Cartel laws undermined: Corruption, social norms and collectivist business cultures

Stephan, Andreas ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9839-7338 (2010) Cartel laws undermined: Corruption, social norms and collectivist business cultures. Journal of Law and Society, 37 (2). pp. 345-367. ISSN 1467-6478

Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)

Abstract

The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in United States Antitrust Law. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these ‘conventional’ enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. This paper identifies three issues which may undermine the universal efficacy of these cartel laws: (i) corruption and organized crime; (ii) social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (iii) collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Competition, Markets and Regulation Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy
Depositing User:	Julie Frith
Date Deposited:	15 Apr 2011 12:40
Last Modified:	11 Aug 2023 13:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/29472
DOI:	10.1111/j.1467-6478.2010.00507.x

Actions (login required)

View Item