javanese tend to put appearance above anything else and ‘reality’ is of secondary importance (Kingsbury, 2005). Knowing this is helpful in Chapter 8, where I discuss how women are treated at MOF: although everything may seem fine on the surface and people are polite to each other, it may not reflect what they actually think and believe.

1.2.2. Islam as the predominant religion

Islam is the dominant religion of the country, with 86.1% of Indonesians Muslims. There is no option for people in Indonesia to call themselves agnostic or atheist, at least formally, especially in the civil service. Everybody has to have a religious affiliation or they are suspected of being connected with the communist coup of 1965, whether or not they were born by then. Five religions are acknowledged in Indonesia: Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and, since 1999, Confucianism. Although Islam is the predominant religion and acknowledges Judaism, the State of Indonesia does not.
There is a widespread perception that in countries with strong Islamic traditions, women’s participation in the labour market tends to be lower than in other countries due to their restricted movement (Miles 2002). Baramitash (2002) argues that this does not apply to Indonesia despite the strong revival of Islamic traditions in the last two decades. My research observes the extent to which Islam as a religion affects how people think and behave in the MOF as an organisation.

According to the MOF human resource (HR) database, more than 85 percent of staff is Muslim, in keeping with the proportion of Muslims in Indonesia. Most people at MOF practise their religion devoutly. This involves participating in prayers five times a day for Muslims, and joining a monthly congregation for other religions depending on numbers of believers in the same office.

Throughout this thesis I refer to Islamic religious devotion and piety when analysing MOF women’s agency. Mahmood (2005) argues that female subjectivity obtained through religious practice is a form of agency that is not well captured by what she sees as the western feminist binary of submission versus resistance, and this research also observes the extent to which religious devotion frames MOF women’s choices in their employment with MOF. As White (2010 p.342) suggests: ‘...women’s subjectivity may be found in and not just against religion — and ... such subjectivity is many layered and at times contradictory.’

1.2.3. **The lingering effects of civil service politicisation during the Suharto regime (1966-1998)**

The MOF is part of the Indonesian civil service bureaucracy founded immediately after Independence in 1945 (GOI, 1997b). Despite the long history of the civil service, this research focuses on the Suharto regime, known as the ‘New Order’ period (1966-1998), and the subsequent Reformasi (post-Suharto to present). All civil service regulations that remain in place to date originated in the Suharto
era. Most, if not all, of the high-ranking officials in the Indonesian civil service today were recruited during the Suharto regime and, given the top-down power dynamics in the bureaucracy, play an important role in shaping the organisation (Dwijanto et al., 2006).

Working in the Indonesian civil service is a strictly full-time commitment, and everybody starts as a junior clerk regardless of educational background (Rohdewohld, 1995). There is no part-time option for working in the civil service (GOI, 1974a, GOI, 2000). Unlike some developing countries, where civil servants come and go with changes of political regime, in Indonesia a job in the civil service is a life-time tenure that does not usually end until retirement at the relatively low age of 56. Nor do civil servants move between public and private employment. The Civil Service Law clearly states that people who leave the service cannot be recruited again by the government (GOI, 1974a), and civil servants only move from one ministry to another under very special circumstances.

Suharto manipulated the civil service as the tool of his regime (Rohdewohld, 2004), with civil servants expected to set an example to the wider public of how to behave, not only in carrying out their duties in the office but also in their daily lives (GOI, 1983). The New Order Regime introduced a comprehensive regulation of the Indonesian civil service (GOI, 1974a).

MOF has a complex geographical hierarchy, with branches at the kabupaten/regency level (of which there are currently nearly 500), and some sections, such as the Tax Office, extending to branches at the kecamatan/district level (of which there are over 6,500) dispersed across the archipelago.

1.2.4. Corruption and public perception

For a long time, Indonesian civil servants have been associated with a culture of corruption, delay, laziness and inefficiency (Ginting, 2003, Kristiansen and Ramli, 2006, Rock and Bonnett, 2004, Server, 1996, Sherlock, 2002, Wang and Rosenau, 2001, World Bank,
They are rarely fired, despite the long lists of threats in the regulations drafted to manage their lives. The machinery of the state suffers from a bureaucratic inertia that makes many plans and programmes disappear into thin air (Dwiyanto et al., 2006), which is one of the reasons for the ongoing civil service reform (Tjiptoherijanto, 2006).

The Corruption Perception Index produced by Transparency International ranks Indonesia 118 out of 174 countries in the world (Transparency International, 2012). The World Bank notes that corruption is a serious problem in the civil service as acknowledged by the civil servants themselves (World Bank, 2003b). As a key part of public service accountability, civil servants are responsible for both creating regulations and delivering services to the public and yet corruption is rampant in both areas (World Bank, 2005).

MOF has been under public scrutiny for corruption (Blane D. Lewis, 2003, Ikhsan et al., 2005, Kuncoro, 2004), especially in two Directorate Generals: the Directorate General of Tax (DGTX) and the Directorate General of Customs and Excise (DGCE) (Wijaya, 2012). I explore how corruption interacts with gender issues at MOF in Chapter 9.

1.2.5. **Female civil servants in the context of the Indonesian labour market**

According to the GII, Indonesia’s labour force participation rate (the ratio of female to male workers) was 0.605 in 2011, meaning that 37.5% of paid workers were female. This is higher than in other countries in the region such as Thailand (0.811) and Malaysia (0.561), and is broadly comparable with the Philippines (0.627).

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1 The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A country or territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 - 100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it is perceived as very clean. A country’s rank indicates its position relative to the other countries and territories included in the index. Year 2012 index includes 176 countries and territories.
The civil service only accounts for slightly more than 3% of the total labour market (excluding the informal sector), despite the fact that during its early development between 1945 and 1968 it was intended to generate employment (Rohdewohld, 1995). Female participation in the civil service and the formal labour market at three points in time over the last three decades is summarised in Table 1-1. Overall levels of female participation in the public and private formal sector combined are broadly consistent with those reported in the 2011 GII (37.5%).

Table 1-1 also shows that between 1986 and 2008 there was a marked increase in the proportion of female civil service workers, with no comparable change in the private sector. Even in 1986, female representation in the Indonesian civil service was higher than in other Asian countries such as Bangladesh (10%), India (10%) and even Japan (19.6%) (Burns and Bowornwathana, 2001a). Intentional government initiatives appear to have played no role in this rapid increase and there have been no changes to the Civil Service Law or regulations. This rising female participation is mainly the consequence of the increasing number of female university graduates entering the labour force. In Chapter 6 I discuss why these educated women choose to work in the public sector, and whether it reflects any specific advantages in terms of gender-friendly working arrangements.

Although a higher proportion of civil service workers are women relative to the private sector, the small size of the civil service means that the majority of women in the formal labour market work in the private sector. In other words, there are more female private sector than public sector managers. This thesis focuses on the latter, partly out of opportunism, given my own professional background, and also in recognition of the wider influence that key government organisations can exert on many aspects of gender relations.
Table 1-1 Female participation in the formal labour market and the civil service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Civil Service (% of civil servants who are women)</th>
<th>Total labour force, including civil service (% of workers who are women)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>29.43%</td>
<td>39.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>35.37%</td>
<td>38.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>44.72%</td>
<td>38.23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table based on data from BKN and BPS

1.3 Why the Ministry of Finance?

Before embarking on a PhD I worked in MOF for 15 years. I studied at its State Accounting College (STAN) from 1990 and 1993, and from 1993 to 2005 I occupied various posts, mainly dealing with teaching at STAN and managing training for various MOF departments.

During my employment, as well as being aware that as a woman I was part of a minority, I often came across situations where women were directly or indirectly discriminated against in daily procedures. As will be seen in later chapters, MOF decided that women are ‘naturally unsuited’ to working there due to the nature of its jobs and functions, which require a rotation around all of Indonesia’s challenging geography.

I also observed that once they were married and had children my female colleagues found it difficult to progress in their careers because they seemed to have to choose between home and work, while their male colleagues did not. Yet I also knew that compared to their counterparts in the west, middle-class Indonesian women (the category that female employees of MOF fall into) are in a good position to combine work with their family responsibilities. The cheapness of labour in Indonesia makes au-pairs and full-time
nannies affordable for those earning an MOF salary. In fact, every person that I know who works at MOF has at least one helper (called a *pembantu*). Furthermore, the way the family support system works in Indonesia often makes it possible for grandparents to take over childcare. Despite this, the excuse given for the small number of women in managerial positions was always ‘family obligations’. Only a handful of women at MOF are directors, and none are directorate generals or deputy ministers.

Apart from my personal links with MOF there are good academic grounds for focusing a case study on this organisation. Many approaches have been adopted to make sure that women’s share of the benefits of development are equal to that of men. Despite the limited success of GM and efforts to engender public sector bureaucracies (health, education and other public services) having become the norm, one policy area is known to be particularly resistant to feminist incursions: macro-economic decision making, which is usually under the authority of finance ministries. In both national and international agencies, gendered machinery still makes it difficult to succeed in this field, which is increasingly dominated by men with neo-classical economic backgrounds (Miller and Razavi, 1998, Razavi, 1998, Sen, 2000).

The importance of doing gender research at finance ministries is justified by Gita Sen (Sen and Commonwealth Secretariat., 1999, Sen, 2000), who sets out a strong rationale for mainstreaming gender in finance ministries, identifying potential entry points for change at the levels of ongoing macroeconomic management and structural reform and in the specific context of credit liberalisation and the provision of micro-credit. Although Sen provides some advice about how to deal with attitudinal change she has not studied this process of change itself in an actual organisation, perhaps due to difficulties in obtaining access to internal information about finance ministries in low- and middle-income countries.
My personal experience, however, places me in a privileged position to pursue this topic. This thesis observes organisational dynamics in MOF’s efforts in implementing gender mainstreaming, without systematically assessing levels of gender mainstreaming in MOF’s work itself. To do so would require macro-economic analysis, which is currently unfeasible due to a lack of gender-disaggregated data. Instead, the thesis focuses on internal processes in the Ministry as a gendered organisation. When analysing the GM effort at MOF, my focus is on the internal processes that can bring about GM policies rather than on the policies themselves. The critical starting point for any process of meaningful change is to change the people before changing the institution (Cassar and Bezzina, 2005). At MOF, this translates into how to get the predominantly neo-classical male economists from traditional Indonesian family backgrounds to realise that they need to engender what they are doing. As Mukhopadhyay et al (2006 p.13) note, ‘Mainstreaming is not only about institutionalising gender concerns in policies and programmes, but also requires addressing gender issues within organisations themselves. There is an acknowledgement that organisations themselves are gendered, and this is related to their outcomes’.

To achieve this, detailed knowledge of MOF, both as an organisation and from the points of view of the public officials who staff it, is necessary. We need to know who they are, their values and ideologies and to what extent these provide the basis for their behaviour. Furthermore, we need to identify bureaucratic policies, standard operating procedures and new initiatives (Staudt, 1997). Given the male-domination of MOF there are grounds for focusing this research on masculinities.

Critical mass theory, which I elaborate and discuss in Chapter 2, posits that women’s voice in an organisation will be skewed towards the majority (i.e. male voices) until they have exceeded tokenistic representation (Dahlerup, 1988, Kanter, 1977b). Given the small number of women at MOF, to understand what hinders their
participation it is necessary to study the women working there. It is also important to seek to understand gender relations from their point of view and to assess the extent to which they have shaped MOF as an organisation. This thesis focuses on women’s experiences of working at MOF, and while it sometimes elicits the perspective of male workers it does not attempt to make a systematic comparison between men and women at MOF.

1.4 Aims and Objectives

Analysing a state bureaucracy such as MOF from a gender perspective requires expertise on gender and development debates and thorough knowledge of the nature of state bureaucracy in a particular country, including its structures, procedures and processes. Lastly, it requires knowledge of the local context. This is an area where the literature is lacking, and this thesis seeks to fill the gap.

In this thesis I am interested in looking at the whole problem of women’s unequal access, presence and influence (using the three types of political engagement and control suggested by Goetz and Hassim, 2003) in public employment. This is done from different perspectives: from women’s positions, the point of view of MOF as an organisation, and considering the wider institutions of household, community, market and the state. Given these complex and multiple dimensions, Goetz’ gendered archaeology of organisations is an appropriate framework for the thesis.

I analyse the Indonesian MOF as a gendered organisation seeking an answer the overarching question: ‘What hinders women’s career progression at MOF?’ Using Goetz’ framework, this thesis offers a comprehensive approach to gender issues at MOF. This goes beyond an exclusive focus on the organisational point of view, which is typically found in management studies (see, for example Woodall et al., 1997).
The gendered archaeology framework involves looking at the organisation’s gendered cognitive context, gendered culture and gendered participants. It also involves scrutinising MOF’s approach to structuring time and space in employees’ work-lives and observing the gendered authority structure both within and outside MOF as a gendered organisation and assessing how these affect its female employees. Central to this research is an understanding of women at MOF as ‘gendered participants’. Consequently I investigate how these female managers exercise their agency in the organisational structure and culture, the strategies and choices they employ and how these in turn shape MOF as an organisation.

Taking into account the history of the politicisation of the Indonesian civil service during the Suharto era, which led to the establishment of the Civil Service Law that applies to all employees of Indonesian government organisation, I also investigate which parts of MOF’s organisational culture make it difficult for women to pursue their careers.

Within this framework there are three areas that I am particularly interested in: education, discretion -‘the idea that administrative officials should be free to employ their expertise and training in the pursuit of the policy responsibilities delegated to them’ (Vaughn and Otenyo, 2006 p.xii), and corruption. As the women who work at MOF are educated middle-class women rather than illiterate peasants, I am interested in the extent to which their education has empowered them in a civil service organisation in terms of both exercising and being on the receiving end of discretion, bearing in mind that corruption is rampant.

1.5 A word on methodology and approach

Because of my previous employment with MOF this research involves research in a familiar environment. During the second year of my PhD I returned to Indonesia to do my fieldwork, which enabled me to look at MOF from a different perspective as I was no longer an employee. As Chapter 3 on the research methodology elaborates, researching in familiar surroundings has numerous institutional, cultural and social advantages, especially related to ease of access. It also, however, poses some challenges when it comes to positionality and subjectivity.

Having once worked at MOF, where I was on the receiving end of its gender discriminatory policy to some extent, my experience unavoidably shapes the way I think about MOF and thus the way I approach the whole research project. However, the research is about women currently working there in mid- and top management, not my personal experience.

1.6 Organisation of the thesis

Chapter 2: The Gendered archaeology of the Indonesian MOF

This chapter elaborates the formulation of the research questions and the extent to which Goetz’s (1997) framework of the gendered archaeology of the organisation is adapted in this research. I have modified and adapted two elements of Goetz’ gendered archaeology – gendered organisational culture and gendered participants – and instead of presenting them as I do the other elements, in single chapters, they are themes running throughout the thesis.

The chapter also discusses and analyses concepts relating to gender and bureaucracy in developed countries and international development settings, and sets out how I have adapted them to suit this study.
Chapter 3: Research Methodology

Chapter 3 discusses the methodological approach to answering the research questions set out Chapter 2. It also looks at issues of subjectivity related to my previous employment at MOF, which, while facilitating the fieldwork in many ways, also posed challenges and dilemmas.

Chapter 4: MOF as a subsystem of the Indonesian bureaucracy

This chapter serves as a contextual instruction to the wider institution to which Indonesia’s MOF belongs, by analysing the general state of the country’s gendered bureaucracy. It begins with a general discussion of the history and development of the Indonesian civil service up to the time of my fieldwork. Then it sets out the formal organisational structure of Indonesian bureaucracy, and MOF as part of it, with a brief exploration of MOF’s organisation. This is followed by a gender analysis of civil service HR statistics.

Chapter 5: The gendered cognitive context of Indonesian bureaucracy

Based on the information supplied in Chapter 4, this chapter deals with three specific questions: (1) what are the gendered implications of civil service regulations? (2) what is the gender ideology behind the rules and regulations in Civil Service Law? (3) how does the Indonesian bureaucracy value gender empowerment goals in its own organisation? I approach the latter by analysing GM in Indonesia’s bureaucracy as a national effort, and the extent to which it serves its purposes.

Chapter 6: Gender discrimination as a formal policy in MOF’s recruitment process

The discussion and analysis in this chapter focus on gender discrimination in MOF’s recruitment process. While discrimination can be direct or indirect, this chapter deals with the former. It
reveals the extent to which gender discrimination is overtly applied in recruitment, denying more than 1,000 women employment in the Ministry every year.

**Chapter 7: Diploma Disease: To what extent does education empower women at MOF?**

In this chapter I focus on how the Indonesian civil service values education and how this affects women working at MOF. The core question is the extent to which education empowers the women at MOF. The chapter reviews all the education and training requirements at MOF and civil service in general and how accessible they are to women, and shows how MOF’s approach to formal and informal training is not always accessible, let alone convenient, to women with family obligations.

**Chapter 8: ‘Would you mind if we promote your wife?’ Gendered Discretion in Promotion**

This chapter looks into the general rules on civil service career progression and how they translate into MOF internal policies. I discuss how the gendered authority structure in wider society spills over into the organisational terrain and how women in public positions of power are still seen as anomalies. I pay special attention on how MOF links promotion with relocation and analyse how discretion works at MOF in terms of promoting women; perceptions of women, and how they perceive themselves as managers; and the kind of treatment they receive once they reach a managerial position.

**Chapter 9: Money talks: Disentangling gender from the knot of corruption**

In this chapter I discuss how gender issues can be buried under the issue of corruption. MOF is perceived as one of the most corrupt government organisations in Indonesia and serious efforts are being made to combat corruption and improve the Ministry’s public image. The core question in this chapter is to what extent corruption
affects the working experience of MOF’s female employees. I observe how women are often excluded from the bureaucratic ‘game’ by their unwillingness or inability to engage in corrupt behaviour. Lately, under the bureaucratic reform, women have been used to improve MOF’s public image as public relations workers. In either case, this treatment sidelines women from the core tasks of the organisation.

Chapter 10: Locating the identities of MOF women in relation to MOF’s gendered space and time

This chapter analyses how female employees respond to their workplace situation in relation to their domestic responsibilities and societal expectations. I analyse the individual agency and strategies that they employ and their views on work-life balance. I also analyse the domestic front: how childcare decisions are made, what kinds of support are available to the women and how families cope. I discuss how female managers support their husbands’ careers and what happens if women’s positions or ranks exceed their husbands’.

Chapter 11: Gender Mainstreaming at MOF

This chapter analyses MOF’s gendered incentive and accountability system through the setting up, implementation and day-to-day operation of GM efforts, including how budgets and activities are set and decided, as well as what has been achieved and how far these initiatives benefit MOF’s female employees. Put into the wider context, the chapter links these achievements and failures to the bureaucratic reforms recently implemented at MOF.

Chapter 12: Conclusion

The conclusion revisits the theoretical discussion and analysis of empirical data set out in the previous chapters and assesses how MOF’s gendered archaeology affects both women’s empowerment and internal organisational processes of change. I assess the usefulness of Goetz’s gendered archaeology framework and suggest
some modifications for its application in public bureaucracy settings in developing countries. As part of this discussion, I consider the wider implications of the case study for women’s empowerment in public administrations across low- and middle-income countries.
2 The gendered archaeology of MOF, a conceptual framework

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter laid out the scope of this research and placed it in a wider context. This chapter sets out the main theories, concepts and assumptions I use in examining the Indonesian Ministry of Finance through a gender lens as a bureaucratic organisation. This thesis makes use of existing theories and concepts relating to gender and bureaucracy in general and applies them in the context of a developing country. To this end, it also draws on theory and literature from development studies. While the thesis does not create substantial new theory, it makes significant contributions by assessing the validity of existing theoretical frameworks in a specific setting and, where necessary, adapting them.

Until recently, the literature on gender and state bureaucracy had been dominated by cases from developed countries focusing on issues such as equal opportunities and the glass ceiling (Cockburn, 1991, Halford and Leonard, 2001a, Kanter, 1977a, 1993) while case studies on gender issues in organisations in developing countries mainly centred on NGOs working for women in the development arena. With the introduction of GM in 1995, feminists started applying their analysis to state bureaucracies of developing countries. However, these analyses are generally more concerned with what has gone wrong in terms of mainstreaming gender into development programmes and projects than with looking at the gendered state bureaucracy itself (Clisby, 2005, Daly, 2005, Kusakabe, 2005).

Kabeer (1994b) suggests that gender training should enable and encourage development planners to reflect on how exclusionary structures work in their own institutions through their hierarchies
of authority, rules of recruitment, privileged disciplines and the division of resources and responsibilities. As such, planners should direct their attention to their own experiences rather than constantly looking outside their organisations.

In this chapter I discuss Goetz’s (1997a) concept of the gendered archaeology of organisations. I focus on the different elements of her framework and consider the extent to which they are applicable to my own research, and why. Following the Goetz framework I discuss how the concept of gendered organisation is used by other writers to analyse their case studies (Rao et al., 1999).

2.2 Formulation of the research questions and identification of the conceptual framework

I have shown in the previous chapter that the Indonesian MOF has very few female employees and even fewer female managers, and that while female participation at MOF is growing it remains significantly lower than in other Asian countries where women are also under-represented. This research seeks the causes and consequences of this under-representation and asks whether the growing number of female managers represents a genuine opportunity for empowerment, both for the women personally and for Indonesian women more generally.

Different approaches to examining a development organisation and how it operates in its institutional framework through the lens of gender have been suggested, including that of Goetz (1997a), whose framework proposes that the gendered nature of an organisation can be understood by engaging in an ‘archaeological’ investigation that: ‘... involves disinterring and reinterpreting histories, scrutinizing artefacts such as favoured concepts, terms of inclusion or exclusion, symbols of success or failure...’ (Goetz, 1997a; p.16).

Goetz outlines eight elements in this framework, namely the gendered organisational and institutional history; gendered
cognitive context; gendered organisational culture; gendered participants; gendered time and space; gendered authority structure; gendered sexuality of the organisation and the gendered incentive and accountability system. This thesis adapts Goetz’s framework to examine to what extent and how MOF’s gendered archaeology hinders women’s participation at MOF, studying each element of its gendered archaeology to find ‘patterns of exclusion’ (Goetz, 1997a p.16) that affect MOF’s female employees.

In the following section I elaborate some concepts and assumptions and explain how I have employed and adapted Goetz’s framework to answer the main research question and develop the detailed research questions that stem from the overarching research question: ‘What hinders women’s participation at MOF?’, and how Goetz’s framework is used to answer them. Table 2-1 sets out the sub-questions and relates them to specific elements of the framework.
### Table 2-1 Goetz’s framework and this thesis’ research questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of the Gendered Archaeology of MOF</th>
<th>Specific Research Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gendered institutional and organisational history</td>
<td>• Historically, how have women been treated by the state, and to what extent does this affect women at MOF?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendered cognitive context of MOF</td>
<td>• What are the underlying values of the Indonesian civil service, and which aspects of these values affect opportunities for women to participate?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How do these values translate to regulations, and to what extent do these regulations affect women?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How does the Indonesian bureaucracy value the goal of women’s empowerment, and to what extent does it reflect the views of the Indonesian state?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendered organisational culture</td>
<td>• Given the low number of female employees at MOF, does the recruitment process discriminate against female applicants?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Once women are inside the organisation, what aspects of MOF culture (beliefs, values, norms, symbols and practices) facilitate/obstruct their participation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Is there any direct/indirect discrimination against women in daily practices and procedures, and if so, what is it?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To what extent does MOF value the education of its employees?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To what extent does corruption affect men and women’s careers differently at MOF?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendered participants</td>
<td>• Where are men and women in MOF hierarchy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Who are the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of MOF Bureaucratic ‘Game’?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How many women does it take to change the organisational culture?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Has there been a collective effort from MOF’s female employees to change the organisational dynamics?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendered authority structure</td>
<td>• To what extent does discretion play a role in promotion?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To what extent does discretion against women limit their career progression?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How are women perceived as leaders?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What other structures are imposed on women?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendered space and time</td>
<td>• How does MOF accommodate gender roles across the work/home divide?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To what extent does MOF’s approach to structuring time and space affect women’s participation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How do women reconcile their career and domestic lives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How do women negotiate their gendered (and multiple) identities at MOF?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendered incentive and accountability system</td>
<td>• To whom is GM accountable?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To what extent do GM activities help MOF to change?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To what extent do the internal gender dynamics within the GM team affect their external outcomes?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The next section explores the individual elements of Goetz’s framework. In each case I begin with Goetz’s definition and suggested application, and follow this with a discussion about how each element relates to existing theories on gender and bureaucracy in the context of developing country settings. Finally, I explain how I have adapted the particular element to the purpose of this thesis.

2.3 Gendered archaeology of the organisation

2.3.1 Gendered institutional and organisational history

While the terms ‘institution’ and ‘organisation’ are often used synonymously, when discussing how bureaucracy reinforces biases in larger society we must be clear about the distinction between them (Goetz, 1997a, Rao et al., 1999). ‘Organisation’ refers to a social entity with collective goals, linked to the external environment; ‘institutions’ are defined as the rules for achieving social or economic ends (Kabeer, 1994a). These rules dictate who does what, who gets what and who decides on the allocation of resources, tasks and responsibilities.

Kabeer (1994a) identifies four levels at which institutions operate: household, community, market and state. While neoliberal economics assumes that the household operates according to altruism under the leadership of a benign household head, feminists have identified the family as a highly gendered arena that produces and reproduces unequal power relations, hindering women’s empowerment. While in the past the market and the state have been regarded as relatively gender-neutral, these days discussions of gendered market failures and gendered public institutional failures are included in feminist analysis (see for example Elson and Cagatay, 2000, Elson, 1999).

As I am analysing Indonesia’s MOF, and since the civil service has been manipulated by Suharto as discussed in the previous chapter,
the immediate environment of relevance is the history of the Indonesian state. Contrary to the situation in the West, where women were initially excluded from the public sphere (among others, see Pateman, 1988), the Indonesian Constitution guarantees the equal rights of Indonesian men and women, including the right to vote. Nevertheless, in Indonesia the state's views on women and their place *vis a vis* the market, state, community and family is strongly influenced by the views of the current president. Therefore in this thesis I carry out an analysis of gendered institutional and organisational history in tandem with an analysis of the gendered cognitive context of the organisation.

### 2.3.2 The gendered cognitive context of the organisation

Goetz argues that identifying the gender interests that have shaped their broader institutional frameworks over time is a starting-point for analysing organisations by gender. To analyse an individual bureaucracy such as the Indonesian MOF she suggests looking at the state as the broader institutional framework (1997a p.16). As she (1992) argues, what is needed is ‘an appreciation of the connections between gendered social relationships and gendered organizational relationship in public administration’.

Since this thesis focuses on MOF as a state bureaucracy it is useful to briefly look at the literature on gender and the state and the rules and norms embedded in the developed and the developing world. Savage and Witz (1992), citing Weber, who perceives the modern state as ‘absolutely dependent upon a bureaucratic basis’, argue that there is a parallel between the relationship between gender and the modern (Weberian) bureaucratic state and the relationship between gender and the government bureaucracy as a workplace, where the gendered state is reflected in the gendered nature of bureaucratic government organisations.

Franzway et al (1989) argue that the state is involved in the patterning of gender relations and gender order, and that the
gendered nature of bureaucracy manifests (and can thus be analysed) in four ways: (a) in the basic constitution of the realm of the state (related to the notion of the paternalistic nature of the state); (b) in the composition of the controllers of the state apparatus; (c) in the staffing of the state machinery and its internal organisation; and (d) in what the state does, who it affects and how.

In asserting the gender-blindness of the state, Mills and Tancred (1992) maintain that women suffer from dual structures of unequal representation: first, the state’s failure to accommodate ‘women’s issues’, and second, women’s powerless position in the bureaucracy, which makes it difficult for them to challenge the state’s failure to accommodate their interests.

These two elements are adapted in this thesis to answer the following questions:

1. Historically, how have women been treated by the state, and to what extent does this affect women in the civil service in general?
2. What are the underlying values of the Indonesian civil service, and what aspects of these values affect the opportunity for women to participate?
3. How do these values translate into regulations, and to what extent do these regulations affect women?
4. How does the Indonesian bureaucracy value the goal of women’s empowerment, and to what extent does it reflect the views of the Indonesian state?

2.3.3 Gendered organisational culture

Goetz does not define exactly what she means by organisational culture, but she quotes Ferguson (1984, p.18) that male dominance is embedded in distinctive features of bureaucratic culture ranging

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2In the development arena the terminology of gender interests and gender needs is preferred. I deal with this in the section on gendered participants.
from top-down command and communication systems to specialisation and aggressive goal-oriented styles of management.

Other authors of organisational studies extend the concept of culture well beyond the managerial style, some describing the whole process within the organisation as part of its culture. For example Rutherford’s (2011) model of gendered organisational culture includes the organisation’s background, gender awareness, physical layout and artefacts, management style, the public/private divide, informal socialising, long-hours culture, sexuality, and language and communication (Rutherford, 2011 p.29). Smircich (1983) discusses two major ways in which culture in organisations has been studied: as a variable and as a root metaphor. The first focuses on causality, whereby culture is an independent variable that affects a dependent variable, for example productivity or leadership. This is a simplified way of looking at culture, since culture itself is not easily defined. The second approach focuses on understanding how organisational members create cultures and how these cultures affect them in turn. Here, culture is seen as a process and not as a product or a variable.

Another widely-cited author on organisational culture is Hofstede (1994), according to whom organisational culture bears the characteristics of being holistic (referring to a whole which is more than the sum of its parts), historically determined (reflecting the history of the organisation), related to the things anthropologists study (such as rituals and symbols), socially constructed (created and preserved by the group of people who together form the organisation), and difficult to change. Hofstede’s description coincides with Smircich’s second category of how organisational culture is viewed. If this broad definition of organisational culture is applied to Goetz’s framework, the other elements – gendered cognitive context, gendered space and time, the organisation’s sexuality, gendered authority structures, and gendered incentive
and accountability systems – can all be subsumed into the gendered organisational culture.

Wilson (1998) suggests that organisational culture can serve as the biggest barrier to women advancing in their career paths while at the same time enabling men to ‘sail through’. Kanter (1977a) believes that gender stereotyping, differences and inequalities derive from traditional values outside the organisation that are sustained within it. She regards organisations as arenas in which outmoded beliefs, customs and prejudices continue to operate. The result is a glass-ceiling effect, where women seem not to face any barriers but cannot reach the top of the hierarchy.

Itzin and Newman (1995) claim that women fail to achieve their potential and to match their performance with men in top managerial positions due to organisational culture which includes, amongst other things, long hours expected from senior managers that are incompatible with women’s domestic responsibilities; obstruction by supervisors; lack of encouragement from male managers; lack of motivation and confidence; and the prevalence of gender stereotyping. While their claim is based on a study set in developed countries, other studies focusing on the civil service in developing countries (Amos-Wilson, 1999, Ogenyi, 2004, Zafarullah, 2000) report the same barriers.

I define the organisational culture of the Indonesian MOF simply, as ‘the way things are done around here’ (Deal and Kennedy, 1982), with ‘here’ referring to MOF. This analysis takes into account the assumption that an organisational culture has subcultures (Deal and Kennedy, 1982, Schein, 2004), so while MOF may have an overarching culture, every department may also have some distinctive cultural elements.

Hofstede (1991, 1994, 2001, 2005) identifies national culture as one of many factors that can shape organisational culture. This link has been used to understand corruption based on comparisons of
different nations (Scott et al., 1993, Seleim and Bontis, 2009). I analyse the effect of corruption on MOF female employees in this study, although it is not explicitly included in Goetz’s framework.

Like the other elements of the gendered archaeology of organisation discussed so far, I look at MOF’s organisational culture for patterns of women’s exclusion. The detailed research questions here are:

1. Given the low number of female employees at MOF, does the recruitment process discriminate against female applicants?
2. Once women are inside the organisation what beliefs, values, norms, symbols and practices within MOF’s culture enable or obstruct their participation?
3. Is there direct or indirect discrimination against women in daily practices and procedures, and if so, how?
4. To what extent does MOF value the education of its employees?
5. To what extent does corruption at MOF affect women’s careers there?

In asking these questions I adapt and go slightly beyond Goetz’s specific focus on managerial styles, without touching on the other aspects of organisational culture that she covers in other elements of the gendered archaeology.

2.3.4 Gendered participants

This section discusses three related issues: identification of the decision makers in the organisation, which is linked to the issue of ‘which group’s interests are served’ (Goetz 1997 p.19); how to define ‘gender interests’; and the extent to which women exercise agency to get their interests onto the agenda.

Itzin and Newman (1995) note that one way to look at a gendered organisation is looking at the people working there. Staudt (1997 p.12) suggests that in the terrain of government bureaucracy we turn our attention to public officials (‘who they are, what are their
values and ideologies, and to what extent do these ideologies provide the bases for their behaviour?) to understand the people behind public policy. Besides being policy makers, public officials, also live in households and have community level relationships (Rao 1999).

Given the small number of women at MOF, especially at the managerial level, it is instructive to observe the gender dynamics in the organisation. In terms of public policy generated by MOF as a state bureaucracy, what is the likelihood that a larger proportion of women in a bureaucracy would make a difference?

There is a longstanding argument about the link between the proportional representation of women and their effectiveness in public forums (Dahlerup, 1988, Kanter, 1977b). The basic assumption of this argument is that there is a positive link between descriptive representation (the number of women in a public body) and substantive representation (decisions made in the interests of women), based on the idea that a small number or percentage of women would act on behalf of and in the interests of other women, because women’s actions when elected as political representatives are affected by the way they experience the world (Williams, 1996).

The impact of gender representation on decision making has been studied in several areas besides government bureaucracies (Dolan, 2002), including corporations (Kanter, 1977b), legislatures (Bratton, 2005) and the judiciary (Collins et al., 2010). Different writers propose different proportions of females to males as necessary for effective female representation. Kanter (Kanter, 1977b) argues that in the corporate setting 15% of women is considered a token presence, 15-40% increases effectiveness and 40-50% provides a balance and an effective presence. Lovenduski (1997) argues for 20% and Dahlerup (1988), 30%, which is later referred to as ‘critical mass’. This 30% figure is the quota prescribed for effective political representation by the Beijing Platform for Action and in general recommendations of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and has been adopted by
parliaments in more than 50 countries around the world. Indonesia has ratified this convention, although so far only at the level of legislation, and it has yet to come into practice (CEDAW, July 2012). Given the low representation of women at MOF (less than 22% and only 12% at managerial levels) it would be interesting to assess their substantive representation in the organisation.

In the context of developing countries, Agarwal (2010), focusing on the decision-making process rather than on decisions made, noticed a critical mass effect in decision-making in local forest governance because women felt encouraged to speak up when there were other women present. She also noticed that women engaged more actively when the discussion was on a subject that directly affected them.

Over the last decade discussion about ‘critical actors’ (Dahlerup, 2006) has added a new dimension to the critical mass debate. By paying attention to individuals, the critical actor approach focuses more on the question of substantive representation than on assessing the percentage of women needed to get their issues represented. For example, McAllister and Studlar (2002 p.248) note that substantive representation by female politicians requires more than just a rise in the number of female politicians; it requires ‘feminist attitudes’ in the legislature. Grey (2006) concludes from reviewing the existing literature on gender and critical mass that four factors need to be investigated besides the role of critical mass in bringing changes to political processes and outcomes: the position of the female politicians in question; their time in office; their own and their political party’s ideology; and the reactions of and to women politicians.

The term ‘gender interests’ is used in this thesis rather than ‘women’s interests’ following Molyneux (1985), as the latter does not take into account the fact that different women in different social positions may have different interests, even if they may still have certain general interests in common. According to Molyneux, gender interests are ‘those that women (or men for that matter) may develop
by virtue of their social positioning through gender attributes’. Molyneux further categorises gender interests as practical and strategic according to their urgency and whether or not they challenge the existing gendered division of labour and women’s subordinate position. Moser’s (1993) gender planning framework uses the term ‘gender needs’ to capture the means that women need to experience empowerment. While ‘needs’ implies a top-down bureaucratic approach to planning, ‘interests’ are more related to rights.

In terms of policy-making, Goetz (1998 p.46) argues that ‘what we are looking for is the establishment of a strategic presence for women’s gender interests in policymaking, where there is legitimacy for the expression of interests of women as a gendered social category endowed equally with values and resources, and with potentially different ambitions for the way policy is pursued’

In this thesis, however, I limit the discussion to the gender interests of the female members of MOF in relation to their employment at MOF, and do not include the gender interests of Indonesian women in general as the recipients of MOF public policy. Kabeer’s formulation of practical gender needs and strategic gender interests is useful in the analysis of MOF’s personnel policy, including, but not limited to, promoting women to managerial positions, tours of duty and filling posts in remote areas.

This thesis also addresses women’s agency in the state bureaucracy. In trying to capture the gender interests of female managers of MOF I recognise that women do not always exercise their agency according to how GAD professionals and feminists define their priorities (Fierlbeck, 1997, Jackson, 1997). In a different setting, the context of participatory rural appraisal (PRA), Jackson (1996: 500) argues: ‘For women who are excluded from dominant world views and male vocabularies (Ardener 1975), it is not wise to assume that they can, or will, simply express their priorities as PRA assumes.’ This consideration is essential in the interpretation of the female
manager interviews, especially in relation to decision-making and choices made during their careers.

The broad research questions concerning gender participants are:

1. Where are men and women in MOF hierarchy?
2. Who are the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of MOF Bureaucratic ‘Game’?
3. How many women does it take to change the organisational culture?
4. Has there been any collective effort from MOF’s female employees to change the organisational dynamics?

Unlike the other elements, I do not analyse ‘gendered participants’ separately but include it in analysis of the other elements. So, for example, when discussing gendered time and space I also discuss how MOF employees, as gendered participants, respond to how MOF structures their time and space. By doing this, instead of portraying MOF’s women as objects of the MOF’s bureaucratic structure, I am highlighting their agency which in turn shapes MOF’s gendered organisational dynamics.

2.3.5 

**Sexuality of the organisation**

This element is not discussed in a separate chapter, featuring instead in the analysis of the other elements. For example, in the recruitment process it is clear that MOF wants to keep its organisation as masculine as possible by limiting women’s participation. Setting out this issue in a specific chapter would lead to repetition of the same point. Furthermore, sexual harassment, one of the core issues in discussion of the sexuality of the organisation, did not explicitly emerge from my research fieldwork. This may have been due to embarrassment or the stigma of being harassed, or because sexual harassment is an alien concept for government officials whose state does not yet acknowledge marital rape. Exploring these issues involves specific ethical challenges and would require a specific research project of its own: it was not
possible to deduce its prevalence and effect from the data collected for this study. Despite excluding sexual harassment, the other elements of gendered archaeology provide clues about the sexuality of MOF as an organisation, as I discuss in the conclusion to the thesis.

2.3.6 Gendered authority structures

Weber (Weber and Parsons, 1947) elaborates specifiable organisational structures that he refers to as the ideal type of bureaucracy. The characteristics embedded in his ideal type of bureaucracy involve functional specialisation, a clear hierarchy, precise contracts of employment, the standardisation of rules and procedures, credentials (where each member of staff is appointed to a specific job based on their technical skill and competence), and rewards strictly determined by a worker's place in the hierarchy (Weber and Parsons, 1947, Halford and Leonard, 2001b p.39-40, Albrow, 1970).

Clegg (1990) and Witz and Savage (1992) reject the Weberian concept of bureaucracy, arguing that bureaucracy is not the only means of organising and that there are many examples of organisations that do not conform to Weber’s ideals. With regard to gender, recent years have seen an increasing number of organisations, including government agencies in developing countries, claiming to emphasise the work-life balance by introducing part-time work and job sharing. In the absence of such flexible arrangements in Indonesia’s civil service one might suspect that MOF has not moved away from Weberian ideals. Chapter 4 discusses how Indonesia’s Civil Service Law, which is still actively used and referred to in every single case involving civil servants, still embodies traditional, rigid Weberian principles.

Weber believed that the establishment of a bureaucratic system could ensure the most efficient form of modern organisation, since bureaucracy operates according to competence regardless of the
characteristics of its players. Bureaucracy is ruled by organisational structures that permit only one sort of power, which is rational-legal authority. This power is acquired through the strict application of objective procedures. All individuals are judged by their merits and ability rather than by personal attributions such as gender. Therefore according to Weber, the dominance of the rational-legal form of power means that processes and procedures are totally objective. Another bureaucratic characteristic assumed and imposed by Weber is impersonality. This suggests that gender does not and should not matter in bureaucracy as long as the people there are (1) selected and recruited according to their professional qualifications and (2) once in the bureaucracy they do their job properly according to the job description.

Kanter (1977a), who shares Weber’s assumption about the gender-neutrality of the organisation as a terrain, identifies the gender-neutrality of organizations as a central problem and observes: ‘While organizations were being defined as sex-neutral machines, masculine principles were dominating their authority structures’ (Kanter, 1977a p.46).

Kanter (1977a, 1993) observes links between levels of management and the use of personal discretion. She found that ‘the importance of discretion increases with closeness to the top of hierarchical organisation’ (ibid. p.52). This situation arises as the criteria for good decisions or good management performance become less certain the closer one gets to the top managerial levels.

Discussion of the use of discretion at MOF links back to the fact that women are in a minority of 22% in total and 12% at managerial levels in the organisation. According to Kanter (Kanter, 1977b), this level of representation is only slightly beyond ‘tokenistic’ and falls short of ‘tilted’. In this context, rather than looking at how the women exercise discretion it may be more appropriate to ask how they are affected by discretion.
I explore this element of MOF’s gendered archaeology through the following questions:

1. To what extent does discretion play a role in promotion?
2. To what extent does discretion against women at MOF limit their career progression?
3. How are women at MOF perceived as leaders?
4. What other structures are imposed on women at MOF?

### 2.3.7 Gendered space and time

This element of Goetz’s framework mainly stems from the divide between gendered private and public life and how this relates to the physical and social structure of an organisation’s work. For example, men’s social capacity frees them from domestic responsibilities, including childcare, allowing them to invest more time in the workplace. For women, however, this boundary is blurred; in fact the main problem for women with and within organisations is that organisations have been constructed with ‘male-centred assumptions about the extent to which the private can be marked off from the public’ (Halford et al., 1997 p.192). This assumption rings especially true in bureaucratic organisations such as MOF, where there is a career hierarchy to climb. While a man’s bureaucratic career usually relies on the existence of a wife to look after his children and mind his household the reverse does not automatically apply to female bureaucrats. Women’s experience in the organisation cannot easily be separated from their domestic situation, often to the extent that domestic responsibilities and identities become central to workplace life, as Halford et al (1997) found in their study of banking, nursing and local government in the UK. In a further study, Halford and Leonard (2006a) look at the effect of gendered space and time on gendered identities in the gendered organisation. They argue that understanding the mobility and fluidity of the concepts of time, space and place is essential to understanding power and agency.
In this thesis, ‘gendered space and time’ refers to practices at MOF that deal with placement, relocation and overtime, how MOF female managers respond to these policies and the extent to which this experience shapes their identities. While these issues would be formulated as ‘procedural justice’ versus ‘work-life balance’ in mainstream management studies (see, for example, Poelmans and Beham, 2008), in this thesis I look at them from an international development perspective, taking into account the Javanese cultural understanding of expected gender roles. This is the area that Rao et al (1999) refer to as ‘the split between work and family’.

Acker (1990) argues that people who are qualified and do not have to divide their commitment are able to get to the top regardless of their gender. As her research is mainly based on developed country experiences, her argument may be informed by western lifestyles in which people manage their domestic responsibilities without external help. In countries like Indonesia, however, many households have a servant or a maid, making it easier for women to advance in their careers. The thesis assesses the extent to which this is the case in Indonesia’s MOF.

In dealing with the concept of time, I use a sociological life-course framework (Elder, 1996, Elder, 1994) to analyse the choices that MOF female managers make about their careers in order to reconcile their work and family life.

This element of MOF’s gendered archaeology is explored through the following questions:

1. How does MOF accommodate gender roles across the work/home divide?
2. To what extent does MOF’s approach to structuring time and space affect women’s participation?
3. How do women reconcile their career and their domestic lives?
4. How do women negotiate their gendered (and multiple) identities in MOF?

### 2.3.8 Gendered incentive and accountability systems

As Goetz (1997a p.22) explains: ‘Incentives may be tied more to quantitatively measurable performance targets than to qualitative matters such as promoting empowerment processes. Accountability may be oriented towards more vociferously demanding constituencies (...) rather than downwards or horizontally towards women’s groups’.

As other research (see for example Miller and Razavi, 1998) shows, the process of implementing GM usually has more to do with external pressure and accountability to donors than with accountability to female employees.

I discuss these gendered incentive and accountability systems through the lens of the setting up and implementation of a GM effort at MOF. The main research questions in this chapter are:

1. To whom is MOF’s GM effort accountable?
2. To what extent does GM help MOF to change as an organisation?
3. To what extent do the internal gender dynamics within the GM team affect their external outcomes?

### 2.4 Other approaches to the gendered organisation

Goetz’s framework assumes that organisations are not gender-neutral terrain. In the past, it was assumed that the limited number of women in bureaucracies was a reflection of wider society, including their lower participation in higher education and disparities in the distribution of social and economic goods (Goetz 1992). These days however, it is widely accepted that the organisation is gendered terrain in its own right.
Ferguson (1984) argues that bureaucratic organisational structures cannot be separated from gendered power because bureaucratic organisational structures are masculine. She suggests that contemporary bureaucracy should be understood both as a structure and a process. Male dominance will persist no matter how the structures are redesigned, because bureaucratic principles are much closer to the male way of doing things, from the establishment of office hours that do not take into account the needs of the family at home, to how out-of-office networking is arranged. The only way to overcome this is for women to establish alternative forms of organisation that suit their needs and aspirations.

Ferguson’s argument suggests that a bureaucratic organisation is not gender-neutral terrain. This assumption is developed by Acker (1990), who suggests that organisations are inherently gendered. Based on studies in developed countries, she sets out the theory of gendered organisation to make sense of the gender inequality in bureaucracies, arguing that organisations are gendered institutions due to five interacting processes:

1. the construction of divisions along the lines of gender (labour; allowed behaviour; location in physical space; power, including institutionalised means of maintaining divisions in the structures of family; the labour market, and the state);

2. the construction of symbols and images that explain, express, reinforce or sometimes oppose those divisions;

3. interactions between men and women, women and women, and men and men, including all patterns that enact dominance and submission;

4. the gendered components of individual identity that these constructions and interaction processes help to produce, which may include consciousness of the existence of other aspects of gender,
namely choice of work, use of language, clothing, and the presentation of self as a gendered member of an organisation;

5. an ongoing process of creating and conceptualising social structures, including complex organisations.

Acker (1990) argues that the concept of a job, although apparently gender-neutral, is actually gendered as it already encapsulates gender divisions of labour and separation between the public and the private spheres. Hierarchies are gendered because they are constructed with the underlying assumptions that those who are committed to employment are more suited to responsibility and authority and that those who must divide their commitments (i.e. women) are more suited to the lower ranks.

If it is accepted that organisations in general are by definition gendered, it is necessary to assess the ways in which this occurs. Britton (2000) discusses three ways in which the concept of the gendered organisation is applied in academic writing. Firstly, the ideal-typical bureaucracy is inherently gendered, which means that it has been defined, conceptualised and structured based on a distinction between masculinity and femininity and will thus inevitably reproduce gendered differences. Both Ferguson and Acker’s conceptions of gendered organisation fall into this category. Secondly, an organisation or occupation can be seen as gendered by headcount: i.e. by which gender dominates in terms of representation. Thirdly, an organisation or occupation can be regarded as gendered in that it is symbolically and ideologically described and conceived in terms of a discourse that draws on hegemonically-defined masculinities and femininities (Britton, 2000 p.420).

Rao et al (1999), who combine feminist and organisational change theories, argue that the way to understand the gendered nature of organisation is to work with what they call the ‘deep structure’ of organisation. In this they include four elements: 1) valuing heroic
individualism, which encourages the culture of winning (and the winners tend to be men); 2) exclusionary power, which devalues participation and silences the voices that would present the alternative perspective and knowledge required for gender-equal outcomes (Rao et al., 1999 p.12); 3) a split between work and family; and 4) the monoculture of instrumentality (the tendency to focus narrowly on a single purpose and one course of action to get there, which often takes the attention away from the bigger picture of women’s empowerment).

While ‘valuing heroic individualism’ can be paralleled with Goetz’s gendered cognitive context, and the ‘split between work and family’ resonates with her concept of gendered space and time, ‘exclusionary power’ is a concept that is not easy to deal with in analysing an organisation, in this case MOF. It intersects with Goetz’s gendered authority structure, with more focus on the external organisational environment. Depending on one’s view of organisational culture, a monoculture of instrumentality could be pigeon-holed as part of it.

### 2.5 Power and empowerment

The overarching research question in this thesis is about the extent to which MOF’s gendered archaeology impacts on women’s empowerment. By ‘women’ in this context I mean the female employees of MOF. It is widely acknowledged that the word ‘power’, from which the concept of empowerment derives, has both negative and positive meanings (Kabeer, 1999). The negative notion of power refers to ‘power over’, the type of power that controls, dominates and subordinates others to achieve particular goals. The positive sense of power refers to people’s capacity to decide for themselves about what they want to do. This kind of power includes ‘power in’, ‘power with’ and ‘power to’. ‘Power in’ represents self-confidence, self-awareness and assertiveness. People who have already acquired this type of power may join together (here the idea of ‘power with’ – power through collective action and solidarity – operates) to exercise
power to do something in their interest. In the sense of women’s empowerment, power cannot be granted. According to Kabeer, it should be acquired by the women themselves. As such, an institution or organisation can create an environment that enables disempowered women to gain power.

Hall (1992) defines empowerment as individual self-realisation and self-assertion, while Oakley and Marsden (1984) extend this to control over decisions regarding all aspects of not only one’s life but also one’s livelihood.

Many theories of empowerment are small-scale and tend only to be applied to poor rural men and women, rarely touching the subject of the urban middle classes in developing countries. It has long been acknowledged that women in developing countries commonly perceive themselves differently to how western feminists portray them (Momsen and Townsend, 1987), and I argue that even in an urban middle-class setting this difference still holds. A female manager at MOF may hold a master’s degree from a developed country but this does not necessarily mean that she thinks and regards herself the same way her counterparts in developed countries do.

In this thesis the term ‘empowerment’ is used loosely to describe a process that a female employee goes through from being less empowered to becoming more empowered in the sense of negotiating her existence at MOF. Power is not seen as a top-down, systematic, one-way journey imposed from the organisation onto the employees. Instead, I choose to see power as dispersed, with everybody at MOF, as a bureaucratic organisation, exercising power in their daily lives to negotiate their identities in the organisation in relation to other organisational members, which in the end makes their identities fluid rather than stagnant.

Post-structuralist perspectives on gender and the organisation rest on different understandings of power. Rather than being restricted
to the hands of a dominant few, power is seen as circulating between all social actors and operates through the construction of language and discourse. This shapes how people perceive themselves and how they see the world around them. (Foucault, 1986 p.233-234) discusses this at length:

*Power is not that which makes the difference between those who exclusively possess and retain it, and those who do not have it and submit to it. Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always simultaneously in the position of undergoing and exercising power. They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not the points of its application.*

Based on post-modernist/post-structuralist understandings of power, my research does not assume that agency rests only with the government of Indonesia exercising its power to sustain a gendered civil service; neither do I assume that women in the Indonesian bureaucracy are powerless and oppressed by all powerful bureaucratic men. I see both women’s and men’s relation to power in a bureaucratic organisation as complex and shifting, where both may have power and be subject to power. For example, a female manager has power over her male subordinates but at the same time is constrained by the director who is her immediate boss.

Women at MOF may have their own strategies for making their way through the bureaucracy. They may also be shaping the organisation, or some posts in it, to enable themselves to achieve goals in other aspects of their lives. For example, some may not
strive to achieve a position in top-level management, feeling that mid-management is a more convenient position which leaves them time and energy to play with their young children. Again, this can be seen as a conscious choice rather than one made ‘under oppression’ or ‘false-consciousness’.
3 Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter elaborates the research process relating to the questions set out in the analytical framework chapter, including the planning and execution of the fieldwork and the analysis and interpretation of the data. As established in the framework chapter, the research exposes the ‘gender archaeology’ (Goetz, 1997a) of the Indonesian Ministry of Finance’s bureaucratic system.

The research is mostly qualitative, applying organisational ethnography, and is mainly focused on women in top and middle management. UNDP's GEM (1995-2010) suggests that decision-making positions are located at these two managerial levels, and hence they constitute one of the four GEM indicators. Although GEM was replaced by the Gender Inequality Index in 2011, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, it played an important role in the design of this research framework.

This chapter pays attention to my positionality as a researcher because of my own working experience in the Indonesian MOF. Before embarking on a PhD I was a MOF employee for more than ten years. I gained my familiarity with MOF after studying at the State Accounting College (STAN), a college belonging to MOF whose graduates are automatically employed by MOF all over Indonesia. After graduating I worked in the Training Agency (TA), a unit that meets the training needs of all MOF employees. I also became the gender focal point for the TA. I resigned from the organisation after twelve years.

I studied finance and accounting for my undergraduate degree, so gender research represented a shift in my career interests. The turning point was a result of working in MOF, where I noted blatant gender discrimination in recruitment and throughout my colleagues’ careers.
This study does not constitute action research (Argyris et al., 1985, Reason and Bradbury, 2001), as its results and findings do not aim to directly improve practices within MOF; nor was it commissioned by MOF for its own benefit. My employment there ended before I started my PhD.

This chapter begins with an overview of the broad methodological approach used to answer the set of research questions laid out in the framework chapter. From there, I explain how the methods were operationalised, and the chapter closes with a discussion on the effectiveness of the research strategies.

### 3.2 Methodological Approach

I conducted an organisational ethnography in the organisation where I had worked and in my own cultural setting with the aim of reporting the results to an international readership. Although some writers would define this research as autoethnography as it involves me translating my ‘home’ culture for an audience of ‘others’ (Reed-Danahay, 1997, Karra and Phillips, 2008), my personal experience is not central to the research, nor did it become the main source of the data gathered and analysed. And being autoethnographic in the sense of translating my ‘home’ culture, for me the choice of research site was also opportunistic (Reimer, 1977), as I did not make a special attempt to seek out and gain access to an interesting field location. Instead, I found myself in an interesting organisation and then decided to do research on it.

I am familiar with two parts of MOF, which became my research loci. The first is the TA, where I was mostly based during my employment. Included in the TA is the STAN, where I had studied before my employment in MOF. The second is the Gender Mainstreaming (GM) Team, an inter-organisational matrix programme with members from across the Ministry.
My personal involvement with MOF’s GM programme began when I returned to work there after completing a Masters degree in Gender and Development in the UK. Upon my return I was not immediately reinstated in my previous managerial position but placed in the Human Resources (HR) Division in TA without a formal job description. Since I was less busy than my colleagues, I was sent to attend meetings outside TA that the Director could not attend, including GM meetings. Everybody at MOF knew that I was the only person in the ministry with a specialised degree in gender and development, but since the GM team had been set up while I was abroad, my initial involvement was rather limited. I also attended meetings to represent the head of HR, reporting back to her afterwards. I became more involved in the programme in the following fiscal year, when I was chosen as the focal point for the TA. This gave me a place on the team, allowing me to be more active in shaping MOF’s GM strategy for the five months before I resigned and moved to the UK.

During these five months I formed acquaintances with everybody who was involved in and related to GM in MOF. I also made detailed notes on all my meetings and interactions within MOF and with people from outside MOF. These five months formed a foundation for the research chapter on GM in MOF. When I returned for my fieldwork a couple of years later, I not only knew my way around and which people I should approach for what information, I was also welcomed by the staff as a returnee.

In organisational ethnography it is very important to immerse oneself in the researched organisation, which involves shifting one’s position between that of insider and that of outsider (Bell, 1999, Neyland, 2008, Ybema, 2009). During my fieldwork I was moving between the two positions all the time depending on which office I was observing. In the training office I had to shift from insider to outsider; in the tax and treasury offices I was mostly outside their
group, but still an insider in the sense that I belonged to the Ministry.

I was and am an outsider in the sense that I am no longer working for MOF. Meanwhile, whilst switching between being insider and outsider, my position as an outsider was still different from that of a western social scientist researching Indonesian bureaucracy. As someone born and bred in Indonesia, I was doing research in my own cultural context for presentation in an international audience and for the people at MOF. So from this perspective I might be considered an ‘insider’.

Also, having been part of MOF for so long and knowing so many of its staff, I could not help being perceived as an insider by my research participants, some of whom did not even realise at the beginning of their interview that I not been working there for a while. Even after I told them I had resigned from MOF a year before starting my PhD, they still treated me as ‘one of them’. All of this helped to establish rapport and trust, as I discuss in section 3.8.3 of this chapter.

My experience working in MOF granted me easier access to it as a research setting than would have been possible for someone without a similar background, let alone a western academic conducting a similar study. My feelings about certain aspects of MOF shaped the research questions and how I phrased them in the interviews. My subjectivity and emotions as a researcher unavoidably played some part in shaping the knowledge that I produced through this research.

Acker et al (1996) discuss power relations in research, not only amongst the researched subjects but also between the researcher and the researched. My positionality as insider (or the researched subjects’ perception of me as an insider) created interesting power relations between us. I had feared that power issues would interfere with my fieldwork when I interviewed people who had been my
superiors at MOF. This would have represented the case where the researcher, too, can be vulnerable in terms of power relations with the researched (Cotterill, 1992). In most cases this did not happen as the participants did not exercise their power in such a way as to hinder my data-gathering activities, for example when I was investigating the MOF recruitment system, which I found gender-discriminatory. Although some of the participants from higher managerial levels assumed a superior position to me, as someone who used to be or could have been their subordinate, I did not challenge their patronising attitude. I accepted that as a researcher I was learning from them, by way of the interview, about their lives and their views on MOF.

Another issue that I faced, especially during my fieldwork, was my concern about exploiting my friendship with ex-colleagues in MOF in return for data that I needed for my research. In feminist research this anxiety about trading off friendship has been related to power relations between the researcher and the researched (Acker et al., 1996, Kirsch, 2005), and emerges when the researcher forms friendships with research participants in order to encourage open communication. In my case the friendships predated the research and my concern was about exploiting long-term friendships. I chose not to exclude these friends from my research, mainly because by doing so I would have reduced the number of research participants. Since the total number of female managers in MOF was already limited, excluding friends would have been a major limitation. I also included them because some were very keen to be part of my research. The only strategy I could think of to minimise the danger of exploiting them was to ask them, when the interview got very personal, whether they minded if I included this part in my direct quotation and analysis.

3.2.1 Formulating the research questions

The research questions for this PhD are derived from the conceptual framework elaborated in the previous chapter and dictated by the
availability of data. As discussed in the conceptual framework, this thesis applies Goetz’s (1997a) concept of the ‘gender archaeology’ of organizations, several aspects of which are investigated in this research (see Table 2.1).

3.2.2 Research timeframe

This thesis is based on observations made intermittently during my employment at MOF from 1993-2005 (with an interruption in 2002-2003), and during my fieldwork in 2006 and 2007. At the time of analysis and writing up I was still in contact with respondents to clarify some issues and get updates of subsequent events.

3.2.3 Choice of fieldwork site

MOF Personnel Bureau data show that women in senior and mid-level management tend to be based in medium to large cities and not in remote areas. My research was mainly located in Jakarta and in several offices in big cities on the main islands of Indonesia: Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Medan. The Ministry of Finance is administered centrally, and employees are moved around to posts across Indonesia every three years. By basing the research mainly in Jakarta plus some big cities, I expected that it would be possible to obtain a representative sample of women at the top levels of management.

3.2.4 Design and sampling

3.2.4.1. Local organisational knowledge: MOF

At the time of this fieldwork, MOF comprised eleven ‘echelon I units’. Some of these units were called Directorate Generals (DGs) and others Agencies. MOF is a holding company whereby individual units have job descriptions that are independent of each other, instead of forming a production line. Every echelon I unit is directed by an echelon I official, whose title depended on the name and type of the organisation. Each echelon I unit comprised several echelon II units which managed some echelon III units. Table 3.1, showing the
structure of MOF, is based on my first fieldwork visit in July-September 2006.

Table 3-1 shows that all of the heads of echelon I units were men. Immediately after my fieldwork period the TA’s leadership was given to a woman. Before I managed to arrange an interview with her, however, she was moved to another ministry. In the next chapter I explain that echelon I positions are highly political rather than career-based appointments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>Echelon I</th>
<th>Echelon II</th>
<th>Echelon III</th>
<th>Echelon IV</th>
<th>Echelon V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Training Agency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Stock Market Agency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fiscal Policy Agency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DG of Budget Planning</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>DG of Customs and Excise</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>DG of Fiscal Institution</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>DG of Tax</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>DG of Treasury</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>State Assets Management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Internal Audits</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Secretariat General</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: DG Directorate General
Source: MOF Personnel Bureau, July 2006
I obtained the data for table 3.1 from the Personnel Bureau, which is under the Secretariat General Office. However, to get the details of each person in the table I had to go to their units because MOF personnel records were not integrated. Also, Personnel Bureau records were updated annually whereas promotion and other placement activities occur two or three times a year. This system was under review as part of the bureaucratic reform programme launched by the Ministry in the year I was doing my fieldwork.

According to the GEM, the women included in the calculation are those at the middle and top managerial levels, which are represented by echelons I, II and III in the Indonesian civil service. Since MOF had no women in the first echelon at the time of my fieldwork, I focused my research on echelons II and III.

During my fieldwork period MOF was undergoing major restructuring with offices changing from one month to the next. Restructuring took several forms: a whole office might merge with another, part of one office might merge with another, several parts might be merged to form a new office or restructuring might occur within the same office. There was also the possibility of forming a new unit from scratch, followed by recruitment to fill the new positions.

To get a picture of the organisation’s culture I decided to observe the offices that were least affected by the restructuring process, or at least were only undergoing internal restructuring that did not involve merging with other offices. In this way I hoped to avoid bias resulting from the instability of the newly-formed organisation when observing relationships and gender dynamics.

This left me with five offices to choose from: TA, the Secretariat General, the Directorate General of Treasury (DGTR), the Directorate General of Tax (DGTX) and the Directorate General of Customs and Excise. From these five, I chose three: the TA, the
DGTR and DGTX. Each of these three offices had regional branches and a more-or-less comparable gender composition.

The Secretariat General is an administrative unit dealing with the needs of the whole Ministry. Its main tasks relate more to internal ministerial issues than to dealings with external organisations. Unlike the other four offices, the Secretariat General has no regional offices and is located in a single building. By contrast, Customs and Excise has regional offices dealing with the general public and a long-established structure. The reason I did not choose this organisation was because it is so male-dominated, with only three echelon III women out of 155 workers (see Table 3.1). Although it would have been interesting to study the struggles that these women faced, it would not be representative of MOF in general.

3.2.4.2. Sampling

The choice of participants was not entirely mine. Before setting off to Indonesia I had sent emails and faxes to inform MOF that I was hoping to do this fieldwork. My experience had taught me which unit and person I should direct these letters to in order to get favourable responses in good time. I sent a fax to the Minister’s office and within three working days received a reply signed by the Deputy Minister, agreeing to my plan and asking me for a list of the people I would like to interview and a timetable, so ‘they can make this a priority.’

Before replying with a suggested timetable, I approached the Personnel Bureau and asked for a list of female mid-level managers who worked in the three units I had selected, and was given the details of 53 women. I replied to the Minister’s office with their names but without offering fixed interview dates, as I did not know whether the women would be willing to participate. Instead, I mentioned that I would be in Indonesia for four months and asked if they would be available during that period.
Meanwhile, using contact details from the Personnel Bureau, I contacted the women and asked if they would be willing to participate in the study. In the process of setting up interviews I learned that the data given to me were out of date. Three people on the list had retired, more than ten had been promoted, rotated or relocated, and more women appeared to hold the echelon 3 positions in the DGTX than the list had indicated.

I managed to trace these female managers and their contact details with the help of friends and ex-colleagues. Some agreed to participate and did so, while others agreed but never found a convenient time to be interviewed. While none directly refused to be interviewed, five people told me that in principle they had no objection to being interviewed but did not think they would be able to find the time.

Table 3-2 Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview types</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Tax</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Secretariat</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key informant interviews</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatekeeper interviews</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.4.3. Key Informant Interviews

According to King (1994), the types of interviews that can be considered qualitative vary from ‘deep’, ‘exploratory’ and ‘semi-structured’ to ‘unstructured’. I chose to use semi-structured interviews in order to obtain comparable data with some flexibility for exploration when needed. During my first fieldwork visit I conducted some preliminary interviews and found that most
interviewees could not give me more than an hour and a half of their time. This time constraint convinced me that semi-structured interviews would work better than unstructured or in-depth ones.

The research made use of two types of semi-structured interview: key informant interviews sought to explore the informants’ work and family lives, and gatekeeper interviews mainly focussed on understanding MOF’s internal organisational structure and culture. In some cases these two types of interview overlapped with the same informant.

A set of questions was put to participants about their careers and working experiences. I focused on women in senior management to get a picture of the complexity of women’s experiences in a bureaucratic organisation, including how they used discretion and how it was used against or for them, and how their careers intersected with other priorities.

In conducting the interviews I did not totally disengage myself from the interviewees. This was made possible by my previous employment in MOF, which helped me to understand how things were done in the organisation. My knowledge of the research site helped my respondents to open up to me, both as a woman and as somebody who was familiar with MOF, although not all had known me in person before the interview.

Ideally, I would have liked to stratify the interviewees, for example according to age, ethnic group or religious belief. However, I had to bear in mind that not all of these female managers (who were few in the first place) would be willing to participate. Therefore my strategy was to send an invitation to participate in the research with a request for an interview to all women holding echelon III positions in the three units. I decided that if everybody agreed to participate, which seemed highly unlikely, I would be able to stratify them when I did the analysis. Nearly everybody agreed to be interviewed.
Just before my second fieldwork period there was another round of restructuring at MOF. This time the Budget Office was restructured and divided into two units: the Budget Office and the Treasury Office. Most of the women I had previously identified and who had agreed to be interviewed went to the Treasury Office. Consequently I chose this rather than the other branch. As soon as I arrived in Jakarta I phoned the Secretariat and checked that people were able to participate in the interviews as I had proposed. We modified the timetable a little to accommodate individual preferences, but in general the interviews were conducted according to plan. I had recruited a research assistant (RA) who accompanied me to several interviews so that she would be able to interview people who were unavailable during my fieldwork period and clarify points based on the interview transcriptions. In the end she only conducted 11 of the 121 interviews and I carried out the rest. All interviews were digitally taped and transcribed on the same day to ensure the quality of the result. This meant that I could go back the next day, or ask my RA to do so, if there were points to clarify or follow-up questions.

I found that people in DGTX tended to follow their standard operating procedure and stick to appointments that I had made, which was reassuring when it came to the interview schedule. Respondents were always where they had said they would be, and never more than an hour late. I had spaced my interviews with a two hour interval between them in order to give me time to write notes and to allow for tardiness.

I had nearly finished the interviews and observation in the Treasury Office when I started at the Taxation Office. The Secretary General had sent a letter informing the office about my research, but there had been no reply from the Director General of Taxation. Instead of going through the official channels I talked to people I knew from my time working there and was pleasantly surprised to find that they were extremely helpful, despite their tight schedule.
One contact that I knew from STAN was a member of a *pengajian*, or Koran reciting group, held during lunch breaks. She contacted some female managers she knew and scheduled interviews for me. The following day, as I was waiting in a corridor for an interview, the person I had just finished interviewing was chatting with someone else and mentioned that like me, the latter was married to a westerner. This new contact turned out to be very useful, introducing me to all the female managers in the Tax Office that she knew through work or church. In the end I interviewed 25 female managers, none of whom I had known at the beginning of my research, within a couple of weeks despite not going through formal channels.

On the tapes and transcriptions there is no obvious difference in terms of content between interviews resulting from this informal approach and those arranged formally. I had anticipated that people who formally arranged to be interviewed might have been reserved in criticising MOF or volunteering delicate information about corruption, but as it turned out, everybody seemed to speak their mind about their colleagues and MOF as an organisation. Moreover, apart from people in TA where I had previously worked, I did not know most of the respondents. In TA I was welcomed as part of the team and nearly everyone volunteered to be interviewed, even before being asked. It felt a little like researching members of my own family, with all its associated advantages and disadvantages, as I had worked with these respondents for more than ten years.

As much as I would have liked the data to be comparable, I did not try to quantify the responses since the main purpose of the research was not to generalise the findings but to explore some possibilities. The concluding chapter of the thesis raises the issue of whether these women’s experiences may be representative of women working in other organisations.
3.2.4.4. Research Participant Profiles

3.2.4.4.1. Female managers in MOF: qualifications, family and marital status
As mentioned above, 59 mid- and top-level female managers of DGTR, DGTX, and TA were amongst the people who participated in this research. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were used to obtain their personal stories.

The Indonesian civil service has a very complex grading and ranking system which is not based only on employees' performance. There is a wide difference in career paths and achievements depending on people's academic qualifications when they first join MOF (see Chapters 4 and 5). With this in mind, I divided the interviewees into three MOF recruitment categories: those who joined from high school, those who joined on completing the STAN three-year diploma course; and those who joined as sarjana (university graduate recruits) (Table 3.3).
Table 3-3 Female Managers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruitment</th>
<th>Number of interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SMA</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAN</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarjana</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4 shows the age of the informants at the time of interview. Since very few people over 30 years old join the civil service (most of my interviewees joined MOF directly after graduating), their length of service corresponds with their age: older employees would have longer term of service than the younger ones.

Table 3-4 Age at time of interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number of interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38-44</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-50</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-56</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-5 Marital status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Number of interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never married</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5 shows that 8 of the 59 female managers, or 10 percent of the sample, are not married. Fifty-one women were or had been married. Amongst them, only one was already married when she joined MOF. STAN prohibits its students from marrying (see
Chapter 6), but there was no such requirement for the *sarjana* intake.

Among the 42 interviewees who were married when interviewed, 27 had partners working as civil servants; the others’ partners worked in the private sector. This categorisation was made with the understanding that civil servants can be required to move around Indonesia, so where both partners worked in the civil service it would be interesting to see how they managed such rotation and relocation, and whether and how their respective careers were affected (see Chapters 6 and 8 for more on this subject).

3.2.4.4.2. Male participants
When I started my first fieldwork period I was hoping to be able to hold similar semi-structured interviews with men employed in MOF. I interviewed my male ex-colleagues from the TA, intending to cover the same range of issues as with their female colleagues. However, these interviews were much shorter than those with women and tended to reveal a clear boundary between work and domestic life, which was not the case with the women.

The male employees were generally less inclined to do ‘this kind of interview’, as one of them put it. One suggested that I should be more efficient about taking their time, and proposed that I use the assembly hall for half an hour, standing at the front and going through my questions, which they would answer in turn from left to right. However, the men in the TA agreed to participate in a focus group discussion about organisational culture and how it enables or disables women’s participation.

When I tried to approach male employees in the DGTR and DGTX I got a similar response. I mostly had to catch the men on my way to other interviews. For example, I bumped into some men who had been at college with me, and they offered five or ten minutes of their time for an interview. Often during an interview with a female manager some of her male colleagues appeared for one reason or
another, usually related to their work, and chipped in on the interviews, offering their views on particular subjects. As the tape was running, their responses were recorded as well, and they did not mind me using what they said in my analysis. In total, including those who ‘chipped in’, we interviewed 33 male MOF employees (see Table 3.6).

Table 3.6 Male interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruitment</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SMA</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAN</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarjana</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38-44</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-50</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-56</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never married/divorced/widowed</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.4.5. Gatekeeper Interviews

Apart from the core interviews with women and men in the top managerial positions described above, I also conducted some interviews with ‘gatekeepers’ to investigate the nature of power relations in MOF. These gatekeepers included the people responsible for recruitment, posting and promotion, and those responsible for combating corruption at MOF. These interviews covered the history of MOF, its organisational culture, informal structures, the elite circles found in each of the three echelon I units, and how decisions were made.

3.2.4.6. Direct Observation

As in most organisational ethnography, observation played a big part in the fieldwork. Junker (1960) looks at four different positions that an ethnographer can occupy: complete participant, participant
as observer, observer as participant and complete observer. Neyland (2008) does not recommend the positions of complete participant or complete observer. I kept shifting between participant as observer and observer as participant. In part, this resulted from changes in my own work status and official relationship to MOF.

I started observing MOF long before I embarked on the PhD. My decision to apply to do a Masters in Gender and Development in 2002-2003 was driven by the high level of discrimination against women that I had faced for my ten years as an MOF worker. On returning from doing my Masters to work at MOF I started keeping a personal journal based on my experience and observation of daily practice at MOF. Although the journal is personal and includes my feelings at the time, I had been expecting to refer back to it when I did my interviews, although to do so I would have to ask staff’s permission to use the material gathered before I started my PhD. During this time my position was that of ‘participant as observer’. After two more years I resigned from MOF to move to the UK and start my PhD. In the second year of my studies I returned to MOF to carry out my fieldwork, this time as ‘observer as participant’. Further discussion of my role as insider and outsider and its implications for the research follow later in this chapter as part of a reflection on the effectiveness of the fieldwork strategy.

At the same time as conducting the interviews I also made observations in the workplace. According to my experience of the preliminary research and of working in MOF, most people (1) wanted to be interviewed in their office so that they would not have to leave their work, and (2) were late for the interview, usually because they were dealing with issues that had just come up and needed an immediate response, in which cases I had to wait for some time. I used this waiting time, too, to observe and talk to other people, generally subordinates of the female manager respondents, in the office. Key aspects of observation included the
layout of the office, the way people dressed, and how employees communicated with each other their seniors and their subordinates.

3.2.4.7. Focus Group Discussions (FGD)

Initially I did not expect focus group discussions to be feasible in the two Directorate Generals, where it was difficult enough to arrange a meeting with the top managers individually, let alone get them together at the same time and place. However, an opportunity arose unexpectedly. While I was waiting to conduct a key interview at DGTX, several people that I was going to interview that day happened to be having a meeting together. When their own meeting finished, they asked me if it would be possible for me to interview them together to save them time. I took this opportunity to run an FGD about which aspects of MOF’s organisational culture enable or disable women’s participation.

In the end this FGD at DGTX took more of the respondents’ time than all the individual interviews together would have done. I stayed in their office from 9am-2pm and was even given lunch. As I was leaving, they thanked me for ‘helping them to offload’. This put me on the spot, as I had to be very careful about managing their expectations of my research, which was not meant to be action research and to emphasise that they would not benefit directly from participating. This FGD was taped but not fully transcribed because of its length: while listening to the recording I just made notes of points I wanted to use when writing about certain subjects.

3.2.4.8. Secondary data collection

Secondary data and grey literature, including data about internal HR management and development, were obtained from several MOF sources, particularly the Secretariat General, a unit of which has a housekeeping function for MOF including planning and budgeting to which the GM programme is attached. HR statistics were used to obtain a general picture of the *gendered participants* (Goetz, 1997a)
of MOF and to locate the sample for interview early on in the research.

MOF had a reasonably good archive system and did not dispose of old documents. To access the appropriate documents, however, it was necessary to know the right questions to ask the right people. This required considerable familiarity with the organisation. Most of the statistics were found to be correct when triangulated with other sources of information, although this did not seem to apply in other government ministries. When I was trying to develop a comparative analysis with the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) I found many mistakes in the HR statistics that could not be traced or triangulated. Even the HR statistics on their websites did not add up.

The policy documents were mostly used to collect data for Chapter 11 on GM. Chapter 11 draws upon several forms of data: my personal work experience, my fieldwork, official documents from the Ministry of Women Empowerment (MOWE) and some international funding agencies, all the notes and files kept by the GM team between 2003-2010 plus various updates that they continued to supply me with, and documents available on the Internet.

As I was not involved when the GM effort started, the section on MOF is based on interviews I held during my fieldwork period with men and women involved in the programme. These were triangulated with formal documents such as the minutes of meetings, MOF's internal and external correspondence and other forms of documentation. Later in my research these internal documents and interview data were also triangulated with national and international reports on GM in Indonesia such as a UNDP country report on GM (Cattleya, 2006).

Another source of information was the laws and regulations about specific financial issues that have gendered impacts on people's lives and livelihoods, such as taxation law, and other secondary
data obtained from formal documents, internal and external reports, journals, newspapers and magazines.

### 3.3 Interpretation and analysis

At the end of my fieldwork I had interview transcripts, field notes, audio recordings, and many official reports and policy documents. These were analysed and categorised into themes according to my conceptual framework. Initially I used NVivo to categorise and analyse the data. The software kept crashing my computer, so I performed a manual coding and categorisation based on my interpretation of Goetz’s gender archaeology of organisations.

Throughout the research process I needed to be constantly aware of my own positionality. As mentioned in the introduction, my own working experience in MOF has played an important role in shaping this research. Accurate observation was a delicate issue as it was impossible to entirely mask my personal perceptions and opinions.

### 3.4 Reflections on positionality and the effectiveness of the strategies

#### 3.4.1. Researching in a familiar setting

Researching in a familiar setting created both opportunities and challenges. Karra and Phillips (2008 p.549) identify four strengths in doing research in one’s own cultural setting: ease of access, reduced resource requirements, increased ability to establish trust and rapport and reduced problems with translation. In my own research another strength became apparent apart from these four: the ability to triangulate information from research participants and the ease of keeping in touch even after the fieldwork finished.

#### 3.4.2. Ease of Access

Studying at STAN gave me the advantage of knowing college colleagues who took up positions in units across MOF after graduating. My familiarity with MOF in general gave me another
point of contact with people of various ages, positions and managerial levels from other MOF units. These factors helped me to negotiate my re-entry to the organisation as a researcher rather than an employee.

My personal familiarity with MOF was advantageous in numerous ways. It enabled me to navigate through a very complex organisational structure and personnel hierarchy. At the time of my fieldwork, MOF was going through a major reorganisation; because my research is about the organisation and the people there, knowledge of these gave me an important head start.

**3.4.3. Establishing Trust and Rapport**

My familiarity with staff at MOF helped me considerably in setting up interviews and arranging direct observation. I knew someone I could interview or who could point me to someone else who could be interviewed in each unit and nearly every office. This is particularly important when doing research in a government agency in Indonesia, where nearly every piece of information has to be handled with extreme confidentiality. It would have been difficult for a stranger to access the information that I obtained.

My advanced knowledge of the MOF’s organisational culture helped me not only to identify the most relevant questions to put to my interviewees but also to tailor the questions in a way that did not offend them or make them uncomfortable. Furthermore, my interviewees felt confident enough to share stories and gossip about what was going on in MOF and rumours about the future with me. Some of this was off the record, so I could not draw on it directly to support my analysis. Nevertheless, it gave me a more complete picture and sometimes provided me with the opportunity to revisit these issues with other informants who were prepared to discuss them openly, without jeopardising my original source.
3.4.4. Reduced resource requirements and reduced problems with translation

As an Indonesian my research costs were low, as I did not have to pay for accommodation during my fieldwork and there was no need for translation; the latter also meant that no detail was lost in translation. I could capture expressions and nuances and put them into the context of the interview, resulting in a higher degree of data reliability. Speaking the same language also helped me to oversee the quality of the work that my research assistant produced.

3.4.5. Triangulation

Triangulation is one of the strengths of the research design, and this is inseparable from my familiarity with MOF. First, I had access to the employee database, including the details of the people I interviewed. So, for example, if an interviewee stated that she had passed a test to study abroad but in the end had not gone I could crosscheck this with the MOF database, including when it had happened, what had been done about it and who had been handling the case, and could follow this up with another interview if necessary.

Second, the contacts and acquaintances that I made when working in TA helped me to identify the recruitment batch that interviewees came from, and in some cases their life stories self-triangulated with others’. Here is an example of how this was done:

Respondent A (talking about recruitment):

*I joined MOF in 1981. In my batch there were four people who got posted in this office: Norma, Timbul and Rusdi and myself. Oh, actually it was five ... with Edward. But then Edward was reposted to the Secretariat General, and in the end he left MOF and became a lecturer in Yogyakarta, and Norma moved to the Treasury Office, so there were the three of us left...*
I immediately noticed that the three people the respondent mentioned were on my interview list. From the HR database I could see that Norma was at the same level of management as Respondent A, and had an overseas Masters degree, but had only taken up that position ten years later. When I interviewed Norma later I asked her why she had been promoted so late, despite her degree. It came to light that a year after she joined MOF she had asked to be placed in Central Java to follow her husband, who worked there. Given the organisational culture, including how promotion was handled around that time, she might have been overlooked because she did not want to be moved to another city. Meanwhile, I could see from the organisational structure and HR data that both Timbul and Rusdi had been directors for ten years at the time of interviews.

This ability to triangulate the data also proved useful for finding out whether a respondent was being truthful. One interviewee mentioned that she had passed a test to study abroad but at the time she was about to get married. There were no records on people who did not go abroad after passing the required test to do so, so I would have not been able to verify this had another women not brought up the subject. According to two different respondents who were interviewed at different times and in different places, this particular respondent did not pass the test. They stated that she had always claimed to have deliberately failed the test because she was getting married.

Internal triangulation is linked with my ability to understand the key terminology and concepts used by my interviewees. For example, when they referred to mutasi (tour of duty) I could immediately relate to this concept, having once worked in HR development. My knowledge of working in the Training Centre enabled me to compare the situation in their particular office to the offices where I had been based and other offices where my other interviewees worked.
Third, I was allowed access to important internal documents that facilitated triangulation. For example, when dealing with GM effort in MOF I was given all the relevant internal reports, minutes of meetings and tapes of meetings. I also managed to get access to the national evaluation of GM written by the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment-MOWE—(Kementerian Negara Pemberdayaan Perempuan, 2006) and UNDP’s country report (Cattleya, 2006). Both reports included MOF in their evaluation, which enabled me to crosscheck with MOF’s internal report. I do not believe that this would have been possible had I not been keeping up good connections with so many people in MOF over the years.

3.4.6. Keeping in touch after the fieldwork had finished

When doing my fieldwork, everybody I interviewed kindly gave me their email address and told me that I was welcome to get in touch in case I needed clarification or to follow up on anything. Initially I thought this was just politeness, but when I sent them all a small souvenir through my research assistant they all emailed me their thanks and asked if there was anything else I needed. I took this opportunity to ask them some follow-up questions and they all responded in detail within a week.

All my key informants and some of the interviewees have Facebook accounts and they all added me as a Facebook friend. As I did not use Facebook systematically I did not formally include it as one of my research methodologies. During my data analysis, however, people’s status on Facebook sometimes served as a useful starting point for follow-up and triangulation with what they had said during an interview.

Despite these important advantages there were also challenges in being a semi-insider, especially those related to my positionality as a researcher, as I discuss below.
3.4.7. Lack of critical distance

During my fieldwork, and when I was analysing the research findings I took things for granted which a complete stranger would have found interesting or not understood; I missed them because they were familiar. These problems were reduced by obtaining feedback from my research supervisors and other readers unfamiliar with the specific setting.

3.4.8. Conflicting roles?

My initial involvement in MOF’s GM efforts sometimes put me in an awkward position during my fieldwork. When I was part of the GM team, people often turned to me for advice as the only person with a degree in gender analysis in development. Once I resigned from MOF I kept in touch with them as part of my research, in order to review the progress of the MOF’s GM effort. The people responsible for it, however, still saw me as a gender expert and kept asking my advice on where to direct their activities and channel the budget. This put me in a difficult position, because if I helped them there would have been a conflict of interests in the sense that I would be reviewing my own organisational agenda. On the other hand, I felt a certain sense of responsibility and did not want them to waste resources on activities that were unlikely to succeed. In the end I helped them to put forward a funding proposal to a European bilateral donor for a gender training programme, after they had independently come to the conclusion that they needed it.

3.4.9. Asking ‘obvious’ things

Being familiar with the surroundings also brought some challenges in the interview process, especially when people started their sentences with: ‘You know what I mean about [such and such]...’. It was apparent that they expected me to share their views on certain MOF bureaucracy issues. This put me in an awkward position, especially when, unavoidably, I interviewed friends and former colleagues. Some respondents found it bizarre that I asked certain
questions. For example, once I asked a respondent about the importance of religion in her life and she responded: ‘...Of course it is important, you know it is the most important thing in life. Why do you ask me that question? Have you become atheist now that you’ve lived abroad for a while?’ The next time I asked a similar question I had to find a more indirect way of putting it to avoid offending the participant by appearing to question their religiosity.

My religion and nationality also posed a challenge during the fieldwork. Most of the research participants were interested in whether I changed my religion and my nationality to follow my British husband after I left MOF and Indonesia to settle in the UK with him. Those who have known me for a while knew that I am not a practising Muslim, although Islam is entered as my religion on my Indonesian identity card. Most of my friends accept this, and others, although disagreeing, avoid talking about this subject with me. In Indonesia it is not acceptable to directly admit that you are an atheist, agnostic or even that you are not practising your religion. It is best to avoid discussing it. I found it very difficult, however, when somebody asked me about my religious beliefs, as it is common for Javanese people to ask such personal questions. I was reluctant to give a straight answer as I did not want to offend them. There was an element of hypocrisy in this, since I was asking them about their personal lives and expecting them to be truthful.

3.4.10. Ethical issues

The description of the methods above makes it clear that the research participants were not dependent on the researcher in any way. Participation was voluntary, the participants were free to withdraw at any stage of the research, and I obtained informed consent forms from them all. The participants were mostly women, with some men in senior positions at the Ministry of Finance who were fully informed about the purpose of the research and could decide whether they wanted to participate.
All data were anonymised. I was careful not to mention the positions at MOF of interviewees who could be identified by them.

Sometimes participants said something that did not represent the view of the organisation. I respected their right to make an off-the-record statement which would not be quoted verbatim but might still be used to help in the data analysis. At the end of the research, the interview transcriptions were sent to the respective participants for confirmation of their content. Some sent the transcription back with minor corrections about the details of places and dates, and one person changed her mind about an event she had told me about and asked me to keep it off-record.

The notes taken during the period when I was not officially doing fieldwork were only used to help in my analysis. Although I described some events in my notes in a very detailed way, I did not use direct quotes without the permission of the participants concerned. On several occasions when these detailed accounts could be useful to support my argument I discussed them with the participant in question during an interview, both to confirm my observation and to get the participants’ first-hand account of the event.

3.5 Limitations

The research has two key limitations. First, it does not provide a comparative study of men and women’s experience of working in Indonesian MOF. Instead, it focuses on women’s life experiences working in a male-dominated bureaucracy. Second, it does not systematically analyse what each of MOF’s directorate generals could have done in mainstreaming gender in their line of work. To do so would require macroeconomic analysis, which is not my area of expertise, and gender disaggregated data that currently do not exist. More details on the limitations of this thesis will be discussed in my concluding chapter.
4 MOF as a subsystem of the Indonesian Bureaucracy

4.1 Introduction

This chapter gives background information on the civil service system in Indonesia and MOF as a subsystem of the Indonesian bureaucracy. It serves as a prologue to the discussion about how this formal setting affects the careers of the men and women working there in different ways. It also introduces some key terms that are useful for understanding relationships in the hierarchy of Indonesian bureaucracy.

The chapter is divided into five main sections. The first three examine the civil service system in Indonesia, including its historical development, characteristics and relationship to changing political scenarios. The fourth section deals with the civil service’s organisational structure and job hierarchy. It looks at the hierarchical structure of MOF as a government organisation, the positions and jobs within the structure, the relationships between them, and the requirements for different positions. The fifth section deals with current and future female representation in MOF. It examines the gendered composition of MOF’s civil servants and the extent to which it is representative of the civil service as a whole. The last section deals with the current bureaucratic reform.

4.2 The civil service system in Indonesia: an overview

According to the Civil Service Law, the Indonesian civil service is made up of people working for central government, regional governments, and ‘other civil servants’ (including those in the military, the Ministry of Defence and embassies).

In 2010, the number of civil servants in Indonesia was around 3.7 million, about 1.65% of the total population. Although Table 4-1
shows an increase compared to 1974, the ratio to total population remains small compared to other South East Asian countries (United Nations, 2004, World Bank, 2003b), and is more comparable to the situation of countries like China and India (2008).

Table 4-1 Ratio of civil servants to total population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population *</th>
<th>Civil servants **</th>
<th>% CS of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>129,083,000</td>
<td>1,640,733</td>
<td>1.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>167,881,000</td>
<td>3,159,652</td>
<td>1.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>201,559,000</td>
<td>4,090,437</td>
<td>2.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>228,553,000</td>
<td>4,083,360</td>
<td>1.79%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: * Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics
** Data from National BKN

4.3 The development of Indonesia’s civil service

Dwiyanto and Partini (2006) divide the history of Indonesia’s bureaucracy into three eras: traditional (pre-colonial) bureaucracy, colonial bureaucracy and New Order bureaucracies. This division helps understanding shifts in the collective attitude of public servants to the nature of their work and in their wider status. In this respect, the history of the Indonesian bureaucracy is little different from civil services in developed countries. This saw the civil service evolve from serving the emperor, to acting in the interest of the colonial/feudal state, and then to serving the general public without taking the side of the political regime in power (Burns and Bowornwathana, 2001b).

During the pre-colonial era, civil servants served individual kingdoms which now form the national jurisdiction. In the colonial period they were Dutch public servants, referred to as ambtenaar, who served the interests of the colonial state rather than the native population (then referred as inlander/bumiputera). The Proclamation of Independence in 1945 created two separate civil service divisions, the Dutch colonial government and the Indonesian government. These were merged in 1950, when the Dutch government acknowledged Indonesia’s independence.
In most developing countries the civil service has shifted from being state servants (serving the interests of the ruling regime which acts in the name of the state) to the servants of the people (regardless the regime in power). The Indonesian experience is rather different: civil servants retained their position as serving the state, while at the same time serving the people. According to the 1974 Civil Service Law, they were both *Abdi Negara* (state servants) and *Abdi Masyarakat* (public servants). During the Suharto regime, however, more emphasis was placed on their being state servants and the civil service became an extension of the state and a tool of the ruling power. After Suharto’s downfall, despite the bureaucratic reform prescribed by international donors such as the World Bank, this position as servant of both the state and the people remained unchanged, as there has been no amendment to this clause of the Law. Despite their status as both state and public servants, civil servants are directed to serve the best interests of the general public.

### 4.4 Characteristics of Indonesian Bureaucracy

#### 4.4.1 Political influence in the Indonesian Civil Service

The main characteristic of the New Order bureaucracy was the centralisation of power in the hands of President Suharto. Once he assumed power in 1968, he started to depoliticise civil servants who had previously held divergent political views. He also removed members and supporters of the banned Communist Party from the civil service and discredited religious movements, making them unpopular. This effort to control civil servants and their attitudes continued with the foundation of the Ministry of Civil Service, MenPAN. Suharto formed BPKP (the State Audit Board) as the main state auditor. The BPKP superseded the older State Audit Agency (BPK), which had independent powers backed by the Constitution. The BPKP, by contrast, was seen as less independent as it reported directly to the President. Since Suharto’s fall, the BPK has slowly been regaining its role as external auditor.
Suharto declared that Indonesian civil servants were the ‘guard of Pancasila’ (Indonesian state philosophy). The term Pancasila dates back to Independence and was coined by Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president. It comprises five principles: belief in one God, a just and civilised humanity, a united Indonesia, democracy under the wise guidance of consultative representation, and social justice for all Indonesia’s peoples. During Sukarno’s presidency, these principles were compressed into three (socio-nationalism, socio-democracy and belief in God), and then further into ‘cooperation’. When Suharto took power he declared that Indonesia should return to the original concept of Pancasila ‘purely and consistently’, but along the way he reinterpreted the concept to suit his own political agenda, elevating it to a quasi-religious status. Suharto’s interpretation was based on Javanese feudalistic culture which he used extensively during his presidency (Sarsito, 2006). Suharto only allowed a single interpretation of Pancasila: any other was considered subversive. Although he claimed that Pancasila should be flexible, it was he who determined its flexibility, and he was heavily criticised by local political activists for making Pancasila a monolithic ideology (Rohdewohld, 1995). Much effort and energy, not to mention money, was spent on indoctrinating the entire population, from primary school pupils to the highest echelon of bureaucrats, with Pancasila. Suharto’s authoritarian and oppressive government was also notorious for imprisoning its political enemies and anybody who criticised the government for ‘subversive action’, accusing them of endangering Pancasila and the unity of the nation.

4.4.2 A role model for society

Another characteristic of the New Order period was the civil service’s strong presence in public life as a representative of the state. The civil service set an example to the wider public about how to behave, not only in their work but also in their daily lives. To this end, the New Order Regime introduced a comprehensive regulation
of the Indonesian civil service. I explore the gendered effects of these regulations in Chapter 5.

4.4.3 Military influence

Another influence that coloured Suharto’s civil service was the Dwifungsi ABRI, or dual function of the armed forces: guarding the country and holding administrative power. This was not originally Suharto’s concept; it was proposed just after Independence by the head of the army at the time. It advocated that military personnel should be given political and administrative positions, in an individual rather than institutional capacity, to take up posts in the upper echelons previously occupied by colonials. The dual function was expanded and formalised by Suharto, who himself had a military background, enabling officers to hold civil service positions in an institutional rather than an individual capacity. Suharto even extended the dual function, involving the armed forces not only in government and politics but also in social and economic arenas (Callahan, 1998). For example, the leadership of Pertamina, the national Indonesian gas and oil company, was given to a military general. Unlike other South East Asian countries such as Thailand and Burma, where the military regimes promised a transition to civilian government, Suharto brought the military into his government without claiming that it was a temporary measure. As a consequence, the armed forces played a significant role in central, regional and local government, limiting the power of civilian officials (Said, 2006).

In the Suharto regime, working in the civil service was much like working in the armed forces. As a consequence of Dwifungsi ABRI, the Suharto government encouraged civil servants to idolise their military heroes by imposing semi-military regulations on them. These hero figures are also still represented in the way the civil service conducts recruitment: it is only willing to admit people who appear prepared to put their loyalty to the country and its ideology above everything else.
Semi-military discipline applied in the civil service, including but not limited to marching, a flag-raising ceremony on national days and a day of military training on the 17th of every month. The in-service training also included a course called *kesamaptaan* in which workers were taught to do exercises such as crawling under barbed wire, and in some cases to use weapons. Civil Service colleges such as the Institut Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri or IPDN, owned by the Ministry of Home Affairs, were managed similarly to the Indonesian Military Academy. Top-level managerial training for civil servants was carried out jointly with armed forces officers and a large proportion of the course dealt with national ideology.

After Suharto’s fall in 1998 it was proposed that the dual function of the armed forces be gradually reduced and eventually eliminated (Gonggong, 2004). However, this has yet to be done, and is observed that the military still needs to redefine its role and transform its capabilities in the new democratic polity (Sebastian and Iisgindarsah, 2011). The military still influences the working values of the civil service, as most senior managers were recruited during the Suharto era and due to the top-down culture of Indonesian bureaucracy.

Despite this, Indonesian civil servants have long been associated with a culture of corruption, time delays, laziness and inefficiency. They are rarely fired, despite the long lists of threats in the regulations drafted to manage their lives. The machinery of the state suffers from bureaucratic inertia, which makes many plans and programmes disappear into thin air (Dwiyanto et al., 2006).

### 4.4.4 Corruption and public perception

The Indonesian civil service is perceived as corrupt by the Indonesian public. The Corruption Perception Index produced by Transparency International ranks Indonesia 118 out of 176 countries (Transparency International, 2012). The World Bank notes that corruption is a serious problem in the civil service, as
acknowledged by civil servants themselves (World Bank, 2003b). Civil servants are a key part of public service accountability, both creating regulations and delivering services to public. I explore the relationship between corruption and gender issues in Chapter 9.

4.5 Hierarchy in the Indonesian Bureaucracy

4.5.1 Organisational structure and job hierarchy

According to Presidential Decree No. 44/1974 (GOI, 1997b), a cabinet ministry consists of:

1. A cabinet minister as the head of the ministry
2. A secretary general as the minister’s aid, who reports directly to the minister and leads an office called the secretariat general
3. An inspector general, as the control element, who reports directly to the minister and leads an office called the inspectorate general
4. Several director generals as executing agencies, each of whom reports directly to the minister and leads offices called directorate generals
5. Heads of agencies or centres
6. Heads of vertical units at the regional level, which can be department/ministry regional offices or, in the case of MOF, directorate general regional offices
7. Expert staff.³

³These positions are usually given to members of the public who have not previously worked in the civil service, but whose expertise is needed by the Minister. On some occasions, however, these positions are also provided as a “safe deposit box” for echelon I officials who have recently committed a serious error or are regarded as so incompetent that he (there has never been a female at this level) needs to be removed from his position without being forced to resign from the civil service. More discussion on this is found in the next chapter.
People occupying the positions in points 2 to 6 above (secretary general, inspector generals, director generals and so on) are usually referred to as ‘pejabat eselon I’ (echelon I officials). The term echelon indicates the structural level of the position, and these organisations are referred to as echelon I units. Each echelon I unit consists of several echelon II units (one secretariat of the directorate general, several directorates, and several regional offices). In turn, each echelon II unit has several echelon III units (sub-directorates), the latter consisting of several echelon IV units (sections). When necessary, some echelon IV units are allowed to have echelon V units (sub-sections), but there are few of these. For each echelon level there is another category: ‘a’ and ‘b’. The scope of the work, the number of staff and size of the area managed in echelon I-a is slightly higher than in echelon I-b.

While the Government Minister appoints echelon V, IV and III positions, echelon I and II are appointed by the President, based on the recommendation of the Minister. To have this recommendation, one needs to be recognised/acknowledged by the person in power, which requires good networking skills.

This categorisation has impacts on personnel management regarding eligibility for posts, scope for promotion and allowance entitlement. In the next section I discuss how civil servants are categorised into grades and ranks.

### 4.5.2 The grade and rank system

Indonesian civil servants are ranked into grades from I to IV, I being the lowest grade. Each grade is then segmented further into ranks a, b, c, and d, except for grade IV which includes a rank e. Unlike the echelon system, where lower roman numbers denote a higher echelon, in the grade system the reverse applies.

Civil service regulations (GOI, 1997b) stipulate that grade/rank corresponds to formal education qualifications, and in practice this regulation tends to be rigidly applied (King, 1998). According to Law
No. 8 1974 on Civil Service Personnel and PP 99/2000, revised by PP 11/2002, there are minimum educational requirements for each civil service grade. The grading based on formal qualification shows how much Indonesian civil service values education, which I am going to explore later in Chapter 7. Grade I is occupied by people who have graduated from primary and junior high school or who are using their primary or junior high school diploma at the time they apply for a civil service position. Grade II is the entrance point for people who have graduated from high school (grade II/a), or hold a non-degree undergraduate diploma (grade II/b). While the highest grade is grade IV, the highest entrance qualification is for grade III. The system allows university graduates to apply for positions open to people with lower qualifications as long as the applicant is willing to take a lower post. The fairness of this system is questionable, as people with university degrees can compete in the entrance exam with high school graduates.

Civil servants’ grades are advanced every four years. According to article 18 of the Civil Service Law (GOI, 1974a), this is their right, and it is applied automatically unless there is a valid reason not to do so (such as people who are facing a disciplinary action). It is accompanied by a pay rise on top of a regular pay increment every two years, and increases the chance of promotion to a managerial position. As such, regardless of work performance a person with a high school qualification who has been working for 20 years will have a higher grade than a university graduate who has been working for three years.

While grade advancement within ranks (for example from II/c to II/d) occurs automatically, advancement to another rank (for example from II/d to III/a) requires an examination called Ujian Dinas (see Chapter 7). There is a point, however, when an employee’s grade cannot advance any further, which is set according to their education and whether or not they hold a certain managerial position.
Table 4-2 illustrates the grades that people can be assigned according to their education when they apply to join the Civil Service and the point at which they cannot proceed any further until they retire.

Table 4-2 Entry and maximum grade based on education level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Entry-Grade*</th>
<th>Maximum Grade**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SD (Primary School)</td>
<td>I/a</td>
<td>II/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMP (Junior High School)</td>
<td>I/c</td>
<td>II/c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMPK (Specialised Junior High School)</td>
<td>I/c</td>
<td>II/d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMA (Senior High School)</td>
<td>II/a</td>
<td>III/b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-1 (1 year Diploma)</td>
<td>II/a</td>
<td>III/b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-2 (2 year Diploma)</td>
<td>II/b</td>
<td>III/b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-3 (3 year Diploma)</td>
<td>II/c</td>
<td>III/c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-IV/S-1 (Undergraduate)</td>
<td>III/a</td>
<td>III/d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2 (Masters Degree)</td>
<td>III/b</td>
<td>IV/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-3 (Doctorate Degree)</td>
<td>III/c</td>
<td>IV/b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* based on PP no.11/2002, these are the first grades they are assigned when they apply using the diplomas on the left-hand side column.
** based on PP no.12/2002, these are the maximum grades people can get if they are not in a structural or functional position (see section 4.5.4) and have not obtained other qualifications during their service.
Source: Civil Service Regulations

It is important to bear in mind, however, that the minimum educational requirements still apply to the maximum grade. To have their grade advanced, applicants must also upgrade their formal education, such as by attending night school.

4.5.3 The link between the grade and echelon systems

The main civil service system is based on seniority. Regulations oblige every unit to maintain a list of employees’ ranks, called Daftar Urutan Kepangkatan or DUK (GOI, 1979b). There is a rule that no two or more individuals can have the same position in DUK in the same office. This rank list will depend on their grade, echelon, length of service, in-service training and formal education. Article 6 of Regulation No.100/2000 (GOI, 2000) on Civil Servants’ appointments to structural positions reads:
To appoint a structural official, close attention needs to be paid to seniority in terms of grade, age, education and training as well as experience.

(Article 6 Regulation no. 100/2000).

PP no.13/2002 dictates a set of requirements for the minimum and maximum grades of people in structural positions (see Table 4.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Echelon</th>
<th>Minimum Grade</th>
<th>Maximum Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-a</td>
<td>IV/e</td>
<td>IV/e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-b</td>
<td>IV/d</td>
<td>IV/e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-a</td>
<td>IV/c</td>
<td>IV/d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-b</td>
<td>IV/b</td>
<td>IV/c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-a</td>
<td>IV/a</td>
<td>IV/b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-b</td>
<td>III/d</td>
<td>IV/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-a</td>
<td>III/c</td>
<td>III/d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-b</td>
<td>III/b</td>
<td>III/c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-a</td>
<td>III/a</td>
<td>III/b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-b</td>
<td>II/d</td>
<td>III/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOI, PP no.13/2002

Civil Service Law does not state the minimum educational level needed to occupy structural positions, as long as one’s grade is within the range required. In MOF, however, the educational requirement is regulated internally.

Box 4.1 provides a hypothetical illustration of how this works in practice.
Suppose Mary joins the civil service after she graduated from university with a Bachelor degree. After finishing her probation period, she is ranked as grade III/a.

If she does not hold a structural or a functional position and remains a *pelaksana* (junior member of staff), she will continue to be awarded an increment to her salary every four years up to III/d and then stay on that grade with a salary adjustment every other year until she retires.

If, when she is at grade III/b, she is assigned to an echelon IV position, the highest grade she can reach in her career is also grade III/d. If, however, she continues her studies during her career and gains a master’s degree but is still in her echelon IV position, she can advance to grade IV/a. And if she gets a doctorate and is still not promoted to a higher position, she will advance further to grade IV/b.

If, after a period of being an echelon IV manager, she is promoted to echelon III, she advances to grade IV/b and stays there until her retirement.

If, instead of pursuing a structural/managerial career, she prefers to be in a functional post, her grade will advance according to the credit points that she accumulates.
4.5.4 Functional Positions

Functional positions (*jabatan fungsional*) were first introduced in the 1980s to accommodate people in professional occupations with less managerial responsibility than in structural positions, such as teachers/university lecturers, tax auditors and extension workers. Their grade does not advance automatically every four years, unlike those in structural positions or junior staff. To advance their grades they have to meet particular requirements that include formal education and specific or technical training. Their work is assessed in terms of points applied according to their main activities, and they must accumulate a certain number to progress. It is possible to advance in less than four years if they accumulate the necessary points. The sets of rules that apply to functional officials differ according to position.

MOF has several functional positions in its organisation: tax auditors, customs and excise auditors, tax extension officials, land and building tax surveyors, IT specialists and teachers (at STAN, MOF’s college, and in TA). At MOF, the functional position that gives the widest career span is IT specialist, where people can start with a high school diploma and by upgrading themselves through formal education and technical training can retire at the highest grade in the civil service, IV/e, equal to a structural colleague at echelon I level.

4.6 Female participation in the civil service

*Error! Reference source not found.* shows that the gender gap in civil service employment closed significantly between 2003 and 2010, although male levels of employment remain somewhat higher.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate trends in the sex composition of the Indonesian civil service, based on data from the Civil Service Agency (BKN). Female representation in the Indonesian civil service has been studied by at least two researchers: Logsdon (1985) and Oey-Gardiner (2002). Both were interested in total numbers of female civil servants, as well as their grades and managerial levels in the bureaucracy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Grade I</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Grade II</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Grade III</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Grade IV</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Female share</td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Female share</td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Female share</td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Female share</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>769,329</td>
<td>112,929</td>
<td>12.80%</td>
<td></td>
<td>506,506</td>
<td>175,198</td>
<td>25.70%</td>
<td></td>
<td>61,576</td>
<td>8,716</td>
<td>12.40%</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,103</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>5.80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>567,528</td>
<td>89,023</td>
<td>13.56%</td>
<td></td>
<td>691,804</td>
<td>302,080</td>
<td>30.39%</td>
<td></td>
<td>95,384</td>
<td>17,451</td>
<td>15.47%</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,484</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>7.39%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>643,732</td>
<td>90,575</td>
<td>13.33%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,163,739</td>
<td>625,933</td>
<td>34.97%</td>
<td></td>
<td>188,521</td>
<td>45,671</td>
<td>19.50%</td>
<td></td>
<td>14,552</td>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>8.89%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>531,428</td>
<td>78,305</td>
<td>12.84%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,548,914</td>
<td>986,333</td>
<td>38.90%</td>
<td></td>
<td>431,740</td>
<td>158,269</td>
<td>26.82%</td>
<td></td>
<td>29,847</td>
<td>3,653</td>
<td>10.90%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>327,510</td>
<td>36,576</td>
<td>10.05%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,162,245</td>
<td>721,404</td>
<td>38.30%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,073,810</td>
<td>670,982</td>
<td>38.46%</td>
<td></td>
<td>80,080</td>
<td>17,830</td>
<td>18.21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>230,053</td>
<td>26,150</td>
<td>10.21%</td>
<td></td>
<td>983,163</td>
<td>606,742</td>
<td>38.16%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,150,800</td>
<td>808,811</td>
<td>41.27%</td>
<td></td>
<td>87,257</td>
<td>34,170</td>
<td>28.14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>64,833</td>
<td>6,669</td>
<td>9.33%</td>
<td></td>
<td>599,798</td>
<td>351,731</td>
<td>36.96%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,193,161</td>
<td>947,314</td>
<td>44.26%</td>
<td></td>
<td>333,679</td>
<td>244,310</td>
<td>42.27%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>112,693</td>
<td>10,912</td>
<td>8.83%</td>
<td></td>
<td>768,440</td>
<td>665,013</td>
<td>46.39%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,142,515</td>
<td>1,035,529</td>
<td>47.54%</td>
<td></td>
<td>436,635</td>
<td>426,363</td>
<td>49.40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BKN
### Table 4-5 Sex composition of Indonesian Civil Servants according to educational background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary and Jr High School</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>Non-degree Diploma</th>
<th>University Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Female share</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>763,629</td>
<td>128,619</td>
<td>14.42%</td>
<td>520,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>688,168</td>
<td>81,875</td>
<td>10.63%</td>
<td>1,099,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>797,467</td>
<td>142,471</td>
<td>15.16%</td>
<td>1,325,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>593,971</td>
<td>85,959</td>
<td>12.64%</td>
<td>1,417,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>456,403</td>
<td>71,254</td>
<td>13.50%</td>
<td>1,332,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>213,444</td>
<td>22,161</td>
<td>9.41%</td>
<td>804,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>237,006</td>
<td>24,163</td>
<td>9.25%</td>
<td>971,663</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BKN
Until 1995 the total number of civil servants according to their educational background does not correspond with the total number according to their grades/rank, nor does it match the annual totals reported by BKN. This difference is due to temporary workers, who are not on the formal payroll, mainly labelled by the BKN as ‘unspecified workers’. These totalled around 11,000 in 1983, but their number decreased from 1984 until in 1996 there were none.

As observed by Logsdon (1985), between 1974 and 1984 the composition of Indonesian civil servants changed in terms of grade, with a higher proportion in higher grades. Table 4-4 shows that this continued in the 90s and since 2000. This is also a reflection of the change in composition based on educational background, because, as explained, there is a direct link between grades and formal education. While in 1974, civil servants were mainly in grade I, in the 1980s most were in grade II, and since 1990 the number of both males and females at grade III has increased. Since 2000, people in grade III have outnumbered those in grade II, possibly simply because the population has become better educated over time.

In terms of female participation, Oey-Gardiner(2002) observes there has been a promising increase in the number of women in grades III and IV, which has continued since her article was published. Table 4-4 shows the proportion of women in grade III increased from 12.40% in 1974 to 47.54% in 2010. The same increase also occurred in grade IV: from 5.80% to 49.40%.

The change in composition of civil servant grades can partly be explained by the change in their formal education. Table 4-5 shows that in 1978, primary and junior high school graduates formed the biggest group, but since the 1980s this group has been overtaken by high school graduates. The proportion of primary and junior high school graduates in relation to groups with higher educational levels fell over time. In 1984, 62% (1,099,775 male and 600,573 female) of all civil servants were high school graduates. In 2010, although they were still the biggest group, they only made up 36% of civil servants.
By contrast, the proportion of university graduates kept increasing, from 58,177 (3.2%) in 1978 to 1,526,464 (32%) in 2010. A promising sign is that 44% of those university graduates were women, which may represent an opportunity for women’s empowerment. The main question, however, is whether and how far the trend of increasing grades and education levels takes women into decision making positions in public life. In her analysis using data from the end of the 1990s, Oey-Gardiner is optimistic that the increasing number of women in grade III means that ‘it is probably only a matter of time before at least some of these women move up to level [grade] IV, ready to occupy structural posts currently filled by men’ (Oey-Gardiner, 2002 p.110).

In the civil service regulations there is no specific clause stating the minimum education requirement for a civil servant to occupy certain managerial/structural functions. However, every ministry has its own internal policy. A university degree is required to occupy even the lowest echelon. As a result, if most women in grades III/a and III/b are only educated to high school level, they are unlikely to have a promising future in the civil service, as their grade III will not lead onto more senior managerial positions.

Therefore, as well as observing the number of women who hold a managerial position it is useful to consider (1) the actual grade/rank of the composition (III/a, III/b etc) rather than just the bulk of the grades (grade I, II, III or IV); (2) the number of women with a university education, as they have more chance of progressing in their careers; and (3) their age. A detailed calculation of what the future holds for women in the civil service based on these three points is provided below.

### 4.7 The future of women in the Indonesian bureaucracy

By 2010 there had been an increase in the proportion of women in managerial positions. However, although the proportion of women
with university degrees nearly equalled that for men, the proportion of those in structural positions was still far smaller at only 22% (see Table 4-6); and these women were concentrated at the bottom levels (echelons IV and V).

We have seen that grade III consists of a range from III/a to III/d. Table 4-2 shows that grade III/b is the maximum rank that can be achieved by a person with a high school diploma if they are not in a managerial position. Once this person reaches the maximum rank they will stay there until they retire.

Statistics for 2010 show marginally more women were at grade IV/a (25% of all female civil servants, 90% of women in grade IV) than was the case for men (20% of all male civil servants, 80% of men in grade IV). Does the high share of women in IV/a mean, as proposed by Oey-Gardiner (2002), that women will reach managerial posts in the near future? To assess this, we need to know whether these women at IV/a are on a structural career path. As discussed, civil servants can choose whether to follow a structural career path (which means that they can be promoted to a managerial post) or a functional one.

Regulations on the grade span (see Table 4-2 and Table 4-3) show that to be managers or to be eligible for a promotion to management, people in grade IV/a must hold a structural post and have either a master’s degree, or be in echelon III or IV (in practice it is very unlikely than a person in echelon V would have a master’s degree). BKN data for 2010 show that throughout the civil service 27,029 women had a master’s degree, 40,483 were in echelon IV and 5,882 in echelon III positions. If none of these categories of women were to overlap, this would give a total of 73,394 women who were either managers or eligible to be promoted to a managerial post. This compares to 396,969 women at grade IV/a, be they in a structural or functional post. In other words, only a small proportion of women at IV/a can expect to be managers. In fact, this substantially overstates the real proportion, since the categories of women with
master’s degrees and those in either echelon IV or III must overlap. Publicly available BKN data are structured according to fixed categories and so it is not possible to analyse these data more flexibly.

Using a separate BKN dataset, it is possible to assess the proportions of civil servants at each grade who are in structural and functional positions. According to BKN, from 2007 to 2010 around 80% of functional posts were occupied by primary and secondary school teachers. Of these, marginally more than half (56%) were women. In theory teachers’ careers span from II/a to IV/e. However, in practice, according to the Ministry of National Education (GOI, 2009) around 400,000 male and female teachers were still at level IV/a in 2008 and were unable to proceed to IV/b because they could not fulfil the requirement of writing an academic essay. In other words, the large majority of women in IV/a are in fact teachers who will not rise above this grade.

This analysis demonstrates the importance of going beyond simply counting the numbers of women with different bureaucratic grades, to take into account the actual jobs and positions that they hold. It is possible that there are some inconsistencies between BKN and Ministry of National Education data on personnel, but it is extremely unlikely that even 20 percent of women in grade IV/a have the prospect to go onto grade IV/b, let alone reach echelon III or a higher level of management. As such, Oey-Gardiner’s optimistic prediction about the future prospects of female civil servants should not be taken for granted.

Although the great majority of women at grade IV/a will never become managers, the rapid increase in the absolute numbers of women at this grade means that there has been an rise in the absolute number who go on to make it into senior positions. This is seen in Table 4.6, which shows that male domination of managerial has fallen since 1984. Nevertheless, the increase in female
representation remains concentrated at the lower levels (echelon V and IV).

The civil service career ladder is very rigid, and it is rare to hold, for example, an echelon III position without having progressed through echelon IV. Consequently, the increasing number of women who hold echelon IV positions and those with university degrees may indicate that there will be more high-ranking women in the future. This, however, depends heavily on whether upper-echelon officials in the Ministry, especially those responsible for HR development and management, consider women suited to upper echelon positions. The civil service regulations state: ‘A structural position reflects trust, on the part of the institution, invested in an individual assigned such a job.’ This creates considerable space for discretion in decisions to promote men and women into these senior positions. Later chapters examine how this discretion is exercised in MOF.

Echelon 1 is an exception to this hierarchical system. Since it is a political position, those who occupy it do not have to climb the career ladder from the bottom but can be chosen from across ministries. This also explains why, as Table 4-6 shows, there were more women than ever in echelon I units in 2000 (11.65%). During his presidency, President Wahid demonstrated concern for gender equality and encouraged government ministries to include more

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>8.14%</td>
<td>3.98%</td>
<td>5.70%</td>
<td>9.58%</td>
<td>12.36%</td>
<td>11.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4.26%</td>
<td>5.42%</td>
<td>6.88%</td>
<td>11.55%</td>
<td>13.19%</td>
<td>11.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>4.85%</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
<td>7.40%</td>
<td>12.70%</td>
<td>16.57%</td>
<td>14.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>11.65%</td>
<td>5.03%</td>
<td>8.72%</td>
<td>14.10%</td>
<td>17.95%</td>
<td>15.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>8.47%</td>
<td>6.82%</td>
<td>13.18%</td>
<td>21.65%</td>
<td>21.49%</td>
<td>19.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>9.77%</td>
<td>6.71%</td>
<td>13.56%</td>
<td>22.09%</td>
<td>22.32%</td>
<td>19.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>8.70%</td>
<td>7.55%</td>
<td>15.70%</td>
<td>24.90%</td>
<td>25.34%</td>
<td>22.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
women in their upper echelons. The number fell after his presidency ended.

The preceding analysis has shown it is necessary to look at bureaucratic processes and structures in more depth for a full appreciation of the consequences of the rise in female civil service employment. This will be developed in greater depth in the later chapters, with reference to MOF.

4.8 The history and structure of Indonesia’s MOF

4.8.1 History

MOF in its current form dates back to the Dutch colonial era. In 1999 the Indonesian government decentralised most of its government ministries apart from the Ministries of Finance, Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Religious Affairs. Since its structure and performance were not affected by the 1999 decentralisation, MOF’s employees have remained part of central government and its human resources are still managed at the central level. This covers its employees’ entire careers from recruitment and development to retirement.

MOF is one of the largest public employers in Indonesia operating at the central level and according to the personnel records employed 62,000 people in 2008, of whom more than 75 per cent were men. Civil servants working in MOF are bound not only by MOF regulations but also by civil service regulations. Every MOF regulation has to comply with the higher Civil Service Regulation based on Law No.8/1974.

4.8.2 Structure

MOF’s structure has undergone a major reorganization following the Bureaucratic Reform which it is committed to implementing over the next four years, with a possible extension. At the time of writing this chapter, MOF comprises twelve units: the Directorate General (DG) of Budget, DGTX, DG of Customs and Excise, DGTR, DG of
State Assets, DG of Fiscal Balance, the Debt Management Office, the Stock Market Office, the Training Agency, the Fiscal Policy Office, the Secretariat General and the Inspectorate General. MOF is a holding company in which each DG operates independently and does not form a stream of work (GOI, 2006b). The units are not normally related to each other, apart from the Secretariat General and the Training Office, whose main jobs are related to personnel administration and MOF employee training respectively, and the Inspectorate General, MOF’s internal auditor.

Of the twelve units, the three largest in terms of number of employees and coverage across Indonesia are the DGTX, the DGTR and the DGCE. These have offices down to district level all over Indonesia. They have around 30,000, 12,000 and 11,000 employees, of which only 28, 38, and 17% are women respectively. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, my research focuses on the departments of DGTX, DGTR and TA. Some reference is also made to DGCE, but without an in-depth organisational analysis for the reasons mentioned in the methodology (there is a very limited number of women in that unit, as it has not recruited women for the last decade or so). The Training Office employs around 850 civil servants, of which more than 75% are men.

As elaborated above, each echelon I unit has several echelon II units, one of which is the Secretariat of the Directorate Generals/Agency. The main task of the secretariats is to coordinate other echelon I units within their ministry. They are also responsible for housekeeping functions for all units, including, among other things, the management of HR for all MOF employees. The HR division is at the third layer of management, echelon III. Theoretically, all HR managers, report both to their Secretary of the Directorate Generals/Agency and the head of the HR Bureau, an echelon II unit under the Secretariat General. However not every HR development issue is tackled at this level of management. Personnel training, which is theoretically part of HR development, is managed centrally.
by the Training Office. In later chapters I discuss how the placement of the HR division as an echelon III rather than an echelon II unit can create a power asymmetry when dealing with higher-echelon officials.

4.9 MOF HR statistics

4.9.1 Overview

This section shows where female employees are located within MOF and their prospects for reaching senior management positions. It uses an HR database to reveal the numbers of men and women working at different levels of the MOF hierarchy, their levels of education and hence their prospects for upward mobility.

4.9.2 Structural Positions

Table 4-7 shows that women are underrepresented in every grade, especially grades I (the lowest) and IV (the highest). Recruitment for grade I targets high-school and middle-school graduates, who are most likely to be given a position as office assistants, making tea and delivering or photocopying documents. Recruits for grade I can also start as temporary employees, and when there is a permanent position they take an examination. In MOF this is the only recruitment process that is semi-informal and allows a degree of discretion on the part of higher management. For example, security guards who have been temporary workers for years may be permitted to sit the exam if their performance has been good.
Table 4-7 MOF Employees and Indonesian Civil Servants according to grade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesian Civil Service</td>
<td>59,146</td>
<td>5,868</td>
<td>65,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>23,485</td>
<td>6,055</td>
<td>29,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesian Civil Service</td>
<td>561,324</td>
<td>332,031</td>
<td>893,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>22,912</td>
<td>7,217</td>
<td>30,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesian Civil Service</td>
<td>1,150,003</td>
<td>924,379</td>
<td>2,074,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>2,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesian Civil Service</td>
<td>338,743</td>
<td>261,767</td>
<td>600,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>49,227</td>
<td>13,563</td>
<td>62,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesian Civil Service</td>
<td>2,109,216</td>
<td>1,524,045</td>
<td>3,633,261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOI, MOF Human Resource Bureau 2006

Men are more likely to be found in grade II than other grades, but interestingly there are more women in grade III than any other grade. This may be a good sign, in the sense that in the near future these women’s careers may progress, as managerial positions can only be held by people with grade III and above.

Despite the numbers of women in upper-middle managerial positions, there are very few at Grade IV, the top grade. Civil service regulations state that their grades will stop at grade III/d and will not advance further unless they hold an echelon III position (see Table 4.2). If they are in echelon IV, they must have a postgraduate degree acknowledged by the Ministry of National Education and are only permitted to advance to grade IV/a. Thus, having more women in grade III does not necessarily guarantee the same proportion of women will be in grade IV in the future.

When we compare MOF with the Indonesian civil service, however, we find that the small proportion of women in MOF is not typical. Table 4-7 shows that in the entire civil service, most employees of both sexes are in grade III. However, while women make up almost 44% of civil servants in grade IV, fewer than one in ten of MOF employees in that grade are women.
To investigate this discrepancy further it is important to compare MOF managerial positions with national data. Whilst every unit will have up to *echelon IV* levels, not all of them have *echelon V* units. This depends on the structure of the ministry or government organisation, such as how many people they employ, whether they deal directly with the public and whether they have regional branches around Indonesia. Several echelon I units in MOF have echelon V officials, while others do not. Table 4-8, below, illustrates the current situation in MOF and in the civil service in general.

**Table 4-8 Managerial Levels in MOF and National Civil Service**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Echelons</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Civil Service</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>10.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>3.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Civil Service</td>
<td>10,108</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>10,385</td>
<td>6.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>1,344</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>6.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Civil Service</td>
<td>46,290</td>
<td>7,351</td>
<td>53,641</td>
<td>13.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>4,551</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>5,330</td>
<td>14.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Civil Service</td>
<td>156,821</td>
<td>45,965</td>
<td>202,786</td>
<td>22.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>6,080</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>6,967</td>
<td>12.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Civil Service</td>
<td>224,322</td>
<td>57,235</td>
<td>281,557</td>
<td>20.32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOI, MOF Human Resource 2006

While I was doing my fieldwork all the top managerial positions at MOF were filled by men, as has historically been the case. Only one woman in MOF’s history has occupied a top position, whereas at least 10% of women in the civil service hold this prestigious position. This explains the scarcity of women in grade IV in MOF compared to those in the whole of the civil service (Table 4-7).

### 4.9.3 Functional Positions

At the time of interview, 2,905 people in MOF held functional positions. Of these, only 327 (11%) were women. One of the women I interviewed said that it was more suitable for her to be in a functional job because there she only competes against herself to accumulate points, rather than competing with the whole office,
which is dominated by men. This said, female tax auditors in the DGTX have to compete with their male colleagues in accumulating their points because of the organisational culture amongst tax auditors, who prefer to keep the jobs and work for the men, as discussed in Chapter 9.

Table 4-9 Functional Positions in MOF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Positions</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tax Auditors</td>
<td>1,653</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>1,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs Assessor</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Auditors</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Property Tax Assessors</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT Specialists</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researchers</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,578</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>2,905</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MOF 2006

4.10 Bureaucratic Reform

Bureaucratic reform has been an on-going effort funded by multilateral donors such as the World Bank since the mid-1990s, even before Suharto stepped down. One of the plans was to implement zero growth in civil service employment from year to year. According to data from the BKN, this aim has been more or less achieved.

The most recent development in the Indonesian Bureaucratic Reform has been a pilot project conducted in MOF with World Bank funding. The reform consists of three pillars: organisation, business processes, and HR. In terms of organisation there are two main objectives: organisational restructuring and reinvention. The business processes element includes job-evaluation analysis, creating standard operating procedures for individual activities and workload analysis. The HR element covers four areas: a training assessment centre to evaluate employees’ working performance,
tour of duty arrangements, a Personnel Management Information System and development of a specific set of disciplinary codes.

However, this bureaucratic reform does not involve changing the Civil Service Law. Instead, the reform is imposed on an add-on basis. For example, instead of wholly reforming the employee grading system, grades have been created within the existing grades, making the already complicated system even more complex. This is already in place in some MOF offices. It will stratify and specify the grade system imposed by civil service regulations in order to decide employees’ benefits. According to the new system there will be 27 grades in MOF (Table 4-10).

**Table 4-10 Grading system under MOF Bureaucratic Reform**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Echelon</th>
<th>Grade Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Echelon I</td>
<td>24-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echelon II</td>
<td>20-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echelon III</td>
<td>17-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echelon IV</td>
<td>14-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echelon V</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Staff</td>
<td>1-12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So, for example, under the new system, a civil servant who holds grade III/a could be allocated grade 8, 9, or 10, depending on the type of job they are assigned to.

As a result of this new job grading, many employees in grade III/a have had their salaries reduced by up to 2 million rupiahs per month (GBP 100), whereas some others’ salaries have increased by up to 400,000 rupiahs (GBP 20). Once all the job grading is in place, it will be instructive to see whether men and women have gained or lost out.

A more meticulous system is being developed to link business processes to the HR reforms; for example employees’ working performance will be evaluated according to targets and related to standard operating procedure alongside the traditional performance
assessment sheet required by Civil Service Law. Some of these issues are discussed in Chapter 8.

4.11 Conclusion

This chapter has provided background information on the Indonesian civil service in general and on MOF as its subsystem, including details about the complexity of its grading and ranking system, with an overview of female representation in the Indonesian civil service.

Statistics show that during the last 30 years there has been a considerable change in the number of women working in Indonesia's civil service and the gender gap has nearly closed. Rather than resulting from affirmative action by the Indonesian government, this is simply due to an increase in the number of educated women who choose to work in the public rather than the private sector. The Civil Service Law and other regulations remain the same.

The chapter questions Oey-Gardiner’s claim that the rising proportion of Grade III civil servants who are women will inevitably lead to increased female representation in managerial positions. The closing of the gender gap in total civil service employment does not automatically mean that there are equal numbers of men and women at managerial levels. While the number of women in managerial positions has increased from 11% in 1980s to 22% in 2010, they are concentrated at the lowest managerial levels. To predict what the future holds for women’s managerial positions, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive organisational analysis involving formal and informal organisational structures as well as the organisational culture of an individual organisation. These are provided in the following chapters.

This chapter has also presented a specific analysis of MOF’s HR structure and the extent to which it conforms to the Indonesian civil
service in general. The sex composition of people occupying grades I-III in MOF is in line with the total composition of those grades across the entire civil service, but MOF has significantly lower numbers of women occupying grade IV. Since only those in grade IV are eligible for promotion to top managerial levels, these data do not send a promising signal about the prospects for women in MOF.

Based on the background information provided in this chapter, the next chapter discusses the cognitive context of the Indonesian bureaucracy and its gender ideology.
5 The gendered cognitive context of Indonesia’s bureaucracy

5.1 Introduction

Following Chapter 4’s discussion of how structural hierarchies and functions work in Indonesia’s bureaucracy, this chapter examines the bureaucracy as a gendered organisation. The gendered cognitive context – the second element of Goetz’s framework – of the bureaucracy is examined together with the gendered history of the organisation.

Chapter 4 has shown that Indonesia’s bureaucracy has very rigid hierarchies and is male-dominated in terms of the ratio of male to female civil servants. This chapter explores how the bureaucracy assumes the gendered division of labour of civil servants: that it is a male job and that there is a clear separation between home and work and whose domain it is. In some ways the cognitive context of Indonesia’s bureaucracy is similar to that of a military organisation. Carreiras (2006 p.40) argues that the military is an extreme case of gendered organisation: it is based on gender both in terms of its hierarchical structure and its division of labour, there are more male than female employees and its culture is masculine.

This chapter deals with three specific questions:

1. What are the underlying values of Indonesia’s civil service, and which aspects of these exclude women from equal participation?
2. How do these values translate into regulations that affect women?
3. How does the Indonesian bureaucracy value the goal of women’s empowerment?
This chapter comprises two sections. The first looks at the gender ideology behind values and beliefs in the Indonesian civil service, as part of the service’s wider socio-political environment. Changes in this ideology are traced from the Suharto regime, when the Civil Service Law was first enacted, to the current government.

As the civil service is considered one of the most important institutions in Indonesia, it is necessary to assess the extent to which civil service bureaucracy generates policies that reflect state gender ideology. This is especially relevant for the Ministry that is supposed to deal with women’s empowerment. In the second section I analyse how the goal of women’s empowerment is valued by reviewing GM efforts across Indonesia’s bureaucracy.

5.2 Indonesian Gender ideology

State gender ideology refers to ‘assumptions about gender on which the state acts and the way it attempts to influence the construction of gender in the society’ (Blackburn, 2004 p.9). While there are numerous ways of analysing a state’s gender ideology, I do this according to different presidencies, since these tend to correspond to key historical shifts in gender ideologies and the associated institutional arrangements. This analysis pays particular attention to the role and changing status of what was to become the MOWE.

5.2.1 The Suharto Era

5.2.1.1 Ibuism and State-ibuism

As previously mentioned, although the New Order ended more than ten years before this fieldwork was conducted, the old regime has had a lasting influence on the civil service and other aspects of Indonesian life. The New Order had a fairly consistent gender ideology based on the strong belief that a woman’s place is at home. Wieringa (1995) provides an extensive analysis of how the regime crushed the women’s progressive movement and replaced it with women’s organisations that conformed to traditional gender roles.
Feminists have written about how the Suharto regime sought to domesticate women entirely (Blackburn, 2004, Suryakusuma, 1991, Wieringa, 1995, Wieringa, 2002). This effort started very early in Suharto’s presidency, when he declared that Gerwani, a women’s organisation associated with the Communist Party, was responsible for torturing generals murdered during the coup (Wieringa, 1995). Suharto labelled Gerwani a product of atheist socialism, gaining support from Islamic groups, at least in the area of domesticating women, despite the fact that his regime oppressed conservative Islamic groups.

A widely-accepted concept to describe Suharto’s gender ideology was coined by Suryakusuma (1991), who refers to ‘state ibuism’. This draws on a paternalistic view that places men as the core element of a state and women as secondary. *Ibu* means both mother and woman. State ibuism is related to the notions of ‘housewifisation’ (Mies, 1982) and ibuism (Nieuwenhuis-Djajadiningrat, 1987). Housewifisation refers to:

> a process by which women are socially defined as housewives, dependent for their sustenance on the income of their husbands, irrespective of whether they are de facto housewives or not. The social definition of housewives is the counterpart of the social definition of men as breadwinners, regardless of their actual contribution to the family’s subsistence. *(Mies, 1982 p.131)*.

Ibuism is derived from a combination of gender concepts of Dutch colonial bourgeois and elite/upper class Javanese women (the wives of high-ranking civil servants) in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. These women were required to be subservient and to look after not only their families but also the colonial state in a quiet and understated way, while authority and power remained with their husbands (Nieuwenhuis-Djajadiningrat, 1987). Suryakusuma (1991) saw parallels between this concept and the gender ideology formulated by Suharto’s New Order regime, whereby men were
subjects of the state and development efforts, and women were seen as passive objects.

Women’s duties as wives and mothers are prescribed in Panca Dharma Wanita⁴, which means women’s five duties: (1) as loyal companions to their husbands; (2) as procreators for the nation and educators of children; (3) as managers of households (4) as social workers or secondary earners of additional household income; and (5) as Indonesian citizens. These all are mentioned in the Indonesian State’s Development Guidelines (GBHN) which are issued every five years and are a reference point for every government agency (Indonesia, 1999). The first three duties bound women to the domestic sphere, and even the fourth only allowed them to be involved in society for reasons of charity or, if absolutely necessary, to earn additional money to help their husbands.

This domestication was promoted consistently alongside other characteristics of the New Order, which controlled the whole of society centrally through the army and the bureaucracy. In the civil service arena, the state controlled every aspect of public workers’ lives through the Civil Service Law. To make sure that their social lives were monitored closely, Suharto’s regime formed the KORPRI, or civil servants’ corps. This association of civil servants addressed members’ welfare issues and encouraged them to engage in activities that included their family members. Unlike labour unions (declared unlawful due to their left-wing associations), which act for the benefit of their members and can represent them against the employer, KORPRI was manipulated to keep the regime in power.

To make sure that civil servants’ families were included in sustaining the regime, the Dharma Wanita organisation for civil servants’ wives was founded in 1974. All similar civil servants’ wives organisations at that time were merged into this big centralised organisation. Dharma Wanita’s structure was similar to that of

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⁴ This is not to be confused with the organisation for civil servants’ wives, Dharma Wanita (see below).
Dharma Pertiwi, the organisation for military wives, in which members’ status depended on that of their husbands. The whole organisation was directed and monitored by the central bureaucracy. Put simply, the state controlled the lives of its civil servants, who controlled their wives, who in turn controlled the wives of their junior colleagues, and so on.

At the grass-roots level, in 1973 Suharto also formed the PKK (Family Welfare Programme), to accommodate women not included in Dharma Wanita or Dharma Pertiwi. The PKK served both as a vehicle of state control and as the lead agency for the extension of welfare services, including family planning and education to women in lower socio-economic strata. This could be understood as part of the regime’s attempt to promote human development, both as a means to enhance economic growth and to sustain its legitimacy among less privileged Indonesians (Emmerson, 1999). It broadly conformed to the Women In Development view that prevailed among international development agencies at that time (Hadiwinata, 2003 p.171). As a result, female literacy and educational qualifications improved significantly (Emmerson, 1999 p.256). As seen in the previous chapter, this was a key factor in the increased numbers of women entering the civil service over subsequent years. However, the regime’s enthusiasm for family planning and female education was not seen to contradict its wider ideology of state ibuism (Suryakusuma, 1991, Wieringa, 1995, Wieringa, 1998). Education was viewed instrumentally as a means of reducing fertility and enhancing women’s capacity to be good mothers to their children, rather than as a means of transforming their status (Sen, 1998, Wolf, 1992).

Below is a quote from Suharto’s speech at the 1984 celebration of Hari Ibu (Mothers’ Day):

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5Hari Ibu in Indonesia celebrates not only women as mothers but also women in general, which is clear from the origin of the date itself. It was created to commemorate the first Indonesian Women’s Congress in 1928
Women are the keepers of cultural morals and national values which must be passed down through the generations. It is the special duty of Indonesian women to filter out influences from other cultures which have penetrated Indonesia, to develop self-discipline and to prevent their children from developing destructive elements such as egotism and vanity. (Berninghausen et al., 1992 p.31)

The Suharto regime established boundaries and gender norms such as Panca Dharma Wanita to make sure that neither the WID programmes nor Dharma Wanita and Dharma Pertiwi’s activities would lead to female militancy. The regime also separated its WID programme from the activities of civil service and military wives’ organisations. WID was directed at improving the welfare of poor rural women, and was channelled through the PKK. This organisation was part of the Panca Dharma Wanita framework, which clearly defined women’s position. As such, Suharto’s gender ideology was not challenged by the implementation WID polices, which sought to promote women’s role in development rather than pursue a women’s rights agenda (Tickamyer and Kusujiarti, 2012).

5.2.1.2 The establishment of the Junior Ministry of Women’s Role

The Junior Ministry of Women’s Role was founded in 1983 following the First World Conference on the Status of Women in 1975. Its main tasks were to (1) formulate policies to enhance the role of women in all fields of development; (2) co-ordinate all government institution activities concerning programmes involving women; (3) submit regular reports, information and recommendations to various government institutions concerning the enhancement of the role of women in development.

The establishment of the Junior Ministry for the Role of Women did not mean that Suharto was thinking differently about gender roles. First, the status of Junior Ministry is bureaucratically lower than which had a progressive agenda to advance women’s capacity and contribution to the colony’s socio-economic development.
that of a Ministry or a Department, which represented an obstacle when coordination was required (see Chapter 11 on Gender Mainstreaming in MOF). Second, it was made very clear in the GBHN that ‘women’s role in national development should be in line with their duties as wives and mothers’, referring, of course, to the Panca Dharma Wanita.

There were four Ministers for the Role of Women during the Suharto era. The first, Lasiyah Sutanto, was also the first woman to head a cabinet office under Suharto. After her death she was replaced by Sulasikin Murpratomo, who pioneered the foundation of Women’s Study Centres at the University of Indonesia, her alma mater, and several other universities. Discussion about feminism at these Centres was not always in line with Suharto’s views on gender. Outside the academic environment, however, Sulasikin was a Suharto supporter: she was reported to have argued during a discussion on violence against women that the concept of ‘marital rape was not appropriate under the state ideology, Pancasila, and did not fit with Indonesian culture (Baso and Idrus, 2002).

Towards the end of his regime, Suharto used this ministry to further his own political ambitions. After Murpratomo, the office was given to the wife of a crony, Mien Sugandhi, and just before the end of Suharto’s presidency, when he was seeking Muslim votes, he appointed Hj Tutty Alawiyah, an Indonesian Islamic scholar, to lead the office despite her conservative views on gender relations (for samples of her sermons, see Alawiyah, 2009). She was a cabinet minister when a riot broke out in Indonesia in May 1998, towards the end of Suharto’s regime, which involved the gang rape of Chinese women (Heryanto, 1998, Strassler, 2004), which for some resulted in pregnancy. Responding to this, she claimed that she ‘had not found any rape victims so far’ and asked for ‘concrete proof’ of the incident (Oki, 1998). The event was followed by debate about abortion, which she said was ‘against the Quran and
therefore should be forbidden for whatever reason’ (Handayani, 1998 p.5).

5.2.1.3 Introduction of the Marriage Law and its implications for civil servants

In 1974, Suharto’s regime enacted the Marriage Law (GOI, 1974b), which is largely based on Islamic principles. This law has been heavily criticised by Indonesian feminists (Mulia, 2001) on the grounds that:

(i) While the definition of marriage is a relationship between a man and a woman, in practice it is a contract between two men, i.e. the husband and the wife’s father or male guardian, since the woman is not permitted to say anything during the wedding ceremony.

(ii) The regulation defines the husband as both the head of the family and the breadwinner and the wife as a homemaker.

(iii) The regulation leaves space for polygamy.

This Marriage Law became the basis for the regulation of civil servants’ marriage and divorce, and has remained so. While most employers in the world would regard their employees’ marriage and divorce their own private business, the Indonesian government feels that it is in its interest to make sure that civil servants ‘set a good example to both their staff and the general public as good citizens, including leading a good family life’ (GOI, 1983, GOI, 1990). In order to set a good example, according to the Civil Service Law civil servants are not allowed to engage in extramarital sex or live together without being married. If they fail to comply with these rules they may be subjected to disciplinary measures.

Permission is not needed for a civil servant’s first marriage; people need only report their marriage to their Minister through the chain of bureaucracy in their office up to a year after it takes place. This is related to payment of family allowances.
Since the Indonesian Marriage Law recognises polygamy, civil service regulations cannot rule it out completely, although it states that ‘the civil service marriage law is based on monogamy’ (GOI, 1974b). However, regulations make polygamy difficult for civil servants, who must ask permission from their line manager, who will need to consult at a higher level. Permission to engage in polygamous marriage can be granted if one or more of the following conditions are met: (1) the wife cannot fulfil her ‘obligation’ (which refers to her domestic obligations, including providing sexual pleasure to her husband); (2) the wife has become disabled or chronically or terminally ill; and (3) the wife cannot bear children. A further set of requirements applies: (1) there must be agreement from the first wife; (2) the civil servant in question has enough income to finance both wives; and (3) there is a written agreement that the civil servant will treat all his wives and children equally.

All of these conditions are directly taken from the Indonesian Marriage Law and concern the need of the man to enjoy sex, have children and have someone to take care of his house and children (Mulia, 2004). Female civil servants are not allowed to engage in polygamy, either by taking more than one husband (even if their husband cannot fulfil his obligation, becomes ill or cannot give her children) or by becoming anybody’s second, third or fourth wife. Whilst not being allowed to take more than one husband applies to all Indonesian women, not being allowed to become anybody’s second, third or fourth wife only applies to female civil servants.

Civil servants also need permission from their ministry before they can file for divorce. Upon receiving an application, the respective authority (who is typically their line manager’s line manager) should demonstrate that they have done their best to reconcile both parties and prevent the divorce. Among other things, the divorcing couple and/or witnesses are usually interviewed personally by the line manager. This divorce procedure can only be applied to those whose religion permits divorce; therefore a Catholic civil servant will never
be granted permission to file for divorce. Even for those whose religion permits divorce, because of this bureaucratic procedure the process can take as long as four years.

Civil service divorce regulations are based on Islamic codes that treat men and women differently. Men can divorce their wives by simply pronouncing ‘talaq’ (translated from the Arabic ‘I divorce you’) to them. Women are not permitted to apply for divorce unless they can demonstrate that their husband left them at least three years previously without providing any support for them or their children. If this is not the case, divorce is impossible, unless the husband agrees and initiates the procedure. The combination of these religious requirements and the drawn-out, intrusive, bureaucratic process serves to prolong and complicate divorce, which can be stressful for both male and female employees, with women in a potentially more vulnerable position.

There are disciplinary measures for civil servants who fail to comply with these regulations. Even here there is a gender bias in terms of the penalty applied. Male and female civil servants are liable to serious punishment if they fail to report a divorce. The same applies to male civil servants who fail to report second, third or fourth marriages. The punishment ranges from (a) temporary demotion by one level for six months to a year: (b) temporary removal from a managerial post for at least a year; (c) dismissal with honours (pension entitlement, reference letter, etc), and (d) dismissal without honours.

For female civil servants who marry as a second, third or fourth wife and are caught, the regulations (article 15 item 2) state that there is just one punishment: dismissal without honour. This is the level of punishment meted out to civil servants convicted for crimes such as robbery, rape or serious assault. In theory, men may also face this level of punishment. However, most male civil servants who fail to report their second, third or fourth marriages only face temporary, category (a) or (b) type sanctions. This discriminatory approach is
linked to a male bureaucratic culture of *tahu sama tahu* in the civil service (literally translated as ‘we all understand that’, and meaning ‘turning a blind eye’), which is inclined to forgive men their marital misdemeanours. This forgiving attitude is not extended to female civil servants who become a second, third or fourth wife. Instead of recognising the potential vulnerability of at least some women who are drawn into such polygamous arrangements, this draconian treatment appears to reflect highly negative judgement of their behaviour.

Box 5.1 illustrates how divorce can put female civil servant in a very difficult situation with the bureaucracy.
Sari found out that her husband had been unfaithful to her, and he left her and her children for another woman. Nobody knew his whereabouts; some said that he had moved abroad.

According to Islamic law, which also serves as the basis of marriage law in Indonesia and applies to Muslim civil servants, if a husband has left his wife for two years without any ‘legitimate reason’, has not supported her at all during those two years and the wife is unhappy about this, she can file for a divorce. However, this is far from easy to achieve. According to the civil servants’ marriage regulations, Sari first needed permission from her line manager, who would have to investigate the grounds for divorce by listening to both parties and trying to persuade them to stay married before referring Sari to apply for permission to proceed with the divorce through the bureaucratic channels. In Sari’s case this was impossible, since her husband had disappeared. The line manager, who, according to Sari, was very sympathetic, told her to go to the Islamic Court and proceed with her divorce. The divorce process itself, which under normal circumstances and with both parties present would take six months, took more than two years. The one and a half extra years were spent trying to contact the husband to prove that he had genuinely disappeared.

The story did not end with the granting of the divorce. When Sari reported to the MOF that her divorce had been finalised in the Islamic court, headquarters were unhappy that they had been skipped in the process. Sari was demoted from her position (the local terminology is ‘non-job’, which refers to being expelled from her structural position but keeping her status as civil servant, i.e. going back to a support/junior staff post) as her punishment for not processing her divorce through the proper bureaucratic channels. She was even threatened with the severest punishment, dismissal, but for some reason this did not happen. The officials who granted her permission to proceed were warned that they had crossed the line and undermined the headquarters’ authority. After three years on ‘non-job’ status, Sari was reinstated in her echelon IV position. Only in 2006, about ten years after the protracted divorce process ended, was she promoted to an echelon III position.

In Sari’s case there had been a lack of coordination between headquarters (Kantor Pusat) and the regional office (Kantor Wilayah), and headquarters felt that the regional office had undermined its authority. Instead of looking at the case thoroughly and trying to understand it with the best interests of the employee in mind, the bureaucracy was inflexible and busy fighting over territory. As a result the system punished the employee rather than helping her to resolve her family problems.

It is claimed that the way the state imposes its gender norms on its civil servants can encourage civil servants to keep their marriage only as a status symbol (Suryakusuma, 1991). Rather than going through what my interviewee
experienced, many civil servants stay married only for the sake of not losing face in the bureaucracy. From the bureaucratic point of view there is no sanction if a civil servant does not report a separation. They only have to report divorce. As long as the civil servant does not instigate the formal divorce process, their spousal allowance is still paid regardless of whether the money is channelled to the person entitled to it. Even though this practice constitutes a drain on government’s finances, it has not been challenged.

5.2.2 President Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie (1998-1999)

Following Suharto’s downfall, the regime’s hierarchical structure of social control collapsed. As a result, minority interests, including women’s organisations that were oppressed under Suharto, flourished. There are no longer sanctions for not participating in Dharma Wanita, which still exists as an organisation where wives can meet and socialise but no longer has an overt political agenda. As before, members’ status reflects their husbands’ official position in the respective government organisation, although this is not interpreted as strictly as in the past.

BJ Habibie, Suharto’s vice president, replaced him in 1998, and during his presidency the Law for Regional Autonomy was enacted, giving the regions more autonomy in all aspects of government apart from foreign affairs, monetary policy, defence, justice and religious affairs. It was hoped that this new law would empower people in regional societies through democratic means. It was enacted in the spirit of acknowledging the diversity within Indonesian society that had been suppressed and oppressed under Suharto. Not all aspects of the legislation were conducive to gender equality, particularly in regions that practice Sharia law, where the emphasis of the regulations is mostly on restricting women’s freedom from the way they dress to their movements (Noerdin, 2002).

During this short presidency there was no significant change in gender policies or the status of the Junior Ministry of Women’s Role.
5.2.3 President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001)

The years from 1999 to 2001 were a promising time for democracy and gender empowerment. Abdurrahman Wahid had become President when parliament played a ‘gender card’ against the winning party, which was led by a woman, Megawati (Van Doorn-Harder, 2002, Sen, 2002). The parliament decided to give the presidency to the runner up, Abdurrachman Wahid. Despite this, the new President encouraged policies favouring diversity and gender equality. During the short-period of his presidency, supported by the First Lady, who had a degree in Women’s Studies and conducted research and teaching in the field of Islam and gender studies, he issued a presidential decree on GM to integrate gender issues into the development process (Inpres no.9/2000). Wahid is also famous for promoting diversity and gender equality at the grassroots level.

President Wahid appointed Khofifah Indar Parawansa, a feminist Muslim (Blackburn, 2004), to head the Ministry for Women’s Affairs, and she changed its name to the MOWE. Wahid also made Khofifah Head of the Family Planning Board. The idea of locating these two government organisations under the same person was to ensure that family planning issues were tackled from a gender perspective. This contrasts with Suharto’s approach, which saw women as targets for population policy and family planning as primarily women’s responsibility (Robinson, 1998).

Under Khofifah’s leadership, all four deputies worked with GM in mind. The Deputy for Policy Development established programmes, projects and activities to mainstream gender; the Deputy for Gender Equity coordinated all the sectoral ministries to mainstream gender; the Deputy for the Improvement of Women’s Quality of Life mainly dealt with affirmative action, and the Deputy for Social Participation maintained and developed the involvement of NGOs in working with the government to mainstream gender. These four deputies functioned as ‘catalysts, facilitators and mediators in implementing
the GM strategies in all ministries and other government agencies, provinces and kabupaten or municipalities (Inpres no.9/2000).

5.2.4 President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004)

In 2001 Wahid was ousted from the presidency and succeeded by the former vice-president, Megawati. Although she had previously been prevented from becoming president because of her gender, she did not pay particular attention to women and gender issues. She was not in favour of affirmative action for women, opposing a proposal for a 30% quota for women in parliament. In a speech on Mother’s Day she claimed that a quota system would have negative effects, ‘undermining women’s dignity and role as well as weakening the institution that applies the preference’ (Secretary of State, 2001). She was reported not to be keen on the idea of the state pursuing gender equality because she felt that it already existed, and it was up to women themselves to prove their ability (JakartaPost, 1999). Some of Megawati’s gestures clearly lacked gender sensitivity. For example, she presented a ‘polygamy award’ initiated by a businessman, Puspawardoyo, who was promoting franchising his restaurant to each of his four wives and trying to persuade other people to do the same with their businesses (Nurmila, 2005).

Under Megawati’s presidency, the leadership of MOWE, which had been radically reformed during Wahid’s presidency, was given to Sri Rejeki Sumarjoto, a member of the Golkar Party. This appointment was more a matter of keeping the Golkar Party happy than due to the capacity of this individual, as Sri Rejeki had no track record whatsoever in the women’s movement. During her leadership, MOWE was disconnected from the Family Planning Board and given the additional task of overseeing children’s welfare. Indonesian feminists regarded this as a backward movement: instead of seeing women as subjects with their own merit, their identity was dependent on their status as mothers (Cattleya, 2006). It was a
clear setback from the efforts of the previous era when reproductive tasks were seen as the responsibility of both married parties.

5.2.5 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–present)

Megawati’s successor, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (known as SBY) is from a military background and was one of Suharto’s escorts. With regard to his stand on gender issues, it is interesting to analyse some speeches given on Mother’s Day. In 2008, to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the first Women’s Congress (which also happened to be 10 years after Suharto’s departure), the Indonesian Military Commander gave a speech advocating that women should never deny their *kodrat* (natural destiny) as mothers, indicating that the state’s gender ideology had progressed little in terms of gender equality:

"Women’s emancipation for Indonesians should not be contrary to a women’s *kodrat*. Instead, every effort and struggle to advance women’s role and performance should be channelled to strengthen, enrich and give added value so that women can be more respected and noble in their natural destiny. One thing that must never be denied, let alone eliminated, is women’s destiny to be a mother: to give birth, nurture and educate her children and the new generation. It is in this role that women must ensure that this nation will have well-behaved children and a young generation with strong character and personality." (Saleh, 2008)

On a similar occasion two years later, the tone of the President’s speech resembled that of his military commander:

"There are various agendas picked up by women’s movements, including the NGOs and women activists, these days. Which is fine, because life is diverse; this nation faces many problems and challenges. Of course we are happy and grateful, we appreciate all of these women’s movements where women activists are filling the gaps to develop the nation and tackle the problems we are facing. Nevertheless, I must remind you all not to forget to put the care of
the children as the first and utmost agenda. How you are going to do it is up to each organisation and woman’s movement. (President Yudhoyono’s speech on Mother’s Day, 22 December 2010)

Islamic conservatism, which was oppressed and controlled during the New Order, has since surfaced with a significant number of supporters. In several regions they have succeeded in enforcing Sharia law, especially in relation to women and their behaviour. These regional laws restrict women’s movement (they are not allowed to travel on their own or work night shifts) and even their freedom to choose their attire (they must cover their head). Headlines such as ‘A woman had her head shaved for not wearing a jilbab’ (head scarf)’ and ‘A pregnant woman was arrested and detained for four days’ for standing on the street in the middle of the night’ are now seen in Indonesian newspapers. It is rumoured that President SBY dislikes these new regional laws, but cannot do anything about them (Suryakusuma, 2010). In September 2010, the local government of Jambi proposed to run virginity tests for all girls before they could enter state school in response to ‘the rise of premarital sex amongst teenagers’, but the proposal was turned down (Afrizal, 2010).

Believing that Indonesian women should find their cultural roots, President SBY appointed an academic anthropologist who was also a senior official in the Ministry of Tourism and Culture as Minister of Women’s Empowerment. During SBY’s second presidency (2009-present) the Ministry’s responsibility for child protection was recognised by changing its name to the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection. At the same time, leadership of the Ministry was given to the wife of one of SBY’s four-star generals, whose capacity to deal with gender issues was questioned by Indonesian feminists on the grounds that her involvement in women’s organisations was limited to the organisation of army wives (Cattleya, 2009).
Table 5-1 illustrates how the organisation of MOWE has evolved over time. Developments during the last two cabinets under the SBY reveal the government’s view on women. Instead of a deputy for gender equality, there is now a Deputy for the Protection of Women, which gives women the same status as children. This shift can be seen as a step in the opposite direction to previous GM efforts, from addressing power relations between both sexes to achieve gender equality to regarding women as a vulnerable group.
### Table 5-1 MOWE's organisational structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Abdurahman Wahid</td>
<td>Megawati</td>
<td>Susilo Bambang Yudoyono</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of the Ministry</td>
<td>MOWE</td>
<td>MOWE</td>
<td>MOWE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister and their background</td>
<td>Khofifah Indar Parawansa (feminist Muslim)</td>
<td>Sri Redjeki (Lawyer, member of Golkar Party)</td>
<td>Meutia Hatta (anthropologist, senior civil servant of the Ministry of Tourism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The main Deputies (echelon I units)</td>
<td>Policy Development</td>
<td>Development and Information</td>
<td>Gender Mainstreaming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improvement of Women’s Life Quality</td>
<td>Quality of life of Women</td>
<td>Improvement of Women’s Quality of Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender Equality</td>
<td>Gender Equality</td>
<td>Protection of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Participation</td>
<td>Welfare and Protection of Children</td>
<td>Protection of Children</td>
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<tr>
<td>Source: MOWE website, accessed between 2001-2010</td>
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</table>
Another change under SBY was the creation of a new Deputy for Gender Mainstreaming. This led to a shift in the perceptions of MOWE employees from believing that they should mainstream gender in all their duties to seeing GM as the sole responsibility of that particular deputy (Cattleya, 2006). This meant that only people from the Deputy of GM were sent to assist government ministries and agencies, limiting the human resource pool available for these efforts. Under the last government, women’s issues have been further side-lined: there is no longer a Deputy for the Improvement of the Quality of Women’s Life. Instead, children’s issues now have two deputies.

As Table 5-1 illustrates, these changes have happened gradually and the structures reflect changing government views about women and gender in general. When new cabinets are announced, a newspaper article is often published the next day commenting on how some ministries should be eliminated or merged, and MOWE is usually one of these (See for example Zuhro, 2009), followed by limited discussion amongst women activists defending MOWE’s existence (Dian Kartika Sari, 2009). Other than that, there has been no major political debate or resistance from women’s NGOs, which in itself is suggestive of the low profile of GM in wider Indonesian society and politics.

Having discussed state gender ideology in Indonesia from the Suharto era to the present day, it is pertinent to ask how the goal of women’s empowerment is valued in the bureaucracy. The next section looks at efforts to mainstream gender in the work of Indonesia’s bureaucracy. This will provide both a foundation and essential background information for the more specific analysis of gender and bureaucratic reform in the Ministry of Finance in Chapter 11.
5.3 Gender Mainstreaming in the Indonesian Government

Despite the changes set out in the previous section, MOWE has become the key agent for ensuring that GM is implemented in every government ministry and agency, at both the central and regional levels. MOWE is the advisor and coordinator for all GM activities. Along with MOWE, other actors involved in GM are BAPPENAS (the National Development Planning Agency), the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Women/Gender Study Centres at provincial and district levels and NGOs such as the Women’s Research Institute and Centre for Regional Information and Analysis (Pattiro).

Table 5-2 illustrates the tasks and functions of each organisation, ensuring the implementation of GM at the national and regional levels.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government agencies</strong></td>
<td><em>MOWE</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advocate the appointment of Gender Focal Points within government agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting the formation of Working Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Encourage working groups to find and seek solutions to gender-related problems in their institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prepare tools to implement GM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluate GM implementation in other government agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Development Planning Agency</strong></td>
<td><em>BAPPENAS</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advocating gender equality and promoting GM within public sector development planning and the budgeting process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordinating Ministry of Social Welfare</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure coordination amongst the work of line ministries involved in social welfare issues:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of National Education</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Social Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Religious Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Culture and Tourism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Women’s Empowerment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Administrative Reform</td>
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<td></td>
<td>State ministry of Housing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Sport</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other government agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In its structural line, one of the posts was Deputy for Women’s Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of Home Affairs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure the implementation of gender mainstreaming at regional levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Universities</strong></td>
<td><em>Women/Gender Study Centres</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Act as a source of technical expertise in the area of gender-sensitive policy research</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working in coordination with the regional women’s empowerment divisions (WEDs), a regional division of the MOWE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NGOs</strong></td>
<td><em>Women’s Research Institute</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assist in capacity building for government officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Research in gender budgeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mainly in gender budget initiative research at the regional level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International organisations</strong></td>
<td><em>UNDP</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Build capacity in technical support and advocacy for gender mainstreaming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide support to regional stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve the national policy framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting the establishment of a gender mainstreaming strategy</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>UNIFEM</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen and build capacity for the national machinery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assist with gender responsive budgeting</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>CIDA</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Build capacity of the national machinery (MOWE)</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>ILO</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Assist in mainstreaming gender in labour-related areas for the Ministry of Man Power and Transmigration</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>GTZ</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Gender advocacy in Population administration reform</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>Asia Foundation</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Gender aspects of Islamic Law</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>ADB</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender mainstreaming in poverty reduction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MOWE, UNDP, Bappenas
In 2002, MOWE produced a Guidelines Manual for the implementation of GM programmes. The manual defines ‘gender mainstreaming’ as a strategy to ‘achieve gender equality through the integration of male and female experiences, aspirations, needs, and issues in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, programs, projects, and activities in various development fields’.

In the next section I analyse the practice of GM in one of Indonesia’s ministries.

5.3.1 Gender mainstreaming and the Ministry of Religious Affairs

The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) mainly carries out government policies for the officially recognised religions – Islam, Catholicism and other branches of Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. Since Islam is the majority religion in Indonesia, the Ministry deals with the interests of Muslims more than those of other religious believers. They manage Islamic religious activities such as the hajj (Islamic pilgrimage) service, marriage registration, divorce procedures and inheritance matters.

We have seen in the previous section that the Marriage Law drew criticism from feminists for its discrimination against Indonesian women, particularly Muslim women. This is one of the issues that GM in MORA tried to address.

GM activities in MORA started in 2002. After a discussion with MOWE during the initial phase of GM implementation (Bambang, 2004) MORA’s GM team suspected that the current Compilation of Islamic Law (CIL), a holy reference source for Islamic judges in religious courts, could encourage domestic violence against women, not least because it recognises polygamy, as reflected in the Marriage Law (Mulia, 2004, Nurmila, 2009). MORA decided to establish a working group to analyse the CIL from a gender perspective. For a couple of years the working group conducted
desk studies and fieldwork in different regions and consulted fiqh books (Islamic jurisprudence) with Muslim ulemas (clerics).

In 2003 the result of the analysis was published as a counter legal draft of the CIL. This proposed changes to aspects of Islamic law seen as containing gender bias and discrimination against women. The changes focussed on three issues: Marriage Law, inheritance law and waqf (the donation of property for religious purposes). Where the Marriage Law was concerned, proposals were made, among other things:

(i) to define husbands and wives as equals (as opposed to the husband being the head of the household, as stated in the current Marriage Law),
(ii) to forbid polygamy/polyandry (the Marriage Law allows up to four wives and does not allow polyandry),
(iii) to allow women over 21 years of age to marry without the permission of a guardian (currently, whatever their age, women need the permission of their guardian to get married), and
(iv) to give both husbands and wives the right to reconciliation after a divorce (which under the Marriage Law is only the right of the husband).

This work obtained support from gender and human rights activists, as well as NGOs, including Muslim women’s organisations. The chair of the GM team, Dr Musdah Mulia, gained celebrity status and was invited to give talks, seminars and interviews. This gave traditionalists an opportunity to brand the team as ‘western agents’, because of their use of concepts such as pluralism, gender equity and human rights. The counter legal draft was proclaimed heretical by Muslim traditionalists and there were highly charged discussions in the media. Headlines such as *Pikiran Sesat anti Islam Kuasai Departemen Agama* (Heresy has taken over the Ministry of Religious Affairs) (Hutapea, 2004) adorned conservative Islamic magazines.
After massive pressure from the grassroots, on February 2005 the Minister of Religious Affairs forbade the GM team leader and her team from conducting seminars and workshops in the name of the Ministry and instructed them to return all pertinent documents (Irianto, 2006, O'Shaughnessy, 2009). The Minister was quoted saying: ‘In principle, we should never put reasoning above the Holy Revelation’. (Romly and Agil, 2003). This ban stopped the draft proposal from being discussed at the House of Commons (HC) with a view to legislation.

This case provides an ironic example of GM in the Indonesian bureaucracy. While many government agencies’ response to GM was lukewarm (see below), within two years MORA’s GM working team had identified a tangible issue with the potential to alter the fate of women across the country. This shows that despite supposedly high levels of civil service inertia, there was capacity to perform in Indonesia’s bureaucracy, given the right leadership and commitment. Yet, despite the support from senior levels in MORA, the proposed revision to the marriage law was dropped. This reflected a lack of political will in other parts of the government, coupled with the degree of resistance from some social sectors.

The fact that there were Muslim women amongst the opponents to the revision can be read in two ways. One interpretation is that the GM working group was trying to represent women in Indonesia, but that Muslim women refused to be represented in this way and preferred their current lives. This is seen by progressive Muslims as living under male domination. Another interpretation is that these women had a false sense of security and were unaware of their disadvantaged position (see, for example, Furseth and Repstad, 2006 for discussion on women and religion). Instead of referring to the Constitution, which guaranteed gender equality, and in this spirit, holding a meeting among the parties that disagreed, the Minister gave way to mass pressure and used his male authority to freeze the activity.
One could also say that the GM team was too ambitious in setting its goal and was neither strategic nor diplomatic in conveying its results to the general public. Perhaps this was because the team consisted of academics who did not engage with public sentiments. In terms of strategy, coordinating with other ministries and lobbying Muslim groups, including those in opposition, might have produced a better result.

Since these events, the GM focal points and working groups in the Ministry of Religious Affairs have continued to work in other, on less controversial areas. For example, they run training events for the penghulu (marriage registrar) on giving marriage sermons that promote gender equality.

Table 5-3 Ministry of Religious Affairs, Personnel Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total employees</td>
<td>106,195</td>
<td>84,119</td>
<td>190,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural posts:</td>
<td>9,167</td>
<td>1,054</td>
<td>10,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echelon I</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echelon II</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echelon III</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echelon IV</td>
<td>7,064</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>7,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echelon V</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>1,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional posts*</td>
<td>81,013</td>
<td>69,766</td>
<td>150,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Staff</td>
<td>16,015</td>
<td>13,299</td>
<td>29,314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Functional posts include Marriage Registrars (2,066 males and 20 females) and are mostly occupied by religious teachers in primary and secondary schools (63,555 males and 64,628 females).

Source: MORA

To what extent did MORA’s efforts in implementing GM in external policies, such as the marriage law, match its commitment to GM within its own organisation? Table 5-3 shows MORA’s statistics for its human resources (HR). The head of the GM team, Dr Musdah Mulia, whom I interviewed during my fieldwork, stated that she was not particularly concerned about the number of women in the Ministry. She said it was difficult to change overnight, but they could still seek to sensitise existing personnel to gender issues. I argued that it is difficult to sensitise personnel about gender issues.
when the number of women in the organisation does not reach a “critical mass” (see Chapter 2). As such, it would seem that MORA had done less to embrace GM internally than it terms of outward-facing policies. I return to this issue with reference to MOF in chapter 11.

The next section looks at progress in mainstreaming gender in other government agencies.

### 5.3.2 Evaluation of gender mainstreaming implementation in selected government ministries/agencies

In 2006, six years after the presidential decree, MOWE and BAPPENAS conducted a joint evaluation of twelve government organisations in nine sectors which had been running GM for at least five years. In total, eleven were included in the evaluation: the Ministries of Manpower, National Education, Law and Human Rights, Agriculture, Cooperative and Small-Scale Industries, Health, Social Welfare, and Environment; the National Police, the Attorney General’s Office, the Supreme Court and the Family Planning Agency. The report was funded by UNIFEM.6

The report evaluated five aspects of GM implementation in these government organisations: political commitment, policies, institutions, information systems and HR. This analytical framework followed a standard model used by international donor organisations to evaluate GM (see, for example, Asian Development Bank and Cambodian Ministry of Women's and Veterans' Affairs, 2004). Each sector was evaluated by an independent expert via SWOT analysis, and the overall evaluation was compiled from the individual reports. Although the format of the report was not

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6In the same year, UNDP also commissioned a gender mainstreaming assessment from a local independent consultant, which I return to later in Chapter 11. Also in the same year, a country gender assessment was carried out jointly by the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and some other donors to mark the Beijing plus 10, as they also did in several other developing countries. I also return to this report in Chapter 11.
consistent across sectors, the following points can be extracted from its 265 pages (Kementerian Negara Pemberdayaan Perempuan, 2006).

**Political commitment.** MOWE considered whether a government institution had political support in terms of a ministerial decree to ensure the integration of GM into its system (a *de jure* aspect of GM at the ministerial level). All of the evaluatees had this political commitment. The problems lay in the communication and dissemination of these ministerial decrees, the regulation of lower-level units and with monitoring and evaluation. None of the organisations possessed a good monitoring and evaluation system. The lack of clear planning and defined goals, objectives and time frames made it difficult to measure the progress of GM efforts.

**Policies.** This considered whether the government ministries produced gender-sensitive policies. Several ministries still did not appreciate GM’s core issues or understood GM as a women’s project as part of a WID approach. Another issue that came to the surface was the frequent lack of coordination between the regional offices of decentralised ministries and policy at ministry level, let alone with national policy.

**Institutional mechanisms.** This examined the appointment of focal points and the establishment of gender working groups. In most of the organisations GM was still managed by *ad hoc* teams which had to be renewed every year, as is the case in MOF. The Ministry of Manpower was the only ministry that included a gender-related division in its organisational structure, as an echelon II unit. This unit’s task was mainly to deal with gender-related issues in the labour force and with female workers. Another common situation in the government agencies assessed was that they had an echelon III and in some cases even an echelon IV official as a focal point in each of their echelon I units. The bureaucratic culture requires everybody to respect hierarchy more than expertise, as it is assumed (often wrongly) that those with more expertise are at the
higher level. This means the focal point does not have enough power
to influence policy and decision making in their echelon I unit. One
of the evaluators put it in very strong terms: ‘This situation, along
with lack of planning and exact targets for the activities, as well as
incompetence and lack of advocacy from MOWE makes the GM
programme ineffective’.

The Ministries of Agriculture and of Cooperatives and Small Scale
Industries were the only organisations with focal points down to the
regional level. Apart from the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of
Social Welfare and the Ministry of Environment, all of
ministries/government agencies had formed internal working
groups to tackle gender-related issues in their work places.

**Information systems.** This mainly considered whether there were
sex-disaggregated data in the information systems. The Ministry of
Manpower/Labour Force has been sex-disaggregating its data since
1989, even before the GM programme started in its organisation
and these sex-disaggregated data had been accessible on its
website. Their was, however, no evidence that these data had ever
been put to any specific use. Another ministry that had gender-
disaggregated data accessible on the web was the Ministry of
Education. These were the only two ministries that had
disaggregated their data.

**Human resources.** In this section there is inconsistency between
the individual expert reports. Only one evaluator – for the law sector
(comprising the National Police, the Ministry of Law and Human
Rights, the Attorney General’s Office and the Supreme Court) –
included an institutional analysis, to see if HR management was
gender-sensitive. In the law sector, none of the assessed
organisations had implemented a gender-sensitive internal HR
policy. They were all still operating under gender-neutral
assumptions, without paying attention to women’s specific needs,
which resulted in a low level of female participation amongst
decision makers. The other evaluators only considered whether or
not most decision and policy makers had been trained in gender issues. A problem highlighted in this respect is that several ministries had no record of who had participated in gender training. Considering that relocation is a common occurrence in the civil service, this recording system is needed to keep track of who has been trained and to decide whether a sensitisation programme should be run in a particular area. Another typical problem in this regard is the difficulty of bringing the higher echelons together to discuss the direction of GM in their institution. Round-table meetings initiated by the MOWE were supposed to bring together these echelon I officials. However, these officials delegated the task to junior staff, as they were busy doing things they considered more important.

The evaluators claimed there was considerable confusion across these ministries about how to approach GM. They report tended to criticise these ministries for “doing GM in the wrong way”, by saying they ‘still had the mindset of WID’. This implied that targeting disadvantaged women was no longer relevant, as WID had been superseded by GM. In fact, mainstreaming gender perspectives can include targeting activities for women or men who need them. Experience with multinational donor organisations in other countries tells us that often both approaches are carried out simultaneously (Jahan, 1995, Moser and Moser, 2005). Rao and Kelleher (2005b) point out that ‘the most pernicious misunderstanding is the separation of gender mainstreaming from women’s empowerment work’, showing that in many cases women’s empowerment projects have been abandoned for the sake of mainstreaming.

Another interesting aspect of the report is criticism of MOWE as the key agent in GM at the national level. One evaluator noted that MOWE was not included in the evaluation and said it should have been the first institution to be assessed. MOWE was seen as not providing enough guidance and advocacy to the government
ministries/agencies. In the National Police, for example, the GM programme was not defined clearly and had no obvious direction. The evaluator questioned MOWE’s intervention and asked why was this not picked up earlier, since they had been sent reports annually and a MOWE official sat on the GM team in the National Police. For the Family Planning Board, the evaluator’s criticism related to a lack of knowledge about family planning issues and priorities on MOWE’s part. This had prevented it from mainstreaming gender into the Family Planning Board’s activities.

### 5.3.3 The National Plan of Action for Gender Mainstreaming

Six years after the Presidential Instruction, some progress had been achieved. Increased funds had been allocated for the implementation of GM in government departments, some country-specific analytical tools had been developed, coordination mechanisms between central and regional governments had been put in place and there were some examples of best practice. Despite this, there were still many weaknesses and constraints, such as different views and understandings of GM amongst the decision makers and the fact that gender issues were still not mainstreamed in development planning (Kementerian Negara Pemberdayaan Perempuan, 2006).

In 2006 MOWE felt it necessary to draft a National Plan of Action for GM that included capacity-building activities, gender analysis, and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. This included the Parahita Ekapraya Award, which is given to government ministries/agencies/local government that have made particular efforts to ensure gender equality in their line of work. This award has three categories: Pratama (beginner), Madya (intermediate) and Utama (advanced) that are awarded according to how long an institution has been mainstreaming gender within its area of authority. The award has no monetary value. MOF received this
award in the Madya category in 2010, and the Utama category in 2012.

This section has examined the institutional framework for GM in Indonesia’s bureaucracy in general, along with a review of its implementation in various government agencies. This analysis, along with later chapter’s discussion of formal and informal structures in the MOF and its wider organisational culture, provides essential background information for understanding how GM fared in MOF.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has brought together three pieces of information that are crucial to understanding gender issues in the Indonesian Ministry of Finance. Following the previous chapter’s discussion of the Indonesian civil service and its wider environment including socio-economic, social and political issues, this chapter pays particular attention to gender issues at the state level and in the civil service bureaucracy. It also discusses the extent to which the bureaucracy, as an organization, values women’s empowerment.

The relationship between society, the state and the civil service is not linear. There are different layers of influence and complex relations between them. These include the state in a general sense (which is itself more multi-faceted than monolithic), the civil service (which was the key state institution in Suharto’s era), and wider society (which increasingly includes a range of influences from liberal feminism to conservative Islam). The patterns of this relationship change over time, posing different challenges to women’s empowerment.

Although the New Order regime reduced gender gaps in education and employment, it had a patronising attitude towards women and limited their movements by promoting state ibuism. Suharto did not promote gender discrimination in education because he believed
that a clever and educated mother is needed to bring up future generations. Working mothers were not condemned either, as long as they put the family first. The new regional laws introduced in the post-Suharto era are similar, if not worse than state ibuism, limiting women’s physical freedom of movement in the name of Islam.

The chapter has demonstrated that Indonesian civil service law was shaped to fit Suharto’s gender ideology and has not changed in the 13 years since his departure. Indonesians seldom refer to gender discrimination as a characteristic of Indonesian bureaucracy. In fact there is a common perception that working for the civil service is more suitable for women than working in the private sector, due to its flexibility. Yet this common perception is at odds with the fact that far from being flexible, civil servants are highly regulated. Chapter 4 discussed how their working lives are hierarchical and full of jargon reminding them of their duty as state and public servants: to be loyal to the state and the national ideology. Their codes of conduct require them to prioritise their work over their families, ‘work day and night untiringly’ and be prepared to be relocated around Indonesia at any stage in their employment. This chapter has revealed that their lives are also regulated outside work, even down to domestic affairs such as marriage and divorce, due to the expectation that they set a good example for wider society.

Goetz’s gendered cognitive context considers how women’s empowerment is pursued within organisations. As well as looking at specific ministries, it is useful to look at Indonesian bureaucracy at the national level. This chapter has reviewed the experience of GM across the civil service. The available information suggests that GM has not progressed far in addressing internal organisational issues. In Chapter 11, I return to the topic of GM in the MOF and discuss the link between internal organisational dynamics and external outcomes.
6 Gender discrimination as a formal policy in MOF’s recruitment process

6.1 Introduction

Chapter 5 analyses the gender ideology of the state and the extent to which the women’s empowerment agenda has been pursued over the past 40 years. It demonstrates that, although there have been some shifts in the way the state approached women’s empowerment, there has been no change to the Civil Service Law, which remains gender-biased.

The rest of the chapters in this thesis focus on MOF. Bearing in mind that as part of the national bureaucracy, MOF civil servants are bound by the gendered civil service laws and regulations, this chapter examines the third element of a gendered bureaucracy: gendered organisational culture. As discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of organisational culture is employed in this thesis to examine MOF practices that hinder women’s equal participation.

Before we examine daily practice within MOF in general, there is an important question to address. Given the low number of female employees in MOF, does the recruitment process discriminate against female applicants? This question is set out as part of, and an opening to, a broader question: ‘Which aspects of organisational culture facilitate and hinder women’s participation?’

Research on gender in organisations and bureaucracy reveals that gender discrimination usually occurs in the informal structure through power relationships amongst the people in the organisation (Savage and Witz, 1992). In the case of MOF, however, gender discrimination also exists at the formal level, is openly embraced by senior management in the recruitment process and acts as a barrier to entering the organisation.
6.2 Background to civil service recruitment

Until Suharto’s regime ended, a civil servant had to undergo a form of screening test during their probation period which included assessing whether the person in question, or any member of their family – which, given Indonesia’s extensive family and kinship system, includes very distant relatives – had any connection to the 1965 coup, however remote. If this was suspected, the applicant was barred from joining the civil service.

The recruitment regulations state that to be eligible to apply for a civil service career, one should not have any form of disability and be in very good health. Even if the job assigned does not involve physical work, the civil service does not admit disabled people. This again reminds us of the organisational culture of the military, where the emphasis is upon physical standards, implying that masculinity is determined by a healthy body rather than a healthy mind (Carreiras, 2006 p.41). Unlike other countries such as India or China, which hold a general exam for entry to the whole of the civil service, in Indonesia each ministry manages its own recruitment according to its needs, but must make an agreement with MenPAN before beginning the recruitment process.

Following a generalist rather than a specialist system, everybody recruited to the Indonesian civil service starts in a junior or non-managerial position. At recruitment a warning is issued that a civil servant should be ready to be placed anywhere in Indonesia. This clause refers not only to geographical location but also to the type of job that might be assigned, which may not be related to the applicant's expertise.

6.3 Recruitment practices in MOF

6.3.1 Overview

As the title of this chapter suggests, there is blatant gender discrimination in MOF recruitment. While discrimination against
women in recruitment processes is usually discrete and therefore has to be proven systematically (Petit, 2007, Yoder et al., 1989), discrimination in MOF happens as a matter of policy. Although some people at the top managerial levels denied this, others admitted it. The relaxed way in which some senior managers made this blunt admission partly reflects the small number of women currently working at that level in MOF. It is unlikely that they would be as comfortable making such statements if women were already well represented amongst them (Johnson and Schulman, 1989).

As well as being unjust, this practice is also contradictory. At the national level such discrimination is against the law, since the Constitution guarantees gender equality in employment (articles 28 D (2, 3) and rules that everybody should be free from discrimination of any kind (article 28 I (2)). Indonesia ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1985, with only one reservation to article 29 about which body should settle any dispute about the interpretation or application of the Convention. Indonesia also introduced the National Action Plan (United Nations, 1998) following the Beijing Platform for Action, although the quota of 30% of women in parliament was never implemented. Such contradiction, however, is not new, as UNIFEM (2005) notes the existence of laws that have yet to be harmonised with the provisions of the Convention in areas such as the family, marriage, economic rights and health. What is more surprising is the contradiction within the Ministry itself. Since 2004, MOF has set up an internal gender mainstreaming programme, yet to date open discrimination in recruitment coexists with this programme.

The recruitment process is handled centrally by MOF, rather than at the directorate general or agency level. Every year, each unit within MOF must state how many employees it will need for the next three years based on its HR planning. The numbers for every unit are then compiled and form the basis for recruitment. MOF
employees are currently recruited from two sources: the public, with MOF holding a one-day recruitment exam for university graduates who meet the minimum criteria, and STAN, the ministry-owned accounting college.7

6.3.2 STAN

6.3.2.1 Ministry-owned College

Around 70% of MOF employees are hired through STAN. This college was founded in 1959 to cater for the needs of MOF employees specialising in public finance. Its programmes follow the pre-bureaucratic reform structure of the Ministry’s organisation and include Taxation, Treasury, Customs and Excise, State Receivables and Action Administration, Land and Building Valuation and Public Accounting. The college admits high school graduates and provides free education for three years (some other schools also offer one-year training courses), and on passing the final exam they are recruited to MOF as civil servants. When they apply to sit the MOF exam, applicants choose their preferred speciality, although their choice is may not be granted depending on the positions available.

MOF applies a set of difficult and competitive entry exams to recruit 2-3,000 high school graduates every year. Once students successfully complete the MOF exam, the ministry guarantees them civil service employment, normally for life.

6.3.2.2 Eligibility to take the exam

The recruitment process is conducted in several stages. Each year, MOF invites A-level graduates to take the STAN entrance test. There are certain eligibility requirements to sit the exam, including A-level passes with a minimum average of 70 percent in all subjects and none below 60 percent. Ministry of Education Statistics (GOI,

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7 In Indonesia it is common for a ministry to own a college from which it recruits graduates. The Interior Ministry does this on a larger scale and employs graduates in local government around Indonesia. This approach provides tailor-made graduates, as the programmes the ministerial colleges offer are not available at state or private universities.
2006) reveal that the average grades in high school exams in Indonesia in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 were 48, 48, 57 and 59 percent respectively. STAN’s requirement of a minimum average of 70 percent therefore filters out more than half of all high school graduates. Amongst the other requirements, which vary from year to year, participants must not have any form of disability or be addicted to narcotics or other substances, as confirmed by a letter from a GP or health institution local to where the applicant is registered.

Furthermore, applicants must be under 21 and have never been married, as confirmed by the applicant’s local authority, and if accepted they must agree not to marry before they graduate. The same criterion of never having been married is used nowhere else in Indonesia, apart from in the Indonesian military academy (2007).

MOF requires its recruits to be single because it funds their study and claims that it cannot afford to lose people as a result of marrying, pregnancy and child-care, and there is no maternity leave. At this stage there is indirect discrimination against women. According to Indonesian law, the children of unmarried parents are only registered under their mothers’ name and in such cases the authorities will not issue a statement that the mothers have never married. Instead, they include the information that they have had an ‘unregistered marriage’ in the past which resulted in one or more children. The fathers are still considered single and can therefore apply to take the examination.

Not allowing a year’s maternity leave during the study period is inconsistent with STAN’s policy for underperforming students. The minimum pass grade is a Grade Point Average (GPA) of 2.65 (out of 4)\(^8\) with no D marks and no mark below C for core subjects. If a student does not reach this in the first or second year, s/he is obliged to leave. If this happens in the third year, however, the

\(^8\) Marks range from A to D, which is a fail. A has value of 4, B=3, C=2, and D=1.
student is allowed to repeat the whole year in all subjects, not just particular subject(s) that s/he has failed in. Like the first three years, this extra year is fully funded by MOF. If the student still does not pass in the repeat year s/he is expelled.

This policy not only appears unfair to the student but is also a waste of MOF resources. The drop-out rates in the first and second year are high at 15-20% per year, and around 3% of students repeat their third year. The contrast with maternity leave is stark. Since STAN students do not have civil servant or MOF employee status, MOF is not bound by statutory civil service maternity leave regulations, and has no direct responsibility for the student.

The customs and excise course applies further requirements: only fit, healthy and non-disabled men are admitted. Again, the only organisation that applies this kind of gender discrimination is the Indonesian military academy, which never admits women, who join the military via a separate entrance process as university graduates or directly from high school to serve as low-level officers.

The Customs and Excise course is run in a semi-military style. Students learn how to handle guns in the second semester and are exposed to various basic military training methods. This course recruited women until the mid 1990s, when it suddenly stopped admitting them. Managers at the Customs and Excise office argued that their duties are very complex and dangerous, and it would be difficult for women to go on beach or sea patrol because ‘The patrol vessels do not have toilets. If these ladies are prepared to wee in the sea standing up then they’re welcome. But I don’t think that is the case’. This contrasts with HM Customs and Excise in the UK, which shifted from being very male-dominated until 1972 to becoming an award-winning government department for equal opportunities 20 years later (Palmer, 1996). At the time of my fieldwork there were few women in Indonesia’s Customs and Excise Offices as a result of the past years’ recruitments. While their justification for not accepting women is highly questionable and based on prejudice,
Custom and Excise Office has been starkly honest about this form of discrimination by openly stating that only men can apply to the course. The other schools are less overt in their discriminatory practices, but they know the exact number of women and men they are willing to accept every year, as I discuss in the next sections.

6.3.2.3 The entrance exam

As a fully-funded course, STAN has proved very popular among bright students, especially those who come from non-wealthy backgrounds and from outside Jakarta. Despite the eligibility requirements, more than 120,000 candidates (between 5-7% of total high school graduates) from across Indonesia participate in the entrance exam every year, making it as popular as Seleksi Penerimaan Mahasiswa Baru (SPMB), the entrance exam for Indonesian state universities. Table 5.10, below, illustrates the numbers of high school graduates and STAN applicants. Compared to other ministries whose recruitment, especially at the regional level, tends to involve corruption, bribery and nepotism (Kristiansen and Ramli, 2006), and despite the rampant corruption alleged against MOF, all of my interviewees believed that STAN has been relatively free from this kind of problem.

According to the Ministry of Education’s statistics, around a million people pass the final high school exam every year. As detailed in Table 6-1, 5 to 7% of graduates apply to take the STAN exam.
**Table 6-1 High School Graduates and University Examination Participants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Passed High School Exams</th>
<th>Sat in State Universities Exams (SPMB)*</th>
<th>Sat in MOF Exam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>806,925</td>
<td>722,523</td>
<td>586,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>862,853</td>
<td>727,915</td>
<td>525,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>859,729</td>
<td>759,825</td>
<td>364,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>884,602</td>
<td>815,513</td>
<td>403,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>901,289</td>
<td>816,531</td>
<td>459,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>900,108</td>
<td>828,969</td>
<td>688,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>959,038</td>
<td>882,493</td>
<td>727,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,044,935</td>
<td>943,494</td>
<td>599,457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from MOE and MOF 2003-2010

* SPMB is run yearly for students who have graduated from high school that year or the year before. The exam for entry to a state university is nationally administered.

Table 6-1 shows that although fewer women than men finish high school each year, more women apply to STAN. Statistics from the Ministry of Education reveal that, although more boys participate in the final high school exam (probably meaning that more boys attend high school than girls), on average girls tend to outperform boys in these exam results by 3%. The pass rate is also higher for girls than for boys. This means that, despite the smaller number of female high school graduates, more of them are qualified to take the STAN exam. Higher rates of female participation in the STAN exam may also show different gender interests when it comes to higher education. It might also be due to the fact that STAN does not ask for a tuition fee, and families with tight budgets might prioritise boys’ education over girls’ (UNICEF, 2007 p.39).
The STAN exam itself covers maths, English, Indonesian language and general knowledge in multiple choice format. Only about 3% of applicants pass the test every year. The exam results are posted on the Ministry's webpage on a named day and are also available at the registration locations. Table 6-2 shows the proportion of test participants accepted at STAN in 2003-2010.

Table 6-2 STAN Admission Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>STAN Applicants</th>
<th>Accepted</th>
<th>Admission rate*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>% Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>41,605</td>
<td>45,232</td>
<td>52.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>27,835</td>
<td>31,293</td>
<td>52.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>38,521</td>
<td>43,399</td>
<td>52.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>57,625</td>
<td>62,003</td>
<td>51.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>61,375</td>
<td>63,910</td>
<td>51.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>46,728</td>
<td>48,637</td>
<td>51.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>42,542</td>
<td>46,202</td>
<td>52.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>55,766</td>
<td>57,783</td>
<td>50.89%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MOF Training Agency
Admission rate is the percentage of males/females admitted per male/female applicant

Since more women apply every year and women tend to outperform men in the high school exam, the low number of women gaining admission to STAN is surprising. Every year fewer than 20% of those named on the pass list are women, even though each year roughly 10% more women than men take the exam. Less than one in a hundred female applicants was accepted in 2003 and 2006-2008, and only slightly more than one in the other years.

As a comparison with state university admission, Table 6-3 illustrates the number of men and women participating in SPMB. The proportion of women enrolled as new students more or less corresponds with the proportion of female applicants.

158
Table 6-3 State University Examination Admission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sat in state university admission examination</th>
<th>Enrolled as new students</th>
<th>Admission rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>% Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>586,697</td>
<td>471,212</td>
<td>44.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>525,193</td>
<td>554,379</td>
<td>51.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>364,661</td>
<td>585,405</td>
<td>61.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>403,774</td>
<td>494,717</td>
<td>55.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>459,395</td>
<td>467,922</td>
<td>50.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>688,309</td>
<td>701,188</td>
<td>50.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>727,864</td>
<td>763,004</td>
<td>51.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>599,457</td>
<td>634,035</td>
<td>51.40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Biro Pusat Statistik (BPS), Kemendiknas

Comparing Tables 6-2 and 6-3, it can be seen that in 2010, 23 % of admissions into STAN were women, but women accounted for 57% of admissions to state universities. This is surprising, since women outperform men at high school and this is a criterion for eligibility to take the STAN exam, but not for the state university exam. An admission committee member who wished to remain anonymous told me that the low percentage of women who are accepted into STAN/MOF exam is not due to their exam results; in fact women tend to perform better in the exam. The only thing that prevents them from gaining admission is MOF itself.

This key informant lent me the 2003-2007 recruitment dataset and helped me to analyse it, first by showing me how the data were processed step by step to come up with the number and composition shown in the announcement, and then, using the same set of parameters but removing the gender-discriminatory quota, calculating how many women had been disadvantaged.
Every year, regardless of the number of the applicants, MOF only accepts as many people as the organisation is expected to need in three years’ time when the students graduate. As the college has a quality standard to maintain, only people who give more than 70 percent of correct answers proceed to the next round in the selection process. This is not difficult to achieve and STAN has never had to lower its standard, as every year more than 100,000 applicants have already been filtered by the registration requirements.

Table 6-4 Numbers of STAN Applicants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Applicants</th>
<th>Candidates in the final round (mark 70 % and above)</th>
<th>Accepted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>41,605</td>
<td>45,232</td>
<td>86,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>27,835</td>
<td>31,293</td>
<td>59,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>38,521</td>
<td>43,399</td>
<td>81,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>57,625</td>
<td>62,003</td>
<td>119,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>61,375</td>
<td>63,910</td>
<td>125,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>46,728</td>
<td>48,637</td>
<td>95,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>42,542</td>
<td>46,202</td>
<td>88,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>55,766</td>
<td>57,783</td>
<td>113,549</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Year 2003-2007: based on interview with people from Student Admission Records
Year 2008-2010 based on follow up through announcement on MOF’s website

Table 6-4 shows that more women than men are eligible for the final round of the selection process. In 2006 only 378 women were accepted: 2% of those who had achieved a mark of 70 or more. In some other years the figure is as low as 3 per cent. For men in 2006, the respective figure is 14%, and for 2005 it is as high as 37%.
Why were so few women accepted for STAN? One explanation might be that among the applicants who scored 70 and above, men scored significantly higher. However, the official responsible for compiling these data provided a rather different explanation:

*We always end up with more than 15,000 people above this 70 percent threshold. As you can see in the database, there is no specific trend of women doing better or worse; it really depends on the applicants every year. However, since most of the directorate generals in MOF prefer male to female employees, their shopping list will also be gender-segregated. Based on the employees’ needs analyses for each Directorate General for the next three years, we compile a ranked list of results of the entrance exam and then selected the top x number of women and y number of men from that list.*

*(Key-informant MZ, interview no. 21/BPPK/2007-Aug)*

If candidates were selected purely on the basis of their exam scores and not their sex, the proportion of men and women accepted would have been very different. Table 6-5 shows that despite being outnumbered by men in total, women were concentrated in the ranks of the highest scorers. Taking 2006 as an example, MOF had a total requirement of 2,668 employees. Of the highest 2,668 exam scores, 1,538 were achieved by women. In a gender-neutral scenario all of these women would have been accepted. In reality, as seen in the final column of Table 6-5, only 461 women were appointed and the other 1,077 posts were transferred to men. This shows the scale of the discrimination in this process.
### Table 6-5: Number of posts transferred to men

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Employees Needed*</th>
<th>Met the Requirement**</th>
<th>Accepted</th>
<th>Posts Transferred to men***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2,749</td>
<td>1,227</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>2,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2,924</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>1,756</td>
<td>2,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3,725</td>
<td>1,649</td>
<td>2,076</td>
<td>3,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2,668</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>1,538</td>
<td>2,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2,014</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>1,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2,325</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,336</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3,770</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2,905</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Year 2003-2007: based on interview with an informant from Student Admission Records  
Year 2008-2010 based on follow up through announcement on MOF’s website  
* Total employee needed in the year x+3 regardless of sex  
** Numbers are based on the compiled ranked list (not gender segregated)  
*** the difference between the number of female candidates who met the requirement and the number of those actually accepted.  
n/a : data unavailable, the person contacted said that they ‘could not find the data’

Based on the data in Table 6-5, we can deduce that every year more than 1,000 women are denied access to employment at MOF purely on the basis of their sex. Their places are given to less-qualified men, showing that MOF is prepared to compromise the quality of its recruitment considerably to keep women out of the system.

According to Law no. 39/1999 article 46, elections in the legislature and judicial and executive appointments arenas have to ensure female representation. In 2007 Parliament noticed that STAN was admitting very few women and questioned the Finance Minister about its recruitment policy. In internal meetings, the Minister
challenged MOF’s misogynist environment, but before Parliament she defended the policy to limit the recruitment of women. She said, as quoted by one of my key informants, that while MOF is working towards gender equality within its organisation, at the moment they believe that most of their positions in remote parts of Indonesia are not safe for women. Consequently, MOF will not send women to these locations until work has been done to make these offices safe. Since Parliament did not offer an applicable solution for this problem, MOF has retained its discriminatory practice.

The latest development, in 2010, is that under pressure from Parliament and the gender mainstreaming team, MOF told Parliament that they were willing to increase the intake of women to a maximum of 30 percent (although the number of qualified female applicants exceeds 50 percent). This is a novel interpretation of the 30 percent quota to increase the participation of women in Indonesia’s Parliament. The Parliament quota was established to make sure that there is a minimum of 30 percent of women, while in MOF this quota will operate as a cap. Despite this policy change, in 2010 the female share of recruits was still only 22 percent.

When finalising this chapter, I asked the Head of the TA if they still applied this gender discrimination policy. The reply was: ‘We never discriminated. Everything is based on the needs of the end users. They want such and such a number of women, so that’s what we process and present to them. There is nothing discriminatory about it’.

Effectively, MOF applies a policy of affirmative action in favour of male applicants. There are parallels between this and a separate policy aimed at boosting the number of recruits from eastern Indonesia. This region is slightly poorer than the western part of the country and has benefited from an affirmative action initiative to hire putra daerah’ (translated literally as ‘local boys’ – but not local girls, of course). Indonesia’s experience of unequal development has made Java and to some extent Sumatra much richer than other
areas, especially those in the east; MOF’s centralised hiring system, which has very high standards, also means that only people who have attended relatively good high schools (most of which are situated in Java) can pass. These are then sent to occupy positions all over Indonesia, including the east. This situation has created envy among local people in the region, who feel that they themselves should have positions in these offices but do not yet have the qualifications to get them. The affirmative action policy is also pursued as an effort to reduce tensions between local people and the ‘immigrants’ from western Indonesia. This demonstrates that affirmative action can be made to work if there is the political will. However, the opposite happens in the case of women.

The threshold of 70% is sufficiently low that, even with the affirmative action policy, nobody below this mark needs to be accepted, and so “standards” can still be maintained. One official told me, that sometimes they also have to accept orders from high position officials, members of parliament, cabinet ministers and so forth to admit their children. He said that as long as these children achieve more than a 70% mark, the request can be considered.9

When STAN students have finished their training they are formally recruited as MOF civil servants10 in grade II/b, the grade given to people who hold Diploma III certificates. Internal MOF policy stipulates that STAN graduates should receive special treatment, and that after two instead of the normal four years in service their grade should advance to II/c. This policy does not apply to employees who obtained their Diploma III elsewhere.

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9 Once one of former president Suharto’s grandchildren sat the MOF exam in 1995, and the whole Ministry, especially the recruitment team, was under pressure to admit her, but she failed to score more than 70% and was not admitted. The story went that the Director of the School was removed from his position and given a new position as an Expert Staff.

10 Until 1997, formal recruitment took place in the second year of training; therefore in the past, second-year trainees had already been given their Employees Identification Number and were entitled to receive 80% of the basic salary of civil servants in grade II/a.
6.3.3 *Direct recruitment from local universities*

There were no comparable data available for the recruitment of university graduates, mainly because this is not a regular recruitment process and the last time it had occurred before my fieldwork trip was in 2002. MOF recruits university graduates when it needs staff with non-financial backgrounds such as lawyers to deal with the legal side of government accounting, psychologists mainly for psychometric testing, which is applied at every level of recruitment and promotion, engineers, and – rarely – librarians. From the various interviews I did for this research, however, I gathered that the same rule applies to this recruitment: every unit states how many new women it can tolerate, a fact never mentioned in the vacancy announcement. Customs and Excise, of course, does not want any women and clearly states that only men should apply in every advertisement.

The recruitment process for private and state university fresh-graduates takes place in three stages. First, applicants complete an academic exam comprising a set of multiple choice questions on basic mathematics, English, and general knowledge lasting around 3 hours. There is no essay-writing involved, making the exam easy to mark. From this, a set of parameters are applied to decide which candidates can go on to the second stage, the psychometric test. Those who pass the psychometrics are invited for interview.
Table 6-6 University fresh graduate recruitment 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage of recruitments</th>
<th>Male**</th>
<th>Female**</th>
<th>Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applicants</td>
<td>38,600</td>
<td>31,582</td>
<td>70,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passed the academic test and invited to take the psychometric test</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>1,208</td>
<td>2,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passed the psychometric test and invited to the interview</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>1,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepted</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>1,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial recruitment target</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrepancy</td>
<td>-155</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*GOI, MOF press release 2002
** MOF internal HR data

In June 2002, MOF announced 1,035 vacancies and invited applicants to take the exam. As my informant told me, MOF had internally (and quietly) decided that it wanted only 101 women amongst those 1,035 recruits. This was a unanimous decision, despite the fact that there were several women on the recruitment committee. Table 6-6 outlines the stages of the process MOF applied to select the candidates. As shown, while men accounted for a higher share of initial applicants, around 20 per cent more women passed the academic test. After the psychometric test, more than three-quarters of the men and only a third of the women who had succeeded in passing the previous stage were invited to the interview.

Since I could not obtain the data about this psychometric test I can only speculate about what might have happened at this stage. The first possibility is that only 796 men and 456 women passed the psychometric test. While there is evidence that there are gender differences in psychometric test results (Balderson and Broderick, 1996, Codorniu-Raga and Vigil-Colet, 2003), the psychometric test in this case is not designed to anticipate such differences. Not only
that, but MOF’s team of psychologists has designed one test for all applicants, despite the fact they will have different jobs in different settings, depending on the echelon I units they are deployed to. The extent to which this process may have discriminated against women would require analysis from a trained psychologist and is therefore beyond the scope of my research. The second possibility is that more women than men passed the psychometric test but only 456 were invited to the interview. This is a possible scenario as only 101 women were wanted.

Fifty-six per cent of the women invited to interview and 98 per cent of the men were successful and were offered the position. As a result the distribution of successful applicants is significantly skewed towards men. This is predictable, since the gatekeepers are the interviewers, who are the same directors who set the quota of men and women from the very beginning. It turned out that they had to make a compromise and recruit 155 more women than they were initially willing to tolerate, probably because not enough male candidates met the minimum criteria. Even after accepting 155 more women than they had initially intended, I suspect that this still left some women out despite their scoring better than the men who were recruited, as in the case of STAN recruitment.

Women have been seen as undesirable employees in MOF for a long time. MOF has always claimed that it has difficulties allocating women to posts in various parts of Indonesia and therefore does not wish to employ too many, as I discuss later. When asked whether they realised that by implementing that system in the admission exam they are clearly denying women employment in the Ministry, which equates to discrimination against women in the institution, one of the directors of the TA replied:

Let’s think that our Training Centre is a restaurant, and we are the cook. We prepare the food according to the guests’ order. Can you imagine coming to a restaurant and being forced to eat the food you don’t order? They don’t want women, so obviously we can’t send women to their offices... The Directorate General of Tax and the
Directorate General of Treasury in fact would like to limit their recruitment to men only, but they can’t do that because of Parliament.

(Key-informant NF, interview no. 08/BPPK/2007-Apr)

According to another key informant, in 2008 MOF allowed women increased access (i.e. not strictly the 15% limit but slightly more) to training programmes conducted outside Jakarta on the assumption that they would stay in the region where they received their education and not ask to be moved elsewhere. The policy only applies to one-year Diploma-1 (D-1) programmes that supply lower-grade employees. Furthermore, while Indonesian universities recognise the credit points that applicants have achieved in D-3 training, allowing them to transfer their credits when they decide to continue their education elsewhere, their D-1 education is barely acknowledged by universities, especially state ones. If somebody with a D-1 diploma wishes to continue their education for a better chance of progressing in their career (see the section on Training and Development in Chapter 7), they must enrol at a university as a high-school graduate rather than using the credits from their D-1 units. As a consequence, they find it difficult to continue their formal education, which affects their career progression. Allowing more women to occupy lower positions in MOF sustains the current situation in which women are not welcome at higher management levels.

Kanter (1977a) speculates that group processes are influenced by the gender composition of the group. I present details of the decision-making processes in the following chapter, but it is useful to remember here that the management composition in Table 5.3 shows that very few women hold middle and top managerial positions. It is likely that these women find it difficult to challenge the decision to hire as few women as possible; Goetz (1997a p. 21) recognises that ‘gendered ideology and disciplinary structures can leave little space for women to validate their perspective…’. From late 2005 to early 2011 the Indonesian Finance Minister was a woman. Did she challenge the institutional practice of denying women
employment in MOF? I did not get the opportunity to interview her myself, but from what I could gather during interviews with top managers at MOF, the Minister had felt disturbed by the fact that there so few women at STAN. She expressed these concerns to the TA Director, who simply replied that ‘there may not be many women in this school, but the ones we have are of the best quality’. This is true, because according to an interviewee, ‘from year to year on graduation day we always announce the best ten graduates of the year, and most of them will be women...’.

We would expect, then, that these ‘best people’ to be at the top of the management pyramid. However, this is not the case. Instead, women face double discrimination – first in recruitment and then in promotion, which I address in Chapter 8. HR statistics shows that women occupy about a quarter of managerial positions. Considering that in total women only make up 20% of the whole MOF workforce, the statistics confirm the senior official’s statement, above. However, women are concentrated in the lower managerial levels. Currently there are no women at echelon I level and only seven in echelon II positions compared to 208 men. Women continue to occupy the bottom rank, and when they do get to managerial levels they remain in the lower ranks of these.

6.4 Women’s motivations for joining MOF

It came to light during the interviews that none of the female managers I interviewed had been aware of the gender discrimination in this government organisation before they joined MOF. At the same time, however, career advancement was not one of their reasons for seeking employment with MOF.

As discussed before, MOF has several entry points depending on the HR vacancy. While the biggest intake is through STAN, there is recruitment for those with an undergraduate diploma and those who complete high school (who are employed straightaway without
three years of training at STAN). Nine of my interviewees joined MOF via this route. One said:

*You know university was very expensive in those days. My father had not retired by then, but all my siblings were boys. Actually I passed the test to Undip [University of Diponegoro in Central Java], but I knew my father would not pay for my education so I tried to find a safer option. I learned that MOF was recruiting from High School and that those who passed the test would be given a year’s training in the IIK (the old name of STAN) as a pembantu akuntan (accountant-assistant). But later it simply didn’t happen; instead we were sent around Indonesia on placements. Some men left and some others have now become echelon I and echelon II officials [naming some people]. Yeah, they all started from high school just like me, but you know, they are all men…*

In general, most female managers recruited from STAN had parents who were not wealthy and either could not afford to send their children to university or prioritised their sons’ education. The women were only funded to finish high school and then were left to decide whether they wanted to get married or go to work (and, hopefully, quickly find themselves a husband). STAN provided a good opportunity for them, as it was free and they would not have to ask their parents to support them. Until the end of the 1990s, STAN students were given salary starting from their second year of study and were guaranteed a place at MOF once they graduated.

Although most women from the university graduate intake had parents who were financially sound, surprisingly they told me that it had not been their own decision to work as a civil servant, let alone at MOF. Theoretically having a degree, especially from a reputable university, should give them more agency to decide what was best for them. Instead, they were persuaded by their parents or siblings – usually elder brothers, who are seen as father figures, especially if the age difference is big. Although there is no
requirement to be single when joining MOF from university, most of the women I interviewed were single when they were hired.

According to non-STAN female managers:

... from the very beginning I had made up my mind to take the first job offer: whoever called me first, there I would pledge my loyalty. To be honest with you, I got offers from BULOG (a government-owned rice distribution company) and PLN (the national electricity company). Even PLN placed me in Gambir, while BULOG placed me in Surabaya. Then BRI offered me a place as well... But my late brother told me that I should accept MOF’s offer instead of the bank’s. He said: ‘You are a woman, this is your place’. (Padma)

We women sometimes find this stuff a real dilemma. At the time I had a boyfriend, and some people were a bit concerned that I wouldn’t get married. During my employment in the private sector I enjoyed my work a little bit too much because my boss fully trusted me and my creativity really developed. As a consequence, I wasn’t thinking about settling down and having a family. That scared my parents a lot. I’ve got an auntie who didn’t get married until just before she retired and my parents were worried that I might end up like her... Well, then, in the beginning I didn’t take it very seriously when I applied to join MOF. A friend asked me if I would take the exam, and I said why not. And I found myself passing the test. Then I thought, I’d been successful in finance, and this was also about finance, so why not give it a try? According to some of my friends, it would be better for me because of the job security, the pension and other stuff. That was what interested me, so I moved to MOF. (Marina-DJPBN).

I got an offer from one of the national banks but my parents didn’t allow me to work there. They said that for a woman it’s better to become a civil servant, so you can divide your time between minding the children and working. (Wita-DJPBN)
This set of answers provided a stark contrast to the responses I got when I asked the same questions of male MOF managers, most of which referred to long-term security, good pension benefits and being able to work ‘at their own pace’ as well as ‘the satisfaction of contributing to the country’s welfare rather than to private or multinational corporations’.

The female interviewees were not just thinking about what would give them the most economic satisfaction. They chose a type of employment that would suit them as Indonesian or Javanese women. Even though they were still single when they decided to work in the civil service, and had a range of possibilities open to them, they were already projecting several years ahead to when they would be wives and mothers. In some cases, as quoted above, the choice was not even theirs. Although nobody forced them to work as civil servant, they were persuaded to accept their main duty and role as a woman, a wife and a mother, and to engage in a type of employment that would not distract them too much from their main responsibilities. As such, it is not surprising that opportunities for career advancement were not a priority. Ford and Parker (2008 p.3) summarise this situation in another setting very well:

*When we come to study real women working in Indonesia, we come to understand that we are dealing with single women, daughters, mothers and wives who are not free to make market-based decisions about what will provide most income or the best career for them as individuals. Rather, they make choices about work – or sometimes have their decisions made for them – and in the process they constitute their own identities as full, gendered human beings: as good mothers, capable wives, virtuous daughters or reputable, marriage-able young women.*

The above testimonies suggest that the informants felt that the public sector would be a more accommodating employer for women than the private sector. This view is sometimes proposed in the women-in-management literature (Lewis, 1992, Blank, 1985). As
this thesis demonstrates, however, the extent to which these perceptions reflect the reality of life in MOF is highly questionable.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the extent of gender discrimination in MOF’s recruitment process. From the outset, MOF has established a reverse-quota of a maximum of 15% (lately increased to 22%) of women in all new intakes. The statistics reveal that women score better than men in the recruitment exams, and that every year this discriminatory procedure denies more than 1,000 women decent employment. In terms of HR staffing, it also means that MOF admits a larger number of less competent men just on the basis of their sex.

This chapter clearly answers the research question: the recruitment process in MOF is gender-discriminatory, as formally acknowledged by the management of MOF. The next chapters examine other aspects of the organisational culture that hinder women’s equal participation.
7 Diploma disease: to what extent does education empower women in MOF?

7.1 Introduction

After reviewing the recruitment process in the previous chapter, the discussion now turns to how the Civil Service career structure is implemented at MOF via internal regulations and policies. This chapter deals primarily with gendered organisational culture, although it also touches the issues of gendered time and space.

I have shown in Chapter 4 that formal education plays a major role in civil servants’ lives. It determines what grade they are allocated when they join the service, and during their working life a higher diploma can take them to a higher grade. As well as being a requirement for holding a given grade, educational qualifications are necessary for holding a managerial position.

Haque (1997) states that the nature of the civil service in developing countries is heavily influenced by Western and colonial rules and education, which has led to the creation of, among other things, ‘diploma disease’. It is a terminology coined by Dore (1976, 1980, 1997) to criticise the excessive reliance on formal education that results in a requirement for higher educational levels for jobs that previously did not need them and which do not necessarily prepare people to do the work. The misfit between employees’ qualifications and the requirements of the position they hold in the Indonesian civil service, especially at the regional-level, is identified by King (1998). Amongst his findings is the fact that often an employee’s field of educational specialisation is unrelated to the employing agency.

The establishment of STAN was to avoid this kind of misfit, but in general the civil service still has ‘diploma disease’ to the extent that
diplomas determine position on the ‘seniority list’ more than real-time performance assessment, and this system affects MOF promotion practice.

This chapter analyses the extent to which education empowers women in MOF. It is widely accepted that education empowers people generally, not only because it transfers useful knowledge but also because it opens up better-paid employment opportunities. In the Indonesian civil service, education is already being used as a filter to select its employees, who are entitled to a relatively well-paid job for life. The higher the qualifications, the higher the grade initially allocated and the greater chance of reaching a (higher) managerial post.

Whilst this grade allocation seems to be gender-neutral at the recruitment point, the civil service regulations that set the links between education, grade and echelon makes the whole system more complicated in practice, and moreover, they aregendered. This chapter investigates gendering practices within MOF concerning employees’ education and the extent to which it empowers women to reach managerial positions. Included in the discussion is the issue of in-service training, which forms part of civil servants’ career development.

7.2 Where would your diploma take you in MOF?

Once graduates leave STAN they are channelled into echelon I units according to their specialisation. Graduates of the Diploma Programme on Taxation are posted to one of the offices of the DGTX; graduates of the Diploma in Customs and Excise gain a post in the DGCE, and graduates of the State Accounting School (given the title Junior Accountant), may be posted to any directorate generals, BPK or BPKP.

While recruits from other state and private universities occupy upper and middle management levels, graduates of the STAN three-
year degree programme are allocated to middle management levels, and those with a one-year diploma are channelled to lower positions, replacing employees previously recruitment from A-level graduates. Unlike STAN graduates, who do not need further technical training after their three years at the MOF academy, newly-recruited undergraduates (sarjana) are given short orientation courses, varying from one unit to another, to make sure there is no gap in their knowledge. These sarjana, however, are allocated to grade III/a, which is higher than the grade II/b assigned to STAN graduates. In practical terms, this means that they are separated from each other by 12 years in terms of their career paths, taking into account the fact that all staff grades advance every four years.

The seniority rule in the Indonesian civil service means that these sarjana have a head start in being promoted to managerial level. This rule applies equally to both sexes, but there is a gender difference in the way it works. Most male MOF managers were recruited from STAN. In the case of the female managers in the three DGs studied here, only 5% came from STAN. This suggests that for STAN women, the double disadvantage of their sex and their mode of recruitment combined to substantially reduce their prospects of becoming managers.

Their reproductive role may be one of the reasons that female STAN recruits do not fare as well as female sarjana where promotion is concerned. The average age at first marriage for women in urban Indonesia is 19 to 24 (BPS, 2002). STAN students are prohibited from marrying during their studies (typically between the ages of 19 and 22), and many female STAN graduates marry shortly after joining MOF. For most women, assuming they have children relatively soon after marriage, the reproductive career is at its most demanding in the first decade of married life. This means that female STAN recruits experience this critical reproductive period when they are in grades II/a-II/d. Their female sarjana colleagues are already in grades III/a-III/c.
As discussed in Chapter 4, grade III/is a minimum requirement for a junior managerial position in the Indonesian civil service. MOF also requires at least an undergraduate degree to hold a junior managerial position, so STAN graduates take evening classes to achieve this. Female STAN recruits have to juggle their undergraduate studies, work responsibilities and reproductive tasks. Their sarjana colleagues, who may be promoted from pelaksana (junior staff) to junior managers shortly after they enter MOF, only have to deal with work and family commitments.

Educational background also plays an important role in holding a mid-managerial post at echelon III which entails supervising a number of echelon IV staff. According to the Civil Service Law, formal education and qualifications are not a requirement for such a managerial position. According to the Law, education is only comparatively important: for example, if there are two candidates with the same grade and length of service, the one with higher education and more training is placed higher in the DUK (list of ranks). MOF internal regulations, however, make education a requirement for certain managerial positions. Since the early 2000s, MOF has had an unwritten regulation that echelon III management posts can only be given to a candidate with a master’s degree. I found that this unwritten regulation applied strictly to both men and women.

During a civil servant’s career there are opportunities to upgrade education qualifications to increase the chance of being assigned a (higher) managerial post. This opportunity seems gender-neutral at first sight, but is in fact highly gendered. The next section observes how this gendering process occurs in the pursuit of a higher diploma.
7.3 Opportunities to obtain further degrees

7.3.1 MOF Scholarships

Further study can be self-funded, or supported by MOF or donor agencies such as the World Bank. When MOF pays for this education, it can be provided at STAN, a local university or abroad. Overseas study is a prestigious opportunity for MOF employees to pursue a further degree in a developed country, which opens up better career prospects, partly because the study itself is conducted in English which is seen as an important skill.

When STAN graduates have served their first three years they are allowed to sit an exam for another two years of fully-funded study. No gender measures are applied; the exam is marked blindly and those whose scores meet the minimum requirement are invited to study for the two years. The number of women in this cohort is already very low due to the quota applied in recruitment. However, the number of females who sit the exam and are accepted is even lower. When these men and women graduate they will have a higher qualification as a government accountant,11 which is equivalent to an undergraduate degree. When MOF pays for the study, the scholarship recipients sign a compulsory service contract which obliges them to keep working for MOF for a certain period of time, depending on the duration of the study and the amount of money MOF spends on them during the study period.

11Between 1999 and 2004, there was a standoff between the MOF and the Ministry of National Education (MNE) about the status of STAN. The MNE insisted that the accounting degree provided by MOF should not differ from those offered in other state universities, and therefore the MOF should cease conducting this programme and leave it to the state universities. This unresolved argument between the two ministries affected employees who wanted to continue their studies to a higher level, since the degree they took at STAN was not acknowledged by state universities. The problem was only resolved in 2004 when the former Finance Minister was appointed Education Minister.
Every year, depending on its budget (usually funded by donors), the TA offers a placement test for employees wishing to study for a higher degree overseas or at a local university. Those who score highly in English language are prioritised for overseas study. One of the TA’s requirements is that applicants must be under 35 to be eligible for the selection process. While this should not make any difference to men, it has an effect on women. Most of the female employees under 35 have young children, and since children are seen in Indonesia as mainly the mother’s responsibility this stops mothers from applying for the programme.

The TA does not retain time-series data on applicants, but table 7.1 below shows applicant data for 2007:

**Table 7-1 Selection for a scholarship in 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invited to take the test</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat in the exam</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passed the exam</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Personnel Training Centre, 2007

As those who were invited to take the test have more or less equal academic capacity, the figure is interesting. More than 90% of the invited men but less than 50% of the women turned up for the test, which was conducted in several training centres around Indonesia rather than centrally in Jakarta. MOF pays travel expenses for applicants who have to go to a training centre in a different city from where they work. The fact that only half of the eligible women participated in the test might be due to family constraints, as I discuss in the next chapter. However, of those who did the test, 60% of women and only 25% of men passed.

Not everybody who passes the selection exam takes this opportunity to upgrade their formal education, especially in the case of women. All the married women that I interviewed framed their decision in
terms of whether their husband allowed them to study abroad. Some husbands were not willing to give permission to their wives when these opportunities arose. Several female managers simply chose to exclude themselves from these scholarships.

Me? Studying abroad? It’s guaranteed that my husband will never give me permission to do that. So I’m just kind of resigned in that department. If I’m going to get a further qualification, then I’ll find a local university.

When Zainab said this there was no trace of anger in her voice. She merely stated it as a fact and did not seem concerned or resentful. Interestingly, none of my interviewees faced with similar situations appeared angry with their husbands. Some female managers told me that they had taken the test but then decided not to go:

I sat the selection test together with my husband, who was also a MOF civil servant. That was the second time I did the test. The first time round I passed, but since I’d just got married I didn’t go for the degree programme. I just took a short course for three months. This time I passed again, but he failed. By this time we’d been married for six years and still had no children. I asked my husband what I should do, and his answer was: ‘Terserah’ [up to you]. This is what I found very hard. He did not say ‘Go ahead’ [which would have meant that he was supporting me]. In the Javanese context, terserah can have two meanings: one actually means ‘No, do not do that’, and the other one is ‘It’s your choice, and don’t blame me if anything goes wrong’. Neither had I found easy. On one hand I wanted to further my career, but on the other I didn’t want my marriage to collapse. That was my reason when I went to see the Director to express my doubts about going away after what my husband had said. [The director] was angry: he said, ‘I’ll find him and talk some sense into him’. But I asked him not to, because I thought that would only make the situation worse with my husband. In the end I decided not to go… I’m Javanese. In the Javanese tradition, successful as I might be in my career, my ‘real’ success is still measured by my ability to keep
the household going. In principle I would never sacrifice my marriage just for the sake of my career. If I can do both, then I will, but if I have to choose, I will choose my marriage. Padma

It’s difficult to be a woman; we can’t just focus on our career. Although sometimes I think, ‘would I be happy anyway if I just focused on my career?’ How can I not take my husband and children into account in deciding to go overseas to study? If I’m not sure whether my family would be fine during my absence, what am I looking for? For me, if I study or have a good career, it’s supposed to have a good impact on the whole family, not just for my personal satisfaction. You see, a man wouldn’t think like that. As long as his wife supports him, which many would do anyway, then he would go. If my husband has a chance to do a PhD, for example, I will support him. But I wouldn’t do it myself. So even before he prevents me from going, I’ve stopped myself. Yanti

I passed MOF’s internal test but decided not to continue with the process of applying to an overseas university. I’d got married by then and had two children. My husband said he would let me go for it only if I took both of the children with me. He might as well have said no – that wouldn’t have made any difference. How could I be expected to study in a foreign country, in a foreign language, and at the same time look after two children on my own? Of course I decided not to go. Haryati

Unlike Haryati, Irma did not find it impossible to take two of her children with her to study abroad. Even then, she still felt supported by her husband:

My late husband was very supportive. When I got a scholarship to study in Europe, he supported me, he didn’t mind at all. When there was an opportunity to take a test to get an MOF scholarship to study abroad, I asked him: ‘Pa, can I go for the test?’ He said, ‘Yeah, do it’. Then when I surprisingly learned that I passed, I asked him again:
'Can I go?' And he said, ‘OK, off you go’. I was so lucky, not everybody’s husband is like that you know...

Twelve of my fifty-nine interviewees were, like Irma, married, but managed to get their husbands’ permission to study abroad. I did not come across any women who went against the wishes of their husbands or families, and when I asked about other cases, nobody seemed to know anyone who had done this.

Table 7-2, below, summarises the 59 interviewees’ decisions about studying abroad:

**Table 7-2 Women’s decision in term of overseas study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overseas study status</th>
<th>Number of People Recruited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Before the 1990s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not take the test</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Took the test and failed</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passed the test but decided not to go</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passed the test and went</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7-2 shows that female interviewees recruited from the 1990s onwards were more likely to go abroad. I discuss this in detail in Chapter 10.

Of the 16 women who did not take the test, 9 paid for their own master’s degree at a local university in their home town, in order to progress in their careers.

**7.3.2 Self-funded study**

For their own reasons, some of those who do not pass the exam and gain a MOF scholarship, or who do not wish to be bound to compulsory service, prefer to fund their own study outside office hours. According to BKN regulations, once they have finished their
studies and when their diploma has been certified by the Ministry of Education, if it is from an overseas or non-state university, they can submit it to have their grade adjusted accordingly. MOF, however, applies a set of requirements.

Before starting the study, the employee must get written permission from their director for the study to have an effect on their career/rank and grade. Permission is only given under certain circumstances; for example, the area of study suits the needs of the organisation, the candidate’s length of time in service, their minimum grade and the length of time they have been occupying that grade, and that their performance has been satisfactory for the preceding two years. Although there is general guidance from MOF, every DG has different internal regulations based on its own requirements. While the TA requires candidates to have been in II/c grade for at least two years (which it applies to candidates who work in TA), DGTX insists on them being in their second year of II/d. This means that people in DGTX will only gain two years from this particular exam, as there are four years between II/d and III/a. DGTR follows the TA’s requirements without adding further conditions.

According to MOF’s HR Bureau database, about 78% of all female employees who have master’s degrees had been funded by MOF to study overseas or at a local university. The remaining 22% were self-funded. By contrast, around half of the men had self-funded their master’s degrees. Some women find it almost impossible to get a master’s via self-funding. One of my female interviewees expressed suspicion about this:

*Where do [these men] get the money from? You see how much their salary is, and compare it to the tuition fees in state universities. The numbers don’t add up. Us women, we put our children first. Once our oldest child finishes studying, then there are the younger brothers and sisters. Women would only start to think about getting their own graduate degree once all the children have finished.*
Fees at private universities are significantly higher than at state universities, which raises the question of how male employees are able to finance their studies. The most likely sources of finance for most men are the unofficial forms of income that I discuss in Chapter 9, to which men have greater access than women. Additionally, men are more prepared to spend money on their personal education. One male manager commented:

_As the head of the family, it is my responsibility to support the family. In this age of competition, everybody needs to upgrade themselves, so paying for a master’s degree is an investment. I prefer doing it at a local private university by attending night classes; it means I can keep supporting my family fully. You can’t do that with overseas study. Your income would be slashed._ (Ali)

### 7.3.3 Third-party scholarships

Some scholarships are available from foreign institutions such as the British Council (the British Chevening Awards), the Japanese Embassy (the Monbusho Scholarship), the Dutch embassy and the US embassy (the Fulbright Scholarship). These organisations invite anybody who meets their criteria to take their test. When MOF civil servants pass the test they have to negotiate with their office about the status of their study. Discretion is applied. Some offices might grant the study leave period the same status as for people MOF sends to study abroad: their salary is fully paid and the time taken is counted as service. Other offices may refuse permission, in which case the civil servants must quit their civil servant status or turn down the scholarship. Another possible route is to take unpaid leave. In practice, this kind of leave is rarely granted at MOF for the purpose of study as it is reserved for women to follow their husbands abroad, not to go abroad for their own purposes (see Chapter 10).

Third parties sometimes offer scholarships to the institution rather than individuals. In this case the initial selection is done by the
employer. At MOF this kind of scholarship is administrated not by the TA but by the Secretariat General. There have been complaints in the past that the competition is not transparent, and sometimes the Secretariat General distributes invitations at the last minute after preparing its own candidates, so people from other DGs do not have time to prepare. Although the TA has expressed its unhappiness about this arrangement, the practice continues.

In the first two sections of this chapter I have discussed how the Indonesian civil service values formal education and university diplomas. While formal education is essential for both men and women in the civil service, I have shown that the opportunity to pursue a further degree is gendered. Women have to choose between staying with their family and going abroad to study, and between using their own money to upgrade their formal education and spending it on their children. Men are more likely to choose to go abroad for study and to self-fund their study.

Given the civil service’s emphasis on education, the next question is to what extent this gendered opportunity in pursuing further education affects the number of women appointed to managerial positions. The next section discusses how far MOF’s female employees’ educational levels contribute to the limited number of women in higher grades and managerial posts in the civil service in general.

7.4 Educational Background of MOF employees

According to BKN statistics, the average educational level of MOF employees is higher than that of employees in other ministries. Oey-Gardiner (Oey-Gardiner, 2002) pronounces her optimism that the increasing number of women at grade III in Indonesia’s civil service in the 1990s will have a positive impact on women’s careers in government. Although some of these women might make their way to the top, it is not that simple. As explained in Chapter 4, it is not possible to advance beyond grade III/d unless the employee has a
master’s degree (S2) or higher, or is in an echelon III position or above. In MOF, especially since the implementation of bureaucratic reform, educational background is seriously considered in appointments to structural positions. In the case of functional positions, educational qualifications have always been an important factor in promotions.

Table 7-3 illustrates the educational background of people in MOF at all levels, from junior staff and functional officials to managers. It shows that among the 12,572 male employees who have undergraduate diplomas, 55% are in managerial or functional positions while the rest are still at junior level. Among women with undergraduate degrees, only 40% occupy managerial or structural positions. Because in the civil service candidates (even from inside the organisation) never apply directly for a position, this may indicate MOF’s preference for appointing men rather than women with the same qualifications. By contrast, only 15% of women with master’s degrees are employed as junior staff compared to 20% of men with the same qualification.
### Table 7-3 Educational background of MOF employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Echelon I</th>
<th></th>
<th>Echelon II</th>
<th></th>
<th>Echelon III</th>
<th></th>
<th>Echelon IV</th>
<th></th>
<th>Echelon V</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle school</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3,223</td>
<td>1,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 year diploma</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2,719</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>2,425</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,344</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>4,551</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>6,721</td>
<td>2,144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Human Resource Bureau, MOF, December 2006e
While Table 7-3 presents a general picture of the educational levels of MOF’s employees, Table 7-4 focuses on middle managers in the three directorates general in which the research was based. Table 7-4 indicates the highest qualifications of people in echelon III, not the degree they held when joining. It shows that most women in echelon III positions have a master’s degree or higher, compared to only half of the men (only a quarter in the DGTR) in the same echelon. These statistics raise the possibility that men at MOF are trusted to hold management posts regardless of their educational attainment and women are only trusted when they have a master’s degree. I explore this when I discuss promotion in Chapter 8.

### Table 7-4 Educational background of middle managers in the DGTX, DGTR and TA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>DGTX</th>
<th>DGTR</th>
<th>TA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma 3 and below</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master’s</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MOF Human Resource Bureau 2006

Formal educational qualifications determine employees’ initial grades at the point of recruitment education, and continue to play an important role though a civil servant’s career. Another form of learning during civil service employment is provided through in-service training, some of which is crucial to civil servants’ promotion and career development. This is discussed in the next section.

### 7.5 In-service training

During Suharto’s New Order, State Administration Agency (LAN) was set up to be in charge of civil service training and development. Although this body was created to develop the civil service, its
underlying purpose was to create a government apparatus (borrowing their terminology, *aparat pemerintah*) whose loyalty was only to Pancasila and UUD’45, the state ideology and constitution, as prescribed by the New Order.

Under LAN’s guidance, members of the Indonesian civil service are subject to pre- and in-service training. Pre-service training (*diklat prajabatan*) is based on a curriculum designed by LAN. At MOF, every batch of STAN graduates attends this training between finishing their studies and being sent to their new offices. University graduate recruits participate in a similar programme aimed at higher-rank employment. The training lasts about two months and emphasises discipline and loyalty to the state ideology.

According to Regulation No.14/1994 (GOI, 1994), in-service training consists of:

- **structural training**: career development training, mainly focused on managerial and interpersonal skills. It is called Pendidikandan Latihan Pimpinan (Diklatpim), and consists of Diklatpim IV (to prepare people to occupy echelon IV positions) and Diklatpim III (for echelon III positions)
- **functional training**: professional training for functional post-holders. This training, following LAN guidelines, is given by government ministries whose curricula strongly relate to the core function of each government organisation
- **technical training**: training related to the core task of a particular job, regardless of trainee’s managerial or functional position.

In MOF, the Personnel Training Centre is responsible for delivering pre-service and structural/managerial training for all MOF employees. It liaises with LAN to get certificates upon completing these programmes, as certificates are regarded highly in Indonesia. Other training centres cater for particular DGs (the Taxation Training Centre meets the training needs of the DGTX; the Customs
Training Centre those of the DGCE and so on), and are responsible for functional and technical training.

7.5.1 Structural/Managerial Training

Managerial training is required before allocation of a managerial position and before promotion to the next managerial level, or echelon. It is provided as in-house training programmes lasting at least a month and, as prescribed by LAN, a quarter of the training is on national ideology. The structural training programmes are also in-house, and last three to six weeks depending on the level – the higher the level, the longer the training – and require full attendance; participants are not allowed to miss classes.

MOF policy does not offer managerial training to everyone. There is a selection process before an employee can participate in the training, involving internal selection by the line manager and a formal test. Every year the Personnel Training Office (an echelon II unit under TA) issues an invitation to all echelon I units to send their employees to take a test for a particular managerial training course, along with a quota for each unit. The quota is not gender-discriminatory; it is based on a list of employees by rank (Daftar Urutan Kepangkatan, or DUK). Each HR division then sends employees whose rank, education and other prerequisites meet the minimum requirement, and those who pass can join the training programme, provided they have no urgent work.

The procedure described above has several potential problems:

1. The DUK operates on the basis of seniority rather than capability. Although the test itself is a filtering system, the participants are chosen from this DUK. Although there are no obvious gender-specific issues in this case as no junior, male or female, is invited, women may still be disadvantaged compared to men when they have experienced career
disruption due to maternity or unpaid leave (see Chapter 10), which pushes them further down the list.

2. Line manager permission is required to participate in both the test and the training course. Therefore even if one passes the test but the training times are not convenient for the job, the line manager has the authority to postpone the employee’s participation in the training.

3. A candidate may not be available on the day of the test or even for the training programme itself. Given Indonesia’s gendered culture, women are more vulnerable here. According to several key informants in TA, over the years some women have withdrawn themselves from the test or from the training due to their family situations. These informants, however, could not provide statistics on the exact number of women who did so. Women who are pregnant, nursing or have a young family often miss their turn to participate in this training. Every DG has a different policy in this respect. Some do not re-invite an employee who has turned a training programme down more than once; others, like the DGTR, are more flexible and keep their names on a waiting list, offering a training place at every opportunity.

4. People who do not pass or do not attend exams are invited once more in the next round, but if they still fail they are not invited again. Currently, different units have different policies for women with young families or expecting a baby. Units with a good database system (not the case in every unit) can postpone inviting these women or ask them whether they would like to participate in the training. In units without a good database or which are less concerned about their female employees, such women may be passed over for several years and may never get the chance to take the training course, preventing them from achieving a managerial position.

Many women who have young families find it difficult to participate in these training programmes because they have to leave their
families behind. MOF’s six-week training takes place at a training centre in Magelang, Central Java, where the Personnel Training Centre is located. Accommodation is provided, but there is no crèche.

7.5.2 Technical Training

Technical training is offered through the respective training centres. Some female junior staff I interviewed complained that they tended to be invited for secretarial and clerical training (not necessarily linked to their daily responsibilities) while their male colleagues were offered places on more job-related and technical courses. These technical training courses may not correspond with their current job, but are often useful in the future. For example, people who are not in the IT division but receive some IT training benefit from it in their work and the training certificate might lead to a new assignment requiring the qualification.

The bureaucratic reform proposed a competence-based training and development system which includes linking training to employees’ career paths, only giving training that matches the employee’s job. While this will make the training system more effective and efficient, without thorough consideration it could lead to pigeonholing people in a way that might disadvantage their future careers. At the moment there is a tendency to channel women into clerical or PR-type jobs, and men into more technical ones (see Chapter 9). There is a danger that the new system could strengthen this tendency, and once employees are in a certain position they may not be able to move on. In the DGTKX, for example, most women at middle managerial levels are given PR positions even though some have a master’s degree in tax auditing. According to key informants in DGTKX, the excuse for this is that it needs to improve its public image, and since women project the ‘clean and respectable, free from KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism)’ image, the DGTKX wants them in their front line.
7.5.3 Distance learning in MOF

All of the training programmes are conducted in a traditional way (in a classroom with rows of chairs facing the trainer and a white board), with the exception of some distance learning technical courses conducted by Customs and Excise. The idea of delivering more distance learning programmes was developed between 1995 and 1999. Distance training was seen as suitable for Indonesia, as it would save the cost trainees’ travel from their home to the nearest training centre. MOF received a grant from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and several people were trained in Japan; the TA was given a studio in which to produce and process multimedia and assistance in converting teaching materials to suit distance-learning processes. In 1999, the head of the TA decreed that several distance training courses would be launched.

After several trials, however, an evaluation of exam results for the same training courses done in the traditional way and long-distance showed a significant discrepancy. The main reason given was that employees trained via distance-learning were not freed from their routine tasks by their line managers, but were expected to work as usual and study outside office hours. Studying after work can be difficult for women with young children and other family responsibilities, even when they do not have to leave their homes. Another reason was that during the initial period the interactive student support system had not been developed. As a result, participants found it difficult to absorb the training materials because only one-way communication was possible. By this time, JICA’s support for this initiative had ended. Instead of trying to improve the distance method by applying more time, support and infrastructure, the TA decided to freeze the programme’s development. Then, as often happens in Indonesian public service, the distance-learning experts trained in Japan were relocated or promoted to other posts with job descriptions unrelated to distance learning. As a result there was nobody left to take the programme
forward apart from the technical training schemes for Customs and Excise mentioned above.

This is another example of MOF’s failure to apply a gender-sensitive approach. If developed properly, with proper support system, distance learning might reduce training costs as well as helping women to combine their career and family responsibilities. 12

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the extent to which education is valued in the civil service, not only at the recruitment stage but throughout employees’ careers. Because of this, the Indonesian bureaucracy permits its civil servants to study for higher diplomas during their service via a strictly regulated process. I have discussed how opportunities to get a higher degree, which enhances subsequent promotion prospects, are gendered.

It is accepted that higher education usually empowers women not only to obtain better employment but also to challenge discriminatory practices within the family and society (Malik and Courtney, 2011). All the female managers I interviewed had a university diploma and, theoretically, fell into this category of ‘empowered women’. However, as I have shown, the way MOF values education has to some extent disempowered these women.

One can argue that in this case, unlike its policy on STAN recruitment, MOF does not directly discriminate against women in

12The failure to continue developing the distance learning training was in large part due to the New Order’s policy of dividing budgets into routine and project components. This approach seems to prevent innovative practice. The state budget is evaluated in terms of whether monies are spent on the correct activities rather than by the actual outcomes of this investment. Once the funds have been spent, there is no particular incentive to obtain additional funding, even if it is essential to sustaining ongoing initiatives.
terms of providing equal opportunities for achieving a higher diploma. A woman may choose not to take the opportunity to study abroad, limiting her chances of promotion. However, the conceptual discussion in Chapter 2 shows that the ability to make a choice is a central element in empowerment. Being able to make a choice, however empowering, is still less powerful than being able to present other people with such choices or set the framework of decision making (see Lukes, 2005 for discussion of agenda setting power).

At least some of the women I interviewed might have been more prepared to go abroad to study for a master's degree if they had found it easy to take their children with them or have their children looked after while they were overseas, or if their husbands had been happy to accompany them or to let them go. Some of these women, however, were not offered this kind of support. Their husbands did not allow them to go, or to go and leave the children behind, and MOF offers no help with taking children abroad easier.

While providing an allowance big enough to support the whole family during an overseas study period may be unrealistically expensive, in general MOF is not good at developing gender-friendly policies to support their employees’ education. There was a chance to make its training both more gender-friendly and more cost-effective by implementing a distance-learning system, but MOF abandoned this once the external funding ran out.

This chapter has shown the extent to which MOF’s gendered organisational culture makes it difficult for women to compete equally with their male colleagues in studying for higher diplomas, which in turn limits their chances of promotion. The next chapter looks at promotion in more detail.
8 ‘Would you mind if we promoted your wife?’ Gendered discretion in promotion

8.1. Introduction

The previous chapter showed that education can potentially take women to managerial positions, but the ways in which MOF’s organisational culture values formal education and handles in-service training disempower women, compared to their male colleagues, and limit their participation. This chapter continues to observe MOF organisational culture and practices, analysing the next element of Goetz’s gendered archaeology of the organisation, its gendered authority structure, by applying concepts relating to both bureaucracy and patriarchy.

In public administration, the description of administrative discretion ranges from ‘freedom to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction’ to ‘the idea that administrative officials should be free to employ their expertise and training in the pursuit of the policy responsibilities delegated to them’ (Vaughn and Otenyo, 2006 p.xii).

The use of discretion in Indonesian public service has been assessed in several studies (Dwiyanto et al., 2006, Koentjaraningrat, 1985). From their research on several local governments in Indonesia, Dwiyanto et al (2006) conclude that in general the level of discretion is very low. According to the authors, Suharto’s centralised government style is responsible for this phenomenon: the centralised, top-down bureaucracy makes people lower down the hierarchy reluctant and unable to think about and decide what to do when faced with an unusual situation at work. Twenty years before this research, Koentjaraningrat (1985) blamed the lack of discretion on the Javanese culture, which puts harmony above everything else: the fear of getting on the wrong side of
superiors leads subordinates to rely on them heavily and makes them fearful of deciding for themselves when an awkward situation arises.

The use of discretion observed in Dwiyanto’s research (2006) refers to local government employees’ interactions with the public, which in public administrative terms is referred as ‘discretion at the street level’. This chapter explores the use of discretion at a higher level of government, involving the management of MOF as a public organisation.

The lack of women in senior management, where discretion is more commonly exercised in HR, makes it impossible to compare how men and women exercise discretion. Bearing in mind the discussion of critical mass in Chapter 2 and the small number of women in decision-making positions at MOF, this chapter focuses on administrative discretion towards women, rather than discretion exercised by women in MOF.

It is to be expected that peoples’ understandings of the gendered division of labour at the household level affects how they behave in the workplace. When entering an organisation people bring with them their social understandings of gender as well as other sets of cultural values and expectations (Mills, 1988 p.356). A belief that a woman’s domain is the household, and that therefore she does not belong in the public sphere, means that women are not seen as men’s equals in this domain. For example, research on female managers in Nigeria’s civil service highlighted the fact that eight out of ten male civil servant respondents thought that women should not be promoted to top managerial levels because women should ‘care’ instead of ‘lead’ (Ogenyi, 2004 p.367).

This chapter focuses on how women get into managerial positions and their experience once they are at that level of bureaucracy, where men form the great majority and hold the power to decide. I discuss how the gendered authority structure ‘further undermine[s]
This chapter addresses four research questions: (1) to what extent does discretion play a role in promotion? (2) To what extent does discretion against women limit their career progression? (3) How are women perceived as leaders? (4) How do women at MOF respond to discretion and perceptions? To answer these questions, I begin with an analysis of civil service regulations on performance assessment. This is followed by an exploration of MOF’s gendered practices relating to promotion. These practices include the use of discretion against women and women’s reactions to such gendered practices.

### 8.2. Civil Service Regulations on Performance Assessment

A standard performance assessment form is completed each year for all civil servants (GOI, 1979a). The assessment is called Daftar Penilaian Pelaksanaan Pekerjaan (DP3) and, like other regulations in the civil service created at the beginning of the Suharto regime, it heavily emphasises loyalty to Pancasila and UUD 45, the country’s main ideology and its constitution, respectively. It consists of eight indicators: *kesetiaan* (allegiance – loyalty to Pancasila and UUD45), *prestasi kerja* (work performance), *tanggung jawab* (responsibility), *ketaatan* (compliance), *kejujuran* (integrity), *kerjasama* (teamwork), *prakarsa* (initiative) and *kepemimpinan* (leadership). The score is 0-100, the latter being the perfect score. In Suharto’s New Order, and to some extent until now, there has been a consensus that the first indicator overrules the others: if someone scores below 70 for allegiance (signifying that they have committed a ‘subversive act’), the other scores do not count and the employee is seen as not performing well. During the Suharto era this was a very powerful...
weapon used to get rid of the regime’s political enemies, and could even result in imprisonment. Today, ten years after the regime fell, this particular indicator is kept as a formality and most people are given a score of over 75.

The ‘compliance’ indicator refers to compliance with the employee’s line-manager, and can be used against the interests of employees if necessary. Overall, the assessment is conducted top-down by a single line-manager rather than comprehensively by a wider team whereby the managers, peers and subordinates can evaluate an employee’s work performance. There is no discussion between the evaluator and the worker during this process. Although there is an appeal mechanism once the evaluation has been made official, the procedure is very cumbersome and slow. Leaving the decision to a single person creates space for considerable discretion and, potentially, bias.

The guidelines for filling in the DP3 form are not very clear, and each supervisor may have different marking standards. A problem occurs where there is a job rotation in which people change positions and thus are not supervised by the same line managers. The new line manager might have a more generous or stricter scoring system, and the newly-arrived subordinate’s score will not be comparable with their previous one.

Some years ago, MOF decided that the DP3 was not sufficiently comprehensive to serve as a performance assessment, and for the last ten years it has been developing key performance indicators to complement the DP3’s second indicator, work performance. The key performance indicators and their weightings vary across the DGs, largely in line with the type of work characterising their individual units. Hence, for example, in Treasury Offices (part of the DGTR), the number of SPMs (payment orders) completed in a set time is assessed, while in DGTX it might be the amount of state revenue generated by a tax officials.
Even though these key performance indicators make the employees’ work more measurable and thus assessment more reliable, this does not mean that the assessment is bias-free, as it is conducted from the top down. For example, the teamwork component is assessed solely by the line manager without involving colleagues who have been working with the person in question. There is no discussion between the line manager and the member of staff being assessed about why a particular score has been given. As such, the person assessed cannot question their line manager about the score before it is formalised. Once the assessment is official, with the signatures of the line manager and their line manager, the employee is asked to sign it. If s/he is unhappy with the score there is an appeal mechanism, which begins with a formal complaint via a bureaucratic procedure. A subordinate cannot assess or even give feedback on their superior’s leadership. Consequently there is always room for the superior’s discretion, which can reflect their bias towards the individual under assessment. As most top management positions are occupied by men and bottom positions by women, women are in a very vulnerable position.

Having a high DP3 grade does not guarantee a place on the list for promotion. Other criteria also apply, as I observe below.

8.3. Civil Service and MOF Promotion Regulations

According to Civil Service Law, the Indonesian civil service is based on both an open (karir terbuka) and a closed career system (karir tertutup). In a “closed career system”, positions can only be filled by people already within that system who meet the required criteria. In a “open career system”, vacant positions can be filled by anybody who meet the required criteria, even if they are from different institutions in the civil service (GOI, 1997b).

Civil service regulations oblige every unit to maintain DUK, a list of employees’ ranks (GOI, 1979b). There is a rule that no two or more individuals in the same office can have the same rank. The
difference will depend on grade, echelon, length of service, in-service training, and formal education. Article 6 of Regulation No. 100/2000 (GOI, 2000) on Civil Service appointments to structural positions reads:

To appoint a structural official, close attention needs to be paid to seniority in terms of grade, age, education and training as well as experience.

Article 6 Regulation no. 100/2000, author’s emphasis.

Based on this clause, the DUK is consulted in every promotion round, and those at the top of the list are picked for promotion. The decision to replace a structural official with someone who is not next in the queue must be properly justified. There is no system that allows employees to apply for a vacant managerial position: candidates are chosen by the HR Division according to the DUK and then presented to the Promotion Committee, whose members are in the higher echelons.

Although Civil Service Regulations stipulate that the DUK should be used for ranking staff, each DG at MOF has its own policy that complements the DUK with other assessments or gives different weights to specific DUK components. Again, these criteria and their weighting vary among the DGs and are not always transparent. All of my informants, men and women, complained about the lack of openness in decision making. They said that apart from people directly involved in it, nobody knew what was going on, especially when it was related to promotion and relocation. One said:

Nobody asks us, so how should we know? What is the reason behind the relocation, why is A being moved there but not here, why is B getting promoted instead of C – we never know. There’s no transparency here. So we just have to resign ourselves to it: if we get promoted we say ‘alhamdulillah’ (praise the Lord); not getting promoted we also say ‘alhamdulillah’.
Even people in the HR division of each DG admitted to me that although there are basic rules, the decision was always *tergantung atasan* (‘depends on what the boss wants’). The HR division only collect the data about people eligible for promotion and do not decide who to promote.

While education plays a very important role in deciding who gets promoted, it is not the only consideration. There are still some grey areas that enable top management to exercise discretion when choosing their staff. We have seen in Chapter 4 that according to the Civil Service Law, grade advancement is an employee's right as it is linked to the increments on their pay scale. By contrast, holding a managerial post is not a right but a *kepercayaan* (mandate) which can be conferred and equally taken away. Decisions about promotion cannot be challenged: a person who is not promoted may not complain that other people who perform less well have been promoted in their place.

At the time of my fieldwork there was no integrated information system for personnel management in MOF, nor a standardised system for monitoring the workforce. For example, HR Bureau data had been compiled from individual units but the numbers did not match the total number from individual units, and the DGTSGTX had a very disorganised and outdated HR database, with someone who had resigned several years ago still on the payroll and even in the previous year’s round of promotions. This disorganisation seriously impeded personnel assessment, which in turn affected decisions about promotions, leaving more room for discretion.

One of my interviewees cynically told me that once she had questioned her line manager about why X had been promoted instead of Y, who worked better, to which the line manager had replied by referring to the clause that promotion is about trust. ‘So

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13 According to one of the gatekeepers, when this information was leaked to the press the whistle-blower was identified and punished by having his salary cut down by 95 per cent for the next three months.
there you go. If the boss puts his trust in a low-rank, underperforming so-and-so, he’ll get the promotion, because he’s the one who is trusted. Since then, I never question a promotion any more, just take it as an act of God’.

8.4. Linking promotion and relocation

MOF has branches down to district level throughout Indonesia. As civil servants, all employees have to sign a statement that they are willing to be posted anywhere in the country. Postings outside Java are less popular than those in Java: the outer regions are less developed and many people prefer Java’s better services. The higher quality of education in Java means that more Javanese people are hired, and they prefer to work near their homes. In some cases promotion is used as an incentive for remote postings, and turning down the ‘tour of duty’ means losing the promotion.

When people are first hired by MOF their initial post is based on their final exam score. However, their career journey almost always involves relocations, tours of duty and job rotation (known as mutasi in MOF). Mutasi are a major and constant cause of concern for all MOF employees; the problem is not the cost of moving, as MOF pays for the whole family to be relocated, including transportation fares and housing allowance, but the extent to which the relocation can fit around women’s traditional responsibilities as primary home makers.

Despite the signed agreement about willingness to relocate anywhere in Indonesia, in reality there is a degree of discretion, which varies amongst MOF units. Units with regional offices such as the DGTX, DGTR, TA and DGCE have specific policies about relocating their female employees. For example, DGTR, which has Treasury Office in every municipality, is known as a branch of MOF where it is easier for women to get a placement. The type of work is quite general, making it easy for new people to learn and catch up
once they are on the job than, for instance, in the Tax Offices under DGTX.

There is an unwritten regulation at MOF that a person take their first appointment at a higher managerial level in an office outside Java, and that these opportunities should be given to someone with experience of working outside Java. MOF values the experience of managing an office outside Java highly. According to one of my informants, there are two aspects to this outside-Java requirement; the formal explanation is that, given the lack of modern facilities and limited HR skills in regional offices, working outside Java is challenging. The informal explanation is that because of their distance from the capital, places outside Java are seen as training areas where making small mistakes is acceptable because you are hidden from the centre of power.

Promotion is charged with gendered power relations in MOF. When men at MOF are promoted with relocation they simply go, taking the family with them, or leaving them behind and thus having two households to finance. Promoting women, however, is less straightforward.

If promotions are only awarded to somebody as a new post or to somebody who has worked outside Java it is difficult for women with family commitments in Java to be promoted. This creates a vicious circle, because if a woman has never been posted outside Java she cannot be promoted. The argument about the difficulty of placing women has been used to exclude them from recruitment, and tying relocation to promotion serves to exclude women from promotion to middle and senior management.

The next section deals with gendered discretion in decisions about promoting women to echelon III and II positions.
8.5. Gendered Discretion in Promotion

8.5.1. Promotion as a ‘family affair’

MOF tries to be flexible enough to allow women to join husbands assigned to other cities wherever possible. However, in practice this depends heavily on the DG. In the DGTR, the HR manager, a woman who seemed to have some grasp of gender issues, claimed that her DG had a meticulous system for deciding tours of duty and promotion. Family is one of the factors that they consider; for example they take into account where the husband works and whether it is possible to relocate both husband and wife if both work at MOF. Some female DGTR managers confirmed this family-friendly policy; one said:

... I can see that our top management really understands their female employees. If a woman gets a promotion, of course she will have to leave Jakarta, but they will make sure that unless the woman wants to, she will stay in Java. You know that men tend to get new assignments outside Java when they’re promoted. In my case, they knew that my husband was in Jakarta, so they placed me in areas near Jakarta. Of course I don’t feel discriminated against in the sense of missing an opportunity to be promoted, because the Director General at that time really took family unity very seriously. (Ayu)

The same HR Manager went on to say that echelon II positions in her office are only given to women when it is felt that they have finished their reproductive tasks, be it due to widowhood or old age. Women who are willing to be placed a little further from or even outside Java are preferred in promotion to echelon III. A third of the echelon III female managers I interviewed had been moving around Indonesia for the past ten years and some were living away from their families at the time of interview. The remaining two-thirds had had their promotions postponed because they had refused to be relocated. One said she had been offered a promotion to echelon III twelve years before she felt able to accept it. In the whole of the
DGTR, only one woman had been promoted without leaving Jakarta. She had an IT background and her main responsibility was developing information technology for the DG, which is based in Jakarta. Ironically, she is single, so in fact might not have had any problems with being relocated.

The HR manager of the Treasury Office explained that before appointing someone to a position involving relocation she always consulted the candidate about their domestic situation. When dealing with married women, especially those with continuing reproductive responsibilities, she also consulted their husbands’ employers to ensure that this would not conflict with their career prospects:

*Otherwise, the women might refuse to relocate and prefer to return to a junior position. This sometimes happens. For example, if the husband works as a local government official, there’s no way he could move to the same post in another region...*

Wives’ bosses, however, were never consulted about their husbands’ promotion.

At the time of my interviews the DGTR had four women in their thirty-two echelon II positions, all in offices outside Java. They did not have young families, and three of them were divorced or widowed. When asked whether this meant that there was no chance of promotion to a higher managerial level for women of reproductive age, the HR manager simply said:

*In reality it is difficult. In the past I promoted a woman, only to find that the husband came to me the next day, very angrily, and told me that I should not mess with his family. In the end, the woman preferred not to take the promotion and stayed a junior staff member.*

Her statement was confirmed by a female echelon II director:
Once when I was at Head Office in Sumatra, the husband of a subordinate came to see me. He’d just received news that his wife had had an invitation to attend confirmation of her promotion, which involved relocation to a place six or seven hours from the family home. He said: ‘Please don’t promote her. Our son has a health problem and needs my wife’s attention, and I too need looking after’. I said, ‘It’s up to you; I’ll never force your wife to take up this promotion. This has been decided by headquarters; this is a big compliment to your wife. But the authority lies with you. Now you can decide, but let me give you the big picture. Behind your wife in the queue there are a lot of men and women holding III/c grades. More than that, in the headquarters in Jakarta, many women with III/b grades already hold echelon IV position. If your wife refuses this promotion she might never get promoted again. Now it’s your choice. If you forbid your wife to take this up, tell her not to come to the ceremony tomorrow’. In the end she didn’t come. Well that’s their decision, you manage your own household. On the other hand, I also asked head office to consider this problem because it would be sinful if we knew their family background and forced them to do this. There might be another chance in later rounds, not straight after this one. (Sukarni)

Under the DGTR system, if women compete like men they can obtain an equal position to men if they can leave their household responsibilities behind. For most women this can only come relatively late in their careers; for some, the chance may never come at all.

The DGTR appeared to blame this situation on the women themselves. As the HR manager put it:

I always told these women not to be weak and complaining. I’ve been let down so many times by some of the women I tried to promote: they refused to advance their careers because of their families. If women want to have a place in the structure, they need to compete like the men and not be tied down by family matters. They have to
make their husbands understand that they have their careers as well.

She went on to explain how she applied this philosophy with her own husband. Sometimes when she needed to work at the weekend she would take her husband to the office to keep her company, to show him that she was genuinely working and not being unfaithful.

Not all female managers had a husband who recognised that women can have their own careers rather than simply being content with their husbands’ professional achievements. Of the women I interviewed, 80% reported that their husbands were not happy with the prospect of their moving away from the family to take up a promotion. One of my interviewees, Shinta, was married to an MOF director. She worked at the DGTR near Jakarta and he worked in another DG in Jakarta. Despite generally being recognised as a very capable manager she has remained in an echelon III position for more than 15 years. She has been rotated at the same level of management around every office in Jakarta and its satellite cities but has never reached a higher level, although most of her male colleagues from the same recruitment batch and with the same degrees were promoted long ago.

After being overlooked for promotion several times, she planned to go the HR division to make it clear that she would not mind being placed away from her family. When she discussed this with her husband his response was very dismissive. She quoted him saying: ‘But why? Your place is here right beside me. Who is going to look after you if you’re ill when you’re away? Who is going to give you a massage when you’re tired?’ Shinta later learned that after this conversation her husband had made it very clear to staff at the DGTR that he was against his wife’s promotion and relocation.

Interestingly, Shinta blamed the HR division and not her husband:

*I find this so unfair. I finished my schooling at STAN and got to the position I have at the moment because I have been working so hard.*
It was unrelated to my husband in any way. Now, when it’s time for me to get a promotion, why do they insist on relating it to my husband’s position?

Another DGTR interviewee told me that when women are promoted they tend to be placed in echelon IV-b rather than IV-a units (the higher rank). As well as limiting their rank, this also confines them to a lower grade. HR confirmed that this is indeed the case. The main explanation was that these were the only positions available at the time, and that men are also affected by this restriction sometimes. However, I was unable to find examples of men being treated in this way. Many of the echelon IV-b units were in locations that would permit women to continue to spend a substantial amount of time with their families. My informants in HR claimed that family proximity has the most bearing on women’s promotion decisions, unlike those of men, who accord it less importance.

So far, this section has focused on how concerns about women’s family affairs affect their chances of promotion in the DGTR. The TA’s smaller office and the location of branch offices in big cities made promotion more manageable. Nevertheless, the HR manager, again a woman, told me that she sometimes regretted promoting women:

In my career as an HR Manager I’ve promoted two women to other cities, away from their husbands [who were working in the private sector in Jakarta and did not wish to accompany them] and both ended up getting divorced. I feel very sorry for them and their children. I should have realised that boys will be boys, and as soon as their wives are not around to look after them they’ll find another woman. Since then I always ask female employees if they’re willing to be relocated, and if their family will be okay. I never ask the male employees whether they wish to be relocated or not, because they’re the heads of the household.
The next section examines promotion practices in the DGTKX. This DG was understood to have particular problems with corruption. The wider influence of corruption on MOF’s organisational culture is addressed in Chapter 9.

8.5.2. Promotion related to corrupt behaviour

The DGTKX is the largest unit in MOF, with half of all of MOF’s employees and offices across Indonesia, even in very remote regions. Despite this, it has struggled to find a good system for HR development. In the past, and to some extent now, the location of a tax office corresponded with a particular set of taxpayers. Given the opportunities for corruption, some areas (called tempat basah, or literally ‘wet places’) were favourites and other places would be less popular (tempat kering, or literally ‘dry places’). Being posted to tax offices that deal with big, profitable companies can open up opportunities for tax fraud.

A male key informant told me that the opportunity to commit tax fraud generates further corruption and collusion in the DGTKX. According to this informant, a special fee is paid to people ‘close to the decision makers’ for a good posting. This starts at 10 million rupiahs (GBP 500) for a non-strategic location in Java and Sumatra. Being an HR Manager can be both influential and perilous, because many managers at higher levels have the power to appoint ‘their own people’, including those who pay a special fee. These senior managers sometimes override the HR managers’ authority in relocation as well as promotion.

In early 2000, the then Director General of Taxes appointed someone from the TA as HR Manager in an effort reduce corruption, who, with his team, drafted a promotion system. There were three criteria for eligibility: a minimum grade, minimum level of education, and minimum length of service. These criteria were absolute and no one who did not meet them would be considered. There were also comparative criteria, such as leadership, motivation.
and discipline, which varied depending on the job description. The line manager and his/her line manager were responsible for this comparative assessment, with a share of 75% and 25% respectively. Then the names of the eligible people and their scores would be compared and a ranking list drawn up to be discussed and decided in a closed meeting. At this meeting ranking was not the only criterion for promotion: a person’s main educational qualifications, their experience and whether they were considered ‘fit’ for a certain post (which is assessed using, among others, a psychometric test) was be taken into account.

While this is theoretically the standard operating procedure, the HR manager told me that he and his team found it difficult to play by the rules. He told me he had to be very careful not to irritate ‘powerful people’, because if they started to resent him he would soon lose his job and the anti-corruption programme would grind to a halt. He told me that he tried to:

...accommodate what people want as much as possible. In my view it’s better to place people where they want to be placed, so that they can settle and do a good job for the DGTK. Of course, that’s not always as easy as it sounds....

Inevitably it was difficult to place everybody where they wanted to be. Most people wanted to be in a ‘wet office’ in Java, or at least in a big city with good amenities. Normally when people join the DGTK, those with the highest marks are located in Java and those with lower marks have to work off-island. Theoretically, further prospects for promotion depend on how people perform in the annual assessments. Frequently, however, the DGTK makes an exception for women. Even when a woman has a low mark or performs poorly she might still get a placement in Java (probably not in a ‘wet office’), although this placement might mean that they are overlooked in the next round of promotions. This policy favouring
women often made men very jealous and resentful of their female colleagues. One of them said:

*It is very nice to be a woman. Just smile and be nice and do a half-decent job and your place in Java is guaranteed. I don’t find this fair. Women ask for emancipation, but where are they when it comes to mutasi? Everybody is just hiding behind their family. Don’t ask for special treatment. If you want to be treated equally you should be prepared to move around Indonesia, just like us.* (Nasir)

Another reason given for not relocating women to offices outside Java is that unlike the DGTR, whose offices are in Kabupaten regions (municipalities), the DGTX has offices at the kelurahan (district) level, ranging from big cities to the remotest parts of Indonesia, some of which are not considered safe for women.

The DGTX has made particular efforts to reduce corruption through the recent wave of bureaucratic reform and modernisation. Almost all of the people involved in these reforms had recently been promoted. One of my interviewees said that she was very surprised that someone who she did not rate very highly got promoted: *‘How come they got promoted and I didn’t? They were much more junior than me and several of my colleagues who were not promoted in 2006. Then I started seeing a pattern: those are the ones involved in the reform.’*

This view was confirmed by most of my DGTX interviewees, apart from those who were themselves promoted. Some people (mainly men) who were promoted on that occasion and who were indeed in the modernisation team emphasised that they were chosen because their bosses realised their potential and not simply because they were in the reform team. Being in the team meant working until late nearly every night. Because women found it difficult to work overtime due to their family responsibilities, only a handful were selected for the team and so very few were promoted.
8.5.3. Other forms of gendered discretion

The DUK list is followed more rigorously in the TA than in the DGTX. There is an inherent flaw in the DUK; it tends to reflect seniority in terms of age and length of service rather than work performance. Also, I was told that in the TA people are often promoted because of their ‘visibility’ to senior managers. This approach to promotion sometimes reduced the quality of TA managers, and other units in MOF often complained about their performance.

The way in which the TA applies the seniority system does not exclude women from the top of the list. However, there is clear gender discrimination with regard to the level of discretion applied to women lower down the list. In other words, a woman at the top of the seniority list will be selected; however, when a relatively junior position is available it tends go to a man.

In early 2006, the TA promoted a female junior manager to a mid-management position, despite many people’s doubts about her capacity. Somewhat unusually, this promotion did not involve relocation and the new post had previously always been held by men. After six months it became clear that the woman was not performing well in her job. She was moved to an equal position in a different division. Postings in that division are unpopular, as many people consider its work dull. Since this happened during the first half of my fieldwork I was able to observe people’s reactions. When men working at the TA did not want me to interview them, they used this incident to justify their objection to promoting women to middle management.

One of the female managers I interviewed expressed her exasperation at this behaviour by her male colleagues: ‘When someone is unsuccessful and she’s a woman, people readily assume that she’s incompetent because she’s a woman. Why don’t people
ask themselves whether they have appointed the right woman for the job?"

There were several women with better qualifications who might have done the job better, but they were further down the DUK list. After moving the incompetent female manager, a more junior person not at the top of the DUK list was given the job. This person was a man.

Some respondents from the DGTX who were particularly cynical about the way promotions were managed claimed that there are only three criteria for promotion: kepandaian (a combination of formal education and competence to do the job); kedekatan (being in the inner circle of the people in power); and for women, kecantikan (physical appearance). All of my informants from the DGTX were of the opinion that the promotion of at least two of the twenty six women at middle managerial level had been based on their relationships with influential men. I managed to interview one of the two female managers in the DGTX, and my impression was that even though she claimed to hold a doctoral degree achieved via self-funded study at a local university, she did not appear competent to hold this post, unlike most other women at this level. Three years after my fieldwork period, however, she was promoted to an echelon II position.\footnote{One of my informants told me later that within a year of her promotion this woman had been reprimanded by the Minister of Finance at several executive meetings for being ‘incompetent, irrelevant and outside the context of the meeting agenda’.} In that round of promotions, another female middle manager who was highly respected by everybody in the DG due to her competence was also promoted.

Whether or not such strategies affect promotion, there are grounds for suspecting that women may be especially vulnerable to the accusations that they are using their relationships with influential men to get promoted. For example, none of my informants could tell me whether any of the men holding equal positions had also been
chosen due to their proximity (in this case interpreted more broadly than sexual intimacy) to key decision makers.

At the time of my fieldwork, the DGTR had four women in echelon II positions, all located outside Java. Why were none of these women given positions in Jakarta, where their families lived? I was told that in the DGTR, one criterion for someone to hold an echelon II position at headquarters was to have served in a similar position outside Java. It looked unlikely that those women in echelon II positions would ever be offered a position in the capital. When they have completed their reproductive careers they are promoted and sent out of Java, but by this time they are already approaching retirement.

That said, when I checked the database on the DGTR’s echelon II officials located in Jakarta (who are all men), I found that two of the eight had never been placed outside Jakarta, let alone Java. So how did they reach their current positions? The only answer HR staff gave was that they were exceptionally high flyers. It is surprising that the two ‘high-flyers’ were men, since bias in the recruitment process meant that women needed higher scores to be accepted. It might be expected that high-scoring women would go on to become high-flying women.

A year after I finished my fieldwork, the HR manager, who herself is considered by many to be a high-flyer and has good relations with powerful decision-makers, was promoted to an echelon II position in an obscure region outside Java even though her family is in Jakarta. This is another example of the problems faced by women categorised as ‘high-flyers’ and who, if they were men, would be said to deserve fast tracking.

One of my female DGTR interviewees was recently promoted from echelon III to echelon II, and both positions were in Jakarta. Her promotion was not in her original DG and it is unlikely that she would have been able to get a similar post if she had stayed in her
original DG. There is no doubt that she was as much a high-flyer as her two male colleagues, who were also promoted without having to move. As in the case of the IT manager discussed before, she was also single. The logic appears to be that if you are a single woman you can perform as well as your male colleagues and are therefore entitled to some of the privileges which are denied to mediocre colleagues.

8.5.4. Perceptions: ‘women are not after promotion’

One male interviewee in the DGTX HR division gave me an interesting explanation for why there were only a few women in management. He claimed that there are too many cases where women had turned down the promotion, preferring to stay in Jakarta, or at least in Java, as a pelaksana (non-managerial/junior staff; see next section). He claimed that MOF’s offices in and around Jakarta are full of women with advanced grades who cannot be given clerical jobs, but nor can they be promoted as they have not met the criteria for promotion. According to him, this creates complications for other people’s promotion and job rotation as the civil service regulations do not allow managers to have subordinates in the same or a higher grade than their own. Meanwhile, he continued, there are ‘a lot’ (without quoting the exact number) of posts remain vacant in some remote areas, because nobody wants to go there. While there may be some truth in this, there are no time-series data on the number of people who have rejected promotion to allow statistical analysis of this issue.

Female DGTX interviewees, however, provided a different explanation. They maintained that they were not offered promotion and that the HR division prefers to assume that they did not want it. They compared themselves to male colleagues who are climbing their career ladders and touring the country. Nevertheless, one female interviewee felt very strongly that women should not be treated the same as their male colleagues in terms of relocation:
We would be very, very, disadvantaged if we had to be relocated the way the men are. The Office [DGTX] has to prioritise our safety before they can move us anywhere’. And another woman said: ‘Also, as a mother and a wife, our responsibilities do not end with our office duties. At the end of the day, if we have to choose [between being promoted and relocated and remaining with our families without being promoted] we will choose the family first. At least that is what I think.

Since the DGTX has decided to assume that women do not want to be promoted if this means being separated from their families, they tend not to promote many women either in remote areas or in Java. This is part of the wider policy of promoting few women in general. At the time of my fieldwork, no woman at DGTX held an echelon II position. This only improved in 2010, when two women were promoted to echelon II. As mentioned previously, one is said to have a special relationship with someone in a high place and the other was chosen for her competence. Both have teenage children and neither was moved away from Jakarta.

8.6. Resisting promotion

In general, MOF does not tend to relocate female junior staff (non-managers) to cities away from their family home. MOF’s flexibility in keeping female junior staff close to their families often compromises the performance of an office. During interviews, key informants and gatekeepers consistently mentioned that some regional offices, such as DGTR’s KPPN Bogor, DGTX’s Kantor Pajak Solo and TA’s Balai Diklat Yogyakarta, are 60 percent or more staffed by women. These offices, generally referred as “kantor ibu-ibu” or mothers’ offices, had been performing very poorly.

Unfortunately the women working in these regional offices are among the least-motivated employees in terms of performance. They tend to come into the office later and leave earlier than they should and often do not meet their performance target, using family
obligations as an excuse. For example, an informant referred to the statistics for one of these offices with a high level of absenteeism, late arrival and going home early. A typical reason given was ‘taking my son to a swimming lesson’.

This strategy often backfires on women in general: instead of just giving underperforming female employees a warning and without conducting a proper statistical analysis of female performance, MOF higher management arbitrarily decided that it was necessary to limit the number of female workers (by applying the reversed-quota system against female applicants) to improve performance.

While female junior staff tend to be clustered in kantor ibu-ibu, for obvious reasons the same cannot be done with mid-level managers. Since the 2000s there has been a rise in female promotion at DGTX. Some women recruited after the 1990s were promoted away from Jakarta, where they had been based, shortly after finishing their MOF-funded study. The prospect of being relocated, however, had always been at the back of their minds as the higher somebody’s position is, the fewer the available posts, increasing the possibility of being relocated elsewhere at the same managerial level. Some of these women told me that they did not know what they would do if this happened; most would consider resigning.

_This is a bit traditional, I’m afraid. For me the important thing is that my husband and I share responsibility for standing by the children. The other day my husband and I discussed this issue. If my husband is relocated to another city which is too far away from where we are at the moment, the children will need one of their parents with them; then I will resign. I might even follow him. But we see other people they manage having their family living in different places. Therefore my husband said that actually it doesn’t matter if he goes and I stay here and keep working._ [Nina]

_I’m not after a career and promotion. For me the most important thing is that working makes me happy, knowing that I’m contributing to_
society. If I have to be relocated and that makes me unable to see my family – oh no, I don’t want that. I wouldn’t fight for that. There’s much more to life than just my career at MOF. I would just resign; I could always find a job somewhere else. And that’s my principle.[Yanti]

None of the older generation who had joined before the 1990s said they would resign if they were relocated. Most had been placed outside Jakarta and claimed they were ready to go anywhere if told to. The commonest answers were along the lines of ‘Namanya tugas ya dilaksanakan’ (when it is a duty then it should be done), and one, who had never been posted anywhere but Jakarta) said ‘Wah mbok jangan, ya... (Oh please don’t let that happen to me, I would beg for it not to happen...).’

By contrast, amongst the younger female managers there was a sense that MOF is not the only place for a career. If they did not like what MOF had to offer them, for example if relocated, they would not hesitate to resign. They were confident that they would get a job somewhere else, and failing that they would still have a ‘proper job’ looking after their family. In part, this may reflect the increasing availability of managerial jobs in the private sector since the 1990s (Basri and Eng, 2004).

Although the same preference (to resign if being relocated to an unfavourable remote office) might also apply to men, I did not come across any male interviewees who said they would resign if they were relocated to less favourable areas. All of my male research participants said they were ready to go anywhere, and one said: ‘Bismillah aja dijalani’ (‘In the name of Allah’ I will go along).

This difference in attitudes to relocation is one of the reasons why MOF limits the number of women it takes into the organisation, as confirmed by the person responsible for MOF recruitment. It appears that MOF views female employees as a bad investment because they are seen as less reliable than men in terms of
remaining at MOF. As part of my research, I did not collect data on the number of women who had resigned from MOF. None of the informants I interviewed during my fieldwork in 2006/7 have since resigned. Several said they would consider doing so, if they were required to move to a location that interfered with their family duties.

As explained earlier, MOF obliges those who have been sent to study abroad or locally to sign a contract that they will remain in MOF’s employ for three times their study period plus an extra year. When this time has elapsed they are free to give notice, although this hardly ever done in practice, either by men or women.

Once certain women do manage to gain MOF’s trust and are allowed to hold managerial positions they are still not treated equally to their male colleagues, as I show below.

8.7. What happens to women when they become managers?

Some of my interviewees found that even if their male bosses treated them politely, they seldom listened to their opinions in meetings. One was happy with her current superior, a man who was apparently not sexist, but she did not hold her previous boss in high regard:

*Very Javanese. To your face he would bow a lot to show his respect to women, but behind you he made it clear that he did not feel comfortable with having women at managerial levels. It seems that some men find it difficult to tell the difference between women as professionals and women in a biological and reproductive sense. In the meetings that my ex-boss used to chair, women were not given the chance to contribute their views; he always skipped over them and gave his attention to male colleagues whenever these women tried to speak. And when I interrupted (that seemed to be the only*
way to get his attention) he would stare at me in such distaste, although obviously he could not stop me...

When these women were involved in meetings which lasted late into the evening they would be asked to make their point and then, as one of my interviewees quoting her boss saying: ‘without belittling your contribution to the meeting, we should let you go back to your families’. While some women insisted on staying until meetings finish, others were grateful for this ‘privilege’. Although it gives them some flexibility, they can at the same time be excluded from having a final say in the meeting. On a subtler level, such a practice potentially restricts women’s opportunity to exercise their opinions and undermines their credibility and status.

Some women in the DGTX admitted that they needed to be more assertive than their male counterparts in order to convey their point at meetings. One said, at a focus group discussion, that they were listened to when they demanded attention, for example by persistently telling different people the same thing until they got their way. Another woman mentioned that she preferred to stay non-judgemental: when she was ignored at meetings would tell herself that she had not come up with good ideas, and would try harder next time.

Women in the DGTR reported that they had rather more opportunity to speak in meetings. One of my interviewees said that at meetings she had attended her boss always asked female managers to contribute by addressing them specifically: ‘I haven’t heard the ladies’ voice today, is there anything we need to know?’ Depending on the sincerity of the speaker, this could be encouraging or patronising.

From my interviews it was apparent that older men tended to accept the presence of women in supporting or clerical positions. However, they tended to be uncomfortable in the presence of women at more senior managerial levels. I came across a director who was very
hostile about the possibility of promoting women to echelon II positions. Pointing out that no woman had either the capacity or the will to take up such a position, he added: ‘I can only think of one woman who is eager to be promoted to that level. But who wants to promote her? She’s so aggressive; she even scared her husband off and made him run away with another woman some time ago.’

Following Maddock and Parkin’s (1977a) typology of organisational cultures operating in public sector organisations, these patronising attitudes fit the description of the ‘gentleman’s club’ culture according to which women are accepted and respected in lower positions but are not expected to move up the career ladder and through the glass ceiling, which is seen as outside their traditional work role.

**8.8. Conclusion**

This chapter has provided an account of the top-down and arbitrary nature of the promotion process in MOF, and how it leaves a lot of room for the application of discretion. While there is a growing body of literature on female managers in developing countries (Ogenyi, 2004, Yousof and Siegel, 1994, Snyder and Hunter, 1995), none pays particular attention to procedures for promoting women.

In terms of Goetz’s framework, this chapter has discussed the extent to which the way MOF structures space and time intersects with the gendered authority structure. MOF staffs offices all over Indonesia, including in its most underdeveloped and remote regions, and its postings and placements there are considered unsafe for unaccompanied women leaving their family homes in more developed areas.

While it is obvious that all MOF offices need staffing, at the junior level women seem to have an advantage over men in that they are not sent far from their family homes. This is not the case at managerial levels. There is an internal policy to link promotion with
relocation to offices outside Java, including to the remote areas. The overt rationale for this policy is that it allows managers to acquire experience; in some ways it resembles a rite of passage, a journey that a boy has undergone to become a man. It is also a ritual that differentiates a man from a woman, as often found in military organisations (Carreiras, 2006 p.41).

This chapter has demonstrated that the policy of linking promotion with relocation is problematic for women with family responsibilities. Although civil service regulations give detailed guidance on HR management, discretion is often used in promoting women to higher managerial levels, with particular emphasis on perceptions of women’s family responsibilities.

On the one hand, MOF is trying to accommodate its female employees’ practical gender needs to combine their domestic and career lives by giving them posts near their family homes. However, this policy compromises women’s career prospects and reaffirms MOF’s gendered division of labour at not only the organisational but also the family/household level. I have demonstrated in this chapter how a husband can interfere with a MOF decision to promote his wife. Instead of using his power in a nepotistic way to get his wife promoted, this works the other way around.

Goetz’s (1997b) reports that in a research project she observed, male staff often first sought the permission of the project recipients’ husbands before working with women. This chapter demonstrates that seeking their husband’s permission is an issue not only for MOF’s female employees but also for its HR managers when it comes to promoting women.

Many of the women I interviewed felt as if they were fighting with one hand tied behind their back. On one level, they had to fight according to the rules of the game, which were originally arranged exclusively for men, while on the other, a different set of rules was
being forced onto them by their families and society. This makes combining career and home responsibilities very difficult. Goetz (1997a) uses a basketball metaphor to describe this situation:

Like pygmies competing with the Harlem Globetrotters on a conventionally designed basketball court, they will be unable to win, because they cannot change some of the basic ‘rules’ – like the height of the net or the size of the court. Most often, new participants have to adapt their behaviour to the existing rules. They may learn to win, but often at the cost of bringing their ‘different’ needs and interests to play.

(Goetz, 1997a p.7)

In the DGTX, while the main policy of linking promotion with relocation still holds, promotion policy is made more complex by corruption issues.

I have also discussed the gendered treatment that women face, even after playing along with the bureaucratic game, in relocation and promotion. There is evidence that women who reach more senior positions are still not regarded as equal to their male colleagues.

This chapter has observed and analysed how women reacted to MOF’s internal policy of linking promotion to relocation to remote areas. Many chose to stay at a junior level and did not seek to be promoted. This led to the phenomenon of the ‘mothers’ office’, and only confirmed the gender stereotypes that MOF already imposes on women in its service. One might view women’s decisions not to seek promotion as evidence of their disempowerment by the MOF bureaucracy, but it is possible that their decision reflects a genuine choice: that they were not ambitious for managerial responsibility and only wanted a good salary and to be with their families. I develop this issue in Chapter 10.
Money talks: disentangling gender from the knot of corruption

9.1 Introduction

The two previous chapters have observed and analysed aspects of organisational culture that enable and disable women’s participation in MOF. I have shown how MOF’s approach to structuring time and space, especially in the way it values education and links promotion to relocation, has made it nearly impossible for women to compete on equal terms with their male colleagues.

Chapter 4’s general discussion of Indonesian bureaucracy noted that corruption is a serious and widespread problem which can occur in several forms such as embezzlement or accepting bribes. In government agencies whose main job involves spending money, the most common forms of corruption are embezzlement and kick-back payments (a portion of the contract value given to the bureaucratic organisation by the company to win the bid). In an organisation that collects money from the public such as MOF, embezzlement and accepting bribes are the most common forms of corruption. In 2010, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) rated Indonesia the most corrupt country in Asia Pacific (Wong-Anan and Marshall, 2010). MOF is one of the government organisations most linked to corruption in public opinion; in fact the DGTX, one of my research sites, has been under public scrutiny for the corrupt behaviour of employees who, to date, have all been men (Kompas, 7 April 2010, 21 March 2012).

This chapter discusses the difficulty of separating gender issues from corruption in daily practice. While corruption itself is not an element of Goetz’s framework of gendered archaeology, it is embedded in the Indonesian civil service’s working culture and thus forms part of its organisational culture. There is a body of literature
that suggests that women are less likely to engage in corruption than men (Glover et al., 1997, Reiss and Mitra, 1998, Swamy et al., 2001). The literature puts forward different explanations for this, including gender differences in moral standards (Reiss and Mitra, 1998) and risk-taking behaviour (Wane, 2008). Goetz (2007) argues that men and women do not have equal opportunities to engage in corruption and, when they do, may do it differently. In her study of lower-level government staff in a micro-credit programme in Bangladesh she found that the corrupt behaviour of male fieldworkers typically involved making a deal with local elite men so that the credit went to these elite men’s wives. By contrast, female staff tended to advise their clients to use their credit to engage in dishonest activities such as putting chillies into vegetable oil and selling it as mustard seed oil. Honour et al (1998) discuss the importance of business links in the corruption of public service officials in India, noting that women in Indian public service had less access to these business links than their male colleagues. They also suggest, however, that idealised norms and expectations of female behaviour, such as being passive, virtuous and less materially ambitious than men, are likely to discourage corruption. Alolo’s (2005) study in sub-Saharan Africa concludes that when exposed to a corrupt environment, women may be no less corrupt than their male colleagues. Alolo found differences in the underlying reasons for engaging in corruption according to gender roles: for example women did so out of compassion and men out of a ‘thirst for money’.

This chapter seeks to answer this question: To what extent does corruption affect women’s equal participation compared to their male MOF colleagues? This is divided into more specific research questions:

1) What is the household division of labour in term of earning money, and what is expected from a working woman in terms of bringing money home?
2) How are the Indonesian civil service salary and remuneration structured, and to what extent are they (a) gendered, and (b) vulnerable to corruption?

3) What do women think about corruption in their organisation?

4) To what extent does MOF’s perception of women and corruption affect decisions about women’s postings?

The chapter is structured as follows: to show how gender plays out in the financing of households, the first section discusses the household division of labour terms of financial matters. From there, the discussion turns to civil service regulations about remuneration, including common practices for managing salaries and obtaining additional income, and how these entail an element of gendered corruption. I consider the extent to which opportunities to engage in corrupt practice are open to both men and women, paying particular attention to women’s access to networks within and outside MOF. From there, I turn to women’s views of corrupt behaviour at MOF. The chapter ends with a discussion of the extent to which MOF’s view of women and corruption affects women’s promotion and placement.

9.2 The household division of labour and finance

Studies of corruption and gender tend to focus on the corrupt organisation rather than the wider setting in which corruption occurs (Alolo, 2005). This chapter demonstrates that the gendered aspect of corruption at MOF is to some extent related to the household division of labour. Consequently, it begins with a discussion of gender and finance in the household.

According to Javanese values, a husband and wife should not argue about or discuss money with a third person when there is financial dissatisfaction between the couple. The participants’ responses to
my question about financial arrangements may reflect this culture. As in neighbouring Malaysia (Carsten, 1989), Indonesian women are expected to be the household money managers (Papanek and Schwede, 1988). While control over money is considered a form of power in western understanding, Wolf (2000) argues that managing financial resources is not necessarily empowering for Javanese women, as Javanese culture regards it as a low-level activity. Going back to the discussion of halus (refined) and kasar (crude/coarse) in Chapter 1, money, especially exchanging money for everyday necessities, is considered kasar. Men, particularly those in the upper classes or priyayi, do not deal with or discuss money. This is similar to Stirrat’s (1996) findings in a fishing community in Sri Lanka, where the fishermen saw money as ‘dirty’ and ‘unclean’. This was felt particularly strongly in the older generation: ‘...when older men were asked about money they would dismiss the topic by spitting out, chi – a term of approbation used of filth in general’ (Stirrat, 1996 p.99). Javanese men deal with things that are considered more refined and from which real power emanates (Anderson, 1990, Nieuwenhuis-Djadiningrat, 1987).

Although Wolf’s argument can be justified with reference to women who work as cheap labourers or market traders, it may not apply in the same way to those working as mid-level managers in the civil service. As they work in a western-style bureaucracy, it is interesting investigate whether the economic power they possess as a result of their education and employment has an impact on their agency in the household.

An unpublished study by a women’s study centre in East Java (Sunaryo and Zuriah, 2002) explored decision-making patterns in families of female junior civil servants in Malang, East Java. The research revealed that women tend to make their own decisions about domestic matters, but decisions involving a large amount of money or their children’s education are made equally by husbands and wives. This echoes what my interviewees told me.
None of my female married interviewees expressed any discontent with their financial arrangements with their partners or reported that they ever had a disagreement about money. During my fieldwork, the majority of people in MOF still received their salary in cash on the first day of the month rather than as a bank transfer. At the end of the month the finance division in each office was given a single cash payment for employees’ salaries. This was distributed to every division, where someone would act as cashier.

Six of fifty-nine female interviewees saw themselves as the backbone of their families. They maintained that they were the main breadwinner and that their husbands did not have much say in their career progression and work-life balance. By contrast, three were very dependent on their husbands, despite having their own career prospects. The rest felt that they shared the burden of financing the household equally.

The way the interviewees handled money in the household varied. Most of the women who were married at the time of the interview told me that they kept separate bank accounts from those of their husbands, mainly with the bank operating in their office, although it was common for them to have several bank accounts. About three-quarters of the women were responsible for the financial management of the household, even when they were living away from home on a tour of duty. Ayu, who had recently been promoted to a position as head of one of the Treasury Offices in West Java and whose husband worked in Jakarta, said:

*Between me and my husband we never make a big fuss about money. His salary goes into a bank account, and these days mine comes in an envelope every month. Some of the bills can be paid using direct debit, so they’re taken from his account. My salary goes to pay for things that are not directly debited like the groceries. I keep the debit card [for my husband’s account]. So if we need some money, I get it from there. Then if it is running low, I have to warn him: be*
careful, the well is drying up... Generally the household money is my responsibility. Yeah, that’s what we call women’s business. Everything that concerns money is dumped on me, from paying the bills to buying the rice – everything. Now that we have two kitchens we have to be more careful about money, though. Especially about the children... because you know what they’re like...[laughs] they might ask me for some money to get something and then ask their dad for the same thing. So we have to communicate when it comes to giving them money...

Other interviewees stated that they kept joint accounts and communicated with their husbands about their cash flow.

No, so far we’ve never had any disagreement about money. We discuss everything. If I have extra income\textsuperscript{15} I discuss it with my husband, and vice versa. Usually he says: ‘Let’s not spend it, just save it for a rainy day’. (Sulastri)

Latifa reported that she kept her income entirely for herself. Her salary was not used to pay bills or the mortgage, which were covered by her husband’s income. She said that she did not have to work to finance the household.

So my salary pays for my personal needs. Well, I buy my children clothes or treats sometimes, but I don’t have to. My husband’s income is enough to pay for all those things. Besides, it’s his responsibility as he’s the breadwinner, not me.’

Latifa regards her husband as the head of the household as well as the main breadwinner. She, on the other hand, worked only for her ‘social life’:

Actually I would rather stay at home and mind the children and the household. It’s just that my husband said that I should keep working. We met each other when I was already working at MOF and he didn’t

\textsuperscript{15} See the discussion about extra income in later in this chapter
want me to resign. He said that women who stay at home gossip a lot with their neighbours and friends, and he doesn’t like that. He likes me to dress smartly every morning ready to go to work, but he never expects me to use my earnings to contribute to the household needs.

This arrangement is quite exceptional, as is Latifa herself. She was the only interviewee who was hostile to the idea of gender equality: ‘What are those feminists looking for? Don’t they realise that we women belong to the house and our family?’ and said that equality would never happen because ‘God does not want it that way.’

9.3 Overview of civil service remuneration

It is well-documented that Indonesian civil servants are not well paid, which contributes to the difficulty of attracting better qualified personnel (Rohdewohld, 1995). According to the World Bank, however, they are ‘not particularly underpaid relative to their market comparators’ (2003a page 15), considering that their income tax is covered by the government. Filmer and Lindauer (2001) show that civil servants with high school education or less are paid better than those with equivalent qualifications working in the private sector, while the pay of those with education beyond high school is marginally lower than in the private sector.

9.3.1 Basic salary and other allowances

The current remuneration scheme for civil servants is based on the Civil Service Law (GOI, 1974a, 1999) and regulated by Regulation no.7/1977 (GOI, 1977). Since 1977 this legislation has been amended with reference to basic salaries and additional allowances. Civil servants are also entitled to free health insurance, work accident allowance, home loans, bereavement payments and a defined benefit pension after working for a minimum of 20 years or upon reaching the age of 50, whichever is longer.
The civil service salary system is very complex and rigid and depends on grade, position and length of service. The salary consists of the basic salary, a rice allowance (20 kg per person plus 10 kg for each family member up to a third child), a family allowance (also for up to three children), a special allowance for people holding structural/functional posts (worth between half to five times the basic salary), an income tax allowance (worth 15-30 per cent of the basic salary), and variable allowances for those working in remote areas.

On paper, it seems that the salary formula is gender-neutral and fair. In practice, however, the implementation of a formula based on conditions that are not clearly stated in the regulations can be unfair. The regulation states that (1) a civil servant who is married will be given a spousal allowance worth 10% of their basic salary and (2) If a married couple both work as civil servants the allowance will be paid to the person with the higher basic salary (this is reassessed over time). Although under very special circumstances a male civil servant is allowed to marry more than one wife (see Chapter 5), only one of his wives can get the spousal allowance. Up to three children, however, still attract allowances regardless of whether their mother is on the allowance list or not.

While in theory a female civil servant can support her husband, in practice this is not straightforward and varies across ministries. In MOF, the civil servant in question needs to prove that she is the main breadwinner in order to include her husband in her allowance. This requires a formal letter from the local authority (kelurahan) and one from the Ministry of Labour to confirm that her husband is on its job-seeker list or a letter from the GP at the local surgery certifying that he is unable to work. To include a wife in a man's allowance is not as difficult as including a husband. The wife's allowance is added to the salary structure as soon as the male civil servant submits his marriage certificate. If the wife works in a private company and fills in her income tax form separately, the
couple has to provide this information to the BKN so that her name is not included in the civil servant’s family allowance. This default setting in the salary structure is another example of the state’s strong view that men are the main breadwinners and women the homemakers, as clearly stated in article 34 of the Indonesian Marriage Law (GOI, 1974b).

**9.3.2 Special Allowances for MOF employees**

Every employee of MOF receives special allowances. The rationale is that this will reduce the prevalence of corrupt behaviour when dealing with public finances. The special allowances are paid on condition that the employee works every working day of the month. When they are absent for non job-related reasons the allowance is reduced accordingly. Most MOF employees obtain substantially more remuneration via these various allowances than from their basic salary.

When the basic salary is taken together with the various allowances and entitlements that employees are entitled to receive, it is arguable that civil service pay does not always compare unfavourably with the private sector. Take-home pay varies substantially across different units in MOF for two reasons. First, opportunities for augmenting legitimate income through corruption vary across units. Second, salary, allowances and other entitlements are topped up by yet another set of payments called honoraria, which vary substantially across units. They are determined by the task a particular unit performs and the role of the individual within that unit. In some cases the additional payment can be very high indeed. For example, in the TA people are paid honoraria for every hour they teach, set exam questions, mark exams, or engage in any other activity related to training. This is paid in addition to the monthly salary they already receive. Honoraria can affect men and women differently, as I show in the next section.
9.3.3 Membership of ad-hoc teams

As mentioned in the previous section, salary is not the only payment that civil servants receive. Every year the different units propose an expenditure budget that contains routine elements like salary payments and office maintenance, as well as one-off elements that include, among other things, the formation of various task-force teams. Often task-force teams are formed to carry out jobs that are already part of the unit's job description and so should be done without additional payment. The policy to establish these teams, however, seems rooted in the government's acknowledgement that civil servants are not well paid, and therefore various ways are created to compensate for this without making a future commitment (which would be the case if they simply increased the salary standards).

Membership of these task-force teams carries additional payment, the amount depending on the role in the team. The rank of the team members corresponds positively with these payments, although usually the more junior members do most of the work. Even though the higher ranks do not carry out the actual work, they are responsible if anything goes wrong and is reported in the internal audit. The ranking system of the membership of these teams more often than not mimics the structural/managerial positions of the officials. For example, the team advisor will be an echelon II official (with the highest honorarium but the least work); the head of the team is an echelon III official and the ordinary members, who do all the work, are echelon IV officials.

As women are concentrated in the bottom layer of MOF’s managerial system, the payment gap between men and women is by default. Moreover, when the tasks are demanding and overtime is needed, women tend not to be chosen, which makes their exclusion even more prominent both in terms of social networking and earning additional income. One example of this exclusion is
membership of the bureaucratic reform team discussed in Chapter 8.

9.3.4 Budaya amplop (envelope culture): Taking bribes

Before MOF’s Bureaucratic Reform, it was usual for the public or other government organisations that need MOF services to give the official on duty some money in an envelope either before the job is done to smooth things out, which is called pelicin (lubricant), or afterwards as a thank-you gift. To some extent, in the unreformed offices of MOF (as the reform is carried out gradually), some corrupt employees still do what they can to get ‘an envelope’. For example, one informant told me that in the DGTR, which functions as MOF’s cashier, the commonest way of obtaining extra money is to impose ‘additional rules’ or refer to old regulations (which in general requires more supporting documents) before their purchases can be reimbursed or money can be paid into the client’s account.

When was doing my fieldwork, MOF employees seemed to disagree with each other about whether these envelopes constituted bribery. At a press conference the Finance Minister, who was championing the Bureaucratic Reform, complained that one high-rank official thought that as long as they did not ask for them such envelopes were halal and they could accept them (Napitupulu, 2008). One item on MOF’s bureaucratic reform agenda is the setting up of clear descriptions and boundaries regarding bribery, as people often claim that they have been given money without their knowledge. For example, it may be left by a client in the files they have to process, and when they try to return it the client denies putting it there.

As a convention, just as hotel management manages customers’ tips, the person who receives the envelopes is expected to share the money with others and manage it as a combined resource to use if necessity arises. Men and women all get their share, but the proportion is left to the discretion of the seniors. This money is kept with money from other resources and can be used for the benefit of
the whole division or to cover expenses when there are guests from ‘the centre’ or Jakarta. In the traditionally-run tax offices the amount of money in the envelope usually exceeds the individual salary and is managed similarly.

**9.3.5 Mark-ups and mark-downs**

In the Indonesian civil service people often mark up their expenditure budgets, although the Bureaucratic Reform is making this harder. Marking up is done by inflating invoices in collusion with the vendor. Verification involves reconciling the goods only with the invoice and not with the market price of the goods. Consequently, this kind of embezzlement is easy as long as there is a good relationship between the treasurer and the vendor. Even in the TA there are such opportunities, for example over-invoicing for office stationary or catering services for training workshops. The pickings are particularly rich for in-house training, for which the participants are provided with accommodation and three meals a day. One of my informants said that since other forms of corruption have become less available to people in the TA they take full advantage of these opportunities.

Marking down is practiced by units dealing with state revenue. The DGTX is one such unit and there are major concerns about tax embezzlement by its officials. This kind of corruption requires collusion with taxpayers whereby the reported/assessed tax is less than it should be according to tax law; for this ‘service’ the tax official is given a sum of money. Tax disputes about self-assessed tax payment not corresponding with an official’s assessment during a tax audit, of which there are many, are also open to corrupt practices (Agung, 27 February 2012).

**9.3.6 Lembur fiktif (Falsifying overtime claims)**

Another common practice is falsifying overtime claims. Every month, each unit has a specific overtime budget that can only be used for
this purpose. Any unspent money should be returned to the State Treasury Office. In performance audits, every unit is assessed in terms of whether it has used up the budget as planned. Not being able to use the money it has been allocated is looked on unfavourably and the unit might not get the amount it requests in the next budget year. Due to fear of this sanction (and because people are happy to receive extra money), every month this money is paid to employees regardless of whether they have worked overtime or not.

While some people fervently refuse this money (and of course refuse to sign the receipt), most consider it normal practice and take the money. One told me: ‘If you don’t like where this money comes from, or feel that it is haram to accept what you should not, then you should just give it away to charity rather than making a big deal about it as if you’re a saint.’

Unlike most other forms of corruption, men and women engage equally in this practice despite the gendered practice in actual overtime hours worked (see chapter 10). In this sense some women are in the advantageous position of getting overtime payments at the official rate\textsuperscript{16}. This behaviour is mainly affected by religious identity as opposed to gender. Among my informants, most conservative Muslims fervently denied taking such payments and were very critical of this behaviour. Other informants drew attention to the generally poor time-keeping of these same conservative Muslims, who, they claimed, tended to arrive late and leave very early. The non-conservatives justified their own behaviour by comparing themselves to workers who took a full day’s pay for half a day’s work.

9.3.7 Moonlighting

A second job outside the MOF job may be done at weekends or out of office hours, during office hours without using office facilities, or

\textsuperscript{16} There is a regulation issued every year about the day rate.
even within office hours and using office facilities. Most people exploit the expertise they already have.

In the DGTX new recruits from STAN who have not yet been allocated a desk or are still in training are sometimes given clerical jobs by seniors who are not their line manager, as part of a tax audit. They receive as a fee for this kind of work (generally referred to as subkon, derived from ‘sub-contract’), which involves data entry or low-level auditing. The size of the fee depends on the discretion of the senior who gives them the work.

In the TA, trainers and those capable of teaching sometimes teach at universities. The TA also has some teaching foundations that operate alongside its routine activities. The Finance Law of 1999 stipulates that no civil servant can be a member of such foundations. However, it can still be arranged that some MOF employees can teach there without being formal members.

Nearly all of the female participants found it hard to manage their work-life balance with additional work outside office hours, as I explore in Chapter 10. The men do not have problems juggling and combining their working and family lives. This difference increases the de facto pay gap between men and women in MOF.

**9.3.8 Gifts for the bosses**

Envelopes are not just passed from clients to civil servants. High-ranking officials expect to be given their share of money collected by their subordinates. This is similar to how people in traditional Indonesian (mostly Javanese) kingdoms in the past made payments to their kings (Dwijanto et al., 2006). In the Indonesian civil service, particularly MOF, it is called is upeti or setoran which means ‘offering’ or simply ‘payment’. The DGTX has retained this culture. It is one of the factors that determine whether someone is in their superior’s inner circle, which in turn affects promotion, placement and relocation.
One of my informants from the DGTX claimed that the culture of keeping superiors happy with this kind of gift has marginalised women, since most, although turning a blind eye to this process, feel uncomfortable doing it themselves. Some women complained that they find it difficult to be ‘one of the chaps’, since it is claimed that they are not as effective as men at forcing taxpayers to pay up. As women tend not to take bribes from their customers, they have nothing to offer their superiors. On the other hand, male bosses do not expect payments from their female subordinates, and since they like to keep this money coming in they resent having women as their subordinates.

9.4 Are women less corrupt?

All of the 26 women managers based in the DGTX that I interviewed expressed strong unhappiness about the corruption in their organisation. They would have preferred to be placed where they did not have to deal with taxpayers, for example at headquarters doing administrative or PR jobs. For tax auditors, however, this is obviously impossible. The reasons the women gave me for not taking bribes were related to their status in the family as mothers and wives. One told me:

*I always think so far ahead when someone offers me a bribe. Like, what if then I somehow meet his family on the street? He would point at me and tell his family that this is the woman who is willing to take a bribe. Or can you imagine if it turns out that my children go to the same school as this person’s children? Then I’ll be infamous in the school, which would really embarrass them ... Those kinds of thoughts so far have prevented me from taking bribes.* (Nareswari)

Another woman said:

*Why do I want to lower myself to take a bribe from taxpayers? I’m not a breadwinner. My husband keeps me well. I can keep my salary to buy whatever I want for myself. More than that, I’m working to*
apply my knowledge, not to earn money. Well, money will come eventually, but that’s not my priority. (Jayanti)

According to some of my informants, male bosses were preferred to female ones for this reason alone. As the women did not collect envelopes from taxpayers, their subordinates could not expect a share.

Since the Bureaucratic Reform, 75% of Account Representative (those dealing with taxpayers) positions in the reformed Tax Offices have been given to women. The reformed offices promise taxpayers a one-stop, speedy service. The appointment of women was not formal gender mainstreaming policy emerging from the reform. According to the HR manager, women were put in the front line to send a message to taxpayers that the DGTX is serious about combating corruption. He was hoping that the taxpayers would be more reluctant to offer bribes to courteous but businesslike women.

In the meantime, traditional tax offices are still operating under the old system where corruption remains prevalent.

One Account Representative told me that she and her female colleagues were very happy working under the new system, as their clients know very well that they should not try to offer bribes and everything is done according to standard operating procedures. In the reformed offices officials are paid four times what they used to earn and what their colleagues in the unreformed offices are still paid, which makes them happier to work under the new system. This aspect of the reform has been very beneficial for women in terms of pay, although Account Representative is not a senior or high-status post.

One of my informants in the HR division of the DGTX told me, without quoting the exact number, that some male tax officials had preferred to delay moving to reformed offices. This gatekeeper speculated that although their salaries would be four times greater, this would be their only source of income. Under the old system still
in place in the unreformed offices, with the bribe money they could make ten or even twenty times their salaries. It is not surprising that some DGTX employees turned down the offer to take an exam for a place in the modern offices because they felt that their earnings would plunge without any chance to earn ‘additional income’.

According to my informants, corruption still exists at a different level of management, even in the reformed offices. Taxpayers who think they are being asked to pay too much can lodge a complaint and ask to be reassessed by another tax authority under the same DGTX where things can be ‘settled’. In other words, instead of being eradicated, corruption has just become more localised.

The fact that some men delay joining reformed offices does not mean that they are all happy with old regime. Their reactions varied, even among men who were not happy with the corruption in their workplace. While some shrugged their shoulders and accepted it as a rule of the game – ‘Well, that’s just the way it is here. We don’t want to be called extremist or hypocrites if we don’t do what other people do’ – some tried to justify it by the way they spent the money – ‘I never use that money to buy my children’s food or clothing, that is haram. I just use it for something else’. When I asked them what they meant by ‘something else’ they refused to tell me.

One of my male informants said about his female colleagues who claim not to take bribes:

All I know is that they do not want to collect it from the taxpayers. But when the money is already here and it’s time to share it among all the staff, then they’re very happy to accept it. I haven’t seen any women so far saying that they don’t want their portion. So what is this then?

I cannot provide direct proof from the interviews that women in MOF, especially at the DGTX, were less corrupt than their male
colleagues, mainly because the interviews only relate to perceptions of corruption. There are no statistics kept specifically for this purpose anywhere in MOF. Since the Bureaucratic Reform only two major corruption cases in the DGTX have been made public: those of Gayus Tambunan, costing tax payers £40,000 (Kompas, 7 April 2010) and of Dhana Widyatmika, £38,000 (Kompas, 21 March 2012). Both were men, and both were dismissed from MOF and sentenced to seven and 12 years in prison respectively. Interestingly, Dhana’s case involved his wife, who is also an employee of the DGTX and worked with Gayus. Since she was not charged in person, she was not dismissed but only rotated to an administrative job.

In the history of the TA only one woman has had to resign because of corruption. She was known to approach STAN applicants and offer to help them ‘pass the exam’. In fact, instead of influencing the exam results she simply claimed the credit for clients who passed and returned half of the money paid by those who did not. She was exposed when a dissatisfied client reported her to both the head of the TA and the local press.

Now that its services are under the scrutiny of the Bureaucratic Reform, all high-ranking DGTR officials remind their staff at every meeting not to take envelopes from their clients. In a speech to celebrate Finance Day 2009, a director made a specific request to the Wives’ Association not to insist that their husbands bring home more than their official earnings, as this would push them into taking bribes. This implies that even when women are not involved in a corrupt act they are still accused of being behind men’s corruption, which shows that the Javanese proverb ‘Stuwarga nunut, neraka katut’ (if her husband goes to heaven, she’ll get a lift there, and if he goes to hell, she’ll be dragged there too) still applies to some married women.
9.5 A question of opportunity?

So far I have shown that the main reasons women do not obtain additional income, either legitimately or through corruption, are the limitations they face as women. These limitations affect their time (for moonlighting or out-of-office networking), their status (few women were ad hoc team members, as only a few were senior enough to meet the membership requirement) and their culturally-ascribed roles (regarding dealing with men, specifically those in more senior positions). This section discusses further implications of gendered corruption, relating it to gender-based networking, which impacts on opportunities to engage in corruption.

While there is a tendency for people to mix with others of the same origin, recruitment point, religious belief and other characteristics, gender also plays an important role in networking. For example, at MOF there is a tradition that on the big boss’ birthday (depending on the location, in a regional office this could be the Regional Director or the Office Head) the office staff celebrate it with a party out of office hours, usually at a weekend. As this is seen as a networking opportunity, people try their best to attend, even if just for half an hour, to show their loyalty. Most of my female research participants, however, said that they never went to this kind of occasion because they would rather spend the time with their families.

One of my female informants in the DGTX told me that it was very difficult for women to compete with men in this informal network because there are many things that only men can or are approved to do:

*Men can approach their bosses or the tax payers (who are mostly men) quite easily, just by keeping them company outside office hours or joining in with whatever their hobby is: from fishing, playing golf, even taking them to visit sex workers. Obviously women cannot do this.*
When strategic decision making can be influenced by this informal network, it is understandable that those who have limited access to this network also have limited access not only to promotion (Kanter, 1979) but also to corruption (Goetz, 2007, Honour et al., 1998).

9.6 Is women’s lack of engagement in corrupt behaviour the cause or the consequence of their marginalisation?

In MOF there has been a general tendency to pigeonhole women into jobs and tasks that require ‘prudence’ such as administrative roles and jobs that rely on their supposed intuition, such as dealing with clients or employees.

At the DGTR, an HR manager who seemed concerned about her female colleagues’ career development and tried to champion them admitted to me that she still felt that women were better than men at doing things that require tidiness and carefulness. She was very particular that at least one of her echelon IV staff should be female so that she could help with housekeeping issues such as dealing with the caterer or florists when organising events like a summit or conference.

In the TA women tend to be placed in the evaluation division, where the main tasks are marking exams and producing statistical reports based on the results. One of my interviewees in such a position speculated that women must be seen to have the patience and carefulness needed to ensure that the process of marking thousands of exam sheets every week went smoothly. The Planning Division, on the other hand, tends to be headed by men.

Views about women’s supposed people skills meant that they were disproportionately represented in the HR division. Women were also more likely to be promoted to managerial positions in this division than they were in other divisions. Even in the DGTX, where the HR manager position has always been held by a man, there were more
female than male subordinates in the HR division because maintaining the employee database requires particular care. Also, in the DGTX all the PR managers are women.

A junior manager in the DGTX complained to me that in the beginning of her assignment she had been expected to serve tea and coffee to her male colleagues at meetings. She also tended to get boring assignments such as auditing cooperative shops while her male colleagues from the same recruitment batch were taken by their senior to audit foreign investment companies, and data entry while her male colleagues went to the tax court on interesting cases. Apparently she was not the only female employee who experienced such treatment, as confirmed by other interviewees.

When I asked other senior female managers in DGTX about this they all stated that they had endured the same treatment from their seniors at the beginning of their careers until they proved themselves:

*It’s the rule of the game in this organisation. You have to prove that you’re capable of working hard before you can be trusted, and if you’re a woman then you have to prove yourself four times as much as your male colleagues. I know it seems unfair, but if we want to move on with our careers we must get on with it and stop whingeing: nobody would listen to us, and that would only prove that what [the men] say about us is right.*

She did not say, however, whether this also involved proving themselves in the ‘male’ world of corruption.

Despite having master’s degrees in Tax Auditing, two of the female senior managers had never been given a post as tax auditor. Instead they had always managed PR and housekeeping at the tax offices they were posted to. By the time of my fieldwork, there had been no female tax investigator (whose job involves working with the police in cases of tax fraud) in the DGTX.
A male tax auditor said that he did not like having females in his team because they could not be expected to work as hard as the male auditors, either in terms of overtime or of investigating taxpayers suspected of committing fraud. When I asked him what aspects of the job women could not do in normal office hours, he only provided reasons such as problems with climbing ladders when women needed to get archives or counting shares: ‘That would be dangerous. Not just that she might fall, but what if people look up her skirt when she is up there getting the files?’ He did not appear to understand when I pointed out that what he had said was inappropriate.

During the focus group discussion at the DGTK, all the male tax auditors agreed that auditing taxpayers can sometimes be dangerous and that it often involves overtime, especially when approaching deadlines. The men told me that they would not insist that female staff stay overnight or engage in intelligence tasks such as spying on taxpayers suspected of fraud, as this involves an element of danger as such people might become violent. One said, ‘We don’t like it if our wives come home late or do dangerous tasks, so why would we ask other people’s wives to do that?’

The experience of women, in the DGTK in particular as well as the TA and the Treasury, indicates that they were sometimes denied important jobs with potential for career development or access to corruption (or, in the DGTK, both) because as a male participant put it very bluntly, ‘Women should not invade men’s territory’.

### 9.7 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed how gender interplays with corruption issues in MOF. Corruption is not one of the elements of Goetz’s gendered archaeology, but I have shown that it is another dimension of organisational culture that interacts with wider societal status and norms, and is thus worth analysing.
There is a tendency, for example by the World Bank (World Bank, 2001) to use essentialist arguments that women are inherently less corrupt to support an instrumentalist agenda to get more women into parliament or government bureaucracies. This simplistic and monolithic treatment of women may lose credibility if it is demonstrated that women who go on to senior positions are no less corrupt than men. If the primary purpose of promoting women is framed in terms of reducing corruption, this may undermine the wider women’s empowerment agenda. While some women claimed that they had moral grounds for not getting involved in corruption, there was also the issue of limited opportunity. In the DGTX, for example, women are more likely to have administrative and PR jobs, where bribery is uncommon, rather than technical posts. Consequently, this gendered job distribution is also related to gendered opportunities to engage in corruption. Meanwhile, gender-based networking in MOF makes it difficult for women to develop the informal contacts required for corruption, due both to time and space constraints and to norms about appropriate female behaviour.

Gendered corruption presents both constraints and opportunities for women at MOF, although the former were more evident. The assumption that women are not or should not be interested in corruption – because they are not seen as the main breadwinners, because big tax deals with big companies are male business, or because women should be kept away from rough and dirty deals to keep their purity intact – increases the likelihood that they are posted to less attractive positions. According to general perception, since they tend not to engage in corrupt dealings why should they be given a lucrative post in a strategic office? On the other hand, the association of women with purity and integrity has been used to hide corruption and improve the public image of some MOF offices. The Bureaucratic Reform has opened up opportunities for advancement for some women, although usually these do not include higher status or more influential positions.
Some studies demonstrate how household finances can be affected by incidents of corruption, for example having to pay extra for health care (Sen and Ostin, 2007). This chapter has looked at the other side of this relationship, revealing how gendered corruption may be partly rooted in household financing arrangements. It shows that the gendered aspect of corruption in MOF is influenced by the perception that men are the main breadwinners, and so any opportunity to earn extra money should be more available to them than to female employees.
10 Locating the identities of MOF women in relation to MOF’s gendered space and time

10.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at how MOF female managers negotiate their identities as managers, wives and mothers. It considers how women make their decisions and choices, and the strategies that underpin them. The chapter is based on semi-structured interviews conducted with 59 MOF female managers. As mentioned in Chapter 3, I did not systematically gather the same data from men, mainly because most of the men I interviewed did not have time for an interview or were not interested in the subject.

Chapter 9 showed that the majority of female interviewees saw themselves as sharing the burden of household financing equally with their husbands. This suggests that husbands and wives valued each other’s work equally. But did this mean that they valued each other’s careers, as opposed to just working to put food on the table, equally?

Previous chapters have shown that women’s experiences of employment at MOF go beyond a simple division between office and home life. They also face the chance of being placed away from their family homes as part of their employment contract, temporarily for a study assignment or for longer tours of duty. While in developed countries the implications of work relocation as part of the career path for the family have been studied, this chapter addresses a gap in the literature on similar issues in developing countries.

The chapter focuses on two of Goetz’s elements of the gendered archaeology of organisations: gendered participants and gendered space and time. Drawing on studies of marriage and kinship systems in Indonesia and especially Javanese culture, to which
most research participants belong, this section deals with questions about how female MOF employees negotiated their identities in the household and the workplace. It is important to take this perspective, as organisations should be viewed:

*as frameworks of human experience which have key implications for the construction and reproduction of gender relationships, but which, in turn, have implications for the development and existence of the organisation itself.* (Mills, 1992 p.134)

This chapter links and correlates some critical steps in these women’s career development with their domestic lives, taking into account their reproductive role and personal choices. Because of the nature of the participants and the focus of this study, the predominant concept of time that emerges from the narratives is as a ‘ladder’ (Halford and Leonard, 2006b p.136). The female managers describe themselves climbing to the positions they occupied at the time of the interviews. To explore the interaction between personal narratives, the wider environment and the women’s agency, the last section of this chapter draws loosely on sociological life-course frameworks (Elder, 1996, Elder, 1994).

In the context of developing countries, women’s limited access to senior management in government bureaucracy is often related to traditional expectations about their domestic roles and responsibilities (Amos-Wilson, 1999, Ogenyi, 2004, Ogenyi Ejye and Victoria Odu, 2006), and thus MOF’s approach to geographical space and time may be one of the most crucial factors hindering women’s participation, especially in management. While much has been written about the difficulties women face in accessing positions in top managerial levels due to domestic factors, only a few studies have looked at the articulation of private and working lives (Guillaume and Pochic, 2009). This study addresses the work-life balance from the organisational as well as individual and family perspectives.
This chapter seeks to answer the main research question: ‘How do women negotiate their gendered identities throughout their employment at MOF in relation to their domestic lives? The more specific research questions are:

- How are gendered roles in the public and private spheres prescribed by society?
- What are MOF’s regulations on daily working lives such as office hours and leave of absence?
- How do women reconcile their domestic and work responsibilities on a daily basis and over their lifetime? As part of this, how do they set their priorities, and how do they feel about them?

The chapter begins with a general account of family arrangements and gender roles in Indonesia followed by a discussion of civil service working regulations. From there the discussion moves to the daily experiences of female managers and their reflections on their multiple identities as civil servants, wives and mothers.

**10.2 Child- and husband-care**

‘Couples’ multiple work-family adaptive strategies cannot be captured by individual experiences separately but require couple-level analysis.’ (Moen and Sweet, 2004:219)

Among anthropologists and other social scientists (Geertz, 1961b, Hull, 1986, Koentjaraningrat, 1985, Magnis-Suseno, 1991) there is consensus that Javanese women’s position is equal to that of their husbands, at least in the sense that they respect one another. There is, however, a clear gender division of labour, whereby women’s main domain is the household and men’s, the public sphere.

Among the women I interviewed there was no uniformity in terms of their relationships with their husbands. The vast majority
considered themselves in an equal position to their husbands, whereby they took turns at balancing their career development while ensuring that they fulfilled their parenting role jointly. Whether this marital relationship was actually equal, and whether they did share their parental responsibilities equally is another matter. For example, two women who stated that they enjoyed an equal relationship with their husbands complained that their spouses always expected their wives to come home earlier than them. One, Laksmi, an echelon III in DGTX, whose husband also worked at the same managerial level in DGTR, said:

He always calls me before the office hours end and asks whether I will be home on time. What does he mean by ‘on time’? Of course I’ll go home as soon as my work is done. But what he means is just leaving the office at bang on 5 pm. It’s not that easy, you know. The higher our position, the more responsibility we have, and sometimes it’s beyond our control what time a meeting finishes or a case is completely finished. He often comes home late – usually he calls to say he’ll be home late because there’s still some work to be done, in a sort of matter-of-fact way, and there’s nothing you can do about it – but he’s always in a bad mood when I do the same. It’s as if I have to beg to be allowed to come home late.

The male managers confirmed the female managers’ views that, as head of the household by default, they are the main breadwinners and their wives are home-makers:

It’s different for men. When our children are not well, we can still continue working. For women, it’s not that easy. I’ve been in a meeting with the [female] Minister. When she opened the meeting she apologised for having to keep her mobile on to be able to receive a call in case her son, who was not well in the morning, had to be transferred to hospital. We fathers do not have to do that. A sick child can be looked after by its mother.
Geertz (1961a) describes Javanese men as rather dependent on women, both emotionally and practically. She points out that they ‘…rarely live alone self-sufficiently, whereas women frequently do; a man always needs someone to perform the household duties; a woman can do these herself in addition to doing her daily work’ (Geertz, 1961a p.123).

Unlike some career women in developed countries who choose to remain childless (Wood and Newton, 2006), none of my interviewees had done this. In Indonesia, and particularly in Javanese society, motherhood is regarded as very important and nothing else can gain women more respect in the public eye than having children (Berninghausen et al., 1992).

Eight of the female interviewees had never been married and did not have children. All of those who were or had ever been married had at least one child (see Table 10-1 Number of children of female managers). Two who had been childless for several years of marriage had adopted a child. The number of children they had corresponds well with MOF HR statistics, which show that employees had on average three children.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of children</th>
<th>Female managers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most female managers regarded their children’s education as their primary responsibility, and not even a shared responsibility between them and their husbands. I found this quite interesting, since when initially I asked whether they shared equal parenting
responsibilities with their partners, the answer was yes. When I probed into actual practice, however, a different story emerged.

The interviewees believed very strongly that the division of labour between parents should be along the lines of the mother being responsible for the children’s education and the father for earning the money to sustain the family. Of the 51 women with children, 44 stated that they did more than their fair share of child rearing:

_They do their homework with me. Usually they do what they can before I get home, then I check, and if there’s something that they don’t understand or get wrong then we do it together. Every day. Even if Daddy is home long before me they just wouldn’t ask him, and he wouldn’t interfere either._

This is particularly clear in Prasasti’s case. She leaves for work at 6.30 am, returning home at 7.30 pm. Her husband works from home but contributes little to childcare:

_Let alone when they’re not well, when they wake up in the morning it’s their mum they immediately look for, not dad. Well, you see, it’s true that he works from home and is physically there. But he’s constantly in front of the computer. If he plays with them, it only lasts for a few minutes…So it’s not strange that they’re closer to me even if I see them less._

There was no evidence that husbands in younger couples were prepared to play a more substantial role in childcare or other domestic duties than those in older couples.

Every interviewee referred to the notion of the husband as the head of household as a ‘fact’ that ‘nobody can deny’. Some people, men and women, cited the Koran or Bible to support this division of labour, and several compared their households to a ship. Maruti said:
The household is like a ship, it only needs one captain. If you have two people and each wants to go in a different direction the ship might even sink. And men are biologically superior to women; that’s why religion gave them the privilege of leading the household.

Yanti, a manager at DGTX, explained her view of *kodrat perempuan* (women’s destiny) and her responsibilities as linked to Islam. She said:

Many women join the workforce and start their career without having any idea whether the jobs they do every day are their choice or not. They don’t have any clue what they’re looking for in their job. As a result, that person is consumed by the job and goes off the rails. But if we realise the meaning of our life, our mission as human beings, we will understand our purpose. God created us as women and not men. What is it that women should do? Raise a family, that’s our responsibility. Our contributions to family life weigh more that those of men... Men are the other way round. For them, work weighs more..

This begs the question: how do women reconcile these beliefs with working full-time? I return to this after first examining civil service regulations on working hours and leave of absence.

### 10.3 Leave of Absence, working hours and overtime

#### 10.3.1 Annual leave

According to Regulation No.24/1976 (GOI, 1976), civil servants are entitled to several kinds of paid leave. All are entitled to twelve fully paid working days of annual leave. The minimum period of leave is three days. This inflexibility created a dilemma for many of the working mothers I interviewed. For example, if they needed to go to a child’s school for a parent-teacher meeting lasting a couple of hours, a half-day leave was sufficient. Since this option was not available they were forced into taking a full three-day leave or arriving at work late. The penalty for arriving late is usually a cut in
their next monthly allowance and is strictly applied with the bureaucratic reform.

One of my gatekeepers mentioned that she had complained about this to the Civil Service Agency and expected them to propose a revision to the regulation. Instead, the response was: ‘For such purposes, women are advised to ask permission from their line manager’. According to my informant, under the bureaucratic reform measures this kind of permission, although allowed, would entail a penalty of £30.

Since 2005, the Minister for Civil Service Planning and the Civil Service Bureau, along with the Ministries of Manpower and Religious Affairs, have regulated what they call cuti bersama or collective annual leave. This has arisen because during important religious holidays like Eid many people take leave in addition to the official public holiday\textsuperscript{17}, leaving the offices half-empty. This was seen as unprofessional and in 2005 it was decreed that the entire civil service must take a part of their annual leave at these times. In 2007, collective leave for such occasions totalled eleven days, leaving a single day of annual leave which could not be taken as holiday due to the three-day minimum regulation (Table 10-2).

This added to the inflexibility of the leave system. Given the gender roles in Indonesia, mothers are expected to deal with any problems that their children may have, for example when they are not well. This inflexibility adds to working mothers’ difficulties.

\textsuperscript{17} There are 14 national holidays, three of which fall at the weekend.
Table 10-2 Civil Service Annual leave days 2005-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Collective holiday*</th>
<th>Total remaining day off</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td>8 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6 days</td>
<td>6 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>11 days</td>
<td>1 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5 days</td>
<td>7 days</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>4 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3 days</td>
<td>9 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td>8 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6 days</td>
<td>6 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data taken from www.menpan.go.id

After working full-time for six years, a civil servant is entitled to take a ‘grand leave’ of up to 3 months. This is repeated every six years.

10.3.2 Maternity leave

According to civil service regulations, women are entitled to maternity leave for their first, second and third children and can apply for unpaid leave for the fourth child and beyond. The leave is three months and must be taken a month before the birth and two months afterwards. The intention may have been to enable women to rest before giving birth. However, many of the women I interviewed found it unhelpful as it reduced the time they could spend with the child after the birth. Among other things it also limited the period that they could breastfeed exclusively, contrary to Ministry of Health advice that they should do so for at least six months. At MOF there are no crèche services or private rooms for women who wish to breastfeed; and there is no paternity leave.

10.3.3 Unpaid leave

Civil servants can only apply for unpaid leave under very special circumstances, and there is no guarantee that it will be granted except in the case of unpaid maternity leave for the fourth child onwards. Unpaid leave can last a maximum of four years and the
employee is removed from her/his position. This time is not counted as service, which is reflected in promotion and pension entitlements. There is no guarantee that there will be a place to return to at the end of the leave, making it almost like a temporary resignation with the possibility of reinstatement in the same grade.

To a large extent this form of leave was created with female civil servants in mind. It deals with the range of contingencies that women are more likely than men to confront: giving birth to more than three children (article 19), and the ‘need to follow one’s husband on a foreign assignment’ (article 26). In practice no male civil servant has ever been granted such leave, since Article 26 makes no reference to ‘husbands who need to follow their wives on a foreign assignment’, reflecting the wider belief that it is inappropriate for men to submit to their wives and sacrifice their careers.

When a woman returns from unpaid leave she is given the grade she held before leaving. However, after four years of absence her place in the DUK employees’ ranking is lower in comparison to that of others in the same office, who have been advancing in the meantime. This can have important implications: several of the women I interviewed found that one of their ex-subordinates had become their line manager. If promotion were based on work performance, high-performing women might eventually be able to recover their prior managerial level. However, the DUK system rates seniority more highly than performance. For the women I interviewed this created a ‘snakes and ladders’ effect – having slipped down the list, they often had to wait a long time before reaching the top of the list for promotion.

On one hand, this system of unpaid leave of absence seems to offer women the flexibility to combine a career in the civil service with family life. On the other, the way it is regulated embodies a stereotyped view of the gender division of labour in civil servants’
families. Even when both spouses are civil servants it is assumed that women are not the main breadwinners and that they should prioritise their families over their careers. As such, men are not expected to take unpaid leave. The perception that women should be less concerned than men about their careers has encouraged a system whereby most women return from leave to the same level of pay but have effectively been downgraded. The implication is that women work purely to be paid rather than pursuing a career.

### 10.3.4 Working hours

According to civil service regulations, working hours are 07.30 to 16.00, with a break between 12.00 and 13.00. On Friday working hours are 07.30 to 16.30, with a longer break (11.30 to 13.00) to accommodate Friday prayers for Muslim men (Muslim women do not attend Friday prayers in Indonesia). MOF regulations set out rather longer working hours: 07.30 to 17.00, with a break between 12.15 and 13.00. During fasting for Ramadan, where civil servants in other ministries and government agencies work shorter hours (08.00-15.00), MOF employees work from 07.30-16.30 and the lunch break is reduced to 15 minutes.

The MOF clock works like a factory clock. In MOF headquarters in Lapangan Banteng a siren marks each working period. Since the bureaucratic reform, employees have clocked in and out using their fingerprint at each door.\(^{18}\) This creates a big administrative task at the end of each month, as every absence from the office has to be justified. Absences that cannot be justified result in cuts to the monthly allowance.

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\(^{18}\)Before the bureaucratic reform there was more freedom and flexibility for civil servants, even in MOF, where standards tended to be higher. This fed into general public perceptions and encouraged a view that civil service work was suitable for women, since it would allow them to combine career and household responsibilities.
Some of Indonesian’s remote regions lack basic facilities such as a good transport system or reliable electricity supply and are therefore not considered safe places for women to work. Yet Jakarta poses a challenge of its own: traffic congestion (Haryo, 2010, Ooi, 2012). Most people in Jakarta spend at least three hours a day on the road. To get to the office before 07.30, all my interviewees and their colleagues based in Jakarta had to leave the house by 6 am at the latest. Because housing has become very expensive in Jakarta, people tend to live in the suburbs, adding to their travel time. Those living on the outskirts and who used public transport had to leave at 5 am and typically did not get home before 8.30 pm. This has a big impact on women’s ability to combine domestic and office careers effectively (Jeff Turner, 2012).

Setting off to work early in the morning, often before their children woke, and only returning once the children were in bed meant leaving them in the hands of domestic helpers (see below). This increased the women’s determination to do a very good job of being managers. One, Kirana, said that she felt she had to justify her absence from home and her children by working as efficiently as she could. She seldom took a lunch break, ordering her lunch from the cafeteria and eating it in her room so that she could finish her work and leave at exactly 5 pm. Kirana said she hated having to work overtime because it meant that she would miss seeing her children before they went to bed, but also because not all the overtime was justifiable: some was just the result of other people’s inefficiency during the day.

10.3.5 Overtime

There is a specific regulation prohibiting companies from employing women in nightshifts without specific authorisation (GOI, 1997a). Additionally, the Ministry of Manpower decrees that overtime cannot exceed three hours a day and 14 hours a week. However, neither of these regulations applies to civil servants, as Indonesian civil
servants have their own labour codes. There is no specific regulation of civil servants’ overtime apart from its definition in the regulation about the rate paid per hour: ‘overtime is any work that has to be done by civil servants outside normal office hours to complete urgent and immediate jobs.’ (GOI, 1977, GOI, 1974a).

A World Bank Report (Rodgers, 1999) argues against gendered protective labour market policies in developing countries on the grounds that they hinder women’s equal participation in the labour market and limit their potential earning power, as well as raising the cost to firms of hiring women. While this refers to the lower end of labour market where labour is paid on an hourly basis, the situation may be different at the other end of market such as for medium and high-level civil servants. Ines Smyth found that 10% of overtime was obligatory at the Asian Development Bank and thus could not be avoided, even by female employees with young families (Smyth and Turquet, 2012).

In practice, the amount of overtime worked at MOF depends on the activities of a particular office. At DGTX and DGTR the workload usually intensifies towards the end of tax/fiscal year, in TA, STAN recruitment usually significantly increases the workload.

In some cases overtime is needed because of employees’ low capacity to fulfil their job roles properly. Direct recruits from universities other than STAN have the same general capacity as STAN graduates. However, people recruited through other channels, such as directly from high school or by temporary work agencies, are not necessarily as competent. Supervisors tend to give jobs to

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19 An informant from DGTX told me that their department was going to recruit 35,000 employees between 2012 and 2017. They said this recruitment plan was not based on job analysis and had just come out of the blue. According to another informant, it is estimated that around 3,000 DGTX employees are not productive, and if proper employment standards were applied they would be fired. A source in TA said their department had a joint plan with DGTX to train these 3,000 people with transferable skills. Thirty training sessions were planned, but only one was
people whom they are certain will complete them on time, leaving out people who are unable to do so and leading to unequal job distribution, with some people underutilised and others overburdened; the latter often have to do overtime. While this is not generally a problem for men, whether single or married, it creates a problem for women with family responsibilities.

One of the female managers I interviewed told me that she had once had a warning letter about her performance because she was not doing overtime, mainly because she had a very young baby. The letter quoted an article in the Civil Service Law (GOI, 1974a, GOI, 1999) that says ‘seorang PNS harus bekerja dengan sungguh-sungguh tanpa kenal waktu dan mengutamakan kepentingan dinas di atas kepentingan pribadi, keluarga maupun golongan’ (a civil servant must work hard day and night at all times and prioritise their duties over their own interests). At the next round of promotions she was downgraded and relocated to a smaller office, although her echelon level remained the same. Although she was unhappy about it, she said she was resigned as there was nothing she could do.

The World Bank argues that working hour restrictions applied specifically to women are no longer needed and should therefore be removed, as: ‘Protective measures that constrain women more than men in their working-hours can hinder women’s progress towards equity in the labor market’ (Rodgers, 1999 p.27). While the World Bank refers here to manual and factory workers, this study demonstrates that the potential effects of overtime rules on women’s interests may operate differently in other sectors of the labour market such as the civil service.

given. The trainers gave up because only one or two people bothered to attend.
So far I have discussed how female MOF managers manage their working day. The next section discusses full-time working mothers’ daily household arrangements.

10.4 Behind every successful woman there is a pembantu

Instead of sharing the childcare with their husbands, female managers share it with another woman, be it their mother, their sister or a domestic helper. Susan Blackburn (2004) notes that for Indonesian people the concept of motherhood is not limited to the biological mother; children are used to being cared for by multiple mother figures including servants, grandmothers, aunts and even co-wives.

All the women I interviewed had what is locally called a pembantu (literally, a helper); some had more than one. This is common in middle-class families regardless of whether the woman works outside the house.20 A third of female interviewees had employed the same pembantu for over ten years. My informants reported that they would not be able to cope without a helper. One told me:

From the beginning of my career I always had somebody I could trust. For me the pembantu is so essential that I’d rather argue with my husband than tell my pembantu off.’

The pembantu is the backbone of many families, who depend on her. Children do not notice if their parents away from home, but once Si Mbak (literally ‘big sister’, as servants are usually called) is pulang

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20Research conducted by the ILO and the University of Atmajaya in 1995 estimated that 1.4 million women were working as pembantu in Jakarta alone. According to Indonesian law, pembantu are considered informal workers as they work in domestic areas (Putusan P4 Pusat No. 70/59/111/02/C tgl. 19 December 1959), and are thus not protected by law. This makes them vulnerable and increases the risk of exploitation of one woman by another.
*kampung* (going back to see her family in the village) the whole household is under stress.\(^{21}\)

All of the female participants said that they left the housework to their *pembantu*, from cleaning and tidying the house to washing and ironing. As Indonesian cooking tends to be labour-intensive, the *pembantu* do this as well.

*When I get home around 7.30 pm I’m usually worn out. All the household chores have been done by the pembantu. Sometimes the children have even finished their dinner – they ask if they should wait for me, and when I’m not sure when I’ll get home I say no, have your dinner without me. All of that has been sorted out by the pembantu. Just before I go to bed I may discuss with her what to cook the next day. Normally I get the groceries once a week, but it’s up to her what to cook. It’s really up to her what kind of food she’s going to feed my husband, my children [laughs]. I really never cook.*

In this way the female managers could afford to separate themselves from the traditional role of women as domestic worker by buying the time of a *pembantu*. There is a parallel between the *pembantuses*, who leave their own families, including young children, behind with their extended family, and the lives of their female employers, who leave their children with the *pembantu* on a daily basis or their own extended family when they go on a tour of duty. This creates a degree of solidarity between some of the women I interviewed, although others were less aware of their parallel situations.

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\(^{21}\) Studies of working women in other countries draw attention to the childcare problems caused by long and inflexible school holidays (Moen, P. and Sweet, S. (2004) ‘From ‘Work-Family’ to ‘Flexible Careers’, *Community, Work & Family*, 7(2): 209-226. Having a *pembantu* meant that school holidays were not usually a problem for the informants in my research. The big problem, however, typically arises around Eid, when all *pembantuses* go back to their own village for a period of time that exceeds the civil servants’ holiday. Another typical crisis occurs when the *pembantu* resigns to get married or for another reason.
Would a crèche at the office be a good idea? Some women would welcome such provision when the *pembantu* are *pulang kampung*. However, on normal days they preferred the children to stay at home, supervised by the *pembantu*. This might reflect Jakarta’s urban setting, where parents want to spare their children three hours in a traffic jam.

A number of my interviewees also relied on the support of their extended families. The role of these relatives is supervisory, meaning that instead of doing all of the housework they supervise a set of helpers, a babysitter and driver to ensure that the household runs smoothly. In the event that a female manager has to be absent from her family for a longer period of time than normal holidays the children are often sent to live with the extended family, as I discuss below.

The next sections look at the different situations that require female managers to be away from home outside their usual office hours.

### 10.5 Family arrangements when women have to be away from home

Indonesian ideals about the family define women as carers for both their husbands and their children. Therefore, not having small children or any children at all does not automatically free women to pursue their own careers; there is still the husband to look after. As a consequence, moving away from the family home to pursue their career is still uncommon for women in Indonesia.

Chapter 7 observed that civil servants can apply for a scholarship to study abroad and that some women decide not to take this opportunity because of their domestic responsibilities. This section looks at those who do decide to go. Given women’s responsibility as money managers (see Chapter 9) and childcare managers, how do they cope with their responsibilities under these circumstances?
Table 10-3 summarises female managers’ family arrangements for studying overseas. It shows a diverse range of strategies, with most leaving their children with their own parents. Among the male managers I interviewed, 23 went abroad for study, of which 22 left their children and wives in Indonesia and one took his wife and only child. Data from MOF’s Overseas Training Centre show that over a period of 25 years only a handful of men took their families with them when studying abroad.

Table 10-3 Strategies during overseas study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies when going abroad to study</th>
<th>Number of interviewees who had a family by the time they went to study abroad (n=12)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taking the husband and children with them</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking the children with them</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking only the husband</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaving the children with the husband</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaving the children with their own parents (one of them took her husband with her but left the children with her mother)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaving the children with the in-laws</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Irma told me that her husband was very supportive of her studying abroad, although later it became clear that what she meant by being ‘supportive’ was simply that he did not prevent her from going. She took two of her children with her, leaving her youngest daughter in the care of her mother. Her husband was left largely free of childcare and even domestic chores such as cooking and cleaning:

_I did not take my youngest daughter because at the time she was only two years old and I was worried that I wouldn’t be able to look after her properly while studying. We were lucky that my mother lived very near us. So my daughter stayed with her grandmother. Every morning my husband would go there to see her, and again in the evening once he came back from the office. He also had his dinner_
at my mother's house. He just slept in our house and everything else was done at my mother’s.’

Hesti, a manager at the Training Office, was married to a tax auditor at the Tax Office and had a daughter, Farida. When Farida was three, Hesti passed the MOF selection test for a master's degree abroad and got a place at a university in Japan. Her husband objected very strongly to living alone and looking after a three-year-old, so he made her choose between taking Farida with her to Japan or leaving her with her family in Yogyakarta. Hesti chose the second option. This arrangement was kept for several months until it was time for Farida to go to primary school, which was far from the grandparents’ house but close to where Hesti’s sister, also in Yogyakarta, lived. Hesti’s sister and her husband did not have children and decided that Farida should stay with them, and Farida herself found no difficulty in adjusting to this new arrangement. While Hesti was studying, Farida only saw her father at weekends when he visited her.

Of the twelve interviewees who were married with children when they were sent to study abroad, seven left their children with their parents and four took the children with them. Only one left her children (and her husband) with her parents-in-law. It is common for a woman's family to help out when she goes away to study. To some extent these parents may have seen themselves as taking over their daughters' responsibilities, including doing the cooking and the laundry.

Saraswati, Puspita and Trisna took their husbands with them when they abroad to study. Their husbands all worked in private companies and they resigned from their jobs to follow their wives. Puspita, who left her son in Indonesia with her mother, had a lot of help from her husband: ‘He helped a lot with my reading list’. Trisna’s husband worked part-time and looked after their son while she attended lectures. Saraswati was not as lucky as her colleagues.
She took her husband and two children and ended up spending most of her time looking after them. She recalled:

In the morning before going to campus I took the children to the nursery. Then I went to lectures, collected some books from the library and rushed to pick up the kids, stopping at the grocers on the way home. After that there would be the household chores, cleaning, cooking, dinner, bathing the kids and putting them to bed. When they were in bed it was their dad who needed looking after. Basically I could only work on my subject after midnight, when my two children and husband were sound asleep.

Still, she remembered her time studying abroad as the most exciting time in her life.

While going overseas for postgraduate study has a fixed duration, placements in other cities do not. Not many women are willing to go, either because they do not want to be away from their family or because their husbands dissuade them.

When female managers had to relocate for a new managerial position, family arrangements typically involved leaving the children in the care of the husband; taking them all the children and leaving the husband in the marital home; taking some of the children and leaving others in the care of the husband; leaving the children in the care of the maternal grandmother while the husband stayed in the marital home; or leaving both husband and children in the care of either grandmother. This is not a fixed arrangement, and it sometimes varied for the same person. For example, Pramesti had been posted away from her family home twice. In one placement she took all her children with her. The other placement was more remote, so she sent her children back to their family home.

Amrita, who joined MOF as a high-school recruit, was working as a junior manager in Jakarta (echelon IV) when her husband, who worked in a private company, was moved to Sulawesi. After a year
living at home with their three children in Jakarta she was promoted to an echelon III post in Sulawesi, but in a town about 100 miles from her husband. After discussing it with her husband she accepted the promotion, left the children in Jakarta with an au pair, monitoring them twice a day over the telephone, and travelled 100 miles to see her husband every weekend. The arrangement was still in place when I interviewed her.

This supports Blackburn’s (2004 p.141) argument that western-style notions of maternal deprivation do not necessarily discourage Indonesian mothers from sharing child-rearing with other women. The question is, however, whether they can accept the consequences of sharing their child care. In a different setting, Locke et al’s (2010) research on low-income rural-urban migrant labour in Vietnam reports that migrant labourers found the loss of everyday relations with children ‘painful’ and that ‘strategies of remote parenting become harder to sustain over long distances’ (Locke et al., 2010 p.12).

According to several of my informants, being away from their children when they were very young could affect their relationships even long after they had been reunited. Some found that their children had established a strong bond with their carer and compared their mother unfavourably to her. As Hesti recalled:

*Sometimes when I think about this, it’s very hard to accept that my daughter is more attached to her aunt than to her own mother. When I’m with her and do things for her she always criticises me for not doing it ‘the way Bude – that’s what she calls her auntie – does it’, like ‘Your nasi goreng [fried rice] is not as nice as Bude’s’ or ‘you’re not as patient as Bude...’. Because I left her when she was at a critical age in a child’s development she’s never felt sure of my love for her. I think there’s been something missing in her development, something that I can never redo, and there’s nothing I can do about it apart from accept her the way she is. At the end of the day it was my*
decision to leave her when she was little, and as a psychologist I should have been aware of the consequences.

Hesti’s daughter was only eight years old at the time of the first interview, and Hesti was still looking for a way to reconnect with her without abruptly cutting her off from her aunt. Her efforts to be relocated to where the child lived with her aunt had failed and she was considering moving the child to live with her in Jakarta. When I returned to continue my fieldwork a year later Hesti’s husband had been posted back to Jakarta and they were both waiting for their daughter to join them when the new school term began.

While Hesti accepted that her decision to leave her daughter behind had created a close relationship with her carer, Irma tried to correct the carer’s influence on her daughter during her absence. Her youngest daughter was 20 years old at the time of her interview. During her mother’s absence, she had grown to be independent and ‘a bit stubborn and adventurous’, as Irma described it. She recalled that once she was back from studying she found that she had to be very firm with her daughter, who had been ‘spoiled soft’ by her grandmother:

On my return from studying in the Netherlands, my mother and husband brought my youngest daughter to pick me and my other two children up at the airport. She didn’t recognise me, understandably, because for the past two years, since she was two years old, she’d only heard my voice over the phone and never seen me at all in person. I held her and said, ‘Hi, it’s mummy…’ but she just stared at me and pulled her body away from me when I carried her. She was four by then, so she didn’t really understand what was happening. But from what I’d read, as long as a child is not yet 5 years old there’s still a chance for me to catch up so that she accepts me as her mother. They said that if the child was older than five it would be more difficult. Although looking back now, there was nothing I could have done anyway, even if she were three years old – I still wanted
to go and get my master’s degree. My husband was really supportive to let my mother fill in for me.

But once I was home, I realised what had happened. Well, you know, being brought up by a Granny is totally different from being brought up by your own parents. In general, Gran will spoil you soft. Granny doesn’t have responsibility towards the child, it’s the mother’s responsibility [laughs]. She was just feeling sorry all the time for the child: you poor thing, your mummy left you... and then she let the child get away with murder. As a result, my daughter turned a bit wild and naughty. When I came back she didn’t want to do what she was told. She refused to have a bath, didn’t want to do this and that. She had to have what she wanted there and then. If I took her to a shop and she asked for something and I refused, she’d cry and jump up and down...But I just had to be firm. I thought (going back to that article that I read before about 5 years old being the limit for trying to discipline a child), ‘I only have one year left, it will be harder when she’s five…’. In the end, she adjusted to having me as her mother.

Now she doesn’t seem to remember that I left her when she was little. But for me, there’s always a nagging sense of guilt, although I try not to dwell on it too much, that I took my other children abroad but not her. When can I take her? I think every mother would like to be fair with all her children. Well, we just have to save some money: one day I’m sure it will happen...

Despite this, none of the women I interviewed expressed any general regrets about leaving their children for their studies. They believed that their study had contributed to both their career and their personal development, which in turn made them better mothers for their children. Spending time abroad to study is not something that their counterparts in developed countries tend to do as they can enrol themselves in courses close to where they live. Even study at home can require compromises and changes to the normal pattern
of daily family life, but women managers in Europe and North America do not usually have to sacrifice the unity of their families.

Interestingly, no informant explicitly mentioned the possible consequences of their being in work for their children’s welfare, although some referred to conflict when relocating away from their children. By contrast, numerous informants explicitly referred to the advantages that they felt their employment at MOF conferred on their children.

Despite her past stagnant position at a lower managerial level, Sulastri’s children were very proud to have a mum as a government official. They had never known her as anything else because she had been working before she started a family. Sometimes she used this as a weapon against them if they misbehaved:

*Whenever they started getting out of control I would say to my husband that it was time for what I call ‘daster therapy’. He wouldn’t interfere in that case. Usually we went to the office together in the car, but on those days I wouldn’t go with him. I’d just stay in the house, still wearing my daster [a loose dress that Indonesian women wear at home]. Then my children would ask, “Why aren’t you dressed yet? Aren’t you going to the office?” I would say: “From now on I’ll stay at home and look after you all, because it seems that you cannot be trusted without direct supervision: you’ve crossed the line and not obeyed the rules that have been set up for you”. That would be enough to teach them: they’d say, “Okay, okay, I’ll do what I’m told, but you keep your job!”…*

Almost all the interviewees believed that their children benefited from having a career woman as their mother. One said that she would not be a good full-time mother anyway because she would be bored and stressed just being at home, so it would be the children who suffered. Nina believed this too, although she admitted that her five-year-old son often asked her to stay at home ‘to keep me company when I’m playing’. One day he was waiting at the front
door for her to come home from the office, and as soon as Nina appeared he said, ‘Mama, you know Ryan? I’ve just found out that his mother doesn’t work, she just stays at home, and apparently it’s all right, she doesn’t get into trouble with anyone. Maybe you can just try not to work; I think you’ll be OK too.’ Nina later realised that her son had thought that she would be arrested by the police if she did not go to work.

10.6 Behind every successful man there is a woman? Being the wife of another civil servant

10.6.1 Dharma Wanita activities to support husbands’ careers

As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, during the Suharto era which ended in 1998, Dharma Wanita, the civil servants’ wives’ association, played a prominent role. According to my informants and based on my own experience as an MOF employee, Dharma Wanita never really influences MOF in any area of policy, including decisions on staffing or promotion. Some female MOF employees, however, were married to male bureaucrats whose offices had required full Dharma Wanita participation. Despite their own professional duties, these female civil servants had not been exempted from this association and its activities. Of the 17 female managers aged over 50 at the time of interviews, 10 were married to civil servants and some remembered the Suharto era as ‘a tricky time’ because their participation in these activities had been important to their husband’s careers:

*The Dharma Wanita in my husband’s office put on a lot of activities and the Chair insisted that every member came and participated. If they didn’t, she would tell her own husband, who would then give the woman’s husband a ‘warning’. Sometimes it created tension between me and my husband. He would complain if I hadn’t been coming to Dharma Wanita at his office for the whole month, for*
example at the end of the fiscal year when the work here was very hectic. Of course I wanted to support his career, but I had my responsibility towards my own job. I couldn’t just leave my staff meeting deadlines at the office to go visiting the Wacoal underwear factory with them. [Ria]

Some women found that the branch of Dharma Wanita attached to their husbands’ office had fewer activities and the Chair was not so strict. They participated in meetings and relaxing get-togethers to maintain a good relationship with their counterparts in their husbands’ offices.

After Suharto lost power, Dharma Wanita continued, but for a while its power was reduced. During Yudoyono’s government, however, there was a move to re-establish it, especially in regional and local government, the Home Office and the Attorney General’s Office. Between 2009 and 2012 local newspapers often carried headlines about governors’ speeches on the importance of ‘wives supporting their husbands’ careers through Dharma Wanita’ (Adnan, 2011, Pemda SumSel, 2011, Riswanto, 2011).

10.6.2 When a woman’s position is higher than her husband’s

In developed countries such as the USA there has been an increase in the number of dual-earner households, where the wife earns more than her husband (Winkler, 1998). The implications of this in terms of the woman’s increased bargaining position (Bergstrom, 1996, Lundberg and Pollak, 1996) and decision-making power in household resource allocation (Thomas, 1990) have been studied, although the focus has been mainly on disparities in income rather than work status. A separate study of couples working for the same US private sector firm found that women in higher managerial positions than their husbands experienced higher ‘work-to-family spillover’, whereby work issues affected their family life. Issues noted included role conflict, for example when the wife could not
discuss confidential issues at work with her husband (Moen and Sweet, 2002).

As discussed earlier, in Indonesia, and particularly in Javanese culture, the notion of the man as the head of the household is very prominent and is accepted as a fact of life. It is considered strange for a woman to have a higher position at work than her husband, especially when they both work for the same organisation.

Padma’s husband Teja worked in a different unit at MOF to that of his wife and had once had a lower rank and position than hers. Padma joined MOF through sarjana recruitment and Teja entered through STAN. About ten years ago Teja managed to reach the level of middle management. Padma expressed her relief at her husband’s promotion. She recounted how, over the ten years during which her rank and position were higher than her husband’s, whenever they had an argument about anything, including domestic matters, he had always brought this up, for example saying sarcastically: ‘Of course you’re right. You’re always right, you’re the boss.’ Padma portrayed those ten years as the hardest time in her life.

Irma, in DGTX, had faced a similar situation when she had been promoted to echelon III following her overseas study, while her husband, who only had a high-school diploma, stayed in echelon IV until he retired. Irma speculated that the only thing that saved him from feeling insecure about this was the fact that he was still the main breadwinner because somehow he was always placed in wet offices (see the Chapter 9) while she remained in dry ones.

10.6.3 ‘I will follow him wherever he may go’: When the husband relocates

As discussed above, general civil service regulations include a special clause for women to allow them to take unpaid leave ‘to follow their husbands who have been reassigned abroad’. When the
husband is relocated to another city or region in Indonesia, some wives want to be relocated with them. A large number of couples at MOF had met at STAN. When a couple goes on to work at MOF they are not always placed in the same directorate general, in which case the wife usually asks to be transferred to where her husband is serving. If this is not possible, she may consider resigning. Either way it can create problems for the HR manager. Transferring somebody to a different location simply to join her husband creates difficulties for the organisation’s HR planning, as does losing an employee. As a rule, when people ask to be relocated from Java to other islands it is granted fairly easily as long as the destination city is not too popular. Moving to Java, and particularly Jakarta, on the other hand, can be much more difficult.

This situation affects the reputation of the female employees, although not all of them may want to move to follow their husbands. In some cases the wife is under pressure from her husband to seek relocation. Threats such as ‘If you don’t come with me, I can’t guarantee that I’ll be faithful in my new placement’ (Kartika’s husband) or even a threatening joke such as ‘Manado is known for its beautiful and attractive girls’ (Binu’s husband) suffice to make a women follow her husband regardless of the consequences for her own career.

The HR Manager of the DGTR, who claimed that her organisation had a family-friendly policy (see Chapter 8) told me that she did her best not to separate couples. This was possible, she said, if both worked in the DGTR, when she would negotiate with the Kepala Kanwil (Regional Director) closest to where the husband was placed to secure a place for the wife in a different office in the same region. The negotiation process is not always easy, however, because there is a power asymmetry: Kepala Kanwil is an echelon II position and the HR Manager is in echelon III.
This convention is not straightforward. There is another rule of the game in MOF that states that husband and wife cannot be employed in the same directorate (echelon II unit) in Jakarta or in the same office (echelon III unit) in a regional area, to avoid a conflict of interests between family and work. Since in many cases there is only one echelon III unit in a municipality, many couples still have to live separately. I was unable to find evidence of discretion being used to allow men to join their wives.

In DGTX, as I have shown, tours of duty are entirely a matter of discretion. According to the HR manager at the DGTX, relocation is heavily influenced by collusion, corruption and nepotism, and there is no scope for dealing with women who wish to relocate to be with their husbands.

When a female employee’s wish to be relocated is granted, she must be prepared to start again as a pelaksana (junior member of staff) regardless of her previous managerial level. In a future promotion round she may be able to recover her former position, although some women remain junior staff.

In an on-line group discussion on the subject of relocation among people at DGTR, one man claimed that when his wife had had to abandon her career it had been his sacrifice:

*Everybody makes sacrifices in this life. I got promoted, which means that I got better pay which benefits my family members. But to get that, I made sacrifices: being away from my family (because of relocation away from the family home). I had to do everything myself, no wife to cook for me. I also had to accept that my wife could no longer work, she had to resign from her office to look after my children now that I’m away from the family. So with her absence from paid work, I had to accept the fact that I have to shoulder all the financial burden.*
10.7 Work and the gendered life course

While for both men and women, time is continuously relational, gender difference reveals itself in the ever-shifting hierarchy of importance and the demands of lives as time slips by. (Halford and Leonard, 2006b p.134).

The previous sections have shown how gendered time and space affect the experiences of female MOF managers in multiple and complex ways. It is useful to examine how these different influences play out over their working lives and not only at specific junctures. This section draws loosely on sociological life course frameworks to explore the interplay of personal biographies, historical events, the wider environment and individual agency (Elder, 1994, Elder, 1996). A number of studies have focused on gendered aspects of the life course, observing a disconnect between occupational career structures and expectations about women’s life trajectories (Moen, 2001, Moen and Sweet, 2004):

Widening gender disparities throughout the period of career and family building, as career decisions (having a child, moving to part-time hours, leaving the workforce) result in the production and reproduction of gender, at home and at work’ (Moen and Sweet, 2004 p.214).

This section compares these effects in the lives of three women, purposively selected from the wider set of informants because the starting points for their professional lives were similar. They are of a similar age, and all began their careers at MOF in the early 1980s and therefore experienced the same flow of historical change. They worked for the same department (DGTR) and were recruited from universities as sarjana rather than through STAN.

10.7.1 Sulastri

Sulastri was only ready to make room for her career when her children were old enough:
I joined MOF once I graduated from university in 1982. Then I was promoted pretty quickly to echelon 4, still in Jakarta, in 1983. I spent years in that echelon, being rotated from one position to another but still in the same rank, and always in Jakarta. In the mid '90s I got an offer of promotion to echelon 3 which would involve relocation, and I discussed the possibility with my husband. He didn’t say no, he just tried to discuss it sensibly, I think. My argument was that I would be able to contribute to the country better if I took up the offer and worked in a higher position. His was: ‘If we’re both equally busy with our careers and work outside the house and the children are neglected, there’s a chance that they’ll become delinquent; doesn’t that mean that we aren’t contributing to society? Wouldn’t that mean that we will increase the crime in society?’ To be honest, when he said those things I could see that he had a point. In life we have to aim for the best. I think this is the best compromise. And this is also a responsibility that is no less important than my responsibility at the office.

It is interesting that Sulastri had to put forward the argument about making a ‘higher contribution to society’, which shows that her career had to be justified more than just in terms of her own self esteem.

As a consequence of this decision, Sulastri did not feel ready to be promoted and relocated until ten years later in 2005. During those ten years her husband, who worked as a widyaiswara (special trainer, see Chapter 4) in another ministry, finished his studies abroad and was promoted to the highest level in the teaching hierarchy. Sulastri’s case is broadly typical of female managers whose husbands have a prominent career in the civil service.

10.7.2 Aisyah

Aisyah, who joined MOF in the same recruitment batch and had a comparable work performance as Sulastri, accepted an offer of promotion in 1999 (later than Sulastri’s first offer) straightaway. It
required her to move out of Jakarta, where her old office and marital home were located. When asked whether her decision created tension between her and her husband, who then was a high school headmaster, she replied:

Quite the contrary: it’s my husband who always supports and pushes me to progress in my career. When I was invited to take the SPAMA test, I asked [his permission]. He asked me what the consequences would be. I said that if I passed I would do this managerial training, and when I finished I might be promoted, but the first promotion would be outside Jakarta. He said OK, as long as it wasn’t too far away so I could still come home to see the children once a week...If he hadn’t given me permission, I wouldn’t have sat the test.

Aisyah’s promotion took her to Garut, a five-hour journey from the family house in Jakarta. She was there for a year until the office was merged with the one in Sukabumi, three hours from Jakarta, of which she was head for nearly four years before she got an appointment at the same level in Jakarta. During the five years working away from her family she came home at weekends and her husband managed the children during the week with the help of a pembantu who took care of the housekeeping.

When I asked Aisyah whether she felt that she was more productive when working away from the family due to the lack of household responsibilities, she said it was quite the opposite:

When I was away, even at the office my mind often drifted to the family: I couldn’t focus 100% on the office. Since moving to Jakarta I think I do better, although I’m probably less present at home physically because of the different nature of the job. In Garut and Sukabumi I was only at the office between 7.30 and 17.00; sometimes I got back to my rented house even sooner than that. In Jakarta I leave the house much earlier and rarely get home before 8 pm. In this office if I don’t finish and clear the decks the same day I
get double the next day. I don’t want that. But it’s not a problem, because even if I get home when my children have already gone to bed I can still look at them sleeping. So I’m more relaxed and calm. When I was away, even though I had a lot of time on my hands after work I was always worried about my family.

10.7.3 Ratna

Ratna has had a different career path. She married a colleague, Timbul, also a DGTR employee, four years after joining MOF when they were based in Jakarta. Not long after they married, Timbul was promoted to an echelon 4 position which required relocation to a small town in Sumatra where Ratna could join him easily because she was still a junior.22 A couple of years later, still in Sumatra, Ratna fell pregnant with their first son and Timbul was sent to study in England. Ratna did not go with him because she did not want to trouble her husband: ‘I was about to give birth to our first child at around the time of his final exam, so rather than distracting him I chose to stay in Indonesia.’

From MOF’s point of view, Ratna had been given a concession in the sense that she was allowed to follow her husband to Sumatra. As a result her own promotion was compromised. When she did get promoted in the end she was placed in West Sumatra, but her husband had already been promoted again to Jakarta after his study abroad. She stayed in several posts in the same echelon for more than ten years, having to move around. At the time she was interviewed for this study she had just been promoted to an echelon 3 post in a small town in Central Java.

As a result of their employment with MOF, Ratna and her husband spent most of twenty years of marriage separated from each other. While Timbul managed to finish his study abroad and was promoted shortly afterwards, Ratna’s career lagged behind. When

\[22\] The more senior the position, the less flexibility in terms of placement due to the pyramid management structure. See Chapter 8 for details.
she asked the HR division why she had not been promoted, she was not given a proper explanation; she was teased that it would be inappropriate for her to have the same rank as her husband. Ratna said that there had never been tension between her and Timbul about whose career to put first and he was sympathetic about her delayed promotion: ‘He felt hurt as well to know that I was treated unfairly.’

Sulastri, Aisyah and Ratna’s narratives are typical of sarjana recruits who entered MOF in the early 1980s. Each had to resolve contradictions between the templates of their professional career path and the reproductive stage of their personal life course. While they resolved these contradictions in different ways, they were clearly expected to make more sacrifices than their husbands. Another female manager, Rita, a DGTX manager who joined MOF in early 1980, had a similar experience and described how she had to keep shifting her priorities throughout her life and career:

Year after year my priorities kept shifting. When my children were little they were my first priority. When my husband’s career started to take off I put a brake on mine – well, I was still committed to my work, I made sure I did the job well enough so I was in my boss’s good book, but at the same time [I made sure] not to excel, to avoid getting promoted, which might involve relocation...

Rita told me that she would suggest doing the same to staff who sought advice about their work-life balance:

When any of my female staff share their family problems with me, my advice is always along these lines: While you’re still young, as you are now, don’t make your career your priority. Think, and decide what’s most important in your life. You can’t have both an excellent career and a family life ... well, maybe you could, but that would be a very hard target and reaching it might stress you out, in which case both might slip out of your hands. Don’t be too ambitious in your career, just do it moderately so that you can
combine it with looking after your family. Later, when your children have grown up, you can focus on your career.

In practice, the early age of retirement for male and female MOF employees (at the age of 56 in general, or 60 in the cases of echelons I and II and widyaiswara/teachers), meant that the time left after their children had grown up to focus on their careers was very limited. This was a major constraint on their prospects of reaching a senior position.

Life course frameworks note the interplay of personal biography and the wider historical context, raising the question of whether women who joined MOF the 1980s had different experiences to those of the older women discussed so far. Broadly speaking this was not the case, although the younger women who entered MOF as sarjana more recently tended to marry later than their older colleagues, delaying the start of their childbearing years and, unlike their older colleagues, allowing them to accrue several years of professional experience before they married and had a family. This later marriage reflects a wider tendency in Javanese society, but it may also be the result of the women’s specific strategies. Their later marriage and motherhood made it possible for them to take up the opportunity of studying overseas (see table 7-2 in Chapter 7). This shows the interplay of changing social norms about the age of marriage and childbearing with specific organisational factors, as well as with the women’s agency.

Interestingly, this experience was less evident in the lives of female STAN recruits, most of whom were conservative Muslims who had opted to marry and start a family almost as soon as they completed their studies. Although they did not necessarily go on to work in ‘mothers’ offices’, few were able to progress to managerial positions. This example fits a more general pattern whereby the differences between younger and older cohorts of female managers were
generally less significant than those between STAN and sarjana recruits.

10.8 Conclusion

This chapter has explored how gendered time and space affect the experiences of female managers at MOF. It considers how their professional and non-working lives intersect, paying particular attention to their relationships with their husbands and children, in the specific context of urban Jakarta’s logistical challenges, the availability of cheap domestic labour and wider expectations about women’s domestic role. While this approach draws directly on a component of Goetz’s framework, few other studies have systematically investigated these effects, particularly in a developing country setting (amongst the few are Mustafa et al., 2012, Sumaira and Muhammad Azam, 2012, Yousof and Siegel, 1994).

The main research question addressed in this chapter is how women negotiate their gendered identities in relation to their domestic lives throughout their careers at MOF. As in most, if not all, societies, their participation in the labour market requires them to juggle their traditional gender role as home maker with their career (Guillaume and Pochic, 2009, Kim, 2008, Sumaira and Muhammad Azam, 2012, Watts, 2009). This is made more difficult by MOF’s inflexible approach to organising time and geographical space, including the requirements of tours of duty, fixed holiday dates and an open-ended overtime commitment. It is also hampered by the social expectation that a woman’s place is at home. These problems are compounded by the distance between work and home in large cities such as Jakarta, particularly in terms of the time taken to travel to and from work. The challenges are more problematic for female managers than for their male colleagues and this hinders their capacity to compete effectively in the professional sphere.
The primary means by which women navigate these challenges are by personal sacrifices (such as leaving children behind or taking on the stress of dual responsibilities) or accepting that their careers will inevitably come second to their wider social duties. Even if women are prepared to make personal sacrifices, their freedom to do so depends on their husbands’ consent. Opting out of these challenges by not marrying or not having children is heavily stigmatised and therefore does not represent a genuine alternative, no matter how highly women value their careers. Putting the family first is particularly evident during these women’s reproductive years, in keeping with the experiences of many women in developed countries (Hoser, 2012), and may include following the husband if he is relocated (Bielby and Bielby, 1992). However, for many informants in this study this prioritisation does not end once their children reach adulthood. A combination of other effects including the religious positioning of women as subordinates in marriage continues to constrain their freedom to pursue their professional ambitions, especially when their husbands also work at MOF.

Although many of the female managers in the sample experienced limited career mobility, few directly devoted substantial amounts of time to childcare or housework. Every woman that I spoke to had a pembantu or domestic helper. Some had more than one, and many also received support from their parents or parents-in-law. Acker's (1990) comments about gendered time and space mainly stem from the home-work tensions, especially childcare, that make it difficult for women to compete equally with men. In the case of MOF female employees, rather than the actual domestic work and childcare it was the social expectation that they be present in and take general responsibility for the domestic sphere that constrained their professional lives.

Many female managers had met their husbands while working at MOF or being trained at STAN. Since civil service management is normally a job for life, they found themselves working in the same
organisation as their husbands until they retired. This had several consequences: first, their husbands were part of MOF’s patriarchal work culture (examined in previous chapters), which was likely to affect their attitude towards their wives; more generally, it increased the extent of work-to-family and family-to-work spillover, as in the lives of Irma and Hesti. Rather than facilitate the work-life balance, these spillovers tend to further restrict female managers’ capacity to reconcile their different roles.

There is considerable evidence from developed countries that changing attitudes to gender roles both at home and at work have reduced the constraints on working women, particularly those in higher-level professions (see Moen, 2010 for a brief history of work, family and gender). However, in developing countries family responsibilities continue to constitute a barrier to women’s employment and good-quality jobs (ILO, 2012). This study has found little evidence that changing social norms allow women greater freedom or opportunities to navigate their domestic and professional roles. There were few obvious distinctions between women recruited in older and newer cohorts. The rise of religious conservatism over recent decades appears to have counter-balanced any liberalising effects of globalisation (Bayes and Tohidi, 2001). This was particularly evident among female STAN recruits, for whom the opportunities for balancing their work with the rest of their life were very limited.
11 Practicing what you preach? Internal organisational processes and external outcomes of gender mainstreaming in MOF

.... Why do we at the Ministry of Finance need to understand gender issues? We know that, as those responsible for allocating development funds to the technical ministries, we need to understand how the funds will be spent. What does that have to do with gender? I’ll give you an example. Suppose there is a proposal to build a community toilet in a village. We usually ask them, ‘Why do you need this much wood’? They answer: ‘Well, this is the design’. We might see that the design is for open toilet facilities where the wall does not reach the roof. In this case we can tell them, ‘That design works only for men, but women would hesitate to use such facility. Why? Some men in the village could climb up a tree and peek at these women having a shower. We don’t want that’. So there, ladies and gentlemen, is an example why we, as the government agency that examines budget proposals, need to have a gender perspective on carrying out our tasks so we won’t cross out a proposal or agree to it out of ignorance.

(Chair of the GM Team addressing the team at its first meeting of the fiscal year, 05 May 2005)

11.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a general account of efforts made to promote GM in the Indonesian MOF. It does not provide a comprehensive review of the literature on GM, which is too extensive to deal with in a single chapter. It draws on elements of the wider literature including studies of GM in other state agencies and particularly finance ministries. It focuses on a specific issue: the relationship between GM (and gender processes more generally) within an organisation and that organisation’s capacity to develop gender-friendly external policies.

GM encompasses issues of planning, implementation and the monitoring of any social, political or economic action, including addressing internal aspects of organisations. Changes in internal organisational procedures refer to ‘...changes needed in
organizations to embrace the goals and values of GM and to alter systems and procedures to meet these goals’ (Mehra and Gupta, 2006 p.3).

It is logical that any organisation should set its own house in order before it can credibly develop gender-friendly external policies. There is an implicit argument that internal organisational change is a precondition for successful GM, as quoted in Moser and Moser: ‘Could we realistically expect to achieve at the programme-level what we could not achieve in our own workplace?’ (2005 p.16).

Moser and Moser (ibid.) refer to Valk’s (2000) statement that an organisational culture which is male-dominated and male-biased in terms of recruitment, working conditions, structure and procedures represents an obstacle to GM as it discriminates against female staff and clients. The need to address internal organisational issues is identified by Rao et al (1999), Rao and Kelleher (2005a), True (2003), Hafner-Burton and Pollack (2002), Walby (2005) and Daly (2005), who believe that transformative policies for women’s empowerment can only be achieved through discursive and organisational transformation.

There are two reasons for this chapter’s focus on GM. First, it enables us to explore the last element of Goetz’s gendered archaeology of the organisation: MOF’s gendered incentive and accountability structure. Second, this focus emerges from an apparent paradox, or at least an incongruence, between MOF’s internal experiences and the external policies it generates.

Since a GM programme was first implemented at MOF there have been concrete examples of shifts towards more gender-friendly external policies. These include a change to the tax law, introduced as part of a wider tax reform, which grants married women a tax status independent of their husbands’. This has wider implications for these women’s financial status and independence. Also, MOF now requires that government ministries and departments include
explicit consideration of gender issues in all budgets submitted to it. Beyond this, there is some evidence of the GM's impact internally, including an increase in the quota of women accepted to study at STAN (albeit still well below parity with men).

Given these concrete examples of progress, at first sight MOF might even be considered a model of best GM practice. The apparent achievements of the programme are even more impressive in light of the deeply-embedded gender discrimination set out in the previous chapters.

In fact the process of GM in MOF is less straightforward and more ambiguous than these apparent successes suggest. This chapter reveals an incongruence between flawed internal GM processes (which are constrained by MOF’s organisational culture and the failure of other organisations to engage effectively with MOF) and external policies, where there is evidence of growing momentum towards gender friendliness. I explore this incongruence and its causes and consequences, both for MOF employees and for the wider Indonesian environment. This addresses an important gap in the general literature on GM. Few studies systematically examine the interface between internal and external elements of mainstreaming programmes (Dawson, 2005, Van Dueren, March 2001).

This chapter examines MOF’s gendered incentive and accountability structure as part of Goetz’s framework. However, it goes beyond the scope of her approach. Taking into consideration the level of gender discrimination demonstrated in the previous chapters, its main objective is to assess how far GM can go when the internal organisation itself is gender-discriminatory. To answer this main question the chapter is structured around the following sub-questions:

- Given the gendered organisational structure and culture, including the gendered authority structure and how MOF
approaches time and space, to what extent can GM activities help MOF to change?

- What is the history of the GM activities? How did they start? Who initiated them? How were the members chosen? Did they have an adequate budget?

- What has GM achieved internally and externally since its establishment?

- Are there any incentives for addressing gender issues at MOF?

- What structures and systems demonstrate accountability to women’s interests in the organisation and in society?

I begin with an analysis of the origins of the GM and then examine what external policy and internal changes have been achieved. This leads on to a critical analysis of the GM’s core activities that assesses the extent to which they have been the main drivers of internal and external change. The final part of the chapter considers the programme’s sustainability and scope to extend it, given the fundamental contradictions in its underlying processes.

11.2 Establishing GM in MOF

11.2.1. A MOF GM seminar

Since 2000, the year when the president decreed that government institutions must incorporate GM, UNIFEM and MOWE have invited MOF to attend all their discussions on gender. One of my informants related that she was always embarrassed because at every meeting she was asked: ‘So what about MOF? When are you going to get your act together and get moving?’ It was only in 2003 that MOF started to take concrete measures towards GM.

As a first step, MOF decided to run an internal seminar on GM. It was attended by 50 representatives, including 34 women, from all
the MOF units. Although the seminar was opened by the Secretary General and the moderator was an echelon II official from the Secretariat General, all the speakers were from outside the Ministry, being mainly from MOWE and the National Planning Agency, Bappenas. The first session was delivered by a Bappenas official and covered gender-responsive development policies with an emphasis on gender-sensitive budgeting, with reference to Indonesia’s strategic development planning system, RENSTRA. The Bappenas speaker opened his presentation with data on gender disparities in development as a result of gender-neutral planning.

Claiming that the end result of GM would be ‘kesetaraan dan keadilan gender’ (gender equality and equity), the presenter used mainly instrumentalist arguments to justify GM, arguing that female participation is essential to achieve economic development goals. He claimed that it was necessary to justify GM with these instrumentalist arguments, arguing that among MOF employees, economic concepts and jargon would be more acceptable than the language of ‘rights’.

The second session was presented by an MOWE official, who talked about gender concepts. Many MOF staff members had never heard of ‘gender’. Once the concepts of gender and GM had been

23 According to an internal archive, invitations were sent to each of the 76 units in MOF, stating that two officials (one echelon III and one echelon IV) were invited to attend. If everybody invited had come, this would have gathered 152 participants. However, the event was attended by less than a third of the invitees. Most of the regional offices outside of Java did not send a representative, mainly because the invitation was issued at short notice and there was not enough time for people to rearrange their commitments. According to a key informant, however, there was a money issue too, as travel expenses had to be met by the respective regional offices. Under the bureaucratic reform, the regional offices are allocated limited travel expenses and my informant suspected that a gender seminar was not seen as sufficiently important to justify the use of a scarce resource.

24 The terminology of ‘gender’ does not translate well into Bahasa Indonesia, as there is no such concept in the indigenous culture. As a result, ‘gender’ itself is not usually translated and is sometimes written jender. GM is translated into Bahasa Indonesia as ‘pengarusutamaan gender’. Pengarusutamaan is a word especially created to translate
introduced, MOWE presentation quickly moved on to cultural aspects of gender roles and blamed the patriarchy (another unfamiliar concept for the bureaucrats) for all gender gaps. While this may be a core belief of radical feminists, discussing it in an introduction to gender concepts may not be effective, especially when dealing with bureaucrats from whom a certain degree of resistance was to be expected.

Since many in the audience had not heard the term ‘gender’ before, one would think that a session explaining what it means would have been held before the discussion about gender-sensitive budgeting. The organising committee explained that they preferred to present things in this order: Bappenas was concerned that people would not stay for the second session if they found the first one boring. They deliberately ran the session on gender budgeting first because they knew the speaker would use the language of economics, which was familiar to everybody in the room. The audience could learn what gender is in detail once they had appreciated how it relates to their work.25

The minutes of the discussion show that the participants took three major positions: supporters who realised that a GM was needed, given the male-dominated internal bureaucracy and the role of MOF in public policy making; opponents, who thought that gender issues were the core business of MOWE and that MOF was busy enough carrying out its own tasks. With reference to the internal policy of limiting women’s access to MOF, these people considered that female employees tended to create additional work for the HR department in terms of promotion and relocation. They strongly believed that if women do not reach the top managerial levels it must be because they have opted out as a matter of personal choice mainstreaming literally. Not only this is a newly-created word but it is also difficult to pronounce.

25 Later in this chapter, in a discussion of power dynamics between government institutions, I will show that MOF considered Bappenas an equal partner, as staff there were conversant in economics and financial issues. MOF tended to look down on MOWE as its staff were not.
and that those who had managed to occupy the top positions did not need the help of a gender policy. The third group consisted of sceptics who saw the necessity for a GM but were sceptical about its prospects, given the male domination of MOF’s bureaucracy.

In the end, the GM supporters won the argument despite their small number, not because they had convinced the others of the necessity of a GM but simply because the GM was decreed by law. It was decided that MOF needed a GM Team. The Planning and Finance Bureau, an echelon II unit under the Secretariat General of MOF, would be MOF’s Sector Focal Point (FP), and in each echelon I unit there would be a Finance Sub-Sector FP.

11.2.2. Putting the team together

The first step was the creation of a GM Team which was planned to be the embryo of the gender focal point and working groups. It is common in Indonesia’s bureaucratic structure to form an ad-hoc team or committee such as this to perform a specific task that requires a matrix of people from different units. Such teams usually have a lifespan of a year and can be renewed in the next fiscal year if required (see the discussion of the Distance Learning Programme in Chapter 7).

The GM TEAM had its own bureaucratic structure consisting of a director, chair, coordinator, secretary, 17 FPs and 8 administrative supporters. In total, 29 people were involved in the GM TEAM every year and each was given a monthly honorarium that varied according their position in the team. The size of such monthly honoraria depends heavily on the type of project being run; in this case the GM TEAM was paid IDR300,000-600,000 (GBP25-50) a month according to position. This represented around 15% of their basic civil servant salary.

In theory anybody can head a team: it is the expertise that counts and not position or seniority. So an echelon III official could be the
head of the team presiding over a number of echelon II team members. In practice, however, since the hierarchy in this team has financial consequences and because of Indonesia’s style of bureaucracy (see Chapter 4), the structure of the team tends to mirror the structure of the wider bureaucracy. As the team was placed under the auspices of the Secretariat General, the Secretary General became the director of the GM TEAM. The chair was the head of the Planning and Finance Bureau (an echelon II unit in the Secretariat General), which would be the FP and deal with the allocated budget. The coordinator was the head of the Programme Planning Division, an echelon III unit where the actions were to be carried out, and therefore the administrative staff were taken from the same division.

There were team members representing each of MOF’s echelon I units, who were also expected to be the gender FPs in their units, plus three people from the Programme Planning Division who were responsible for planning and managing GM activities. The letter from the Secretary General to the head of each echelon I unit stated that each unit should ideally send their respective Head of Planning (an echelon III unit under the Secretary of the respective department) to join the team, as the Planning Division was seen as a strategic post to start the GM process. So in theory the GM TEAM consisted of 8 women and 21 men selected according to their formal, structural managerial levels (Table 11-1). Representatives from Bappenas and MOWE were also on the team as consultants and coordinators. In the end, some units sent their HR Manager and some their Planning Manager, all echelon III officials.
Table 11-1 GM Team Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focal Points</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative/supporting team</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 17 FP, four were from the Planning and Finance Bureau. There was initial discussion about whether a gender quota should be set for team membership, as MOF’s managerial levels were all dominated by men. In the end it was decided to let the GM TEAM have more men than women. The main argument was that since MOF had more male than female employees, gender issues would be taken more seriously. It was argued that if the FPs were men it would be easier to convince other men about gender issues. Another argument was that the GM would otherwise be seen as women crying for help, which would be counterproductive.

While it is indeed important to include men in every mainstreaming programme (see, for example, Pearson, 2000), forming a male-dominated team chosen from men in a male-dominated institution runs the risk of the overall process being dominated by male interests and thus subverting the original ideas behind the GM. An example of this phenomenon is provided by Suzanne Clisby with reference to the Law of Popular Participation in Bolivia (Clisby, 2005).

11.2.3. **Terms of Reference**

Box 1 sets out the terms of reference (TORs) for MOF’s GM, translated verbatim.
Box 11. 1 GM Terms of Reference

Efforts to optimize the participation of women in the Ministry of Finance can be implemented through an integrative, participatory and adapted Gender Empowerment program. To address gender disparities in the Ministry of Finance, all policies, programs, projects and activities carried out by the Ministry in the present and the future should integrate experiences, aspirations, needs and problems of both men and women in the process of planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

To achieve this, the following is needed:
1. Understanding of gender issues and a gender perspective should be mainstreamed in all tasks and functions of the Ministry of Finance.
2. To ensure that gender bias does not occur during implementation of policies at the Ministry of Finance, a unified gender vision should be built, through awareness-raising among policy makers.
3. A sense of collaboration should be developed among operational level staff and stakeholders in the implementation of gender sensitive policies.

To achieve these goals, the following steps are needed:
1. Dissemination of GM at national and regional levels through several activities including: Capacity building, Gender Analysis Pathway (GAP) training, and Policy Outlook and Plan of Action (POP).
2. All MOF employees, especially the policy makers, should understand GM, including knowing what is meant by gender, how to address gender disparities, how to do gender sensitive planning, and how to carry out monitoring and evaluation of these activities.
3. In order to disseminate GM concepts, there should be gender advocacy and GM training for managers in MOF. Gender advocacy refers to a communication process aimed at decision makers and policy makers, to influence them to make better and more appropriate policies which will increase the quality of life of MOF employees. The GM training is aimed at building the capacity and will to integrate gender elements into policies and development programs – so that GMP can be carried out effectively.
4. GAP analysis is needed to formulate gender responsive policies, which should then be followed by gender responsive policy formulation, its plan of action, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.
5. These steps can be implemented in many ways, including through training, seminars, workshops, and other methods.

These TORs come across as somewhat vague, aspirational and incoherent. Although it was mentioned that MOF’s GM would be integrative, participatory and adapted to the tasks and functions of MOF, the TORs are not tailor-made for MOF’s task and functions.
Instead, they are generic and do not specify the potential role of MOF in addressing gender disparities in Indonesian society through its policies, let alone recognise that some of these policies may exacerbate the gender gap.

From the first line of the TORs, it seems that the ultimate goal of the GM is internally-oriented, i.e. to ‘optimise the participation of women in MOF’ and ‘to address the gender disparities in MOF’. This sounds promising if we take into account the male domination of MOF’s bureaucratic structure discussed in the previous chapters. The problem, however, is that this is not properly followed through in steps to achieve these goals, which focus instead, on MOF’s external tasks.

There are no clear priorities, let alone step-by-step implementation guidelines. What are called ‘steps’ in the third paragraph onwards are not all steps in the usual sense of the word, apart from the first bulleted item about dissemination. Even there, it is unclear whether dissemination should involve GM itself or make use of gender lenses in development.

There is no mention of how the GM is to be monitored or evaluated, or who is responsible for this task. The fact that GM is described as a programme under the auspices of the Secretariat General implies that the whole project is accountable to the Secretary General in person. Every year at the end of each fiscal period the team has to produce a report on what it has achieved and how the budget has been spent. As with every project and programme run by Indonesia’s ministries and agencies, this is subject to scrutiny by BPK and BPKP as external auditors and the Inspectorate General as internal auditors.

Describing GM as a “programme” was problematic, because it implies that it is a separate, add-on activity. This runs counter to the ethos of mainstreaming.
Having an unclear and incoherent set of TORs is not unique to GM. TORs are mainly drafted to secure funding, as they are subject to scrutiny by the people who review budgets. Sometimes when a project is deemed necessary and granted funds the submission of TORs is only a formality. In this case, the TORs are reviewed during the execution of the programme to match activities to the budget but not to consider the actual activities (for example, how many meetings, how many people travelling, how many pages of reports and the respective costs). Until recently, the Indonesian government’s auditing system was limited to financial matters and did not take into account the substance of the activities. In this system what matters is that the procedure has been followed and the spending does not exceed the budget: only then may the substance be considered.

11.2.4. Budget

Once it was decided that the GM would go ahead, it was included in the budget proposal for 2004, the next fiscal year. Of the IDR 127,890,000 (GBP 8,142) proposed, the amount agreed was IDR 89,700,000 (GBP 5,710) (see Table 11-2). The budget for the GM Team covers not only the cost of developing materials and paying speakers, instructors and tutors but also the honoraria of the team members.
Table 11-2 GM Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total MOF budget</th>
<th>GM budget proposal</th>
<th>GM budget</th>
<th>Percentage of total MOF budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>USD 332,924,816.95</td>
<td>USD 14,307.21</td>
<td>USD 10,035</td>
<td>0.0030%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>USD 373,147,490.60</td>
<td>USD 21,498.77</td>
<td>USD 10,351</td>
<td>0.0028%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>USD 564,125,052.98</td>
<td>USD 33,386.77</td>
<td>USD 24,227</td>
<td>0.0043%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>USD 1,051,055,683.19</td>
<td>USD 52,439.56</td>
<td>USD 42,578</td>
<td>0.0041%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>USD 1,066,938,860.73</td>
<td>USD 54,001.03</td>
<td>USD 42,605</td>
<td>0.0040%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USD to IDR exchange rate is based on the World Bank’s World Development Indicator at the time of the fieldwork.

Table 11-2 shows that the amount channelled to GM activities in 2004 was USD 10,035, 0.0030% of total MOF expenditure that year. This brings MOF’s commitment to GM into question. It might be argued that USD 10,035 is not a negligible amount of money, if spent well. However, more than half of the budget was spent on honoraria. There was a significant budget increase from 2006 to 2007, but this was mainly due to a doubling of the honorarium rate.

With half of the budget already spent on honoraria, the rest of the money was spent on training and other forms of dissemination relating to gender equality. ‘Training’ here refers mostly to activities run by MOWE, Bappenas or its NGO partners. Section 11.4 provides more details about these activities. First I discuss the achievements of the GM since its establishment.

11.3 External and internal policy changes

11.3.1 Revision of the Draft of Income Tax Law

According to the old Income Tax Law, on marriage a woman who does not have a prenuptial agreement must contact her local tax office and ask the tax officials to remove her tax identity number (TIN) and merge her tax reporting with that of her husband. This was considered as one of the factors that inhibit women’s economic
empowerment, as without an independent tax identity they could not access a bank loan. After considering the inputs from the GM TEAM this regulation was changed, and since 2008 a married woman no longer needs a prenuptial agreement to be able to have her own TIN if she wants it. While the default position is still that the TIN belongs to the husband as head of the household, wives are at least permitted to apply for their own. If they do this, the calculation of the income tax is the same as if they had a pre-nuptial agreement.

The revision to the tax law was made while I was doing my fieldwork. Consequently, I was able to observe parts of the decision-making process at first hand. The identification of the gender bias in the old Tax Law did not come directly from MOF’s GM TEAM but from a researcher at the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia (FE-UI), whose report was read by the GM TEAM. In 2007 income tax law was being revised as part of the bureaucratic reform. The GM TEAM felt that this created an opportunity to advise the tax reform team to address this gender concern. To clarify the matter and gather evidence about the gender bias in the tax law, they opened a dialogue with the FE-UI researcher. The GM TEAM held a meeting of the FPs, the Tax Reform Team, MOWE and Bappenas representatives and the FE-UI researcher.

I was present at this meeting and some others related to the tax revision, as both a participant and an observer. My notes on these meetings reveal a process that was more ambivalent. They suggested that the fundamental attitude towards gender issues of those present from MOF was no different from that described in the previous chapters.

Below is a snapshot of one these meetings, drawn from my personal research notes:

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26 My role as a participant was related to the fact that during my fieldwork period I was often asked to advise the GM Team.
GM meeting, 25/05/2005.

On the agenda is an item to discuss the taxation law, which was said to be gender biased. It started with a discussion about the tax law and how it was seen as gender unfriendly. The regulation then obliged that upon marriage, a professional woman should join her husband’s TIN (tax identity number), unless they had a pre-nuptial agreement.....Suddenly the Head of the Planning Bureau got up and started speaking about gender and why MOF needed to have a GM TEAM. This was not on the agenda of the meeting itself. He talked about the budget to make community toilets in villages and that they had to be entirely enclosed so that nobody would look at women having a shower: he said ‘this is gender budgeting’.

I have been in three meetings with him over recent months and for some reason he always used this toilet example. He spoke for half an hour, about gender and how he valued women, etc. The next half an hour, there was still no word on the gender bias in the taxation law coming from him. Then, five minutes later, he left, saying that he was needed by the Boss to discuss something else, but he wished us luck.

I suggested that the team should see the draft of the newly proposed Income Tax Law, to be able to comment on it in detail. The GM member from the DGTK (Tax FP), however, doubted that we would be allowed to see it, considering the confidentiality of the draft. The GM TEAM could only send a recommendation letter to the team responsible for the income tax law amendment.

But then it occurred to the members that the GM TEAM’s position might not be strong enough to give such a recommendation, and somebody suggested that a letter be sent from the FE-UI and another from Bappenas. Both representatives raised their eyebrows: they said that in their institutions a memo would have been enough to deal with such a matter, as they ‘were not so bureaucratic’. In other words, they refused to provide MOF team with a supporting letter.

The Customs and Excise FP raised another issue that he considered relevant to the subject being discussed. He mentioned that their patrol ships were mainly crewed by men. He said the main reason was because those ships did not have toilets, so they all had to relieve themselves in the sea. This was not possible for women, so women were just not invited to join. But then there was a complaint from the association of female captains. In the end the Custom and Excise Office had to negotiate the situation with the PT PAL, the company that makes the ships, to renovate their ship and put a proper toilet in those ships.

Suddenly the Chair of the GM came back from his other meeting. He interrupted: ‘Well yes this is complicated isn’t it. Sometimes there are jobs that we don’t want to assign to a woman, just because we don’t have the heart to do so, even if the woman is willing to do the job, for example, ship welding. It is a difficult and dangerous job, I don’t want my wife or my daughter to be told to do that, so why would I tell somebody’s wife to do it?’
During the meeting there was a sense of rejection from the Tax GFP about the tax revision proposal. She repeatedly made statements such as: ‘Well, it isn’t a problem at all if we want to let those women have a TIN separately from their husbands, but are they really ready to complete the tax return? Is the whole idea not giving women more of a burden?’

I found it interesting that the Tax FP was referring to the burden on women of having to complete a tax return. She was thinking of the question of ‘which women’, and this is an important exercise to think about gender issues. If done properly, this exercise could come out with ‘how can we help those poor and uneducated women – as well as men – with filling out their tax returns?’ Unfortunately, this was not where the argument was leading: it was just mentioned to dismiss the idea of giving women a separate TIN from their husbands.

Although this particular meeting ended in deadlock, in the end, despite the reluctance and hesitation of the GM Team, whose members were not confident that their voice would be heard, the team drafted several letters. These included a letter from the team coordinator to the Chair reporting the meeting and the suggested change to the Tax Law, which led to a draft letter signed by the Chair to the Secretary General and a draft letter signed by the Secretary General to the Director General of Tax for the attention of the Tax Reform Team. As a result, the clause was changed and women could choose whether or not they would join their husband’s tax code.

11.3.2. Gender-responsive Budgeting

Another important external policy was gender-responsive budgeting. In 2009, MOF decreed its Finance Minister’s Decree (PMK) No. 119/2009, which stipulates that every ministry and agency must
include a gender budget statement when proposing budgets and
detailing how the proposed budget will affect men and women as
beneficiaries. This is an important step, as it ensures that
budgeting, part of MOF’s core business, will contribute to gender
equality and the fulfilment of women’s rights. If done properly,
gender-responsive budgeting should identify the interventions
needed to address the gender gaps in ministerial policies, plans and
budgets (Barkat and Nazme, 2005, Budlender, 2002, Budlender and
Networking Programme, 2004, Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre

By the time this policy had been discussed I was no longer in
Indonesia, so could not directly observe the informal processes and
discussions behind this reform.

PMK No. 119/2009 has been implemented gradually since 2010,
with seven government ministries and agencies (the Ministry of
Agriculture, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Health, Ministry
of National Education, MOGE, MOF and Bappenas) promoting
gender-responsive budgets as a pilot project. While the first four
ministries act as service providers, the other three are drivers of
wider policy frameworks.

Defining MOF and Bappenas as drivers in the national GM
mechanism puts them on the same level as the national machinery.
This was one of the recommendations of various donor
organisations as well as independent consultants (Asian
Development Bank, 2006, Cattleya, 2006). Nevertheless, it took a
while for MOF to accept this strategy.

In 2007, when gender budgeting was being discussed, one of the
informants told me that there was concern among top officials that
putting the word ‘gender’ in the budget proposal requirement would
create an opportunity for people in the units with the lowest
budgets to ask for more money ‘in the name of gender [i.e. to form a
gender FP, working groups, doing advocacy, training and other activities] while the benefit was still unclear’. While there was no clear evidence that such a cost inflation occurred when GM was established in other government organisations, it took years of hesitation on MOF’s part before this regulation was finally decreed. Other projects, programmes and activities that cost the bureaucracy a large amount of money were implemented on schedule.

During my fieldwork period most MOF employees expressed their opinion that MOF’s role was just as a cashier: it makes payments as requested by the government agencies that propose the budgets, and gender budgeting exercises are more the responsibility of social sector ministries. The fact that two years after my fieldwork period this gender-responsive budgeting statement became an official requirement in the budget proposal mechanism is a big step for the rest of the Indonesian bureaucracy, as it will require every ministry to apply a gender perspective when proposing the budget. The likely impacts on these changes are discussed towards the end of this chapter.

In the six years since its inception, the GM effort has made progress in ‘doing gender’ in MOF’s core functions and these changes will have impacted on the wider society. The next section looks at the extent to which the GM affected MOF’s internal handling of gender issues.

### 11.3.3. *STAN’s intake of women*

The third concrete policy that related to the GM was an increase in the number of women recruited to STAN. As seen in Chapter 5, every year more than 1,000 women were denied access to employment at MOF and their seats were transferred to men. This policy was changed in 2010 when STAN increased the proportion of female recruits to from 15% to 22%. The policy process, however, was quite different from those for the two external policies discussed above.
During my fieldwork period I found that not everyone had realised the degree of gender discrimination occurring during the recruitment process: some assumed that the limited number of women recruited was a result of a fair hiring process (i.e. only a few women passed the recruitment test). Others knew about the policy but did not consider it gender discrimination.

When I raised this issue at a GM Team meeting, TA FP firmly said that we should not be ‘airing our dirty laundry’ in the presence of people from outside MOF (there was one person from MOWE attending). When the issue was raised again after MOWE person had gone, the majority of the GM Team agreed that it was difficult to change this situation ‘because it was the women themselves who make it difficult for MOF to employ them’.

According to an informant, this was raised again at a 2009 meeting in which MOF was deciding how many people to admit to STAN in 2010. The female Minister of Finance mentioned that she was being pressured by Parliament to open STAN’s door to more women. As discussed in section 11.2.2, GM Team members consist mainly of the planning or HR managers of each echelon I unit. This particular meeting involved planning managers and HR managers in their managerial capacity rather than as GM FPs, in which latter capacity they had been exposed to complaints from the parliament about gender discrimination in STAN recruitment. After a lengthy discussion they agreed to increase the maximum female intake from 15% to 30%. In practice, however, only 22% of recruits in subsequent rounds were women.

As outlined in MOF’s GM terms of reference, in addition to external policies the GM is intended to address internal issues. But to what extent can we interpret ‘MOF policy makers should understand GM, including how to address gender disparities, how to do gender-sensitive planning’ [point 2 of the steps in the TORs] as addressing
gender gaps in recruitment, promotion and other human resource development issues?

This example indicates that not only are the TORs vague but also that they are not necessarily pursued. This is not just a case of policy evaporation due to neglect, but the result of MOF staff themselves feeling strongly about not employing and promoting women. Some of my informants mentioned that the people running the GM (mostly men) did not feel that the programme was primarily concerned with what went on in their own organisation.

According to one of my informants, people were also disinterested because, as the men of MOF bureaucracy put it, they could not see what was in it for them. They had been told that GM was not focused on women’s welfare only but on both men and women’s. They could see that this might be true as far as a programme to mainstream gender in poverty alleviation is concerned, for example. Yet they felt that GM in their internal HR policy would only benefit women. I have discussed the hostile attitudes of many men in MOF towards women because they felt that women had a good deal by not being posted to remote areas. According to my informants, even some of the male FPs did not understand why internal change was needed. They were afraid that GM would help women to take over their managerial positions without having to do tours of duty in remote areas. Until they can be convinced that GM will benefit them too, they will not be persuaded to employ this strategy.

The previous chapters have demonstrated the extent to which gendered processes in MOF limit female employees’ ability to achieve their potential compared to their male colleagues. Ines Smyth (in Smyth and Turquet, 2012) argues that feminist bureaucrats must persevere in tackling obstacles and areas of persistence. She provides an interesting account of the internal organisational processes at the Asian Development Bank, where she worked for a year. She was more confident of inducing changes in
her limited sphere of influence than more generally across the Bank, and hoped that introducing less rigid and authoritarian relationships with her staff and other workers would encourage debate around gender issues. The same strategy might be attempted at MOF, whereby an agent of change develops a gradual and indirect approach to promoting gender equality rather than directly challenging gendered practices from the beginning.

The change to STAN recruiting and the two external policies discussed in the previous section demonstrate that some progress has been made in promoting gender-friendly policies. Yet this has occurred in spite of and not because of the attitudes of MOF policymakers. As the national advisor/coordinator for GM, MOWE itself never raised the importance of linking internal issues with the whole effort of mainstreaming gender into the Ministry’s tasks. This is a gap that needs to be addressed, not least because in MOWE’s Five Year Strategic Plan one of the intended outputs from ‘female representation in politics and decision making positions’ is ‘an increased number of women in executive positions’.

Studies on GM activities in African NGOs and projects point out that one of the key factors contributing to effective GM is that gender is embraced in its fullest application to both sexes, not just to women or men as targets or obstacles but rather as partners; proactively hired women for senior level positions, hired young women and supported non-traditional roles for women’ (Mehra and Gupta, 2006 p.9).

11.4 Mainstreaming activities

In all the interviews I conducted for my fieldwork, I asked informants whether they had heard about the GM activities and what they thought of them. The answer was revealing: after three years almost no one at MOF other than members of the GM TEAM had heard of the GM. This section reviews the GM’s efforts to inform
and change attitudes at MOF and identifies the reasons for its limited effectiveness.

11.4.1. **Advocacy for top-level management**

According to the TORs, gender advocacy is ‘a communication process aimed at decision makers and policy makers, to influence them to make better and more appropriate policies that will increase the quality of life of MOF employees’.

Gender advocacy for decision takers and policy makers at MOF is mainly conducted in the form of in-house workshops several times a year, with echelon II officials the main target. All the presenters/speakers are from Bappenas and MOWE; none are from MOF itself.

The material delivered introduced gender concepts and explained why they are an important issue for consideration in development. Instrumentalist arguments were maintained throughout these sessions. The presenters realised that if they used women’s rights as part of a human rights justification they would be countered by the ‘female responsibilities’ discourse, especially from a religious perspective. Unfortunately, even the instrumentalist argument was challenged by the audience, using anecdotal examples of low female productivity due to childbearing and rearing.

Because they prefer focus group discussions in small groups and there are around 200 echelon II officials in the whole of MOF, the workshops were run in batches. Staff turnover as a result of retirement and promotion added to the complexity of this job. Once a batch had been sensitised, delegates were invited to participate in a discussion on appropriate implementation at MOF.

By the time I finished my fieldwork, there had been two focus group discussions (FGDs). One involved some MOF echelon II officials for advocacy purposes and the other involved gender FPs. The internal MOWE report states: ‘There has been some positive effort by MOF to
implement GM, although the phenomenon of gender-neutral and gender biased thinking still lingers among the high level officials’. According to MOWE report, although all MOF’s officials agreed with the effort to achieve gender equality, they were of the opinion that development is a gender-neutral process and development results trickle down automatically to the whole of society, regardless of gender. With this view they were resistant to the idea of including gender analysis in the planning process and they associated affirmative action with radical feminism. They did not seem to realise that some of their policies actually embrace affirmative action for men as the preferred sex for employment and promotion. Their resistance was also apparent in how they insisted that their role in state budgeting was only as cashiers. The MOWE report on the gender FPs’ FGD was more positive, saying that they agreed and understood that gender must be mainstreamed in development processes.

My interview with an MOF official about three months after the last FGD provided a different perspective. Not all the participants had been happy about the form of training and dissemination. An echelon II official I interviewed said that he had been deeply offended by how the workshop had been conducted. He said that the presenters might talk like that to illiterate people in village meetings, but surely they could have adapted their presentation for the directors.

When I investigated further it turned out that on that particular occasion the focus group discussion was facilitated by a representative of a local Women’s NGO. There was a stereotypical cultural clash between the government bureaucrats and NGO representatives, the former being formal and bureaucratic and the latter used to an informal style. The NGO facilitator was a confident young woman who treated the bureaucrats as her equals. They, however, were not used to being addressed with any less than the ultimate respect and felt patronised. From the very beginning, the
chemistry was not good, and this continued until the session finished. According to the organiser, it was a waste of time: instead of being enlightened about gender perspectives the directors felt humiliated.

One of the participants told me in an interview: *I was so bored. I couldn’t wait to get out of the room. It was not linked to our job description in any way, and the presenter was so patronising...’*, while another said:

*I don’t think that session was run as it should have been, the facilitator was so smug and disrespectful, she did not appreciate that some of us might have had a western education and therefore have rubbed shoulders with these gender justice themes. I think I have been gender-fair in these years leading the office. That’s why I always disagree with the way STAN recruitment discriminates against women. I think we should just keep access open to both sexes and apply no barriers, so there will be fair competition. That’s why I disagree with the quota system that they want to have in Parliament, reserving thirty per cent of seats for women. I think we just open the door and welcome whoever wants to come in.*

It was clear that the session did not achieve what was intended. The participants I spoke to could not see past their sentiments about the facilitator to appreciate the need to integrate gender issues into their work. The official who considered himself knowledgeable about gender justice assumed that gender-neutral policy was gender-just rather than gender-blind.

11.4.2. Training of Trainers

Once a year, ‘training of trainers’ (TOT) on gender issues is provided for the GM TEAM FPs. The core team set up the training programme using trainers from MOWE and Bappenas, as well as academics and religious scholars recommended by MOWE or Bappenas. The
training sessions are run in a hotel for several days, with participants’ accommodation funded by MOF.

I attended one of these TOTs. The first part of the session was a presentation followed by questions and discussion. Training materials included information about gender theory and concepts, the gender gaps in various development sectors, GM and gender analysis techniques. MOWE seemed to use a standard format and materials for presentations at every session and did not alter it to suit the audience. The idea was that MOWE was the coordinator and advisor; the respective ministries would then tailor their GMs according to their core tasks and job descriptions. Even so, MOWE’s role as coordinator and advisor should put other government agencies in a position where they can turn to MOWE for advice when in need. MOWE simply did not have any idea what MOF did, and even when the participants had elaborated their unit’s core tasks, it could not help them to develop their case studies, let alone come up with a specific programme for each unit. This situation is not unique to MOF; in Chapter 5 the section on GM in other departments related some telling stories about MOWE’s inability to perform as the national machinery for GM.

Here are some excerpts taken from my field notes:

*During the presentation of gender analysis techniques, the MOWE presenter referred to the Ministry of Education or Health or other service ministries. MOF’s GM TEAM, however, objected to these examples and said, ‘Could you please give an example that will suit us and our job? We can see how this is important, but this is not our job’. When the presenter produced a slide of gender disparity in manpower, it turned out that he did not do the sums in the table correctly. Somebody asked (being a typical economist), ‘how did you work out that percentage?’ The presenter was very defensive, and said: ‘It doesn’t matter how the percentage was worked out’. Then*
the arguments started: ‘Well of course it matters’. This kind of dynamic was maintained during the whole TOT.

Another trainer started his session by inviting the participants to sing the song *Sangkar Madu* (Honey Cage) with him, with the following lyrics:

*Women have been oppressed by men for decades*  
*They were seen as an adornment, imprisoned in a honey-filled cage.*  
*Nevertheless, there is a time when men are made helpless,*  
*Down on their knees, cornered by a woman’s glance.*

The message of this song, according to the trainer, is that despite the history of women’s oppression, men are not stronger than women when they fall in love. Needless to say, this song is inappropriate for a gender training session. When I made this point to him he replied that it was the most appropriate song he could find.

In the following TOT session, the issue of gender from a religious perspective was raised. This was important, as religious arguments, especially Islamic ones, are frequently used to justify male domination. Previous workshops and discussions had not identified any issues related to other religions. From an Islamic perspective, however, there was always a heated discussion about how Islam sees women.27

The session I attended was presented by a MOWE representative whose specialist area was gender and Islam. Her presentation explored how, contrary to what many people currently believe, Islam is a gender-friendly religion and that the Koran should be interpreted contextually. She raised the issue of polygamy and how

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27 This may have been because the participants in these sessions were exclusively Muslim. An alternative explanation is that other religions were seen as fundamentally less problematic in terms of gender issues.
the Koran restricts the number of wives a man can have. Historically, she said, this was because before Muhammad’s time men would sometimes have more than ten wives. Consequently, having four should be seen as “instead of a hundred” rather than “instead of just one”.

Up to this point, people were listening, but when she declared that women could be imams and lead prayers the participants started to appear uneasy. The room felt heavy with disapproving silence and the participants looked at each other and frowned, but nothing was said. During the break all the participants, both male and female, agreed that the presenter had gone too far in making this suggestion.

The speakers recommended by MOWE were relatively liberal Muslim scholars who read the Koranic verses with an open interpretation and detached them from Arabic cultural traits. The majority of Muslims at MOF were conservative and believed that men were bound to be superior to women and hence had the status of household head. Instead of opening their eyes to ‘alternatives’ to traditional gender relations, this advocacy based on liberal interpretations incensed the men, especially when the speaker was a woman.

The TOT was meant to enable the GM members to disseminate the idea of gender equality to other MOF employees. In the end it was the only form of training given to the GFPs. In general, training seems to have been the main, if not the sole activity in MOF’s GM. A similar situation is reported in other South East Asian countries where lack of political will causes ‘policy evaporation’ when it comes to implementation (Kusakabe, 2005).

11.4.3. **Dissemination to regional offices**

After being trained, the GM TEAM members were sent to MOF’s regional offices to disseminate what they had learnt. The core team
had prepared materials for the members to present. Dissemination events usually took place in a local MOF assembly hall (GKN), attended by the lower and mid-managerial levels – echelon IV and III – from all MOF offices in that region. I attended these activities on several occasions as a participant-observer.

The event itself was like a big seminar, with two GM TEAM presenters sitting on a raised stage. Normally the Kepala Kanwil (Regional Director) an echelon II regional official, opened the session and left shortly afterwards. The issues disseminated at these sessions were exactly the topics covered in the TOT: the theory and concept of gender, the gender gaps in various development sectors, GM concepts and gender analysis techniques in development.

Apart from disseminating the idea of gender equality, these events were also used to gather information on what MOF employees thought about gender issues in their respective units. The results of this data gathering were to be used for GM activities at MOF. They included data on whether MOF employees thought selected MOF policies were gender-biased. Data were collected before and after the training sessions to assess the impact of the training, and usually indicated clearer understanding of the difference between sex and gender. There was, however, no evidence of change in what the participants thought about gender roles as prescribed by their religion. Responses included statements like ‘God said that men are superior to women and as believers we must accept that’ and ‘God has given men authority to lead the family’.

As a team member between late 2004 and early 2005 and also doing my fieldwork, I often found that other team members complained that they did not feel confident enough to give a presentation in regional offices ‘preaching’ about gender. They claimed that the TOT sessions had not prepared them sufficiently. One team member said: ‘I feel as if I’ve just finished primary school and immediately have to teach in that school’.
Three years after my fieldwork period, I conducted several telephone and email follow-up interviews with my informants to update my data on the GM effort at MOF. Half of the gender mainstreaming team members had been replaced since 2003. While activities still centred on training and dissemination to regional offices, I was expecting that those who had been doing this since 2003 would have gained more technical expertise. Rani, who had been a member since 2003, told me:

*I’m so bored now. We’ve been here for the last seven years. Some offices have changed their GFP and some are still the old people. But apart from that, nothing has changed. The Planning Bureau still invites us to attend training sessions at least a couple of times a year, but even the training materials haven’t changed. The trainers might change, but the material is the same – the same PowerPoint presentation, the same picture, even the same song. You remember that lady with the PowerPoint with the picture of a stork? It’s still there – would you believe it?*

As standard practice at the end of training, workshops or presentations the participants are given a CD containing all the training materials plus reading suggestions. Rani forwarded me the content of the CD for the latest training session so that I could compare it to the one used when I was in Indonesia. Nothing had changed, apart from the dates on the slides.

So how much progress have the FPs made in promoting the GM? From the beginning it was not clear what they were expected to do in their units, apart from collecting information to take into the GM meetings. According to Arum, who had been a GFP/GM TEAM at the Training Office for the last three years:

*I’ve been to most of their trainings and workshops and you name it. But I still can’t put my finger on this gender stuff. I don’t think people explain things very clearly here. For example, that consultant from*
Indonesian Science Institute LIPI – she’s taught us three times and she always uses not just the same format but even the same slides. I think people from MOWE cannot appreciate our work so they can’t help us. Last year we had some training on gender budgets with a person from the Netherlands. They gave us some tools for analysis, eight or nine, I can’t remember, then we had to choose whichever suited us best, or, as she said, we might want to adapt it to suit our organisation. It’s that level of discussion.

This excerpt suggests that Arum did not feel she belonged to the GM but saw herself as a passive member who did as she was told, attending training, workshops, etc. It emphasises the need for training to be ‘made specific or tailored to operational activities, clearly demonstrating its relevance to the work that people do’ (Moser and Moser, 2005 p.17).

Some team members complained about the lack of time available for the work:

These days I’m just too busy. With the bureaucratic reform and other things, as the head of the planning division I often have to attend meetings which frequently clash with the GM meetings arranged by the Planning Bureau. Of course I can’t escape the meeting that I’ve invited people to, so I’ve got no choice but to miss the gender one. This sort of thing has happened several times now. I’m just so busy doing other things. I can’t dedicate all my time, energy and intellectual capacity just to do gender, that’s not my job title ...

No specific tasks and targets were given to the FPs. A working group was not established until the beginning of 2010, and even then it was just a shadow of the GM TEAM. The heads of the Planning Division who made up the GM TEAM were always busy and could not attend meetings, which was the main reason for forming the working team. The new team consisted of echelon IV staff based in
the Planning Division – the subordinates of the Head of Planning Division. By mid-2010, the working team’s main job was to develop a training material handbook for the purpose of GM at MOF. This ‘project’ has been planned since the implementation of GM in 2004. Without a handbook, the FPs are forced to rely on MOWE’s presentations, most of which are irrelevant to MOF.

Even if there were a clear job description and target for FPs it would be impossible to ask one person to be in charge of GM for a whole echelon I unit, which in the DGTX, for example, employs about 32,000 people. This becomes even more impossible when the FP is already overburdened with other aspects of their job. The scenario gets worse when the FP delegates tasks (for example attending GM TEAM meetings, as often happened) to a subordinate echelon IV official who also has many other responsibilities. As previously mentioned, in the Indonesian bureaucracy, and especially at MOF, hierarchy is very important. How can an untrained junior manager be expected to convince seniors about an issue on which nearly everybody already had a strong opinion? Political commitment from the upper echelon and a top-down approach are needed in such a situation, so that gender issues can be mainstreamed into daily business.

Studies of GM in other government ministries in Indonesia (Kementerian Negara Pemberdayaan Perempuan, 2006) and elsewhere in the developing world (see, for instance, Greed, 2006, Kusakabe, 2005, Rao and Kelleher, 2005b, Woodford-Berger, 2004) identify similar issues relating to institutional mechanisms and personnel. The commonest example is that the FP delegates responsibility to a junior person already overburdened with other work and whose rank is not senior enough to make decisions that challenge the organisational culture.

Despite failing to influence MOF’s internal dynamics, the GM strategy has achieved some significant success in external policy.
The weaknesses, constraints and limitations of its implementation within MOF cannot be separated from wider Indonesian bureaucratic mechanisms and socio-cultural aspects of Indonesian society. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a number of key problems.

11.5 Factors constraining GM implementation at MOF

11.5.1. Power dynamics between the different actors: MOF, MOWE and Bappenas staff versus NGOs and academics

The previous sections have shown that relationships among the key agents of MOF’s GM activities were often asymmetrical. My key informants in the GM TEAM kept complaining about MOWE with statements such as: ‘People in MOWE are still not with us’ and ‘It’s so hard to make them understand that our work is different to that of the Ministry of Health or Education’.

MOWE is a relatively young ministry compared to MOF, which has been in place since independence. HR is another important contributor to this power asymmetry. Both MOF and Bappenas take pride in their ‘first-class manpower’ and this is widely recognised, given the difficulties of obtaining employment in both organisations, especially for women. This is wrongly seen by some people in the bureaucracy as a sign of prestige: ‘di sini ngga banyak ibu-ibunya’ (we don’t employ too many mothers here because we do serious work). MOWE, on the other hand, is seen as struggling with the quality of its HR; it employs many ‘mothers’, is seen as a women’s institute and, most importantly, does not understand economic jargon.

A study by the University of Gadjah Mada Yogyakarta in 2002 (GOI and Gadjah Mada, 2002) reveals that 64% of MOWE’s employees had at least an undergraduate education. Those sent out to deal with clients such as MOF were usually staff members with an
education higher than a bachelor’s degree, and so in theory education should not impede client communication. The Gadjah Mada report, however, mentioned that there was a mismatch between the employees’ educational background and the expertise needed by the organisation.

I observed that among MOWE staff there was a diverse view on gender and a different level of technical expertise in implementing GM depending on the context of the client’s ministerial duties. For example, one MOWE trainer, a dentist, told me that since this was her main subject she could not give any examples of what MOF should do to mainstream gender. Situations like this never occur in MOF: all of its staff, particularly those who deal with outsiders, have a good grounding in finance and economics.

Another issue related to power asymmetries. Because Bappenas and MOF have the final say in how much money a ministry receives each fiscal year (Booth, 2005), they have considerable power over the other ministries, including MOWE, whose fear of losing budgeting puts it in an inferior position to MOF. Jokes like ‘Awas nanti dicoret’ (be careful not to get stuff in your budget crossed out!) were sometimes made in informal meetings.

Academics who worked with MOWE as consultants often expressed exasperation about ‘these bureaucrats’. I attended a seminar on gender budgeting run by an NGO that had invited a senior MOF manager to be keynote speaker. Some female academics who had been doing consultancy work for MOWE attended. During the talk I heard them commenting on the poor content of the speech, and saying ‘these bureaucrats will never get it after all these years of our effort’. During the break, when I introduced myself and tried to talk to them about GM efforts in the Indonesian bureaucracy in general, one said: ‘Look, your director has been to so many gender training sessions and seminars abroad and locally, and he still confuses “gender” with “women”. What more can I say?’
11.5.2. **Religion and GM at MOF**

The experience of GM at the Ministry of Religious Affairs discussed in Chapter 5 was in some ways a setback for GM in the Indonesian bureaucracy, MOF included, if not for Indonesia in general. While it is frequently claimed that men resort to religious texts and verses to justify their resistance to the idea of gender equality (Mulia, 2004, Mulia, 2001) 2004) I observed genuine fear, especially among women, that they would be ‘sinful’ if they stepped outside what they believe is prescribed in the Koran. As one interviewee expressed to me: ‘I am not really sure that [the presenter] interpreted the Koran properly. I don’t want to follow her and find myself in hell later when I’m dead.’

As discussed in a previous chapter, most female managers at MOF, including those educated abroad, tended to be conservative when it came to religious affairs. Therefore, it was unsurprising that when the MOWE speaker suggested women could become imams and lead daily prayers, the MOF women did not accept this. The trainer’s radical suggestion made the wider religious discussion counterproductive and entirely discredited her in the eyes of the participants.

Religious issues also constrained the activities of the GM TEAM. The FPs did not feel confident preaching about gender equality and saying that Islam was in favour of it, even if they believed this to be the case, because they were not conversant with Islamic teachings and so did not know which verses and Hadits to use to defend their position. They found this frustrating, as they realised that they would need to defend themselves against religious challenges from conservative Muslims who were more able to provide religious justification to back their arguments.

The fact that the MOWE trainer specialised in gender and Islam and belonged to the Liberal Islam Network, the same network as the leader of the GM TEAM working in MORA, was also seen as a
problem at MOF, which is mainly staffed by conservative Muslims who oppose open and democratic (as well as women-friendly) interpretations of Islamic texts and verses (Blackburn et al., 2008 provide an analysis of the complexity of the Indonesian Islam).

Some women’s groups have tried to initiate gender-sensitive interpretations of Islamic teachings with the assistance of international funding agencies, particularly the Asia Foundation (Asian Development Bank, 2006). Some of these women’s organisations are mass-based and affiliated to the main Islamic organisations in Indonesia (Muhammadiyah and Nadhlatul Ulama). Nevertheless, having foreign donors behind their efforts often puts them in a difficult position. Addressing gender issues in the face of the current rise of conservative Islam is not easy, and both the government and women’s organisations have to be careful that their efforts do not backfire and are seen as promoting a Western agenda (Schech and Mustafa, 2010).

11.6 GM in relation to other reforms

11.6.1. MOF Bureaucratic Reform and introduction of the New State Financial Law: missed opportunities for GM?

In theory, the bureaucratic reform should have provided MOF with the momentum to mainstream gender. The reform consists of three pillars: organisation, business processes and HR. Mainstreaming gender in MOF’s line of work would involve reforming the organisation to accommodate gender issues, developing business processes that prevent new gender-blind policy and ensuring that HR is managed in gender-sensitive and gender-responsive ways. None of these, however, were included in the bureaucratic reform agenda.

The jargon of accountability, transparency, effectiveness and efficiency feature prominently in the effort to transform MOF so that its organisation, business processes and HR perform better and,
most importantly, are free of corruption. Combating corruption – in MOF, financial corruption – is the main goal of the bureaucratic reform.

The failure to include gender indicators in MOF’s bureaucratic reform should not be blamed entirely on MOF but also on a wide range of actors. International organisations such as the UNDP only prescribe the use of gender indicators in good governance for social sectors. For the economic and business sectors that MOF belongs to, governance only refers to corruption, business and finance, economic growth, competitiveness and regulatory quality (Corner, 2002).

Another missed opportunity was the launch of the State Finance Law at the end of 2004. There has been criticism from feminists that this law was passed without any involvement or consultation from MOWE or female activists (Cattleya, 2006).

The new law prescribes that state budgeting must be unified, performance-based and part of the medium-term expenditure framework. Unified budgets mainly seek to avoid duplication. Performance-based budgeting means a change in budget allocation from input- to output-based, shifting the focus of performance measurement from the amount of resources put into an activity to the results of this resource allocation. The medium-term expenditure framework gives each ministry a chance to see the broader picture, rather than focusing on programmes and projects financed on an annual basis.

The State Finance Law is gradually being implemented. If properly followed, old problems such as the lack of links between programme inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes will be overcome, duplication will be avoided and any form of corruption will be detected early and tackled. There is still a chance to integrate gender concerns into the law, as it is by implementing gender perspectives at each step that it ‘offers the opportunity to establish
gender equity as a standard performance measure’ (Asian Development Bank, 2006). This has been done, for example, by the government of Cambodia (PeaceWomen, 2010).

This new budgeting system and MOF’s bureaucratic reform provide an opportunity for MOF to require that all ministries integrate gender concerns into their development processes, from planning and implementation to monitoring and evaluation. In MOF’s 2010-2014 strategic planning (GOI, 2010), however, there is no mention of GM and women are only mentioned once, when describing the total composition of MOF’s employees in 2010: 14,139 women and 47,220 men.

11.6.2. The National Plan of Action for GM: can it work under MOF’s current bureaucratic structure?

MOF’s Decree no. 119 on gender-responsive budgeting supports Indonesia’s National Plan of Action for Gender Mainstreaming by requiring each government agency to carry out a gender budgeting exercise before submitting a budget proposal. Once the ministry in question has submitted the proposal, under the current organisational structure it is the Directorate General of Budgets’ task to review it. The immediate question is whether the latter is ready and competent to review the gender exercise. Considering the current male-dominated bureaucratic context, there is a risk that this review will end up constituting no more than an exercise in ticking boxes on a checklist. If the decree is to be taken seriously, MOF’s GM workload will double as it will need to address gender budget reviews more seriously by preparing mechanisms and training personnel. There has been no mention, let alone planning, of how they will develop the skills and expertise necessary for this. There was no plan, for example, to train more people in the DG of Budget on gender issues or to involve GM TEAMs in the budget evaluation cycle.
As previously mentioned, the TORs of MOF’s GM mention nothing about monitoring and evaluating activities. Until lately, the monitoring and evaluation of GM activities in government institutions were only carried out by MOWE, using the five criteria discussed in Chapter 5: political commitment, policies generated, sex-disaggregated data, institutional mechanism and HR. This will change with the GM National Plan of Action, which takes into account the new budgeting system. According to the National Plan of Action, MOF will be responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of GM activities in all government agencies. Individual ministerial reports on GM activities will be reviewed by MOF, Bappenas, BPKP and the Ministry of Civil Service before being analysed by MOWE, which will then report to the President.

The involvement of BPKP in this process raises a number of issues. BPKP is a government audit agency created under Suharto. In the constitution there is a separate audit agency, the BPK. According to the national constitution, the BPK has the same authority as the executive and legislative bodies. Suharto did not want his financial affairs to be subjected to BPK scrutiny, so he weakened it and created the BPKP, which reports to the president only. There is an element of rivalry between these two audit agencies and it is possible that BPKP will eventually be subsumed into BPK. If that happens, it is unclear whether BPK would be willing or permitted to take on BPKP’s gender audit responsibility.

The BPKP aside, there are some problems with the reporting mechanism that relate to the power dynamics among the various organisations involved. I have shown in previous sections that its failure to appreciate the work of other government agencies is one of MOWE’s major weaknesses, which in turn makes it difficult for it to play its role as gender advisor to these government agencies. Under the new mechanism it can be assumed that MOWE will have to synthesize the reports of the other four government agencies to
produce an overview report for each. For this mechanism to work, a number of conditions must be fulfilled:

- staff of in these four government agencies must be able to perform gender audits (which will involve, among other things, all the auditors, who until now have mainly carried out financial audits, being able to understand gender issues and being able, prepared and willing to incorporate a gender perspective as part of the compliance audit).

- staff at MOWE must analyse financial audit reports through a gender lens, which I consider unlikely given their inability to understand other organisations’ work and functions.

While the ministerial decree on gender-responsive budgeting was a big achievement for MOF’s GM TEAM, there is a loophole in the regulation that may be exploited. One clause of the decree states that not every project or programme/activity has to be gender-responsive, and some may be gender-neutral. Staff without the capacity or will to do gender analysis properly may take advantage of this statement.

Although theoretically the reporting system appears appropriate, an organisational analysis should have been carried out at MOF to find out whether it will work in practice. Placing MOF above other government ministries may be a good approach to ensuring the compliance of other ministries, given MOF’s particular influence. However, this may give it a sense that it is beyond the reach of the other government agencies: nobody will be able to reprimand MOF for not mainstreaming gender in its own organisation, tasks and functions.
11.7 Conclusion

This chapter cannot provide a comprehensive overview and critique of the global theory and practice of GM, as to do so would require a much lengthier discussion and fuller analysis than is possible in a single thesis chapter. Nevertheless, this case study brings to light a wide range of issues that are potentially relevant to researchers and practitioners interested or engaged in GM in a range of settings.

MOF’s GM effort has brought tangible results in the eight years of its existence and may even be construed by outside observers unfamiliar with its organisational structure and culture as a potential model for other government departments inside and outside of Indonesia. Income tax law has been changed, gender budgeting has been introduced, and toilets have no doubt been updated.

Raising the female recruitment cap on STAN entry examination candidates from 15% to 22% represents more limited progress, but may allow the number of female MOF managers to reach a critical mass over time, leading to wider changes in the organisational culture. When discussing female representation and critical mass, Kanter (1977a p.208-209) distinguishes between ‘tilted groups’ (20%-40% of the workforce) and ‘skewed groups’ (under 20%). She argues that while token women in a skewed group are not ‘treated as individuals but as representative of the group’ (ibid.), the tilted group can operate collectively and influence the culture of the group. Having 22% of women, at least in STAN recruitment, may be just enough to establish a tilted group, and arguably a higher female presence among MOF managers may, in the long run, modify some of the deeply entrenched patriarchal norms and practices that subordinate women in MOF.

There is no evidence to date, however, that the GM effort has addressed the internal organisational culture that discriminates against women. Internal gender issues, although mentioned in the
TORs, seemed to be missing from MOF’s GM agenda. MOWE never recommended that MOF should link internal and external issues, because it was either unaware of the problems or afraid to raise them, given the power dynamics among the GM actors. Rosario (1995, 1997) notes a similar situation in the Philippines’ Department of Labour and Employment, where staff were supportive of their clientele but very resistant when came to GM in their own organisation.

Gender has been mainstreamed in ministries of finance in developed countries including Australia and Canada and developing countries such as South Africa and Sri Lanka (Budlender, 2002, Budlender and Hewitt, 2002). The key to successfully implementing GM in finance ministries, as in other ministries, is political will. MOF’s political will, especially regarding resolving internal gender issues, is limited. For example, appointing junior staff as gender FPs is unlikely to be effective in a large bureaucracy where seniority is highly valued. This is especially problematic where job rotation and relocation mean that juniors are continually moved before they achieve their GM tasks.

This raises an important question: how far are internal changes needed in order to be able to make external changes? This case study has witnessed several external successes in terms of producing favourable gender equality outcomes in MOF’s line of work – the reform of an item in the Tax Law and gender budgeting – without touching the internal organisational culture. The question is perhaps not so how much MOF has done through GM without changing its male-biased practice as whether GM can achieve all its potential, as listed in the TORs, without internal changes.

For example, the first line of the TORs says that the GM was established to optimise the participation of women at MOF. This is somewhat instrumentalist, as it sees women as the means of achieving MOF’s goals. Nevertheless, current practice does not allow
women to participate in the gendered organisational culture on an optimal basis. We might assume that advocacy ‘to influence decision- and policy-makers to make better and more appropriate policies that will increase MOF employees’ quality of life’ refers to the quality of life of MOF’s female as well as male employees. Chapters 6-10 of this thesis, however, have demonstrated that GM has not succeeded in this, as women continue to be both directly and indirectly discriminated against in a wide range of ways.
12 Conclusion

12.1 Overview

This thesis contributes to social science knowledge in two ways. At the theoretical level, the thesis applies and adapts Goetz’s framework to the gendered archaeology of the Indonesian Ministry of Finance. In doing this, it assesses the extent to which the Goetz framework is workable in a specific organisational setting. At the empirical level, it provides a unique and thorough analysis of a government bureaucracy through a gender lens, an area in which the literature is still quite thin. In the international development literature, research on gender and organisation is dominated by case studies of NGOs and includes a handful of studies of local government. The focus of these studies is mainly on organisational outcomes (Goetz, 1997a, Kardam and Erturk, 1999, Tiessen, 2004). Had it been located in a high income country, my research might have been framed by the western context of equal opportunities. However, the specific nature of the cultural setting where my study is located calls for a wider approach, taking into account specific Indonesian and Javanese conceptions of equality and gender norms, and how these interact with organisational cultures and processes.

12.2 Reflections on the overall approach and methodology

This thesis uses Goetz’s framework of the gendered archaeology of organisations to analyse the Indonesian MOF, paying particular attention to women’s experience as MOF employees. Given its detailed and multi-dimensional approach, the Goetz framework has the potential to reveal specific insights about gender dynamics in an Indonesian government organisation. At the same time, the study assesses the usefulness of this framework for analysing the gendered dynamics of a bureaucratic organisation in a developing country.
Goetz's framework involves dissecting the MOF bureaucracy from various angles. These include the historical and cognitive context of the organisation, the organisational structure and culture, the gendered participants, the gendered way the MOF structures time and space, gendered authority structures, and gendered incentive and accountability systems. This is a different way of looking at an organisation than following a human resource management cycle (from hiring to development, then firing or retirement).

A mixed method approach was used for data collection. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 121 respondents, coupled with FGDs with mid and top level managers, and gatekeeper interviews. Observation also played an important role in this study. As someone who is native to the MOF, using the gendered archaeology framework was like using another lens when looking at a familiar organisation. In this research, my familiarity with the MOF enabled me to point the lens into the right direction when looking for evidence to support my analysis.

As elaborated in the methodology chapter, familiarity with the research subject poses researcher to research subject positionality issues. My biggest dilemma when doing this research was interviewing former colleagues, some of whom were friends. I decided not to exclude these friends from the data set, since this would have substantially reduced the number of research participants.

Given the diversity of the research participants in terms of age, education background, recruitment points (STAN and Sarjana), managerial levels, and other dimensions of their lives, it was impossible to stratify the sample. Ideally, I would have liked, for example, to systematically compare the different experiences of female managers in the three directorate generals not only according to their recruitment points but also year of recruitment. With hindsight, it might have been useful to have been more
persistent in attempting to collect systematic equivalent data for men as well as women, even if only for the purpose of comparison. This would have provided me with a different perspective on gender dynamics as experienced by both sexes rather than mainly from women’s points of view.

Another limitation of this research is the lack of visual data. I was not granted permission to obtain any visual data including photographs of office layouts.

Despite its limitations, the research design is sufficiently robust to support meaningful analysis, and its strengths include the range and diversity of the evidence it generated. Primary data were obtained from interviews with MOF managers and policy makers, as well as personal observations. Secondary data came from a wide range documents including policy documents from MOF and other government agencies, as well as international development agencies and national and regional publications. The use of extensive sources of information helped with data triangulation, which to some extent compensated for my subjectivity as a researcher.

My ability to triangulate the data was inseparable from my familiarity with the MOF as an organisation. In this research, data triangulation was done in several ways: (1) to cross-check aspects of information obtained from an interviewee with MOF internal documents such as human resource data, minutes of meetings or other internal reports; (2) to cross-check aspects of information obtained from an interviewee with another interviewee, which was done carefully without pitting informants against each other, (3) to cross-check MOF internal documents with external and independent reports and publications.

Since the sample includes more than two-third of middle and senior female MOF managers (59 out of 86 female echelon III and II managers), the findings can be taken as representative of this group. The extent to which they reflect the experiences of female managers
in other Indonesian government ministries is harder to verify. All Indonesian civil servants in the MOF and beyond are regulated by the Civil Service Law, which sets out standard regulations on working hours, holidays, leave of absence, promotion, rank advancement, payroll adjustment and retirement. For example, the clause that once a person resigns from civil service, he or she cannot be re-employed even as an employee in a different ministry or regional office, applies uniformly across the civil service. Also, the challenges of juggling between family responsibilities and work commitments in Indonesia’s cultural setting are shared by women across ministries.

That said, the MOF has a particularly sharp gender imbalance in higher level management, which may set it apart from other parts of the Indonesian bureaucracy. From my discussions with informants in other ministries, it can be said that overt gender discrimination in the recruitment system is also unique to the MOF, as is the requirement of working outside Java for first promotion. Even in the Indonesian Ministry of Defence (MOD), neither of these applies. Consequently women are better represented in MOD, making up 40 per cent of its workforce. Despite this, only 6 per cent of MOD managers are women. This suggests that even when there is no overt discrimination in recruitment, other aspects of the MOD’s gendered organisational culture disadvantage women just as much (if not more) than is the case in the MOF.

The scope to generalise from this study to the situation of women working outside government is much more limited. There are very few studies in Indonesia that look at the subject of ‘women in the office’. Most private sector firms are considerably smaller than the MOF and are less likely to share features such as complex formalised hierarchies of authority or nationwide networks of branch offices (Basri and Eng, 2004, Bennington and Habir, 2003). Unlike the civil service, private sector firms are bound by government restrictions on overtime for female employees, although
the extent to which they comply with these regulations has not been verified. All of the above may reduce the restrictions faced by female private sector managers, compared to their public sector counterparts. That said, among Indonesians, there is a general perception that private sector employees work harder and longer than civil servants. If this is indeed the case, the challenges faced by female private sector managers may be greater.

To what extent do the experiences of the female managers in this study mirror those of their civil service counterparts in other developing countries? This is not straightforward to assess, given the degree of variation not only in civil service management but also the cultural contexts that women inhabit. For example, senior female civil service in Ghana, as well as facing difficulties of juggling family and work, report frustration about being intellectually underused and face widespread sexual harassment from male colleagues (Amos-Wilson, 1999). In the Nigerian civil service women managers are severely discriminated against in term of promotion because of the traditional view that women should ‘care’ rather than ‘lead’ (Ogenyi, 2004). The findings of studies located in other Islamic countries are broadly similar with the findings of this study. In Bangladesh, Zafarullah (2000) reports that female civil servants encounter direct and indirect forms of discrimination during recruitment, placement, advancement, mobility and training. With reference to female civil servants in Malaysia, Yousof and Siegel (1994) refer to the challenge of balancing work and domestic responsibilities. They observe that many female civil servants remain unmarried, which is less apparent in this study and may reflect different social norms about the requirement to marry for Malaysian women. They report that those women who do take on family commitments appear to have low self-esteem and attribute any career progress to luck, rather than their own efforts of abilities (Yousof and Siegel, 1994).
12.3 The position of women in the MOF

This study shows that looking at the “position” of women in an organisation is more useful than simply counting heads to see “how many” women work there. There are at least two ways we can look at the position of women in MOF. The first is to observe their official rank in the organisation (echelon). Chapter 5 shows that female managers in the MOF are concentrated in the lower levels (echelon IV). Although this is a common situation across the Indonesian civil service, the low proportion of senior managers in the MOF is particularly marked. Overall, 10% of female Indonesian civil servants hold echelon I positions, but none of them are in the MOF. Meanwhile, the proportion of MOF women holding the echelons II and III positions is half that for civil service as a whole. At lower managerial levels (echelon IV), only 13 per cent of MOF employees are female, compared to a civil service average of 20%.

The second way of looking at women’s position in the MOF is by observing the roles that they play in the organisation. Chapters 8 and 9 show there is a tendency to promote women to administrative jobs that are perceived to require particular diligence, patience or other attributes related to feminine characteristics. As a result, in DGTX most women holding echelon III positions are Public Relations Managers even if they have masters degrees in Tax Auditing. In TA, women tend to manage the Evaluation Division which deals with examination marking and report writing: these are considered women’s jobs as they need attention to detail.

Men and women’s positions within the organisation can also be seen from the way they cluster together forming networks. It has been observed that women do not tend to have gatherings or socialise outside office hours as men do, since when they finish their office work they have to go home and mind their families. Although women can still socialise within office hours, such as
weekly Quran recital groups, these opportunities are more limited and tend to be less significant in terms of career advancement.

12.4 On Goetz’s Gendered Archaeology of the organisation

The thesis explores why women in MOF were not able to reach the same organisational levels or participate in the same activities as their male counterparts. It shows that women in MOF faced several constraints: both organisational constraints (including constraints on joining MOF, the experience of being a minority group within the MOF and constraints in getting promoted) and societal constraints (such as having a double-burden of workplace and household responsibilities and having to comply with traditional gender roles that are culturally and religiously prescribed).

This thesis has demonstrated that the constraints women face in the MOF do not operate separately, but are closely interrelated. Wider social gender norms frame the MOF’s organisational culture and structure. Goetz’s framework is useful for revealing these links, since each of its elements relates what is happening within the organisation to wider societal phenomena and more fundamental processes (such as the way organisations are conceptualised, based on and in tandem with divisions between the public and domestic spheres).

The first two elements of Goetz’s gendered archaeology of organisation are the gendered organisational history and cognitive context of the organisation. These reveal the context of the state as a wider environment that impedes female civil servants’ equal access, participation and control of the MOF. The dual status of the Indonesian armed forces as the servants of the public/society as well as the servants of the state had a general effect on the Indonesian civil service. The grading and ranking system is more employee-oriented (grading them to I/a to IV/e) than job-oriented, and resembles a military system. This is also seen in other
countries, such as Bangladesh, where a military regime has also been in power (Zafarullah et al., 2001).

The adoption of a military style has a gendered effect, as happens in military organisations (Carreiras, 2006). Sending people remote areas for their first managerial assignment, for example, resembles military service, which is in fact depicted as rite of passage which transform boys and youths into men, and at the same time as differentiation between men and women (ibid., p.41).

The civil service law is premised on the notion that female civil servants are secondary earners and that their primary responsibility is as homemakers. For example, the law permits women to take unpaid leave, but in practice, the only reason these women can apply for this leave is in order to follow their husbands on overseas assignments. At first sight, this policy could be interpreted as offering women’s flexibility, but closer inspection shows that it reflects the state’s validation of male authority over their wives.

Apart from mirroring the military in terms of hierarchy, another characteristic or cognitive context of the Indonesian civil service in general is the value placed on employees’ academic qualifications. This diploma system resembles the one used in France where managerial grades are structured according to different qualifications in the national education system (Guillaume and Pochic, 2007). Although the result could be gendered, it is not an ‘intentional’ measure to channel women into lower rank jobs. In that sense, it differs from, for example, the UK’s “white blouse revolution” in the UK in the beginning of 20th century where a large number of women were recruited to do routine clerical work with no upward career prospects (Witz and Savage, 1992).

Unlike the first two elements of Goetz’s framework, which are applied without modification, the third element, organisational culture, required some adaptation. This element was too wide-ranging to permit discrete analysis in a single chapter, and
elements of organizational culture spill into issues covered by other elements. This thesis takes a more focussed approach, referring to “MOF’s structure and gendered practices”.

Chapter 6 analyses the MOF “house rules” from a gender point of view. It reveals overt discrimination in the recruitment process whereby MOF limits its intake of women to a minimum (less than 15 per cent) even though more qualified women than men apply. It provides a detailed analysis how the procedure of filtering out female applicants was applied in the recruitment processes. This policy has been denying employment to more than a thousand eligible female applicants every year just because of their sex. STAN provides scholarship for bright students who otherwise would not access to university education, plus the opportunity to work in the MOF. As such, the biased recruitment policy has been denying women an opportunity for social mobility, not just employment.

For those women who overcome this barrier and join MOF, other constraints and disadvantages restrict their career development vis à vis their male colleagues. For example, promotion requires workers to have a masters degree that they did not possess when they joined the MOF, but the opportunity of pursuing further degrees is gendered. Consequently, the process of promotion is weighted against women. Women are further marginalised due to their inability or unwillingness to take part in corrupt behaviour.

The next element in Goetz’s framework is the gendered authority structure, which in this thesis is analysed using the concepts of patriarchy and weberian bureaucracy. Chapter 8 discusses the role of discretion in promotion, and the extent to which this discretion affects women’s career development. This overlaps with spatial aspects of gendered space and time, in the sense that MOF links promotion to posting outside Java. Whilst MOF gives women flexibility in terms of placement and is more flexible to women as junior staff than men as junior staff, this flexibility does not continue to managerial levels. This means that even when some
women have managed to overcome the diploma barrier and successfully obtained a further degree, they face another obstacle to promotion. Not every woman is both free and willing to move away from their family home for an unknown period (unlike overseas study which is for a fixed time), especially when the family is not prepared to follow her. Promotion decisions also reflect the wider gendered authority structure of Indonesian society. In some cases, the Human Resource Manager might ask a woman’s husband if he would mind his wife being promoted to a higher managerial level with higher responsibilities. These managers would never make similar enquiries with the wives of male workers – such an idea would be seen as absurd.

Using Kabeer’s framework of practical gender needs versus strategic gender interests, we can see that MOF human resource management only deals with women’s practical gender needs, such as being close to their families so that they could manage their “primary” responsibility as homemakers. This links to the gendered cognitive context of Indonesian Civil Service as a wider umbrella organisation, as elaborated in Chapter 5.

The gendered space and time of the MOF, the next element of gendered archaeology, is explored in Chapter 10. Even though they have domestic helpers at home, female managers often seem to be required to be in two places at the same time. This is not the case for their male colleagues, who can focus on one issue at a time. The use of a life-course framework provides insights about the shifting priorities of these female managers over time, as they struggle to reconcile their careers and family lives.

Chapter 11 discusses the final element of the Goetz framework, the gendered incentive and accountability system. It looks at gender mainstreaming in the MOF both as a case study to demonstrate the incentive and accountability system, as well as to see to what extent the gender mainstreaming activities have changed the MOF as an
organisation. The gender mainstreaming effort is mainly concerned about external policies, such as example removing gender bias in tax law or imposing gender responsive budgeting on other government agencies. In this sense, it has been quite successful. There is less evidence that the programme has changed the MOF’s internal gendered practices. It does not, for example, offer help women deal with specific problems they encounter with the masculine bureaucracy. The prospect of this changing is remote, since the current bureaucratic reform makes no direct reference to gender issues.

Overall, the Goetz framework is effective in capturing women’s experiences in the Indonesian MOF as a bureaucratic organisation. It takes into account both structural effects, as represented by organisational and societal constraints, as well as female agency. That said, the Goetz framework also has some imperfections. Rather than operating in isolation, each element of the framework contains aspects of other ones. This thesis does not always make neat distinctions between these elements. Instead, it applies each element like a lens to reveals different aspects of the MOF and its female managers. Some figures and scenes may overlap when seen from several angles, and some issues straddle several elements of the framework. This sometimes created difficulties for the division of the analysis into discrete chapters focussing on single elements.

12.5 The MOF as a gendered organisation and wider issues of Indonesian governance

The MOF’s insistence to keep the number of female employees to a minimum, apart from mirroring prescribed gender roles in Indonesian society, is also due to some specific aspects of Indonesian development. For example, uneven regional development, including unequal provision of education, means that only people from more prosperous regions pass the recruitment test. MOF has to staff offices all over Indonesia, including its most underdeveloped
and remote regions. Consequently, MOF employment includes posting and placement in these remote areas, which are considered unsafe for unaccompanied women who would have to move away from their family homes in more developed areas.

MOF’s internal policies of gender discrimination are also related to other government civil service policies. In Indonesia civil service employment is regulated by a special Civil Service Law, rather than by general national employment laws. General employment law keeps changing and adapting to the current situation, including efforts to implement CEDAW. By contrast, the civil service law, which applies to all government employees both in regional and national government, has not been changed since the 1960s. Even the current bureaucratic reform makes no alterations to this civil service law.

The civil service is still seen as a source of life-long employment with a closed career system, where it is impossible for people to discontinue their careers and resume them at some future time. There is a clause in the Civil service law saying that to be eligible for recruitment, a person must not have previously resigned from the service. Apart from being unfair to women, this closed career system has contributed to inefficiency in the civil service, by reducing managerial flexibility and accountability. It also limits the pool of leadership talents to insiders, encourages the dominance of seniority and patronage in promotion and appointments, and reduces incentives to perform well (Rohdewohld, 2007 p.153-154).

Furthermore, there is no option for going part time in the Indonesian civil service, let alone job sharing. In developed countries there is a growing acknowledgement of workers’ needs for an improved work-life balance, leading to flexible hours and options for part-time and job sharing (Russell et al., 2009). This is not possible in the context of Indonesia’s rigid and immutable civil service regulations.
With more than two million civil servants engaged in many different activities across a large and diverse national territory, there may be some advantages in maintaining a simple, centralised set of bureaucratic regulations. Despite this, some aspects of civil service operations have been increasingly decentralised in recent decades (Haris, 2005, Rohdewohld, 2007, Tjiptoherijanto, 2006). If this process of decentralisation were extended to allow for include locally-based regulations for civil servants, it could conceivably lead to a more flexible approach. Decentralising civil service administration would resolve the problem of transferring employees across the archipelago, since positions would be locally based. However, the likelihood that this would benefit women is questionable: where local discretion has been permitted in other aspects of government policy this has usually led to a heavier emphasis on gender discriminative customary and religious law (Irianto, 2006, Noerdin, 2002). For example, in Aceh sharia law has been operation since 2001. As a result all Muslim women are obliged to wear a hijab and are not permitted to go unaccompanied in the evening (Bowen, 2003 p.232, Clarke et al., 2012, Fernandes, 2013). As much with concerns about security in remoter regions, these local laws may increasingly serve as a disincentive for female MOF managers (who are accustomed to the more liberal laws of cities like Jakarta) to be posted in some parts of the country.

The impact of specific policies such as decentralisation on the status of women may therefore be double-edged. This demonstrates the need to apply a more holistic approach to civil service employment, especially when addressing gender issues. This thesis has demonstrated that most of the time, the MOF only deals with its own organisational “interests”. These interests are to staff the organisation with people whose commitments are not divided between the office and the home, or at least people who prioritise work over domestic commitments. How can an organisation be staffed with people who, at least in theory, give their careers their undivided attention but at the same time support gender equality?
This work-family tension is not an uncommon problem in the world of work. Both in the private or public sectors there has been an assumption that people who go to work at the office have somebody else to cover for their absence in the domestic sphere. Perhaps the right question is not how this can be achieved, but should it be viewed that way at the first instance. Moen (2010) argues that there is a need for a transformation, rather than just assimilation or accommodation of women’s work. This means recognising that both members of a couple are often in the workforce, and so employers should accept “the reality of the changing workforce and the fact that their male workers as well as female workers no longer had an adult family member at home to care for all the non-work aspects of their lives” (p.12-13). It might be argued that these sorts of accommodation would be easier for a government employer than a private sector one, since the main purpose of such a government organisation is meant to be serving people, not maximising profit. If the state is expected to set an example to wider society, then there should be scope for it to lead rather than be led by wider societal norms. In practice, however, this is contingent upon influential decision-makers’ political will for change, and there is little evidence of this in Indonesia.

This is the area where gender mainstreaming, if applied appropriately, could play an important role, by linking the organisational goals with the processes to achieve them. Gender mainstreaming activities in the Ministry of Civil Servants’ Empowerment and the Civil Service Agency should be directed to find a good work/family ‘fit’ (Moen, 2010 p.6) for Indonesian civil servants, and be integrated into the current bureaucratic reform.

12.6 Women’s agency in the MOF

Despite the many structural constraints, female managers in MOF exercise agency in different ways to negotiate their places within the bureaucracy, their families and society. This is done according to
their personal priorities, including their careers, families and religious views. Within particular religions, such as Islam, these women adopt different interpretations of religious teachings and doctrine, and these interpretations significantly affect their choices and perceptions.

The thesis explores these women’s reactions to MOF’s gender policy. Some women, regardless of their educational background, choose to stay as junior staff and do not seek promotion. In some cases, these women are placed in particularly quiet offices, widely known as “mothers’ office”, where productivity is claimed to be very low. Other women try to compete equally with their male colleagues despite all the difficulties balancing their work and family lives. Only a handful of my interviewees had abandoned the chance to have a family, and focussed their efforts on their careers.

It would be easy to label the non-achieving or slow-achieving women as victims of both bureaucracy and patriarchy, if not of Islam as a dominant religion. It has been shown throughout the thesis, however, that MOF women exercise their agency throughout their working and family lives. Gerami and Lehnerer (2001) identify four different methods that Iranian women have used to exercise their agency since the 1979 Revolution: collaboration, acquiescence, co-optation, and subversion. If the same categorisation is used to describe the agency of female MOF’ managers, we can see that these strategies are not mutually exclusive.

Very few female managers ‘collaborate’ fully and play the MOF game at the expense of their own personal lives, by remaining unmarried to be able to compete with their male colleagues. In doing so, these exceptional women subvert the patriarchal expectation for women to have families and stay at home. More often, female managers try to meet the demands of both bureaucracy and patriarchy. They try to find a balance between their careers and families, often making slower progress than their male colleagues, but still reaching senior
positions in the end. Other female managers co-opt and manipulate MOF regulations on promotion: they stay in the mothers’ offices, and get paid more than enough money to meet their families’ needs without wanting to be promoted. Under Civil Service Law, their rank might stop at a certain point depending on their education, but their salary will keep being adjusted until they retire. These female employees co-opt MOF’s bureaucratic regulations. However, they also ‘collaborate’ and play along with traditional gender roles by putting their families first and treating their work as a source of secondary income.

While the strategies of these female employees vary, there is little or no evidence of them pursuing a strategy of resistance. This might take the form of resigning from employment at MOF. Such women would have been excluded from my data set, which could represent a form of potential bias in the study. According to my wider knowledge of MOF managers, resignation was very unusual and the main reason given by such women was to focus on their families or remain in Jakarta. Rather than resistance, resignation might be better interpreted as opting out of the bureaucratic regime. So far there has been no overt move among MOF female employees to fight for their rights collectively. The establishment of a gender mainstreaming programme was due to external pressures rather than an internal push from female employees who felt a sense of injustice at the way MOF bureaucracy had been operating.

The thesis considers the role of religion, especially Islam, in the lives of female MOF managers. Some writers have demonstrated how the relationship between women and Islam is more complicated than the binary question of whether Islam empowers or disempowers women (White, 2010), not the least because of the multiple subjectivities that individuals tend to have (Torab, 1996). Meanwhile, Mahmood (2005) explores women’s agency within religious structures rather than against them. This brings us to the discussion back to the issue of empowerment. What is considered
as being empowered in western society does not necessarily or automatically apply to Muslim women in different social settings (Abu-Lughod, 2002), including, as shown in this thesis, Indonesian society.
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