It is typical for reports such as this to have a long list of capital letters, clumsy shorthand for the array of organisations, programmes and project components that populate international development. I have done my best to keep acronyms and abbreviations to a minimum, using only the following:

**Amref**  
African Medical and Research Foundation (the principal NGO involved, responsible for managing the project in Katine)

**KCPP**  
Katine Community Partnerships Project (the name of the project)

**NGO**  
Non-governmental organisation

I would like to thank all of those who have helped make this review possible – in particular, those at the Guardian, Barclays, Amref and Farm-Africa who have contributed their time and effort, and to the people of Katine who have shared their thoughts on the Katine community partnerships project.

I would also like to give particular thanks to Dan Wroe, who has worked on analysing the data and putting the review together.
The Katine community partnerships project (KCPP) is a major development initiative, located in Katine, a sub-county of 29,300 people in north-eastern Uganda.

The KCPP is an integrated, community-based development project that aims to improve the lives of people living in Katine. It is sponsored by Guardian News & Media and Barclays, and receives support from Guardian readers. Over three years, £2.5m has been budgeted for the project. Responsibility for managing the project is with the African Medical and Research Foundation (Amref), an African non-governmental organisation (NGO). Specific elements of the project are supported by two other NGOs, Farm-Africa and Care International through its local partner, Uweso. The KCPP is making major investments in the following related sectors:

**Education** [page 19]

**Water & Sanitation** [page 21]

**Health** [page 23]

**Livelihoods** [page 25]

**Governance** [page 27]

The governance strand focuses on empowering people in the sub-county. This is to ensure that people have the capacity to keep the infrastructure in place and maintain the work of the KCPP once the project draws to a close in 2011.

The KCPP is important for its use of journalism and web-based technologies. In place of the usual Christmas appeal, the Guardian decided to see if Katine offered a new way of reporting development, and a new way of using “21st-century technologies” to address problems of poverty and under-development. Could a news organisation hold the attention of readers beyond Christmas? Throughout the project, the Guardian has run a website dedicated to Katine, which provides a forum for discussion and debate. The website has used traditional reporting alongside “new media”, such as blogs from “experts”,

---

‘This is the village where the Guardian hopes to transform lives and prospects. In three years’ time Katine and its sub-county should have taken some sizeable steps... it may be a very different place’

*Guardian launch supplement, October 2007*

‘The record is mixed. Development is a difficult business, with frequent setbacks’

*Madeleine Bunting “Katine: Two Years On” 1 November 2009*
comments from readers, videos and interviews, which provide an ongoing discussion about Katine, exploring what is being done there and what might be done better. It is a remarkable degree of exposure for one development project. The openness shown by all of the partners involved means that source material rarely put in the public domain — surveys, budgets and evaluations — is available on the site.

The purpose of this review is to provide an overview of the KCPP, how it was conducted and what lessons have been learned. In each chapter, I look at a particular aspect of the KCPP, building a story of the project, how it has been reported, commented on and used, and how it has evolved over the past three years. In a move away from the usual evaluations — with their multiplicity of acronyms and accumulated detail — the concern is to offer an overall narrative which appeals to a wider audience of policy makers, academics, journalists, NGO workers and others interested in international development.

A central focus is the relationship between the Guardian and the different NGOs involved in the project. As the opening quotations suggest, what started out as a relatively simple idea of helping people in a rural community in Africa became increasingly complicated as time went on. What follows is my assessment of the project, how it worked and how it changed over time. I look at key moments, such as the building of the school at Amorikot and the football tournament. In piecing together an analysis of the KCPP, I draw on insights from academics looking at similar situations elsewhere. I also draw heavily on my own knowledge of eastern Uganda, its history, patterns of social organisation and politics. (I have conducted detailed ethnographic work in a community 30 miles to the south of Katine.) Included within the analysis are shorter pieces on what has been achieved in the five different project strands (see pages 19–28).

First, some background on the project. The KCPP was started by the Guardian and Barclays in October 2007. The idea for Katine came from the Guardian’s editor, Alan Rusbridger. He wanted to use “all the possibilities of the web [to] give maximum exposure to the challenges of development". The project also made sure that the Guardian, as a news organisation, continued its commitment to innovate in terms of reporting international development issues. When the project was first proposed, web-based technologies were far less developed than they are now. In April 2007, Facebook had 20 million subscribers (compared to 500 million today). Newspaper websites could not carry much video material. Technologies which now seem relatively commonplace – Twitter, Flickr, Posterous – had not yet been invented, or were not yet widely used. A concept such as “crowd-sourcing” (using the internet to get people from wherever they are to pool information on a given subject) had yet to be tested in the context of a development project. The web 2.0 platform that Katine uses was, in 2007, at the cutting edge in terms of interactive information sharing.

This was an innovative approach to development. It moved coverage away from one-off stories, or the sort of reporting that traditionally profiles major crises in the developing world. Two Ugandan journalists, Joseph Malinga and Richard M Kavuma, worked as reporters to provide a different view on the KCPP and development generally. Katine looked at the complex processes of development and change in a community over a three-year period. The close partnership between the Guardian and the NGOs on which the Katine project was built has been widely recognised for its achievements in bringing development to a wider audience in a new way. The website was awarded the 2008 International Visual Communications Association “Clarion” award, and the 2008 One World Media new media award for its ongoing coverage of development. Guardian News & Media (which owns the Guardian), Barclays and Amref also won the 2010 Coffey International Award for Excellence, granted by Business in the Community, which recognises organisations that have had a positive impact in pursuing the UN’s millennium development goals.

Katine was launched through the Guardian Christmas appeal back in 2007. Interested readers could give a one-off donation or commit to giving a monthly sum. They could then track the progress of the project over the three years on the website and in the newspaper. Before this, the Guardian had established a partnership with Barclays. Barclays was interested in supporting an holistic development programme that offered significant learning and also the opportunity to test new approaches to financial services. Barclays made an initial donation of £500,000, partly to help with start-up funding, including the costs of setting up the website, and then a further £1m in match-funding reader donations over the three years of the project. Barclays also funded the village savings and loans associations. The choice of Katine made sense for Barclays’ corporate profile in Africa. Barclays has 53 branches dotted throughout Uganda and more than 120,000 Ugandan customers.

Why Katine? A number of NGOs responded to the Guardian’s call for expressions of interest. In the end, there was a shortlist of three. The two that did not succeed were proposals by major, UK-based, international NGOs. Amref’s winning proposal for an
integrated community development project in Katine was chosen for two principal reasons. First, Amref is based in Africa, with headquarters in Nairobi. This gives a different profile from the more famous or visible international NGOs, such as Oxfam. Second, there was a sense that Katine would be a place readers could identify with. Katine was poor, demonstrating many of the fundamental issues associated with poverty in rural Africa. Being rural meant it was also a bounded space. People using the website or reading the paper would have a defined sense of the geography within which their project was operating.28

Amref’s office in London set up a dedicated staff team to work on Katine, to manage the relationship with the project donors — the Guardian and Barclays — and to provide separate administrative support to manage the donations.30 The Uganda country office in Kampala and field office in Katine were responsible for the implementation of the KCPP on the ground. Amref UK managed the grant and reported to the funders, along with Amref Uganda, on how the project was doing. This reporting was done most obviously in the form of the six-month and annual project reports. There were also two types of project evaluation, one commissioned by Amref, the other commissioned by the Guardian.31 Evaluators gave ongoing feedback to the project as it progressed. Much of the documentation for the project was made available on the website, including all the reviews and evaluations. These reports provide much of the material for this review.

In terms of the overall governance structure of the project — the way it was run from the top — the original idea was to have a steering committee made up of Alan Rusbridger, editor of the Guardian, Dr Michael Smalley, director general of Amref, and Rachael Barber, the then head of global community investment for Barclays. As the project progressed, the management structure shifted down towards a system of monthly conference calls involving those closer to the project. This group included Joshua Kyallo and Susan Wandera (Amref Uganda), Grace Mukasa and Claudia Codsi (Amref UK), Madeleine Bunting, Liz Ford and Jo Confinio (the Guardian) and Barclays’ relationship manager, initially Susie Hares and then Rachael Barber. These monthly calls were an opportunity for partners to explain what they were doing, and to relate the work of the project to what was being discussed on the Guardian’s Katine website.●

Katine is a poor part of a poor country. Uganda’s gross national income per person in 2007 was $1,059 (£676), making it 163rd out of 181 countries listed in the UN Human Development Report.32 Soroti district, where Katine is located, has a poverty prevalence of 77% (meaning 77% of the people there are categorised as poor by the government of Uganda), far worse than the national average of 31%.33

The majority of households in Katine make a living through cultivating foodstuffs — cassava, groundnuts, millet, sorghum and sweet potatoes.34 Much of this is used to feed the family, and life is categorised around a fairly modest set of activities, which generate some sort of income for people. Day labouring for a neighbour, farming one’s land or, in the case of women, brewing and selling beer, offer the most regular sources of income for the majority.35 What you find in most villages are churches, a primary school, a local court and organisations based on the extended family. There are also NGOs and community-based organisations working in many rural areas.

This present-day poverty contrasts sharply with Katine’s history. In the first half of the 20th century, the Teso region, where Katine is located, was noted for its cotton production.36 For most of the colonial and post-colonial period, Teso was relatively prosperous. Cotton production required the imposition of a number of hierarchical structures — chiefs, schools, mission churches, local government offices — which have also persisted through the various post-colonial regimes. Profits from cotton were invested into acquiring large stocks of cattle, which retained their cultural value. As late as the early 1980s, it was not unusual to find a “big man” in Katine with 200 or 300 head of cattle.37 To a certain extent, Katine falls outside the standard narrative of Uganda.38 The 1970s, the years of Idi Amin — typically seen as the nadir of Uganda’s post-colonial disaster — were relatively peaceful. This is not really true for Katine. For Katine, things got much, much worse in 1986.

The current government came to power in 1986. At the time, there was a power vacuum in the east of the country. The new government had its support base in western and central Uganda and saw Katine as
an opposition area. Raiders from the north-east were allowed into Katine, and they looted cattle. Over a three-year period, up to half a million head of cattle were taken from Teso, destroying the region’s wealth. By the end of 1986, Teso was in open rebellion against the new government. Initially, rebels targeted soldiers, police officers and politicians from the new regime. But as the rebellion dragged on, much of the violence turned inwards. This had a profound effect. The rebellion became localised and politicised, with rebels attacking local leaders and clan elders, often on the back of already existing conflicts. In 2003, incursions by a rebel movement called the Lord’s Resistance Army further underscored the sense of insecurity.

---

Amref
In the spotlight

‘Our vision is an Africa where good-quality, affordable health care is accessible to everyone’
(Amref)
http://amrefuk.org/who-we-are/

‘Our mission is to create lasting change in poor communities and we put money where it is needed most’
(Care International)
http://www.careinternational.org.uk/who-we-are

‘Oxfam is a global movement of people working with others to overcome poverty and suffering’
(Oxfam)
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/
Public perceptions of NGOs are very positive. They can claim to work with people on the margins of the global system. Their work is value-driven, and NGOs raise funds on the basis that they bring about meaningful change (Howell and Pearce, 2001). Visits to the websites of different NGOs (including those involved in the KCPP) reveal the mission statements (previous page).

For most people interested in development, knowledge of NGOs comes from a newsletter or from a fundraising campaign. This means that NGOs have been relatively free to define how they are perceived, with the result that something of the complexity and compromise involved in doing development work gets edited out. Those who actually have to implement a project are aware that claims made in newsletters or fundraising campaigns are optimistic and have to be a simplification of what is a complicated reality. The wider public is less aware of these constraints. There is often a fairly sizeable gap, therefore, between the way NGOs present themselves at home and the complex and messy business of implementing a project abroad. The KCPP began with the dictum “it starts with a village”. The complexity of starting with a village only became clear as the project went on.

The Guardian’s spotlight on the KCPP has both highlighted this gap and helped to bridge it. This has not always been a comfortable experience. The Guardian’s involvement meant a remarkable degree of public scrutiny for one particular development project, and the KCPP has been a particularly defining experience for Amref. Its work has been scrutinised by journalists, academics, practitioners and bloggers.

Commentary on the website became critical of the KCPP fairly early on. Take, perhaps, the most complicated story told on the website – that of the building of Amorikot primary school. Over the past three years, Guardian journalists and public commentators documented the mixed and uneven experience of Amorikot. Amref adopted an approach that differed from the usual “community-supported” model used by other NGOs in the Teso region. It brought in a contractor from Kampala, the capital city, in the hope of getting the school built quickly. This was later presented as a way of winning over people in the area and of showing early results to those funding the project. A basic chronology of what appeared on the website, in terms of critical articles and blogged comments on Amorikot and education, is as follows (right).
The last piece, written by Anne Perkins in November 2009, suggested that the confident-looking outside appearance of the new school at Amorikot threatened to become a “shell”, with declining local support, no money from the district education office, unused textbooks and a high turnover of teachers. While there were a number of more positive pieces, particularly early on – “training to make a difference”, “primary schools get health kits” – the dominant narrative is of the unevenness of the work.

This is not an unusual story. Getting schools built in Uganda is a difficult business, and there are many far more troubling stories than that of Amorikot primary school. Many of the government-built school facilities, for example, collapsed or were not fit for use because contractors substituted cheaper sand for cement. What was unusual about the construction of Amorikot primary school was not that things went wrong, but that it happened so publicly. The story was available to anyone who wanted to go to the Katine website. While this story is something Ugandans observe on a regular basis, it is less familiar to the sort of people who receive a campaign newsletter, or contribute to a fundraising appeal, back in the UK.

The criticism and scrutiny that surrounded different parts of the project proved extremely difficult for KCPP staff. A review of the project conducted at the halfway stage noted that project staff had little idea of what blogging might mean in terms of opening up their work to criticism, which was often hostile in tone (Slavin, 2009). Take, for example, the following comment from Ugandalife about the use of outside contractors in school building work:

"It was insulting [of Amref] to suggest that local builders could not build a quality school ... Involved with the design? Not likely. Was the community informed that 173 Ugandan shillings (£52,424) were being spent on a school? Not likely. There were no specifics about what the community involvement was ... Of course, the people would be happy with what they got. An oversized tent could have been erected and they would have been happy."

This kind of commentary was difficult for Amref staff to deal with. Hazel Slavin, author of the mid-term review, said that staff “go to work anticipating what they might see on the website”, making them feel “upset, sometimes confused and angry”. And yet, Ugandalife raised real issues. The way the decisions were made deserved scrutiny, while Amref’s claims about community involvement, which takes time, contradicted its earlier statement about making Amorikot a quick win.

The Guardian also invited experts such as Jeffrey Sachs and Paul Collier to post on the Katine website. These contributions typically took the form of a transcribed interview with a journalist, or an editorial on a particular development topic. They offered a way of debating some of the big issues in global development. Experts presented their view on such development topics as why Africa is poor, whether aid is a good thing, or the nature of the relationship between religion and HIV/AIDS. This brought important issues in development to a wider audience.

At the same time, the views of these experts were sometimes at variance with what was being done on the ground, demonstrating the plurality of views on development and how best to do it. On 25 February 2008, for example, an interview with Bob Reed of Loughborough University’s Water, Education and Development Centre, was posted. Reed made a general statement about what works in terms of water interventions in Africa. He argued that for boreholes and piped water systems to succeed, there needed to be continued financial and managerial support from outsiders. This contradicted the approach adopted in Katine (where the boreholes were funded by an NGO, and where communities were trained to manage and maintain the borehole once the project ends).

Like the ongoing reporting on Amorikot, the interview with Reed is an example of journalism opening up some of the assumptions behind a particular development project. At the same time, this sort of “comment” had to hang in the air; it could not be easily incorporated into the project design on the ground (something discussed later). There was a tension between what could be debated on the website and what was practicable.
The Guardian
Debating development/ funding

By the halfway stage, there had been a total of 17 separate visits to Katine by Guardian journalists. More often than not, the same journalist visited on more than one occasion, producing a more complex and critical picture of development issues in the UK media. The story of Amorikot primary school showed readers what development looks like. As Charlie Beckett, of the London School of Economics, notes:

The fact is that we want NGOs to work against injustice and poverty. We expect them to speak out passionately in favour of policies that advance their goals and support their work. That is quite different from our traditional assumptions about journalism. We want journalists who are independent, critical and skilled at investigation and honest storytelling.  

The sort of journalism that speaks directly to the reader is that which provokes a debate or reveals something otherwise hidden. The pieces criticising Amref’s work or pointing to problems on the ground generated more debate, more “traffic” from bloggers. The article on school desks by Joseph Malinga generated more reaction than did “opening new doors at Katine primary school”: 63 blogged comments compared to zero.

The Guardian’s simultaneous role as sponsor of the project and also as host of the online space where the project was debated pulled in different directions. The information that appeared on the website – whether in the form of comments from bloggers, articles by journalists, or opinion pieces by experts – was more than just a way of opening up development to a new audience. It also challenged what was being done in a project the news organisation had chosen to fund. Many journalists interviewed for this review expressed a desire to draw a clear distinction between the Guardian’s role as funder and its work in reporting on the project. But this was not always how things were perceived by others. There was a blurring of boundaries. The KCPP had, in some ways, to respond to what appeared on the website. By the time of Amref’s March 2009 report, for example, the school building component of the KCPP had moved to “the community approach that Amref had used in other projects”, where construction costs were minimised through the “community contribution of local building resources” such as bricks and sand for the cement. This was, in part, a response to pressures from the website.

The power that comes with funding a project is something that all development agencies deal with. In the more usual case, the funding agency – the World Bank or the UK’s Department for International Development, for example – is highly familiar with the way things are done. The World Bank staffer is practised in the ways of being a donor and can set to one side some of the discomfort that comes from being very powerful in a place where people are relatively powerless. For journalists, the situation has been much less familiar. The desire to draw a clear distinction between the project as something managed by the NGO, and the reporting as something done by journalists – a point made repeatedly in interview – was also a way of acknowledging that this separation was never really complete. Things were never as settled or fixed as had been imagined at the start.

The reporting of health issues shows some of the complexities of debating development while also sponsoring a development project. In its original design, the KCPP health programme focused the majority of its efforts on community-based approaches and preventative measures. Children were immunised, insecticide-treated bednets provided, clean water access increased. Early articles looked at Amref’s efforts in these areas of community health work. As time went on, discussions on health looked more and more at the question of access to drugs and the lack of expert medical treatment at the health centres in Tiriri and Ojom.

Tiriri offered a window on global health concerns such as the provision of cheaper generic drugs. In the above, you also notice that the constituency which built up around Tiriri health centre included DfID and GlaxoSmithKline. At the same time, the KCPP had its focus on community-based approaches and preventative measures such as the distribution of bednets. There was a degree of disjuncture between what was debated on the website and what was happening on the ground.
benefit more people directly. The scaling up was also a response to demands from people in Katine, who matched by the scaling up of the agricultural component (livelihoods) to reach more people. The increase in budget allocation was also matched by the scaling up of the agricultural (livelihoods) increased from £144,762 to £195,467, and as a share of the budget from 17% to 29%.

There was also a concern that the original structure of the project allocated too few resources to the livelihoods component. The project evaluator, Rick Davies, mentions this as a concern in his review at the end of the first year of the project. Farm-Africa also argued for more funds for livelihoods, as did the Guardian and Barclays. In the initial conception of the project, it was the least prioritised of the four areas that required major physical investments. There was much less money when compared to water and sanitation, education and health. As the project progressed there was a fairly dramatic increase, as the increasing slice of pink in the graph (right) shows:

Over the three years, the money allocated to agriculture (livelihoods) increased from £144,762 to £195,467, and as a share of the budget from 17% to 29%.

This increase in budget allocation was also matched by the scaling up of the agricultural component (livelihoods) to reach more people. The project shifted from working with 18 farmers’ groups in a fairly intensive and innovative way, towards a more surface-level interaction with 66 groups (one for each village in the sub-county). This was in response to demands from people in Katine, who argued that the livelihoods component should benefit more people directly. The scaling up was also something supported by evaluators, journalists and commentators on the website. At the same time,
rapid scaling up caused concern among staff working on livelihoods both in Katine and in Farm-Africa’s UK office. This may explain the mixed results (Livelihoods, page 25).

What appeared on the website was not a neutral thing, nor was it entirely extrinsic to the life of the project on the ground. Bloggers, journalists and development experts helped shape what was valued in terms of what was being done on the ground. This was a more open way of doing development work. It made the project more complicated, and meant that there was a much wider and more diverse constituency addressing the question of how to do development in Katine. One way in which Amref responded to this was to stick to the way the project was originally designed.

What emerges, when going through the KCPP reports and reviews, is a sense of a well-designed blueprint. The six-monthly reviews measure the progress of the project against the original project design. Surprisingly, given what has been discussed so far, there is almost no reference to the Guardian in the KCPP’s own reporting, or the influence that the website had on the project. Though journalists, “experts” and bloggers made the project a very particular experience for field staff – as evaluators noted – this is something rarely discussed in the project documentation provided by Amref. If a regular reader of the website went to the KCPP reports to find out about the project’s complexities, it would not really be revealed. Instead, changes to the school building programme, the agriculture (livelihoods) budget, or the health centre at Tiriri are described with little reference to the role of the newspaper or the website. The picture which emerges in the project documents is very much one of an organisation implementing its work. Why is there this disjuncture?

In answering this question, it is important to think of the number of relationships KCPP had to manage and maintain. Projects involve myriad relationships. In terms of the KCPP, there were relationships between different NGOs, beneficiaries, funders, local, district and national governments, academics, Barclays, the Guardian, journalists, bloggers and a global audience. There are also relationships within organisations. Some journalists were closer to others; some of the KCPP staff in Katine had a closer relationship with the country team in Kampala or the London office. There were also relationships between different organisations. A journalist might have a good relationship with one project officer on the KCPP, or an Amref project officer might get on well with a counterpart in Farm-Africa. Maintaining an
idea of the logic or coherence of the project while also making sense of the complexity of these different relationships is difficult. In the case of the KCPP, the complexity was of a different order, because of the involvement of the Guardian, which was running a website on the project.

Professor David Mosse, of the School of Oriental and African Studies, argues that project documents offer a space for coherence in a world that is otherwise diffuse. Documents are a way of holding together what are often contradictory interests. Development projects involve many participants, and any sense of unity is easily destabilised: “The greater the number of people invited to the party, the more energy is expended attending to their needs, and the more their needs shape a project”. They are also holding off demands. Not only does the neatness and logic of the original blueprint give some assurance of coherence, it offers a space which gives value to the authority and expertise of the NGO. This explains why those parts of the project that were in the original blueprint are also those discussed in greatest detail in the KCPP reports.

The one thing that truly existed outside the blueprint was the football tournament held in 2009. (This is something barely commented on in KCPP documents.) The tournament was initiated by journalists from the Guardian and was seen as a way of involving youth in the sub-county. The football tournament provided the sort of event that might engage new readers (football fans) in using the Katine website, and had the active support of the editor of the sports desk. It was very much the initiative of the Guardian and was supported by the country office of Amref Uganda. The football tournament was based on the understanding that NGOs should be able to adapt their work as they go along. As the planning progressed, however, it became clear that there was much less interest in the tournament from KCPP staff on the ground.

In Mosse’s language, the football tournament “destabilised” the project too much, and at this point the blueprint became something very real.

The tournament was never fully integrated into the work of the KCPP. It was not the sort of thing KCPP staff were used to doing, and it involved lots of people from Katine, many of whom expected a lot from the KCPP, but who had been marginal to other aspects of the project. The football tournament was hugely popular with young men and women in Katine. It required a lot of time, spontaneity and adaptability. At the same time, it added yet more relationships, organisations and individuals to the project. Aside from the large numbers of youths involved, the Uganda national football team came to Katine; there was also a visit from the Barclays Premier League trophy. Officials from the Ugandan Football Association were involved, as was another NGO, Cosseda, which had been working in the region to set up a Teso-wide football league. No one really owned the football tournament, even though for many people in Katine it was a very tangible and popular moment.

Reflecting on the tournament a year on, for example, Charles Eromu, chairman of the Katine sub-county football association, observed in an interview with Richard M Kavuma: “The football tournament was a good idea because it helped us identify talented youngsters … it helped the young people themselves to discover what they can do.” But Eromu also added that “things had gone back to what they were before the tournament”. New football pitches that had been promised for the different schools had not been delivered, while the goalposts and signposts had spent half a year in the storeroom of the KCPP office, before being transferred to the schools. While the project could be stretched to reflect new thinking on existing strands, it was difficult to adapt to something entirely new.

NGOs are often admired for their adaptability, flexibility and capacity for innovation. Yet NGOs are also anxious to implement what they have committed themselves to do. They are wary about being pulled in too many directions. A blueprint is a coherent framework that provides a practical guide to what to do. It articulates goals, methods and expected outcomes and is a way of achieving a degree of predictability. In the case of the KCPP, the blueprint also served as a way of resisting demands placed on the project by others. While people at the Guardian, or those participating on the website, wanted to feel that the project was a dynamic, responsive and evolving thing, this was not necessarily what was wanted by project staff. In some ways, NGOs are in a bind. If they don’t implement the blueprint – which is, after all, a contractual agreement – they are failing to deliver. But if they stick too closely to the blueprint, they are open to the criticism that they are not flexible enough.
Katine
Influencing the project?

In all of this back-and-forth between NGOs and the Guardian, what influence did people in Katine have? Development is often framed around ideas of engaging with the powerless, allowing the “voices” of the poor to be heard. NGOs, in particular, present themselves as giving a voice to the voiceless. The KCPP included the idea that blogs, citizen journalism, live link-ups between schools in Katine and the UK, and the use of new media would offer people in the community ways of campaigning and commenting on what they saw taking place around them. In Katine, a media resource centre was established to allow people to achieve these things. The resource centre was a room with computers and access to the internet, and was one half of the building that housed KCPP staff in Katine. In the centre people could read about the project and use the internet to communicate concerns and stories.

The experience of KCPP suggests a number of things. First, that the digital divide is, in many ways, difficult to bridge. There are problems of literacy and a lack of formal education. Many of those living in Katine struggled to translate or formulate their stories in ways that fitted in to how outsiders wanted to understand them. Those with more education, or more past experience of development work, proved better at putting their stories across. The way Katine is discussed on the website, or in this review, would seem odd to many, and trying to fit a comment or write a response to a piece by a journalist was not always straightforward. To give an example, it is fairly usual in Katine to talk about life through a religious or strongly moral idiom — Pentecostal Christianity is a big influence in the region. This is a form of expression that may be at odds with the secular, liberal narrative of development.

At the same time, accessing new media depended on using the community resource centre, which meant sitting in the same building as KCPP staff or talking to Joseph Malinga, a journalist employed through Panos, a global network of journalists and reporters. Malinga helped run the community centre (the only place in Katine with access to the internet). This meant that the potential of the internet as a democratic or critical space could not really be realised. The use of web-based technologies placed KCPP staff in a contradictory position. While, on paper, there must be a commitment to listening to communities, to hearing their voices, in practice certain voices are easier to listen to than others.

Instead, what seemed to worked well in Katine was the more traditional approach of talking to journalists to get their story out. Many of the reports on the website relied on observations or information from locals. The building of Amorikot primary school is more than a story of journalists observing a problem at a distance from the community. It is also a story of people in Katine helping make the story. Journalists were approached by locals and provided with leads. The article by Joseph Malinga that reported a discrepancy between the number of desks delivered to a school and the number accounted for on the project books depended on a schoolteacher raising the issue in the first place.

The American scholars Margaret E Keck (Johns Hopkins University) and Kathryn Sikkink (University of Maryland) write about this. They show how people use a distant third party to apply pressure on those with power nearer to them. In their particular study, Keck and Sikkink look at advocacy networks and focus on community organisations which use international NGOs to change national government policy. They term this a “boomerang effect”. The issue is thrown out by the relatively powerless and returned back with greater force by the powerful outsider. In Katine, a slightly different boomerang was to hand. Journalists became the powerful outsider and people on the ground were the ones who threw out the issue to put pressure back on the NGO. In this, the people of Katine appeared to understand the Guardian’s role as reporter/funder more clearly than others.

But boomerangs do not always bounce back. For the powerless to bring about change, they must get the powerful interested and engaged. People in Katine most consistently petitioned for cattle, but they were never part of the project. While the Guardian journalist, David Smith, noted that “it seems it will take a long time to persuade Katine farmers that cattle is anything but the answer to their prayers” (8 December 2008), Farm-Africa, the NGO responsible for the original design of the livelihoods component (subsequently managed by Amref with technical support from Farm-Africa), did not allow space for cattle to enter into the project. The NGO’s initial assessment committed the project to promoting food security and cash crops, village savings and loans associations, and “rural innovation groups”. Venansio Tumuhaise, project officer for...
Development agencies tend to focus more strongly on the promised delivery of change in the future than they do on analysing the historical contexts and origins of development ideas and practices.”

Lewis, 2009: 32

David Lewis, of the London School of Economics had just returned from visiting the Swedish government’s international development agency. Sida had recently moved offices. Amid the chaos of the move, staff were told to jettison documents that were more than two years old. Lewis reflects on this, and puzzles over the way development is drawn towards the future to the exclusion of the past. Though recent history is probably the best way of predicting the immediate future, it is rarely allowed to influence the way development gets done. Development has “a strong – and in many ways understandable – sense of wanting to look forward rather than back.”

One of the things the Guardian wanted to do with Katine was to get beyond this. Early on in the project there were a number of articles on the website that linked Katine to broader histories of development, for example, pieces looking at the evolution of Uganda’s relationship with international donors. In a more particular way, repeated reference has been made to the incursions of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Katine from 2003 to 2006 (though, it should be noted, this has been a less defining experience for people than the insurgency of the late 1980s and early 1990s). More generally, the website allowed space for a discussion of the past and how it informed the

livelihoods, suggested that people placed too much emphasis on cows: “There are other farming communities in Uganda where people just rely on a hand hoe” (30 November 2008). This denies the skills-base of the region (ploughing is a technique that people in Teso have - a technological advantage over other societies in Uganda). As the anthropologist Ivan Karp suggests, cattle are “an important nexus of value for the Iteso”. They not only plough the fields, they also mean a lot. To implement a project the size of the KCPP in Katine without doing much involving cattle was unusual. Cattle provide milk. They form part of the gifts given to a woman’s family on marriage, and the giving of cattle from father to son is a way of showing that the son is becoming a man. They also represent a way of maintaining social order and peaceable relations between generations. The loss of cattle during the insurgency years (1986-1993) is a big part of the reason people are poor and there are high levels of latent conflict.

A series of articles looked at the cattle question. But this did not bring about changes in the project design. The expertise of the NGO took precedence over what would have been popular on the ground. The problem of “the cultural tradition of individual ownership” was pointed to, as was the need to bring people into line with the government’s agricultural priorities. The livelihoods component of the KCPP, like the work of many other NGOs in the Teso region, focused on cash crops, such as oranges and lemons, where the results have been mixed. A major investment later on in the project was in the community produce store, though such collective enterprises have a high failure rate in the Teso region. At the same time, I wanted cattle to be part of the project. But I was also aware that cattle were not seen as suitable, based on budget availability and the timescale of the project. At times, models of development are not always easy to relate to the history of a place.
present. This was what I chose to write about. At the start of the KCPP, I was brought in to write blogs on the history of Katine, to give some political and social context. But if you look at where the weight of reporting falls, the focus is on the present and future. History matters not just because it is “context”, but also because it influences how people act in the present. Past experiences inform the way people respond to a new development project (this may also be why the past is seen as an inconvenience that compromises the promise of “change”).

Village health teams, introduced by the KCPP, are an example of this. Village health teams are meant to keep working once the funded part of the project comes to an end. They are part of a national strategy, which the government is formally committed to supporting. But villagers have seen village health teams in Katine before. Their earlier incarnation had fallen into disuse because of a lack of external support. According to the Ugandan journalist, Richard M Kavuma, the position of KCPP staff is that these earlier versions lacked “mobilisation, motivation and facilitation”. This is a less important point than the fact that this earlier failure shapes people’s expectations (something discussed in the next section).

At the same time, it is important to understand that the KCPP is not only contextualised against past development interventions but also made sense of against Katine’s broader history. The KCPP was only part of what was going on in Katine, not the whole story. During the Teso insurgency from 1986 to 1993, Katine was one of the most troubled areas. The major road that runs through the sub-county was subject to ambush and robbery and was rarely travelled. People even took to cutting down the electricity poles as a way of cutting the area off. As many journalists have observed, conflict is not something external to Katine, not something “brought in” by the Lord’s Resistance Army. The KCPP was operating in a fragmented and politicised landscape of often sharp divisions.

This history of violence also has implications for the long-term success of the KCPP. For many of the things that require a lot of “community participation”, such as the village health teams, the prospects are uncertain. Similarly, the resistance to giving people cattle because this encourages individualism may be problematic. Individualism is not only part of some deep cultural logic, it is also a measured response to the recent past. One exception may be the Barclays-sponsored village savings and loans associations in Katine as a way of testing out possible approaches to meeting the need for financial services among poorer people, and felt that it was working well enough to roll out a much larger version of the same scheme to work with half a million people in poorer parts of the world. In Katine, an Amref report states that in one year the 66 associations already in existence had accumulated a total of 72,504,550 Ugandan shillings (£22,482).

In some ways, village savings and loans associations do seem to build some sort of co-operation and trust in a place still coming to terms with the memory of the insurgency. But in many ways, their success comes from the fact that the social agenda of village savings and loans associations is fairly modest. They allow people to choose what to do with the money. They are not particularly prescriptive and, unlike many other development efforts, do not require people to engage in collective enterprises. People could borrow money from village savings and loans associations to buy cattle. Loans emphasised the individual, rather than the co-operative. Loans for fishing, brewing, running restaurants, setting up businesses and purchasing equipment have helped households diversify their sources of income in ways that did not require group work. Part of the usefulness of village savings and loans associations is that, unlike comparable programmes, they leave it up to the individual to decide what to do with the money. People had a say and did not have to rely on the government.

The associations require a membership fee of only 200 Ugandan shillings (8p) and members save regular sums; this then provides a common pool from which they can borrow, but the borrowing can be for individual needs. Barclays supported village savings and loans associations in Katine as a way of testing out possible approaches to meeting the need for financial services among poorer people, and felt that it was working well enough to roll out a much larger version of the same scheme to work with half a million people in poorer parts of the world.
The KCPP: Sustainability and empowerment

The table below lists the amount of money available for development-related activities in Katine. It lists the money available from the district government, the sub-county government and the KCPP (it excludes staff salaries).

### Budget allocation for activities in Katine sub-county in 2008 and 2009 (GBP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Sub-County</th>
<th>KCPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£308,590</td>
<td>£13,507</td>
<td>£361,976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Amref budget 2009; Soroti district development plan 09/10 p.41; Katine sub-county development plan 09/10 p.15 and p.17

The KCPP is designed around the idea that sustainability is to be achieved through working with local and district governments. As the above suggests, the relative budgets of district, sub-county and the KCPP are somewhat at odds with this aim. While KCPP documents argue that the district government will “incorporate continued project work into their budgetary plans” and will thus take on the “community structures” put in place during the project, their capacity to do this is limited.

This government-oriented approach explains why so many committees and community management structures have been either set up or revived during the project. There were those government committees and community structures already meant to be active, but which had to be revived by the KCPP:

- Village health teams
- Farmers’ groups
- Health management committees
- Parish development committees
- School management committees
- Parent teacher associations
- Sub-county technical planning committee
- Sub-county health committee
- Parish sanitation committees
- Sub-county sanitation committees

There were those committees and community structures set up by the KCPP, which were outside the government system but which worked with local or district officials:

- Water source committees
- Project management committees
- Project steering committees

And there were those committees and community structures set up by KCPP, which were in some ways at a distance from the government:

- Marketing associations
- Information education communication working groups
- Hygiene working groups
- Community resource centre management committee
- Katine joint farmers association
- Village savings and loans associations

The point is twofold: that the majority of these structures are meant to ensure that people in the community have a way of organising themselves to keep the work of the KCPP going once the funding ends, and that most of these structures are government-oriented. The water source committee, for example, offers people a forum to petition the district water office, should the borehole require serious engineering work. The village health team links to national policy.

In this, the KCPP reflects international “best practice”. In the past, NGOs have been criticised for setting up parallel structures that run alongside, and in some ways compete with, what the government is doing. The favoured approach at the moment is to build up things that the government is itself formally committed to taking on, once the project comes to an end. And in expecting high levels of community participation, the KCPP is also in line with community development approaches. The best chance of keeping things going comes from the goodwill and active participation of people. Community structures are meant to keep the boreholes working, homes hygienic and sanitary, and...
agricultural innovations continuous. As the Guardian stated at the outset, the KCPP model depends to a degree on active participation: “Unless everyone is engaged and enthusiastic, the achievements of the three-year project will not last.”

Empowerment is meant to be the glue that makes people participate and makes these governance structures work. As Amref’s country director, Joshua Kyallo, stated: “Katine is about community empowerment”. He defines this as the “capacity of the community to plan and to gather information on Katine so that the district can submit better plans to central government”. In development circles, empowerment typically means giving people knowledge about their rights and a sense of entitlement to demand those rights. The emphasis is on people challenging the government, its officials and representatives and “giving people or communities the power to control their lives”.

What the material provided on the website makes clear is that the KCPP is, in many ways, indicative of the paradoxes and contradictions that inhabit the way NGOs use concepts such as sustainability or empowerment. People in Katine are poorly served by their government. There are not only problems of underfunding but also issues of corruption, understaffing and the many demands exerted by different NGOs doing different projects. The health centre in Tiriri illustrates the difficulties of working with an under-resourced public health sector.

Policies such as universal primary education, which are meant to give students at Amorikot a good education, work poorly in practice. Many children in Katine were taught under trees or not taught at all. Teachers continue not to turn up to work or are not employed because there is no money to pay them. How do you ensure sustainability when local government structures are so weak? How do NGOs, which are relatively powerful themselves, actively empower poorer people?

In his analysis of development work in Uganda, EA Brett, of the London School of Economics, also questions the limits on the amount of participation or community engagement an NGO can reasonably demand. On-the-ground structures require investments of time and effort; they do not come without cost. This explains why so many of the community structures and committees supported by the KCPP were inactive at the start of the project. What it means to actually keep people engaged and enthused explains, perhaps, why the KCPP has had to give financial and material incentives to people who join committees or who take on responsibilities in the community. Village health team members received bicycles and gumboots, and allowances for attending training. Uganda’s government does not give financial incentives for people to participate, which mostly explains why so many committees in rural Uganda are moribund or underutilised once an NGO leaves.

The belief that the government will work with members of the community once Amref and the other NGOs leave is, perhaps, the most troubling aspect of the KCPP. Working with government is the only substantive way in which sustainability is conceptualised. It suggests an overly optimistic assessment of the capabilities of the state in Uganda, and does not really address the wider issue of whether or not the district government can budget for all of the things introduced by the KCPP.

In what ways, then, is the KCPP sustainable? The official line is that sustainability will come from working with the government. This would align the project with the current hope that the Ugandan government will do a better job of matching its policies with what it does in places like Katine. My best guess is that sustainability is more likely to come from the work of other NGOs. They will come to Katine and do similar sorts of things. This should help keep the boreholes working, and maintain the new school buildings.

While the district government does a certain amount for some of the time, much of what exists in much of the developing world is the result of the work of NGOs, past and present. The KCPP in Katine revived, renovated and rebuilt past interventions, and also did some new things. Many of the water sources that were renovated were installed by other NGOs. In several instances, pieces of infrastructure that look like “the state” — a school building, health clinic, or borehole — are the convoluted legacy of earlier encounters with development. While NGOs often raise funds on the claim that they do something new and different, part of the truth is that each individual project connects to a much longer, and much more complicated, history. There may be a logic, over the longer term, to empower people to make government structures work for them. In the meantime, NGOs will continue to fill in the gaps.
Conclusion

‘We chose it because it had the hardest problems’
Alan Rusbridger, the Guardian, 22 June 2010

‘Over the course of a year, just £8 a month could train and equip a community health worker, who will prevent and treat diseases and illness’
http://uk.amref.org/donate/

Development appears simple. When a fundraising newsletter comes through the door or an email arrives in your inbox, you are told how easy it is to bring about change. “Give £5 a month and educate a child”; “Pledge £8 a month and train a community health worker”. The five-minute video during a Comic Relief telethon makes development look straightforward. A school is built, a poor family given a lifeline. The focus is on the end result.

Katine shows that actually doing development is difficult. In Katine, the classrooms built at Amorikot are a lot better than what was there before, but the school also needs good teachers, which is the responsibility of the local education office. The village health teams have been good at raising awareness but are poorly supported by the Ministry of Health. Village savings and loans associations are a big success, and people have used the money saved to set up businesses and improve their lives. But you only really understand the value of their work if you know about how they help move beyond the violence of the recent past. You are shown that development is less than perfect. But you are also shown that there is positive change.

The village savings and loans associations, supported by Barclays and the NGO, Care International, have encouraged people to save money and start new businesses. By the middle of 2010, people had banked more than £22,482 in these associations. (To put this in some sort of perspective, the total amount saved was more than six times what people paid to the local government in tax.) In health, the number of people reporting for HIV testing has gone up from 1,278 to 4,357 in the space of a year. The percentage of under-fives immunised went from just over 40% in 2006 to close to 100% in 2009. By the end of the third year of the project, Amref had built 16 new classrooms, provided more than 5,000 textbooks and delivered 1,100 desks. In water, only 42% of people had access to clean water at the start of the project. By September 2010, clean water coverage had rocketed to 69.9%.

These numbers are important. At the same time, this review has focused on the relationship between the media and development. Katine has brought the complexity of development work to a global audience. Journalists report on failures as well as successes. The popularity of a new variety of cassava, the staple food crop, can be set alongside the failure of orange and lemon trees to cope with the drought in 2009. Amref put its work on the Guardian website for people to see, unedited and unspun. You can trace the story of Amorikot school, look at the success of the village savings and loans associations, debate the approach to community health. Questions about sustainability have been raised, prompting people to blog in with their advice and criticism. The project has lasted three years, and Amref has one more year to go (it has secured funding for an extra year to consolidate its work). In this time, we have got to know a lot about Katine and what it has meant to implement the KCPP.

Katine suggests a different way of reporting development. It shows that you can engage with one place, over a period of time, and show how development works. The sustained coverage of Katine has produced insights on development that are not gained when more traditional ways of reporting are adopted. Journalism usually focuses on crises in the developing world or picks up only one issue or theme. In Katine, you get to see how issues of politics, society, culture and economics are related to one another. You gain an insight into the complex lives of people there. But what is also seen is how these lives intersect with local, national and international systems. In this, you see what it means to bring about development and change in a poor, rural community. ●
Uganda’s education system is uneven. Despite a national policy of “universal primary education” — in place since 1997 — the quality and quantity of educational provision remains poor, with wealthier parents sending their children to private schools. In Soroti district, which includes Katine sub-county, there are 60 primary school pupils for every teacher. There are 82 pupils for every classroom.

There are problems with attendance (both pupils and teachers), not enough teachers, quality of teaching, financial oversight and mismanagement. More than a decade after the inception of universal primary education, Katine sub-county needs the following investments to meet government standards:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12 more teachers</th>
<th>42 classroom buildings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000 textbooks</td>
<td>1,411 desks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The KCPP intervention in Katine has gone some way to addressing this shortfall. Of the 42 classrooms needed, the KCPP committed itself to building 16.

The KCPP exceeded the required number of books for all schools to meet the government standard (though the year 2 report notes that only 10 of the 15 schools received enough books).

It is too early to tell what this means in terms of educational performance. Enrolment, which was low in Katine when compared to the national average at the start of the project, increased at a faster rate locally than nationally. Whether this increase is matched by increasing levels of educational performance depends on a number of factors beyond the project’s control (most obviously the provision of trained, qualified teachers, who turn up to work).

While the number of students passing the primary leavers examination is higher than the national average (88.9% versus 85.6% in 2009), this gives no indication of the number of children put forward for examination or the quality of passes.

Enrolment figures for 2009 show an increase in Katine of 12% compared to a national increase of 4.18%. The district figures tell a slightly different story. Enrolment across Soroti district increased by 13.72% in 2008 as compared to a figure of 5.88% in Katine in that year.
Of the six parishes within Katine sub-county (Olwelai, Ojom, Ochuloi, Merok, Katine and Ojama), Ochuloi had the poorest enrolment rate at the start of the project, with 74% of boys and 61% of girls of primary school age on the register. Investments in Ochuloi have been less than in other parishes. Through the first three years of the project there has been training for teachers on: school materials; child-centred methods; hygiene (year 1); child-centred methods (year 2); lesson planning; and role-modelling for girls, orphans and vulnerable children (year 3). There has also been training for parent teacher associations and school management committees in all three years.

The work of the KCPP in education shows the gains that can be made through a development project. At the same time you also see the limitations imposed by the Ugandan government and its commitment to universal primary education. Much of the emphasis, from donors and outside observers, has been on meeting this commitment rather than addressing practical concerns in Katine. In this, the gap between rhetoric and reality is often jarring. Schools are under-resourced, poorly provisioned and the prospects for poorer people in Katine are unpromising. Katine schools were far below the government’s own standards in terms of classroom allocation and pupil-to-desk ratio when the KCPP started. While the project helped to put in place the necessary infrastructure, there remains the bigger question of the structural weakness of Uganda’s education system.

### Enrolment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Katine sub-county</th>
<th>Growth</th>
<th>Soroti district</th>
<th>Growth</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>106,400</td>
<td>-4.65%</td>
<td>7,362,000</td>
<td>+1.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7,531</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>107,415</td>
<td>+0.95%</td>
<td>7,537,000</td>
<td>+2.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7,974</td>
<td>5.88%</td>
<td>122,151</td>
<td>+13.72%</td>
<td>7,964,000</td>
<td>+5.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9,071</td>
<td>12.00%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>8,297,000</td>
<td>+4.18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** As books are difficult to quantify based on available data, they are detailed here as deliveries (i.e. “one” means a single delivery of books). The number of desks is to a factor of 30 (i.e. “one” means 30 desks received).
For people living in Katine, the most popular aspect of the water and sanitation component has been the provision of clean water (Kavuma, 27 January 2008). The headline figure is that clean water coverage has gone up from 42% at the start of the project to 69.6% in September 2010. By the end of the fourth year, it is projected that clean water coverage will stand at 85%. This compares to a national average of 63%. Water is, perhaps the most tangible and most visible intervention by the KCPP. For the fourth year of the project, Amref has identified five more sites for new boreholes.

Boreholes and renovated water sources have had to cope with large numbers. A protected shallow well, renovated by the KCPP in 2008, was used by 1,400 people (against the government recommendation of 150). A 2009 report notes that a borehole meant for 250 people was being used by more than 600. This means there is the longer-term question of how to maintain the boreholes and other water sources. Mechanical failures are common in the water sector and are often costly to fix. That said, the relatively high functionality rate in Soroti district (90% of water sources are operational) is encouraging.

Amref trained water source committees to establish codes of practice and to levy user fees for maintenance. Amref also trained three pump mechanics to cope with borehole repairs and set up a general fund at sub-county level for the purchase of spare parts by water users who may want to carry out repairs or routine maintenance of their water facilities.

Interventions in the sanitation sector, though important, are less easy to quantify both in terms of coverage and impact. The overall goal of improved sanitation was clear, and there were a number of
methods through which this was achieved (and data on many of these methods depended on village health teams, of which more later). In terms of interventions at the household level, six parish sanitation committees were formed. Some 240 sanitation kits were handed out over the first year of the project, with which villagers constructed 1,400 latrines. Homes with latrines and other sanitation facilities are termed “ideal homesteads”, and by 2010 there were 398 of these homesteads in Katine. Amref also trained 24 masons in constructing the concrete standing platforms that cover these latrines, improving their effectiveness, hygiene and durability. Water storage jars were provided to 10 vulnerable households in a sub-county of 29,300.

The graph (below) shows the increase in the number of households with a pit latrine. Unfortunately, Amref does not reference this statistic as consistently as it does safe water coverage. The graph shows that Katine was in a very poor position relative to the rest of Soroti district, and also shows significant improvements over the course of the project.

Amref’s investments in sanitation were also channelled through the school system. Schoolteachers were put on “refresher courses” run by KCPP staff to promote awareness of hygiene and sanitation among schoolchildren. National sanitation week was also used as an opportunity to spread the message, with schools holding music, dance and drama events on the theme. The table (above) reproduces the totals required to bring the schools up to national standard, and looks at the actual facilities Amref delivered over the three years. The KCPP did a good job in terms of latrine coverage and rainwater harvesting in schools. At the start of 2010, Madeleine Bunting was able to report on the overall success of sanitation: “Another major success has been latrine coverage at household level. It’s not a glamorous issue, but it makes a huge difference to the disease burden in the family, particularly among children.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latrines stances</th>
<th>Hand-washing facilities</th>
<th>Rainwater harvesting facilities in schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Required</strong></td>
<td><strong>Delivered</strong></td>
<td><strong>Required</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Delivered</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Required</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Delivered</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure calculated as mid-point between 2007 and 2009 achievement as 2008 indicator is unavailable*
Amref’s baseline survey contains a number of figures demonstrating the failings of Uganda’s health system at the start of the project.\textsuperscript{142}

5\% of respondents said that they had received some form of health encounter from a village health team over the previous three months.

38\% of children had suffered with diarrhoea in previous two weeks.

33\% of women had delivered their children at a health facility.

40\% of children had slept under a mosquito net.

Health interventions focused on community-based approaches.\textsuperscript{143} Much of this was done through immunisation, mosquito net provision and ensuring access to clean water.\textsuperscript{144}

In human terms, the focus was on supporting village health teams,\textsuperscript{145} government-supported groups of people who provide advice on health issues.\textsuperscript{146} The KCPP, which laid on training, provided 272 village health team members with training on basic treatments for common diseases, on prevention strategies and on health record-keeping. A smaller number of team members received further training to administer the vaccinations that Amref looked to roll out across Katine.\textsuperscript{147} In budgetary terms, the amount spent on training in the health component was £179,373 compared to £32,751 on supplies and equipment.

Over the course of the project, Amref distributed 7,103 mosquito nets.\textsuperscript{148} There was a reported drop in malaria in the under-fives, from 75.5\% in 2008 to 72.9\% in 2009. In the same period, there was a reported drop in the number of over-fives suffering from malaria, with figures dropping from 57.7\% to 54.9\%.\textsuperscript{149}

In terms of immunisation, Amref trained up community immunisers to take the immunisation programme away from health centres and into communities.\textsuperscript{150} This produced a year-on-year increase in the number of under-fives being immunised.\textsuperscript{151} The achievement is summarised in a graph (next page), where a comparison is made with the national figures over the same period. Village
health teams are also largely responsible for the increase in HIV-testing in Katine. In the first year of the project 1,278 people reported for testing, while in the second year 4,357 reported for testing, almost a fourfold increase.\footnote{152}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage under fives vaccinated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Graph showing vaccination rates" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The success of village health teams in Katine runs counter to the national story. At the start of 2010, the state-backed New Vision newspaper published a series of articles on the failure of village health teams.\footnote{153} NGOs filled the void in different places. It was only because of Amref’s encouragement in Katine that the teams were active. And part of this encouragement came from providing gumboots and bicycles to village health team members.\footnote{154} There were also allowances and per diems given to team members when they attended training. When Amref stopped paying these allowances, the village health teams stopped working.\footnote{155}

This “strike” was called off by September 2010, and Amref worked through concerns with village health team members. This short-term resolution does not necessarily resolve the question of what will happen to village health teams once the project finishes in 2011. In theory, village health teams are an integral part of the national policy and the health sector management system of Uganda’s ministry of health. In practice, their level of activity varies greatly and is often dependent on the work of NGOs.
Livelihoods ‘Improved income generating opportunities’

Some 83% of Katine’s households say growing and selling agricultural products is their number one source of income. The livelihoods component, focusing on new crop strains, cash crops and village savings and loans associations (VLSAs), is critical to the success of the KCPP. The NGO, Farm-Africa, was responsible for the initial design of the agricultural strand of the livelihoods component. Care International implemented the VLSAs with local NGO Uweso. The livelihoods component became increasingly central to the work of the KCPP, receiving a larger share of the budget year-on-year (see pink segments below):
broken boreholes, understaffed medical centres, schools without teachers, and the failure of disadvantaged groups (eg women, people living with Aids and people with disabilities) to make decisions and participate in local governance discussions are explained by the KCPP in terms of a community disempowered in its dealings with government. The governance (empowerment) programme of the Katine project is meant to bring change. And Amref, conscious that it initially only had three years in Katine, has been anxious to avoid setting up systems which make people dependent on the project. This has meant working with structures that are part of the government system, such as village health teams and parish development committees. However, there is often a considerable gap between what government structures exist on paper and what actually operate on the ground.

As I have already suggested in the section on empowerment and sustainability, it is usual to argue that communities need to be empowered to challenge the local, district and national governments. The empowerment agenda is part of the mainstream of development thinking at the moment. More empowered communities, so the theory goes, should be better at planning and co-ordinating development activities and will also do a better job of petitioning those in power for better services. This is an argument made famous by the Ugandan scholar, Professor Mahmood Mamdani, who argues that Africans should become full citizens, and in so doing shake off a colonial legacy that has made them passive subjects. There are historical, political and even psychological reasons for supporting an empowerment agenda. At the same time, power is also about competition over resources, and the Ugandan state does not have the money to do in practice what it is committed to on paper.

This section is less concerned with the capacity of communities to engage with local governance, which is difficult to measure, than with the ability of the local government system to respond to people’s demands. If people in Katine are to have a better relationship with the government, there must be a correspondence between expectations and resources. The first point is that there is not enough money at the disposal of the district and local governments to sustain the demands of empowered communities. The KCPP budgets are more in Katine than the budgets of the district and sub-county government combined.
Livelihoods has had a number of successes. In 2009, the new disease-resistant strain of cassava helped people through a period of famine, with 540 households benefiting. Village savings and loans associations were also very popular. By the middle of 2010, there were 150 associations banking a total of £22,482.159

The associations require a membership fee of only 200 Ugandan shillings (8p) and ask members to save regular sums, providing a common pool from which they can borrow.160 Training covers financial planning, reporting, conflict management, needs assessment and leadership. Over time, these associations generate enough money to take out loans for entrepreneurial activities, though in many cases people use the funds as a safety net, a way of coping with problems.161 It was a popular model that was easily replicated. Barclays decided to “go global” with village savings and loans associations in 2008, with the aim of improving access to basic banking services for 500,000 people in poorer parts of the world over a three-year period.162

There were some issues in the livelihoods component in terms of the scaling up of the agricultural element. Farm-Africa, the NGO responsible for the initial design, typically prefers a model of working with a small number of groups in an intensive way. This way, they can really see if new innovations and technologies work. If they work well, others copy. This is a qualitative approach, which relies on training more than giving people things and benefits fewer people directly. In the first years of the project, there were only 18 groups.163 But as the KCPP moved into its second and third years, the number of farmers groups increased to the point where, by the third year, the field staff were working with 66 groups. 164

The shift, in terms of numbers of groups and types of support, was explained by Farm-Africa staff as a response to pressure from below (from people in Katine who felt they were not benefiting directly from their work) and from above (funders who wanted wider coverage and who were critical of training). This may explain why the project was less successful in the more innovative agricultural components, such as the introduction of orange trees. It also explains why some new techniques did not always work as well as expected. 1
Note that the above numbers do not include staff salaries, so they are a reflection of the money available for development activities. The project budget for 2008-2009 was nearly 28 times the development budget available to the sub-county. In 2008 and 2009, the KCPP was able to build as many new classrooms in one sub-county as Soroti district government managed to construct across the entire district. Or, to put it another way, the KCPP built 16 classrooms for 28,602 people, whereas the district government built 16 classrooms for 369,789.

The amount budgeted per classroom in the KCPP was also higher than that allocated by the government per classroom.

A different but related point concerns the source of district funding. If empowerment is to work, then it helps to have a real stake in the money spent. In Soroti district and Katine sub-county, the size of local tax revenues is dwarfed by the contributions made by donors either directly or in the form of government grants (where much of the money comes from donors such as the World Bank or the UK’s Department for International Development). In theory, this is meant to change over the long term. In the meantime, the situation has serious implications in terms of the feasibility of any empowerment strategy, people in Katine have very little financial investment in their elected representatives, who draw most of their salary from money that comes from elsewhere. The following pie chart shows all tax revenues collected by the district government in Soroti, and compares this with the contributions made to the district government budget — either directly by donors, in the form of grants — or through subventions from the national government in Kampala.

Source: Soroti District Three Year Development Plan 2009 p41
References from academic works


References from literature on the KCPP

3 UWESO, or the Ugandan Women’s Effort to Save Orphans, is an NGO created in 1986, with particular expertise in setting up savings and credit schemes. For more information on Uweso see http://www.ifad.org/media/success/uganda2.htm
5 See, for example, the editorial by Alan Rusbridger in the original launch supplement for the Katine initiative (20 October 2007).
6 Interview with Alan Rusbridger, 22 June 2010.
7 For more information on the growth of Facebook see http://www.insidefacebook.com/.
8 On the possibilities of the internet see, for example, Time magazine’s editorial from 2006: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1569514,00.html
10 More information on Barclays Uganda can be found at http://www.barclays.com/africa/uganda/.
11 Ibid.
12 Interview with Alan Rusbridger, 22 June 2010.
13 Amref Uganda (2008b) p5
18 Ibid.
23 See www.guardian.co.uk/katine
25 Note the following chronology lists the articles critical of
the Amorikot school building process; other articles on Amorikot and education were also posted on the website during this period.


36 Ibid.


38 See the earlier report by Ongom Komakech on the failings of School Facilities Grant Schools in Teso, (22.11.02). Schools collapse in Teso’, The Monitor.


Amref could have challenged this sort of commentary on the evidence to hand. Boreholes in Soroti District — where Katine is located — have a functionality rate of 90%, which is much higher than the general figure for Africa (Soroti Statistical Abstract 2009).


45 In this the reporting on the Katine website was a significant shift away from the sort of Sunday-supplement journalism where reporters are invited as guests of an NGO or aid organisation.


49 Interviews with staff from The Guardian 22.06.10.


52 Richard M Kavuma (22.05.08) ‘Katine health centre to get piped water’ The Guardian, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/katine/2008/mai/22/projectgoals.water


59 A disjuncture that is most obviously apparent in comparing Amref’s project documents to the campaigning weeks on the website.

60 (Amref Uganda 2009a), p15.

61 In its own way this review is also one more attempt at achieving coherence over something that was probably, on a day-to-day basis, diffuse and complicated.


63 Interview with Liz Ford, The Guardian 22.06.10.

64 This is apparent in the lack of coverage in Amref’s reporting Amref Uganda (2009a).

Ibid.  
67 See also the article by Paul Doyle (01.05.09) ‘How football can help bring new hope to a neglected region of Uganda’, The Guardian, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/katine/2009/may/01/football  
70 The belief that NGOs can be participatory and adaptable, relates very closely to the work of Robert Chambers. See, for example, the classic (1983) Whose Reality Counts?: putting the first last. London: ITDG Publishing.  
71 It served as a way of challenging those articles which raised the issue of cattle.  
76 This point was made in an interview with Madeleine Bunting, The Guardian 22.06.10.  
80 A later piece continues in a similar vein arguing that cattle would cause problems because some would get and others would not, as if this were somehow different from other components. See David Smith (08.12.08) ‘Should we launch a cattle drive in Katine?’, The Guardian, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/katineblog/2008/dec/08/farmers-and-cattle  
82 See the discussion of conflict in post-insurgency Teso in Jones 2009.  
86 See Ben Jones (14.08.08) ‘Katine: how the past informs the present’, http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/katineblog/2008/aug/14/katinehowthepastinformst  
93 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/katine/livelihoods  
97 Ibid.  
99 The numbers below do not include staff salaries.  
100 The district figure is arrived at from dividing the total district budget for 2008-2009 (Soroti District Development Plan 09/10 p41) by the 14 sub-counties. Please note that the district budget does not include salaries of government workers.  
101 In composing the figure for the KCPP I have deducted staff salaries and recurring costs. The £361,976 is the money allocated for project activities.  
104 There is an early discussion of this in Roger Riddell and Mark Robinson’s (1995) Non-governmental organizations and rural poverty alleviation. London: Clarendon Press.  
107 See, for example, Oxfam (GB)’s discussion of rights based development, available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/issues/right_heard/introduction.html.  
109 In a recent report by Uganda’s Parliamentary Committee on Local Government Accounts, Soroti District was the worst performing district in Uganda (New Vision 18.07.10).  
References

Katherine Amref's, Conceptual Framework 2007, Slide 3; available at: http://www.amref.org/where-we-work/katine-it-starts-with-a-village/


This system of allowances was both reported by the Guardian (Malinga 17.03.09) and Amref Amref Uganda (2008a), p10.

This system of allowances was both reported by the Guardian (Malinga 17.03.09) and Amref Amref Uganda (2008a), p10.


Amref Uganda (2008a) p15.


Amref Uganda (2008a) p10.


Amref Uganda (2008a) p18. See also, AMREF Uganda (2008b) p18. In response to encouragement from The Guardian and demands from the community, thirteen boreholes were eventually installed as part of the KCPP (one of which was funded by the district water office).


In the first year of the project the health component also worked with traditional birth attendants, though this was discontinued when government policy changed (Amref Uganda 2009a, p11).


These numbers do not include staff salaries.

See endnote 100.

Ibid.
