Privileged actors in environmental policymaking: the historical development of the aviation industry in the UK

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Abstract

Through a theoretically informed examination of two cases fundamental to the growth of the aviation industry in the UK, this thesis aims to illuminate the mechanisms behind the industry’s oft-claimed position of privilege in environmental policymaking. It is claimed that historically the aviation industry has occupied such a position, manifest in tax breaks for fuel, delayed entry into the emissions trading scheme and continuing ability to secure permission for new airport development, all in the face of fierce opposition. However, the existing literature fails to adequately empiricise or explain the precise mechanisms behind its alleged position of privilege.

This thesis focuses on the role of the UK state in arbitrating between rival interests in the historical development of the aviation industry in the UK. Two case studies are explored: the development of the third London airport at Stansted, and a new runway at Manchester. The former was characterised by delays and reviews, becoming a cause célèbre; the latter occurred more rapidly. Archival analysis and elite interviewing uncover fresh details of the two cases. Two contrasting theories of policy are employed to understand and explain the industry’s role: the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (which maintains that policy change arises primarily from an open competition between policy coalitions in adjusting to external events) and the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) (that acknowledges the importance of structural imperatives on the state to consistently privilege some actors over others).

This research finds that both the ACF and SRA offer convincing accounts of the policymaking process, however, singularly, neither is able fully to explore all the mechanisms that underpin the industry’s privileged position. By paying close attention to the beliefs of actors, the ACF uncovers the mechanisms behind how and why actors work together to achieve their policy goals and draws attention to the important role played by external events and policy learning play in creating policy change. Complementing these insights, the SRA draws attention to the strategies actors use to achieve their policy goals and explores the structural factors that continuously privilege the aviation industry. In initiating the first theoretical dialogue between these two contrasting perspectives, this research has found that there is no need for theoretical synthesis in a quest to find the ‘best’ single theory, rather, that combining their insights to in a complementary manner offers the most valuable exploration of policy and the policymaking process.
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<td>ACF</td>
<td>Advocacy Coalition Framework</td>
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<td>AEF</td>
<td>Aviation Environment Federation</td>
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<td>ATAG</td>
<td>Air Transport Action Group</td>
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<td>BAA</td>
<td>British Airports Authority</td>
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<td>BA</td>
<td>British Airways</td>
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<td>BCAL</td>
<td>British Caledonian</td>
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<td>BEA</td>
<td>British European Airways</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOAC</td>
<td>British Overseas Airways Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAA</td>
<td>Civil Aviation Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR2</td>
<td>Campaign Against Runway Two</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO₂</td>
<td>carbon dioxide</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPRE</td>
<td>Campaign to Protect Rural England</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FoE</td>
<td>Friends of the Earth</td>
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<tr>
<td>IATA</td>
<td>International Air Transport Association</td>
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<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAEN</td>
<td>Manchester Airport Environmental Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJAG</td>
<td>Manchester Airport Joint Action Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>mppa</td>
<td>million passengers per annum</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWEEHPA</td>
<td>North West Essex and East Hertfordshire Preservation Association</td>
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<td>PNA</td>
<td>Policy Network Analysis</td>
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<td>RPG</td>
<td>Regional Planning Guidance</td>
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<td>SRA</td>
<td>Strategic-Relational Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>T&amp;E</td>
<td>European Federation for Transport and the Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trade Union Congress</td>
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<td>WARA</td>
<td>Wing Area Resistance Association</td>
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Introduction

“[T]he demands of the aviation industry are insatiable [and] successive governments have usually given way to them” Chris Mullin (2003), Aviation Minister July 1999 – February 2001

The aviation industry provokes fierce controversy whether it is about the development of airports, the social acceptability of night flying or the global carbon impact of flights (Daley, 2010: 1). Comments like the above from Chris Mullin are not uncommon, with many politicians and commentators suggesting that the aviation industry occupies a position of continuing privilege in the policymaking process. With the ability to dominate the process to serve its own ends, it has been described as a structurally powerful industry whose interests are inextricably tied up with those of the state (Gossling and Upham, 2009: 13; May and Hill, 2006; Paterson, 2000; Upham, 2001a; Whitelegg and Williams, 2000).

Historically, conflict has often been framed as a straight trade-off between national need and local amenity: “it too easily assumed that the national interest and that of the aviation industry is synonymous” (Mullin, 2003). However, as Owens (2002: 951) identifies, there is at least one deep fault in this storyline: “the ‘national interest’, as a singular conception is problematic. But so too is ‘local amenity’, not least because the effects of major infrastructure projects invariably transcend the local”. Further complicating matters, “the worldview in which certain kinds of development are seen as ‘essential’ is not one that is universally shared” (Owens, 2002: 951).

This thesis does not set out to dispute the role of the aviation industry as one of the world’s most influential industries, nor does it debate the (de)merits of air travel or of airport expansion. Rather, it seeks to analyse the aviation industry’s position in environmental policymaking and to explore questions well rehearsed in political science since the 1950s, namely: who gets what, where, and how (Lasswell, 1986), to investigate how and why the aviation industry is able to occupy a claimed position of privilege in this process.

This chapter begins by discussing why this is an area worth studying, detailing the positive and negative impacts associated with the aviation industry and how the policymaking process attempts to strike a balance between them. This discussion highlights the gap in
the in existing academic research, which this research seeks to fill. This chapter then details how this will be achieved, first, by setting out its aims and objectives. It then details the research approach, specifying the philosophy that underpins the research, details of the political theories that are used to explore long-term changes in policy and the aviation industry’s position in policymaking, and the methodological framework. It concludes by introducing and signposting the rest of the thesis.

**The aviation industry**

Since the Wright Brothers took the first powered flight in 1903, the growth of the aviation industry has been phenomenal. Globally, it has experienced growth rates in air passenger traffic (in terms of revenue-passenger-kilometres) of approximately nine percent per annum, outstripping the growth rate of global average gross domestic product by 2.4 (Bows et al., 2009: 10). In terms of terminal and transfer passengers, the UK is the largest in Europe. Its airports operate as key hubs for transatlantic routes or as central nodes of the low-cost market. Despite being considered a relatively mature market, between 1990 and 2005 its growth rates, in terms of passenger numbers, have averaged at 5.5 percent per annum (Bows et al., 2009: 16; 17).

**The positive impacts of the aviation industry**

The aviation industry generates huge private and social benefits, associated with employment, leisure, recreation, education and access to family and friends, and are self-explanatory when it comes to disaster relief, medical assistance and law enforcement (Bishop and Grayling, 2003; Caves, 2003; Shaw and Thomas, 2006). Tourism in particular has helped to create the increase in demand for air travel and is dependent on the availability of long-distance services (Bieger and Wittmer, 2006; Daley et al., 2008; Debbage, 1994; Goetz and Graham, 2004; Gossling and Peeters, 2007; May, 2002). An important economic sector in its own right, globally, the tourism industry is expected to expand at approximately four percent per annum until 2020 (Daley, 2010: 3). In the UK however, there is a £17 billion tourism deficit from UK residents spending more money abroad than what visitors bring in (Cairns and Newson, 2006: 5).

In the UK, and increasingly elsewhere, an air dependent culture is developing with lifestyles adapting to this expectation (Cairns and Newson, 2006: 5). It conjures positive images of leisure, recreation, connectiveness, business, social contact and cultural exchange which no other mode of transport can offer, and increasingly, cultural assumptions connecting
transport and development (Daley, 2010: 1; Paterson, 2000: 261; 263). What used to be considered a luxury good is now seen as a commodity with air travel now embedded in peoples’ lives (Gossling and Upham 2009: 9-10). However, it is not an industry that is universally seen as socially inclusive. For example, in the UK, while growth rates have steadily increased and flight prices dropped, there is little evidence to suggest that a wider range of income groups is accessing air travel (Cairns and Newson, 2006: 4; Caves, 2003: 39).

The economic contribution that the aviation industry makes to local, regional and national economies is well-documented and debated (Bailey, 2007; Friends of the Earth, 2006; Graham, 2003: 198; Humphreys, 2003; Oxford Economic Forecasting, 1999; 2006). An important economic sector itself, it simultaneously facilitates and supports growth in many other sectors with many parts of national economies now relying on the industry (Daley, 2010: 2).

In its quest to maintain high and stable levels of economic growth, the UK Government has been, historically, continually supportive of the expansion of the aviation industry. Indeed, regarded it as a bellwether of the entire economy (Button, 1996: 289; Daley, 2010: 2). This support has been demonstrated through a range of policies, from the supply of land during the UK’s post-war development, to the current tax breaks the industry enjoys (e.g. there is no VAT on air tickets while kerosene (aviation fuel) is exempt from fuel tax), to the delayed inclusion from climate change targets at the national, European and international scales.

**The negative impacts of the aviation industry**

A dynamic industry, with important economic and social benefits, the aviation industry, nationally and globally, faces a growing and unprecedented concern over its environmental impact and increasing attention from both the private and public spheres (Bows et al., 2009: 1; Cairns and Newson, 2006: 12). At the local level, noise is considered to be the most serious environmental problem with local air pollution, land-take and waste generation all having serious negative impacts on the quality of life of nearby communities (Graham, 2003: 200; Hume and Watson, 2003; Janic, 1999: 160; May and Hill, 2006; Upham, 2003). Air quality legislation and local agreements to limit noise illustrate the ability, and potential, of local concerns to constrain the development of the industry and as public tolerance of these impacts falls, environmental regulations will become tougher and affect the
industry’s ability to expand (Daley, 2010: 4; Graham and Guyer, 1999; Upham, 2001a; Upham et al., 2003).

At the global level, the aviation industry’s main environmental impact is its contribution to climate change through the emission of greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide (CO₂). Fuelled by a combination of high growth rates and limited technological improvements, the aviation industry’s emissions continue to rise (Bows et al., 2009: 1; IPCC, 1999; Sustainable Aviation, 2005). In the UK, between 1990 and 2000, CO₂ emissions from aviation doubled while combined emissions from all other UK activities fell by approximately nine percent. Using predicted growth trends, it is estimated that emissions from the industry are set to more than double again between 2000 and 2030, and by 2050 could consume all the emissions savings achieved by other sectors (Cairns and Newson, 2006: 4; Daley and Preston, 2009: 367). In the absence of international legislation, the assumption is that this environmental impact will be internalised in the UK’s commitments to tackle climate change (Cairns and Newson, 2006: 4). With dangerous climate change an imminent threat, the aviation industry has become a potent symbol of fossil fuel consumption, greenhouse gas emissions and climate change (Anderson et al., 2006; Daley, 2010: 1).

**Positive and negative impacts: a political balancing act?**

Balancing the economic, environmental and social impacts of aviation is a difficult task, especially when agreements are made multi-nationally; when the industry is seen as central to economic growth; within a culture that is becoming increasingly dependent on air travel (Bishop, 2003; Daley, 2010). The concept of sustainable development, which sets out to balance these demands, has clear policy implications for the aviation industry and there is a growing body of literature examining the relationship between the two (e.g. Bishop and Grayling, 2003; Boons et al., 2010; Bows et al., 2009; Daley, 2008; 2010; Dimitriu, 2003; Gossling and Upham, 2009; Kaszewski and Sheate, 2004; Upham, 2001a; b; 2003; Upham et al., 2003; Walker and Cook, 2009). However, while there is a long history of the industry talking about sustainability, in practice they have done very little (Upham, 2001a: 247).

This lack of action results from a field of tension existing between economic interests and environmental concerns. The strong links between air transport and economic growth have created an understandable reluctance, at all a level of governance, to mitigate its environmental impact (Aviation Environment Federation, 2008; Bleijenberg, 1995; Daley and Preston, 2009: 347; Gossling and Upham, 2009: 9; Upham, 2001a). Regardless of this
overwhelming, and increasing, environmental impact, the dominant social paradigm of economic growth is difficult to challenge (May and Hill, 2006; Paterson, 2000; 2007).

At the national level, society looks to the state to co-ordinate a balance between the economic, social and environmental. Responsible for the overarching policy that sets the framework for the development of aviation industry in the UK, it must ensure this is conducted in respect to environmental limits and impacts.

At the local level, the planning system is the venue where many of these conflicts are exposed. However, there is a, “tendency to treat ‘subjective’ environmental values as a less basis for decisions” (Owens, 1997: 571). In theory, the planning system should be the mechanism whereby the economic, environmental and social can be balanced in the quest for sustainable development. However, the problem with this remit is that the balance is weighted in a presumption of development, reflected explicitly in policy guidance but also through the, often subtle, prioritisation of certain demands and values over others (Owens, 1997: 574).

Planning inquiries are routinely charged with, “exploiting the mutual compatibility of economic development and environmental protection as far as possible and thereafter with performing a delicate balance of social, economic and environmental considerations” (Owens, 1997: 574). It is not intended to examine the policy upon which the proposal is based (Rough, 2011: 30), rather, in theory, it provides a relatively open forum where policy assumptions to be questioned by interested parties (Cowell and Owens, 2006: 405; Rough, 2011: 24; 29).

**Aim and objectives**

As identified, there is a significant, and growing, body of academic research that examines the positive and negative impacts of the aviation industry and increasingly, what the rhetoric of sustainable development means for its continuing growth (e.g. Bishop and Grayling, 2003; Boons et al., 2010; Bows et al., 2009; Daley, 2008; 2010; Dimitriu, 2003; Gossling and Upham, 2009; Graham, 1998; Graham and Guyer, 1999; Graham and Shaw, 2008; Kaszewski and Sheate, 2004; Upham, 2001a; b; 2003; Upham et al., 2003). Furthermore, there is a significant literature that explores the role of the state, at both the national and local levels, to balance and reconcile economic, social and environmental concerns (Cowell and Owens, 2006; Owens, 1994; 1997; 2004; Owens and Cowell, 2002)
and the inability of these systems to do so (May and Hill, 2006; Paterson, 2000; 2007). However, the existing research does not engage in a theoretically informed analysis of how and why certain actors (i.e. the aviation industry) are able to occupy a privileged position in these processes (i.e. in environmental policymaking). This thesis seeks to address this gap, and contribute to these areas of existing research, by providing fresh empirics; fresh theoretical interpretation of those empirics; and new insights into broader theoretical debates about the state.

By conducting a theoretically informed examination of policy change in two decisions fundamental in the historical development of the aviation industry in the UK, the aim of this thesis is to illuminate the mechanisms behind the industry’s oft-claimed position of privilege and to explore the obstacles to balance in long-term environmental policymaking. More specifically, its objectives are threefold:

1. To generate a systematic empirical account of the main actors and events involved in the historical development of aviation policy in the UK
2. Analyse two in-depth case studies of policy decisions that have been crucial in the sectors long-term development: the development of Stansted as the third London airport and the extension of Manchester Airport
3. Apply two modern theories of policy (namely the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Strategic-Relational Approach) to understand and explain the modes and modalities of the aviation industry’s position in policymaking

It seeks to advance existing research in a number of important ways. Aside from pieces examining its military function, the development of the aviation industry in the UK is a ‘strangely thin field’ comprising either company histories or heavily theoretical pieces (Staniland, 2009). Bar notable pieces by Lawton (1999), Staniland (2003; 2008) and Kassim and Stevens (2010), there are few systematic accounts that analyse of the development of aviation policy since World War Two, particularly at the UK level. This is surprising given its position as an engine of growth in UK and global economies, its increasingly recognised environmental impact, and its role as a continual source of conflict. The empirical findings will also contribute to the body of academic research that examines business influence in policymaking (see for example, Hacker and Pierson, 2002; Kamieniecki and Kraft, 2007; Salamon and Siegfried, 1977). In addition, the application of political theory will provide a fresh interpretation of historical events and new insights into broader theoretical debates.
on the state as well as creating a valuable dialogue between two, yet to be compared, modern theories of policy.

**Research approach**

The thesis will take a comparative research approach that will allow for an exploration of the conditions under which decisions are made and policies developed (Burnham et al., 2004; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003). This section will detail the political theories used to explore the processes of policy change under study, the philosophy that underpins the research, the case studies chosen for investigation and the methodological framework. It begins, however, by defining what policy and policy change mean in the context of this study.

**Policy and policymaking: core definitions**

Describing government policy would be a simple if we only had to look at the final policy decision, which for Lasswell (1986) would correspond to the who got what and when. However, understanding the how part is far more complex (Howlett et al., 2009: 7). Dye provides a very simple definition of policy (“anything a government chooses to do or not to do”), with government regarded as the primary actor who occupies a unique position, making authoritative decisions on behalf of citizens and responsible for balancing competing demands (Dye, 1972). Dye’s definition emphasises that policy constitutes a deliberative and conscious choice on the part of government to, or not to, act on a problem, which will result in both positive and negative intentional and unintentional consequences (Howlett et al., 2009: 5). Heclo takes these ideas a step further, by viewing policymaking as, “a course of action or inaction rather than specific decisions or actions” (Heclo, 1972) (i.e. it’s a process of allocative decisions, not a single outcome). Jenkins (1978) clarifies some of the implicit parts of Dye’s definition, specifying the content of a policy and defining policymaking as a dynamic process and the result of a series of interrelated decisions. However, what remains absent is a consideration of the mechanisms that lead to certain courses of action, or inaction.

Hall (1993: 278) starts to unpack this, identifying policymaking as a process involving three dimensions: overarching policy goals that guide policy; the instruments and/or techniques that are used to attain these goals; and the precise setting of instruments. From this, Howlett and Cashore (2009: 38) produce a more nuanced understanding, where, “every ‘policy’ is in fact a more complex regime of ends and means, related goals (more abstract),
objectives (less abstract) and settings (least abstract)”. By viewing policymaking as a process (i.e. a series of linked ideas, debates, actions, analysis and evaluation resulting in a formal decision and implementation), studying it focuses attention on understanding how it changes and whose interests these changes promote, rather than the result and its impact (Heywood, 2007: 426; Howlett et al., 2009).

Drawing on these ideas, the why and how behind policy change, this research will therefore view aviation policy and policymaking as a process (John, 1998). The historical development of the aviation industry in the UK is characterised by overarching goals informing the series of events that led to certain decisions becoming enshrined in policies (i.e. to develop Stansted as the third London airport and to approve a second runway at Manchester). Examining this process, a series of decisions resulting in a cumulative outcome, is the first step in exploring the position of privilege the aviation industry occupies in environmental policymaking. The second step is to connect the events that occur and to explore the mechanisms behind this process (John, 1998), which will be achieved through the application of two contrasting theories of the policymaking process. However, before the theories are detailed, it is crucial to consider the research philosophy that underpins the research design.

**Research philosophy**

Acknowledging that, “political research cannot be properly conducted in a moral vacuum” (Burnham et al., 2004: 250), implies a recognition that certain philosophical perspectives guide research, perspectives that need to be consistent with the research design a researcher employs (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Kuhn, 1970). Drawing on Corbetta (2003), there are three questions that should be addressed when considering the philosophical approach behind a research design.

First, the ontological question, which examines how we perceive reality and the nature of what we know (Bryman, 2001): is there a real world out there that exists independently of our knowledge of it, or is it purely ‘constructed’ by the interpretations we put upon it? Second, the epistemological question, which reflects a researcher’s view of the world: what should be/can be considered knowledge and can real or objective relations between social phenomena be identified, and if so, how (Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 19)? While there is a relationship between the first two, they are not mutually exclusive, for example, ones ontological stance may reflect their epistemological stance but it does not necessarily
determine it. However, these philosophical assumptions impact upon the process of research, from how research questions are formulated to the way conclusions are drawn (Bryman, 2001: 19; Marsh and Smith, 2001: 529). Crucially, they are linked to the research methods that are used (Hughes, 1990; Trigg, 2001). Hence, third, is the methodological question.

There are three main epistemologies of social science: positivism, critical realism and interpretivism (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). Positivism stems from the natural sciences and while it has been a major influence on social science research, its hold is weakening (Hughes, 1990; Trigg, 2001) and its assumptions increasingly challenged (e.g. the criticisms detailed by Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 22-24). It considers the social world as existing independently of our knowledge of it and is premised on a functionalist or objectivist ontology. Positivists believe that causal relationships can be discovered in an objective manner, being observed, measured and explained through the development of predictive and explanatory models and experimentation (Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 20; Marsh and Smith, 2001: 529). Theory is considered a tool for generating falsifiable hypotheses, which can then be tested through observation, and explained and assessed in a deductive way and by using quantitative research methods (Bryman, 2001: 20; Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 12).

At the opposing end of the epistemological spectrum is interpretivism, which views the subject matter of social science as totally different from that of natural science and maintains that social phenomena cannot be explored using the methods promoted by positivism (Bryman, 2001: 12). It derives from a constructivist ontology that challenges the idea that categories and social phenomena are pre-given, believing that they are produced through social interaction and are in a constant state of revision (i.e. the world is socially constructed) (Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 26). Interpretivists reject the idea that the social world exists independently of our knowledge of it; reality only exists in terms of the meanings attached to it and hence, there is no notion of an objective world (Bryman, 2001; Marsh and Furlong, 2002). An inductive approach, it seeks to build theory from empirical data, and hence, is at odds with the aim and objectives of this research, which seeks to empirically test theory.

Critical realism sits between positivism and interpretivism, drawing on many elements of the latter while maintaining a belief in the causal explanations of the former. By taking a
critical realist epistemological position, this research will view the social world as existing independently of our knowledge of it and will believe that causal relationships can, and should, be observed, but will reject the positivist notion that social science should be value-free, acknowledging the important role of the normative and empirical questioning in social science research. Taking a critical realist position means holding a belief that there are deep underlying structural relationships between social phenomena that are essential to understanding behaviour and that social process themselves are shaped by social structures (Marsh and Smith, 2001: 530). However, this does not mean believing that structures determine outcomes, rather, that they have the ability to constrain and facilitate the behaviour of actors (Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 31). In contrast to a positivist position, the facts should not be accepted as what they appear to be, or what actors claim them to be (Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 30) and therefore, while it is acknowledged that phenomena in the social world exist independently of our interpretation, interpretations do affect behaviour and hence, outcomes. Ergo, it is important to understand the external reality and its social construction in order to sufficiently explain and understand the relationships in social interactions (Benton and Craib, 2001: 120).

Applying policy theory

As previously mentioned, this thesis will apply two contrasting theories of policymaking to help understand how and why the aviation industry has obtained and exercised a position of privilege in the policymaking process. By providing generalised explanations of political behaviour, theory, or in this case theories, can be used to help explain power in policymaking and the events and decisions that go into its creation (Bryman, 2001: 13; Cairney, 2012; Hill, 2005; John, 1998; Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 21; Marsh and Stoker, 2002).

This research employs two contemporary, comprehensive, policy theories that adopt contrasting perspectives on how policy changes and the distribution of power and influence: Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and Jessop’s Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA), and will compare the insights they offer (Cairney, 2012). A multi-theoretical approach will force the clarification of assumptions, minimise any theory testing bias, provide alternative explanations of the policy process and potentially uncover different mechanisms behind the patterns of power demonstrated (Allison, 1971: 249; Blatter and Haverland, 2012; Sabatier, 1999; 2007a: 330). In line with the critical realist approach being taken, neither is being employed to explain all the mechanisms; rather,
they are both employed as lenses through which to view events, investigate complex phenomena and to capture different constructions of reality (Bryman, 2001: 13; Harré, 1986; Marsh and Smith, 2001: 531)

While there are a range of theories that explain the policymaking process, the ACF and SRA attempt to consolidate existing theories of the policymaking process and are modern exemplars of established traditions (namely pluralism and Marxism). Appropriate for the analysis of complex policy problems such as that examined in this research, they offer contrasting explanations of the distribution of power and influence in the policymaking process and the role of the state in balancing competing interests, which will illuminate different aspects and mechanisms behind the processes of policy change under study.

Agency-centred and a step on from traditional pluralist theories of policymaking, the ACF maintains that power is broadly shared across a range of interest groups, who compete for hegemony and adjust to external shocks (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). By contrast, the SRA focuses on the recursive nature of the relationship between structure and agency. It maintains that the terrain on which policymaking takes place is uneven, favouring certain actions and hence certain actors (i.e. those aligned with the reproduction of capital) (Hay, 2002b; Jessop, 2001; 2005).

The ACF and SRA are obvious rivals, but they are yet to be compared or brought together in an empirical study. While the ACF has been applied and compared with a number of other theories (Weible et al., 2009: 133), it is yet to be compared with a Marxist theory of the policymaking process. The ACF has been applied alongside the multiple streams framework (Compston and Madsen, 2001; Dudley and Richardson, 1999); cultural theory (Eberg, 1997); punctuated equilibrium theory (Meijerink, 2005); actor-centred institutionalism (Parrish, 2003); narrative theory (Radaelli, 1999); the policy entrepreneur model (Mintrom and Vergari, 1996); institutional analysis and development framework model (Lubell, 2003); and policy narratives (Shanahan et al., 2011). By comparison, with limited application to date, the sole comparative study the SRA has been employed in was in conjunction with policy-network analysis (James, 2009). This research will address the mutual disregard that appears to exist between the two, initiating a worthwhile dialogue between them in relation to their ability to explore and explain both the privileged position of certain actors in the policymaking process and how the state attempts to balance competing interests. Furthermore, independently of one another, this thesis will add to their empirical and
theoretical testing and development. The ACF, though vastly tested in the United States, will benefit from application to the UK system of policymaking while the SRA, an emerging theory of the policymaking process, will benefit from systematic empirical and theoretical testing.

Case selection
This research will examine two cases of social processes to research and compare specific phenomena in an in-depth way (Yin, 2009). The emphasis is not about achieving statistical generalisability in order to make generalised inferences about a population; rather, it is on achieving a sufficiently in-depth empirical investigation, with the criteria for choosing case studies based upon the research aim and objectives. The insights gained from the case studies will be used to debate the relevance of the ACF and SRA in explaining how and why the aviation industry occupies a privileged position in the environmental policymaking process with a view to contribute to their future theoretical and empirical development (Blatter and Haverland, 2012: 32). While a UK focus may sacrifice breadth, it allows for coherence across chapters and the grounding of the developed argument.

The two case studies chosen for empirical investigation have been fundamental in the development of the aviation industry in the UK: the decision to develop Stansted as the third London airport, and the approval of a second runway at Manchester airport. Both of these case studies were crucial infrastructure projects for the development of the aviation industry in the UK, and as such, are of priority in any examination of the aviation industry in the UK and hence, can be used as focal points for wider discussion. Crucially, with an objective to develop a comprehensive overview of events, both can be studied empirically and within the time and financial constraints of this research (Blatter and Haverland, 2012: 25; 102).

The first case study, the decision to develop Stansted as the third London airport, is characterised by a series of committees, commissions, consultations, recommendations, opposition movements, political stalemates and policy u-turns; balance in the policymaking process was a struggle to achieve and even harder to deliver. Initially suggested for development in 1960, approval for the development of Stansted as the chosen site for the third London airport did not come until 1984, with the airport opening its doors in 1991.

1 The decision to approve a fifth terminal at Heathrow airport was considered as a possible case study but was withdrawn due to financial and time constraints inhibiting potential data collection.
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The second, the decision to approve a second runway at Manchester Airport, was a far quicker decision, with the debate lasting just over ten years. However, with the development of airports in the UK rare, and runways even rarer, the decision to approve a second runway was equally as controversial. At the time national level policy demonstrated a commitment to both the development of regional airports as a means to increasing the UK’s air capacity and the economic regeneration of the regions, the development of a second runway at Manchester Airport was a means to fulfil both of these policy goals.

Methodological approach

The common research methods in political science are documentary analysis, interviewing and direct/participant observation (Burnham et al., 2004). However, due to the historical nature of the case studies, the latter is not appropriate; therefore, documentary analysis and interviewing will be applied extensively alongside an in-depth review of existing literature. Illustrating their suitability, these are methods of data collection that have been used in existing studies that have employed the ACF (e.g. Albright, 2011; Elliott and Schlaepfer, 2001a; b; Jordan and Greenaway, 1998; Litfin, 2000; Smith, 2000) and the SRA (e.g. Chettiparamb, 2007; Heigl, 2010; 2011; Theil, 2010). Furthermore, aligned with the critical realist philosophy that underpins the research, the methodological approach will provide insights into both the observable and unobservable processes at work and will uncover the perspectives of key actors.

Documentary analysis

The aim is to work with as many primary documents as possible, not written for political scientists or historians these are written as part of the process under study (Burnham et al., 2004: 166). Public records provide the widest range of information on which policy is based, policy implementation can be traced, motivations of actors can be identified, and a departmental view that transcends ministers and officials can be identified (Burnham et al., 2004: 177).

Used correctly, documentary analysis is a reliable data source that can facilitate the development of novel accounts of significant events and the formulation of new interpretations (Burnham et al., 2004). Crucially, the use of documentary sources will enable a timeline of events to emerge for both case studies with the nature of the case studies (focused around public inquiries and/or official reviews) meaning that a wealth of ‘official’ primary sources are available. Secondary and tertiary documents will also be called
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upon (Burnham et al., 2004: 168; Finnegan, 1996: 142). The National Archives at Kew, the Essex Records Office in Chelmsford and the John Rylands Library in Manchester will be the repositories used to consult primary sources (the first two for the Stansted decision and the latter the Manchester case).

While Webb and Webb (1932: 100) view primary documents as the facts themselves, not merely as the representation of facts, perhaps the most serious issue when dealing with documentary sources is the question of their representativeness and meaning (May, 2001: 197; Scott, 1990: 24). Assessing documents is a subjective process, with the potential for bias to emerge from how they are read, recorded and interpreted. This risk can be minimised by consulting the widest range of documents possible and by becoming completely engrossed in the social, political and economic context that the document was made in (Burnham et al., 2004; Finnegan, 1996: 146; May, 2001: 197).

The authenticity of a document concerns its genuineness, that is to say, is it what it claims to be (Scott, 1990: 186)? It is crucial to consider how sound it is (i.e. is it an original copy/has it been corrupted in any way) and its authorship (i.e. can you authenticate those responsible for producing the document) (Finnegan, 1996: 144). Although there is often no completely robust way to establish beyond doubt the authenticity of a document, again, by situating the document in what is known about the wider context in which it originates and by consulting a wide range of sources this risk can be minimised (Burnham et al., 2004: 186). To establish the credibility of a document it is crucial to consider how distorted the contents potentially are and the sincerity and accuracy of the author, which can be done by paying attention to the conditions under which the document was produced and the interests that drove the author to write it (Burnham et al., 2004: 186; Finnegan, 1996: 144).

While bias can emerge in documentary analysis, with their authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning all open to scrutiny, documentary analysis offers one of the most reliable methods available to the political scientist (Burnham et al., 2004: 188). In order to ensure success, and to facilitate triangulation (cross-checking data using a variety of methods), the methodological approach will combine documentary analysis with elite interviewing (Burnham et al., 2004; Davies, 2001; Devine, 2002; Moran-Ellis et al., 2006; Scott, 1990: 22).
**Elite Interviews**

Elite interviews offer the potential to achieve a deeper understanding of events than documentary analysis alone could provide, with some information only obtainable using this technique, for example, finding out what people think, how events have been interpreted and what people have or are planning to do in the future (Richards, 1996). With their focus on empirically detecting actors’ beliefs and intentions, this type of data is crucial when applying the ACF and SRA.

Interviewees, selected on the basis of what they may know, can help fill in the gaps or confirm pre-existing information, whereas more rigid methods, such as questionnaires, would struggle to uncover such information (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). While the notion of what defines an ‘elite’ is debatable, they are likely to have had significant influence on the policymaking process (Burnham et al., 2004; Morris, 2009: 209; Richards, 1996: 199; Smith, 2006: 644). The interview sample will emerge from a combination of documentary analysis (primary, secondary and tertiary) and a snowballing technique (asking interviewees to recommended others), ceasing when saturation point is reached and/or through financial constraints (Burnham et al., 2004: 207; Goldstein, 2002; Richards, 1996).

The interviews will take the form of semi-structured exploratory conversations loosely following the model put forward by Rubin and Rubin (1995). They advocate an informal conversation to put respondent at ease (rapport building); a brief discussion of the aim and purposes of research; introductory questions; central questioning; probing including clarification on specific points; and finally, an opportunity for interviewee to provide additional information. A balance will be struck between what the research design considers important and allowing the interviewee to open it up to areas perhaps not considered, with certain topics prioritised over others (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Burnham et al., 2004: 213-214; Richards, 1996; Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 5). While all types of interview (semi-structured, structured and unstructured) are socially constructed and offer insights from different perspectives, semi-structured elite interviews will account for the status of interviewees and the aim and objectives of the research (Aberbach and Rockman.

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2 Appendices A and B provide the details of those interviewed, whose participation had a direct impact on the policymaking processes under study. Appendix C provides an example of an interview access letter.
Wherever possible, interviews will be recorded and complemented with written notes. Different from standard interviews, in elite interviews the power is with the interviewee and there are practical and philosophical issues with this, for example, bias in questioning and interviewees ignoring or deflecting specific questioning (Leech, 2002; Seldon, 1988: 201; Smith, 2006). Issues of access may also arise (Cochrane, 1998; England, 2002; Richards, 1996; Sabot, 1999) while reliability may be questionable due to memory loss, oversimplifications, biased perceptions, or even deliberate misleading (Berry, 2002; Richards, 1996). There is also the problem of remaining objective, avoiding the risk of finding one interviewee more persuasive than another (Berry, 2002: 680). However, by reflecting on these potential hurdles, and by triangulating the data that emerges, these issues will be minimised (Berry, 2002: 680). A strength of the elite interview is that they allow for the perceptions of key actors to be uncovered, and although they present problems, combined with other sources of data they can be part of a powerful methodological package (Richards, 1996: 204).

**Ethical considerations**

When elite interviewing, it is crucial to consider the ethical issues such as confidentiality, deception and consent (Woliver, 2002: 677). The researcher must be honest and open throughout the process, ensuring it is clear who they are, what their affiliation is, and the purpose of their research. In this research, the interviewee access letter will initially convey this information (Appendix C), then reiterated, in person, at the start of the interview. Informed consent will be sought and formalised via the completion of an interviewee consent form (Appendix E). The interviewee will receive a copy of the form in advance of the interview and given many opportunities to raise any concerns before the start of the interview. The consent form will also seek permission for the recording of the interview and for the future use of data. Throughout the process, there will be the opportunity for the interviewee to raise any concerns, and it will be emphasised that they have the right to withdraw at any time.

Beyond data collection, ethical considerations will remain important throughout the analysis and any subsequent publications that emerge from the research (the interview

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3 Appendix D provides an example interview crib sheet.
consent form will explicitly seek consent to the processing of interview data) (Burnham et al., 2004: 262; Burton, 2000: 299). If requested, interviewees will be provided with interview transcripts and copies of any subsequent publications disseminated to those involved. As Woliver (2002: 678) highlights, this is more than just a courtesy; it is an acknowledgement that their participation was important.

Abiding by the key principles of data protection in the UK, interview data will be classified as ‘sensitive personal data’ and treated accordingly. It will be: processed fairly and lawfully; processed for limited purposes; adequate, relevant and not excessive; accurate; kept no longer than necessary; processed in accordance with the data subject’s rights; securely stored; and not transferred to countries without adequate protection (Burnham et al., 2004: 262). Furthermore, in accordance with ESRC guidelines, a record will be submitted to the ESRC data store.

**Triangulating sources**

The principle of triangulation entails the use of multiple methods or sources of data in the study of social phenomena (Bryman, 2001: 274) and is the process of cross-checking a variety of research methods to minimise uncertainty and misinterpretation and to enrich the findings (Burnham et al. 2004: 31; Read and Marsh: 2002: 238; Moran-Ellis et al. 2006: 48). It is often recommended that to ensure success a researcher should triangulate the data from documentary analysis (primary and secondary) and elite interviewing (Devine 2002; Burnham, Gillard et al. 2004). This minimises any uncertainty, for example, that may arise from the former being potentially a more reliable source (a result of being less volatile over time) and the latter being more valid (that is, has been collected for the specific research project) (Davies, 2001: 77). Not an easy task, the approach of this research will follow the recommendations of Davis (2001: 79): information will be cross-referenced between and within the data types and if there are any divergence, written records will be taken as the final authority.

**Conclusions**

The epigram at the start of this chapter suggested that the demands of the aviation industry are insatiable and successive governments have usually given way to them. An industry with vast positive and negative, economic, social and environmental impacts that has seemingly developed unconstrained at a time when the consequences of environmental change are becoming ever-more dire, needs to be scrutinised, questioned
and examined, alongside an analysis of the state’s ability to balance these competing interests. This thesis seeks to do this.

By providing an analysis of these economic, social and environmental impacts, as well as the role of the state in balancing these interests, this chapter has outlined the motivations and rationale behind this research and set it in the broader context. This will be further explored in Chapter Two, which examines the historical development of aviation policy in the UK, identifying the key actors and events at the UK, European and international levels that have shaped its development.

This chapter has also identified the research gap this work seeks to fill. It will contribute fresh empirics via a systematic analysis of the historical development of the aviation industry in the UK by drawing on a number of academic disciplines. From this, it will provide a fresh theoretically informed analysis of those empirics, using political theory to understand the how and why behind the aviation industry’s position of privilege in the policymaking process and provide new insights into broader theoretical debates about the state.

In addition, it aims to fill an important theoretical gap, by empirically testing two highly contrasting contemporary theories of the policymaking process and creating the first theoretical dialogue between the two. Chapter Three will examine these two theories in further detail, considering, under comparable terms, their origins, units of analysis and how they explain policy change, before exploring existing applications and the critical reactions and refinements they have provoked. This chapter concludes by highlighting their key similarities and differences relevant to the objectives of this research, notably, their attempt to consolidate existing theories of the policymaking process; how they conceptualise the distribution of power among actors; the mechanisms behind policy change; and their view of the state in balancing competing interests.

Chapter Four is the first of two case study chapters. Taking the same structure as Chapter Two, it begins by identifying the key actors involved in the decision to develop Stansted as the third London airport, before a chronological discussion of the events that led to this decision. Chapter Five then applies the ACF and SRA to these events to help understand the series of complex interactions and relationships detailed, to assist in explaining the process of policy change, and in particular, to explore how and why the aviation industry is able to occupy, an oft-claimed, privileged position. Chapter Six is the second case study chapter,
detailing the process that led to the approval of a second runway at Manchester Airport. Following the same structure as Chapter Four, it identifies the key actors involved before providing an in-depth chronological discussion of events. Chapter Seven then applies the ACF and SRA to these events in the same manner as Chapter Five.

Chapter Eight brings together the main findings of Chapters Five and Seven. First, it will assess the theories independently, considering questions such as whether they are logically coherent and whether their scope is clear and broad. Using the same structure as employed in Chapter Three, it will compare and contrast the ability of the ACF and SRA to explain the mechanisms behind the aviation industry's position of privilege in the policymaking process and will offer insights into the ACF and SRA's future theoretical development. Furthermore, it will initiate the first theoretical dialogue between the two theories, analysing and evaluating the extent to which they are complementary or contradictory. The final chapter (Nine) presents the main conclusions of the thesis, briefly addresses the main aims and objectives detailed above and outlines future research directions.
The Historical Development of Aviation Policy in the UK

In order to illuminate the mechanisms behind the industry’s oft-claimed position of privilege and to explore the obstacles to balance in long-term environmental policymaking, it is crucial to have familiarity with the key actors involved in this area of policymaking and to understand how the policy in this area has evolved. This chapter will build upon the motivations and rationale behind the aim and objectives of this thesis and explore the broader context that has shaped the development of aviation policy in the UK.

This chapter begins by considering the main actors that have been involved in the development of UK aviation policy (case-specific actors will be introduced, where appropriate, in Chapters Four and Six). For ease of analysis, these actors are grouped by geographical scale and within this, broadly discussed in three groups (industry, the state and environmental). The chapter then provides a chronological overview of the development of aviation policy in the UK, drawing on international influences and again, examined by geographical scale. To conclude, the key events are briefly summarised, the environmental implications of how aviation policy has developed touched upon and the links to the aim and objectives of the thesis highlighted.

Key actors

International

At the international level, there are three key actors involved in shaping the development of aviation policy: the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the International Air Transport Association (IATA), and the Air Transport Action Group (ATAG).

ICAO is a specialised organisation of the United Nations that is primarily concerned with government interests in aviation (Doganis, 2002). Set up in 1944, under Article 44 of the Chicago Convention, its aim is to cultivate the planning and development of international air transport in order to ensure safe and orderly growth, and to formally codify the principles and techniques of international air navigation (Kassim and Stevens, 2010: 24). The common view is that ICAO has, to date, done little to confront the aviation industry’s

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4 A fast evolving area of policy, this chapter analyses the development of UK aviation policy until roughly 2010. Current debates will be touched upon in Chapter Nine.
rapidly growing environmental impact (AirportWatch, 2009; Bows et al., 2009: 76; European Federation for Transport and Environment, 2007; Gossling and Upham, 2009)

IATA operates as a counterweight to ICAO. Its mission is to represent, lead and serve the airline industry’s interests in aviation (Doganis, 2002; International Air Transport Association, 2009). Formed in 1945, and a key pillar of the post-war regime, virtually all aspects of airline activities are co-ordinated and standardised by IATA, through a number of committees and sub-committees that periodically bring airline experts together (Doganis, 2002; Kassim and Stevens, 2010: 28). It represents airlines in negotiations with airport authorities, governments and ICAO, as well as working as a forum to facilitate inter-airline discussion and as a pressure group representing their interests (Brancker, 1977; Doganis, 2002).

Industry lobby groups first appeared in the 1990s, with the ATAG the singular international association that represents all sectors of the air transport industry. Their mission is to, “promote aviation's sustainable growth for the benefit of our global society” (Air Transport Action Group, 2011a) and they describe themselves as, “an independent coalition of organisations and companies throughout the air transport industry that have united to drive aviation infrastructure improvements in an environmentally-responsible manner” (Air Transport Action Group, 2011b). Based in Geneva, Switzerland, its members include airlines, airports, aircraft manufacturers, airline pilot and traffic controller unions, chambers of commerce, air navigation service providers and travel and tourism operators (Upham, 2003).

**European**

At the European scale, the key actors involved in shaping the development of aviation policy are the European Union (EU), the European Commission (EC) and the European Federation for Transport and the Environment (T&E).

The essence of the EU’s approach to aviation policy has been, and remains, centrally guided growth to maximise the economic benefit and environmental performance of the aviation system as a whole (as opposed to a reliance on airport-initiated growth) (Upham, 2001a). However, while making continual reference to the need for sustainable development, their commitment has been to environmental efficiency in aviation, not to zero growth (Upham, 2001a: 241).
The emergence of the EC as a regulatory authority had notable, but initially unexpected, consequences for the aviation industry, particularly its effect on interest intermediation for airlines (Kassim, 1996). Its decision to create a single internal market altered the protected status and monopoly the flag carriers enjoyed, forcing them to restructure for survival (Kangis and O’Reilly, 2003). From the perspective of airlines, the creation of EC changed the role of the state; whereas previously airlines would lobby national governments, they now direct their lobbying activities to institutions at the European level.⁵

Established in 1990, T&E has grown to be the primary environmental non-governmental organisation (NGO) campaigning for sustainable transport at the European level. Around 50 members, including those from the UK – the Aviation Environment Federation (AEF), Friends of the Earth (FoE) and the Campaign for Better Transport, support it and it coordinates the International Coalition for Sustainable Aviation, an observer at ICAO. T&E’s mission is to:

“promote a policy of transport and accessibility, based on the principles of sustainable development, which minimises negative impacts on the environment and health, use of energy and land and all economic and social costs, maximises safety, and guarantees sufficient access for all” (European Federation for Transport and Environment, 2009).

National

At the national level, key actors include: from the aviation industry, airport operators and airlines; the UK Government; and environmental NGOs.

Since the end of the World War Two, the UK has experienced a dynamic pattern of airport ownership. In 1947 the Ministry of Civil Aviation owned and managed 44 airports in the UK, with airports viewed as facilities that should be publicly owned, operated and subsidised (Bailey, 2007; Humphreys, 1999). The British Airports Authority (BAA) was set up in 1965 to take over these responsibilities, however, after its privatisation in 1986 airport ownership patterns across the UK diversified. Today, three main groups dominate the UK’s airport ownership: BAA plc, Manchester Airport plc and TBI Limited and there has been a recent

⁵ Airlines are also now increasingly represented at this level through three Euro-level groups; the Association of European Airlines, which represents major European airlines, the Association des Compagnies Aériennes de la Communauté Européenne, which is the European section of the International Air Carriers Association representing non-scheduled carriers, and the European Regional Association, which represents regional airlines (Kassim, 1996).
increase in the foreign ownership of UK airports, with BAA plc and TBI Limited, recent acquisitions of Spanish firms, Ferrovial and Airport Concessions and Development Limited (Humphreys and Francis, 2002; Humphreys et al., 2007).

Experiencing ownership patterns that mirror those of airports, in the aftermath of World War Two airlines in the UK (and in Europe) were dominated by state-owned flag carriers whose survival was often based upon periodical injections of state capital (Barrett, 2006; Kangis and O'Reilly, 2003). Seen as a symbol of national pride, airlines were supported by public finances and benefitted from a number of subsidies, cheap loans and tax exemptions and compared to their commercial counterparts, were typically granted monopolies, given favourable positions at airports, and granted privileged access to runway slots (Barrett, 2006; Kassim, 1996). They were considered, and viewed themselves as, fullfillers of public goods and combined with their contribution to economic growth, the preservation of their existence was seen to be in the ‘national interest’ (Barrett, 2006; Kangis and O'Reilly, 2003). However, akin to airports, airlines went through a similar round of privatisation.

The previous decade has also seen a marked rise in the number of pro-aviation lobby groups, such as Flying Matters, Future Heathrow and the Freedom to Fly campaign, designed to promote the interests of the aviation industry (Future Heathrow, 2009; HACAN ClearSkies, 2003).

When airports and airlines were public assets, the UK government played a crucial role in facilitating the political and financial conditions for their development and survival (Kassim, 1996). However, after privatisation, their direct control over the aviation industry reduced (Yarrow, 1995: 52). Despite the increasing role played by actors at European and international levels, the role of national governments in aviation policy has not been abandoned (Kassim, 1996). Today, the state is removed from the direct operations of airports and airlines, however, remains in control of setting the broad direction of national policy and strategy, and to lead in international negotiations (Department for Transport, 2011a). Airport operators have an interest in maintaining a good relationship with the UK Government as in terms of expansion and development they are the entity that has the final say, exercising power and control in planning law.

Analysing the historical development of the aviation industry in the UK uncovers how the aviation issue reached the agenda of environmental NGO’s. In the mid-1960s, when the environmental movement really began, there were the first signs that the environmental
impact, albeit at a local level, was gaining recognition. However, as the environmental movement has grown, and expanded out of this local remit, the environmental impact of aviation has transcended the local and been pushed up environmental agendas, with diverse national level NGOs such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the Campaign to Protect Rural England campaigning on the issue.

Furthermore, there has been a marked increase in NGOs focused solely on the issue, for example, the Aviation Environment Federation (AEF) and HACAN Clearskies. AEF works closely with local, national and international policymakers, has representation on both UK Government and EC working groups and occupies observer status to the environmental committee of ICAO. HACAN Clearskies, based in London, is the biggest voluntary organisation in Europe dedicated to campaigning on behalf of those whose quality of life is affected by aircraft flight paths (HACAN ClearSkies, 2006). In addition, AirportWatch formed in 2000 to operate as a umbrella body to unite local level site-specific community groups opposed to the development of aviation with national NGOs opposed to airport expansion (Stewart, 2010: 5).

**Phases of development**

This section will now situate these key actors within context, providing a chronological overview of the development of the aviation policy in the UK, drawing on international influences and again, examined by geographical scale.

**1940s: setting an international regime and a commitment to post-war regeneration**

In the aftermath of World War Two, 52 states met to consider a form of multilateral agreement for the development of the aviation industry. This resulted in the establishment of the ICAO and the signing of the Chicago Convention in 1944, which laid the foundations of the international air transport regime that remained largely unchanged until 1978 (Doganis, 2002: 30; Glaister et al., 2006; Jenkins, 1959: 159; Nilsson, 2009: 114). A bilateral regime whereby national governments exercised power emerged with agreement on two fronts: the right to fly over another state when on an agreed service and the right to land in another country. This imposed an international regulatory framework, where each state retained sovereignty over its own airspace, price levels were controlled and national

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6 The Chicago Convention now has over 150 signatories (Kassim and Hadley 2010: 24).

During the 1940s, the dominant attitude of international aviation was one of global idealism (Lawton, 1999: 92). However, this was not a view that lasted long and even with the establishment of international organisations such as ICAO and IATA, the international regime for aviation quickly became very state-centric (Kassim, 1996: 109; Lawton, 1999).

As national governments began to realise the political and economic significance of the aviation industry, exacerbated by fears of US hegemony over air transport, a protectionist, nationalist, mentality developed (Kassim and Stevens, 2010: 23; Lawton, 1999: 92). Both a heavily regulated and subsidised industry, national governments extensively intervened to protect their national aviation market, and for reasons of national security, wanted to assert sovereignty over their airspace (Jenkins, 1959: 155; Kassim, 1996: 107; Nilsson, 2009).

The post-war period opened up a realm of possibilities for Europe, with a central aim of the European plan the free and increased movement of people; an aim which hinged on the development of the transport sector. Fast and affordable modes of transport were becoming available to the masses and, in theory, Europe was to become a much smaller and harmonised place. With the aviation industry rapidly developing, it had the potential to play an important role, however, through its nationalist persona it also had the potential to be the biggest hurdle (Lawton, 1999: 91).

At the UK level, the end of World War Two saw the publication of the 1945 White Paper British Air Services, which committed appropriate financing to the development of UK airports (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1945). The industry was unable to develop unaided: finances were needed for infrastructure, demand had to be created, and the costs and risks were high (Jenkins, 1959: 155). Due to the political and international significance of the aviation industry, and the economic problems associated with its initial development, its development became a prime responsibility of the UK Government. The White Paper advocated a national approach to airport planning, with state ownership the means to achieving this (Barnes, 1983: 53; Humphreys, 1999; McKie, 1973: 41). As a result, in 1947, the Ministry of Civil Aviation became responsible for the ownership and management of 44 airports in the UK and it was they who acted on behalf of the industry on the international stage (Edwards Committee, 1969; Humphreys, 1999: 122; Jenkins, 1959: 161).
Not only did UK airport operators need government assistance. Both airlines and aircraft manufacturers needed financial help to recover from the war (Jenkins, 1959: 164). Two airlines became the chosen policy instruments of UK’s civil aviation policy: the British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC), established in 1939, and British European Airways (BEA), established in 1946. Publicly owned, they had a close relationship with the Ministry of Civil Aviation (Jenkins, 1959: 162; Kassim and Stevens, 2010: 53).  

1950s: a decade of indecision
At all geographical scales little changed during the 1950s. While efforts to create a European air policy had begun in the 1940s, they had limited success, with progress in the 1950s equally limited. A Common Transport Policy did emerge from the 1957 Treaty of Rome, however, aviation was initially excluded, while progress to develop a full aviation transport policy at the European level was constantly blocked by national governments, who were committed to protecting their own aviation markets (Button, 1996: 280; Lawton, 1999: 93).

The UK Government’s commitment, in the 1945 White Paper, to a centralised approach to airport planning failed to materialise (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1945). By the mid 1950s, “the airport pattern had been determined by not by a central plan but by the route policies of the Air Corporations and the private airline companies and by the initiative and drive of different local authorities” (Barnes, 1983).

The 1953 White Paper London Airports proposed the rationalisation of London’s airports, concluding that for the near future Heathrow could cope with the predicted air traffic demand of the UK, except for in the peak summer when the overspill would be handled at Gatwick (Bailey, 2007; McKie, 1973; Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1953). The White Paper recommended that Gatwick should be developed as London’s second airport, which, after a public inquiry, was approved and it opened in 1958 (Helsey and Codd, 2010: 33; McKie, 1973: 44).

1960s: beginning to relax state control over civil aviation
Akin to the 1940s and 1950s, there was little progress in the 1960s on any form of European aviation policy. In 1964, the European Commission tried to extend the application

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7 From 1939 until 1946, BOAC was the British state airline and from 1946 until 1974, the long-haul British state airline. BEA was a British domestic airline in operation from 1946 to 1974 (Kassim and Stevens, 2010).
Chapter Two

of the Common Transport Policy to include aviation, however, as before, national governments had no desire to change the status quo and the plan failed to secure the support of the Council Ministers (Lawton, 1999: 93). The traditional picture of European aviation remained one of, “institutionalised cartelisation and collusion” (Button, 1996: 279).

In the UK however, the 1960s saw the first steps towards the gradual relaxation of state control over civil aviation (Glaister et al., 2006: 19). At the start of the decade, central government controlled all commercial aviation, but the combined pressure of significant financial losses, technological advances and the increasing popularity of air travel, meant that the management of airports was becoming too complex for them. Plans were outlined to transfer the ownership of loss-making airports to local authorities; the notion of central control and planning was beginning to be sidelined to reduce financial pressure on the Treasury (Humphreys, 1999).

In 1965, Roy Jenkins, then Minister of Aviation, introduced the Airports Authority Act. This set out to make airports more flexible and potentially profit earning, while still remaining the Government’s responsibility (BAA, 2009). The passing of the Act saw the creation of the British Airways Authority (BAA), a government department created to be self-supporting. In 1966, BAA took control of Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted and Prestwick airports, later acquiring responsibility for Edinburgh (in 1971) and Glasgow and Aberdeen (in 1975) (BAA, 2009; Butcher, 2010a; Higham, 1995: 21; Humphreys, 1999).

By 1967, bar Southampton, central or local government owned all of the UK’s main airports; however, there still was no effective national policy framework to guide airport development in the UK (Humphreys, 1999). Local authorities developed their airports in isolation and consequently the main regional airports in the UK were (and still are) located in pairs about 70km apart, for example Manchester-Liverpool and Bristol-Cardiff. BAA-controlled airports however, did develop in a co-ordinated manner, with Heathrow, already designated the UK’s main international scheduled service airport, and Gatwick London’s second (Humphreys, 1999).

At the same time, the Government set up the Edwards Committee to examine the structure of the UK aviation industry and its prospects for the coming decade. Its report British Air Transport in the Seventies was designed to define UK commercial aviation policy (Edwards Committee, 1969; Thomson, 1990). It argued that while the UK aviation industry needed to operate as a commercial enterprise, this did not require the denationalization of its airlines.
(BEA and BOAC). However, it maintained that a more competitive environment was needed, with the development of a second-force UK airline the way to achieve this (Staniland, 2003: 193; Yarrow, 1995: 55).

The Edwards Committee also reviewed the regulatory structure of the aviation industry in the UK. They recommended that the Air Transport Licensing Board (that the Conservative Government had set up in 1961) should be replaced by an authority to work as an, “independent specialist aviation regulator and provider of air traffic services” (Civil Aviation Authority, 2009; Department for Transport, 2011a; Kassim and Stevens, 2010: 53). With greater powers, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) was set up to be, “an advisor of government and an initiator of policy” (Staniland, 2003: 193). Significantly, the UK was the only country in Europe to establish an independent regulatory authority for aviation (Kassim, 1995: 194; 1996).

In was during the 1960s that the negative environmental impact of the aviation industry began to be recognised, notably, the issue of noise. Mentioned in Sealy’s (1966) Geography of Air Transport, and discussed at a conference in London in the same year, where representatives of 26 nations and 11 international aeronautical organisations were present, the problem of noise posed a serious threat to an industry wanting to grow. A year later, a special edition of the Journal of Sound and Vibration (1967) was published that contained several studies on the impacts, and management of, aircraft noise. This recognition that noise was becoming a serious environmental problem was reflected at the international level in 1969, when ICAO established its Committee on Aircraft Noise, set up to develop international standards and to encourage technological development (Daley, 2010: 11).

1970s: recognising the environmental impact

The 1970s saw environmental impacts other than noise begin to be discussed at all geographical scales. The dark plumes from the exhausts of early turbojet-powered aircraft were very visible and people began to worry about local air pollution as well as the pollution from the run-off of de-greasing agents and de-icing fluid (Daley, 2010: 12).

At the international level, in 1971, ICAO adopted Annex 16, Environmental Protection, into the Chicago Convention, which covered both emissions and noise (Freer, 1994: 30).
Furthermore, at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, ICAO adopted a resolution to investigate the impacts of aviation on the quality of the human environment. This resulted in the publication of ICAO’s *Control of Aircraft-Engine Emissions* (1977), which proposed measures to limit pollutants from engine designs and the establishment of the Committee on Aircraft Engine Emissions (Daley, 2010: 12).

In the UK, as had been recommended by the Edwards Committee, the 1970s saw BEA and BOAC merge to form a single public airline, British Airways (BA), and the creation of a ‘second force’ airline, British Caledonian Airways (BCAL) (Kassim and Stevens, 2010: 53). BCAL, and other existing independent carriers, now had to work out how to survive in a market dominated by state airlines and defined by intergovernmental agreements (Kassim and Stevens, 2010: 44; Staniland, 2003: 194-195).\(^9\) As detailed previously, the motivation for the merger was to reduce the inefficient service, low productivity and poor labour productivity that had characterised both airlines (Yarrow, 1995: 53). While both the Labour and Conservative parties were accepting of the merger, they were less supportive of the creation of a second force independent airline as it would mean taking routes from BA, the public airline (Staniland, 2003: 193-194). A French-style ‘spheres of interest’ solution was imposed that stopped BCAL competing with BA on trans-Atlantic routes, justified on the grounds that it would protect the jobs of the UK airline industry (Staniland, 2003: 196).


A result of the oil crisis and subsequent recession, reflecting global trends, the 1978 White Paper *Airports and Policy* concluded that rates of growth had slowed, which subsequently altered the options for heavy public investment into airport infrastructure (Department of Trade, 1978; Higham, 1995: 33). However, the newly elected Conservative Government, who gained power in 1979, were not bound by the recommendations of this White Paper, instead, reviewing national airports policy themselves, publishing their conclusions in *The Report of the Advisory Committee on Airports Policy* (Department of Trade, 1979a). The tide

\(^9\) For further analysis of the unfavourable conditions facing BCAL, see Staniland 2003: 194.
was to turn dramatically when in July 1979, just weeks after the election of the Thatcher administration, the first plans for BA’s privatisation were announced.

1980s: the transformation of the aviation regime

The international regulatory framework that emerged in the late 1940s remained largely unchanged until the late 1970s (Doganis, 2002: 26). Led by the United States and the UK, the first half of the 1980s saw the emergence of a global trend towards greater economic liberalisation and rapid deregulation of airlines (Kassim, 1996: 110; Lawton, 1999: 96; Nilsson, 2009: 114).

The environmental impact of aviation continued to rise up international political agendas. In 1981, ICAO established standards for three pollutants emitted by aircraft (carbon monoxide, unburned hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides), limits on emissions of smoke, and the prohibition of the venting of fuel from engines (Daley, 2010: 12). Concerns over local air pollution prompted the United States Environmental Protection Agency to regulate aircraft emissions, which set the conditions for the ICAO engine standards that are still in use today (International Civil Aviation Organisation, 1993; 2005). In 1983, ICAO established its Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection to undertake most of their environmental activities (and which remains in operation today) (Daley, 2010: 13).

At the European level, largely stimulated by the move towards liberalisation and deregulation, and mounting pressure from consumer groups, the European Parliament and the European Commission began to develop a Common Air Transport policy (Doganis, 2002: 55; 2004: 46; Lawton, 1999: 93; Nilsson, 2009: 114). Its aim was to liberalise European air transport and promote fair and open competition (Doganis, 2002: 66).

However, liberalisation and deregulation unnerved national governments who were very against losing control of their aviation market. Even though their obligations under the Treaty of Rome were to promote and enforce competition, their position as major stakeholders in their aviation industry did not make them at ease with actively promoting increased competition against their flag carrier (Lawton, 1999: 98). With only the UK and the Netherlands supporting European action in air transport, initially, little progress was made until the mid-1980s when the European Court of Justice ruled (in the ‘Nouvelles Frontieres’ case), that competition rules outlined in the Treaty of Rome did apply to air transport (Button, 1996: 281; Kassim, 1996: 114).
Changes to the European regulatory environment were introduced in two ways: bilaterally through the renegotiation of air service agreements between pairs of countries, and through actions initiated by the EC or the European Court of Justice (Doganis, 2004: 46). In 1984, the UK and the Netherlands renegotiated their bilateral agreements, with the complete deregulation of air services between the two occurring the following year. This was a significant break with tradition and marked a major step towards European-wide deregulation and a clear move away from the traditional and protectionist European bilateral agreements that had been in place (Doganis, 2004: 46; Lawton, 1999: 97).

At the national level, the 1980s saw the aviation industry of the UK transformed. The privatisation and commercialisation of airports resulted in a variety of continually evolving ownership patterns, ranging from wholly private to local authority consortiums, while liberalisation and deregulation dramatically altered the operations of airlines (Heath, 1988: 173; Humphreys et al., 2007). Transport and aviation in particular, was an attractive target for the ideology of radical reform advocated by Thatcher (Caruana and Simmons, 2001: 279).

The ideologically driven, laissez-faire 1985 White Paper Airports Policy established general UK aviation policy objectives: approving the development of Stansted as the third London airport and rejecting both a second runway at Stansted and the planning application for a fifth terminal at Heathrow (Bailey, 2007; Department of Transport, 1985; Graham, 2003: 207; Graham and Guyer, 2000). It was largely concerned with addressing airport capacity problems in the South East and setting the conditions for privatisation and commercialisation (Graham and Guyer, 2000: 249).

The 1986 Airports Act signalled a dramatic change in the ownership pattern of British airports, the first part, mandating the privatisation of BAA (and hence, the seven airports it controlled), and the second, commercialising local authority owned airports (Butcher, 2010a: 2; Caruana and Simmons, 2001: 279; Humphreys, 1999: 124). A wholly private

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10 Both the 1985 Airports White Paper and the subsequent 1986 Airports Act were primarily concerned with addressing capacity shortfalls in the South East, the development of regional airports was largely put on the backburner.

11 Prior to this the CAA ran airports on the northern periphery of Britain, BAA ran those in lowland Scotland and London while throughout the rest of England and Wales a municipal ownership structure prevailed (Humphreys 1999; Humphreys, Ison et al. 2007).

12 Privatisation is defined as, “the transfer by Governments to private investors of the assets of publicly owned enterprises, so that the new entity gains a legal status that enables it to act as a private company”. In contrast,
company, BAA was no longer an arm of the state, with its privatisation generated £1.2 billion for the Treasury (Humphreys, 1999: 124; Humphreys and Francis, 2002: 250). However, what this policy lacked was competition, with the selling of BAA as a bloc meaning that competition was limited (Caruana and Simmons, 2001: 279).

The second part of the Act required all airports whose turnover was over £1million per annum in at least two of the past three years to be set up as commercial companies (Francis and Humphreys, 2001; Humphreys and Francis, 2002; Humphreys et al., 2007). For the first time, airports had to become financially self-sufficient. Initially, 16 municipally owned airports were commercialised, a figure that had risen to 45 by 2000 (Humphreys and Francis, 2002). The 1986 Act also saw the introduction of the economic regulation of airport charges in the UK (Humphreys et al., 2001; Humphreys et al., 2007).

Driven by the need to become commercially solvent, and because of economic regulation, privatisation and commercialisation has meant that there is an incentive for airport operators to expand non-aeronautical activities. As a result, airport management has (and continues to be) turned towards the generation of commercial revenue from, for example, retail and car parking charges (Humphreys and Francis, 2002; Humphreys et al., 2007). Since privatisation and commercialisation, there has been a surge in the speed and magnitude at which airport development has taken place, owing to the ability of private investors to provide funds (Humphreys, 2003; Humphreys and Francis, 2002; Humphreys et al., 2001: 13). Consequently, this has placed increasing pressure on the planning system and has raised policy issues regarding the compatibility of development with long-term capacity growth (Humphreys, 2003).

Furthermore, and a knock-on effect of privatisation and commercialisation, the global financial community has discovered that airports can be very profitable investments. Of concern however, is that the rise of these global airport companies will make it difficult for governments to regulate and guide in regards to national and regional social, economic and environmental objectives, objectives which are unlikely to coincide with the those of the airport operator (Humphreys and Francis, 2002).

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commercialisation refers “to the introduction of commercial objectives to a publicly owned enterprise” (Humphreys, 1991: 121; Humphreys et al. 2001: 10).
During the 1980s, UK airlines went through a similarly revolutionary phase. The intention of airline privatisation was to promote competition. The 1979 Conservative manifesto was explicit, stating that, “the principles of competition which govern other industries in the community should also be applied to air travel”, asserting that these principles would apply in the transfer of public companies to the private sector (Staniland, 2003: 199). Their 1983 manifesto was clear about the need to protect competition and it being a priority of privatisation, “merely to replace state monopolies by private ones would be to waste an historic opportunity. So we will take steps to ensure that these new firms do not exploit their powerful positions to the detriment of consumers or their competitors” (Staniland, 2003: 199).

However, the Government, and in particular the Treasury, were keen however to obtain as high price as possible for BA (Staniland, 2003: 199). This implicitly suggested a need to protect the airline’s (already extensive) control of domestic and international air traffic routes in order to make it as attractive purchase as possible. Guaranteeing that BA was an attractive proposition for shareholders was potentially at odds with ensuring a competitive UK air transport market (Baldwin, 1990: 97, 101; Rickard, 1988: 204; Staniland, 2003: 198, 272).

The 1985 White Paper reiterated the Government’s commitment to a competitive, multi-airline industry, promising to promote the liberalisation of the European air transport market and to deregulate domestic air fares and service (Department of Transport, 1985). However, it gave very little to independent airlines. Nicholas Ridley, then Secretary of State for Transport, admitted that, “practical politics” had taken priority over the government’s commitment to competition (Staniland, 2003: 208). BA’s actual privatisation, though repeatedly postponed and not helped by the recession of the early 1980s, finally went through in February 1987 and redefined the relationship between flag carriers and the state (Glaister et al., 2006; Kassim, 1996: 106; Staniland, 2003: 201).

1990s: open skies for Europe

At the international level, noise remained an important issue throughout the 1980s and 1990s, however, the emergence of concerns over climate change renewed the interest in the environmental impacts of aviation and brought a wave of new actors into this area of policymaking (Daley, 2010: 13). However, it was not enough to infiltrate international legislation, with the Kyoto Protocol (that set international targets for the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions) excluding emissions from aviation due to a lack of agreement on how emissions should be allocated to individual countries (AirportWatch, 2009).

In June 1990, the second liberalisation package at the European level was agreed. Making minor improvements to the 1987 liberalisation package, bilateral air service agreements between states were renegotiated (Doganis, 2004: 47). In 1992 the final package came, addressing the relationship between flag carriers and the state (Kassim, 1995: 197). It was broader and more radical than its predecessors and represented a milestone in the development of an EU Common Air Transport policy, transforming the EU into a domestic market for aviation, an ‘open skies’ regime for air services in the EU was created (Doganis, 2002: 66; Humphreys, 2003; Kassim, 1995: 198; 1996: 115; Lawton, 1999: 100; Nilsson, 2009). This meant there was free market access for all European airlines, with no restrictions on capacity and pricing, and for the first time, the relationship between governments and their airlines was under the eye of European regulation (Kassim, 1995: 198; Nilsson, 2009: 114).

European level liberalisation and deregulation successfully deprived states of the mechanisms they had traditionally used for patriotic interventionism and flag carriers lost their commercial advantages, such as regulatory protection and financial support (Kassim, 1995: 198; 1996: 121; Lawton, 1999: 100). The era of monopolies was drawing to an end and the balance of power was shifting (Kassim, 1996: 124; Lawton, 1999: 100).

Liberalisation and deregulation revolutionised the aviation industry (Mander and Randles, 2009: 274). Those advocating it believed that it should be treated like any other industry and not benefit from the protectionist mentality that had characterised it since World War Two. However, whether it really is treated like any other industry is open to discussion. For example, one of the restrictions remaining from the Chicago Convention is an agreement not to put taxes on aviation fuel (a restriction that the EU unsuccessfully tried to change in 2007) (International Civil Aviation Organisation, 2006; Nilsson, 2009). Unlike other modes of transport where (in general) fuel is heavily taxed, through this agreement, states have agreed that aviation will not be treated like any other industry and will have substantial indirect subsidies (Meijers, 2005; Nilsson, 2009: 115).

An effect of airline liberalisation and deregulation, the UK and Ireland led the low-cost revolution within Europe (Francis et al., 2006). In 1995, easyJet began operations between
Luton and Glasgow, while Ryanair began a service between Stansted and Prestwick. Since, these two have led the development of low-cost aviation across Europe, and bar these two airlines, the low-cost market has been very volatile with many new competitors failing or being bought by competitors (Creaton, 2007; Francis et al., 2006; Jones, 2007; Nilsson, 2009: 116).

In terms of airport development, the UK witnessed a lot of policy reviews and recommendation, but very little action in practice. The environmental impact of an ever-expanding industry was also increasingly a factor. In 1993, the Department of Transport published the results of their Study into Runway Capacity in South East England (RUCATSE). It concluded that there may be an economic justification for at least one further runway to be developed and in operation by 2010, recommending that a runway at Heathrow would be the most beneficial to both the aviation industry and passengers, but would also create the largest number of negative effects (Bailey, 2007).

In 1998, in the Transport White Paper A New Deal for Transport, the newly elected Labour Government committed themselves to preparing a UK airports policy that would look ahead 30 years (Bailey, 2007; Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions, 1998). This White Paper set a framework for future transport policy as well as expressing a commitment to a sustainable transport policy, with the potential conflict between the goal of sustainability and the economic welfare of individual firms permeating the entire report (Bows et al., 2009: 70; Graham, 2003: 199; Graham and Guyer, 2000; Upham, 2001a: 238).

**2000s: the low-cost revolution**

At the European level, a consequence of liberalisation and deregulation was an explosion of the number of low-cost airlines in operation, radically changing travel patterns (Graham and Shaw, 2008; Nilsson, 2009: 115). Following a strategy based on high efficiency, large cost reductions and price levels radically lower than their competitors, low-cost airlines opened up new markets focusing on short haul routes, using secondary airports and offering very basic services (Nilsson, 2009: 115). In 2000, low-cost airlines in Europe carried

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13 easyJet started life as a low-cost carrier whereas Ryanair had been running a London to Dublin route for a number of years and gradually transformed itself into one.

14 The Department for the Environment, Transport and Regions defined a sustainable transport system as one which supported employment and a strong economy, increases prosperity, addresses social exclusion, protects human life and provides a better quality of life for all now and in the future (Bows et al., 2009: 70).
approximately 20 million passengers, by 2007 this figure had increased to 150 million. With growth rates showing little sign of slowing down and this trend looks set to continue, however, “from a global, environmental perspective, the development of low-cost aviation is nothing less than disastrous” (Nilsson, 2009: 126).

Also initiated at the EU level, in 2012 aviation finally, after delayed exclusion, entered the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) (Department for Transport, 2011b). The EU ETS applies to all airlines that fly in and out of the EU. However, it is expected that the majority of airlines cuts will be made by purchasing international credits (that were created by the Kyoto Protocol) rather than the purchase of EU ETS credits or by reductions in emissions. International aviation organisations and countries outside of the EU have expressed strong opposition to the scheme, which in theory, could lead to non-compliant airlines being banned from flying to countries in the EU (Ares, 2012). It has also faced criticism from environmentalists, with claims that it will fail to create any real cuts in emissions, offers no incentive for technological improvements, and essentially allows the aviation industry to buy its way out (EU Commission, 2006).

At the UK level, in March 2003, the Department for Transport, in collaboration with the Treasury, published Aviation and the Environment: Using Economic Instruments (Department for Transport, 2003a). A consultative policy document, its aim was to support discussion with stakeholders regarding the use of economic instruments to encourage the industry to take account of, and reduce, its environmental impact both locally and globally (Bows et al., 2009: 70).

In the same year, the Department for Transport published the White Paper The Future of Air Transport, setting out the UK Government’s vision for the aviation industry up until 2030. Its aim was to create a balance between the increasing demand for air travel and environmental protection (Department for Transport, 2003b; Glaister et al., 2006: 36-37; Mander and Randles, 2009: 276). However, generally forwarding the broad policies of its predecessors, it set out a clear view on expansion based upon economic arguments, emphasising how crucial airport expansion was to the UK economy and how it should be focused at certain airports (Bows et al., 2009: 70; Department for Transport, 2003b).

The White Paper gave approval for UK passenger numbers to grow from approximately 200 million passengers per annum (mppa) in 2003, to 480 mppa in 2030, and supported new runways at a number of airports (including those at Heathrow and Stansted) as well as new
terminals and runway extensions at others (Bows et al., 2009: 70; Department for Transport, 2003a). However, it did state that this would be carried out with respect to environmental limits, though how was not specified (Bailey, 2007; Humphreys et al., 2007; Mander and Randles, 2009: 275, 286).

Also in 2003, the Department of Trade and Industry published the Energy White Paper *Our Energy Future – Creating a Low Carbon Economy* (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003). This accepted the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution’s report *Energy – The Changing Climate* and was consistent with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change that a carbon dioxide (CO₂) emission reduction of 60 percent was needed by 2050 (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 2000; UNFCCC, 1997). Though it failed to explicitly include aviation in this target, in order to achieve this reduction the Department for Trade and Industry implicitly acknowledged that all sectors should be included (Bows et al., 2009: 71).

In 2003, the position of the UK Government was one that supported the growth of the aviation industry, while at the same time committing to massive reductions in UK CO₂ emissions (Anderson et al., 2006; Cairns and Newson, 2006: 4). Their strategy was to achieve these reductions in the most cost-effective manner, across the whole economy rather than in specific industries. At the time, critics argued this approach was inefficient; with the technological and efficiency gains possible in the aviation sector limited and not necessarily the scope in other sectors to absorb growing emissions from the aviation industry (Cairns and Newson, 2006: 8).

In December 2006, the Department for Transport published *The Future of Air Transport Progress Report* (Department for Transport, 2006). It was not intended to review the conclusions and recommendations of the 2003 White Paper but rather, to report on the progress that had been made and update forecasts based on new assumptions (Department for Transport, 2006). The report refuted the claim that the 2003 White Paper had a ‘predict and provide’ approach to UK airport policy, maintaining that the approach was one in which the aviation industry pays its environmental costs while simultaneously bringing economic and social benefits to the UK. However, new attitudes were implicit in the text, with stronger support made for the aviation industry and its importance to the UK economy (Bailey, 2007).
In 2009 the Committee on Climate Change published *Meeting the UK Aviation Target* (Committee on Climate Change, 2009), which exposed the fact that the expansion outlined in the 2003 White Paper could not be carried out in line with the 2050 target for UK CO₂ emission reductions, implying that UK aviation policy was incompatible with the 2008 *Climate Change Act*. In the same year, the UK Government confirmed their support for a third runway at Heathrow Airport (Lockley, 2011: 10). However, in 2010, the new Coalition Government committed themselves to ruling out a third runway at Heathrow (and second runways at Stansted and Gatwick) (Butcher, 2010a: 4).

**Conclusions**

In the aftermath of World War Two, the state was placed firmly at the centre of the international aviation system. Though there was little progress at the European level, the 1960s saw the start of the gradual relaxation of state control over aviation in the UK via the creation of BAA and the development of a more competitive aviation market. At the same time, noise was gaining attention for being a major environmental impact, which posed a serious threat to an industry wanting to grow.

The recognition of the industry’s environmental impact beyond noise continued throughout the 1970s, reflected in international commitments to environmental protection. At the global level, liberalisation and deregulation began to create a paradigm shift, which saw the aviation industry move away from being a highly regulated, government-owned industry and subsidised mode of transport run as a public service, towards an industry that was increasingly privatised and commercialised. Europe’s transnational authorities began to increase their policymaking mandate at the expense of national governments.

The 1980s saw the aviation industry in the UK transformed. The UK Government promoted the liberalisation of the European air transport market, at a time when most of the EC were committed to the public service ethic. The UK Government allowed (and arguably facilitated) its flag carrier to move into the private sector, a move which other European governments could not even imagine (Kassim, 1995: 196). Airport ownership underwent a similarly revolutionary transition. Driven by a desire to remove the financial burden of airport ownership, the UK Government took the decision to take a hands-off approach to airport development, promoting the privatisation and commercialisation of UK airports (Humphreys et al., 2001: 9).
In the 1990s, liberalisation and deregulation further revolutionised the aviation industry, opening the skies across Europe and paving the way for the low-cost revolution that was to explode in the following decade. The UK saw little progress on aviation policy in the 1990s, however, in 2003 the UK Government’s position was one committed to the industry’s continued growth but also to massive reductions in CO₂ emissions, a position that the in 2009 the Committee on Climate Change highlighted was incompatible.

At the UK level, whether it has been protecting and promoting their national airlines, to providing favourable conditions for airport privatisation, throughout the post-war period the UK Government, of whatever political colour, has been broadly supportive of the development of the UK aviation industry. Many of the policy reforms have been a combined result of general ideological shifts regarding the role of government and the failure of existing regulatory structures to provide the desired social objectives. However, with this changing landscape, there has been an increase in both the numbers of actors behind its expansion, but also opposed to its expansion.

Environmentally, privatisation and commercialisation, and liberalisation and deregulation, have created major problems, facilitating the conditions that encourage the aviation industry’s expansion and its position as an engine of growth. Over time, the aviation industry has become increasingly motivated by short-term profits with little regard for long-term sustainability goals. Fundamentally, the protection of the environment is not one of the primary motivations of the private sector.

There is, however, a growing social, political and environmental opposition to airport expansion. In the past the feeling of opposition was a NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) attitude, however, we are now seeing a shift towards BANANAs (Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anyone) (Humphreys and Francis, 2002). This trend has been reflected in a marked rise in the number of NGO’s with aviation on their agenda and those committed solely to the aviation issue (e.g. T&E, AEF and AirportWatch). Furthermore, the recognition and acceptance of climate change is increasing, particularly at the European level. Globally and nationally, the pressure to accommodate growth is intense, but the provision of further infrastructure to increase capacity is facing increased scrutiny due to the negative environmental impacts.

As this chapter has shown, throughout history, the development of aviation policy in the UK has been rooted in supporting its growth, with conflicts increasingly framed in terms of the
economy versus the environment. The challenge for the state is to create policies that ensure a sustainable balance of interests to a variety of stakeholders at local, national and international levels from economic, environmental and social perspectives. However, with the claim that the aviation industry is able to occupy a privileged position in this process, does the state face an impossible task?

To conclude, this chapter has begun to unpick the complex relations that so evidently exist between the actors and debates that have shaped, and will continue to shape, the development of the aviation policy in the UK. This thesis will employ two contemporary theories of policy in order to comprehend these power debates and relationships, to explore the mechanisms behind the aviation industry’s oft-claimed position of privilege and to uncover the obstacles to balance in long-term environmental policymaking. This is where the next chapter turns, to an in-depth examination of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Strategic-Relational Approach.
Theorising Policy Change

The previous chapter uncovered the array of actors involved in the development of the aviation industry in the UK including, but by no means limited to, airport operators, airlines, local community groups, local authorities and environmental non-governmental organisations. It also revealed the dynamic political landscape upon which this area of policymaking has taken, and continues to take, place on. In exploring two decisions fundamental in the aviation industry’s development, the use of theory, or in this case, theories, and the ideas and hypotheses they advocate, will help guide the empirical work and subsequent analysis. Crucially, they will assist in determining whether, and if so how and why, the aviation industry occupies a privileged position in environmental policymaking (Harrison, 2001; Marsh and Stoker, 1995).

A theory can be described as, “an explanatory proposition, an idea or a set of ideas that in some way seeks to impose order or meaning upon phenomena” (Heywood, 2007: 98). An integral element of any political study, its purpose is to explain, comprehend, and interpret the real world and to help make sense of empirical data (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987; Harrison, 2001; Hoffman, 2007; Marsh and Stoker, 1995). As introduced in Chapter One, this thesis employs two contemporary political theories to help comprehend and explain policy change and to guide data collection: the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA). Useful analytically, multiple perspectives force the researcher to clarify varying assumptions and facilitates the building and testing of hypotheses (Sabatier, 1999). Neither theory has been applied to this area of policymaking, nor have they been compared in an empirical, or theoretical, study. Highlighting the novelty in this research, this thesis will contribute to their empirical and theoretical development and initiate a valuable dialogue between the two.

As discussed in Chapter One, the ACF and SRA have been selected as they are modern exemplars of well established political theories (pluralism and Marxism) that provide very differing accounts of how and why particular groups dominate the policymaking process and thus occupy a position of continuing privilege. An agency-centred theory, the ACF studies the policy process over a decade or more, maintaining that political power is broadly shared among a range of interest groups who compete for control over the broad
direction of policy (Smith, 2000). Advantageous over other pluralist/neo-pluralist theories of policy, it is particularly appropriate for the analysis of ‘wicked problems’ such as those presented here. By contrast, the SRA focuses on the recursive relationship between structure and agency, maintaining that certain actors are structurally privileged over others in the policymaking process (Hay, 2002a). A step forward for Marxist thinking on the state, it is praised for being in-touch with the modern era of politics and hence, offering an opposing view of the role of the state in balancing competing interests and the distribution of power, ripe for application here.

This chapter provides an in-depth exploration of the ACF and SRA. First, the details of each theory are revealed under comparable terms: origins; main units of analysis; explaining policy change; applications; and critical reactions and refinements. Second, their key similarities and differences relevant to the objectives of this research are highlighted, notably, their attempt to consolidate existing theories of the policymaking process; how they see power shared between actors; the role of information in creating policy change; and their view of the state in balancing competing interests.

**The Advocacy Coalition Framework**

Developed by Paul Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a theory of the policy process that was developed to deal with ‘wicked’ problems, that is to say, those involving substantial conflict, technical dispute and multiple actors from various levels of government (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 189). A departure from pluralist theories that view the policy process as a conflict between institutions, the ACF focuses attention on the interactions that occur between coalitions of state and non-state actors within a policy subsystem, where beliefs are the causal driver of policy change (Weible et al., 2009: 122).

**Origins**

Emerging from a desire to find an alternative to the stages-based model that dominated policy studies, Sabatier set out to synthesise the best features of top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation and to give technical information (that which concerns the causes, magnitude and solutions of a problem) a more prominent role in the understanding of the policymaking process. His aim was to create a more systems-based approach (Sabatier, 1986; 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 118; Weible et al., 2009: 122). In the mid-1980s, he joined forces with Jenkins-Smith who had been developing a
similar way of conceptualising the role of scientific information within public policy. They encouraged other scholars to apply and critically evaluate their emerging framework (Figure 3.1), the results of which were published in a special issue of *Policy Sciences* in 1988 (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1988: 189; Weible et al., 2009: 121).

Figure 3.1 The Advocacy Coalition Framework in 1988
Source: Sabatier (1988: 132)

Sabatier believed a problem with the existing policy implementation literature was that the four to five year time span it used for analysing the policy process, was too short to draw solid conclusions regarding policy change and consequently omitted important features of the policy process (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Sabatier, 1986). To solve this, a key facet of the ACF is that it advocates analysing policy change over a period of a decade or more, assuming that actors are relatively stable over this time, which makes policy change difficult (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 192).

Taking these applications and evaluations on, in 1993 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith co-edited *Policy Change and Learning: an Advocacy Coalition Approach*, which outlined the ACF and included a set of hypotheses concerning the role of science in learning, policy and belief change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Weible et al., 2009: 121). Their book included six case studies and finished with a critique and a revised framework (Figure 3.2). In response
to increasing application and feedback, further theoretical revisions were made by Sabatier in 1998 (Figure 3.3) and Sabatier and Weible in 2007 (Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.2 The Advocacy Coalition Framework in 1993
Source: Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993: 224)

Figure 3.3 The Advocacy Coalition Framework in 1998
Source: Sabatier (1998: 102)
The ACF begins with three ‘foundation stones’: a macro-level assumption that the majority of policymaking takes place within a policy subsystem among specialists whose behaviour is affected by broader political and socioeconomic influences; a micro-level model of individual behaviour that draws heavily on social psychology; and a meso-level conviction that advocacy coalitions are the best way to deal with the multitude of actors in a policy subsystem (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 191). These affect the dependent variables: actors’ beliefs and policy change, through two mechanisms: policy-oriented learning and exogenous perturbations (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 191-192).

**Main units of analysis**

Deemed more useful than a single or specific governmental institution, the main unit of analysis in the ACF is the policy subsystem within which actors are grouped by their beliefs into advocacy coalitions (Hann, 1995).

**Policy subsystems**

The ACF assumes that policymaking is so complex that actors must specialise to be influential (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 23; 1999: 119; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 192-193). The policy subsystem defines this specialisation and is composed of actors that
have been, “interacting regularly over periods of a decade or more to influence policy formulation and implementation within a given policy area/domain” (Sabatier, 1988: 131; Sabatier, 1998: 111). The important temporal dimension of the ACF creates a distinction between mature subsystems (those that have been in existence for at least a decade) and nascent subsystems (those that are in the process of forming), the former containing actors who share expertise and see themselves as a semiautonomous community (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 136; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 192).

Actors involved in policy subsystems are not constrained to the traditional ‘iron triangle’ of participants such as legislators, interest group leaders and officials, rather, they encompass all of those who want to influence policy in a specific area (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 119; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 192; Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998). The eminent role the ACF gives to technical information means the subsystem also includes researchers such as university scientists and policy analysts as well as journalists who play an important role in the dissemination of information (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 119; Weible, 2005; Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004).

In applying the ACF, it is deemed crucial to define the scope of a policy subsystem, focusing, “on the substantive and geographic scope of the institutions that structure interaction” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 193). However, the existence of overlapping and nested policy subsystems can make this problematic (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 193). For example, Zafonte and Sabatier (2004) wanted to determine whether an automotive pollution control subsystem existed independently of the broader air pollution control subsystem in the United States. They found that it had its own title in the Clean Air Act, a large sub-bureau in the Environmental Protection Agency, a large sub-unit within the California Air Resources Board, interest groups on both industry and environmental sides and a distinct research community. They concluded that a separate automotive pollution control subsystem did exist but was nested within the wider air pollution control subsystem (Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004).

The sometimes-sporadic nature of actor participation in the policymaking process further complicates policy subsystem definition. There are those that are involved in virtually all issues (regular participants) while some, often from overlapping subsystems, are involved in only a distinct set of issues (periodic participants) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 137).
Two sets of exogenous variables affect the behaviour of actors within the policy subsystem: relatively stable parameters and dynamic external factors. The former refer to the basic constitutional structure, sociocultural values and the natural resources available to a political system. Difficult to change, they rarely provide the stimulus for behavioural or policy change but affect the actors’ behaviour (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 20; 1999: 120; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 193). The latter also have the ability to alter the behaviour of actors but more importantly, they can change substantially over a decade or more making them crucial in creating policy change. They include major socioeconomic changes such as the rise of social movements, policy decisions from other policy subsystems and changes in the governing coalition (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 19; 1999: 120; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 193).

**Actors and their belief systems**

Unlike rational choice frameworks, which assume that self-interested actors rationally pursue their material interests, the ACF, “assumes that normative beliefs must be empirically ascertained and does not a priori preclude the possibility of altruistic behaviour” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 194). The way that a coalition understands the connections between institutional structures and policies and their effectiveness for realising their goals is contained within an actor’s belief system (Schlager and Blomquist, 1996: 657).

Belief systems are of a threefold, hierarchal nature (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Weible et al., 2009: 122). **Deep core beliefs** are the broadest and most stable. They are the basic ontological and normative beliefs that operate throughout all policy subsystems and are what defines ones personal philosophy, for example, liberal and conservative beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 31). An actor’s fundamental moral or philosophical principles, they are largely the product of childhood socialisation with any change akin to religious conversion (Weible et al., 2009: 122).

Actors’ policy goals and preferences are held in their **policy core beliefs**, subsystem wide basic strategies and policy positions for the achievement of deep core beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 31). These include value priorities such as the relative importance of economic development versus environmental protection, and the seriousness of a policy problem. They are considered the ‘glue’ of coalitions, remain relatively stable over time, and are considered ideal for coalition formation (Weible et al., 2009: 122).
Secondary aspects are where an actor’s instrumental beliefs are held (their views on policy application and implementation) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 31). Less than subsystem wide, they are a set of beliefs that are easily altered in light of new information and/or for strategic purposes and are the most likely to change over time (Weible et al., 2009: 123). They are relatively narrow in scope and concern beliefs such as the seriousness of a problem in a specific locality and the evaluation of actors’ performance (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 196).

The ACF considers beliefs held in the policy core as the most important. They are more salient to the individual than deep core beliefs and illustrate behaviour more efficiently than secondary aspects (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). As the ACF assumes instrumental rationality (the most efficient or cost-effective means to achieve a specific end) it presumes that actors hold their ultimate goals in a position higher than the contingent means of achieving said goals, predicting that actors will make concessions to their secondary aspects prior to changing their policy core beliefs (Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004).

In some policy subsystems, debate among coalitions is around opposing preferences regarding system-wide policy proposals. To describe this type of belief, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith introduced the concept of policy core policy preferences (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 134; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 195). Although policy preferences usually fall within the secondary aspects of the belief system they can fall within the policy core if they are, “(i) subsystem wide in scope, (ii) are highly salient, and (iii) have been a major source of cleavage for some time” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 134). Policy preferences become policy preferences through translation into secondary aspects policy core, “related to specific instruments or proposals dealing with only a territorial or substantive component of a policy subsystem” and may in fact be, “the stickiest glue that binds coalitions together” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 195).

Adding further difficulty to the alteration of deep core beliefs, the ACF stresses that actors relate to the world through perceptual filters based upon pre-existing beliefs. Actors from differing coalitions are likely to perceive the same piece of information in different ways and will resist information that suggests their deep core or policy core beliefs are invalid or unachievable (Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 131; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 194). Screening out dissonant information, perceptual filters make the changing of
beliefs difficult and compounds distrust between coalitions but strengthens in-group cohesion (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 194).

Taking a proposition from prospect theory, the ACF maintains that actors have a propensity to value losses more heavily than gains and consequently remember defeats more than victories, particularly in high conflict situations (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This creates a tendency for actors to view opponents as more powerful than they really are, which when interacting with perceptual filters, creates ‘the devil shift’ (Sabatier et al., 1987; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 131; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 194). The resolution of conflict between coalitions becomes more difficult than classic rational actor models predict with coalitions viewing each other as more evil, less trustworthy and more influential than they really are, again, exacerbating conflict between coalitions but strengthening in-group cohesion (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 132; Sabatier and Weible, 2007).

**Advocacy coalitions**

Within a given policy subsystem the ACF assumes that actors who share a belief system will unite in advocacy coalitions, holding distinct viewpoints and co-operating over time to achieve their policy aims (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 120; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). There will always be a dominant coalition whose ideas and beliefs shape policymaking with changes in the core aspects of policy requiring the replacement of this coalition (Greenaway, 1998; Sabatier, 1991: 153; Schlager and Blomquist, 1996).

The conflicting strategies of coalitions are mediated by policy brokers who are more concerned with achieving stability in the policy subsystem than policy change (Sabatier, 1991: 153). A third group of actors, their role is to mediate conflict and find a suitable compromise (Freudenburg and Gramling, 2002; Ingold and Varone, 2011: 1; Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 122). Once (and if) a compromise is reached, coalitions may revise their beliefs (primarily their secondary aspects) and/or alter their strategies (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 122). However, shaped by the policy broker’s own bias, this compromise has the capacity to fuel further conflict (Smith, 2000: 99). For example,

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15 Developed in 1979 by Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist at Princeton University (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), a descriptive model, prospect theory describes decisions that involve alternatives with uncertain outcomes.
while high level civil servants may be in the position of policy broker they are also policy advocates, particularly when their particular department has a clear goal (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 27).

The 2007 revision of the ACF (Figure 3.4) makes two additions to the conditions within which advocacy coalitions operate. The inclusion of coalition opportunity structures was a response to the frequent criticism that the ACF was too rooted in American pluralism and hence inapplicable to other regimes (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 199). Borrowing heavily from the (mainly European) literature on political opportunity structures, they, “refer to the relatively enduring features of a polity that affect the resources and constraints of subsystem actors”, notably the degree of consensus that is needed for major policy change and the openness of the political system (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 200).16

While belief systems determine the direction of policy a coalition wants to pursue, its resources critically affect its ability to do so. A typology of resources was created to aid the understanding of these resources (Figure 3.5) (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 201).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal legal authority</th>
<th>Actors in positions of legal authority are seen as potential members of coalitions and when this occurs it is a major coup for the coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion</td>
<td>A supportive public is far more likely to elect coalition supporters into key decision-making positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>A resource utilised to win political battles against the opposition, often used strategically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile troops</td>
<td>Particularly important to coalitions with few financial resources, policy elites often utilise engaged members of the public in campaigns, an inexpensive resource they are often used to garner public support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial resources</td>
<td>Money can be used to purchase other resources, for example, research, media campaigns and advertising as well as bankrolling potential candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilful leadership</td>
<td>Leaders can create an attractive vision for a coalition to aim for, strategically and efficiently use resources and attract new resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.5 The Advocacy Coalition Framework’s typology of resources
Source: Sabatier and Weible (2007: 201)

16 In general, the higher the degree of consensus that change needs, the higher the incentive coalitions have to be inclusive, to seek compromise, to share information with opposing coalitions and to minimise the devil shift (Sabatier and Weible, 2007).
Explaining policy change

To the ACF policy change is the result of a shift in the balance of forces within a policy subsystem through a change in the dominant coalition. Beliefs are the causal driver for political behaviour and while the provision of information and subsequent learning may stimulate changes in secondary aspects, it is unlikely that an actor’s policy core beliefs will change voluntarily. Therefore, as it is near impossible that major policy change will come from within the policy subsystem, outside sources must play a role (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Making the distinction between major policy change created by changes in policy core beliefs and minor policy change generated by changes in the secondary aspects, the ACF identifies two main sources of belief and policy change; policy-oriented learning and external events (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 147). In addition, the ACF’s 2007 revision incorporated two further sources of policy and belief change: internal events and negotiated agreements (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 199).

Policy-oriented learning

Placing emphasis on the role that information and learning can have as a motivating factor in creating policy change, the ACF assumes that policy changes, “as people ‘learn’ or get more and better information which they can then use constructively” (Hann, 1995: 20; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 123). A result of the specialisation that occurs within a policy subsystem, conflict between coalitions drives policy-oriented learning; coalitions strive to outlearn one another and use knowledge in their quest to become the dominant coalition and hence, control the direction of policy (Greenaway, 1998; Hann, 1995). Policy-oriented learning is crucial in the development of policy over time, not because of reduced conflict between groups and the attainment of consensus but because policy becomes better informed. By becoming better informed, the closer policymakers get to identifying the ‘real answer’ to a particular policy problem (Hann, 1995).

Referring to changes in thought or behaviour that result from experience and/or new information, policy-oriented learning is concerned with the attainment, or revision, of policy objectives resulting from an increased knowledge of the parameters of the problem under question and the factors that affect said problem (Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 123). Learning is instrumental - actors have a desire to better understand the world in order to further their policy objectives (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 19). Perceptual filters play a role, with learning within a coalition tending to confirm pre-existing beliefs and coalitions resisting information that questions their deep and policy...
core beliefs (Hann, 1995; Litfin, 2000; Mawhinney, 1993; Meijerink, 2005; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 123).

**External events**

While policy-oriented learning can alter the secondary aspects of a coalition’s belief system, the ACF maintains that changes in policy core beliefs require a shock external to the subsystem (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 123). External events, such as changes in socioeconomic conditions; changes in government; disasters; and changes in other policy subsystems, are a necessary but not sufficient condition for major policy change and have the ability to alter the behaviour of actors (Sabatier, 1999; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 198). These events can shift agendas, create media and public attention and capture the eye of decision-makers, creating change in the subsystem by shifting resources, changing the balance of between coalitions and altering beliefs (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 198; Schlager and Blomquist, 1996; Weible et al., 2009: 124).

Offering the opportunity for a redistribution of resources among coalitions, the most important effect of an external event is that it opens up the possibility of the dominant coalition being replaced (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 199). External events provide a window of opportunity for major policy change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 148). A minority coalition will have to skilfully exploit such a window to become dominant however, the dominant coalition will have a range of delaying strategies to try to ‘ride it out’ (Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004).

**Internal events**

Drawing on the rationales developed in the focusing events literature (events that attract public attention), internal events highlight policy vulnerabilities and failures in the policy subsystem, allow new information to enter and have the potential to change the balance of power between coalitions, stimulating major policy change (Birkland, 1996; 1997; 2004; Kingdon, 1984; Weible et al., 2009: 124). However, unlike the focusing events literature, the ACF maintains a distinction between internal and external events. Internal events have the ability to directly question policy core beliefs whereas the effect of external events on these beliefs is less clear (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 204).

**Negotiated agreements**

In developing the concept of negotiated agreements, Sabatier and Weible (2007: 205) combined the hypotheses from the ACF concerning policy-oriented learning across...
coalitions with the literature on alternative dispute resolution (Bingham, 1986; Carpenter and Kennedy, 1988; O'Leary and Bingham, 2003; Susskind et al., 1999; Ury, 1993). Situations exist where longstanding opposition coalitions come to an agreement that is a change from the status quo. In the absence of either an internal or external shock, the negotiating of an agreement between opposing coalitions can be a path to policy change (Sabatier and Pelkey, 1990).

Applications of the ACF

The majority of early applications of the ACF were in the United States. However, this has gradually spread across the globe with applications in Africa (Beverwiki, 2005; Tewari, 2001); South America (Arnold, 2003; Carvalho, 2001); Australia (Chen, 2003; Swaffield, 1998); Asia (Hsu, 2005; Kim, 2003; Sato, 1999) and, increasingly, on a global scale (Elliott and Schlaepfer, 2001a; Farquharson, 2003; Green and Houlihan, 2004; Litfin, 2000; Lowry, 1998; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 190; Sewell, 2005) though applications in the United States and Europe still dominate (Weible et al., 2009: 125).

The framework is increasingly being applied to a variety of policy areas including domestic violence (Abrar et al., 2000); sports policy (Green and Houlihan, 2004; Parrish, 2003); disaster policy (Olson et al., 1999); tobacco policy (Farquharson, 2003); alcohol policy (Greenaway, 1998); intelligence policy (Nohrstedt, 2011) and foreign policy (Hirschi and Widmer, 2010; Pierce, 2011). However, the majority of applications have built on the frameworks legacy, applying it in the area of energy or environmental policy (Litfin, 2000; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 190, 217-219; Sotirov and Memmler, 2011; Weible et al., 2009: 125).

In most of the applications by Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith and their students (former and current) quantitative research methods have been employed (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991; Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair, 1993; Sabatier and Brasher, 1993; Weible et al., 2004; Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004) as well as by others external to this group (Chen, 2003; Henry, 2011; Matti and Sandström, 2011; Pierce, 2011). However, importantly to this research, qualitative methods have been successfully employed in the area of environmental policymaking (Albright, 2011; Elliott and Schlaepfer, 2001a; Farquharson, 2003; Jordan and Greenaway, 1998; Litfin, 2000; Smith, 2000) and in other policy domains (Green and Houlihan, 2004; Larsen et al., 2006a; Nohrstedt, 2011).
Critical reactions and refinements

The capacity of the ACF to deal with complex situations and its model of the individual derived from social psychology, make it attractive for those looking for an alternative to rational choice models. Moving away from the idea that policy sectors are composed of integrated networks and viewing them as a political terrain upon which coalitions compete is far closer to reality and as John (2003) highlights, provides a grounded way of understanding the important role of discourse in the policy process, integrating ideological aspects of policymaking into the operation of coalitions. Providing a relatively sophisticated explanation of the role that beliefs, knowledge and learning play in the policymaking process, the ACF challenges the implicit assumption of many political scientists that an actor’s organisational affiliation is primordial (Schlager, 1995).

Scholars have questioned the ACF’s outright rejection of coalitions of convenience (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 27) where actors motivated by short-term interests work together to achieve said interests (Hann, 1995; Kim and Roh, 2008). The hierarchal belief system suggests that no coalition could exist between actors who do not share core beliefs; however, in reality it is not unusual to find actors with differing beliefs working together. Hann (1995) cites the example of fascists and liberals who may find themselves in the same coalition on the issue of free speech but who certainly do not share deep core beliefs.

The framework has been criticised for its failure to account for how actors within a coalition overcome (or do not overcome) issues of collective action or how they co-operate in pursuit of common goals and strategies. It assumes that there will be highly coordinated behaviour between actors who share policy core beliefs (Fenger and Klok, 2001; Kim and Roh, 2008; Schlager, 1995; Schlager and Blomquist, 1996). However, many have commented that it is inevitable, for example, that distributional issues will arise when coalitions have to decide between policies as in any decision actors will benefit to varying degrees (Kim and Roh, 2008; Schlager and Blomquist, 1996).

Schlager and Blomquist (1996: 666) believe that the ACF could be strengthened by incorporating theories of collective action, for example, acknowledging that a coalition is likely to be more stable and effective the more they resolve issues associated with collective action. In response, Sabatier and Weible (2007: 208) have stated that they hope the continuing integration of network analysis into the identification of coalitions will help to address this issue (Fenger and Klok, 2001; Smith, 2000; Weible, 2005; Weible and
Sabatier, 2005; Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998). Furthermore, in a recent special issue of *Policy Studies*, Weible et al. (2011) point to an increasing number of applications that identify coalitions that share co-ordination patterns (Henry et al., 2011; Weible and Sabatier, 2005).

Scholars have explored the conditions that do, or do not, create coalition stability. Some empirical studies have illustrated stability (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991; Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair, 1993; Sabatier and Brasher, 1993; Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004) whereas others have sought to explain instances of instability (Andersson, 1999; Munro, 1993). Applications of the ACF have shown that external events can create coalition defection with both relatively stable parameters and opportunity structures affecting the stability of coalitions (Elliott and Schlaepfer, 2001a; Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991; Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004). For example, an actor considered on the periphery of a coalition may switch coalitions over short time periods in order to increase their political influence (Larsen et al., 2006b). The diversification of members within a coalition may also affect its stability. Coalitions, glued together by a certain set of policy core beliefs and a common enemy, may be internally divided on other policy core beliefs and/or secondary aspects (Olson et al., 1999; Weible and Sabatier, 2005). In response Weible et al. (2009: 130) emphasise the need to not assume that coalition membership assumes homogeneity among members and to look for core and peripheral members and sub-coalitions to help explain instability and defection.

Questions have been asked over the ability of the ACF to explain periods of dynamic change with suggestions that the framework is incapable of predicting exactly when change takes place, failing to, “explain what kinds of environmental changes are critical for a specific policy change or how those changes influence policy outcomes” (Kim and Roh, 2008: 675). As a result, many scholars refer to the core mechanisms of policy change in the ACF as a ‘black box’ (Cairney, 1997; John, 1998; Kim and Roh, 2008; Sato, 1999; Sotirov and Memmler, 2011). Sabatier (1998) claims that one of the ACF’s major strengths is in its capability to provide a clear way to distinguish between major and minor policy change. Mintrom and Vergari (1996) argue the opposite, stating that a strength of the ACF is its ability to explain policy stability with the long-term focus of the framework smoothing out short-term fluctuations, extending the evidence base and meaning it has the capacity to understand the many short-term events that lead to incremental policy change (Szarka, 2010: 849).
Some scholars have argued that the ACF relies too extensively on external events as the main driver of policy change (John, 1998; Mintrom and Vergari, 1996). While there have been applications which illustrate the link (Dudley and Richardson, 1999; Kubler, 2001) there are also those which maintain that shocks external to the subsystem do not themselves create policy change. Jordan and Greenaway (1998) and Ameringer (2002) conclude that after an external shock, skilful coalition members are needed in order to exploit the opportunity to create policy change while others discuss the impact of external events in changing coalition structure and in creating minor policy change (Burnett and Davis, 2002; Carvalho, 2001; Davis and Davis, 1988). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) maintain that major policy changes are infrequent and largely unpredictable with the vast majority of policy change occurring in secondary aspects. External events are deemed, “a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of change in policy core attributes of a governmental program [emphasis in the original]” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 147). Notably, the authors have acknowledged that questions remain about the link between exogenous shocks and policy change (Weible et al., 2011; Weible et al., 2009: 128).

Applications of the ACF support the expectations the framework has about the role of science in the policymaking process (Weible et al., 2009: 131) both as coalition members (Litfin, 2000; Meijerink, 2005; Weible and Sabatier, 2005) and in reaffirming pre-existing beliefs and legitimising arguments (Eberg, 1997; Litfin, 2000; Sato, 1999). Similar to the arguments put forward by Heintz and Jenkins-Smith (1988) and Jenkins-Smith (1990) (reversing the causal direction with controversy creating scientific uncertainty), Montpetit (2011) challenges the ACF’s depiction of the role of science in policy subsystems. He argues that the level of conflict in a subsystem affects actors’ perception of credibility in science and that scientists may in fact be more divided than other actors in the subsystem.

The role that policy-oriented learning has in creating policy change divides scholars. Some find a strong connection (Lester and Hamilton, 1987; McBeth et al., 2007) and others a weak, if any, connection (Eberg, 1997; Nohrstedt, 2005). While empirical studies have shown that learning often occurs within the secondary aspects of belief systems, questions remain on what facilitates cross-coalition learning and how it links to policy change (Albright, 2011; Weible et al., 2009: 130). Greenaway (1998), for example, found that policy learning is more likely to take place when coalitions share technical or professional expertise. The ACF theorises that cross-coalition learning is more likely to occur when discussions focus on secondary aspects, when conflict levels are intermediate and when a
professional forum exists. However, Larsen et al. (2006b) have shown that learning can occur in policy core beliefs and a number of studies have shown that the existence of a professional forum does not always facilitate cross-coalition learning (Litfin, 2000; Munro, 1993).

The ACF assumes that actors beliefs are complex and should be ascertained empirically (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 131). Methodologically, questions have been asked about whether it is realistically possible to confirm belief systems empirically, particularly retrospectively (Hann, 1995; Jenkins-Smith, 1991). Sabatier (1988: 142) states that the preferred method is to allow actors to indicate their belief systems via questionnaires and content analysis of documents and then examine how they change over time. Critics believe that this is a naive approach to discovering beliefs (Hann, 1995). Even if actors are willing to answer questionnaires, they themselves may not be fully aware of their deep core beliefs or very good at articulating them. It is not design that is the problem, rather that actors may just not know the answer, leaving responses to inference on the part of the researcher with assumptions made as a result (Hann, 1995: 24). It is also important to bear in mind the neutrality of the researcher who may themselves be members of a coalition. While Jenkins-Smith (1991) recommends the use of public documents such as transcripts of public hearings in gaining retrospective data, he acknowledges their pitfalls. Notably that even when these documents are available key data is missing, particularly data that which relates to more abstract core beliefs and the possibility that public documents may represent strategic positioning rather than beliefs (Jenkins-Smith, 1991).

A strength of the ACF is the extensive empirical testing it has been subjected to with continuous development and revisions taking place as a result (Schlager, 1995; Schlager and Blomquist, 1996). It is a theory that is very much still alive with scholars still engaged in the refinement and development of the theory (Weible et al., 2011). However, there is a growing criticism that through this, the ACF is becoming too stretched and losing its parsimony. For example, the recent inclusion of internal events and negotiated agreements as possible routes to policy change, suggest that the ACF may be trying to cover all paths to policy change (apart from what cannot be included because of its pluralist roots i.e. structure). Unsurprisingly, Sabatier refutes this suggestion seeing the ACF’s constant

17 Most recently, a special issue of Policy Studies Journal contained seven empirical applications and one application dedicated to theoretical development, six of which emerged from an international workshop on the ACF at the University of California-Davis in September (Weible et al. 2011).
development and revisions as a strength and part of the, “productive path of science” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 208).

**The Strategic-Relational Approach**

Developed by Bob Jessop (Jessop, 1990; 2001) and promoted by his former PhD student Colin Hay (Hay, 2002b), the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) focuses attention on the recursive relationship between structure and agency to understand the policymaking process. Agency referring to the ability of individuals to act independently and make their own free choices and structure to the recurring pattern of arrangements that influence or constrain the choices and opportunities available to agents (Hay, 2002b; 2005; Valler and Wood, 2004).

Akin to Giddens’ theory of structuration (1984), the SRA attempts to transcend the dualism that has been created between structure and agency, asserting that they need to be analysed alongside one another with the aim of understanding the recursive nature of their relationship (Hay, 2005; Kelly, 1999; Valler and Wood, 2004: 1835). It maintains that certain structures privilege some forms of agency over others and that actors reflect on the nature of structures when selecting their courses of action (Hay, 2005; Kelly, 1999; Valler and Wood, 2004: 1835).

**Origins**

In his early work, Karl Marx developed two distinct approaches to understanding the relationship between the state and particular classes: the first where the state is relatively autonomous from the dominant class, and the second where the state operates as an instrument of it (a perspective associated with the *Communist Manifesto*) (Hay, 2005; Taylor, 1995: 249). Though complicated and interpreted in different ways at different times, Marx’s work embodied a theory of history where the means of production was the dominant and determining force (historical materialism) (Hill, 2005: 40). He maintained that the economic ‘base’ (the mode of production or economic system) conditioned and/or determined the ideological and political ‘superstructure’, suggesting that both historical and social development could be explained in terms of class and economic factors (Hill, 2005: 56).

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18 Giddens’ theory of structuration maintains that all human action is to an extent predetermined by the contextual rules under which it occurs, however, the rules are not permanent and external but modified through a process of reflexive feedback (Giddens, 1984).
In classical Marxist theory, the social structure of a capitalist society is in essence one of class where the bourgeoisie (the owners of the means of production) are in confrontation with the proletariat (who work for the bourgeoisie) (Hill, 2005: 40). This confrontation intensifies as competitive production forces the bourgeoisie to systematically reduce the rewards going to the proletariat, eventually to the point where the latter rebels, overthrowing the former and replacing capitalism with socialism, an essentially determinist argument where your position in the means of production determines your political interests (Hill, 2005: 40). The role of the state is to assist capital accumulation, creating conditions that encourage the production of profit and keeps order and control in society (Hill, 2005: 41). However, there are examples where Marx (and Engels) move away from this instrumentalist view of the state and take a slightly more structuralist position (Hay, 2005: 67). In both *The Eighteenth Brumaire* and *The Civil War in France* the state is given a much more independent role where its structure and function is to guarantee (or at least powerfully select for) the reproduction of capitalist social relations (Marx, 1852 [1979]; 1871 [1986] quoted in Hay, 2005: 67).

Building on the work of Marx, in the early 1990s Lenin developed a conceptualisation of the state as, “an organ of class rule, an organ for the oppression of one class by another” (Hay, 2005: 68). Somewhat one-dimensionally, Lenin (and to some extent Engels) viewed the state as the repressive arm of the bourgeoisie, unable to advance social transformation as this would require the destruction of the state (Lenin, 1917 [1968] quoted in Hay, 2005: 60, 68). At a similar time, Plekhanov and Kautsky were developing theories on the relationship between the state and class struggle. Driven by a desire to establish a scientific Marxism grounded in a scientific prescription of the inevitable downfall of capitalism, they emphasised the role of productive forces at the expense of the relations of production (economism) (Taylor, 1995: 252).19

Gramsci began in his attempt to reformulate the Marxist theory of the state through a rejection of this scientific way of thinking. He argued that economism failed to comprehend class struggle and wanted to develop a more inclusive definition that incorporated human subjectivity as a dynamic agent (Hay, 2005: 69; Marsh, 1995: 274; Taylor, 1995: 252). He believed that reducing everything to its economic base ignored the most crucial feature of a

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19 Economism overemphasises the determination of social life by the economic base, underestimating the importance of the political and ideological (Taylor, 1995: 252).
dialectical approach; the interplay between the objective and the subjective in the
development of history, that is to say, what provides capital with the capacity to reproduce
and reassert its dominance over time despite its inherent contradictions (Hay, 2005: 69;

In redefining the concept of hegemony, Gramsci made a significant move away from the
view of Marx and Engels that the ruling material class were also the ruling intellectual force.
By extending the definition of the state to include the institutions and practices by which
the ruling class maintain consensual dominance over the sub-class Gramsci attributed, “a
greater degree of importance to the struggle taking place at the ideological, political and
cultural levels” (Gramsci, 1971; Hay, 2005: 69; Taylor, 1995: 254). Gramsci believed that
hegemony was not solely reliant on coercion by the dominant class (structure) but also
upon the social and political acceptance of the subordinate classes (agency). A dominant
class needed to succeed in presenting its own values as societal norms and in constructing
an ideological common sense to be hegemonic, illustrating the struggle between constantly
shifting ideological positions and the struggle between structure and agency (Hay, 2005: 69;

To Gramsci the state assumes a broader definition that constitutes, “the entire complex of
political and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains
its dominance, but manages to win the active consent over whom it rules” (Taylor, 1995:
254). Power is inclusive, encompassing all the operations that make up the apparatus of the
political and cultural hegemony of the ruling class, for example, the inclusion of institutions
through which power is mediated in modern society, such as the media and the educational
system (Taylor, 1995: 254). The struggle over public consciousness is considered to be
equally as important as the struggle over the ownership of production with the power of
the state residing it in its ability to influence and shape the perceptions of the subordinate
classes by either convincing them of its legitimacy or that resistance is futile (Hay, 2005: 70;

The French tradition of structuralism that emerged in the 1960s/70s was diametrically
opposed to the central thrust of Gramsci’s work to re-establish the role of the subject
within Marxist theory. Bereft of a subjective core, this field of thinking maintained that
there were no subjects in history, only individuals that occupied objective structures
(Taylor, 1995: 255). These ideas of French structuralism, and in particular the work of Louis Althusser, influenced the next Marxist theorist: Nicolas Poulantzas.

Drawing on Althusser’s concept of relative autonomy, where all levels and practices are dependent on one another, Poulantzas argued that if the state was to operate as a successful class state that acted in the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie then it needed to maintain a degree of autonomy from the dominant class; presenting itself not as a class state but as a state operating in the interests of the people (Taylor, 1995: 255). While accepting Althusser’s view that the political and ideological are relatively autonomous, Poulantzas believed that the role of the state was not limited to the reproduction of the external conditions where production takes place but they themselves crucial components in the social relations of production (Taylor, 1995: 256). Adapting Gramsci’s focus on hegemony, Poulantzas (1968) held that state power needed the consent of the oppressed via class alliances.

Poulantzas disagreed with instrumentalist accounts of the state, viewing the capitalist class as too focused on its own short-term gain to be concerned about maintaining class power as a whole; considering the function of the state to ensure the smooth operation of the capitalist society. His work focused on how an inherently divisive system such as capitalism could co-exist with the social stability required for its reproduction, attempting to theorise the relative autonomy of the state and the idea of structural selectivity (Marsh, 1995).

During the 1960s/70s Poulantzas became involved in an intense theoretical exchange with Ralph Miliband regarding the source of power in contemporary capitalist societies and the relationship between the ruling class and state apparatus in determining state policy (Hay, 2005: 71). Hay (2005: 71) notes that the importance of this debate lies not in the quality of the exchange or its historical significance, but in the problems it reveals in Marxist conceptions of the state.

Poulantzas began by critiquing Miliband’s *The State in Capitalist Society* (1969), highlighting the absence (bar Gramsci) of any attempt to create a Marxist theory of the state and praising Miliband for his attempt to do so. However, he criticised Miliband for remaining tarnished by bourgeoisie assumptions about the state, notably that power is held by the personnel of the state not the apparatus and failing to grasp what he considered the, “objective structural reality of social classes and the state” (Hay, 2005: 71). Dismissing what he saw as a sociological approach taken by Miliband, Poulantzas emphasised that economic
structures and social power constrain state autonomy, suggesting that the state cannot do anything but act to propagate the social system in which it operates (Hay, 2005; Heywood, 2007).

The debate became a crude and polarised struggle between instrumentalism (Poulantzas’ caricature of Miliband) and structuralism (Miliband’s caricature of Poulantzas) (Hay, 2005: 71; Heywood, 2007; Hill, 2005: 39). Miliband viewed the state as a neutral instrument that was there to be manipulated by the ruling class, stressing the way in which the state elite was disproportionately drawn from the privileged (Heywood, 2007). Agency is given primacy over structure, with an instrumentalist theory thus a theory of the state in capitalist society rather than a theory of the capitalist state (Hay, 2005: 72).

In contrast, Poulantzas’ more structuralist position asserts the priority of structure over agency, with agents as mere bearers of objective structures over which they have minimal influence (Hay, 2005: 71). The state serves the long-term interests of capital with the capitalist state a structural system whose form and function develops independently of any intentions, motivations or aspirations of the political elites or ruling class. A theory of the capitalist state, it is state centred where the state apparatus acts in the long-term interests of the ruling class (Hay, 2005: 73).

While a large part of Poulantzas’ (1978) State Power and Socialism details the processes of how the state reproduces individuals as juridical subjects, Taylor (1995: 257) suggests its most significant contribution to Marxist thought is the way it develops a view of the state as an arena of class struggle (a view similar to that taken by the SRA). Theorising the state as a ‘social relation’ Poulantzas (1978: 132) sees state power as relational and selective, referring to the state as a strategic terrain that connects networks of power (Jessop, 1985: 127; Taylor, 1995: 258). The state is relational in that its structures and policies are, “historically contingent episodes in a dynamic process of evolution” and selective in that it is comprised of institutional mechanisms that advance or obstruct strategies and favour the dominant class of the moment (Kelly, 1999: 110).

Jessop (1985: 134) highlights a tension between necessity and contingency in the way Poulantzas relates institutional forms and class struggle. By wanting to avoid economism but not wanting to abandon the Marxist view that in the long-term the capitalist state must reproduce the dominance of the bourgeoisie, Poulantzas introduced an element of contingency (Taylor, 1995: 258). No longer is state unity seen in terms of functioning to
reproduce the dominant class; the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie are served through a multitude of micro-policies that reflect the nature of class struggle. However, Jessop states that this fails to provide an adequate solution to the problem, “since Poulantzas would need to address the awkward issue of how this macroscopic necessity (the need to ensure bourgeois class domination) emerges out of microscopic diversity (the chaotic nature of state policies)” (Taylor, 1995: 259). Poulantzas fails to explain how the relative autonomy of the state can ensure class hegemony, and if he did manage to answer this, his view that crises of hegemony can occur would be undermined (Taylor, 1995: 259).

The SRA attempts to overcome Poulantzas’ tension between necessity and contingency in the relationship between institutional forms and the class struggle, by abandoning the primary role given to class struggle. It favours a broader, more flexible conception of struggle not limited to class, “which acknowledges the need to disaggregate social analysis and embrace the particularities of divisions along the lines of ethnicity and gender” (Taylor, 1995: 259).

While failing to significantly advance Marxist theory, the Miliband-Poulantzas debate highlighted the limitations of structure-centred and agency-centred accounts, providing a point of departure for more recent developments in state theory (Hay, 2005: 73; Marsh, 1995). Developments in modern Marxism have shown a convergence between pluralist and Marxist theories and just as (some) pluralists have begun to acknowledge the role of corporate power, neo-Marxists have begun to move away from the idea that the state is purely a reflection of the class system, with an increasing recognition that the classical two-tier model between the bourgeoisie and proletariat is too simplistic for modern societies (Heywood, 2007).

Block (1987a; b) developed Miliband’s position, concerning himself with demonstrating how, in spite of the division of labour between state managers and the capitalist class, the state will tend to work in the long-term interest of capital. Maintaining that the capitalist class will often provide the loudest opposition to reforms, Block argues that they (the capitalist class) are incapable of acting in the long-term collective interest. Those in the ruling class who are involved in policy formulation become atypical of their class and hence quite likely to diverge ideologically from those in the ruling class who are politically unengaged (Hay, 2005: 74).
To Block, state managers may have interests closer aligned to the long-term interests of capital than capital itself, citing the example of the dependent relationship between state managers on one hand and the performance of the capitalist economy on the other (Hay, 2005: 74; Marsh, 1995: 275). The state takes on the role of custodian of the general interest of capital; economic activity produces state revenues, public support for a regime falls unless accumulation continues, state managers will do whatever they can to facilitate accumulation, economic activity is largely determined by private investment; hence, managers become particularly sensitive to business confidence (Hay, 2005: 74).

Block’s work is a dialectical view of the relationship between state apparatus and the ruling class void of the intentionalism and indeterminacy of instrumentalist accounts and the functionalism and determinism of structuralist accounts. However, it remains an agency-centred account due to its focus on state managers as utility-maximisers (Hay, 2005: 74). Jessop’s SRA attempts to transcend this dualism and while Block’s view of the state as the custodian of capital can be seen as the heir to instrumentalist Marxist accounts, Jessop’s SRA can be seen as the heir to structuralist accounts (Hay, 2005: 75).

**Main units of analysis**

Jessop’s work is an example of how modern Marxism has attempted to move away from economism, determinism, materialism and structuralism, developing the concept of strategic selectivity as an alternative to Poulantzas’ concept of structural selectivity (Hay, 2005; Marsh, 1995; 1999; 2002: 162). Jessop’s view that the form of the state is the result of previous strategic struggles between social forces builds upon Poulantzas’ work, but marks a step forward in recognising the importance of social forces other than class and acknowledging the dialectical and contingent nature of the relationship between structure and agency (Kelly, 1999; Marsh, 1995; 2002; Taylor, 1995).

To the SRA, the distinction between structure and agency is purely analytical, “in the real world, structures are constituted *only* by their impacts on agents, and agency takes place *only* within a structured context” (Valler and Wood, 2004: 1835, emphasis in original). The two logically follow one another and therefore there can be no analysis of one without the other (Hay, 2005: 75). Concentrating on the interplay between structure and agency in the real contexts of social and political interaction, while the analytical distinction is useful to differentiate between the two it is important to ensure that this is not hardened into a rigid ontological dualism (Hay, 2002a: 127).
For advocates of the SRA, one of the main issues with the structure-agency debate is the language in which it has been conducted in (Hay, 2002a: 127). The SRA deserves recognition for attempting to privilege neither structure nor agency and seeking to devise a new conceptual language that better reflects the relational and dialectical qualities of the ongoing interaction between the two. It sets out to bring agency into structure with the production of a structured context (an action setting) and structure into agency (a situated agent) (Hay, 2002a). Taking this a step further and repeating the process, it then brings the situated actor into the structured context and the structured context to the situated actor. This results in a new conceptual pairing where the dualism has been dissolved; strategic actors within strategically selective contexts can now be identified, better reflecting the manner in which actors appropriate the environment in which they are situated and the manner in that context dictates the parameters of their possible action (Hay, 2002a).

**Strategically selective contexts (structure)**

Following Poulantzas, the SRA sees the state as a strategic site sculpted by class struggles and a, “specific institutional ensemble with multiple boundaries, no institutional fixity and no pre-given formal or substantive unity” (Jessop, 1990: 267). Rather than viewing the state as a means where capitalism is maintained through the weakening of class tensions and an instrument used by the dominant or ruling class, the state is a dynamic, unfolding system whose specific form at a particular moment in time represents a, “crystallisation of past strategies”, that privileges certain actors and strategies (Hay, 2005: 75; Jessop, 1990: 129). An arguably pluralist view of the state, it is considered fluid and inclusive (Marsh, 2002).

Reflecting the balance of power within society at a given time, the state obtains its power from the forces acting within it (Heywood, 2007; Jessop, 1982: 149; Taylor, 1995: 261). The effectiveness of this power is dependent on the balance of forces in any given situation, “the state is not simply something towards which one must adopt a political strategy but is something (or better, a social relation) which can be fruitfully analysed as the site, the generator, and the product of strategies” (Jessop, 1989: 3). Positioned within, “a complex dialectic of structures and strategies” (Jessop, 1990: 129), the state and the institutions which comprise it are strategically selective and, “more open to some types of political strategy than others” (Hay, 2005: 75; Jessop, 2005). It represents an, “uneven playing field whose complex contours favour certain strategies (and hence certain actors) over others” (Hay, 2005: 75; McAnulla, 2002: 280), under which there is no guarantee that the state will operate in the interest of capital (Hay, 2005: 76).
Actors’ strategies collide, affecting the structured terrain of the strategic context upon which they have been deployed and transforming (both intentionally and unintentionally) the context where future strategies are developed and deployed (Hay, 2002b; McAnulla, 2002). “The state evolves through a series of political and social crises as the pre-existing mode of intervention of the state within civil society and the economy proves increasingly dysfunctional” (Hay, 2005: 76). The outcomes of these crises cannot be predicted and the SRA sees them as conditional on the balance of forces, the nature of the problem, and public perceptions of what the problem is (Hay, 2005: 76).

**Strategic actors (agency)**

The SRA sees actors as conscious, reflexive and strategic who act intentionally towards their preferences but also intuitively and/or out of habit with the ability to explicitly state their motivations and intentions. Actors’ intentions and preferences are neither fixed nor determined by the material circumstances in which they find themselves; different actors in similar material circumstances may construct their preferences and intentions differently (Hay, 2002a). By monitoring the effects of their actions, actors will review and modify their intentions and preferences accordingly in both the long and short term and have the ability to formulate strategies to overcome problems created for them by strategically selective contexts (Hay, 1995; 2002a; McAnulla, 2002). Likewise, actors will continuously review, revise and reform their interests and preferences over time as a result of changes in material circumstances and ideological influences (Hay, 2002a).

The capacity to overcome any strategic disadvantage they face assumes a relationship between the actor and the context in which they reside. By acting strategically, actors are predicting the likely outcome of their actions and are therefore constantly judging the contours of the terrain in which they operate (the strategic context) (Hay, 2002a). Through this understanding, actors formulate strategies that provide them with a higher chance of overcoming the hurdles created by strategically selective contexts (McAnulla, 2002). The ability that agents have to alter the structural circumstances in which they find themselves is through a process of what the SRA terms strategic learning, “agents are reflexive, capable of reformulating within limits of their own identities and interests, and able to engage in strategic calculation about their current situation” (Hay, 1996: 124).
Explaining Policy Change

Whereas Giddens views structure and agency as flipsides of the same coin, the SRA sees them as distinct phenomena; structure and agency are, “in practice completely interwoven (we cannot see either metal in the alloy only in the product of their fusion)” (Hay, 1995: 200), they only exist through their relational interaction. The properties of the coin (society) derive not solely from the sum of its component metals (structure and agency) but also from the complex chemical reactions that occur between them (Hay, 1995; 2002a: 127). Logically following one another, the SRA believes that it is not possible to understand structure (strategically selective contexts) and agency (strategic actors) in isolation (Hay, 1995; 2002a; 2005: 75).

The SRA sees all social and political change as the result of conflict between actors upon a terrain that favours certain actions (and hence certain actors) over others (Hay, 2002b; 2005; McAnulla, 2002). Strategies collide, impinging on the structured terrain of the strategic context within which they are formulated, “their effects (however unintentional, however unanticipated) are to transform (however partially) the future context within which future strategies are formulated and deployed” (Hay, 2005: 75). Emphasis is on hegemonic domination and struggle with the outcomes of past struggles shaping the political terrain upon which present struggles are conducted (Taylor, 1995: 251). Figure 3.6 illustrates the process.

![Figure 3.6 Structure, Strategy and Agency in the Strategic-Relational Approach](Source: Hay (2002a: 131))
Actors operate strategically, pre-judging the impact of their actions. By emphasising the strategic context of action, the SRA acknowledges, “that agents both internalise perceptions of their context and consciously orientate themselves towards that context in choosing between potential courses of action” (Hay, 2002a: 129). However, for action to have any chance of being successful it must be informed by a strategic assessment of the context in which action occurs and upon which strategy impinges (Hay, 2002a: 129). Strategic action has two results: direct effects that transform the structured context where action takes place and strategic learning, which enhances actors’ knowledge of structures (Hay, 1996; Jessop, 1990).

In applying the SRA, the strategic selectivity of every institution needs to be assessed separately (Heigl, 2011: 84). As Hay and Richards (2000: 14) highlight, there is a need, “to understand what are the determining factors behind an individual or organisational selection of one particular option over another”. By understanding strategic activity, the often disguised meanings that operate around these activities and the rationalities that underscore them, business politics can be explored and policy change explained (Hay and Jessop, 1995).

**Applications of the SRA**

While the SRA is gaining increasing attention, compared to the ACF it has had very limited use in guiding empirical work particularly by its author, “Jessop is notoriously hesitant when it comes to using his theoretical propositions in empirical research” (Uitermark, 2005: 141) to the point where there is a large discrepancy between the formal methods the SRA proposes, and Jessop’s actual analysis (Uitermark, 2005: 141). However, there are notable empirical examples by other scholars, as well as those engaging with it on a theoretical level.

Empirically, it is yet to be applied in the UK, but has been subject to testing in Europe (Theil, 2010), Africa (Chettiparamb, 2007) and South America (Heigl, 2010; 2011; Ioris, 2011). Theil (2010) applied the SRA to explore the ways in which a changing political landscape shaped actor’s strategies regarding the implementation path of the Odelouca Dam in Portugal, finding that the SRA’s focus on the interplay of structure, strategy and agency provided the most useful way to ascertain how ecological modernisation informed the actors strategies (Theil, 2010: 497). Chettiparamb (2007) employed the SRA in a study of land mobilisation for road widening in Kochi, India. She found that paying attention to the structures of
participation processes at difference scales was a way to manage conflicting interests among multi-organisational partnerships. Heigl applied the SRA in examining Mexico’s transformation into an internationalised competition state (2010) and in investigating the privatisation of the Mexican oil sector (2011). Expanding the SRA to urban political ecology, Ioris (2011) used it to examine water management problems in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. Methodologically, these applications have predominantly used a combination of documentary analysis and interviews, with one example where participant observation was used (Ioris, 2011).

Theoretically, Goodin et al. (2005; 2006) and Jones et al. (2005) have employed the SRA to discuss governance and devolution in the UK. Utilising it in similar way, Lagendijk (2007) adopted the approach to explore the significance of the region in economic, political, social and spatial processes. Valler and Wood (2004) have used it to analyse the response of business interests to the UK’s devolved and regionalised governance context, while Uitermark (2005) has used it to assist in the development of an analytical framework to analyse the genesis and evolution of institutions involved in the initiation of urban policy in the Netherlands. In a multi-theoretical approach, James (2009) combines policy-network analysis (PNA) with the SRA to analyse changes to the European Union policymaking process within the UK core executive introduced under Tony Blair, employing the SRA’s key assumptions to evaluate and explain the impact of adaptation, with PNA employed as an organising framework. James’ study confirmed a number of the SRA’s key assumptions, notably that the strategically selective nature of contexts favour certain strategies over others, and the important role of strategic learning (2009: 218-219).

Critical reactions and refinements

Critiques of the SRA have come from those who have engaged with it theoretically and empirically, and more broadly from Marxist commentators. In his review of Marxist political theory, Barrow (1993) believes that Jessop’s ideas are far from being original and are really just a regurgitation of some of the basic ideas from Poulantzas’ work on structuralism, “albeit without the functionalist verbiage” (Barrow, 1993: 154). He comments that it is difficult to regard Jessop’s work as having any synthetic power and that he makes claims that contradict one another (Barrow, 1993). While critical of structuralism, the SRA has, in part, developed as a critique of it and is a natural heir to, and step forward from, structuralist accounts like that of Poulantzas (Taylor, 1995: 261; Valler and Wood, 2004: 1835). Jessop maintains that the improvement the SRA makes on structuralism is that
structure is seen as a strategic accomplishment; the SRA analytically embeds the differences in the opportunities created by structures (Jessop, 2001). Jessop views structuration theory as conceptualising actors as relatively free and unconstrained, which fails to recognise their different capabilities and specificities. The SRA conceives actors as embedded within structures that are differentiated and specific, while at the same time giving them agency (Chettiparamb, 2007: 415).

Valler and Wood (2004: 1852) see a strength of the SRA in its ability to directly engage with the realities and complexities of political strategy and in providing important insights into the process of policy change. Allowing for a deeper understanding of strategic activity, it pays close attention to questions surrounding the perceptions of businesses, personality and political manoeuvring in the analysis of business politics. Theil (2010) agrees, describing it as a progressive theory that reflects a changing political landscape by recognising that structural circumstances change and that actors modify both their intentions and strategies to achieve their objectives.

Valler and Wood (2004: 1837) commend the SRA’s units of analysis, which they believe are less about abstract theorising and more concerned with identifying the immediate concerns of structural constraints, strategic actions and learning. For example, rather than seeing the representations of business interests as an expression of the structural characteristics of capitalist society, or solely reducing it to the rational calculation of individual agents, “the SRA examines the interaction of a strategically selective that privileges certain forms of interests and activities and strategic actors who continually examine the options open to them in pursuing their various interests” (Valler and Wood, 2004: 1837). Interestingly, as Uitermark (2005: 141) highlights, on the rare occasions where Jessop has applied the SRA, he pays little attention to the strategies of individual actors.

The SRA’s conception of the state has received praise from scholars. In not giving it any form of innate power, the state’s power is determined by the balance of forces that exist within society at any one time (Taylor, 1995: 261), operating as a, “dynamic institution that offers unequal opportunities to different social groups to achieve their specific political purposes” (Ioris, 2011: 7). However, as pointed out by Heigl (2011: 84), there is no concept within the SRA to describe and assess the internal dynamics of the state resulting from the interaction of different political institutions of varying historical importance.
Chettiparamb (2007: 414) and Uitermark (2005: 141) criticise Jessop for failing to fully explore the scalar implications of the SRA, notably the nature of the relationships between actors operating at different scales. Uitermark (2005: 141) highlights that this becomes particularly problematic when you assume, as Jessop does, that all institutions and behaviours have mutually determining relationships, “the challenge is to combine such an ontological claim with an approach that does not provide tautological explanations”. As Jessop himself notes (Jessop et al., 2002), in studying the state, a more systematic treatment of spatial dynamics is needed, as well as, Ioris (2011) argues, the relationship between nature and society.

This temporal dimension is crucial, strategic selectivity exists only in the context of specific horizons of actions of different actors (Heigl, 2011: 84). In employing the SRA, there is a need to understand current debates in the context of past ones (Valler and Wood, 2004: 1842). Adopting the approach implies sensitivity to history, as strategies are both path dependent and path shaping (Lagendijk, 2007: 196; Valler and Wood, 2004: 1838). The temporal dimension of the SRA signals a further step on from structuralism. Whereas Giddens’ theory of structuration resolves the structure-agency debate over time, Jessop resolves the structure-agency within time (Chettiparamb, 2007: 415, emphasis in original). Structuration theory temporarily blots out the influence of structure when actors do or do not act. For Jessop however, the temporal and spatial are not separate; the choice of time scale will in part dictate the spatial scale at which governance is organised (Chettiparamb, 2007: 415).

Uitermark (2005: 141) critiques the SRA’s conceptualisation of strategies. He believes that it is unclear where strategies originate (Uitermark 2005: 141). Jessop’s view is that actors operate upon one another and the selectivities that confront them. However, Uitermark (2005: 142) believes that actors do not operate solely upon other identifiable actors and selectivities but also entities such as neighbourhood populations that are not considered actors or selectivities per se. In emphasising the relationship of state actors to their institutional and organisational context, Jessop ignores the way that categories and entities of government are constructed and the relationship of state actors to the entities they are supposed to govern.

Uitermark (2005: 142) believes that that the actions of state actors should be explained as the result of the creative and generative responses of actors to the institutional context in
which they operate and the inherently troublesome relationship to the entities they govern. Through what he believes is a tendency to ignore the places where power makes itself felt and the body and institutional setting that surrounds it, the SRA fails to explore the microphysics of power (Uitermark 2005: 142). Heigl (2011: 93) agrees, commenting that there is a limitation to the SRA’s conceptualisation of the structure-agency relationship. With a tendency to focus excessively on structure-oriented actor strategies, she concludes that it ignores the extra-institutional strategies that may also affect the result of specific struggles and that play a role in framing the conflict.

To conclude, empirically underdeveloped and in need of further theoretical testing, the SRA is a sophisticated Marxist conception of policy change with the unrealised and untested potential to offer a great deal (Hay, 2005; Valler and Wood, 2004). Both Bob Jessop and Colin Hay are leading figures in political science, which in itself is a good reason to engage with the SRA and to contribute to its development.

Conclusions

This chapter has provided an in-depth examination of the two theories this thesis employs to explore whether the aviation industry has occupied a privileged position in the policymaking process regarding the environmental impact of its development. While there is no single ‘theory of policy’, the ACF and SRA attempt to consolidate existing perspectives (pluralism and Marxism). Sabatier began with a desire to find an alternative to the stages-based model that dominated political studies, synthesising the best features of top-down and bottom-up approaches and giving technical information a more prominent role, whereas the SRA is a sophisticated Marxist conception of the state building on structuralist accounts of the policy process, notably that of Poulantzas. Table 3.1 provides a summary of their main points.

Since its unveiling in 1988, the ACF has developed into one of the most significant public policy theories of recent decades (John, 2003; Parsons, 1995; Schlager, 1995; Schlager and Blomquist, 1996). Its assumptions are abundantly clear; the primary unit of analysis is the policy subsystem; a long-term perspective is required; actors are grouped by their beliefs into coalitions and policy designs are seen as the translation of beliefs (Sabatier, 1988). With completely different origins, the SRA emerged in the 1990s through a desire to transcend the artificial dualism between agency and structure within Marxist theory. The SRA goes a step further than previous efforts (e.g. Althusser and Balibar, 1970; Archer,
1996; Giddens, 1979) by attempting to understand how agency and structure interact and transform one another through the analysis of strategic actors operating in strategically selective contexts (those which privilege certain strategies, and hence actors, over others) (Hay, 2002a; b; 2005; McAnulla, 2002).

In the ACF, policy change is the result of a shift in the balances of forces within a policy subsystem, that is to say, a change in the dominant coalition, maintaining that there are two drivers for policy change: policy-oriented learning and external events. It emphasises the important role of information in the process as actors ‘learn’ and use information more constructively in their quest to dictate policy. External events have the ability to shift agendas, create media and public attention, redistribute resources and capture the attention of key decision-makers. Recent revisions of the framework have seen internal events and negotiated agreements added as possible routes to policy change.

The SRA views policy change as the result of conflict between actors who are strategic upon a terrain that favours certain actions (and hence certain actors over others). Actors’ strategies collide, changing the strategic context upon which future strategic action takes place and facilitating strategic learning. This process of learning enhances actors’ knowledge of structures, providing them with the information to change structural circumstances and to alter their strategies accordingly.

Whereas the ACF fails to explicitly acknowledge the state (due to its pluralist roots), viewing it in the same way as any other group involved in the policymaking process, it plays a prominent role in the SRA; seen as a dynamic entity whose form is the result of past battles, reflecting the balance of power at the time. Both consider actors as reflexive, who will continuously review, revise and reform their preferences over time as a result of changes in material circumstances and ideological influences (termed policy-oriented learning in the ACF, strategic learning in the SRA).

The ACF has been subjected to extensive empirical and theoretical testing in an increasing number of policy areas and geographical domains, and through this has been subjected to a series of revisions (Sabatier, 1999; 2007b; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Whether this has enhanced the theory is open to debate, with criticisms that it has, or will lead to, the ACF sacrificing its explanatory value in its quest to explain every aspect of the policy process (albeit from what its pluralist roots inhibit it from i.e. structure). By contrast, the SRA remains empirically and theoretically in its infancy.
Agency-centred approaches such as the ACF arguably underplay the relationship between state strategies and agency, focusing on internal decision-making and the preferences of individual actors. The ACF’s commitment to its pluralist roots makes it unable to explore and explain some political phenomena, for example, the structural constraints that may inhibit coalitions from forming and seeking influence (Smith, 2000). Sabatier pointedly fails to acknowledge the existence of Marxist theories in his review of the field (Sabatier, 1999; 2007b). On the other hand, a more structure-centred approach like the SRA can make it difficult to explain the specific responses of individual actors and to understand why they become involved in political action (Valler and Wood, 2004: 1851). However, while they are inherently different theories there are pluralist elements in the SRA, notably its interest in the policy network and institutional pluralism literature (Hay 1995; Marsh 1995).

Empirically, through their application to the two case studies, this thesis will use these two contrasting explanations of policy change to guide the analysis and help understand and explain the pattern of power shown. Theoretically, it will initiate a worthwhile dialogue between the two and contribute to their development. Chapters Four and Six explore the two empirical case studies while Five and Seven apply the ACF and SRA to these cases to help understand the series of complex interactions and relationships detailed and to assist in explaining to what extent, and why, the aviation industry occupied a privileged position in the environmental policymaking process. Chapter Eight brings the main findings of Five and Seven together, comparing and contrasting their ability to explain policy change and initiating a valuable theoretical dialogue between the two.
### Advocacy Coalition Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origins</th>
<th>Stems from American pluralist literature. Desire to synthesise the best features of top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation and to give technical information a more prominent role. Agency-centred.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit of analysis</strong></td>
<td>Policy subsystem comprising actors in advocacy coalitions united by their policy beliefs. Critical importance of ideas and the central role of scientific and technical information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explaining policy change</strong></td>
<td>Policy change results from a shift in the dominant coalition. Policy oriented learning, external and internal perturbations and negotiated agreements all have the capacity to realign beliefs and create change. Beliefs the causal driver for political behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Applications</strong></td>
<td>Vastly applied by authors, their students, and others. Increasing number of policy areas and geographical locations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Strategic-Relational Approach

|     | Sophisticated Marxist conception of the state. Attempts to transcend the artificial dualism between structure and agency. Structure-centred. |
|     | Structure and agency (though the distinction is deemed purely analytical). Strategic actors operating in strategically selective contexts (i.e. those that privilege certain strategies and hence certain actors over others). |
|     | All social and political change is seen as the result of strategic interactions taking place in a strategically-selective pre-existing context. Strategies collide with one another changing the structured terrain. Strategic action results in direct effects which alter the structured terrain and strategic learning which provides actors with the information they need to change structural circumstances. |
|     | Limited empirical and theoretical testing. |

**Figure 3.7 Summary of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and Strategic-Relational Approach**

*Source: author’s own*
Chapter Four

The Search for a third London Airport

“Behind the proposal to enlarge Stansted as London’s third airport there lies a long and extraordinary story of committees and commissions, recommendations made and rejected and made again, rows and ructions and furious reactions, resistance movements and demonstrations” (Buchanan, 1981: 23)

Taking over thirty years to arrive, the decision to develop Stansted as London’s third airport finally came in the 1985 White Paper with the airport officially opening in 1991. Initially marked for development in the 1950s, the search for a site for the third London airport involved two inter-departmental committees, two public inquiries and a thorough cost-benefit analysis by an independent commission. A fluid cast, an array of national and local level actors entered, left and re-entered the policymaking process as the site for a third London airport continually changed and the environmental movement emerged.

This chapter combines extensive archive analysis from documents held at the Essex Records Office, Chelmsford and The National Archives, Kew with a series of elite interviews and a review of the existing literature to construct an empirical timeline of the events that led to Stansted’s eventual development as the third London airport (Figure 4.1 provides a timeline of these events). The chapter begins by identifying the key actors involved in this area of policymaking, followed by a chronological discussion of events that took place leading to Stansted’s approval. The chapter concludes by summarising who got what, where and how, and identifying the case study’s key themes. Chapter Five then applies the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Strategic-Relational Approach to help explain how, and why, policy changed.
Chapter Four

1953 White Paper *London’s Airports* proposes the rationalisation of London’s airport system.

1960 House of Commons Estimates Committee demands immediate investigation into the possible development of Stansted as the third London airport. Hole Committee appointed.

1964 Newly elected Labour Government promise to stand by Conservative promise to hold a public inquiry into Stansted.
1965 BAA created, takes responsibility for Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted.
1966 Inquiry finds Stansted case unproven and recommends evaluation of alternatives. Government appoint Peterson Committee to review situation.

1971 Roskill Commission recommends Cublington.
1971 Government reject Cublington, announce Maplin. Labour (in opposition) makes it clear they oppose Maplin.

1974 Labour announce review of Maplin and subsequently cancel the project.

1979 BAA invited to bring forward proposals for the development of Stansted.

1984 Eyre recommends the development of Stansted up to 15mppa with possible expansion up to 25mppa.
1985 Government approves Stansted as third London airport.

1991 Stansted officially opens.

*Figure 4.1 Timeline of events leading to the designation of Stansted as the third London airport*  
Adapted from: BAA (2008); Bailey (2007); Buchanan (1985); Feldman (1985); Hall (1980); and McKie (1973)
Key actors

All with different motivations and policy goals, the search for a third London airport involved a huge array of actors, including airport operators, government departments, environmental NGOs, technical experts, inquiry inspectors, legal teams, local residents and the community groups they were involved in, regional airports, parish councils and airlines.

Throughout the whole affair, the Government via some means owned Stansted, whether directly through the Ministry of Aviation or indirectly through the British Airports Authority (BAA). This saw the state move away from a direct, hands-on approach in all aspects of airport operations to one where its role was to develop national policy and guide its implementation. BAA became responsible for four airports, one of which was Stansted. An arm of government, it occupied a quango like status, benefiting from the protectionist mentality discussed in Chapter Two but able to push forward its own agenda, only becoming privatised in 1986 after Stansted’s approval.

Airlines in the UK, though hardly noticeable in this case study, were also experiencing a similar shift, moving away from protected flagship carriers to privatised operations about to experience the effects of a liberalised air market. Regional airport operators were also involved, particularly during the 1980s, who wanted to see airport expansion in their regions, not the South East.

Aside from BAA, the Government’s presence was felt by the various governmental departments involved in the case at different times dependent on where the responsibility for civil aviation lie: the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the Ministry of Aviation, the Ministry of Civil Aviation and Transport, the Board of Trade and the Department of Transport. Other departments, such as the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, also became involved if policy decisions would have an impact on their jurisdiction.

The role of the state at the local level was quite different. Local authorities and MPs became involved when the site for a third London airport affected their constituency, with them often siding with local public opinion. In the case of Stansted, this fell to Hertfordshire County Council, Essex County Council, Uttlesford District Council and East Hertfordshire

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20 Detailed in Chapter Two, the British Airports Authority was established under the 1965 UK Airports Authority Act.
District Council, all of who opposed the development at each inquiry/review and who often worked together.

Environmental concerns at the early stage of this case study (circa 1950s/60s) were of a local nature and were concerned with the impact of airport development on noise, local air pollution, blight and surface access. When the search for a third London airport reached a climax in the early 1980s, the global environmental impact of aviation was creeping into and up, environmental and political agendas. Fuelled by an increasing number of active local and national environmental organisations, there was increasing awareness of the negative impacts of an ever-expanding industry and the acceptability of this. The characteristics of the groups that represented ‘the environment’ during the case study reflected these changes, with little input from national level environmental NGOs (with the Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE) and the National Trust notable exceptions). The local community groups at specific sites mounted the opposition on environmental grounds: North West Essex and East Hertfordshire Preservation Association (NWEEHPA) at Stansted, Wing Area Resistance Association (WARA) at Cublington and Defenders of Essex at Maplin.

Events that led to the development of Stansted

Initially developed by the United States Air Force in 1942, Stansted airport was used as a wartime airfield and military base until 1946 (Blake, 1966; Eyre, 1984b: 74; Hall, 1980: 17). In 1949, the Ministry of Civil Aviation bought it to develop as London’s second airport however, due to its prime location for infiltrating the continent, it become immersed in developing American air capacity following the onset of the Cold War. Control reverted to the United States Air Force who constructed a runway at the airport in 1952 (Sanders and Mead, 2007: 1).

The 1953 White Paper *London’s Airports* (Cmd. 8902) proposed the rationalisation of London’s airport system to cope with the predicted increase in demand for air travel (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1953). Heathrow was deemed the UK’s hub airport with Gatwick (unofficially) London’s second airport. Stansted would be held in reserve if and when Gatwick reached saturation (Eyre, 1984b: 74; Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1953). A public inquiry the following year confirmed Gatwick as the second London airport with the third yet to be determined (Feldman, 1985: 60). Becoming a Royal Air Force maintenance unit and licensed as a civil aerodrome, the United States Air Force maintained an interest in
Stansted until 1958 after which the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation took control (Blake, 1966; Higham, 1995: 25; McKie, 1973: 64).

The Hole Committee (1960-1963)

Since the 1950s, a third London airport was considered crucial for the UK’s trade and economic well-being, demands that were accentuated during the 1960s when the UK was facing increasing criticism over its economic development (Feldman, 1985: 51). In response, in 1960 the Estimates Committee of the House of Commons called for an immediate investigation into the possible development of Stansted as the third London airport (Eyre, 1984b: 74; Feldman, 1985: 61). An inter-departmental committee (the Hole Committee) was appointed to consider the requirements for a third London airport but not to consider the need for an airport, this was assumed (Eyre, 1984b: 74).

Chaired by George Hole, the Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Aviation (Aerodromes (General) Division and who would later become Chief Executive of BAA), the inter-departmental committee was dominated by representatives from the airline industry and members of government departments committed to the development of civil aviation (Kirby, 1982: 104; Wraith, 1966: 269). The composition of the Hole Committee reflected the marginal consideration the Government gave to issues of national and regional planning, agriculture and amenity (including noise). It contained a sole representative from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government who, at the time, were responsible for land-use planning (Buchanan, 1981: 31; Eyre, 1984b: 157; Feldman, 1985: 61; Hall, 1980: 21; Ministry of Aviation, 1963; Wraith, 1966: 269).

The Hole Committee presented their report in June 1963 (CAP 199) (Ministry of Aviation, 1963; Wraith, 1966: 269). They concluded that by 1972 both Heathrow and Gatwick would be unable to handle all of London’s air traffic. A new airport needed to be in operation by 1973 with the committee unanimously recommending that the site should be Stansted, views presented as those of the Ministry of Aviation (Blake, 1966; Eyre, 1984b: 75; Ministry of Aviation, 1963: ix; xi).

They concluded that by 1980 a third London airport would require two runways to cope with demand but problems with air traffic control meant that any airport this size within a reasonable travel distance of London (which they deemed fifty miles) would be unable to operate planes in all directions. They also felt it would be impossible to site the airport to the south or north west of London (interestingly, where the Roskill Commission...
subsequently chose in 1971). The committee advised that although Stansted was not perfect it, “seemed the only possible site” (Hall, 1980: 24; Ministry of Aviation, 1963).

Stansted complied with requirements for air traffic control; was an operational airport with a 10,000-foot runway; had the space for the laying of parallel runways; the noise problem could be minimised; it was within reasonable distance of London; and with the completion of the M11, it would have good surface access. It would interfere with military flying in East Anglia and would destroy a lot of quality agricultural land, but the Hole Committee believed that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages. Unsurprisingly, local protest at Stansted followed (Buchanan, 1981: 31; Hall, 1980: 24).

With the defeat of the Conservatives in 1964 (who appointed the Hole Committee) the newly elected Labour Government was left to stand by its predecessors’ promise to hold a public inquiry into the development of Stansted, reiterating the Conservatives promise that the airport question was still wide open (Eyre, 1984b: 77; McKie, 1973: 79; 86). A concession by Government, this was forced by political pressure as development within existing airport limits (which was being proposed) did not require a statutory inquiry (Buchanan, 1981: 32; Hall, 1980: 25).

On 11 October 1965 Richard Crossman, Minister of Housing and Local Government, announced that there would be a public inquiry into the development of Stansted. He reiterated that questioning the need for a third airport for London was not up for debate; the purpose of the inquiry was to look at the suitability of Stansted as a site with objectors free to suggest alternatives if they wanted, which they did (McKie, 1973: 89).

The Chelmsford Inquiry (1965-1966)

The public inquiry sat in Chelmsford from 8 December 1965 until 11 February 1966 (Wraith, 1966: 265). The inspector, G. D. Blake, eventually concluded that an airport at Stansted should only be developed if it was deemed a national necessity (Blake, 1966). Not drawn from the Government’s regular team, Blake was a senior partner in a Kensington estate agent and described as an, “unmistakeably independent figure” (Buchanan, 1981: 33; McKie, 1973: 87; Wraith, 1966: 280). He was assisted by a technical assessor, J. W. S. Brancker, a former official of the International Air Transport Association who had worked with airlines in both the UK and US (Buchanan, 1981: 33).
Objections came from local authorities proximate to the site (Hertfordshire and Essex County Councils), other local authorities with operating airports, the Farmers’ Union and NWEEHPA (Wraith, 1966: 265). The main objection to the site at Stansted was that its proposal was based upon, and driven by, aviation interests. Objectors felt that the proposal inadequately considered issues of town and country planning, noise, agricultural impacts and changes to the rural character of the area (Blake, 1966; Eyre, 1984b: 78; McKie, 1973: 88; Wraith, 1966). Via the publication of the Wilson Report, noise became quantifiable and for the first time noise contours were drawn. However, proponents and opponents drew different contours. The proponents contradicted themselves, stating that the rural location of Stansted was a positive as it meant a minimal number of people would be affected by noise but also emphasising that it would create a new town of up to 10,000 inhabitants – increasing the number of people affected by noise (Wraith, 1966: 274).

NWEEHPA co-ordinated and represented various local groups at the inquiry, providing a unified front for the local resistance. They recruited over 13,000 members and raised £25,000 in time for the inquiry. This meant they had enough funds to secure eminent solicitors, a QC, expert witnesses and a full-time organiser (Eyre, 1984b: 78; Hall, 1980: 25; McKie, 1973: 81; Wraith, 1966: 270). Importantly, they managed to gain national press support (though not local) which as Sue Forsyth, daughter of, at the time, NWEEHPA chairman John Lukies, recollects was quite unusual for a local protest group (Forsyth, 2010: 00:10:14).

Writing on 12 October 1964 (prior to the start of the inquiry), Roger Hawkey, Vice-Chairman of NWEEHPA, wrote to Roy Jenkins, Minister of Aviation, stating that NWEEHPA would strenuously oppose the development. He asked Jenkins to really consider whether there was a need for a third London airport, and if so whether Stansted was the most suitable site, NWEEHPA assumed that the terms of reference of the inquiry would be inclusive of questioning the need of the airport (Forsyth, 2010: 00:05:23; Hawkey, 1964). In their response, the Ministry of Aviation stated that the main purpose of the inquiry would be to consider the objections against Stansted not to discuss the need for a third London airport, this was once again assumed (Lovelock, 1964).

Opposing the development, the CPRE also questioned why the need for a third London airport was being excluded from the debate (Dreschfield, 1965). They were informed by Richard Crossman, Minister of Housing and Local Government, that the issue of need was a
national one which could not be discussed at a local inquiry, an issue of policy to be decided by the Government with the views of people all over the country taken into account (Crossman, 1965).

The terms of reference of the inquiry made it very clear that the need for a third London airport was not to be questioned (Wraith, 1966: 266). The UK Government had decided that relief for demand needed to be provided with a third airport in London, irrespective of any long-term national airport plan, taking into account the origin and destination of passengers and freight. Objectors were however free to suggest alternative sites (Wraith, 1966: 267).

Although all the local authorities opposed the development (at county and local levels) in his commentary of the debate A Sadly Mismanaged Affair: a Political History of the Third London Airport, David McKie (1973: 83) comments that the front put forward by them was not as monolithic as it may have appeared. Feeling that their case against the airport was not strong enough, in February 1965 Hertfordshire County Council agreed to accept the Stansted proposal if modifications were made to the runway plan. Despite her best efforts, Councillor of Sawbridgeworth, L. A. M. Lloyd-Taylor, was unable to convince the Council to oppose the development with them opting to delay making a decision on their position (McKie, 1973).

In May 1965, Lloyd-Taylor encouraged her Council to follow that of Essex who voted 76-5 to oppose the proposal. Essex County Council had at first resigned itself to the development but later decided to appoint independent consultants to investigate the proposal. They recommended that a more conclusive study was required before firm conclusions could be drawn, calling for a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis to be carried out (Hall, 1980: 25).

At the end of July 1965, Hertfordshire County Council had still not made a decision on their position. The planning committee stated that they could not oppose the development from a Local Planning Authority position, as it was not in their county. Six days before the inquiry was due to begin (November 1965) a unanimous decision to oppose the development was made (McKie, 1973: 83). The Labour-controlled local authority of Harlow were against the proposals from the beginning, however the local Trades Council emerged as a supporter (McKie, 1973: 85).
In Bishop Stortford, a town just three miles away from the proposed site and with a population of 21,000, there was indecision over what attitude the council should take towards the development. While there were those attracted by the proposals, many were concerned about the noise impact the airport would create. As late as November 1965 there was still doubt, the Councillor who proposed the final decision stated that while he felt that the economic benefits outweighed the disadvantages, to present its view on noise and surface access with any credibility the only option was to make an objection (McKie, 1973: 84).

McKie (1973: 84) comments that even the village of Stansted was not entirely against the proposals. A parish meeting on 13 October 1965 voted 98-68 on a motion to reject the proposals. A resolution which called on the parish council to donate £100 to the Stansted Preservation Association, the local group for the Stansted parish (and affiliated to NWEEHPA), went through by just six votes. A parish poll took place to determine the parish’s position. Held on 29 October, just 29 percent of those eligible took part and the resolution to oppose the airport was subsequently carried 434-244 and the one approving the donation 351-288 (McKie, 1973: 84).

In addition, the National Trust gave evidence at the inquiry, stating that the development would have very negative consequences on the tranquillity of 1,000 acres of open space and woodland owned by them (Hatfield Forest), a space enjoyed by thousands of people each year (The National Trust, 1968).

In 1965 the Stansted Area Progress Association formed, chaired by Fred Browne, an engine fitter at the existing Stansted airport, it was comprised mainly of workers from the existing airport. They were the NWEEHPA’s counterpart, supporting the proposals. Quickly falling into conflict with NWEEHPA, they produced 927 letters from local residents and workers who did not oppose the airport (subject to certain reservations on compensation and the preservation of amenities) and submitted a petition to the inquiry (Blake, 1966). Played out in the local media, they accused NWEEHPA of being dominated by well-to-do people and that they reflected the views of a certain social group rather than the whole of the people they were meant to represent (McKie, 1973: 82).

Reinforced at the national level, the media (primarily the BBC) depicted events in terms of a class struggle; affluent property owners versus airport workers, a depiction that McKie (1973: 82) notes was over-simplified and created objection from the opposition. The Labour
Government appeared to concur with the media, proclaiming that the opposition protests were of a middle-class origin leaving the voice of the less-articulate unheard (Travis, 1985b; Wraith, 1966: 271).

Both the Government and BAA were surprised at the opposition’s level of professionalism. As well as arguing on technical grounds, they grounded their objections in human terms; the affect the development would have on quality of life as well as on the wider grounds of national planning. This approach was in stark contrast to the Government departments involved, who, as Blake emphasised in his report, were completely unprepared (Blake, 1966; McKie, 1973: 90; Wraith, 1966: 278). The inquiry proved to be uncomfortable for the Government with officials shaky on critical and simple points such as whether Stansted really was within one hour’s travel time of London (Hall, 1980: 25; McKie, 1973: 91; Wraith, 1966: 272).

The inquiry finished in February 1966 and while Blake’s report was ready in June, its publication was delayed by 11 months (Feldman, 1985: 65; Hall, 1980: 25). It concluded that the case for Stansted’s development was solely proven on air traffic control grounds; there were strong arguments against it on a range of other criteria. In terms of planning, Stansted was not in the right location for this kind of urban development and traffic focus. In terms of access, the proposal was unacceptable to both passengers and airlines. To control noise, restrictions would have to be imposed that would severely affect the operational capacity of the airport. Noise and traffic would significantly change the character of the rural area and vast swathes of good agricultural land would need to be taken for the development (Blake, 1966: 2). Blake concluded that:

“It would be a calamity for the neighbourhood if a major airport were placed at Stansted. Such a decision could only be justified by national necessity. Necessity was not proven by evidence at this inquiry” (Blake, 1966: 2, para. 12), recommending that, “a review of the whole problem should be undertaken by a committee equally interested in traffic in the air, traffic on the ground, regional planning and national planning” (Blake, 1966: 5).

He suggested that an independent commission or another government review should study the problem afresh and did a short series of lectures to interested Government departments about how this should be tackled (Hall, 1980; McKie, 1973: 92). The Government initially made it clear that they would be extremely hesitant in overruling the
recommendations of Blake; however, this promise was subsequently broken (Sanders and Mead, 2007: 1; Wraith, 1966: 268).

The tone and recommendations of Blake (and Brancker) left the Government with a problem; they were against an independent commission on the grounds of urgency and that they felt that the facts had been fully discussed (Hall, 1980: 26). An early assumption of the local opposition at the inquiry had been that Ministers had already made up their mind and the inquiry was little more than whitewashing (Wraith, 1966: 267).

The Government appointed an inter-departmental committee chaired by Arthur Peterson, a Deputy Secretary at the Department of Economic Affairs, to conduct another review. However, this was not carried out in the way Blake and Brancker envisaged and would not involve anyone outside of Whitehall (Eyre, 1984b: 79; McKie, 1973: 94).

The media did not take to this secrecy well, fuelling public antagonism. Writing on 2 January 1967, Terence Bendixson, planning correspondent at The Guardian, wrote:

“What seems less likely to see the light of day is the subsequent work of Whitehall officials. So long as this remains secret suspicion will linger that the officials were not given the right brief, did not ask the right questions, did not look far enough ahead and caved in under pressures from the defence departments. Whitehall’s acute nervousness about Stansted bears this out” (Bendixson, 1967).

Peter Masefield, Chairman of the newly created BAA, and other BAA representatives had met with MPs and informed them that Heathrow was turning away traffic. In a letter to The Times on 28 April 1967, just before the publication of the White Paper, Masefield launched an attack on the alternative site at Sheppey, which the White Paper subsequently suggested was the best of the coastal sites (Masefield, 1967). On 12 June 1967, two weeks before the White Paper was due to be debated in the House of Commons, Masefield held a large press conference where the urgency of beginning the development of Stansted was once again emphasised (McKie, 1973: 112).

On 24 June 1967, Norman Payne, BAA’s Director of Engineering, described the opposition to Stansted as, “emotional, ill-informed and exaggerated”, stating that having designed airports for 15 years he was confident that Stansted was the only viable site for a third London airport (McKie, 1973: 112). On 17 July, George Hole, Chairman of the first inter-
departmental committee in 1960 and now BAA’s Chief Executive, commented that it would be, “practically impossible”, to find an alternative to Stansted (McKie, 1973: 113).

The Government delayed the publication of Blake’s report until the Peterson Committee finished its review. The findings of the Peterson Committee formed the main content of the 1967 White Paper, *The Third London Airport* (Cmnd. 3259) (Board of Trade, 1967), published at the same time as Blake’s report, “…his [Blake’s] report was not released until the Government were in a position to try and rebut it” (Keene, 2011: 00:14:07). A strategic move on the part of the Government, both reports were published on the eve of an annual holiday, when people were not about in Parliament to discuss it at any real length (McKie, 1973: 95).

The White Paper stated that a third London airport was a national necessity, emphasising the economic imperative of the development (Buchanan, 1981: 56; McKie, 1973: 85, 102). Peter Hall, town planner, urbanist and geographer who considered the Stansted debate in his book *Great Planning Disasters*, notes that it was with total predictability that the Stansted decision was being stuck with, due to the apparent urgency with which an airport was required (Hall, 1980: 26). The Peterson Committee had considered a series of other possible sites including the site at Foulness (which was already emerging as the favoured alternative site at the Chelmsford inquiry) but the objections to the alternatives were deemed more significant than those levelled at Stansted (Hall, 1980: 27; McKie, 1973: 111).

Antagonising the opposition further, the White Paper was adamant that the opposition had been given a fair voice (McKie, 1973: 102). The Chelmsford inquiry had been framed around the development of an airport with two runways and the prospect of a third in the future. In addition, the White Paper envisaged two parallel sets of runways; the whole proposal had changed, changes to which the opposition had no opportunity to object to (McKie, 1973: 103).

By exerting government power over its recommendations, the White Paper gently demolished the points raise by Blake and Brancker. However, it did nothing to extinguish the ever growing feeling of suspicion and distrust around the Stansted case, a result of inadequate inquiries, the hiding of Blake’s report, and announcing the decision on the eve of a holiday (Eyre, 1984b: 79; McKie, 1973: 99). The media also suspected that those who had been in support of Stansted at the Chelmsford inquiry had been the same people who
comprised the Peterson Committee (Hall, 1980: 27). With the Committee’s composition never published this suspicion continued to manifest itself.

In response to this criticism, the Government argued that a public inquiry would have just stimulated discussion over the same material. This implied that the Government had nothing to add to the evidence presented at the Chelmsford inquiry, an evidence base that Blake and Brancker considered inadequate (McKie, 1973: 96). The Government proclaimed that they were better placed to consider the information and that they knew best (McKie, 1973: 97).

In public, Lord Beswick, Chief Whip, staunchly defended the decision to keep the committee composition a secret, however in personal correspondence with Anthony Crosland, President of the Board of Trade, and Anthony Greenwood, Minister for Housing and Local Government, it appears this was done out of party loyalty. In a letter from Beswick to Crosland and Greenwood on 12 December 1967, Beswick asks whether there was any reason why the composition of the Peterson Committee could not be released stating that, “the rather unforthcoming attitude about disclosure of other facts has been a contributory factor in the lack of public support for the Stansted scheme” (Lord Beswick, 1967).

On 12 May 1967 Douglas Jay, President of the Board of Trade, announced that the Government’s decision was to develop Stansted as London’s third airport. He stated that the advice of Blake had been taken on board and a comprehensive re-examination of the issue been carried out (Jay, 1967). The Board of Trade advised BAA to go ahead with a plan for development (which would require planning permission in the normal manner). They would be granted this permission under a Special Development Order under the Town and Country Planning Act of 1962 with the only hurdle getting it through Parliament (Buchanan, 1981: 35; Hall, 1980: 27).

The decision created a wave of protest. As a response, just five days after the publication of the White Paper the Stansted Working Party formed. With no political affiliation, it was composed of local MP’s, amenity groups, the National Farmers’ Union, NWEEHPA and the Essex branch of the Landowners Association. The group claimed that the review under the Peterson Committee was unfair, unsatisfactory and nearly unconstitutional, fiercely objecting to the way that Blake’s recommendation had been dismissed and demanding another inquiry (Buchanan, 1981: 37; Hall, 1980: 27).
Providing the stimulus for a passionate debate in the Commons on 29 June 1967, the Stansted Working Party published *The Case for Reappraisal* (Stansted Working Party, 1967). The main analysis came from the Essex Deputy Clerk and his officers, who highlighted an important constitutional issue; had the Chelmsford inquiry been set under the normal rules for planning inquiries, following changes to the proposed development (the parallel runways) and the introduction of new facts, it would now be reopened (Hall, 1980: 27).

With the opposition gaining momentum, other groups were voicing their objection to Stansted. The Town and Country Planning Association stated their opposition, as well as the South East Economic Planning Council who the Government had notably failed to consult regarding the Stansted decision (McKie, 1973: 107). The national press continued to condemn the decision and the process it was reached by (Buchanan, 1981: 36).

The Government held firm on its position, but further evidence appeared which was difficult to ignore. An unexpected objector joined the campaign. On 29 July 1967, J. W. Brancker, the technical assessor at the Chelmsford inquiry, wrote to *The Times* stating his objections to what the Government were doing. NWEEHPA knew how important public opinion, at both the local and national levels, was so they raised enough money to fly Brancker back from Canada, commissioning him to write a full account challenging the 1967 White Paper on technical and constitutional grounds and stating his objections (Brancker, 1967a; Forsyth, 2010: 00:44:54; Hall, 1980: 28; McKie, 1973: 105). *The Stansted Black Book* was formally published by the Stansted Working Party and described as one of, “the most formidable”, documents in the whole debate (Brancker, 1967b; Forsyth, 2010: 00:03:30).

Containing Brancker’s letter to *The Times* and two further articles by him, it concluded that:

“As a public document, the White Paper fails to give the impression of being impartial...until alternative solutions have been examined in depth, and comparative costs are available, I cannot feel the case is proven” (Brancker, 1967b: 18).

Brancker’s commentary made it clear that the Chelmsford inquiry had received ministerial assurances that the Government would not overrule the Inspector’s decision on Stansted

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21 A regional economic planning council set up under the Harold Wilson Labour government, the South East Economic Planning Council was appointed in 1965 (Hall, 2011: 00:03:43).
Chapter Four

(Brancker, 1967b: 29-31). He also made clear his preference for the site at Foulness (Brancker, 1967b).

A flurry of media correspondence followed a House of Lords debate on the issue on 11 December 1967. Peter Masefield wrote a letter to the Observer on Christmas Eve, reiterating his claims about the economic imperative of developing Stansted and the disadvantages of a coastal site. He followed this with a letter in the Financial Times on 27 December stating that the site at Foulness would cost £150 million to build and have operating costs £20 million per year more than Stansted (Masefield, 1967).

After two inquiries, the Government were still convinced that Stansted posed the ‘least difficulties’ of all the considered sites (McKie, 1973: 100). It was made clear that there was no time for any further public debate, the decision to go ahead with Stansted was made (Buchanan, 1981: 56; McKie, 1973: 101). However, as before this decision did not stick.

In August 1967, Anthony Crosland became President of the Board of Trade. His predecessor, Douglas Jay, had been a staunch defender of the Stansted decision whereas Crosland was concerned with, and had a personal interest in, the emerging public interest in maintaining the quality of the environment (Crosland, 1965; McKie, 1973: 125). Anthony Crosland, “...was someone who genuinely believed in having a much more thorough and open ended look which didn’t begin from the crude premise that we’ve got a bit of concrete in the ground which we ought to exploit. He recognised that is was a much broader based question that needed to be investigated” (Keene, 2011: 00:15:28). An economist by training, he also believed in systemic economic analysis through the new orthodoxy of cost-benefit analysis, a method which any review so far had lacked (Hall, 1980: 28).

The news that the Board of Trade were considering reopening the case quickly made its way into the media which reported that the urgency with which the decision had been made was being questioned; the capacity of Heathrow was now greater than assumed and the arrival of jumbo jets was now scheduled earlier than the 1967 White Paper had predicted. Questions arose around the predictions used, with even the Hole Committee failing to appreciate the increasing size and capacity of planes and vastly underestimating the capacity of Heathrow and Gatwick (Hall, 1980: 24).
The Board of Trade never officially announced that Stansted was vulnerable. Richard Crossman, then Leader of the House and responsible for the conduct of government business, stated on 10 November 1967 that Stansted was to go ahead and that a Special Development Order would be coming before Parliament (McKie, 1973: 133). This was problematic. The Government was facing an impending reform of the House of Lords and knew this would make it difficult to push through a Special Development Order for Stansted. The resulting decision was not to pursue an Special Development Order, but to ask BAA to apply for planning permission in the normal manner and therefore, involve a public inquiry (Crosland and Greenwood, 1968). This was given further weight in November 1967 when the Council on Tribunals called in an entirely new inquiry on the grounds that because the Government was now asking for a realignment of the runways the proposal had changed, concurring with many of the opposition’s comments (Hall, 1980: 28).

In the midst of growing rumours that Crosland and the Board of Trade were about to reopen the whole debate, on the 8 February 1968, Peter Masefield again emphasised the urgency around the development of a third London airport, “unless work begins on London’s third airport not later than the end of this year, Britain will be caught with her national and aeronautical pants down by 1974” (McKie, 1973: 114). Two days later he sent a letter to the Daily Telegraph accusing Sir Roger Hawkey, Co-Chairman of NWEEHPA, of doing a, “disservice to the country”, by suggesting that there was still time to conduct another inquiry (McKie, 1973: 114).

The media were increasingly reporting on the possible changes to the Stansted plan despite continual statements from Ministers and BAA that there would be no question of a reversal. An article in the Financial Times on 12 February 1968 accused the Government of being particularly picky in the information they were revealing to the general public and that doubts about the strength of the timing argument were emerging in Whitehall (Keegan, 1968). Ten days later, on 22 February 1968, Anthony Crosland announced in the House of Commons that a new inquiry into the third London airport would take place on the grounds that the proposal had changed due to the realignment of runways (Kirby, 1982: 104; McKie, 1973). This inquiry (the Roskill Commission) would question the siting of the third London airport (Buchanan, 1981: 39; Eyre, 1984b: 81; Hall, 1980: 29).

A brief prepared for a Cabinet meeting on the same day stated that the Government’s reason for having a new inquiry was the possible rejection of the Special Development
Order in the House of Lords. However, it also stated that the presentation of this reversal to the public would be somewhat different. Publically, the case for reopening would be justified on three counts; to consult on the possible realignment of runways (at Stansted), the desirability of proposals to build a new airport at Foulness and to look at the assumptions made by the Ministry of Defence which almost made Stansted inevitable (Unknown, 1968).

While there were some within the Board of Trade that were happy with this decision, liberating those who had grown tired of the Department’s official tie to Stansted, it did attract criticism from many of Crosland’s colleagues (McKie, 1973: 130). A decision that they had spent a large percentage of their working lives towards was now to be challenged and potentially shelved, disdain which was fuelled further by the fact that the soon to be appointed Roskill Commission was an outside body. This took the decision out of the hands of the department, implying a question on their competence and a knowledge that in the end, regardless of the decision, they would have to implement a decision which could conceivably be a one they were against (McKie, 1973: 130).

MP’s were outspoken about the way they were treated. For reasons of party loyalty they had stood by a decision they knew had been crooked and now the Government was sweeping it aside. Backbenchers felt treated like ‘lobby fodder’, with others describing it as government by pressure group. MP’s such as Eric Moonman, whose constituencies were to be directly affected (his at Billericay), had put their natural instinct to oppose Stansted aside for party loyalty and now felt they were now made to look ridiculous (McKie, 1973: 142). To add to these deliberations/uncertainties, the estimated rate of growth of civil aviation turned out to be about half of what was predicted in the 1960s to around 17 percent per year and the new 747’s that were coming into service in 1969 had approximately five times the capacity of their predecessor (Higham, 1995).


Working from June 1968 until December 1970, the Roskill Commission comprised a 23 strong research team equipped with the skills needed to carry out an in-depth cost-benefit analysis including academics (in economics, aircraft design and transport), a civil engineer and a planning inspector (Buchanan, 1981: 40; 86; McKie, 1973: 12). The use of this method drew huge attention to the case, planning on the grounds of attempting to quantify. It was
a new technique, advocated by Crosland, but its use had been considered successful in evaluating new road projects and the Victoria Underground Line (Hall, 1980: 32).

The Commission did not have to answer the question of whether a third airport for London was needed, this was once again assumed (Eyre, 1984b: 84; Feldman, 1985: 69). They were appointed, “to inquire into the timing of the need for a four runway airport to cater to the growth of traffic at existing airports serving the London area, to consider the various alternative sites, and to recommend which site should be selected” (Crosland, 1968). Critics argued that in other words they were, “precluded from looking at the national airports policy and the possibility of large scale diversions to provincial airports” (Hall, 1980: 30).

Compared with those used in earlier inquiries and reviews, the Roskill Commission forecasts showed a distinct increase in passenger numbers and air traffic movements but also a larger handling capacity at both Heathrow and Gatwick, concluding that a third London airport needed to be operational by the early 1980s (Hall, 1980: 32).

BAA were asked to co-operate with the Commission’s work and provide, when requested, planning applications for sites other than Stansted. However, while happy to an application for Stansted they refused to do so for other sites, unwilling to submit applications for sites they did not advocate (Croft, 1968; Girling, 1968). Archive correspondence reveals that this concerned the Government on two counts. First, they felt it would jeopardise any success in persuading any other developers to submit applications. Second, they feared that if it were known that BAA had successfully taken this stand against the Government, the credibility of any investigation would be weakened (Cox, 1968). It was, “yet one more attempt by the aviation interests to frustrate any course of action which might result in the sighting of the Airport anywhere else but Stansted” (Osmotherly, 1968).

At a huge cost, 78 sites over 20 counties were considered, narrowed to a list of 20 then a shortlist of four of which Stansted was notable by its absence (Eyre, 1984b: 85; Leigh, 1985). Within seven months the shortlist was ready and it was on these sites where the rest of the work was focused: Thurleigh, Cublington, Nuthampstead and Foulness (later known as Maplin) (Hall, 1980: 32). Criticism came alongside the shortlist. The absence of Stansted insulted previous analysts, creating political damage and robbing the commission of potential political defenders who had previously advocated Stansted. In its final report the Commission did explain why; it was deemed inferior to Nuthampstead on the grounds of air
traffic control, noise impact and surface access, it had to go (Buchanan, 1981: 43; Hall, 1980: 30).

Another criticism rested on the inclusion of a coastal site (Foulness), endorsing a site miles away from London which was, in previous inquiries, seen as a key criterion for site selection. In hindsight, the Commission did admit a failure in the inclusion of Foulness. While it ranked the highest of all sites in terms of noise, defence and air traffic control it failed miserably in terms of expense and surface access costs. Overall it ranked thirteenth out of fifteen, four places behind Stansted but got its place on the shortlist for being a, “novel solution” (Hall, 1980: 30).

A few criteria dominated the differences between sites with passenger-user costs providing the real distinction. Cublington came out as the best site from the analysis (in terms of cost) with Foulness (the coastal site) the most expensive of all (Hall, 1980: 33). Foulness was considered the most costly due to its location – the farthest site from London (and most of England’s population) while Cublington was ideally situated between London and Birmingham (Hall, 1980: 33). The cost-benefit analysis used was so significant in the Commission’s thinking that a site with easy access from the both the South East/London and Birmingham/the Midlands was going to prove hugely attractive (Keene, 2011: 00:19:05).

The choice of cost-benefit analysis itself attracted criticism, the most common being that it omitted certain items. For example, Peter Hall notes that while it was possible to quantify noise and agricultural impacts, and the loss of landscape and rural amenity illustrated through house prices, it was not possible to quantify the loss to non-residents and although economists would beg to differ, this type of conflict showed the ideological differences at play. There was also criticism that the use of money was negative in that the value of money is very subjective meaning different things to different people (Hall, 1980: 34).

In separate academic pieces, Peter Self, Professor of Public Administration at the University of London and Vice Chairman of the Town and Country Planning Association, and John Adams, UCL, satirised the application of the cost-benefit analysis in choosing an airport site. Adams used it to justify the inclusion of Hyde Park in a short list of sites for a London airport due to minimal travel time from London and because it is a flat open space (Adams, 1970; 1993; Self, 1970). In their final report, the Commission accepted that cost-benefit analysis
could never be inclusive to all factors relevant to the case but maintained that it provided a useful framework under which to encompass all the evidence (Hall, 1980: 34).

Specialist consultants were brought in to produce sub-regional plans of each site under consideration and these combined with the overall cost-benefit analysis were first published in the early part of 1970 (Hall, 1980: 32). Subsequently, these plans were subject to detailed criticism both by the Commission and in the various public hearings that followed, providing the basis of the Commission’s final evaluation.

The Commission concluded that despite the negative environmental impacts, Cublington was the best site (Commission on the Third London Airport, 1971: 140, para. 13.61). There was however one member of the Commission who dissented from this view. In the latter stages of the Commission’s work, Professor Colin Buchanan, a town planner, announced that he could not accept the choice of Cublington. Outspoken in his disagreement he argued that Foulness was the only suitable site and that in recent years too many decisions had favoured the economy over the environment (Higham, 1995: 29; Leigh, 1985). In his account of the affair, Peter Hall (1980: 36) comments that the rest of the Commission were surprised with Colin Buchanan’s dissent while David Keene comments how the Roskill Commission were irritated as he [Buchanan] left it very late to express his disagreement (Keene, 2011: 00:19:33).

The official line of the Roskill Commission was that the first 12 chapters of the report had been virtually completed, with only the recommendation left to do when they were informed that Colin Buchanan disagreed (Commission on the Third London Airport, 1971: 140, para. 13.63). However, correspondence between Buchanan and Justice Roskill shows that this may not have been entirely the case. In a letter dated 30 September 1968, Buchanan expressed his doubts over the conclusions raised in the second stage of the inquiries (before the shortlisted sites were taken to local inquiries) (Buchanan, 1968). Buchanan emphasised the need to provide the public with correct information, for example, what the actual land-take of an airport would be and the effects this would have on noise and associated urbanisation. This was in contrast to the Commission’s approach, which was to inform them of the actual land-take but to leave them to draw their own conclusions regarding the subsequent noise and urbanisation impact (Buchanan, 1968). The letter leaves the reader feeling that even at this early point in the inquiry, Buchanan was
becoming disillusioned with the process, alluding to the need for validity and transparency when informing those people who could be potentially affected by development.

Colin Buchanan produced an 11-page note of dissent, a passionate and highly emotional personal account in stark contrast to the logical, detached nature of the Roskill report. It concluded that, “I believe it would be nothing less than an environmental disaster if the airport were to be built at any of the inland sites, but nowhere more serious than at Cublington where it would lie athwart the critically important belt of open country behind London and Birmingham” (Colin Buchanan, Commission on the Third London Airport, 1971: 149).

Buchanan explains how he was sceptical of the cost-benefit approach being used, stating that planning considerations needed to be paramount (a view rejected by the rest of the Commission) (Commission on the Third London Airport, 1971: 149). His dissent hints at deeper considerations than those considered by the Commission: the belief that natural heritage and particular landscapes need to be protected for future generations (Hall, 1980: 36). Terence Bendixson, planning correspondent at The Guardian, wrote how Buchanan would have been under huge pressure to agree with the Commission and that a less opinionated and unconscientious man may have fallen to this pressure (Bendixson, 1970: 855). However, Peter Hall takes a different stance, noting that Colin Buchanan, “completely put a bomb under the whole rest of the [Roskill] report and wrecked it” (Hall, 2011: 00:11:36).

In January 1971, the Roskill Commission published their report and as expected, the split in the Commission was widely reported. However, unlike within the Commission, Colin Buchanan’s view was not the minority, garnering support from those who agreed that Cublington would be an environmental disaster. Like Buchanan, the South East Economic Planning Council favoured the coastal site at Foulness but conceded that if it had to be an inland site then Cublington would be their choice, while the Countryside Commission also announced their preference for the Foulness site (South East Economic Planning Council, 1970; The Countryside Commission, 1970: 8).

The Wing Area Resistance Association (WARA) formed immediately, uniting those in the Cublington that were against the development. Named after the wartime airfield at Wing (one of the original reasons for its selection), WARA modelled their campaign on NWEEHPA’s one at Stansted with resources coming from some very affluent residents and
the protests making national headlines. Providing the opposition with crucial political strength, 218 MPs signed a motion opposing an inland site for the third London airport (Bendixson, 1970: 856; Buchanan, 1981: 46; 93; Hall, 1980: 37; Ridley, 1974: 416)

Much like the criticism levelled at NWEEHPA in the 1960s, proponents of Cublington criticised the prosperous nature of the opposition. However, this critique was not surprising: WARA had a Rothschild as its Treasurer and the wife of the editor of a major daily national newspaper on its committee. Those fighting against the Cublington proposals were able to draw on a huge professional body of support and advice for free and had unanimous grass-root support (Bendixson, 1970: 855; Ridley, 1974: 416). It was also aided by a growing environmental movement motivated by the desire to improve and maintain nature, of which Cublington, a rural and beautiful site, fell neatly into the remit of (Bendixson, 1970: 855; Ridley, 1974: 416). Akin to NWEEHPA before them, courting the press was a central part of the campaign (Buchanan, 1981: 94)

The strength of the planning profession, the media, public opinion, political support and Colin Buchanan succeeded in overcoming the Roskill Commission. The Government accepted Roskill’s recommendation that a third London airport in operation by 1980 was necessary, however it went against the recommendation of the site at Cublington, considering the coastal site at Foulness the most appropriate (Eyre, 1984b: 88; Feldman, 1985: 71; Turrall-Clarke, 1983: 29). On 26 April 1971 John Davies, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and President of the Board of Trade, announced that the third London airport would be developed at Maplin (Foulness) on environmental and planning grounds (Perman, 1973: 17). In Cublington: a Blueprint for Resistance David Perman (1973) wrote that, “the Cublington victory was tinged with a weary relief that it was all over and with sadness that now another community would suffer ... the first prayer said in Stewkley Church was for the people of Foulness”, illustrating perfectly a dilemma environmentalists face, unless of course they were really just NIMBYs (motivated by Not In My Back Yard concerns).

In 1973 the Maplin Development Bill was introduced, giving power to the recently established Maplin Development Authority to reclaim and manage the land needed, with the Maplin Project Management Committee (formed in 1971) co-ordinating and monitoring progress (Eyre, 1984b: 89; Helsey and Codd, 2010: 35). Huge opposition arose at Maplin (Eyre, 1984b: 88). Local politician Derek Wood had formed a local group, Defenders of
Essex, during the Roskill inquiry and it was now having its voice heard alongside local MPs voicing their opposition (Hall, 1980: 38). Helped by documents published by the Roskill Commission that showed the vast impact the development would have, the economic feasibility of the project was starting to be questioned and the merits of the Roskill Commission’s work becoming evident (Hall, 1980: 39; McKie, 1973: 21). Those who supported the Roskill Commission were not surprised at the increasing questions surrounding Maplin. Notably, this included Anthony Crosland, at the time Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, now in opposition and Labour MP for Grimsby, who, as discussed, had been mainly responsible for setting up the Roskill Commission in 1968. He voiced concerns about the vast amount of national resources that would be needed for the Maplin project, resources that he felt could be put to better use, describing it is as a, “mad plan for Heathograd in South East Essex” (Crosland, 1973; Hall, 1980: 39).

Even in March 1971, two months before the final Maplin decision, Crosland argued for a national aviation strategy that would make better use of existing airports with the development of a two, not four, runway airport, possibly at Cublington. Peter Hall (1980: 39) comments that it was Crosland’s position that shifted the position of the Labour Party and without any formal discussion, they adopted the view that Maplin was a Tory prestige project and that national resources could be put to better use (McKie, 1973: 218-220). In a Commons debate on 23 October 1973, Crosland made clear his objections to the scheme, confirming that if elected, the Labour Party would scrap the plans (Helsey and Codd, 2010: 36).

The oil crisis of 1973-74 added to Maplin’s woes (Higham, 1995: 30). Creating a fall in the predicted rate of growth, this further questioned the economic feasibility of the project and the sense in providing such an increase in mobility (Feldman, 1985: 75; Hall, 1980: 39; Leigh, 1985). The increasing use of jumbo jets pressurised the capacity of airport terminals but reduced runway demand hence it was the provision of more terminal not runway capacity that was emerging as the pressing issue and alternatives to flying, such as high speed rail and the Channel Tunnel were also being talked about. The case for a large-scale project such as Maplin was becoming less compelling (Eyre, 1984b: 90; Hall, 2011: 00:17:38; Higham, 1995: 30). By 1974, there was strong local and national opposition to Maplin.

comments that this review was a hasty exercise, conducted internally by the Department of Trade and resembling the 1967 White Paper. In a statement to the House of Commons on 18 July 1974, Peter Shore, then Secretary of State for Trade, announced the Government’s decision to abandon the Maplin project (Shore, 1974). Regardless of the review, Crosland committed the Labour Party to dismissing the project even before they had returned to power.

In light of the revised demand forecasts, the Government were under no pressure to choose a site for the third London airport and decided to conduct a review of national airport strategy (Brancker, 1967b: 19; Hall, 1980: 44; Sanders and Mead, 2007: 2). Published in 1975 the Airport Strategy for Great Britain reiterated many of the comments made in the Maplin review, notably that increasing capacity at regional airports was not a substitution for the provision of capacity in the South East. It concluded that the most pressing issue was that of terminal capacity, not air traffic capacity; with the provision of more terminal capacity existing airports could cope (Department of Trade, 1975). Maplin was abandoned and, “...they began to circle around Stansted once again” (Haselhurst, 2011: 00:04:47).

The Town and Country Planning Association continued to support the Maplin project, urging the Labour Government to uphold the policy of the Conservatives, highlighting its advantages on environmental grounds. They believed that the Labour Government had downplayed the advantages of Maplin, “because they are not directly or obviously related to the needs of airlines and air passengers with whom the aviation authorities are concerned. But they are of direct economic, environmental and social significance” (ENDS, 1979). Essex and Hertfordshire County Councils immediately reiterated their previous arguments against Stansted but they failed to attract the same level of attention as before. In his commentary, Peter Hall speculates that the public had become tired of the whole debate or that in light of the oil crisis and recession, people were viewing the issue in a different way (1980: 44).

The Department for Trade published a national aviation strategy in the 1978 White Paper Airports Policy (Cmnd. 7084) (Department of Trade, 1978). While it lacked any emergency in accommodating air travel, London having survived 20 years without the construction deemed essential in 1960 and with no evidence showing any traffic loss as a result, it did stress the important role of the aviation industry to the UK economy (Department of Trade,
1978; Eyre, 1984b: 96; Feldman, 1985: 78; Leigh, 1985). Acknowledging that more capacity would be needed during the 1990s, the White Paper gave assurances that Heathrow would not be taken beyond four terminals, Gatwick beyond two, Luton beyond 5 million passengers per annum (mppa) nor any wholly new airport developed (Buchanan, 1981: 51; Department of Trade, 1978). Effectively ruling out expansion everywhere bar Stansted this was a, “Stansted by stealth”, policy (Anon, 2011; ENDS, 1980). The local area erupted with anger (Haselhurst, 1982: 1).

The Eyre Inquiry (1981-1983)

Resulting from the White Paper, in August 1978 two committees were set up to look at long-term options for handling London’s air traffic: the Advisory Committee on Airports Policy (investigating the need for a third London airport) and the Study Group on South East Airports (investigating potential sites, assuming the need was proven) (Fulton, 1981: 201). Both reported in December 1979 (Department of Trade, 1979a; b). Immediately after, John Nott, then Secretary of State for Trade, invited BAA to, “bring forward proposals for the construction of a single terminal building at Stansted based on the existing runway facilities capable of handling about 15mppa”, subject to a public inquiry (Buchanan, 1981: 54; Fulton, 1981: 201; Nott, 1979). The Government had chosen Stansted to meet the incremental demand for airport capacity as it arose and it was their view that Stansted chose itself, even though it had never done before (Buchanan, 1981: 56; Eyre, 1984c: para 4.1).

BAA lobbied hard in a number of areas and emphasised the job creation that would occur as a result, both during and after development, with the local construction industry were told of the benefits of the proposal in the hope that they would rally their local councils to support it (Turrall-Clarke, 1983: 2). However, while securing the support of the Greater London Council, BAA failed to persuade the local authorities around Stansted. Essex and Hertfordshire County Councils and East Hertfordshire and Uttlesford District Councils completely condemned the proposals and formed a consortium to work together in opposing the development (Essex and Hertfordshire County Councils and East Hertfordshire and Uttlesford District Councils, 1981; Hertfordshire County Council, 1981; Jameson, 2010: 00:00:53).
By inviting BAA to submit a planning application, the opposition felt the Government had
given legitimacy to the proposal placing it in a favourable position going into the public
inquiry:

“There is a danger that the application will attract to it a measure of credibility and
respectability by virtue of the fact that it is brought forward at the invitation of
Government, despite the repeated changes in policies and decisions by
Government over the years in respect of a third London airport” (Essex and
Hertfordshire County Councils and East Hertfordshire and Uttlesford District

BAA submitted their application to Uttlesford District Council on 25 July 1980. It detailed
plans for the construction of a new terminal and associated facilities; and defined the land
that would be needed to provide a second runway and further terminals should one be
required in the future (BAA, 1980; Turner, 1980). BAA believed that, “a major new terminal
at Stansted is essential to meet demand, to maintain an efficient airport system for London
and to keep the UK at the forefront of world air transport” (BAA, 1981).

The public inquiry sat from 29 September 1981 until 28 October 1982 at Quendon Hall,
Essex with Graham Eyre the inquiry inspector (Anon, 2011; Eyre, 1984c: para. 8.1; 8.2).
There were 246 witnesses in total with the youngest just 13 years old, 3850 inquiry
documents and 21069 pages of inquiry transcript (Eyre, 1984c: para. 8.6; 8.7; 8.8).

David Keene, QC for the local authority consortium, recollects that the character of the
inquiry was interesting, “not a jolly atmosphere exactly it was too tense for that, but it was
conducted on a reasonably friendly basis, behind the scenes at least. I mean there were one
or two social gatherings for all those involved” (2011: 00:24:06). However, Sue Forsyth, of
NWEEHPA, remembers it a little differently:

“the first time NWEEHPA started giving evidence and my father who was chairman
came to give his evidence and we had the hall packed with people, everybody
clapped, and Eyre said I can’t have clapping in my inquiry. His inquiry? We had been
fighting for years, it was our inquiry, it was our livelihoods” (Forsyth, 2010:
00:28:44).
Characterising Graham Eyre as a ‘bully’, Forsyth believes that the agenda was already set and Graham Eyre didn’t like anything that went against it, “I don’t think we dominated anything, we were dominated” (Forsyth, 2010: 00:31:00).

NWEEHPA regrouped and refocused. Sue Forsyth, by now Campaign Director, remembers feeling that although she knew she had to re-engage with the campaign, she really did not want to devote her life to it again. “It dominates your life, I was rung by the press at 2am one morning to ask a question before they went to print, your life was no longer yours”, continuing that it was, “all run from here [her personal residence], paid nothing. Nothing for electricity/heating/lighting, everybody did it because that is what they wanted to do” (Forsyth, 2010: 00:42:06). “Technical experts, witnesses to give evidence, planners, noise experts all had to be found and it was, a lot to achieve and it does not happen overnight” (Forsyth, 2010: 00:45:52). To their advantage, through representing hundreds of people in over 240 affiliated groups, so long as they ensured that people felt involved in the campaign and were able to keep morale high they had a large pool of individuals to draw upon for expertise (Forsyth, 2010: 00:46:44).

The Countryside Commission objected to the development on the grounds that it would have an, “unacceptable impact on the natural beauty and amenity of the area” (Coleman, 1980). Lord Winstanley, Chairman, wrote to Michael Heseltine, Secretary of State for the Environment, stating that the proposal, “…would constitute a massive urbanisation of an attractive area of the countryside...” (The Countryside Commission, 1980).

The opposition argued that Stansted’s development was totally at odds with local and regional planning policies. With an unemployment rate far below other parts of the country, the area around Stansted was not one that desperately needed the economic benefits that came with an airport. It was argued that development should go to areas such as Manchester, who were desperate for economic stimulus (Forsyth, 2010: 00:12:23; Jameson, 2010: 00:01:03; Keene, 2011: 00:28:20). However, BAA did not own Manchester or any regional airports and hence had little interest, financial or otherwise, in regional solutions to the capacity problem (Jameson, 2010: 00:01:28). Those opposing the development of Stansted tried to draw on the support of regional airports such as Manchester who wanted to see development at their airports, however this proved difficult due to the power of BAA. Regional airports, “didn’t think it was worth it” (Forsyth, 2010: 00:13:16). With this involvement of regional airports, however small, an interesting case
arose where a state owned corporation was attacked by a municipally owned airport (Doganis, 2011: 00:06:58).

Robert Jameson, instructing solicitor for the consortium of local authorities, remembers the shock they received when they arrived at the inquiry. They thought they had a trump card; that regional planning policy stated that this was an area of restraint and the economy of the South East did not need the development. However, at the start of the inquiry Graham Eyre made it clear that as this was a nationally important decision regional planning policies would be set aside, “that was our first indication that things weren’t necessarily going to be easy for us” (Jameson, 2010: 00:03:15). He recalls a conversation with a senior civil servant who implied that the local authorities were only there to keep up appearances and keep ratepayers happy. Shocked, Jameson replied that no, they wanted to win the inquiry and stop the development to which the civil servant appeared shocked and embarrassed (2010: 00:05:36). On reflection, Jameson recalls that they [the opposition] had, “a fond, if mistaken, belief that we were going to win the thing” (Jameson, 2010: 00:13:04).

In his evidence at the inquiry Alan Haselhurst, then, and still now, MP for Saffron Walden, emphasised that after two inquiries the people of Stansted deserved a respite. By this inquiry people had become resigned to the airport, either through disillusionment with the process or convinced that the civil service would get Stansted by whatever means and that the decision had already been made (Haselhurst, 1982: 2; 2011). This claim was refuted by Graham Eyre, “I was left in no doubt that the Government had intended from the very outset that the inquiries were to provide the opportunity for a comprehensive and wide ranging examination of its proposals” (Eyre, 1984c: Ch. 2, para 4.12). However, while the decision may have not have already been made David Keene, QC for the consortium of local authorities, believes that, “the economic arguments on the whole are likely to win and that the most one can normally hope for is to minimise environmental damage” (Keene, 2011: 00:34:15).

The consortium of local authorities maintained a good relationship with NWEEHPA, agreeing on the angles each should promote at the inquiry and the tactics that should be employed (Jameson, 2010: 00:12:12). While the local authorities had the resources to fund a broad set of arguments this relationship meant that NWEEHPA were able to focus their, much more limited, resources on the local human impact, “they were in a position to deal with matters certainly with a lot more emotion than local authorities would have applied”
(Keene, 2011: 00:21:40). Sue Forsyth recollects that the activities of the local authorities were markedly different to how they were at the 1964 inquiry, “I don’t think the local authorities took it very seriously at all [in 1964], felt that they could do nothing. NWEEHPA had all the technical expertise and their witnesses were massively superior to the local authority ones…whereas at Eyre inquiry, it was the local authorities that led the whole thing” (Forsyth, 2010: 00:19:25).

While the opposition challenged the need for increasing airport capacity, if Graham Eyre concluded that there was a need for increasing airport capacity in the UK, they had to prove why the objections to meeting it at Stansted were overwhelming and that other sites were more suitable (Essex and Hertfordshire County Councils, 1984). Working closely with British Airways, who were concerned that expansion would occur at Stansted at the expense of Heathrow, the consortium of local authorities put forward an application for a fifth terminal at Heathrow. They argued that the UK needed a strong hub airport and that the solution to the air capacity problem would be better met there (Essex and Hertfordshire County Councils, 1984; Harris, 2011; Keene, 2011: 00:25:13), “of course there were objections to the alternative but we had to say that the objections to Stansted were greater than the objections to T5” (Keene, 2011: 00:27:15).

BAA were not opposed to a fifth terminal at Heathrow per se but argued that as there were substantial issues regarding the relocation of a sewage works on the site it could not achieved quickly enough to cope with the forecast increase in demand. 22 Graham Eyre agreed and according to David Keene, QC for the local authorities, “that was principally why he gave Stansted the go-ahead” (Keene, 2011: 00:32:24).

In 1984, Graham Eyre recommended the immediate development of Stansted to handle up to 15mppa and ruled out the possibility of a second runway:

“There is no doubt that a two-runway airport at Stansted would have so detrimental an effect on the environment, would so affect the character of the

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22 The Inspector’s recommendation for the T5 proposal debated at this inquiry was that it should be refused at this time but recommended that the Government take action to ensure that the Perry Oaks sludge treatment facility is removed in preparation for the objective of providing a fifth terminal in the f uture (The Airports Inquiries 1981 – 1983, Parts VII, VIII: Chapters 55-62 inclusive, Graham Eyre).
local communities and the ecology of the area and would have such implications beyond its immediate neighbourhood as to be wholly unacceptable” (Eyre, 1984a).

The opposition had made it clear to Graham Eyre that granting permission up to 15mppa would inevitably lead to development beyond that. In response, Eyre stated that permission should only be granted for expansion to 25mppa if the Government could provide assurances that there would be no permission to go beyond this or the development of a second runway (Sanders and Mead, 2007: 2). Eyre’s report concluded that the provision of additional capacity at regional airports would not reduce the need for further airport capacity provision in London and that there was a need to maintain and enhance the London airport system (Eyre, 1984a; Leigh, 1985)

In his commentary of the Stansted inquiry, Robert Turrall-Clarke notes that the approach taken at the inquiry was one of a feasibility study, testing the objections to see whether, or how, they could be ignored, minimised or met:

“The inquiry appears to have set out on the footing that the decision had been made, certainly in the minds of the Government, and that what needed to be done was to ensure that the problems that might arise from the development were kept at a minimum or were overcome” (Turrall-Clarke, 1983: 4).

The 1985 White Paper *Airports Policy* (Cmnd. 9542) announced Stansted’s approval ending 25 years of indecision (Department of Transport, 1985). The White Paper went partway to implementing the recommendations of Eyre, granting permission for an increase in capacity from two to 15mppa but it was subject to an interim limit of seven to eight mppa. Eyre’s recommendation that there would be no expansion beyond 25mppa was accepted with capacity being restrained by the single runway (Higham, 1995: 35). However, there were no assurances on its future growth via the development of a second runway (ENDS, 1985).

In response, Nicholas Ridley, then Secretary of State for Transport, faced hostility from both his party and the opposition. Many criticised the lack of regional airport planning and the focus on airport development in the South East as well as questioning him over the possibility of a fifth terminal at Heathrow (Travis, 1985a). Alan Haselhurst, MP for Saffron Walden, told him the decision to expand Stansted was a, “case of putting the most capacity in the wrong place in order to meet the prescription which you have given”, Ridley maintained that Stansted’s development was in the national interest (Travis, 1985a). With
the aim of getting it through before the protest movements built up enough steam to stop it, a week after the decision was made the Government motion to approve it went through the House of Commons (McKie, 1985). Stansted officially opened in 1991.

**Eventually, who got what, when and how?**

A diverse cast of actors were involved in the search for a third London airport each with different motivations for wanting to influence the policymaking process and with varying degrees of participation. Aside from BAA, the aviation industry was hardly noticeable until the Eyre inquiry, when British Airways and regional airport operators joined the opposition against the development of Stansted (albeit with differing motivations to those they worked with). BAA’s participation was limited but in the end, they still prevailed: action without agents.

At the national level, the state’s role was twofold. First, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the aviation industry was seen as an engine of growth and crucial in redeveloping the UK economy. The Government committed itself to fostering the development of the UK aviation industry, part of which was the development of a third London airport. Second, from its formation in 1965 until its privatisation in 1986, BAA was an arm of the government, occupying, and benefiting from, a quango like status and the nationalist mentality that characterised the industry. This interweaved the interests of the state with those of the aviation industry. Conflicts at the national state level were down to ideological differences between political parties, however, while their solutions to the capacity problem may have differed, they were united in the belief that there was a problem and that capacity should be provided.

The role of the state at the local level was quite different. Local Government had a responsibility to reflect the concerns of its constituents, which meant it was often in conflict with the state at the national level. Local authorities and MP’s were actively involved in the opposition campaigns, adding political legitimacy and credibility to their arguments.

Local community groups (such as NWEEHPA, WARA and Defenders of Essex) played a prominent role, reflected in their commitment to often-prolonged campaigns. While groups such as the CPRE and the National Trust made their position on specific site developments known in as much as it affected their direct remit, they did not play a prominent role, with the environmental arguments left to local groups. This representation is unsurprising and
reflects the nature of the environmental movement at the time. The environmental impact of the aviation industry was not on their agenda; the national and global impact of an ever-expanding aviation industry was not yet recognised with the environmental impacts largely constrained to the local level, for example, noise, local air pollution and the loss of land.

Not an actor as such, the media played a crucial role in creating and managing public and political opinion. First, it was a tool used by actors to create and manage public and political opinion, for example, proponents and opponents conducted their disputes in the national press. Second, it provided commentary on events via journalists, disseminating their (the journalist's/media outlet's) perception and opinion on events. Finally, and arguably most critically, it linked the issue of airport development to broader environmental, economic and social concerns, through the media, the development of a third London airport became an issue of national importance.

The structure of both the legal and planning system worked in the favour of proponents of development. The legal system reflected the effect of the inequality in resources between actors. Those with the most financial resources (e.g. BAA) were able to fund, attract and sustain the best legal team with those less financially secure (e.g. local community groups) unable to sustain their physical presence at inquiries or afford the top legal team. The planning system, illustrated via the public inquiries, assumed an adversarial rather than inquisitorial nature with inquiries becoming feasibility studies for specific sites. The tight terms of reference that characterised inquiries and reviews inhibited information from entering the policymaking process and stopped any form of policy learning taking place, with some issues completely omitted from debate. With the need to increase airport capacity, and the filling of it, always assumed, debate circled around implementation, that is to say the location of the third London airport and not whether or not one should be developed.

Throughout the whole affair, a sense of inevitability surrounded the development of Stansted as the third London airport (Buchanan, 1985; Hall, 1980). Each time the Stansted decision was reversed, proponents of the site (namely BAA) were able to steer the agenda back in its direction, by, for example, refusing to co-operate with the Roskill Commission.

The debate appears to be sufficiently polarised to reduce all available interpretations to a standoff between the proponent and opponent. However, on closer inspection, it is more complex than this. The position of BAA, changing forecasts, political oscillation, external
shocks, underhand strategies, public pressure and a moving definition of the ‘need’ all contributed to why the designation of a site for the third London airport took so long. The next chapter applies the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Strategic-Relational Approach to help comprehend the series of complex interactions and relationships detailed here and to help to explain whether, and if so how and why, the aviation industry occupied a privileged position in the environmental policymaking process.
Explaining policy change: the prolonged search for a third London airport

The series of events that led to the decision to develop Stansted as the third London airport spanned over thirty years, saw three sites approved (with ten times as many suggested), involved two public inquiries, three in-depth reviews, and featured an evolving cast of actors from both the public and private spheres. This chapter employs the two theories detailed in Chapter Three, namely the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA), to shed light on, and make sense of, the empirical observations and events that led to the decision to approve Stansted for development as the third London airport. The application of these theories, and the critical reflection on this application, will aid the explanation and understanding of these events and will explore the precise mechanisms behind the claimed position of privilege it is claimed that the aviation industry enjoys. Furthermore, this chapter initiates a process of theoretical evaluation that the rest of the thesis builds upon.

This chapter begins by explaining the series of events in the search for a third London airport from the perspective of the ACF. An advocate of the ACF studies the policymaking process over a decade or more and sees power as broadly shared among a range of interest groups. Policymaking takes place in the policy subsystem, which unites all those actors interested in influencing the process. Beliefs stimulate political behaviour and these beliefs unite actors in advocacy coalitions within the policy subsystem. Coalitions battle for dominance in order to control the broad direction of policy. This application is then critically reflected on, drawing on existing critiques, discussing new insights it has uncovered and touching upon future theoretical refinements.

It will then explain events from the perspective of the SRA and similarly subject it to critical reflection. An advocate of the SRA attempts to transcend the dualism between structure and agency by focusing attention on the recursive nature of relationship between the two. Policy change is viewed as the result of struggles between actors, who employ various strategies to achieve their (explicitly stated) policy goals. These struggles take place on a terrain that by its very nature privileges certain strategies, and hence certain actors, with
the form of the state representing the latest incarnation of these battles and illustrating the current balance of power.

The Advocacy Coalitions Framework’s perspective

As Chapter Three explained, the ACF seeks to explore policy change by employing the core concepts of policy subsystems, advocacy coalitions, exogenous shocks and policy-oriented learning.

The ACF would view the policy subsystem as uniting those actors who had an interest in the development of a third London airport as a means to implement the UK Government’s policy to develop UK air traffic capacity. A changing cast of actors over a long period, this included airport operators, airlines and government departments concerned with the development of UK civil aviation. The initiation of site-specific public inquiries saw the policy subsystem expand and contract, as actors at the local level entered and left the policymaking process, for example, Essex and Hertfordshire County Councils and the North West Essex and East Hertfordshire Preservation Association (NWEEHPA) at Stansted, and Defenders of Essex at Maplin. Widening the analysis beyond the traditional iron triangle of actors, the policy subsystem encompassed journalists, commentators and academics such as David McKie, Terence Bendixson, Peter Hall and John Self.

From the ACF’s perspective, advocacy coalitions united actors within the policy subsystem, glued together by their policy core beliefs. These coalitions held distinct viewpoints and co-operated over time to achieve their policy goals. Throughout the search for a third London airport, conflict within the policy subsystem took place primarily between two advocacy coalitions. One dominant, which was in control of the broad direction of policy, and one minority, which hoped to exploit a window of opportunity emerging from a shake to the subsystem (i.e. an external perturbation).

The advocacy coalition uniting those actors who held a policy core belief that a third London airport should be developed, occupied the position of dominant coalition. For example, at the Chelmsford inquiry (1965-66) the dominant coalition united those actors holding a policy core belief that Stansted should be developed as the third London airport: the Ministry of Aviation, the British Airports Authority (BAA), and the Stansted Area Progress Association (that united those local level actors supportive of the proposals). After the report of the Roskill Commission (in 1971), the dominant coalition united those actors
who held a policy core belief that Cublington should be developed as the third London airport. While at the Eyre inquiry (1981-83) the dominant coalition, once again, united those with a policy core belief that Stansted should be developed: BAA, the Department of Trade and the Greater London Council.

Minority coalitions emerged as a response to policy outputs, in an attempt to overthrow the dominant coalition and steer policy in their direction. For example, in 1965, when Richard Crossman, Minister of Housing and Local Government, announced that there would be a public inquiry into the development of Stansted (the Chelmsford inquiry) an advocacy coalition emerged, which united those actors with a policy core belief that the site should not be developed as the third London airport. This brought together NWEEHPA, the National Trust, local authorities directly affected by the proposal, the Farmers Union and the Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE).

Similarly, when the Roskill Commission recommended the development of Cublington, a minority coalition emerged with a policy core belief that Cublington should not be developed, uniting BAA, Colin Buchanan, the Wing Area Resistance Association (WARA), Peter Self and John Adams. When the Government then announced the reversal of the Cublington decision and that Maplin was to be developed instead, in response, a minority coalition emerged there, uniting actors who held a policy core belief it should not, encompassing the Defenders of Essex, local MPs, BAA and the Labour Party (at the time, in opposition). In 1980, when the Government invited BAA to submit a planning application for the development of Stansted, a minority coalition uniting those held a policy core belief that Stansted should not be developed emerged, uniting NWEEHPA, Essex and Hertfordshire County Councils and East Hertfordshire and Uttlesford District Councils, the Countryside Commission and the airport operator at Manchester Airport.

The ACF acknowledges the important role resources play in constraining and facilitating the actions of coalitions. With better-resourced actors often occupying the position of dominant coalition, proponents of a specific site were in a favourable position compared to their counterparts. For example, during the Eyre inquiry (1981-83), the dominant coalition was able to afford the top legal team, sustain a daily presence at the inquiry and court the media. By contrast, those actors in the minority coalition did not have access to the same level of resources and hence, were unable to finance the same calibre of legal representation and technical expertise. Furthermore, the minority coalition often contained
actors who had to fundraise extensively just to fund their participation and survival in the policy subsystem (e.g. NWEEHPA, WARA and the Defenders of Essex).

From the ACF’s perspective, two exogenous variables affected the behaviour of actors within the subsystem: relatively stable parameters and external subsystem events. Changes in the former, failed to provide the basis for policy change, but did affect actors’ behaviour and stimulated policy-oriented learning. For example, the emerging environmental movement created a change in fundamental socio-cultural values, which affected actors’ perceptions of the problem and its solution, highlighted by the actions of Anthony Crosland, whose belief in the public’s emerging interest in the quality of the environment reopened the Stansted decision in 1967.

To the ACF, external subsystem events played an important role in the process of policy change. With the potential to create major policy change, they quickly redistributed resources and provided a window of opportunity for minority coalitions to exploit. Changes in the governing coalition brought a new set of ideological preferences into the policy subsystem and hence, a different construction of what the solution was to solve the UK’s air capacity problem. For example, in opposition in the early 1970s, the Labour party made it clear they viewed Maplin as a ‘Tory prestige project’ and would cancel it, should they return to power.

Changes in socioeconomic conditions had similar effects. For example, in the early 1970s, when Maplin was the chosen policy output to address the UK’s air capacity problem, the oil crisis, subsequent recession and altering forecasts of demand provided a window of opportunity for the minority coalition to exploit, which they did successfully. Other socioeconomic changes with similar subsystem-shaking effects included the onset of the Cold War, which meant control of Stansted airport reverted to the United States Air Force, and the reform of the House of Lords in the 1960s, which meant the Board of Trade were unable to push through a Special Development Order for Stansted.

The ACF would view the development of the jumbo jet as an exogenous (technological) event, which created a change in the basic attributes of the problem area. Through the increased use of the jumbo jet, terminal capacity, not runway capacity, became the pressing issue, which redefined the problem. Furthermore, other external events exacerbated the effect the jumbo jet had on changing the basic attributes of the problem area. The oil crisis and subsequent recession created a fall in predicted growth rates, while
discussions in other policy subsystems surrounding the development of the Channel Tunnel and high-speed rail questioned the need for a large-scale problem such as Maplin.

The ACF also views changes in public opinion as an external event, with the potential to shake the policy subsystem and redefine the problem. A dominant coalition out of favour with public opinion provides a window of opportunity for minority coalitions, for example, when public opinion failed to align with the recommendations of the Roskill Commission. To the ACF, public opinion is not solely an external subsystem event, but is itself an important resource that constrains and facilitates the actions of coalitions. For example, leading up to the Chelmsford inquiry, both coalitions attempted to gain national media support as a means to achieving favourable public opinion.

In contrast to external events, the exclusion of Stansted from the Roskill Commission’s shortlist of sites is an example of what the ACF would consider an internal event. While similar in effect, those within the subsystem stimulate internal events, while external events are largely outside the control of subsystem actors. By excluding Stansted from the shortlist of sites, the Roskill Commission insulted previous analysts, an omission that robbed them of potential coalition members.

In summary, while minority coalitions were able to exploit windows of opportunity and exert pressure on the direction of policy, the dominant coalition behind the development of a third London airport prevailed. Conflict between coalitions was site-specific, driven by changes to the relatively stable parameters resulting from changes in fundamental socio-cultural values and to the basic attributes of the problem, and from external events shaking the policy subsystem. In the early 1980s, when conflict returned to the site at Stansted, the minority coalition was unable to exploit any window of opportunity and hence, the decision to develop Stansted stuck.

**Critical reflections: the Advocacy Coalition Framework’s perspective**

While the ACF has provided a convincing explanation of the mechanisms behind the process of policy change that led to the development of Stansted as the third London airport, its application has both provided evidence that backs up existing critiques of the framework and has uncovered new theoretical insights. This section identifies and considers these.
The application refutes the criticism posited by John (1998) and Mintrom and Vergari (1996) that the ACF relies too heavily on external events as the driver of policy change. In explaining the process of policy change in the search for the third London airport, external events did play a prominent role; shaking the policy subsystem, which redistributed resources and importantly, provided windows of opportunity for the minority coalition to exploit. However, it would be unfair to suggest that the ACF relied too heavily on these events as the causal drivers of policy change. Rather, it was a combination of external events, changes to the relatively stable parameters and skilful coalition members that drove policy change, the latter a point picked up by both Ameringer (2002) and Jordan and Greenaway (1998), who conclude that after an external shock, skilful coalition members are needed in order to exploit the opportunity.

An extension of this, and a question that the ACF fails to address adequately, is how can a minority coalition effectively exploit a window of opportunity that arises immediately after a shake to the policy subsystem? As Albright (2011) comments, a more nuanced understanding of how different shocks shift agendas and redistribute resources among coalitions would assist in developing the ACF’s understanding of these causal mechanisms, as would an analysis of the event beyond its proximity to the subsystem. While internal events, notably the omission of Stansted from the Roskill Commission’s shortlist of sites, created effects similar to external events (the redistribution of resources and opening up of a window of opportunity), beyond observation, what does this dichotomy add to the ACF’s understanding of policy change? Are internal events more likely to be pre-empted by those within the policy subsystem and hence, have less of a shock? Are they more likely to encourage policy-oriented learning?

The application provides evidence of the existence of coalitions of convenience, a phenomena commented on by Hann (1995) and Kim and Roh (2008), but rejected by the ACF (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 27). Coalitions of convenience are where actors motivated by short-term interests work together to achieve said interests. For example, the minority coalition that emerged in response to the Roskill Commission’s decision that Cublington should be developed as the third London airport, in which actors were motivated by a short-term interest to stop the development of Cublington.

The existence of coalitions of convenience calls into question a key assumption of the ACF: that policy core beliefs are the ‘glue’ behind coalitions (Weible et al., 2009: 122). Using the
same example, the empirical evidence provides uncertainty as to what level actors in the minority coalition held their opposition to the development of Cublington. BAA’s rejection of Cublington could be described as a secondary level aspect, that is to say, a means to achieve their policy core belief that Stansted should be developed. Similarly, Colin Buchanan’s opposition to Cublington could be a secondary level aspect, a means to achieving his policy core belief that Foulness (Maplin) was the most appropriate site for the third London Airport. In fact, it is feasible that the Wing Area Resistance Association (WARA), the local community group, were the only actor in this coalition who held their opposition to the development of Cublington as a policy core belief.

Adding further complexity to the internal dynamics of advocacy coalitions, this application has uncovered the existence of coalitions within coalitions, with the local community groups that united local actors against a specific site exemplifying the phenomena. NWEEHPA and SAPA at Stansted, WARA at Cublington and Defenders of Essex at Maplin all united local actors with a policy core belief that their locality should not be the site for the third London airport, coalitions that were then part of a broader coalition (arguably, of convenience).

Reflecting the fluid nature of policymaking, this application provides evidence that not all actors in the policy subsystem are engaged in the policymaking process to the same extent. While Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999: 137) acknowledge that there are regular (those that are involved in virtually all issues) and periodic (involved in only a distinct set of issues) participants within a policy subsystem, the evidence here demonstrates that actor participation can also vary within an advocacy coalition. For example, the coalition opposed to the development of Stansted at the Eyre inquiry (1981-83). NWEEHPA and the local authorities took an active role on a broad range of issues (regular/core actors), while British Airways, the airport operator at Manchester and national non-governmental organisations such as the National Trust, took a less active role and only became engaged on specific issues (periodic actors). Similarly, in the coalition opposed to the development of Cublington, Colin Buchanan and WARA were regular/core actors, while BAA, Peter Self and John Adams were periodic.

This application has highlighted the important role resources play in facilitating and constraining the ability of actors, and the coalitions within which they exist, to achieve their policy goals. However, it also uncovers an important insight into the typology of resources
that was included in the most recent revision of the framework (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 201); that certain resources have more of an effect on coalition activity than the ACF acknowledges and that resources themselves affect one another. Equally, the ACF’s application highlights the crucial role financial resources play with well-financed coalitions in a better position to attain other resources, such as information and the recruitment of influential actors to their coalition.

The nature of this case study, with its focus of the public inquiry as the venue in which conflict takes place, automatically pushes the analysis from the national to the local level, which uncovers a useful insight into the ability of the ACF to handle multi-level structures of policymaking. From the perspective of the ACF, there is a broad understanding of ‘the problem’ throughout the policy subsystem: the development of a third London airport to fulfil the need to increase UK airport capacity. However, with the initiation of site-specific public inquiries, an influx of local level actors entered the policy subsystem and with them, entirely new conceptions of ‘the problem’.

From the ACF’s perspective, policy-oriented learning did not feature in the process of policy change. Critically reflecting on this uncovers an important insight: that the assumed need for a third London airport, and the presumption that this need would be filled, actively blocked any form of learning. A structural concept that the ACF struggles to engage with, the tightly defined terms of reference at all inquiries and reviews, inhibited actors from questioning the need for increasing the UK’s airport capacity. Conflict in the policy subsystem was over the implementation of policy, that is to say, the site of development for the third London airport, with no room for the discussion of technical information and subsequent learning among coalitions.

Although the ACF provides a convincing explanation of the events that led to the decision to develop Stansted as the third London airport, illuminating the importance of external events and relatively stable parameters in facilitating and constraining the ability of actors to achieve their policy goals, this application has provided evidence that backs up a number of existing critiques of the framework as well as uncovering new critical insights. Drawing on former applications, it has provided evidence that refutes the claim that the framework relies too heavily on external events as the driver of policy change; shows that coalitions of convenience and coalitions within coalitions do exist; and questions whether policy core beliefs are really the ‘glue’ of coalitions. Furthermore, it has uncovered new insights into
the dynamics of coalition activity; the role that differing resources can have in facilitating and constraining the ability of actors’ to achieve their goals; and has questioned its ability to handle multi-level policymaking.

These critical reflections will be evaluated further in Chapter Eight, where they will be combined with those that emerge from the ACF’s application to the second case study. However, this chapter now explains the events that led to the approval of Stansted as the third London airport from the perspective of the SRA.

The Strategic-Relational Approach’s perspective

In what it perceives to see as an artificial dualism between structure and agency, in understanding the policymaking process an advocate of the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) focuses on the relationship between the two, employing the concepts of strategic actors and strategically selective contexts to explain policy change.

From the SRA’s perspective, throughout the search for a third London airport the strategic selectivity of the terrain upon which conflict took place, remained largely unchanged: an emphasis on the economic imperative of increasing the UK’s air capacity via the development of a third London airport and the urgency with which it was required. Furthermore, the favourable position of the British Airports Authority (BAA), which at the time was an arm of government, ensured that the debate around a site for a third London airport continually returned to Stansted (which BAA owned).

Broader than the site specificity of Stansted, the need, and the apparent urgency with which a third London airport was required, shaped the strategically selective context to one that favoured those actors whose strategies aligned with the fulfilment of this need (i.e. airport operators). Setting rigid structural conditions, this need (enshrined and reflected in the form of the state, observable in the White Papers of 1953, 1967 and 1978), was fiercely protected, with tightly defined terms of reference constraining all public inquiries and reviews, providing a structural barrier to its challenge.

Explicitly stating their intentions and motivations, actors acted strategically to achieve their policy goals, reflecting upon the strategically selective context and calculating their strategic actions in light of this knowledge. At the start of the search for a third London airport, circa 1950s, a single, state-based, actor was involved: the Ministry of Civil Aviation, who had a clear policy goal to rationalise London’s airport system and a defined strategy to
achieve this via the development of a third London airport (enshrined in the 1953 White Paper). As time passed, and debate turned to the implementation of this policy goal, more and more strategic actors entered the conflict.

There were those behind specific sites. BAA motivated by an intention to develop Stansted airport; the Roskill Commission who made the strategic calculation that Cublington was the best site; the Conservative Government that saw the solution to the air capacity problem as the development of Maplin as the third London airport; and the Conservative Government who invited BAA to submit a planning application for Stansted in the early 1980s. The strategies of these actors collided with those of another swathe of strategic actors who were against the development of specific airport sites: at Stansted, NWEEHPA, local authorities and local MPs; at Cublington, Colin Buchanan, BAA, and WARA; and at Maplin, the Defenders of Essex and BAA.

From the viewpoint of the SRA, the delays to Stansted’s approval as the third London airport was the result of there being no guarantee that the state will always act in the best interests of capital. For example, the Chelmsford inquiry did not find the Stansted case proven, placing the Government in an awkward position. Themselves a strategic actor, they deployed a strategy to collide with the inspector’s recommendation, appointing the Peterson Committee to conduct a review. The recommendations of the Peterson Committee, not the Chelmsford inquiry, were enshrined in the form of the state (illustrated in the 1967 White Paper). This strategic action went on to transform the strategic context for future action, with many strategic actors cynical over the ability of the state to reflect accurately the balance of power in society, instead choosing to consciously align with those interests crucial in the reproduction of economic growth.

Similarly, from the SRA’s perspective, the events proceeding Anthony Crosland’s appointment as President of the Board of Trade in 1967, further demonstrate the lack of guarantee that the state will always act in the best interests of capital. At the time, in the aftermath of the Peterson Committee, the terrain was set in BAA’s favour. However, Crosland transformed the strategically selective context. His concern with both the emerging environmental movement and the use of thorough cost-benefit analysis in the decision-making process changed the balance of power and hence, the forces crystallised in the form of the state. Through a process of strategic learning, those opposed to the development of Stansted could see the terrain shifting and employed strategies to exploit
this shift, ultimately proving victorious and overthrowing, albeit temporarily, the Stansted choice.

Perfectly illustrating the recursive nature of the relationship between structure and agency, actors formulated their actions based on what they knew about the strategic selective context. For example, in the late 1960s, in the knowledge that the terrain was against them, the groups of actors opposed to the development of Stansted took the strategic move to recruit Brancker, the technical assessor at the Chelmsford inquiry, into their campaign, predicting that this would shift the terrain towards them. Equally, many actors opposed to a specific site grounded their arguments in economic terms, knowing this had the best chance of impinging on the strategically selective context.

Learning from past conflict, actors considered both the short and long-term effects of their action. BAA played the long game, and when short-term decisions went against their interests, they altered their strategy accordingly, for example, the strategic decision to refuse to co-operate with the Roskill Commission’s research. Equally strategic and forward-looking, Colin Buchanan pre-judged the effect his dissent from the Roskill Commission would have in transforming the strategically selective context. By publicising his rejection of Cublington, he stimulated a process of strategic learning among actors and tilted the terrain away from those advocating the development of Cublington.

From the SRA’s perspective, the reversal of the Maplin decision was the result of a shifting terrain. The oil crisis and subsequent recession in the early 1970s, had transformed the strategically selective context, and the structural conditions surrounding the decision for a site for the third London airport were changing, notably, growth forecasts were falling, meaning that the attraction of a large-scale project like Maplin, requiring vast injections of capital, was becoming less appealing.

Illustrating the balance of forces in society, the state (observable in the 1978 White Paper) reflected these changes, setting the strategically selective context for what was to be the final battle in the search for a third London airport. The White Paper all but selected Stansted than by name: ruling out the development of a wholly new airport as well as the expansion of London airports bar Stansted. From the perspective of the SRA, the Department for Transport then formulated their strategy within this context, inviting BAA, at this time still an arm of government, to submit a planning application, providing it with political legitimacy and tilting the terrain further in its favour.
Though ultimately unsuccessful, leading up to the Eyre inquiry, the collective of strategic actors opposed to Stansted pre-judged the terrain, and through a process of strategic learning, modified their strategic actions. Confident that the inquiry would prove there was a need for a third London airport (this never before challenged), they took the strategy to prove why Stansted was not the best solution to the capacity problem and the need could be fulfilled better elsewhere. To this end, they put in a planning application to develop a fifth terminal at Heathrow Airport, calculating that this was their best chance of pulling the terrain in their favour. It failed to have the desired effect, with the approval of Stansted in 1985 reflecting the balance of power within society.

To an advocate of the SRA, structural factors inherent in the policymaking process placed the aviation industry, and in particular BAA, in a favourable position. Tightly defined structural conditions at inquiries and reviews meant that planning inquiries took on the characteristics of site-specific feasibility studies. The legal system favoured those more financially resourced actors who could afford top legal representation and sustain their presence at inquiries. However, it was not straightforward, with public opinion, a powerful social force, forcing the state to re-open and re-examine the problem. While those opposing the development of the third London airport at Stansted, Cublington and Maplin won battles and forced the re-examination of the problem, ultimately, in the early 1980s, those at Stansted faced a terrain that was so uneven their strategic actions failed to impinge upon it.

Critical reflections: the Strategic-Relational Approach’s perspective

Akin to the ACF’s application, the SRA has provided a convincing narrative in explaining the mechanisms behind the process of policy change that led to the development of Stansted as the third London airport and the position the aviation industry occupied in it. Similarly, its application has provided evidence that both backs up existing critiques and uncovers new insights into the theory’s ability to explain policy change. As before, this section identifies and considers these.

Advancing Marxist thought, and in-line with the current era of politics, the application here has provided evidence that the SRA is a step forward from Poulantzas, notably in the way it abandons the primacy given to class struggle (a critique posited by Barrow, 1993). Explaining the process of policy change witnessed in this case study purely through class domination would have ignored other social forces. For example, the role that public
opinion played in transforming the strategically selective context after the Roskill Commission’s recommended Cublington. Nonetheless, this is not to rule out class as a powerful social force, with a criticism often levelled at local opposition groups (e.g. NWEEHPA and WARA) that they were affluent middle-class NIMBYs, using their political and financial resources to maintain their quality of life with no care for the environmental impact of development. However, while this is an advance on the thinking of Poulantzas, theoretically the SRA falls short by failing to explore what these other social forces are.

The application concurs with Valler and Wood’s (2004: 1837) comment, that a strength of the SRA is that its units of analysis are concerned less about abstract theorising, and more about detecting the immediate concerns of structural constraints, strategic actions and strategic learning, that is to say, they focus on what is happening in reality. Empirically, this is achievable via the close attention that the SRA pays to the perceptions of actors, making the identification of actors’ motivations and intentions achievable through empirical observation. For example, it was clear that BAA’s intention was to get Stansted developed as the third London airport. Furthermore, by encouraging an examination of the strategies that actors employ, the SRA directs attention to the way actors plan to achieve their policy goals, for example, BAA’s refusal to co-operate with the Roskill Commission’s work.

However, while this focus on observable strategic actions is useful, the SRA fails to explore where the strategies of actors originate, a point picked up by Uitermark (2005: 141) and to which this application adds weight. Empirically, it fails to encourage an examination of the beliefs and motivations that lay behind these actions. For example, the SRA explains Colin Buchanan’s dissent from the Roskill Commission as a strategy to achieve his intention to get the Cublington choice shelved. However, as both the empirical evidence in Chapter Four and the application of the ACF demonstrate, the motivations behind his dissent were more complex than this and included a belief that Maplin was the most appropriate site.

Scholars have praised the SRA’s conception of the state (Taylor, 1995: 261). In not giving it any form of innate power, the state’s power is determined by the balance of forces that exist within society at any one time, operating as a, “dynamic institution that offers unequal opportunities to different social groups to achieve their specific political purposes” (Ioris, 2011: 7). However, this application adds evidence to Heigl’s (2011: 84) critique that what the SRA’s conception of the state lacks, is a mechanism to describe and assess the internal
dynamics of the state, which would assist in, for example, assessing the internal dynamics between BAA and other government departments.

An extension of this is the failure of the SRA to fully explore its scalar implications, a critique highlighted by both Chettiparamb (2007: 414) and Uitermark (2005: 141). By failing to do so, the SRA is unable to assess the internal dynamics of the state’s form at multiple levels. This is particularly problematic in a case such as this, where national level policymaking takes place at the local level, creating an interesting dynamic where the state at the national level (e.g. the Ministry of Civil Aviation, BAA, etc) was often in conflict with the state at the local level (e.g. site-specific local authorities).

Although the SRA is innovative in its attempt to analyse the recursive nature of the relationship between structure and agency, it is yet to examine the role of group dynamics, putting co-ordination among actors down to a strategic decision. This fails to explore the mechanisms behind how and why actors work together to achieve their policy aims and the potential obstacles to co-ordination, activities that need to be understood to fully grasp the agency side of the structure-agency relationship. Furthermore, the SRA fails to theorise on the ability of actors to alter structural circumstances in which they exist; for example, do they all have the same ability to do so? If not, why?

In spite of the terrain so heavily tilted in favour of the aviation industry, and even more so in favour of Stansted, from the perspective of the SRA, the final decision still took an inordinate amount of time. To advocates of the SRA, with its clear focus on an uneven terrain placing certain strategies, and hence certain actors, in a position of privilege, BAA should have been able to achieve their policy goals far quicker. This suggests that there are underlying mechanisms behind the how and why of policy change that the SRA cannot grasp.

In summary, the application here illustrates that the SRA is a definite step forward for Marxist thinking, notably in its attempt to draw attention to the recursive nature of the relationship between structure and agency and its acknowledgement of powerful social forces other than class. A major strength of its application is its focus on the realities of political action via the observation and analysis of actors’ intentions and the strategies they employ to achieve them. However, this application has provided evidence to back up existing critiques and uncovered new critical insights. Notably, in the case of the former, its inability to explore fully what underpins actors’ strategies and its failure to engage with the
scalar implications of the policymaking process, and in the case of the latter, its negligence of group dynamics. As with those of the ACF’s application, these critical reflections will be evaluated further in Chapter Eight, where they will be brought together with those that emerge from the SRA’s application to the second case study.

Conclusions
To conclude, this chapter has applied the ACF and SRA to help explain the series of complex interactions and events that led to decision to develop Stansted as the third London airport, and in particular, to explore how, and why, the aviation industry was able to occupy, what is oft-claimed, a position of privilege within the policymaking process. Both offered convincing accounts of the process of policy change that occurred in the search for a third London airport and both explored some of the mechanisms by which the aviation industry was able to enjoy a privileged position within the policymaking process. However, singularly, neither is able to explain sufficiently the events that took place. Structural influences having too big a role for the ACF to fully explain, and simultaneously, the process was too drawn out and chaotic for the SRA to wholly comprehend.

Policy change in this case proved to be slow; a process that, due to its pluralist roots, the ACF was better able to comprehend. For the SRA, the process was arguably too drawn out: in theory, the terrain should have been heavily in favour of those actors crucial in the reproduction of capital (i.e. the aviation industry) and their policy aims should have swiftly been achieved. To an advocate of the SRA, any activity that aligns itself with these objectives is likely to occupy a privileged position within a capitalist system. However, as the ACF uncovered, events outside of their control meant that this process was not as simple as the SRA would have liked. However, the ACF’s explanation was not exhaustive. Though hard to believe that more could be added to such a comprehensive approach, through its pluralist roots, the ACF is unable to engage the economic, political and institutional structural influences that have played a key role in this case study, affecting the actions taken by actors to achieve their policy goals.

By employing the ACF’s core units of analysis (policy subsystems, advocacy coalitions and the hierarchal belief system) close attention was paid to the motivations behind why actors became involved in the policymaking process and how and why they work together to achieve their policy goals. This focus helped to explore some of reasons behind how and why the aviation industry is able to occupy a privileged position, notably, through the
assemblage of powerful pro-growth coalition(s) that were able to retain control over the broad direction of policy. Complementary to this understanding, the SRA engages with the strategies actors used to achieve their policy aims (as opposed to the beliefs that lay behind their aims), which uncovered some of the strategies used by actors to place them in a position of privilege and maintain this position. Structural factors inherent in the policymaking process facilitated the actions of the aviation industry and those promoting its interests, while these same factors inhibited the actions of those opposed to it.

These findings will be brought together with those of the second case study in Chapter Eight, to assess the ability of each theory to explain policy change and the reasons behind the aviation industry’s position of privilege in the policymaking process. Furthermore, it will initiate a theoretical dialogue between the two theories, which will analyse and evaluate the extent to which they are complementary or contradictory, and if there is any scope or indeed any need for, synthesis. However, prior to further theoretical evaluation, the next chapter (Six) provides an in-depth account of the events that led to the approval of a second runway at Manchester Airport. A far shorter case involving one public inquiry, Chapter Seven will then subject the case to the same theoretical application and reflection as here.
The Approval of Manchester Airport’s Second Runway

“As connoisseurs of disaster movies know, airports can be the backdrop for the strangest alliances” *(The Times, 1997b)*

To keep up with the predicted growth in air traffic, which it estimated would outstrip existing capacity within a few years, on 29 July 1991, the airport operator at Manchester Airport announced plans to develop a second runway. Ranked third in the UK, both in terms of passenger numbers and volume of freight, between 1983 and 1993 terminal passenger traffic more than doubled to 12.9 million and flown freight almost trebled to approximately 89,000 tonnes *(Mason, 1994: 3, para. 3.1)*. With projections showing strong passenger growth to 30 million by 2005, a second runway was considered by the airport as a strategic necessity *(Holden et al., 2011: 6)*. The Civil Aviation Authority had warned Manchester that, for scheduling purposes, with a single runway there was little potential to increase the hourly sustainable capacity beyond 42 air traffic movements; a figure that with a second runway could increase to 63 *(Butcher, 2010b: 2; Civil Aviation Authority, 1995)*.

Figure 6.1 outlines the main events that led to the runway’s approval. In August 1991, Manchester Airport formally announced their plans to develop a second runway *(Manchester Airport plc, 1991)*. In March 1993 a runway option had been chosen and in the following July a planning application and environmental impact assessment submitted. Due to the nature of the development, in October 1997 the proposal was ‘called-in’ by the Secretaries of State for the Departments of Transport and Environment and in the following December it was announced that a public inquiry would be held. This sat from 21 June 1994 until 9 March 1995 at Wythenshawe Forum, Manchester *(Booth, 1995; Smith, 1996: 1, para. 13)*. Gaining approval on 15 January 1997, on 10 February 2001, after ten years of planning and construction, Manchester Airport’s second runway officially opened.

To explore the events that led to the runway’s development, this chapter proceeds in the same manner as Chapter Four. By combining extensive archive analysis from documents held at the John Rylands Library, Manchester with a series of elite interviews and a review of the existing literature, an empirical timeline of the events that led to the approval of a
second runway at Manchester Airport is constructed. The chapter begins by identifying the key actors involved in this area of policymaking before moving to a chronological discussion of events. It concludes by summarising who got what, where and how, and identifying the case study’s key themes. Chapter Seven applies the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Strategic-Relational Approach to help explain how, and why, policy changed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>White Paper <em>Airports Policy</em> designates Manchester as a gateway international airport and principal airport outside the South East.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Greater Manchester Green Belt Local Plan acknowledges unique circumstances relating to the Airport.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>White Paper <em>Airports Policy</em> encourages use of regional airports in meeting the UK’s aviation needs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 1991</td>
<td>Manchester Airport announces plans to develop a second runway, site to be confirmed. Three informal rounds of public consultation take place.</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 July 1993</td>
<td>Manchester Airport submits planning application for second runway (with closure of Altrincham Road).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1993</td>
<td>Planning application is called-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1993</td>
<td>Six months of negotiations begin between Manchester Airport and Cheshire County Council resulting in agreement of extensive mitigation package.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 June 1994</td>
<td>Public inquiry begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 August 1994</td>
<td>Section 106 Agreement signed between Manchester Airport, Manchester City Council and Cheshire County Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 September 1994</td>
<td>Manchester Airport submit second planning application (includes diversion of Altrincham Road).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 January 1995</td>
<td>Section 106 Agreement and Second Supplemental Agreement signed between Manchester Airport, Manchester City Council and Cheshire County Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 March 1995</td>
<td>Public inquiry completes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 January 1997</td>
<td>Campaign Against Runway 2 (CAR2) begins.</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 May 1997</td>
<td>Local residents march.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 February 1998</td>
<td>Manchester Airport awards the contract for the construction of the runway to AMEC-Tarmac Joint Venture.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 March 1998</td>
<td>CAR2 received a two-week reprieve from the High Court.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 May 1998</td>
<td>CAR2 lose stay of execution.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 May 1998</td>
<td>Operation Fulcrum begins.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 January 1999</td>
<td>New protests begin in Cedar’s Wood and Arthur’s Wood in the Bollin Valley against the lopping of trees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>Appeal court rules that protestors can be evicted as trespassers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2001</td>
<td>Tony Blair, Prime Minister, opens the second runway.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.1 Timeline of events that led to the approval of a second runway at Manchester Airport
Adapted from: Butcher (2010b); Department of Trade (1978); Department of Transport (1985); Holden et al. (2011); Twigg (1994); and Manchester Airport plc (1991)
Chapter Six

Key actors

Four key groups were involved in the events that led to the second runway’s approval: the aviation industry; the various local authorities that had an interest in the runway’s development; local communities (predominantly Mobberley and Knutsford, the two areas directly affected by the runway proposal); and a number of national and local environmental organisations (Yates, 2011: 00:14:12).

The aviation industry

After the 1986 Airports Act, which resulted in the commercialisation of Manchester Airport, ten local authorities gained ownership of Manchester Airport (Butcher, 2010b: 2; Dudley, 2005: 96). Manchester City Council were, and still are, the majority shareholder owning 55 percent, while the local authorities of Bolton, Bury, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport, Tameside, Trafford and Wigan each owning five percent (Gibbs et al., 2002; Humphreys and Francis, 2002). Remote from the airport, many of the local authorities involved in the airport’s ownership were, and remain, unaffected by the immediate impact of the airports operations (Moss et al., 1997: 324). Setting the airport up as a public limited company created a distance between the airport and the local authorities. Graham Stringer, then Airport Chairman and later Leader of Manchester City Council, acted as a mediator between the two (Dudley, 2005: 96). Manchester Airport considered itself the Heathrow of the north and saw the development of a second runway the way to solidify this position (Carter, 2011: 00:03:31; Keene, 2011: 00:12:34).

At the time under study, four major airlines operated at Manchester Airport: British Airways, Caledonian Airways (British Airway’s charter subsidiary), Britannia Air, and American Airlines. Along with the tour operator Airtours, they all supported the proposal. They felt there was a need to increase capacity at the airport, particularly during peak periods, in order to provide flights at convenient times for the consumer, connecting airports, and the US market. All made it clear that should this need not become a reality, they would look elsewhere to expand their business (Carter, 1994b: para. 9.10, 11.3; 1994c: para. 1, 2; Doganis, 2011: 00:15:26; Feeser, 1994: 11, para. 5.6; 12, para. 5.12; Marcall,

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Still owned by the local authority consortium, in 2001 the Manchester Airports Group formed to operate and manage Manchester Airport and a number of smaller acquisitions; purchasing an 82.7 percent share in Humberside airport from the local authorities in 1999 and both East Midlands and Bournemouth airports for an estimated £241million from National Express in 2001 (Humphreys and Francis, 2002).
Local authorities

Unsurprisingly, as majority shareholder, Manchester City Council supported the proposal for a second runway, stating that it was, “consistent with urban regeneration and economic development policies in the existing and emerging development plan framework for Manchester Airport and the surrounding area” (Smith, 1996: 381, para. 4.1.1). They saw the airport’s development as essential to the economy of Manchester and the wider North West region; to the aspirations for the future economic and social health of the City; and to reinforce both Manchester and the North West’s place in Europe and the world (Manchester City Council, 1995; Smith, 1996: 381, para. 4.1.3).

Echoing the sentiment of City Council, local business and commercial interests and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) supported the proposal (Smith, 1996: 947). Alan Manning, at the time North West Secretary of the TUC, said that, “the economic and social benefits arising from the project far outweigh the environmental concerns ... Trade Unions across the North West are deeply concerned to protect the living standards and quality of life of workers, and the unemployed, across the region” (Alderson, 1994). The proposals also had the support of the Trafford Park Urban Development Corporation and the Central Manchester Development Corporation. Introduced under the 1980 Local Government and Planning Act, in their role as statutory regeneration agencies, both supported the second runway due to the economic and regenerative benefits it would bring to the area (Keene, 1994: 2; Smith, 1996: 438, para. 5.1.1; 5.1.5).

Aside from those with an ownership stake in the airport, two other local authorities had an interest in its activities. Located nine miles south of Manchester City Centre, then, as now, the airport lies on the administrative boundary between Cheshire and Greater Manchester. The local planning authorities for the site were Manchester City Council and Macclesfield Borough Council with the then Cheshire County Council, a strategic planning and transportation authority for the Cheshire part of the site (Holden et al., 2011: 6; Twigg, 1994: 1, para. 6).24

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24 In 2008, the roles of Cheshire County Council and Macclesfield Borough Council merged into the new Cheshire East Council.
Initially opposing the second runway, just days before the public inquiry began, Cheshire County Council announced their support for the proposal. Manchester Airport recognised that gaining approval for the runway would be easier with their support and quickly became involved in negotiations with them over the ways in which the proposal could be made acceptable (Dudley, 2005: 97; Holden et al., 2011: 9). After these negotiations, Cheshire County Council, Manchester City Council and Manchester Airport agreed on an extensive environmental mitigation package enshrined in a Section 106 Agreement. Rosemary Williams, then Principal Planning Officer at Cheshire County Council, stated that the proposal was in line with national policy, was needed to cope with forecast demand and that the site was acceptable as long as additional mitigation measures were carried out (Williams, 1994).

Macclesfield Borough Council, with responsibility for many of the towns and communities at the end of the proposed runway and much of the surrounding landscape, objected to the proposal on five counts (Holden et al., 2011: 9). First, was the impact that the development would have on the landscape, both visually and recreationally. In particular, there was concern that the construction of the Bollin Tunnel (to divert the Bollin River) would breach the visual continuity of the valley through the introduction of an engineered structure into a landscape that had slowly evolved over thousands of years (Macclesfield Borough Council, 1994b). Second, was the ecological impact of the development, notably the loss of irreplaceable environmental capital. Third, they felt that the runway was inappropriate development in the Green Belt (Griggs et al., 1998: 361). Fourth, the noise impact of the runway, and finally, its negative impact on listed buildings (Macclesfield Borough Council, 1994b; Smith, 1996: 545-612).

The proposals did divide the North West with Merseyside authorities opposing the development. They wanted to see expansion at Liverpool John Lennon Airport and believed that expansion at Manchester would scupper these plans (Bounds, 2011; Griggs et al., 1998; Smith, 1996: 613, para. 10.1.1). At the time of the inquiry, Manchester Airport dominated the market in the North West, handling 90 percent of demand (Mackenzie, 1994: para. 4.2; Read and King, 1994; Tucker, 1994: para. 4). Liverpool Airport had submitted development plans in December 1993 for expansion, up to 12 million passengers per annum by 2030 as an alternative to the construction of a second runway at Manchester, and in a tactical move had the support of the Macclesfield Borough Council (Bounds, 1994: para 1.2; 2011; Halsall, 1994; Smith, 1996: 613, para 10.1.1; Yates, 2011: 00:42:59). The position of the Merseyside
authorities was that any claim of regional development should consider that Liverpool was an area in desperate need of economic growth and considerably worse off than Manchester (Bounds, 1994: para. 3.2, 4.1, 8.1, 8.2, 8.4; 2011).

Central government, though not a key actor in the public inquiry process (Smith, 1996: 511-544) retained two important mechanisms of power. First, by setting the policy conditions that provided the political backdrop that the second runway resonated with, and second, by calling-in the proposal, they, in the guise of the Secretaries of State for the Environment and Transport, made the final decision. At the inquiry, the Department of Transport contributed to the discussion of national aviation policy objectives. Furthermore, through the liberalisation of air services via bilateral and European policies the Government provided policy conditions to support the growth of regional airports (Smith, 1996: 511, para. 8.1.6).

Local communities

In July 1991, when Manchester Airport announced plans to develop a second runway, local communities were mobilised into action. The airport had previously submitted plans for a second runway in the 1970s so when revived, a strong conservationist ideal was already embedded in the local community (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 58; Griggs et al., 1998). The Mobberley Village Society was an established community group from which emerged a working group of residents opposed to the second runway (Griggs et al., 1998: 360). This group formed the Knutsford and Mobberley Joint Action Group in 1991 as a direct response to the airport’s announcement (Griggs et al., 1998: 360). Tactically they knew they stood a better chance of success by uniting all those opposed to the development so took the lead in the formation of the Manchester Airport Joint Action Group (MAJAG), an umbrella organisation that went on to represent local groups at the inquiry. Chaired by Derek Squirrell (Mayor of Knutsford), MAJAG’s overall objective was, “to oppose the construction of a second runway and associated development at Manchester Airport” and to ensure there was a collective voice at the public inquiry (Smith, 1996: 641, para. 11.1.5; Squirrell, 1994: para. 5). Each group retained its identity, appointing one member to the MAJAG committee (Butcher, 2010b: 3; Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 56; Griggs et al., 1998: 360; Manchester Airport Joint Action Group, 1994b; Smith, 1996; Squirrell, 1994).25

25 Others that emerged against the proposal were; the Styal Action Association, Hale Altrincham and Bowden Action Group (HABAG), Stockport Campaign Against Runway Expansion (SCARE), Heald Green and Long Lane
At its peak, MAJAG united an estimated 10,000 individuals against the second runway (Griggs et al., 1998: 360; Manchester Airport Joint Action Group, 1994b: para. 1.2). In his analysis of the group, Booth (1995: 70) notes that there were surprisingly few internal conflicts despite the concerns of each group being slightly different. As the group united a diverse pool of individuals, they were able to draw on expert support and resources from a range of professionals as well as politicians from the various local authorities around the airport (Griggs et al., 1998: 360). With resources a major issue, by organising local events the group raised £300,000 in the run up to the public inquiry (Griggs et al., 1998: 360).

There was however, one rupture in the group. Emerging due to a split over strategy, in April 1994, just prior to the start of the inquiry, Jeff Gazzard formed the Manchester Airport Environmental Network (MAEN). MAEN was, “a voluntary group, campaigning to control the environmental impact of Manchester Airport through research, media activities and forging links with other similar groups both here in the UK and abroad” (Gazzard, 1994; Griggs et al., 1998: 361). Gazzard disagreed with MAJAG’s strategy to concentrate their (limited) resources on the hiring of expert witnesses, preparing for the inquiry and the appointment of a solicitors firm from London. He believed that a greater proportion of their resources should be put into lobbying at Westminster and a national media campaign (Griggs and Howarth, 2000). As well as MAJAG, and MAEN, there were local residents who made individual representations at the inquiry (Manchester Airport Joint Action Group, 1994b: para. 1.4).

National and local environmental organisations

At various points, different national and local environmental organisations entered the debate into a second runway. The National Trust had three main objections to the development. First, they considered it out of scale with the setting, causing unacceptable damage to three of their properties. The Styal Estate was within 130 metres of the airport boundary; Tatton Park within 2000 metres of the proposed runway and under a flight path; and Dunham Massey, under the predominant northern flight path (Gibbs, 1994: para. 35; Ratepayers Association, Ashley Action Group, Mere Residents Association, Handforth Ratepayers Association and the Knutsford Civic Society (Manchester Airport Joint Action Group, 1994; Squirrel: 1995, para. 2; Smith: 1996, para. 11.1.2).

26 MAJAG had the support of Peter Burns, a Stockport Councillor, Fred Ridley, from the Liberal Democrats in Stockport, Bert Grange, a Knutsford County Councillor, Harold Tucker, the former Lord Mayor of Manchester, Bill Firth, the Chairman of the Hale Ward Conservative Association and Meg Taylor, Chairman of the Mobberley Women’s Branch of the Conservatives (Booth 1995).
Nixon, 1994a: para. 5; 1994b: para. 11.1; 2011). Their second objection was that it required the taking of inalienable land from Mobberley, land that the National Trust had a responsibility to preserve and protect, though it turned out the proposed runway was not on inalienable land but very close (Nixon, 2011). Finally, they felt that the mitigation and compensation packages on offer were inadequate (Nixon, 1994a: para. 9.1; 1994b: para. 11.1). The Trust were also concerned with the precedent that development would set, the likely financial impact the properties would see as a result of falling visitor numbers, and the effect on events that relied on the tranquillity of the area (Nixon, 1994a: para. 9.2, 9.3; 1994b: para. 11.6).

Cheshire Wildlife Trust and Manchester Wildlife took the lead on the environmental arguments for the protection of badgers, wildfowl and natural habitats. From their point of view, as nature conservation organisations, full mitigation was impossible as irreplaceable ancient woodland would be lost and that habitat re-creation was, at best, a second measure and still in the experimental stage (Mahon and Grayson, 1994: 1, para. 7.0, 8.0, 9.0).

Due to the airport lying just out of the city boundary and because there was no initial groundswell of interest in opposing it, Manchester Friends of the Earth (FoE) were not immediately involved in the campaign against the second runway (Howden, 2011: 00:02:17). However, as it became clear that approval and subsequent construction of the runway was imminent, the group decided they should have some sort of presence, with the environmental impact of the land-take in the Bollin Valley their main argument for opposing the runway (Howden, 2011: 00:02:46; 00:23:22). The group made connections with existing groups in Cheshire, namely MAEN and the Manchester sect of Earth First!, who were at the more radical, direct action end of the environmental movement (Howden, 2011: 00:03:59). The unity brought together two different models of working; Manchester FoE were skilled in media work and had formal organisational structures whereas Earth First! had a larger group of people who wanted to be involved in actions, hence there was merit in making common cause (Howden, 2011: 00:07:08).

**Events that led to the second runway’s approval**

Manchester Airport’s plans to develop a second runway resonated well with the political landscape at the time. At the national level, due to its strategic role geographically, successive governments continued to support the development of Manchester Airport
(Griggs et al., 1998: 359). During the late 1980s/early 1990s, when the North West was seen as an area in desperate need of economic growth and modernisation, both the Thatcher and Major Conservative governments (1979-1997) pledged the expansion of regional airports to cope with the predicted increase in passenger and freight numbers, policy commitments that resulted in significant investment into terminal facilities at Manchester (Griggs et al., 1998: 359).

Emphasising the importance of civil aviation to both local and national economies, the 1978 White Paper *Airports Policy* (Cmnd. 7084) had designated Manchester as a gateway international airport and the principal airport outside the South East (Department of Trade, 1978). A position reaffirmed in the 1985 White Paper *Airports Policy* (Cmnd. 9542), which encouraged the utilisation of regional airports in meeting the UK’s aviation needs (Department of Transport, 1985: para. 6.27; Doganis, 1994: 4, para. 5.2). Advocating the market model and taking airport planning outside the remit of central government, the *1986 Airports Act*, commercialised the airport, strengthening its institutional autonomy (Dudley, 2005: 96).

The runway plans also aligned with regional level policies. The Regional Economic Strategy, published in June 1993 by the North West Regional Association, set out a vision for the future that made it clear Manchester Airport was an asset of huge value and strategic importance, emphasising that its continued growth was central to the region’s development (Twigg, 1994: 3, para. 12). Following this, the Regional Transport Strategy also supported the region’s airport facilities, citing the second runway at Manchester Airport as a key priority for investment (Twigg, 1994: 3, para. 13). A presumption in favour of the second runway’s development infiltrated the Greater Manchester Structure Plan (Twigg, 1994: 3, para. 15), and the Cheshire Structure Plan viewed Manchester Airport as a key component of the area’s economy (Cheshire County Council, 1992).

Though the second runway was entirely sited in the Green Belt, the Greater Manchester Green Belt Local Plan contained a specific policy stating that any development directly related to the operational efficiency and amenity of the airport would be acceptable within the confines of the Airport Operational Area (Greater Manchester Council, 1984; Twigg, 1994: 5, para. 30). At the time of the inquiry there was no central government approved Regional Planning Guidance (RPG) for the area, however, a draft RPG had been submitted to the Secretary of State in 1994 and this was referenced at the inquiry (Twigg, 1994: 2,
para. 10; Yates, 2011: 00:44:09). The central theme of the RPG was the economic revitalisation of the region and it confirmed Manchester Airport as one of the North West’s key assets, whose development should be supported (Twigg, 1994: 2, para. 11).

By the time of the public inquiry, there was a strong economic and political regional agenda throughout planning policy as well as national policy support for the development of regional airports. At a time when the UK was coming out of a recession, the development of Manchester Airport was seen as key to the regeneration of the North West with the second runway, “a common cause” (Holden et al., 2011: 6).


In August 1991, Manchester Airport formally announced their plans to develop a second runway in the *Manchester Airport Development Strategy to 2005* (Manchester Airport plc, 1991). Under the *Town and Country Planning Act 1990*, the airport made two applications to the local authorities of Macclesfield and Manchester City for planning permission to develop land for a second runway and associated facilities. The first was dated 16 July 1993 and the second 16 September 1994 (during the inquiry). They were identical except that the second included the closure rather than the diversion of the Altrincham Road, plus further mitigation measures (Butcher, 2010b: 2; Holden et al., 2011: 7). The National Trust had highlighted potential problems with the road diversion, so to avoid any delays the airport took the strategic decision to submit the second application just in case the first proved problematic (Macclesfield Borough Council, 1994a). The application was for a 3050-metre parallel runway, 390 metres away from the existing one, which halfway along would cut across the River Bollin via an earth embankment with the river diverted through a tunnel (Butcher, 2010b: 2; Twigg, 1994: 2, para. 8).

Driven by the desire to gain planning permission, the airport endeavoured to mitigate the impact of the second runway at every opportunity. Manchester Airport took the approach that if they were to be a world leading airport they needed to have a world leading environmental programme, a philosophy partly based upon the ownership structure of the airport and the responsibility this entailed (Thomas, 2011: 00:09:29; Twigg, 2011). For example, after the announcement of the runway plans, the airport initiated a lengthy scheme of public consultation and environmental assessment (Moss et al., 1997: 325; Smith, 1996: 990, para. 26.2.2).
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Thomas, 2011:23:59; Twigg, 2011). The airport knew that as soon as discussions began internally about the possibility of a new runway, the public would find out, and hence took the strategic decision to go public from the start (Thomas, 2011: 00:16:34; Twigg, 2011).

In preparation for the inquiry, Manchester Airport assembled a powerful growth coalition drawing on support from ‘privileged relations with successive national governments’ as well as business and political elites who had the desire to transform Manchester into a ‘headquarter city’ (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 58). Crucially, they had the support of Cheshire County Council who, as mentioned previously, just days before the start of the inquiry revoked their position of opposition and announced their support for the proposals due to an agreed environmental mitigation package.

In recognising that gaining approval for the runway would be easier with their support, Manchester Airport quickly became involved in negotiations with Cheshire County Council over the ways in which the proposal could be made acceptable (Dudley, 2005; Holden et al., 2011: 9). Cheshire County Council felt that the development of the runway would have a significant ecological impact, which they deemed unsustainable in nature conservation terms and at odds with the Cheshire Replacement Structure Plan (Marshall, 1994: para. 1.5; 2011). Armed with a ‘shopping list’ of requests, they entered negotiations with Manchester Airport and Manchester City Council, which formed the basis of an extensive Section 106 Agreement that included a thorough environmental mitigation package (Bartlett, 1994; Cheshire County Council, 1994; 1995; Harrison, 1995: para. 10.5; Muirhead, 1994; Smith, 1996: 449, para. 6.1.21; 451, para. 6.1.29; Various, 1994).

Section 106 Agreements are a private, legally binding agreement between local planning authorities and a developer, intended to make development acceptable when it would otherwise be unacceptable in planning terms (i.e. the developer provides ‘public’ benefits such as roads, playgrounds, etc). Enforceable in the courts, they are tougher than planning conditions alone but rarely imposed on a developer, so require extensive negotiation between interested parties (Dudley, 2005: 97; Holden et al., 2011: 10). Though normally agreed post-approval, agreement in this case was made early in the application (the first draft was completed prior to the 1994 application) (Holden et al., 2011: 3). A strategic move on the part of Manchester Airport, this meant it played a key role, “not just in the decision on the application, but in advance of emerging schemes of mitigation and operation of the runway, the discussion of planning conditions, and on the subsequent operation of the
Airport” (Holden et al., 2011: 10). Dudley (2005: 93) describes the agreement as a political solution to the Airport’s need to create a pro-growth coalition and by doing so, marked an attempt to deal with the competing ideas of economic growth and sustainable development. He comments that in the long-term, the problem with this was that the idea of economic growth was entrenched in the activities of the airport, while sustainable development had shallower roots.

Once agreed, Cheshire County Council committed its support to the proposal (Bartlett, 1994; Booth, 1995; Cheshire County Council, 1994; 1995; Harrison, 1995: para. 10.5; Holden et al., 2011; Muirhead, 1994; Smith, 1996: 449, para. 6.1.21; 451, para. 6.1.29; Various, 1994). They believed that, “those adverse ecological effects which mitigation measures cannot overcome are not sufficient to outweigh the benefits that a second runway is considered to provide” (Gilfoyle, 1994a; b: 24, para. 5.11; Marshall, 1994: para. 5.6). Peter Yates, then Chief Planning Officer for Macclesfield Borough Council, remembers that they felt let down by Cheshire County Council (Yates, 2011: 00:33:18). However, Cheshire County Council criticised Macclesfield Borough Council, suggesting that they did not carry out a balanced exercise and purposefully avoided entering into a debate about the benefits of the proposal (Bartlett, 1995: 1).

The Section 106 Agreement was, what Callum Thomas, then Head of the Environment Department at Manchester Airport, termed, ‘a contract with the communities’ containing more provisions than any other planning agreement, “because we just went out to communities and said what do you want” (Thomas, 2011: 00:20:29; Twigg, 2011). Through this, and the assemblage of a strong pro-growth coalition, Manchester Airport went to the public inquiry reasonably confident and ready to be ‘tested’ (Thomas, 2011: 00:14:55). Down to extensive consultation prior to the inquiry, and an approach that sought to minimise the problems discussed by objectors, Manchester Airport could, “prove we did everything we did and the reasons we didn’t do some things” (Thomas, 2011: 00:18:38).

Just prior to the start of the inquiry, British Airways (BA) pulled their transatlantic route from Manchester to Los Angeles stating that leisure traffic alone was not sufficient to maintain the route. This led to those opposed to the proposal questioning the airlines commitment to the airport and subsequently, the need for a second runway (Carter, 1994a; Spencer, 1994). However, a letter dated 20 June 1994 from Sir Francis Kennedy, Chairman of BA Regional, attempted to alleviate any fears. This stated their [BA’s] commitment to the
development of their regional services and cited their recent establishment of BA Regional as a separate business and the construction (at the time underway) of new BA Maintenance facilities at Manchester as evidence of this commitment (Carter, 1994a).

The inquiry (1994-1995)

Starting on 21 June 1994 and completing on 9 March 1995, the public inquiry into the second runway received evidence from over 180 witnesses with written representations made by, or on behalf of, 14,813 parties of which 11,632 supported the runway and 3,114 objected. MAJAG also submitted a petition with 18,984 signatures (Butcher, 2010b: 2; Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 56; Holden et al., 2011: 7; Smith, 1996: 949). In his opening speech, David Keene, QC for Manchester Airport, highlighted that, “the written representations sent in to the Secretary of State so far are, very unusually for a major project, split more or less evenly, with a slight majority in favour. Normally, as experience shows, it is those who object who are moved to put pen to paper” (Keene, 1994: 2). Kenneth Smith was the Inquiry Inspector who was aided by P. M. Brannan, the Assistant Inspector and Highway Assessor, and for part of the inquiry H. H. Jones, the Architect Assessor (Smith, 1996: 1, para. 13).

In promoting the economic imperative of the runway, Manchester Airport cited a planned £530 million capital expenditure programme between 1994 and 2004 as evidence to their commitment to the growth of the airport. They argued that the development of a second runway would create employment benefits both at the airport and further afield and would attract new commercial and industrial activities to the region (Griggs et al., 1998: 359; Mason, 1994). An economic impact study carried out by York Consulting Ltd on behalf of the airport concluded that the second runway would have substantial economic benefits for the North West, providing a much needed stimulus to economic development and urban regeneration in the region and developing its position as a key business location in both Europe and the world (Mason, 1994: 22, para. 7.1, 7.3). Those opposing the runway saw it as a threat to, “an area that is one of the wealthiest and environmentally most pleasant commuter belts outside the South East” (Griggs et al., 1998: 359). They argued that the communities south of Manchester (Knutsford, Mobberley and Wilmslow) were not areas in need of economic stimulus and among the highest per capita income areas of the UK (Griggs et al., 1998: 360; Yates, 2011: 00:09:00).
Both Macclesfield Borough Council and MAJAG argued that the proposal conflicted with national, county and local planning policies and Green Belt policy (Yates, 1994: para. 3, 4; 2011: 00:18:00; 00:31:38). They felt that the central issue for consideration by the Secretaries of State was whether the proposal was contrary to local (and national) policy and if so, whether there were any material considerations that justified the granting of permission contrary to that policy (Manchester Airport Joint Action Group, 1994b: para. 3.1).

In defence, John Twigg, then Infrastructure and Planning Manager at the airport, cited occasions where development had taken place on Green Belt land: two Channel Tunnel Freight Terminals (Coleshill, West Midlands and Port Wakefield, West Yorkshire); a new terminal building at Birmingham Airport; and the development of a major business park at Ashton Moss, Greater Manchester. He noted that the difference between these and the second runway was that the runway did not involve the construction of any substantial buildings (Twigg, 1994: 8, para. 41). While they acknowledged the environmental impact of the development, by contributing to, “the economic and social health of the city”, Manchester Airport maintained that development was an appropriate use of Green Belt land (Griggs et al., 1998: 361). Cheshire County Council echoed this, commenting that where the proposal was potentially in conflict with national policy, the economic benefit from the development was enough to justify the environmental impact and that through the agreed environmental mitigation package there would be ‘no net loss’ of biodiversity (Griggs et al., 1998: 361; Harrison, 1995: para. 10.2).

Giving evidence for the Cheshire Wildlife Trust, Christopher Mahon and Robin Grayson, drew attention to the unique habitats and woodland that would be affected, “[the] Cheshire Wildlife Trust cannot support development applications which reduce non-replaceable habitats as a point of principle” (Mahon and Grayson, 1994: 1, para. 2.0). Their evidence highlighted the affected legally protected species and the wildlife corridors the runway would interrupt, affecting the movement of animals and the dispersal of plants. Dr. D. M. Parker, giving evidence on the ecological aspects on behalf of Macclesfield Borough Council, echoed their view that the proposed mitigation package was inadequate and hence that the development should not be permitted (Mahon and Grayson, 1994: 1, para. 4.0, 5.0; Parker, 1994). The National Rivers Authority also objected to the proposals because of the loss of approximately 800m of high conservation value river (Smith, 1996: 742, para. 12.1.1).
Benefitting from Macclesfield Borough Council opposing the proposals, MAJAG presented themselves as the legitimate voice of the community, focusing their arguments on the local impact (Booth, 1995; Griggs et al., 1998: 361; Smith, 1996: 641-741). They accepted that the airport was important for the regional economy but argued that the economic benefits of a second runway had been overstated; questioning the commercial viability of the project and contesting the official line that it would result in the creation of 50,000 jobs. An arguably NIMBYist attitude, they also argued that Liverpool Airport could be expanded to handle a larger proportion of leisure passengers with Manchester focusing on business travellers (Griggs et al., 1998: 362; Thomas, 2011: 00:53:16).

Merseyside Authorities made a case for a complementary airport system, utilising the existing runways at Manchester and Liverpool, an idea that was unsurprisingly rejected by Manchester Airport (Doganis, 2011: 00:06:43; Read and King, 1994). Louise Congdon, then General Manager for Market Strategy at Manchester Airport, made it clear that airlines were not receptive to the use of Liverpool Airport as an alternative to Manchester. Tom Carter, witness for British Airways, reiterated this point, “to say that Liverpool is an alternative to Manchester is to say Gatwick is an alternative to Heathrow” (Carter, 1994b: para. 11.2; 2011: 00:13:27; Congdon, 1994: 22, para. 9.9, 9.10; Feeser, 1994: 13, para. 6.2; Marcall, 1994: 7; Parker-Eaton, 1994).

MAJAG also argued that the claimed economic benefits of a second runway could be achieved with better utilisation of the existing runway (Smith, 1996: 641, para. 11.1.5). Jim Shepherd, covering operational and technical matters for MAJAG, maintained that it was a completely inefficient proposal, citing Gatwick as an example where one runway was being used far more efficiently (Mackenzie, 1994: para. 4.7, 4.8; Shepherd, 1994: para. 1.6; 2011). An Environmental Impact Assessment, commissioned by MAJAG and using the airport’s own data, backed up these claims (Lichfield, 1994: 26, para. 9) and they had the support of Macclesfield Borough Council (Yates, 2011: 00:23:26).

Terry Waite, a high-profile patron of MAJAG who had grown up in the area, gave evidence for the group (Waite, 2011). A strategic move on the part of MAJAG, Waite became involved in the campaign at the request of local people who wanted him to ‘fight their case’ and ‘give it some profile’ (Waite, 2011: 00:10:30). While he did not pretend to know about the technicalities of the proposal, he used his profile to bring attention to the environmental consequences of the development which he called, “nothing less than
environmental vandalism masquerading under the pretence of progress” (Waite, 1994: para. 5). Graham Stringer, at the time Leader of Manchester City Council, was aware of the profile that Waite would bring to the case, and as a counter-move invited him to visit the airport even though he no longer lived in the area nor really knew anything about the airport (Waite, 1994: para. 3).

Manchester Airport took the opposition very seriously, pouring vast resources into both the inquiry itself and their publicity campaign (Bowen, 1995; Halsall, 1995; Macclesfield Borough Council, 1994b; Manchester Airport plc, n.d.; Twigg, 2011). The Independent reported that they became involved in the kind of tactics usually employed by protesters. For example, handing out ‘Yes to R2’ sticks of rock, badges and bumper stickers at party conferences and encouraging airport workers and the public to write letters of support (Bowen, 1995).

MAJAG made it clear how resources constrained their activities and tilted the debate in favour of the Airport. Unable to sustain their presence at the inquiry, they felt they were relegated to the bottom of the inquiry process (Manchester Airport Joint Action Group, 1994a: para. 2.1, 2.4):

“The applicants, and the supporting local authority, are in the fortunate position of being able to instruct leading members of the bar and national consultants of the highest stature. In order to present its case in opposition, MAJAG through its membership, has had to raise funds, privately, through collection or donation in order to be able to instruct consultants of a calibre similar to those instructed by the applicants and their supporters” (Manchester Airport Joint Action Group, 1994a: para. 2.3).

Giles Kavanagh, barrister for MAJAG, expressed the groups growing frustration of the process. They were disillusioned by the inequality in terms of money, manpower and resources between the groups which was reflected in the calibre of evidence provide by Manchester Airport and that they had legal representations each day (Booth, 1995). Terry Waite highlighted his dismay with what he perceived to be inequality in the public policy process, “the inevitable analogy between the Airport and Action Group is that of Goliath and David. I hope that David, armed with a sling of common sense, will be sufficient to demonstrate that this bad proposal should not be allowed to proceed further” (Waite, 1994: para. 10).
In their closing submissions, Manchester City Council addressed claims by MAJAG that as a shareholder in the airport they were a corrupt body and unable to deal with the application impartially (Manchester City Council, 1995). MAJAG believed that had the airport been in private sector ownership it would have been less likely to have made the application on the grounds that a private sector company would be far more concerned with maximising the efficiency of the existing runway (Mackenzie, 1994: para. 4.11). Manchester City Council stated that they had been, “alert to its potentially conflicting roles and diligent in keeping its functions [as shareholder and Local Planning Authority] separate” (Castle, 1994: 3; Manchester City Council, 1995: para. 1.4, 1.5).

Anthony Merrick, an owner of one of the properties highlighted for demolition, wrote to Kenneth Smith, the Inquiry Inspector, on 6 March 1995, outlining his dismay at not being able to present his case at the inquiry (Merrick, 1995b). Merrick felt that the costs of relocation and temporary accommodation for those affected had not been adequately addressed and claimed that Manchester Airport had withheld information and harassed him and his family (Merrick, 1995b). However, return correspondence shows that Merrick’s motivations were not entirely innocent. The response from Manchester Airport outlined the context in which Merrick made his claim; Merrick committed himself to purchasing Hanson House in October 1992 – ten months after Manchester Airport announced plans for runway (Manchester Airport plc, 1995).  

An article in the Manchester Evening News on 25 February 1995 (and reported a few days later in the Guardian) showed that the motivations of the local residents were not as unified as they tried to project. An owner of an affected property admitted that he had received secret payments for the early acquisition of his property (Merrick, 1995a). Dr. John Westwood, a senior lecturer at the Manchester Business School, began the campaign promising the airport, “the fight of their lives” however, over time this mantra became, “at some point you have to look after number one”. Dr. Westwood also purchased twenty acres of land next to his property to use as a bargaining chip (Merrick, 1995a).

To exacerbate discontent within the local community, only the official price paid for the property was published, not the value of the secret payments, which in turn depressed the

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28 The announcement of the second runway proposal (in the Development Strategy to 2005) highlighted the potential risk to Hanson House from one of the runway options with the airport immediately opening negotiations with landowners in December 1991 once the runway option had been decided.
value of other properties. Both Manchester Airport and Manchester City Council denied any secret payments and while Jeff Gazzard of MAEN uncovered the deal claiming it was another example of the ‘sleazy tactics’ being employed, those who supported the runway claimed that the revelation backfired and purely illustrated that people were more concerned in achieving a good price for their property (Merrick, 1995a).

Post-inquiry (1995-2001)

Kenneth Smith, Inquiry Inspector, recommended that permission be granted for the 1994 application for a second runway (closure rather than the diversion of the Altrincham Road) (Smith, 1996: 1179). After considering Smith’s report, in January 1997 John Gummer, then Secretary of State for the Environment, and Sir George Young, for Transport, announced their joint decision in favour of a new runway (Butcher, 2010b: 2). The Secretaries of State felt that the openness of the Green Belt (deemed its most important attribute) would be retained and the amount of built development in the Belt would be lowered through the removal of the south-side hangars complex (Butcher, 2010b: 4; Smith, 1996: para. 26.24.30). They accepted Smith’s conclusion that Manchester Airport had achieved a critical mass of services and facilities to attract air services sufficient to warrant a second runway:

“It is important to build on Manchester airport’s success. It is already the 18th busiest airport in the world in terms of international traffic, with more passengers than Chicago. The second runway will cater for long-term customer demand. It will also create thousands more jobs and brings benefits for the whole of the North West. This decision will be a boost for Manchester and the whole of the North West. A development of this scale will inevitably have impacts on the local environment, but the applicants have put together an impressive package of proposals to reduce these impacts and to seek the balance implicit in the concept of sustainable development” (Gummer, 1997).

The decision to approve the runway signalled the beginning of a prolonged campaign of direct action, “the scene was now to shift decisively away from the committee meetings of the protest groups to the construction site and muddy camps of the eco-warriors” (Griggs et al., 1998: 363). Activists across the UK had been alerted to the approval and the second runway was to become their next big ‘battle’ to play out in front of the media, “it was the ideal follow-up to the actions at Twyford Down, Newbury and Fairmile” (Griggs et al., 1998: 363-364; Howden, 2011: 00:08:41). Less than ten days after the decision was announced,
activists began to establish camps and the Coalition Against Runway 2 (CAR2) was born (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 57; Howden, 2011). CAR2 united activists through the loose networks that characterise the direct action movement and brought together the cultures and tactics of activists and campaigners from Manchester FoE, Earth First!, the Green Party, Manchester Wildlife and MAEN.

Jeff Gazzard, MAEN lead, was chief co-ordinator for CAR2 and worked as a crucial hinge between the different groups involved and, with organisational support from Manchester FoE, co-ordinated the local and national media coverage (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 59; Griggs et al., 1998: 363). Earth First! set up the first camp, Flywood, with five others established soon after: Cliff Richard, River Rats, Jimi Hendrix, Wild Garlic and Zion Tree (Durham, 2000: 79; Howden, 2011: 00:07:41).

The campaign was media driven, with the national press reporting on the backgrounds and tactics of activists, as well as experiences from journalists who were residing at the camps. Due to the attention he gained at Newbury, Swampy became the mouthpiece for the campaign. On 1 April 1997 The Times reported that he intended to stand as a candidate at the general election for the Never Mind the Ballots Party in the Blackley constituency against Graham Stringer, former leader of Manchester City Council, then Chairman of Manchester Airport (1996-1997) and soon to be Labour MP for Blackley (1997-2010) (Jenkins, 1997; The Times, 1997a). Furthermore, he was commissioned to write a column for The Mirror which earned him £550 per week and appeared on an episode of Have I Got News For You on 18 April 1997 alongside Neil Hamilton, then MP for Tatton (1983 – 1997) and who was against the second runway (Howden, 2011: 00:13:05).

Prior to, and during the inquiry, MAJAG had struggled to gain media support, even at the local level (Seel et al., 2000: 152). Once CAR2 began, they had to adapt quickly as the media dissented on the area. Though they had informal connections with the activists, there were those within MAJAG who were concerned that they would be seen to be endorsing the illegal action. However, akin to the environmental activists, they were people disillusioned by the inquiry process. They had placed great faith in the political process to deliver a fair judgement and the approval of the runway completely undermined the confidence they had in such processes. The recognition that established democratic channels were unreliable, helped many local residents (of a generally affluent demographic) to identify,
and form linkages with, the environmental activists; a linking yet to be seen in the UK (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 52; Griggs et al., 1998: 364; Nixon, 2011).

Described as a Vegan and Volvo alliance, The Times commented, “on the queer way in which the camp dwellers were working closely with the twinset and pearled Cheshire residents” (Howden, 2011: 00:17:29). A marriage of convenience, they were two groups that would otherwise have no association (Howden, 2011: 00:17:38; Moss et al., 1997; Thomas, 2011). The Mobberley Women were a prime example of such linkages. Led by Gaynor Trafford, a housewife, and Sylvia Selfe, a company director, they established a support group for the camps, providing baked goods, recharging mobile phones and car batteries, and filling water containers (Farrell, 1997; Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 62). The Times described them as, “women in Barbour coats and Hunter Wellingtons who joke about having become surrogate mums to the dreadlocked and nose pierced protestors” (Farrell, 1997). Analogous to the criticism levelled at MAJAG during the inquiry, there was the suggestion that some of the local residents who supported the camps were motivated more for concern over their house prices than the environmental impact of the runway (Seel and Plows, 2000: 124).

High-profile support once again came from Terry Waite who, on 23 May 1997, led members of MAJAG onto the runway site. Their goal was to emphasise the moral authority of the activists while also highlighting that the legal process had been weighted against them from the start. It was behind the media profile of Waite that the local residents and the environmental activists really merged. He provided the campaign with the legitimacy and credibility that local residents needed to become involved (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 62; Griggs et al., 1998: 366).²⁹

Manchester Airport was quick to react to the campaign, branding those involved as ‘anti-progress’ and claiming that they were rich Cheshire NIMBYs opposed to economic growth. However, this only served to solidify the relationship between the divergent groups with the media, publishing pictures of local residents and direct action campaigners standing side by side, further legitimising the coalition (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 61).

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²⁹ Not all local residents partook in the campaign of direct action, opting to drop out of the campaign (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 64).
On 10 February 1998, Manchester Airport awarded the contract for the construction of the runway to AMEC-Tarmac Joint Venture who became responsible for security on the site (Butcher, 2010b: 5). There was no immediate attempt to remove the protestors with a ‘phony war’ composed of light conflicts taking place throughout February and March. Media coverage intensified as both sides battled over public opinion. Manchester Airport continually raised concerns over the safety of activists and the dangers that they posed to the emergency services if they were called upon to rescue those in tunnels (also aware that the death of a protestor would have been a PR nightmare) (Durham, 2000: 80). On the other side, CAR2 engaged in equally media-driven tactics, for example, making it known that the police and security guards had cut off water supplies to the camp (Griggs et al., 1998: 365).

On 27 March 1998, CAR2 received a two-week reprieve from the High Court to provide time for them to organise their case against eviction. However, they lost at the full hearing on 10 April, signalling the start of camp evictions and on 10 May, a Judge at the High Court in Manchester refused the protestors a stay of execution (Butcher, 2010b: 5). Operation Fulcrum, led by the Under-Sheriff of Cheshire Randal Hibbert, began on 20 May when the Zion Tree and Jimi Hendrix camps were stormed by 60 bailiffs and 100 police (Howden, 2011: 00:35:18). Expert tree climbers used ‘cherry-picker’ platforms to evict tree dwellers while quad bikes driven by evictors in black boiler suits drove across the camps. The evictions took approximately four weeks when the final few individuals were removed from the Cakehole tunnel at the Flywood camp (Howden, 2011: 00:35:53).

New protests against a directive from the Civil Aviation Authority, that trees had to come down to enable planes to safely use the second runway, arrived in January 1999 at Cedar’s Wood and Arthur’s Wood in the Bollin Valley, areas owned by the National Trust (BBC News, 1999; Holden et al., 2011: 7). In June 1999, appeal court judges ruled that the National Trust could evict the activists as trespassers, leading to accusations that the National Trust was bought-off. Attracting less attention than CAR2, the last evictions from Arthur’s Wood took place in September 1999 (BBC News, 1999).

In February 2001, Tony Blair, then Prime Minister, opened the second runway. Around the site, approximately 150,000 trees were planted, 97 ponds restored or recreated and 37,000 amphibious creatures relocated (Butcher, 2010b: 1; Buyck, 2001: 46; Manchester Airport plc, 2011b). In their ten-year review of the Section 106 Agreement, Holden et al. (2011: 3)
conclude that in hindsight, more could have been done to mitigate the environmental impacts, particularly in regards to noise control and public transport. Passenger growth has also not been as great as was predicted. However, in overall terms, their review concludes that the agreement, “significantly mitigated the impact of the Second Runway” and there is a commitment to continuing the agreement (in some form) beyond 2011 (Holden et al., 2011: 3).

Dudley (2005) takes a slightly different view of the lasting effect of the Section 106. He has carried out an analysis of the effect that time has had, and will continue to have, on the agreement, concluding that it represented a policy solution to an immediate problem, rather than a long-term infiltration of the idea of sustainable development into the workings of the Manchester Airport. Both Cheshire County Council and Macclesfield Borough Council have played a role in monitoring the agreement, however, without the level of technical expertise or resources required, there have been difficulties in keeping the Airport to its agreed commitments and targets, and its salience among the local communities has also dissipated over time (Cheshire County Council, 2001; Dudley, 2005: 99).

Eventually, who got what, where, when and how?

Prior to Manchester Airport’s announcement of the second runway proposals, the political landscape, both at the regional and national levels, presumed in favour of development. The thrust of national policy during the 1980s and 1990s was to promote economic development and urban regeneration with the North West identified as a region in urgent need of economic stimulus. Considered key in achieving these goals was the development of Manchester Airport. Through this support, Manchester Airport entered discussions into a second runway with strong political and economic backing.

Furthermore, the 1986 Airports Act had lessened the role of central government in the operation of the airport, leaving its success to market forces and the airport responsible for the protection of local communities. Municipally owned, the consortium of local authorities were in the unique position of having responsibility to the airport, their constituents and the environment. The airport held their inbuilt responsibility to local communities to high regard, both economically in terms of the provision of employment opportunities but also in protecting their quality of life and the environment. However, those opposed to
development of the second runway felt that this pattern of ownership left those local authorities with an insurmountable conflict of interest.

Uniting those with varying motivations, a diverse group of actors were involved in the campaign of opposition. In the run up to, and during, the public inquiry, this included an array of local resident and community groups united under the MAJAG umbrella; MAEN emerging from an internal split within MAJAG; local environmental NGOs such as the Cheshire Wildlife Trust; national environmental NGOs such as The National Trust; and the local authorities of Macclesfield Borough Council and Merseyside. Manchester Airport assembled a powerful pro-growth coalition, uniting the local authority consortium that owned the airport with key business interests in the region. However, what proved crucial to their success was the recruitment, through an extensive environmental mitigation agreement, of Cheshire County Council to their coalition. By conducting a lengthy process of negotiation prior to the public inquiry, both with Cheshire County Council and local communities, Manchester Airport entered the public inquiry in a relatively bulletproof position with the Section 106 agreement reducing the vulnerability of the airport to attacks on its environmental awareness.

With the announcement that the runway had been approved the story of the second runway entered a new phase, characterised by environmental activism that united direct action protestors with local residents in what was a pairing yet to be seen in the UK, bringing a wave of new actors into the process. Though ultimately unsuccessful, the campaign was important in the movement against the uncontrolled expansion of the aviation industry and for the first time, united actors with truly diverse motivations but a common policy goal. Through the media, it became one of national significance and in the long-term facilitated a process of learning, transforming the political landscape and pushing the aviation issue up political and environmental agendas.

Debate about whether the economic benefits of the second runway outweighed the local environmental impact dominated the public inquiry. Manchester Airport had worked hard to minimise the environmental impact of the development. However, while an extensive environmental mitigation package and Section 106 agreement dealt with this at least in the short-term, time will only tell how salient it remains. Interestingly, discussion failed to address the global environmental impact of the second runway, notably the environmental impact of increasing the number of flights to the levels now seen and illustrated through
the diversity of actors that became involved, airport expansion was becoming a national issue, however, it appears these ideas were yet to fully infiltrate the policymaking process.

Manchester Airport’s second runway was the first runway built in the UK in twenty years and at the time of this writing (2012) remains the most recent (Butcher, 2010b: 2). Framed as the economy versus the environment, an array of actors, united in two clear coalitions, debated the merits of a second runway. However, as in the previous case study, the situation is more complex than this simple polarisation with the political backdrop of the time implicitly in favour of the second runway’s development and strategy and tactics playing a key role in swaying public and political opinion. The next chapter applies the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Strategic-Relational Approach to help explain and comprehend the events and mechanisms that underpinned the decision to approve the second runway and to shed light on whether the aviation industry was able to occupy a privileged position in the policymaking process.
Explaining policy change: the approval of Manchester’s second runway

Adopting the same format as Chapter Five, this chapter applies the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) to shed light on, and make sense of, the empirical findings discussed in Chapter Six, against the backdrop of the broader historical and political context detailed in Chapter Two. The theoretical insights these theories offer will help to explore the oft-cited claim that the aviation industry occupies a privileged position in the environmental policymaking process and will assist in exploring the mechanisms behind how and why.

This chapter begins by explaining the series of events that led to the approval of the second runway from the perspective of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). An agency-centred theory that studies the policymaking process over a decade or more, the ACF views power as broadly shared among a range of interest groups. According to its advocates, beliefs stimulate political behaviour, which takes place in the policy subsystem among advocacy coalitions. These coalitions battle to become dominant and control the broad direction of policy. The following section critically reflects on this application and examines the capacity of the ACF to explain events by drawing on existing critiques and highlighting new potential theoretical refinements.

The decision to approve a second runway at Manchester Airport is then explained from the perspective of the SRA. In attempting to transcend the relationship between structure and agency, the SRA focuses attention on the recursive relationship between the two and views policy change as the result of battles between actors who use various strategies to achieve their (explicitly stated) policy aims. As before, the subsequent section critically examines the ability of the SRA to explain the events that led to the runway’s approval and, once again by drawing on new and existing critiques, illuminates theoretical insights.

The Advocacy Coalition Framework’s perspective

As Chapter Three explained, the ACF seeks to make sense of decision to approve a second runway at Manchester Airport by employing its core concepts of policy subsystems, advocacy coalitions, exogenous shocks and policy-oriented learning.
In explaining the approval of the second runway, an advocate of the ACF would define the
policy subsystem as the result of two, overlapping, local ‘legs’ of national level policy
subsystems: that concerned with the provision of regional airport capacity and that
concerned with the economic regeneration of the regions. The development of a second
runway at Manchester Airport was a policy solution to the problems faced by both of these
subsystems, simultaneously increasing the UK’s airport capacity and providing an economic
stimulus to Manchester and more broadly, the North West. Policy outputs such as the 1978
White Paper (that had designated Manchester as a gateway airport and principal airport
outside the South East) and the 1985 White Paper (that encouraged the use of regional
airports to meet the UK’s aviation needs) reflect these complementary goals.

The ACF’s definition of the policy subsystem would encompass all those actors interested in
this area of policymaking, including the airport operator, the consortium of local authorities
who owned the airport, other interested local authorities, local communities, airlines and
environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as The National Trust and the
Cheshire Wildlife Trust.

From the ACF’s perspective, within the policy subsystem two coalitions fought to control
the broad direct of policy: the dominant, which united all those actors who held a policy
core belief that the second runway should be developed; and the minority, which united all
those actors holding a policy core belief it should not. The former included the airport
operator, the consortium of local authorities that owned the airport, the major airlines
operating out of the airport, Cheshire County Council, local business and commercial
interests, and central government (who were committed to the expansion of regional
airports as part of the solution to the UK’s air capacity problem). Emerging in response to
the airport operator’s announcement of the proposal, the latter included the Manchester
Airport Joint Action Group (MAJAG); the Manchester Airport Environmental Network
(MAEN); Macclesfield Borough Council; Merseyside Authorities; and local and national
environmental NGOs (e.g. Cheshire Wildlife, Manchester Wildlife Trust, the National Trust).

The ACF would explain Cheshire County Council’s change in coalition as the result of a
process of policy-oriented learning, which altered their policy core beliefs. Initially, Cheshire
County Council held a policy core belief that the environmental impact of the second
runway outweighed the economic benefit and hence, was part of the minority coalition in
opposition to the runway’s development. However, the development of an extensive
Section 106 agreement, which saw new information enter the policy subsystem and stimulated a process of policy-oriented learning, shifted the Council’s policy core beliefs.

To the ACF, changes to the relatively stable parameters that characterise ‘the problem’ are unable to provide the stimulus for policy change but are able to affect actors’ behaviour. Politically constructed, and in stark contrast to the previous case study where the problem was continually redefined, the basic attributes of ‘the problem remain’ unchanged. To the dominant coalition, there was a need to increase the capacity of regional airports, and a need to regenerate the North West: to the minority coalition, the economic benefit of the runway did not outweigh its environmental impact. Fundamental sociocultural values were equally as static, with a pro-growth mentality characterising the dominant coalition and a conservationalist ideal entrenched in the minority coalition.

In contrast to the previous case study, where the ACF explained policy change as being driven by external events shaking the policy subsystem, in the approval of Manchester Airport’s second runway there were no external events that provided a route to policy change. While there is evidence of what the ACF would consider internal events, they proved insufficient to overthrow the dominant coalition, with the minority coalition unable to exploit the window of opportunity they offered. For example, British Airways pulling their transatlantic route from Manchester Airport just prior to the start of the public inquiry created an endogenous shock, providing an opportunity for the minority coalition to question the airlines commitment to the airport and hence, the need to increase capacity when airlines were reducing their routes. Equally, the Merseyside Authorities submission of a planning application for development at Liverpool John Lennon Airport failed to provide a sufficiently large endogenous shock, with airlines (an airport’s key customer) never considering it an alternative to development at Manchester.

Highlighting the critical role, to the ACF, of technical information in the policymaking process, from the perspective of the ACF, policy changed incrementally through a process of policy-oriented learning, concerned with determining whether the economic benefits of the runway outweighed the environmental impact (i.e. in a quest to achieve balance). The dominant coalition used information to emphasise why the economic benefit of the runway was so crucial to both Manchester and the North West and to defend why it warranted development within an area protected by Green Belt legislation. The minority coalition used it to highlight the environmental impact, to prove that the economic benefits were
overstated and could be achieved with more efficient use of the existing runway, and to persuade policymakers that the economic benefits were not enough to warrant development in the Green Belt. As both coalitions brought information into the policy subsystem about the environmental and economic impact of a second runway, actors engaged in a process of policy-oriented learning, where ultimately, the economic outweighed the environmental. The inspector concluded that, through an extensive environmental mitigation package, enshrined in the Section 106 agreement, a suitable balance had been struck.

As predicted by the ACF, resources played a crucial role in constraining and facilitating the ability of coalitions to achieve their policy goals. For example, the recruitment of actors in positions of formal legal authority provided a major resource for coalitions, illustrated via the dominant coalition’s successful recruitment of Cheshire County Council. Furthermore, with the financial resources of the dominant coalition dwarfing those of the minority coalition, akin to the previous case study, the former was able to fund advertising and media campaigns, employ the best legal team and sustain a strong presence at the public inquiry.

From the ACF’s perspective, the period of direct action that occurred after the runway’s approval was a policy impact, that is to say, a consequence of the policy output to approve the runway. It transformed the policy subsystem. New actors entered, for example, direct activists from across the UK and Manchester Friends of the Earth, while existing ones left, for example, Macclesfield Borough Council, Cheshire County Council and the Merseyside authorities. Again, two advocacy coalitions were in conflict: the dominant coalition, consisting of the airport operator, and a minority coalition, which united all those with a policy core belief to stop the runway’s construction, namely local residents and direct activists. In contrast to events pre-approval, conflict was media-driven, consisting of a series of internal events that attempted to open a window of opportunity for the minority coalition to exploit, and hence, gain control of the direction of policy, for example, campaign marches around the runway site. However, as before, the minority coalition was unsuccessful in overthrowing the dominant coalition.

**Critical reflections: the Advocacy Coalition Framework’s perspective**

The application of the ACF provides a convincing narrative of the events that culminated in the second runway’s approval, explaining it as a process of incremental, and mostly
endogenous, change created by policy-oriented learning. However, there are areas the ACF inadequately addresses and/or under-specifies, to which this chapter now turns.

The application here extends on a problem raised by the ACF’s authors, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, who acknowledge the policy subsystem definition can be made problematic through the existence of overlapping policy subsystems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 193). As Figure 7.1 illustrates, the policy subsystem encompassing those actors with an interest in this area of policymaking was the result of two overlapping policy subsystems, however, what the ACF fails to fully specify is the implications that multi-level governance structures pose for policy subsystem definition (i.e. how conflict over national level policy was taking place at the local level).

Building on Hann (1995) and Kim and Roh (2008), and agreeing with the previous case study, these findings cast doubt on the ACF’s outright rejection of coalitions of convenience (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 27), where actors motivated by short-term interests work together to achieve said interests. The hierarchal belief system the ACF employs suggests that no coalition could exist between actors who do not share policy core beliefs and that these beliefs are the ‘glue’ of coalitions. However, in this case study, while advocacy coalitions did unite those actors who shared specific beliefs (e.g. opposing the second runway), it would be unwise to suggest that all actors held this belief at the same level and misleading to think actors would be unable to work together as a result.

Figure 7.1 The approval of a second runway at Manchester Airport - policy subsystem definition
Source: authors own

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The minority coalition against the development of the second runway is an example of a coalition of convenience. While all actors united in this coalition held a belief to oppose the second runway, the empirical evidence does not suggest that all these actors held their rejection as a policy core belief, rather, that many held it as a secondary aspect, that is to say, a means to achieving their policy core beliefs. The local residents united in MAJAG saw the second runway as a threat to their quality of life; they held a policy core belief to stop it, as did MAEN. However, the National Trust held a number of policy core beliefs that the second runway threatened, based around the protection of their estates. Their rejection of the second runway was a held as a secondary aspect, the means to protecting their policy core beliefs. Equally, Merseyside Authorities held their opposition to the runway’s development as a secondary aspect, with the development of a second runway a threat to their policy core belief to develop Liverpool John Lennon Airport.

Equally, the dominant coalition in support of the second runway was a coalition of convenience. While the airport operator held the development of a second runway as a policy core belief, it was not widely held at the policy core level. For example, to the airlines operating at Manchester, the development of a second runway was a means to achieving (i.e. a secondary aspect) their policy core belief to expand their operations, while business and commercial interests in the North West considered the development of a second runway a means to achieving a economic stimulus.

The coalition that emerged as a direct response to the Secretaries of State’s approval of the runway can similarly be described as a coalition of convenience, uniting direct activists from across the UK with local residents. For the former, the campaign against the second runway neatly followed up action at Newbury and Twyford Down, with it providing the next big battle to fight for their policy core belief that the policymaking process was unjust, a belief that was much broader than the site-specificity of Manchester. For the latter, while they retained their policy core belief to reject the second runway, through a process of policy-oriented learning, stimulated by their disillusionment with the public inquiry process their secondary aspects shifted to those that aligned with the direct activists (i.e. the campaign of direct action a means to achieve their policy core belief).

Adding further complexity to the analysis of coalition activity is the existence of coalitions within coalitions. For example, MAJAG, where a coalition of actors is itself encompassed within a broader coalition, in this case, the minority coalition against the second runway’s
development. Bringing together local community groups (and hence, possibly coalitions within coalitions within coalitions), MAJAG operated as an umbrella organisation that represented local concerns as a united front both to, during and post inquiry. As a single entity, MAJAG held a policy core belief to oppose the second runway. However, the beliefs of those MAJAG united was not as uniform, with actors holding varying policy core beliefs (e.g. to maintain their quality of life, to protect the environment, to protect their house prices), with their belief to oppose a second runway a means to achieving these beliefs (i.e. a secondary aspect).

The ACF has been criticised for its failure to account for how actors within a coalition overcome (or do not overcome) issues of collective action. While it assumes that there will be highly coordinated behaviour between actors who share policy core beliefs, the actions of MAJAG add weight to the growing evidence base that suggests this may not always be the case (Fenger and Klok, 2001; Kim and Roh, 2008; Schlager, 1995; Schlager and Blomquist, 1996). By assuming collective action, the ACF is unable to fully explain cases where this is not the case, for example, the split within MAJAG that occurred over the distribution of resources. Furthermore, an extension of this critique and contributing to the emerging body of research that examines coalition stability within the ACF, with a result of the split in MAJAG the formation of MAEN, this research tentatively suggests that there may be a connection between collective action and coalition stability.

Similarly, by presuming collective action, the ACF would take the view that all actors in the minority coalition opposed to the second runway’s development would work together to achieve this goal. However, beyond Macclesfield Borough Council providing support to the Merseyside Authorities application to develop Liverpool Airport, there is little evidence to suggest that this was the case.

While Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith have acknowledged the possibility of core and periodic actors within a policy subsystem (1999: 137), this application provides further evidence that actor participation within advocacy coalitions also varies. For example, in the dominant coalition pre, and during, the inquiry, the airport operator, Manchester City Council and Cheshire County Council were core actors, providing evidence on, and engaging with, a broad range of topics. By contrast, others, such as the Trade Union Congress, central government and airlines, occupied a periodic position, only becoming engaged on certain issues. The minority coalition pre and during the public inquiry shows the same pattern.
MAJAG took the lead, providing evidence on nearly all issues, while other actors, such as the Cheshire Wildlife Trust, Manchester Wildlife and the National Trust, occupied a peripheral position.

Refuting an existing critique of the ACF, that it relies too heavily on external and ad-hoc events as the driver of policy change (John, 1998; Mintrom and Vergari, 1996), exogenous events (defined as changes in socioeconomic conditions, public opinion, in the governing coalition or in other policy subsystems) were absent from the ACF’s analysis of events. Furthermore, while there were internal events that had the potential to create policy change, they did not prove substantial enough to create a window of opportunity for the minority coalition to exploit.

A broader question, which brings together many of the insights raised here, is whether, through its constant development and revisions, the ACF remains an integrative theory as Sabatier intended, or whether, it has become stretched and hence, has become too complex. Its application here has remained true to its core foundations, employing the concepts of policy subsystems, advocacy coalitions, and policy-oriented learning to explore the process of change, with recent additions out of consideration. The insights, both those raised by this application and those that build upon or extend existing critiques, relate to these core foundations and are not areas that recent developments have addressed: policy subsystem definition, coalition dynamics, inconsistencies in the hierarchal belief system, and what drives really policy change.

Chapter Eight discusses further this broader, meta-theoretical critique, when these critical reflections are combined with those that emerge from the ACF’s application to the first case study. This chapter however, now moves on to explain the events that led to the approval of a second runway at Manchester airport from the perspective of the SRA.

**The Strategic-Relational Approach’s perspective**

By focusing on the relationship between structure and agency, the SRA seeks to transcend what advocates perceive to be an artificial dualism between the two. It regards policy change as the result of struggles between conscious and reflexive actors, which takes place on a terrain that by its very nature, privileges certain strategies (and hence certain actors) with the form of the state representing the latest incarnation of these battles and demonstrating balance in the policymaking process at a specific time.
From the perspective of the SRA, even by the time the public inquiry began, the terrain was tilted in favour of the second runway’s development and hence, in favour of those actors promoting it. The state’s form at the national level provided structural conditions that supported the growth of Manchester Airport, observable in the 1978 White Paper, which designated Manchester as a gateway airport and principal airport outside the South East, and the 1985 White Paper, which encouraged the use of regional airports in meeting the UK’s aviation needs. The state’s form at the regional and local levels provided equally supportive structural conditions, illustrated in the Regional Economic and Transport Strategies, which considered the development of the airport key to the region’s economic growth. In addition, and neatly illustrating the relationship between structure and agency, a collective of strategic, state-based, actors (the local authority consortium) owned Manchester Airport. From the perspective of the SRA, this pattern of ownership meant the airport’s intentions were interwoven with those of the state, which created a powerful, agent-based force in favour of the runway.

The airport operator, already in a position of privilege, employed a range of strategic actions to overcome potential obstacles that stood in the way of the runway’s approval, formulated in light of the terrain they would be deployed on. For example, the submission of a second planning application, which was a strategy deployed to collide with the actions of The National Trust, who, in opposition to the runway, had identified potential problems with the airport operator’s first application. To overcome any potential problem this created (and any delay to achieving their policy goals) the airport submitted a second application.

The SRA would view the Green Belt legislation that encompassed the proposed runway site as another structural constraint. Once again pre-judging the terrain, the airport operator knew the proposal would be challenged as being contrary to Green Belt policy and hence, formulated their strategic actions accordingly. Above providing evidence that the economic benefit of the runway outweighed its environmental impact, at the public inquiry John Twigg, at the time Infrastructure Planning Manager at Manchester Airport, cited occasions where other infrastructural development had taken place in land protected by Green Belt legislation, development he maintained was more intrusive than the second runway.

Through what an advocate of the SRA would describe as a process of strategic learning, the airport operator built up their capacity to alter the structural circumstances they potentially
faced. For example, an awareness that once discussions over the second runway had begun internally, word would get out. To this end, they made the strategic calculation to announce the plans publically from the start and to engage with interested actors and local communities.

From the SRA’s perspective, the airport operator’s commitment to minimise the environmental impact of the runway was a strategic action, motivated by their desire to achieve planning permission. Aware that the strategically selective context (i.e. the terrain the battle took place on) was increasingly receptive to environmental issues; nationally, the environmental movement had gained momentum and consequently, environmental issues were creeping up political agendas, the airport operator calculated their strategy accordingly. For example, at every opportunity the airport operator highlighted their environmental credentials and their efforts to minimise the runway’s environmental impact (i.e. the creation, and promotion, of their environmental department and the development of an extensive environmental mitigation package).

Conscious of the terrain they faced, all actors knew the economic argument behind the runway was not itself enough; there needed to be a powerful social force, such as a coalition of actors or favourable public opinion, behind its development. Demonstrating that the economic argument itself was not strong enough, the authorities in Merseyside argued, unsuccessfully, that Liverpool was an area in need of economic regeneration, even more so than Manchester. Explicitly stating their motivations, they wanted to see development at Liverpool John Lennon Airport as a route to the area’s economic redevelopment and saw a second runway at Manchester as a threat to that development. However, the airport operator at Manchester had not only assembled a strong economic argument, but, crucially, had also assembled a strong pro-growth collective of actors.

In what the SRA would describe as a strategic move, the airport operator recruited Cheshire County Council into this collective, knowing that getting the strategic planning authority behind its proposals would help tilt the terrain even further in its favour. Initially opposed to the development, Cheshire County Council was equally as strategic, constructing its actions in the knowledge that the airport operator wanted its support. Cheshire County Council, though in support of the economic benefits of the runway, had concerns over its environmental impact and did not believe the former outweighed the latter.
Cheshire County Council formulated their strategy within context (one tilted in favour of the development). They entered negotiations with the airport operator and Manchester City Council armed with a shopping list of demands, a strategy that proved successful and transformed the context upon which future action would take place. Cheshire County Council secured their demands via an extensive environmental mitigation package enshrined in a Section 106 agreement. Furthermore, the agreement of the Section 106 prior to the start of the public inquiry was a strategic coup for the airport operator, further enhancing their strategy to promote their environmental credentials and placing them in a relatively bulletproof position at the public inquiry regarding their attempts to minimise the environmental impact of the second runway.

The airlines were another collective of strategic actors who, while being part of the collective in support of the runway, had slightly different intentions, all wanting to see the development of a second runway at Manchester Airport in order to expand their operations. Deliberate positioning, they made it clear that development at Liverpool Airport was not an alternative to Manchester and made it clear that if the second runway was not approved they would look elsewhere to grow their business.

The SRA maintains that it is not guaranteed that the state will act in the best interests of capital and the position Macclesfield Borough Council took against the second runway proposal demonstrates this. An affected local authority, they took the strategic action to oppose the second runway, maintaining that the environmental impact of the development outweighed its economic benefit.

Although the airport operator assembled a powerful collective (i.e. social force) in favour of the runway’s development, many strategic actors opposed the runway, it itself a social force than the airport operator did not take lightly. These actors had an explicit intention to stop the second runway’s approval and formulated strategies to attempt to achieve this goal. In pre-empting their effectiveness at the inquiry, the local residents opposed to the development of a second runway took the strategic decision to work as a collective, with the formation of MAJAG, the umbrella group that united those actors from the local community who were opposed to the runway, their strategy in doing so. MAJAG were explicit in their intentions: they were not against the growth of the airport per se, but argued that the airport could achieve the capacity increase by utilising the existing runway more efficiently and hence, did not warrant the environmental impact. A strategic action,
they used evidence from Gatwick Airport that showed a more efficient use of a single runway. However, this strategy failed to affect the strategically selective context, or to shift the terrain in their favour.

Illustrating the SRA’s view that enhanced strategic knowledge of the terrain affects the actions of actors, MAJAG took the strategic action to recruit Terry Waite, a high-profile patron of MAJAG, into their campaign. Formulating their strategy within the strategically selective context and hoping to bring the terrain towards them, MAJAG knew that Waite was an agent who the public and interested stakeholders would perceive as rational and impartial, and who would provide high-profile support to the opposition campaign and attract positive media attention. Proponents of the runway were also aware of the potential effect of this action and acting reflexively Graham Stringer, then Leader of Manchester City Council (and hence, an indirect owner of the airport), attempted to shift, unsuccessfully, Waite’s position to one that supported the runway.

While those actors opposed to the development of the second runway deployed a range of strategic actions calculated in light of the terrain upon which they would be deployed, they failed to shift the terrain that was tilted in favour of the runway’s development. Favourable structural conditions, creating a strategically selective context, reflected in the state’s form at both the national and local levels and given added weight by the Section 106 agreement, combined with a powerful pro-growth social force meant the terrain was stacked in favour of the runway’s development, even prior to the public inquiry. Furthermore, with the interests of the airport interwoven with those of the state, the strategies of those opposing the runway had very little chance of success.

Once the Secretaries of State approved the second runway (and enshrined this decision in the state’s form at both the local and national levels), opponents reacted. A new collective of strategic actors sprang up uniting direct activists and local residents, both disillusioned by the public inquiry process. Direct activists, fuelled by past conflicts at Newbury and Twyford Down, considered the second runway as the next way to manifest their disdain at the policymaking process and intended to disrupt the runway’s construction. Local residents, many from MAJAG, who had gone through a process of strategic learning, joined them. Reflecting on, and learning from, the strategies they had deployed (to no effect) during the public inquiry, they amended their strategy of operating within the tightly
defined structure of a public inquiry to one completely outside of formal democratic channels.

Though ultimately it failed to reverse the Secretaries of State’s decision, this action transformed the context upon which future debates into the development of the aviation industry in the UK would take place on. It was the first time direct activists from across the UK had united with local residents against a common cause, and by gaining widespread media attention, it brought the issue of the development of the aviation industry firmly onto national-level political and environmental agendas.

**Critical reflections: the Strategic-Relational Approach’s perspective**

The SRA has provided an as convincing explanation as the ACF of the events that led to the approval of a second runway at Manchester Airport. Similarly, there are areas where it struggles. By drawing on existing critiques (discussed in Chapter Three) and detailing new theoretical insights, this section will critically reflect on the SRA’s ability to explain policy change and the distribution of power and influence within it.

Agreeing with Valler and Wood (2004), a value of applying the SRA is that by drawing attention to the perceptions of actors and the strategies they employ, it is able to engage with political realities, uncovering the *how* to achieve policy goals behind the *why*. To the SRA, strategic actions are the means by which actors attempt to achieve their policy goals. For example, MAJAG, aware of the economic force behind the airport’s growth, took the strategy to argue that more efficient use of the existing runway could achieve the capacity increase that airport operator claimed the second runway would provide. However, concurring with a critique raised by Uitermark (2005: 141), the SRA fails to examine where actors’ strategies originate. For example, did MAJAG employ this strategy because they believed in the airport’s growth but wanted it achieved within environmental limits, or because they saw it as the most effective strategy to simply stop the runway’s development and hence, achieve other underlying motivations (as identified by the ACF’s application).

The SRA provides a realistic look at the policymaking process, by not reducing the two sides of conflict to a simple polarisation (which, by contrast the ACF does), demonstrating the reality that it is not necessarily the case that actors on the same side of a conflict will necessarily choose to co-ordinate their strategic action. For example, though both in opposition to the runway’s development, Macclesfield Borough Council had little to do with
MAJAG, let alone working with them. However, it fails to fully explore and engage with the dynamics of a collective of strategic actors: why do strategic actors decide to work collectively? What conditions provide for successful collective action? A failure that appears shortsighted when attempting to analyse the recursive nature of the relationship between structure and agency. For example, it shone little light on the internal conflict that created the split in MAJAG and the subsequent creation of MAEN (a conflict over strategic action that created a split within a collective of strategic actors). Similarly, once actors who realised that the terrain was so stacked against them, the empirical evidence shows that some within the MAJAG collective reformulated their strategy, opting to sell their properties in secret, gaining the best possible price for themselves and undermining the ability of others to do so in the future.

Likewise, the SRA is unable to explore what underpinned the airport operator’s motivation to go public with their proposals from the start. In pre-judging the terrain, they knew that not having public opinion in favour of the runway could create a potential obstacle, but were their intentions simply to achieve their ultimate goals or did they hold a wider social and commercial responsibility? Equally, while Macclesfield Borough Council took the strategic action to oppose the second runway on environmental grounds, they were not adverse to runway expansion elsewhere, pledging to support Liverpool’s plans, suggesting that what underpinned their environmental opposition to expansion was a motivation to protect their constituents’ way of life rather than the environmental impact of airport growth per se. Without any consideration of what underpins strategic action and the beliefs behind actors’ motivations, intentions attributed to actors may be misleading and issues of collective action unexamined.

An new insight uncovered in this application, is that even though the SRA advocates that actors pre-judge the effect of their actions, and are reflexive upon the effectiveness of said actions, it fails to fully explore (beyond the lack of guarantee that the state will act in the best interests of capital), why strategies fail, even if deployed upon favourable terrain. For example, during the period of direct action that followed the second runway’s approval the airport operator took the strategic action to diffuse the situation by trying to create unfavourable public opinion towards it, deciding to badmouth the unification of local residents and environmental activists, pre-judging that the former would be unhappy and embarrassed, and hence, cease working together. However, the effect of this action was not what they had pre-empted, and in fact solidified the collective.
In critically reflecting on the SRA’s conceptualisation of the state, this application adds weight to Heigl’s (2011: 84) critique that it lacks a mechanism to describe and assess internal state dynamics. For example, what are the implications for the manifestation of the state when the state itself (in this case at the local level), owns the means of production (i.e. the airport)? Equally, what are the implications of inter-state dynamics, for example, Macclesfield Borough Council in opposition to Manchester City Council and Cheshire County Council?

An extension on this, which also adds weight to the critiques posited by Chettiparamb (2007: 414) and Uitermark (2005: 141), is that the scalar implications of the SRA are unexplored, interestingly, a critique the ACF also suffers from. The state’s form is not simply reflected at one level, with an important dynamic existing between actors operating at different levels and the form of the state at different levels. For example, national level policy provided favourable structural conditions that set the strategic selectivity of the context that conflict was to take place on. Equally, while conflict played out at the local level, strategic actors at the national level (the Secretaries of State) held the ultimate decision.

Conclusions

This chapter has applied the ACF and SRA to help explain the series of events that led to the approval of a second runway at Manchester Airport and to explicate the mechanisms behind the aviation industry’s position in this process of policymaking. Both have offered convincing accounts of the process of policy change, however, singularly they fail to uncover some of the key mechanisms behind how policy changed and the distribution of power and influence witnessed.

From the ACF’s perspective, two broad coalitions battled over technical information within a policy subsystem that brought together all those actors who wanted to influence the decision to develop a second runway at Manchester Airport. Policy changed incrementally and was the result of policy-oriented learning where local level actors, united in advocacy coalitions by their policy core beliefs, thrashed out the specific details of policy in the subsystem. However, the ACF struggled to precisely explicate coalition activity, notably, what it is that really glues a coalition together and in exploring issues of collective action.
By contrast, the value of the SRA lies in its ability to illuminate the underlying strategic context upon which conflict took place, one that was receptive to those strategies (and hence, those actors) that aligned with the economic aspirations of the North West and more broadly, the development of UK air capacity. Furthermore, applying the SRA drew attention to the strategic nature of the actions that actors take to achieve their policy goals. However, the SRA proved weak in conceptualising these strategies, for example, where they originate, and failed to adequately assess the internal dynamics of state manifestation, a phenomenon crucial when analysing multi-level policymaking.

This application demonstrates that it would be ill advised to explain the series of events that led to the development of the second runway at Manchester Airport from just one of these two perspectives. To fully explain the mechanisms behind the process of policy change witnessed, and to explore the reasons behind the aviation industry’s privileged position within it, both are needed. Interestingly however, there are three key areas neither theory was able to adequately explain.

First, the period of direct action that followed the runway’s approval. From the perspective of the ACF, it was a policy impact resulting from the second runway’s approval (a policy output), which, given its far-reaching impact on broader debates on the expansion of the UK aviation industry, appears to belittle its effect somewhat. Also underplaying its impact, from the perspective of the SRA, it is an effect of action that transformed the context for future strategic action. As the empirical evidence in Chapter Six shows, this period of direct action transformed the environmental movement, linking local residents and direct activists for the first time and pushing the aviation issue up political and environmental agendas.

Second, neither is able to explore the long-term effect of the Section 106 agreement. In ACF terms, this agreement proved so crucial in recruiting Cheshire County Council into the pro-growth coalition, while from the SRA’s perspective, it was a vital part of the airport operator’s strategy to assemble a powerful collective of actors and to appear environmentally responsible. However, both theories, with an apparent inability to look forward, failed to consider and explore the long last effects of such an agreement, concerns that were illuminated by the empirical evidence in Chapter Six.

Finally, neither theory is able to appreciate fully the role of the media played in the series of events, both as a resource used by actors and as itself an advocacy coalition/a collective of strategic actors, operating strategically and with observable intentions.
The next chapter (Eight) will bring together the findings and critical insights presented here with those of the first case study and will assess the ability of each theory to explain policy change and the reasons behind the aviation industry’s position of privilege in the policymaking process. Furthermore, it will initiate a theoretical dialogue between the two theories, which will analyse and evaluate the extent to which they are complementary or contradictory, and if there is any scope or indeed any need for, synthesis.
This chapter takes the research findings from Chapters Five and Seven, which applied the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) to explain the events that led to the decisions at Stansted and Manchester respectively, to the next level of analysis. Using the same structure as employed in Chapter Three (i.e. origins; units of analysis; explaining policy change; and applications), it will compare and contrast the ability of the ACF and SRA to explain policy change and the mechanisms behind the aviation industry’s position of privilege in the policymaking process, and will offer insights into the ACF and SRA’s future theoretical development. Furthermore, it will initiate the first theoretical dialogue between the two theories, analysing and evaluating the extent to which they are complementary or contradictory.

**Origins and key contributions**

This chapter will begin by comparing and contrasting what the empirical applications have uncovered about the origins and key contributions of the ACF and SRA.

**The Advocacy Coalition Framework**

With its roots in the American pluralist literature, the ACF is a synthetic theory that emerged from Sabatier’s desire to combine key insights from top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation. Its aim was to create a more systems-based approach to the understanding of policy change; built upon a rejection of policy cycles and stages (Cairney, 2012; Sabatier, 1986; 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 118; Weible et al., 2009: 122). The research findings presented in this thesis confirm that it has achieved these aims, providing a more systems-based view of the policymaking process. Explaining either case study from a linear, stages-based model of the policymaking process would have left many events and mechanisms unexplored, for example, in the Stansted case, a stages-based model may have ignored, or not given enough weight to, the role of external events in redefining the parameters of the problem.

Sabatier considered a problem with the existing policy implementation literature was the four to five year time span it used, believing this was too short to draw solid conclusions regarding policy change, and consequently, omitted crucial features of the policy process.
The findings presented here concur that the time scale of analysis that the ACF advocates, analysing policy change over a decade or more, is more useful, first, in identifying the events that led to policy change, but second, in uncovering changes to the relatively stable parameters that may otherwise remain unexplored. For example, the environmental movement that emerged alongside the search for a third London airport. Furthermore, analysing the policy process over long periods provides the opportunity to observe coalition formation, notably, the conditions that facilitate their emergence. For example, in both case studies minority coalitions only emerged as a response to policy outputs.

However, the research findings add weight to the critique put forward by Szarka (2010), that its propensity to look backwards means it shies away from asking questions about the future. For example, in the Manchester case study, the development of the Section 106 agreement was crucial to the success of the dominant coalition. However, as Dudley (2005) highlights, the consequences of this agreement have had far reaching implications, and considering the salience of this agreement may have in fact, uncovered some of the beliefs of the actors promoting it. For example, did the airport operator view it as an important tool to mitigate the environmental impact of the second runway, or was it purely a means to achieving their policy core belief of runway approval? Similarly, to the ACF, the period of direct action after the second runway’s approval was simply a policy impact, however, as the empirical evidence in Chapter Six uncovered, it had long lasting effects on this area of policymaking.

A motivation for the creation of the ACF was to give technical information (i.e. concerning the causes, magnitude and solutions of a problem) a more prominent role in the analysis. The research findings show that by drawing attention to the role of information within the policymaking process, the ACF is able to explore the mechanisms behind how actors construct problems and solutions. For example, in the Stansted case, the availability of technical information within the policy subsystem contributed to the continual redefining of the problem, and hence the solution. While in the Manchester case, the availability of technical information stimulated policy-oriented learning, a key driver of policy change.

The Strategic-Relational Approach
The SRA is critiqued for being no different to existing Marxist accounts (notably those of Poulantzas) (Barrow, 1993). Jessop is explicit that the SRA builds upon, and is a natural heir
to, existing Marxist accounts, but believes it marks a real step on from these accounts through its attempt to transcend the artificial dualism between structure and agency (Jessop, 2001).

This research finds that it does signal a step on for Marxist thinking in a number of ways and concurs with the view that it is a sophisticated Marxist conception of policy change and the state (Hay, 2005; Valler and Wood, 2004). Agreeing with the conclusions that Valler and Wood (2004: 1851) drew, if a more structuralist perspective had been applied, the specific responses of actors to a changing structured context would have remained unexplored, for example, in the Stansted case, how BAA responded to the u-turns in, and reviews of, policy.

Barrow (1993) criticises the SRA for being just a regurgitation of Poulantzas’ work on structuration, however, the research findings here demonstrate that it would be unwise to explain the processes of policy change witnessed in this research purely through class domination (as per Poulantzas). Signalling a major step on for Marxist thought, and in-line with the current era of politics, the research findings show that power cannot be simply reduced to class domination, with other powerful social forces such as public opinion and collectives of strategic actors crucial in policy change. However, this is not to suggest that class is not a powerful social force, with evidence of this in both case studies. For example, the local opposition groups (e.g. the North West Essex and East Hertfordshire Preservation Association (NWEEHPA), the Wing Area Resistance Association (WARA) and the Defenders of Essex) were often criticised for being of affluent middle-class origin and hence, had access to crucial political and financial resources.

Although Jessop moves forward from Poulantzas in acknowledging the importance of social forces other than class, the SRA fails to theorise and fully explore what they are. For example, the SRA explains the overturning of the Roskill Commission’s recommendation that Maplin should be developed as the third London airport through the lack of guarantee that the state will always act in the interests of capital. However, the empirical evidence (and the insights from the ACF), show that social forces, notably, public opinion and the assemblage of a strong collective of actors, played a key role in creating this change, highlighting that state action (agency) still needed to be legitimised.

Jessop (2001) maintains that the SRA is a development over theories of structuration (à la Giddens) as it views structure as a strategic accomplishment, opposed to a universal entity from which agents can draw upon for action, and hence, where differences in the
opportunities for different strategies are bit acknowledged. The research findings concur with Chettiparamb (2007: 415) that the SRA, through this conceptualisation, facilitates an examination of privilege by analytically embedding the selectivities of structures and hence, forcing questions to be asked such as whose interests was the Maplin decision made in? Or, whose interests did the u-turn of this decision serve?

**Combining theoretical perspectives**

Both the ACF and SRA are solid attempts to consolidate existing theories of policy and mark significant steps forward in the development of pluralist and Marxist thinking that are in touch with the realities of modern policymaking. Though taking different perspectives, both analyse the interplay between individuals and institutions, the role of ideas, and the political environment in which they exist. Importantly for this research, is that combined, through their contrasting origins they have illuminated varying aspects of policy change and the mechanisms behind the aviation industry’s position in policymaking.

Through its desire to give technical information a more prominent role in the analysis, the ACF has shed light on the important role the provision of information has in both problem construction and stimulating policy change via policy-oriented learning. While the SRA, through its desire to transcend the dualism between structure and agency, has focused analytical attention on the relationship between the two, facilitating the examination of privilege through empirical questioning.

**Main units of analysis**

This section considers the main units of analysis employed by the ACF and SRA. In the case of the former; this is the policy subsystem, which contains groups of actors united by their beliefs in advocacy coalitions. In the case of the latter, they are strategically selective contexts and strategic actors.

**The Advocacy Coalition Framework**

The main unit of analysis in the ACF is the policy subsystem, within which policy core beliefs group actors in advocacy coalitions that hold distinct viewpoints and co-operate over time to achieve their policy goals (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 120; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). In applying the ACF, it is deemed crucial to define the scope of a policy subsystem, focusing, “on the substantive and geographic scope of the institutions that structure interaction” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 193). However, the
research findings show that in practice, delineating the subsystem it is not quite as simple as this.

The authors of the ACF acknowledge that the existence of overlapping and nested policy subsystems can make subsystem definition problematic (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 193) (to which the Manchester case added evidence and which is explored later in this chapter when considering issues of the ACF’s applicability). However, in applying the unit of the policy subsystem, the ACF fails to engage with its fluid and evolving nature. The research findings demonstrate, that as a problem, and hence, the potential solutions to a problem, change, so does the policy subsystem. For example, as the site for the third London airport changed, actors left and entered the policy subsystem, with a similar pattern observable in the aftermath of the approval of Manchester Airport’s second runway.

This is not to suggest the policy subsystem is not a useful unit of analysis, with the inclusive nature of its definition one of the ACF’s strengths. Beyond the traditional ‘iron triangle’ of participants, the concept of the policy subsystem encompasses all those actors who wish to influence policy in a specific area. Combined with the prominent role the framework gives to technical information in the policymaking process, this naturally extends the analysis to include a wide range of actors. For example, to journalists, such as Terence Bendixson, academics, such as Peter Self, John Adams and Peter Hall and political commentators, such as David McKie. All of these actors played a key role in the policymaking process in the search for a third London airport, particularly in the dissemination of information, which contributed to problem definition and in creating public and political opinion.

Within a given policy subsystem, the ACF assumes that actors who share a belief system will unite in advocacy coalitions that hold distinct viewpoints and co-operate over time to achieve their policy goals (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 120; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). While the ACF maintains that policy core beliefs are the ‘glue’ of a coalition, the research findings provide compelling evidence that this is not necessarily the case through the existence of coalitions of convenience, coalitions within coalitions and the varying nature of actor participation. Furthermore, these question the ACF’s assumption that beliefs are stable over time and hence, crucial in coalition formation (Weible et al., 2009: 122).
By firmly rejecting the existence of coalitions of convenience (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 27), the ACF dismisses the possibility that actors motivated by short-term interests could work together to achieve said interests, a phenomena posited by both Hann (1995) and Kim and Roh (2008) and to which these research findings add weight. Furthermore, the existence of coalitions of convenience calls into question a central tenet of the ACF, that policy core beliefs are the ‘glue’ of coalitions and crucial in coalition formation (Weible et al., 2009: 122).

Coalitions of convenience were evident in both case studies. For example, in the minority coalition that emerged in response to the Roskill Commission’s decision that Cublington should be developed as the third London airport, actors were motivated by a short-term interest to stop the development of Cublington. In fact, the findings uncover that only the local residents held their opposition to Cublington as a policy core belief. Equally, the minority coalition against the development of the second runway at Manchester Airport united actors with a short-term interest to stop the runway’s development, with many in this coalition holding this belief as a secondary aspect.

Similarly, the dominant coalition in support of the second runway was a coalition of convenience, united by a common interest to get the runway developed. Again, while the airport operator held the development of a second runway as a policy core belief, it was not universally held at this level and as before, many actors in this coalition considered it as a means to achieving their other policy core beliefs (i.e. a secondary aspect). Equally, the coalition that emerged as a direct response to the Secretaries of State’s approval of the second was also one of convenience, uniting direct activists from across the UK with local residents, who, while holding very different policy core beliefs were united in opposing the second runway to achieve them.

The research findings show that it may be a commonality of a belief, rather than the level at which it is held, that is more important in coalition formation, adding weight to Sotirov and Memmler’s (2011) conclusion that the idea that policy core beliefs determine coalitions is becoming increasingly nebulous. It does appear however, that in recent revisions to the ACF, the authors are trying to blur the distinction between policy core and secondary aspects, going so far as to recognise the possibility that secondary aspects may be, “the stickiest glue that binds coalitions together” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 134; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 195).
Coalitions within coalitions further complicate the internal dynamics of coalition activity, again a phenomenon the ACF fails to engage with and for which both case studies provide evidence. The local community groups that united local actors against a specific site illustrate this clearly; NWEEHPA and the Stansted Area Preservation Association at Stansted, WARA at Cublington, Defenders of Essex at Maplin and the Manchester Airport Joint Action Group (MAJAG) at Manchester were all coalitions that united local actors by their policy core beliefs (i.e. to oppose development at their locality), which were then part of a broader coalition. NWEEHPA and MAJAG complicate matters even further, by arguably being coalitions of convenience themselves, operating as umbrella organisations to represent local concerns.

While the ACF maintains that the sometimes-sporadic nature of actor participation in the policymaking process can complicate policy subsystem definition (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 137), it is only recently that authors of the ACF have acknowledged the possibility that this sporadic nature of actor participation could extend to within coalitions (Weible et al., 2009: 130). However, while Weible et al. (2009: 130) discuss the potential that core and periodic coalition membership has in explaining coalition instability and defection, the research findings here provide evidence to the contrary, that the sporadic nature of actor participation within a coalition may in fact be a route to coalition stability.

For example, the dominant coalition in the Manchester case study contained a core actor, the airport operator, and periodic actors, such as local authorities, airlines and trades unions, who provided support to the policy goal but only engaged with specific issues and did not necessarily hold this goal at the same belief level. The coalition opposed to the development of Stansted at the Eyre inquiry (1981-83) shows a similar pattern. NWEEHPA and the local authorities took an active role on a broad range of issues (core actors), while British Airways, the airport operator at Manchester Airport, and national non-governmental organisations such as the National Trust, took a less active role and only became engaged on specific issues (periodic actors). Again, while core actors held their opposition to development as a policy core belief, periodic actors held it as a secondary aspect.

The Strategic-Relational Approach

For advocates of the SRA, one of the main issues with the structure-agency debate is the language that it has been conducted in (Hay, 2002a: 127). The SRA attempts to privilege neither structure nor agency by devising a new conceptual language that better reflects the
relational and dialectical qualities of the ongoing interaction between the two. To do this, it seeks to bring agency into structure with the production of a structured context (an action setting) and structure into agency (a situated agent) (Hay, 2002a). This is then repeated, bringing the situated actor into the structured context and the structured context to the situated actor, dissolving the dualism and creating the SRA’s units of analysis; strategic actors who exist within strategically selective contexts (Hay, 2002a).

The research findings confirm Valler and Wood’s (2004) view that the close attention the SRA pays to the perceptions of actors makes the identification of actors’ motivations and intentions achievable through empirical investigation and facilitates an examination of the strategies that actors employ to achieve their policy goals. For example, by examining the strategies BAA employed (e.g. refusing to co-operate with the Roskill Commission’s work) it was clear their intention was to get Stansted developed as the third London airport. Equally, MAJAG, aware of the powerful economic force behind the airport’s continued growth, they took the strategy to argue that more efficient use of the existing runway could achieve the capacity increase that airport operator claimed the second runway would provide to achieve their goal of stopping the second runway’s development.

The application of the SRA facilitates an empirical analysis of the reflexive nature of actors involved in the policymaking process, an element it considers crucial in the development of actors’ strategies; how they are modified in light of strategic knowledge and learning in their quest to achieve policy aims. Again confirming the view of Valler and Wood (2004), by drawing attention to this, the SRA immediately engages with political realities; focusing attention on how actors judge their past actions, and how they modify and pre-empt the effect of their future actions to achieve their policy goals. For example, by exploring the reflexive nature of MAJAG’s strategic decision to work as a collective, or uncovering how Colin Buchanan pre-empted the effect of his dissent from the Roskill Commission.

The research findings add weight to Uitermark’s (2005) critique that how the SRA conceptualises actors strategies needs further work, as it stands, it provides no explanatory mechanism behind the origin of actors strategies. While analyses of action can identify actors’ strategies, an exploration of what motivations lay behind these actions, and how these may change over time, would help confirm actors’ strategies as well as providing a useful insight into why actors participate in the policymaking process – a crucial part of agency in the structure-agency relationship.
Chapter Eight

The SRA’s contention that actors have the ability to state explicitly, and reflect upon, their motivations and intentions is one-step towards this; however, is it not possible that the strategies that an actor employs will garner results different from what their motivations intended? For example, if they realise their policy goals are impossible to realise, or are happy to make concessions on them, it may be the case that their strategic actions reflect this, a solution that is just ‘not too bad’. For example, a consideration of these questions may have uncovered some of the underlying mechanisms behind Cheshire County Council’s shift from a position of opposition, beyond a strategic action on the part of the Council and the airport operator.

An important aspect of the structure-agency relationship that the SRA is yet to fully engage with and theorise is the impact that group dynamics play, putting co-ordination down to a strategic decision on the part of actors. This fails to explore issues such as whether there are obstacles to co-ordination; how and why actors work together; how actors agree on strategic action; and what conditions facilitate successful coalition activity. For example, it shone little light on the internal conflict that created the split in MAJAG and the subsequent creation of MAEN (a conflict over strategic action that created a split within a collective of strategic actors). Furthermore, the SRA fails to theorise on the ability of actors to alter structural circumstances in which they exist; for example, do they all have the same ability to do so? If not, why?

How the SRA’s conceptualises the state has received praise from scholars. It not giving it any form of innate power, the state’s power is determined by the balance of forces that exist within society at any one time (Taylor, 1995: 261), operating as a, “dynamic institution that offers unequal opportunities to different social groups to achieve their specific political purposes” (Ioris, 2011: 7). However, as Heigl (2011: 84) points out, there is no concept within the SRA to describe and assess the internal dynamics of the state resulting from the interaction of different political institutions of varying historical importance. A potential area of future refinement, this would help uncover insights into, in the Stansted case study, the relationship between BAA and other government departments, and in the Manchester case study, the implications of the state itself (in this case at the local level), owning the means of production (i.e. the airport).

A question that arises as an extension of this, is what are the implications of inter-state dynamics when, for example, the state is in opposition with itself, a phenomenon observed
in both case studies. In the Stansted case, local authorities proximate to Stansted opposed national policy to develop the third London airport there, and in the Manchester case study, Macclesfield Borough Council were in opposition to Manchester City Council and Cheshire County Council.

**Combining theoretical insights**

The units of analysis promoted by the ACF and SRA have drawn attention to different, albeit complementary, aspects of the policymaking process. Reflecting the modern era of politics, both are inclusive in their analysis, acknowledging the broad range of actors involved, with no single-authoritative decision-maker.

Agency-based, the ACF has sought to make complex situations comprehensible through its well-defined units of analysis: the policy subsystem and advocacy coalitions. These units provide a useful organising tool in visualising the actors involved in the area of policymaking under study, while also focusing attention on their motivations behind their involvement via the empirical analysis of belief systems. However, due to the existence, and influence of, nested and overlapping subsystems, coalitions of convenience, coalitions within coalitions and the sporadic nature of actor participation, it is unwise to prescribe to the concepts too rigidly with a need to acknowledge their fluid and evolving nature.

By focusing attention of the strategic nature of both actors and the context upon which conflict takes place, the SRA has made a solid attempt to transcend the dualism between structure and agency. Developing the concept of strategic selectivity as an alternative to Poulantzas’ concept of structural selectivity is another illustration of how the SRA has attempted move Marxist thinking forward. The close attention it pays to the perceptions of actors has facilitated an examination of the strategies that actors employ to achieve their policy objectives. However, it proves weak in uncovering what underpins these strategies, in investigating the dynamics behind actor participation, and in illuminating internal and inter-state dynamics.

Combined, the ACF and SRA have provided the analyst with a range of tools to explore the policymaking process and to uncover and illuminate the process of policy change. While the units of analysis posited by the ACF face the criticism that they are too rigid in application, they do provide a useful starting point for the analysis in contrast to the SRA, where the area under study remains unspecified and the units of analysis somewhat vague. However, the ACF needs to acknowledge the fluid nature of the policy subsystem, is not a static and
fixed concept, an ethos more in line with the SRA, interested in a certain area of policymaking within society at a given time.

A criticism levelled at the ACF is that it largely ignores the behaviour of coalitions with little attention paid to the strategies that coalitions use to advance their beliefs or to the strategies they employ to confound opposing policies, by contrast this is where the SRA excels (Mintrom and Vergari, 1996; Schlager, 1995). Combining these insights has provided a valuable means by which to explore actors’ actions, considering coalition activity alongside strategic action. While beliefs may uncover the motivations behind an actor’s participation in the policymaking process, strategies uncover actual actions (which may diverge from an actor’s beliefs), in fact, the existence of coalitions of convenience implies an element of strategy in coalition behaviour.

**Explaining policy change**

Consideration now turns to assessing the ability of ACF and SRA to explain policy change. To the ACF, policy change is a result of a shift in the balance of forces within the policy subsystem through a change in the dominant coalition. Beliefs are the driver for political behaviour and there are two main sources of belief and policy change: policy-oriented learning and external events (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 147). To the SRA, policy change is the result of struggles between conscious and reflexive actors, which takes place on a terrain that by its very nature, privileges certain strategies (and hence, certain actors). The form of the state represents the latest incarnation of these battles and demonstrates balance in the policymaking process at a specific time (Hay, 2002b; 2005; McAnulla, 2002).

**The Advocacy Coalition Framework**

Some scholars have suggested that the ACF relies too heavily on external events as the main driver of policy change (John, 1998; Mintrom and Vergari, 1996). This research refutes this criticism, with the research finding evidence that external events are crucial in creating policy change but with change also occurring in their absence, emerging incrementally through policy-oriented learning.

The ACF’s explanation of the events that led to the development of Stansted as the third London airport demonstrates the important role of external events. Here they played a key role in shaking the policy subsystem, which redistributed resources and the political agenda and crucially, opened up windows of opportunity for minority coalitions to exploit.
Importantly in this case, and an element the ACF fails to consider, is that these external events operated as catalysts for change in the relatively stable parameters that framed the problem. While the ACF acknowledges that relatively stable parameters have an impact on external events, it considers the relationship one-way. Furthermore, it fails to acknowledge the relationship external events have on one another, for example, in the search for a third London airport, the oil crisis, recession and talks on alternative modes of transport exacerbated the effect the emergence of the jumbo jet had on growth forecasts and hence, in creating a window of opportunity. The research findings in the Stansted case also highlight the important role skilful coalition members play in driving policy change, concurring with the comments of both Ameringer (2002) and Jordan and Greenaway (1998), who conclude that after an external shock, skilful coalition members are needed in order to exploit the opportunity.

By contrast, the ACF’s explanation of the events that led to the approval of Manchester Airport’s second runway does not rely at all on external events; rather, it draws attention to the critical role of technical information in the policymaking process. As information entered the policy subsystem, actors engaged in a process of policy-oriented learning leading to policy change. This finding adds weight to Szarka’s (2011: 849) view that a strength of the ACF is that its long-term focus allows for the identification of the many short-term events that lead to incremental policy change.

Internal events, a recent addition to the ACF as a route to policy change (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 199), were observable in the research findings, for example, the omission of Stansted from the Roskill Commission’s shortlist of sites. However, beyond their proximity to the policy subsystem their explanatory contribution was no different to the effect of external events. Posing questions for future theoretical refinement, an analysis of an event beyond its proximity to the policy subsystem would be useful: beyond observation, what does this dichotomy add, if anything, to the ACF’s understanding of the drivers of policy change? For example, are internal events more likely to be pre-empted by those within the subsystem and hence, have less of a shock? Are they more likely to encourage policy-oriented learning?

An extension of this critique, the research has found that a question that the ACF fails to address adequately is how a minority coalition can effectively exploit a window of opportunity that arises immediately after a shake to the policy subsystem. In addition, why
do some events fail to provide a substantial enough window of opportunity for the minority coalition to exploit? As Albright (2011) comments, a more nuanced understanding of how different shocks shift agendas and redistribute resources among coalitions would assist in developing the ACF’s understanding of these causal mechanisms.

In both case studies, resources were important to coalitions for two reasons: first, in forming and sustaining a coalition and second, as a means to achieving policy goals, facilitating privileged access to policymaking the policymaking process. Applications by other scholars have sought to build upon this idea (Albright, 2011; Ingold, 2011; Nohrstedt, 2005), attempting to explain how changes in the distribution of coalition resources affects policy change to which the research findings here contribute. The research findings show that in general, better-resourced actors occupy the position of dominant coalition, and hence, are a favourable position compared to their counterparts.

The authors behind the ACF have increasingly acknowledged the important role of resources, with the recent development of a typology a strong sign of this recognition (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 201; Weible et al., 2011). However, the research findings agree with Sotirov and Memmler (2011) and Nohrstedt (2011) that there is scope for this typology to be improved via the incorporation of a hierarchy. It is clear that some resources are more important than others, and crucially, having more of one resource can facilitate the achievement of other resources, which strengthens a coalition’s ability either to maintain their dominant position, or to exploit a window of opportunity. For example, the role financial resources can play in procuring other resources and the importance of skilful coalition members to exploit a window of opportunity.

In addition, the research findings illustrate the important role of public opinion, and the media, as important resources. The eminent role technical information is given, and the inclusion of journalists within the policy subsystem, demonstrates that the ACF goes someway to acknowledging this importance. However, an exploration of the role of the media beyond this would enhance the ACF, with this research finding that its role is threefold: in framing a problem; disseminating information; and in creating public opinion, the first two of which affect the relatively stable parameters that characterise a problem and the final, an important resource for coalitions.

For example, in the run up to the Chelmsford inquiry conflict was media-driven at both the local and national levels and in its aftermath, the media played a crucial role in creating
public disdain for the appointment of the Peterson Committee. Equally, in the Manchester case, conflict in the subsystem was played out in front of the media, particularly during the phase of direct action, where the approval of the second runway gained a national stage through journalists staying in camps and Swampy appearing on Have I Got News For You.

An oft-cited critique of the ACF is its failure to explore issues of collective action, assuming that there will be highly co-ordinated activity between coalition members to create policy change (Fenger and Klok, 2001; Kim and Roh, 2008; Schlager, 1995; Schlager and Blomquist, 1996). In assuming collective action, the ACF treats each coalition as a single entity, which the research findings illustrate is somewhat misguided, with evidence showing examples where coalitions do, but also do not, work together to achieve their policy goals.

For example, in the case of the former, the minority coalition involved in the campaign of direct action after the approval of Manchester Airport’s second runway worked collectively. However, the minority coalition that emerged before the public inquiry into the second runway showed little or no co-ordination between actors. Furthermore, by assuming collective action, the ACF fails to observe and explore the relationship between collective action and coalition stability or instability. For example, it is unable to explain the split that emerged within MAJAG that resulted in the formation of MAEN.

**The Strategic-Relational Approach**

Maintaining that structures are more receptive to certain forms of activity than others, and hence, privilege certain actors over others, the SRA views policy change as the result of battles between intentionally strategic actors. Fluid and inclusive, the state’s form is a crystallisation of these struggles, representing the balance of power within society at a given time.

In the search for a third London airport, the SRA showed that structural factors inherent in the policymaking process placed the aviation industry, and in particular BAA, in a privileged position. Tightly defined structural conditions at inquiries and reviews meant that planning inquiries took on the characteristics of site-specific feasibility studies while the structure of the legal system favoured better-resourced actors. However, public opinion, a powerful social force, forced the state to re-open and re-examine the problem.

In the approval of Manchester Airport’s second runway, even though actors opposed to the development of the second runway deployed a range of strategic actions calculated in light
of the terrain upon which they would be deployed, they were unable to shift the terrain in their favour. Again, structural factors inherent in the policymaking process placed the aviation industry in a privileged position. Favourable structural conditions created a strategically selective context that combined with a powerful pro-growth social force meant the terrain was stacked in favour of the runway’s development, even prior to the public inquiry. Furthermore, with the interests of the airport interwoven with those of the state, the strategies of those opposing the runway had very little chance of success.

Akin to the criticism levelled at the ACF’s explanation of policy change, the SRA fails to fully engage with issues of collective action, putting co-ordination down to a strategic decision. Similarly, for example, it was unable to explore the internal conflict that created the split in MAJAG and the subsequent creation of MAEN (a conflict over strategic action that created a split within a collective of strategic actors). This failure means that the mechanisms behind how and why actors work together to achieve their policy aims and the potential obstacles to co-ordination remains unexamined.

While the SRA is a step beyond Poulantzas in that it acknowledges that social forces other than class play a role in the policymaking process, it fails to explore what these social forces are. The research findings here make some suggestions for theoretical refinement in this area. For example, public opinion was clearly a powerful social force, fought over by actors with the ability to create u-turns in policy. Equally, the assemblage of a powerful collective of actors was a powerful social force, clearly demonstrated in the Manchester case where the airport operator went to great lengths to secure a pro-growth coalition, despite the terrain already stacked in its favour.

Another question that emerges from the research findings considers the SRA’s ability to explain why strategies fail, even if their effects are pre-judged and they are deployed upon favourable terrain. For example, why the airport operators’ strategy to badmouth the local residents and direct activists during the period of direct action that followed the second runway’s approval fail to have the expected outcome (i.e. a breakdown of the collective).

The research findings in both case studies show that the terrain upon which conflict was played out, by its very nature, favoured better-resourced actors. However, the SRA fails to draw attention to the importance of resources, and their role in facilitating and constraining actors’ abilities to formulate, and deploy, strategic actions that will have an effect upon the structured context. For example, the structure of the public inquiry favours
better-resourced actors: they can employ the better (i.e. more costly) legal team, can sustain lengthy presence at inquiries and can commission extensive research into technical issues. The findings show that another important resource was the media, again unexamined by the SRA. In both case studies the campaign was media driven, used tactically by strategic actors to try and move the terrain in their favour.

**Combining theoretical insights**

Both the ACF and SRA have illuminated, and explored, important mechanisms behind policy change. However, when combined, their explanatory power is enhanced.

The ACF drew attention to the role of external events and policy-oriented learning in creating policy change. The former demonstrates how resources can be redistributed within a subsystem and windows of opportunity opened for minority coalitions to exploit. The latter draws attention to the important role of technical information in creating policy change and the potential for change to be incremental. By contrast, the SRA shines light on the structural conditions embedded in the policymaking process that favour certain actors and explores the strategies actors employ to achieve their policy goals. The SRA has also demonstrated that structural privilege is not enough to ensure an actors’ control over policy, with powerful social forces also needed, an area unsurprisingly, that the ACF, through its focus on agency, is able to better explore.

However, the research findings show that there are common blind spots that neither theory sufficiently explores. While both acknowledge the important role resources play in facilitating and constraining the ability of actors to achieve their policy goals, neither adequately explores why some resources are more important than others are. An extension of this, both theories recognised the important role public opinion plays in policy change, however; again, neither fully explores its role.

Equally, neither is able to fully explore issues of collective action. The ACF assumes actors will co-ordinate, while the SRA puts it down to a strategic decision. In the case of the ACF, ignoring the important dynamics of coalition activity by presuming collective action among coalitions potentially undermines the concept of the advocacy coalition as being anything more than a mapping tool. In contrast, by not reducing both sides of the conflict to a simple polarisation and not assuming collective action, the SRA appears more realistic. However, failing to explore and engage with the dynamics of collective action (and as discussed,
Applicability and methodological reflections

This section now considers the applicability of the ACF and SRA to these two case studies and more broadly, this area of policymaking, and reflects upon their methodological implications.

The Advocacy Coalition Framework

As detailed in Chapter Three, the ACF has been vastly applied by its authors, their students and others in an increasing number of policy areas and geographical locations. Despite this, its application to the case studies in this thesis has uncovered some important insights into its applicability and provided evidence to support existing critiques of its methodological approach.

The research findings raise questions regarding the ACF’s applicability in the UK. Both case studies focused on the public inquiry as the venue of decision-making, which automatically pushed the analysis from the national to the local level. While the ACF acknowledges that policymaking takes place at multiple levels (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 189), in practice, it under-recognises this shift away from the national level. For example, in the search for a third London airport, it struggled to cope with the influx of local level actors, and the new conceptions of ‘the problem’ they brought with them, that entered the policy subsystem through the initiation of site-specific public inquiries. Equally, in explaining the approval of a second runway at Manchester Airport, it struggled to cope with the implications that multi-level governance structures pose for policy subsystem definition.

An extension of this, the ACF’s fails to explore the implications of multi-level governance structures for policy subsystem definition. For example, in the case of Manchester’s second runway, while two national level policy subsystems overlapped to create the policy subsystem under study, once the public inquiry took the policymaking process down to the local level a subsystem firmly dealing with the second runway was easily identifiable.

Arguably, the ACF’s inability to deal with the multi-level governance structures that characterised the UK policymaking process is unsurprising. The venue of local planning is uncommon in the United States (where the ACF was conceived) and hence, has not been applied vastly to this type of policymaking system. If, for example, this research concerned
itself with policy change regarding the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, it is unlikely that there would be such ambiguity in defining the policy subsystem with conflict taking place among actors at the national and European levels. However, further empirical testing in political systems akin to that found in the UK, and possibly theoretical developments as a result, would enhance the geographical applicability of the ACF.

The research findings provide evidence to support the existing critique that there are difficulties in empirically examining actors’ beliefs, particularly retrospectively, with particular uncertainty emerging when trying to determine the level at which a belief is held (Hann, 1995; Hirschi and Widmer, 2010; Jenkins-Smith, 1991; Matti and Sandström, 2011; Sotirov and Memmler, 2011). A critique further complicated by the existence of coalitions of convenience and coalitions within coalitions, where the belief system represented by the advocacy coalition does not necessarily reflect the belief system of individual actors.

As Chapter One discussed, one of the research methods employed in this research was documentary analysis, which has been used in previous applications of the ACF. However, even the ACF’s authors acknowledge the potential difficulties in using documents to ascertain beliefs (Jenkins-Smith, 1991). This research set out to minimise the potential for any incorrect belief identification by triangulating documentary analysis with interview data and a review of the existing literature. Ascertaining beliefs retrospectively proved more problematic, particularly in the case study examining the search for the third London airport, where, due to it beginning in the 1950s, many key actors were deceased, while some of the interviewees were recalling events from over thirty years ago.

A broader question that unites many of the points raised in this chapter is whether the ACF is an integrative theory, as Sabatier intended, or whether, through its constant development and revisions it has been stretched and hence, has become too complex and no longer parsimonious. Sabatier (2007a) believes the former, that through constant development and a series of revision the ACF has developed from a complex theoretical framework into a more logical and coherent one.

However, the operational difficulties that have emerged from applying the ACF’s well defined units of analysis and its many routes to policy change, suggest that through these revisions the ACF has become just too unwieldy and hard to manage, with revisions no longer just part of the ‘productive path of science’ as Sabatier contends. This research provides evidence that recent additions have in fact, diluted the framework’s explanatory
value and/or were out of consideration, with the framework’s application remaining true to its core foundations (subsystems, coalitions, external events and policy-oriented learning) to explore the process of change.

**The Strategic-Relational Approach**

As Chapter Three examined, while the SRA is gaining increasing attention, compared to the ACF it has had very limited use in guiding empirical work, particularly by its author, “Jessop is notoriously hesitant when it comes to using his theoretical propositions in empirical research” (Uitermark, 2005: 141), to the point where there is a large discrepancy between the formal methods the SRA proposes, and Jessop’s actual analysis (Uitermark, 2005: 141).

However, there are notable empirical examples by other scholars, as well as those engaging with it on a theoretical level. Therefore, its application to the case studies in this thesis, and the insights it has uncovered in terms of its applicability and methodological implications, offer a lot to the theory’s development.

There are operational difficulties associated with the SRA’s units of analysis. While the ACF’s conceptualisation of the area under study, the policy subsystem, proved too rigid, the SRA’s failure to specify the area under study was equally as problematic. Advantageous on one hand as it meant the area under study could be as vast and inclusive as desired, operationally, it means that the SRA is initially difficult to navigate. Furthermore, the SRA provides little guidance on how to assess the strategies of actors, which methodologically, leaves it open to the analyst (Uitermark, 2005). Heigl (2011: 84) suggests a need to assess the strategic selectivity of every institution involved in a particular policy conflict, however, with an undefined area of study does this not leave the analyst with a) a daunting task and b) ignores individuals?

Both case studies were of a sufficient length to facilitate an empirical analysis of the reflexive nature of the actors involved, an element considered crucial by the SRA and closely related to how actors develop their strategies. However, the reflexive nature of actors would be hard to identify in a shorter case of policy change, for example, if the decision to develop Stansted after the Chelmsford inquiry stuck. Furthermore, this time span allowed the observation and analysis of the process of strategic learning and strategic knowledge, effects of strategic action and mechanisms by which actors can alter their capacity to overcome the structural circumstances they may face in future conflict. For
example, in the search for a third London airport, how the opposition at the Eyre inquiry formulated their strategy in light of what they had learnt from previous conflict.

Akin to the ACF, the SRA struggles to deal with the policymaking system in the UK, which is similarly unsurprising as it is yet to be empirically applied in the UK (though it has been theoretically applied, see Goodin et al. (2005; 2006); Jones et al. (2005); and Valler and Wood (2004)). Akin to the criticism levelled at the ACF, the SRA fails to fully explore its scalar implications, notably the nature of the relationships between actors operating at different scales, adding weight to the criticisms put forward by Chettiparamb (2007: 414) and Uitermark (2005: 141). For example, in the Stansted case, an interesting dynamic arose where the state at the national level (e.g. the Ministry of Civil Aviation, BAA, etc) was often in conflict with the state at the local level (e.g. site-specific local authorities). While in both case studies, even though conflict took place at the local level, strategic actors at the national level (the Secretaries of State) held the ultimate decision.

Equally, this research has drawn attention is the SRA’s failure to fully consider the temporal dimension of its application. As Lagendijk (2007: 196) and Valler and Wood (2004: 1838) highlight, strategies are both path dependent and path shaping, and hence, adopting an SRA implies a sensitivity to history. The research has found the temporal dimension crucial in understanding the events that lead to policy change, strategic selectivity exists only in the context of specific horizons of actions of different actors (Heigl 2011: 84).

Combining theoretical perspectives
Both the ACF and SRA are progressive theories of the policymaking process with increasing numbers of scholars applying them. However, both suffer from some applicability and methodological weaknesses.

Operationally, a weakness of the ACF is whether or not the policy subsystem has any basis in reality. The fluid nature of the policy subsystem and the sporadic nature of actor participation, combined with the difficulties in analysing multi-level policymaking, lead the analyst to ask whether in practice, there is an identifiable policy subsystem. By contrast, applying the SRA was easier to apply, with its focus on the immediate concerns of structural constraints, strategic actors and learning is a plus over a focus in abstract theorising. However, perhaps a result of its empirical infancy, the application of these concepts is somewhat vague.
Interestingly, both fail to fully explore the scalar implications of their application, with the research findings presented here providing strong evidence that both struggle to fully handle multi-level policymaking, both in terms of national policy conflict taking place at the local level and the implications of the relationships of actors across these scales.

**Conclusions**

Providing radically different lenses through which to view public policy, the ACF and SRA have explored conflicting accounts of the policymaking process and importantly, combining their insights has helped to understand and explain the modes and modalities of the aviation industry’s position in policymaking. A multi-theoretical approach has uncovered aspects of the process of policy change and the position the aviation industry occupies in it, that would have been unidentified had a single perspective been employed.

The research findings demonstrate that agency-centred approaches, such as the ACF, underplay the crucial interrelationship between state strategies and agency, focusing on internal decision-making and the preferences of individual actors. By contrast, more structure-centred approaches, such as the SRA, struggle to explain the specific responses of individual actors: in understanding why they become involved in political action and group dynamics. Solely employing the ACF would have left the relationship between structure and agency unexplored, notably the effect that structural conditions played in determining the actions of agents. Similarly, solely employing the SRA would have left the important role of technical information unexplored and the beliefs that underpin actors’ strategies unexamined.

The contrasting perspectives complement one another in their explanatory ability. In particular, the SRA’s analysis of the strategies actors employ complements the ACF’s exploration of coalition activity. Combined they are able to explore in-depth the strategies coalitions employ to achieve their policy goals. Equally, the ACF’s ability to uncover the beliefs that underpin actors’ participation in the policymaking process enhances the SRA’s exploration of actors’ strategic actions. Both have drawn attention to the crucial role that resources have played in facilitating the position of privilege the aviation industry enjoys. In finding that favourable structural conditions do not alone ensure a position of privilege, the SRA began to uncover the important role that social forces play, an aspect that, due to its agency-focus, the ACF was able to complement, exploring group dynamics and the role of beliefs and technical information in stimulating policy change.
This thesis now moves onto the final chapter (Nine), which presents the main conclusions of the thesis, briefly addresses its aims and objectives and outlines future research directions.
Understanding the development of aviation policy in the UK

Aviation politics remains centre stage in the UK, with the UK Government once again reopening the whole debate, in a pattern of events that closely resembles those that led to the appointment of the Roskill Commission to review UK aviation policy. Whether or not it will lead to further policy u-turns and reviews is yet to be seen, however, it illustrates why it is claimed that the aviation industry is a privileged actor in policymaking. This thesis set out to explore this position, seeking to analyse the aviation industry’s position in environmental policymaking and by answering questions well rehearsed in political science since the 1950s, namely: who gets what, where, and how (Lasswell, 1986), to investigate the mechanisms behind how and why the aviation industry is able to occupy such a position. This final chapter will present the research findings by addressing the aim and objectives of the thesis, detailing its key contributions to knowledge, and outlining future research directions.

Main research findings

This thesis sought to illuminate the mechanisms behind the aviation industry’s oft-claimed position of privilege and to explore the obstacles to balance in long-term environmental policymaking by conducting a theoretically informed examination of policy change in relation to airport expansion. The main objectives were threefold:

1. To generate a systematic empirical account of the main actors and events involved in the historical development of the aviation policy in the UK
2. Analyse two in-depth case studies of policy decisions that have been crucial in the sectors long term development: the development of Stansted as the third London airport and the extension of Manchester Airport
3. Apply two modern theories of the policy (namely the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Strategic-Relational Approach) to understand and explain the modes and modalities of the aviation industry’s position in policymaking

The first objective was addressed primarily in Chapter Two, where a systematic empirical account of the main actors and events involved in the historical development of the UK aviation policy was provided. This chapter identified the key actors involved at the
international, European and national scales and provided a chronological account of the events that shaped the development of the industry since World War Two. It identified how aviation policy has systematically facilitated the growth of the industry, which has simultaneously, created difficulties for the state to achieve balance in policy and the policymaking process.

Chapters Four and Six addressed the second objective, by analysing in-depth two case studies that have been crucial policy decisions in the sectors long-term development with fresh empirical information uncovered through extensive documentary analysis and elite interviewing.

Chapter Four examined the decision to approve Stansted as the third London airport. In the same manner as Chapter Two, it identified the key actors involved in this area of policymaking and provided an in-depth chronological discussion of the events that led to Stansted’s approval, concluding with a consideration of who got what, where and when. Stansted’s approval as the third London airport came in 1985, after a series of events that spanned over thirty years, saw multiple sites approved, involved two public inquiries and three in-depth reviews, and featured a constantly evolving cast of actors from the private and public spheres. The environmental movement emerged alongside these events; however, with the aviation issue largely perceived to be a local problem, this movement failed to really impact upon national political and environmental agendas. In the aftermath of World War Two, the development of the UK aviation industry was widely seen as an important engine of economic growth, and the development of a third London airport was perceived as a key instrument in this. Consequently, the interests of the aviation industry, in this case the British Airports Authority, were tightly aligned with those of the state (at the national level at least) and hence, benefitted from a privileged position in environmental policymaking.

Chapter Six analysed the decision to approve a second runway at Manchester Airport. A far shorter case, it was framed as a straight fight between economic and environmental interests. Prior to the start of the public inquiry the airport operator occupied a privileged position, with the development of the second runway seen by the state, at both the national and local levels, as crucial in contributing to the UK’s (apparent) need to increase air traffic capacity and in providing an economic stimulus to the North West. In addition, Manchester Airport was (and remains) owned by a consortium of local authorities, and
hence, the airport operator’s interests were directly entwined with those of the state. In the end, the state, operating as an independent arbiter, deemed that the economic benefits of the runway outweighed the environmental impact, with the development of an extensive Section 106 agreement demonstrating the airport operator’s commitment to environmental mitigation. A period of direct action followed the runway’s approval, which transformed future debates on the environmental impact of an ever-expanding aviation industry, capturing national public and political attention and pushing the aviation issue up political and environmental agendas.

Chapters Three, Five, Seven and Eight addressed the final objective, to apply two modern theories of the policymaking process, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) to understand and explain the modes and modalities of the aviation industry’s position in policymaking. Chapters Five and Seven applied the ACF and SRA to the two case studies empirically explored in Four and Six while Chapter Three provided an in-depth examination of these theories and considered, under comparable terms, their origins, units of analysis and how they explain policy change, before detailing existing applications and the critical reactions and refinements they have provoked. It concluded by highlighting their key similarities and differences relevant to the objectives of this research, notably, their attempt to consolidate existing theories of the policymaking process; how they conceptualise the distribution of power among actors; their mechanisms behind policy change; and their view of the state in balancing competing interests.

Chapter Five examined the decision to develop Stansted as the third London airport, where both the ACF and SRA offered convincing accounts of the process of policy change and some of the mechanisms underpinning the aviation industry’s position in the policymaking process, however, singularly, neither proved able to fully explain the events that took place. Economic and political structural influences played a big a role, which the ACF was unable to explain, while the process proved too drawn out and chaotic for the SRA to wholly comprehend. However, by paying close attention to the beliefs of actors, the ACF uncovered the mechanisms behind how and why actors work together to achieve their policy goals. This helped to explore some of reasons behind how and why the aviation industry is able to occupy a privileged position in the policymaking process, notably, through the assemblage of powerful pro-growth coalition(s) that are able to retain control over the broad direction of policy. Complementary to these findings, the SRA shed light on the strategies actors used to achieve their policy aims and explored the structural factors
inherent in the policymaking process that privileged the actions of the aviation industry and those promoting its interests.

Chapter Seven analysed the events that led to the approval of Manchester Airport’s second runway, where again, both the ACF and SRA provided convincing accounts of the process of policy change, however, as before, singularly both failed to uncover all the mechanisms underpinning the aviation industry’s position in the policymaking process. The ACF highlighted the important role of technical information and policy-oriented learning in creating policy change, however, as before, economic and political structural influences played a big role, which the ACF could not explain. By contrast, the SRA was able to illuminate and explore the effect of these influences, notably the underlying strategic context in which conflict took place, one that was receptive to those strategies (and hence, those actors) that aligned with the economic aspirations of the North West and more broadly, the development of UK air capacity. However, it also had blind spots, proving weak in conceptualising what underpins actors’ strategies and failing to adequately assess the internal dynamics of the state.

Chapter Eight brought these research findings together, combining their insights and creating the first theoretical dialogue between the two perspectives. It compared and contrasted the ability of the ACF and SRA to explain policy change and offered insights into the ACF and SRA’s future theoretical development. It found that agency-centred approaches, such as the ACF, underplay the crucial interrelationship between state strategies and agency, focusing on internal decision-making and the preferences of individual actors while the SRA has difficulties in explaining the specific responses of individual actors, in understanding why they become involved in political action, and group dynamics. While uncovering a number of critical insights into each theory, interestingly, both proved to have common blind spots: a failure to fully theorise the role of the media in policy change or the important role of public opinion; an inability to adequately address their scalar implications; and a tendency to be backwards facing, all areas that are theoretically ripe for future refinement.

**Main contribution of thesis**

This thesis sought to contribute to the existing literature by providing fresh empirical data; fresh theoretical interpretation of those empirics; and new insights into broader and
continuing theoretical debates about the role of the state. This section highlights its main contributions to knowledge.

By providing a fresh systematic account of the historical development of UK aviation policy, this thesis has contributed new empirical evidence to a field which Staniland (2009) has described as ‘strangely thin’. This thesis helps to overcome this thinness, drawing together the existing literature and contributing new empirical evidence. Furthermore, has unearthed in-depth fresh analysis of two decisions that have been key in the sector’s long-term development, which provides a timely historical look at previous debates in the development of the aviation policy in the UK.

As Chapter One highlighted, there is a significant, and growing, body of academic research that examines the positive and negative impacts of the aviation industry and increasingly, what the rhetoric of sustainable development implies for its continuing growth. This thesis has contributed evidence to this growing body of research, by providing a theoretically informed analysis of the reasons that have underpinned the obstacles to balance in long-term policymaking in this area, notably, why the negative impacts of the aviation industry (i.e. the environmental) are continually, but not always easily, outweighed by the positive (i.e. the economic).

This research also contributes to the significant literature that explores the role of the state, at both the national and local levels, in balancing these concerns. First, in analysing two decisions where conflict over national policy was played out at the local level via the means of a public inquiry, it has contributed to the emerging body of literature that examines the public inquiry as a space where conflict over sustainability is played out (for example, Cowell and Owens, 2006; Owens and Cowell, 2011; Rough, 2011). Second, it has provided evidence to complement the conclusions drawn by scholars such as Paterson (2000; 2007) and May and Hill (2006), who, in their analyses of automobile and aviation politics respectively, demonstrate that regardless of the environmental impact, industries occupy a privileged position in policy due to the dominant social paradigm of economic growth that is so crucial in the reproduction of the capitalist state is difficult to challenge. To both these areas of research, this thesis contributes a new empirical case study (i.e. the aviation industry), that illuminates the mechanisms behind the state’s inability to balance concerns, notably, the structural influences that are inherent in the policymaking process and the ability of powerful pro-growth actors to dominate said process.
This thesis has made both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the development of the ACF and SRA. Perhaps most importantly however; this research has initiated the first theoretical dialogue between the two contrasting perspectives.

In the literature, combining the merits of theories is ‘standard advice’ (Sabatier, 2007b). However, what is less clear is how analysts go about doing this (Cairney, 2012). Either, it is assumed that they are broadly complementary, and their insights are combined to produce a single theory or to provide complementary perspectives (John, 1998: 18) or, that they provide contradictory explanations and engage in a ‘policy shootout’ to find the ‘best’ theory based upon the ‘basic tenets of science’ (Eller and Krutz, 2009). This thesis adds weight to the critiques that the latter is problematic on two counts (Cairney, 2012: 266). First, there is no universal understanding of the scientific method and second, policy change is open to interpretation, a point illustrated by Chapters Five and Seven, where both the ACF and SRA were able to provide equally compelling, but contrasting, accounts of policy change. This research has shown that a multi-theoretical approach facilitates this and provides evidence for the argument that there is no single ‘best’ theory.

The ACF and SRA have provided complementary insights that illuminate equally important aspects of policy. It has shown that neither is exhaustive and while it may have been easier (operationally at least) to employ just one perspective, the insights gained would be inferior, for example, structural influences would have been absent from the explanations had the ACF been the sole theoretical perspective. It is not the contention of this thesis that there is any need for, or indeed any scope for, theoretical synthesis, rather, that that value of the two perspectives lies in their ability to provide complementary insights.

In contributing new empirical case studies, this thesis has provided evidence that adds weight to existing critiques of the ACF and SRA, and has exposed new insights. These areas are ripe for theoretical development and offer a number of future lines of enquiry.

For the ACF, despite what Sabatier says, with so many tweaks, it has become unwieldy and hence, hard/nigh on impossible to test the whole framework. Though this thesis did not set out to test every aspect of it, it found that many of its recent additions were simply absent from its explanation of events (e.g. negotiated agreements and coalition opportunity structures), while also uncovering flaws in its core foundations: policy subsystems, policy core beliefs and external events. Importantly, it has contributed to the growing body of applications outside of the United States, which is crucial given Sabatier’s wish it to have it
widely adopted and in addressing the problems of its applicability identified in this research.

To the SRA, theoretically and empirically in its infancy, this research contributes an important empirical application and theoretical evaluation. The potential refinements identified demonstrate that the concepts the SRA employs need further theoretical and empirical development, notably, in its conceptualisation of the agency-side of the relationship between structure and agency. However, it is a promising theory of policy, whose development should be fostered accordingly through the development of a long-term research program.

**Future research directions**

This thesis has analysed one area of policy to explore the claim that the aviation industry is a privileged actor in environmental policymaking, in the development of UK aviation policy, and more specifically, in the provision of infrastructure. However, there are a number of other areas of policy that there would be merit in examining to analyse further the claim that the industry is privileged (in spite of its increasingly recognised environmental impact).

Staying with a UK-focus, areas of policy ripe for examination include the exclusion of aviation emissions from the Climate Change Act 2008; the historical monopoly that BAA, until recently, enjoyed; and, an area where the aviation industry was arguably not privileged, the 1979 agreement between BAA and West Sussex County Council that committed the former to not building a second runway for thirty years. Expanding the analysis to the European scale, there would be value in examining the aviation industry’s historical position in the EU ETS, notably, their delayed exclusion from it and the conditions surrounding their inclusion in 2012. At the international scale, there would be value in examining why a convention dating back to 1944 still defines the policy framework, one that, in spite of the industry’s increasingly recognised environmental impact, allows international aviation to be exempt from tax.

Another possible line of investigation is to examine similarly contentious air transport issues in other countries, for example, in the emerging markets of Asia, where the industry is expanding at a phenomenal rate and where the role of the state in policymaking is quite different. The findings could potentially uncover quite different mechanisms behind the aviation industry’s position of privilege in policymaking and the motivations and beliefs
behind the actors engaged in the process. Similarly, while this thesis has adopted an historical perspective, cross-national (less-historical) studies would provide a different perspective, particularly in the comparing the effect of different policymaking systems.

In exploring these areas, an approach similar to that used in this research could be taken, collecting empirical data from public records and interviews with key actors and employing the ACF and SRA to help explain the mode and modalities of the aviation industry’s position in policymaking. Familiar with these areas of policymaking and the broad landscape of aviation politics, it is expected that the research findings emerging from an examination of these areas would be broadly similar to those presented here. Specifically, that the combination of structural influences inherent in the policymaking process and the assemblage of powerful pro-growth coalitions facilitate the aviation industry’s position of privilege in environmental policymaking.

Taking a step away from aviation policy, the further development of the ACF and SRA could be facilitated through their application to other areas of environmental policymaking where it is claimed certain actors benefit from a position of privilege (e.g. the nuclear industry) or conversely, a position of (under)privilege (e.g. the renewables industry). Furthermore, applying the ACF and SRA beyond environmental policymaking could complement the theoretical research findings of this thesis, for example, examining the pharmaceutical industry’s position in healthcare policymaking.

As well as facilitating complementary and comparative analysis with the results presented here, employing the ACF and SRA in a multi-theoretical study would further theoretical development, adding weight and helping to address many of the critical refinements posited in this thesis. Extending the geographical scope of the investigation, would encourage further theoretical testing of the ACF and SRA, notably in their ability to travel, a central critique of this research. Methodologically, there is scope to quantitatively test the theoretical conclusions of this thesis, and of these other potential areas of research (e.g. through the coding of interview data), which would offer further opportunity for greater theoretical development.

Final thoughts
As the first paragraph of this chapter highlighted, aviation politics is once again centre stage in the UK. However, where the current situation differs from the case studies examined in
this thesis is that the environmental impacts of the aviation industry are even clearer, with climate change widely recognised as a threat to society. It is a worrying situation that in spite of these environmental impacts, the industry still appears to be able to control the broad direction of policy and act as an obstacle to balance in long-term environmental policymaking. Whether the newly appointed Aviation Commission will be able to settle the debate is anyone’s guess, however, as history has shown, what is not uncertain is that the aviation industry will battle to retain its privileged position in policymaking.
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### Appendix A: List of interviewees, the search for a third London airport

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Date and time</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Role in case study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anon</td>
<td>09/06/10, 1000</td>
<td>Personal residence of Tricia Barber</td>
<td>NWEEHPA Volunteer, worked with Norman Mead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barber, Tricia</td>
<td>09/06/10, 1000</td>
<td>Personal residence</td>
<td>NWEEHPA Volunteer since 1960s, worked with Norman Mead running the office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jameson, Robert</td>
<td>17/06/10, 1030</td>
<td>Jameson &amp; Hill Solicitors, Hertford</td>
<td>Instructing solicitor at Eyre inquiry for consortium of local authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbone, Carol</td>
<td>07/07/10, 1000</td>
<td>SSE Campaign Office, Takeley, Bishop’s Stortford</td>
<td>Stop Stansted Expansion Campaign Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forsyth, Sue</td>
<td>27/10/10, 1130</td>
<td>Personal residence</td>
<td>NWEEHPA member and later campaign director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon</td>
<td>04/11/10, 1700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keene, Sir David</td>
<td>20/01/11, 1115</td>
<td>Royal Courts of Justice, London</td>
<td>QC for consortium of local authorities at the Eyre inquiry and junior counsel (with Douglas Frank as lead QC) for Essex County Council during the Blake inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haselhurst, Sir Alan</td>
<td>25/11/10, 1000</td>
<td>House of Commons, London</td>
<td>MP for Saffron Walden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris, Sir Thomas</td>
<td>13/01/44, 1430</td>
<td>Via telephone</td>
<td>Senior Civil Servant at Department of Trade, responsible for airport policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hall, Professor Peter</td>
<td>16/02/11, 1100</td>
<td>Bartlett School of Planning, UCL</td>
<td>Witness for BAA at Eyre inquiry and Stansted commentator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doganis, Professor Rigas</td>
<td>11/08/11, 1100</td>
<td>Rigas Doganis &amp; Associates, London</td>
<td>Witness for BAA at Eyre inquiry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix B: List of interviewees, Manchester

### Airport’s second runway

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Date and time</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Role in case study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keene, Sir David</td>
<td>20/01/11, 1115</td>
<td>Royal Courts of Justice, London</td>
<td>QC for Manchester Airport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waite, Terry</td>
<td>04/08/11, 1345</td>
<td>The Bridge Project, Suffolk</td>
<td>Patron of, and witness for, MAJAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doganis, Professor Rigas</td>
<td>11/08/11, 1100</td>
<td>Rigas Doganis &amp; Associates, London</td>
<td>Witness for Manchester Airport, specialist advisor/expert witness on airport planning and Head of Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas, Callum</td>
<td>12/08/11, 1000</td>
<td>Café opposite the Centre for Air Transport and the Environment, Manchester Metropolitan University</td>
<td>Head of Environment Department, Manchester Airport and witness for Manchester Airport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yates, Peter</td>
<td>16/08/11, 1000</td>
<td>Personal residence, Macclesfield</td>
<td>Chief Planning Officer for Macclesfield Borough Council and witness for Macclesfield Borough Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter, Tom</td>
<td>17/08/11, 1030</td>
<td>Personal residence, Ludlow</td>
<td>Witness for British Airways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall, Ian</td>
<td>19/08/11, 1000</td>
<td>Backford Hall, near Chester, Cheshire West and Chester Council offices</td>
<td>Principal Conservation Officer, Environmental Planning Services, Cheshire County Council and witness for Cheshire County Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon, Peter</td>
<td>23/08/11, 1400</td>
<td>Via phone</td>
<td>Regional Director, National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural beauty and witness for National Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounds, Peter</td>
<td>24/08/11, 1015</td>
<td>Marriott Hotel, Liverpool</td>
<td>Chief Executive, Liverpool City Council and witness for Merseyside Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shepherd, Jim</td>
<td>25/08/11, 1400</td>
<td>Personal residence, Mobberley</td>
<td>MAJAG supporter and former Director of Engineering at Manchester Airport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howden, Colin</td>
<td>05/09/11, 1000</td>
<td>Transform Scotland office, Edinburgh</td>
<td>Manchester Friend of the Earth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twigg, John</td>
<td>10/10/11, 1630</td>
<td>Via telephone</td>
<td>Infrastructure Planning Manager, Manchester Airport and witness for Manchester Airport</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Interview access letter

Dear Mr. Carter,

I am a PhD Researcher from the School of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia and the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research analysing the role of privileged actors in environmental policymaking: a case study of the aviation industry in the UK.

One of the case studies I am looking at is the decision to approve a second runway at Manchester Airport. Due to your role in the case as a witness at the inquiry for BA plc, and your knowledge and expertise in this general area, it would be really great to talk to you.

I am hoping to begin interviews from the week commencing 25 July 2011 through until the end of September 2011, please suggest a time and place which is convenient with you.

I have enclosed an overview of my research providing you with further details, your contribution would be really valuable to my research.

I look forward to talking to you soon,

Yours Sincerely,

Lauren Roffey

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14 July 2011
Appendix D: Interview crib sheet

Exploratory conversation around a general topic.

1) Introduction
   a. Introduce yourself
   b. Introduce research and answer any questions (use overview form)
   c. Explain nature of interview (consent form)

2) Questions that are not too challenging
   a. Your role in the inquiry
   b. Your relationship with others in the process

3) More central/sensitive areas
   a. Ideas of privilege/fairness
   b. balance
   c. Air of inevitability
   d. Ideas of national interest? Who benefits and who feels the costs?
   e. Relationship between government and aviation industry
   f. Economic vs. environmental
   g. Why do you think policy reversals?
   h. Why do you think it took so long to come to a decision?
   i. What inhibited the policymaking process?
   j. What do you think of the relative power the industry has compared to other actors in the process?
   k. Future of Stansted? Was the end actually the end?

4) Tying up
   a. Any questions?
   b. Any points you would like to tell me which we have not covered?
   c. Any exchange of material?
   d. Can I contact you again as my research progresses?
   e. Any other potential interviewees?
Appendix E: Interview consent form

I can confirm I have read and understood information about the project. The purpose and intent of the interview has been explained to me.

I understand my participation is voluntary and I can withdraw from the interview at any point, without providing any justification.

To maintain confidentiality please select one of the following options:

I give permission for my name to be used where what I have said as part of this study can be used in all research outputs so that anything I have contributed can be recognised.

I do not wish my name to be used, however I am happy to be cited as:

I do not wish my name to be used.

I confirm that the information gained may be used in internal and external publications, reports and presentations; however my name will not be used unless I gave permission above.

I agree that if there is any information I would like to keep completely off the record I will indicate this clearly.

Any questions that I have asked about the purpose and nature of this interview have been answered to my satisfaction.

I voluntarily agree to take participate in the research project. This will include being interviewed and recorded (audio).

I agree to assign the copyright I hold to any materials related to this project to Lauren Roffey.

........................................................................................................................................
Name of participant (PRINT)  Signature and date
........................................................................................................................................
Researcher (PRINT)  Signature and date