Equity-efficiency trade-offs in irrigation water sharing: Evidence from a field lab in rural Tanzania

D'Exelle, Ben ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9332-5223, Lecoutere, Els and van Campenhout, Bjorn (2012) Equity-efficiency trade-offs in irrigation water sharing: Evidence from a field lab in rural Tanzania. World Development, 40 (12). pp. 2537-2551.

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Abstract

This article studies how users of scarce common water resources deal with equity-efficiency trade-offs. For this purpose, we conduct a field lab experiment in Tanzania that simulates the distribution of irrigation water between upstream and downstream users. We find a strong preference for equal sharing even if this comes with large foregone efficiency gains. However, we also find indications that efficiency considerations are taken into account. (Selfish) deviations from equal sharing are more likely implemented when they are efficiency-enhancing. Finally, we detect a tendency to alternate between altruistic and selfish sharing, which reconciles equity and efficiency considerations.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Global Development (formerly School of International Development)
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Experimental Economics (former - to 2017)
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Gender and Development
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Impact Evaluation
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural and Experimental Development Economics
Depositing User: Julie Frith
Date Deposited: 03 Dec 2012 13:13
Last Modified: 15 Jun 2023 23:35
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/40338
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.05.026

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