Grammatical and Genealogical Investigation: Two Models of Antidogmatic Philosophical Method

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How small a thought it takes to fill a whole life! Just as someone may travel around the
same little country throughout his whole life, & think there is nothing outside it!

You see everything in a queer perspective (or projection): the country that you
ceaselessly keep covering, strikes you as enormously big; the surrounding countries seem
to you like narrow border regions.

Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Manuscript 131, 180: 2.9.1946
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First and foremost I thank Oskari Kuusela, without whose work the ideas contained in this thesis would not have occurred, and without whose supervision, they would not have taken semblance. I would also like to thank Marie McGinn and Tom Greaves for their support as secondary supervisors, as well as John Collins and Rupert Read for the disparate influences they have had upon my thought over the last five years. My fellow doctoral students, Alun Davies, Tamara Dobler, Fiona Roxburgh and Simon Summers have also been of huge importance to me, both in their influence and their camaraderie.

Finally, I would like to thanks Iris Marston, Karis Upton and Annie Walker, three women who bring me happiness, keep my feet planted, and make me proud.
Introduction

The following thesis can be made sense of in a number of ways. Firstly, it is in part a continuation of the parallelism undertaken by David Owen, and later Cressida Heyes, in their treatment of Wittgenstein and Foucault as thinkers of complementary thoughts. Despite the works of Owen and Heyes acting as an impetus for this text, it analyses neither of their work in great detail. Instead its focus is upon the plausibility of this move, and derives its justification from an alternate set of exegetical analyses, in order to reveal those interstices in which such complementarity is shown to be not only plausible but compelling. Chief among them is the analysis of the work of Gordon Baker who (besides our two protagonists) represents my most sustained interlocutor, with his influence felt most explicitly in Chapters I, II and VI. Other philosophers certainly leave their mark on my reading – most obviously Oskari Kuusela, Paul Veyne and David Owen himself – but Baker’s analysis is constitutive, rather than instrumental, to the thesis. Secondly, my focus upon a form of parallelism has led to a peculiar treatment, one that omits many of the topics which, for Foucault and Wittgenstein, are understood as being almost ‘trademarks’ of their thought. Frege and Russell, for instance, are entirely absent from this thesis – a sin most cardinal, for example, in Travis’s view (2006). It is in this regard that, like Heyes, I accept that – while the primary set of problems that concern Wittgenstein are to be found within metaphysical philosophical statements – his remarks concerning conceptual dogmatism have many applications beyond those fields of academia relevant to metaphysics and logic. Likewise, Foucault’s triangulation of knowledge, power and the subject only appears here when distorted through a prism that is quite alien to many of his exegetes, especially those in the social sciences. The clearest and most simple reason for these omissions can be best understood as a preoccupation with the two modes of authorship, and the methods of philosophical practice, that Wittgenstein and Foucault exhibit in their activity, and

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2 Heyes 2007, p17.
project through their incitement of their reader’s task. In Chapters II and IV I argue that to elide these characteristics of their work is unsustainable, if one acknowledges their shared commitment to the incitement of anti-dogmatic thought in their reader. This brings us the third, more general manner by which to conceive of this thesis’s remit; its various chapters – each representing a different overture upon related themes – are intended to combine in a portrayal of the key aims of the methods that so concern me. This is the locus upon which my comparison turns, and I premise that this thread runs with remarkable consistency through four decades of philosophical writing, penned by authors working in differing traditions, largely unaware in the main, of each other’s work.3

Finally, then, and in some sense unrelated to the first way of understanding it, this text is concerned with the extent to which both authors can be considered as overriding antidogmatic in their account of what those tasks are that constitute philosophy. From a central concern with invention and self-creation, and therefore self-determinacy, emerges a set of procedures, presented in notations particular to their purpose, that work upon the principle of the incalculable indeterminacy of an individual’s operations with words and concepts. Both methods respect this indeterminacy as a key criterion as to what philosophy should acknowledge as pertinent to its own procedures. From this central perspective an ensuing set of similarities can be observed to emerge and reflect usefully upon each other’s methodological concerns, in a manner that suggests a kind of compatibility or accrued effect, quite in keeping with Owen and Heyes. Chapter V is devoted solely to comprehending and comparing Foucault and Wittgenstein’s notions of dogma; suffice to say here that I advance an account of dogma as the habitually collocated commitment to a certain set of concepts as revelatory, natural, essential and otherwise generally indispensable tools in our conception of human affairs. A key premise of the thesis, entailed by this third aspect, is that, for these to be judged as sound and compelling methods, such anti-dogmatic philosophies must not commit the self-aggrandizing and fatal mistake of *omnes sed mecum* (or ‘everyone but I’). Exactly what is entailed by these author’s refusal of any exhaustive position upon which to secure the status of their methods is a chief concern for Chapters II, V and VI.

3 Although see Sluga’s account of Foucault’s stated eagerness to learn more of Wittgenstein, shortly before his death, as well as his apparently crediting Wittgenstein for his notion of a language game, recoined by Foucault as a “game of truth”, in Miller 2000, p416, n28.
There are a significant number of contemporary philosophers whose interest takes in both the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Foucault. To my mind, the foremost examples of this set are Michel de Certeau, Raymond Geuss, Ian Hacking, Pierre Hadot, Martha Nussbaum and Hans Sluga. Aside from these, the following is an experience that may be familiar to any reader of Foucaultian scholarship: to happen across a brief, often underdeveloped, yet philosophically complementary contingency with Wittgenstein’s philosophy, to be found for example in the works of Janik, Flynn, Dreyfuss & Rabinow, Rajchman and Oksala. Yet none of these authors begin to undertake the task of reading their perceived similitude – suggested by their brief employment of Wittgenstein’s notions of ‘throwing away the ladder’, of ‘language games’, or of ‘pictures’ at work in our language – with anything approaching the rigour necessary to continue in a clarifying manner.

The number of exegetes who do concern themselves with comparative or combinatorial treatments of Foucault and Wittgenstein’s philosophy is very limited, and the foremost members of this small group, as already mentioned, are Heyes and Owen – hence their influence upon this thesis. In two papers in particular (2002 & 2003) Owen ‘sketches’ out a claim regarding a sympathy between the works of Michel Foucault and Ludwig Wittgenstein that is in great sympathy with the one advanced in this thesis.

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4 Hacking perhaps best represents this set – his concerns, in their synthesis, reflect those of Wittgenstein and Foucault, but he neglects, for whatever reason, to reflect upon any comparative understanding between two of his greatest influences. Of particular relevance to this convergence is Hacking’s description of himself as a “dynamic nominalist”, interested the manner in which “our practices of naming interact with the things that we name.” (2002, p2) His work stand on its own however, not as a commentary, but as a novel application of his inheritance from both thinkers.

5 Hadot was perhaps the first interpreter of Wittgenstein, outside of the circle of his students, to preference an account of his method as therapeutic. As early as 1959, Hadot reflect that the purpose of Wittgenstein’s philosophical texts “imposes a certain literary genre: the work cannot be the exposition of a system, a doctrine, a philosophy in the traditional sense … *Philosophical Investigations* wishes to act little by little on our spirit, like a cure … The work therefore does not have a systematic structure, strictly speaking.” (cf. 1999, p18) Hadot has also written with great critical precision about the later Foucault’s turn towards ethics and self-invention, and his use of stoic texts.

6 Despite her generally negative appraisals of the work of Foucault (cf: 1997, p40), Nussbaum is clearly respectful of Foucault (e.g. see Nussbaum 1999), and represents an important interlocutor to his thoughts, and it is a shame, in this author’s opinion, that the two will never have the opportunity to engage in debate.

7 I am in direct disagreement with Sluga when he disambiguates Wittgenstein from Foucault along the lines that Foucault was a thinker of ‘essentialist and reductive formulas’ (2011, p138), or that Wittgenstein ‘was certainly in no way a political thinker’ (ibid, p132).


9 See Owen 2002, p225.
Owen’s comparison of the two models of philosophy is based upon what he takes to be the key operative conception at work in Wittgenstein’s later writing, in order to conclude a kind of equivalence between the philosophical aims of Foucault and Wittgenstein. By combining remarks made by Wittgenstein in *On Certainty* (§§94–147) and *Philosophical Investigations* (§§109–127) in a portrait of his use of the term “picture”, and by presenting a series of quotes as constitutive of what this term cashes out as, Owen’s aim is to both posit ‘picture’ as an element which unites Wittgenstein’s later work, and more generally to “draw out the centrality of pictures to our lives as necessary conditions of thought and action.”

The concept of a picture is taken to denote the “prior systems of judgments that generate an unquestioned background determining truth value.” In alliance with Gordon Baker, the inability of an individual to notice, or alter, such pictures is taken as the cause of a condition Owen refers to as “aspectival captivity” – defined as a type of self-imposed “non-physical constraint on our capacity for self-government”. Once this characterisation of captivity has been arrived at, it is then paralleled convincingly with Foucault’s various genealogical projects, in “that genealogy is best understood as a practice of critical reflection directed to enabling us to free ourselves from a condition of aspectival captivity.”

Yet, as we shall see in Chapter I, Owen’s methodological premise – that a singular notion of “picture” can be excavated from a wide territory of Wittgenstein’s remarks, and that such remarks are unproblematically accumulative – result in his positing a determinate set of conceptual features that disagree somewhat with my account of Wittgenstein’s method, and with Bakers interpretation of it.

I therefore take it, regarding Owen & Heyes’ claim of similitude concerning the role of aspectival captivity in the work of Foucault and Wittgenstein, that there is a story with a different emphasis to be told regarding the methodological, rather than necessary, conditions that make such a claim possible. As it currently stands, the proposal rests upon a notion of the meaning of the term picture in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, one which seems to be in partial disagreement with the later work of Gordon Baker (see §1.4). This thesis, then, is in alliance with Owen’s groundbreaking exegetical decision to

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10 2003, p83.
12 Owen 2003, p82.
base a genealogical account of aspectival captivity upon an apparent conceptual unity in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, that of ‘pictures’. Rather than attempting a clarification of that term in order to then reintroduce a qualified account of it into Owen and Heyes’ account of aspectival captivity, however, I will advance a more fundamental rethinking of the points of methodological similitude between these two thinkers.

While the approach of this thesis will diverge from Owen and Heyes’, then, its conclusion will be in significant agreement. Negatively, it will not warrant claims of hidden equivalence between a great deal of the elements of the two philosophers’ terminology; the closest we will come to making such a claim will be with regard to the two notions of Wittgenstein’s switching an aspect of comprehension, and Foucault’s dislocatory experience of a new problematisation. Nor will we find ourselves, at investigation’s end, availed of the ability either to identify a contiguity in those elements that collectively constitute their two philosophical methods, or to reduce them down to a core set of similitudes: for example, the philosophical work being done by Foucault’s presentation of *parrhesia* and Wittgenstein’s ‘private language argument’ will, on this reading, remain noncontiguous. Positively, the operative intention behind both philosophers’ creation of new philosophical techniques will be the point of convergence to be documented, with important similarities being entailed throughout their methods’ intended effects upon their practitioner. Hence tracing the impact left upon the reader of such texts will be rendered as of paramount importance to the comprehension of these methods.

The first chapter portrays a seminal moment in our understanding of Wittgenstein – namely the exegetical revisionary work that demands that we refer, just as with Wittgenstein, to an ‘early’ and ‘later’ instantiation of the work of Gordon Baker.\(^{15}\) The central qualification for such a division is argued to be the shift in Baker’s understanding of the status of Wittgenstein’s grammatical remarks. This shift, from a veridical conception to an aspectival one, is examined in detail because it is employed in many of this thesis’s central arguments, occurring not only in relation to Wittgenstein but Foucault also; this aspectival shift is clearly echoed in §4.3.

Having ‘struck my colours’ as a Bakerian reader, Chapter II does its best to confound this position, by arguing against a central element of the later Baker’s reading of Wittgenstein. Specifically, the therapeutic understanding of the role of the philosopher

\(^{15}\) Indeed, by Kahane, Kantarian and Kuusela’s count, Baker was the author of at least three schools of Wittgenstein interpretation (cf: 2007, p2).
in such a method is disputed, with a more modest and less interventionist position being
developed, one that focuses upon the imaginative, open-ended and interrogative nature
of the later texts. So that, while this thesis is most evidently Bakerian in reading, and
owes more to his exegesis than any other, this chapter presents the grounds for my
limited disagreement with his conception of philosophy.

The final piece needed to establish my exegesis of Wittgenstein’s later method is
Chapter III, in which a more traditional interpretation of the text is argued against, in
favour of conceiving of its style as a constitutive, rather than a contingent (or even
maladapted) element of Wittgenstein’s later methods. In making this defence, I advance
an understanding of Wittgenstein through his use of ‘schemes of interruption’, with this
defence against revisionism being equally as important for the previous chapter’s claims.

Chapter IV marks the introduction proper of the philosophical methods of Michel
Foucault to the thesis, beginning with a consideration of the status of historical theory,
and the revision that his work represents, along with sympathetic historiographers,
towards acknowledgement of its narrative status. This being the basis for my
comparison of methods, Chapter IV plays a key role in this thesis, and hence its final
section seems as good a place as any to conduct an overview of the parallelism this thesis
has posited thus far.

Chapter V continues from this account by establishing a complimentary reading of
the notions of dogma at work in our two methods, offering a number of examples of
how and where conceptual unity can become constrictive. The parallelism posited in
this thesis is shown to be derived from the methodological implications of this
understanding of dogmatism.

Chapter VI begins by presenting two of the most commonly asserted and bitterly
disputed critiques of Foucault’s method. It responds to them by presenting as a key facet
of our two methods a notion of creativity as the condition for freedom, rather than
freedom in itself. This notion is derived in part from Foucault’s own remarks, and in part
from the key themes of this thesis.

Ian Hacking, in his *Historical Ontology*, presents Foucault as a thinker consumed with the
question of how it is that we come to do the things we do to ourselves. Hacking sees the
responsibility for dogmatism as laying with oneself, and like Wittgenstein, tasks the
philosopher as someone who must investigate the manner by which she subjects herself
to disciplinary foreclosure:
Again, it is we who are doing it, not having it done to us. The knowledge/power story has been elaborately illustrated in Foucault's books, but those are outer-directed narratives—what we say about others, say to others, have said to ourselves by others, do to others, or have done to ourselves. They leave out the inner monologue, what I say to myself. They leave out self-discipline, what I do to myself. Thus they omit the permanent heartland of subjectivity. It is seldom force that keeps us on the straight and narrow; it is conscience.\(^\text{16}\)

What one “says” to oneself, and the task of dissolving the strictures which are daily reaffirmed through the collocating expression of our conceptions, is the ideal of philosophy to which this thesis is addressed as an answer. In particular, Wittgenstein’s method will emerge as therefore being a uniquely apt complement to that of Foucault’s, both in its treatment of the inner monologues that determine and set in place our conceptions of the world, and in its direct sympathy with Foucault’s three procedural precepts, examined in Chapter VI: those of curiosity, refusal and innovation.

Lastly, a few words justifying my overall approach. I hope that this thesis will not strike the reader as merely an exegetical parlour game. Both Foucault and Wittgenstein located the perspectival element that represents the centre of my parallelism as procedurally fundamental\(^\text{17}\) to their conceptions of philosophy, conceptions that thereby emerge as radically different to much of what they took philosophy to previously be. Hence, I take it that my reading provides the opportunity of not only achieving a certain clarity concerning what these coherences constitute, but of being able to employ them in a way that makes these philosophies more purposeful in their combination than alone in singularity.

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\(^\text{16}\) Hacking 2002, p116

\(^\text{17}\) As Foucault remarked, “This experience that permits us to single out certain mechanisms (for example, imprisonment, penalization, etc.) and at the same time to separate ourselves from them by perceiving them in a totally different form, must be one and the same experience. This procedure is central to all my work.” (1991c, p38) Likewise, Wittgenstein’s qualifications, while less straight-forward, can be considered to revolve around a principled aspectival activity – see for instance Kuusela 2008, pp161 & 164, or Baker 2004, p33.
What is philosophy if not a way of reflecting, not so much on what is true and what is false, as on our relationship to truth? … The movement by which, not without effort and uncertainty, dreams and illusions, one detaches oneself from what is accepted as true and seeks other rules – that is philosophy.

— Michel Foucault, ‘The Masked Philosopher’. ¹

¹ 1997a, p327.
In 1991 Gordon Baker published ‘Philosophical Investigations §122: Neglected Aspects’, a paper containing a forceful critique of the then (as now) prevailing exegetical model for understanding the later philosophical methods of Wittgenstein. Remarkable for both the precise depiction of its target and its “radical redescription” of key passages in the *Investigations*, the impact that Baker’s paper had upon his field is undoubtedly due in part to the fact that – much like Wittgenstein’s *j’accuse* in *PI* §113-5 – the philosophical model abrogated was one authored by the critic himself. Working as co-author to his colleague and friend PMS Hacker in the seventies and eighties, Baker wrote a series of seminal works that were later elaborated upon solely by Hacker, which include *Wittgenstein – Meaning and Use, Language, Sense and Nonsense*, and *Rules, Grammar and Necessity.* This chapter examines the pivot upon which Baker turned in his reassessment of the grammatical methods extolled by Wittgenstein. Consequently this chapter also, by extension, casts light on the development that led to such disagreement between Baker and Hacker over Wittgenstein’s conception of his philosophical method.

Following Kuusela (2008), this pivotal element in Baker’s rereading will be posited as the methodological status to be attributed to the grammatical remarks, rules and comparisons that populate Wittgenstein’s later work. Specifically, the treatments of a grammatical rule as alternately a model for comparison or as a veridical constituent of its language will be posited as the shift that led to two remarkably divergent exegetical models being postulated by the earlier and the later Baker. To this end we will initially examine the relevant features of the original model, as postulated by Baker and Hacker, then consider four remarks that raise exegetical concerns, some of which at least seem to have motivated Baker’s exegetical repositioning, finally then introducing Baker’s revised model, which centres upon the notion of an ‘aspect’.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, in 2007, Baker’s former co-author, PMS Hacker, published an article deeply critical of this later account of Wittgenstein’s method, identifying five features particularly deserving of close attention. Briefly, Hacker’s criticism focussed upon: philosophy as being primarily a therapeutic task; as being person-relative rather than concerned with alternate schools in philosophy; as laying the responsibility for philosophical confusion with the individual, rather than with given features of a language’s grammar; a lack of concern with argumentation *per se*; and instead a concern with philosophy as being motivated by the construction of alternate pictures for the

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2 NA, p30 (See Bibliography for an elaboration of all abbreviations; they are recorded in bold under relevant references).

3 Most noticeably, of course, *PI* §122 and its precursor TS 220.
alleviation of philosophical confusion. It should be noted that none of these five characteristics will be considered at any great length in this chapter. While the treatment here is so brief as to be nonexistent, these themes are considered in depth over the following two chapters. The reason for this should become clear – all five characteristics so identified by Hacker depend upon Baker’s central requalification of the status of a grammatical remark, and can be better understood as implications Baker derived from this requalification. It is this move that is both conspicuously absent from Hacker’s critical 2007 paper, and the subject of the present chapter.

The reasons for my beginning with such an investigation should be largely self-evident to the reader; Baker and Hacker’s original collaborations bore fruit that demands to be recognised as the most detailed, considered and connotatively exhaustive example of Wittgenstein exegesis to date. Similarly, Baker’s later volte face represents both a critique of that position from the unparalleled vantage point of one of its authors, as well as a novel and promising model of interpretation in its own right. Therefore an understanding of the contention that led to the genesis of this later position lends one a deeper understanding of the model of philosophical methods advocated by Wittgenstein. More specifically, the two models here explored mark in bold relief two alternate ways of understanding that method, as described by Wittgenstein himself; those of philosophy as an account book for the meaningful transactions made in our language, and of philosophy as a form of work on one’s conceptions as a transformative undertaking. It is not a contention that the two are mutually exclusive, but that Baker and Hacker and the later Baker offer alternate interpretations that output two models of philosophical method that demonstrate extreme fidelity to the aims of these two aspects. This will become more important as the thesis progresses. Looking forward, for example, this distinction between aspectival and veridical exegesis is mirrored in Chapter IV’s reading of the methods of Michel Foucault.

The characteristics of Baker and Hacker’s conception of grammar that are most relevant to Baker’s later critique are of grammar as edificial, veridical, additive and sense-determining, and outlining these characteristics will be our starting point proper. Throughout the outline, the idea of assembling pertinent grammatical features in a surveyable, cartographic presentation will be acknowledged as best exemplifying the method as understood by the early Baker. The notion of aspects will be considered and expanded upon as a starting point for the later Baker’s critique, and it will be

\footnote{cf: P, p187 & Z, §273 respectively.}
demonstrated why an aspectival consideration of grammatical features of language is so compromising for his earlier qualifications of the status of Wittgenstein’s grammatical remarks. In addition it will be argued that Baker’s later account of grammar demonstrates fidelity to a certain class of remarks that can sensibly qualify those passages his earlier model relied upon for direction and that, crucially, the reverse cannot be achieved without a degree of exegetical contortionism.

§1.1 The edifice of language

According to the exegetical model under investigation, Wittgenstein’s philosophy’s purpose can be found in his tracing “the web of conceptual connections by means of which we conceive of the world.” The nature of this project and its proposed elements might appear rather grand on first hearing. Here are a few abstract qualifications: The ‘conceptual web’ alluded to above consists of the rules by which a language community tacitly operates with its words, and can be satisfactorily elucidated by explicitly accounting for these normative relations; the rules that constitute this network are what determine the limits of sense made within a language by its community of users; the majority of philosophical questions, puzzles and theories that occur in a language can be clearly posited as the obfuscation, miscomprehension and misapplication of these same rules and, hence, most philosophical claims can be diagnosed as operational mistakes arising from errors in the application of the rules of language. Now, these are not modest claims, by anyone’s measure. Indeed, on first blush they appear acutely theoretical in nature – that is, they appear to posit fundamental and necessary characteristics present in human language that both enable the possibility of sensible language use and, through the collection and arrangement of its normative relations, also offer the opportunity to act as arbiter in clearly identifying where an individual transgresses those same rules. Quite apart from an immediate potential discrepancy between such a method’s theoretical mode and Wittgenstein’s repeated claims to be operating in a way that avoids theoretical postulation, the inquisitive reader might sensibly ask the following of such a bold position: from whence does the philosopher derive their license to make such claims? Or, what is the source of the certainty from which a philosopher can posit and derive the rules for a word’s use? This is the

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qualification we shall first turn to in seeking to elucidate both this model and Baker’s
derivational, aspectival account.

One of Wittgenstein’s most common qualifications of grammatical rules is in
analogical relation to the rules of a game: "Grammar” can be considered to have
“somewhat the same relation to the language as ... the rules of a game have to the
game." Baker and Hacker commonly employ exemplars in relation to this key
depiction of grammar, such as the following:

Rather like ‘The chess king moves one square at at time’, propositions such as ‘Red is
darker than pink’ or ‘Red is a colour’ are partly constitutive of the meanings of their
constituent expressions (in whatever language these statements are made), determine the
concepts thus expressed, and license (or prohibit) inferences.

The two statements ‘Red is darker than pink’ and ‘The chess king moves one square at
at time’ share regulatory characteristics: they can both be taken as stipulating a rule
within a local system. For example, it is a grammatical rule that if a rose is said to be
lighter than pink, it cannot be inferred from this statement to be red; if someone moves
a king chess-piece two squares up and one to the side, that means it is necessarily not
operating as a king in that person’s move, whether they are aware of it or no. In both
cases were such an aberrant use to occur, we would be liable to judge such activity to be
in discord with the established rules by which we use a chess king or the term red.

There would therefore be a discrepancy between the normal use and the current
aberrant use, and this accordence is precisely the normative strength of a grammatical
rule that a philosopher seeks to employ in the resolution of conceptual confusion. The
application of a rule is correct, or else goes astray, with either a different game being
played or a confusion taking place in how to follow the grammatical rule. This is to say
that such instances of normative regularity are not empirically necessary in regard to the

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6 e.g.: PG §23, BT p38, WLC pp3-4 & OC §95.
7 RGN p26, but see also there pp19, 51, 158, 242, etc.
8 Whether it could make sense to say ‘that red is darker than pink’ seems doubtful, if the red being
referred to were a communist. Hence the rule being given in this example is localised to a set of language
games, just as the rules of chess are irrelevant to twister.
9 “If someone claims that a combination of words has perfectly good sense for him, while we can discern
none, we can only assume that he uses language differently from us, or else that he is talking
thoughtlessly” (PR p97).
nature of the chess piece or rose in question (rules are dynamic,\textsuperscript{10} and of course change in response to pertinent developments), but instead relate to our modes of representation. If we wish to employ such terms as ‘king’s move’ or ‘red’ within the interconnected set of rules that allow for a certain action or expression (i.e. playing the game of chess or describing the colour of a rose), we must apparently abide by certain rules, or suffer the consequences of partaking in a nonsensical kind of activity; a mistaken application of rules means that one fails in what one set out to do – either move out of check or converse with a gardener in a way she might understand, as the case may be. Thus sentences such as ‘Red is darker than pink’ and ‘The chess king moves one square at a time’ are expressions of grammatical rules; they do not need to state empirical facts to be so,\textsuperscript{11} but instead determine certain rules by which states of affairs are so represented. We are free to employ novel uses that countermand a given set of rules, but at the expense of our no longer saying something sensible within the bounds of how others might normally expect us to play and speak.\textsuperscript{12}

In order to capture the normative relations that are to be the building blocks of philosophical method, these grammatical rules must be solely and unproblematically elicited from, and observed in, the use of language as it is commonly practiced in consensus by its users. Another way of stating this premise is that someone is competent in a language if and only if they know of and operate with words in accordance with those grammatical rules that are of interest to the philosopher:

Grammatical description merely makes explicit what is already known by competent speakers of the language – the humdrum standards of usage according to which they proceed (and also various comparisons and contrasts between familiar rules, which they may not have realised).\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10} Baker describes this ‘conception of language ... as loosely governed by rules that do not try to budget for all conceivable eventualities’. (WUM I, p50)

\textsuperscript{11} Although they may well be so used – e.g. ‘it is a fact that, in the modern game of chess, the king moves one square at a time’.

\textsuperscript{12} “We would not call something ‘red’ if it were lighter in colour than any pink thing; we would not call someone a ‘bachelor’ if he were married; and so on. Could we? – Of course, but then we would not be talking of the colour red or the status of being a bachelor, but of something else. For these concepts are determined by this pattern of grammatical, conceptual, connections” (RGN, pp263–4).

\textsuperscript{13} RGN, p59.
The grammatical constituents of philosophical practice must be “humdrum” in the sense that when clearly articulated they are familiar, to the point of assumed normativity, to their employer. If an individual does not know a given rule for the use of a word, then they cannot be said to be operating in accordance with it. Hence the grammatical rules that are elicited and employed in philosophy cannot be posited contrary to an individual’s claim of ignorance, because that individual can only apply a rule and adhere to its use if she acknowledges it in practice. In this way the constituents of a philosophical account must be derived in complete agreement with users of the language that is being elucidated. This premise provides certain license to the grammatical philosopher: if one is merely stating those humdrum standards of usage that everyone freely admits to, the burden of viability is dramatically lessened in two key ways. Firstly there is an appeal to the descriptive fidelity of a grammatical account: when one’s instruments include such common-or-garden artefacts as “red is darker than pink” and “men are mortal” then the danger of contention is significantly lessened. Secondly, if an individual does not recognise a rule being employed by a philosopher, then that particular employment must be irrelevant to that individual: they are not aware of a rule, and therefore they cannot be said to be operating in accordance with it. Hence, contrary to first blush, the early Baker could help himself to a claim that the method he advocates is purely descriptive, being that it is only relevant in relation to those who acknowledge the accuracy and pertinence of the rules so described. We will see, however, that this second qualification does nothing to compromise the purview he wishes to claim for his conception of grammatical philosophy.

The normative features of language that are to be picked out and arranged in this philosophical method are immediately available and recognisable, then, due to their being followed in every example of normal language use one cares to examine. What is the relation of such rules to the language they each partially describe? Well, they are the local accounts of how people do and most likely will, perhaps even should, operate with words in relation to a given field of concepts. The rules of the language games are local norms of representation pertaining to relevant features of the life of that community who partake in these games. There is of course a spectrum of alternate features and alternate employments to be considered in relevance to the use of a word, and this complexity varies across alternate areas; colour terms may demonstrate pretty similar rules of use across different language games, while one sees the utmost complexity and

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14 There are, of course, far more debatable rules explicated in the work of Baker and Hacker. We will return to this shortly.
alterity in psychological concepts such as to know, think, believe, etc. The important issue, in the meantime being, is that of determining that rules may be broadly applied or parochial; clear or obfuscatingly complex, according to the area of language being investigated. And these characteristics are due to the grammatical rules they exhibit. Hence, while we say of grammar that it is local to a discrete segment of a language, it does normatively pertain to that segment in a constituting manner: the various rules for the use of a word, combined and synopsised, present the inner structure of that given segment of language. It is this structure, or rather the connections that adhere within this structure – whose rules are to be tabulated in order for their user to be able to ‘take in at a glance’, that provides the philosopher’s tools with which to resolve the dissembling confusion that arises when one does not know one’s way about these normative features of language.

Taking one step back, away from given instances of grammar, towards a more birds-eye-view of how a remark’s instance interconnects with other rules, one can begin, according to the early Baker, to achieve a perception of language’s rules as they stretch away and interact with alternate boroughs of language use in a reasonably formalisable manner. Grammar is therefore referred to as an extensive, ramifying or reticulating patten that is edificial to the possibility of individuals within a language understanding each other. Without such an edifice there would be no rule-governed language use, for language would lack the regularity that understanding and agreement supervene upon. Grammar is therefore the inner structure of language that is at once both tacitly relied upon in daily discourse, and immanently available through reflection and inquiry to every user of that language.

§1.2 Grammar as veridical

Philosophy, under the interpretive scheme established in the works of Baker and Hacker, is designed to provide the philosopher with “descriptions of normative connections within the web of concepts that constitute our form of representation. They are said to be true.”¹⁵ So far we have been concerned with establishing a conception of grammar as constitutive of the language it describes, and certain characteristics follow quite validly from such a model. One of the most striking is that these normative relations, being both derived from the behaviour of a language’s users, and constitutively

¹⁵ Hacker 2009, p78.
necessary for the possibility of language, are veridical *de jure*\textsuperscript{16} descriptions of a language. This is because the forms of representation that they describe accurately capture the way people use words and form agreements when operating in a given segment of their language. Hence ‘Red is darker than pink’, our earlier exemplar, is *true* in virtue of our rules for representing a certain set of colours. This status, accredited to such grammatical rules, means that while their investigation will not conclude in a final analysis, it is an enterprise best considered as a quest for *complete clarity*, in the sense that one can aim at achieving the *correct* point of view of one’s language, if one accrues the pertinent normative relations in one’s philosophical work, thereby completely dissolving the problems that triggered the investigation.\textsuperscript{17} It is because they are veridical, structural elements of our language that they “can be organised to act as reminders, guidelines and *boundaries* that come into play at moments of philosophical confusion.”\textsuperscript{18}

It follows quite sequentially from this account that the elucidation of grammatical rules *qua* the veridical account of normative relations should be the central enterprise of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. In a sense, Wittgenstein’s work is reducible to a concern for their elucidation:

> “The focal point of all grammatical remarks [in the *Investigations*] is the rules of grammar, whether or not these remarks are themselves rules of grammar.”\textsuperscript{19}

Therefore Wittgenstein’s common use of imaginative scenarios and fictive examples (to name just two of the more multivalent traits of his writing) serve to lead the reader into recognising such oddness and fiction precisely as a result of some disobedience to the rules that govern normal utterances in our language games. On this understanding, no matter how odd Wittgenstein’s chosen tools may appear, he keeps at all times one eye on the veracity of his descriptions of the normative relations relevant to his task at hand.

Similarly, one can derive from a veridical notion of grammatical rules their potential for *accumulation* within a tabulated account. Indeed it is not just an option, but an integral task for the philosopher to accumulate more and more of the rules that govern a language game’s ‘internal structure’. Grammatical investigation “is a holistic notion; we are striving to take in as a whole a segment of grammar, to grasp the environs of a

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\textsuperscript{17} Cf: WUM, p282 & I&I, p152.

\textsuperscript{18} RGN, p64, my emphasis. Cf: pp242 & 370.

\textsuperscript{19} Baker 1986, p26.
This makes grammatical investigation an additive and progressive affair; more and more substantive in its eventual corpus of norms, as a condition of its greater and greater perspicuity. Completeness and comprehensiveness in our systemic models are therefore regulative ideals for a philosopher to act in accordance with. The role of philosophy is constructive and positive due to this possibility, and lends itself well to an analogy with the art of cartography. As with grammatical investigation, cartography is concerned with capturing local detail, such as a terrain's shape and notable features, in an easily surveyable representation intended to be referred to in moments of uncertainty when traversing the relevant terrain. Through contour lines, shading and various other legends, a map's user can determine the position of any feature within a given segment of terrain, as well as its relation to other features; an ability that is simply unavailable from solely traversing the terrain being depicted. In philosophy, the cartography of grammatical features allows the privilege of attaining a synoptic viewpoint from which to take in features at a glance, equivalent to “the mastery of the logical geography of concepts in a given domain.”

Thus our common inability to grasp the rules by which we operate is cured by the attainment of their correct perspective. It would be unfair, then, to characterise Wittgenstein's method as negative, for it offers the possibility of accumulating a unique kind of knowledge about language – one that, at a glance, can resolve the confusions that have so dogged philosophy as a discipline.

In this way Baker and Hacker’s model of grammatical investigation seems to imply two distinct ways of doing philosophy. Firstly, there is the role of the cartographer, whose groundbreaking work and attention to discursive detail result in a set of ever-increasingly exhaustive permutations for the employments of given words and concepts. It is she who follows the example set by Wittgenstein, through expanding upon and renovating his work in new ways, as new philosophical problems emerge in new cultural and scientific developments. There is also the secondary role of one who benefits from these tabulations, employing them as guides with which to navigate the often tricky ground of language use. Baker and Hacker conceived of this second group as being made up of not only philosophers, but also neuroscientists, linguists, and other theoretical researchers, ideally with such individuals’ uses of philosophical tabulations...
intended to occur antecedent to their composition of working hypotheses. In this way philosophers can provide positive assistance to theoretical endeavour, by ensuring that the language contained within such theories does not wander from the ‘high roads’ of sense, a mistake that would doom their research to barren investigation along conceptually confused avenues. These synoptic presentations are of course equally efficacious for students of philosophy, as they resolve in clear, programmatic steps many of the problems returned to again and again in philosophy. Tabulations are not philosophical autopilots by any means, as their application, remembrance and occasional tweaking are all still required, but the task of resolving philosophical questions is fundamentally and positively altered by the accrual and synoptic presentation of language’s normative relations. Tabulation is, by this account, intended as “a permanent prophylaxis against whole sets of philosophical problems”. Part of this application results in one’s use of expressions being bounded by the rules so expressed – with the result being that complex-use terms such as language, thought and belief, “if used intelligibly at all, must have their everyday meanings; this must be true of them even if they appeared in a philosophical grammar.”

§1.3 Some exegetical concerns

To understand the disillusionment that led Baker to shift towards his later standpoint, we can consider some remarks that seem to generate notable friction with the interpretation established thus far. These remarks will also prove useful in the following section, providing starting points with which to compare the early and later Baker’s qualifications. It is also a method particularly suited to the study of the exegesis of Baker, given that it appears that the consideration of this class of remarks seems to have played a large role in Baker’s volte face, and that the later Baker paid so much credit to the importance of the modal qualifications present in Wittgenstein’s work.

Firstly recall that we saw how there was a positive role to be played in philosophy and that, despite the central objective being the resolution of philosophical problems, there was also room for a constructive account in which one might accumulate the rules for

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23 Presumably in order to stop such theorists from “merely pursuing yet another monstrous chimera.” (LSN, p11)

24 NA, p27.

25 WUM, p341.

26 A sensitivity that resulted in Baker’s proposed principle of exegetical minimalism. (see NA, p67)
the employment of a given set of language games. In this manner we saw how Baker posited an apparent and “obvious connection between [Wittgenstein’s] positive conception of philosophy and his analysis of the concepts of a rule and of following a rule.”27 This account depends upon the possibility of accruing the various meanings, or established rules of use, for a word, and thus being able to tabulate these rules in a sense-bounding and synoptic presentation. Yet in the following passage, taken from one of Wittgenstein’s mid-1930s lectures, he describes his method in a way that apparently seeks to describe language in a manner quite unlike the earlier veridical model, qualifying it as discretely negative in purpose:

“The point of examining the way a word is used is not at all to provide another method of giving its meaning. When we ask on what occasion people use a word, and in reply try to describe its use, we do so only insofar as it seems helpful in getting rid of certain philosophical troubles.”28

This is an unequivocal report of the reasons for which a philosopher might examine and describes language use. The method so accounted for does not seem to have much relevance to a positive undertaking of accruing rule sets; indeed, grammatical investigation is presented here as unconcerned with the task of establishing the normative meanings of a word. Instead, investigation is presented solely as a concern with the removal of certain philosophical troubles.29 Perhaps the most puzzling element of this remark is the point that the philosophical act of examining the way a word is used is not equivalent to a method of providing its meaning, indeed it is not at all intended to make such provision. Not only does this seem problematic for Baker’s earlier conception of the task of philosophy – for what is tabulation if not the accumulation and synoptic presentation of normative meanings? – but it also begs the question of why one should bother at all to perform such an examination. In a similar manner, it appears


28 AWL, p97, my emphases. Consider also: "When we discover rules for the use of a known term we do not thereby complete our knowledge of its use, and we do not tell people how to use the term. Logical analysis is an antidote. Its importance is to stop the muddle someone makes on reflecting on words." (ibid p21). Further, “Our investigation does not try to find the real, exact meaning of words; though we often do give words exact meanings in the course of our investigation.” (Z, §467)

29 The wide range over which the tabulated rules of grammar is intended to extend likewise seems open to serious question in Wittgenstein’s own remarks, and this seems so in two ways. Firstly, the sheer impossibility of tabulation in every case of language use, and secondly in the apparent misconstrual of a necessary equivalence between meaning and use. See Knuesla 2008, Chapter IV, for an exegetically detailed consideration of the limits of meaning as use in the later Wittgenstein.
somewhat doubtful that we can help ourselves to the assumption that Wittgenstein considered the status of grammatical rules for terms such as ‘red’ as being qualitatively consistent with those rules that might bound the sense for such terms as ‘to think’:

There are words with several clearly defined meanings. It is easy to tabulate these meanings. And there are words of which one might say: they are used in a thousand different ways which gradually merge into one another. No wonder that we can't tabulate strict rules for their use.\(^{30}\)

The model of tabulation, earlier presented in §1.2, is dependant upon a quantitative difference between the rules for the use of the terms ‘red’ and ‘to think’, in that their difference is equivalent to the number of permutations and relations that pertain to their use in our language. This is because the proposed philosophical method concerns itself with the accumulation of pertinent norms relating to problematic terms such as thought and meaning. If there is, as this passage seems to suggest, a qualitative difference between such troublesome areas of language and more clearcut areas – in that the meaning of certain words resists the possibility of clear instantiation – then their inclusion within a tabulated survey is rendered somewhat implausible. For how is one to synopsise the central rules governing the use of a word when those rules do not suffer elucidation as discrete norms, but instead “are used in a thousand different ways which gradually merge into one another”? If we are unable to tabulate the uses of certain words due to their rules’ coalescence rather than their complexity, it seems problematic for such a survey to lay claim to attributes such as ‘correct’, ‘sense-bounding’ or ‘topographical’, especially when it is considered that it is precisely these more problematic areas of language use that are most likely to require philosophical elucidation. For the notion of division inheres to the notion of a norm; something is to be judged either correct or incorrect, in or out, allowed or forbidden, all according to the application of a boundary to the field of inquiry. Yet if the subject of our investigation will not yield to such divisive descriptions, the method must surely reflect this characteristic nature of the things it wishes to describe. Hence the early Baker cannot, by this understanding, help himself to the idea that, in our language use, “More involved cases are just more involved cases”\(^{31}\).

To this end, we can consider the following remark as an early indicator of the reasons that motivate Wittgenstein’s peculiar notion of philosophical method:

\(^{30}\) BB, p28.

\(^{31}\) WMU, p119.
If we look at the actual use of a word, what we see is something constantly fluctuating. In our investigations we set over against this fluctuation something more fixed, just as one paints a stationary picture of the constantly altering face of the landscape. When we study language we envisage it as a game with fixed rules. We compare it with, and measure it against, a game of that kind. If for our purposes we wish to regulate the use of a word by definite rules, then alongside its fluctuating use we set up a different use by codifying one of its characteristic aspects.32

Here the ‘codification’ of actual uses of a word as both fixed and rule-governed is presented as – rather than a veridical account of the normative structure of a language – a stipulation on the philosopher’s part. When ‘envisaging’ language use as highly regulated, the philosopher employs a strategy in which she ‘sets over against’ language a model with which to ‘compare it with, and measure it against’. This constitutes an explicit denial of the ideal that language reflects Wittgenstein’s methodology in its inner structure, instead making double reference to the interminable, fluctuating condition of language use. It therefore appears that Wittgenstein’s methodologically regulative stipulation is accorded its worth due to the purposes of the philosopher; rather than according to a necessary status of language as rule governed; this recalibration of a grammatical account’s portrayal of rule-governed activity as methodologically purposeful rather than necessarily veridical is absolutely central to the later Baker’s exegesis. Hence, when the early Baker remarks that “[t]here is no such thing as meaning independently of rules which determine how an expression is to be used”33 he is, judged by his later understanding, equivocating between a facet of language use and a methodologically codified presentation of that use, composed to resolve a certain conceptual confusion.

Finally, consider the range over which Wittgenstein’s investigations were earlier considered to operate: grammatical rules supposedly revealed the rules that are constitutive of meaning34, and thus the bounds of sense. The rules themselves are autonomous, and cohere in a shared, consensual web of conceptual connections by which we conceive of the world. The accrual and tabulation of our grammar, therefore, is a grand undertaking, one which reveals to the confused individual the culturally

32 PG, p77, my emphasis.
34 WMU, p20.
established usages to which they already adhere, without conscious acknowledgement of this fact. Yet in the following passage, we are presented with a very different remit by which we concern ourselves with the uses of words:

What is it that is repulsive in the idea that we study the use of a word, point to mistakes in the description of this use and so on? First and foremost one asks oneself: How could that be so important to us? It depends on whether what one calls a ‘wrong description’ is a description that does not accord with established usage – or one which does not accord with the practice of the person giving the description. Only in the second case does a philosophical conflict arise.35

Here, Wittgenstein sees such a concern with studying our established usage as in some sense unimportant, perhaps even repulsive, in its interest in regulating the use of a word according to compliance with the uses we think we discover. Only in the practice of a given individual’s use of that word does a philosophical conflict arise – with philosophy, as conceived of by Wittgenstein, deriving its purpose solely36 from such arising conflicts.

To summarise, then, the later Baker’s exegesis developed an acute sensitivity to a set of methodological characteristics that were previously obscured by his emphasis upon grammar as veridical, accruable, and sense-bounding. Specifically, we have seen how a series of his earlier working assumptions can be challenged by consideration of four of Wittgenstein’s remarks: that the consolidation of a set of meanings is not the purpose of philosophy; that certain complex concepts refuse to yield to clearcut tabulation according to their convergent and merged meanings; that Wittgenstein’s presentation of language as coherently rule-governed is a methodological stipulation, rather than a veridical fact of language use; and that philosophical problems emerge in, and are relative only to, a given individual’s conceptions, and thus the individual stands as the site of grammatical investigation, rather than a grand matrix of normative conventions operative for language in use. It is by now clear, I think, that when Baker remarked that “[c]ommentators on Wittgenstein seem to be pulled by powerful gravitational forces towards assimilating all of his remarks to factual observations about the logical geography of natural languages”,37 he considered his former self to be most assuredly guilty of indulging in this assimilative tendency.

35 RPP I, §548.
36 Cf: PI, §109, AWL, p97 & BT, p421.
37 NA, p70, n4.
We can also use these four remarks to get clear on another substantial problem Baker came to perceive in his earlier position. Unlike, for example, Wittgenstein’s infamous remark regarding the methodological benefit in treating meaning as use, in these four examples we see very little of the author’s frequent and characteristic use of limiting modal qualifiers, such as ‘can’, ‘might’, ‘we can say’, or ‘imagine it as’, etc. There is no equivalence present in such remarks as: “No wonder we can’t tabulate strict rules for [a certain word’s] use”; “The point of examining the way a word is used is not at all to provide another method of giving its meaning”; “When we ask on what occasion people use a word, and in reply try to describe its use, we do so only insofar as it seems helpful in getting rid of certain philosophical troubles”; “Only in the second case does a philosophical conflict arise”; or “Our investigation does not try to find the real, exact meaning of words.” Indeed, we can surmise that the disqualifying modality that characterises these remarks make them particularly important in understanding Wittgenstein’s methodological intentions. While one can, with some light footwork, marginalise an author’s modal qualifiers and thereby render a sentence in a more universal sense than may have been originally intended, one cannot inversely ‘build’ modality into sentences that are as univocally disqualifying as those presented above. And this seems to be clearly in keeping with their intended method. As Read and Hutchinson argue,

Positive pronouncements on subjects, such as meaning, are presented with care so as to clearly guard against our seeing them as anything other than reminders for a particular purpose. Remarks about this method of philosophy are stated in a manner that clearly projects (and clearly delimits) its scope.

With Morris, Read and Hutchinson, then, we can qualify Baker’s later exegetical practice as one highly sensitive to the modal qualifications present in Wittgenstein’s text, in that he grew to take these elements at face value: as recommendations of intent and attenuations of applicability, rather than as moments of modesty or uncertainty. We

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38 “For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” (PI §43)


40 Hutchinson & Read 2008, p142.

will now see how such attentiveness to the conditionality and context of Wittgenstein’s remarks led Baker to a radically new model of reading.

§1.4 From language is rule governed, to language as rule governed

Remarks such as those central to §1.3 appear troubling to the model of philosophy Gordon Baker earlier attributed to Wittgenstein, problematising, as they do, central assumptions that Baker considered himself to have indulged in. Wittgenstein’s characterisation of certain areas of language – indeed, precisely those same areas where we are most in need of clarity – as being simply too coalescent and complex in their use to be successfully tabulated, present the problem of how to judge the assertion that tabulation of grammatical features is the central purpose of philosophy. Baker was faced with the prospect of concluding Wittgenstein’s method as being inoperative, then, in that it invented a tabulating method of description that could find no purchase when confronted by the harder problems of philosophy. More generally, the modality of his remarks, and Baker’s acknowledgement of his previous insensitivity to the importance of such modality, also clearly left quite a mark on Baker’s later exegesis (as testified in his two papers “Remarks on ‘Language’ and ‘Grammar’” and “Italics in Wittgenstein”).

Baker could also, of course, have considered these problematic remarks as somehow not representative of Wittgenstein’s actual position. Instead he proceeded under a drastically modified notion of what Wittgenstein thought he was doing when he assembled grammatical remarks in service of dissolving philosophical confusion. His revisionary avenue of interpretation turned upon his understanding of Wittgenstein’s conception of an aspect. The “unity of his method” was not now to be derived from the method of veridical tabulation, but from “the application to grammar and language of the concept of an aspect (and of the related concepts of seeing an aspect and being blind to an aspect).” Baker considered that, whilst primarily found in his remarks on perception, the notion of an aspect should not be considered as restricted to only those passages, but instead offered a coherence to his methods that demonstrated fidelity to the notions of philosophy as the stipulated codification of rules in the service of remedying an

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43 NA, p33.
individual’s confusions, rather than in the search of a total cartographic assembly of rule-governed meaning.44

An ‘aspect’, as Baker presents the term, can be understood as a particular way of seeing that alters one’s way of orchestrating one’s perception, with the ‘dawning’ of a new aspect appearing in our experiences as “half visual experience, half thought”.45 Contemplating a face and suddenly noticing its likeness to another;46 seeing a triangle as alternately striking one as “a triangular hole, as a solid, as a geometrical drawing; as standing on its base, as hanging from its apex; as a mountain, as a wedge, as an arrow or pointer, as an overturned object which is meant to stand on the shorter side of the right angle, as a half parallelogram, and as various other things”47; and seeing a schematic cube first as a lying down, then as receding from view48: these are just some of the examples Wittgenstein uses to explain how one can “switch” between ways of noticing features in that which we observe. Anyone who has laid back on the grass and picked out differing forms in the clouds that pass overhead is well aware of this switch. Hence while “noticing an aspect” changes the way we see the thing we are examining – perhaps its dimensions reverse, its features orchestrate in familial resemblance to another face, or its identity switches over to reveal that thing as something other than what we previously considered it to be – we can also say that nothing has actually has changed in the thing itself. “The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new perception and at the same time of the perception's being unchanged.”49

This account of the term aspect is directly relevant to the task of philosophy in the following manner: Baker’s ‘turn’ occurs in his treatment of the notion of an aspect as being “closely analogous” with that of a conception. Conceptions are “ways of seeing” the world too, and many of “the points made about the concept of visual aspect-seeing seem to hold equally for the wider use of ‘aspect’ or ‘way of seeing things' in application to conceptions in philosophy.”50 Morris goes so far as to put it thus: “Conceptions are, to

44 Cf: NA, p279.
45 PI, p197.
49 Ibid, p196.
50 NA, p283, but Baker is keen to qualify this “most”; he lists a number of useful disanalogies too, see p286–7.
put it crudely, the intellectual counterpart of visual aspects." Rather than this only constituting bold stipulation, Baker’s reformulation can derive serious exegetical plausibility from Wittgenstein’s frequent use of the term aspect when remarking on the method of philosophy. For aspects, far from being a term to be confined to perceptual experience, are clearly crucial to the comparative task of considering alternate analogies and systems of expression that is the pivotal mechanism in Baker’s reading. For example,

> We change the aspect of things by juxtaposing with one system of expression other ones. Thus can the thrall in which an analogy holds us can be broken, if it is juxtaposed with it another analogy which we acknowledge to be equally justifiable.  

The ends of philosophy, then, appear not to be solely the cessation of a particularly troublesome system of expression, but instead the dawning of a new aspect that occurs because of this change. By reflecting upon Wittgenstein’s earlier remark, that in “our investigations we set over against this fluctuation something more fixed, just as one paints a stationary picture of the constantly altering face of the landscape”, we can place the notion of an aspect as playing a crucial role in this proposed methodology. For such ‘fixed pictures’, by which we describe language use, are to be set up alongside our actual use to resolve our conceptual difficulties: “We then change the aspect by placing side-by-side with one system of expression other systems of expression.” Once again, we see that the aspect of our conception is altered by the system of expression we habitually employ, being juxtaposed with an alternate system, one which draws attention to alternate characteristics of the field of inquiry. The method is not interdictory, then, but seeks to trigger the noticing of a new aspect, one that means we no longer find our previous notation wholly satisfactory, precisely because it did not admit of this new way of seeing. It is this change, rather than the accompanying one in our expression, which matters for Wittgenstein.

Actually I should like to say that ... the words you utter or what you think as you utter them are not what matters, so much as the difference they make at various points in your life ... 

Practice gives words their significance.  

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32 TS220 §99.  
33 TS 220 §99.  
34 CV, p85.
Hence aspects govern what our systems of expression seek to depict, and contribute to the kinds of practices that we invest ourselves in, just as that system expresses and reinforces a preferred way of conceiving. Because one’s consideration and application of differing notations can trace for one the possibility of a new aspect, “how it comes about that it appears” can be “characteristically exemplified” if we consider certain ways of asking questions which best express the logic of such systems of expression. Such questions as "Where does the present go when it becomes past, and where is the past?" speak of a manner of conceiving of time as a mysterious relation between tenses, one that may well prove striking in certain circumstances (see §3.2). Many of the questions posed by Wittgenstein resemble such ‘characteristic exemplification’. It is this being struck, being taken with a certain expression, which leads to a way of seeing things in which we may “become obsessed with our symbolism.—We may say that we are led into puzzlement by an analogy which irresistibly drags us on.” What one is “dragged on” into is the orchestration of the world more and more exclusively according to this aspect, leading to a point at which we “aren’t able to rid ourselves of the implications of our symbolism.” It becomes increasingly difficult to shift away from this way of seeing time; we are “tempted” or “lured” into making further statements in accord with this aspect, “which seems to admit of a question like ‘Where does the flame of a candle go to when it's blown out?’ ‘Where does the light go to?’, ‘Where does the past go to?’” Such a problematically abided aspect “thus becomes analogous to continuous aspect-seeing. The person behaves intellectually as if his picture represented the only possibility.”

If instead we can be convinced that a given style of question or description can be foresaken, then there is a chance that a rigidly adhered-to aspect can be discarded in favour of a new dawning. If prompting an aspect switch is now understood to be the purpose of presenting the reader with a particular language game, an intermediate case, or a model of comparison, then it is equally important to note that philosophical problems arise “because the forms of representation of our language have taken on a

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55 BB, p107.

56 ibid.

57 ibid, p108.

disquieting aspect”.\textsuperscript{59} Baker emphasises that Wittgenstein’s use of the term aspect is common to both the problems to which his methods are addressed, and the alleviating means of this addressal. The rule-governed systems of comparison that Wittgenstein lays alongside language “stand on the same level as the unexamined analogies which they are intended to displace in dissolving particular philosophical problems”, and therefore, “both philosophical problems and their dissolutions involve conceptions or ‘aspect-seeing’”.\textsuperscript{60} Philosophy is no longer to be in the business of interdiction, but instead of noticing, then judiciously presenting, ways of seeing that have been neglected, in order to achieve an aspect switch, analogous with that half-sight/half-thought when one notices the ‘duck’ in Köhler’s famous diagram, rather than the ‘rabbit’. Neither the means of the switch, or the new aspect itself, are hierarchically superior, more precise or more widely applicable than those that gave rise to the initial problem. An individual who remarked upon suddenly seeing the duck, “aha! Now I see the right way of looking at this picture” would not have understood that picture’s purpose at all, nor what had just happened to her. Likewise, the antidote matches the problematic conception in form because it contests the comprehensiveness of that problematic rule-set, rather than because the ‘correct’ or exhaustive rule-set is now made available through due grammatical diligence. Sometimes, perhaps certain aspects might prove to be so likely to cause conceptual confusion that Wittgenstein feels compelled to give a warning against their use.\textsuperscript{61} In such cases, these aspects can be made sensible through explication, to then to be used to presage against their seemingly simplifying or intriguing possibilities.\textsuperscript{62} This does not reduce, however, to a hierarchy of correctness, only a forewarning of possible confusions that may emerge in the practice of a particular aspect.

This is the reason why the later Baker chose to refer to Wittgenstein’s method as a form of ‘homeopathy’ – it suggests the introduction of a small dose of a pathological element in the treatment of the condition which that element gave rise to. The analogical choice of homeopathy here is perhaps somewhat unwise, however, with perhaps ‘vaccination’ being a better choice. This is because not only does vaccination

\textsuperscript{59} TS 220 §98, my emphasis.

\textsuperscript{60} Morris 2004, p9.

\textsuperscript{61} RFM, p137.

\textsuperscript{62} Certain propositions may sound remarkable and lead one into a way of seeing a state of affairs that promise to be revelatory, such as “fractions cannot be arranged in order of magnitude” – a statement that on first blush appears revelatory. Upon further inspection, Wittgenstein notes, this facet of fractions reveals itself to be derived from mathematical notation, rather than a regularity in an object that can be cashed out in relevant applied domains, such as physics. (See RFM, p137)
avoid certain unhelpful connotations with a discredited medical method, but because many of the grammatical remarks that permeate Wittgenstein’s later work relate in some sense to a form of ‘dead’ philosophical confusion, whose introduction allows the reader to examine this disquieting aspect in the light of alternate aspects, so as to be able to recognise and counter its occurrence elsewhere in his life with language. These models not only provide examples of what it is to apply rules beyond their remit – hence at the expense of attention paid to alternate aspects – but as we shall see, they also invoke the voice of such confusion. Perhaps this is the pertinent feature of what Wittgenstein referred to as his ‘talent’ – to keep grasp of his confusion, to not let it slip between his fingers before it could be dissected. His mastery of the ability to switch between aspects now becomes our strongest candidate for the kind of perspicuity his writing advocates. Previously, let us remember, the accumulative effect of philosophical practice was the achievement of a perspective in some sense above or outside language (what the later Baker termed the ‘bird’s-eye view’), through the assembly of a cartographic account of its features in which we are given to stand outside of its functioning:

In general, what is necessary is to obtain a kind of synoptic view without getting lost in the details which would produce completeness. A surview must delineate the salient logical articulations forged by grammar, the central structure of the net of language, not the local refinements.

The purpose of philosophy was positive in its accrual of grammar by which people may avoid the problems inherent in language. Now, Baker’s later Wittgenstein presents his models in order to achieve a kind of perspicuity that involves switching between conceptual aspects, and knowing how to employ alternate notations that help trigger such a switch. Perspicuity becomes an ability to cycle through different aspects of language use, rather than being able to survey a greater and greater totality of language at any given time. Hence perspicuity is rendered as a personal ability one develops, rather than a synoptic position afforded by the good work of past philosophers, for such

63 “My talent consists in being capable of being puzzled when the puzzlement has glided off your mind. I am able to hold the puzzlement which it has slipped through your hands (and you therefore think you are clear). The art of the philosopher is not to be cheated of his puzzlement before it is really cleared up.” (MS 157b, p31) Cf: NA, p268. See also §2.3 of this thesis for more a detailed consideration of related themes.

64 WMU, p543.
an ability allows one to approach our concepts without prejudice. A perspicuous representation is, on these grounds, to be comprehended as an achievement term, rather than a synoptic model of grammar. Similarly to perspecuity, prejudice now means something quite specific—it is no longer the preformulation of a concept which we unquestioningly take to be universally correct; it is rather a form of captivity to a certain way of seeing the world, one that lures us into making philosophically confusing expressions; a brake upon our reasoning, rather than a wall that we cannot pass. In much the same way, the notion of clarity is not the striking off of the chains of language, but “the complete disappearance of particular philosophical problems relating to problematic concepts, which does not require once-and-for-all accounts or ‘completed grammars’ of the relevant concepts.” From §1 ("the individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.") through to p225 ("I cannot know what is going on in him"), Wittgenstein’s *Investigations* orbits around particular expressions that might strike the reader as either wholly sensible or deeply problematic, depending upon whether they themselves see with the aspect which such sentences exemplify. It is when such aspects go unacknowledged as being voluntary, rather than necessitated by the thing being represented, that we require assistance, for “[w]e don’t see that something can be looked at in a certain way until it is so looked at. We don’t see that an aspect is possible until it is there.” In such circumstances—those which concern philosophy as a method—one finds oneself in an arrested position “comparable to that of someone who continuously sees a single aspect in the duck-rabbit diagram.”

Aspects are mutually exclusive of each other, because they are optional in their adoption. One aspect may lead us to a conclusion that is based upon a confusion as to the status of our expressions, while another may provide an account that reveals the fallacy or incompleteness of that first aspect. Hence, the term ‘aspect’ gestures towards the different ways in which we judge something to be the case, according to the pertinent features that appear to us when attending to that thing, with the proviso being, of course, that certain connections and characteristics will not ‘appear’ to us as pertinent when conceived under a particular aspect. Hence, in order to alter the aspect of our seeing, new cases, new questions, newly imagined alternate conditions need to be

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65 See CV, p27.
67 PG, p444.
68 PI, p194.
considered in order to allow a new field of pertinence to emerge. In order to ‘teach us differences’, Wittgenstein proposed the ‘laying alongside’, or ‘measuring against’, of a new model of comparison, in order to effect the dawning of a new aspect upon his reader. The notion of an aspect is, in this regard, a way we can model the “transiently exclusionary” character of our understanding. Ways of seeing are not combinatorial, but competing, and consequently, “seeing something in one way interferes with seeing it differently.” An aspect instantiates a given way of seeing the use of our words that may contradict or make irrelevant alternate aspects: as with the duck-rabbit, differing aspects represent differing orientations, but unlike the duck-rabbit, aspects can be chosen, encouraged, warned against and, most importantly – as demonstrated by Wittgenstein – invented.

We have now before us a radically different notion of philosophy to that one considered in §1.1 and §1.2, one in which inciting the dawning of a new aspect which overwrites a previously problematic conception is, methodologically speaking, absolutely fundamental to its success. As Wittgenstein advocates, “philosophy’s entire task is to shape expression in such a way that certain worries disappear.” Similarly, imagining a particular procedure or behaviour to be markedly different – not as an account of what is or is not the case, but in terms of what is possible – can change the aspect of a problematic account. It can therefore be “very useful to imagine” events to be very different from how they are, not because one is assessing the viability of one’s imagined scenario, but precisely because “this changes the aspect” by which one views the subject being represented. The status of Wittgenstein’s grammatical remarks are no longer predicated upon those rules they represent as being veridical, or as bounding the realms of sense in some complete manner, and now “the focal point of all grammatical remarks is” no longer “the rules of grammar, whether or not these remarks are themselves rules of grammar.”

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69 NA, p280.
70 Ibid, p281.
71 Wittgenstein considered Copernicus, Newton and Einstein all to have invented new aspects through which to proceed. We will return to consider this notion more fully in the final chapter.
72 BT, p421.
74 TS 220, §99.
consistent, we should extend this qualification to the tools of its own application. An aspect itself is a *procedural* description, not a psychological or metaphysical one. Indeed, Rupert Read goes so far as to consider this feature as being “in the end an obstacle to be overcome. The last temptation of the Wittgensteinian philosopher is to treat these terms as providing a kind of *ersatz* foundation.”

If we accept this account of aspects, then we are bound to follow Baker in overturning his earlier position regarding what it is that restricts the *breadth* of the set of grammatical rules that can be sensibly tabulated. The previously conceived purpose of philosophy lay in “surveying all the uses and applications of words, phrases, and sentences in a given domain of thought which gave rise to philosophical perplexity.”

This project of assembling a surview was restricted by the brute fact that “language as a whole cannot be taken in at a glance. It is here that piecemeal (but not unsystematic) work is all that can be hoped for. Problems are tackled as they arise, segments of grammar surveyed, but the *totality* cannot be grasped at once.” The piecemeal nature of Wittgenstein’s investigations is to be accounted for in terms of the task attempted and the limits of comprehensibility, defined by the limits of sensible work that such a surview could be put to. In short, then, the completion of such rules was possible, but the resulting account’s use would be impossible. Hence for the early Baker, tabulation is *functionally* asymptotic but *ideally* exhaustive; “With time, a total picture may emerge … But, it does not follow that the total picture can itself be *readily* surveyed.”

Yet as we have considered, grammatical rules are not unproblematically accumulative. They are codified aspects of a constantly fluctuating field of phenomena. We adopt a notation which “sharpens” particular instances of such phenomena only for good methodological reason; to address certain aspects that have led us to expressing (similarly sharpened) problematic accounts of meaning, thought, definition, experience, etc. To expect an amalgamation of these antidotal notations to accrue as a completely tabulated map of our language is akin to expecting a photo album to define the events it portrays in their interactional, emotional, figurative & symbolic totality. Rather, such comparative tools stand against, compromise, or cast new light on alternate aspects, that

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76 Read 2005, p81. See Read 2005 for a fuller consideration of this challenging methodological implication.

77 WUM, p531.

78 ibid, p543.

were previously presented as definitional, bounding and constitutional of the use of a
given expression. Hence for the later Baker, grammatical remarks do not cohere within a
systematic presentation unproblematically.\textsuperscript{80} This is certainly not to deny that
normativity pertains to language in use, but instead it is to assert that it is exactly the
overly rigid application of a rule, which we formulate when reflecting upon the way that
language is used, that stands as the source of most of our philosophical troubles.\textsuperscript{81}
Wittgenstein’s philosophy has thus shifted from a way of reflecting on what is sensible
and nonsensical, to a method of detaching oneself from what was previously accepted
as necessarily true, by modelling other rules and acknowledging other possibilities.

In conclusion, we would do well to acknowledge, as Baker did\textsuperscript{82}, that many problems
remain for his aspectival later reading. Chief among them might be numbered his
exegetical reliance upon Waismann’s collaborative work with Wittgenstein, even though
Wittgenstein suspected the results of that collaboration to be somewhat incongruous
with his own work. There also remain many exegetical battles to be fought, most
noticeably in explaining the sympathy between Baker and Hacker’s account of
philosophy’s purpose as accumulating the grammar of our language in order to provide
a surview of the treacherous, confusing terrain of language in use, and a set of remarks
by Wittgenstein, which refer to the task of philosophy as being either cartographic or to
the philosopher’s task being to act as a ‘tour-guide’ to a complex geography.\textsuperscript{83} While
neither of these problems would prove unsurmountable, they will not further concern us
here, in part because of the work done by a student of both Baker and Hacker, Oskari
Kuusela, in his book \textit{The Struggle Against Dogmatism}. His close study and refutation of the
early Baker’s position in favour of a position close to his later one is extensive, particular
and, hence, convincing in a manner in which this single chapter does not hope to be.
That is not to say that avenues of research are not still available to the reader of Baker—he explicitly set out a number of pointers as to how his research could be continued with

\textsuperscript{80} Other than perhaps in odd instances of regularity. His reading does not amount to a universal claim of
accumulation’s impossibility in all instances, one suspects.

\textsuperscript{81} Cf: Cavell 1998: “That everyday language does not, in fact or in essence, depend upon such a structure
and conception of rules, and yet that the absence of such a structure in no way impairs its functioning is
what the picture of language drawn in the later philosophy is all about.” (p48). Cavell provides an
excellent discussion of this point, and in particular, a cutting treatment of an author who treats
Wittgenstein as advancing a normative theory of language use (see especially pp47–8).

\textsuperscript{82} Cf: Morris 2004, p13.

\textsuperscript{83} See Read & Hutchinson 2008, pp142–9, for just such a treatment of this point of contention.
great benefit. Sadly, this thesis cannot take up Baker’s challenge – instead, we will continue by addressing a new problematic in Baker’s later reading. Specifically, the following chapter addresses Baker’s over-emphasis of Wittgenstein’s analogy between therapy and philosophical investigation, and the manner in which this emphasis renders Baker’s later exegesis incapable of wholly sloughing off his earlier interventionist understanding of philosophy.

 See, e.g., NA pp206 & 245.
Chapter II

The Promise of Therapy

Curiosity is a vice that has been stigmatised ... I like the word however. To me it suggests something altogether different: it evokes ‘concern’; it evokes the care one takes for what exists and could exist; an acute sense of the real which, however, never becomes fixed; a readiness to find our surroundings strange and singular; a certain relentlessness in ridding ourselves of our familiarities and looking at things otherwise; a passion for seizing what is happening now and what is passing away; a lack of respect for traditional hierarchies of the important and the essential.

— Michel Foucault, “The Masked Philosopher”

1 1997a, p305.
Two interpretations of the status of a grammatical remark, and therefore of the method of grammatical investigation, were depicted and contrasted in the previous chapter. It was argued that accompanying these models, or rather implied by their characteristics, are two discrete conceptions of the tasks that doing philosophy consists in. Adopting either a cartographic or aspectival understanding of the concept of grammar led to radically different notions of what philosophy is, and how it should be applied in the remedy of philosophical confusion. The present chapter is a limited critique of what was judged to be the more viable interpretation, tested in, and therefore inherited from, the previous chapter – that of Baker’s later reading. Specifically, we turn now to the role of the philosophically confused individual, namely that individual whose problems are to be addressed in Wittgenstein’s later texts, and the roles he expected his reader to fulfil. More generally, I seek to address the questions implicit in Wittgenstein’s cryptic statement that “anything your reader can do for himself, leave to him” — namely ‘what is it that is left to the reader?’ and ‘why should it be so?’

Firstly, we will examine the identity of the reader (or accordingly the patient, or grammar-transgressor) as entailed by both the early and later Baker, noticing their similarities and dissimilarities, specifically the increased importance of the confused individual’s (or patient’s) participation in, and ability to alter the procedure of, the process of philosophy-as-therapy. Secondly we will consider three accumulative characteristics of the later writing of Wittgenstein that not only support this move towards an individual-relative concept of doing philosophy, but also challenge the scope allowed for by the later Baker in this regard. Recasting the reader, alternately, in a more dynamic and less determinate role has an effect upon the way we understand the comparative elements of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, leading to a more substantial reevaluation of many of the central tenets of Baker’s model of therapeutic philosophy. The tenets considered in this light are the therapeutic role of the interlocutor, the role of the patient’s acknowledgement and the possibility of their resistance as a hindrance to the process of therapy. It will be argued that a choice naturally presents itself, between the adoption and investigation of this new characterisation of philosophical investigation, or instead an avowal of a strict Bakerian interpretation that, while

2 CV, p77.

3 ‘Accumulative’ here denotes the fact that the three characteristics interlink and, separately, do worse work in depicting certain facets of the text. The contention is that the reader’s imagination is purposely elicited through the portrayal of open-ended scenarios, and so the three characteristics could, if one preferred, be considered one.
admitting of its own lacunae, dismisses them as of limited importance. Unsurprisingly, it will be argued as a conclusion to the chapter that, considered as a whole, the problems lain out here represent a critique of what the application of therapy might hope to achieve that is too significant to wholly ignore, and that therefore the opportunity to develop a modified model of the later philosophy of Wittgenstein should be grasped with conviction.

§2.1 Anything your reader can do for himself, leave to him

The early Baker’s conception of grammar as bounding and determining with regard to the activity of a group of language speakers—and therefore of the role of the philosopher as guardian to those boundaries of sense as entailed by this conception—imply a number of concrete characteristics. Any individual who transgresses the grammar of their language, as tabulated and presented by the philosopher, is likely to draw nonsensical or irrelevant conclusions from their own grammatically bankrupt language use. The role of the philosopher is therefore one concerned with theoretical generalisations in particular—whether scientific, humanistic, or philosophical—because of the possibility for the establishment and circulation of conclusions based on grammatically incoherent premises. While the stakes may differ, the task remains essentially the same, whether the transgression takes place in personal conversation or in peer-reviewed journals: “a philosopher has a duty as a policeman to deprive [such theorists] of the enjoyment of their ill-gotten gains.” Since the grammatically confused individual is in a muddle, and cannot find their way about their own language, they quite naturally cannot be considered a meaningful partner in the resolution of their problems, as any statements they make on the subject of their confusion are necessarily compromised by their lack of a surview of their own language use. Yet Baker did postulate that the patient, as master of the techniques that constitute her language, already knows the rules of grammar that are being violated in her confused utterances, and therefore only needs reminding of them in order to cure her bafflement. As Hacker remarked,

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4 “a supra-personal institutionalised normative system”, as Baker later put it (in NA, p148).
5 Baker & Hacker 1986.
“[Problems] can be dissolved by a surview which the philosopher endeavours to attain by arranging the grammatical rules which he elicits from the person who suffers from the bafflement. The touchstone of the correctness of the rules he thus elicits is the language user not the independent judgement of the philosopher.”

Clearly, then, the grammatical rules by which the patient’s confusion is alleviated are first elicited from her by the work of the philosopher, so why the insistence that the early Baker, with Hacker, leaves no significant role for his patient? Because, despite his stipulation that the touchstone of correctness of the rules thus elicited is the language user herself, there remains the all-important task of qualifying the elicited responses as either rule-governed sense or ungrammatical nonsense; a task placed firmly in the remit of the philosopher. As Hacker & Bennett later elaborate,

“The issue is not whether a certain doctrine propounded by a dualist or a physicalist – for example, that the mind is a spiritual substance or that the mind is identical with the brain – makes sense to him, but only whether it makes sense.”

It therefore makes as much sense to argue with the rules clearly laid out by the grammarian as to attempt to explain why robbery is a perfectly acceptable form of wealth redistribution to a policeman. Both figures of authority would respond by repeating the rules that they know to have been violated by the actions of the individual in question, until that individual relents, accepting the incontrovertibility of the position. According to Baker and Hacker’s interpretation, therefore, “the end result, or what will be agreed upon, is already known in advance. Discussion will be resumed until agreement about grammatical reminders is reached.”

Given that the end results of a particular conceptual investigation is often known in advance, and that what is of concern is not whether an individual’s language use makes sense to her, but that it makes sense according to the rules of grammar regarding a particularly problematic area of language, there remains very little for the reader to contribute, once their maladapted grammatical condition has been successfully elicited. The participation of the confused individual in this conception of investigation is attenuated almost entirely to an enabling

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6 I&I, p121.
7 Hacker & Bennett 2003, p383.
role, as both the initial source of confusion, and the “proof” of the aptness of the grammatical rules used in its dissolution.

Contrastingly, and conceived of as “essentially dialogic”, later Bakerian therapy offers the hope of a more substantial role for the individual partaking in conceptual investigation in partnership with the Wittgensteinian philosopher. The reason for this interactive element of philosophy, as we have already seen, can be attributed to Baker’s advocacy of …

... a highly unified account of the method which Wittgenstein tried to demonstrate by examples. … There is a general strategy exhibited in all the various therapies, and the possibility of mastering it and transferring it to new problems gives substance to the conviction that the correct treatment of each problem casts light on the correct treatment of all.

The unity of the method turns on the application to grammar and language of the concept of an aspect (and of the related concepts of seeing an aspect and being blind to such an aspect).\(^9\)

As previously argued, perspicuous representation is best understood as an achievement term\(^{10}\) that applies to the successful application of an alternate model or object to an individual’s rigidly held concept of meaning, sensation, thought, language, etc., thereby making perspicuous to that individual a previously neglected aspect of language use. Since perspicuous representation is an achievement term, successful therapeutic philosophy is to be tailored to the particular conceptions of a troubled individual and since, therefore, perspicuous comparisons or analogies are not asserted due to their incontrovertibility (as a result of their accurate tabulations of the grammar of the patient’s concept), the therapist instead is engaged in a more open form of dialog. This is because the patient’s acknowledgement is the key criteria of successful therapy, in that only an individual’s recognition of her therapist’s portrayal can mark the diagnosis as being correct. In this manner, the later Baker attributes an important mechanism of therapy to the role of the patient – their ongoing responses literally ‘make or break’ the investigation, and in this regard stands in stark contrast to the inflexibility that characterises the insistence of his earlier reading. The aim of therapy is to discover the appropriate key with which to unlock an individual’s acknowledgement, thereby

\(^9\) NA, p33.

\(^{10}\) Cf: NA, p42.
initiating the process of conceptual clarification and resolution. Thus therapy is a “hit and miss process”\textsuperscript{11} of diagnosis, whereby the therapist tests the waters through various proposed analogies and comparisons, seeking to uncover the unacknowledged pictures that are generating that particular patient’s mental cramps, obsessions and prejudices.\textsuperscript{12} This reflexive attention to the problems of the patient is why Baker describes the role of the philosopher as one demanding patience, imagination and creativity\textsuperscript{13}.

As the patient in this model, one confesses to the suitability of a certain proposed analogy or account to one’s own ways of thinking, or rejects that same account as inappropriate, and the therapist then responds by trying alternate models; therefore a variety of patient responses are validated as relevant and important to the process of philosophy, and the argument will not continue in the same vain regardless of the patient’s protestations precisely because the subject of investigation are the patient’s own expressions. Despite this, the proposed comparative models are conceived of, constructed, and variegated by one’s therapeutic philosopher, no matter the fact that their efficacy is dependant on the benediction of the confessing patient. In this limited sense, Baker can be placed in relative proximity to the interpretation he previously shared with his friend and colleague, Peter Hacker. Philosophy is posited as an applied art, substantiated and given purpose by its treatment of an actual individual, but that treatment’s success, character and imaginative innovation still remain firmly in the therapist’s remit. While the role of the patient greatly exceeds its equivalent in his earlier interpretation, it still subsists upon the far more philosophically profound role of the therapist, and is dependant upon it in the hope of achieving perspicuity. The subject of therapy is the particular confusion of the patient, rather than some ‘grammar at large’, and so his interpretation of the process is thought of as “radically individualistic because it demands the active participation of the ‘patient’ in a discussion. He must explain what he wants to say, how he wants to define expressions; he must acknowledge the pictures that influence him; he is invited to adopt novel ways of ordering things; and so on.”\textsuperscript{14} In a sense, much of the following chapter is concerned with demonstrating exactly why Baker’s use here of the adjective ‘radically’ is somewhat misplaced when characterising his own exegetical position.

\textsuperscript{11} NA, p214, and here Baker’s account is presumably meant to echo the criss-cross, circling, multi-perspectival nature of Wittgenstein’s writing.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, p184.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, pp11, 149 & 291. Cf: Chapter VT’s revised notion of the importance of creativity.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, p181.
Consider that Wittgenstein stipulated that his readers need “to get down to the application of our concepts” in order to find different, alleviating dimensions of their possible employment. He constantly stresses that we should take responsibility for looking at and thinking about our use of our words afresh, yet by Baker’s account the achievement of a perspectival shift in the way one understands a certain part of one’s own language use is caused by one’s therapist — not, oddly, by oneself. The question that seems quite natural to ask here is: ‘to what extent, if any, is Wittgenstein’s reader required to partially fabricate the means of their own perspectival comparison?’

In answering this question, and in substantiating why it is at all relevant, what can be found when one turns to the structure of interactions presented in the *Investigations* for clarification? If the completion of such comparative tasks were clearly and visibly predetermined and presented by Wittgenstein, we should expect to witness common occurrences of this sort: ‘look and see if this model manipulates this conception so that your problem disappears’. This kind of concrete example is certainly not impossible to find, (see, e.g., PI §341, §360) but it is uncommon in comparison to Wittgenstein’s more prevalent methods of provoking perspicuous representations in his reader. The comparative scenarios that constitute a significant part of the text are commonly underdetermined in structure, interrogative in form, and capable of sustaining multiple interpretations. It is to be argued that the contingent determinations, answers and interpretations provided by the reader in response to the incompleteness of such scenarios are the moments at which perspicuous representation is achieved, rather than in the tailored precision of a scenario that forces the dawning of a new aspect upon the reader. Hence his reader should not be surprised if “there has emerged, not a single clear portrait, but a series of competing and often wildly contradictory Wittgensteins.” I posit that the following three accumulative characteristics are useful indicators of the text’s investigative structure that are in danger of being somewhat marginalised by Baker’s account of perspicuous representation, and that their consideration should bear

15 PI p200.

16 Eg PI §66. “He has the great gift of always seeing things as if for the first time. But it shows, I think, how difficult collaborative work with him is, since he is always following up the inspiration of the moment and demolishing what he has previously sketched out.” – Waismann, quoted in NA, p16.

17 If, contra Baker, such examples were not considered to constitute objects of comparison, due to their lack of synoptic survie of rules of grammar (cf: Hacker 2004, p328), then the following three characteristics are still relevant to a percentage of the text of the *Investigations* far greater in significance than those that could be taken to satisfy his particular definition of objects of comparison, and thus still represent a qualification to be considered seriously by those sympathetic to Hacker’s positions.

18 Kahane, Kanterian & Kiusela, p2.
some greater part in deciding the manner in which the achievement of perspicuity is advocated by the author.

i) **Imaginative**: We find in the *Investigations* over 180 direct requests for the reader to “think themselves into the skin”\(^\text{19}\) of a peculiar comparative situation, along with countless other indirect examples of Wittgenstein providing scenarios that are intended to prompt an imaginative response from the reader.\(^\text{20}\) The reader is asked to *try*\(^\text{21}\) to think in a certain way, to conduct *experiments*\(^\text{22}\) with the words they use, to *suppose*\(^\text{23}\) radically odd conditions for language use, and to *imagine*\(^\text{24}\) games and contexts that alter the angle from which one views a subject. We can label these imaginative prompts ‘scenarios’ and assert (similarly to Baker, cf: NA pp24 & 29) that they make up the bulk of what Wittgenstein referred to as “objects of comparison”. This method can be broadly characterised as one of prompting the person considering them into imagining alternate possibilities of language use that are often non-factual, fictional or even absurd.

For this reason, the imaginative role of the reader is a key determinant of philosophy, with the act of imagination that of inventing possible ways a scenario can be applied or compared with one’s current understanding. This imaginative and therefore implicational role can be understood as a form of ‘proof’ of a scenario’s applicability to that reader, in the resolution of her philosophical problems.\(^\text{25}\) It would be a mistake, however, to consider imagination as an end in itself – as if the author desired proof of whether his reader possessed the ‘capacity’ to imagine a particular factual or fictional state of affairs – it is rather a means of achieving a desired investigative goal. Such

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\(^{19}\) MS 137, p136b: 1948.

\(^{20}\) One example from many would be: “For how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between pain and its expression?” (PI, §245)

\(^{21}\) e.g. PI, §§154, 161, 303, 335, 420, 624, ii, iii, p215.

\(^{22}\) e.g. PI, §§161, 166, 169, 510.


\(^{25}\) cf: PI, p213.
requests aren’t “about a particular power of my own imagination, in the way that ‘I can
lift this stone’ is about the power of my own muscles.” Instead, engaging the reader’s
imagination is a key to changing their inclination or habits of comparison, as the request
to imagine a certain scenario is in part a request for the reader to experiment with the
possible senses in which something can be sensibly represented, rather than a test of a
particular person’s imaginative skills.

Wittgenstein’s repeated requests for imaginative involvement with his text can
therefore be understood as a means to a particular end: his reader’s achieving a series of
aspectival shifts. By exploring the different patterns by which one can view a subject,
such patterns can be recognized for what they are — habitual modes of representation
— rather than being stipulated as belonging to the subject of enquiry itself. The
particularity of an individual’s conception is elicited and disclosed through her own
contingent imaginative investigation and acceptance of a particular scenario — hence
grammatical investigation entails imaginative investigation.

There are therefore many good reasons to pay attention to the importance of
imagination in conceptual investigation, with Wittgenstein’s own repeated emphasis not
being least of these. If “nothing is more important for teaching us to understand the
concepts we have than constructing fictitious ones”, and if we are encouraged to play
out hundreds of imaginary scenarios, and if our interaction with them is considered by
their author to be a method by which we might be brought to a perspicuous
representation that is contingent upon our own particular language use, then the
reader’s imagination can be considered a vital aspect in our understanding of the later
Wittgenstein’s methods. Interestingly, at one point in the Investigations, Wittgenstein asks
himself, and his reader, where one hears such requests as “Imagine that …” in contexts
other than the overtly philosophical ones he initiates himself, and responds thus: “We
say, for example, to someone who has to play a theatrical part: “Here you must imagine

26 PG, p128.
27 “When I speak of a pattern in my mental catalogue, or of a sheath into which an object fits if it is
familiar, what I would like to say is that the sheath in my mind is, as it were, the “form of imagining”, so
that it isn’t possible for me to say of a pattern that it is in my mind unless it really is there.—The pattern
as it were retires into my mind, so that it is no longer presented to it as an object.” (PG, p180)
28 PI, §144.
29 For example, “The variety a thought experiment is of course not an experiment at all. At bottom it is a
grammatical investigation.” (PR, p52) And: “The sentence “I can imagine the transition”, like “this state
of affairs can be drawn”, connects the linguistic representation with another form of representation; it is
to be understood as a proposition of grammar.” (PG, p128)
30 CV, p74.
that this man is in pain and is concealing it)—and now we give him no directions, do not tell him what he is actually to do… We now watch the actor who is imagining this situation.” Watching the response of the actor (or oneself in response to the author’s prompt) is the point of the request—it is not a command where one is precisely told what is required of one, or what the ‘correct’ response is in a given scenario. One passage in particular stands out as a compelling account of the kind of level of involvement that might be expected of the reader when this requirement to imagine is invoked. It demonstrates how Wittgenstein conceived of such an undertaking as an empowering process of investigation, quite alien to the predetermined responses portrayed earlier:

"Let us ask now, not "Can there be such a thing?" but "What do we imagine?" So give free rein to your imagination. You can have things now just as you choose. You only need to say how you want them. So (just) make a verbal picture, illustrate it as you choose—by drawing, comparisons, etc.! Thus you can—as it were—prepare a blueprint.—And now there remains the question how to work from it.”

ii) **Open-endedness:** To this end, imaginative objects of comparison often require the reader’s involvement in completing them. This requirement can take the form of a dense network of interrelated questions in which it is unclear that there is a “correct” answer in the author’s mind. There are scenarios in which certain aspects of what is being described might strike the reader as incomplete, misleading, or symptomatic of an as-yet unrevealed philosophical problem (e.g. §1’s “five red apples”), or which need further work before we can see their purpose. (e.g. §24) The importance of this dimension of text is that by imagining and completing the tasks, the reader is wilfully deployed and involved in their own problem’s dissolution. The reader is left with a number of choices to make about what is being discussed and how it fits into Wittgenstein’s previous and proceeding remarks. Through this response, and by these

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31 PI §393.

32 Z §275, the first emphasis is mine.

33 E.g. “Describe the aroma of coffee.—Why can’t it be done? Do we lack the words? And for what are words lacking?—But how do we get the idea that such a description must after all be possible? Have you ever felt the lack of such a description? Have you tried to describe the aroma and not succeeded?” (PI §610)

34 See Read and Hutchinson’s excellent analysis of the incomplete surreality of this particular scenario, in 2005, p445.
decisions, the comparative scenarios inflate and become more intricate and concrete, according to the particular imaginative “blueprint” that is thereby designed. Thus by employing an underdetermined style of comparison, and by leaving it to his reader to do a great deal of work for themselves, Wittgenstein manages to elicit wilful, contingent interaction through a developmental process of renegotiation and ambiguity. This is one particularly fruitful way of doing greater justice to Baker’s comment that the text is “radically individualistic”. Inhabiting the scenarios prepared for the reader, and thereby “thinking one’s way into the skin” of a different perspective, is a relevant aspect of Wittgenstein’s comparative methods, one that is intimately tied to the open-ended structure of the *Investigations*. The crucial premise here is that often the specific shift in perspective is not completely defined by the scenario that initiated the perspectival change, but is partially an achievement of the investigation of the reader. This entails that such scenarios’ applications are varied in completion according to the reader’s context, and thus that not only are perspicuous representations varied according to their particular reader, but the actual *objects of comparison* too are themselves underdetermined models that are intricated by their employment. We can stipulate therefore that objects of comparison, and the perspicuous representation they are intended to incite, are both commonly imaginative and remain curtailed until taken up and imagined by a particular individual; *only then*, in this sense, do they qualify as such.

We should not, therefore, treat as inconsequential the remark that “anything the reader can do for himself, leave it to the reader.” It is indicative of a methodological commitment, namely that it is the performance of the reader which fulfills the aims of the text. This constitutes a radically literal reading of Wittgenstein’s famous remark that “[w]ork on philosophy is – as work in architecture frequently is – actually more of a kind of work on oneself. On one’s own conception. On the way one sees things. (And what one demands of them.)” It is literal because it takes the remark as a *face value* qualification of what Wittgenstein’s philosophy is intended to be, rather than seeking to hierarchically place it under, or make it dependant upon, far less explicit qualifications of his notion of philosophy (see §§2.2 & 2.3).

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35 NA, p181.
37 R, p87.
iii) **Incitive.**

It’s no accident that I’m using so many interrogative sentences in this book.\(^{38}\)

The interrogative nature of the *Investigations* is no mere foible of style. During the *Investigations* the reader is posed over 1,450 explicit questions, done so in a manner whereby it is often far from clear how one is expected to answer them, whether one can expect to answer them at all, and even whether the voices that pose such questions can be considered reliable or not. Clearly this interrogative mode is a cornerstone of Wittgenstein’s later methods\(^ {39}\). The success of such an endeavour is dependent, then, upon contracting the reader in the resolution of their particular conceptual problems, in the light cast by a series of objects of comparison. The active agent for change is the reader, and the manner by which the activity progresses involves the eliciting of comparisons in the resolution of philosophical difficulty. This difficulty is one closely tied to Wittgenstein’s notion of philosophy being a difficulty of the will.\(^ {40}\) “It is a difficulty which I can’t remove if I try to make you see the problems. I can’t give you a startling solution which suddenly will remove all your difficulties. I can’t find one key which will unlock the door of our safe.”\(^ {41}\)

The provision of incomplete and imaginative scenarios is intended not to provide a complete set of conceptual templates by which an individual might have their problems indubitably resolved. “They are only meant to enable the reader to shift for himself when he encounters conceptual difficulties.”\(^ {42}\) Their intent is not so much predictive or exhaustive then, but incitive of a performance that will hopefully occur after the reader’s encounter with the text. For the reader to achieve such a shift for themselves they are first required to perceive the deficiencies and distortions that may be part of their particular conception, presumably as a prerequisite for undertaking such work:

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\(^{38}\) RPPII, §150.

\(^{39}\) “One could teach philosophy solely by asking questions.” (AWL, p97)

\(^{40}\) See Chapter III for a complete discussion of the notion of will and its role in grammatical investigation.

\(^{41}\) MS 153b, p30; also see Chapter III.

\(^{42}\) PI, p206, my emphasis.
I must be nothing more than the mirror in which my reader sees his own thinking with all its deformities & with this assistance can set it in order.43

Note that in this fragment, and in examples presented earlier, not only is the significant philosophical work tasked to the reader – namely the timely shifting of perspective when one encounters conceptual difficulties, or the setting in order of one’s own thoughts – but further, the perception of the conceptual deformity that might incite such work is also to be achieved by the reader. Rather than making a series of accusations, Wittgenstein’s role is to provide ‘assistive’ portrayals in which certain grammatical confusions are substantiated, giving his reader the opportunity to both recognise his own confusions, and see certain avenues of investigation for their resolution. (The manner in which Wittgenstein wilfully depicts the interlocutor in order to portray confusion is the discussion we shall soon be turning to.)

Wittgenstein frequently rebuts a possible alternative to this model of philosophy, where the demonstration and adoption of static models of comparison lead to a stable continuity of a recognisable doctrine or school of philosophy. He remarked that he should hope only for a most indirect effect upon his reader, he was far from certain that he wished for a continuation of his work by others, seemed to perceive philosophy as ideally a process whereby one is stirred to think about a proposed subject for oneself, and held that philosophical positions should not be “arrived at by any process other than an honest and wholehearted strenuous endeavour to find out the truth for oneself.”44 As with all complex systems – philosophical or otherwise – a few small changes can result in that system outputting disproportionately large differences in outcome. I premise that neglecting the incitement of the reader’s imagination, as elicited throughout a great many open-ended objects of comparison, has led to a somewhat problematic emphasis in the therapeutic interpretation upon the role of the therapist, and on the text of the Investigations as a template for how to go about playing that role. In such a reading, I will argue, the role of the interlocutor becomes substantively vital.

§2.2 The interlocutor45

43 MS 112, p225.
45 I will, for the sake of brevity, refer to the interlocutor in the singular. This does not reflect any exegetical assumption on my part.
There are a number of reasons why Baker’s reading of the interlocutorial voices in Wittgenstein’s later work is of particular relevance here. Firstly, Baker’s interpretation treats conceptual investigation as an undertaking “essentially dialogic” in character. His claim that “Wittgenstein conceived of philosophy primarily as a kind of therapy” is therefore a literal one – philosophy is essentially dialogic in that it discursively treats the conceptual confusions of an individual through a process of hit and miss diagnoses, proposed analogies and shared grammatical investigations, even if the patient is imaginary, oneself, or as we shall consider later, an idealised, fluid equivocation of the two. We could therefore expect the dialogue in a text so interpreted to bear a great deal of methodological weight as a demonstrative element, and thus to be a fruitful subject for critical appraisal. Similarly, such an interpretation is most likely to express a form of bias in its treatment of dialogue, if its purpose is to frame the entire text as pivotally dialogic and therefore instructive of how to resolve someone’s confused and knotted thinking for them. Secondly, the earlier shift of emphasis achieved in §2.1 is one based on exegesis and makes claims regarding the purpose, style, and inferred method of the text it examines. Therefore if it cannot account for the interlocutor in a satisfactory way, its explanatory force will be substantially weakened. Conversely, if it can usefully give an account of the device in a manner symmetric to those aspects earlier established, then there would seem, on the one hand, far less reason to posit the interlocutorial device as symptomatic of the literally therapeutic intentions of the text, and on the other, an opportunity to demonstrate the commensurability of the general account established so far. Finally, if a form of misrepresentation of the interlocutor is perpetrated in Baker’s interpretation, it will surely lead to an unwarranted emphasis and activity out of kilter with the localised, acute aims of the author of the Investigations, thus being an example of the kind of disproportionately large outcome caused by a limited oversight, as recently considered.

The Investigations’ interlocutor is portrayed in Baker’s commentary as “the average member of the audience of Wittgenstein’s seminars at Cambridge”. It may be assumed that the nondescript identity of the book’s interlocutor is a positive aspect of the device, in that by not designating a specific interlocutor, as for example Plato chose to do, Wittgenstein is able to present a generalised account of the average positions,

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46 NA, p205.
47 see NA, pp149 & 218.
48 NA, p113.
objections, and ideas that a philosopher is likely to encounter, and be tempted by, in the process of therapy. For Baker, Wittgenstein’s frequent employment of double quotation marks “commonly pick[s] out … words of an imaginary speaker in a dialogue, although the replies (Wittgenstein’s own?) occur without quotation-marks.”

To this end, Wittgenstein is presented as seeking to bring to life a series of tendencies, confusions or arguments that the reader is likely to meet with when practicing therapeutic philosophy, either on herself or with her own ‘interlocutor’, by inventing and substantiating an imaginary speaker with which to demonstrate his therapeutic methods. This is done by means of “an imaginary dialogue with an indefinite someone”, in which Wittgenstein “reigns in” the confused assertions of an intelligent, but slightly naïve individual who, despite palpable difficulties, is keen to escape from the grammatical bear-traps she has put her foot in. Wittgenstein, then, is often taken to be demonstrating a method that might potentially be adopted and used by those who read his work – if the interlocutor does represent an idealised dialogist of some form, it is sensible for his reader to perceive such a voice as the expression of a set of predictions as to the quandaries that Wittgenstein considered us most likely to succumb to.

While this reading may appear uncontroversial upon first inspection, its adoption entails a number of definite characteristics for what Wittgenstein’s later project hoped to achieve, the methods it employed in pursuit of its goals, and what the continuation of his methods – but practiced by other philosophers – might look like. For if by our familiarity with the interlocutorial positions and responses we are able to identify the very same quandaries in ourselves, or more pertinently in others, then we might hope to ‘do as Wittgenstein did’ and apply dialog therapy in a way similar to that found in the Investigations. We would essentially employ the interlocutorial voice as a modular set of templates or guidelines for this undertaking. By casting the interlocutor in this role, Baker assigns to Wittgenstein a complex set of interconnected hypotheses that identifies philosophical disquiets and demonstrably explains how they can be predicted, diagnosed and relieved. What evidence is present for such an interpretation? Well, considering the purpose of the interlocutor as “demonstrative” of an ideal dialogic process might be considered sympathetic to references to method such as that found in §133. And Wittgenstein did indeed remark that a philosopher who never took part in discussion

50 NA, p127.
51 cf: NA, p113.
was analogous to a boxer who never stepped foot in the ring, thus possibly qualifying discussion as *sine qua non* for his methods of philosophy – what looks to potentially be a short step from asserting, as Baker does, that philosophy is *essentially* dialogic.

Treating the interlocutor as a direct demonstration of how to proceed in the therapy of others or oneself leads to a position where it is read as Wittgenstein’s uncanny attempt to depict for the would-be therapist the imagined likely responses of those who suffer from philosophical confusion. Imagine – the interlocutor could be a ‘layman’ with nascent tendencies, a philosopher of science or the therapist herself, and the interlocutorial demonstration might have been authored twenty, forty, or sixty years previous to the event of a particular disquiet or assertion it was intended to address, with the author of course having never met this particular interlocutor, perhaps never even been party to their language or culture. If we are certain we wish to conceive of the interlocutor in this way, then we are left with the premise that Wittgenstein’s representations of the typical/possible respondents to philosophical quandaries display a stable quality, quite independent of a particular conceptual confusion’s owner. It is difficult to see how Baker’s account of Wittgenstein’s notion of the person-relative, radically individualistic nature of philosophy accords with an assertion of the interlocutor in a predictive or diagnostic way. For from such a position it looks as if the success of the *Investigations*, in a rather ironic turn, would hang upon the degree of universal application that can be accredited to the remarks and portrayals of such dialogues, thus potentially resulting in the project of conceptual investigation being dependent upon census for its claims of efficacy. Failure to do so would make the text irrelevant through inaccuracy — for what would be the use in a device whose purpose was to ideally diagnose and rectify philosophical problems, yet failed to portray the problems it was meant to dissolve?

If the interlocutor *were* the predictive/demonstrative element of the *Investigations* – the average member of a philosophy seminar as it were – it would effectively represent Wittgenstein’s substantiation of the role of the patient, with the “Wittgensteinian” voice standing as the avatar for therapy. Yet in our previous reconceptualisation of the role of the reader, three characteristics of that role were identified and substantiated. Together, they presented a picture of a process of investigation remarkable in its demand upon the imagination and self-determination of the person involved with it, and one radically heuristic in its aims. Either this picture is wholly incorrect, or the interlocutor-as-patient is, for they are divergent models of how to encourage intellectual engagement. From those three characteristics, and from certain remarks made in writing and conversation
by Wittgenstein, we can justify an understanding of his brand of philosophy as not intended to be replicable, but stimulative and heterogeneous in effect. The manner of stimulation his writing offered was not intended to be a stable system upon which a school could be founded, but rather to be judged by its variable effects upon those who used it, and the changes it might bring about. It was sensitive to the time in which it was written, and might indeed appear to be banal or gibberish to people of a later time, or even to those of his own time who did not suffer from the same problems as he. Its author hoped it to have only the most indirect of influences, and was acutely opposed to imitation, of thoughts learnt, not discovered for oneself. Above all, we can say that Wittgenstein’s philosophy was intended to exemplify (and incite) a kind of working on one’s own conceptions, and what one expects from those conceptions, in a manner not limited to or predicted by its textual progenitor. As his student, Britton recalls,

If we took a book seriously, he would say, it ought to puzzle us so much that we would throw it across the room and think about the problems for ourselves.

In this light, it seems more sensible to understand the interlocutor as a method of expressing such a working on oneself, of speaking forcefully of the tendencies and shortcomings that the author found in his own thought, depicted in order to bring about a heterogeneous kind of work in its readers; that is, to inspire, not inculcate. If this is the more accurate treatment of the interlocutorial device, then when we read his later work we are not reading Wittgenstein’s philosophy, contingently packaged in easily-digested, follow-my-lead dialogues, but rather witnessing Wittgenstein’s best attempt at giving voice to the wide scope of grammatical confusions and anxieties that he himself struggled to emancipate himself from, using dialogue analogously to give a developing,

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32 Cf: PI Preface.
33 Cf: MS 134, p143.
34 Cf: ibid & PI Preface.
35 CV, p43.
37 MS 134, 143: 13.
38 Cf: Gasking and Jackson, p53, Heller, p91, & PI, Preface.
39 P §86.
40 Britton 1967, p58.
interactive voice to the character of such problems. There is no predictive mechanism at work in Wittgenstein’s choice of a certain interlocutorial objection or rejoinder, but an invitation to a joint investigation of the permutations and misleading habits encouraged by particular conceptions: the interlocutor is his best descriptive account of these possibilities and permutations. The central aim of it would then be best understood as the portrayal of “the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved.” It is not exclusively wayward, nor exclusively alius Wittgenstein, as could be expected from Baker’s interpretation: it is a patterned evocation of thought, intended to give life to the civil status of a philosophical contradiction, a device that again and again shows the ways in which things commonly turn out otherwise than foreseen. As both a record and the performance of the temptations and confusions that Wittgenstein struggled with, the interlocutorial voices are the coins struck from every mistake.

From the point of view of this reading we therefore do not witness so much a performance of many characters, some confused, others clear-sighted, but rather a mind diagnosing and confronting its own actual and potential temptations, generalisations, anxieties, conceptions and unsubstantiated assertions. This self-work is not ‘merely’ stylistic, but integral to his proposed model of philosophical investigation, for Wittgenstein maintained that “if a false thought is so much as expressed boldly & clearly, a great deal has already been gained.”

It is helpful to remember, in conjunction with this characteristic of his writing, Wittgenstein’s remark that “[n]early all my writings are private conversations with myself. Things that I say to myself tête-à-tête.” While it is equally true that Wittgenstein commented of his work that one should not busy oneself with what presumably only applies to oneself, it is viable to suppose that the wide-scale applicability envisaged by many of his interpreters, and thus the accompanying need for positing a method which

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61 PI, §125.
62 E.g. §§296, 344, 456 & 520.
63 E.g. §§388, 438, 487 & 507.
64 E.g. §125.
65 Cf: CV, p79 & MS 137, p17a: 10.2.1948.
66 Cf: (1999, p178) Cavell’s discussion of a potential “confessional” reading of the interlocutorial voices in this regard.
67 MS 137, p100a, 19.11.1948.
68 CV, p77.
69 Ibid, p63.
entails the possibility of such application, is an exegetical theme not wholly native to his later works. In this way, a self-interrogative reading of the *Investigations’* interlocutor has an effect on how we perceive what it is that Wittgenstein is doing and advocating, bringing it more into line with his many comments regarding his methods’ unsuitability for wide-scale replication, while also, to a limited degree, contradicting Baker’s account. For Baker, “philosophical investigation must take the form of a dialogue, whether the interlocutor be real (in a class in Cambridge) or imaginary (in the text of the private language argument).”70 It is a clear illustration of his commitment to a certain style of philosophy that, of the above qualification that nearly all of Wittgenstein’s writings are private conversations he had with himself, Baker takes as the pivotal nature of conceptual investigation that it is overwhelmingly discursive, rather than overwhelmingly self-investigative. The first move extends a phrase (“conversation”) to include activity and participants that contradict Wittgenstein’s original qualification; the second constitutes a less problematic restatement of this remark. Therefore Baker’s treating these tête-à-tête remarks as “the record of a discussion (real or imaginary) between a philosopher-therapist and a patient undergoing ‘philosophical analysis’”71 is a suspect generalisation.

If as stipulated here, the polyphonic72 nature of the *Investigations* is an integral stylistic technique used to simultaneously portray self investigation while inciting the reader to do likewise, then Baker’s methodological “must” is a misunderstanding – one which places non-dialogical work on oneself as something subordinate to the larger set of philosophical investigation, or at the very least, shifts attention away from such activity towards one founded on a generalisation. If instead we choose to perceive the interlocutor as a textual technique, used to play out a series of interlocking thoughts, and as a way of recording and developing the ‘life’ of the precipitate tendencies and anxieties Wittgenstein experienced over a sixteen-year period of philosophical investigation, then consequently we find ourselves abruptly limited in regards to the ways we might feel comfortable employing the notion of “interlocutor”.

For example, Baker and many other commentators use the term “interlocutor” to refer to a participant in therapy, a method by which a person is brought to acknowledge and accept new aspects or comparisons which compromise the previous

70 NA, p152, my emphasis.
72 I am grateful to Thomas Wallgren (cf: 2006) for his account of this term in relation to his considered response to sections from this chapter, presented at Kirchberg 2009.
pictures that captivated their way of thinking. Here the word “interlocutor” is used to
describe an ideal or actual individual, engaged in therapeutic dialogue with the
Wittgensteinian philosopher, whether “the interlocutor be real (in a class in Cambridge)
or imaginary (in the text of the private language argument).” Hutchinson and Read
similarly remark that “perspicuity is accorded to the presentation that achieves the
bringing to light of new aspects which are freely accepted by one’s philosophical
interlocutor.” The interlocutor is qualified as just that person upon whom therapy is
performed. From here the potential for equivocation becomes clear; namely a
bifurcation between a series of specific textual techniques used to sketch out the author’s
personal disquiets, and the living, breathing person whom one is addressing from the
adopted role of philosophical therapist. For if the interlocutor makes sense as a textual

technique used by Wittgenstein to record his own temptations and problematic
philosophical habits, there are limited justifications remaining for us to comprehend and
interpret a different person through the lens of these recordings. Why would it be useful
to hold up Wittgenstein’s “album”, and try to discern the manner in which the sketches
contained therein allow us to diagnose and treat other people? Even granting that it
might well work in some cases, (in other words, a method far from general in effect), this
practice still raises the following concerns.

An interlocutorial equivocation appears unjust to both Wittgenstein’s textual

technique and the philosopher who sits before us. As already noted, if one treats
Wittgenstein’s voice as constituting the author’s pre-empting, or characterisation, of the
kinds of confusions one is likely to run into in philosophy, his method starts to look more
universal in intent and hence disrespectful of the peculiarities of a person’s contingent
disquiet – or equally, their lack thereof – that it may be used to try to diagnose and treat.
Pre-emption also runs counter to the notion that Wittgenstein sought indirect effects
from his work, sought to create no followers or teachers of his work, and intended only
the stimulation of his reader’s thoughts, rather than the imposition of his own, for it
suggests a stable mode of resolution for a stable type of problem. The painful struggle to

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73 The everyday use of the word ‘interlocutor’ is of course totally unproblematic, rather it is the
unacknowledged equivalence between the conceptual complex of an individual one is engaged in
therapising and the instances of Wittgenstein’s self-dialogues that is here challenged as potentially
detrimental.

74 NA, p152.

75 Hutchinson & Read 2005, 436. See also Hutchinson & Read 2008, 149, for a discussion of “our”
interlocutor as “a diverse and dialectically structured range of philosophical impulses.”

76 Also see, for example, NA pp183, 280.
square Wittgenstein’s work with his self-professed non-theoretical method runs through a
great deal of exegesis in the field, and in the light cast here stems from consideration of
the method on display in the *Investigations* as being directly intended for the establishment
and training of a cadre of philosophers who practice philosophy upon others as
Wittgenstein apparently does, namely ‘therapeutically’, with the interlocutor acting as
the crucial demonstrative element in our apprenticeship. The conversations of one man
with himself become the template by which one adopts a discursive position in relation
to other philosophers, and the voices that were meant to depict the temptations and
developments of their author now function as a pedagogical tool by which we learn
philosophy as an interruptive therapeutic treatment of diseased intellects.

This equivocation equally seems to usher the “interlocutor” one engages with in
discourse into a pre-configured characterisation of a mistake or tendency (one that
Wittgenstein experienced and investigated); the therapist apparently exercises her
acquired ability to perceive her interlocutor’s orchestrating picture of language beneath
their complex and substantiated arguments, thus allowing the detail, research,
explanative force and robustness of their argument to be potentially accounted for as the
signature symptoms of a mind in the grip of a picture. The therapist who would employ
such a technique is in danger of perceiving their interlocutor in a pre-determined way,
mapping onto their problems a treatment to which they must either willingly undergo,
or face a potential diagnosis of captivation, denial or even worse, should the therapy
prove ineffective, of lacking philosophical problems.77 It is telling that this kind of activity would appear to be in direct opposition to a number of caveats left by the
author. When framing his work, Wittgenstein often reiterated that their effects were
conditional upon a very specific type of reader, in that his philosophy might only prove useful for those already in possession of a similar style or spirit of thought, uncommon in number, who demonstrate a kind of rebelliousness or dissatisfaction.78 If this notion of philosophy’s condition of suitability is related to its reader’s already established
instinct for rebellion, and is only likely to be present in a few of his readers, then why
would we seek to square Wittgenstein’s interlocutorial technique as being predictive or
demonstrative of a wide range of stable behaviour?

77 Z §456; see Morris 2004, p6, for her strong equation between a philosopher on whom therapy has no benefit and a suffering from a loss of philosophical problems.

78 Regarding this sentence’s claims, please consult PR’s foreword; *Tractatus*, preface; *Investigations*, preface; and P, p190, respectively.
As suggested in 2.1, it looks more likely that we should not see his interlocutorial dialogues as intended to directly causally trigger a shift in his reader’s concepts or notions – the most we should want to say is that they are intended to incite the reader into being able to shift for themselves when they encounter conceptual difficulties, perhaps in a manner unforeseen by their author.\textsuperscript{79} It seems even more pressing that we should not see it as our duty to seek to causally trigger such a shift in others, acting as a kind of proxy for Wittgenstein, by employing an equivocation in which a textual technique is taken as a stable divination of what problem will occur and what technique will resolve it. It follows from this that any role of “therapist” (if we feel we must retain this reference to \textit{Investigations} \S133) should be enacted by the reader herself, having been successfully prompted into undertaking the succession of questioning-tasks implied by the \textit{Investigations}’ peculiar, unresolved, interlocutorial style.

We have now seen why the positing of the interlocutor as a predictive element is not harmless. Emphasis upon the interlocutor as a dialectic medium, predictive tool or imaginary wayward philosopher deteriorates the emphasis that Wittgenstein placed upon philosophy as a kind of work on oneself, instead leading to a situation in which talk-cures, diseases of the mind, diagnosis and treatment are all established ways of describing his method, with therapy seriously considered as a task that needs to be performed upon the diseased concepts of fellow faculty members. We will therefore provisionally reject Baker’s ‘oratio recta’ interpretation of the array of voices found in \textit{Investigations}, and instead consider Wittgenstein’s dense spectrum of suppositions, objections and questions as a set of thematic devices intended to achieve his oft-stated aim. Namely, to aid his reader in learning to \textit{do} philosophy in a \textit{new} way, using himself as a substantive model\textsuperscript{80} of what this philosophy looks like in practice, so that the reader, having acknowledged, to some degree, the relevance of these self-investigative accounts to their own conceptual habits, is stirred to set about working on their own conceptions of how things are and what they expect from them.

\section*{§2.3 The function of acknowledgement}

There remains the question of acknowledgement, its role in the therapeutic reading, and how such an incitive reading as the one presented here might make alternate sense

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\textsuperscript{79} E.g. LWPP-I, §686.
\textsuperscript{80} Cf. P, p197 & MS 112, p225.
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of it. As the defining function of the ‘patient’ role accompanying that of the Wittgensteinian philosopher, it is of particular relevance to this chapter. It is also, as we shall see, an element so crucial to Baker’s interpretation that to neglect it would be to present a fractured, incomplete schema of his therapeutic reading. This section will therefore examine acknowledgement as a criterion for therapy, challenging Baker’s interpretation of who it is hoped for, and how it might be achieved. An alternate understanding of Wittgenstein’s call for acknowledgement will be proposed, one that makes the process of eliciting it coextensive with the contracting of the reader in insightful therapeutic manoeuvring. For Baker, the patient’s acknowledgement, of the therapist’s proffered comparison or analogy as precisely that which unconsciously exerts a grip on her, acts as Baker’s criterion of successful therapy and is deeply related to what can be said of an individual’s confusions, and therefore what manner of help can be proffered:

There is no such thing as a grammatical rule of my language which I am in no position to acknowledge or which holds in the teeth of my sincerely refusing to acknowledge it.

It therefore bears a great deal of methodological weight, as both the key to an individual’s potential for change of perspective, and the therapist’s remit and justification to continue in her therapy. Without it therapy cannot proceed, having no problem to perspectivally clarify. As the concern is thus solely with the patient’s grammar (regardless of its potential similarity with other cases), there can be no external arbiter to attribute the successful portrayal of concepts, other than by the patient’s verification. If the patient refuses to acknowledge the therapist’s imputation as an accurate portrait, it is necessarily not so, and must be dropped, and the patient subjected to new attempts. Textually, Baker’s later work comes back again and again to the problem of acknowledgement, and how Wittgenstein saw the task of eliciting it from a diverse range of imaginary interlocutors as his central role, with the Investigations functioning as a set of case histories of these attempts and their subsequent treatments,

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81 NA, pp8, 148 & 161.
82 NA, p149.
83 See, for example, ibid, pp41, 68, 164, 178, 209, 212, 249, 280, etc.
84 “Therapy primarily takes the form of persuading the patient to acknowledge that things need not be as he has said that they must be” (NA p151).
similar in kind to that kept by a medical general practitioner. The main referent in this schema, and the source of acknowledgement understood as a conditional element, is the following passage from BT p410:

Indeed we can only convict someone else of a mistake if he acknowledges that this really is the expression of his feeling. // ... if he (really) acknowledges this expression as the correct expression of his feeling. // For only if he acknowledges it as such, is it the correct expression. (Psychoanalysis.)

What the other person acknowledges is the analogy I am proposing to him as the source of his thought.

This passage is proposed as describing a key aspect of philosophical therapy concerning the role that the confused individual must take in the resolution of her own mistakes. Baker asserts that in an ideal case of therapy, the therapist “sells” an analogy as the source of an individual’s confusion and, by that person’s acknowledgement of it as the correct expression of her thought, their captivated concern with an analogy or picture can be broken. Thus acknowledgement promises a scheme by which one can understand how to progress in philosophy: by offering persuasive accounts of potentially misleading conceptions that the patient is herself unaware of, conceptions that subsist upon their unrecognised status for their impedimentary effect. There is clearly something right in this account, yet acknowledgement is not presented as relevant to the success of a particular technique of philosophical writing per se, but as the criterion for resolving all philosophical problems, as the bane of such problems, which in themselves can only flourish in its absence.

The inspiration of ‘our method’ is the idea that unacknowledged pictures generate mental cramps, obsessions, prejudices … As long as pictures or analogies are unconscious, we cannot be critical of, or even on our guard against, their influence. They exert tyranny over our thinking; they hold us in thrall; they produce mental cramps; in short they restrict our freedom of intellectual movement.

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85 NA, p132.
86 Cf: NA, pp189 & 287.
87 Ibid, pp184-5, the first emphasis is mine.
Philosophical problems have as their necessary condition an unacknowledged picture or concept of how something must be (or cannot be), in that they are actually “generated” by these unacknowledged pictures and, without therapeutic intervention, their unacknowledged status makes philosophical problems indissoluble. The “blindness and prejudice” that constitute philosophical confusion “are cured only by acknowledging previous unrecognised possibilities.” It is therefore worth investigating whether Baker has mis-emphasised the role of acknowledgement in a way similar to that of the interlocutor. Immediately prior to the earlier passage from BT410, helping us here to re-qualify it, is the following remark:

One of the most important tasks is to express all false thought processes so characteristically that the reader says, "Yes, that's exactly the way I meant it". To make a tracing of the physiognomy of every error.

It bears pointing out that the subject of the sought acknowledgement is Wittgenstein’s reader, not some unspecified future beneficiary of therapy, nor an imagined interlocutorial case study within the curative dialogue: so as a first movement towards reexamining acknowledgement, we can assert that when Wittgenstein raises the notion of acknowledgement here he is specifically concerned with describing his intended relationship with, and effect upon, his reader. This is a pertinent fact, suggesting straightaway that if Baker wishes to posit a fully-fledged model of dialogic philosophical therapy as present in Wittgenstein’s text, with acknowledgement as its main criterion of success, then there is work to be done in showing how this characteristic, outlined by the author as an aspect of what he intends to achieve in relation to his reader, can be transferred, intact, to the ulterior setting of conducting therapy upon a fellow philosopher.

There are, for example, characteristics of reflection and consideration that differ markedly between the two modes of investigation; namely of working on one’s own with a text and involving oneself in philosophical argument. This is a neglected theme, present on occasion in Wittgenstein’s writing – that of the calm and quiet atmosphere (P 197) that is so conducive to doing good philosophical work. Indeed, the cut and thrust of diagnosis, resistance, counter-diagnosis, and acknowledgement

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88 NA, p191, my emphasis.
89 BT, p410, my emphasis.
is here rendered problematic for the slow, arboreal process of attending to the quiet inquisitive voice: “The voice of a philosophical thought is so soft that the noise of spoken words is enough to drown it and prevent it from being heard, if one is questioned and has to speak.”

Secondly, the project being described as that which leads to the reader’s acknowledgement is “a tracing of the physiognomy of every error”. As has been previously posited, the polyphonic voices in the *Investigations* are demonstrative of Wittgenstein’s own confusions, insights and conceptual self-work, and so seem satisfactory candidates for examples of what this precise ‘tracing’ of error might be. The aim of this tracing (at least, the aim being discussed by Wittgenstein in this passage) is to lay bear certain possible thought processes so convincingly and characteristically that the reader is forcibly struck by any suitability that this description may have in regards to her own problematic conceptualisation. This is to build up a detailed portrait of a mistake, fulfilling the dual functions of inciting one’s reader’s developing participation, and providing a warning as to a potential problem that Wittgenstein has himself struggled with. I posit that this requalification of acknowledgement is absolutely key to understanding the purpose of his philosophical methods, for it describes the relation he wanted to establish with those who employ his methods.

I wanted to put that picture before him, and his [acknowledgement] of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: that is, to compare it with this rather than that set of pictures. I have changed his way of looking at things.

Here, then, acknowledgement is represented as consisting in the reader’s inclination to regard a problematic case differently, not in his willingness to accept the philosopher’s diagnosis as apt to his condition of conceptual confusion. We can therefore propose two important qualifications: 1) acknowledgement is a task intended for Wittgenstein’s reader, and 2) the problems traced in order to achieve that task reflect those that Wittgenstein has found himself extricated in. The interlocutor is not the party required to acknowledge a particular account, as one would expect if it were

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90 Z, §453.

91 PI, §144. Note that *Anerkennung* has here been translated as *acknowledgement*, instead of *acceptance*, but this is in keeping with the translation of BT, p410’s *anerkennen* as *acknowledge*.

92 This is not, however, to qualify these problems as relevant to only Wittgenstein! The relation between individual-relative grammar and the deep roots of many of the problems in philosophy is discussed in §3.3.
considered a guideline to therapeutic discourse, but rather, as already argued, a procedural tool employed by Wittgenstein to engage the reader in the task of acknowledging and substantiating different perspectives. This is in contradiction to Baker, who compounds the reader and the interlocutorial device into one acknowledging individual: Wittgenstein’s “tracing” is, for Baker, intended to make “his interlocutor aware of a particular ‘physiognomy’ in the use of our words.”

If this chapter’s arguments are right, then this is a form of mistaken identity, where the only difference recognised between the patient and the interlocutor are their status as actual or ideal participants in therapy. And yet the polyphonic device used to characterise a philosophical confusion should surely not be treated as the actual intended beneficiary of that same characterisation. The interlocutor instead represents the instrument used to record an ‘imprint’ of the physiognomy to be traced.

To this end, Wittgenstein’s interlocutorial voices indulge their author’s bad habits, demonstrate disagreement with proposed resolutions, often to the point of exasperation and repetition, or of confusion as to which ‘voice’ is ‘correct’, forcing the reader to adjudicate in each case, to literally (as noted in the Investigation’s preface) “trouble” them to “think for themselves”. They are commonly noticeable in their truculent refusal to acknowledge alternate aspects, casting an almost satirical light upon this wilful truculence.

Philosophical problems are raised up and animated by reasoning, as a shared form of investigation “we” (here minimally understood as the author and his reader) are involved in, in which the reader is encouraged “to start to examine one thing after another methodically, and in peace and quiet; then I am willing to look with you and direct myself with you as model in the method.”

This directing of himself was not intended as exemplary, but on the contrary, as indicative of the quandaries he had found himself in, and the tendencies that perhaps still tempted his way of thinking. Even if the reader is only led to see Wittgenstein’s interlocutor as crazy, or completely stupefied, incapable of seeing even see the simplest thing, then at the least she is still thereby brought to think the matter through in a new light.

\[93\] NA, p280.


\[95\] For an excellent discussion of Wittgenstein’s relation to the satirical modes of his literary hero, Karl Krauss, see Savicky 1999, Chapter I.

\[96\] P, p197, my emphasis.
Acknowledgement seems closely related to this process of depicting self-investigation in order to trigger an act of self-investigation in one’s reader. Its eliciting appears to be a complex literary undertaking, rather than a dialogical one in the normal sense of the word, in that the criteria for this method’s success seem to depend upon a prolonged layering of descriptive detail, extended characterisation, and the implication of the reader’s active acknowledgement and ensuing investigation. Rather than understanding it as the signature of successful therapy, and therefore a licence to continue through providing alternate perspectival models in order to resolve a patient’s philosophical malady, acknowledgement can be sensibly seen as a less problematic side-effect of an active grammatical investigation, occurring as the reader is drawn into completing the series of problematising scenarios and comparisons that constitute the bulk of the *Investigations*. From this perspective, Wittgenstein’s attempts to elicit acknowledgement from his reader are an effect of his scenarios’ success in engaging the reader’s imaginative involvement; if they fail then by definition his reader did not acknowledge them as pertinent.

It should be clear that by this reading acknowledgement remains a central element of Wittgenstein’s later methods and that triggering such an achievement is likewise one of its most important aims. But Baker chooses not only to treat this aspect as reflective of the ontic status of the class of philosophical problems, with much in common its Freudian counterpart, rather than of an experimental method aimed at triggering a response in the reader, but also to emphasise the role of the therapist in this achievement, arguably at the expense of Wittgenstein’s own emphases. One need only compare the active agent in Baker’s and Wittgenstein’s writing to get a sense of this discrepancy. For Baker, the therapist *brings* to an individual’s consciousness the influence of pictures, and *strives* to directly *combat* them. Therapy is the application of a *strategy* in which the therapist *sells* an account to the patient, whose acceptance is *won* from the individual, thereby confirming the correctness of the therapist’s original diagnosis.

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97 This is not an attempt to disqualify the *possibility* of dialogic acts in Wittgenstein’s philosophy (such an attempt would be absurd) but rather a description of the text upon which such acts would be based – but it is telling that the stylistic, imaginative, multivalent characteristics of the *Investigations* appear, on this interpretation, to be integral to its methods (see Chapter III).

98 see, for example, NA note 20, p173: ‘I have been engaged for many years . . . in unravelling certain psychopathological structures. ... If a pathological idea . . . can be traced back to the elements in the patient’s mental life from which it originated, it simultaneously crumbles away and the patient is freed from it’ (Freud, ‘The Method of Interpreting Dreams’, Complete Works, vol. 4, p. 100).”

99 NA, p187.
Misleading pictures are imputed to one’s interlocutor, which must be accepted as correct before further assistance is provided. For Baker, Wittgenstein’s Investigations makes most sense conceived of as the notebooks of a GP, in which he demonstrates upon imaginary individuals the method whereby one can “get the sufferer to renounce his grammatical prejudices”. His proposed model consistently posits the therapist as the one doing philosophically interesting work: first, the therapist’s insightful imputation, and the respondent’s confession, thence the therapist’s creative aspectival presentation leading to her respondent’s renunciation. When we turn to examples of Wittgenstein’s direct commentary upon his own method we often, but certainly not always, find a quite different emphasis at work. He conceives of the fundamental aim of his job as to portray conceptual mistakes before they are resolved, thereby allowing the reader the opportunity to see their own ‘reflected’, and to thereafter, through this ‘assistance’, set these problems aright for themselves. To aid the reader by demonstrating for him a method by which he might more usefully search for a resolution. To enable the reader to shift for themselves when they encounter difficulty; to encourage a change of activity in his reader, rather than a change of belief – indeed more generally to think and to look for themselves. As a preparatory task, which will help the reader to continue on their own. At the most – at his most rhetorical – to perhaps show a possible route out of a problem that is embarrassing in its simplicity, when comprehended. There is an inherent avoidance, dislike or sense of futility, in accusing or imputing the reader of an error, as something (even if correct in diagnosis) utterly futile in its intent.

My warnings are like the posters on the ticket offices at English railway stations “Is your journey really necessary?” (As if anyone reading that would say to himself “On second thoughts, no”) Quite different artillery is needed here from anything I am in a position to muster. Most likely I could still achieve an effect in that, above all, a whole lot of garbage is written in response to my stimulus & that perhaps this provides the stimulus for something good. I ought always to hope only for the most indirect of influences.

E.g. nothing more stupid than the chatter about cause & effect in history books;

100 See NA, pp189, 187, 210, 220 & 261, respectively.
103 In this respect, consider Foucault’s remark on the “secondary” intentions that drive his purpose for writing: ‘I don’t write a book so that it will be the final word; I write a book so that other books are possible, not necessarily written by me’. (Foucault 1994a)
nothing more wrong-headed, more half-baked.—But who could put a stop to it by saying that?

This is an important and commonly overlooked qualification of Wittgenstein’s hopes and aims for his methods, which states that any hope of his philosophy having a direct effect upon an individual’s deeply held and problematic concepts is vain, half-baked, almost humorous to him; the “artillery” necessary to effect a change in the way we live and think cannot be constituted merely by a poster or a book’s decree, precisely because it is a change that can only be effected by the person whose will is implicated in and sustaining that problematic way of seeing in the first place. The kind of problem that Wittgenstein is concerned with might be clearly dealt with once acknowledged, but when approaching the resolution of such problems in others, he is drawn to ask “who could put a stop to it by saying” what is confused in someone’s wilful conception? Yet putting a stop to it, by saying what it is, is considered the pivotal procedure in the therapeutic treatment of dogmatic aspects. Thus, in a manner somewhat similar to his earlier position, Baker proposes a somewhat interventionist attempt to orchestrate a philosophical overcoming, in some greater or lesser degree of discursive partnership with the individual herself, according to the period of his writing, later and earlier respectively.

Such a style is tailor-made to engage the imagination and intellect of the reader by almost tricking them into challenging, noticing, accepting or denying a host of philosophical pictures. In this sense, if the style that proceeds in this manner achieves its intended outcome, roping the reader into thinking for themselves, extending and breathing detail into one incomplete scenario or conversation after another, in a manner far from mimetic, then acknowledgement would be assured by, and synchronous with, their taking part in investigation. Acknowledgement ‘comes for free’ through the distension of Wittgenstein’s philosophical scenarios and puzzles because, by their


105 There is, after all, a qualitative difference between one’s noticing for oneself a change of aspect, an incongruent detail upon closer inspection, or the point at which an analogy no longer does good work, and having it asserted to you by another. If one manages to achieve a writing style in which one’s reader is often allowed to notice important details and limitations for herself, it is likely that she will automatically attribute the event to herself; it will be her investigation, her working out of a scenario in a contingent manner; and that contingent precision unique to her completion of the text would also insure a relevance to her particular grammatical confusions unlikely to be achieved through normal pedagogical means. As we shall see in the final chapter, there is another good reason to prefer such incitement over orchestration; it is fundamentally respectful of the indeterminate innovation that characterises a person’s practices in language.
imaginative investigation, the reader comes to recognise them as relevant and intriguing, hence helping one to adopt a previously unconsidered aspect. As we shall soon see, Foucault is distrustful of characterising his philosophy as a form of teaching in a manner significantly symmetrical to the account laid out here:

I would reject this term "teaching"; such a term would reflect the character of a work, of a systematic book that leads to a method that can be generalized, a method full of positive directions, of a body of "teachings" for the readers. In my case it's another matter entirely: my books don't have this kind of value. They function as invitations, as public gestures, for those who may want eventually to do the same thing, or something like it, or, in any case, who intend to slip into this kind of experience.106

For both authors, as we shall see, this peculiarity can be directly related to a methodological motivation. Currently, the concept of acknowledgement now stands rather modified by our reading, away from a general model of the nature of philosophical problems and their resolution, towards a local model's intended effect upon its reader. If we were to insist upon the veracity of Baker's more ontic account of what must be plaguing the philosophical individual, the main task for the practicing therapist is to unlock an individual's particular problem by presenting in a rather hit-or-miss manner a series of models, one of which should cause self-awareness in the confused individual.

It is perhaps finally worth noting that Baker’s qualification of unacknowledged pictures exerting a thrall over their owners draws heavily upon §§112–5. In light of the exegetical positions developed in this chapter, it is now a salient fact that these sections, so often called upon to provide therapeutic terminology are drawn from one of the most conspicuously autobiographical passages in the Investigations. Wittgenstein is at license to speak so assuredly in his accusation of a certain way of thinking as deceptive and misled precisely because it is his own previous way of thinking that is being convicted of such cramped limitations. In part by employing two of Baker’s principles of exegesis107, minimalism and charity, we have arrived at a very different account of

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106 Foucault 1991c, p39-40. The conversation between Foucault and Trombadori, recorded in “How an 'Experience-Book' is Born”, from which this remark is taken, is directly relevant to this discussion. See, in particular, §4.3.

107 See §1.4.
acknowledgement, and more generally, of the role to be played by the philosophically confused individual in her own relief.

Previously, the task of varying objects of comparison to suit the particular grammar of the individual was performed by the therapist, demanding supernatural levels of perception, imagination and sympathy on their part, in order that they might correctly divine the problems of their perhaps-truculent patient. It is therefore my assertion that those problems in Baker’s account of acknowledgement all stem from the precision required of the therapist. Under the model here outlined, open-endedness allows for a degree of innovative customisation according to each individual’s employment of the text (and, therefore too, of relevance to a far greater spectrum of problems than that which would be achieved by a more precise set of objects of comparison). The problem of eliciting acknowledgement is removed, as is the problem of resistance as an intractable barrier and, assisted by Wittgenstein’s methods, the reader functions as a more efficient ‘therapist’ than that role postulated by Baker. Reformulated as part of what is left to the reader, this task can now be performed with far greater accuracy, with diagnostic variance occurring as a symptom of the reader’s substantiation of her aspectival comparisons. Further, that which is achieved by the reader can be expected to improve with practice, as the habits of comparison and imagination become better formed. The aim of conceptual investigation, then, can be understood not as is commonly considered the dissolution of philosophical problems, but the inculcation of an ability to do so when one later encounters them afresh. Struggle is what Wittgenstein seeks to incite, not a particular success: this is from whence the importance of leaving as much to the reader as possible derives from. Contrastingly, Baker treats the skills learnt from Wittgenstein’s thus:

The only product of the teaching is imparting a skill. … [Wittgenstein’s] case studies are of interest in respect of the methods exhibited in the treatment of absolutely specific individual difficulties; what is demonstrated are procedures for untying the particular knots that someone has tied in his own thinking.108

The emphasis of these procedures learnt by the therapist is placed firmly upon resolving someone’s troubles; they are to be replicated as a marvellous set of tools by which to carry on Wittgenstein’s good work, employed upon one’s own interlocutors — be that someone imaginary, academic, or otherwise.

108 NA, p218.
This chapter’s exegesis suggests a programme significantly alternate to that given above, while remaining in deep debt to its basic methodological premises, as outlined in Chapter I. It has sought to draw emphasis back towards oneself as the subject of philosophical work. Considered as a programme, the *Investigations* demonstrates an explicit desire to help its reader adopt a new style of thought in which the habits that lead to confusion and dogmatism are prevented from gaining purchase through the development of a new manner of thinking and seeing. The struggle Wittgenstein referred to as being constitutive of his philosophy expresses without doubt a demand extended through time: it is the demand for a recurrent commitment to a new way of thinking, a new way of life. The therapy that Baker promises, even if successful in spite of the problems explored here, is an event, an achievement, an intervention in the life of its patient, and thus doesn’t fully satisfy the demand for philosophical struggle. How is the patient to acknowledge the sources of her confusion once the therapy is finished? Where can she find a new object of comparison with which to break her particular habitual way of seeing, if not provided by the philosopher? From whence can the new possibilities emerge with which to surround an expression that has the glamour of necessity, in order to reveal it as a fervently held contingency? And how is she to be saved from a regress into confusion? Having returned the exegetical emphasis to the reader’s responsibility, fresh ground emerges from which to interpret Wittgenstein’s struggle as a sustained wilful activity, persisting when the therapist has gone home, when the book sits back on its shelf, perhaps even informing the thousand judgements and expectations that occur within the welter of our everyday life.

To convince someone of the truth, it is not enough to state it, but rather one must find the *path from error to truth.*

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109 FR, p119.
Chapter III

Difficulties of the Will

What role can thought play in what one does if it is to be neither know-how nor pure theory? ... The answer: to give us strength to break the rules in the very act which brings them into play.¹

— Foucault, Interview in *Nouvel Observateur* no.934

¹ in Morey 1992, p125.
§3.1 Glock's challenge and the question of style

The position we have worked to advance thus far is one that flies in the face of much criticism, disagreeing, as it does, with that school of interpretation which Baker himself was so pivotal in establishing before his aspectival turn. One of its most prodigal members is Hans Johan Glock. In a recent volume commemorating the work of Gordon Baker, Glock issued the following challenge:

>[S]tylistic interpreters owe us a clear and well-argued account of what philosophical substance (concerning problems, arguments or insights) is lost by rephrasing Wittgenstein’s thought in a more conventional manner. Barring such an account, this kind of paraphrase is not just legitimate but imperative.²

To take Glock up on his challenge, and to set about “a clear and well-argued account” regarding the irreducible importance of Wittgenstein’s later style of writing to his philosophical arguments and insights, is now a task worth pursuing for two reasons. The previous chapter and the current one both seek to ascertain the relationship between characteristics of Wittgenstein’s writing and its philosophical purpose. Glock’s challenge therefore provides an opportunity to repudiate a common imputation made as to the unfortunate ‘drag-factor’ that his style represents by means of an exampled set of counter-arguments. Secondly, in explaining why the project of rephrasing Wittgenstein’s remarks would have a negative impact upon their philosophical efficacy, we are presented with the opportunity to close-read the text in the pursuit of clarity as to possible reasons why Wittgenstein did expend so much labour over his style of presentation. The stylistic characteristic that will concern the first part of the chapter is that of what I shall term Wittgenstein’s ‘schemes of interruption’; his arrangement of text so as to both resemble and elicit the timely interruption of philosophical confusion. This chapter aims to do so in a ‘positive’ manner – that is, to examine elements of his style in relation to both a number of the author’s inter-related remarks, and the position established in Chapter II, so as to give a helpful reading of what such a style is concerned to achieve, how many of its characteristics jibe well with Wittgenstein’s explicit claims as to the required methods of his philosophy, and what would be lost if, as Glock so suggests, his arguments were to be refashioned in a more regulated and

² Glock 2007, p63.
coherent manner. Glock’s position is not novel, and in conclusion we will consider a counter argument, authored by Hilmy, whose excellent exegesis perhaps represents the most considered and detailed exponent of the ‘revisionary’ exegetical position he shares with Glock. Earlier evaluations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy are in sympathy with Glock’s appeal for revision too, such as the following, made by his friend, contemporary and collaborator, Freidrich Waismann:

He has the great gift of always seeing things as if for the first time. But it shows, I think, how difficult collaborative work with him is, since he is always following up the inspiration of the moment and demolishing what he has previously sketched out.\(^3\)

This chapter will argue that to treat Wittgenstein’s style of thought solely as a ‘natural’ gift (or as Waismann intimates, something of a curse) of the faculty of the kind of man Wittgenstein was, is to quarantine that style as a discrete aspect of a certain persona, rather than a methodological ethos emerging from a set of philosophical practices. From there, it would follow that Wittgenstein’s style of writing, rather than being another tool of the philosopher’s methodology, is similarly and solely a reflection of this anachronistic quality of the man. Since in both his writing and his thought the effect of this anachronistic ‘demolishing’ and ‘criss-crossing’ style can sensibly be judged to be detrimental to the task of doing philosophy in a clear and programmatic manner, it can supposedly be considered as of only biographical interest, or perhaps of interest to the literary scholar, or at best, charitably, as a unique, admirable sugar coating with which to help the substantive philosophical medicine go down.\(^4\) This tendency is clearly present here in Waismann’s frustration at his attempts at collaborative work with Wittgenstein, just as it is clear in the contemporary revisionary position as posited by Glock and Hilmy. There are patent reasons why this reading has strong support. Wittgenstein was an enigmatic character, full of foibles that might puzzle any who read the many biographical accounts of the man, lending circumstance to a dismissive reading of his style. More importantly, there is a strong exegetic payoff from adopting this position, that of application. The ideas, examples and arguments that populate the *Investigations* have had a pronounced critical effect upon many of the central issues of academic philosophy. The ‘private language argument’, for example, is capable of raising novel

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3 Waismann, quoted in NA, p16.

4 See, e.g., Hacker’s reference, in this regard, to Wittgenstein’s “bedside manner” (Hacker 2003, p19).
problems in a range of ethical, cognitive and epistemic fields. Removed from their polyphonic setting, formalised and restated as a series of arguments, they have already played a substantial role in shaping much of our contemporary philosophy, for good or for ill (according to your commentator of choice). If we accept the fecundity of Wittgensteinian exegesis, and in particular the contribution of figures such as PMS Hacker to fields as diverse as neuroscience, linguistics and logic, then it is clear that we would do well to avoid making a strict interdiction regarding the ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ ways of reading Wittgenstein, or risk the danger of self-contradiction with our earlier account of the ‘open-ended’ characteristic of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

However, this does not dismiss our initial concern as trivial, for the important additional qualification of fidelity remains. The novel employment of elements of Wittgenstein’s philosophical texts, notes and lectures in a rewarding avenue of critique is commendable, but if that avenue claims close fidelity to the original text, and by doing so questions the legitimacy of much of the other elements of Wittgenstein’s philosophy that disagree, then a sensible response is to provide a coherent reading of the relevance of those elements to the task of comprehending and practicing the methods, as advocated by their inventor. It is partially in the interest of fidelity, then, and in taking Wittgenstein at his own word, that there follows a series of interconnected investigations into traits of his philosophical writing style.

In a relatively early remark, a few note-pages prior to his infamous stipulation of philosophy as a kind of work on oneself, Wittgenstein reflected upon the relative importance of the will in undertaking philosophical investigation. It still has a rather unorthodox ring to it even when read for the twentieth time, as it expresses a startling analysis of the relative importance of the ‘will’ and ‘intellect’ in overcoming philosophical confusion:

Tolstoy: the meaning (importance) of something lies in its being something everyone can understand. That is both true & false. What makes the object hard to understand--if it's significant, important--is not that you have to be instructed in abstruse matters in order to understand it, but the antithesis between understanding the object & what most people want to see. Because of this precisely what is most obvious may be what is most difficult to understand. It is not a difficulty for the intellect but one for the will that has to be overcome.
Someone who teaches philosophy nowadays gives his pupil foods, not because they are to his taste, but in order to change his taste.³

This chapter will concern itself with evidencing the manner in which Wittgenstein’s style was directly informed by his advocacy of “overcoming” difficulties of the will as a constitutive task of philosophy. As will soon become evident, the latter aphorism regarding ‘feeding’ students of philosophy in order to change their ‘taste’ is not only contiguous with the former remark itself, but also important in our understanding of Wittgenstein’s style of philosophy and the objectives he sought to achieve. The end result will be an account of this activity that results in many of the characteristics of Wittgenstein’s work attributed by Waismann and Glock as anachronistic elements being reconsidered, rather, as both products and exemplars of the methods of philosophy as advocated by Wittgenstein. Thus this chapter offers a close reading of text with the aim being a reversal of the core assumptions regarding the relationship of method and style found in the revisionary challenge to Wittgensteinian philosophy. Firstly, a novel interpretation of a common, recurring set of characteristics identifiable in Wittgenstein’s later writing will be analysed and treated under the rubric of ‘schemes of interruption’.⁶

This emerging position asserts that Wittgenstein’s stated intention – that of influencing the actions and considerations of his reader – is directly related to such schemes and that, as such, they demonstrate an intended synergetic relationship, with the interruptive depiction of the interaction between alternate philosophical expressions intended to portray and elicit such activity as an exemplar of what philosophical investigation should achieve. This interpretation will then be related to a substantive account of Wittgenstein’s notion of a ‘difficulty of the will’ and posited as being emergent from this concern, as well as indicative of the extent to which Wittgenstein considered it to be significant. Finally, Hilmy’s refutation of the possible relevance of this interpretation (or any other that is concerned with Wittgenstein’s textual style as substantive in relation to his methods) will be addressed and dismissed as ultimately ineffectual.

³ MS 112 223: 22.11.1931.
⁶ I use the term ‘scheme’ because the stylistic feature under consideration is not dissimilar to the rhetorical notion of a scheme, namely a figure of speech that alters the ordinary or expected patterns of a text in order to achieve a specific persuasive effect upon its reader. See also Pichler 2007, for his advancement of a closely related understanding of the Investigations as being littered with what he calls “skandalon (Greek for ‘stumbling block’), because they make the reader stumble, pause, and ask certain questions.” (Pichler 2007, p127)
§3.2 Interruption, or “— it need not be so”

The cadence of the *Investigations* is punctuated with a peculiar movement. Rare is the line of argument that sustains for long without soon meeting an interjection, whether profoundly considered or apparently banal. Amongst these interchanges there can be identified an iterated theme. Consider the following example:

"But if the concept 'game' is uncircumscribed like that, you don't really know what you mean by a 'game'."—When I give the description: "The ground was quite covered with plants"—do you want to say I don't know what I am talking about until I can give a definition of a plant?8

Typically, moments in the text such as this have been understood as being examples of a pedagogical mannerism,9 and this seems broadly true. There are more specific components at work that require closer scrutiny, however. In §70, as in so many other sections we will consider, a secondary challenge is made to the author’s initial line of thought, occurring in a very specific manner. In this particular section the concern is animated by a question as to the virtue of family resemblance, specifically that such a concept seems incapable, by definition, of providing the semblance of the precision one might expect when defining a word’s meaning. An interruptive element responds to this question, in this particular instance, with an analogical example of an expression in which a similar concern does not seem relevant; in the new comparative example it does not contribute to, but rather compromises, the understanding of the given expression, “the ground was quite covered with plants”.

The first line of thought might be considered broadly ‘philosophical’—abstract and concerned with the generality of a concept as a watermark of its efficacy. The interruptive line introduces an example of an expression that demonstrates that if such a similar demand were made upon the given analogical example, the result would clearly be asinine. The reader is then left to pore over the analogical comparison, spot the elements that are being compared, and conclude on these grounds whether the analogy is fair or misleading; merely amusing or conceptually revelatory. The general

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7 PI, §67.
8 PI, §70.
9 See, for example, Savicky 1999.
effect might charitably be: we witness the author’s portrayal of an interruption to a way of expressing himself that, through a timely counter-example, leads to an understanding of the precision of his words as no longer necessarily obligatory. We can thereby clearly note a tactical element to the interruption, in which the intention of the initial line is tempered by its repositioning within a newly-imagined context. Moreover it seems that the tactic involves emphasising a distinction between the philosophical (pre-) determination of an expression and its everyday employment; something of a common theme in many such examples of interruption. Next, consider the frequency with which such remarks and appeals occur in the *Investigations*. Here are only a few examples in which a philosophical determination is stopped in its tracks by a demand for a qualification as to the possibilities of its employment:

§296 — Only whom are we informing of this? And on what occasion?
§327 — Well, don't you ever think? Can't you observe yourself and see what is going on? You do not have to wait for it as for an astronomical event and then perhaps make your observation in a hurry.
§278 — Certainly: what use of the proposition are you thinking of?
§47 — Asking ‘Is this object composite?’ outside a particular language-game is like what a boy once did, who had to say whether the verbs in certain sentences were in the active or passive voice, and who racked his brains over the question whether the verb "to sleep" meant something active or passive.
§68: ‘—It need not be so.’
§48 — I do not know what else you would have me call ‘the simples’, what would be more natural in this language-game.

The ‘topics’ of these sections vary wildly over relatively short periods of text, yet their method of interruption is consistent in its appearance. Typographically, they are normally prefaced by a single or double en-rule and respond to an initial voice presented in quotation marks. In idiom, they are discursive, informal and convivial – if often a little teacherly in the manner of their comment or challenge. In timing, they nearly always occur at a moment of supposed peril, where the potential for taking a misturning, or continuing a line of reasoning in a grammatically skewed manner, is made apparent to the reader. Such interruption always employs an initial voice or concern as driven to make a given assertion, and commonly responds before that assertion has time to develop or elaborate, typically challenging a conditional element of
the initial assertion through a variety of techniques. These techniques are not reducible merely to counter-examples, as would be hoped if one sought to revise them in Glockian fashion. They comprise, for example; questions, maxims, rhetorical devices, humour, bald challenge, agreement through disambiguation, appeal to experience and, as we saw in §70, counter-examples. The conglomeration of such a wide collection of figures in Wittgenstein’s writing under the rubric of ‘schemes of interruption’ is thus one I make in relation to the timing they demonstrate in relation to an initial philosophical position, their typographic presentation, and their idiom; their differences are evidently numerous yet they routinely occur within a strict stylistic scheme.

When isolated like this as a concern, Wittgenstein’s writing demonstrates a very persistent way of framing philosophical problems and their dissolution, with innumerable examples of this interruptive style signalling a remarkable continuity in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. As we shall now see, by understanding these interruptions’ persistence as indicative of the author’s demand for a recurrent commitment to new ways of thinking through a struggle with those already established, this stylistic facet appears of far greater import than if they were taken solely as the author’s reliance upon, or penchant for, the impact or turn of phrase that such interruptions allow. I will now argue that, as a complex form of philosophical punctuation, this style is intended as a means to explore and transform the conceptual space in which one expresses one’s ideas of how one thinks, understands and behaves, and thus is of significant importance for Wittgenstein’s unique notion of philosophy.

Having considered the provocative nature of Wittgenstein’s writing in Chapter II, our focus here is upon the rhythm and timing demonstrated by such provocations. The previous seven remarks are all examples of interruptions occurring in response to an attempt to set out a definition or general account of the field of problems that occupy the author. They are the manner of his most common response to the confusions that generate the need for philosophical investigation. “An unsuitable type of expression is a sure means of remaining in a state of confusion. It as it were bars the way out”, and Wittgenstein’s main methods of overcoming such ‘barring’ expressions can be demonstrated to be routinely interruptive in nature. Taken in relation to its reader, it seems sensible that the purpose of such a consistent element is not only to provide specific counter-examples, objections and challenges, but to encourage a pattern of response as

\[ \text{E.g. PI, §§1, 6, 14, 20, 24 … 147, 151, 155, 156, 158 … 565, 573, 578, 583, 584, etc.} \]

\[ \text{PI, §339.} \]
an activity. By ‘pattern of response’ I mean a form of incremental training or habit that installs – first through demonstration, then through the incitement of novel employment – a predilection for spotting and interrupting what might otherwise pass as the unproblematic use of an expression. To break up, as it were, language in use and to formulate the grammar of the given expression in imaginative ways that help attenuate the likelihood of philosophical confusion. Or again, to install in the reader a wariness when employing certain expressions, so that it becomes quite natural to adopt a grammatically critical relation to one’s own language. It is important to note how often Wittgenstein’s interruptions to the interlocutorial voice focus upon the *conditions* by which that voice goes about formulating a question, rather than an answer to the question so posed. This might be a request for the context in which such a question would likely occur or a challenge to the manner in which a contributing word or phrase is being employed. Thus the style of activity being demonstrated and encouraged in such examples is closely tied to the conditional objections being offered. If this is correct, then it seems that interruption is a common facet of Wittgenstein’s method, due to the *timing* that must be employed to avoid philosophical confusion, being dependent as it is upon establishing a critical investigation at the root, or beginning, or likely occurrence of that confusion, rather than in their being answered ‘straight up’. The apt assembly of reminders is a feature of Wittgenstein’s method that has received a great deal of attention, yet the actual timing by which one must deploy such reminders is in comparison something of a neglected feature. For it is clearly articulated in many of his remarks in an urgent appeal to “[r]emind yourself at the right time when doing philosophy” of certain practices, models, or grammatical remarks. “When you are tempted to make general metaphysical statements, ask yourself (always): What case am I actually thinking of?” A certain question “most easily arises if we are preoccupied with cases” that sympathetically reflect upon a simile in our language, for example when “there are things flowing by us,—as logs of wood float down a river. ... We then use this situation as a simile for all happening in time and even embody the simile in our language, as when we say that ‘the present event passes by’ (a log passes by).”

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12 In other words, the stylistic persistence on display is acutely principled and programmatic, rather than accidental or lethargic.


14 Ibid, p171.

15 BB, p107.
To get clear about philosophical problems, it is useful to become conscious of the apparently unimportant details of the particular situation in which we are inclined to make a certain metaphysical assertion. Thus we may be tempted to say "Only this is really seen" when we stare at unchanging surroundings, whereas we may not at all be tempted to say this when we look about us while walking.\textsuperscript{16}

Wittgenstein’s presentation of a confusion’s occasion sensitivity can be extended, from these cases, where he draws explicit attention to it, to a more general appreciation of his cadence. His schemes of interruption are quintessentially designed to portray a response to the lived utterance of a problematic expression, caught in the act, as it were. This is to posit style as performatively demonstrative, and thus an irreducible aspect of the means of philosophy – namely the dissolution of philosophical confusion. Viewed as a technique reinforced through varietal repetition, the interruptive voice thereby teaches a method by which to undertake a practical and timely reordering of one’s habits of thought. It is practical because, viewed recursively over a period of reading, the text prompts one to learn a set of methods by which one might continue to operate once bereft of the text’s interjections, examples and comments. In this \textit{limited} sense, the varied topics of philosophical investigation are exemplary but inessential – the pattern and habits of sharp-sightedness and response to the troublesome things one is liable to utter are also a coherent philosophical objective of the text. The aim of writing in such a manner is therefore not doctrinal but agonistic. The struggle there displayed is intended to incite an activity in its reader, but more than that, it is intended to incite new habits of reflection that persist inventively, beyond the given examples. Wittgenstein’s style is a patterned response to this concern, best expressed by the author himself:

A teacher who can show good, or indeed astounding results while he is teaching, is still not on that account a good teacher, for it may be that, while his pupils are under his immediate influence, he raises them to a level which is not natural to them, without developing their own capacities for work at this level, so that they immediately decline again once the teacher leaves the schoolroom. Perhaps this holds for me; I have thought about this. (When Mahler was himself conducting, his private performances were excellent; the orchestra seemed to collapse at once if he was not conducting it himself.)\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} BB, p66.

\textsuperscript{17} MS 122, p190c: 13.1.1940.
Wittgenstein’s style depicts the temporal unfolding and resolution of philosophical problems, often following alternate permutations, because his conception of the practice of philosophy is one that extends into the everyday life and times of its practitioner, away from the influence of its teacher. There, only the newly developed capacities of his reader can determine whether she succeeds or collapses back into confusion through the re-adoption of abidingly aspect-informed forms of expression. Given proper attention, this characteristic of his style coherently expresses a specific model of interruption that is intended to encourage the development of a symmetrically specific set of capacities in his students and readers.

The sustained iteration of interruptive tasks and dialogues on display in the *Investigations* is certainly not a shortcut in effort or style on their author’s behalf – we can be anecdotally and biographically sure of the obsessive effort that he put into their writing and incessant rewriting – but a demonstration of the self-interrogative methods necessary to achieve the goals Wittgenstein persists in presenting as crucial to the task of emancipation from philosophical confusion. The examples Wittgenstein offers us “point beyond” their current employment; not necessarily in their content (which may well hit or miss their target of relevance to the reader), but in their philosophical style. They aim at altering not only the way an individual understands a given subject, but their way of looking at and thinking about things *per se*.

If one doesn’t want to SOLVE philosophical problems why doesn’t one give up dealing with them. For solving them means changing one’s point of view, the old way of thinking. And if you don't want that, then you should consider the problems unsolvable.

There is accordance, then, between Wittgenstein’s common style of interruption and his repeated plea as to the pervasive aims philosophy should set about achieving. We previously accounted for the interlocutor as a method of expressing the undertaking of work on oneself, of speaking forcefully of the tendencies and shortcomings that the author found in his own thought, depicted to in order to bring about a related experience in its reader. The interruptive cadence of the text reflects what such work looks like in practice. This practice – namely of cultivating certain interjectory techniques, through variance in a participatory scheme of critical investigation – can be

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19 MS169 1949, p84.
judged a crucial element of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, both by his interruptive exhortations\(^\text{20}\) and in their obverse explications.\(^\text{21}\) Providing “tips” in order to help inform his reader’s “experiences” away and apart from the \textit{ad hoc} instances to be found in the \textit{Investigations} is clearly legible as an explicit aim of his later work.\(^\text{22}\)

“Writing the right style means, setting the carriage precisely on the rails. … We are only going to set you straight on the track, if your carriage stands on the rails crookedly; driving is something we shall leave you to do by yourself.”\(^\text{23}\)

Philosophy is not a description of language usage, and yet one can learn it by \textit{constantly attending} to all the expressions of life in the language.\(^\text{24}\)

The self-correcting activity encouraged through Wittgenstein’s interruptive philosophical style has the aim of cultivating a constant habit of attentiveness to the expressions of life in our language and a sharp-sightedness to these problems that are hard to perceive because they concern that which is common to every day of our life;\(^\text{25}\) our expressions, our judgements, how and what we want to say. Attentiveness to and awareness of one’s own tendencies of expression are central to grammatical investigation, and imply a certain ethos in one’s relationship to oneself. We can now start to respond, perhaps incompletely but certainly with some force, to Glock’s challenge. Certain elements of Wittgenstein’s style demonstrate a set of techniques by which the author seeks to illicit an alteration in the behaviour of his reader. It presents his remarks in such a way that they rouse the reader to think for themselves in the detailed service of giving a description of the modes of expression they find in their own language, and that of those around them. It is in the training, incitement, comparative tools and interruptive patterning on display in Wittgenstein’s style that one can make sense of the difficulty of the will and its primary importance in resolving philosophical problems.

\(^{20}\) E.g. “ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, ”Now I know how to go on,” when, that is, the formula \textit{has} occurred to me?” (PI §154)

\(^{21}\) E.g. “The way to solve the problem you see in your life is to live in a way that will make what is problematic disappear. The fact that life is problematic means that your life does not fit life’s shape. So you must change your life, & once it fits the shape, what is problematic will disappear.” (MS 118, p17c: 27.8.1937)

\(^{22}\) See PI, p227.

\(^{23}\) MS 117, p225: 2.3.1940 & p237: 6.3.1940.

\(^{24}\) LWPP I, p121, my emphasis.

\(^{25}\) cf: MS 118, p113r: 24.9.1937.
So far we have examined a prevalent stylistic in the later writing of Wittgenstein that seems to make certain claims upon the behaviour of its reader that are unconventional in their demand. Because of this account, Wittgenstein’s notion of treating his *Investigations* as a workbook rather than a hermetic text now appears to extend beyond explicitly corresponding sections such as §27 and §182, instead permeating the majority of the text through the stimulation of an interruptive attentiveness to one’s own habits of expression in light of the author’s own projects, with the end intention being the production of a kind of perspicuity which makes it possible – desirable, even – to make significant changes in our ways of conceiving, and attentive enough to do so in response to the problems it identifies in its own behaviour. Sections such as our initial example of §70 are not necessarily exhausted by the arguments, in the academic mode, that can be divined in them, and their aim similarly isn’t solely the refutation of a given philosophical problem. It is also to stimulate a form of conceptual and expressive repositioning which causes the kinds of problems that are involved in the way his reader expresses herself to cease, and therefore the way she lives to be drastically altered. This is an explicit concern for Wittgenstein — in order to solve philosophical problems “you have to start thinking about these things in a new way”, and “the new way of thinking is what is so hard to establish” — so while much of the argument here so far rests upon a relatively narrow treatment of the text, there should be little doubt that Wittgenstein was motivated by the question of whether his work would manage to imprint a persistent change upon his readers and pupils. We have advanced an account of the importance of interruption to the aim of stimulating a new way of thinking and speaking as a substantive (but certainly not exhaustive,) aim in Wittgenstein’s philosophical writing. We have yet to examine why Wittgenstein employs such unique methods in his philosophical style, why he worried regarding how lasting his model of philosophy would prove to be, once he was no longer “conducting the orchestra”, and why he deemed such a radical style of writing to be a necessary facet of his philosophy. His notion of difficulties of the will and their relationship to philosophy are, I argue, the key to this examination.

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26 I am in sympathy with Baker’s account of the misattribution of Wittgenstein’s work as a response to classical philosophical positions, but believe it to be a too-strong formulation of an important insight. Wittgenstein’s work is not exhausted in its response to such positions, but it undeniably is issued in some kind of response to the field of questions that have animated philosophy as an academic discipline in the modern era, and Wittgenstein was an academic working in a centre of tremendous activity in that discipline for over twenty years.

27 See quoted MS 122, p190c: 13.1.1940, on p82.
As we have seen, in this conception of philosophy, its practice demands certain skills be developed by the reader, and if she is to succeed in applying his method in pursuit of the confusions present in her own life, then they must be deeply learnt, to actually change the way she thinks and speaks. This learning isn’t an easy process, as Wittgenstein sees it, and neither is the performance that follows. Yet as he makes clear, the undertaking is not made difficult because of a requirement for recondite knowledge, or due to its complexity:

People have sometimes said to me they cannot make any judgement about this or that because they have never learnt philosophy. This is irritating nonsense, it is being assumed that philosophy is some sort of science. And people speak of it as they might speak of medicine. — What one can say, however, is that people who have never carried out an investigation of a philosophical sort, like most mathematicians for instance, are not equipped with the right optical instruments for that sort of investigation or scrutiny. Almost, as someone who is not used to searching in the forest for berries will not find any because his eye has not been sharpened for such things & he does not know where you have to be particularly on the lookout for them. Similarly someone unpracticed in philosophy passes by all the spots where difficulties lie hidden under the grass, while someone with practice pauses & senses that there is a difficulty here, even though he does not yet see it.28

Examining Wittgenstein’s analogy, we can infer that it posits certain preconditions inherent to successful philosophical inquiry, tantamount to sharp sightedness and acquisition of “the right optical instruments”. These preconditions are presented as habitual, in that one must be pre-prepared to pay special attention when in territory where one’s words are particularly fraught with the possibility of confusion. Practice entails apt caution, an ability to search and identify the moments that Wittgenstein insists lead to philosophical difficulties. If one is restricted in one’s possible examinations of expression to what one ‘catches’ in time then, due to their familiarity and common appearance, most sources of confusion will go undetected. Conversely, if one is trained to be willing to cease in one’s train of thought and expression, problems become clear as one’s attention adjusts to the task. Wittgenstein is keen to stress that there is nothing very special in this account of this ability – it is depicted in a way broadly equivalent to other skills one picks up through exercise and practice, and Wittgenstein intimates that it is

28 MS 118 113r: 24.9.1937, my emphasis.
indicative of a misunderstanding to express surprise at this account, presumably due to the deep ‘profundity’ often expected in any tasked assigned as philosophical in nature. This account is further related to the modal, conditional elements of Wittgenstein’s method. In Chapter I we examined the strong reading made available by the later Baker for conceiving of grammatical rules as codified and non-exhaustive “snap-shots” of meaning, as opposed to being conditional upon theses regarding the necessary characteristics of language. The upshot of this convincing conception of grammatical rules and their investigation is the need to remain alert to the possible treatment of such rules as exhaustive or necessary to an investigation.

It is arguable that this methodological non-contiguity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is a factor that leads to his placing a strong emphasis upon the will, for the questions, qualifications and challenges posed to an individual regarding the use of their words are “essentially person-relative, and [centre] on the dynamics of somebody’s thinking, not on the geometry of thoughts.” The philosophical experience depicted should not be generalised as a method for uncovering the conclusive, exhaustive or exclusive meanings of those words. Therefore no procedural shortcut is available and, given the piecemeal and therefore unending tasks in front of anyone undertaking this kind of grammatical investigation, an implied challenge is one regarding the task of finding the will to continue with such an undertaking. In the literary structure of his work, in his explicit remarks and in the above reflection upon the resolution required for the tasks at hand, difficulties of the will, as conceived of by Wittgenstein, seem crucially related to the role played by our expressions and our relation to them in his philosophy. This is the subject to which we now turn.

§3.3 Difficulties of the will

Chapter I considered the grammatical method of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and in line with Baker we settled upon grammatical investigation as a means to codify alternate aspects of meanings. This method’s aim was presented as the eventual alteration of an aspect, with this recoordination leading to the cessation of dogmatic insistence in one’s modes of expression. In this account, grammatical examples are designed to be employed strategically in the service of providing alternate perspectives upon concepts which Wittgenstein took to be particularly likely to “drag one along” into confusion.

29 NA, p68.
This kind of confusion was therefore presented as being caused by the dogmatic assertion of one abided aspect of a complex, overlapping pattern of uses made of a word, with the exemplary case being considered as essential, underlying, necessary, and therefore deeply explanative.

This is a concern we will turn to again now, because, as we shall see, Wittgenstein considered the task of grammatical investigation to be exponentially complicated by one’s attachment to, and reliance upon, one’s preferred modes of representation. Firstly, consider, as Kuusela details below, how a tendency recurrently portrayed in Wittgenstein’s investigation is the assumption of a form of representation as being constitutive of the subject being represented:

When the mode of presentation is (mis)understood as a truth, the philosopher is, as it were, driven by the dynamics of the situation to state dogmatically that the characterisation must hold for all propositions. Thus what is a defining feature of her mode of presentation is claimed to be a necessary feature of her object of investigation. Wittgenstein writes: ‘now everything which holds of the model will be asserted of the object of the examination; & asserted: it must always be … This is the origin of a kind of dogmatism.’

Wittgenstein records himself as having been certain that he perceived a state of affairs of the highest generality, represented by a model that promised the deepest kind of explanatory efficacy, and he employed a host of different ways of characterising this condition of philosophical confusion. His most well known idiom is his account of how he thought himself to be tracing the outline of a thing’s nature over and over again, while he was in fact merely “tracing the frame” through which he insisted upon looking at it. Another theme which he employed on more than one occasion was of this kind of attribution as an “optical illusion [by which] we appear to see within the thing what is marked on our spectacles”. There is his more literal account of how one predicates of the subject what lies in the method of its representation, the consideration of how an explanatory preconception can act as a “filter” that admits into view only a tiny number

31 PI §114.
32 Ts220 §110, cf PI §104.
33 PI §104.
of the possible descriptions one might otherwise adopt, and the related notion of such dogmatic adherence acting as a “brake” upon one’s freedom of thought. It is relevant for our purposes to note that inherent in all of these accounts of filters, frames, projections, brakes and spectacles, is a substantive role for such preferred modes of representation; they are a way of making sense of a complex field in an abbreviated approximation, thus making that field comprehensible and simpler to navigate, at the price of attenuating alternate possible aspects of a given centre of variation. They are not stupid prejudgements precisely because they substantively relate to perceived solutions and explanations of the highly complex concepts relative to one’s conception of language, thought, mind, meaning, etc. The depiction of this habitual orchestration, as well as the direct references made to it above, occupied a great deal of Wittgenstein’s effort, and integrally involves his notion of a difficulty of the will.

This is partially because, in normal light, the approximating legibility that is conferred by seeing one’s preferred model of representation as constitutive of the subject of inquiry appears as overwhelmingly beneficial to its employer; it is preferred precisely because of its efficacy. It admits the possibility of elegant accounts, and it is partly these accounts’ elegance that occludes their simultaneous contribution towards the philosophical confusion that accompanies the subject of inquiry. This is a conflict central to Wittgenstein’s conception of difficulties of the will: what one takes for a gift is instead a problem that one has to solve. Hence philosophical investigation gives rise to difficulties of the will in a quite painful way, challenging the preferred, habitual modes of presentation that one previously conceived of as fundamental, efficacious and revelatory. If one takes all individual words in language to name objects,
or all sensations to be private, this projection of one’s representation onto the subject of enquiry seems to allow one a certain certitude and elegance in how one operates with those concepts, and hence the installation of a mode of representation as a universal aspect permits profound readings to be made of otherwise too-complex phenomena. More specifically, treating an aspect of our understanding as constitutive of the subject itself inters a stability in our conceptions, making their employer context insensitive; we no longer need to be “on the lookout”, nor to “pause to check” to see how our words operate in accordance to the contexts of our use, for we have grasped the invariant essence of a subject. Wittgenstein is adamant in his advice to his reader regarding the renewed endeavour required to learn new habits, to pay closer attention to the details of how one operates in one’s expressions, precisely in order to counteract the effect of such insensitivity. The solution to the mistake Wittgenstein imputes himself of having fallen into seems, from this perspective, to necessitate the dismantling of “everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important”, an interfering and ascetic task that seems contrary to one’s accrued intellectual achievements: “[t]he edifice of your pride has to be dismantled. And that means dreadful work.”

In seeking to substantiate this account, one does not have to look far for a portrayal of such difficulties. When Wittgenstein admits to being tempted to persist in using a particular expression, to assert an alluringly universal explanation, or to treat a word’s variegated meanings as more simple than is made evident through consideration, he is demonstrating cases of how he wants to conceive of his own language use. Likewise, his interlocutorial schemes – either marked in quotations or implicit in the interactional style of his text – commonly portray what Wittgenstein is tempted to express, occurring in relation to his undertaking a given philosophical investigation, be that temptation speculative, skeptical, assertive or contrary in

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41 Cf: PI, §§1 & 246.
42 Hence difficulties of the will retard the very methods that Wittgenstein advocates in their solution.
43 MS 157a 57r: 1937.
44 E.g. PI §§39, 20 & 182 respectively.
45 E.g. §193 “If we know the machine, everything else, that is its movement, seems to be already completely determined.”
46 E.g. §68 "But then the use of the word is unregulated, the 'game' we play with it is unregulated."
47 E.g. §187 “But I already knew, at the time when I gave the order, that he ought to write 1002 after 1000.”
48 E.g. §520 “But surely that is arbitrary!”
formula. Therefore, far from being an outlying, contingent concern in understanding Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, difficulties of the will prove, upon examination, to be absolutely central to that task. This exegetical position is complementary to Wittgenstein’s own remarks on the subject: true, the reordering of concepts, the remembrance of how one normally uses a word in achievement of perspicuity, and the invention of new schemes for comparative purposes all feature heavily in his definitions of the activity of philosophy, for example:

The most important aspects of the case are not accessible to me because I do not have a perspicuous view of the possibilities. … Look at it in a new way, through a new scheme. // Make a different kind of comparison.\textsuperscript{49}

Yet the achievement of perspicuity through successful comparisons is contingent upon addressing one’s difficulties of the will, in respect to the entrenched manner in which we persist in projecting certain characteristics of our representation as necessary and constitutive of the subject of inquiry. The task of ordering our concepts is forestalled by the way we want things to be. Making a different kind of comparison, achieving a new way of looking, through a new scheme, supposes an ability to interrupt and to relent from an already established scheme, thereby making alternative cases “accessible”. Until this wilful problem is addressed, there can be no possibility of a perspicuous view or an alleviating description because the task of ordering concepts is forestalled by the habitual, systematic (§143) way we want to see them. “The philosophical problem is an awareness of disorder in our concepts, and can be solved by ordering them”,\textsuperscript{50} yet such reordering presupposes that one is capable of treating one’s claims of necessity, or ‘projections’, as contingent or merely representational. “It can be difficult not to use an expression, just as it is difficult to hold back tears, or an outburst of anger”,\textsuperscript{51} and it is this difficulty that prompts his unique style of solution.

It is important to note that Wittgenstein at no point seems to posit the will as a psychological mechanism or capacity, as something perhaps roughly extensive with the considerations of two of his favourite authors, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. If it were so, Wittgenstein’s remarks and methods could be considered broadly veridical, as claims regarding the hidden nature of the mind and of philosophy. This of course would be

\textsuperscript{49} MS112, 112r.

\textsuperscript{50} TS213, p421.

\textsuperscript{51} P, p5.
out of step with the grammatical strategy outlined in Chapter I. Instead, as Cavell does
down, we can comfortably conceive of Wittgenstein’s concern with the will as a method
of expressing a conviction and ethos in his approach to the task of philosophical
investigation.

I am not thinking of the will as a kind of strength which I may have more or less
of, but as a perspective which I may or may not be able to take upon myself. So
one may say that the will is not a phenomenon but an attitude toward
phenomena.\(^{52}\)

The will, as interpreted here, is an \textit{attitudinal} consideration. A difficulty of the will is a
difficulty in our attitude towards a phenomenon, related to our expectation, habit
and desire for a universal conception of a given complex concept, at the expense of
more particular descriptions. Changing one’s attitude is therefore a conditional
requirement upon which Wittgenstein’s account of the practice of philosophy turns;
attention to and resolution of what one wants and what one expects one’s expressions
and concepts to do. Just as it is important to note that the will is an attitudinal
philosophical concern, rather than a veridical one, so too must we note that it is the
practitioner’s fascination itself, rather than its expression \textit{per se}, that is the target of the
philosophical scenarios, questions, games and dialogues that populate Wittgenstein’s
later compositions. Hence it is quite sensible why Wittgenstein qualifies philosophy as
unconcerned with the reformulation or improvement of language, but with the habits
and expectations that accompany its expression\(^{53}\). It is not our language that needs
revision, but our tendencies and hopes when employing it, for “philosophy, as we use
the word, is a fight against the \textit{fascination} which forms of expression exert upon us.”\(^{54}\)

We saw earlier how adopting a certain aspect is voluntary, in that one can drop one
way of seeing in favour of another. We also saw how differing aspects were not
necessarily accumulative, in that one way of seeing competes with, and “transiently
excludes”\(^{55}\) another. Because of these features, abiding by or dropping a certain
aspect is deeply tied into difficulties of the will. Indeed, we can say that “Seeing an

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\(^{52}\) Cavell 1999, p361.

\(^{53}\) Cf §1.4, pp31-2.

\(^{54}\) BB, p27, my emphasis.

\(^{55}\) NA, pp268 & 280.
aspect and imagining are subject to the will. There is such an order as ‘Imagine this’, and also: ‘Now see the figure like this’; but not: ‘Now see this leaf green’.\(^{56}\)

It may well be objected that, instead of the attitudinal and voluntaristic picture depicted here, Wittgenstein rather treats certain characteristics of our language as the cause of philosophical confusion. Doesn’t he state that “[t]he problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language”? That philosophical problems have remained in a certain sense unchanged due to constancies in the form of language since the time of Plato? Well yes, yet the idea of confusion being somehow rooted in a “language” in this monolithic and normative conception seems quite out of sync with Wittgenstein’s own accounts, and with our conclusions in previous chapters. In the above passage from the *Investigations*, the problems were as deep in us as the forms of our language, not depicted as being identical with such forms, but rather as supervening upon them. A cursory survey of Wittgenstein’s use of the term “root” is most revealing:

“The root of this muddle is the confusing use of the word 'object'.\(^{57}\)” “There is a tendency rooted in our usual forms of expression”.\(^{58}\) “Which form [one] prefers, and whether [one] has a preference at all, often depends on general, deeply rooted, tendencies of [one’s] thinking.”:\(^{59}\) “By being educated in a technique, we are also educated to have a way of looking at the matter which is just as firmly rooted as that technique.”:\(^{60}\) “Grasping the difficulty in its depth is what is hard. ... It has to be pulled out by the root; & that means, you have to start thinking about these things in a new way.”\(^{61}\) In all of the above examples, the “deep-rootedness” of a philosophical problem is associated specifically with the use & tendency of a particular aspect, *accompanying*, rather than equating, the form of expression by which one is drawn into uttering deeper and deeper confusion. The philosopher is tasked, then, with critically interrupting and investigating her own fascinations and compulsions of expression, rather than adjudicating over a pernicious and static form of language. To be clear: Wittgenstein

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\(^{56}\) PI, p213.

\(^{57}\) PR, p303.

\(^{58}\) BB, p17.

\(^{59}\) Ibid, p30.

\(^{60}\) RFM, p243.

\(^{61}\) MS 131 48: 15.8.1946.
most certainly does seem to hold that language possesses characteristics that commonly lead to certain forms of conceptual confusion being dramatically more likely to occur than others, and this is not here being disputed as a substantial element of his account, it is rather being asserted that his investigations are tendential rather than linguistically interdictive in intent. This is an important point, relevant to what has so far been said and what will now be considered regarding difficulties of the will.

Just such a tendential approach regularly occurs in Wittgenstein’s ‘civil’ depictions of the lives of philosophical problems, as examined here and in C2. These depictions, through their variance, are not concerned with imputing a specific form of representation that is at fault – although certain forms are more likely in his diagnosis to result in confusion – but instead with an insistent attitude expressed towards what ought to be the case, with “what ought to be” being orchestrated by various interchanging, discriminatory conceptions. The transformative experience of challenging and then overcoming this attitude is precisely what is personified through Wittgenstein’s schemes of interruption.

Difficulties of the will are problematic in this account of philosophy because they are equivalent to an insistence in conception, and it is insistence that wars with one’s curiosity for those differences Wittgenstein wants to draw our attention to. A difficulty of the will in Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy excludes the possibility of attaining a perspicuous new order in one’s conceptions, due to an insistent habitual ways of perceiving a subject. A concern with such attitudinal filters, held to the detriment of philosophical investigation, is a significant motivation in Wittgenstein’s manner of structuring his philosophical remarks. It is one reason why he takes such great pains in achieving a high fidelity in his characterisation of philosophical confusion through those things he is tempted to say, why he favors an interactional portrayal of such confusions, and why schemes of interruption feature so markedly in the *Investigations*. The questions, interjections, portrayals and pacing of his text both reflect and encourage the task of addressing those difficulties of the will that assert restrictive conditions upon the range of concepts we are capable of considering, and are willing to employ. Wittgenstein’s interruptive style reflects the methodological demands that his conception of philosophical problems gives rise to, with an intended synergy between his portrayals and his reader’s subsequent behaviour. His intent to stimulate philosophical investigation is expressed and effected to a significant degree in the structure and schemes of his style of writing. An interruptive experience in language use is intended to incite one to shift perspective in relation to
a given subject, thereby noticing differences, similarities and connections, through an interaction with the models provided. As we have argued, Wittgenstein’s models are notably open-ended, their presentation characterised by an incitive attitude towards their reader, and possessed of a structure intended to portray the interruption and modification of an aspectival avowal that is posited as a precondition of philosophical confusion. Hence, Wittgenstein’s schemes of interruption are concerned with combating difficulties of the will, and inattention to his style of writing means inattention to one of the key qualifications of his notion of philosophy. Schemes of interruption signal his attempt at assistive portrayals, by which the reader gains the chance to see their own congruent habits mirrored, and their timing demonstrates how one can succeed in employing Wittgenstein’s conception of the task of philosophy. As Wittgenstein repeatedly stresses, the aim of his philosophy is not to teach anything in the normal sense, nor to impart a set of beliefs or arguments, but instead represents an attempt to persuade the reader to do something, to stimulate them to act in a new way that is likely to be contrary to their pre-established habits and attitudes.

What I should like to get you to do is (not to agree with me in particular opinions but) to investigate the matter in the right way. To notice the interesting kind of things (i.e. things that will serve as keys if you use them properly) … I don’t try to make you believe something you don’t believe, but to make you do something you won’t do.

We have reached a point where Glock’s revisionary challenge has been met to a satisfactory degree, in a manner that yields a nuanced account of the interaction between a conception of the difficulty of the will involved in philosophical investigation, and a peculiar structure of text that reflects a novel manner of both documenting and inculcating a commitment to struggle against philosophical confusion. The base structure of the justificatory argument looks something like the following:

Wittgenstein states consistently that he wants to encourage a change of behaviour in his students and readers’ thoughts, rather than the adoption of a specific opinion or argument. He states that such changes are to be related to one’s expectations, desires and attention to one’s own expressions, and depend upon an alteration in accordance.

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62 See pages, §2.1 and §1.4 respectively.
63 Cf: MS:155, p58.
64 MS 155, p83.
This explicit concern led to an impact upon his style of philosophical writing, given that it can be shown that its purpose, beginning as early as 1931, was to achieve the above aims. As demonstrated, Wittgenstein’s style does indeed express a pattern of investigation that serves to interrupt problematic expression as it occurs, as detailed in this chapter. This pattern has been demonstrated to be relevant to Wittgenstein’s explicit aim in his philosophical writing, and one must suppose a gross coincidence in order to account for this synergy in a way that insists upon his style as irrelevant or detrimental to his philosophical methods and aims. Therefore an incitive reading of his later writings is a justified and useful addition to exegesis, made in agreement with his later writings and therefore, pace Glock, Wittgenstein’s style is of direct methodological interest.

Through attention to demonstrable patterns in his later writing’s style, to the author’s remarks regarding his aims in writing philosophy, and to his conception of the role of the will in the solution of philosophical difficulties, we have arrived at a portrayal of Wittgenstein’s philosophy that makes a methodological boon of the relation discernible between his attribution of the character of philosophical problems, his intended resolution of them, and a set of discrete characteristics prevalent in the structure and timing of his writing.

§3.4 The revisionist counter argument

While Glock’s challenge has thus been met, there is an argument posited by Hilmy that actively seeks to impute this chapter (and a sizable section of the last too) as misconstruing the true nature of Wittgenstein’s stylistic features, while supporting Glock’s main claim as to the frivolity of laying any exegetical weight upon facets of Wittgenstein’s style. In his book, *The Later Wittgenstein*, Hilmy argues against an exegetical position roughly analogous to the one detailed here, labeling it, somewhat uncharitably, as the “conspiracy theory” – presumably because in his judgement, such a theory posits Wittgenstein as conspiring to ‘covertly’ provoke a response from his reader.65 His target is substantially different to the interpretation given here, but its argument can be equally applied and is thus insensitive to fine-grain differences.

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65 The label is uncharitable in its connotations, but also rather misleading. As we have seen this chapter, there are numerous explicit remarks that detail Wittgenstein’s intentions to effect a change in his reader’s actions and manners of thought through his writing and teaching, his consideration of how his text should demonstrate synergy with his reader’s activity, and his concern as to how persistent the effect of his approach will be. This is either the work of an incredibly inept conspirator, or the attribution of conspiracy is false.
“The [conspiracy] theory is roughly that Wittgenstein’s method was deliberately to write in what has been called a ‘non-linear’ manner for the therapeutic goal of getting the reader to learn to ‘cope’ for himself philosophically.”

Hilmy offers two main objections against “what otherwise would be a plausible theory.” “Firstly, most of what Wittgenstein wrote was initially written for himself – that it was written in notebooks as a personal record of his own struggles with philosophical problems.” This objection treats Wittgenstein’s remark as to the tete-a-tete nature of his work in its literal sense, just as we did in Chapter II, yet it does so as a means to qualify both the entirety of Wittgenstein’s later writing and the author’s intentions in producing it, as strictly autobiographical. However, this objection does not admit of the possibility of an intentional synergy, as discussed in this chapter, in Wittgenstein’s writing, yet we know from one of Wittgenstein’s most well-known remarks that the express intention for his writing was just that: to achieve an interaction between his own ‘assistive’ portrayals and the cued revisionary philosophical work of his reader. Further, it cannot sensibly be claimed by Hilmy that this strategy is unprecedented: rhetorically speaking, this kind of display – in which an agonistic exchange takes place in an attempt to sway one’s reader or listener – can be traced back to antiquity, to the rhetorical method of eliciting response known as inter se pugnantia. Something similar can be said to be present in Plato’s dialogues, whose depictions of philosophical problems are known to have been well considered by Wittgenstein, with his life-long interest in the strategy and elegance of the writings of Kraus and Nestroy equally indicating an active interest in satirical prose and its typical depiction of shortcomings in the hope of stimulating, shocking, or shaming the reader into change. There are therefore both known precedents and clear motives for Wittgenstein to be said to be doing something analogous, in the manner qualified here, in his own writing.

Be that as it may, it should be noted that Hilmy is not making unqualified accusations; his position is derived in part from Wittgenstein’s own remarks; he offers

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66 1984, p18.
67 Ibid.
68 “I must be nothing more than the mirror in which my reader sees his own thinking with all its deformities & with this assistance can set it in order.” (MS 112 p225)
69 “Fighting amongst themselves”.


one quotation in particular in support of this “private” account of Wittgenstein’s records:

“I have no right to offer for publication a book in which simply the difficulties which I perceived are expressed ad repeated over and over again. These difficulties are indeed of interest for me who was stuck in them, but not necessarily for humanity (others). They are peculiarities of my thinking, necessitated by my development. They belong, so to speak, in a diary, not a book.”

We will return shortly to the efficacy of basing one’s exegesis upon the “most despondent” self-reflections of an author. First, the obvious question that arises is: ‘did Wittgenstein, then, conceive of his later writing as solely, discretely, of interest only to himself?’ The answer to this question depends upon which fragment of Wittgenstein’s self-analysis one takes as exemplary, or revelatory of a universal quality, of Wittgenstein’s work. One can quite clearly take alternate quotes that project a different light upon the author’s consideration of the importance of his own writing:

“When I solve philosophical problems I have a feeling as though I had done something of utmost importance for all of humanity [and] don’t think that these matters appears so immensely important to me (or shall I say are so important to me) because they plague me.”

“Do not trouble yourself with what is, presumably, only of interest to yourself”

The similarity between the tete-a-tete style of many of Wittgenstein’s notes and their polished form also raises some interesting problems for Hillmy. Was Wittgenstein preparing for publication of a diary, then? Did he conceive of the precipitation of his investigations, and their agonistic portrayal, as of no interest or relevance to his professed aims to stimulate and persuade the reader? Why the radical disjunction between his stated aims and their precipitate’s regular and consistent stylistic features?

70 In Hillmy 1984, p25.
71 To answer in the affirmative would render the majority of it as trivial, and this perception is not entirely discordant with Hillmy’s position, holding as he does that much of stylistic work contained in it to be “opaque and disjointed” (p16), full of “incidental stylistic idiosyncrac[ies]” (p15).
72 MS183, pp125-6.
73 In Hillmy 1984, p20.
What characteristics, if not those explored in this chapter and the previous one, do correspond to the descriptors that litter his notes regarding the role of his writing? Hilmy’s error seems to be his treatment of the text as possessing only a singular role, to the exclusion of its other dimensions, and yet these dimensions have been recurrently documented as wholly intended. Why does Hilmy claim that it is implausible to conceive of Wittgenstein’s style in his presentation of his own philosophical experiences as synergetic with the stimulus of a related experience for his reader? Was this effect, so desired by the author, merely professed, remaining ineffectual due to a lack of proficiency, then? Apparently, this is precisely the position adopted by Hilmy.

Hilmy’s reading of the text in support of this position is as diligent here as elsewhere in his book. He assembles a number of remarks made by Wittgenstein in which the author attributes his own style of writing as betraying a form of incompetence;\textsuperscript{74} as being inevitable given the limited nature of the “equipment” he had at his disposal in writing prose;\textsuperscript{75} and as a failure of strength, where a suitable exertion would have resulted in a complete, formal and linear treatise quite unlike the form of writing we find in the *Investigations*.\textsuperscript{76} Apparently, Wittgenstein “wrote in a non-linear manner because this was a stylistic idiosyncrasy of his which he could not overcome to his satisfaction, however much he tried.”\textsuperscript{77} Therefore Hilmy concludes that any argument that assigns philosophical relevance to an entirely accidental, unintentional, even debilitating, style of writing, is necessarily vacuous. What is actually needed, Hilmy contends, is to see beyond this style, towards those elements that survive the chronic “shortcoming” of Wittgenstein’s style.

This second objection supposes Wittgenstein’s more self-deprecating, confessional remarks to be equally worthwhile in their account of his writing as the more method-explanatory remarks considered in this chapter. If we accept this exegetical supposition, treating Wittgenstein as necessarily being a reliable reporter at all times, the problem then becomes the qualitative differentiation between remarks that are ‘desirable’, because they support Hilmy’s preferred reading, and remarks that are equally recurrent in their attitude towards Wittgenstein work, but display characteristics that are either contradictory with that preferred position or appear altogether absurd. For example, are

\textsuperscript{74} MS:118, 12.09.1937, p20 in Hilmy 1984.

\textsuperscript{75} CV p59, p22 in Hilmy 1984.

\textsuperscript{76} MS:118, 15.09.1937, p21 in Hilmy 1984.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid, p21.
we equally entitled to help ourselves to the conclusion that Wittgenstein’s work is, as a whole, almost entirely worthless? That he displays no genius in his work? Or that his Jewish heritage is as detrimental to his work’s potentiality as is his “faulty equipment” and stylistic “incompetence”? It is pertinent that Hilmy is unwilling to accept the veracity of Wittgenstein’s confessions in this regard, whilst simultaneously relying heavily upon qualitatively similar remarks in his argument.

There is also an obvious concern in this supposition of such disconsolate remarks as universally veridic of Wittgenstein’s later writing; Hilmy’s indictment along such lines is willfully negligent of the characteristics of that style that are clearly contiguous with their professed aims, as documented in this chapter. It is a treatment that seeks to uncharitably impute to his later work the qualifications made of it at the weakest, most pessimistic moments of its author’s reflections. The reading given here can by contrast be considered as ‘optimistic’ about Wittgenstein’s achievements in philosophical prose, and hence it attributes greater importance to those remarks that express intriguing and original characteristics of his writing, contiguous with other remarks made regarding the aim of such writing, rather than contiguous with those morose reflections that also punctuate his diaries that record only a fear of failure, unoriginality and limitation. This is not a naive optimism, but a reading strategy intended to avoid conclusions that are based solely on psychological assumptions regarding the philosopher, rather than his work. As Janik & Toulmin succinctly put it,

> To grope after the ultimate source of Wittgenstein’s deepest intellectual attitudes in his personal temperament and makeup would, very likely, betray us into unprofitable and irrelevant speculations. (As he says to Engelmann in a letter written from England, in the summer of 1925: ‘How could I expect you to understand me, when I barely understand myself?’)"79

It seems likely that Wittgenstein did indeed fear irrelevance and unoriginality, yet whether these fears were proportionate to his authorship remains to be judged by that person he was so commonly concerned with, whose opinion and response to his work was of utmost importance to him; his reader. The success of the process that animated Wittgenstein’s notion of philosophical activity, of which he struggled to precipitate in his

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78 Hilmy assigns to Wittgenstein an “undeniable genius” (p24), to his work a massive import, and understandably does not consider his lineage as in any way important to his philosophical work.

79 Janik & Toulmin 1973, p236.
readers, is to be judged by the criteria thereby defined, rather than by the moments of
doubt and distress that are common to Wittgenstein’s reflections.

Even so, despite all these concerns, one might be tempted to accede to Hilmy’s
insistence that Wittgenstein didn’t modify the structure, pace and iteration of his writing
in order to affect and aid his reader’s own philosophical undertakings, and that his
‘stylistic idiosyncrasy’ was an unmitigated burden which impaired an otherwise great
mind’s output. In such a position, it is still exegetically necessary to acknowledge the fact
that his “unmediated” remarks – understood as Hilmy does – being discretely
autobiographical in character and effect, might well lead to the kind of philosophical
incitement discussed here regardless, seeing how they are a diary or sketchbook of his
undertakings, authored with great skill and consideration.\footnote{\textit{See} §6.3 for further discussion of the binary function (i.e. as both ledger and provocation) of both Wittgenstein’s & Foucault’s text.} If one admits this, then the
differentiation between the two positions recedes to the point of banality. The only
difference between an ‘accidental’ and an ‘authored’ incitive style would be one that
rests upon a judgement to do with Wittgenstein’s abilities as a philosopher, teacher and
writer, and more generally, whether he was perceptive enough to interleaf the explicit
philosophical aims of his methods into the considered presentation of those methods. \textit{Of
course} Wittgenstein had these considerations, and of course he would have at least
attempted to modulate his style to articulate his philosophy to better achieve his aims. To
suppose otherwise is to impute a gross limitation to Wittgenstein’s intelligence, quite
incongruous with his literary interests, his taste, his authorship, and his achievements.
That, over the course of a twenty-year period, Wittgenstein expressed doubts as to
whether his writing was of any worth, was a product solely of his deficiencies, or was
capable of achieving what it set out to do, is not altogether surprising. What \textit{is}
surprising is that Hilmy might seek to use these moments as incontrovertible proof that
Wittgenstein’s style of writing is of absolutely no relevance to his philosophical method
and aims.

Finally, Hilmy relies upon pure coincidence in accounting for the synergy
documented in this chapter: he claims that although one might readily concede that “his
remarks lend themselves to teaching philosophy, there is no suggestion that this is what
he had conspired to do in writing them.”\footnote{Hilmy 1987, p20.} Hilmy further admits there is a “strategy
behind the drafting of the \textit{Philosophical Investigations}” which he takes “to convey a way of
thinking, a method of doing philosophy, rather than [to] disseminate philosophical
It seems highly incongruous for Hilmy to be perfectly comfortable when attributing to Wittgenstein’s work a hidden strategy, one concerned with the conveyance of a manner of thinking, while also denying that the style of this work – that is, such characteristics as its pace, structure, use of questions and timing, as well as its polyphonic characterisation of philosophical difficulties – might have some role to play in the achievement of such a strategy. Is this hidden strategy, then, so anaemic, or alternately so devious, that it does not impact the text’s characteristics at all? Are we to believe that this text’s composition is structured in a way that achieves these aims purely by coincidence? By subconscious mishap? And are we to believe this solely on the evidence of remarks made by Wittgenstein regarding his own shortcomings?

Instead, I posit the aptness of an account of style and method which directly informs what we take his method to constitute. The disruption of the procedures that make up one’s life is clearly entailed by this reading; that familiar irritation that accompanies the occasion of one’s personal belongings being uprooted and reordered according to preferences other than one’s own, is made relative to the notion of difficulties of the will. It is clearer now that the success of adopting a new manner of thinking supervenes upon one’s ability to undermine those willful characteristics that collocate set ways in our understanding. It is now no surprise, then, that Wittgenstein’s style of authorship should strike his reader as perplexing, if it were to be taken as irrelevant to his transformative concerns:

I am like a piano teacher. I am trying to teach a style of thinking, a technique – not a subject matter. If you hear me playing just a bit, you’d think it was awful – just noise, discordant notes. You would think it was a poor performance, but it is not a performance at all.  

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82 Ibid.
83 PPO, p357.
I should like you to say: "Yes, it's true, you can imagine that too, that might happen too!"—But was I trying to draw someone's attention to the fact that he is capable of imagining that?—I wanted to put that picture before him, and his acceptance of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: that is, to compare it with this rather than that set of pictures. I have changed his way of looking at things.

— Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* §144

Nothing is more important for teaching us to understand the concepts we have than constructing fictitious ones.

— Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*¹

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¹ CV, p74.
This chapter marks an obvious shift of subject, being concerned with establishing a particular reading of the later philosophical methods of Michel Foucault. The reason for this shift is to establish and qualify the kind sympathy that exists between his and that of Wittgenstein’s, and the complementary nature of their two methods’ approach to the solution of a certain type of problem, leading to their integrated application in Chapters V & VI. There is of course a shared lineage between these two philosophers, with both men being influenced in particular by the works of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Yet the approach adopted here instead compares the operative aims of their philosophies, rather than seeking to claim common-ground solely in terms of constituent influences.

I will argue that, once Foucault’s intention of creating fictional experiences by which to problematise a variety of his reader’s conceptions has been established, a number of direct methodological similarities emerge. This may well sound like startling news to a reader accustomed to one but not the other of these philosophers’ work, or perhaps even to one familiar with both. One territory where this shared method is relatively explicit is in the construction and presentation of models specifically chosen and created to compromise their reader’s previously unproblematic conception of a field of inquiry, and the complicated relation to the evidence that such models employ. Another relates to the status of such models; evidence will be given for the suitability of applying an aspectival reading, in sympathy with Chapter I, with both methods resulting in a form of philosophical writing that function as work-books by which the reader is expected to experiment, rather than *ex-cathedra* treatises, and as such both imply a peculiar relationship to their reader. Yet another relates to the intended effect of such methods, namely the dissolution of the hold which a generalised account may exert upon the imagination, judgement and, therefore, actions of an individual, in favour of a more occasion-sensitive habit of thought. Similarly to the previous chapter’s concluding position, Foucault’s method will be shown to place an emphasis of responsibility on the reader, demanding the experience of reconsidering their own actions – how they respond to and conceive of their “cultural universe”⁴ – in light of such models. Both philosophers share a concern with the formative nature of one’s conceptions upon the life one experiences, the relationship between one’s conceptions and one’s related behaviour, and the irremediable status of problems that arise from such conceptions, if one is unwilling or incapable of also altering the habits iterated in one’s experience. The dissolution of the conditions that require a certain question to be asked, rather than the

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⁴ Cf: Foucault 1991c, p37.
answering of said questions, will be posited as the net effect of both methods of work on oneself, as will the consideration of philosophy as a discipline that problematises certain generalised classifications through the use of models that demonstrate their contingency upon singular context (a theme taken up in Chapter V). To this end, a substantial reading will be offered regarding the treatment of Foucault’s later texts – with *Discipline and Punish* taken as the exemplar – that focuses upon his ascription of his own work as fictive, and this ascription’s similarity to a number of historiographical theorists. The aim of his methods will be shown to be primarily the problematisation of a field of experience through the presentation of alternate modes of intelligibility, which compromise the conceptual unities they are designed to compete with.

I will briefly argue that Foucault’s philosophy has two distinct fields of exegesis which share characteristics with those investigated in Chapter I. Gordon Baker’s game-changing shift from veridical claims regarding the status of Wittgenstein’s grammatical remarks, towards an asceptival reading as to the nature of his method is significantly similar to the school of interpretation identifiable in Foucaultian exegesis. A summation of the second school will demonstrate alternate notions of the purpose and process of Foucault’s philosophical method, and will come to much the same conclusion as the later Baker did in Chapter I: a preference for the asceptival reading on the basis of both fidelity to the author’s own remarks, and the consistency in the position that such a reading yields, in opposition to problematic disparities that emerge if one follows a veridical model of interpretation. It will thereby be demonstrated that the majority of criticism aimed at Foucault are supplemental to a veridical reading, and thus operate under a misunderstanding of the status of his work.

By this stage a set of characteristics convergent with Wittgenstein’s own methods should have become recognisable to the reader, and therefore available for pursuit in Chapter V, and so the chapter closes with a summary of Foucault’s method that allows us to heed the symmetry between the two methods’ aims. In the final chapter I argue that this symmetry enables their complementary employment, while also explaining the close agreement in both thinker’s concepts regarding the task of philosophy; namely to problematise familiar conceptions in order encourage a type of perspicuity that curbs certain tendencies of dogmatic thought.

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3 A phrase also favoured by Foucault: "A way to work on ourselves [that allows us] to invent—I don't mean discover—a way of being that is still improbable." (1989, p27)
§4.1 History and narrative

Foucault is often treated as a duplicitous and unreliable source when exegetes attempt to determine the status of his work. This is due no doubt in part to his common use of anonymity, to him famously destabilising the unity in the notions of author and oeuvre, the non-contiguous styles and terms to be found in his different works, and of course the complexity of his philosophy. Despite his explicit and consistent denials, Foucault is commonly located within either the Marxist or structuralist traditions that were at their apex in mid- to late-20th century French cultural theory and philosophy. This results in a reading clearly inconsistent with Foucault’s self-ascriptions. We can usefully conceive of such sets of readings as falling under a greater set, here labelled ‘the veridical reading’, and this broad set of interpretations includes theorists who are both critical of, and in agreement with, Foucault’s supposed method. The reason for here collecting a number of divergent interpretations under one heading is their shared premise as to the status of the claims being made by Foucault in works such as *Discipline and Punish*. That is to say, those interpretations subsumed under this heading presume Foucault’s various models to represent historical causal explanation in a manner broadly convergent with other enquires such as structuralism and academic history. Foucault is commonly understood in the veridical interpretation as a historian, a structuralist, a social theorist, a Marxist or a nihilistic philosopher. The commonality in all these readings is in their attribution of Foucault’s texts as offering a series of correct, truth-attaining (or more caustically, truth-attempting) accounts which, due to their stark difference from previous historical accounts, underline an academical bias in those discourses they war with. If such a status were accepted then it validly follows that Foucault’s own “historical analyses cannot be exempt from the standard assessment of such studies”.

One of the most common subsets of the veridical reading locates his method firmly within the structuralist tradition; in Merquior’s book-long attack (1985) on the methods of Michel Foucault, for example, he is presented as a ‘good’ or a ‘maverick’ structuralist, who is guilty of committing three major methodological mistakes. Firstly,

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4 For the sake of simplicity, many of the examples considered in this chapter will be taken from *DP*. Both the veridical criticisms and my responses generalise quite acceptably across his later works. Indeed, according to some theorists, something similar unifies his entire body of work (cf: O’Leary 2010).

5 Merquior 1985, p150.

6 Ibid, p88.

7 Ibid, p11.
Foucault’s histories render their subjects in a manner which strongly disagrees with the “master historians” of the 20th century, an august group, in which Merquior includes Pieter Spierenburg, Jean Léonard, Lawrence Stone, Franco Venturi and Arthur Lovejoy. This explanatory incompatibility with their work is taken to cast serious aspersions on the fidelity of Foucault’s accounts. Secondly, Foucault apparently exhibits a bias in omitting pertinent evidence and events: Léonard accuses Foucault of failing “to stress enough the religious origin and motivation of many a technique of drill or rite of exclusion belonging to his catalogue of disciplines”, while Merqiour despairs that he “could find no quotes from the *Emile* or from Pestalozzi in *Discipline and Punish*.9 Even Louis McNay, whose own work is indebted to Foucault’s, similarly remarks that “some critics have rightly argued that the construction of the subject cannot simply be explained through reference to bodily experiences” and therefore “Foucault emphasises too heavily the effects of a corporeally-centred disciplinary power.”10 Thirdly and finally, Foucault is accused of a tendency towards circular reasoning; his conclusions are already present at their beginning due to his bad habit of “ideological pre-interpretation”.11

I argue that the predilection for this exegetical tendency, and its subsequent angles of criticism, are unwarranted when there clearly exists, as there does, a far more suitable set of philosophers and critical theorists with which to compare and comprehend his work, according to a common theme in Foucault’s self-ascriptions. This theme is of direct relevance to his PhD supervisor, George Canguilhem, his colleague and close friend Paul Veyne, other theorists such as White, Chartier, Jenkins, certain historians whose work Foucault showed great respect for,12 such as Braudel and Le Roy Ladurie, and, by extending this common denominator only slightly, to Tolstoy and even to Wittgenstein himself. The persistent denominator is a conception of historical causal explanation of the past as substantively narrational and consequently in some sense unavoidably fictive. This understanding of the fictive element of history can be shown

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8 Ibid, p43.
9 Ibid, p12.
10 McNay 1994, p41.
11 Cf: Williams 1981. Oddly, there is little agreement between veridical readers upon exactly what Foucault is pre-committed to. Merquior himself diagnoses a form of nihilistic anarchism: “[Foucault] was the founding father of our *Kathedranielismus.*” (p160)

12 This is a contestable account. For three well argued and well acquainted, yet partly opposing depictions of Foucault’s relations with his contemporaries in the *Annales* school and other historians, see Veyne 2010 & Rajchman 1988 (pp102-3), and the excellent Dosse 1998.
to be central to Foucault’s work; indeed I argue that without its acknowledgement and consideration, gross misreading of that work can ensue. Locally, in respect to our current interests, it is equally true that without this consideration, any claim of there being a methodological sympathy between his work and that of Wittgenstein remains somewhat tenuous.

In what way can history be considered fictional? There are two broad fields of argument in support of the ascription; one that relies upon apparent characteristics of the past as a potential field of enquiry, and one that relies upon what narrational, *sine qua non* characteristics can be attributed to the discipline of history. Some of the main premises of these arguments were coherently argued as early as 1869, in a series of theoretical asides that punctuate Tolstoy’s Napoleonic narrative in *War and Peace.* Tolstoy’s critique is remarkably prescient, and can be broadly understood along three lines. Firstly, and most importantly, the past is a field of inquiry that is causally limitless and thus enables a multiplicity of alternate systems of explanation:

> [A]n incalculable number of causes present themselves. The deeper we delve in search of these causes the more of them we find; and each separate cause or whole series of causes appears to us equally valid in itself and equally false by its insignificance compared to the magnitude of the events, and by its impotence — apart from the cooperation of all the other coincident causes — to occasion the event. To us, the wish or objection of this or that French corporal to serve a second term appears as much a cause as Napoleon’s refusal to withdraw his troops beyond the Vistula and to restore the duchy of Oldenburg; for had he not wished to serve, and had a second, a third, and a thousandth corporal and private also refused, there would have been so many less men in Napoleon’s army and the war could not have occurred.¹³

Thus Tolstoy posits the past as being irremediably composite, suited to innumerable causal accounts which, only when combined *in toto* in a single account (a quite clearly absurd condition for an historical inquiry), could hope to exhaust the causes of an event. When Tolstoy examined the Napoleonic histories, what he found was the preferencing of particular individuals, themes and trends as hierarchically more important causal explanations, over and above less glamorous, worse documented, more complex and obscure candidates, according to the perspective adopted by the given historian.

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¹³ Tolstoy (2007) *Vol III, Book I, Chapter I.*
Secondly, the combinatorial effect of numerous histories, each preferencing alternate systems of causal explanation, results in history revealing its deeply contested status, in stark difference to the truth claims that their historians hope for them to bear. “As soon as historians of different nationalities and tendencies begin to describe the same event, the replies they give immediately lose all meaning, for [such causal forces are] understood by them all not only differently but often in quite contradictory ways.” Thus history taken as a broad discourse is self-compromising, as each account preferences alternate causal organisations from an innumerable field, each arriving at wildly varying accounts and thus “mutually destroying one another’s positions”.  

Thirdly, the process of disproving an history is, unless it clearly falsifies records or invents historical accounts, fraught by its reliance upon other histories to do the disproving. The first two criticisms clearly apply equally to any verifying account as much as that one under scrutiny. As soon as one moves from the “incalculable series of causes” that present themselves towards the imposition of a definite and limiting casual history, one has also imposed a preferential system of organisation upon the past that outputs a system of explanation that is as dependent upon the force of its exposition and its place within its discipline as it is upon its explicative power. Histories from different countries and periods express differing accounts according to the conditions under which they were written, the causalities they preference, and are therefore destructively, constantly contested, and thus unstable as a means of falsification in comparison to naturalistic methodology, leaving the field debilitated by its limited means of falsification. Therefore differing histories demonstrate alternate positions from which to understand past events, as much as they represent truthfully causal accounts.

So much for a Tolstoyan critique of history. Critics more contemporary to Foucault take a different tack, one that is however compatible with Tolstoy’s argument. Their interest focuses upon the nature of the historical narrative by which casual accounts occur, rather than an idea of the past as indeterminable; perhaps the most well-known of these critics are Paul Ricoeur and Hayden White. 

14 Tolstoy 2007, Second Epilogue.

15 However Tolstoy does give a distinct reason for the fictive status of history, relative to those accounts given by Foucault’s contemporaries:

“The first method of history is to take an arbitrarily selected series of continuous events and examine it apart from others, though there is and can be no beginning to any event, for one event always flows uninterruptedly from another. The second method is to consider the actions of some one man - a king or a commander - as equivalent to the sum of many individual wills; whereas the sum of individual wills is never expressed by the activity of a single historic personage.” (2007, Book 11, Chapter 1)
intricacies of their arguments’ various incarnations are not directly relevant to our concerns here – the role of a narrative in a given history is that of coherence won through attention to preferred detail and its assimilation within a causal sequence. An historical narrative "grasps together" and integrates into one whole and complete story multiple and scattered events, thereby organising the intelligible signification attached to the narrative taken as a whole. In the process, preferred vehicles are designated and then manipulated as the unifying casual units of significance; such agents upon the stage are commonly leaders, goals, cultural motifs, motivations, interactions, capacities, sudden reversals, zeitgeists, destinies, national character, greatness, ineluctable force or, failing all else, sheer chance. Typically, these narrative vehicles are synecdochic\(^\text{16}\) in nature, in that that stand in proxy for complex fields of past events, that do not readily or simply yield to singular historical explanation, and thus require generalised approximation. As Chartier remarks,

All history, even the least ‘narrative’, even the most structural, is always constructed according to the same formulas that govern the production of narratives. The entities that historians manipulate (society, classes, mentalities, etc) are ‘quasi characters’ implicitly endowed with the properties of the singular heroes and the ordinary individuals who make up the collectivities designated by the abstract categories.\(^\text{17}\)

In addition to this causal nomothesis, historical narratives must paraphrase events, in that ‘[t]ime is foreshortened, details selected and highlighted, action concentrated, relations simplified’ with such invention occurring not to alter the events but rather to give them meaning.\(^\text{18}\) Omission and emphasis, the pace at which a timescale is represented, and rigid designation of a history’s limits of interest all serve to render it sensible as a discrete field of knowledge. As Tolstoy saw in 1869, such narratives allow multiple alternate schemes of signification and causal apportioning, by editing, compressing and arranging a series of events, derived from historical documentation, to cohere a pattern significantly organised according to one’s unifying principles of narration; progressive, Marxist, feminist, neoliberal, humanist, etc. The sum of this critique is not that the documental evidence employed in historical accounts is false or

\(^{16}\) Cf White 1975 & 1987, although White’s use of the term synecdoche is technical and specific to his historiographical argument.

\(^{17}\) 1997, p26.

\(^{18}\) Lowenthal 1985, p218.
flawed, but that the narratives in which they are placed assimilate this evidence in coherent casual systems whose sum expression is not so much an exhaustive history – their technical means prohibit such an aim – but instead a narrative which resignifies a field of phenomena, or redesignates which of those phenomena are particularly worthy of explanatory attention. Thus the historical author serves to *collocate* the sets of coordinates by which one comprehends its given field of inquiry.

This critical position is clearly related to one taken in Wittgenstein’s reflections upon causality in historical accounts: “What is insidious about the [historical] causal approach is that it leads one to say: ‘Of course, that’s how it has to happen’. Whereas one ought to say: It may have happened like that, and in many other ways.”19 … “[There is] nothing more stupid than the chatter about cause & effect in history books; nothing more wrong-headed, more half-baked. — But who could put a stop to it by saying that?20 Foucault clearly saw the same deep problem in causal historical accounts as did Wittgenstein, and resolved “to discard the preconception according to which history without causality would not be history.”21 His compositions are an attempt to problematise given fields of experience through alternate narrational modes of presentation, in order that their reader is led to see the dogmatism of their previous commitment towards something necessarily being the case because of its causal linkage in a historical narrative, and thus to admit that the received accounts of how we arrived at where we are are already committed to a particular form of nomothesis. As we shall see, Foucault’s method differs from most of those historians and historiographers mentioned above in regard to his conscious play upon the fictive status of his work, using narratives to drive his transformative philosophical method. It therefore differs from that of authors such as White and Ricoeur in its explicit aim. On his critical understanding, historical narrative is a codified form of unity, present in a means of representation, rather than in the highly complex phenomenon being so represented, and its purpose is to create a fixed model by which to envisage this multivalent and undisclosed past.

Michel Foucault’s work is reflexively fictional, then, its purpose very specific. His account of his own methods as characteristically fictive is one that he repeats often,22 and which

19 MS 162b 67r: 2.7.1940 It seems likely that Wittgenstein may have been influenced in this by Tolstoy’s reflections upon the constitutive nature of narrative in historical accounts.


21 DE I, p607.

thereby delimits his philosophical method so starkly, that it makes it a characterisation rare in both the stability and the conditionality of its self-ascription, and therefore of importance to any would-be reader. It is true that the conception of historical accounts as irremediably narrational is central to a crisis that has deeply impacted upon history as a discipline, but Foucault’s purpose was not necessarily concerned with provoking this crisis. As we shall see, Foucault’s method is quite unique to those of his forerunners, namely in its invention and application of reflexively fictive history in the service of emancipatory programs that sought to provide a form of experiential ‘interference’ in the manner in which a person employs generalising conceptions and classifications in their judgement.

As we have already seen, Foucault’s account of his work as fictive can be made sense of as a qualification of the manner in which the historical events that constitute them are ordered and arranged in order to establish a causal narrative between their occurrence. From his lecture, *The Order of Discourse*, through to his final interviews, Foucault speaks of the role of fiction in establishing the coherence and regime necessary for the production of his critical genealogy:

> I am not merely a historian. I am not a novelist. What I do is a kind of historical fiction. In a sense I know very well that what I say is not true. A historian could say of what I've said, “That’s not true.” . . . What I am trying to do is provoke an interference between our reality and the knowledge of our past history. If I succeed, this will have real effects in our present history. My hope is that my books become true after they have been written—not before . . . I hope that the truth of my books is in the future.  

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When Foucault imagines, in the above text, a historian reporting on what he has written “that’s not true” he is certainly not acceding in regards to the particular events that his work documents but instead to the narrational telos by which they are coordinated. Likewise, fiction is clearly not meant as a pejorative term – Foucault is making no confession – but instead recognises the imposition of an arrangement of selected events in service to a particular descriptive end and, therefore, a preferred perspective.

23 Foucault 1989b, p301, my emphasis.
24 E.g.: “the documents on the insane chased from Frankfort, transported to Mainz by ship, or sent back to Kreuznach, are they myths? – the pilgrimage of the insane to Larchant, Gournay, Besangon, Gechl, are they myths? – the document which indicates the price of a re-placement for a pilgrimage of the insane, is it a myth? – the equal numbers of foreigners among the insane of Nuremberg, are they a myth?” (Foucault 1978, p58)
Foucault’s ‘historical fiction’ is a self-conscious imposition upon elements acquired through archival research, in pursuit of a narrative that is coherent enough to achieve the aim of the *problematisation* of its subject. The role of he who produces such narratives is therefore as “he who implants, into the troublesome language of fiction, its unities, its coherence, its links with reality.”

The purpose of his ‘history’, then, is the imposition of a particular narrative upon a set of past events, made in pursuit of destabilising effects as a defining mode of a philosophical practice.

Foucault was much taken with the work of those of his peers who demonstrated that new forms of history were possible once narrative was rendered as its explicit, malleable method. For example, the innovative approach of Braudel, in his genesis of the method of *longue durée* – history on a vast, almost geographical scale, that emphasises change that is so slow and incremental that it is otherwise imperceptible. In such works as *The Mediterranean*, Braudel (1996) expands the perspective of his narrative to its maximum resolution, in his attempt to prove that history can do more than ‘study walled gardens.’ This work contrasts with Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s works, such as *Carnaval de Romans* and *Montaillou* – ‘micro-histories’ that compound their narrative time frame to a brief point taking in a single location. An alternate furcation of scale occurs in the work of Georges Lefebvre’s ‘histories from below’, a method by which the perspective of the disenfranchised takes precedence over that of the traditional locus for history; the great and the good individuals who wield power and authority. At each extreme, the virtues of modifying the traditional historical narrative scheme becomes clear: influence over the range that a history traverses, the forms of arguments and perspectives that are made viable and, tacitly, the effect exerted upon a reader’s scheme of understanding a field of events. In each case a set of considerations is omitted in favour of emphasis upon a set of alternate quasi-characters, certain themes are treated in the abstract, if at all, and others are concretised through attention to description, detail and evidence. If any three of these narrative schemes – *long durée*, micro-history or history from below – were applied to the alternate topics chosen by Braudel, Le Roy Laudurie and Lefebvre, radically different work would emerge. Foucault was impressed with such histories; they demonstrated the sense in his consideration that “[f]iction is the regime of the narrative, or rather the various regimes according to which it is recounted.”

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26 Foucault 1966, p149.
Foucault’s own method intends to establish an interference in the connection between one’s current conceptions in a field of experience and the objective historical fictions that underpin and assure those conceptions. His “fictive kind of conceptual history”27 is composed so as to arrange historical events in a way that provokes the reader into a sustained reconsideration of any relative concerns in their field of experience, as they appear in her own thought, providing her with a series of comparative and competing narratives that destabilise the purported naturalness of a class of notions. Foucault’s method is “a re-ordering of documents so that they shed their inertness and become a sort of measurable activity; this re-ordering, or re-orienting of texts from the past takes a maximum of intellectual and scholarly energy.”28 By the choices and comparisons Foucault makes, new modes of intelligibility are available, new similarities and continuities, new groupings under novel characteristics. The overall effect of this reassignment and regrouping is one of ‘disremembrance’29 in that the highly generalised concepts that populate much historical discourse are laid against new accounts, making evident the fictive status of both the original and the new narrative, and inviting radically new potential methods of appraisal. As Ian Hacking remarked, Foucault “was adept at reorganizing past events in order to rethink the present. He engagingly turned familiar truisms into doubt or chaos.”30

The status of his histories is therefore that of a kind of simulacrum of their essentialist competitors — dopplegangers that, like their mythical counterparts, appear similar in form yet act so differently as to be quite disturbing to anyone familiar with the original subject of their mimicry. In much the same way that ‘red is darker than pink’ can be a true grammatical remark without necessarily entailing its employment within a veridical grammatical method, it is key here to see why Foucault’s fictive method doesn’t negate the veracity of the details it employs, being assembled as they are from events drawn from empirical documents, archives and treatises. Hence, far from the restructuring of or contribution to an ongoing historical discourse, an aspectival reading of Foucault’s method’s purpose can perhaps be sufficiently summarised as ‘the problematisation of a field of experience by the fictive employment of historical

27 Miller 2000, p303.
30 Hacking 2002, p73.
We can now say what the fictive employment of historical elements constitutes; the codification of past events, through arrangement, compression, comparison and characterisation, drawn from a field of events too innumerable to otherwise causally conceive of, in the service of the establishment of a narrative of the emergence of a given condition over time, that destabilises certain concepts presently in circulation. “Foucault has no intention of grasping the event-fact ‘as it actually occurred.’ Rather, he writes a “history of the present” that, in effect, seeks to diagnose and suggest alternative avenues of behavior, or at least their possibility.”

By turning to *Discipline and Punish*, perhaps Foucault’s most celebrated work, we can clearly make out the reflexive employment of narrative as a codified unity, situated in the provocative means of its representation, rather than in the phenomenon that is being represented. As Wittgenstein earlier remarked, it would not be enough to simply say that ‘received concepts of justice, law and progress are conditional upon a dogmatic nomothetic set of assumptions’, and thereby hope the reader somehow treats this remarks as sensible and revelatory. Foucault’s great achievement was to elaborate a method whereby a set of detailed examples are shown to be congruent – not through outright criticism or synecdochical truth-claims, but through the creation of new narrative that leads its user into conceiving of the phenomenon according to a new code, and therefore to bring about a switch in their habits of conceiving. For Foucault, this has the important effect of providing new perspectives by which to view the phenomenon that are substitutable for the original model “without yielding to any of them as if they were sovereign requirements”; thus acknowledging their own conditional status and thereby avoiding the entailment of new dogma. Indeed, Foucault is most explicit in his rendering, providing the reader with four rules that will determine the narrative dimensions and priorities of *Discipline and Punish*:

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31 Without reflection upon this intent, interpretation of his philosophical works suffers from a poverty of explanatory power, failing to comprehend to what end the elements that constitute that work have been assembled. Before progressing to a series of examples to help elucidate this claim, it will prove most useful to examine the manner in which the various phrases that constitute the above characterisation are employed, derived from Foucault’s own use.

32 Flynn 2005, p45.

33 In Morey 1992, p125.

34 cf: DP, pp.22–4 for the original unabridged ruleset.
1. Do not concentrate the study of punitive mechanisms on their 'repressive' effects alone, but situate them in the series of their positive effects, even if they seem marginal at first sight.

2. Attempt to analyse punitive methods not simply as consequences of legislation or as indicators of social structures, but as techniques possessing their own specificity.

3. Instead of treating the history of penal law and the history of the human sciences as two separate series who overlap, see whether there is not some common matrix.

4. Try to study the metamorphosis of punitive methods on the basis of a political technology of the body in which might be read a common history of power relations.

The most obvious thing that strikes one on reading this ruleset is that they constitute a tactic of representation, an explicit statement of preference and attention and, thereby, an implicit denial of his work’s veridical completeness. Foucault intends to analyse x as a kind of y, to focus on neglected avenues, to describe his fields of inquiry using new systems of organisation. The above four rules overtly express the methods by which Foucault will decide the manner in which his narrative will progress, and there are many stylistic examples of this strategy at work. The book opens with one of its most striking comparisons; that of Damiens the Regicide’s gruesome public torture and eventual execution in 1757, and, eighty years later, Leon Faucher’s highly regimented rules for the House of Young Prisoners in Paris, both rendered in disturbing detail. Legible in the first two models offered in Discipline and Punish is a direct challenge to the reader; how do you account for the disparity between these two penal techniques? What can explain their radical metamorphosis at a distance of 80 years from each other? The compression of a time period for effect, the alterity of the mechanisms described, and the problematic effect these presentations create are signatures of Foucault’s style of envisaging the punitive society.

We could consider any number of elements in Foucault’s carceral narrative as a clarifying example, but one that will suit our purpose is his problematisation of the humanist account of the reasons for the reform of public execution. The opening move in the this account describes the manner in which the body of the condemned man, prior to reform, was required to emblazon his crime by such means as public

35 There is, for instance, no doubt that Foucault could have written his book according to a diametric set of rules, with a radically different outcome.

36 The aspectival force of his examples are commonly dependent upon their great detail, and so the following description is the briefest account I could give without compromising on its effect.
confession and the wearing of signs that explain his deed: “in him, on him, the sentence had to be legible for all.”\textsuperscript{37} Likewise, the particular punishment was modulated in order to signify the crime that brought its punishment upon him. In Damiens’ case, the dagger with which he attempted regicide was burnt into the hand that made the attempt, using sulphur and brands. “The body has produced and reproduced the truth of the crime – or rather it constitutes the element which, through a whole set of rituals and trials, confesses that the crime took place.”\textsuperscript{38} Yet while the punishment applied to the body of the condemned was to be symmetrical in form to the crime, it was often overwhelmingly asymmetrical in its level of violence, with the condemned body often being utterly destroyed, with this destruction of the body sometimes continuing even after its death. The next premise is key to Foucault’s rendering, and explains this gruesome asymmetry; “Besides its immediate victim, the crime attacks the sovereign: it attacks him personally, since the law represents the will of the sovereign; it attacks him physically, since the force of the law is the force of the prince.”\textsuperscript{39}

This is pivotal because in serving as an explanatory function as to the status of the act of punishment, it allows the perspective of the sovereign exposing its power in a public display of massive violence, as a means to achieve recompense for the grievance done against it by the condemned man: “It is a ceremonial by which a momentarily injured sovereignty is reconstituted.”\textsuperscript{40} Clearly the ceremony must be public, or the signification of the display of strength would not circulate among its intended population, providing no warning and no display of what occurs to those who crossed swords with the sovereign’s law. Here emerges a deep flaw in punishment as a technique – the crowd that attended the spectacle of the scaffold did so “not simply to witness the sufferings of the condemned or to excite the anger of the executioner: it was also to hear an individual who had nothing more to lose curse the judges, the laws, the government and religion.”\textsuperscript{41} The marriage of an individual now beyond the fear of punishment (as it will soon be delivered in a most gruesome way no matter what their immediate actions,) with a crowd of onlookers who were eager to hear the blasphemies, denunciations and last-minute truths in the offering, was one aspect of the instability of such a ceremony.

\textsuperscript{37} DP, p43.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, p47.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid, p48.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, p48.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid, p60.
Another was the very real possibility that the crowd might attempt to overturn the sovereign’s legal mechanism, through trying to kill the condemned man on sight, or by championing and emancipating the condemned man due to a perceived injustice in either the bestowal, or botched performance, of the punishment. “In these executions, which ought to show only the terrorizing power of the prince, there was a whole aspect of the carnival, in which rules were inverted, authority mocked and criminals transformed into heroes.”

Therefore, instead of a demonstration of the total power of sovereignty, in which the injured prince is reconstituted by obliterating the offending lawbreaker, “the crowd could intervene, physically: enter by force into the punitive mechanism and redistribute its effects”, thus rendering the intended significance of the ceremony in its inverse.

Very well; but what is the point in all this detail? How does it constitute a ‘history of the present’, or ‘the problematisation of a field of experience’, or an ‘irreducibly aspectival philosophical method’, as I have previously claimed? What effect is it supposed to have? By constructing this (rigorous and plausible) narrative, Foucault provides the reader with a convincing alternate casual explanation of the drive towards the reform of public torture and execution into the carceral and disciplinary systems he goes on to describe. The “silent thought” he anticipates of his reader is that the reason for this reform should be attributed to a vocal and heroically humanistic element within an increasingly enlightened society baulking at, and eventually overthrowing, a clearly barbaric set of practices. By providing a feasible yet highly controversial alternate account of the reasons for reform as instead being based on efficacy of technique, Foucault places a question-mark deep inside any received progressive account the reader might harbour. To be clear, Foucault does not deny the presence of such reformist movements or their humanist rhetoric, for to do so would not only be clearly counter-evidential, but would also represent an attempt to replace, rather than compromise, this causal system of intelligibility. He instead strategically employs an alternate model by which to conceive of the evolution of punitive systems into their current state. This account helps us to give the meaning of the following reference to the ‘build-up of evidence’, and the aim of compromising its effect upon the reader:

42 Ibid, p60-61.
44 See Owen 2002, p213, for the example he gives of Foucault’s method in this regard.
My role – and that is too emphatic a word – is to show people that they are much freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called evidence can be criticised and destroyed.\(^{45}\)

§4.2 Problematising a field of experience

‘Problematisation’ for Foucault entails a change in terms of how one intentionally orders one’s attention; which elements of one’s experience appear as important, or minimally, noticeable and coherent as something worthy of critical appraisal. It is the focussing of attention on a field that may previously have seemed unproblematic. Fields of experience so chosen as subjects of problematisation by Foucault are most commonly conceived as natural, essential, universal, etc, if they are considered at all; their ‘there-ness’ makes them poor choices for reflection, resisting critical attention.\(^{46}\) As McGushin puts it,

A problematization is the process by which an aspect of reality, of one’s world, one’s experience, is brought into focus as a problem in need of a response. Through a problematization “people begin to take care of something . . . they become anxious about this or that.” (DT 48) This caring-about-something is a way of disclosing the world in light of a problem and is therefore a response to that problem.\(^{47}\)

Problematisation is an important undertaking for Foucault because he conceives of it as a precondition for subsequent critical appraisal: “for a domain of action, a behavior, to enter the field of thought, it is necessary for a certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, to have made it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of difficulties around it.”\(^{48}\) The defamiliarisation of the practice of carceral practices, for example, is a precondition for its sustained critical appraisal, itself necessary for an alteration in one’s expressions and actions in regards to the concepts of criminality,

\(^{45}\) Foucault 1988 p10.

\(^{46}\) Foucault also describes in more general terms problematisations as important historical events in themselves, quite apart from his philosophical method, representing such moments in a history of thought as the instance in which, for example, sexual deviance became an explicit problem, and thus demanded response.

\(^{47}\) McGushin 2007, pp15-16.

\(^{48}\) 1997b, p388.
disciplinary techniques, surveillance and justice. It is important to note when qualifying this term that the achievement of a given problematisation occurs despite one’s familiarity with a subject, and so problematisation is not solely a concern with destabilising the familiar and inert status of its subject, but also with the habits by which one may have allowed familiarity to foster a critical de-sensitivity — in this respect, the purpose of such activity is “not to show the invisible, but to show the extent to which the invisibility of the visible is invisible.”

Therefore to problematise a field for someone is to change their relation to it by provoking an activity of thought and reflection regarding it, which might not have occurred otherwise. Hence, Owen remarks that given problematisations “refer to the specific ways in which a topic is constituted as an issue for reflection and action within particular systems of judgment.” Once designated anew, the individual not only admits of the possibility of seeing a part of the world in a new light, but is drawn to do so, through curiosity, by a form of reconsideration that would appear radical to their previous system of evaluation, given light, as it was, by a differing set of problematisations. Events might occur and ‘bounce off’ of one, hardly registering, until one has an interest in, and a new mode in which to express, a particular topic. Yet this supposed process is complicated by one’s involvement in, and reliance upon, preferred modes of comprehension regarding, e.g. mental health, sexuality, justice, normativity, etc. For if one is committed to the employment of these generalised concepts in one’s discriminations of identity, or even stronger, if one physically, financially or mentally benefits from that ongoing discrimination, then such problematisation is liable to provoke complex and disagreeable responses. Finally, we must note that problematisation, as Foucault uses the term, denotes the means by which individuals confront their existence via a series of choices, rather than those representations that led to that confrontation: problematisation is a type of thought, rather than a mode of representation in itself.

For such radical reappraisal to occur, for Foucault, one must partake in a special kind of experience, and, while such investigation makes use of ‘true’ documents, they do so not in order to reveal an exhaustive set of veridical facets that are to be relied upon as invariants by which to orchestrate one’s knowledge. Instead, they are intended to provoke “an experience that might permit an alteration, a transformation, of the


relationship we have with ourselves and our cultural universe”.\(^{51}\) We can be quite precise in our account of what Foucault intends such an experience to be, for it consists of a dual event in the reader’s experience:

This experience that permits us to single out certain mechanisms (for example, imprisonment, penalization, etc.) and at the same time to separate ourselves from them by perceiving them in a totally different form, must be one and the same experience.\(^ {52}\)

The experience that Foucault is trying to elicit consists of his drawing one’s attention to a specific topic by means of representing it in such a way that a totally new way of understanding it is made possible. The models that populate his work are intended to function as systems that dislocate one from habitual ways of seeing, so that one’s attention becomes available as a viable field of reorchestration. This “procedure” of inciting a self-effect, referred to by Foucault through his particular use of the word ‘experience’, is central to all of his work.\(^ {53}\) Foucault’s procedural assumption, then, is that these relationships we have with ourselves are determinate of how we conceive of the world: a self is made a subject, Foucault suggests, out of habitual modes of classifying one’s own behaviour and that of others. Let us follow Ian Hacking here, and be a little more precise in our description; Foucault’s method is a means of critically examining the ways in which “our practices of naming interact with the things that we name.” Hacking coins the term ‘looping effect’ in this regard, that is, the interactions between people, on the one hand, and ways of classifying people and their behavior on the other. Being seen to be a certain kind of person, or to do a certain kind of act, may affect someone. A new or modified mode of classification may systematically affect the people who are so classified, or the people themselves may rebel against the knowers, the classifiers, the science that classifies them. Such interactions may lead to changes in the people who are classified, and hence in what is known about them. That is what I call a feedback effect. Now I am adding a further parameter. Inventing or molding a new kind, a new classification, of people or of behavior may create new ways to be a person, new choices to make, for good or evil. There are new descriptions, and

\(^{51}\) 1991c, p37.

\(^{52}\) Ibid, p38.

hence new actions under a description. It is not that people change, substantively, but that
as a point of logic new opportunities for action are open to them.\footnote{Hacking 1995, p239.}

Thus Foucault, via Hacking, provides a precise model by which to understand the
importance of conceptual work on oneself: the schemas by which we ascribe definitions
and judgements can alter the \textit{de re} characteristics of the way in which people classify
themselves. This is why only the systems of classification and representation that are
employed to comprehend human behaviour, identity and action, are the chosen fields
Foucault is concerned with problematising, rather than, say, the physical sciences, where
(barring Heisenberg’s interpretation of quantum mechanics!) there is no looping effect.
Hacking’s term is a useful handle to employ when struggling to grasp the remit and
purpose of Foucault’s methods. When combined with an understanding of the
narrational and interpretive status of much of the history upon which these concepts
are based, the possibility for the emergence of dogma becomes quite evident. When the
subject is human behaviour, nomothetic \textit{de dicto} inflects \textit{de re} in a feedback loop.
Judgements inform the interactions in which they occur by determining the coordinates
by which one perceives an act as necessarily falling under or outside a certain class;
classifications which rely upon totalising concepts of their subject; concepts whose tacit
evidence claims a status that its fictive nature cannot justify; a nature that is not
reflexively recognised; and a lack of recognition that entails dogmatism. Dogma in this
sense has a distinctly consequential sense to it; it is the stability and normativity of those
ascriptions made on the basis of looping effects described as truthful, rather than
habitual: necessary, rather than aspectival.

“[T]hese games are not imposed on the subject from the outside according to a necessary
causality or structural determination. They open up a field of experience in which the
subject and the object are both constituted only under certain simultaneous conditions,
but in which they are constantly modified in relation to each other, and so they modify
this field of experience itself.”\footnote{Foucault 2000a, p462.}

In two recent works (2009 and 2010) Timothy O’Leary makes explicit a bivalence in
Foucault’s use of this term ‘experience’ that had drawn little attention, at least in
anglophone readings, and is particularly relevant to our current definitional discussion.
This bivalence is actually part of the French language — *expérience* means both experience and experiment. O’Leary bases around this term a reading of Foucault’s method, in sympathy to that outlined here, in which he insists that “we can read Foucault’s work, almost in its entirety, as an attempt – admittedly comprising revisions and dead-ends – to provide the conceptual tools both for understanding an experience … and for helping us to transform it through an engaged and experimental practice.”  

Foucault’s aim, as attested to in his interview entitled “How an ‘Experience-Book’ is Born”, was to produce a series of experience/experiment-books, designed to be models by which the reader experiments in a radically alternate form of experiencing elements of her life, with each text acting “like so many traps, questions, challenges, or whatever you want to call them”. So, this is a concept of a kind of experience that is an exceptional, perhaps unexpected, occurrence from which one emerges in some way changed. And this is to be expected, given the reordering of representations by which new opportunities for action are opened.

§4.3 Statement of methodological parallelism

[My work] does not have the function of a proof. It exists as a sort of prelude, to explore the keyboard, sketch out the themes and see how people react. … I am well aware that I have never written anything but fictions. I do not mean to say, however, that the truth is therefore absent.”

We can summarise certain key characteristics that can be derived from this account of Foucault’s philosophical method, and thereby prove the potential for this method to operate in a manner complementary to that advanced in the first half of this thesis. Firstly, we can assert, in line with Owen, a very close parallel between the two philosophical aims of achieving a ‘switch in aspect’ and a ‘dislocatory field of experience’. This assertion does not entail a constitutive theoretical principle, but it is rather, as we shall see, reducible to a methodological parallelism, with both authors positing the incitement of such conceptual reorchestration as a unifying condition for their philosophical practice. A similar parallel exists in the means employed to achieve

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36 O’Leary 2010, p165.
37 Foucault 2003, p12.
38 O’Leary 2010, p166.
39 Foucault 1980a, p193.
such a ‘switch’: both practice an application of invented models of comparison, and systems of expression, that seek to cause a revisionary experience by which dogmatic assertion can be forsaken in favour of a new, less strictured manner of conception. The materials employed in this method are analogical too – they are often ‘facts’ that are truthful in some sense, but their purpose is not the ascertainment of truth, but rather the elucidation of fresh possibilities, with such possibilities playing the role of dislocatory investigations into how things might be other than we previously considered. Hence the status of both Wittgenstein and Foucault’s remarks is one that must be understood as being dependent upon this ‘dislocatory’ effect; they do not stand separate to the consequences they intend to have upon the thought of their reader, and can only be sensibly located within a series of modular studies intended to problematise certain dogmatic conceptions through the generation of alternate, competing narratives and descriptions.

Hence, just as with Baker’s reading of Wittgenstein’s employment of the term ‘aspect’, this dislocatory ‘experience’ Foucault seeks to elicit “is neither true nor false: it is always a fiction, something constructed, which exists only after it has been made, not before; it isn't something that is ‘true,’ but it has been a reality.” 60 It, in some sense, lies outside the games of truth and fabrication.

There is a further methodological parallel when considering the generation of these investigations. In similarity to the position advanced in Chapter II, Foucault asserts that “there is no book that I’ve written without there having been, at least in part, a direct personal experience.” 61 The problematisation and transformation of Foucault’s own fields of experience are what are recorded in his genealogical investigations; as with Wittgenstein’s assistive portrayals of the civil status of those philosophical confusions that most animated him, Foucault’s investigations “function as invitations, as public gestures, for those who may want eventually to do the same thing, or something like it, or, in any case, who intend to slip into this kind of experience.” 62 This special kind of experience is driven, “not to discover what is hidden, but to make visible precisely what is visible, that is to say, to make evident what is so close,” 63 and this because “the aspects

60 1991c, p36.
61 1991c, p38.
62 Ibid.
63 Foucault 1994, p 540.
of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something because it is always before one’s eyes.)”

Given these telling parallels, it should be of little surprise if both authors insist that such aspectival and dislocatory practices are not predicated upon theoretical accounts. For both methods, “there does not exist a theoretical background which is continuous and systematic.” Because of this, as argued in Chapter II, neither method can be adequately described as a form of teaching, for “such a term would reflect the character of a work, of a systematic book that leads to a method that can be generalized, a method full of positive directions, of a body of ‘teachings’ for the readers. In my case it's another matter entirely: my books don't have this kind of value.” Instead of being a teacher, a theorist or a philosopher, Foucault conceived his role as being “an experimenter, in the sense that I write in order to change myself and in order to no longer think the same thing as before.”

It is clear from these remarks that Foucault wrote in order to change himself, to no longer think what he was thinking before, yet while the accrual of such dislocatory methods clearly do not equate to a generalisable set of teachings, this attempt to get free from those aspects that occupied him was by no means an hermetic undertaking. “This work of changing one’s own thought and that of others seems to me to be the reason for being an intellectual.” The method by which Foucault detaches both himself and his reader from certain practices and habits of thought, is the central procedure of the method that he took to be his calling. This much might perhaps strike one as unexceptional, for many authors dream of forcing such an effect upon their reader. The procedure by which this way of altering one’s way of seeing cannot, however, by both Foucault and Wittgenstein’s insistence, consist in eliciting a set response from their reading partner: “if the intellectual starts playing once again the role that he has played

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64 PI §129.
65 1991c, p38.
66 Foucault 1991c, p39-40. The conversation between Foucault and Trombadori, recorded in “How an ‘Experience-Book’ is Born”, from which this remark is taken, is directly relevant to this discussion. If space permitted, a similar treatment of Foucault, using this text to begin from, would be most helpful.
67 2000b, p240.
68 DE IV, p675, in ibid.
69 “This experience that permits us to single out certain mechanisms (for example, imprisonment, penalization, etc.) and at the same time to separate ourselves from them by perceiving them in a totally different form, must be one and the same experience. This procedure is central to all my work.” (cf: 1991c, p38)
for a hundred and fifty years – that of prophet in relation to what “must” be, to what "must take place" – these effects of domination will return and we shall have other ideologies, functioning in the same way.”

Instead, in a manner that closely mirrors Wittgenstein’s, Foucault’s method is predicated upon the notion that for “a domain of action, a behavior, to enter the field of thought, it is necessary for a certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, to have made it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of difficulties around it.”

At every turn we do well to recall that a model which intends to trigger transformative effects upon one’s aspects of seeing, does not foreclose by stipulating exactly what kind of change will occur, what new order of arranging one’s own way of seeing will be orchestrated. “Thus I don’t construct a general method of definitive value for myself or for others. What I write does not prescribe anything, neither to myself nor to others. At most, its character is instrumental.”

Foucault is vehement that “[e]veryone has their own way of changing, or, what amounts to the same thing, of perceiving that everything changes. In this matter, nothing is more arrogant than trying to dictate to others.”

Thus, contra Merquior, Foucault’s method is concerned, with Wittgenstein’s, neither with the bounding nor the denial of those realms of sense one can feasibly operate within. Foucault explicitly aligns himself against such interdiction, observing that “there are ideological traffic police around, and we can hear their whistles blast: go left, go right, here, later, get moving, not now” – and only his more myopic exegetes fail to recognise that Foucault himself equated interdictory “injunctions” with a kind of intellectual “abuse”, precisely because they foreclose the tasks of reevaluation, curiosity, and innovation and, instead, proffer a method of mimicry. Therefore, because, for Foucault, his books are experiences/experiments, and because “an experience is something that one comes out of transformed”, then he is best considered as “an experimenter, not a theorist.”

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70 Foucault 1988c, p197.
71 Foucault 1997b, p117
72 Foucault 1991c, p29.
73 Foucault 2000c, p444.
74 Ibid.
75 Foucault 2000b, pp239-40.
Nilson remarks, Foucault’s method “does not produce truths and certainties, but is a strategy of resistance.”\textsuperscript{76}

As well as establishing a striking form of parallelism, this chapter’s reading enables us to take the rare step of actually taking Foucault at his word when he describes the status of his studies as not having the function of a proof, theory, nor doctrine\textsuperscript{77}, but instead solely as a critical practice which thought brings to bear on itself, in an endeavour to think differently.\textsuperscript{78} Crucial to this reading is his interest in the way we form judgements, and ascribe membership of an occurrence as belonging to a generalisable unified concept, as this is the site for the ‘reaction’ that his ‘themes’ are aimed at. As we shall see in the following chapter, Foucault’s task is to fragment this membership, to make an act of generalised ascription a ‘fraught’ one by the provision of alternate viable models with which to inform those judgements. Further, his method renders these acts of designation both explicit, “mak[ing] evident what is so close, so immediate, so intimately linked to us”, and contentious due to their complex and interactional implications. By this propagation of alternate models, Foucault provides different codifications as to-hand ‘reminders’ for the reader, in order that they can effect the imaginative application of these modes of intelligibility to their own experiences and thus “give us strength to break the rules in the very act which brings them into play.”\textsuperscript{79} Again, in similarity with Wittgenstein’s method, as read in Chapter III, the models which Foucault provides are not intended to supplant the reader’s current avowals - instead, the intent is to provoke the desire to “[r]eject all theory and all forms of general discourse.”\textsuperscript{80} This is because just supplanting them will not be enough; it is instead the style of thought, which demands a determinate and exclusive aspect to take precedence, that is to be problematised. That is why Foucault insisted, in much the same way as Wittgenstein, that “this need for theory is still part of the system we reject.”\textsuperscript{81}

Finally, the task of such problematisation – and the hope for subsequent reevaluation and work on oneself – proceeds along highly deflationary lines that seek to remove a compulsion or limit upon one’s conceptions, via the shifting of the reader’s modes of

\textsuperscript{76} Nilson 1998, pp72–3.
\textsuperscript{77} Foucault 1991b, p50.
\textsuperscript{78} Cf: Foucault 1992, pp8–9.
\textsuperscript{79} In Morey 1992, p125.
\textsuperscript{80} Foucault 1980, p231.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
representation and signification, rather than by directly responding to the dogma that previously coordinated those general concepts. Hence Foucault’s method is a complex one that inscribes conflicting casual accounts into a previously mundane field of our experience, and by this inscription seeks to reconfigure the aspect by which we evaluate it, thereby altering the range of questions that we feel compelled to ask.

“What is the answer to the question? The problem. How is the problem resolved? By displacing the question. … We must think problematically rather than question and answer dialectically.”

Because this philosophical method is concerned with defamiliarising the accustomed, re-coordinating the habits of attention and the ‘emancipation of thought from what it silently thinks’, the body of work built up by Foucault in his fictive philosophical practice is not to be considered as veridical, accumulative or theoretical. Instead the method that it demonstrates has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.

Thus Foucault’s ideal of philosophy is one premised upon flexibility in representation, the rearrangement of detail to present examples in order to trigger the imaginative adjustment of a reader’s previously-static habits of judgement. It is also premised upon our willful desire to take part in such struggles. "I am going to describe certain aspects of the contemporary world and its governmentality; this course will not tell you what you should do or what you have to fight against, but it will give you a map; thus it will tell you: if you want to attack in such-and-such a direction, well, here there is a knot of resistance and there a possible passage. The tools to achieve this effect are the contemplation and exploration of alternate models or accounts, constructed from historical elements, that undercut any notion one might have of one’s dogmatic aspect being natural, logically necessary or maximally generalisable. While the rhetorical method is radically different, and the elements which his models assemble are historical

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82 1980, pp185–6.
83 Foucault 1991b, p50.
84 In Veyne 2010, pp6-7.
rather than grammatical, it is implied by this conception of method that Foucault’s writing was conceived of by its author as as a ‘tool’ book, rather than an *ex-cathedra* treatise, in a manner close to Wittgenstein’s: Foucault clearly “writes for users, not readers.” The defamiliarisation triggered by his philosophy is intended to impair the concepts and institutions he problematises, thereby rendering their *functioning* problematic, not just their conception; Foucault would be disappointed if his works were to remain, in his reader’s hands, solely as abstract critique: “I would like my books to be ... Molotov cocktails, or minefields; I would like them to self-destruct after use, like fireworks.”

We saw earlier that other models of interpretation are available in reading Foucault. A major fault-line between different readings relates to the status of his text, with two sides made sensible from the many readings it runs through. Yet we have seen that, predicated as it is upon both a complex appreciation of the fictive nature of causal historical accounts, and a concern to present a form of philosophy that comprises a set of techniques by which their user modifies their attention to and assumption about a series of generalising claims that emerge from those accounts, Foucault’s method doesn’t match up too well with these assumptions.

A reading of Foucault that renders his work as a series of veridical claims thereby makes his method massively self-contradictory. For Foucault to recognise the irreducibly narrational character of history, to ascribe a fictive status to his own work, and to then proceed to author, e.g., the *true yet hidden history* of the prison, in a manner which flagrantly neglected these characteristics in his philosophical practice, would render his work trivially false, embarrassingly so. Instead, by means of an aspectival reading, the three veridical criticisms made earlier transform into mere descriptions of a philosophical method. An overwhelming explanatory incompatibility with the accounts of other historians, a bias to omit certain evidence, and ideological pre-interpretation; all three qualifications of his work can now be seen as rather misunderstood references to facets of an anti-dogmatic philosophic method. We have seen that such incompatibility is certainly to be expected, but not along lines of supplanting dogma, as

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86 Foucault 1975. Relatedly, and more specific than this lively account: “It’s true that certain people, such as those who work in the institutional setting of the prison - which is not quite the same as being in prison - are not likely to find advice or instructions in my books that tell them 'what is to be done'. But my project is precisely to bring it about that they 'no longer know what to do', so that the acts, gestures, discourses which up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous. This effect is intentional.” (1991a 84)
“Foucault did not attack the choices of others, but the rationalizations that they added to their choices. A genealogical criticism does not say, ‘I am right and the others are mistaken,’ but only, ‘the others are wrong to claim that they are right.’ Likewise, the charge of omitting pertinent features from his genealogical models falls flat because it misunderstands the method it accuses. These models are not intended to be exhaustive, nor accumulatively veridical. Each is written as an “opening”, to prompt an underdetermined and transformative experience in which the reader is convinced to relent in their avowal of a certain way of understanding, by means of adopting a fresh way of seeing; one whose event Foucault anticipates, but whose nature is left to the innovative means of his reader.

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Now I don't say that this is not possible. Only, putting it in this way immediately shows you that it need not happen. This, by the way, illustrates the method of philosophy.

— Wittgenstein, *The Blue Book* \(^1\)

\(^1\) BB, p12.
Philosophy is not to be concerned with a kind of conceptual disqualification, as a means of homing in upon the correct model from the remaining contenders, but instead with modifying one’s style of attention. It is not its place to say “this is not possible” – instead, to be successful in its task, previously elided aspects should snap into focus, whilst statements formally considered indispensable are rendered as contingent, incapable of cohering every case within their single rubric. Obversely, the previously adhered to way of seeing is not to be treated as a sin to be forgotten, but instead acknowledged as one optional aspect among many: “The ideal loses none of its dignity”, said Wittgenstein, “if it is posited as the principle determining the form of one's approach.”2 This conceptual shift is to be achieved through the invention of new notations and models with which to attend to a field of experience, proving the previous system to be both optional and newly evaluable in light of one’s new mode of presentation. Following this treatment, both philosophical methods under investigation are conceived of as undertakings that situate oneself as the site of a personal critical practice and, in so situating, seek to apply a series of arguments, perspectives and inceptive models in the relief of certain conceptual avowals.3 This class of philosophical method demands that the reader acts upon themselves – as Foucault put it, “to monitor, test, improve, and transform”4 themselves.

As it stands, this description – developed over the past four chapters – is far too broad, as it could be used to denote a too-wide set of philosophies – perhaps Socrates or Seneca, for instance, would have recognised parts of this account as relevant to philosophy as they conceived of it. Certainly, Foucault and Wittgenstein’s techniques of work on oneself could indeed be presented as occurring at an intersection with stoic or socratic practice. Foucault’s later work demonstrated both respect and curiosity towards these models of philosophy; he read them as expressing a deep concern with the task of epimeleia heautou (or ‘care of the self’), and thus as providing a bountiful set of comparative models by which to clarify our current practices through comparison.

Wittgenstein, meanwhile, commented both upon his utter infuriation with Plato’s

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3 In this chapter and the next I often make reference to Foucault’s or Wittgenstein’s “notation”. I use this term to denote the particular and differing range of “arguments, perspectives and inceptive models” that each method relies upon, whether grammatical or genealogical. This is done for the sake of brevity, and does not claim that the two sets of techniques are in some sense reducible to each other; it is rather to respect and retain the differences they display.

Socrates, and a continuity in their questioning method of philosophy\(^5\) – “One might say that the subject we are dealing with is one of the heirs of the subject which used to be called ‘philosophy.’”\(^6\) However, for our interests it would prove most unsatisfying to leave it there, to render Wittgenstein, Seneca, Foucault and Plato as members of a shared discipline, for apart from anything else, there are clear differences at play in their concepts of what work on oneself constitutes. In addressing this differentiation, this chapter will advance a form of dogmatism concerning conceptual unity as a shared problematic between the two methods, one that leads to our two philosophical methods being easily differentiated from others, precisely as being antidogmatic in purpose.

Therefore we will also be concerned with answering the question of why it is that the philosophical methods of Wittgenstein and Foucault exhibit those particular parallel methodological features that have emerged so far in this thesis. To this end, the first two sections of this chapter consider in turn the differing ways in which the problem of dogmatism is presented, and thereby clarify a concern with a type of conceptual unity that is at the heart of both models of philosophy. The final section will advance two entailments that can be seen as essential to both methods, and therefore of great importance in our understanding of both philosophies. In conclusion, both philosophies will be considered “partisan” in their response to those supposedly self-evident concepts, in that both are committed to disabusing them of their apparent exclusivity, thereby altering the manner in which their reader conceives of phenomena that previously fell under their purview. This parallel will be shown to derive from an apprehension towards the effects that generality and totality in one’s conceptions exert upon one’s judgements, attentions and diagnoses, rather than from their somehow being wrong ‘in principle’.

Both philosophers’ works are marked au fond by this justification of method by the effects of dogmatism, and we will examine these concerns in detail in the final third of this chapter, positing two broad categories of dogmatic effect that concerned both Foucault and Wittgenstein, albeit in different ways.

Certain themes established in earlier chapters will be of immediate relevance here. Both methods have been shown to demonstrate a demand for a heightened sensitivity to

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\(^5\) “Reading the Socratic dialogues one has the feeling: what a frightful waste of time! What’s the point of these arguments that prove nothing and clarify nothing?” (CV, p14e). Socrates gets into difficulty in trying to give the definition of a concept because “again and again a use of the word emerges that seems not to be compatible with the concept that other uses have led us to form” (ibid, p30e). On this basis Wittgenstein questions Socrates’ right to keep on reducing the sophist to silence (ibid, p56e).

\(^6\) BB, p28, and see Hadot 1997, pp17-23, for a neat discussion of Wittgenstein’s inheritance of the ancient conception of philosophy as a set of practices.
alternate possibilities of description, instigated by those models, scenarios, narratives and counter-examples that are their methodological signature. Further, I have already argued that the operative status of these comparative elements is dependent upon their successfully functioning within a given method, rather than deriving their purpose or value from any objectively veridical account one might seek to assemble from their discrepant parts. Instead, they have been presented as concerned with struggling against affective tendencies of thought that lead to an impoverished set of conceptions regarding language-in-use, the potential for an individual’s self-determination, and the manner in which we judge and describe other massively complex and dynamic human phenomena. As we shall see in the next chapter, the competing models and descriptions that populate the writings of both philosophers are intended to trigger an innovative attendance to the context of one’s acts, by disproving for oneself the necessity, naturalness or generality of those concepts that might otherwise be unproblematically informing those acts. In this respect, both methods are concerned not only with triggering a switch in particular aspects, but at a more basic level, with dispelling a craving for a certain type of conceptual unity.

Another, more procedural, way of seeing the importance of clarifying the notion of dogmatism is this: at certain points in previous chapters, notably II and III, a somewhat underdetermined notion of dogma has been leaned upon in order to frame discussions on the will and its relation to inceptive philosophical method. This subject now demands greater consideration, if we are to throw any light on why both our methods demonstrate parallels in their treatment of their key problematic – and their decisions as to what philosophy should be doing, in order to address it. For Wittgenstein, it is best described as a problem concerned with generality; for Foucault, (in part,) with totality.

§5.1 Wittgenstein and a ‘craving for generality’

In Chapter I we encountered an idea of generality as characteristic of a style of philosophy whose shortcomings inform both Wittgenstein’s later methods, and the interpretation of those methods by Wittgensteinian thinkers such as Baker, Cavell and Kuusela. Specifically, his non-contiguous, non-accruable ‘freeze-frame’ grammatical models were shown to be chosen according to his concern with assisting an individual with the task of dispelling their philosophical confusions, rather than with charting an

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7 cf: §§5.3, 6.2 & 6.3.
invariant characteristic of a field of language itself.\(^8\) It was Wittgenstein’s point that, given the innumerable, fluctuating characteristics of language in use, the desire to sustain a total generality in our representation, “once and for all; and independent of any future experience”,\(^9\) is one derived from a dogmatically-maintained way of seeing that does an injustice to those cases we suppose as falling under our generalisations. At key passages in his writing, most noticeably in PI §115 and BB p18–20, the desire for such generality is cast as a tendency that should be of central concern his reader’s investigation into the operative tendencies of their own conceptions. This tendency was presented as one of the targets of what I referred to in Chapter III as Wittgenstein’s ‘schemes of interruption’.

Wittgenstein states that a “craving for generality is the resultant of a number of tendencies connected with particular philosophical confusions.” We will therefore examine three of these tendencies of thought, and examine how a commitment to a model’s maximal applicability, or an uncritical type of avowal of a kind of expression can be understood as resulting in a form of tendential conceptual invariance. What is meant by this is that such thinking is tied to a deeply-rooted tendency towards favouring concepts that maximise the range of cases they apply to, in order to achieve a purview of cases capable of legitimating a kind of static representation. The cost, Wittgenstein suggests, is one paid in terms of our decreased attention to the local context and contingencies of a concept’s spatio-temporal use. It is in the disjunction between what we expect and wish these generalised expressions to do, and those contextual instances that are thereby obviated from our attention, that a sense of injustice emerges in Wittgenstein’s portrayal of this confusion:

“The object of comparison, the object from which this way of looking at things is derived, has to be given to us, so that injustices won’t constantly flow into the discussion. For everything that holds true for the archetype is now being claimed for the object under examination: and it is claimed that “it always has to . . .”. This comes from wanting to give the characteristics of the archetype a foothold in the investigation. We conflate the archetype and the object, and then we have to dogmatically attribute to the object what should be ascribed only to the archetype.”\(^10\)

\(^8\) See also §3.3.

\(^9\) PI, §92.

\(^10\) BT, p204.
Let us consider a few examples of how this account emerges in Wittgenstein’s remarks. The *Investigations* is littered with problematic moments that might be taken as utterances of this form of dogmatism, by which we project a conceptual unity onto our objects of inquiry. From a plethora of examples, we can, e.g., see how in §14 we are asked to imagine someone exclaiming that “All tools serve to modify something” (with this conceptual misstep being immediately problematised by Wittgenstein’s double interruption: “– And what is modified by the rule, the glue-pot, the nails?”, and then, “—Would anything be gained by this assimilation of expressions?”). In §59, we are presented with another utterance of a generalisation – “A name signifies only what is an element of reality.” – but this time this expression is supposed in some sense to indicate a “particular picture which we want to use.” Lastly, in a manner pertinent to our current parallel reading, we can also consider Norman Malcolm’s account of Wittgenstein’s lasting disapproval of one of his remarks as providing us with a neat example of how the notion of such conceptual unity might inform our thoughts in a more quotidian setting. Wittgenstein and Malcolm were walking together when they observed a newspaper billboard that announced that the Germans had accused the British government of an attempt to assassinate Hitler. Malcolm remarked that such an act would be impossible because “the British were too civilized and decent to attempt anything so underhand, and ... such an act was incompatible with the British 'national character'.” Wittgenstein was dismayed by Malcolm’s remark, and he stewed on it for five years before writing the following in a letter to his friend:

> Whenever I thought of you I couldn't help thinking of a particular incident which seemed to me very important. ... you made a remark about 'national character' that shocked me by its primitiveness. I then thought: what is the use of studying philosophy if all that it does for you is to enable you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic, etc., & if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday life, if it does not make you more conscientious than any ... journalist in the use of the DANGEROUS phrases such people use for their own ends.

I take this remark to be relevant, and apt for inclusion alongside those two examples taken from Wittgenstein’s *Investigations*, because Malcolm’s utterance seems to match a

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11 My emphasis.

12 Foucault 1984a, p93.

13 Ibid.
number of the criteria that Wittgenstein provides as to what a craving for generality emerges from. Let us now examine what those criteria are. First, such a tendency exhibits a treatment of concepts as including in their composition a *unifying essential feature*, in which *all* instances that fall under that concept partake: hence *goodness* might be understood as essentially distinguished by the welfare of others, *politics* by the governance of them (or Malcolm’s *Britishness* by the inscrutable adherence to fair play). Conversely, any case falling under a given concept must *not* harbour certain disqualifying characteristics; perhaps taking pleasure in domination, or governance of no more than oneself, would function as characteristics that might be conceived of as barring a case from being *good* or *political*, respectively. It is the task of identifying and testing these essential features that has traditionally been taken up by the practice of classical philosophy in its various incarnations. These unifying properties are typically derived from a ‘prototype’ or ‘exemplary’ case; a favoured instance that makes explicit that property considered as a constant in any case that falls under the concept in question, and are thus made to “stand at the apex”\(^{14}\) of *any* investigation into *any* subject that falls under the conception that is constituted by the exemplary. The act of the good samaritan, and the *demos* of ancient Athens, might function as exemplars in our earlier two examples. In one’s craving for generality, such cases will provide the means for comprehending a much wider class of cases than those singularities that stand at the apex of our conception.

Secondly, therefore, the employment of a preferred model or prototype seems to license a subsequent method whereby a derived similitude can lead to a reductionism in one’s explanation in search of elegance and unity, as demonstrated in our three earlier examples. “Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.”\(^{15}\) It is because this predilection for reductive methods of conceiving of language-in-use (and people-in-action) is at odds with the irreducibly complex interactional-effects, that Wittgenstein takes issue with them. Specifically, from this reductive preference springs the consequent “contempt for the particular case”;\(^{16}\) such cases not only offer little explanatory power when abstracted away from the contexts of their occurrence, but

\(^{14}\) BT, p204.

\(^{15}\) BB, p16.

\(^{16}\) Ibid.
may threaten to interfere with our conceptual unity, thereby limiting the range of abstracted generality apparently available. Hence Wittgenstein presents the unifying similitude that is perceived between one’s exemplary ideal and the cases it is projected onto as both a result of, and a continuing guarantee for, a “one-sided diet” in the examples one is willing to contemplate.

Thirdly, as we saw in Chapter III, the problem of dogmatic thought can be significantly framed as a problem of the will: we are inclined to see certain cases as prototypes, glimpses of underlying unities and, thus, ciphers by which to administer our comprehension of all relevant cases in the world. The will is key to Wittgenstein’s account, therefore, because it is in our abiding drive to select an instance as an exemplary key that philosophical confusions emerge. A problem of dogma, therefore, proceeds from what one wants, and what one expects one’s expressions and concepts to do, to instrumentally constitute what we consider to be a representative, true and fair conception of a state of affairs, and does so in a way that we become tendentially committed to that way of seeing. Perhaps I might be drawn to place a particular model at the heart of my understanding, because I am tempted by the opportunity to make sense of a previously unyielding problem, fearful of that powerlessness that accompanies incomprehension, or proud of my perceptive insight into the heart of the matter.

One effect of such an avowal can be considered as something akin to a ‘gambit’; one sacrifices attention to – and acknowledgement of – seemingly irrelevant contextual variance, in order to ensure a more profound kind of conceptual unity, by advancing one’s preferred archetype as the encoding element through which to understand and legislate for all cases. Thus competing accounts, which perform alternate gambits according to differing exemplary cases, can be seen as models that threaten the characteristic that is the primary virtue of one’s conceptions; their invariable applicability, by means of ‘outranking’ one’s exemplar within a yet more generalised schema. As Cavell puts it, craving for generality “is betrayed not by a hasty generalization from "some" cases to "all" cases … but by the way in which, or the purpose for which, the philosopher selects that "best" case of knowledge, and by what

\[\text{17 PI, §593.}\]

\[\text{18 Philosophy, in response, must “teach differences”, offer new models with which to compete with those one perceives as exemplary, make clear the limits of such models, and incite the reader into an ongoing work that confronts their will to unify divergent cases, as much as the models that represent their chosen means of achieving it.}\]
he has had to do (to himself) in order to get the question … to arise there.” With Cavell, I see Wittgenstein’s problem of generality as best understood not as the result of a hasty or premature decision to take a shortcut or a gamble; it is not a lazy act, and nor are the prejudices that arise from generality stupid ones. Rather “the easy transition from some to all” is made facile by the promise of a revolutionary gain in descriptive and inferential power that occurs when one places a defining exemplar at the apex of one’s account as uniquely revelatory of the conditions that must be met for any other such case to be adequately unified under the same concept. It seems as if such a craving is not only sensible but promissory of greater things to come; the world is rendered sensible, clearly defined normative boundaries appear, and because these characteristics appear to adhere in the thing itself, the possibility of objective agreement and final judgement appears. Perhaps this is the reason, as Wittgenstein suggests, that we want so badly “to give the characteristics of the archetype a foothold in the investigation”, namely, to cut through the fog of complexity and particularity, in order to seize upon an example that offers the chance to “enlighten” us, to make possible the imposition of organisation upon an otherwise chaotic field of existence, by means of “a state of affairs of the highest generality.” Kuusela makes a similar point, when he reflects that

“What is regarded as an illuminating example, i.e. A particular case that seems to bring to view something essential … is here treated as if it opened up a window to the essence of all cases. The example seems to allow a clear perception of features barely visible in other cases, but which those other cases too must possess, insofar as they share the same essence.”

Finally, I would like to consider one more of Wittgenstein’s examples, one that brings to life the potential for confusion that can occur when our words are treated as expressing a unified generality instead of an context-determined, and therefore context-dependent, utterance. The one that follows is of particular interest to our current concerns, as it

19 Cavell 1999, p134.
20 cf: PI, §340.
21 PI, §344.
22 BT, p204e.
23 Cf: TS220, §93.
24 Ibid, §104.
draws an explicit relation between generality’s gambit and that form of attentional “invisibility” with which an hierarchically superior, organising prototype seemingly legitimates an invariable purview. It also depicts how, if one indulges in always conceiving by means of conceptual unities, with greater and greater regularity (due to the wider and wider range of applications they admit), then this habit threatens to make one’s generalities a kind of “furniture” in our reasoning – an unnoticeable tendency of representation we rest upon:

To the statement "I feel in my hand that the water is three feet under the ground" we should like to answer: "I don't know what this means". But the diviner would say: "Surely you know what it means. You know what 'three feet under the ground' means, and you know what 'I feel' means!" But I should answer him: I know what a word means in certain contexts. i.e. Generality in our operating with words, thus making them familiar and therefore invisible. Thus I understand the phrase, "three feet under the ground", say, in the connections "The measurement has shown that the water runs three feet under the ground", "If we dig three feet deep we are going to strike water", "The depth of the water is three feet by the eye". But the use of the expression "a feeling in my hands of water being three feet under the ground" has yet to be explained to me.  

When Wittgenstein speaks here of a “[g]enerality in our operating with words, thus making them familiar and invisible”, he is making a critique concerning our habits; the maximal generalisation in one’s use of words renders them normalised, unapparent, unproblematic. They just fit, they work in a way that becomes second-nature to us, so that the diviner would no doubt prove at first uncomprehending, then indignant, at the possibility that he not be understood when he is operating with such common concepts such as ‘measurement’ and ‘feeling’. Perhaps the operative archetype in the diviner’s concept of ‘feeling’ might be ‘an internal sensation that confirms or disconfirms an external event’ along the lines of what Wittgenstein refers to as an “inner, occluded mental sign” – say, the feeling when one is being watched as one reads on a train, and how that feeling is subsequently confirmed by glancing up. That conflation would indeed allow the diviner to combine the two concepts to form an activity in which she “feels” in her hand that the water is three feet under the ground. To which, presumably, the task before her, were she to consider conducting philosophy in the manner suggested by

26 BB, pp9-10.
27 BB, p5.
Wittgenstein, would be to consider confounding examples in which an ‘internal’
sensation is not at all indicative of an ‘outside’ event; followed, perhaps, by an
investigation into the manner in which she employed ‘internal’ and ‘external’ in her
former explanation.\(^{28}\) Just as in the example, Wittgenstein’s solutions to his prototypical
tendencies commonly derive from the closer examination of a particular case. In this
manner, Wittgenstein suggests, confusions of different stripes appear in the light of, and
supervene upon, one’s affectively driven and uncritical employment of conceptual
unities, and the commitments that lead to our application of certain concepts outside of
the particular circumstances to which they are native.

A point that will be of increasing importance in the later sections of this chapter is
that in the current example we witness a *lived form* – of acting, thinking, of a kind of
identity – as pivoting upon a misconception concerning some perceived invariance in
conceiving of the world. The license for the diviner’s activity, his understanding of a
significant part of the world, and the sense in which he understands his *own* actions and
reasons for doing so, are all shown to depend upon a kind of (philosophical) confusion.
The ways in which we are prone to describe the world, and the ways in which these
descriptions have concrete effects upon how we then consider our actions and their
justifications, are therefore directly affected by grammatical investigation.

§5.2 Foucault on totality, power and the subject

The reader might be struck by an asymmetry in the following section – that is, while
§5.1 addressed solely the notion of generality in Wittgenstein's philosophy, §5.2 attempts
to examine a set of *three* notions in their relation to one another. Rather than this being
evidence of bias, I hold that this approach is demanded by the nature of Foucault’s
interlocking account of dogmatism. I will argue that a trinity of totality, power and the
subject represent Foucault’s attempt to model, in greater detail than Wittgenstein, the
manner by which dogmatism comes to be exerted in one’s conceptions, but in a way that
is still analogous to Wittgenstein's concern with how exclusive conceptions “exert a
palpable tyranny without any apparent restriction of freedom”.\(^{29}\)

\(^{28}\) Regardless, the example points to the breadth of the problem as Wittgenstein conceives of it; our
craving for generality does not only express itself in membership criteria for conceptual ascriptions – e.g.
Whether Jim is *like* Bob, whether bowling is a sport, whether all word meanings are rule-like, etc. – but in
our accounts of what we are, what we feel, how we justify our actions. That is to say, craving for generality
also occurs in relation to what we want to say *are* we are like.

\(^{29}\) NA, p.248.
This trinity can be sketched out in the following manner. Totality is a style of comprehension based upon conceptual unity, similar to the accounts we have just considered, in which a massive field of phenomena are cohered under a ‘central’, deeply explanatory, and therefore invariant account. Here, however, such coordinating generality is said to be expressed through a myriad of differing relations of power which, in turn, constitute human beings within those relations as being subject to those conceptual unities. Put simply, ‘totality’ models a form of knowledge that expresses a hierarchical model that is immobile and context-insensitive to the cases that fall under its purview. ‘Power’ models the many unequal relations in which this form both occurs and is propagated. ‘Subject’ models the individual whose conceptions of the world and self-comprehension are both determined by these relations. Now, this rough map will be of little use without an accompanying legend, and therefore I propose that we briefly examine each concept in turn, before turning back to the task of seeing how they interlock, in an examination more detailed than that given in this short paragraph. We should then be in a position to summarise Wittgenstein and Foucault’s concerns and to locate similar problematic at work in both of their methods.

To begin with, we can say that Foucault’s notion of totality shows certain similarities with those exemplary-legitimated generalisations addressed in §5.1. Reference is made by Foucault at various points to totalising discourse, philosophy or theory, to total histories and descriptions. In each of these uses, Foucault is describing the manner by which certain characteristics are understood as unified and invariable across differing contexts of their employment, being made constant by their picking out a feature in a subject’s nature that is essential to it being just so, and hence operating as the unifying condition of that manner of conceiving. A totalising concept puts forth a ruling principle, which accounts for its coherence; it establishes an homogeneous network of explanatory relations across a set of conceptual, spatial and historical coordinates in relation to it, allowing a series of judgements, relations and identities to be formulated in reference to any case that falls under its remit. Foucault conceives of their effect as a kind of “conceptual architecture” – namely, a “system of permanent and coherent

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30 I do not claim that this potted reading has any sort of exhaustiveness! What instead is intended is an account that brings to light those characteristics of Foucault’s descriptive notations that are of direct interest to my comparative reading. Each member of this trinity is deserving of a book-length treatment. Totality in particular is problematic, as Foucault’s method underwent a series of changes that affected the ways in which he conceived of and presented the problem of conceptual unity.
concepts”31 within which we live our lives. In the introduction to his *Archaeology of Knowledge*,32 Foucault makes the following succinct remark:

A total description draws all phenomena around a single centre – a principle, a meaning, a spirit, a world-view, an overall shape.33

For example, one might well reflect upon the fact that ‘attitudes towards madmen have varied throughout history’ without the possibility striking you that the existence of the concept of madman is historically situated and limited. It did not exist, and it will likely recede in favour of other concepts that account for those conditions that are currently cohered under that of “madman”. Foucault called this the ‘presentist fallacy’; an implication of totality, in which we ‘naturally’ expect this unity, demonstrated by a particular “model or a concept, an institution, a feeling, or a symbol from [our] present” to be echoed in our past (and to be unavoidable in our future), and are thereby led to attempt to “find that it had a parallel meaning in the past.”34 Totalising thought, while perhaps admitting of various schools or interpretations, nonetheless places the unifying characteristics of one’s concepts below the ‘hurly-burly’35 of its referent incarnations.

Thus, “all the statements that named [madness], divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its developments, indicated its various correlations, judged it, and possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were to be taken as its own” operate on the understanding that they do so in a relation of truth to “the unity of the object ‘madness’”, “its secret content, its silent, self enclosed truth”.36 Even in Foucault’s earliest work, *History of Madness*, we witness a process intended to disperse this coordinating conceptual unity, by means of a tracing of the origins of our conception of human beings as psychological subjects from “the moment when a radical separation between madness and reason had taken place, the classical age, and when the possibility

31 AK, p38.
32 I take *Archaeology of Knowledge* to be a work deeply concerned with differing forms of conceptual unity, and thus refer to it at length in this section.
33 AK, p11.
34 Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, p118.
35 “How could human behaviour be described? Surely only by sketching the actions of a variety of humans, as they are all mixed up together. What determines our judgment, our concepts and reactions, is not what one man is doing now, an individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any action.” (Z, §567)
36 AK, p35.
of a science of this new object appears.” 37 It thus presents madness not as a stable referent, existing in a timeless, total sense, and separate from those cases it conceives of, but rather as the *product* of a series of totalising systems of knowledge. 30 As Paul Veyne puts it,

To say that madness does not exist is not to claim that madmen are victims of prejudice, nor is it to deny such an assertion, for that matter. The meaning of the proposition lies elsewhere. It neither affirms nor denies that madmen should not be excluded. Or that madness exists because it is fabricated by society, or that madness is modified in its positivity by the attitudes various societies hold to it, or that different societies have conceptualised madness in very different ways; the proposition does not deny, either, that madness has a behaviourist and perhaps a physiological component. But even if madness were to have such components, it would not yet *be* madness. A building stone becomes a key stone or a header only when it takes its place as part of a structure. … For Foucault the material for madness (behaviour, neuromicrobiology) really exists, but not as madness; to be mad only materially is precisely not yet to be mad. 39

When Foucault set out to problematise madness, it was therefore not, as many of his critics understand it, “a way of denying the reality of such phenomena. On the contrary, I have tried to show that it was precisely some real existent in the world which was the target of social regulation at a given moment.” 40 A totality – here the positing of the truth of madness as running below, through, and sometimes irrupting into rational hypothesising during the history of human endeavour – therefore displays *limited* similarities to Wittgenstein’s concern with generality. These similarities centre upon a way of thinking that treats certain characteristics of a conception as immutable, as “groupings that we normally accept *before* any examination”, whose “validity is recognised from the outset” 41 and as therefore being essential to any case that is judged to fall under that conception.

37 Khalfa 2006, pxix.

38 Although I acknowledge that there is a good argument that, at this early stage, Foucault did in fact consider there to be a ‘total’ truth to madness that had been marred by the rationalist inscriptions made upon it. (See, e.g., Still & Velody 2002.)


40 Foucault 2001, p171.

41 AK, p24.
Foucault argues that the insistence upon the totality of a concept often supervenes upon an historical or physiological account of what must be the case, of what is unavoidably a facet of our reality. There, too, in “the project of a total history” we seek “to reconstitute the overall form of a civilisation, the principle material or spiritual – of a society, the significance common to all the phenomena of a period, the law that accounts for their cohesion”, 42 according to the preferred aspect we are convinced by. Just as in our earlier examination of the dogmatic effect of projection, and how it becomes a kind of furniture in our reasoning, it is because totality is the apex that governs the manner in which we orient ourselves in relation to a field of human experience – and thus see its similarity to all the objects in that field – that it is “not presented to the perception as the manifest bearer of its limits and characteristics. It requires a certain change of viewpoint and attitude to be recognised and examined in itself. Perhaps it is like the over-familiar that constantly eludes one; those familiar transparencies which, although they conceal nothing in their density, are nevertheless not entirely clear.”43

In a sense similar to Wittgenstein, then, Foucault is concerned with the problem of a kind of thought that, while it imposes an aspect by which to see the world, it does so in an exclusive manner that encourages the consideration that things must necessarily be understood this way, for that is just the way the world is. Again with Wittgenstein, it is exactly this quality, which Foucault here terms the ‘transparency’ of dogma, that renders it as such an offensive and intolerable condition, because “a system of constraint becomes truly intolerable when the individuals who are affected by it don’t have the means of modifying it.”44 Thus this form of dogmatic constraint is an effect of the provision of an apparently exhaustive notation by which to make sense of oneself, to individualise oneself by means of appeal to a totalisation, to differentiate or include oneself accordingly and, finally, to thereby conscript oneself as an exemplar that supports the further proliferation of that global and unitary knowledge in one’s further relations with others.45 It is on the basis of such identities that we recognise ourselves as members of a group, nation, state, strata, etc., and it is also on this basis that we consent

42 AK, p110.

43 Ibid.

44 Foucault 1988c, p294.

to be recognised and administered as such. The task of philosophy for Foucault is first and foremost to fracture these totalities by which we conceive of the world, to reverse their claims of immobility, by undertaking genealogical investigations that respond to them with singular detail and contrary depictions. As Owen puts it:

By showing that a given limit is not ‘universal, necessary, obligatory’ and thus that we can think and act differently, that we can become otherwise than we are, genealogy opens a space in which what are experienced as immobile, irreversible and stable limits to reflection are re-experienced as mobile, reversible and unstable bounds.46

While we might perceive a similitude between generality and totality, in contrast, the notion of a power relation is one that seems wholly alien to Wittgenstein’s methodology.47 The term is used to denote not only the means by which totalising thought is transmitted, circulated, and agreed upon within a group, but also how it is formed, tested and verified. Totalities are expressed from person to person, they are inherited in the techniques we employ with and upon one another, and thus their circulation among us supervenes upon the relations that they coordinate. For example, the unifying conception of human life as being determined by the tripartite structure of the psyche’s id, ego, and super-ego is a totality that both coordinates and is expressed by the manifold techniques of psychoanalysis. Without those relations that instantiate it, this totality would not be expressed in the particular way it is – it might still, however, find expression through other relations. Advertising and public relations, for example, can be seen as employing certain techniques that both derive their legitimacy from, and help to circulate, this particular unitary aspect of human nature.48 Yet a power relation is a term that can be understood more generally than this; Foucault also, more minimally, described it as simply “the name one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a society”.49 To this end, it is an underdetermined concept, in a manner similar to our earlier use of aspect: as Colin Gordon remarked, “[p]ower for Foucault is not an omnipotent causal principle or shaping spirit but a perspective concept.”50

46 Owen 1999, p36.
47 Barring, of course, what I take to be a too-strong reading of the commonality between language games and games of truth, proposed earlier – see Introduction, n3.
48 See, for example, the work by Edward Bernays (1955), Freud’s nephew.
49 Foucault 1990, p94.
50 Gordon 1980, p245
provides a way of presenting different models of how to understand human practices, like so:

What does it mean to exercise power? It does not mean picking up this tape recorder and throwing it on the ground. I have the capacity to do so—materially, physically, sportively. But I would not be exercising power if I did that. However, if I take this tape recorder and throw it on the ground in order to make you mad, or so that you can’t repeat what I’ve said, or to put pressure on you so that you’ll behave in such and such a way, or to intimidate you—well, what I’ve done, by shaping your behavior through certain means, that is power.51

Power presents us with a way of describing different types of relation between people; it is useful as a tool for describing dogmatism because it allows one to represent the means by which one comes to act upon the actions of another, and in turn is so acted upon. It is not a means to paint a morbid picture of the brute restriction of freedom,52 but instead how a person, institution or group enlists a subject’s will in their freely deciding to do as that relation determines; the concept of a power relation is one that enables one to perceive the means by which a relation can determine the “possible field of actions of others”.53 The notion of power allows Foucault to model and represent the means of dogmatism as a cultural, shared, normative effect “that tends to render immobile and untouchable those things that are offered to us as real, as true, as good.”54

If power is a descriptor used to denote the activities, transactions and discourses we commonly participate in, as they are performed upon us, and by us, then we are subject to these relations, and it is we who respond, repeat or resist the total descriptions, philosophies and histories that are expressed through our relations. This is how the individual is to be understood as both an effect of power and “the element of its articulation.”55 Those power relations that impose a conceptual unity thereby allow one the means by which to adopt a static identity for one’s self. On the condition that we recognise and govern ourselves as members of the set thereby understood, we gain access to a way of understanding ourself, differentiating ourself, and of forming ourself

51 Foucault 1988a, p1. This qualification will be of importance in the next chapter.
52 Foucault’s term domination applies here instead: see Foucault 2000f.
53 Foucault 1982a, p221.
54 Foucault 1988a, p1.
55 Foucault 1980a, p98.
within a field of meaning that is both stable and universal. Different forms of power relations operate by means of different conceptual unities, and hence provide different modes of subjectivity.\textsuperscript{56} The notion of a subject can therefore best be understood as the product of a series of differing relations, which each “categorize the individual, mark him by his own individuality, attach him to his own identity, impose a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him.”\textsuperscript{57}

For Foucault the reason why we give a “foothold” to archetypes in our accounts of the world is already imprinted in the scheme by which we go about understanding ourselves. We already understand ourselves in terms of generality and similitude, through the choices we make, from the endless schemes of self-understanding we are given through our relations with others. The functioning of those relations are predicated upon our classification, our self-recognition, the logic of similitude that makes me self-sensible as a white man, as middle aged, as English, a geek, a leftwinger, a Dawkinsian gene-robot, a gemini, a potential rapist, a child of God, an occupier, a box-set watcher, a squatter, an addictive personality, or a philosopher. We are too late in our resistance, if we do not acknowledge that the subject we understand ourselves to be – the one we take pleasure or guilt in – is the incorporation of a series of totalities, instantiated by the way we are understood, the way we are classified, and the ensuing reflexive manner of our employment of these generalities in our own self-understanding. Hence, for Foucault, the first indication of that form of “[g]enerality in our operating with words” which makes “them familiar and invisible”, as remarked upon earlier by Wittgenstein, is to be inscribed in those principles by which we self-govern and are governed.

Indeed, even if a person conceives of themselves as standing in opposition to a totalised concept of, say, their sexuality, that act of denial will be drawn to being expressed in relation to it, only as a negative coordinate to the normal positive, thereby limiting their critique to its negation, rather than its irrelevance or inappropriateness. For example, to deny homosexuality as a deviance from a natural state of sexuality and to posit it as either co-extensive with, identical with, or positively differentiated from, that norm, is to continue to employ the totalising conception, but in its inverse. The subject is caught, then, because even if it refuses to understand itself by means of certain prescriptions,

\textsuperscript{56} “for example, the objectivising of the speaking subject in \textit{grammaire generale}, philology, and linguistics. ... the objectivising of the productive subject, the subject who labors, in the analysis of wealth and of economics. Or, a third example, the objectivising of the sheer fact of being alive in natural history or biology.” (Foucault 2000f, p326)

\textsuperscript{57} Foucault 2000f, p331, with plural removed (i.e. “marks” becomes “mark”).
then still, the task of redetermining one’s conceptions through this refusal reduces to a shadow cast by the same conceptual unity. By “switching sides”, then, one fails because one does not recognise that one is still seeing by means of the same aspect that causes the problem to emerge in the first place. Foucault put it thus:

What often embarrasses me today … is that all this work done in the past fifteen years or so … functions for some only as a sign of belonging: to be on the ‘good side’, on the side of madness, children, delinquency, sex. … One must pass to the other side – the good side – but by trying to turn off these mechanisms which cause the appearance of two separate sides. … This is where the real work begins.\(^{38}\)

Therefore unless a person can radically undermine those concepts that constitute their normal totalising thoughts, they will be bound in orbit, whether in deference or denial, to that field of totality that both assert a timeless sameness and make possible their self-recognition, through their similitude to it. Foucault thus puts a far greater emphasis upon what we saw earlier in the example of the water diviner – a lived form of acting, thinking, of a kind of identity, as pivoting upon a misconception concerning some perceived invariance in one’s conceptions.

The pay off in this peculiar form of notation now becomes clearer: we can begin to conceive of the individual as being determined – as the accumulative impact marks left by a series of total conceptions of its nature – and mediated by the success, failure and particularities of the power relations it is extricated in. The subject thereby appears in this light, as the “inside as an operation of the outside: in all his work Foucault seems haunted by this theme of an inside which is merely the fold of the outside, as if the ship were a folding of the sea.”\(^{39}\) The subject is held in dogmatic rigidity because, as the object of those totalities that concern its nature, it is convinced of a certain conception of itself as necessarily displaying the characteristics of that total conception. Being convinced of the exemplary exclusivity of a particular way of seeing, the subject is led to see in a manner that reflects back to it the terms of its own understanding, nature and history. This scheme of description allows Foucault access to an extremely forceful style of description, where the reader is challenged to understand herself as a direct product of the language that is used to describe her.

Finally, consider that the reason that power relations depend upon totality for their

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\(^{38}\) Foucault 1988c, p120, my emphasis.

\(^{39}\) Deleuze 2006, p81.
force is because positing contextually-explicated singularities does not produce the same normative effect as positing essentialist conceptual unities by which an individual conceives that they must proceed. Such totally avowed schemes of conception reorder their relevant fields of inquiry according to a configuration of form decided by what our attention is drawn to, so that it reflects back to the subject a coherence or meaningfulness which anticipates the terms of its own way of seeing. In contrast, without totalised modes of conceiving of the subjects they involve, disciplinary strategies would be left with no criteria by which to inscribe ‘correct’ procedure upon the subject, for the perspicuous subject would be left without the immobile norms by which to proceed. This is why the stability and naturalness of such normative applications is the grounds upon which Foucault proposes that the task of resistance should take place.

§5.3 Antidogmatic method

When considering these two accounts of the problem of dogmatism we can see that, while they are certainly distinct from each other, a certain interstice emerges. This parallel occurs in their accounts of how we are led to favour concepts that maximise the range of objects they apply to, in order to achieve a purview capable of legitimating a kind of static representation, regardless of the local contexts and contingencies of a concept’s spatio-temporal use. We have also seen that both authors treat this grand progressive hope as being an effect of a certain style of thought, one that, rather than leading to an objective form of knowledge, is in actuality responsible for a subject’s turn towards dogmatism.

Consider the methodological similarities noted in §4.3. Can the similar parameters and characteristics presented there be accounted for by reference to this shared concern with dogmatic conceptual unity? I argue that it can: namely, by understanding dogma as resulting in a form of injustice, we can give a precise account of the methodological constraints that a philosophical method derived from such an account of dogmatism should adhere to. That is because, presumably, both philosophical methods wish to avoid slipping into a state of affairs in which their proposed solutions partake in the kind of dogmatic injustice that those methods seek to address. I will outline these constraints in response to two broad aspects. First, the Wittgensteinian notion of injustice and second, the notion of a self-imposed form of captivity. These two aspects are far from exhaustive; I will argue that both can be seen quite clearly in the accounts of §5.1 & §5.2.
Dogmatism, whether brought about by a craving for generality, or by understanding one’s own nature in reference to totalised conceptions, describes a form of dislocation from the contexts of our practices. An example of this was examined earlier, in Malcolm’s dismissal of a British assassination plot, by means of an appeal to what Britishness is, and therefore, what could not have been the case. For what reason would we wish to describe Malcolm’s behaviour, emerging from dogmatic avowal of an invariant aspect, as exhibiting a form of injustice? And why would this injustice constitute a problem that was overriding important to grammatical investigation? Well, Wittgenstein was fairly unambiguous in his earlier account of how injustice can flow into one’s expressions: it was because “everything that holds true for the archetype is now being claimed for the object under examination: and it is claimed that “it always has to . . .”60 Let me suggest two common uses of the word injustice that might help us to see why dogmatic projection can be unjust. Firstly, we can understand it in roughly the same manner as when we say that a musician doesn’t ‘do justice’ to the score she is playing. Something is wrong in her performance, she is inattentive to a particular feature that we consider of great importance, or perhaps she is simply not very skilled at depicting the detail found in the score. In short, there is a failure to render the nuance and detail convincingly and hence she is insensitive to the task at hand. Secondly, there is a more literal use of injustice: something is overlooked, a miscarriage has occurred which results in unfairness: the decision is made that does not do justice to the circumstances it is adjudicating.

Next, recall how earlier we followed Baker in his dismissal of his initial exegesis in Chapter I. There, we encountered an understanding of language that was informed first and foremost in its method by an acknowledgement of the “incalculability” of our use of language. Because it is of such methodological import, this is something that Wittgenstein constantly reminds us of, asking us, for example, to “think how many different kinds of thing are called ‘description’”,61 or warning us that “If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games in view you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions like: ‘What is a question?’”62 “There are countless kinds” of sentence,63 because the sense

60 BT, p204.

61 ... “description of a body’s position by means of its co-ordinates; description of a facial expression; description of a sensation of touch; of a mood.” (PI, §24)

62 PI, §24.

63 PI §23.
that they make occurs in relation not solely to one person’s life, “but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any action.” What’s more, when we seek out some order to this mass of interactional complexity and actually “look at the actual use of a word, what we see is something constantly fluctuating”, with many of the words that most confuse us being “used in a thousand different ways which gradually merge into one another.” And this is a characteristic that should not surprise us, because we are using these words to describe “the complex nature and the variety of human contingencies”: there is an “infinite complexity” in the lives, intentions and actions we that we seek to describe. Wittgenstein summons us over and over again to attend to the incalculability of any sum total of human language in use, because this contextual complexity is not a contingent or abstruse concern, but is rather one we judge, describe and react to every day. “Life's infinite variations are an essential part of our life. And so precisely of the habitual character of life.” It is this contextual complexity that Wittgenstein is concerned that we do an injustice to – both by our insensitivity to its detail and by our unfairness to its constitutive place in what we say and mean. In keeping with this complexity and in order for one to resist this form of injustice, Wittgenstein advocates a method where, “[i]n order to see more clearly, here as in countless similar cases, we must focus on the details of what goes on; must look at them from close to.” His commitment to examining the contextual fine-detail in which our utterances take place is one concerned with doing justice to those fluctuating contexts of our practices that our words are situated in, and of letting the complexity of the contexts that we see, from close to, thereby inform our conception of them. Thus the reason that we cannot give clear criteria for the use of many of our concepts in advance of the contexts of their use is because what we are speaking of makes little sense unless the words are contextually given. In this light, the problem of our projection of conceptual unities onto the massively complex contexts of our life with words becomes apparent; such projection “make[s] unjust claims that conflict with their everyday practices”.

64 “What determines our judgment, our concepts and reactions, is not what one man is doing now, an individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any action.” (Z, §567)

65 PG, p77.

66 RPII, p614.

67 MS 137, 67a: 4.7.1948.

68 BT, p535.
Refusing to attend to context, in favour of the unitary judgements apparently afforded by totalities, is an operative concern for Foucault too.⁶⁹ Admittedly Foucault accounts for this idea of ‘projection’ in very different terms, yet his subject is a similar type of widespread dogmatic confusion – namely, one where we are led to “[seek] the unity of discourse in the objects themselves, in their distribution, in the interplay of their differences, in their proximity or distance”, yet when we turn to critically examine our discursive practices, what we “discover is neither a configuration, nor a form, but a group of rules that are [instead] immanent in a practice, and define it in its specificity.”⁷⁰ Genealogy is constituted, like grammatical investigation, by the use of specifically chosen “precise examples” that allow one to “loosen the embrace” in which our understanding held us, so that we are able to recognise that those previously avowed “rules [do not] define the dumb existence of a reality” but, on the contrary, project an unjust “ordering of objects.”⁷¹ Something like this sense of injustice is apparent in Foucault’s account of the foreclosure of the possibilities of the world through our conception of it, most commonly represented as the transparent⁷² or invisible⁷³ quality of dogma. For Foucault, just as for Wittgenstein, this concern determines what the task of philosophy constitutes, at a fundamental methodological level:

I am perfectly aware that I am situated in a context. The problem, then, lies in knowing how to attain consciousness of such a context and even, so to speak, in assimilating it, in letting it exert its effects on one’s own discourse, on the very discourse one is currently employing. You say that one is inevitably a philosopher in the sense that one inevitably conceives the whole in some way ... But are you quite sure that philosophy consists precisely in that? … What does engaging in philosophy nowadays mean, in fact? It does not mean forming a discourse on totality, a discourse in which the totality of the world would be taken up again, but rather, engaging in a certain activity, a certain form of activity.”⁷⁴

⁶⁹ There seems to be an interesting parallel reading available in both authors’ treatment of context as a determining condition of what we say, but this is a project outside the range of the one here. For example, Foucault remarked that “even if the same words are used, even if we find substantially the same nouns, even if in total it is the same sentence – it is not necessarily the same statement.” (AK, p136)

⁷⁰ AK, p51.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² E.g. AK, p110.

⁷³ E.g Foucault/Blanchot 1987, p24.

⁷⁴ Foucault 1999a, p15.
Very well, but what are we to conclude from these parallel methodological concerns? Specifically, what does this shared apprehension of dogmatic injustice amount to in terms of methodological constraint, as was promised earlier? Well, first and foremost, the task of using the various insights gathered through grammatical or genealogical investigation in order to construct, for example, a theoretical account of the processes of language\(^{75}\) or fundamental account of human freedom or reason,\(^{76}\) is immediately disqualified by this notion of dogma: such unifying constructions, because they forward their own exemplary modes of conception, would “only result in [further] injustices.”\(^{77}\)

Therefore it is vital to the success of such methods that they do not commit us to an antimetaphysical position. In this respect I follow Kuusela\(^{78}\) in understanding Wittgenstein’s methods as being antidogmatic, rather than antimetaphysical. Characterising Wittgenstein as an antimetaphysical philosopher would be misleading, for such theories are not rejected outright, but instead they are dislodged from the privileged, and hence projecting, apex they stand at in our thoughts.\(^{79}\) Hence Wittgenstein’s turn away from metaphysics is not a simple rejection of what has been said in metaphysical philosophy, and it would be misleading in this sense to characterize him as an antimetaphysical philosopher. Dogmatism is overcome in philosophy by presenting new rules for the purpose of codifying in them characteristic aspects of the actual, blurred field of language use. I argue a similar qualification should be made of Foucault. In his comments upon the universalist principles of the Enlightenment,\(^{80}\) or in his response to Habermas’s critical theories,\(^{81}\) for example, we can see a similar differentiation between the worth of the positions advanced and the status of the totality it posits.

\(^{75}\) Cf: BT, p156.
\(^{76}\) Cf: Foucault 1984.
\(^{77}\) Cf: BT, p156.
\(^{78}\) E.g. “This misleading aspect of the employment of the model is to be avoided, not the model as such, which may have an illuminating use in specific contexts.” (Kuusela 2008, p123)
\(^{79}\) cf: Kuusela 2008, p261.
\(^{80}\) “[O]ne [does not have] to be ‘for’ or ‘against’ the Enlightenment. [Instead] one has to refuse everything that might present itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian alternative: [namely that] you either accept the Enlightenment and remain within the tradition … or else you criticise the Enlightenment and then try to escape from its principles of rationality.” (Foucault 1984, p42-3)
\(^{81}\) “I am interested in what Habermas is doing … but there is always something which causes me a problem. It is when he assigns a very important place to relations of communication and also a function I would call ‘utopian’.” (Foucault 1987, p18, my emphasis)
It is therefore important that both our methods ensure that the codifications employed to achieve their intended dislocatory effects are not supposed as new revelatory schemes that mark a final or hierarchically superior concept. “Our only task is to be just. That is, we must only point out and resolve the injustices of philosophy, and not posit new parties – and creeds.” For Foucault, the very idea that his genealogies were being taken by some as the new totalities by which the reader should proceed, left him “mortified”, for such a use would render their intended effect in its inverse; a new immobile centre, as opposed to a dislocatory jolt. Antidogmatic method therefore cannot say that a particular conception is not possible. Only that, putting it another way immediately shows you that it need not be applied, and this comparative process “illustrates the method of philosophy.”

If antidogmatic method is not reflexive in regards to the possibility of new modes of injustice emerging from its instruments, then it risks compromising the comparative power of its models through establishing a conceptual unity:

if we want to protect these only lately liberated fragments are we not in danger of ourselves constructing, with our own hands, that unitary discourse to which we are invited, perhaps to lure us into a trap, by those who say to us : ‘All this is fine, but where are you heading? What kind of unity are you after?’

Therefore the schemes, prompts, examples and scenarios that make up the different notations of Wittgenstein and Foucault’s methods cannot be amalgamated as a principled undertaking, in order “to descend upon them from on high with some kind of halo of theory that would unite them.” Foucault describes quite explicitly how this wariness is reflexively expressed in his method, in his refusal to give a total formulation of his

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82 BT, p420.
83 “[I]n The Order of Things, the absence of methodological signposting may have given the impression that my analyses were being conducted in terms of cultural totality. It is mortifying that I was unable to avoid these dangers: I console myself with the thought that they were intrinsic to the enterprise itself, since, in order to carry out its task, it had first to free itself from these various methods and forms of history”. (AOK, p18)
84 BB, p12.
85 Foucault 1980a, p86.
86 Ibid, p87.
genealogies “that [would] invite the kind of theoretical coronation of the whole which I am so keen to avoid”.  

This interpretation results in a somewhat ‘permissive’ relationship to those problematic models arranged against it. It would be a mistake to imagine either philosopher would go so far as to see no worth or sense in those philosophical systems that might be considered good examples of dogmatic conceptual unity. Both preferred the construction of imaginative new examples, in order to function as models of comparison, as an important component of one’s philosophical practice. It is therefore hardly surprising that both, in conversation with close friends, admitted to a reverence for those great metaphysical models of the past that simultaneously present their reader with both feats of conceptual imagination, and with an appeal for new kind of dogmatic avowal:

Don’t think that I hate metaphysics. I regard some of the great philosophical systems of the past as among the noblest productions of the human mind.

I can still hear Foucault talking to me, with pleasure, sympathy and respectful admiration, about St Augustine and his constant flow of ideas: ideas clearly all the more admirable in that, being hard to believe, they indicate just how far the human mind is capable of venturing.

Finally, there is the inverse consideration, of how such injustice commits one to a form of self-constriction. This concern is with how we might, through a mechanistic injustice towards ourselves, inhibit the range of our thought, the thing we might otherwise become. Given the model sketched out in §5.2, Foucault seems to more explicitly address this concern that Wittgenstein. The presentation of dogmatism as a form of constraint upon an individual’s thought, by means of a kind of certainty as to the suitability of their conceptions across a range of cases, instances and contexts, in fact strikes me as the very purpose of Foucault’s accounts of subjectivity. Dogmatism unchecked can determine what kind of person we make of ourselves, what problems we attend to, what we ‘take a

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87 Ibid, p88.
89 Veyne 2010, p39.
90 Perhaps Wittgenstein’s notion of one’s craving for generality performs a similar role to that of Foucault’s notion of subjectivity.
stand on’, what we preference as being of fundamental importance to us, what political acts we undertake (or fail to), the ways in which we are comfortable expressing ourselves, how we understand what it is to mean, say, think and feel, etc, etc.

“Who one was, Foucault wrote, emerges acutely out of the problems with which one struggles.” Therefore if one operates in a ‘frictionless’ conceptual environment, where one thinks one has the means by which every alternative account can be shown to be irretrievably false, then one is liable to exhibit a peculiarly dismissive and combative style of subjectivity. If one’s thoughts are predicated upon the apparent universality of the aspect one is operating under then it is only a short step towards the role of the polemicist. In this way an injustice to the multiplicity of means of description leads one, perversely, to a conviction that one is proceeding according to a great truth, one whose time has come, and must now be shared. This dogmatic subject would proceed encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorising him to wage war and making that struggle is a just undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in the search for truth, but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is harmful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat … The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that his adversary is by definition denied.

Foucault’s presentation is an extreme one, but it can nonetheless be understood relative to that form of certainty that Wittgenstein often describes as a ‘bewitchment in which certain forms of language hold us’, where one is guaranteed access to a necessary truth with which to simplify a complex and fluctuating field of human phenomena. Such attempts at uniformity are to be understood as “the expression of an attitude … which comes out everywhere in our lives. The emphasis of the 'must' corresponds only to the inexorability of this attitude … towards innumerable related practices.” One such practice was that of the water diviner.
Hacking’s discussions in *Historical Ontology* demonstrate that this problem is rendered far more serious when we consider that our exclusive forms of representations are being used by us to describe the indeterminate complexities of human life: the injustice of the imposition of a dogmatically held aspect upon an ‘object’ becomes more immediately troubling when that object is an element of someone’s life. As considered earlier,95 in reference to what he coined the “looping effect”, what “is curious about human action is that by and large what I am deliberately doing depends on the possibilities of description.” Hence “if new modes of description come into being, new possibilities for action come into being in consequence”,96 and likewise, the imposition of preferred forms of description closes off certain forms of life, whilst repressively prescribing others. Philosophy is to respond to this by refusing the organisation of oneself according to the traits, tendencies and capacities that would otherwise define us by reference to total and invariant forms of knowledge. It is the exertion of knowledge as an effect, which subjects human beings to a process of defining themselves in accordance with an unchanging scheme, that is the inverse, accompanying injustice of dogma.

We can conclude that the habitual desire for conceptual unity is a guiding concern for both methods because not only does it lead to a form of contextual blindness, but because it restricts the range of concepts we operate under, causing injustice in our thoughts through our perpetual avowal of a single aspect, a state of affairs rendered especially problematic when we seek to do so when accounting for what human behaviour must necessarily be. The immediate methodological outcome of this aspect of injustice is that neither philosopher can helps themselves unproblematically to the right to tell others what they have to do. By what right would they do so? ... The work of an intellectual is not to shape others' political will; it is, through the analyses that he carries out in his own field, to question over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb people's mental habits, the way they do and think things, to dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to reexamine rules and institutions.97

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95 See p122 for the discussion on Hacking’s account concerning “the interactions between people, on the one hand, and ways of classifying people and their behavior on the other. Being seen to be a certain kind of person, or to do a certain kind of act, may affect someone.”


97 Foucault 1988c, pxxi.
If dogmatism results in a form of injustice that an individual visits upon herself, then it is to be remedied on the level of that individual also. If a form of injustice is self-constricting, then the method of its relief cannot be one that conceives of freedom as one’s being free to conform to another’s preferenced set of idealised rules. Both authors’ location of philosophy on the level of conceptual struggle, of work on oneself, is entailed by our own involvement in dogma; “it is we who are doing it, not having it done to us.”

It is by our ‘shaping’ of our life that our dogmatic tendencies are rendered a persistent effect, and it is that shape that will have to be altered for it to cease. Therefore both methods seek to change the way one sees, the possibilities one considers, the comparisons one is liable to make, in order to overhaul the concepts that “permeate our life” and the limits that we currently set upon that life.

Yet equally, it cannot be as simple as saying that dogmatism is something that we as individuals are personally responsible for. Rather, dogma is something that shapes the life we lead and, by this regimentation, becomes self-confirming by means of the way we describe that life so shaped. The impoverishment of the conditions by which we conceive of language-in-use, and the manner in which we judge and describe massively complex and dynamic human phenomena, etc., are thus at the same time the impoverishment of what we are permitting ourselves to be. It does no good to convict the reader of dogmatism, or convince her of a new and improved dogmatic account, if the possibilities one uses to describe this are unfamiliar to that person’s accounts. They have to be incited to see the limitations within which they are operating in by themselves. This is one way of making better sense of why both Foucault and Wittgenstein considered the problem of dogmatism to imply not just a critical investigation into the faulty purview or logic of certain concepts, but of a work that takes place upon the self.

Dogma is thereby understood as deeply involved in our form of life; it determines the kind of attention we pay to the world, and what we see as deserving of interrogation, what we see as obviously absurd, and what we fail to see at all, because of

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99 “The way to solve the problem you see in your life is to live in a way that will make what is problematic disappear. The fact that life is problematic means that your life does not fit life’s shape. So you must change your life, & once it fits the shape, what is problematic will disappear.” (MS 118, 17r c: 27.8.1937) I take the shape of one’s life here to be related to one’s way of looking at things.

100 That I can be someone’s friend rests on the fact that he has the same possibilities as I myself have, or similar ones. Would it be correct to say our concepts reflect our life? They stand in the middle of it. … Operating with concepts permeates our life. (LWPP II, pp72-3)
it’s transparent correctness. Not only do we project onto the world those features that are characteristics of our means of representation, but we see ourselves in relations of similarity or exclusion to these projections too, a complication that promises the possibility of recognising ourselves, measuring, understanding and contrasting what we are within in a stable field of similitude. Changing our way of thinking in terms of conceptual unities, curiously enough then, has deep reaching effects upon who we are; it is not an abstruse concern.

If injustice is perpetrated by our unwillingness to acknowledge other ways of seeing the world, or in what we cannot pay attention to, then its relief must entail the refocussing of our attention to the contexts that we currently elide. Antidogmatic method results in one doing justice to other, currently unseen, aspects, and in doing so it obviates the possibility of being a certain kind of subject, and so too of “set[ting] up new parties – and creeds.”\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{101} BT; p421.
Life's infinite variations are an essential part of our life. And so precisely of the habitual character of life. Expression consists for us in incalculability.

— Ludwig Wittgenstein – Manuscript 137

My way of no longer being the same is, by definition, the most unique part of what I am.

— Michel Foucault, *For an Ethic of Discomfort*
The optimistic hope that one can achieve conceptual self-governance, advanced in the
last chapter’s account of the relation between philosophical practice and the cessation of
dogmatism, is one that can be seen as having come under attack from a host of
Foucault’s critics. This concluding chapter traces two common avenues of accusation
that Foucault’s work has attracted, and does so as a means to conclude with a final
combinatorial appraisal of our two anti-dogmatic methods. The challenge of these two
accusations is of a kind quite different to that encountered in Chapter IV, in which
Merquior’s argument was shown to result from a straightforward misunderstanding of
the status of Foucault’s methods. This is partly because both the two accusations appear
to be somewhat compatible with our current aspectival reading, and therefore constitute
more interesting, and more serious, charges. In defending Foucault I will be turning to
certain methodological qualifications that were earlier established in this thesis, and in so
doing, clarify the end to which he is shown to be aiming, one concerning freedom. Yet
the freedom I will argue for will not be understood as simply equivalent to liberation, for
I argue that such an understanding, treated as the defining end of philosophy, does
indeed result in troubling inconsistencies in method. When his work is instead
understood as a concern for the creative aspect of freedom that makes such liberation
possible, these two accusations fail to impact. We will examine the idea of creativity as a
‘s source of freedom’ by reference to three values Foucault himself posited as giving form
to his method; those of refusal, curiosity and innovation. I will argue that these three
qualifications constitute what can best be explained in those terms derived from and
developed in this thesis, in a manner which confirms the aptness of my earlier exegesis
concerning the purposes of both Foucault and Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

In this way, I will conclude by demonstrating the inaccuracy of those critics who
treat Foucault’s work as failing simply because it cannot posit a principled foundation for
the subject’s nature, one which could provide a universal, nativist or theoretical grounds
for resistance. This refusal will be considered in the light of Wittgenstein’s own refusal to
posit theoretical principles in his own methods. Indeed, not only this conclusion, but the
means by which it is reached, will be demonstrably influenced by the arguments put
forth in my earlier reading of Wittgenstein. Likewise, by chapter’s end, I will have
provided reasons why a new set of historical methods concerned with averting
dogmatism have now become available for Wittgensteinian philosophical activity. More
generally, I will have advanced a reading by which both our methods can be understood
as a concern with the unbounded possibilities in how we conceive of the world. That is,
I will show how they propose methods by which to undermine those hitherto invisible habits of thought that restrict ‘creativity’ – understood as a summative term by which to express the possibility for innovative conception of the world.

§6.1 Normativity and the failure of method

In order to begin framing these criticisms we first turn to Slavoj Žižek, a cultural theorist who, despite his sympathy for Foucault’s projects, takes great exception with his optimistic conception of resistance. Specifically, in his book *The Ticklish Subject*, Žižek argued that, once analysed in a self-consistent manner, the proposed task of conceptual resistance becomes an act impossible to achieve by using Foucault’s notation. His central premise for this argument concerns Foucault’s representation of resistance as a kind of ‘counter-power’ – that is, as that potential for a subject to “pervert” the normative totalities that have, until that act of resistance, determined the conceptions of the subject with a kind of exclusivity that informs the judgements that subject sees as feasible, and the kind of objects that subject is prepared to recognize as pertinent (see §5.3 & §1.4). Žižek claims that Foucault fails to be consistent in the consequences that derive from his depiction of resistance as being necessarily emergent from the strategic relations it perverts. Because of the irremediable nature of this relation, in which “power and resistance (counter-power) presuppose and generate each another”, it makes about as much sense to expect a subject to transcend those power relations that are the terms of its own expression, as for a trout to attempt to liberate itself onto a riverbank. For Žižek, Foucault’s earlier “embarrassment” at the predictable and binary resistance that he witnessed being inspired by his own work is therefore well-deserved, and must be seen as a rather disappointing and ineluctable feature of his proposed practice. This is because Foucault advocates only the playful mutation of new power relations, rather than a form of emancipatory resistance proper, namely “[a] resistance that would not be ‘part of the game’ but would allow the subject to assume a position that exempts him from the disciplinary/confessional mode of power”. Foucault’s subject can at best replicate negatively, in its refusal or denial, a variant of the totality it

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3 Cf: pp251–7.
5 Ibid, p251.
6 Cf: p149.
7 Žižek 1999, p251.
seeks to overturn. Seen in this light, an act of resistance appears as an inconsequential elaboration on the continuous totalities that are expressed as a subject, rather than an actual escape from a form of dogmatic determination.

This criticism did not wholly originate with Žižek. Five years before he wrote *The Ticklish Subject*, Joan Copjec accused Foucault of a similar failure, couching it in terms very relevant to this thesis. For her, it is his “disallowance of any reference to a principle … that ‘transcends’ the regime of power he analyses” that renders Foucault’s genealogical models useless. What Copjec takes to be Foucault’s squeamishness – namely his constant refusal to provide any principles by which we might form a theory of the subject – results in a form of notation that allows for no negation that could not be “absorbed” by the power regime it contests. Because of this lack in Foucault’s accounts, the subject is left with nothing to refer to as the universal *foundation* for its resistance. The presumed totalities that Foucault presents as being so problematic cannot be countered by, for example, a principled determination of mankind’s dignity in lieu of its rationality. Such a determination, made familiar by authors of the Enlightenment, for example, might permit an absolute refusal, one predicated upon an inalienable principle of the subject that, if threatened, can, in virtue of its categorical nature, overrule the offending problematic. According to Žižek and Copjec, this absence of such foundations in Foucault’s accounts renders it impossible “for individuals to re-articulate and displace the power mechanisms they are caught in”. In this absence, attempts at resistance instead perpetuate the terms of those relations. For this class of critic, the subject, when left without foundation, is conceived of as some kind of sandpit in which power can render its effects unopposed. The facet of Foucault’s descriptions, then, that strikes such a powerful note in our imagination, is the very same facet that renders us incapable of acting upon it, namely that

The individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on by the exercise of power. The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the *product* of a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces.

If the conceptions by which I appear to myself as a subject are radically contingent and historical in nature, then it is vain for me to search for a freedom from relations of

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9 Ibid, p253. Žižek, of course, recommends a more *Lacanian* notion of resistance.
10 1980a, pp73-4, my emphasis.
power, if they are the only means which allow our emergence as subjects. If we therefore refrain from positing foundations from which to express resistance, then we are left no recourse to a force necessary to contravene or overcome those relations that do develop and express themselves through our subjectivity. This argument is one of the most serious criticisms levelled at Foucault, centering, as it does, on an apparently ineluctable problem of power, and has had many incarnations. Predating both Žižek and Copjec, for instance, we can witness Baudrillard’s complaint that Foucault’s presents power as “always already there, purged of all negativity, a network, a rhizome, a contiguity diffracted ad infinitum.”

In a more pedestrian manner, Charles Taylor similarly reflects that there can be “no escape from power into freedom”. Vighi and Feldner put it succinctly when they state that the “burning question fuelling this cluster of criticisms is whether the problem of resistance can be conceptualised at all without a proper theory of the subject as the centre and source of possible resistance.” How, in Foucault’s reading, then, can such relations be represented as anything other than inescapable and ubiquitous? And of course, this further begs the question, “Why should the subject be indeterminable? Why not have a theory of the subject?”

The second common critique to be levelled at Foucault’s notations relates to this question, for it is the equally common charge that an elided normativity is operating in Foucault’s work. While this normative critique has been eagerly adopted by exegetes such as Nancy Fraser and Rudy Visker, amongst a host of others, it was Habermas who originally charged that Foucault could “give no account of the normative foundations of [his] own rhetoric”. Authors such as Fraser inherited this concern from an infamously bitter dispute between Habermas and Foucault, and continue to advance it along much the same lines. In so doing, they are liable to pose questions that

11 1987, p17.
12 2007, p90.
13 E.g.: “Freedom is precisely what many anglo-american commentators have complained is missing in Foucault's history. D&P Confronts Clifford Geertz with 'a kind of whig history in reverse – a history in spite of itself, of the rise of unfreedom.'” (in Rajchman 1985, pp50-51)
15 Visker argued as much with me, at the Leuven 2008 Foucault Masterclass, and was responsible for originally posing this problem to me, for which I am thankful. See, for example: “Isn’t the only chance of still using such a conception of power meaningfully, without lapsing back into rejected naturalism of a repressive concept of power, to be found in introducing a normative framework?” (Visker 1995, p126).
16 Habermas 1985, p344.
17 Cf Owen 1999.
can sound particularly dangerous for Foucault’s hopes as to what his projects can achieve, such as the following:

Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought domination to be resisted? Only with the introduction of normative notions of some kind could Foucault begin to answer this question. Only with the introduction of normative notions could he begin to tell us what is wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime and why we ought to resist it.\(^{18}\)

Thus are we led to ask: ‘By what criteria does Foucault feel pressed to ask those problematic questions in particular?’ ‘Surely the purpose of them must be derived from some notion of what is preferable in human life?’ Or put more charitably, ‘what tactics will be most effective in encouraging the task of resistance, according to certain defining principles of what it is to be human?’ If Foucault is indeed to be understood as the nominalist *par excellence* – as the theorist who refused all theories of the subject – then what can he possibly base his diagnoses and genealogical models upon, if not a normative idea of what we should be? Taylor insists that not only are these normative elements missing, or perhaps elided, in Foucault’s accounts, but further, if they were to be introduced (or rather confessed to) then Foucault’s notation would be rendered as ironically contiguous with the discourses he critiques, positing, as it does, characteristics which are to be treated as immobile, obvious, natural. His work would also be somewhat duplicitous, for the norms it posits are covert and thus are likely to go unrecognised by their reader. Secondly, relative to my reading, what can we say is the experiential function of the genealogical models produced by Foucault? If we do acknowledge their aim as dislocatory rather than veridical, as I have argued, then what directs the selection and presentation of these models as apt to the reader, if not normative (and therefore presumably, at the last, veridical) considerations as to how that reader should conceive?

This leaves us with two hard problems to be addressed. They are the more esoteric Žižekian question of – ‘if resistance definitionally collapses into the iteration of power and counter-power, what then is its worth?’ And the longstanding Habermasian question of ‘Why should an attempt to resist be viewed as a normatively positive goal? And even if resistance were possible, how should one hope to distinguish its success without appeal to a normative set of criteria by which to do so?’ In responding to these two churches of criticism – let us label them broadly as the accusations of ineluctability and normativity – we could of course try to proceed in a manner employed elsewhere in

\(^{18}\) Fraser 1989, p283.
this thesis. Then the mistake made by our critics would be to misinterpret the task of Foucault’s analysis – that of inciting an individual’s resistance – as one involving the positing, then overturning of, a complete and existent matrix of Institutional Power. Yet such matrices do not ‘exist’: instead of being posited ontically, reference to them is a facet of Foucault’s anti-dogmatic methods, whose purpose is to help in the formation of a political will, one that employs singularities and counter-models in the task of destabilising the remit of totalising concepts, thus transforming the rules by which the individual and her cultural universe are experienced. Žižek’s somewhat Marxist Foucault (a distant relation of the Foucault presented here), involved as he is in building exhaustive models of subjugation, would indeed offer no respite from the play of power upon the subject, but this account comes only at the expense of treating his methods veridically, instead of inceptively.

However, this maneuver on its own (perhaps familiar to my reader in its similarity to that advanced in Chapter IV), actually offers little hope of saving his methods from these criticisms. If Foucault’s philosophy “rests upon the postulate of an absolute optimism”, while in its effects it achieves nothing but to provide a convincing new notation by which an individual comes to regard itself as irrevocably determined by restrictive totalities, then it must, by its own criteria, be rejected as repulsively ill-formed. Therefore aspectivally understood, Foucault’s regulative ideal would still mean that resistance fails to incite the formation of a new way of conceiving that escapes from that which it was purposed to achieve, if resistance truly amounts only to a form of counter-power. This has the unfortunate effect of making these criticisms all the more acute, for the ends to which these philosophies are to be understood as primarily being directed towards, are now made unachievable by the methods they recommend.

It will be useful to note that these arguments both respond to an understanding of the aims of Foucault’s methods as enabling a certain kind of freedom. This understanding is well-rehearsed, and not particularly controversial; indeed it is prevalent in many of the texts we have relied upon during this thesis. For one such example, let us return to the purpose of philosophy, as conceived of by Owen and Heyes in my Introduction. Philosophy, as practiced by both Foucault and Wittgenstein, is intended to unshackle its practitioner from a “state of unfreedom” brought about by aspectival captivity, itself a

19 All of my investigations rest on a postulate of absolute optimism. I do not conduct my analyses in order to say: this is how things are, look how trapped you are. I say certain things only to the extent to which I see them as capable of permitting the transformation of reality.” (Foucault 1991d, p174)
condition whereby “one cannot re-orient one’s reflection”\textsuperscript{20} due to a refusal to accept the possibilities of alternate pictures by which to orient oneself to the world. My exegesis is largely in agreement with this qualification.

Yet as Žižek et al argued earlier, the act of resistance as counter-power means that freedom becomes the freedom only to alter the manner of the relation, but never the fact of the relation itself; freedom flatters to deceive because it is always a freedom to choose from a set of criteria for action and judgement that are preconfigured within our current conceptual unities: thanks to Foucault’s austere nominalism, no others are on offer. At most, resistance can be conceived as the reconfiguration of those totalities by which it operates, if it were predicated upon a theory of the subject in which to ground that configuration. That binary presentation of a false pair of either/or referents, which so irked Foucault earlier,\textsuperscript{21} is an example of what freedom appears as in Žižek’s reading: the freedom to choose between determined alternates. Put another way, the freedom Žižek presents in relation to the inescapability of power relations is only the liberty to select from different options within the scheme of one’s entrapment. As Hofmeyr puts it,

\begin{quote}
If the subject merely reacts to imposed identities, he or she inevitably remains tied to the latter. And although the individual is then supposedly free to choose his or her own norms, these norms are not of his or her own making.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

Clearly, then, the freedom which Foucault advances as his methodological purpose cannot simply be the liberty to “merely react” to what is imposed upon one. Neither can it, however, represent something akin to Sartre’s positing of freedom as a fundamental ontological feature of our existence.\textsuperscript{23} The methodological reasons for this should have been made quite apparent by this point in the thesis: if we are concerned with alleviating the conceptual unities that are posited of us, then to do so by reliance on a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{20}]Owen 2002, p218.
\item[\textsuperscript{21}]Cf: p149.
\item[\textsuperscript{22}]Hofmeyr 2006, pp222–3.
\item[\textsuperscript{23}]Interestingly, Foucault sees Sartre’s notion of the practice of creativity as the only useful consequence to be derived from his position: “I think that the only acceptable practical consequence of what Sartre has said is to link his theoretical insight to the practice of creativity—and not of authenticity. From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art. In his analyses of Baudelaire, Flaubert, etc., it is interesting to see that Sartre refers the work of creation to a certain relation to oneself—the author to himself—which has the form of authenticity or of inauthenticity. I would like to say exactly the contrary: we should not have to refer the creative activity of somebody to the kind of relation he has to himself, but should relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative activity.” (Foucault, in Rabinow 1994, p235)
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
freshly posited unifying conception of what we must all be is hardly methodologically consistent. Foucault, while certainly being tempted himself to posit such an “originary freedom”, refuses the temptation to do so.²⁴

While we can assert the philosophical methods that variously concern their readings of Foucault as indeed being concerned with dispelling a state of conceptual immobility, his purpose cannot be reducible to the state of captivity’s inverse, ‘freedom’, for this notion is imprecise in its account of what his methods are intended to effect. “Freedom to adopt what subjectivity?” might be the Žižekian reply. Worse, as we have now seen, an unconstrained and ‘vanilla’ qualification of freedom leaves Foucault open to charges of authoring a kind of covert descriptive deceit, one that doesn’t acknowledge the criteria of its own edicts, that begins its nominalist critique half-way through, and thereby elides the conditionals of its own practice.

§6.2 Three sources of freedom

There are many avenues by which to substantiate a defense of Foucault’s philosophy from these two accusations, but I choose to begin with an interview given in 1980. It is useful in its specificity, for Foucault begins that conversation with a frank account of what concerns motivate his method. He imagines being asked “Why do you do the work that you do?” and formulates a simple and stark account in reply, beginning “Here are the values that I propose.”²⁵ I judge this interview to be particularly apt in answering the two earlier accusations, because of Foucault’s comfort in asserting the fundamentality of the values of refusal, curiosity and innovation, not only to the method he proposes, but also, surprisingly, in some way, to his understanding of them as being

[o]ne of the tasks, one of the meanings of human existence—the source of human freedom— [namely,] never to accept anything as definitive, untouchable, obvious, or immobile. No aspect of reality should be allowed to become a definitive and inhuman law for us.²⁶

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²⁵ 1988a, p1. As we shall see, his account of freedom as being derived from these three values interrelates closely with many of his other remarks, and so we can be confident that this was not an isolated concern. Further, in this interview, Foucault qualifies his works on madness and prison, for example, as precipitated by the same concerns.

²⁶ Ibid.
Of all of his exegetes, perhaps Paul Rajchman most leans towards characterising Foucault foremost in terms of this “virtue”\textsuperscript{27} of refusal – that of never accepting “anything as definitive, untouchable, obvious, or immobile.”\textsuperscript{28} For this reason, we will turn to Rajchman often during the following discussions. Refusal perhaps represents the most obvious of the three values, when considering them as constituting a form of resistance. In qualifying refusal, we can begin by recalling how, in §1.4, we saw aspects as being alternate to each other, as competing with, excluding and replacing one another, and thus being termed ‘optional’ in their adoption by Baker. The term ‘aspect’ describes this characteristic, namely, that there are different ways in which we judge something to be the case, and certain ways of conceiving lead one into confusion because they assume a total, exhaustive status – yet an aspect can equally relieve us of the problems associated with that way of understanding it replaces. The pertinent features that appear to us when attending to that thing, become the means of verifying that aspect but, of course, only certain connections and characteristics will appear to us as pertinent when conceived under a particular aspect, and so we seem to have no recourse to avoid this way of seeing, for it just \textit{is} the way the world is. This was taken to be what Wittgenstien referred to when he remarked that we are confused “because the forms of representation of our language have taken on a disquieting aspect”;\textsuperscript{29} we find ourselves unable “to rid ourselves of the implications of our symbolism.”\textsuperscript{30} Refusal can be related to this model directly, as the capacity, or will, to treat as dubious the implications of the aspect we are currently operating under, to suspend the exclusivity inherent in our understanding. Foucault’s value of refusal is – in much the same way as we saw in the earlier discussion of difficulties of the will in Chapter III – one rendered highly problematic by the connections and assumptions that appear necessary in the light cast by the exclusivity of our conceptions. Gordon Baker put it well when he remarked that because of the difficulty of their disproval, and the exclusionary effect they have upon competing accounts, “[c]onceptions may be damaging because they make certain lines of thinking impossibly arduous (or unnatural) to pursue. (They exert a palpable tyranny without any apparent restriction of freedom!).”\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{27} Cf: Foucault 1997d.
\textsuperscript{28} Rajchman 1985, p98.
\textsuperscript{29} TS 220, §98.
\textsuperscript{30} BB, p108.
\textsuperscript{31} NA, p287.
In Wittgensteinian terms, then, refusal can be considered as a concern for, and an overcoming of, the exclusivity by which aspects occupy us in a manner which does not acknowledge their optionality of application. In the absence of such refusal, we are presented only with obvious ‘answers’, predicated by means of the aspect we operate by, as being always and already easily ‘to hand’, to be relied upon to steadfastly remain so. To refuse the terms upon which this certainty is legitimated can seem a pointless, destructive task, a reaction Wittgenstein seemed to experience during his investigations.\(^{32}\) Recall that we earlier posited that “[s]eeing an aspect and imagining are subject to the will.”\(^{33}\) The will to see according to an established mode of thought is not so easily overturned, being complicated by its refusal’s potential for upsetting the authoritative positions that legislate for what Foucault sometimes termed “crystallized”\(^{34}\) power relations – a description intended to draw attention to those cases in which “organisations are created to freeze the relations of power, hold those relations in a state of asymmetry, so that a certain number of persons get an advantage, socially, economically, politically, institutionally, etc.”\(^{35}\) Because of this, certain refusals will be more obvious to us, while others, due to our dependence upon certain conceptions in the justification of our current advantageous position, will certainly not. The will to refuse is rendered as a personal undertaking made far more difficult by the fact that one may have to make revisions to those seemingly definitive and untouchable laws upon whose certainty we predicate and by which we may be physically, economically and emotionally profiting. Consider that for Foucault, however, in treating seriously this value of refusal we do not necessarily become embroiled in an utterly chaotic lived experience\(^{36}\) – it “doesn’t mean that one must live in an indefinite discontinuity.” It instead implies an attitude or style of thinking that allows the possibility for the adoption of alternate aspects, one that allows you to “consider all points of fixity, of immobilization, as elements in a tactics, in a strategy”, \(^{37}\) rather than as characteristics inherent in the object we conceive of.

\(^{32}\) Cf: PI §118, and “It came into my head today as I was thinking about my philosophical work and saying to myself ‘I destroy, I destroy, I destroy.’” (CV. P21)

\(^{33}\) PI, p213.

\(^{34}\) See, for example, Foucault 1983, p222.

\(^{35}\) 1988a, p1.

\(^{36}\) Although we must certainly become used to living in more chaos that we would otherwise be used to – “When philosophizing you have to descend into the old chaos & feel at home there.” (MS 136, 51a: 3.1.1948)

\(^{37}\) 1988a, p1.
Yet this refusal should not to be lionized as an exemplar of an absolute condition. Such a principled use of the notion, while it would be most satisfying for Copjec, would, Foucault claims, amount to “the theoretical and philosophical paroxysm” of an “originary aspiration”, generalized from particular instances of individual acts of refusal (namely here, in this thesis, those of Wittgenstein and Foucault). If we want to understand why Foucault recoils from establishing such a principled understanding of refusal, even when it appears to be in sympathy with his practice, we would do well to reconsider a qualification made in §5.3. There, we saw totality as problematic due to its attempts to normalize a field of human phenomena which is radically indeterminable, and massively complex. As was argued by Hacking, the means by which totality can actually hold true is through a ‘looping effect’ it has upon a subject; the subject is brought to freely employ those invariant and reductive models in a determining coordination of their own behavior and that of those around them, thus ‘proving’ the totality that constricted their understanding. Essentially, then, the need for refusal arises because of the apparent universality of a totalized conception, when the phenomena so conceived of are irreducible to the strictures of that conception’s necessary features. The task of avoiding dogma means that to recognize an aspect as an aspect is instead the immediate task confronting us, and this ability to make different applications of an aspect is predicated upon a form, or technique, of recognition.

But the will to refuse, understood in this way as a technique – not a universal condition appealed to – would, without methodological rigor, amount to little more than a predisposition to a form of stubbornness, rather than a deep critique of the conditions of our thought, and the practice of outstripping them. So we are in need of a method by which to acquire the techniques that allow us to refuse the self-evident, or else little effect is achieved. Perhaps Wittgenstein describes something along these line in the following remark: “Someone reacts like this: he says "Not that!" — & resists it. Out of this situations perhaps develop which are equally intolerable; & perhaps by then strength for any further revolt is exhausted.” The will to refuse is not enough, for we need to have, ready to hand, the specific means by which we can further problematise what we refuse, and the means to encourage one to pursue an investigation after its first

38 1997d, p72.
39 … “We say ‘If he hadn’t done that, the evil would not have come about.’ But with what justification? Who knows the laws according to which society unfolds? I am sure even the cleverest has no idea. If you fight, you fight. If you hope, you hope.” (CV, p69)
dislocatory, or redeeming, instance has been experienced: refusal for its own sake is not yet antidogmatic. Refusal can therefore be understood as a precondition for the will to undertake an aspectival philosophy, but with the value of curiosity as its accompaniment.

Curiosity is concerned with provoking in one a “casualness in regard to the traditional hierarchies of the important and the essential.” In the current scheme of interpretation, it can be demonstrated to overlap with that element which we first made sense of in Chapter II, as the ‘task of the reader’. There, the role of objects of comparison – namely to draw the reader into considering alternate possibilities by which to make sense of a philosophical confusion by means of either factual or fictive instances – was one concerned with inciting the reader’s curiosity. All references in this thesis to provocation, incitement, prompting, etc., centre upon this concept of curiosity as the precondition for “changing the way one looks at things”, of “straying afield of oneself”, and summed up by Foucault as “a readiness to find strange and singular what surrounds us”. Just as Wittgenstein’s method – in which his reader is tasked with distending his open-ended scenarios – when successful, already involves one in an act of philosophy relative to one’s own investigations, so too Foucault cites his own curiosity as both the motivating activity for his own research and the defining instrumental character of his work’s effect. So while both genealogical and grammatical investigations are personal accounts of their authors’ struggle against dogmatism, that should not be considered the sum total of their methods. In addition, either the Investigations or Discipline and Punish “could be called a textbook. [They do] not teach by imparting knowledge, but by stimulating the thinking.” These text-books are intended “as invitations, as public gestures, for those who may eventually want to do the same thing, or something like it, or, in any case, who intend to slip into this kind of experience.”

The notion of curiosity is closely related to the double function of these texts; it is both the operative condition of their authors’ activity, and the intended effect upon their reader. To both authors, the foreclosure of the task of philosophy as a “learnt” experience is therefore antithetical; both are striking in their portrayal of the importance of their reader’s own contingent imaginative consideration and employment of those scenarios with which they populate their methods. I therefore posit this parallel as an effect of both Foucault and Wittgenstein’s concern with stimulating conceptual curiosity, as well as a shared motivation that drove both men to undertake, to revise, and restart their transformative

40 1988a, p1.
41 1991c, p38.
investigations with such unwavering relentlessness and passion. Foucault sums up this inspiration in the following manner:

As for what motivated me, it is quite simple, I would hope that in the eyes of some people it might be sufficient in itself. It was curiosity — the only kind of curiosity, in any case, that is worth acting upon with a degree of obstinacy: not the curiosity that seeks to assimilate what it is proper for one to know, but that which enables one to get free of oneself. After all, what would be the value of the passion for knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to the extent possible, in the knower's straying afield of himself? There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all.

Curiosity, by this reading, represents the willingness to not just refuse dogmatic accounts, but to engage with and investigate alternates, and the consideration of the plausibility of other narratives, other schemes of organisation. Through this thesis’s parallelism, we can give a precise methodological sense to Foucault’s qualification of curiosity as “an acute sense of the real which, however, never becomes fixed”. And so finally, we can now provide details of the end result of both forms of philosophical critique, understood under this scheme as a practice derived from a refusal to accept one’s current aspects of understanding as exclusive, and a curiosity to investigate and fabricate alternate aspects according to freshly admitted possibilities. This can be understood as the expression of innovation, resulting in an exploration of “what might be changed, in its own thought, through the practice of a knowledge that is foreign to it.” Two types of thoughtful achievement – the genealogically achieved dislocatory experience and the grammatically produced aspectival switch – have been posited as the principle aims of our two sets of methods. Both now also appear as related models by which to describe the form of innovation that concerns Foucault in this interview. What was mapped out in our earlier discussions was a radical alteration in the dynamics of our conceptions,

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42 Foucault employs these two adjective in his description of the effect of curiosity, thus: “a certain relentlessness in ridding ourselves of our familiarities and looking at things otherwise; a passion for seizing what is happening now and what is passing away; a lack of respect for traditional hierarchies of the important and the essential.” (1997a p305)


44 1997a, p305: I take this remark to be in sympathy to our earlier qualification of perspicuity in §1.4.

not achieved by a change in the subjects that we conceive of, but in the conceptions themselves, that project their unity onto the subjects. Nominalist refusal, and aspectival perspicuity, are different expressions of the related goal of innovation, brought about by the consideration of alternative exclusive aspects. Further, as we have seen, both practices are recommending a fundamental form of self-innovation by means not only of a broadening of the models one is willing to operate by, but by the completion or recreation of new, unconsidered ones too, making new connections, new comparisons and new histories. Innovation is therefore also a form of resistance to the kind of foreclosure of certain avenues of existence, which also makes others seem obligatory and mundane, that Foucault ceaselessly recommends.\footnote{To qualify what I mean by innovation here; I am not referring to “global” innovation, by which something never thought, done or made before is brought into the world; such a qualification is of little interest to us here. Instead, innovation refers to the alteration of one’s own “local” thoughts, deeds or creations, in a manner that alters the terms by which these acts previously occurred, thus resulting in a new instantiation.}

These three values of refusal, curiosity and innovation, explicated in interview with Foucault, and in close parallel to the findings of this thesis’s exegesis, will hereafter be referred to under the term ‘creativity’. What we thus label as creativity is, demonstrably, not an optional component in Foucault’s method, but understood correctly, as the source of the freedom his philosophy is tailored to achieve, it is instead its necessary component. I posit that it is, further, the selfsame capacity for resistance, inscribed in his modeling of the power of totalising generality as its transformative, transgressive, “irreducible opposite.” Resistance is qualified by Foucault as entailing self-governance through a series of ongoing "relationships of differentiation, of creation and innovation”\footnote{1984 interview, quoted in Lazzarato 2002, p111.} with oneself. It is to be “not solely a negation but a creative process. To create and recreate, to transform the situation, to participate actively in the process, \textit{that is to resist."} The particular acts of freedom that emerges from this method are thus best understood as solely being a series of effects – singular, contextually variable, and therefore theoretically unimportant, instantiations of an unending and uncompleteable ethic of revolt. Crucially, and similarly to Wittgenstein’s method, his reader’s acknowledgement is the pivot for its success, with acknowledgement (understood in §2.3) as the accompaniment of an innovative conceptual experience: “acknowledgement of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently”\footnote{Ibid.}. This is
why the best candidate as to what resistance looks like is provided in this thesis as the point of juncture noted in the intended aims of Foucault and Wittgenstein’s methods: dislocatory experience and aspectival perspicuity, respectively. Thus I advance creative relationships of differentiation, between alternate aspects that are both voluntary and exclusive, as our best candidate for construing resistance.

In relation to this qualification of resistance, consider the earlier premise from the first half of this thesis – that the aim of Wittgenstein’s philosophy was the incitement of a style of thought, a kind of perspicuity that involves switching between conceptual aspects, and knowing how to employ alternate notations that trigger this switch. There, perspicuity became an ability to cycle through different conceptual aspects, rather than a comprehensive tabulation of the inner structure of our concepts, legitimating a greater and greater totality in our one exclusive model. It was rendered as an ability one develops, rather than a synoptic position afforded by the good work of past philosophers, with such an ability’s aim being to allow one to approach one’s concepts without prejudice. A perspicuous representation was, on these grounds, to be comprehended as an achievement term, rather than a synoptic model of grammar. Similarly, creativity is now widely taken to be the capacity to comprehend the world in a new manner, to describe it in a new lexicon, to think novelty, inventively, in a manner which alters, yet is not bound to, previous ways of seeing.

Finally, before we turn to addressing the two accusations that began this chapter, it is important to consider as a side-note that, in many of the most influential theories that concern creativity, an activity somewhat analogous to aspectival shifting is predicated as the key to its nature. For example, Arthur Koestler’s labyrinthine, repetitive yet rather compelling treatise on the subject, is predicated upon his notion of bisociation, which he takes to be the movement by which “the perceiving of a situation or idea ... in two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference” is to be achieved.50 The cognitive science theories of Margaret Boden, et al, inherit from Koestler this notion of bisociation as the foundational principle for a naturalistic inquiry into the condition of creativity. Einstein often conjectured on what he referred to as “combinatorial play” as being the principle characteristic of creative human thought, while his friend Bohm, the polymath and quantum physicist, was similarly concerned with the terms by which “the mind is free, at any moment, to give attention to new differences and new similarities, allowing for the perception of a new structure of

50 Koestler 1964, p35, my emphasis.
‘things.’\textsuperscript{51} The acts of looking in a new way, of transcending the historical conditions of our conceptualisation, are experiential and experimental and, for Bohm, to “experiment in this way with the formation of new structures is thus seen as a creative act, in part because it suspends the constraints of both personal and historical conditioning, thereby enabling one to acquire a new perspective.”\textsuperscript{52} In agreement with this thesis, and contra Boden, Koestler, et al, Bohm concluded that anyone concerned with encouraging creativity is duty bound to recognise that it cannot be secured by simply following another, or setting up another as his authority for the definition of what creativity is and for advice on how it is to be obtained. Unless one starts to discover this for himself, rather than to try to achieve the apparent security of a well-laid-out pattern of action, he will just be deluding himself and thus wasting his efforts. To realise this fact is very difficult indeed. Nevertheless, one has to see that, to determine the order in which one functions by following some kind of pattern, is the very essence of what it means to be mediocre and mechanical.\textsuperscript{53}

Each of these theorists, despite their alternate disciplines and approaches, demonstrate a varying degree of sympathy with the models advanced here. Yet I do not take any of these limited sympathies as grounds to reveal the ‘truth’ of our model of philosophical method, nor to secure the use of any of their theoretical features along analogous lines in this thesis, nor to posit a technical term under which to advance a new combined philosophy. The reason for their relevance is instead in prompting us to consider the centrality to our lives of the issues that our methods address. Koestler uses his notion of bisociation to qualify a width swath of human phenomena, including scientific and artistic discovery, both the genius and the mundane, our humour and our inventions. Boden believes her own theory of creativity to apply so maximally that it explains equally well both computer and human cognition, citing examples of artificial intelligence which she holds to be continuous with human creativity. Bohm, contrastingly, seeks in his accounts of creativity an alleviation of the mechanical habits

\textsuperscript{51} Bohm 2005, p101.

\textsuperscript{52} Lee Nichol, in Bohm 2005.

\textsuperscript{53} “It is a difficulty which I can’t remove if I try to make you see the problems. I can’t give you a startling solution which suddenly will remove all your difficulties. I can’t find one key which will unlock the door of our safe.” (MS 153b, p30; also see Chapter III.) It can be noted, as an aside, that this thesis is not in complete agreement with the arguments of Bohm. This is because he is eager to posit a perfect, underlying truthful veridicality, which we may approach, if only we are capable of sloughing off dogmatic thought. The disanalogy of this position with mine should be quite obvious.
of thoughts in his society, in his science and in the words of those around him, in a manner much closer to those examined in this thesis, while Einstein reflected upon the activity of combinatorial play as the *sine qua non* for his own work, and for leaps of human intelligence in general. Regardless of the accuracy of this array of positivities, or the new problems that asserting their truthfulness would give rise to, we can use their attempts to model human creativity as indicators of what Foucault is gesturing towards when he describes creativity as “one of the tasks, one of the meanings of human existence—the source of human freedom”. Hence, while both methods are adamant in their refusal that their methods can be derived from those fundamental principles that seem to constitute those theories briefly considered above, they none the less concern themselves with an aspect of human life that holds a very significant place in our understanding of ourselves, suggested by this brief theoretical overview. If their styles of philosophy achieve their intended outcome, stimulating the reader into thinking for themselves, filling out the detail into a whole field of inventive scenarios, in a manner sensitive to their own conceptions and confusions, then creative acknowledgement is assured by, and synchronous with, their taking part in investigation. Something would thereby be achieved in our methods that relates to a deep concern, and a key qualification of those events, deeds, acts and arts that are of paramount importance to our lives, and it is this, rather than the positing of an ontic and originary freedom, that I contend to be Foucault’s referent. By positing refusal, curiosity and innovation as the key values of his work, Foucault must then do justice to them, rather than posit new creeds by which to restrict their occurrence.

We have already investigated the manner in which the provision of incomplete, fictive and imaginative scenarios was not intended to provide a *complete set of* conceptual templates by which an individual might have their problems indubitably resolved. Oddly enough, exhaustiveness – for so long one of the regulative principles of philosophical theories – is thereby rendered as a pejorative, rather than being the noble end of philosophical reflection. The “mechanisation” of one’s thought, to borrow Bohm’s term for a moment, that can be legitimated by the assumption of a concept’s exclusivity is considered deeply harmful, regardless of the perfection of the coordinated theory that

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54 I broadly take Miller’s understanding of Foucault’s use of the term ‘positivity’ to be correct, i.e.: “By ‘positivity’, [Foucault] seems to have had in mind how certain ways of thinking, by embodying a certain style of reasoning, ordered some aspect of existence or defined some field of knowledge.” (Miller 2000, p29)
inspired its immobility. Relatedly, perspicuous representation is best conceived of as an achievement term, with the models that trigger this achievement being “only meant to enable the reader to shift for himself when he encounters conceptual difficulties.”

Likewise, the genealogies that Foucault constructed “ought to be taken as 'propositions', 'game openings' where those who may be interested are invited to join in – they are not meant as dogmatic assertions that have to be taken or left en bloc.” Their intent is not so much predictive, or indeed exhaustive, but inceptive of an imaginative and performative self-relation, to occur after the reader’s encounter with their texts, when they next find themselves tempted to apply those aspects that have been problematised therein.

§6.3 Answering the accusations of normativity and ineluctability

We have located the concern of Foucault’s methods as being the source of freedom, experienced by him as the three characteristics of refusal, curiosity and innovation, subsumed under the notion of creativity. The aim is “to replace an Idealist philosophy of final emancipation with a nominalist philosophy of endless revolt.” This aim does not propose nor posit an originary freedom as the restricted, hidden nature of human existence, for neither does it promise transcendence from the conditions of its previous conceptual captivity, and nor does it substantiate these values as necessary conditions of the subject. It instead offers them as values by which to proceed. We are given the methodological means for the achievement of refusal, curiosity and innovation. We now understand both methods as the recorded expression of a creative impulse, not a new set of positivities concerning its necessary conditions, regardless of the potential for the employment of these methods in more theoretical undertakings.

Now, presumably, someone convinced of our earlier two accusations might well respond to this account in the following way: ‘Very well, but why doesn’t this merely represent the reiteration of exactly what Foucault is pejoratively charged with, namely, the refusal to locate a principled grounding for his representation of the subject? How does the advancement of such wholly negative qualifications as refusal, curiosity and innovation in any way constitute a rebuttal to this accusation? Isn’t it just a

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35 PI, p206.

36 Foucault 1991a, p74.

37 Rajchman 1985, p93.
reformulation of the original charge, that Foucault places a vacuum at the heart of his account of the subject?"

In part, answering these questions demands that we first turn briefly back to the important differentiation made in the last chapter, overlooked by many of Foucault’s critics, between his notions of totality and power. This is because Foucault clearly had no problem with the exercise of power per se – in fact he seems to treat inequality in relations as somewhat inevitable in any complex social setting. It is instead the conceptual totalities, which come to formulate and crystallize power relations, that are his fundamental concern. It is when one makes someone (or oneself) do something, of their own free will, by means of an appeal to a fixed, determinate and immobile account of what they must be, that an injustice is perpetrated. It is unjust because it overwrites their chance for self-governance with a positivity that determines them as being subject to the exclusivity it posits. As we have seen, this injustice is not only one that is perpetrated against creative self-governance, but is also a problem to be solved by its incitement. But returning to Foucault’s power/totality differentiation, he makes clear below that there is nothing essentially invidious in the act of guiding the behavior of others:

If I accepted the picture of power that is frequently adopted—namely, that it’s something horrible and repressive for the individual—it’s clear that preventing a child from scribbling on the walls would be an unbearable tyranny. But that’s not it: I say that power is a relation. A relation in which one guides the behaviour of others. And there’s no reason why this manner of guiding the behavior of others should not ultimately have results which are positive, valuable, interesting, and so on. If I had a kid, I assure you he would not write on the walls—or if he did, it would be against my will. The very idea!

Therefore, by positing power relations as, in all likelihood, an unavoidable accompaniment of our social lives together, Foucault does not immediately further posit the totalities that might currently operate in our relations as being equally inevitable. Indeed, one good example of such a “positive, valuable, interesting” power relation can be found in the very methods that have concerned us in this thesis – for how else are we to consider them, other than as examples of relations that inform the behavior of their readers? Yet, as it has been argued in this chapter and before, such relations do not

59 Ibid.
supervene upon one’s acceptance of the universality or veridicality of their methods, for they appeal to no total positivity that we must render ourselves by, or in opposition to. Yes, in a certain sense, these methods can be seen as restrictive, in that they advocate the solution to philosophical problems to be a particular switching of one means of representation for another, thus fracturing the exclusivity that adhered to the original concept. But in another, more important, sense they are not so, because they refuse to determine the terms of that shifting in advance of the occasion in which it is called for, and nor do they posit the completed forms of representation that are to achieve the relief of dogmatism. It is, contra Copjec, just that desire – to instantiate a principled account of human nature – that determines exclusive aspects by which we arrive at the conceptual immobility of dogmatism. Copjec’s approach certainly would allow for a form of resistance to competing normative accounts, but only at the high cost of defining the content or worth of an individual’s behavior by its correlation to those principles – namely of instantiating a new totalising and exclusive conception, that (because of its redemptive status) is labelled as of irrevocable importance to our well-being, and thus beyond the reach of critique. I argue that this refusal to posit a principled theory of the subject does not entail a form of transcendental indeterminibility in the subject, which seems to so worry Copjec, Žižek, et al. Instead, this restraint from positing a universal determination occurs due to the effect that such theory has, the temptations it poses for our imagination. It is, then, again, a methodological constraint, entailed by Foucault’s commitment to the creative characteristics of refusal, curiosity and innovation, rather than a metaphysical norm of human nature as being unprincipled. As Foucault remarked,

There is always something ludicrous in philosophical discourse when it tries, from the outside, to dictate to others, to tell them where their truth is and how to find it, or when it works up a case against them in the language of naive positivity.61

The binary function of these texts that was earlier a subject of our inquiry also reveals something important here, in regards to what this commitment means in terms of

60 A cost that is far too high, and far too happily paid, according to Foucault: “The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the ‘social-worker’-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behaviour, his aptitudes, his achievements.” (DP, p304)

methodology. They record, in the role of a ledger, their author’s transformative experience, but do so as to intentionally prompt a similar but non-identical experience in their reader. They are not teachings, nor performances, but philosophical practices, to whom refusal, curiosity and innovation are regulative aspirations for both author and reader. Perhaps, as Wittgenstein remarked earlier, if one were to take such a text the wrong way, then “you’d think it was awful - just noise, discordant notes. You would think it was a poor performance, but it is not a performance at all.”

We have seen how the subject’s removal from Foucault’s genealogical notations has led to many criticisms being levelled at them, and the ensuing troubles involving how he then has any right to make any further commentary. But now we have also seen how I advance the subject’s underdetermination as a result of his methodological practice, rather than of Foucault’s covert metaphysics. If this reading is right, then Foucault’s reason for this credo is not that human nature “is” utterly bereft of systemic tendencies in its configuration of its reality, but rather, that a person’s assumption of an aspect of reality as exclusive, and therefore normatively binding, is the start of a process of inhibition for that person’s capacity for innovative thought. That is both why Foucault refuses the task of giving principles for a theory of the subject, and why Copjec’s criticism in particular misses the mark.

Relatedly, if critics who accuse Foucault of normativity still insist upon treating this methodological constraint as normative, then so be it. But let me offer a way of understanding both Wittgenstein and Foucault as being unconcerned with advancing norms in their methods. Both methods recommend this conceptual light-footedness, not in accordance to a normative ideal concerning how one’s thought must operate, but out of a concern to instigate an experience by which the creative ability to change our way of looking at things is provoked in order to overcome a particular dogma, whether it is one concerning mental processes or our conception of madness. The practice by which we are brought to change our way of seeing certainly can indeed be said to employ norms of a kind, but their status is not prescriptive; they are not accounts of what human nature is, or knowledge must be, or cannot be, but instead are to be understood as elements that define a methodology. Further, we have seen earlier, in §§1.4, 2.1 & 5.3, that these methods are not interdictive, prescriptive, or even strictly veridical in their claims, but are instead open-ended practices that seek to provoke a certain kind of experience, not to effect the accrual of a normatively unified kind of knowledge.

These two sets of methods are also both established by biographical experience, from experiential moments in which the authors managed to dislocate themselves in
some manner that was previously completely inconceivable to them. And this experience by which the inconceivable becomes conceivable is that same one they seek to provoke in their reader. This is why it is imperative to understand these texts as the recorded expressions of creativity, rather than treatises upon such a notion’s essential features. There should be no positing of a theoretical component, nor a normative constraint, concerning creativity, but instead the advancing of different methods, or a set of methods, that can be taken up, intricated, and broken off to no detrimental effect. They are to function as work-books, game openings, provocations, and because of this, in a sense, the only hypothetical element in their work is their hope for their records to help prompt similar experiences in their reader. Therefore only the failure of their method can disprove their notions of the task of philosophy. Yet if they fail to prompt such experiences in their reader, they are not thereby somehow disproved en masse, but are instead judged to be inappropriate or inefficacious for that reader – to exhibit flaws, as it were, in the mirror held up to that reader. It is a great shame, a disappointment, but not a falsification. These methods have already been proved, for they are ledgers of the success of their methods for their inventors. Thus they are poor grounds upon which to formulate an accusation of elided normativity.

To conclude, I am not positing that there is something wrong in accounting for Foucault’s philosophical practice as one concerned with freedom – it is a qualification he often made himself. But if we were to leave it at that we would, like Žižek, derive an improper conception of what effect his philosophy hopes to achieve. The motivating concern, made explicit in this chapter, is with deriving a feasible method that respects the “source of human freedom”, namely the ability to overturn fixed systems of comprehension, by refusing, curious, innovative means. Rajchman accounts for freedom in a manner compatible with this understanding, when he notes that, thus understood, freedom

is rooted not in autonomy or the capacity to determine actions according to rules all must rationally accept, but rather in the unwillingness to comply, the refusal to acquiesce, to fit ourselves in the practices through which we understand and rule ourselves and each other. Such noncompliance in concrete situations of power is not something we can abstract and institute in a new form of life. It is specific and unpredictable, not universal and grounded.62

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Quite in contradiction to Žižek’s pessimistic reading, then, Foucault’s method does not in any way set out to present the ineluctable success of disciplinary mechanisms in regulating society, but instead draws attention to the fact that attempting to do so is an artefact of the totalising thought which he refuses. It is precisely the fact that, when understood through his notation, whose function is to explicate how techniques of discipline have colonised and been replicated in many of our society’s institutions, we are brought to refuse the picture thus presented, and to experience the problematisation of a new field of thought along lines antithetical to ones that treat society as an objective disciplinary unity. The demonstration of the failure of such attempts is one of the key aims in his creating such a notation, for its purpose is to elicit the realisation of this claim, and its refusal. As Rajchman again notes,

The theme of the book is not (as is sometimes assumed) that we all live in a totally administered society – one big panopticon. A Utopian image of a totally administered society can be found easily enough in Bentham, and in the more or less explicitly utilitarian reform projects Foucault analyses. But the point of analysing its occurrence there is precisely to dispel the realist or objective illusion that our societies are administered wholes. ... his book is thus a 'dispersed' analysis of one kind of preoccupation with society as a whole.63

This reversal of expectations brings home the problem with Žižek’s proposed reading. His notion of a condition that is made unsurpassable by means of its endless suitability to the differing contexts of a subject’s innovative occurrence, is a representation of power relations that indulges in the worst excesses of an aspect which Foucault sought to problematise. His historical models of the formation of disciplines in our culture are instead supposed to represent their irresolvable shortcomings, their inability to completely determine our subjectivity;

When I speak of a 'disciplinary' society, I don't mean a 'disciplined society'. When I speak of the spread of methods of discipline, this is not a claim that 'the French are obedient'! In the analysis of normalising procedures, it is not a question of a 'thesis of a massive normalisation'. As if these developments weren't precisely the measure of a perpetual failure.64

63 Ibid, p56.
64 Foucault, 1994b pp15-6, my emphasis.
It seems, then, that an unclarity in method has led to a significant misunderstanding of the implications of genealogical investigation. To confuse this aspect of Foucault’s notation leads to a reading deeply at odds with the effect I argue for here. It is instead the case that for Foucault, thought itself is a constantly creative, and therefore resistant, process, which his criticism tries to uncover, advocate and elicit, despite, and in opposition to, its dogmatic tendencies otherwise. His critique does not seek to implant a redeeming theoretical kind of knowledge within the life of an otherwise docile body, but instead to incite a tendency that is already indigenous to everyday thought. Creative thought occurs

“both beyond and underneath systems and edifices of discourse. It is something that is often hidden but always drives everyday behaviours. There is always a little thought occurring even in the most stupid institutions; there is always thought even in silent habits. Criticism consists in uncovering that thought and trying to change it: showing that things are not as obvious as people believe, making it so that what is taken for granted is no longer taken for granted. To practice criticism is to make harder those acts which are now too easy.”

As Baker argued back in Chapter I, aspects are voluntarily adopted, and so too can they be desisted. No liberating ‘release’ is on offer here, only a practice by which to adopt and dispose of alternate ways of seeing, made possible through an imaginative involvement in problematising notations by which to trigger one’s new aspects. To do otherwise is to misunderstand the remit of such philosophy. The fact that we do see the world in a certain way is not an ill to be forever banished, nor a sin to be confessed, but instead those concepts, that represent equally our methods’ problems and their solutions, reflect the forms of life by which a subject is intricated in his environment. Indeed, it is in the alterativity of the many different, yet exclusive, ways we can conceive that we come to acknowledge that we can have no complete point of view to attain to, no ‘view from the outside’:

The fact that man lives in a conceptually structured environment does not prove that he has turned away from life ... just that he lives in a certain way, that he has a relationship

65 Foucault 2000d, p456, my emphasis.
with his environment such that he has no set point of view toward it … Forming concepts is a way of living not a way of killing life.\textsuperscript{66}

The hope expressed earlier – of a transcendent, liberating release from our conceptual transactions with our cultural environment – is based upon an ideal completely irrelevant to the models of philosophy advocated by Wittgenstein and Foucault. We should not be surprised to discover that criticism emerging from that position regards these models as unequivocal failures, then. But as we have shown, their actual purpose is to ‘stay in place’, to engage in aspectival maneuver, rather than transcendental flight, with a form of conceptual light-footedness being advocated in the achievement of this perspicuity. When Foucault writes, he certainly does so in order to change himself, to not think the same thing as before. One clear indicator of Žižek’s miscomprehension is in his complaint that in “[such an] attempt to break out of the vicious cycle of power and resistance, [the later] Foucault resorts to the myth of a state ‘before the Fall’ in which discipline was self-fashioned,”\textsuperscript{67} ignoring the fact that, already, from its inception in \textit{History of Madness}, the task of self-fashioning is first method for Foucault’s philosophy. Consider that by Foucault’s account the thought that allows for self-fashioning occurs even in the “silent habits” of the most disciplined of subjects, in the routine procedures of the most dogmatic of institutions. Therefore we need no turning back to an ideal state ‘before the fall’ to witness such an act, for it is a constant possibility of our practice, even when that practice is currently rendered immobile.

Žižek’s way of positing freedom as the ends of philosophy characterises this process as one in which a subject can never escape its constituent relations, ‘only’ modify them, and thus Foucault’s philosophy appears a futile undertaking. By neglecting our current emphasis upon refusal, curiosity and innovation, Žižek is operating under an underdeveloped model of philosophy’s aims. His onus upon resistance as a form of perversive counter-power is a mistreatment of Foucault’s position, one that no doubt issues from his signature pessimism regarding what it is to be human, an attitude that really could not be more alien to Foucault’s thought.

Answering Fraser, too, we can now clearly say why struggle is preferable to submission. Struggle, ‘one of the meanings of human existence’, is the expression of a negative method, in which no subjection of the subject to an anthropological universal

\textsuperscript{66} Foucault 2000e, p475.

\textsuperscript{67} Žižek 1999, p256.
proves immune to being outstripped, with such struggle located as an effect of thoughtful self-creation. Resistance equated with simple “freedom from constraint” cannot address Žižek’s accusations of ineffectuality, because it imparts no possible conception as to how we are free, once we have once been captivated. Creativity, however, understood as the ability to refuse the dogmatic, to curiously investigate alternative conceptions, and innovatively derive a new aspect from these practices, presents a wholly different conception of resistance. It promises no transcendental escape from the means of our captivation, and neither does it offer a definite means of avoiding future dogmatism; instead, resistance becomes a life practice, one informed by philosophical models by which one comes to recognise, problematise, and dispose of those aspects that previously held one captive, in favour of newly invented ones. In conclusion, then, we should mention that it appears questionable how much use freedom alone is in qualifying Wittgenstein’s ends either. We can, of course, be ‘free’ to indulge our worst conceptual habits, conceive unjustly across an indeterminate field of human affairs by means of a total conceptual unity, as an expression of our freedom. Why not? It would legislate for any number of self-interested ends, no doubt. Instead, what Wittgenstein is concerned with is something more precise than freedom; it is the clarity that is to be won through the choice of adopting and desisting in novel and apt conceptions, speech and practice, in a manner unconstrained by abided aspects that otherwise confuse our understanding and bewitch our choices of expression. ‘Freedom’ under-defines the telos that drives anti-dogmatic philosophy; it is not the ‘freedom-from’, but the innovative ‘how-of-freedom’ that interests us here. For when a new aspect dawns upon you as the reader, what you have “primarily discovered is a new way of looking at things. As if you had invented a new way of painting; or, again, a new metre, or a new kind of song.”

The methodological shift that occurred in Chapter II, in which the practice of philosophy was no longer to be performed by the therapist, but by the reader, is mirrored in my conclusion. Philosophy is to be imaginative, and therefore a creative undertaking, and the attempt made by our potential therapist – to be responsible for causing the outstripping of her patient’s dogmatic confusion on their behalf – should be wary of inattention to this aspect. Philosophy is rendered as an emancipatory practice,

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68 PI, §401, my emphasis.

69 For “Imagining might be called a creative act. (And is of course so called).” (Z §637)
because it has the “goal of allowing refusal, and curiosity, and innovation.”

One can be given “tips”, as Wittgenstein put it, but the effort to dislocate oneself from dogma, and the new position one then adopts, are achieved by the reader. The general question over what is to constitute the aim of perspicuity, first raised in Chapter I, can now be more fully answered; it represents the refusal of immobility in our conceptions, the willful curiosity to pursue alternative problematics, and the creative ability to switch between one’s differing aspects of understanding. For “[o]ur thoughts run in established routines, we make, automatically, transitions according to the techniques we have learned. And now comes the time for us to survey what we have said. We have made a whole lot of movements that do not further our purpose, even impede it, and now we have to clarify our thought processes philosophically.”

Philosophy, then, is in no way reducible to the tools by which its practice is elicited, but by its relation to those problems that have arisen in our habits of thought, and that now demand clarification. What then is to occur, what then is to be thought, are left as undetermined as that creativity to be found in human interests, as depicted in both grammatical and genealogical investigation. Because freedom is the expression of the innovation of his reader, Foucault refuses time and again to define its nature, beyond pointing to concrete singular examples. This was not a tactic with which to infuriate his critics, but an unavoidable implication of his notion of philosophy. Ian Hacking grasps this point well, and he, like I, asserts that freedom is a product that is unknowable in advance of its occurrence. This is not meant as a piece of obscurantism, but instead, “‘Unknowable’ is meant literally; it pertains not just to the knowledge of the physicist or the gnosis of the hermit, the mysticism of the visionary or the high of the jogger. It means that there is nothing to be said about freedom, except that within its space we construct our ethics and our lives.”

It is unknowable, then, because as Foucault put it, there is “no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions”, and hence no unifying total account by which to establish the inalienable condition of freedom. But this does not render us in a quagmire of nihilism, as Habermas asserts. What takes the place of such

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70 Foucault 1988a, p1, my emphasis.


72 Hacking 2002, p120. See also Oksala’s reading, also in agreement with my conclusions: “Hence, by a curious twist, the methodological ‘disappearance’ of the subject in Foucault’s thought does not signal the disappearance of freedom. It is, rather, the case that freedom is understood as the endless proliferation of meanings”. (2005, p87)

73 Foucault 1998, p94.
a “single locus” – which is to say, what lends a form of unity to these innovative undertakings – is instead the method. Why this is a profound difference should by now be quite clear: neither Wittgenstein nor Foucault’s method makes a claim of necessity, neither locates a principle of freedom or creativity in the crown of its hierarchical picture of philosophy. The unity it propounds is rather a facet of its modes of presentation, and in the absence of method, it dissipates. The methodological unity is instrumental to the innovation it incites, not the veridical claims it makes, and therefore the means of our interruption can itself be interrupted, or challenged by means of its own measures, without there occurring a profound instability in the justifications of our practices. No notion of experience, aspect, or dogma is expected to survive as a theoretical artefact here; such a survival would be the signature of a failure of method, an asymmetrical application that refused, at the last, to adhere to its own practice.

This explains why both our methods have been shown to exhibit a strikingly ‘deictic’ notion of the task of philosophy.\(^74\) For while aspectival dexterity represents an overcoming of dogmatic thought, it does not thereby equate to something akin to Habermas’s achievement of *mundigkeit*\(^75\) (the Enlightenment ideal of being rationally mature and responsible), and is not locatable as a basic human condition, generalisable to all, yet inhibited by our dastardly concepts and the terms of their expression. There is no claim of universal systemic human knowledge to be derived from these philosophies. Instead, this deictic “way of no longer being the same is, by definition, the most unique part of what I am.”\(^76\) What is to be done with this philosophy is left in our hands.

Good, well, let’s change the game. Let’s say that the intellectuals will no longer have the role of saying what is good. Then it will be up to people themselves, basing their judgment on the various analyses of reality that are offered to them, to work or to behave spontaneously, so that they can define for themselves what is good for them.

What is good, is something that comes through innovation.\(^77\)

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\(^74\) See, for example, pp59, 83-7, 133, 159-60, & 172 of this thesis.

\(^75\) See Rajchman 1985, p92, Dreyfus & Rabinow 1986, and Owen 1999, pp37-40 for useful discussions and qualifications of this ideal.

\(^76\) Foucault 2000c.

\(^77\) Foucault 1988a, p1.


— All references MS or TS are made to Wittgenstein’s unpublished manuscripts, cited to von Wright catalogue (G. H. von Wright, Wittgenstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982)).