

Cameron Sparkhall

The Shadow and the Spotlight: The CIA, the Press, and
Cold War Public Secrecy

The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

University of East Anglia

American Studies

October 2026

Word Count: 96,151

This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that use of any information derived there-from must be in accordance with current UK Copyright Law. In addition, any quotation or extract must include full attribution.

Abstract

The thesis demonstrates how the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) deliberately and effectively used public secrecy in the Cold War to gain legitimacy as a national security institution at home. From a young organisation to a key government institution, the CIA knew it had to shape the public debate by influencing mainstream newspapers in the United States, persuading them that it was a vital component of statecraft needed to fight the Cold War. The Agency was obsessed with its public portrayal and recognised it held a strange symbiotic relationship with the press. Its presence was routinely covered in newspapers as outlets focused on CIA functions and activities, including controversial exposures and revelations about its operations. Officials had to proactively engage with the press by cultivating a positive public image. CIA achieved this through assessing coverage and selectively releasing material that satisfied public fascination about it while keeping its operational secrecy intact.

Public secrecy shaped CIA-press relations. The Agency dictated what the press could publish and formed close bonds with key correspondents and columnists who supported the CIA. Reporters were excited to offer their readers exclusive insights and glimpses into the Agency, but these accounts did not disclose sensitive material and instead presented carefully curated narratives. The CIA's operational secrecy endured throughout the Cold War because selective access to material shaped coverage, and newspapers across the political spectrum legitimised its deepest secrets. A broad Cold War consensus touted CIA as the first line of defence in its vital intelligence work against the Soviet Union. This ensured the Agency was in a strong position to ward off criticism and scrutiny, especially as arguments that it should be reformed or abolished failed to gain traction in the press. Public secrecy provides a unique window into the political, social, and cultural history of CIA.

Access Condition and Agreement

Each deposit in UEA Digital Repository is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, and duplication or sale of all or part of any of the Data Collections is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for your research use or for educational purposes in electronic or print form. You must obtain permission from the copyright holder, usually the author, for any other use. Exceptions only apply where a deposit may be explicitly provided under a stated licence, such as a Creative Commons licence or Open Government licence.

Electronic or print copies may not be offered, whether for sale or otherwise to anyone, unless explicitly stated under a Creative Commons or Open Government license. Unauthorised reproduction, editing or reformatting for resale purposes is explicitly prohibited (except where approved by the copyright holder themselves) and UEA reserves the right to take immediate 'take down' action on behalf of the copyright and/or rights holder if this Access condition of the UEA Digital Repository is breached. Any material in this database has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the material may be published without proper acknowledgement.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	i
Acknowledgements.....	v
Illustrations	vii
 Introduction	 1
Public Secrecy	7
What Newspapers and Why?	10
Literature on CIA PR, CIA-Press Relations, Agency History and the Secrecy State	13
Chapter Outline.....	21
 1. Reporting on the Secret Agency: Justifying CIA Secrecy in the Early Cold War	 22
Public Reaction to Donovan’s Proposal	25
The Alsops’ Support for Centralised Intelligence.....	28
Constantine Brown and the Push for a Stronger CIG.....	33
Public Debate Over the National Security Act	37
The Crisis in Bogota.....	42
“The Big Job is Civilian and Diplomatic.” Press Support for a Civilian DCI.....	46
CIA Expansion: The Hoover Commission and CIA Act.....	51
 2. From McCarthy to Langley: Public Secrecy Confirms the CIA in Cold War America.....	 61
McCarthy’s Decline and the CIA’s Reaction	62
Cultivating the CIA Profile: Dulles and Grogan	69
Support for a JC and Questioning Secrecy	73
Press Reaction to Mansfield’s Proposal and the Internal Survey Groups.....	79
The Deepening Press Debate Over a JC	82
The Open Secret: CIA and Langley	89
“You’ll Hardly Know It’s There.” Choosing Langley and Laying the Cornerstone	96
 3. Maintaining Headlines: Positive Public Discussions after the Bay of Pigs	 108
Press Reaction to the Bay of Pigs.....	109
“Works 16 Hours a Day”: The Resignation of Dulles and Shaping the Public Debate	114
Langley: The Finished Product	118
Dulles Post-CIA and <i>The Craft of Intelligence</i>	127
John McCone and the 1964 PR Disaster	134

Reaction to Congressional Scrutiny	140
Surveying the Narrative: CIA Reaction to the <i>Invisible Government</i> and the <i>NYT</i> Series	143
4. Managed Transparency: William Colby and Public Secrecy after the Hersh Revelations	149
Reaction to the Hersh Article	152
The Glomar Explorer	158
Colby Shapes the Narrative	163
The Rockefeller Commission	166
Colby and the Church Committee	168
Colby and the Pike Committee	172
The Impact of Richard Welch's Assassination	180
Ford's EO and Colby Post-CIA	186
5. Regaining Lost Ground: William Casey and the Reconstruction of CIA Secrecy	194
Initial Leaks of EO 12333	197
A Turning Point at CIA: The OEA's Recommendations and Press Reaction to EO 12333	200
Senator Chafee and Press Reaction to IIPA	206
FOIA and CIA: The Shift to Total Exemption	212
Casey's Speech to Scrap FOIA and the Goldwater Bill	217
Perusing the Press: Casey and News Leaks	223
Conclusion	234
Abbreviations	243
Bibliography	245
Archives	245
Government Records	245
Presidential Documents	246
Periodicals	247
Websites	248
Memoirs	249
Books	250
Articles and Chapters in Edited Books	256

For My Mum and Dad

Acknowledgements

When I began my PhD in October 2019 at the University of East Anglia (pre-COVID times which feels like a lifetime ago), I did not expect how far the experience would take me. I have thoroughly enjoyed every little bit of it. I was told it can be a lonely experience (especially doing a PhD part-time) and whilst that is true, I am so thankful to all the help I have received along the way.

Firstly, it's hard to imagine me even writing this thesis without the amazing guidance and feedback from my supervisors Kaeten Mistry and Nicholas Grant. I've always enjoyed our chats and found them extremely constructive (especially when we discuss the football). I am seriously grateful to both for all the assistance they have provided. Their unwavering support has inspired me to pursue a subject that I love to talk and write about. My enthusiasm for it is down to their passion in the project and the time they've taken to look and go through it with me. I also want to thank Emma Long for providing crucial advice during the probationary review.

I wasn't sure what to focus on when I started, as is part of the course I suppose. I knew it was something CIA, so I poured into a wide range of secondary material hoping to find a gap somewhere. This is where I want to thank UEA library for having so many books on the subject (big up the second floor, section JK! I swear the outline of my footprints are still visible there) and thanks to no one requesting to borrow these books (some I've had since I started!). I also want to thank UEA interlibrary loans and the helpdesk for bringing in material to collect and sending me online versions of some difficult ones to obtain. On the subject of research and archival material, I would like to thank Princeton University for digitising their collections (and free of charge which was a big bonus!)

A major part I have discovered when doing a PhD is how do you actually communicate your research. I want to thank Kaeten for advising me on presenting my work at academic conferences. The feedback I received was incredibly helpful, so thank you to the Roosevelt Institute for American Studies, the Heidelberg Center for American Studies, and the Historians of the Twentieth Century United States.

Lastly, I want to dedicate this thesis to my family and friends. My parents, Jane and Dave, who have encouraged me, supported me every step of the way and throughout my life. I love them both so much and I'm so proud to be their son. My nana, Audrey, for always being there and always taking an interest in what I do, love you loads nana! My cats, thank you for getting me up in the middle of the night for treats and drilling behind the sofa (see Eddie Izzard). My mates Mark Peden,

Stuart Aitken and Nigel Blumire, thanks for the great chats about the PhD, football, comedies, films, and video games (alongside a few beers! Cheers!)

And I suppose I must acknowledge the Arsenal in keeping me alert and stressed. But there's a chance to be premier league champions again this year, COYG!

Illustrations

Figure 1.1	Picture of Langley	3
Figure 1.2	A selection of images from newspapers featuring CIA	6
Figure 2.1	Walter Trohan article in <i>CT</i>	24
Figure 2.2	Stewart and Joe Alsop article in <i>SLPD</i>	30
Figure 2.3	Constantine Brown article in <i>ES</i>	34
Figure 2.4	George Fielding Eliot article in <i>SLPD</i>	38
Figure 2.5	<i>NYDN</i> editorial on the 1949 CIA Act	53
Figure 3.1	Constantine Brown article praising Allen Dulles in <i>ES</i>	62
Figure 3.2	Stanley Grogan memorandum to Allen Dulles	65
Figure 3.3	Stanley Grogan memorandum urging CIA to survey press coverage	72
Figure 3.4	Anthony Leviero <i>NYT</i> article.	75
Figure 3.5	Stanley Grogan memorandum on <i>NYT</i> editorial	83
Figure 3.6	<i>ES</i> front-page showing CIA's plan to relocate to Langley	89
Figure 3.7	<i>ES</i> images showing debate over Langley	92
Figure 3.8	Members of the public discuss the planned CIA move in the <i>ES</i>	97
Figure 3.9	Images showing the Langley cornerstone event	102
Figure 4.1	<i>NYT</i> article about U.S. training anti-Castro forces	107
Figure 4.2	Allen Dulles memorandum to JFK advisor	113
Figure 4.3	Extract of Myra MacPherson article in <i>ES</i> and Langley's cafeteria building	118
Figure 4.4	Image in <i>ES</i> of Potomac Hills	120
Figure 4.5	Image in <i>ES</i> of Cabin John Bridge	122
Figure 4.6	Images of Langley's finished construction in <i>ES</i> and <i>WP</i>	124
Figure 4.7	Harry Truman article in <i>WP</i>	129
Figure 5.1	Seymour Hersh article in <i>NYT</i>	149
Figure 5.2	William Colby letter to President Gerald Ford	152
Figure 5.3	<i>LAT</i> front page on the Glomar Explorer, and Colby's phone call with an official	157
Figure 5.4	CIA internal survey on the impact of the Church and Pike committees	172
Figure 5.5	<i>WP</i> and <i>NYT</i> front pages on Richard Welch	180
Figure 6.1	<i>NYT</i> article on the proposed EO 12333	194
Figure 6.2	OEA memorandum on EO leaks	200
Figure 6.3	<i>WP</i> article with image of Reagan at Langley	208
Figure 6.4	William Casey letter to William French Smith	213

Figure 6.5	OEA memorandum on FOIA	216
Figure 6.6	CIA memorandum on press relations	222
Figure 6.7	George Lauder letter to <i>Time</i> editor Strobe Talbott	227
Figure 7.1	Joseph DeTrani taskforce on CIA openness initiative	233
Figure 7.2	Joseph DeTrani memorandum on improving CIA openness	236

Introduction

"A serious endeavor should be made to reverse the present unfortunate trend wherein the Central Intelligence Agency finds itself advertised almost exclusively as a secret service organization. It should be presented instead to the public as the centralized coordinator of intelligence. This will help to cover rather than uncover its secret operations." - *Dulles Report, 1949* ¹

"The Central Intelligence Agency is responsible for clandestine operations abroad, although it often seems its conduct is as open as a daily newspaper." - *Jack Raymond, 1963* ²

"CIA has been guilty of some embarrassing apparent failures and excesses, so its operations should be reviewed. But let us be careful we do not destroy the agency in the process...those who tinker with it must do so with sophistication and perspective." - *Franklin Lindsay, 1975* ³

The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) headquarters at Langley is a physical testament to the tension between secrecy and publicity in modern America. On the one hand, the large, public building is the nerve centre for the CIA's secret intelligence work. It is where the Agency collects, analyses, and disseminates intelligence while guarding U.S. national security. On the other, Langley's recognisable architecture as the "big white cliff on the Potomac," is known throughout the greater Washington area and the wider United States. Langley is shorthand for CIA; a secret intelligence agency recognised around the world.⁴

Langley has also intrigued the press because of a seeming juxtaposition between secrecy and openness. It has been a focal point, a beacon, for journalists to hone questions about CIA activities and its place within American democracy. In the Cold War, it offered a mystique that piqued press reporters' interest as they investigated the secret espionage organisation. The press widely reported on the construction of Langley, but Agency officials were not concerned over the exposure of CIA material. Journalists were eager to print information, with editorials, opinion pieces, and public letters saturating newspaper pages. The project was, after all, enormous and difficult to hide. The *Evening Star* (ES) stated that Langley is "such an important move" that it cannot be

¹ Allen W. Dulles, William H. Jackson, and Mathias F. Correa, *The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence* (Report to the National Security Council, 1 January 1949), National Security Archive, 36 (hereafter Dulles Report).

² Jack Raymond, "Role of 'Black Arts,'" *NYT*, March 18, 1963, p. 12.

³ Franklin Lindsay, "The Dangers of Damaging the CIA," *WP*, January 28, 1975, p. A18.

⁴ Marquis Childs, "CIA Impact on Foreign Policy," *WP*, May 21, 1962, p. A18.

concealed “without letting the public in on it.”⁵ As the historian Timothy Melley succinctly argues, “the secret is that there is no secret...the covert state is hidden right out in the open.”⁶

Moreover, senior CIA officials welcomed the fact the Agency’s headquarters were widely debated because it allowed important public relations (PR) benefits. It satisfied the press’s desire to learn more about the Agency, depicting CIA as an important part of the U.S. national security state and central to modern American government. Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) during Langley’s construction, and Stanley Grogan, his close advisor shaping the Agency’s PR, openly conversed with reporters about the move. They happily provided details about how the site was chosen, its facilities, and its impact on CIA. “Construction was inevitable,” Dulles told Fairfax citizens at a turkey dinner and informal talk.⁷ Both recognised that for the CIA to operate and thrive in a society with an inquisitive press, it could not function solely in the shadows. Their candour with reporters, Congressional hearings, businesses, and citizen groups in promoting the Langley site set the precedent for how the Agency engaged in public debates about its secrecy. It was pointless, as Marquis Childs noted, to insist on total secrecy, with Dulles eager newspapers did not “overstress the ‘hush-hush’ nature of the CIA.” Rather, it needed public acceptance and buy-in to effectively carry out its intelligence objectives.⁸

Langley challenges the axiom that intelligence agencies need total secrecy to accomplish their work. The CIA actively embraced a curious space between secrecy and publicity to gain a stronger foothold in U.S. politics and society by shaping the public debate around it. Officials openly discussed the Agency to satisfy public fascination whilst emphasising the need for secrecy on operational details and to effectively perform its duties. During the early decades of the Cold War CIA successfully cultivated a positive public image. But even when press and public scrutiny grew, the Agency continued to shape the narrative. The press acted more as a symbiotic partner to CIA than has been recognised. It was neither a friend nor a foe, relying on the CIA’s selectiveness to access material and satisfy the public’s interest in the Cold War. This work explains how and why the CIA was in both the shadow and the spotlight through “public secrecy.”

⁵ “More Light Needed,” *ES*, March 25, 1955, p. A16.

⁶ Timothy Melley, *The Covert Sphere: Secrecy, Fiction, and the National Security State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 22.

⁷ “Dulles Pledges CIA Will Fit In,” *WP*, May 9, 1957, p. B12.

⁸ Marquis Childs, “Great Expansion of Secret CIA Emphasized by Its New Building,” *SLPD*, November 1, 1959, page unknown.



Figure 1.1 The nominally secretive CIA is housed in a large, public building at Langley. *Source:* CIA History Staff, “50 Years in Langley: Recollections of the Construction of CIA’s Original Headquarters Building,” *Center for the Study of Intelligence* (January 2012), 22.

The CIA is supposed to be a secretive organisation. In theory, we should know little about its structure, leaders, capabilities, activities, even its location. All this is not only public knowledge but widely known and debated. From Hollywood films to all forms of news outlets, the “CIA” acronym is firmly established within the public eye. The Agency has been dubbed an “invisible government,” using “dirty tricks” to usurp American democracy and foreign policy, whilst being described by former CIA employees as a “cult,” a “company,” and “an experiment in amorality.”⁹ It has also been celebrated for its “cloak-and-dagger” exploits, moments of technical brilliance and ingenuity that aided Cold War intelligence, such as the Berlin Tunnel, the U-2 Spy Plane, and the Glomar Explorer project. Whether positively or negatively, CIA is universally known. The Agency’s chief historian,

⁹ “Cloak and Dagger for John A. McCone.” *Life Magazine*, October 6, 1961, p. 53; David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government* (New York: Random House, 1964); Leslie H. Gelb, “Should We Play Dirty Tricks in the World?” *NYT*, December 21, 1975. p. 209; Victor Marchetti and John Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Knopf, 1974); Philip Agee, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (London: Stonehill, 1975); John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: Norton, 1984).

David Robarge called it “the most open secret organization in the world.”¹⁰ How did CIA come to occupy a position unique among intelligence agencies, even for a western democratic political system?

The answer lies in the tension between the CIA maintaining its operational secrecy and promoting publicity to gain acceptance as a political and cultural institution in Cold War America. Understanding how CIA became accepted as the “most open secret organization” is not just about its foreign exploits but also its approach at home. Examining its status within U.S. society shows the institutional development of the secret organisation and, critically, how it managed its public image during the Cold War. Exploring how CIA navigated domestic processes reveals what motivated key officials and how these decisions provide a unique window into the US state and the history of modern America.¹¹ This thesis offers an original view into how and why CIA secrecy emerged, endured, and flourished throughout the Cold War. The Agency’s emergence and development as an influential organisation at the centre of the U.S. government demonstrated that its public secrecy was able to thrive despite systematic press coverage. CIA was a major talking point for American newspapers, but the Agency was not perturbed by such publicity, so long as its operational secrets remained intact.

Newspapers played a crucial role in legitimising CIA secrecy. Reporters were eager and excited to offer readers a peek inside the secret realm with exclusive stories, often written in hyperbole to dramatise the Agency’s work. There was also a recognition of the need to preserve CIA secrecy for fear of undermining the essential intelligence mission against the Soviet Union. It reflected a strong consensus between CIA and the press in shielding the Agency’s operational details. The outcome was that press support for CIA secrecy remained remarkably consistent throughout the Cold War. Despite periods of increased scrutiny, when the press actively questioned CIA’s activities and place within American democracy, reporters and newspapers continued to support the sanctity of the Agency’s operational secrecy.

Reporters, columnists, editors and officials ensured that CIA secrecy was protected because they argued a weak Agency left the nation defenceless in the Cold War. From Dulles and Grogan to future DCIs such as William Colby and William Casey, CIA employed a PR approach that depicted itself as an essential instrument of U.S. statecraft. Through periods of heightened and diminished public attention, this thesis explores the complexity of CIA secrecy as the Agency navigated a fine

¹⁰ David Robarge, “CIA in the Public Spotlight: The Central Intelligence Agency and Public Accountability,” *Journal of Intelligence History*, 9, no. 1-2 (2009), 105.

¹¹ Daniel Bessner and Frederik Logevall, “Recentring the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations,” *Texas National Security Review*, 3, no. 2 (2020), 42, 53-55.

line between protecting the secrecy of its work and sustaining its status as a publicly accepted government institution.

**TODAY IN THE WOMAN'S WORLD
SOCIETY—CLUBS**



AUSTRIAN EVENING—Music, an informal buffet supper, Austrian costumes and people enjoying themselves marked the dinner given by Dr. Karl Gruber, the Austrian Ambassador, and Mrs. Gruber at the Austrian Embassy on Wednesday. Here, Mrs. Gruber helps Mr. Allen Dulles, director, Central Intelligence Agency, to one of the buffet dishes.

Cloak & Dagger Cupid Gets Its Man: McCone

Washington, Aug. 4 (UPI).—The usually tight-lipped Central Intelligence Agency made one of its rare public disclosures today—its 60-year-old director, John A. McCone, is getting married.

The bride-to-be is Mrs. Paul Pigott, a grandmother and widow of a Seattle industrialist. The wedding date is Aug. 29.

McCone's first wife, the former Rosemary Cooper, died last December, about a week after he was sworn in as CIA's head.

The marriage will take place in Saint Anne's Catholic chapel, Seattle.

McCone, a California Republican, has known Mrs. Pigott since their college days at the University of California, a CIA spokesman said. They plan to honeymoon briefly in Europe before taking up residence here.



John A. McCone



(Associated Press Wirefoto)
Mrs. Paul Pigott
To wed CIA chief

GEOGRAPHERS & CARTOGRAPHERS

Openings in the Central Intelligence Agency available for qualified Geographers and Cartographers interested in geographic research and map compilation concerning foreign areas.

Geographic positions involve research, analysis, and preparation of reports concerned primarily with physical and cultural aspects of areas, regions, and countries throughout the world.

Cartographic positions involve research and compilation of data leading to design and preparation of special-subject maps.

Advanced degrees in geography or cartography preferred; area knowledge and competence in language of area of specialization desirable. Minimum of 5 years U.S. citizenship required. Salary range \$5,795 to \$9,980 depending upon education and experience. Positions located in Washington, D.C.

Please send resume with telephone number to:
Mr. Kenneth W. Brice, P.O. Box 5569, Friendship Station, Washington, D.C. 20016

Florence Gorski, Once With CIA

Mrs. Florence V. Gorski, 64, a former receptionist at the Central Intelligence Agency, died today at the home of her daughter, Mrs. Nancie L. Stoehr, 4419 South Thirty-sixth street, Arlington.

A native of Pitcairn, Pa., she worked at the War Department and the General Accounting Office before being employed by the CIA.

She leaves her daughter and one grandson.

Services and burial will be on Monday at Altoona, Pa.

Figure 1.2 The CIA in the public spotlight. The press were keen to publish any information relating to the CIA ranging from the mundane lives of its leaders to vacancy advertisements, to obituaries for those who served in it. Source: "Austrian Evening," *ES*, June 18, 1954, p. 36; "Cloak & Dagger Cupid Gets its Man: McCone," *NYDN*, August 5, 1962, p. 340; "Geographers & Cartographers," *SLPD*, June 21, 1964, p. 54; "Florence Gorski, Once With CIA," *ES*, April 6, 1962, p. 22.

Public Secrecy

Public secrecy was a deliberate and effective approach that was actively developed and managed by the CIA. Agency officials knew CIA had to keep the public onside to gain legitimacy as a national security institution at home. Officials recognised that influencing the mainstream press was essential in shaping public opinion as they strived to maintain favourable newspaper coverage and positive relations with key press members. They formed a complex, symbiotic relationship that allowed CIA to protect its secrecy whilst being in the public spotlight. The press benefitted from this because it meant they established close relations with the Agency and the information they obtained had satisfied public fascination. Crucially, CIA made it appear that it was enhancing democratic discourse through acts of transparency, which were often superficial, to meet the key goal of keeping its operational secrecy intact. Public secrecy leads to two important insights about the CIA during the Cold War. The first is how CIA discussed its own secrecy without revealing important material. The second relates to how the Agency took advantage of CIA-press relations to analyse its coverage and allow access to certain newspapers and journalists.

Firstly, public secrecy dominated the minds of senior officials who recommended methods to improve the organisation's public image in numerous internal documents and private correspondences. CIA had to proactively engage the press, they argued, as it could not forever hide behind the cloak of secrecy. While it could not shield itself entirely from the press, it could shape the release of information. Selective leaks of material helped frame popular discourse around the Agency, and officers recognised that publicity was a powerful tool for portraying favourable images of the CIA. "Could we not leak some success stories?" one CIA station chief asked, "these...stories could retain elements of risk, excitement and clever work in a good cause." While it was recognised that "CIA will never become a folk hero," there was an awareness that "a few good, rattling stories about past successes might improve [CIA] image."¹²

The CIA used public secrecy to manage what information the press obtained. Officials selectively provided snippets of information they knew would satisfy public fascination. Allowing some press access to discuss CIA's functions, structure, location, and certain activities shaped coverage whilst ensuring the Agency's innermost secrets were not published. Reporters felt they gained exclusive insights, without unearthing new or truly secretive details about the Agency. They

¹² CIA, "Memorandum for: Deputy Director for Support from Richard Helms," May 24, 1966, CIA-RDP84-00780R001500050039-1, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84-00780R001500050039-1.pdf>, accessed 9th January 2025.

were also helping to maintain essential CIA secrecy by publishing information officials were happy to circulate in the public sphere.

The CIA knew access to certain material would be beneficial for its public image. Releasing information that depicted the Agency as essential to statecraft and the first line of defence in the Cold War was a concerted CIA PR effort to gain legitimacy. DCIs Allen Dulles and William Colby recognised the PR benefits as they built a close relationship with key correspondents and columnists. Both offered material useful to tell an embellished CIA story. Both provided details about its functions and capabilities, its location, and its role within American democracy. They aimed to instil a narrative that portrayed CIA secrecy as sacrosanct by avoiding the unearthing sensitive material, such as operational secrets, and by depicting unauthorised disclosures as detrimental to the Agency's intelligence efforts. Both also attempted to shape public debate through written articles and interviews. While Dulles relied on a press which was largely supportive of CIA secrecy in the initial Cold War years, Colby adapted to a new period of intelligence accountability in the 1970s. But both recognised the importance of public secrecy for the CIA.

What could and could not be said helped create a favourable narrative. CIA has always attempted to suppress critical publications while encouraging positive coverage. On the one hand, after Dulles's forced resignation in 1961, officials permitted the publication of *The Craft of Intelligence* because it defended the Agency after the Bay of Pigs and upheld the view that CIA secrecy was crucial in the context of Cold War national security.¹³ On the other, journalistic critiques such as *The Invisible Government* and accounts from disgruntled former employees faced deliberate CIA efforts to block their works by depicting them as security threats and damaging to the Cold War effort.¹⁴ These publications became popular as they provided an inside scoop into the capabilities, functions and structures of the hidden state. They exposed CIA overreach and abuses of power by questioning the Agency's motives, activities, and its reliance on secrecy. For the Agency though, it undermined the very secrecy they strived to maintain.¹⁵

¹³ Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).

¹⁴ Kaeten Mistry, "The Rise and Fall of Anti-Imperial Whistleblowing in the Long 1970s," in *Whistleblowing Nation: The History of National Security Disclosures and the Cult of State Secrecy*, eds. Kaeten Mistry and Hannah Gurman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 130-131, 137-140; Richard H. Immerman, "From the Mundane to the Absurd: The Advent and Evolution of Prepublication Review," in *Whistleblowing Nation: The History of National Security Disclosures and the Cult of State Secrecy*, eds. Kaeten Mistry and Hannah Gurman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 187-212.

¹⁵ Wise and Ross, *The Invisible Government*; Marchetti and Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*; Agee, *Inside the Company*; Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*; Frank Snepp, *Irreparable Harm: A Firsthand Account of How One Agent Took on the CIA in an Epic Battle Over Secrecy and Free Speech* (New York: Random House, 1999); Christopher R. Moran, *Company Confessions: Revealing CIA Secrets* (London: Biteback Publishing, 2015), 133-137.

The second insight of public secrecy relates to the CIA-press relationship. Agency officials recognised the benefits by analysing how CIA was depicted in the press. Since its establishment in 1947, a file of domestic press clippings was created for officials to survey press opinion.¹⁶ These were maintained in the Agency's initial years as early leaders spoke to and cultivated key correspondents both publicly and privately. CIA obtained and stored a multitude of press clippings under Dulles, and it continued to assess coverage after the Bay of Pigs fallout in 1961 under DCI John McCone. In the 1970s, Colby recognised the CIA had to continue monitoring the press because he feared investigative reporters, who began to scrutinise its activities, would generate wider criticism of the Agency. Analysing coverage was not a priority under William Casey, as he attempted to keep the press at a distance, but he soon realised the Agency could not abandon its relationship with the press if it wanted to shape public debate.

The CIA granted selective access to certain newspapers and journalists to report on the national security state and to satisfy public fascination with secrecy. For reporters and papers to maintain Agency sources and have access to off-the-record information, they had to exert responsibility and voluntarily withhold publishing some material. Outlets, such as *Time*, *Life Magazine*, *The Reporter*, and the *NYT* cooperated with the Agency by allowing officers access to their sources of information, providing cover for intelligence operations, and promoting anticommunist rhetoric. Objections and dissent were nonetheless present behind the scenes. In private, reporters questioned CIA cooperation and sometimes clashed with the Agency when told to suppress publishing on operations.¹⁷

Press self-censorship was vital in protecting CIA secrecy as journalists shared Agency concerns that withholding such material helped to defend the nation. The press argued that, as a young organisation, CIA secrecy needed strident protection. After the 1961 Bay of Pigs, coverage expanded significantly as the press reported on CIA's development as a governmental institution

¹⁶ CIA, "Agency Clipping Service," November 26, 1963, CIA-RDP80B01676R000600130001-3, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R000600130001-3.pdf>, accessed 2nd June 2025.

¹⁷ See John Foran, "Discursive Subversions: Time Magazine, the CIA Overthrow of Mussaddiq, and the Installation of the Shah," in *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966*, ed. Christian G. Appy (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), 157-182; Elke van Cassel, "In Search of a Clear and Overarching American Policy: The Reporter Magazine (1949-68), the US Government and the Cold War," in *The US Government, Citizen Groups, and the Cold War: The State-Private Network*, eds. Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford (London: Routledge, 2006), 149-176; Richard J. Aldrich, "American Journalism and the Landscape of Secrecy: Tad Szulc, the CIA and Cuba," *History*, 100, no. 340 (2015); Simon Willmetts, "The CIA and Time Magazine: Journalistic Ethics and Newsroom Dissent," *Diplomatic History*, 48, no. 5 (2024), 719-743; Harrison E. Salisbury, *Without Fear or Favor: An Uncompromising Look at the New York Times* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980), 576; David P. Hadley, *The Rising Clamor: The American Press, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Cold War* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2019), 12-15, 99; Kathryn J. McGarr, *City of Newsmen: Public Lies and Professional Secrets in Cold War Washington* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2022), 2-3.

when it moved to its new headquarters at Langley. Under William Colby, amid criticism about its past activities, most of the mainstream press was mindful of not undermining its current and future operations as they accused investigative reporters of compromising CIA secrecy. In the 1980s, the mainstream press accepted that the conservative political shift under President Ronald Reagan meant CIA secrecy would be reinforced, as DCI William Casey attempted to regain lost ground through legislation and executive power.

To understand why reporters were hesitant to publish secret CIA information, it is useful to distinguish between government and CIA secrecy. On the one hand, government secrecy has deeper roots that began at the start of the twentieth century.¹⁸ Establishing state secrets set the benchmark for what material journalists could and could not publish. The press initially refrained from criticising state secrecy in the early Cold War years. By the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court strengthened the press's First Amendment protections, most notably in the 1971 *New York Times Co. v. United States* decision. Public disillusionment increased over executive abuses of power as investigative journalists embodied an adversarial press that targeted and attacked government secrecy.¹⁹ On the other, the press accepted and legitimised CIA secrecy because it emphasised the protection over national security secrets. It helped to build the notion that the Agency's intelligence capabilities needed to be shielded because it was the first line of defence in the Cold War. Guarding national security secrets dictated how the press portrayed CIA as reporters negotiated with the organisation on the severity of disclosing material and notified the Agency before publication.²⁰

What Newspapers and Why?

The CIA has always been fascinated by its public portrayal. Just as the press wants to know more about it, the Agency wants to know more about what the press thinks of it. Over the decades,

¹⁸ Ted Galen Carpenter, *The Captive Press: Foreign Policy Crises and the First Amendment* (Washington DC: Cato Institute, 1995), 18-30; Hannah Gurman and Kaeten Mistry, "The Paradox of National Security Whistleblowing: Locating and Framing a History of the Phenomenon," in *Whistleblowing Nation: The History of National Security Disclosures and the Cult of State Secrecy*, eds. Kaeten Mistry and Hannah Gurman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 16-17; Sam Lebovic, *State of Silence: The Espionage Act and the Rise of America's Secrecy Regime* (New York: Basic Books, 2023).

¹⁹ Samantha Barbas, "The Enduring Significance of *New York Times v. Sullivan*," in *The Future of Press Freedom: Democracy, Law, and the News in Changing Times*, eds. Ronnell Andersen Jones and Sonja R. West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2025), 256; Allison Aviki, Jonathan Cedarbaum, Rebecca Lee, et al., "The Pentagon Papers Framework, Fifty Years Later," in *National Security, Leaks and Freedom of the Press: The Pentagon Papers Fifty Years On*, eds. Lee C. Bollinger and Geoffrey R. Stone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 2-3; Geoffrey R. Stone, *Top Secret: When Our Government Keeps Us in the Dark* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 21.

²⁰ Michael Schudson, "The Multiple Political Roles of American Journalism," in *Media Nation: The Political History of News in Modern America*, eds. Bruce J. Shulman and Julian E. Zelizer (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 195; Tom Wicker, *On Press* (New York: Viking Press, 1978), 235-236.

this press clipping service has been maintained and expanded to the point that using the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) today will often produce a wealth of historical press articles on a wide range of subjects.²¹ Officials focused on the *NYT*, *Washington Post* (WP), *ES*, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* (SPLD), *Los Angeles Times* (LAT), *Chicago Tribune* (CT), *New York Daily News* (NYDN), *Philadelphia Inquirer* (PI), and *The Baltimore Sun* (TBS). These outlets will be examined in the thesis. CIA read, clipped, monitored, and responded to them because they spanned across the political spectrum. The papers' consistent of coverage of the CIA, combined with their popularity, helped to sow and maintain support for CIA secrecy by depicting the Agency as a vital instrument of statecraft in the Cold War.²²

Although the CIA sought to shape public debate, the Cold War press were not pawns of the Agency. During the Second World War, a strong commitment to the U.S. war effort meant the press held a shared responsibility by voluntarily withholding national security information. A 1947 report by University of Chicago president Robert M. Hutchins argued that the press's wartime sense of responsibility reflected the American democratic ethic. It acted as a cornerstone of press freedom and should be shared by reporters, editors, and publishers across the nation. Drawing on wartime experiences, the Hutchins Commission called for an ethos of "social responsibility" that helped shape postwar journalist ethics. Responsibility came to be understood by editors and publishers as a moral obligation to defend American democracy. In the context of a zero-sum Cold War, this meant the press did not want to render the Agency ineffective in its mission against the Soviet Union.²³

²¹ Kaeten Mistry, "The Hollow Archive: The CIA's Digitized Declassified Records," *H-Diplo Forum on Scholars and Digital Archives: Living the Dream?* (2021-2), 15.

²² For works that explore the modern history of the American newspaper and their politics, see: David R. Davies, *The Postwar Decline of American Newspapers, 1945-1965* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); James Brian McPherson, *Journalism at the End of the American Century, 1965-present* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); Alan Brinkley, *The Publisher: Henry Luce and His American Century* (New York: Knopf, 2010); Matthew Pressman, *On Press: The Liberal Values That Shaped the News* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018); For works that focus on mainstream newspapers, see: David Halberstam, *The Powers That Be* (New York: Knopf, 1979); Salisbury, *Without Fear or Favor*; Deborah Davies, *Katherine the Great: Katherine Graham and the Washington Post* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979); For works that focus on conservative media see: James Brian McPherson, *The Conservative Resurgence and the Press: The Media's Role in the Rise of the Right* (Evanston, IL, 2008); Nicole Hemmer, *Messengers of the Right: Conservative Media and the Transformation of American Politics* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); Laurence R. Jurdem, *Paving the Way for Reagan: The Influence of Conservative Media on US Foreign Policy* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2018); Matthew Pressman, "The New York Daily News and the History of Conservative Media," *Modern American History*, 4, no. 3 (2021), 219-238.

²³ For a thorough account of the Hutchins Commission, see Stephen Bates, *An Aristocracy of Critics: Luce, Hutchins, Neibuhr, and the Committee that Redefined Freedom of the Press* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020); William L. Rivers and Wilbur Schramm, *Responsibility in Mass Communication*, rev. ed., (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 47-51; Sam Lebovic, *Free Speech and Unfree News: The Paradox of Press Freedom in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 140-145; Davies, *The Postwar Decline of American Newspapers*, 23-24; McGarr, *City of Newsmen*, 59-62.

Defending American democracy meant protecting the institutions designed to defend the nation. This shared social responsibility influenced the outlets examined in this thesis. The prestigious *NYT* and the *WP* were widely read national newspapers, which crucially reached every member of Congress and the executive branch. The *NYT* had an experienced cohort of foreign affairs correspondents whose connections with government officials brought them into close proximity to the U.S. state. After the war, *NYT* journalists Hanson Baldwin and Wallace Carroll relied on their contacts with intelligence officers to advise on their stories. Whilst *WP* did not have its own foreign bureau until the mid-1950s when it dramatically increased its readership, it had key reporters such as Chalmers M. Roberts, whose credentials made *WP* a prominent voice for intelligence-reporting. The Alsop brothers, Joseph and Stewart, maintained close intelligence connections, and their strong anticommunist rhetoric gave the paper “a hard-line image in foreign affairs.”²⁴

While the *ES* was not comparable in its foreign affairs reporting, it was vital in conveying the CIA’s story at home, particularly within the local Washington community. The paper’s local history was closely intertwined with the Agency’s development as a key government institution. The outlet became one of the most popular and richest newspapers by the 1950s. Because of its focus on local news and its desire to preserve Washington suburbia, it devoted extensive reporting to the nearby CIA headquarters. The *ES* employed Constantine Brown, a key foreign affairs correspondent who provided extensive and dedicated commentary over the CIA’s creation and development. His coverage was aided by George Beveridge, Mary Lou Werner, and Richard Fryklund, who published information relating to the Agency. Their travels abroad and on the home front during the war, coupled with the paper’s devotion to local news, made it an important outlet for reporting on the CIA, and officials paid close attention in surveying its coverage.²⁵

Prominent regional papers, the *SLPD*, *LAT*, *CT*, *NYDN*, *PI*, and *TBS* are examined because they provided a running CIA commentary throughout the Cold War. Each spoke to a distinct geographic audience. While not part of *NYT* and *WP*’s close ties to officialdom, they still served as important outlets for reporters who covered the Agency such as Marquis Childs and Joseph Kraft. The *SLPD* was prolific in its call for the Agency to expand and strengthen after the war whilst the zero-sum context of the Cold War changed *CT* and *NYDN* from papers who were anti-CIA to Agency supporters. The

²⁴ Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 14-16, 30, 68; Salisbury, *Without Fear or Favor*, 151; David M. Barrett, *The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 167; Halberstam, *The Powers That Be*, 305-306; Lebovic, *Free Speech and Unfree News*, 145; Chalmers M. Roberts, *In the Shadow of Power: The Story of the Washington Post* (Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks Press, 1989), 290, 334.

²⁵ Faye Haskins, *The Evening Star: The Rise and Fall of a Great Washington Newspaper* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), 1-2, 54, 165, 186; Donald A. Ritchie, *Reporting from Washington: The History of the Washington Press Corps* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 331.

LAT, *PI*, and *TBS* were key contributors to the public debate in the 1970s, keeping readers abreast of the evolving organisation under DCI Colby, and they aided his PR efforts.²⁶

Literature on CIA PR, CIA-Press Relations, Agency History, and the Secrecy State

The thesis argues that CIA PR has been used since its establishment because officials recognised the importance of shaping the public debate. They understood that keeping the press onside was key, by thoroughly analysing coverage and building close relations to influential journalists. The thesis expands upon David Shamus McCarthy's *Selling the CIA*, which examines CIA PR from the 1970s and argues that "CIA secrecy and CIA PR...have been inseparable from each other."²⁷ While McCarthy highlights a neglected aspect of CIA culture, this thesis will show that CIA PR has a deeper history. It was a key component of public secrecy that dictated the decisions made by Agency officials.

Works by Wesley Wark and Larry Valero have demonstrated the use of PR before the CIA's establishment. Both focus on William Donovan, the Director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), who conducted a vigorous PR campaign to support the Agency's creation.²⁸ Simon Willmetts has contributed important work that traces Donovan's and Allen Dulles's PR efforts to forge a positive public image for U.S. intelligence and CIA. His research offers essential insight into how CIA officials shaped public debate to stifle criticism. His observations on Dulles's persona provide a crucial window into how the former DCI continued to cultivate a favourable press image for his Agency following his forced resignation after the Bay of Pigs.²⁹

To understand the relationship between the CIA and the press, it is necessary to acknowledge what is meant by a "Cold war consensus" and why the term has been contested. Scholars such as Louis Hartz and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. laid the intellectual and ideological foundations for this consensus by arguing that liberalism constituted the "American way of life." It was dominant, underpinned U.S. hegemony in the postwar world, and required an "activist" foreign

²⁶ Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 9.

²⁷ David Shamus McCarthy, *Selling the CIA: Public Relations and the Culture of Secrecy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2018), 8.

²⁸ Wesley K. Wark, "'Great Investigations': The Public Debate on Intelligence in the US after 1945," *Defense Analysis*, 3, no. 2 (1987), 119-132; Larry Valero, "'We Need Our New OSS, Our New General Donovan, Now': The Public Discourse over American Intelligence, 1944-53," *Intelligence and National Security*, 18, no. 1 (2003), 91-118.

²⁹ Simon Willmetts, "The Burgeoning Fissures of Dissent: Allen Dulles and the Selling of the CIA in the Aftermath of the Bay of Pigs," *History*, 100, no. 340 (2015), 167-188; Simon Willmetts, "The CIA and the Invention of Tradition," *Journal of Intelligence History*, 14, no. 2 (2015), 112-128.

policy to defend it against the perceived monolithic threat of communism.³⁰ This commitment to protecting American liberal democracy at all costs was implemented by the architects of U.S. Cold War diplomacy, and a bipartisan consensus dictated the formulation of foreign policy.³¹

Senior government and CIA officials helped sustain this consensus through their support for U.S. internationalism and anticommunism.³² Robert Dean's *Imperial Brotherhood* demonstrates how masculinity and class forged these views during the early Cold War. Members of the foreign policy elite attended the same prestigious private schools and joined the same exclusive social clubs that emphasised conformity.³³ These men shared privileged backgrounds that helped shape U.S. foreign policy by influencing the decisions made by senior officials. OSS and CIA men were recruited from Ivy League universities that reinforced consensus values by instilling shared beliefs in masculinity and internationalism, whilst their strong anticommunist views had laid the groundwork for the Agency's covert network and influenced its covert operations.³⁴

The foreign policy elite were able to enact a long-term consensus because U.S. hegemony was accepted "from top to bottom," Thomas J. McCormick writes.³⁵ The Cold War not only shaped elite decision-making but it also permeated American culture and society. Anticommunism "intensified on American soil," moulding everyday life and becoming a powerful tool to fight the Cold War at home.³⁶ Containing communism was not solely a foreign policy aim; it influenced domestic processes, from family life to citizenship.³⁷ Anxieties over a nuclear holocaust also helped to reinforce this early Cold War consensus. The fear of atomic warfare had dominated the minds of

³⁰ Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955), 10-11; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 159, 163.

³¹ Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970); Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War* (New York: Knopf, 1985), 141, 190.

³² Thomas J. McCormick, *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1989), 15-16.

³³ Robert D. Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001), 3, 6, 29.

³⁴ Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 19, 250; Hugh Wilford, "'Essentially a Work of Fiction': Kermit 'Kim' Roosevelt, Imperial Romance, and the Iran Coup of 1953," *Diplomatic History*, 40, no. 5 (2016), 925; Burton Hersch, *The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA* (New York: Scribner, 1992).

³⁵ McCormick, *America's Half-Century*, 10.

³⁶ Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 10.

³⁷ Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1988); Andrea Friedman, *Citizenship in Cold War America: The National Security State and the Possibilities of Dissent* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2015), 9-10.

Americans as public discussions over urban dispersal and civil-defence planning intensified, especially in the nation's capital.³⁸

On the press and culture of American journalism, a consensus is more complicated. The conventional narrative argues that Cold War reporters merely parroted the U.S. government and CIA until the late 1960s and 1970s, when an adversarial press became critical of foreign policy. Daniel Hallin argues that journalists were committed to sustaining this form of press consensus during the early Vietnam War because government officials remained unified in their policy aims. Only when dissent within the government emerged in the latter stages of the war did the press adopt a more critical stance.³⁹ But this overlooks the complex reality journalists lived in. Their work depended on their organisation, cultural traditions, and institutional constraints. Therefore, the news is “far more complicated than anything one could reduce to an articulate political ideology.”⁴⁰

This is where the notion of a universal “press consensus” falls apart. Journalists were expected to report objectively on the news, but covering foreign policy, including the CIA, required access to filtered official sources within the highest echelons of the U.S. government.⁴¹ Reporters recognised that to maintain access to government and CIA information, they would have to reproduce the official line. In print they did so, but privately journalists held reservations over Cold War policies. As Kathryn McGarr argues, an early Cold War press consensus is exaggerated because journalists and editors knew the “official version was not always true” and privately voiced their grievances.⁴²

However, the careers of the Washington D.C. press corps were dependent on maintaining the accessibility of information gleaned from an elite few. To gain exclusive insights into the elusive world of U.S. intelligence, reporters had to be mindful over the handling of CIA secrets. Journalists knew, for example, that the CIA instigated coups in Iran and Guatemala but they kept details of the operations hidden from the public for fear of losing their elite sources and connections that guided their reporting. A form of press consensus therefore developed within the elite circle of the press and the foreign policy establishment. It was sustained because discussions over the shielding of CIA

³⁸ Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 319-323; Sarah E. Robey, *Atomic Americans: Citizens in a Nuclear State* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022), 11.

³⁹ Daniel C. Hallin, *The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 9, 74.

⁴⁰ Michael Schudson, *The Power of News* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 13, 16.

⁴¹ Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 2.

⁴² McGarr, *City of Newsmen*, 11-14.

secrets were conducted within exclusive, segregated, white, male press clubs and background briefings that stifled “press dissent and helped maintain a culture of secrecy.”⁴³

McGarr argues that Washington correspondents shared a social homogeneity that shaped what could be discussed and published in print. But what about the conventional narrative that argues the consensus broke down in the late 1960s and 1970s? Recent works demonstrate adversarial journalism began earlier. Correspondents turned to interpretive reporting in the 1950s, by including their own judgments and analysis into their articles. Journalists questioned rather than blindly accepted what they were being told as “it implied that the true meaning of the news was neither self-evident nor universally agreed upon.”⁴⁴ Interpretive reporting also resulted in a rise in “contextual stories” since the 1950s, reflecting journalism’s “growing professionalism, growing skepticism, and a growing pride in independence.”⁴⁵ Lastly, the increase in analytical reporting contributed to a broader critical press culture that undermines the notion of a monolithic consensus. Concentrated ownership of newspapers and commercial media markets led to press criticism over regulation and government policies that restricted access to information under the guise of national security. It produced a surge of sustained criticism from editors and reporters.⁴⁶

David Hadley’s seminal work *The Rising Clamor* challenges the idea of a monolithic press consensus by demonstrating that CIA press criticism began earlier in the 1950s. Hadley examines the shifting CIA-press relationship and shows how journalists shaped CIA history. He also argues that the Bay of Pigs invasion ultimately broke the Cold War consensus, resulting in sustained CIA criticism. His focus on the public debate is notably important. However, this thesis is distinct in three key areas. First, it explains there was surprising continuity in CIA-press relations. Turning points were less significant in newspaper coverage because press support for CIA secrecy remained more consistent than is recognised. Public secrecy was ever-present and endured because of the press. For example, the thesis argues that the press did not entertain ideas such as dismantling the CIA after the Bay of Pigs.⁴⁷

Second, Hadley’s methodology uses a wide range of periodicals from the mainstream outlets such as the *NYT* and *WP* to moderate liberal and conservative newspapers to demonstrate how the CIA was covered. His justification for selecting the *NYT*, a “cornerstone of U.S. journalism,” and the

⁴³ Ibid; Willmetts, “The CIA and Time Magazine,” 725-726.

⁴⁴ Pressman, *On Press*, 7-8, 42-43.

⁴⁵ Michael Schudson and Katherine Fink, “The Rise of Contextual Journalism, 1950s-2000s,” *Journalism*, 15, no. 1 (2014), 17.

⁴⁶ Lebovic, *Free Speech and Unfree News*, 146-147, 166-167.

⁴⁷ The Bay of Pigs is seen as a pivotal point in the CIA-press relationship, see for example Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer*, 225-248.

WP, with its “close ties to officialdom,” is convincing and one which this thesis adopts. However, this study moves beyond the political binaries of newspapers to show there was a greater press consensus in supporting CIA secrecy that transcended left-right domestic politics. Third, *The Rising Clamor* emphasises the CIA’s dominant role as a covert influencer of the press. The thesis will instead argue that reporters, editors, and publishers were all responsible for legitimising CIA secrecy.⁴⁸

This thesis demonstrates a greater continuity in CIA-press relations throughout the Cold War. It builds on Gregg Herken’s *The Georgetown Set* and McGarr’s *City of Newsmen*, which examine how government officials and reporters shaped CIA-press relations in the early Cold War. Herken and McGarr focus on Washington’s political and social culture to argue that exclusive private connections between government officials and reporters helped promote a form of Cold War consensus.⁴⁹ For example, the Alsop brothers and the *WP* owner Philip Graham were associates of Allen Dulles, and the DCI even invited Graham for an exclusive tour of Langley.⁵⁰ These works are important because they show how an anticommunist rhetoric, accompanied by internationalism, formed the ideological foundation of CIA-press relations. Journalists had experienced the horrors of the Second World War and contributed to the total war ethic either by serving in the armed forces or reporting from Europe. Reporters, editors, and publishers established a strong devotion to the protection of the United States and believed the nation should lead the postwar world. Supporting the creation of the CIA was key to ensuring this.

Overviews of CIA history have grown exponentially over the years. Key survey texts have chartered the institutional histories of the Agency since the establishment of intelligence studies as an academic field in the 1980s.⁵¹ Other works have traced Congressional oversight of the CIA and examined CIA connections with private citizens and groups.⁵² These texts focus on the Agency as a

⁴⁸ Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 9.

⁴⁹ Gregg Herken, *The Georgetown Set: Friends and Rivals in Cold War Washington* (New York: Vintage Books, 2015); McGarr, *City of Newsmen*.

⁵⁰ “Dear Phil,” January 7, 1963, Allen W. Dulles Papers, 1845-1971, Series 1: Correspondence, 1891-1969, “Graham, Philip L, 1950-1962,” Public Policy Papers, Department of Special Collections, Princeton University (hereafter Dulles Papers).

⁵¹ Key CIA overviews include: John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986); Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Christopher Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995); John Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006); Richard H. Immerman, *The Hidden Hand: A Brief History of the CIA* (Hoboken: Wiley, 2014).

⁵² For CIA-Congressional oversight, see: Loch K. Johnson, *A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation* (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1985); Barrett, *The CIA and Congress*; Britt L. Snider, *The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004* (Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008). For the CIA and the cultural sphere, see: Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The*

covert organisation, examining its covert operations abroad and its secret domestic relationships with Congress and private groups. As a result, they overlook CIA's overt image and presence at home. They do not address the role the press played in covering the Agency or why the CIA was obsessed with its domestic reputation. Nor do they explain how CIA sought to influence their public profile.

CIA invoked national security to shape public debate. It ensured operational secrecy was protected and it was employed as an essential PR tool to dictate what CIA material the press could and could not publish. Although the concept of national security has a longer genealogy that originates in the interwar period, it gained prominent public attention in the early Cold War. With the creation and rapid development of the secrecy state, secret government agencies like CIA sought to shape the nature of public debate.⁵³ Since the end of the Cold War, historians have attempted to unearth the modern secrecy regime through archival and digital research. In 1992, the Agency announced it would release documents detailing its Cold War operations in a new "openness initiative." The result was a single official history written by Nick Cullather on Operation PBSUCCESS, the CIA's 1954 covert intervention in Guatemala. His work faced numerous hurdles including delays, vetoes, and redactions. In the book's forward, Cullather criticised the CIA's slow declassification efforts and noted the wider academic scepticism surrounding its openness program, which George C. Herring, a member of the Agency's Historical Review Panel, described as a "brilliant public relations snow job."⁵⁴

The promise to declassify thousands of CIA documents proved unfruitful. Six years later, CIA officials still opposed releasing material because they feared it would reveal the Agency's post-Cold War sources and methods.⁵⁵ National security was used to protect CIA secrecy. It has proved to be an effective concept used by the Agency to limit public discussion against the unearthing of important documents relating to its history. It has been used to deflect criticism during the Cold War

CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London: Granta Books, 1999); Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The U.S. Crusade against the Soviet Union 1945-56* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 107-121; Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer*.

⁵³ Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Melvyn P. Leffler, *Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-2015* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); Andrew Preston, *Total Defense: The New Deal and the Invention of National Security* (Harvard University Press, 2025).

⁵⁴ Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), xiii-xiv.

⁵⁵ Kaeten Mistry, "Approaches to Understanding the Inaugural CIA Covert Operation in Italy: Exploding Useful Myths," *Intelligence and National Security*, 26, no. 2-3 (2011), 246-250.

and continues to this day to dictate what information historians, and the public can access about the organisation.⁵⁶

To understand why the CIA was able to withhold information by invoking national security, it is important to acknowledge the modern evolution of U.S. secrecy. Since the twentieth century, the U.S. state has protected national security secrets. Statutes such as the 1911 Defense Secrets Act and the 1917 Espionage Act helped establish a modern secrecy regime that compartmentalised and protected national security material.⁵⁷ The press held a responsibility for the preservation of national security secrets during the Second World War.⁵⁸ The devastating impact of a total war ignited a shared desire to protect the nation through loyalty to the Allied cause. This combination of press responsibility for national security and the fear of disclosing it had set the foundations for journalistic practices into the Cold War.⁵⁹

Amid anticommunist hysteria and paranoia, the U.S. state expanded official secrecy in the early Cold War years by rapidly increasing the classification of material through a series of Executive Orders in the 1950s. It was not long before the issue of overclassification was recognised, as restrictions on information available to the public increased.⁶⁰ This received public attention and criticism by individuals and members of the press such as the freedom of information movement in the 1950s. Congressman John Moss and *WP* editor Russell Wiggins wanted stronger First Amendment rights to tackle the expansion of state secrecy.⁶¹ Others have since cited the increase, “culture,” and “routinisation” of classification, noting it as antithetical to the idea of an informed public.⁶²

⁵⁶ Zachary Karabell and Timothy Naftali, “History Declassified: The Perils and Promises of CIA Documents,” *Diplomatic History*, 18, no. 4 (1994), 620-626; Tim Weiner, “C.I.A., Breaking Promises, Puts Off Release of Cold War Files,” *NYT*, July 15, 1998, p. A13.

⁵⁷ Davies, *The Postwar Decline of American Newspapers*, 34; Lebovic, *Free Speech and Unfree News*, 138-145; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 14-15.

⁵⁸ Alexander G. Lovelace, *The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy During World War II* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2022).

⁵⁹ Chalmers M. Roberts, *First Rough Draft: A Journalist's Journal of Our Times* (New York: Praeger, 1973), 80-81; James Reston, *Deadline: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1991), 97-99; Turner Catledge, *My Life and the Times* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 133-142.

⁶⁰ Gurman and Mistry, “The Paradox of National Security Whistleblowing,” 17-18.

⁶¹ John E. Moss, “The Crisis of Secrecy,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 17, no. 1 (1961), 8-35; Michael Schudson, *The Rise of the Right to Know: Politics and the Culture of Transparency, 1945-1975* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2015), 37-63; Lebovic, *Free Speech and Unfree News*, 181-184.

⁶² Daniel P. Moynihan, *Secrecy: The American Experience* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Matthew Connelly, *The Declassification Engine: What History Reveals about America's Top Secrets* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2023).

It has inevitably led to gaps in knowledge, which have routinely been filled by fantasy and fiction.⁶³ Fascination with secrecy gained momentum during the Cold War with the rise of the national security state and public attention on it. The public know the national security state exists, and this creates a tension between openness and secrecy.⁶⁴ Langley, for example, is an open secret because it is recognisable as the CIA's headquarters, but intelligence operations planned at the site are hidden. The public accept that certain material must be withheld and the CIA needs to cover its operations so it can be effective. But there remains an interest to discover more about the Agency, and officials recognised they could use public fascination to protect CIA from exposure. Public secrecy was an effective way to achieve this. For example, DCIs Allen Dulles and William Colby framed the CIA's release of non-operational material to the press as the work of a transparent organisation that upheld the American democratic ethic, while maintaining strict protection over crucial operational secrets.⁶⁵

This thesis connects the separate literatures on CIA PR, press relations, and government secrecy through a research methodology analysing both press coverage and CIA PR to explain why CIA secrecy endured throughout the Cold War. In doing so, it fills a gap in our knowledge about how and why the Agency remained a powerful political and cultural force in modern America. Histories of the CIA is often told through specific periods, whether examining covert operations abroad or domestic turning points such as its relationship with the press. This study moves beyond those approaches to argue that public secrecy was an enduring feature in the Cold War. It was a deliberate strategy used by the CIA to keep the press onside and ensured support for its secrecy remained at the forefront of CIA-press relations.

The structure of the work examines key moments in the public debate that emphasise the CIA's domestic role. It complements the extensive literature on CIA power abroad to produce a more complete picture of a critical political, social, and cultural organisation.⁶⁶ By examining the words of columnists, editors, and the CIA itself, the research undertaken demonstrates that the Agency was

⁶³ Tricia Jenkins, *The CIA in Hollywood: How the Agency Shapes Film and Television* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012); Melley, *The Covert Sphere*, 8, 14, 22-23; Simon Willmetts, "The Cultural Turn in Intelligence Studies," *Intelligence and National Security*, 34, no. 6 (2019), 806-808; Simon Willmetts, *In Secrecy's Shadow: The OSS and CIA in Hollywood Cinema 1941-1979* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 5-7.

⁶⁴ Alex Wellerstein, *Restricted Data: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the United States* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2021), 10-11; Ann Douglas, "Periodizing the American Century: Modernism, Postmodernism, and Postcolonialism in the Cold War Context," *Modernism/Modernity*, 5, no. 3 (1998), 76; David E. Pozen, "Deep Secrecy," *Stanford Law Review*, 62, no. 2 (2010), 288-289.

⁶⁵ Mark Fenster, *The Transparency Fix: Secrets, Leaks, and Uncontrollable Government Information* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2017), 11.

⁶⁶ There is a recent growing emphasis to argue diplomatic historians should highlight and bring the U.S. state back to the forefront of historical analysis, see Bessner and Logevall, "Recentring the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations," 38-55.

central to public debate since its creation. The thesis argues that maintaining a positive public profile was a key aim for CIA officials.

Chapter Outline

The chapters explore the complexity of CIA secrecy and how the press legitimised it during the Cold War. Chapter one shows how secrecy was used to promote the new agency after the war. It was strongly supported from foreign correspondence journalists who stated that only a free, independent, and strong CIA could effectively defend the nation. The second chapter starts in 1953, after Senator Joseph McCarthy accused the Agency of harbouring communists. CIA secrecy shifted towards protection against carnivalesque political spectacles that put it in the spotlight. Through the efforts of Allen Dulles and Stanley Grogan, the CIA became an established government institution, as demonstrated by its move to Langley. The thesis sheds light on Grogan's role as the Agency's PR man which has largely been overlooked by scholars.

Chapter three begins with the aftermath of the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs operation. CIA secrecy was increasingly questioned as a threat to American democracy. This was highlighted by reporters, but it did not reflect a turning point for the Cold War consensus as newspapers continued to support the CIA in its broader Cold War mission. The fourth chapter follows William Colby's "managed transparency," through which he sought to rewrite Agency history, acknowledge past mistakes, and restore its public image. Colby's CIA received help from those in the press who were reluctant to punish it, fearing that criticism could either damage the CIA's intelligence capabilities or risk destabilising it completely. Lastly, CIA secrecy in the fifth chapter was strongly supported through legislation and executive power. Executive Order (EO) 12333, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (IIPA), the push for total CIA exemption from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and William Casey's threat to prosecute news organisations all enhanced Agency secrecy. Assessing press coverage became a key CIA PR approach as senior officials continued to strive for effective solutions to cultivate a positive public image.

The chapters show how CIA secrecy endured throughout the Cold War. It influenced how the organisation adapted its press relations. Public secrecy spurred internal CIA decisions to survey press coverage, release material, manage key reporters, promote successful stories whilst clamping down on negative ones all to shape public debate. The thesis reveals a broader consensus during the Cold War that saw key parts of the mainstream press maintain support for CIA secrecy.

1. Reporting on the Secret Agency: Justifying CIA Secrecy in the Early Cold War

"The logic of experience and the example set by other major powers should make obvious that we need a centralized foreign intelligence system...the all-important value of this being that it would be a guarantee against ignorance of the objectives and intention of other countries and thus be most helpful to those who must shape the diplomatic and military policies of the Nation in the years ahead." - *ES*, 1945 ⁶⁷

"Action this session is imperative if our security plans are not to be severely hampered...Congress had better get a move on." - *WP*, 1947 ⁶⁸

"The weakest spot in Uncle Sam's armor today is the lack of an adequate intelligence service, which is more important to national defense than several peacetime divisions or task forces." - *Constantine Brown*, 1947 ⁶⁹

In May 1952, Gardner "Mike" Cowles Jr., the owner of *Look* magazine, wrote to DCI Walter Bedell Smith requesting permission to publish an article on the CIA's functions and "the half dozen most important men in the organization."⁷⁰ Cowles, a liberal internationalist and ardent supporter of NATO who feared Soviet expansion was eager to demonstrate that the newly established CIA would be a valuable organisation in the Cold War. He proposed John Gunther to write the article, a well-known reporter who previously published a series of books titled *Inside* where he travelled to various regions of the world and documented the changing political climates. The series made him a popular and respected reporter on international affairs.

Gunther wrote to Smith the following day, outlining his intention to produce a "serious article on the whole CIA setup and its corollary activities," along with a brief profile on Smith for a sequel to his 1947 book *Inside U.S.A.* Cautious about trusting reporters, the DCI nonetheless knew the importance of press coverage. Smith's response echoed the view held by senior officials that CIA should respond to the press while maintaining its secrecy. "I can't say that I am happy over your letter," Smith responded, "because as you know we feel here that the less said about CIA the better for our work." But Smith recognised the importance of engaging the public sphere. He agreed to the article, noting "I would rather it be by *Look* [and] John Gunther than...anybody else." Offering his

⁶⁷ "Co-ordinated Intelligence," *ES*, September 12, 1945, p. A10.

⁶⁸ "Neglected Unification," *WP*, July 4, 1947, p. 6.

⁶⁹ Constantine Brown, "U.S. Lacking Adequate Service of Intelligence," *ES*, June 1, 1947, p. C1.

⁷⁰ CIA, "Letter to Gardner Cowles from Walter B. Smith (Signed W Bedell Smith)," May 3, 1952, CIA-RDP80R01731R000400230011-5, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01731R000400230011-5.pdf>, accessed 7th October 2023.

support, and that of Deputy DCI Allen Dulles, Smith approved publication, as long as they both could “check the article before.”⁷¹

Several recommendations were listed and sent to Colonel Sheffield Edwards, head of the CIA’s Office of Security. A passage that described how the Agency “ceaselessly...picks up newspapers, magazines...from every corner of the globe,” was highlighted because it could be “detrimental to [CIA] collection efforts.” The Agency’s PR man, Colonel Chester B. Hansen stated the article would benefit CIA, because “Gunther tosses it three fat bouquets: CIA is good: its people are good: if need be they can play rough.”⁷² A few weeks before publication, the upcoming article was advertised in *ES*, *NYDN*, and *SLPD* under the headline “No War with Russia!” It featured the description “How does the CIA operate? Who are the men who head this most secret of secret agencies? Read startling facts never before revealed in ‘Inside CIA’ by one of America’s best reporters –John Gunther—in *Look!*”⁷³

Gunther’s article listed the Agency’s departments and named the men who headed them. He covered the CIA and Smith in a positive light, claiming the organisation “are doing a first-class job” and Smith “is something special.”⁷⁴ Despite the favourable publicity, some CIA officials questioned why an article needed to be published in the first place. In a memorandum to Edwards, one said the article “should be killed” and another argued *Look* had damaged Agency security because it gave some officers who once “revered the sacrosanctity of this Agency” license to talk more freely about it, and “some of the more loquacious ones could not and did not refrain from identifying themselves.” It states the decision to accept publication was hasty and for the future “it might be a good idea to forewarn everyone.”⁷⁵ The episode demonstrated the CIA’s attempt, albeit informal, at PR in the early Cold War. In 1951 Smith appointed the Agency’s first press officer,

⁷¹ Ibid; CIA, “Letter to John Gunther from Walter B. Smith,” May 6, 1952, CIA-RDP80R01731R000500340009-5, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01731R000500340009-5.pdf>, accessed 23rd November 2023; “Gardner Cowles Jr. is Dead at 82,” *NYT*, July 9, 1985, p. B6; Andrew L. Yarrow, *Look: How a Highly Influential Magazine Helped Define Mid-Twentieth-Century America* (Lincoln: Potomac Books, 2021) 29; Deborah Cohen, “The Man Who Told All,” *Atlantic Monthly*, 329, no. 3 (2022), 87; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 39.

⁷² CIA, “Dear Shep;,” August 15, 1952, CIA-RDP78-04007A000500100007-9, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-04007A000500100007-9.pdf>, accessed 17th October 2023.

⁷³ “No War with Russia!” *ES*, July 29, 1952, p. 14; “No War with Russia!” *NYDN*, July 31, 1952, p. 104; “No War with Russia!” *SLPD*, July 29, 1952, p. 13.

⁷⁴ John Gunther, “Inside CIA: the Story of Our Spy Network,” *Look*, August 12, 1952, page unknown.

⁷⁵ CIA, “Dear Shep;,” August 15, 1952, CIA-RDP78-04007A000500100007-9.

Colonel Hansen. Before Hansen's tenure, the CIA and its predecessor the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), did not formally designate anyone to conduct relations with the press.⁷⁶

This chapter demonstrates why there was no requirement for a CIA PR official until 1951. During the Agency's early years, the dominant voice of internationalist columnists and their newspapers campaigned for a strong, independent CIA. Senior officials did not need to cultivate a positive public image because it was already being moulded by reporters who covered earlier efforts to establish an intelligence system. They focused on the CIG; an organisation they branded as a failure to provide effective intelligence in the early Cold War. The CIA offered a new hope. Reporters were keen to witness its creation and promoted the strengthening of it. The Agency received broad press support because it was seen as an expert intelligence outfit, essential for guarding the United States against surprise attacks like Pearl Harbor, and it enabled the nation to compete with other major world powers that reporters constantly warned were well versed in espionage. The *NYT*'s Hanson Baldwin declared CIA was the "first line in defense." It would prove cost-effective whilst saving the country, proclaimed Constantine Brown in the *ES*. And, as the Alsop brothers insisted, it ensured that intelligence was given an important and authoritative position at the heart of the U.S. government. "It is a prudently professional bureaucracy," Stewart Alsop noted in his memoir, for "it performs an...indispensable, function."⁷⁷

Internationalist reporters across the political spectrum played a crucial role in establishing early CIA support. Scholars have tended to focus on CIA criticism during this period, placing emphasis on the *CT* and its claims that the Agency resembled a Gestapo, threatening American democracy. This view overlooks how and why many newspapers became ardent CIA supporters. Arguments made by internationalist reporters dominated the public debate, compared to the isolationist rhetoric of *CT* and *NYDN*. This chapter moves beyond the conventional history of CIA origins to show how an emerging Cold War consensus shaped positive reporting on the Agency. It argues that anticommunism shaped coverage because it stressed that the CIA was a pivotal organisation in determining America's Cold War fate. Internationalist journalists promoting U.S. leadership argued the Agency needed stronger legislative authority, a professionalised status through civilian

⁷⁶ CIA, "Public Affairs Advisory Group Fact Sheet," date unknown, CIA-RDP86B00985R000100030010-8, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86B00985R000100030010-8.pdf>, accessed 5th December 2023.

⁷⁷ Hanson W. Baldwin, "Set-Up for Intelligence," *NYT*, April 6, 1947, p. 38; Brown, "U.S. Lacking Adequate Service of Intelligence," *ES*; Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Prompt Passage of Arms Unity Bill One of Cheapest Forms of National Insurance for Country," *SLPD*, June 6, 1947, p. 1C; Stewart Alsop, *The Center: The Anatomy of Power in Washington* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968), 251.

leadership, freedom from bureaucratic turf wars with other departments, and an expansion of its capabilities.

Public Reaction to Donovan's Proposal

The *CT* front page reported on a leaked proposal from William Donovan, head of OSS, to establish a permanent peacetime intelligence service. The article, written by Walter Trohan in February 1945, opposed the proposal and argued it would grant the new intelligence chief "tremendous power" and would "permit spying at home." The *CT* criticised the plan again the following day. Trohan quoted anti-New Deal Congressmen, whose statements reaffirmed his and the paper's Gestapo claims whilst an editorial argued that Donovan's plan "suggests...how eager the war-expanded bureaucracy is to find ways to reorganize itself for bigger and better pay rolls once the excuse of war necessity can no longer be invoked."⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Walter Trohan, "Super-Spy Idea Denounced as New Deal OGPU," *CT*, February 10, 1945, p. 1; Walter Trohan, "New Deal Plans Super Spy System," *CT*, February 9, 1945, p. 1; "Bigger and Better Spying," *CT*, February 10, 1945, p. 10.

Trohan's Gestapo criticism led to a surge in press coverage, revealing broad support for the establishment of an intelligence service. *ES* and *WP* were quick to defend the proposal, arguing it aided the nation's security. *ES* highlighted a member for the Senate's Military Affairs Committee who said, "there was a need for strengthening the system of obtaining foreign information." A *WP* editorial criticised Congressmen who opposed the plan, stating their "unfavorable reaction...may be traced to headline reading," for the plan "deserves consideration on its merits as a contribution to our national security."⁷⁹

Wallace Deuel was an experienced diplomatic journalist. Writing in the *ES* he called the intelligence plan "far too serious a matter to be undertaken frivolously."⁸⁰ An internationalist reporter, Deuel served in the OSS and later with the CIA. He was a member of the exclusive Metropolitan and Cosmos Clubs and cultivated an extensive informal network throughout his career. He used the contacts he made whilst he served in OSS to meet regularly with key government officials and became a source they trusted. He defended Donovan's proposal because the two were close associates. Deuel promoted the establishment of an intelligence service because it reflected his vision of expanding U.S. leadership and helped to maintain his network of inside sources by reassuring them of his support.⁸¹

The OSS was dissolved on 20 September 1945. Journalists knew the organisation would be disbanded and *ES* editorials echoed Deuel's advocacy for an intelligence service. It argued the United States cannot revert to its intelligence setup before OSS. Written in hyperbole, *ES* urged Congress to take "appropriate action" to fulfil Donovan's proposal, otherwise, the U.S. "will once again have the odd and somewhat hazardous distinction of being the only major power in the world without a permanent system of co-ordinated global intelligence."⁸² William H. Harrison, an *ES* editor, warned that if the U.S. did not replace OSS with a suitable intelligence organisation, the nation "will give up the peacetime advantages of such a system and again become the only major country in the world without an adequate, centralized foreign intelligence service."⁸³

Donovan served as the OSS's chief spokesman and recognised the importance of PR in promoting public support for the organisation. The public understood intelligence was necessary to protect the nation after the war, and Donovan knew he could shape public debate by emphasising

⁷⁹ "Postwar Intelligence Proposal of Donovan Faces Close Study," *ES*, February 10, 1945, p. A2; "Donovan's Plan," *WP*, February 16, 1945, p. 6; David Rudgers, *Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1943-1947* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 28.

⁸⁰ Wallace R. Deuel, "America's Postwar Espionage Control Stirs Savage Fight," *ES*, September 2, 1945, p. A5.

⁸¹ McGarr, *City of Newsmen*, 59-63, 116.

⁸² "Co-ordinated Intelligence," *ES*, September 12, 1945, p. A10.

⁸³ William H. Harrison, "New Agency Needed As OSS Replacement," *ES*, September 16, 1945, p. C2.

intelligence was a key component of statecraft.⁸⁴ PR played a vital role in pushing his agenda for the creation of a permanent intelligence service. He leaked successful OSS operations, highlighting its wartime achievements. By mid-September accounts of prior OSS activities in Europe and Africa were released to reporters. Harrison stated the organisation “has more than justified its existence,” claiming it “must be credited with having rendered an indispensable service during the war.”⁸⁵

The *NYT* stated the OSS “commandos, operating behind enemy lines in sixteen nations, had delivered more than 27,000 tons of American supplies and weapons to the underground...sabotaged ahead of invasions...supplied military intelligence and had rescued several thousand American airmen.”⁸⁶ Marquis Childs argued in the *WP* that “an OSS might have saved us from Pearl Harbor,” whilst other articles praised it in its contribution to the Nazi surrender in Italy and honoured fallen agents who served in resistance groups.⁸⁷ Editorials remarked that “enough is...known...to make it certain that the organization contributed substantially to victory on every front where the war was fought” and it “has played a part of value beyond computation.”⁸⁸ Donovan understood that he could mount a effective PR campaign through his exclusive and informal press connections. Although his intelligence proposal failed to pass, he could rely on internationalist reporters to highlight OSS successes and lay the groundwork for press support for a centralised intelligence service.⁸⁹

The Alsops’ Support for Centralised Intelligence

Syndicated columnists began to show their concerns over a bureaucratically weak intelligence organisation. When the CIG was established in January 1946, columnists criticised it as ineffective because they argued it was created during a period of bureaucratic tensions to satisfy government departments who wanted control over postwar intelligence. The CIG was supervised by the National Intelligence Authority (NIA), which was chaired by the secretaries of State, Navy, and War.⁹⁰ President Truman wanted it to be placed only in a facilitating role to provide the President

⁸⁴ Jeffrey P. Rugg, *The Spy and the State: The History of American Intelligence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2025), 243-244.

⁸⁵ Harrison, “New Agency Needed,” *ES*; Willmetts, “The CIA and the Invention of Tradition,” 115-116; Valero, “We Need Our New OSS,” 97-98.

⁸⁶ Tillman Durdin, “U.S. Cloak and Dagger Exploits,” *NYT*, September 14, 1945, p.1.

⁸⁷ Marquis Childs, “Calling Washington: Peacetime OSS,” *WP*, September 4, 1945, p. 8; “OSS Active in End of Nazis in Italy,” *NYT*, September 18, 1945, p. 8.

⁸⁸ “Strategic Services,” *NYT*, September 20, 1945, p. 22; “Foreign Intelligence,” *WP*, September 11, 1945, p. 10; “Two District Behind-the-Lines OSS Heroes Reported Dead,” *WP*, September 28, 1945, p. 1.

⁸⁹ Wark, “Great Investigations,” 120-121.

⁹⁰ Robert Bruskin, “Forrestal Urges Defense Council, Attacks Merger,” *ES*, October 22, 1945, p. 1; “Text of Admiral Nimitz’s Statement Opposing Merger,” *ES*, November 17, 1945, p. A7; “Byrnes Aide Advocates Unified Analysis of Foreign Intelligence,” *ES*, December 23, 1945, p. A2; J. A. Fox, “New Agency Created to Co-ordinate U.S. Intelligence Activity,” *ES*, January 22, 1946, p. 1; “Board on Foreign Intelligence Set Up by Truman,” *SLPD*,

with daily intelligence. There was no mention of covert operations. With its lack of legal stature, limited budget, confusion over functions and departmental oversight, it was a weak organisation from its foundation.⁹¹

Columnists wanted a strong and independent intelligence service. The *ES* featured an article by George Fielding Eliot. A Major who served in the U.S. Army's intelligence unit, Eliot wrote in his military affairs column that intelligence should not be the victim of bureaucratic turf wars. Information gathered by the new intelligence agency "may be vital in our safety" and "it should not be subjected to any departmental watering or alteration to fit preconceived ideas of internal prejudices."⁹² Despite the CIG's weak foundations, an *ES* editorial praised the NIA as a step toward addressing the neglected issue of intelligence centralisation.⁹³

Joseph and Stewart Alsop were internationalist columnists who shaped the public debate. Examining their background is important to understand why the pair had fiercely advocated for a stronger intelligence service. The Alsops were part of the "Georgetown set," a group of elite Washington government officials and journalists, all of whom lived in close proximity in the "close-knit village of narrow, leaf-strewn cobblestoned streets and tidy redbrick mansions next to the Potomac River."⁹⁴ The Alsops shared the same privileged education and social life as their neighbours. They served in the war with Joe enlisting in the Navy whilst Stewart joined the OSS. Contacts with government and intelligence officials influenced their internationalist view as they promoted the benefits of U.S. intelligence throughout their careers in journalism.⁹⁵

Stewart supported Donovan's push for a peacetime intelligence service with the help of former OSS and future CIA officer Tom Braden. They promoted OSS operations in several articles, and in 1946 they wrote a best-seller called *Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage*. "On the whole," it concluded, "there seems to be very little doubt that the experiment called OSS was worth the effort it expended."⁹⁶ Stewart assisted Donovan's PR, whilst Joe, a "cold warrior," grew increasingly concerned with Russia as an emerging global superpower. Joe often criticised the

January 22, 1946, p. 9A; Edward T. Folliard, "Intelligence Agency Created by Truman," *WP*, January 23, 1946, p. 9.

⁹¹ Scott A. Moseman, "Truman and the Formation of the Central Intelligence Agency," *Journal of Intelligence History*, 19, no. 2 (2020), 154; Prados, *Safe for Democracy*, 64; Ranelagh, *The Agency*, 100; Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, 164; Immerman, *The Hidden Hand*, 14.

⁹² Maj. George Fielding Eliot, "Facts Without Fear," *ES*, November 1, 1945, p. A12; "George Fielding Eliot Dies, 76," *NYT*, April 22, 1971, p. 44.

⁹³ "Centralized Intelligence," *ES*, January 23, 1946, p. A10.

⁹⁴ Herken, *The Georgetown Set*, 7.

⁹⁵ McGarr, *City of Newsmen*, 99; Ritchie, *Reporting from Washington*, 139; Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer*, 226.

⁹⁶ Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 21; Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, *Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), 231.

Truman administration as appeasers to the Soviets.⁹⁷ In their nationally syndicated column, "Matter of Fact," the Alsops supported the development of postwar Europe to limit Soviet influence. But it was their fascination with espionage that drove the brothers to campaign for the establishment of a permanent intelligence agency.⁹⁸

The Alsops extensively covered the ongoing dispute over who should oversee U.S. intelligence in Washington. As bureaucratic tensions between the State, Navy, and War Departments eased by early 1946, they praised the breakthrough. "To grasp the import of this decision, one must contrast what is now projected with what we have had in the past." They stated that postwar intelligence should not be at the behest of the military and State. They saw intelligence as having an entrenched position within the government and argued it should be taken seriously rather than used sporadically. They praised John Magruder, the former OSS Deputy Director, for proposing intelligence be conducted by an independent agency. If Congress approved this plan, "it will no longer be necessary to form this country's international policy in ignorance and partial blindness."⁹⁹

The appointment of Admiral Sidney W. Souers as the first head of central intelligence in January 1946 was a specific case the Alsops used to state CIG was bureaucratically ineffective.¹⁰⁰ A reserve naval officer and St. Louis businessman who helped draft the EO creating the NIA, Souers was reluctant to take up the role and served only on an interim basis for six months, during which he oversaw the CIG's creation. The Navy and State Departments, alongside the President, had restricted CIG's authority by limiting Souers' role as facilitator to the NIA. Under his leadership, CIG only held two-hundred and fifty employees and in April 1946, three months prior to Souers stepping down as DCI, the NIA met three times.¹⁰¹

The Alsops praised the appointment of Souers because it demonstrated that intelligence was gaining a foothold within the administration. "It can be said...that American foreign policy is at or near some sort of turning point." But CIG's authority needed to go further, the brothers asserted. To recognise the importance of intelligence, "there must be a turning point...a more clearly defined policy is now desirable."¹⁰² The Senate's Military Affairs Committee recommended a bill to create

⁹⁷ McGarr, *City of Newsmen*, 102; Herken, *The Georgetown Set*, 27;

⁹⁸ Herken, *The Georgetown Set*, 65-66; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 23.

⁹⁹ Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Matter of Fact...An American Secret Service," *SLPD*, January 13, 1946, p. 3D.

¹⁰⁰ "Souers and Leahy Named Executives of New Intelligence Unit," *ES*, January 24, 1946, p. A12; Edward T. Folliard, "Souers to Boss Intelligence Unit Operation," *WP*, January 24, 1946, p. 3.

¹⁰¹ Douglas F. Garthoff, *Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007), 16; Richard E. Schroeder, *The Foundation of the CIA: Harry Truman, the Missouri Gang, and the Origins of the Cold War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2017), 90; Ranelagh, *The Agency*, 103; Prados, *Safe for Democracy*, 34; Immerman, *The Hidden Hand*, 15.

¹⁰² Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Matter of Fact...Enter Another Missourian," *SLPD*, March 1, 1946, p. 2B.

the CIA in April. This was publicly discussed throughout 1946 until the passage of the National Security Act the following year. The legislation was regularly delayed because it faced numerous hurdles caused by disagreements between the Army, Navy, and State Departments.¹⁰³

During this period the Alsops criticised the bureaucratic turf wars and urged Congress to approve the unification bill immediately. They noted its delay, fearing that amidst departmental infighting, key capabilities in intelligence analysis would be lost. CIG needed OSS-style authority, the pair contended. It needed to be strengthened by having its own powers in intelligence analysis. They warned that if Congress would not grant this, the U.S. would be critically unprepared in the Cold War. "No law will be placed on the statute books...and sound American defense planning will continue to be impossible...Central Intelligence will lack the inner mechanism which is needed by all good secret services."¹⁰⁴

The columnists emphasised that intelligence was being undervalued and allowed to wither away by costly interdepartmental feuds. It needed independence, a professional staff, and strong funding support. As debate focused on whether Souers would transfer the functions of the War Department's operational arm, the clandestine Strategic Services Unit (SSU), to J. Edgar Hoover's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Alsops expressed deep concern.¹⁰⁵ They despised Hoover, after rumours he had leaked Donovan's proposal in an effort to secure a role for the FBI in postwar intelligence.¹⁰⁶ The *CT*'s Gestapo comparison was "obviously silly," the Alsops assured readers, since Donovan's plan did not include internal police powers. But they applied the Gestapo criticism to Hoover's FBI, as the brothers warned a "dangerous pattern" would emerge if the organisation acquired espionage powers.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ "Merger of Armed Forces Urged in Senate Report," *SLPD*, April 9, 1946, p. 2; Sidney Shalett, "Decision Draws Nearer on Army-Navy Merger," *NYT*, April 14, 1946, p. 81.

¹⁰⁴ Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Compromise Service Merger Plan Submitted by Forrestal, Nimitz," *SLPD*, April 14, 1946, p. 3D; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 23.

¹⁰⁵ Herken, *The Georgetown Set*, 66-67.

¹⁰⁶ Immerman, *The Hidden Hand*, 11; Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Maryland: University Publications of America, 1981), 258.

¹⁰⁷ Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Move to Merge Secret Service With FBI a Dangerous Pattern," *SLPD*, April 30, 1946, p. 2.

The SSU was liquidated when Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg became DCI in June 1946. Nephew of the Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, serving in the Air Force and a director of army intelligence during the war, Vandenberg made it his priority to develop an intelligence service. As Director he worked with CIG's general counsel Lawrence Houston who compiled a report to him stating it held "no substance or authority to act on its own responsibility." Vandenberg and Houston oversaw the expansion of CIG as they aimed to grant it a strong legislative stature.¹⁰⁸

Titled "Our Spy System Has Turned Pro," Stewart Alsop began his article proclaiming that "the foundations for a competent, professional, American secret service are quietly being laid." He applauded the arrival of Vandenberg, describing him as the "professional intelligence officer," and a sign that the CIG was expanding, that intelligence was being taken seriously, and that it was gaining a foothold in the administration. The "passive editing and planning stage is now over," he said. SSU needed to be dissolved as the organisation "made some astonishing mistakes" and created too many departmental adversaries. A professionalised agency, focusing on foreign intelligence was now in the works, Stewart asserted, but it needed an established directive otherwise it could not survive without its own staff and independent budget. "Time is short," Stewart declared, "a competent intelligence service may become America's first line of defense."¹⁰⁹

Their experiences and internationalist outlook provided the Alsops with the impetus to advocate for a centralised intelligence service. Their column shaped public debate because they pressed for a series of reforms to strengthen CIG. Despite their continued support, CIG was still considered a weak bureaucratic organisation. It was at the mercy of bureaucratic turf wars, but its power was slowly growing. The Alsops wanted it strengthened, and they wanted it immediately. The threat of an expansive Soviet Union was consistently referenced as the reason why an intelligence service was a necessity. The Alsops accused the administration of being negligent in protecting U.S. security whilst their status and influence inspired other correspondents to join their campaign.

Constantine Brown and the Push for a Stronger CIG

The Alsops helped ignite public discussion about the advantages of a centralised intelligence service. They sought immediate action and warned that delay imperilled U.S. national security. This rhetoric was used by others in the effort to persuade Congressmen to quickly pass the unification bill. Comparisons over the state of U.S. intelligence before and after the war were made with

¹⁰⁸ "Vandenberg Chosen as New Director of Central Intelligence," *ES*, June 7, 1946, p. 1; Rudgers, *Creating the Secret State*, 129-130; Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 36.

¹⁰⁹ Stewart Alsop, "Matter of Fact...Our Spy System Has Turned Pro," *WP*, June 30, 1946, p. B5, accessed 13th November 2023.

constant reminders that the nation was woefully unprepared before Pearl Harbor. Columnists cited the attack to argue America would be ready and not caught off-guard again if it had an independent, powerful intelligence agency that could provide ample warning of such a surprise assault.

A series written by the correspondent Clarke Beach started with “nobody doubts the need” for an intelligence system. “We managed to recover from the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, but our military leaders warn that we can’t afford the luxury of another such surprise party.” CIG contributed to weak intelligence as it was still in a “formative stage.” It lacked careerist professionals, its foreign agents and funding were limited due to bureaucratic infighting, whilst DCI Vandenberg did not have the authority to direct intelligence units. Only imperative action from Congress would remedy this, Clark stated.¹¹⁰ The series was reprinted in the *SLPD* where it was highlighted next to an editorial fiercely criticising CIG’s lack of autonomy and legal stature. Unlike *ES* and *WP*, the *SLPD* regularly criticised Truman throughout his presidency. His character, integrity, and decision-making were routinely scrutinised. It blamed the President for enacting “a meaningless, powerless paper organization on top of the existing inadequate muddle.” The United States requires a central intelligence service it declared, “not the house of cards with which OSS has been replaced.”¹¹¹

The Alsops and *SLPD* were not alone in their aggressive pursuit of a central intelligence service. Another columnist who held strong convictions regarding CIG’s lacklustre prestige was the *ES*’s foreign affairs correspondent, Constantine Brown. His reporting highlighted a growing awareness within the public debate that the government and Congress were failing to pursue and elevate the importance of postwar intelligence. Like the Alsops, Brown was an internationalist who championed postwar U.S. leadership. However, unlike the brothers, Brown did not serve in the military or intelligence services, though he still harboured a fascination with intelligence.

Brown was one of the first American reporters to interview Russia’s Vladimir Lenin and worked for the *Chicago Daily News* during the First World War. He became friends with future DCI Allen Dulles, whom he met in Turkey at the U.S. embassy while reporting overseas on the final days of the Ottoman Empire. By the time CIG was established, he was an experienced reporter. When the *ES* editors, Newbold and Theodore Noyes persuaded him to join their paper in 1931, Brown began writing his conservative column titled “This Changing World.” Initially it argued the U.S. recognise

¹¹⁰ Clarke Beach, “U.S. Aims at Building First-Class Service on Foreign Intelligence,” *ES*, July 9, 1946, p. A5; Clarke Beach, “Intelligence Service Agents Plan Little Undercover Work Abroad,” *ES*, July 10, 1946, p. A9; Clarke Beach, “Scholars, Specialists Sought for New U.S. Intelligence Unit,” *ES*, July 13, 1946, p. A7.

¹¹¹ “Makeshift for Intelligence,” *SLPD*, July 13, 1946, p. 4A.

and engage commercially with the Soviet Union, but the war changed his views on Russia. In 1943 he predicted the Soviet Union would be America's main adversary after the war.¹¹²

Brown's articles stressed that centralised intelligence provided America with the key infrastructure it needed to be worthy of a superpower. He argued it was essential for the nation's development after the war. He responded to an *ES* editorial, printed on the same page, that warned recent Soviet infiltration in Canada should instigate calls to adopt an effective counterespionage system.¹¹³ Brown declared, the Soviets have "broken the 'gentlemen agreement,'" as he accused the United States of being "the most backward nation in the world, so far as espionage is concerned. We improvise this vital function while we are in a 'shooting war' and rush to dismantle it as soon as the enemy has surrendered." The nation has to learn from the "European powers" he proclaims, who "have old and tried intelligence and counter-intelligence services which function efficiently in time of peace to prevent any surprises...we have been and are continuing to be even now amateurish in a matter which the few who realize its importance regard as being as vital as physical military preparedness."¹¹⁴

Brown consistently criticised CIG. "The Central Intelligence Group is...like a new 1946 automobile which lacks a motor...it is bound to remain stationary because it lacks the necessary funds to operate it." Like George Fielding Eliot, Brown stated the CIG is limited due to interdepartmental squabbles. The organisation is powerless to claim its authority and the intelligence reports it provided to the President "contained little more than had been published in the various American newspapers."¹¹⁵ The CIG was a "failure," and Brown called on Congress to provide appropriations and grant the organisation the legal authority to become an independent agency. He argued "until the CIG becomes an organization created by an act of Congress headed by permanent government officials confirmed by Congress and provided with the necessary appropriations, it is doubtful that any individual, regardless of how able he may be, can produce the results necessary for the defense of the country."¹¹⁶

¹¹² Constantine Brown, *The Coming of the Whirlwind* (Chicago: Regnery, 1964), 239; "Constantine Brown, 76, News Columnist, Dead," *WP*, February 25, 1966, p. C4.

¹¹³ "Canada's 'Fifth Column,'" *ES*, March 20, 1946, p. A10.

¹¹⁴ Constantine Brown, "This Changing World," *ES*, March 20, 1946, p. A10.

¹¹⁵ Constantine Brown, "New Central Intelligence Badly in Need of Funds," *ES*, June 16, 1946, p. C1.

¹¹⁶ Brown, "CIG Called Failure," *ES*.

EIGHT PAGES.

CIG Called Failure as Spy Bureau

Top Men Disappointed: Permanence Depends On Congress

By Constantine Brown

There is a good deal of disappointment in official quarters over the fact that the CIG (Central Intelligence Group) has failed to live up to expectations. The consensus of military men and diplomats is that the change of an armed conflict in Europe this year has been averted. But what we may have to face in the future is a question which no one would venture to answer. The staff between the western countries and the eastern countries is as wide as ever. Whether it can be narrowed down to a question which is not actually answered by the results of the meetings of the U. S. Assembly and the Foreign Ministers' Council.

The Central Intelligence Group has been organized to gain a clear picture of what is going on abroad. Its principal weakness stems from the fact that it has been created by an act of Congress, which would give it permanent status by an executive order, which gives it a temporary status.

Dissemination in U. S. R. S. We have heard recently from some of the best informed sources that Russia is undergoing a severe economic crisis. It is said that production of goods is falling and that the Russian people are suffering from lack of food and clothing. This is a situation which is not only a threat to the Russian people but also a threat to the world.

Our policy towards Russia is a question which is being debated in the United States. Some believe that we should continue our policy of isolationism, while others believe that we should take a more active role in the world.

Significance of Changes. It may be of special significance, for instance, if the production of a farm implement factory in Connecticut or an electrical equipment factory in Sweden were to be closed down.

An unexpected shift of some importance in a government or in an industrial organization when a specialist without political allegiance is being replaced by one who is known for his political connections, can have an important bearing on the trends in that particular country.

The organization of a scientific expedition to go to remote areas where important raw materials may exist, is of vital importance. Unless the intelligence agency has specialists who are aware of the potentials of those areas such an expedition may pass unnoticed and it may be too late before its real significance comes to the surface.

Today, more than ever before, every industrial enterprise must have a war potential. Only well-trained specialists can draw the important conclusion from the data which appear insignificant and unimportant to the average individual.

It is for this purpose and also to coordinate all the reports which are sent by representatives abroad of the War, Navy, State and Commerce Departments, that the Central Intelligence Group was created last year by an executive order from President Truman.

However, before a special organization is set up, it is essential that it be in the face of an unanticipated

U. S. Cotton Stands Today In Most Favored Position

Production and Consumption Presently Headed For Prosperity Levels; Danger Exists In Excessive Price Fluctuations

By Jerry Westbrook

Despite recent fluctuations in the cotton market, which saw prices advance to a high of 28 cents a pound to a little more than 26 cents, United States cotton stands today in a better position today than at any time in history. This is the opinion of representatives of the United States cotton producers and exporters.

During the last two years large surplus stocks of cotton, obtained by the Government in the 1930s as a means of bolstering the market after the fire had been put out, have been sold off.

Mill consumption in the United States during the first nine months of this year has been about 10,000,000 bales, and will start a production rate for a long time to come, representing the demand for cotton in the United States.

On the debt side of the ledger, however, there is a serious situation. The cotton industry is being hit by a combination of factors, including a drop in demand and a rise in production.

Reports from the cotton industry in the United States are being hit by a combination of factors, including a drop in demand and a rise in production. This is a situation which is not only a threat to the cotton industry but also a threat to the world.

While there is a serious situation in the cotton industry, it is not the only one. There are other industries which are also facing difficulties, including the textile industry and the wool industry.

At the same time, there is a serious situation in the cotton industry. The cotton industry is being hit by a combination of factors, including a drop in demand and a rise in production.

The ability of the United States to produce cotton is a question which is being debated in the United States. Some believe that we should continue our policy of isolationism, while others believe that we should take a more active role in the world.

Gradually the change will be to free trade. The Navy proposes to let free trade in cotton and other raw materials, and to let the cotton industry and other industries to compete in the world market.

Spekulative Difficulties. While an increase in production is a good thing, it is not the only one. There are other factors which are also important, including the demand for cotton and the price of cotton.

It is for this purpose and also to coordinate all the reports which are sent by representatives abroad of the War, Navy, State and Commerce Departments, that the Central Intelligence Group was created last year by an executive order from President Truman.

However, before a special organization is set up, it is essential that it be in the face of an unanticipated

Reich Trade Parleys Start On Tuesday

U. S. Conference Seeking To Reduce Costs of Occupation

By Garrett D. Harker

Plans for co-operation action to make the American and British occupation zones in Germany more nearly self-sufficient are expected to be worked out in a conference beginning here Tuesday.

According to official reports, the program to finance the occupation zones in Germany is being worked out in a conference beginning here Tuesday.

Representatives of the United States and Great Britain are expected to meet in a conference beginning here Tuesday.

Reich Trade Parleys Start On Tuesday. U. S. Conference Seeking To Reduce Costs of Occupation. By Garrett D. Harker.

Plans for co-operation action to make the American and British occupation zones in Germany more nearly self-sufficient are expected to be worked out in a conference beginning here Tuesday.

According to official reports, the program to finance the occupation zones in Germany is being worked out in a conference beginning here Tuesday.

Representatives of the United States and Great Britain are expected to meet in a conference beginning here Tuesday.

Reich Trade Parleys Start On Tuesday. U. S. Conference Seeking To Reduce Costs of Occupation. By Garrett D. Harker.

Plans for co-operation action to make the American and British occupation zones in Germany more nearly self-sufficient are expected to be worked out in a conference beginning here Tuesday.

According to official reports, the program to finance the occupation zones in Germany is being worked out in a conference beginning here Tuesday.

Representatives of the United States and Great Britain are expected to meet in a conference beginning here Tuesday.

Reich Trade Parleys Start On Tuesday. U. S. Conference Seeking To Reduce Costs of Occupation. By Garrett D. Harker.

Republicans Facing Golden Opportunity To Establish Party Prestige in Congress By Prompt Streamlining of Committees

Elimination of Choice Posts Called For in Reorganization Act

By J. A. O'Leary

The Republicans have a golden opportunity as they take over the reins on Capitol Hill to build up the prestige of Congress and their party by getting through promptly with the reform called for in the congressional streamlining law.

The first and hardest test they face is the requirement of the act that committee members be cut down from 48 to 19 in the House, and from 25 to 15 in the Senate.

Known in the veterans' group have not yet gathered to discuss the streamlining of the House and Senate committees, but there are no adverse indications that they will try to obstruct the streamlining job, designed to make the law-making process more efficient.

Senate More of Oregon, one of the most liberal-minded Republicans, made it clear yesterday that any move to put the streamlining of the House and Senate committees is a move to put the streamlining of the House and Senate committees.

It is not likely that the streamlining of the House and Senate committees will be a move to put the streamlining of the House and Senate committees.

Another factor that should be taken into account is the streamlining of the House and Senate committees. This is a move to put the streamlining of the House and Senate committees.

Important to Congress. The men in the street may feel that the streamlining of the House and Senate committees is a move to put the streamlining of the House and Senate committees.

Through the years, however, the committee structure has become unwieldy and cumbersome. This is a move to put the streamlining of the House and Senate committees.

There are examples of some of the streamlining of the House and Senate committees. This is a move to put the streamlining of the House and Senate committees.

Before they get into the job of appointing committees, however, the Republicans must choose the men who are to lead them. This is a move to put the streamlining of the House and Senate committees.

Representative Martin of Massachusetts, an almost certain choice for speaker of the House, has called the streamlining of the House and Senate committees a move to put the streamlining of the House and Senate committees.

However, before a special organization is set up, it is essential that it be in the face of an unanticipated



Representative Joseph W. Martin of Massachusetts, probable choice for Speaker of the House.

Armament Views Have Changed Since Dramatic Decision of 1921

World's Biggest Fleet Now Maintained by U. S. Contrasts With S-S Agreement Set Up Following World War I

By Sigurd A.

That sort of armament the United States determined to avoid this time. There are now much greater dangers to the United States than there were in 1921. The United States is now a world power, and the world is now a more dangerous place than it was in 1921.

The very first day of work, the United States Navy was faced with a new situation. The world's biggest fleet was now maintained by the United States, and the world was now a more dangerous place than it was in 1921.

Difficulties in Thinking. The situation was a difficult one. The United States Navy was faced with a new situation. The world's biggest fleet was now maintained by the United States, and the world was now a more dangerous place than it was in 1921.

Confronting Will Have. The situation was a difficult one. The United States Navy was faced with a new situation. The world's biggest fleet was now maintained by the United States, and the world was now a more dangerous place than it was in 1921.

Huge Veteran Bloc. The situation was a difficult one. The United States Navy was faced with a new situation. The world's biggest fleet was now maintained by the United States, and the world was now a more dangerous place than it was in 1921.

There is a new situation in the world. The United States Navy is now a world power, and the world is now a more dangerous place than it was in 1921.

There is a new situation in the world. The United States Navy is now a world power, and the world is now a more dangerous place than it was in 1921.

There is a new situation in the world. The United States Navy is now a world power, and the world is now a more dangerous place than it was in 1921.

Figure 2.3 Constantine Brown was a key supporter of intelligence as a professional enterprise. His substantial commentary on the state of intelligence has been overlooked by scholars. His piece titled "CIG Called Failure as Spy Bureau," criticizes the CIG as a weak organization. It adds to Brown's broader concern that the slow development of U.S. intelligence risked the nation's security. Source: Constantine Brown, "CIG Called Failure as Spy Bureau," ES, November 10, 1946, p. C1

The fear of Soviet expansion dominated Brown's column. Like the events in Canada, he used the recent Soviet interference in Latin America to argue CIG was not a competent organisation to protect the nation. The fact that communist influence occurred within the western hemisphere worried Brown. A coup in Nicaragua's capital, Managua, in May 1947 shocked the *ES* correspondent who argued that due to a lack of funds and authority, the CIG is operating on a "shoestring." He concluded "the United States seems to be unaware of the importance of an intelligence organization and because of the lack of money and misplaced prejudices, is proceeding as amateurishly as before Pearl Harbor."¹¹⁷ Brown recognised the pitfalls that befell CIG and knew that urgent reforms needed to be passed to protect the nation. His anticommunist and internationalist views made him a key figure in pushing the call for a stronger intelligence service. His column aimed to jolt government officials and legislators to back a centralised intelligence system.

Public Debate Over the National Security Act

Newspapers followed the Congressional hearings and development of the National Security Act.¹¹⁸ The *NYT*, *WP*, *SLPD*, and *ES* all argued that swift passage was essential in providing intelligence a greater status in the U.S. government as they criticised opponents of the unification bill. Bureaucratic tensions between the Army and Navy Departments were scrutinised as papers called for an immediate compromise to quicken the passage of the National Security Act. These outlets covered the recommendations from the Congressional Pearl Harbor Committee and a report by the Strategic Bombing Survey, to argue the U.S. have been reluctant to utilise intelligence.¹¹⁹ The committee and survey recommended intelligence be centralised. The press used its findings to emphasise CIA was vital to the nation's security. "Security of the country requires a genuine intelligence service," *SLPD* exclaimed, "until such an intelligence arm is created, there will be a dangerous breach in the nation's defense." *WP* commented that the "continued heckling and pecking away at the merger bill on minor grounds is a disservice to national security when time is of the essence."¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Constantine Brown, "Managua Coup Took U.S. by Surprise," *ES*, May 29, 1947, p. A7.

¹¹⁸ "Merger of Armed Forces Urged in Senate Report," *SLPD*, April 9, 1946, p. 2; Sidney Shalett, "Decision Draws Nearer on Army-Navy Merger," *NYT*, April 14, 1946, p. 81; Arthur Krock, "In the Nation...Basic Army-Navy Differences on Merger Plan," *NYT*, April 30, 1946, p. 20; Cabell Phillips, "Intelligence Unit Faces Obstacles," *NYT*, May 26, 1946, p. E4; "Patterson, Forrestal Report on Points of Unity Proposal," *ES*, June 16, 1946, p. A4; "12-Point Program Has Both Army and Navy Support," *WP*, June 16, 1946, p. M1; "Text of Merger Agreements and Letters," *ES*, January 17, 1947, p. A5.

¹¹⁹ "Clear-Cut Authority, Unified Intelligence Lead List of Points," *ES*, July 21, 1946, p. A6; George H. Hall, "Survey on Winning Pacific War Warns U.S. It Hasn't Done Much to Guard Against Surprise Attack," *SLPD*, August 15, 1946, p. 1C; "Unified Command," *NYT*, December 18, 1946, p. 28.

¹²⁰ "A Dangerous Breach," *SLPD*, January 20, 1947, p. 2C; "Single Secretary," *WP*, May 26, 1947, p. 6.

A month before its passage, the bill became a clash between internationalist and isolationist columnists and papers. On the one hand reporters such as Brown and the Alsops wanted the bill to pass through Congress immediately because national security was under threat. The Alsops declared that until the bill is passed, the U.S. "is the only major power in the world without an agreed national strategy."¹²¹ Brown highlighted abroad events such as Anastasio Somoza's takeover in Nicaragua and Soviet influence in Hungary to demonstrate the State Department was not receiving adequate intelligence reports. "There is no intelligence service worthy of the name in the United States today...the lackadaisical attitude of Congress has placed us at the bottom among nations."¹²²

On the other hand, *CT* and the *NYDN*'s correspondent John O'Donnell argued unification was a conspiracy to install an intelligence agency that would control the U.S. government, implement foreign policy, and spy on its own citizens. Trohan maintained his Gestapo charge alongside *CT* editorials that argued this new agency would cost the taxpayer. It claimed the salaries for intelligence officers and the DCI were extortionate. Trohan and *CT* views contrasted with Brown's justification for the expenditure. They used these figures to say CIG "forced liquidation of the army's world-wide intelligence work" and it was "wasteful, because it is a symptom of developing militarism." Whereas Brown said the annual cost does not matter because "a central intelligence organization, if properly organized and functioning, could save the country, in the long run, billions of dollars."¹²³

John O'Donnell echoed Trohan's Gestapo accusation. He mentioned the term frequently in his *NYDN* column "Capitol Stuff." He accused CIG of intervening in the War Department and FBI's intelligence authority "which have destroyed or weakened their intelligence efforts." He also alleged that "some of our deeply disturbed professional spies...may reach into the Treasury."¹²⁴ O'Donnell frequently published conspiratorial rhetoric including antisemitic, homophobic, racist, and misogynistic comments to argue that America was infiltrated by communists. He often criticised the U.S. government where his views prompted a reporter to label him a "Naziphile" and FDR to mockingly award him with a Nazi Iron Cross at a press conference.¹²⁵

¹²¹ Alsop, "Prompt Passage of Arms Unity Bill," *SLPD*.

¹²² Constantine Brown, "Marshall's Task Made More Difficult by Lack of Intelligence Service," *ES*, June 7, 1947, p. A7.

¹²³ Walter Trohan, "U.S. Set to Pay Super Spies 12.7 Million a Year," *CT*, June 20, 1947, p. 11; "The Budding American Gestapo," *CT*, June 23, 1947, p. 18; Brown, "U.S. Lacking Adequate Service of Intelligence," *ES*, June 1, 1947.

¹²⁴ John O'Donnell, "Capitol Stuff," *NYDN*, June 12, 1947, p. 4C; John O'Donnell, "Capitol Stuff," *NYDN*, June 24, 1947, p. 4.

¹²⁵ "John O'Donnell, Columnist, Dead," *NYT*, December 18, 1961, p. 35; Pressman, "The New York *Daily News*," 225-226, 228, 234-235; Brown, *The Coming of the Whirlwind*, 248.

July intensified public debate over the bill.¹²⁶ *WP* and *SLPD* called for unification whilst *ES* reiterated Brown's remarks that the National Security Act would be a cost-saving measure. Supporters of the bill stressed that immediate passage was vital, and they soon dominated public discussion. "A difference of a few hours in getting information, a difference of a few words in its accuracy, may in the future make the difference between life and death for this nation," George Fielding Eliot wrote. "We cannot depend on the separate, uncoordinated intelligence efforts of the various departments."¹²⁷ *SLPD* urged Congress to pass the bill or risk the nation's security. "Too much is enough...the long, wasteful debate over unifying the armed forces should end in this session of Congress." The paper proclaimed that "nothing is more essential to the purposes of the bill" than the establishment of a CIA.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ "Senate Opens Debate on Military Merger," *ES*, July 7, 1947, p. 1; Philip Dodd, "Senate Votes Unification of War Services," *CT*, July 10, 1947, p. 3.

¹²⁷ George Fielding Eliot, "Need for Central Intelligence Unit Desperate; Its 'Eyes' May Save the Nation in Atomic Age," *SLPD*, July 11, 1947, p. 1C.

¹²⁸ "Sniping at Intelligence," *SLPD*, July 12, 1947, p. 4A.

The bill was passed by the House's Expenditures committee on 13 July.¹²⁹ The chair, Clare Hoffman, spoke publicly over his reservations on the issue that CIA could become too powerful. Described as a "pre-war isolationist," Hoffman had neither experience nor interest in U.S. foreign affairs, but he was fearful that the bill's wording could pave the way for a military dictatorship.¹³⁰ He passed it because military unification was "inevitable," but his concerns were predictably picked up by *CT* who reiterated their Gestapo accusation. Trohan feared that the "alliance of Wall streeters and brass hats" could turn CIA into a "secret police force...under the vague language of the bill."¹³¹ Meanwhile *ES* assured their readers that a "Gestapo ban" was implemented."¹³²

The National Security Act passed the Senate on 24 July and became law two days later. It dissolved CIG, and the CIA replaced it. Again, differences emerged between internationalists and isolationists. On the day of its passage, Brown and *NYT*'s Hanson Baldwin congratulated Congress but stressed CIA needed a clearer purpose. It poses "a major contribution to national defense and prevention of more Pearl Harbors...the...bill represents a substantial strengthening of American defense at a time when it has had to labor under restricted budgets in the face of growing perils abroad," Brown remarked. But the Agency requires "a proper conception of its mission," away from the "'eager beaver' complex which would surely bring it into conflict with the senior defense agencies."¹³³ Similarly, Baldwin declared the bill's "passage...ends the long legislative struggle...but the President's signature will by no means solve the many problems still posed. A tremendous reorganization is impending."¹³⁴

Brown and Baldwin were happy to see CIA's formation, but they wanted to see it strengthened. Compared to *CT* rhetoric who described the National Security Act as a hidden effort to consolidate military authority. The paper labelled the new Defense Secretary James Forrestal as a "dictator" and "generalissimo." It accused him and Secretary of State George C. Marshall of plotting a world war. "At any moment," the paper argued, Forrestal and Marshall "can bring on a war" to which "most of the men in the new department of defense...would not be averse to this outcome...another war would give them back all of this eminence and power." It criticised Congress

¹²⁹ "Unification Bill Approved by House Group," *CT*, July 13, 1947, p. 26.

¹³⁰ Rudgers, *Creating the Secret State*, 144; Barrett, *The CIA and Congress*, 23; Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 63.

¹³¹ "Hoffman Fears Dictatorship in Unification Bill," *CT*, July 19, 1947, p. 3; Laurence Burd, "War Services Placed Under One Command," *CT*, July 20, 1947, p. 1; Walter Trohan, "Super-Cabinet to Get Power to Make Policy," *CT*, July 21, 1947, p. 1.

¹³² "House Unit Approves Military Merger with Service 'Gestapo' Ban," *ES*, July 13, 1947, p. A6; "Bill to Unify Military Services Passed by House With Changes," *ES*, July 20, 1947, p. 1.

¹³³ Constantine Brown, "Armed Forces Merger Bill Called Major Contribution to Defense," *ES*, July 26, 1947, p. A7.

¹³⁴ Hanson W. Baldwin, "New Defense Set-Up Faces Obstacles," *NYT*, July 27, 1947, p. E5.

in committing the “most monumental blunder in its history...when Congress is back in session, its first problem should be...to save the Republic.”¹³⁵

The *CT* was the outlier as internationalist correspondents dictated public debate. The National Security Act demonstrated that they were influential in their aim of establishing CIA. They often wrote in hyperbole to stress the bill needed to be passed immediately to ensure the Agency has its own legislative authority to protect national security. They backed the bill and hoped it would pass because they saw that U.S. Cold War survival depended on an efficient CIA. In contrast, the influence of isolationist opinion was rapidly curtailing. The conspiratorial rhetoric of *CT* and *NYDN* that warned of a military coup did not change the momentum that internationalists had ignited for a stronger CIA. Events in Latin America would only lend more credence towards the internationalist cause.

The Crisis in Bogota

“Men are needed, men in uniform, and now—to back up our cold war diplomacy.” The *WP* urgently responded to events in Bogota.¹³⁶ Colombia’s capital was hosting an important conference with the Secretary of State George Marshall aimed at strengthening U.S. and Latin American relations to limit communist influence. During the conference the popular liberal leader and presidential favourite Jorge Gaitán was shot and killed on 9 April. His assassination prompted widespread rioting and political violence. Colombia’s President and Marshall blamed the revolt on communists and the Soviet Union. What happened in Bogota gravely concerned internationalist reporters because they saw a communist-inspired revolution in the western hemisphere and the newly established CIA failed to predict it.¹³⁷

Scholars have shown Bogota caused a surge in anti-CIA coverage because the press focused on CIA intelligence failure. But internationalists portrayed the Agency in a sympathetic light due to its early existence, and they promoted the view that officials should expand CIA’s intelligence capabilities.¹³⁸ Bogota strengthened the case for a stronger CIA. It brought anticommunism to the

¹³⁵ “Truman to Complete New Defense Setup by Mid-September,” *ES*, August 22, 1947, p. A2; William J. Wheatley, “Forrestal Sworn in as Nation’s First Secretary of Defense,” *ES*, September 17, 1947, p. 1; Willard Edwards, “Dictator, Born of ‘Unification,’ Threatens U.S.,” *CT*, September 28, 1947, p. 4; “Asleep at the Switch,” *CT*, September 30, 1947, p. 14.

¹³⁶ “Crisis in Defense,” *WP*, April 17, 1948, p. 6.

¹³⁷ “U.S. Diplomats Scan Bogota Reports for Hint of Reds’ Role,” *ES*, April 10, 1948, p. 3; “An American Un-Secret Service,” *LAT*, May 2, 1948, p. 28; Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 53; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 34.

¹³⁸ Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 53; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 34; Barrett, *The CIA and Congress*, 33-34.

forefront of public debate because of its proximity. Fear of Soviet influence so close to home led to press coverage over what lessons could be learnt from the event. It became a lightning rod for internationalists to argue that the Agency needed to be independent and acquire additional government support.

Marquis Childs did not accuse CIA of failing to warn officials during Bogota. He asserted the CIA “cannot achieve perfection over-night.” It needed a clearer jurisdiction. Documents show officials’ concern with replacing FBI agents with CIG representatives. The lines were blurred over which agency held authority over foreign intelligence in Latin America before Bogota.¹³⁹ Childs argued FBI “jealousy” over its loss of power in the region and uncertainty over CIA statutory authority hindered its intelligence effort. He stated urgent reform was required, “we need, and quickly, an efficient, mature agency that can bring together all source of information and analyze them promptly. The kind of explosion that occurred in Bogota should not come as a surprise.”¹⁴⁰

Childs reflected the *SLPD* editorial board over what it claimed was the government’s haphazard approach in establishing an intelligence service. The newspaper consistently portrayed the CIG as a weak agency and supported an increase in U.S. defence spending, development of atomic weapons, and mobilisation of forces to counter communism. This view deepened with the news that the Soviet Union won political control in Czechoslovakia a month prior to the Bogota riots in what was referred to as a period of “war-scare.”¹⁴¹ *SLPD* published two hawkish editorials urging the U.S. prepare itself for war with the Soviet Union. “Never before has the American way of life been in such potential danger,” the nation would be “tragically ill-prepared” to meet a state of emergency. It supported increasing the defence force with a selective service bill for military conscription and argued CIA expand its authority and capabilities to make it “second to none.”¹⁴²

The crisis in Bogota prompted *WP* to support increased military expenditure and defence mobilisation. It proclaimed intelligence was essential for discerning the aims of hostiles without the costly outcome of a war, “brains are more important than brawn in coping with the Soviet’s engine

¹³⁹ CIA, “Memorandum for the Record From (Sanitized),” August 8, 1946, CIA-RDP80R01731R002700010006-0, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01731R002700010006-0.pdf>, accessed 16th January 2024; CIA, “Minutes of Meeting Held in Room 214 Department of State Building,” September 25, 1946, CIA-RDP85S00362R000700010017-5, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85S00362R000700010017-5.pdf>, accessed 16th January 2024; CIA, “Dear General Vandenberg,” January 8, 1947, CIA-RDP83-00764R000100050005-2, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83-00764R000100050005-2.pdf>, accessed 16th January 2024.

¹⁴⁰ Marquis Childs, “A Cloak, a Dagger—and a Popgun,” *SLPD*, April 13, 1948, p. 3B.

¹⁴¹ Harry Howe Ransom, “Secret Intelligence in the United States, 1947-1982: the CIA’s Search for Legitimacy,” in *The Missing Dimension: Governments and the Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (Macmillan: London, 1984), 202.

¹⁴² “Let’s Gird Our Loins,” *SLPD*, March 12, 1948, p. 2C; “A Plan for the Draft,” *SLPD*, March 25, 1948, p. 2B.

of conquest, ideas more than arms.” The CIA needed strengthening, it declared, as it should be given “the status it deserves.” An ex-intelligence officer responded to the *WP* to defend CIA. He argued it provides vital work, but its potential is stifled by the Truman administration who seemed hesitant to unleash it.¹⁴³

The new DCI Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter was sent to Congress to provide a statement on why CIA failed to warn about Bogota. He cared about CIA-press relations and worked previously with Joseph Alsop and Hanson Baldwin to establish a positive public profile. He knew that charges of intelligence inefficiency were damaging, and he emphasised the press were unjustifiably attacking the CIA.¹⁴⁴ The DCI issued a public statement announcing CIA was vulnerable because of increased press coverage. “From time to time in the past two years, the Agency, and its predecessor group, have been the object of attack in the press...Public controversy inevitably tends to blow such cover of our personnel as has been pain-stakingly developed.”¹⁴⁵

Hillenkoetter aimed to deflect scrutiny onto the State Department for failing to acknowledge CIA intelligence. His statement emphasises the public secrecy approach. It was designed to urge press restraint over publishing sensitive material, but the DCI shared CIA intelligence. Described by *NYT* as “perhaps the first authorized publication in United States history of top-secret intelligence documents,” it was a glimpse inside the CIA that the press reacted to.¹⁴⁶ A *WP* editorial stated that Hillenkoetter’s comments “caused intelligence officers a lot of astonishment,” whilst Marquis Childs called it an “unusual step of making public secret intelligence reports.” Hillenkoetter’s appearance was later cited in the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report as an example of a broader CIA security problem where its operations and activities became the focus of public discussion after the DCI’s “damaging disclosures.”¹⁴⁷ It was an early example of a DCI using public secrecy but was shunned by the Dulles Report because it was not a managed leak orchestrated by PR officials. Allen Dulles and Stanley Grogan would set the benchmark for what the press could discuss when they led CIA PR five years later.

¹⁴³ “The X at Bogota,” *WP*, April 13, 1948, p. 14; O.P. “Intelligence Evaluation,” *WP*, April 17, 1948, p. 6.

¹⁴⁴ Rogg, *The Spy and the State*, 261; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 33-34; Ranelagh, *The Agency*, 188-189.

¹⁴⁵ CIA, “Stenographic Transcript of Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments,” April 15, 1948, CIA-RDP86B00269R000900080001-3, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86B00269R000900080001-3.pdf>, accessed 20th February 2024.

¹⁴⁶ William S. White, “Marshall Scoffed at Early Warnings on Reds in Bogota,” *NYT*, April 16, 1948, p. 1; William S. White, “A ‘Pearl Harbor’ in Bogota Charged,” *NYT*, April 17, 1948, p. 7.

¹⁴⁷ “Crisis in Defense,” *WP*; “Secret Intelligence,” *WP*, May 22, 1948, p. 8; Marquis Childs, “Washington Calling: Uncoordinated Security,” *WP*, April 22, 1947, p. 11; The Dulles Report, 34-35.

The DCI's statement succeeded in making the case for a stronger, independent CIA. The *LAT* and *WP* said that Bogota indicated "our government has much to learn in the handling of intelligence," whilst "several lessons can be drawn from the Bogota affair." Both argued intelligence was not given the prestige it deserves. Bureaucratic tensions still inhibit CIA's work, and the National Security Act was weak because intelligence coordination is still "little more than a glittering facade." These points were repeated by Childs, who stated that "internal rivalries and suspicions" are contributing to a "lack of real coordination...a matter for serious concern." *WP* noted that the "lack of awareness of the importance on intelligence is due to lack of understanding of the nature of the crisis in our relations with Russia. We have a Cold War on our hands...if we continue to let grass grow under our feet, the choice sooner or later will be a shooting war abroad or a bust at home."¹⁴⁸

Hillenkoetter's testimony was met with sincere praise from Constantine Brown. Initially after Bogota, Brown defended the Agency. It was a young organisation and did not have the "time yet to train men capable of performing all the complex duties given to it." After the DCI accused the State Department of failing to acknowledge CIA intelligence, Brown proclaimed the Agency "has been fully vindicated." Like the *WP*, Brown accused government officials for not stressing the importance of intelligence, "it is clear that those who should have paid attention to its warnings still hold the view that intelligence is just a game played by some young men who delight in sending alarming reports about conditions abroad." Brown was not concerned that Hillenkoetter released Agency intelligence to the press. He backed the release of material as long as it shaped support for the CIA. "Perhaps it will be advisable for the intelligence services to alter their policy and release to the public really important communications dealing with matters other than national defense. The public, by showing concern, could compel Washington officials to pay more attention to intelligence warnings when they are received."¹⁴⁹

The *SLPD* agreed with Brown's view that the State Department was to blame for Bogota. CIA is "inadequate" the editorial began because it needs its own powers to evaluate intelligence. Bogota should instigate support for the Agency's development and full independence. More damning was that the U.S. has not learnt from Pearl Harbor. "It does no good to possess information unless we understand it was one of the lessons...learned at the cost of blood and treasure in the Second World War." It called Truman's support of CIA weak, concluding "it is the President's duty to replace this makeshift with an organization that can perform every function it should perform, and do it

¹⁴⁸ "An American Un-Secret Service," *LAT*; "Crisis in Defense," *WP*; Childs, "Washington Calling: Uncoordinated Security," *WP*.

¹⁴⁹ Constantine Brown, "U.S. 'Loss of Face' at Bogota Seen Due to Intelligence Unit's Lack of Training," *ES*, April 13, 1948, p. A11; Constantine Brown, "Officials' Refusal to Act on CIA Warning of Bogota Recalls Earlier Blunder," *ES*, April 17, 1948, p. A7.

independently.”¹⁵⁰ *CT* was even briefly swayed by Hillenkoetter’s testimony. They blamed Marshall for ignoring Agency intelligence and invoked the recent memory of Pearl Harbor. “Once again intelligence had advance information of ‘enemy’ designs, once again nothing was done about it.” However, the paper did not shift from its anti-CIA rhetoric. It accused Hillenkoetter of “running an espionage service for Russia at American expense.”¹⁵¹

Bogota alarmed reporters because of its proximity to the United States. The event renewed public attention on CIA. “In its year of life the CIA properly has kept out of the news, but out of the revolt in Bogota have come developments disturbing to the future of the agency,” the *LAT* summarised.¹⁵² The intelligence failure supported the argument that CIA was the nation’s first line in defence. It played into the hands of internationalist reporters that wanted the Agency to become an independent organisation immediately. Bogota added to prior arguments over the delay of the National Security Act. It inspired hyperbole rhetoric to see CIA’s authority quickly strengthened and expanded.

“The Big Job is Civilian and Diplomatic.” Press Support for a Civilian DCI

Internationalists promoted independence and strength as important aspects of a strong CIA and argued a civilian leader provided a professional approach to peacetime intelligence. They saw DCI continuity as the solution to military domination in intelligence. Reporters depicted military leadership as a hinderance to CIA as they argued that military figures saw it solely as a wartime venture. Their control weakened the prestige of intelligence because it accounted for the sporadic, amateurish, brief tenures of DCIs who viewed it merely as a stepping stone to achieving a worthwhile profession in the military. “I think some men should specialize in intelligence,” DCI Vandenberg said in an interview, “but they shouldn’t devote all their life to it.”¹⁵³

Reporters claimed intelligence continued to be under-developed and under-utilised in the early Cold War. They feared officials might disregard its importance because it was not considered a serious profession. They asserted that a civilian leader would aid the development of U.S. intelligence by granting it the status of a respected, careerist, professionalised, and standalone

¹⁵⁰ Richard L. Stokes, “U.S. Intelligence was Not at Fault on Bogota, but State Dept. Was,” *SLPD*, April 17, 1948, p. 1; “‘Uncensored’ Intelligence Unit Demanded in Congress,” *SLPD*, April 17, 1948, p. 2; “Weak Spots in Intelligence,” *SLPD*, April 18, 1948, p. 2D.

¹⁵¹ “The Pearl Harbor Lesson Wasted,” *CT*, April 17, 1948, p. 10; “Red Infiltration of Intelligence,” *CT*, April 23, 1948, p. 14.

¹⁵² “An American Un-Secret Service,” *LAT*.

¹⁵³ Beach, “Scholars, Specialists Sought for New U.S. Intelligence Unit,” *ES*.

enterprise. A civilian DCI would be free from the constraints of bureaucratic rivalries and provide clear guidance for CIA to fight the Cold War. They could effectively conduct covert operations, improve intelligence coordination, and ensure the nation was protected.

The call for a civilian DCI began in July 1946 because of an ongoing Congressional committee over Pearl Harbor and a leaked report of army intelligence capabilities. The committee and report proposed intelligence should be a careerist endeavour with longer periods of tenure and training. The *ES* stressed that Congress provide funding to aid the future of intelligence whilst *WP* went further and stated the DCI “should, of course, be civilian” because the military “could easily ruin the agency’s effectiveness and leave the country once again with the same sort of warped, one-sided interpretation of intelligence that led to Pearl Harbor...the divorce from the military should be absolute.”¹⁵⁴

The call for a civilian DCI shifted the view of *NYDN*. The outlet joined internationalists in proposing that intelligence be free from military interference. The news Vandenberg was stepping down in early 1947, led the paper to comment “here we go, off on the same old single-track railroads and trying to stick to the ancient Army-Navy idea of rotating officers regularly...If the U.S. is to have the intelligence network it deserves, Congress will have to...do something about making intelligence a career, not an occasional two-year tours of duty in Washington.”¹⁵⁵ In his pursuit of a stronger CIA, internationalist Hanson Baldwin was a keen supporter of a civilian leader. He argued the military was the “weakest link of the whole present intelligence set-up.” The brief tenures of DCIs Souers and Vandenberg were debilitating to the future of intelligence, “no such frequent shifts in the future can be tolerated,” intelligence must contain “at least a strong cadre of long-term, thoroughly competent personnel...this cadre must make intelligence their career.”¹⁵⁶

The debate over the National Security Act intensified in April 1947. Public debate focused on what authority should be provided to the DCI. The *WP* and *ES* criticised the bill for its lack of clarification over a civilian DCI as they stated U.S. intelligence suffered from a lack of coordination due to a high turnover of temporary leaders. “By rights this job should be one of high honor and long tenure,” if military control continues, the DCI role “will be regarded as a shelf,” *WP* claimed.¹⁵⁷ “One

¹⁵⁴ “Intelligence as a Career,” *ES*, July 22, 1946, p. A6; “Intelligence Agency,” *WP*, December 26, 1946, p. 4; “Intelligence Chief,” *WP*, March 4, 1947, p. 8; “Intelligence Chief,” *WP*, March 6, 1947, p. 6.

¹⁵⁵ Jerry Greene, “Capital Circus,” *NYDN*, March 5, 1947, p. 4.

¹⁵⁶ Hanson W. Baldwin, “Many ‘If’s’ Are Left in ‘Unification’ Blueprint,” *NYT*, January 19, 1947, p. E3; Baldwin, “Set-Up for Intelligence,” *NYT*; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Inquiry for Intelligence,” *NYT*, April 7, 1947, p. 8; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Scope of Intelligence,” *NYT*, April 10, 1947, p. 13; Wark, “Great Investigations,” 122-123; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 24; Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 57.

¹⁵⁷ “Central Intelligence,” *WP*, April 11, 1947, p. 8.

of the major weaknesses of our prewar intelligence system was the tendency of the War and Navy Departments to regard intelligence assignments as little more than pleasant peacetime interludes in the careers of Army and Navy officers," the *ES* responded, "the...director...is proving to be just another temporary assignment for Army and Navy officers."¹⁵⁸

When Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter replaced Vandenberg in May 1947 it was rumoured Vandenberg would step down earlier since he sought a career in the Air Force.¹⁵⁹ *WP* reported it shows a "fundamental weakness in our intelligence set-up...that is the weakness of permitting a military man to retain his active duty status while serving as director of central intelligence." They proposed the unification bill grant an extended tenure for future DCIs.¹⁶⁰ Hillenkoetter served as a Navy admiral. He did not desire a career in intelligence and reluctantly accepted the DCI position. He was leader when the National Security Act passed and continued to serve until 1950. *SLPD* hoped Hillenkoetter could transform CIG from a "shell" into an "intelligence service such as the security of the United States demands," whilst a *WP* correspondent wanted him to make CIG "as familiar to the American man in the street as is the FBI."¹⁶¹

The *ES* argued Hillenkoetter be given extended authority and influence within the U.S. government. The paper wanted him to have a longer tenure to back their view that intelligence should be a separate career platform. Like Souers and Vandenberg, the *ES* feared Hillenkoetter would only serve a brief time. "How long...Hillenkoetter will be permitted to remain as head of the group is a matter of concern to those who have deplored the prewar policy of relegating intelligence to the approximate role of a step-child of the armed services...he should be given plenty of time to carry out his task before being transferred somewhere else."¹⁶²

The liberal *WP* columnist Drew Pearson focused closely on Hillenkoetter's tenure. His widely circulated column, the "Merry-Go-Round," unearthed "major policy disputes and petty political spats, accomplishments and blunders, hypocrisy and malfeasance" including "the disastrous fact that this vital agency has been under so many different heads in so short a time."¹⁶³ A *WP* editorial criticised the lack of a civilian DCI because it left U.S. intelligence vulnerable to military control. Whilst Congress debated the National Security Act, it warned the future of intelligence could

¹⁵⁸ "A Career Assignment," *ES*, April 16, 1947, p. A12.

¹⁵⁹ Raymond P. Brandt, "St. Louis Admiral Expected to Head U.S. Intelligence," *SLPD*, February 27, 1947, p. 15A; "Intelligence Group Headed by Admiral Hillenkoetter," *ES*, May 1, 1947, p. 1.

¹⁶⁰ "Intelligence System," *WP*, May 3, 1947, p. 4.

¹⁶¹ "A Job in Intelligence," *SLPD*, May 12, 1947, p. 2B; John G. Norris, "A 'Marquis' Runs Our Central Intelligence," *WP*, May 4, 1947, p. B1; Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, 170.

¹⁶² "Important Assignment," *ES*, May 4, 1947, p. C4.

¹⁶³ Drew Pearson, "Merry-Go-Round," *WP*, May 15, 1947, p. 7; Donald Ritchie, *The Columnist: Leaks, Lies and Libel in Drew Pearson's Washington* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 2-3.

become a series of meaningless makeshifts. The solution was to implement civilian roles for all the top intelligence officials rather than solely the DCI.¹⁶⁴

The National Security Act specified the DCI would be appointed by the President after Senate approval. He could either be chosen by “the commissioned officers of the armed services or from among individuals in civilian life.” A clause stated the DCI “shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative...if he were a civilian in no way connected with the Department of the Army...Navy...Air Force, or the armed services.” However, if the DCI served in the military, then it would “in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services.” In other words, serving as DCI did not affect the careers of military personnel.¹⁶⁵

Internationalists continued to campaign for a civilian DCI in 1950 amidst rumours that Hillenkoetter would be stepping down. *WP* opposed military influence and said another leadership change weakens DCI continuity. In June 1950, the paper claimed a civilian leader was essential in establishing a stronger CIA. It blamed Hillenkoetter for permitting “military confreres” that infested the Agency with “malcontents, overdeveloped specialists and petty dabblers in policy.” For the security of the nation, the paper contended, it was vital for President Truman to appoint “a nonpolitical civilian of national standing, and a man devoid of outside ambitions and of devotion to the military hierarchy,” as there “can be no second best intelligence agency at a time when any mistake might be the fatal one.”¹⁶⁶

Walter Bedell Smith’s appointment postponed the prospect of civilian leadership. Smith held a mixture of military and diplomatic experience. He assisted General Eisenhower as Chief of Staff of the Allied Forces during the Second World War and served as ambassador to the Soviet Union between 1946 to 1948.¹⁶⁷ Like Hillenkoetter, Smith was reluctant to take the DCI job. Constantly under severe pain due to stomach ulcers, his appointment was delayed in the Senate because it drew questions over whether he could remain in his job for an extended time.¹⁶⁸ The *WP* said Smith could not endure a long tenure as “such a gruelling assignment, in view of his physical condition, would do him no service.” Smith became another DCI caught in the crosshairs of *WP* criticism over the lack of DCI continuity.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁴ “Civilian Intelligence,” *WP*, May 29, 1947, p. 6; “Civilian Job,” *WP*, July 23, 1947, p. 10.

¹⁶⁵ National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. 253, 80th Cong., 1st sess., July 26, 1947.

¹⁶⁶ “First Line of Defense,” *WP*, March 21, 1950, p. 8; “Intelligence Director,” *WP*, June 1, 1950, p. 12.

¹⁶⁷ Immerman, *The Hidden Hand*, 39.

¹⁶⁸ “How Long Will Smith Head CIA, Morse Asks,” *ES*, August 26, 1950, p. A3.

¹⁶⁹ “Civilian CIA,” *WP*, July 27, 1950, p. 12; “CIA and Its Chief,” *WP*, August 21, 1950, p. 6; “Intelligence Cooperation,” *WP*, August 22, 1950, p. 10.

Although *WP* were disappointed by Smith's selection, other publishers such as Mike Cowles were supportive and less keen to advocate for a civilian DCI. A letter sent by Cowles in January 1951 offered to meet with Smith to discuss a forthcoming *Look* article criticising the slow road to intelligence professionalisation. Whilst Cowles stated he felt the article should run to show the public "the confusion which has existed in our government in the intelligence area during the past decade," he disagreed with the author who supported a civilian DCI and said he wanted to see it rephrased.¹⁷⁰

William Harding Jackson was picked as Deputy DCI in August 1950. A lawyer, Jackson was involved in a report a year earlier alongside Smith's successor Allen Dulles and assistant to former Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, Matthias Correa. The Dulles Report advocated for CIA organisational reform including the removal of Hillenkoetter as DCI.¹⁷¹ Notably, it blamed bureaucratic turf wars for impacting CIA independence and undermining broader intelligence professionalisation.¹⁷² It highlighted military officers, "many of them on relatively short 'tour of duty' assignment," have discouraged civilian personnel from undertaking a CIA career.¹⁷³ After the report's publication, Dulles and Jackson remained associates. Dulles sent a letter to Jackson showing recent *WP* editorials continue to advocate for a civilian DCI. "I...gather that there may be some developments there in the not too distant future." He was correct as *WP* praised Jackson's appointment adding it would benefit intelligence because staff would be picked "on the basis of ability," rather than military rank.¹⁷⁴

Jackson became the poster boy of civilian progression within the intelligence field. He offered reporters an opportunity to delve deeper into the CIA. His civilian status meant he could discuss the Agency in ways that would have been difficult had he been serving in the military. Journalists gained information from Jackson about the CIA's role, functions and status. He featured in several interviews. An article examining his public profile was published by the well-known reporters turned talk show hosts, Tex McCrary, and Jinx Falkenburg. Describing Jackson as a "special genius," who is "brilliantly equipped" to fight the Cold War, they declared "Americans should know him better."¹⁷⁵ Jackson was also interviewed by the *ES* at the CIA headquarters in downtown

¹⁷⁰ CIA, "Forthcoming Look Article in U.S. Intelligence," December 1, 1950, CIA-RDP80R01731R001300130089-1, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01731R001300130089-1.pdf>, accessed 24th January 2024.

¹⁷¹ Immerman, *The Hidden Hand*, 37.

¹⁷² Rogg, *The Spy and the State*, 254-255.

¹⁷³ Dulles Report, 39.

¹⁷⁴ "Dear Bill," March 23, 1950, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 33, Folder 20; "Intelligence Team," *WP*, August 25, 1950, p. 18.

¹⁷⁵ Tex McCrary and Jinx Falkenburg, "How to Pin Down a Top CIA Job," *WP*, September 24, 1950, p. B3.

Washington. He cited DCI Smith's remark that he was "his professional civilian," and Jackson acknowledged that the CIA had begun to recognise the importance of its press relations, though he noted briefly that this "presented very difficult problems."¹⁷⁶

Reporters consistently pointed to the issue of DCI continuity in the call for a civilian leader. If directors were constantly changing, U.S. intelligence remained unstable, and its prestige remained in doubt. A careerist pathway was essential for the development of intelligence, internationalists claimed. The *ES* asserted that military leadership "is a dangerously wrong concept...that should be rectified under the new defense program." Positive coverage of Jackson's appointment demonstrated that reporters wanted to see some form of civilian leadership. Their support behind it was driven by the desire to see a stronger CIA. They also recognised another advantage: civilian leadership offered them a rare glimpse inside the hidden world of CIA.¹⁷⁷

CIA Expansion: The Hoover Commission and CIA Act

A commission headed by former President Herbert Hoover in 1948 investigated the Bogota crisis. It recommended methods to reform CIA organisation promoting civilian leadership and improving coordination.¹⁷⁸ Hoover and Wall Street lawyer, Ferdinand Eberstadt, compiled a report with Congressmen, government officials, and Intelligence Community (IC) leaders.¹⁷⁹ A separate investigation led by Dulles, alongside Correa and Jackson, was already underway. The Eberstadt report was public whereas the Dulles Report was confined to the executive. However, outlets knew that Dulles was investigating the CIA. The *ES* reported in late-July that a "shakeup" of the intelligence services was due.¹⁸⁰

Papers interpreted the findings of the Eberstadt Report as a failure, in part, of the Agency. They highlighted the report's criticism showing a lack of professional intelligence officers in CIA and argued that bureaucratic tensions hindered its effectiveness.¹⁸¹ The report reinforced the internationalist view that CIA needed immediate independence for its development. *CT* proved to be the outlier. It continued its anti-CIA rhetoric, blaming it for sluggish intelligence reports in Latin America and linked the Commission's findings to a broader criticism of U.S. intelligence. The paper

¹⁷⁶ Edgar L. Prina, "Intelligence Has Its Limitations," *ES*, December 3, 1950, p. C2.

¹⁷⁷ "Choosing Career Officials," *ES*, August 31, 1947, p. B4.

¹⁷⁸ Daniel Wallace, "Eberstadt, Dulles and NSC 50: The Impetus for CIA Evolution through 1953," *Intelligence and National Security*, 26, no. 5 (2011), 626-627.

¹⁷⁹ Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 57-58.

¹⁸⁰ Joseph Young, "Top Defense Officials Forecast Shakeup in Intelligence Unit," *ES*, July 21, 1948, p. A2.

¹⁸¹ The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force Report on National Security Organization, January 1949, 57-58; "The Nation," *NYT*, December 19, 1948, p. E2.

remarked “our super-sleuths must have qualified by passing a correspondence course entitling them to tin stars and water pistols.”¹⁸²

The Eberstadt report was released in December 1948. *SLPD* and *ES* emphasised the report’s rhetoric because it reflected their own arguments for an independent CIA. Passages in the report such as the National Security Act “was not working well,” and contained “defense deficiencies,” were picked to portray CIA, which was “sound in principle,” as being undermined by poor executive decisions.¹⁸³ A report criticised Air Force intelligence for its assessment of Soviet military intentions following the 1947 coup of Czechoslovakia. It showed CIA rectified the intelligence error by “correctly [evaluating] the available information in good time.” It concluded that the Soviet Union was not intent on military action.¹⁸⁴ The Alsops wrote that Truman preferred CIA intelligence to that produced by the military. *WP* remarked CIA “emphasizes the necessity...to remain apart from and above the military...In the atomic age, to act just once on erroneous intelligence might well prove fatal.”¹⁸⁵

The *ES* noted the National Security Act’s “defense deficiencies” were due to “the painfully slow progress of unification.” Echoing its view that CIA was vital in the Cold War effort and insufficient attention was being paid to either its status and intelligence, the editorial argued the Air Force blunder underlined “the gravity of the situation and the urgency of meeting it.” In its defence of CIA, *ES* remarked it was “all the more deplorable to learn that, three years after the close of World War II, we are woefully weak in the field of collecting and evaluating foreign intelligence.” Intelligence is undervalued, *ES* claimed, because officials continue to ignore its importance. The military are “plagued by poor choice of personnel and rapid rotation of officers,” whereas “the only reassuring note in the report” was that CIA “setup is a sound one.”¹⁸⁶

The *NYDN* shifted from its isolationist stance and downplayed fears that CIA expansion would lead to a military dictatorship. It praised CIA work in Bogota and argued it needed to be given greater autonomy. It emphasised the comments made by Ellis M. Zacharias. The Navy admiral

¹⁸² Walter Trohan, “Sees Collapse of Intelligence in So. America,” *CT*, March 7, 1949, p. 2; “Why Russia is a Puzzle,” *CT*, May 10, 1949, p. 16.

¹⁸³ Raymond P. Brandt, “Proposal to Unify Armed Forces Under Single Secretary Rejected by Hoover Group,” *SLPD*, December 16, 1948, p. 1B; “Intelligence Mistake Could Have Set Off Full Mobilization Last Spring,” *SLPD*, December 16, 1948, p. 1B; Francis P. Douglas, “Defense Setup Under Merger Deficient,” *ES*, December 16, 1948, p. 1.

¹⁸⁴ Francis P. Douglas, “Military Unity Called Weak by Hoover Board,” *ES*, February 28, 1949, p. 1; John A. Giles, “Air Force Intelligence Blamed for ‘War Scare’ Last Spring,” *ES*, December 16, 1948, p. 1.

¹⁸⁵ Joseph and Stewart Alsop, “Matter of Fact: A Slice of History,” *WP*, December 22, 1948, p. 15; “First Line of Defense,” *WP*, December 24, 1948, p. 8.

¹⁸⁶ “Defense Deficiencies,” *ES*, December 17, 1948, p. A10; “Intelligence Still Lags,” *ES*, December 18, 1948, p. A8.

criticised military intelligence, stating that it was unreliable. *NYDN* declared these “oldtime intelligence setups” are impeding the work of CIA. The military “don’t like spies...we need lots of spies, and good ones; so let’s have them and let’s listen to their reports.” Their editorial drew backlash from a reader who echoed the conspiracy that the national security state was sabotaging the nation. However, *NYDN* was not completely pro-CIA in its rhetoric as it argued the State Department’s intelligence capabilities needed to be “reorganized, and enlarged if necessary...as fast as possible?”¹⁸⁷

The *SLPD*, *WP*, *ES*, and *NYDN* argued the Hoover Commission had shown CIA’s effectiveness was inhibited by bureaucratic rivalries. The competition amongst several military intelligence agencies and CIA spurred Congress to pass the Central Intelligence Agency Act in June 1949. The Act “emerged as a linchpin of CIA operations” when DCI Smith took over.¹⁸⁸ It allowed the organisation to expand its staff and foreign agents, whilst acquiring fundings “without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature,” granting the DCI sole authority in the matter.¹⁸⁹ Baldwin wrote a five-part series supporting the strengthening of CIA. In it he argued that interdepartmental turf wars impeded the Agency. “Friction has been pronounced between various intelligence agencies of Government...the CIA...and the [FBI]...the result today is a marked depreciation in the quantity and quality of our intelligence as compared to the war years.”¹⁹⁰

Under the leadership of Carl Vinson, the House’s Armed Services committee passed the CIA Act on 7 March, expanding its covert capabilities.¹⁹¹ Hillenkoetter knew that the CIA’s institutional development depended on the support of sympathetic members of Congress. He contacted Vinson, congratulating him on the bill’s passage, writing “I wish to express to you my very sincere appreciation for the magnificent manner in which your Committee has handled the CIA legislation.” Likewise, Hillenkoetter praised Dewey Short, another committee member, for his “interest and

¹⁸⁷ “And the Brass Feuds On,” *NYDN*, January 2, 1949, p. 45; R. C. O’Brien, “Says Spy Business Booms,” *NYDN*, January 12, 1949, p. 37; “Wanted: Better Spies,” *NYDN*, February 23, 1949, p. 39.

¹⁸⁸ Ranelagh, *The Agency*, 193.

¹⁸⁹ “Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 20 June 1949,” in *The CIA Under Harry Truman*, ed. Michael Warner (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2005), 294; Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 59-60.

¹⁹⁰ Hanson Baldwin, “Intelligence-I,” *NYT*, July 20, 1948, p. 6; Hanson Baldwin, “Intelligence-II,” *NYT*, July 22, 1948, p. 2; Hanson Baldwin, “Intelligence-III,” *NYT*, July 23, 1948, p. 5; Hanson Baldwin, “Intelligence-IV,” *NYT*, July 24, 1948, p. 5; Hanson Baldwin, “Intelligence-V,” *NYT*, July 25, 1948, p. 15; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 35-36.

¹⁹¹ “Quick Approval Asked Without Questions on Super-Secret Agency,” *ES*, March 7, 1949, p. A3; C. P. Trussell, “House, 348-4, Votes a Secret Spy Bill,” *NYT*, March 8, 1949, p. 3.

thoughtfulness at all the...hearings,” for they “were extremely helpful to us.”¹⁹² The Act divided the Senate. Legislators promoted Trohan’s Gestapo allegations because they feared the CIA Act may lead to unwarranted domestic overreach. Hillenkoetter reiterated the National Security Act forbade any police powers and wanted to conduct a testimony *in camera* to avoid “security implications.”¹⁹³ It was approved by the Senate in late May and passed into law on 20 June.¹⁹⁴

The press generally agreed that Hillenkoetter’s *in camera* approach was necessary because the Act involved CIA operational secrecy. But the DCI’s testimony and the secret Congressional hearings fuelled press coverage because it maintained public fascination over CIA. An *ES* editorial said it “presents Congress with the difficult problem of reconciling open legislative processes with the need for utmost secrecy in regard to the bill’s subject matter...Congress has no alternative but to implement the plan with as little publicity as possible.”¹⁹⁵ *WP* meanwhile claimed the CIA Act was not “secret...the bill itself is perfectly open, like any other legislation.” Provisions that were added during the Armed Services committee hearings had to be hidden, the paper asserted, otherwise releasing these details would “thwart the clandestine operations of the agency...it would be foolish to assume that all intelligence activities can be conducted in a goldfish bowl.”¹⁹⁶

The *NYDN* were not concerned over Hillenkoetter’s secret testimony. “We don’t know much about the bill to strengthen the nation’s intelligence service...only one of its provisions has received any publicity up to now. But from what has been reported about the Act, it looks smart.” The paper now distanced itself from the anti-CIA rhetoric of *CT*. Whilst it echoed its warning against allowing foreigner “extra-clever-counter-spies” into the nation as part of the CIA Act, it concluded “the main object is to build a US spy system which can operate at least as effectively as the British and Russian intelligence services have long done. This hush-hush bill has the look of a big step in that direction.”¹⁹⁷ *SLPD* was the outlier opposing the secret Congressional debates. In their editorial titled, “Let’s Have Some Discussion,” the paper questioned “whether legislation...needs to be handled on such a hush-hush basis that it cannot be discussed on the floor of the House...Congress

¹⁹² CIA, “Letters to the Honorable Carl Vinson and the Honorable Dewey Short from R. H. Hillenkoetter,” March 10, 1949, CIA-RDP90-00610R000100170010-8, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00610R000100170010-8.pdf>, accessed 6th November 2023.

¹⁹³ CIA, “Letter to the Honorable Pat McCarran from R. H. Hillenkoetter,” February 24, 1949, CIA-RDP80R01731R001600040086-1, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01731R001600040086-1.pdf>, accessed 27th February 2024.

¹⁹⁴ “Senate OK’s Broad Powers for Spy Agency,” *CT*, May 28, 1949, p.5; “White House Gets Hush Hush Bill to Aid U.S. Spy System,” *CT*, June 8, 1949, p. 1; Hillenkoetter, quoted in Barrett, *The CIA and Congress*, 41.

¹⁹⁵ “For More Effective Spying,” *ES*, February 28, 1949, p. A10.

¹⁹⁶ “No Goldfish Bowl,” *WP*, March 9, 1949, p. 12.

¹⁹⁷ “‘Spy’ Bill Looks Good,” *NYDN*, March 9, 1949, p. 11C; “U.S. Spy Costs Hidden Fully as well as Spies,” *CT*, March 20, 1949, p. 19.

are not too impressive when they wear cloaks, brandish daggers and talk in impassioned whispers.”¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁸ “Let’s Have Some Discussion,” *SLPD*, March 19, 1949, p. 4A.

MEMBER OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
 The Associated Press is entitled exclusively to the use for republication of all the local news printed in this newspaper, as well as all AP news dispatches.

"SPY" BILL LOOKS GOOD

We don't know much about the bill to strengthen the nation's intelligence service, which the House passed Monday by a 348-4 vote. Only one of its provisions has received any publicity up to now.

But from what has been reported about the bill, it looks smart.

In general, it strengthens the arm of the new Central Intelligence Agency—an outfit which, to be blunt, was set up to enable this country to counteract the capable, efficient and far-reaching activities of some other nations' spies.

The House Armed Services Committee looked over the bill carefully, then recommended that the full House pass it without asking much about its contents. The zealously patriotic Representative Dewey Short (R-Mo.) told his colleagues that it would be "supreme folly" for them to debate the measure's numerous details in public.

Among the four members of Congress who voted against the bill were Representatives Vito Marcantonio and Adam Clayton Powell Jr., both of New York City and both long-time followers of the Stalinist party line. Whenever these gents oppose a measure in Congress, Americans are justified in supposing it to be in the public interest.

Certainly the single provision of this bill which has thus far had any publicity leads you to believe that some Americans are at last getting smart and hardboiled on the subject of spies.

We refer to the clause under which, if the bill becomes law, as many as 100 aliens per year will be allowed to enter this country for permanent residence, regardless of immigration quotas, as a reward for having furnished U. S. intelligence agents with valuable information.

Hundreds of millions of people in today's frenzied world would like nothing better than to come to the United States and settle down for the rest of their lives. Conversely, we haven't yet heard of anybody who is burning to leave the United States and live in some other country.

Permanent U. S. residence, therefore, is as glittering a prize as we could offer to foreigners who cooperate intensively and effectively with our spies. The chief danger attached to the plan is that some extra-clever counter-spies may worm into these rewards. We hope the hush-hush bill guards against that in every possible way.

Maybe we'll all find out more about the proposal when the Senate takes it up. That body may not be as willing as the House to buy a 20th Century spy system without public debate on some of the details of the purchase plan. If the Senate does tip the apple cart, that will be part of the price we have to pay for democracy and free speech; but even so, it's to be hoped no really vital apples will be spilled.

The main object is to build a U. S. spy system which can operate at least as effectively as the British and Russian intelligence services have long done. This hush-hush bill has the look of a big step in that direction.

N. H. GOES MODERN; HOW ABOUT N. Y. C.?

After some 30 years of daylight saving Summer time in large areas of the nation, the New Haven Railroad announces that this year it will print its timetables and set its clocks to conform to daylight time beginning April 24.

The New Haven is believed to be the first interstate line to go modern in this respect. All other such roads, so far as we're aware, have consistently stuck to standard time everywhere during the yearly daylight-saving periods. They've offered various reasons, but we never could see that they were being anything except stubborn, stuffy, and bull-headedly opposed to an efficient and progressive dodge for conserving sunlight hours. Correct us if we're wrong.

Pending such enlightenment, we feel that the New Haven has earned a round of applause.

There's just one catch, though. The New York Central owns Grand Central Terminal, through which the big majority of New Haven commuters pass to and fro. So, if the N. Y. C. doesn't switch to daylight time—or at least put extra hour hands on all its Grand Central clocks instead of on only a few—then the confusion of many a New Haven commuter during the daylight-saving period will be worse confounded than ever.

Come on, Mr. N. Y. C. What are we waiting for?

The Inquiring Photographer

By JIMMY JEMAIL

The News will pay \$5 for every timely, interesting question submitted and used in this column. Today's word goes to Mr. Hubert McFarland, Oakland, Me.

THE QUESTION.

Which is more apt to be true, "The love of money is the root of all evil" or the lack of money is the root of all evil?

THE PLACE.

Along Park Ave.

THE ANSWERS.

Edward E. Conway, executive vice-president Security Bureau Inc., "Judging by the knowledge gleaned from a full and eventful life, which included years of work in the FBI, I will go along with the post who said 'The love of money is the root of all evil.' Remember, he said the 'love' of money, not money, itself."

Arthur J. Simmons, W. 44th St., assistant to president: "The lack of money could very well be the root of all evil. Not that it is, actually, in this country, because we have little or no subject poverty, but wherever subject poverty exists, great evil will follow. That's the basic reason behind our help to war-stricken countries."

Louis S. Marchiony, W. 130th St., ice cream manufacturer: "That's a big question to discuss in 60 words, but I can say from experience that if there is a lack of money in the home, that is, if the good wife doesn't have all the money she needs, evil days will descend on her husband's head."

High J. Gostler, Macombs Road, Bronx, company vice-president: "I think that the lack of money is a more likely root of all evil. Crime breeds and flourishes in places like Hell's Kitchen. Whenever a notorious criminal is brought to justice, investigation lishes this fact."

Joseph Patrick A. Goherty, S. 12th Ave., Mount Vernon, political secretary: "Who am I, Joseph Patrick A. Goherty, to argue with the Bible, Timothy, 6th Chapter, 7th verse? Of course, 'The love of money is the root of all evil.' Those who love money work to accumulate as much as they can at the expense of others."

John H. King, boy: "I'm a young lad, just starting in life, working behind the bar. From what I've seen, I'd say that those with the most money seem to have the most fun, but I wonder. I know a lot of people who don't have much money, but they are good folks. People aren't bad just because they don't have money."



VOICE OF THE PEOPLE

Please give name and address with your letter. We will withhold both on request.

PYRAMID REPORTS

Manhattan: The United States may be going slightly mad with the delightful hope of getting \$2.018 for \$1 in 12 days. But at least Pyramiders are getting dizzy from laughing, not from crying.

MARY PAFORT

Manhattan: My wife put in \$8 without getting anything. I think Pyramid clubs should be checked up on, to make sure they aren't just a dodge to get money from trusting people. DISGUSTED.

Haverstraw: With the \$1 I've invested I've met people and had a barrel of fun. Pyramid clubs are bringing smiles to the face of America. Is that a crime?

RICKY BOCCARDI

"CAUSE OF IT ALL"

Queens: The fundamental reason for the unfortunate situation at Calvary Cemetery: Nobody has had enough brains to invent a machine that will dig a square hole in the ground. SAGE.

"NOT OUR FAULT"

Yonkers: Where does the musicians' union get its nerve to blame the Polish Center for that labor dispute in Yonkers? All the Polish Center does is rent the dance hall to clubs and organizations. They in turn hire their own bands or orchestras. Why say the Polish Center is "unfair" to musicians with whom it doesn't deal? NODINE HILLER.

KANSAS SNACKS LIPS

Manhattan: After living for 16 years in a Kansas city I came to live in New York. The first thing I noticed was the fine quality of your fresh-tasting water. Perhaps you lucky New Yorkers don't realize it, but your water is better than that of any other big city in the U. S. CHARLES SIERRA.

FOR LOWER SPEEDS

Middlebury: I'm an ex-auto machinist, but I still don't agree that we should have car inspections. Why don't manufacturers cut down on the horsepower of their motors? Why so much potential speed when we don't need it? UPGATE DRIVER.

GUNS WARMING UP?

Bronx: News, I note that the dear diplomats are setting the stage for World War III. And why not? Isn't war their favorite outdoor sport? HAROLD LIGHT.

SEEMS WE WERE HAD

Newark, N. J.: In the Feb. 25 Voice there appeared a letter signed Sarah H. Levine, of Asbury Park, N. J., concerning the rent control operation, and complaining that "OPA froze my rent on this house at \$22 a month in 1945, and will not allow me to increase it. My tenant has a yearly income of \$10,000. What chance has a small property owner to survive?" A similar letter appeared in the Newark Evening News for Feb. 21. The lady did not send her address to the Newark press. If she sent it to you, may I have it? MICHAEL PECORA, Office of Housing Expediter.

LETTERS TO JOE

Manhattan: Thanks, Jimmy Powers and Ed Sullivan, for your sincere tributes to retiring champion Joe Louis. It was pleasant reading and I, too, would like to add my sincere tribute to this champion who proved that boxing could be a real sport, not mere bloodshed. May you always have success, Joe! Mrs. B. TASEGH.

MOVIE ASPIRIN

Queens: Your recent editorial "What Ails the Movies?" gave some sound reasons for current falling revenues and shrinking audiences. But you failed to mention one main factor—high admission prices, plus the tax. Before prices got jacked up to their present level my wife and I went to the movies twice a week, or more. Now we feel week. This situation is probably worse when the family includes growing children, for whom full admissions must be paid. ARON RAUCH.

LADY COPS READY

Queens: A resolution is pending before the New York City Council asking for 150 more policemen. We are now witnessing a rise in juvenile delinquency, sex crimes, sales of narcotics to children, etc.—all within the policeman's province. As vice president of the Policemen's Eligibles Association, I would like to point out that we have been found qualified for this work. If the policeman's quota is increased, we can give New Yorkers the protection they need. CATHERINE CALAN.

Figure 2.5 In the editorial titled "Spy' Bill Looks Good," the NYDN had praised the 1949 CIA Act. The paper was now distancing itself from its previous anti-CIA rhetoric, leaving CT as one of the only major newspapers that opposed the Agency. Source: "Spy Bill Looks Good," NYDN.

Rumours persisted Hillenkoetter was stepping down as DCI.¹⁹⁹ In May, it was confirmed he would leave the CIA. The Dulles Report criticised Hillenkoetter's leadership, arguing that only a strong director could aid Agency intelligence coordination.²⁰⁰ Truman had already chosen Smith to take over in October, despite reports suggesting that he was reluctant to take the post.²⁰¹ Meanwhile, Hillenkoetter and his CIA were facing sustained criticism following the outbreak of the Korean War. The invasion of South Korea from the Communist North in June 1950 not only shocked the Truman administration but also prompted the press to question whether CIA intelligence had been effective in predicting the conflict.²⁰² Hillenkoetter gave another testimony before the Senate's Appropriations Committee to answer why there was no warning. The DCI responded that it was not CIA's job to evaluate intelligence it received.²⁰³ *ES* and *WP* reacted to his comments and claimed if the Agency was not responsible for evaluation, who was, and what was the Agency's role within the rapidly volatile Cold War?

The *ES* called for a Congressional CIA watchdog from a recommendation made by the Hoover Commission report.²⁰⁴ Drew Pearson remarked that the Agency reported "the world seemed more peaceful" two days prior to the outbreak of war.²⁰⁵ *WP* called for Hillenkoetter's resignation accusing him of failing to acknowledge that CIA was an evaluator of intelligence. The Korean War shows that "CIA does not have the stature it should have." Whether this was because it is a new agency, the paper said, or because Hillenkoetter's military background led him to neglect the importance of intelligence, the answer was the same: the CIA needed clearer guidance.²⁰⁶ The *CT* seized the opportunity to continue their anti-CIA crusade. The Agency was disorganised, and the confusion over its functions "is precisely as useful as a man without a head."²⁰⁷

Like the Bogota crisis, the Korean War reinforced internationalists support for CIA. Questioning whether the Agency was caught napping, the *WP* stated it provided adequate information about North Korea's intentions. "Much as this newspaper believes that a shakeup in CIA is overdue, the responsibility for the lapse cannot be laid entirely at the...agency's doorstep." The

¹⁹⁹ "Hillenkoetter Quits as Head of U.S. Intelligence," *SLPD*, February 22, 1950, p. 3A; "Adm. Hillenkoetter Denies Resignation," *SLPD*, February 23, 1950, p. 3A.

²⁰⁰ Prados, *Safe for Democracy*, 65-66.

²⁰¹ Raymond P. Brandt, "Gen. Bedell Smith is Mentioned as Likely CIA Head," *SLPD*, May 29, 1950, p. 5A; Marie T. Brown, "Spaatz Takes Lead as Choice for Central Intelligence Post," *ES*, August 18, 1950, p. A7; "Gen. Smith Approved as Chief of Intelligence," *ES*, August 24, 1950, p. 1.

²⁰² Immerman, *The Hidden Hand*, 38-39.

²⁰³ "Intelligence Responsibility," *ES*, June 28, 1950, p. A8.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ Drew Pearson, "Diplomats Beat Army on Korea," *WP*, June 29, 1950, p. B13.

²⁰⁶ "Halfway Intelligence," *WP*, July 3, 1950, p. 8.

²⁰⁷ "Pearl Harbor All Over Again," *CT*, July 4, 1950, p. 16.

WP argued that the Agency required greater stability, noting that its lack of status created “so much friction with other departments.”²⁰⁸ Responses to the editorial reinforced CIA support. A former naval intelligence officer argued intelligence is “valueless unless ‘operations’ [act] on what is provided.” Another reply stated that CIA cannot function properly in its current setup. It has been torn between overzealous leaders such as Vandenberg who “wanted CIA to run the whole show” without the thought of “why it was physically and psychologically...impossible,” and legislators like Clare Hoffman who wanted to restrict its functions. It placed the CIA in a “hopeless and helpless spot.”²⁰⁹

Criticisms emerging from the executive branch’s Eberstadt survey and the Dulles Report, together with the outbreak of the Korean War, drove CIA development. Reporters rallied to defend the Agency, promoting the view that CIA was at the mercy of petty bureaucratic squabbles. The result was a spate of intelligence failures. Internationalists argued if CIA could break free, gain full independence, and decide its own future, it would become a strong government institution, worthy of being the nation’s first line of defence. For CIA-press relations, this shows for the first time in CIA’s existence that reporters were seriously debating the issue of secrecy during the Congressional hearings on the 1949 CIA Act.

After the Second World War, liberal and conservative internationalists supported the strengthening of CIA because they firmly believed in U.S. postwar leadership. They argued, often in hyperbole, that it was vital for the nation’s security to acquire a centralised peacetime intelligence service. They commonly referred to Pearl Harbor and the dissolution of OSS as examples of intelligence neglect and accused other government departments of being responsible for the CIA’s limitations. Before the National Security Act, support for CIA only deepened. Foreign events such as the Soviet Union’s tightening grip over eastern Europe, the creation of Cominform, and the fear for communist victories in France and Italy resulted in broad press support of CIA.²¹⁰ Internationalists argued it was an essential institution in the early Cold War. The executive and Congress were pressured to act and pass the National Security Act as quickly as possible.

The Cold War consensus also engulfed opponents of CIA. Criticisms over bureaucratic rivalries, particularly after the 1948 Bogota riots, had shifted the *NYDN* from anti-CIA to echoing the

²⁰⁸ “Eyes and Ears,” *WP*, June 27, 1950, p. 10.

²⁰⁹ Brockholst Livingston, “Eyes and Ears,” *WP*, July 6, 1950, p. 12; Peter Vischer, “Flaw in Intelligence,” *WP*, July 12, 1950, p. 10.

²¹⁰ Immerman, *The Hidden Hand*, 21.

internationalist views of the *WP*, *SLPD*, and *ES*. The *NYDN* operated as a subsidiary of Robert McCormick's Tribune company, and both were known as "the most effective isolationist bloc in the daily press."²¹¹ Publisher Joseph Medill Patterson parroted *CT* because he shared a disdain for FDR and the growth of executive power during his presidency. The paper was an FDR critic for so long "that not even war or concepts of 'national unity' had mellowed them."²¹² The establishment of the national security state should have made the IC an easy target for the *NYDN* but its shift had emphasised just how strong and influential support for CIA had become. The *CT* meanwhile continued its anti-CIA rhetoric up to the mid-1950s when its owner, Robert McCormick, died.²¹³

This period was significant for the emergence of columnists who began to write frequently on U.S. intelligence. Baldwin and the Alsops cultivated close relationships with government officials, had supported the strengthening of intelligence and the appointment of a civilian DCI, but the *ES*'s Constantine Brown is a figure who has largely been overlooked by scholars, yet he played an equally important role in shaping the public debate. Over the next decade, Brown continued to provide essential commentary on the CIA's development until his death in 1966. His close relationship with Allen Dulles was sustained through his wife, Elizabeth Churchill Brown, a *WP* reporter. The Browns covered political life in Washington and travelled abroad where they established contacts with numerous diplomats and officials, including Dulles himself. The future DCI met frequently with the couple, often inviting them to dinner parties and even sent Elizabeth an inscribed copy of his 1963 book *The Craft of Intelligence*.²¹⁴

As DCI, Smith became a focal point for reflection on the growing phenomenon of CIA secrecy that continued into the next decade. Secrecy was beginning to be debated by reporters and legislators who argued it could be used on the one hand to hide blunders and inefficiency but on the other was necessary to prevent national security disclosures. Challenging secrecy, one reporter noted, "is a lot harder to combat. You can't tell Americans what's going on and at the same time keep potential enemies from finding out."²¹⁵ Similarly, Clarke Beach wrote "our government has told more than any other government about its espionage agency."²¹⁶ In the next decade, with CIA firmly

²¹¹ Michael Stamm, *Dead Tree Media: Manufacturing the Newspaper in Twentieth-Century North America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018), 228-232.

²¹² Rudgers, *Creating the Secret State*, 25-26.

²¹³ Wark, "Great Investigations," 120; Stephen Bates, "Prejudice and the Press Critics: Colonel Robert McCormick's Assault on the Hutchins Commission," *American Journalism*, 36, no. 4 (2019), 424; Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 255-256.

²¹⁴ "Dear Elizabeth," October 20, 1965, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 6, Folder 10; Brown, *The Coming of the Whirlwind*, 330-340.

²¹⁵ Proctor Mellquist, "Ten Men Can Save America," *ES*, April 16, 1950, p. 4.

²¹⁶ Clarke Beach, "Agents of Central Intelligence Are Nameless Heroes of Cold War," *SLPD*, October 23, 1949, p. 3B.

established, the ongoing Cold War, and the expansion of covert operations, the Agency's secrecy aligned with the concept of security. Fears of CIA communist infiltration were uttered by Senator Joseph McCarthy. The new head of CIA, Allen Dulles defended his Agency, but he would also be able to count on numerous columnists and newspapers who fiercely protected CIA.

2. From McCarthy to Langley: Public Secrecy Confirms the CIA in Cold War America

“All I know for certain about the...Agency is...Dulles smokes an excellent grade of pipe tobacco...all other information concerning his globe-girdling organization...is a mystery.” - *Fred Othman, 1955* ²¹⁷

“In a free society in which there is an inherent distrust of secret government, the CIA has stirred surprisingly little suspicion despite its remarkable expansion.” - *Marquis Childs, 1959* ²¹⁸

“The fact that the CIA could send out public invitations to lay the cornerstone of its hidden headquarters reflects a basic split personality that plagues the agency and occasionally makes it the butt of unkind jokes. This dichotomy pervades much of what the CIA does. On the one hand it is supersecret; on the other hand it isn’t.” - *The Invisible Government, 1964* ²¹⁹

A series of letters in 1953 and 1954 demonstrated a conflict of interest between the newly appointed DCI Allen Dulles and Joseph McCarthy. The Senator from Wisconsin stated the CIA was infiltrated by communists. McCarthy’s accusation gained public attention because they encompassed a string of charges, he directed at the CIA. Previously he accused an Agency official, William Putman Bundy, of financing the defence fund of Alger Hiss, a former State Department official convicted of perjury over his affiliation to a communist espionage group.²²⁰ “The conviction of...Hiss only scraped the surface,” he declared. McCarthy’s letters to Dulles urged him to force Bundy to testify at the Senate. Dulles refused, citing national security concerns.

“Your insistence that...Congress is not entitled to obtain information about improper conduct on the part of your top officers is extremely revealing,” McCarthy responded. Dulles said the charges were receiving “widespread circulation both in the United States and abroad,” and it “raised some questions as to our security.”²²¹ The letters highlighted a growing concern amongst officials that McCarthy was attacking the organisation’s security. They feared his charges of communist infiltration would prompt press coverage to focus on CIA secrecy and lead to a deeper investigation into the Agency that might compromise its operational secrets. Yet the CIA was never truly under threat, because the press shared the same fear: that McCarthy might expose sensitive material.

²¹⁷ Fred Othman, “No Questions Answered,” July 16, 1955, page unknown.

²¹⁸ Marquis Childs, “Great Expansion of Secret CIA Emphasized by Its New Building,” *SLPD*, November 1, 1959, page unknown.

²¹⁹ Wise and Ross, *The Invisible Government*, 218.

²²⁰ Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 45-46.

²²¹ CIA, “Historical Staff File: Congress – McCarthy Investigations,” July 1, 1953, CIA-RDP84-00161R000100100002-7, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84-00161R000100100002-7.pdf>, accessed 23rd May 2023.

This chapter shows that CIA public secrecy became embedded within the broader Cold War security equation. The Agency's security was interpreted by CIA officials and the mainstream press as shielding its operational secrecy. Both argued that as a young organisation, the CIA needed to be fiercely protected because it was a vital organisation within the zero-sum context of the Cold War. A shared view in protecting CIA operational secrecy helped sustain CIA-press relations. Both saw undermining this left the nation vulnerable. Whilst McCarthy's charges did not threaten the Agency, the press supported Senator Mike Mansfield in extending Congressional oversight in the form of a Joint Committee (JC), because it shielded CIA from future sensationalist attacks. The CIA argued Mansfield's proposal undermined its secrecy and relied on senior legislators and the administration to keep oversight limited.

The role Allen Dulles played is essential in understanding the CIA's public secrecy approach in the 1950s. As DCI, he used his position to release carefully selected pieces of information to reporters whilst emphasising the press's responsibility to protect national security. Correspondents relied on Dulles for insight into the CIA and received only a cultivated narrative that was designed to promote its effectiveness as an essential organisation in the Cold War. Yet Dulles could not shape public debate alone. He relied on Stanley Grogan, an influential and overlooked PR official to help analyse press coverage. Grogan developed a methodical system that involved extending the CIA's press clipping service to monitor what was being said about the Agency, and he recommended what actions Dulles should take to quell criticism.

The CIA's relocation of its headquarters to Langley was a monumental event that etched the Agency's place at the heart of the U.S. government. The move led to extensive press coverage. It aided CIA public secrecy because papers like *ES* on the one hand emphasised that secrecy surrounding its operations were vital to the Cold War effort, whilst on the other the paper satisfied public fascination by publishing any available details regarding its relocation. Langley was an open secret because it offered the public a view into CIA's hidden world, but it did not unearth sensitive material. Dulles and Grogan were happy for reporters to debate whether CIA should move to Langley as it deflected attention from its operational secrecy.

McCarthy's Decline and the CIA's Reaction

Liberal and conservative reporters were generally unified in their disdain for McCarthy. His anticommunist crusade led to multiple accusations of communist infiltration in the government. His

sensationalist approach targeted the press, provoking considerable anger among journalists.²²²

Reporter Marquis Childs criticised McCarthy's disregard for national security in his 1950 accusations against the State Department, whilst the conservative *New York Post* called McCarthy's campaign the "hoax of the century."²²³ The Senator's political prestige deteriorated when he accused CIA of communist infiltration in July 1953. A year later his rhetoric of communist subversion backfired. He was universally portrayed as a bully and as a "mob monster," whose little support he had initially in the press quickly vanished.²²⁴

Many Washington reporters were appalled at the extensive coverage McCarthy was receiving. The *NYT* editor Arthur Hays Sulzberger urged journalists to scrutinise the Senator's attacks. Constantine Brown said journalists were portraying McCarthy as "the only important issue in our national life" rather than interpreting the substance of his claims.²²⁵ As staunch CIA defenders, the Alsop brothers loathed McCarthy and became a constant thorn in his side.²²⁶ They accused the Senator of damaging national security and impeding CIA's work in the Cold War. "It is probably hardly worth mentioning that we are losing the Cold War here in Germany...this...is a problem that deserves the attention of Senator McCarthy...who bellow about 'Reds' at home and meanwhile...continuously forward Soviet purposes abroad." Joe Alsop urged President Eisenhower to defend Dulles against McCarthy, and when the administration blocked Bundy to testify before the Senator, they praised the decision. "Against the background of past Administration appeasement of McCarthy, this event is so politically meaningful...Such is the story of an incident that may well be remembered as the turning of the tide."²²⁷

McCarthy's low reputation in 1953 contrasted with the favourable coverage Allen Dulles received when he took over CIA. Picked to head the Agency in January, his broad support limited McCarthy's accusations and helped to shield the CIA against the Senator. In contrast with their views

²²² Michael Schudson, "General Introduction: The Enduring Book in a Multimedia Age," in *A History of the Book in America: Volume 5: The Enduring Book: Print Culture in Postwar America*, ed. David Paul Nord, Joan Shelley Rubin and Michael Schudson (Chapel Hill, NC; University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 10-11.

²²³ Marquis Childs, "Spreading Confusion," *WP*, February 23, 1950, p. 9; Edward Alwood, *Dark Days in the Newsroom: McCarthyism Aimed at the Press* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007), 70-72; Oliver Pilat and William V. Shannon, "The One-Man Mob of Joe McCarthy," *New York Post*, September 4, 1951, p. 2, (quoted in Alwood, *Dark Days in the Newsroom*, 70).

²²⁴ Michael Straight, "The Fanaticism of Joseph McCarthy," *New Republic*, June 28, 1954, pp. 6-9; Ritchie, *Reporting from Washington*, 87.

²²⁵ Constantine Brown, "News Reporting on McCarthy," *ES*, July 20, 1953, p. A11; Davies, *The Postwar Decline of American Newspapers*, 42-44.

²²⁶ Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., *Joe Alsop's Cold War: A Study of Journalistic Influence and Intrigue*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 65; McGarr, *City of Newsmen*, 156-157.

²²⁷ Joseph Alsop, "We're Losing The War," *WP*, March 27, 1950, p. 8; Joseph Alsop, "President Set to Battle McCarthyism," *WP*, July 13, 1953, p. 6; Joseph Alsop, "McCarthy is Beaten," *WP*, July 17, 1953, p. 25; Ritchie, *Reporting from Washington*, 141.

on McCarthy hindering national security, *ES* and *NYT* portrayed Dulles as a symbol of patriotism who protected the nation's security through his knowledge and expertise in intelligence. Brown praised Dulles's efforts during the Second World War by emphasising his "highly satisfactory" and "outstanding" role in OSS covert operations that lead to Nazi surrender in Northern Italy. He argued Dulles is the best choice because "there are few if any Americans civilians who know as much as he does about so-called cloak-and-dagger techniques or who can match his qualifications for running the big and largely supersecret organization...the Nation can be confident that its top intelligence organization will be effectively run in his experienced hands."²²⁸

²²⁸ Constantine Brown, "Choice of Allen Dulles is Wise," *ES*, January 24, 1953, p. A5.

The *ES* wanted Dulles to sustain a long tenure at CIA. The paper drew comparisons to J. Edgar Hoover's FBI, and claimed Dulles can ensure loyalty, efficiency, and establish CIA as an FBI equivalent "world famous" organisation.²²⁹ Likewise, *NYT* commended Eisenhower for making an "excellent choice" in selecting him. The paper stated his experience in "this complex subject," provides "a stimulus...so necessary if the intelligence service is to develop." Their editorial concluded, "altogether, the outlook for a purposeful and imaginative development of our intelligence service is excellent."²³⁰ Dulles refused to testify and instructed other CIA officials to do the same, as McCarthy accused the DCI of thwarting his investigation. The DCI requested Eisenhower limit the Senator's attacks by emphasising CIA operational secrecy was at risk if CIA employees testified. In return, Eisenhower supported the DCI.²³¹

The administration and CIA were united against the Senator. Dulles and Eisenhower strongly believed in pursuing covert operations and preserving the secrecy those operations required. Eisenhower demanded McCarthy could not investigate CIA because it undermined its secrecy. A compromise soon developed. The Senator wanted Bundy to testify, but Dulles reiterated his security concerns. Dulles met with McCarthy and a deal was agreed that the Senator's Congressional committee would turn over information it had on Bundy to the Agency and Dulles assured McCarthy that Bundy would not conduct further activities. The press incorrectly reported that Dulles had agreed to let Bundy testify. In a rare occurrence, the CIA publicly denied that any agreement was made and declared that the subpoenas on undercover agents compromised their position abroad, damaging the security of the Agency.²³²

CIA memorandums show the attacks were taking its toll on agents' morale. Officials were concerned that a McCarthyite investigation might publicly unearth CIA secrets. CIA feared the charges could provide an impetus for further evaluation and legislative oversight. A public spectacle was something Dulles wanted to avoid. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, serving as the Agency's Inspector General, was aware of the potential backlash CIA could face and highlighted that McCarthy's charges could affect morale amongst agents and officers. "I feel obliged to call [to] your attention what I consider to be a serious state of morale among personnel...these officers have indicated that they and others at their level are giving serious consideration to leaving the Agency...both of these

²²⁹ "The CIA and Allen Dulles," *ES*, January 30, 1953, p. A10.

²³⁰ "Right Man for the Job," *NYT*, January 27, 1953, p. 24.

²³¹ William S. White, "M'Carthy Strikes at Allen Dulles," *NYT*, July 10, 1953, p. 1; William S. White, "M'Carthy in the Middle of a Widening Storm," *NYT*, July 12, 1953, p. E3; Cecil Holland, "McCarthy Witness Charges \$150,000 State Dept. 'Bribe,'" *ES*, July 13, 1953, p. A1-A4; Cecil Holland, "McCarthy-Administration Rift Widens in Dispute Over CIA," *ES*, July 15, 1953, p. A5.

²³² "M'Carthy and C.I.A. Plan Inquiry Deal," *NYT*, July 15, 1953, p. 16; Ranelagh, *The Agency*, 236-238.

officers indicated their concern of a McCarthy investigation and indicated their worry of what such an investigation might reveal, and its effects on the future of the Agency.”²³³

PR officer Stanley Grogan recommended Dulles make no public statement. Grogan insisted that if a response had to be made, Dulles could choose one that emphasised McCarthy’s “carelessness for the national security by not having all of his staff members security-cleared when they had access to classified material.”²³⁴ He urged Dulles to wait until McCarthy’s most vocal opponent in the Senate, Stuart Symington, confronted the Senator on the Hill. Symington held good relations with the CIA since its creation. He supported the National Security Act and met with CIA staff regularly whilst serving on the Senate’s Armed Services committee. CIA officials praised him for his public defence in Congress, and he was on the CIA’s list of preferred Congressional contacts.²³⁵ He served on McCarthy’s committee until the charges of communist infiltration in the State Department. Symington resigned after McCarthy refused to fire his staff director, J. B. Matthews, who wrote an article on communist penetration of the Protestant clergy.²³⁶

Grogan and Kirkpatrick kept Dulles informed of potential damage McCarthy could do if he was allowed to pursue his CIA investigation. The three claimed CIA operational secrecy was under threat. They argued the Senator’s attacks risked damaging the organisation’s intelligence efficiency, undermine agents’ morale, and potentially unearth sensitive material. McCarthy’s reputation collapsed as Dulles took over CIA. Accusing journalists of communist influence placed him in the crosshairs of a hostile press, whilst the appointment of Dulles as head of CIA placed him in an advantageous position.

²³³ CIA, “Morale in the DD/P Area,” June 26, 1954, CIA-RDP64-00046R000100120019-0, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP64-00046R000100120019-0.pdf>, accessed 7th June 2023.

²³⁴ CIA, “(Untitled),” June 16, 1954, CIA-RDP75-00149R000500050088-9, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00149R000500050088-9.pdf>, accessed 24th May 2023.

²³⁵ CIA, “Senators and Representatives I Know,” December 15, 1953, CIA-RDP58-00597A000200030010-8, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP58-00597A000200030010-8.pdf>, accessed 25th August 2023; CIA, “Congressional Lunches,” December 16, 1953, CIA-RDP58-00597A000200030002-7, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP58-00597A000200030002-7.pdf>, accessed 25th August 2023; CIA, “Congressional Contacts,” December 22, 1953, CIA-RDP58-00597A000200030033-3, J <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP58-00597A000200030033-3.pdf>, accessed 1st September 2023; James C. Olson, *Stuart Symington: A Life* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003), 402.

²³⁶ John D. Morris, “3 Democrats Scorn Bid from McCarthy,” *NYT*, July 19, 1953, p. 29; Olson, *Stuart Symington*, 276-277.

16 June 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

In view of Symington's statement that he would have a statement on CIA and OSS for tomorrow's hearing, it is recommended that you make no statement at this time, and certainly not until after Senator Symington has had his opportunity to answer McCarthy.

However, should you feel that you must immediately make a statement, it is recommended that you say:

"McCarthy is still making false charges.

"There are no Communists in the CIA.

"McCarthy has shown carelessness for the national security by not having all of his staff members security-cleared when they had access to classified material. That is alarming.

"I am pleased to find McCarthy laudatory of J. Edgar Hoover, who heads the FBI which handles security clearances within the United States and whose organization is the one to check McCarthy's security and that of his staff."

I assume that you will get in touch tonight with Stuart Symington in view of his statement that he will have something tomorrow on McCarthy, CIA, and OSS.

STANLEY J. GROGAN

Figure 3.2 A memorandum from Grogan instructing Dulles not to make an immediate statement over McCarthy's charges. If Dulles felt it was necessary to, Grogan put forward a list of potential statements. Source: CIA, "(Untitled)," June 16, 1954, CIA-RDP75-00149R000500050088-9.

Cultivating the CIA Profile: Dulles and Grogan

CIA operational secrecy dominated the minds of Agency officials as they monitored and responded to press coverage. Dulles recognised as DCI he could use public secrecy to cultivate a positive image of CIA by releasing selective pieces of information to the press. He knew reporters remained uncertain in their coverage of national security affairs and exploited their hesitancy to dictate what information they could publish. Journalists who were close associates of Dulles had to refrain from publishing when it came to sensitive material, but they also had to maintain a close relationship with the DCI in the hope of gaining valuable information. Dulles used his personal celebrity when communicating with reporters alongside an image of a “professional” DCI who worked tirelessly behind-the-scenes to make CIA an effective intelligence organisation. The public secrecy approach that involved engaging with the press and offering carefully curated snippets of CIA information was praised by newspapers because it gave them a peek inside CIA whilst withholding important operational details. The Dulles leadership was depicted by the *New York Herald Tribune* as “unusual” because “someone connected with intelligence” understood “the importance of getting the facts across to the public,” whilst *NYT* claimed Dulles “broken with all secret-service tradition by speaking publicly and maintaining press contacts to prevent total mystery.”²³⁷

Dulles’s interview with *U.S. News and World Report* in March 1954 exemplified his strategy of public secrecy. He used this interview to emphasise the press’s responsibility when reporting on the CIA and to steer journalists in their future coverage of the Agency. He focused on CIA security concerns and framed them through the zero-sum dynamics of the Cold War. He stated the Soviet Union receives “many advantages” in espionage because of “our free system of government” which “is open to the public” and made the point clear that he “would give a good deal if I could know as much about the Soviet Union as the Soviet Union can learn about us by merely reading the press. Sometimes I think we go too far in what our Government gives out officially...We tell Russia too much. Under our system it is hard to control it.”²³⁸

Some local newspapers saw through the deliberate public secrecy approach. They noted the contradictions in the DCI’s remarks. How could he comment on press responsibility over national security information whilst disclosing this publicly? One article gained traction and was reprinted

²³⁷ Marguerite Higgins, “Folly of Too Secret Intelligence,” *New York Herald Tribune*, June 7, 1953, page unknown; Russell Baker, “The Other Mr. Dulles – Of the C.I.A.,” *NYT*, March 16, 1958, p. SM17; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 44-45.

²³⁸ “We Tell Russia too Much; Interview with Allen W. Dulles,” *U.S. News and World Report*, March 19, 1954, pp. 62-68.

several times. It accused Dulles of proceeding “to outline the operations of his supposedly super-secret agency for publication in this magazine. Some of the details he so willingly supplied should be very useful to the Soviets.”²³⁹ Whereas a Michigan paper said, “the press...are not telling Russia more than the press...have been able to learn from government agencies.” The DCI “is wrong in appearing to make the press the villain,” whilst a North Carolinian newspaper recalled, “the fault is with those who clear this material, for only they can judge the security value.” Intelligence and security officials should ask themselves, “are all our secrets really secrets?” stressed the Illinois’ *Decatur Herald*.²⁴⁰

Dulles wanted to shape the public debate and used his authority to inform journalists about CIA activities. He built a close press relationship by allowing some access to material that did not compromise CIA secrecy whilst arguing the press withhold stories he felt compromised its secrecy and instead back the Agency’s legitimacy. In April 1953, Dulles held his first background briefing with a group of foreign policy reporters, the Overseas Writers Club. In the non-attributable meeting, *NYT* reporter Walt Waggoner made notes that were copied and stored at CIA. It stated that Dulles wanted to shape press-relations to “avoid having to go...to ask that certain information not be printed.” The *ES* correspondent and Agency defender, David Lawrence, provided a report to Kirkpatrick.²⁴¹

Dulles could depend on the press withholding CIA material because it encapsulated this period of communist anxieties in the Cold War. By 1955, however, Dulles was more forceful in limiting information to journalists. In a meeting he said he was dissatisfied with a “recent directive” that covered CIA-press relations. “Mr. Dulles does not want any unauthorized leakage of classified matters from CIA employees,” the minutes stated. “He noted that newsmen use a great deal of ingenuity and through multiple contacts manage to acquire accurate classified data...a certain amount of control over contacts with the press is necessary.”²⁴²

Newspapers reported the restrictions Dulles implemented. In a survey to several federal agencies on solutions to improve providing information to the public, *ES* stated the CIA provided a

²³⁹ “Too Much Loose Talk,” *Columbus Citizen*, March 18, 1954, page unknown; reprinted in *Pittsburgh Press*, *Memphis Press-Scimitar*, and *Evansville Courier*.

²⁴⁰ “Our Way is Better,” *Lansing State Journal*, March 19, 1954, page unknown; “Obliging the Enemy,” *Asheville Citizen*, March 20, 1954, page unknown; “How Many Scientific Secrets Should We Tell World?” *Decatur Herald*, March 21, 1954, page unknown.

²⁴¹ “MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR,” February 15, 1955, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 30, Folder 1; McGarr, *City of Newsmen*, 198-200.

²⁴² CIA, “Senior Staff Meeting,” June 1, 1955, CIA-RDP80B01676R002400010007-0, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R002400010007-0.pdf>, accessed 11th July 2023.

statement that said there was “no need...to improve [the] making [of] information available.”²⁴³ Dulles wanted to control press coverage. He could rely on Grogan to keep him updated on the CIA’s public profile. A former reporter, Grogan served as press liaison for the War Department where he was credited for converting it “into an aggressive public relations effort.”²⁴⁴ In 1951, he became the CIA’s press officer a year later when it began to formally recognise its PR department. Grogan became one of the longest serving press officers in the Agency’s history where he served for eleven years until November 1963.²⁴⁵

Grogan’s tenure demonstrated CIA’s fascination with its public image as its press clipping service was extensively increased. Grogan read press articles for at least three hours a day, and he worked alongside seven assistants who selected, marked, and copied articles for distribution to Dulles. Their analysis of press articles amounted up to thirty-six hours a day. Twenty-two daily and Sunday newspapers were regularly sent to the DCI often containing over a hundred pages of clippings. Under Grogan other departments such as the Historical Intelligence Collection (HIC), the CIA Library, and the clandestine Directorate of Plans increased their press clipping services. Grogan often informed Dulles of trusted press sources, proposals for responding to critical articles, and recommendations for modifying his speeches, all with the aim of promoting the CIA’s public image.²⁴⁶

Two reporters who published articles critical of the CIA spurred Grogan and Dulles to take a proactive PR approach. Allen Drury covered McCarthy’s charges and proposals by Mansfield in *ES* and Iowa’s *Waterloo Daily Courier*. Drury was a novelist who focused on Washington’s political life. His highly acclaimed *Advise and Consent* was based partly on his experiences as a Congressional reporter for the *United Press* and *NYT* where he warned against executive overreach.²⁴⁷ The rapid growth of CIA under Dulles made it a prime target for Drury. In August 1953, his articles prompted Grogan to send a memorandum to Dulles. Grogan notes that Drury differed in his reporting in the *Courier* to criticise CIA, stating that McCarthy’s sensationalism had ruined the opportunity to scrutinise the Agency. Drury wrote that CIA “badly needs investigation” and a “shaking-up.”²⁴⁸

²⁴³ Robert K. Walsh, “Few U.S. Agencies See Any Flaw in News Flow,” *ES*, November 14, 1955, p. A2.

²⁴⁴ “Col. Stanley Grogan, Ex-C.I.A. Aide,” *NYT*, April 18, 1978, p. 42.

²⁴⁵ CIA, “Public Affairs Chronology,” December 22, 2016, CIA-RDP91G01170R003505680006-5, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91G01170R003505680006-5.pdf>, accessed 5th December 2023.

²⁴⁶ CIA, “Agency Clipping Service,” November 26, 1963.

²⁴⁷ “Allen Drury, 80, Novelist,” *NYT*, September 3, 1998, p. C20; Roger Kaplan, “Allen Drury and the Washington Novel,” *Policy Review*, 97 (Oct/Nov 1999), 67-68.

²⁴⁸ Allen Drury, “Drury Sees Possibility of Setback for McCarthy,” *Waterloo Daily Courier*, July 14, 1953, page unknown; Allen Drury, “M’Carthy Warns CIA Head Fight on Bundy Isn’t Over,” *ES*, August 4, 1953, p. 7; CIA, “Memorandum for the Director,” August 5, 1953, CIA-RDP74-00297R000401370023-5,

Grogan stated that Drury's *ES* article "indicated none of the bias that he expresses in his...*Courier* story." He recommended Dulles write a letter to *ES* editor Benjamin M. McKelway urging he contact Drury to clarify his comments since Dulles was "as desirous as anyone to keep CIA as strong a security agency as human effort makes possible." Grogan suggested Dulles included a passage stating, "I can assure you that no one is more anxious than I to have CIA and its security activities improved and bettered wherever possible."²⁴⁹ McKelway's reply echoes the cautious approach editors took when conversing with the Agency. He said he would have raised concerns to Drury if he published anti-CIA material. When writing for *NYT*, Drury published "another out-of-town column" shortly after claiming Dulles tried to get him fired. Grogan insisted that he "is prejudiced against the CIA and should not ever cover any CIA story...because of this bias."²⁵⁰

The Agency could not prevent reporters from publishing critical material, but it could recommend publishers and editors confront their staff on articles deemed unfavourable to CIA. Warren Unna was another reporter who wanted to examine executive authority and political corruption in the United States. Like Drury, Unna drew Grogan's attention as he sought to warn Dulles. Joining *WP* in 1952 he focused on Washington politics before writing on Asian affairs and eventually becoming the bureau chief in New Delhi.²⁵¹ In the 1950s he wrote several articles critical of CIA. In January 1958 he disclosed that a disagreement took place between the DCI and Eisenhower over daily intelligence reports. In a national security council meeting, Unna reported that Dulles told the president his administration pays little attention to CIA findings.

Eisenhower replied that CIA should attach maps signposted with visible red arrows to make their reports decipherable.²⁵² Unna stated that he was given the information from a CIA employee who had no knowledge of the 1955 directive issued by Dulles on contacts with the press. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick urged the DCI to reiterate to officials that any employee who leaks information is "simply tending to bring discredit upon themselves and the whole Agency."²⁵³ Grogan considered Unna's article an embarrassment to the CIA and sent a memorandum to reiterate the directive. The meeting noted that any CIA employee providing information to the press would be checked and certified by Grogan. The minutes stated Unna's story may have never been published if this directive was

<https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP74-00297R000401370023-5.pdf>, accessed 14th July 2023; Barrett, *The CIA and Congress*, 224.

²⁴⁹ CIA, "Memorandum for the Director," August 5, 1953, CIA-RDP74-00297R000401370023-5.

²⁵⁰ CIA, "Memorandum for the Director," August 28, 1959, CIA-RDP74-00297R000401370008-2, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP74-00297R000401370008-2.pdf>, accessed 14th July 2023.

²⁵¹ "Post Bureau Chief India, Washington Correspondent," *WP*, February 2017, p. B5.

²⁵² Warren Unna, "Ike Asks Maps, Arrows to Clarify CIA Reports," *WP*, January 23, 1958, p. A1.

²⁵³ CIA, "Items for April Senior Staff Meeting," April 10, 1958, CIA-RDP80B01676R002400010074-6, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R002400010074-6.pdf>, accessed 11th July 2023.

followed by staff.²⁵⁴ Unna also produced a *Harper's* article that featured in the *Congressional Record*. It attracted legislators who were keen to observe more information about CIA. It highlighted how Dulles wanted less public intrusion into his organisation.²⁵⁵ The DCI responded by urging that CIA employees highlight such an article involving the Agency and raise them at future meetings.²⁵⁶

Dulles and Grogan worked together to prevent critical stories of the CIA whilst promoting a positive public image. Grogan ensured the DCI was kept abreast of CIA coverage and he made CIA more proactive in its press responses. It reflected a broader shift in Agency policy that argues against the notion that the secretive organisation were not concerned about its public portrayal. Surveying press coverage was a dedicated effort across all departments that expanded under Grogan. "No man ever had a more devoted or a wiser advisor in the field of public relations than I did in you," Dulles praised the CIA's press officer after hearing the news of his retirement. "Your wide knowledge of the personalities in the press and of their competence, their affection for you, were of the greatest help in our work...I feel that in the years of our work together we helped in the really difficult task of making the work of CIA better understood in the press and by the public than in the past."²⁵⁷

Support for a JC and Questioning Secrecy

Press support for CIA was strong in response to McCarthy's charges. Newspapers legitimised CIA secrecy amidst the backdrop of a public investigation they characterised as sensationalist, careless, reckless, and damaging to the security of the nation. They shielded CIA by backing Mansfield's JC to counter McCarthy. The liberal *NYT*, *WP*, and *SLPD* wanted a watchdog committee to provide effective Agency oversight.²⁵⁸ The conservative *ES* and *NYDN* were more cautious because they feared sensitive CIA information would be released by "blabbermouths" in Congress, but they preferred professional legislators, supervising the Agency behind closed doors, rather than a public McCarthyite exposé.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁴ CIA, "Memorandum for the Director: From Stanley J. Grogan," January 30, 1958, CIA-RDP80B01676R002400010077-3, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R002400010077-3.pdf>, accessed 11th July 2023.

²⁵⁵ Warren Unna, "CIA: Who Watches the Watchmen?" *Harper's Magazine*, April 1, 1958, 46-53; Barrett, *The CIA and Congress*, 284.

²⁵⁶ CIA, "Deputies' Meeting," April 18, 1958, CIA-RDP80B01676R002300230057-2, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R002300230057-2.pdf>, accessed 11th July 2023.

²⁵⁷ "Dear Stanley," November 14, 1963, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 30, Folder 1.

²⁵⁸ "Congress and C.I.A.," *NYT*, June 8, 1954, p. 26; "Safeguarding the CIA," *WP*, July 12, 1953, p. B4; "To Protect the CIA," *SLPD*, January 21, 1955, p. 22.

²⁵⁹ "The CIA Case," *ES*, July 19, 1953, p. A21; "Report on Spies," *NYDN*, June 8, 1954, p. 71.

“The conflict of secrecy versus public accountability in a democracy is receiving renewed attention as a result of the [McCarthy] charge” *NYT* reporter Anthony Leviero claimed.²⁶⁰ The attacks ignited a broader public discussion over legislative supervision. The Agency surveyed press coverage and in a memorandum to Dulles, Grogan highlighted that in a survey of 129 editorials featuring CIA in newspapers across the nation, from local to large news outlets, only seven were regarded as “anti.” He noted that “pro” articles either expressed “faith in the CIA, trust in the leadership, or at least sufficient confidence to warrant support of Senator Mansfield’s proposal.” The “confidence” Grogan points to, demonstrates that he branded articles mentioning CIA and a JC not as criticism to the Agency, but as a precaution to shield its security against McCarthy.²⁶¹

²⁶⁰ Anthony Leviero, “President Intends to Keep M’Carthy from CIA Inquiry,” *NYT*, June 7, 1954, p. 1.

²⁶¹ CIA, “Memorandum for the Director,” July 7, 1954, CIA-RDP75-00149R000500050083-4, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00149R000500050083-4.pdf>, accessed 24th May 2023.

7 July 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

Since June 2, when Senator Joseph R. McCarthy reportedly stated, "We have got a much more serious situation now in Communist infiltration of the Central Intelligence Agency I am disturbed beyond words by the situation in the CIA," we have seen 129 editorials commenting on CIA, the desirability of its being investigated by Senator McCarthy's committee, or of its being checked upon by a Congressional committee of the type proposed by Senator Mike Mansfield. Of these 129 editorials, 122 might be called "pro", expressing faith in CIA, trust in its leadership, or at least sufficient confidence to warrant support of Senator Mansfield's proposal. Seven have been classified as "anti".

"ANTI" COMMENT

CALIFORNIA	Los Angeles <u>Examiner</u>	June 15	"Secret Panels"
ILLINOIS	Rock Island <u>Argus</u>	June 14	"Not Above Suspicion"
MASSACHUSETTS	Boston <u>Post</u>	June 25	"Poor Intelligence"
NEW YORK	New York <u>Journal-American</u>	June 9	"Secret Panels"
NEW YORK	New York <u>Post</u>	June 28	Letter to the editor signed 'T. Barnes' "Better Look Into It"
WASHINGTON	Aberdeen <u>World</u>	June 5	"Reds in CIA"
WASHINGTON	Seattle <u>Post-Intelligencer</u>	June 10	"Secret Panels"

"PRO" COMMENT

ALABAMA	Birmingham <u>News</u>	June 8	"The CIA's Secret Operations Should Not Be Subject To Public Hearings"
ALABAMA	Birmingham <u>News</u>	June 25	"The Surine Business"
ARIZONA	Phoenix <u>Gazette</u>	June 22	What Others Say "Congress and CIA" from St. Louis <u>Globe-Democrat</u>
ARKANSAS	Little Rock <u>Gazette</u>	June 6	"Showdown Coming"

Figure 3.3 An early example of CIA press clipping. Grogan's responsibility as CIA's PR man was to survey coverage. The McCarthy charges prompted public discussion on the Agency where all but seven of the 129 editorials analysed were considered "anti," demonstrating CIA's strong press support. *Source:* CIA, "Memorandum for the Director," July 7, 1954, CIA-RDP75-00149R000500050083-4.

The *WP* emphasised protecting CIA operational secrecy from McCarthy's investigation. "It is downright condescending of the Senator...to assure...Allen Dulles, that if he and his assistants appear before the committee 'we will not expose their secret, classified operations.'" McCarthy's charges "raises the question of protection of vital national secrets." The paper supported a JC, arguing that "some sort of legislative check on the operations...would help...to protect secrets and to prevent future fishing expeditions." It stressed however that "membership in Congress does not automatically entitle a person to national secrets...there would be little point in having an intelligence agency at all if its operations could be blabbed to the winds by any cheap political demagogue seeking publicity." A JC would remedy this, because "a carefully chosen watchdog committee could both reassure the country and safeguard the agency from invasions by political demagogues."²⁶²

The *ES* warned that whilst McCarthy's attacks endangered CIA, Congress must take responsibility in ensuring his investigation is limited. CIA's work is "too critical to be banded about on Capitol Hill." The paper praised an "excellent" speech made by Mike Monroney where the Senator argued that Congress has unnecessarily interfered with government departments. "More and more we neglect our own duties as we eager-beaver ourselves into assuming legislative direction of the executive department." Legislators should return to the philosophy of "I believe" instead of the McCarthyite assumption of "I doubt."²⁶³ Like Symington, Monroney was a trusted legislator within CIA and was likewise on their list of preferred contacts. His arguments regarding limited Congressional supervision were not surprising given his close relationship with CIA.²⁶⁴ Echoing Monroney, *ES* remarked that "Mr. McCarthy is not the Senate," and this lack of faith in the Agency "is as fully capable of injury to our Government and its institutions as the Communists."²⁶⁵

Support for a JC was also voiced by Hanson Baldwin. Throughout 1953 and 1954 when Mansfield introduced his legislation, he supported oversight. Like Mansfield, he initially hoped that a JC would undermine McCarthy's investigation. As the Senator's influence waned in 1954, Baldwin maintained his advocacy for a JC, citing concerns to abuses to power, a lack of accountable funds, and administrative waste within the Agency. His support echoed his prior backing for the Eberstadt group. He advised it and urged the CIA harbour closer relations with other government departments

²⁶² "Safeguarding the CIA," *WP*; "McCarthy's Retreat," *WP*, July 16, 1953, p. 12; "Protecting Intelligence," *WP*, August 7, 1953, p. 20.

²⁶³ "'I Doubt' or 'I Believe'?" *ES*, July 16, 1953, p.A26.

²⁶⁴ CIA, "Congressional Contacts," CIA-RDP58-00597A000200030033-3.

²⁶⁵ "The CIA Case," *ES*, July 19, 1953, p. A21.

and improve coordination. Naturally his support for closer Congressional supervision would come next.²⁶⁶

Baldwin wanted to preserve CIA operational secrecy however he raised wider concerns that it is unaccountable. His *NYT* article in July 1953 acts as a bridge between the initial anti-McCarthy rhetoric stemming immediately after his charges and the beginning of a wider intrigue that examined Agency secrecy. Like *WP*, Baldwin wrote that legislators should be picked based on their loyalty in protecting CIA secrets. Shielding the Agency from further McCarthyite attacks was one reason why a JC should be adopted, he states, another was to limit the influence of some CIA agents “who are themselves attracted by the megalomania of secrecy.” Baldwin recognised the influence of former OSS officers who staunchly believed in clandestine methods, and he warned their desire for secrecy could instigate future criticism against the Agency. “A...committee might protect the...Agency from destructive and irresponsible attacks...and provide constructive and essential legislative supervision.”²⁶⁷

The McCarthy attacks led journalists to question CIA’s relationship with Congress. In an opinion piece titled “C.I.A. Plays Vital Role in National Security,” Anthony Leviero highlighted that the organisation “has been granted...a degree of immunity from accountability.” This is because of the CIA’s contribution to the national defence, “of preventing an atomic Pearl Harbor,” will weaken any initiative from legislators to scrutinise the Agency for fear of compromising its vital role in protecting the nation.²⁶⁸ Walter Lippmann acknowledged that “it is good that...CIA is not to be demolished and publicly degraded.” Dulles’s refusal to appear before McCarthy “is not a criterion for immunity.” In response to Lippmann, a reader wrote to the *WP* editor to express disagreement with his argument. “To jeopardize the success of this organization is to place the security of the country in a more precarious position...does not security mean secrecy?...certainly Mr. Lippmann would agree that security is a criterion for immunity.”²⁶⁹

²⁶⁶ Wallace, “Eberstadt, Dulles and NSC 50,” 628; Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 57-58.

²⁶⁷ Hanson Baldwin, “A Weakness in Security,” *NYT*, July 30, 1953, p. 15.

²⁶⁸ Anthony Leviero, “C.I.A. Plays Vital Role in National Security,” *NYT*, July 19, 1953, p. E9.

²⁶⁹ Walter Lippmann, “CIA and McCarthy,” *WP*, July 21, 1953, p. 11; Harrison P. Brewer, “Secrecy and Security,” *WP*, July 25, 1953, p. 6.

C. I. A. PLAYS VITAL ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY

Congress Has Hitherto Left Agency Free to Carry on Its Top-Secret Work

By ANTHONY LEVIERO

WASHINGTON, July 18.—How the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the national security has been defined by the Congress, the House Intelligence Committee has learned in a report today.

The report, which is the first of a series of studies on the agency's activities, states that the agency's role is to provide the President and the Congress with the information they need to make decisions on national security.

The report also states that the agency's role is to provide the President and the Congress with the information they need to make decisions on national security.

The report also states that the agency's role is to provide the President and the Congress with the information they need to make decisions on national security.

The report also states that the agency's role is to provide the President and the Congress with the information they need to make decisions on national security.

The report also states that the agency's role is to provide the President and the Congress with the information they need to make decisions on national security.

The report also states that the agency's role is to provide the President and the Congress with the information they need to make decisions on national security.

The report also states that the agency's role is to provide the President and the Congress with the information they need to make decisions on national security.

The report also states that the agency's role is to provide the President and the Congress with the information they need to make decisions on national security.

The report also states that the agency's role is to provide the President and the Congress with the information they need to make decisions on national security.

The report also states that the agency's role is to provide the President and the Congress with the information they need to make decisions on national security.

The report also states that the agency's role is to provide the President and the Congress with the information they need to make decisions on national security.

The report also states that the agency's role is to provide the President and the Congress with the information they need to make decisions on national security.

The report also states that the agency's role is to provide the President and the Congress with the information they need to make decisions on national security.

PRINCIPALS IN MCCARTHY-C. I. A. CASE



William F. Buckley Jr.



Allen W. Dulles

EQUAL RIGHTS FIGHT IS ON

WASHINGTON, July 18.—The fight for equal rights for women is on, and it is being fought in the halls of Congress.

The fight is being fought in the halls of Congress, and it is being fought in the halls of Congress.

The fight is being fought in the halls of Congress, and it is being fought in the halls of Congress.

"WE LIKE HER, BUT..."



A TEACUP OF GAS
that's all it takes to prove
this compact new kind of car...

**RUNS CIRCLES AROUND
ANY OTHER LOW PRICED CAR**

Come in, you may win

**FREE
A HUDSON JET**

After you take the "Teacup Test," all you need is a few more miles to win a free Hudson Jet. The Hudson Jet is the most compact, most economical car in the world today.

1 PERFORMANCE On any road, the Hudson Jet will outperform any other car in the world today.

2 ECONOMY On any road, the Hudson Jet will outperform any other car in the world today.

A SCIENTIFIC, DRAMATIC TEST

The "Teacup Test" is a scientific, dramatic test that will prove the Hudson Jet is the most compact, most economical car in the world today.

The "Teacup Test" is a scientific, dramatic test that will prove the Hudson Jet is the most compact, most economical car in the world today.

The "Teacup Test" is a scientific, dramatic test that will prove the Hudson Jet is the most compact, most economical car in the world today.

The "Teacup Test" is a scientific, dramatic test that will prove the Hudson Jet is the most compact, most economical car in the world today.

The "Teacup Test" is a scientific, dramatic test that will prove the Hudson Jet is the most compact, most economical car in the world today.

The "Teacup Test" is a scientific, dramatic test that will prove the Hudson Jet is the most compact, most economical car in the world today.

The "Teacup Test" is a scientific, dramatic test that will prove the Hudson Jet is the most compact, most economical car in the world today.

The "Teacup Test" is a scientific, dramatic test that will prove the Hudson Jet is the most compact, most economical car in the world today.

The "Teacup Test" is a scientific, dramatic test that will prove the Hudson Jet is the most compact, most economical car in the world today.



Because it's wonderfully compact, it's a delight to handle, drive and park in today's traffic...and there's ample room for six!

HUDSON JET

A COMPACT, NEW KIND OF CAR IN THE LOWEST PRICE FIELD

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

The Hudson Jet has both the hottest performance and the best economy in the lowest price field. Want proof? Come in and try the "Teacup Test." Put a Hudson Jet through its paces. Give it a real workout.

You'll feel performance like of which you've never known before. And you'll see, on the scientific gasoline meter, the almost unbelievable gas economy of this new kind of car. Try the "Teacup Test" today... you may win a Hudson Jet FREE!

HUDSON JET

A COMPACT, NEW KIND OF CAR IN THE LOWEST PRICE FIELD

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Standard and other specifications and accessories subject to change without notice.

Figure 3.4 McCarthy's attacks led reporters to defend CIA. NYT was an avid supporter of a JC and argued that CIA needed legislative oversight to avoid being dragged unnecessarily into the public spotlight through a McCarthyite spectacle that could unearth sensitive material. Leviero's piece titled "C.I.A. Plays Vital Role in National Security," quoted CIA as a "new and strange baby." Source: Leviero, "C.I.A. Plays Vital Role in National Security," NYT.

Dulles was cautious in referencing a JC in public statements and interviews as CIA continued to monitor press coverage. He was against it because he wanted to maintain limited oversight and use his close association to senior officials in the Senate's Armed Services and Appropriations Committees to keep critical legislators away.²⁷⁰ In a letter to the White House's (WH) Chief of Staff, Dulles reiterated his view that CIA operational secrecy would be compromised if more Congressmen snooped into it. He was "somewhat apprehensive" to the idea that "if this staff were to look over my shoulder all the time on sensitive operations, a serious question of security might arise unless the personnel of the staff was most carefully selected."²⁷¹

In the face of McCarthy's attacks, CIA secrecy was broadly supported, but the DCI's refusal for him and Bundy to testify led reporters to ask the bigger questions regarding CIA's role in American democracy. The McCarthy charges unified hawkish and liberal reporters in protecting the Agency. Whilst Baldwin urged U.S. military preparedness and Lippmann warned of CIA's growth and influence within the government, they both agreed that it needed a stronger system of checks and balances. Firstly, to offset McCarthy, whom both considered a danger to CIA's operational secrecy and secondly to examine wider questions over the organisation and its place within American democracy.

Press Reaction to Mansfield's Proposal and the Internal Survey Groups

Mansfield's JC proposal selected eighteen members from the House and Senate like the nuclear weaponry watchdog group, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). He reintroduced his proposal to Congress in March 1954. It led to a compromise that limited the membership from eighteen to ten. "There is a profound difference between an essential degree of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose and secrecy for the mere sake of secrecy...once secrecy becomes sacrosanct, it invites abuse."²⁷² Press reaction to the JC illustrates a different tone from *WP* compared to the previous year. It shows the paper's JC support was because of McCarthy's attacks. After he failed to subpoena Dulles and Bundy, his popularity plummeted and there was limited concern that he would succeed in unearthing CIA secrets. After the JC was reintroduced, *WP* repeated their concerns highlighting the Agency's security as they did a year prior. The paper reversed their JC support and stated that Congressional oversight risked compromising CIA operational secrecy.

²⁷⁰ Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 78; Snider, *The Agency and the Hill*, 6-11; Barrett, *The CIA and Congress*, 203-204.

²⁷¹ CIA, "Letter to Honorable Sherman Adams from Allen W. Dulles," January 19, 1955, CIA-RDP80B01676R004200100046-7, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R004200100046-7.pdf>, accessed 5th September 2023.

²⁷² "Democrats Propose Joint Committee to Watch Over CIA," *ES*, March 11, 1954, p. A2.

The *WP* argued in late-March that the current system of oversight was adequate. In echoing Dulles, the paper claimed, “another committee with broad powers to investigate might be one too many, and there would be additional opportunities for leaks...its secrets must be protected.”²⁷³ *ES* said the committees were receiving a poor reputation since McCarthy, and this was shown by the reaction to Mansfield’s proposal. It argued Congress could not be trusted with sensitive material. “The legislative branch...has never passed the necessary laws or changed its rules to...safeguard confidential material to which it has access.” Congressmen require security clearances, “senatorial tradition and custom have lagged far behind the rapidly changing security situation...until some action is taken, a large gap in the Nation’s security wall will remain.”²⁷⁴ The conservative reporter George Sokolsky published his *WP* column arguing that a JC is “unsound...espionage requires violations of normal public procedures because its essential characteristic is secrecy.”²⁷⁵

Despite Mansfield’s proposal stalling in the Senate, *NYT* maintained its support. Baldwin published an article noting a JC “might have improved and protected the intelligence services.” He criticised the committees for meeting irregularly and remarked “this...secrecy, unless somehow scrutinized, can breed inefficiency or danger to a democracy.”²⁷⁶ He denounced Dulles for not supporting a JC. The reporter was close friends with the DCI and often relied on him for information on the CIA. This affiliation took a negative turn when his article was criticised by Dulles.²⁷⁷ *NYT* editors supported Baldwin, arguing that whilst secrecy is needed for intelligence, CIA should not be beyond Congressional oversight. *WP* saw Congressional interference as a hinderance to Agency security whereas *NYT* argued that closer supervision could only improve it.²⁷⁸

A JC failed to pass the Senate because key Congressional opponents, including the chair of the Armed Services Committee, Leverett Saltonstall, Richard Russell, and Appropriations Committee chair Styles H. Bridges had worked with Dulles to stall any progression.²⁷⁹ Dulles relied on Eisenhower who proposed an executive group to limit oversight reform. The President exclaimed that a JC “would be passed over his dead body.”²⁸⁰ Eisenhower created a task force, directed by General Mark Clark under the supervision of former President Herbert Hoover, to examine CIA’s operational setup.²⁸¹ In June 1954 the Hoover Commission began its investigation into the Agency’s

²⁷³ “Spotlight on Intelligence,” *WP*, March 23, 1954, p. 10.

²⁷⁴ Edward S. Jones, “Does Congress Need a Security Check?” *ES*, May 30, 1954, p. B3; “This Week in Washington,” *The Journal* (Caldwell, Ohio), August 20, 1953, p. 6B.

²⁷⁵ George Sokolsky, “These Days...Time for a Check-Up,” *WP*, July 19, 1954, p. 9.

²⁷⁶ Hanson W. Baldwin, “Myopia on Intelligence:,” *NYT*, June 3, 1954, p. 13.

²⁷⁷ Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 42-43.

²⁷⁸ “Congress and C.I.A.,” *NYT*, June 8, 1954, p. 26.

²⁷⁹ Barrett, *The CIA and Congress*, 175; Ranelagh, *The Agency* 281-284.

²⁸⁰ Eisenhower quoted in Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 78.

²⁸¹ Snider, *The Agency and the Hill*, 11-12.

“progress and management.” Dulles wanted to form an internal committee involving Kirkpatrick and Grogan to highlight CIA’s determination to expand and avoid the oversight debate. He insisted that information given to the task force be focused on “our needs for a new building” and “advice on Career Service legislation.”²⁸²

Dulles worked with legislators to propose a Congressional group be established to divert attention from his Agency. He met with the “S.O.S. Club,” an exclusive fraternal group of newly elected Republican Congressmen who often met with Eisenhower and Dulles to discuss policy and intelligence.²⁸³ They were loyal representatives to the President who backed him consistently. One was Peter Frelinghuysen Jr. who proposed a Presidential commission to conduct a detailed survey on the CIA. The DCI praised the Congressman for his “constructive and helpful attitude.” Dulles was keen on a discreet executive committee because he wanted to avoid what he claimed were overzealous legislators who will scrutinise the Agency. He recommended Frelinghuysen’s proposal be submitted to General Clark.²⁸⁴

Dulles objected to the Hoover Commission’s recommendation to examine CIA covert activities. In July 1954 he urged Eisenhower establish another internal group headed by General James H. Doolittle to deflect further scrutiny. The Doolittle Report surveyed the CIA’s operational capabilities and reported back to Eisenhower. It echoed early Cold War anticommunist anxieties and emphasised the protection of operational secrecy. The report echoed the underlining purpose of public secrecy. It was supportive of covert action, stating that “the American people...understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy,” even though the public had no knowledge of it. The report recommended tighter security procedures such as restricting the “too easy access to much of C.I.A.’s classified data.” Despite these criticisms, it was favourable to the Agency and found it was doing a “credible job.” The findings were sent to the President in September.²⁸⁵

The *ES* supported the executive groups because it reinforced their view that Congress could not keep secrets. The Hoover Commission received press coverage shortly after it was established

²⁸² Lee Nichols, “CIA Study is Scheduled by Hoover Task Force,” *WP*, July 5, 1954, p. 1; CIA, “Diary Notes,” July 5, 1954, CIA-RDP76-00183R000100020103-9, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP76-00183R000100020103-9.pdf>, accessed 28th January 2025.

²⁸³ “15 Freshman Congressmen Form Club,” *Pomona Progress Bulletin* (California), July 29, 1954.

²⁸⁴ CIA, “Letter to H. Alexander Smith from Allen W. Dulles,” July 12, 1954, CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130066-4, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130066-4.pdf>, accessed 6th September 2023; CIA, “(Untitled),” February 23, 1956, CIA-RDP58-00597A000200060001-5, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP58-00597A000200060001-5.pdf>, accessed 6th September 2023; Anthony Leviero, “C.I.A. Now Operating a Far-Flung Network,” *NYT*, June 20, 1954, p. E10.

²⁸⁵ “Report of the Special Study Group on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency,” September 30, 1954 (declassified April 1, 1976), 3, 6, 27; Prados, *Safe for Democracy*, 148-149; Rogg, *The Spy and the State*, 281-282; Ranelagh, *The Agency*, 276-278.

whilst the Doolittle survey did not receive acknowledgment until October due to the highly secretive nature of its work. *ES* remarked the Commission, “offers a reasonable and promising way...to obtain an objective check.” Its findings “may safely assume that they are calculated to improve and strengthen our intelligence arm...It would have been most unwise and possibly dangerous to national security to have conducted congressional hearings on the reports of...infiltration mentioned by Senator McCarthy...in an era of cold war tension...it is good to know that the youthful CIA is doing a reasonably effective job.”²⁸⁶

The *CT* differed in its coverage because of its anti-CIA bias. In a profoundly scathing editorial, the paper stated the Hoover Commission is interfering with Congress’s right to scrutinise CIA. “The CIA should enjoy no more self-conferred exemption than any other agency which was created by Congress and can be abolished by Congress.”²⁸⁷ The *CT*’s anti-CIA rhetoric reflected the views of its owner, Robert McCormick. It was not until 1955 when he died that the paper would cover CIA more favourably. As Grogan noted, it “has changed very much since Colonel McCormick’s death.” Walter Trohan, who was initially critical of Dulles, changed his view of the DCI. Grogan recalled he has recently “been very friendly,” and “he thinks Mr. Allen Dulles is doing pretty good.”²⁸⁸

McCarthy’s attacks in 1953 and the Mansfield proposal a year later led to a shift in press coverage. With McCarthy not able to pursue his investigation, *WP* and *ES* were concerned over Congressional leaks. The term “blabbermouth” became synonymous with conservative coverage on oversight and *ES* trusted the Eisenhower’s executive groups over the legislative chambers. Baldwin and the *NYT*, however, favoured the creation of a JC which the paper continued to voice its support over. The paper maintained its defence of a JC when Mansfield reintroduced his proposals. Also, press hesitancy to trust CIA secrets with Congress had aided Dulles in his effort to stymie any impetus for oversight. The DCI relied on the executive branch and close connections with senior Congressmen who wanted to maintain their access to CIA information and therefore helped to block any momentum toward legislative reform.

The Deepening Press Debate Over a JC

The Hoover Commission recommended a JC in June 1955 that effectively undermined Eisenhower and Dulles’s efforts to suppress calls for oversight.²⁸⁹ Grogan characterised the final

²⁸⁶ “Checking Up on the CIA,” *ES*, July 7, 1954, p. 20; “CIA Probe,” *ES*, July 11, 1954, p. A25; “The CIA’s ‘Creditable Job,’” *ES*, October 24, 1954, p. A26; “Vital to Our Defense,” *ES*, July 1, 1955, p. A14.

²⁸⁷ “Which Came First, CIA or Congress?” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, July 8, 1954, p. 10.

²⁸⁸ CIA, “Memorandum for the Director,” October 19, 1955, CIA-RDP74-00297R000200030055-0, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP74-00297R000200030055-0.pdf>, accessed 14th July 2023.

²⁸⁹ Snider, *The Agency and the Hill*, 12; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 70.

Clark report as “highly critical” and the press will “highlight the criticisms” in its findings. To manage the potential fallout, he urged Dulles accept an invitation to an exclusive dinner with correspondents hosted by *NYT* correspondent William Lawrence. Grogan noted it will provide the chance for Dulles to “give the CIA an opportunity to have its viewpoints considered...without attribution to the Agency or any of its personnel.”²⁹⁰ An alternative proposal urged Dulles meet with “a selected press group for a conference.” Both chose the second option and the DCI met privately with reporters from *NYT*, *WP*, and *ES*.²⁹¹

Despite the DCI’s best efforts to quell criticism, the press began to change their views over a JC and supported the idea. The biggest shift occurred within the *WP* editorial board. Initially supportive of a watchdog to protect CIA from McCarthyite accusations, the paper then opposed it the following year as they claimed it would compromise operational secrecy. However, after Mansfield reintroduced his proposal in 1955, *WP* shifted again to support it. “Initially this newspaper was sceptical of such a step,” their editorial proclaimed, but they were “persuaded...that some broader congressional review would on balance be desirable and could be accomplished safely.”²⁹²

Why did the *WP* alter their stance on a JC? By the mid-1950s, the paper experienced several changes. Its readership grew enough to compete with the *NYT*, and it purchased its archconservative rival the *Washington Times-Herald* in 1954. Its expansion allowed it to extensively cover national security issues. Russell Wiggins also became *WP* executive editor in 1955. He frequently warned about news censorship and was critical of the increase in government secrecy under the Eisenhower administration.²⁹³ Wiggins questioned the government’s reliance on using national security to hide abuses of power and overreach which he argued was “an integral part of a vocabulary of every totalitarian regime.” As a member of the American Society for Newspaper Editors (ASNE), Wiggins stated that editors could directly quote government officials from “off-the-record” ASNE conventions if the information could be verified elsewhere.²⁹⁴ His 1956 book, *Freedom or Secrecy*, he warned that the increase in executive power had curtailed press freedom in the interests of

²⁹⁰ CIA, “Memo to the Director from Stanley J. Grogan,” June 27, 1955, CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130093-4, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130093-4.pdf>, accessed 8th September 2023.

²⁹¹ CIA, “Memo for the Director from Stanley J. Grogan,” June 28, 1955, CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130094-3, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130094-3.pdf>, accessed 8th September 2023.

²⁹² “Intelligence Quotient,” *WP*, January 31, 1955, p. 14.

²⁹³ Halberstam, *The Powers That Be*, 299-300; McGarr, *City of Newsmen*, 196-198; Davies, *The Postwar Decline of American Newspapers*, 96; Carpenter, *The Captive Press*, 70-71; Roberts, *In the Shadow of Power*, 260-261.

²⁹⁴ Gwyneth Mellinger, “Washington Confidential: A Double Standard Gives Way to The People’s Right to Know,” *Journalism and Mass Communications Quarterly*, 92, no. 4 (2015) p. 866.

“security.” His role as *WP* executive editor meant the paper supported more robust legislative checks on the government, including CIA.²⁹⁵

The Hoover Commission reinforced *NYT* support for a JC. The paper repeated its claim that a watchdog safeguarded CIA from public criticism. It criticised the oversight system after the Hoover report. They noted that legislators should implement “closer and more formal liaison with the C.I.A. than the extremely tenuous connection that now exists through informal subcommittees.”²⁹⁶ In their October editorial titled “Controls for the C.I.A.,” the paper argued the Agency is “virtually beyond the law” and that supervision would benefit it “for its own protection.”²⁹⁷ The editorial caught the attention of Grogan who wrote a memorandum to Dulles affirming the article was written by Baldwin. The *NYT* correspondent, Grogan notes, “has been outspoken in his belief that the Agency has too many employees...he is the Shining Knight in Armor for the military and reflects anti-CIA feeling from the Pentagon.” Grogan argued that Baldwin’s criticism stemmed from his connection with the military. A solution recommended Dulles talk to *NYT* publisher, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, about the “contradictory and misleading” editorial.²⁹⁸

Sulzberger responded to Dulles because he held a strong bond with the CIA. This spanned from his close relationship to the IC prior. He received a letter from the head of the CIG, Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg detailing him its functions. Sulzberger replied, declaring “you and your representatives will always meet with the fullest cooperation from all of us here at *The New York Times*.”²⁹⁹ This amity was extended to Dulles as the two regularly met over lunch, sometimes at the *NYT* building, and attended cocktail parties and receptions with their spouses. The pair’s close friendship meant personal matters often dictated their conversations.

Dulles relied on the “security minded” *NYT* publisher to persuade his staff to withhold publication pertaining to sensitive CIA material or instruct them to edit their articles to appease the DCI. Sulzberger also signed a secrecy agreement with CIA, allowed officers to use *NYT* as cover for their activities, and permit its reporters to provide information to the Agency on suspected foreign agents. Grogan recognised the Dulles-Sulzberger relationship could provide advantages for CIA PR.

²⁹⁵ William O. Douglas, “Practical Restraints of Press,” *WP*, November 4, 1956, p. E6; “Post Editor J. Russell Wiggins Dies at 96,” *WP*, November 20, 2000, p. B7.

²⁹⁶ “Congress Is Asked To Supervise C.I.A.,” *NYT*, January 15, 1955, p.7; “C.I.A. ‘Watchdog,’” *NYT*, January 26, 1955, p. 24; “Report on C.I.A.,” *NYT*, June 30, 1955, p. 24.

²⁹⁷ “Controls for C.I.A.,” *NYT*, October 19, 1955, p. 32.

²⁹⁸ CIA, “Memorandum for the Director,” October 19, 1955, CIA-RDP74-00297R000200030055-0, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP74-00297R000200030055-0.pdf>, accessed 14th July 2023.

²⁹⁹ Sulzberger, quoted in Salisbury, *Without Fear or Favor*, 576.

He stated that officers write numerous letters to the *NYT* to challenge Baldwin's editorial. "Twelve such letters has a big effect; twenty means a top level staff conference."³⁰⁰

³⁰⁰ CIA, "Memorandum for the Director," October 19, 1955, CIA-RDP74-00297R000200030055-0; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 16; McGarr, *City of Newsmen*, 108; Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer*, 227.

19 October 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

STAT

The NEW YORK TIMES today renews its support of the Mansfield bill for a Congressional watchdog committee for CIA. Its editorial, "Controls for CIA", says Mansfield is trying to achieve "some kind of Congressional control over CIA." The TIMES wants that.

Congress now has "some kind of control" through its Appropriations and Armed Services Committees and very particularly through the Russell-George-Saltonstall-Wiley group. The TIMES wants "closer contact with the legislative authority" because CIA is "virtually beyond the law"--which is not true since CIA is a creature of Congress. The TIMES states that "no one in the legislative branch knows whether it (CIA) is doing a good, bad or indifferent job", but of course Congress does know from the President within whose executive authority the CIA functions and it reports to and takes directions from the NSC. Congress should not invade the executive function here but accept the Chief Executive's report as to the CIA's effectiveness.

The TIMES states unequivocally that "nobody in Congress knows whether CIA competes with the work of other agencies, whether it is building up a bureaucratic empire, whether it wastes money needlessly, gets into operations where it has no business to function and whether it takes foreign policy into its own hands." That's the whole and complete case. The TIMES quickly disclaims that these are charges--they are possibilities; the TIMES is suspicious. Then, oddly, the TIMES admits that CIA has loosely carried on relations with the Congress but again says that the Congress has little understanding of CIA's work.

This is Hanson Baldwin writing. He was a member of a Task Force for the first Hoover Commission inquiry into CIA several years ago. He has been outspoken in his belief that the Agency has too many employees, compared to Britain and Israel--he never mentions the Soviet strength--and that it has too many "klucks" in its employ. He is the Shining Knight in Armor for the military and reflects anti-CIA feeling from the Pentagon; not only from G-2, he told me, but from "higher up." It would appear that no time should be lost by CIA in building up a more correct atmosphere because of the far-flung influence of the TIMES. The Washington POST and TIMES HERALD can be expected to take the same position.

A chat by the DCI with Arthur Hays Sulzberger might be fruitful. I might invite Mr. Stone of the Editorial Research Reports in to meet the Director and in the course of the conference our position in relation to the Congress could be emphasized. The ERR covers more newspapers than any other editorial service. We could let Stone know that there are more than two sides to this question and the TIMES editorial is certainly contradictory and misleading. It makes allegations and then says that these are merely possibilities and may or may not exist.

STAT

[redacted] wants to get a group together for an off-the-record dinner with the DCI. A dinner early in November could be a vehicle for re-emphasizing the CIA viewpoint.

Figure 3.5 Grogan analysed NYT coverage over a JC. He shows that Baldwin wrote one of their editorials calling for more oversight and suggested to Dulles that he meet with Sulzberger to clarify the "contractionary and misleading" article. Source: CIA, "Memorandum for the Director," October 19, 1955, CIA-RDP74-00297R000200030055-0.

Dulles depended on Sulzberger and he also counted on the President to stifle any remaining momentum for a JC. Eisenhower proposed another solution in 1956 when he established an eight-member executive board, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA). It included key figures who were involved in past and future CIA surveys such as James

Doolittle and chairman of MIT James R. Killian. CIA preferred executive oversight and were willing to share their covert operations and activities to the President's advisory group rather than risk Congressional scrutiny.³⁰¹ Executive oversight split press coverage. The *NYT* were disappointed with Eisenhower's actions and continued their support for a JC whilst the *WP* and *ES* trusted the executive groups to appropriately investigate and make adequate CIA reforms. Executive oversight was supported by Dulles and other CIA officials, including Kirkpatrick, who served as the Agency's liaison officer. Kirkpatrick stated the PBCFIA provided an efficient check on CIA and criticised opponents who remarked the board were biased in their findings on the Agency.³⁰² He earned the trust of the DCI who would later chose Kirkpatrick to head an internal investigation after the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Despite Eisenhower's efforts to divert legislators away from debating a JC, *NYT* reaffirmed their call for it. An opinion piece by Baldwin was similar in tone to his anonymous editorial back in October. He argued PBCFIA should not preclude the creation of a JC. He remarked "it is not powerful enough, or broad enough." The Mansfield proposal would allow for regular checks on CIA than "any periodic check" given by PBCFIA. "The need for such support and control should be obvious; it could mean national life or death in the atomic age." His conclusion summarised the *NYT* position, "if war is too important to be left to the generals, it should be clear that intelligence is too important to be left unsupervised."³⁰³

Editorials in the *WP* demonstrate a friendlier tone towards PBCFIA, declaring it "can perform a highly important function." Despite Wiggins' influence on the editorial board, the paper was less visceral on CIA. If the president's survey group did not interfere with covert operations, *WP* declared, it "should insure a broad check on the effectiveness of both CIA and the military intelligence agencies." But it concluded it be beneficial to oversight if "a more specific legislative link" can be found.³⁰⁴ "There is a serious question whether the authority of the committee goes far enough" the conservative *Wall Street Journal* remarked. "Surely the Congress...has a responsibility to watch carefully over an agency it created." Dulles should have no role in dictating whether his CIA is subject to Congress, another editorial concluded, "he should not be the lone judge in matters that have to do with the intentions of other nationals for war and peace."³⁰⁵

³⁰¹ Rogg, *The Spy and the State*, 285; Snider, *The Agency and the Hill*, 13-14.

³⁰² Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., *The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1973), 51-52.

³⁰³ Hanson Baldwin, "Watchdog of the C.I.A.," *NYT*, January 15, 1956, p. 24.

³⁰⁴ "Watchdog for CIA.," *WP*, January 21, 1956, p. 18.

³⁰⁵ "A Check on the Watch," *Wall Street Journal*, January 18, 1956, page unknown; "The Lone Judge," *Wall Street Journal*, January 27, 1956, page unknown.

A vote by the Senate Rules Committee in late-January ruled in favour of the Mansfield resolution despite Eisenhower's opposition. The Senate debated the bill in April 1956. Mansfield's proposal witnessed increased support in Congress. It was sponsored by thirty-four Senators, but speeches given by Richard Russell and Carl Hayden, the chairmen of the Senate's Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, had stalled the proposal and as a result it failed to garner enough votes to pass.³⁰⁶ Russell argued "it would be more desirable to abolish the CIA and close it up...than to adopt any such theory as that all Members of the Congress...are entitled to know the details of all the activities of this farflung organization." Hayden's speech warned "there must be secrets. There are men all over the world who are engaged in the service of the CIA...Are we to tell the dictators in Moscow how much money we are spending in employing these men, and where they are employed?"³⁰⁷

Russell and Hayden's speeches drew comparisons between *ES*, *WP*, and *NYT*. The *ES* supported the view that CIA received "enough supervision." It praised the chairmen in their "convincing testimony," stating how both "represent the full Congress and are in position to pass judgement on the need for and manner of expenditure of intelligence funds...there is no evident need for a broader diffusion of supervision."³⁰⁸ In contrast, *WP* opposed the statements, it is "hardly enough to keep legislators abreast of policy...we think that the principle of accountability is one that merits fuller recognition in the case of the CIA."³⁰⁹ The *NYT* were disappointed with the outcome of the Mansfield bill. An editorial said it "clearly deserved a better fate...such a committee would be of great service to the C.I.A. itself in lessening the natural Congressional and public suspicion of any secret agency."³¹⁰

The JC proposal fuelled public discussion over an issue CIA wanted to avoid: its operational secrecy. The *WP* were supportive of executive survey groups because it would avoid a public spectacle whilst maintaining oversight. However, the newspaper wanted to challenge the broader notion of executive power under Wiggins, and this resulted in a shift in the editorial position to favour Congressional oversight. The position of *NYT* did not change as it continued to argue CIA would benefit from closer oversight. CIA operational secrecy was the main concern for Baldwin and

³⁰⁶ Barrett, *The CIA and Congress*, 204.

³⁰⁷ "Stand on CIA by President is Discounted," *ES*, February 22, 1956, p. A2; Richard Fryklund, "CIA 'Beclouding Secrecy' Hit as 'Watchdog' is Voted," *ES*, February 24, 1956, p. A8; "'Secrecy Curtain' Covers CIA Flaws, Senator Hints," *WP*, April 10, 1956, p. 27; "CIA Called Better Dead than Under 'Watchdog,'" *ES*, April 11, 1956, p. A2; Senators Richard Russell Jr. (D-GA) and Carl Hayden (D-AZ) quoted in Cong. Rec., 84th Cong., 2nd sess., 1956, 102, pt. 5: 6048, 6058.

³⁰⁸ "Enough Supervision," *ES*, April 11, 1956, p. A14.

³⁰⁹ "Scrutiny for CIA," *WP*, April 11, 1956, p. 14.

³¹⁰ "Four Goose Eggs," *NYT*, April 18, 1956, p. 30.

Sulzberger over public accountability. A safer, protected Agency, they argued, under greater Congressional supervision, would be less vulnerable to public McCarthyite attacks which could unearth sensitive material and damage its operational secrecy. *ES* highlighted the advantages of establishing a JC in their opinion pieces but their editors, under the direction of Benjamin M. McKelway, opposed the measure.

McKelway met with Dulles prior and was the host of a journalism award ceremony.³¹¹ Like Sulzberger, he held a close association with Dulles. It was unsurprising that their editorial position echoed the DCI's view regarding the threat to operational secrecy if a JC was established. Despite Mansfield introducing his bill three times over three years, it failed to pass the Senate, but the Senator ignited a public discussion over CIA-Congressional oversight. The debate on the establishment of a JC continued throughout the Dulles tenure but no subsequent action was taken.³¹² Dulles was successful in guarding his CIA against further legislative checks. The DCI recognised that heightened discussion of the CIA's relationship with Congress risked exposing operational secrecy, particularly if it led to an increase in oversight. Dulles relied on executive groups and friendly Congressmen to block reform. But this failed to stem coverage over legislative oversight because it was still a significant debating point within the press. One key debate Dulles could shape more effectively, however, was the relocation of the CIA's headquarters.

The Open Secret: CIA and Langley

The construction of Langley is a monumental moment in CIA history because it firmly and physically established the Agency in American politics, culture, and society. The move was widely known and acknowledged in the press. The immense coverage it received is remarkable given CIA's supposedly secret status. Langley was an open secret that served to benefit CIA and Dulles in shaping the public debate. Its details were plastered across numerous articles, editorials, and public letters, yet the press neither revealed classified material nor unearthed CIA operational secrecy. Langley offered a unique window that satisfied public fascination because journalists covered the domestic impact of Agency security by reporting on its relocation to a large public building on the Potomac River. James Reston recalled the move to Langley brought the *NYT* closer to the WH, and the foreign-policy establishment, from gaining information by the "crumbs off embassy dinner

³¹¹ CIA, "Letter to the Honorable Allen W. Dulles from Albert Balink," March 10, 1953, CIA-RDP80R01731R001200070135-7, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01731R001200070135-7.pdf>, accessed 13th September 2023.

³¹² Enno Hobbing, "CIA: Hottest Role in the Cold War," *Esquire*, September 1, 1957, page unknown; William S. White, "Unwelcome Attention on CIA," *ES*, August 13, 1958, p. A23.

tables,” to becoming “a bureau of specialists on everything from the missiles and the budget to the social activities of the president’s wife.”³¹³

Langley received attention across the nation, but local Washington papers reported extensively on it. The *WP* featured articles highlighting the move but due to its national reach and growing emphasis on covering foreign affairs, it could not explore the evolving nature of CIA and Langley in detail. In contrast, the *ES*, a local Washington paper, could afford to devote copious amounts of information regarding CIA’s transfer to the new site.³¹⁴ *ES* reporters such as George Beveridge, who won a Pulitzer Prize in 1958 for his coverage documenting the changes in downtown DC, and William A. Millen, kept readers abreast of information involving the CIA’s move.³¹⁵

ES reported in August 1954 that the CIA were exploring the possibility of establishing a new headquarters. This was due to security concerns because the Agency were housed in numerous buildings in the Foggy Bottom area of downtown Washington.³¹⁶ The influential Doolittle Report noted in the same year that “the potential security risks inherent in such wide-spread dispersal make it essential that the Agency continue its efforts to consolidate the headquarters facilities into fewer, more adequate buildings.” Dulles considered the dilapidating, thirty-nine temporary buildings or “Tempos” as “the number one enemy target,” as agents would have to navigate these buildings sometimes holding secret documents in broad daylight.³¹⁷

The “Tempos” were built during the First and Second World War and were deemed as public eyesores with local citizen groups and reporters campaigning for their removal. They were costly to maintain, former official Richard Helms remembered, “the repairs needed repairing.”³¹⁸ The Foggy Bottom area was cited for its lack of efficiency for intelligence work by Dulles and Colonel Lawrence K. White, an ex-intelligence officer who oversaw CIA’s relocation. The DCI pushed for the Agency to be housed in a single building. These statements were evident in letters sent to Harland Bartholomew, the chairman of the regional planning authority, the National Capital Planning Commission. In 1954 plans were underway to demolish the Tempos.³¹⁹

³¹³ Reston, *Deadline*, 206.

³¹⁴ Ritchie, *Reporting from Washington*, 242.

³¹⁵ “George Beveridge of *The Evening Star*, Washington DC,” <https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/george-beveridge-0>, accessed 16th January 2025.

³¹⁶ William A. Millen, “U.S. to Keep New Buildings from Downtown Washington,” *ES*, August 1, 1954, p. A21; Anthony Leviero, “C.I.A. has a Secret but no New Home,” *NYT*, March 13, 1955, p. 82.

³¹⁷ “Report of the Special Study Group on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency,” 28.

³¹⁸ Richard Helms with William Hood, *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency* (New York: Random House, 2003), 106.

³¹⁹ CIA, “NCPC No. 1 11 March 1955 – 9 Dec. 1955,” March 11, 1955, CIA-RDP78-04506A000300010001-6, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-04506A000300010001-6.pdf>, accessed 14th September 2023.

The historian Andrew Friedman explains that Langley was chosen because of its geographic setting and the rich social life it encompassed. Dulles' penchant for celebrity and his personal connections to senior government officials and key members of the press made his decision easier. It meant he could be closer to his sister Eleanor, who lived in the McLean area. She was already well known among government officials due to her family connections and her work as a diplomat who oversaw the State Department's West Berlin aid program.³²⁰ At her bungalow she hosted private gatherings for senior CIA, government, and military officials, where discussions of foreign policy and operational planning took place. It was not only downtown D.C. where powerful figures met, the Washington suburbs also provided an ample setting to gather and discuss policy. Moving CIA into the area allowed Dulles "to spur a redesign of the landscape of power of the capital along a countrified suburban axis."³²¹

The proposed move highlighted CIA public secrecy. An *ES* front page in March 1955 reported that despite it being a "closely guarded secret," the Agency planned to relocate in Virginia. It was disclosed by Stanley Grogan that CIA was "very interested" in the site and planned to start construction in April. The Agency met with planners to discuss the installation of water and electric supply to the Langley site. *ES* noted the new structure would cost thirty-eight million to build and housed between eight to ten thousand employees. The Langley move "is bound to have a heavy impact on Fairfax County planning," and the influx of CIA employees to the area will cause "king-sized" traffic jams. Fairfax County lacked funds for road construction. It asserted that Langley could result in the immediate demolition of around forty Tempos, a move which was campaigned for and favoured by the paper.³²²

³²⁰ Larry Stevens, "The Unknown Dulles," *ES*, October 27, 1957, p. 5; Christine Hotchkiss, "The Dulles Nobody Knows," *ES*, May 10, 1959, p. 22-24.

³²¹ Andrew Friedman, *Covert Capital: Landscapes of Denial and the Making of U.S. Empire in the Suburbs of Northern Virginia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 34-42.

³²² Mary Lou Werner, "CIA Plans \$38 Million Building," *ES*, March 8, 1955, p. A1; "CIA Impact on Fairfax," *ES*, March 9, 1955, p. A24; William A. Millen, "Langley CIA Building Could Raze Tempos," *ES*, March 9, 1955, p.B.

Weather Forecast

Partly cloudy, less cold tonight, low near 20. Mostly sunny and warmer tomorrow.
(Full report on Page A-3.)

Temperatures Today:
Midnight 27 6 a.m. 33 11 a.m. 38
2 p.m. 40 8 a.m. 37
4 a.m. 28 10 a.m. 31 3 p.m. 39

An Associated Press Newspaper

The Evening Star

WITH SUNDAY MORNING EDITION

Home Delivery: Monthly \$4.00, 3 Months \$11.75, 6 Months \$21.75, 1 Year \$40.00. Single Copies 10 Cents. (In National City, Mo., \$1.00.)

1034 Year. No. 67. Phone ST. 3-5000 *** WASHINGTON, D. C., TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 1955—FIFTY-TWO PAGES.

Shad Season

The local shad season is almost here. And, says Food Editor Violet Faulkner, the fish has been considered one of the finest table delicacies. For some cooking hints see Page B-1.

New York Markets, Pages A-18-19

5 CENTS

CIA Plans \$38 Million Building Third as Large as Pentagon On Federal Property at Langley

Will House 8,000; All Units Will Be Under One Roof

By Mary Lou Warner

The Government's super-secret Central Intelligence Agency proposes to build a \$38 million headquarters building which will house 8,000 to 10,000 persons at Langley in Fairfax County, Va.

The mammoth installation—about one-third the size of the Pentagon—will consolidate the scattered offices of CIA in and around Washington.

One hundred acres that now serve the Bureau of Public Roads for highway research has been selected for the CIA office site. It is expected the project will take two years to complete.

Langley is a small town of about 2,000 persons which has been developed to house about 10,000 persons who will work there.

A spokesman for CIA said the agency was "very definitely" interested in the Langley site, but declined to say when construction there might start.

"Langley is one possibility," the spokesman said. "But we still do not have an appropriation or authority from Congress to go ahead."

The spokesman said CIA had been looking around for some time for a place to build a central headquarters and a number of sites have been considered. CIA declined to comment on the proposed site of the installation.

The work of CIA is so secret that its budget is not even disclosed to the public. The Bureau of Public Buildings is supposed to handle construction of the building.

Several Sites Considered. CIA's plans to locate somewhere in nearby Virginia have been kept closely guarded since by Government and local officials for two months. A number of sites were considered, including Halls Valley and Springfield in Fairfax County and a large tract at Shirley highway and Seminary road in Alexandria.

The Langley site was selected because the property already is owned by the Government.

The Fairfax Board of County Supervisors at a recent conference with top-level Government officials approved the Langley location, and agreed to let the agency construct a new security deposit plant which will be built on Potters Run.

It also was agreed that the city officials have promised to extend municipal water service to the site.

Reads Air A Problem. Some other problems remain to be solved. An important one is how soon CIA can get highway improvements in the area. Eventually, the George Washington Expressway will be widened to four lanes.

The "all-clear" has been initiated in view of the radio-activity fallout.

Civil Defense headquarters in Fairfax County, Va., said it would be unable to give a formal all-clear, since some areas could still be in danger.

Want Ad Opens Door To Quick Sales. After the initial remodeling by James H. E. E. came up with two sets of French doors—different from the ones in the new model. He placed an ad in the Washington Post to sell the house.

It was the first day. He was in a hurry to sell the house, so he put it up for sale. He was in a hurry to sell the house, so he put it up for sale.

It was the first day. He was in a hurry to sell the house, so he put it up for sale. He was in a hurry to sell the house, so he put it up for sale.

It was the first day. He was in a hurry to sell the house, so he put it up for sale. He was in a hurry to sell the house, so he put it up for sale.

It was the first day. He was in a hurry to sell the house, so he put it up for sale. He was in a hurry to sell the house, so he put it up for sale.

It was the first day. He was in a hurry to sell the house, so he put it up for sale. He was in a hurry to sell the house, so he put it up for sale.

Cabin John MONTGOMERY CO.

U.S. Bureau of Public Roads Research Center

Langley, Va.

Chain Bridge

FAIRFAX CO. ARLINGTON CO. D.C.

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

193

Soaring Stocks Danger Stressed By Economist

Harvard Man Asks Close U. S. Watch for Quick Intervention

By James Y. Newton

A Harvard economist said today the Government should take immediate steps to curb the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Prof. John K. Galbraith, who is a member of the Federal Reserve Board, said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Galbraith said that the stock market's rise in the early stages of the boom, lest speculation in the market become a serious problem.

Late News Bulletin

Red Cross at \$302,251

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Red Cross campaign reported today that they had collected \$302,251, or 11.5 per cent of the \$2,630,000 goal. Collections are 1.4 per cent ahead of those at the same time last year.

Eden Asks Chiang to Evacuate Troops From Coastal Islands

Report to Commons Praises U. S. and Reds For Restraint, Urges Nationalist Concessions

By Jack Jones

LONDON, Mar. 8.—Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden today called on Chiang Kai-shek to evacuate his troops from the coastal islands of the Republic of China.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Eden said that the British Government was deeply concerned by the situation in the Republic of China, and that it was essential that the Nationalist Government should take steps to bring about a settlement.

Payouts Listed By Prosecutor At Bribe Trial

Accused Policemen Arranged Payment, Troxell Tells Jury

By Jack Jones

Assistant United States Attorney Edward P. Troxell today listed a long list of bribes paid by accused policemen to various officials in the District of Columbia.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Troxell said that the bribes were paid to various officials in the District of Columbia, and that they were used to obtain various favors from the officials.

Clerk Gives Self Up After Check Sale

Amounting to \$1,500

By Jack Jones

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,500.

April 16—Anderson paid Capt. Thomas \$1,

The CIA met with the regional planning commission in March to hear the grievances its members held. The meeting was conducted secretly, and it revealed during a citizen vote that CIA requested the head of the local planning commission to withhold some details of the construction.³²³ The *ES* pointed out the decision “drew laughter when...[CIA] omitted estimates of cost, size and the number of CIA employees affected – all of which have been printed in newspapers.” The paper criticised the closed meeting and stated that whilst CIA “has the right to pull down the curtain on its super-secret operations. There is nothing super-secret...about its plan to build a large headquarters in nearby Virginia.” The meeting was “illogical,” and it was “hard to believe that...CIA revealed...its innermost secrets...yet the press and the public were excluded from the meeting, despite the desire of council officials to admit reporters...it is all right for...CIA to keep the public in the dark about its intelligence work, but the citizens of Fairfax County are entitled to more light on CIA building plans.”³²⁴

The *ES* was critical of Langley. It highlighted the concern that realtor prices and commercial development would increase due to the Agency’s presence. The paper campaigned for the rejuvenation of the D.C. area, including the removal of Tempos which it argued would restore the area’s scenic attraction, but it also stressed for the development of bridge extensions and road widening surrounding D.C., allowing for the easing of traffic congestion. One discussion point was the potential expansion of the George Washington Memorial Parkway. The *ES* supported this and argued that if CIA was going to build a “little Pentagon,” near the Potomac River, then it should not interfere with planned development on the Parkway’s extension.³²⁵

In late-March and April it was disclosed that CIA were considering other sites such as nearby Arlington, Alexandria, Maryland, and Southwest D.C. Editorials in the *ES* and *WP* reflected the papers’ opposition to Langley. Debate highlighted Cold War nuclear anxieties as both outlets preferred CIA remain in the D.C. area because the Agency would be able to respond at a quicker rate to a national emergency such as the detonation of an atomic bomb. Both added it would be meaningless for CIA to reside outside the Capital, for its location should be by the side of the national government, placed near the WH. The *WP* remarked, “the difficulties would be compounded with an agency whose prime function is to keep in intimate daily contact with the Administration...the hazards of locating...the CIA in a target area simply must be accepted.”³²⁶ The *ES* stated, “if atomic-era dispersal were a factor in choosing a new location, the CIA would not, of

³²³ George Beveridge, “Citizen Opposition Imperils CIA Use of Langley Site,” *ES*, March 11, 1955, p. A21; “CIA Building Opposed in Langley Vote,” *ES*, March 23, 1955, p. A29.

³²⁴ “More Light Needed,” *ES*, March 25, 1955, p. A16.

³²⁵ “CIA and the Parkway,” *ES*, March 28, 1955, p. A10.

³²⁶ “CIA in the Southwest,” *WP*, March 30, 1955, p. 12; “Keep CIA Here,” *WP*, April 8, 1955, p. 22.

course, be considering a site near Langley...Langley is well within the target area of an atomic or hydrogen bomb aimed at Washington.”³²⁷

Grogan noted the reasoning behind why *ES* editor Benjamin McKelway and *WP* owner Philip Graham supported the D.C. area over Langley was because “it will help the business of their big advertisers.” He states however there was a difference between the papers. The *ES* will support a move to Langley if Dulles informs McKelway he “will not waver” and pick the site despite the negotiation’s outcome with the Planning Commission. The paper’s desire to see the destruction of the remaining Tempos, Grogan explains, meant it would support a move to Langley, as long as Dulles makes his backing explicit. The *WP*, however, does not want a Langley relocation “under any and all circumstances,” as the paper’s “news columns have been slanted in reporting against Langley.”³²⁸

Dulles publicly argued CIA relocation was about security whereas in private it concerned Langley’s geographical setting. Moving out of downtown Washington was a priority for Dulles. The city was undergoing major structural changes. The *ES* was adamant that the CIA remain in the D.C. area and whilst it covered the costs of development and impact of Washington if the Agency moved, it framed the debate through the lens of a zero-sum Cold War. During the height of the atomic age, the *ES* and *WP* argued that moving the CIA out of the city hindered a national emergency response in the case of a nuclear detonation.

³²⁷ “Why Not Keep CIA Here?” *ES*, April 1, 1955, p. A18; “Good Place to Have It,” *ES*, April 5, 1955, p. A14; George Beveridge, “CIA Abandons Langley Site for New Home,” *ES*, April 8, 1955, p. B2; “Why Hunt Elsewhere?” *ES*, April 11, 1955, p. 10; “Time to Pick a Site—Here,” *ES*, April 23, 1955, p. A6.

³²⁸ CIA, “(Untitled),” January 18, 1956, CIA-RDP78-04718A002700050020-7, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-04718A002700050020-7.pdf>, accessed 15th September 2023.

Why CIA Should NOT Locate in Langley:

July 14, 1955

Mr. Allen Dulles
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

On April 7, 1955, it was publicly announced that the Central Intelligence Agency had given up any plan to construct a new headquarters in Langley, Virginia. It now appears that without any public explanation or notice CIA has reversed its position and has again been considering the Langley site. We fear that because of the secret way in which selection of a site has been handled, neither CIA nor the public may be aware of some of the serious considerations against locating CIA in Langley.

High Cost. The Langley site for a CIA building would cost taxpayers an estimated \$13,000,000 more than other sites being considered—\$8,500,000 in Federal funds for a highway, \$2,500,000 in State funds for road improvements, \$2,000,000 in County funds for utilities. In addition, according to a CIA estimate, choice of the Langley site would put off for at least three years the date when CIA could move into its new headquarters—and, as you have testified, Mr. Dulles, each year's delay costs the taxpayers \$2,900,000 in CIA's present scattered locations.

Damage to the Area. Langley is a unique rural-residential area of one-family homes, country places and farms. There are no apartment buildings. The only commercial developments in 10 miles along the road to Great Falls are two filling stations. A CIA building for an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 persons would destroy the unique character of the area. It has been estimated that the building would bring an additional 20,000 to 35,000 persons into the area, including the necessary service workers. This would mean commercial construction, mass housing and other drastic changes in a rural-residential section.

Strain on Facilities. The huge population increase induced by CIA location in Langley would be imposed on a community already coping with inadequate water, sewerage and roads. Providing water and sewerage facilities for a CIA building itself will do nothing to service the huge new population. The water table is already falling in the area; accelerated development will dry up existing wells. Again, providing a super-highway to Langley might lessen the problems of the building itself, but it would aggravate the existing congestion on other roads throughout the area. Virginia participation in improving the road from Chain Bridge to Langley would make less likely the necessary state help for other area roads. And whatever is done to the roads, Chain Bridge will remain a bottleneck.

In the words of one of the planners who has studied the proposal, Mr. Max S. Wehrly: "The particular site (Langley) proposed for this installation lies in one of the sections of Northern Virginia least able to accommodate it in terms of existing or foreseeable access, utilities and services, or its disruptive effect upon the present character and desirable future development of the area."

Loss of a Park. The proposed site at Langley is the only substantial piece of U. S. Government property on the Virginia shore above Chain Bridge. The property has meadows, forests and a mile and a half of river front overlooking the magnificent Potomac gorge. Congress has authorized the National Capital Planning Commission to take over all or most of this land for park purposes. (46 Stat. 482.) There is no reason to select this unique site and thus destroy potential park land, badly needed in Northern Virginia.

Local Opposition. The McLean Citizens Association, drawing its members from the entire area, voted to oppose location of a CIA building in Langley. Of several sites now being considered by CIA, Langley is the only one in which the local citizens association has objected.

We urge you to locate the new CIA headquarters on one of the other available sites—sites much more suitable for a large office building, and sites where CIA will be welcomed.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Lee Bird
G. Bowdoin Craighill, Jr.
Roger Fisher
Manning Gusch

Anthony Lewis
Samuel E. Neel
Walter T. Ridder
Cynthia Zimmerman



COMMISSION ON THE SITE — Members of the National Capital Planning Commission inspect forest land at Langley, Va., proposed site for the new CIA headquarters building. Left to right are District Assistant Engineer Commissioner Thomas B. Hunter, John A. Remon, Leon Zach, Harland Bartholomew, C. McKim Norton and Supt. of National Capital Parks Edward J. Kelly.—Star Staff Photo.



LOOKING NORTH—This airview shows the site favored by Central Intelligence Agency officials for an installation which will be second only to the Pentagon among Government buildings. The structures in the clearing are the

Research Station of the Bureau of Public Roads. The big CIA building will be in the woods to the right if this site is chosen. The Glen Echo amusement park can be seen to the left across the river.—Star Staff Photo.

Figure 3.7 Langley became a major point of discussion in the ES. Some of the details are shown here in a letter urging Dulles not to build at Langley from the Planning Commission, a picture of the Commission's members, and an airview of the proposed Langley site. Source: "Why the CIA Should Not Locate in Langley," ES, July 15, 1955, p. 37; George Beveridge, "CIA Director Seeks Okay on Langley Site for Agency" ES, November 4, 1955, p. 39; "Looking North," ES, December 4, 1955, p. 8.

“You’ll Hardly Know It’s There.” Choosing Langley and Laying the Cornerstone

In May 1955 the CIA narrowed their options to either build at Langley or the Winkler Tract in Alexandria. Arlington voted against the Agency’s relocation whilst Fairfax County officials were keen for CIA to build at Langley. Fairfax planning supervisors agreed to provide installations for sewage treatment to the site. Colonel White acknowledged that most Fairfax citizens and planners “wholeheartedly welcome” CIA. Dulles appeared in public Congressional sessions to outline why a new headquarters was needed. Speaking to the Senate, he highlighted the Agency’s security. Dulles publicly spoke of security in a conventional sense, one that was “suited to the 1950s, a bureaucratic, systemic notion of protection.”³²⁹ Dulles and White stressed it was vital CIA required an area within a twenty-minute access to the WH, Pentagon and State Department. Speaking to the Senate’s Armed Services Committee, Dulles requested fifty-six million dollars for construction, but a compromise was reached for forty-six with Congress granting an additional eight-and-a-half million on the condition the Tempos were demolished and the Parkway extended to accommodate a larger volume of traffic.³³⁰

It was leaked that CIA favoured Langley instead of Alexandria. The *ES* published a letter by the members of the Planning Commission to Dulles. It warned the site will cause high costs to the taxpayer, damage to the local scenery, and strain the already reduced facilities such as sewage works and road construction. Another letter was published in *ES* by the mayor of Alexandria urging CIA to move there. The area’s facilities would be adequate for the site, he writes, and it also has wide support from the local population. Despite the insistence that Alexandria was a preferable location, Dulles went ahead with Langley. This was largely due to Langley’s one-hundred-and-forty-acre land which was preferable to Alexandria’s hundred acres but the main factor, highlighted by Dulles and White, was the surrounding forest filled with tall trees.³³¹

Dulles publicly stated CIA security was fundamental in choosing Langley. He said the area’s dense forest provided vital screening from nearby public roads. Situated on government land was also a deciding factor. It was owned by the Bureau of Public Roads and the forest was owned by the National Park Service. The area could be expanded and covered in the event of a national

³²⁹ “CIA ‘Invasion’ Plan Opposed,” *ES*, May 1, 1955, p. A34; “Fairfax Board Invites CIA to Build at Langley,” *ES*, May 5, 1955, p. B1; Friedman, *Covert Capital*, 47.

³³⁰ “Virginia Offers CIA Road Plan,” *ES*, June 2, 1955, p. A39; William A. Millen, “20-Minute Factor Vital in CIA Building Site,” *ES*, May 11, 1955, p. A25; “\$56 Million Asked for CIA Building,” *ES*, June 8, 1955, p. C16; “\$46 Million Set for CIA Center,” *ES*, July 7, 1955, p. B2; CIA, “NCPC No. 1 11 March 1955 – 9 Dec. 1955.”

³³¹ Alex R. Preston, “CIA Officially Proposes Langley as Building Site,” *ES*, July 15, 1955, p. 1; “Why CIA Should Not Locate in Langley,” *ES*; “Why CIA Should Locate in Alexandria,” *ES*, July 15, 1955, p. 37.

emergency, and it would not attract commercial development unlike the Winkler Tract in Alexandria. The DCI recognised the advantages of the Parkway in alleviating traffic congestion for his commuting employees. The reaction to Langley as CIA's preferred location led to press coverage. Reiterating their desire for the Agency to locate in southwest Washington, the *ES* remarked that Langley is not security related.³³²

"Since there is no indication that CIA considers the Washington Metropolitan Area unsafe in the atomic era...the security issue is not involved." It would not cost CIA additional funds for constructing facilities, *ES* claimed, if it relocated to the D.C. area as all the required facilities are already there.³³³ Members of the public wrote to *WP* to highlight other locations CIA could be situated that benefitted its security. One reader suggested the estate of the former Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles. The area is "within a 24-minute radius of the White House and...affords a perfect location with respect to evacuation in the event of emergency." Whilst another reader argued for the Winkler Tract site stating, "from a security standpoint," CIA "could have the river on one side and parkways on other sides. It would be nearer the Pentagon and Washington than Langley is."³³⁴

By the time Dulles arranged a meeting with the Planning Commission in November, the DCI already decided on Langley. In an interview with *ES*, Dulles repeated his rhetoric, ensuring that CIA security was a priority in selecting a new headquarters. "I know we need it badly...we're scattered around in temporary buildings...the buildings were supposed to fall down...in about five years, but here they are—and we're still working in them." In publicly backing Langley, Dulles asserted he wants "a model office building." After asking for clarification, he replied "I'm going to put the building a little outside of Washington. I'm going to put it...in a park area where there can be plenty of space for cars."³³⁵

The DCI was referring to his preferred model of a campus-style building that imitated design structures of major corporations and scholarly institutions. At the heart of his public statements on security, the DCI argued that CIA staff would not need to leave the Langley site if all amenities were available on-site such as car parking and lunch cafeterias. He said in a letter to Bartholomew, it would alleviate traffic congestion throughout the day and keep CIA employees situated at Langley. It

³³² George Beveridge, "Planners Delay Decision on Site for CIA," *ES*, August 5, 1955, p. A19; CIA, "NCPC No. 1 11 March 1955 – 9 Dec. 1955,"; Friedman, *Covert Capital*, 53-54.

³³³ "Why Not Stay Here?" *ES*, July 24th, 1955, p. A26.

³³⁴ Bernard S. Glassman, "CIA Suggestion," *WP*, July 27, 1955, p. 12; Hyman J. Cohen, "New Site for CIA," *WP*, September 6, 1955, p. 26.

³³⁵ "Tension in Mid-East Highly Dangerous, CIA Chief Declares," *ES*, November 13, 1955, p. A27.

became a unique selling point for Dulles to make when he appeared before the Planning Commission.³³⁶

The *WP* continued their opposition to Langley. Public debate highlighted other locations for CIA. Proposing the Alexandria site, *WP* stated the construction of a CIA headquarters would ruin the scenic suburban area along the Potomac. Langley is “one of the few remaining park-like retreats...this is as important in its way to the character of Washington.” In replies to the editorial, readers wrote in to argue CIA should relocate to a smaller site, rather than “the present extraordinary set-up,” and the National Park Service should focus on forest preservation instead of granting CIA a new home, the “Langley plan can only be explained as an unrealistic whim in the higher reaches of officialdom.”³³⁷

The paper urged Congress question the architectural firm who consulted on behalf of CIA, Clarke and Rapuano. It stated the company’s explanation behind the selection of Langley “makes some highly unusual reading.” *WP* queried the decision not to pick the Alexandria site. The “waggish suggestion” put forward by the CIA argued that drivers on the roads near Langley “might be able to gaze into CIA’s windows (and, we presume, to read supersecret documents by the use of telescopic windshields).” The debate over housing the Agency drew in public response. A reader commented that placing CIA in Langley’s wooded area will not guarantee security. The discussion should not be about choosing a secure location, but the ability for CIA to be able to recruit employees who are not security risks. It concluded “it may be that Mr. Dulles selected Langley merely because he wants to have his agency located on that beautiful site above the Potomac.”³³⁸

By early-December the *WP* were concerned that Langley would go ahead. It implied the CIA were forcing the proceedings through the Planning Commission to get it approved quickly. “Is it not time to end this absurd situation in which the CIA pushes around all sound planning...from Washington?” The paper urged the commission to oppose construction. It reiterated CIA would not be safe at Langley if an atomic attack occurred. “Dispersal...meaning that CIA employees might be far enough away to avoid being vaporized by a nuclear blast but not far enough to avoid being maimed or irradiated—would be a complete sham.” Concern over Langley grew so intense that *WP* even

³³⁶ George Beveridge, “Langley Site Seen Favored for CIA Center,” *ES*, November 3, 1955, p. A29; Beveridge, “CIA Director Seeks Okay,” *ES*; CIA, “Memo for Mr. Dulles from L. K. White,” March 3, 1956, CIA-RDP80B01676R001100080005-9, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R001100080005-9.pdf>, accessed 14th September 2023; Friedman, *Covert Capital*, 60-63.

³³⁷ “Leave Langley Alone,” *WP*, November 4, 1955, p. 20; Peter Visser, “Letters to the Editor,” *WP*, November 10, 1955, p. 18; Neil Phillips, “Langley and CIA,” *WP*, November 14, 1955, p. 20.

³³⁸ “The View from CIA,” *WP*, November 22, 1955, p. 22; W. R. Morgan, “Letter to the Editor,” *WP*, November 26, 1955, p. 18.

suggested the Agency remain at their current location in Foggy Bottom. It preferred the preservation of Tempos rather than the site on the Potomac. The editorial's rhetoric caught the attention of a reader who accused the paper of failing to be objective. Describing himself as a native Virginian, he said he welcomed CIA's proposed move, considering it a "patriotic honor."³³⁹

The growing coverage of the CIA's move led to numerous public letters in the *ES*. These opinions ranging from residents, economists, and members of citizen groups focused on the impact to the local scenery. Replies to an editorial that warned "undesirable changes" would occur regardless of CIA's relocation also highlighted issues over road and bridge development, and there was broad agreement that CIA would exacerbate prolonged traffic jams and congestion. Occasional pro-Langley letters hoped that the new headquarters would quicken road improvements and the Parkway's development. The public statements Dulles issued regarding a modern campus-style was received favourably by one reader who stated, "I think it is about time for Government employees to be released from the Pentagonian monstrosities...and to be given pleasant working surroundings," whilst another reader complained that Langley will "naturally close out the general public and...will not endear his [Dulles] agency to the people of this country."³⁴⁰

³³⁹ "Anywhere But Langley," *WP*, December 7, 1955, p. 16; Richard R. Payne, "CIA and Langley," *WP*, December 12, 1955, p. 10; "A Home for CIA," *WP*, December 16, 1955, p. 20.

³⁴⁰ "C.I.A. and the Langley Site," *ES*, November 9, 1955, p. A22; E. P. Schmidt, "Site for C.I.A.," *ES*, November 14, 1955, p. A14; Miles L. Colean, "CIA Site," *ES*, November 24, 1955, p. A30; Maj. Gen. U.S. Grant 3d, "CIA Site," *ES*, November 25, 1955, p. A14; Grace Kempton, "Site for CIA," *ES*, December 3, 1955, p. A5; Grace H. Griffith, "Site for CIA," *ES*, December 3, 1955, p. A5; Mrs. William H. Laughlin, "Also Welcomes CIA," *ES*, December 12, 1955, p. A12; G. D. C., "CIA Site," *ES*, December 14, 1955, p. A30; Jane Lane, "Factor in CIA Site," *ES*, December 17, 1955, p. A4.

On 17 December, in a vote of six-to-five the Planning Commission rejected the Langley site.³⁴¹ Dulles wrote to Bartholomew to express his disappointment with the result. "This proposed development of ours at Langley is not an ordinary type that planners may place in a category." He proclaimed Langley was the preferred choice for the CIA and there would be no inclination of a move into the downtown area. Dulles argued against the Planning Commission's report that stated the CIA's move would disrupt the local community. He reiterated his *ES* interview and assured Bartholomew that Agency employees would have no contact with the residential community because of the available car parking and lunch cafeterias on-site. As noted in the numerous letters sent to *WP* and *ES*, Dulles stressed that funds would be available for development of the Memorial Parkway if the site was approved.³⁴²

Despite an *WP* editorial urging the planning commission to request another site immediately, in February 1956 the commission reversed its decision and approved Langley.³⁴³ In their final report published in March, the commission remarked that the January letter sent by Dulles had shifted the commission's vote to approve Langley. Specifically, the report points to the DCI's statements that he was not free to select a site in downtown DC and avowed to improve CIA security. It noted "that by virtue of emergency measures already taken it is important to him to locate on the west side of the Potomac River." Dulles may have influenced the outcome, but incremental changes in the Commission's membership helped to sway the vote. One who abstained and another who voted against were replaced by two supporters of the site.³⁴⁴ "By a strange coincidence," a Congressman noted, "CIA requested a reconsideration of its proposal" and the Langley site was approved in a 7 to 5 vote.³⁴⁵

The role of Dulles was instrumental in the Langley site. He used public secrecy to obtain approval. On the one hand he argued his case for it in public speeches and statements. He openly discussed the practicalities of building Langley such as the need for car parking, cafeterias, and funds for the Parkway. On the other he stressed that CIA needed to locate its new headquarters away from the city, away from public roads and prying eyes. The Agency was still a covert arm of the government, he argued, and needed to withdraw from sight. Preserving the rustic rural setting was a priority for Dulles, as "the cloaks and daggers will all be lost in the trees."³⁴⁶

³⁴¹ "Capitol Planners Reject C.I.A. Site;," *WP*, December 17, 1955, p. 13.

³⁴² CIA, "Memo for Mr. Dulles from L. K. White," March 3, 1956.

³⁴³ "Find CIA a Home," *WP*, February 1, 1956, p. 12; "CIA to Build at Langley with Planners' Blessing," *ES*, February 3, 1956, p. A4.

³⁴⁴ CIA, "Memo for Mr. Dulles from L. K. White," March 3, 1956.

³⁴⁵ Representative Frank Thompson, Jr. (D-NJ) quoted in Cong. Rec., 84th Cong., 2nd sess., 102, pt. 10, 13615.

³⁴⁶ "Virginia Trees to Sequester Cloak-and-Dagger Lair," *ES*, July 21, 1957, p. A13; Friedman, *Covert Capital*, 52.

Shortly after news broke that Langley was accepted as the new site, editorials scrutinised the decision. CIA obtaining Langley “reflects the disorganized planning in the Capital area,” it will become “contagious...to Federal agencies for building their headquarters, many will seek to take advantage of the privilege,” *WP* warned. Whilst it remarked that proposed developments to the Parkway from funds given to the CIA site “is desirable,” there must be no exception made for the Agency in restricting further development along the Potomac.³⁴⁷ *ES* questioned the Commission’s sudden reversal, it “adds confusion to a thoroughly confusing picture...it is all rather bewildering.” The resulting close seven-five vote “will encourage opponents of the CIA invasion of Langley to continue their fight—perhaps at the Capitol.”³⁴⁸

Speaking to the local McLean Lions Club in 1957, Colonel White assured members that the new “attractive” CIA headquarters will not disturb the community. He said due to the site’s convenience, employees will not have to travel constantly between local residential areas. He told members that contracts were underway for the development of the Parkway, and CIA will be able to save funds for the Washington area because it will be able to centralise operations.³⁴⁹ Dulles also travelled to Fairfax County to speak with local citizens. In an informal speech and dinner to residents he declared, “you’ll hardly know its there. It certainly isn’t going to be any Pentagon. We are known as the quiet service.”³⁵⁰

Placing all employees under one roof invited questions regarding how many employees CIA had. When asked this in a public Congressional session, Dulles said that the Agency could not reveal such information. *ES* remarked the number of CIA employees could be deciphered from publicly available information involving the schematics for the Langley headquarters that were openly discussed by Dulles in an earlier Congressional session.³⁵¹ Fortunately for the Agency, the number of employees were only estimated and not certain figures, but it demonstrates that CIA’s battle with publicity in this scenario resembles the experiences of the AEC. It similarly treaded a fine line between secrecy and the growing public interest of their work, often resulting in disputes over misinformation.³⁵²

³⁴⁷ “Exception for CIA,” *WP*, February 4, 1956, p. 14.

³⁴⁸ “Planning Somersault,” *ES*, February 4, 1956, p. A4.

³⁴⁹ “‘Austere’ CIA Home Forecast,” *ES*, January 18, 1957, p. B17.

³⁵⁰ “CIA to be Good Neighbour, Dulles Assures Fairfax,” *ES*, May 9, 1957, p. B3; “Dulles Pledges CIA Will Fit In,” *WP*, May 9, 1957.

³⁵¹ David Barnett, “‘Secret’ of CIA Bared by Simple Arithmetic,” *ES*, July 19, 1956, p. 1; Jack Jonas, “CIA Recovers After a Fumble,” *ES*, July 25, 1956, p. B2.

³⁵² Wellerstein, *Restricted Data*, 10.

Reporters could only make guesswork from the snippets of public information they received regarding Langley. The move aided the rejuvenation of public roads and bridges in the Washington suburbs. Congress voted to provide funds to the area and contracts were approved to extend the Parkway. The demolition of Tempos was delayed because CIA continued to occupy them until Langley was operational in 1962, and concerns persisted over the lack of investment in the Northern Virginia area.³⁵³ The final touches were made to the site in 1959. Dulles wanted Langley to be his own and included a motto that was etched onto the building's stone indefinitely. He chose the Biblical passage "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." Dulles contacted the pious Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, who mentioned the verse in a magazine article and expressed his intention to place the inscription at Langley. "It has always been my purpose to use this quotation prominently...it seems to me particularly appropriate for the work that I am doing."³⁵⁴

To celebrate Langley, CIA would be "getting ready for the biggest public splash in its thirteen-year history" on 3 November 1959.³⁵⁵ The PR event was orchestrated to show Langley as an open secret. Dulles wanted a "formal ceremony, with full protocol and publicity." He planned to give a speech to commemorate the occasion and urged President Eisenhower to lay the building's cornerstone and speak at the ceremony.³⁵⁶ To prepare for such a momentous event, officials sent recommendations to both the DCI and the President's speeches. Officials wanted the speeches to showcase CIA as a formidable new institution firmly rooted in recent U.S. history. Kirkpatrick urged Dulles to highlight the significance of Langley. Mentioning the existence of a "permanent building," will demonstrate that intelligence "has achieved a permanent role in the United States Government." The speech provides an opportunity to cultivate a positive public image, Kirkpatrick insisted. It should proclaim that the CIA's work largely consists of "coordination and...research," rather than covert operations, that is "usually prominent in the public mind." He urged Dulles to state that Langley will not interfere in the suburban area, adding, "we hope it will bring nothing but good."³⁵⁷

Grogan advised Dulles to revise some passages to invoke a patriotic rhetoric. Modifications were proposed such as changing the line "The Agency grew out of our World War II experience," to "America's World War II experience." Another proposition was to clarify the DCI's point on CIA

³⁵³ "Parkway Right-of-Way to Great Falls Pledged," *ES*, February 7, 1957, p. B2; "Lack of Planning Called Peril to Northern Virginia," *ES*, February 19, 1957, p. B3; George Beveridge, "A Primer on That Aging 'Bridge Problem,'" *ES*, February 24, 1957, p. B4; "Contract Awarded for 3 Bridges on Parkway Extension," *ES*, March 22, 1957, p. A7; "'Tempo' Demolition Plan Unchanged, Officials Say," *ES*, April 7, 1957, p. B23.

³⁵⁴ "Dear Ezra," February 7, 1959, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 6, Folder 8.

³⁵⁵ "Hush-Hush C.I.A. to Indulge in its First Publicity Splash," *NYT*, October 25, 1959, p. 33.

³⁵⁶ Peter Grose, *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), 468.

³⁵⁷ "MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director," October 1959, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 36, Folder 13.

domestic powers. Dulles initially said that the National Security Act wisely omitted the Agency from having “internal security functions or police powers. However, the scope of the jurisdiction granted is ample.” Grogan recommended that Dulles rewrite the passage to reiterate that CIA has no internal security powers. He feared the mention of domestic powers would revive past Gestapo criticisms and scrutiny. It would inevitably come to haunt the Agency fifteen years later.³⁵⁸

Filled with patriotism and pageantry, the cornerstone ceremony was designed by Dulles to portray the new headquarters as a place of prolonged sustainability. Kirkpatrick proposed the President make references to Langley that signified U.S. intelligence now held profound influence and a firm foothold within the government because of the CIA. Kirkpatrick wanted it known that the Agency was the pinnacle of intelligence professionalisation. In the context of a zero-sum Cold War, where national defence was vital, CIA’s professionalism and expertise as an intelligence outfit protected the nation. These recommendations were added as the President laid the cornerstone.³⁵⁹ Dulles invited reporters including several who either wrote about CIA or were personal friends of the DCI. He hoped to showcase CIA’s rising prominence amongst friends and critics alike. The list included *ES*’s George Beveridge, Constantine Brown, and Benjamin McKelway, *WP*’s Russell Wiggins and Phil Graham, *NYT*’s James Reston and Arthur Krock, *CT*’s Walter Trohan, and columnists Joseph Alsop, Walter Lippmann and Drew Pearson. Speaking to them, Eisenhower declared, “on this spot will rise a beautiful and useful structure. May it long endure, to serve the cause of peace.”³⁶⁰

³⁵⁸ “MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR,” October 26, 1959, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 30, Folder 1; “MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR,” October 29, 1959, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 30, Folder 1.

³⁵⁹ “MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director,” October 1959, Dulles Papers, 1845-1971, Series 1, Box 36, Folder 13; Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Remarks at the Cornerstone-Laying Ceremony for the Central Intelligence Agency Building, Langley, Virginia,” November 3, 1959, *The American Presidency Project*, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-cornerstone-laying-ceremony-for-the-central-intelligence-agency-building>; Friedman, *Covert Capital*, 65-67.

³⁶⁰ CIA, “Proposed List of Invited Guests for Cornerstone Ceremony,” October 9, 1959, CIA-RDP78-04506A000100030118-4, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-04506A000100030118-4.pdf>, accessed 14th July 2023; “President Lays Stone, Says CIA Helps Peace,” *ES*, November 3, 1959, p. 1.




Figure 3.9 The cornerstone ceremony was a PR event the CIA used to show they had a new “home” and were now an entrenched organisation within the U.S. government. Images show Eisenhower’s speech at Langley, laying the cornerstone next to Dulles, and an official signed document of the event. *Source:* “50 Years in Langley,” 4-5; J.J. Green, “How the CIA Headquarters Broke New Ground in Langley, Va.,” *WTOP News*, October 31, 2014, <https://wtop.com/j-j-green-national/2014/10/how-the-cia-headquarters-broke-ground-in-langley-va/>.

The move to Langley echoed the changes in the Washington area. From urban renewal in removing the Templos, to broader social changes, D.C. experienced a rapid population growth that caused concern for potential traffic jams which in turn fuelled criticism for the CIA’s new location. The Agency’s move to Fairfax resembled a broader economic shift within the county. It changed from a quiet rural area into a bustling Washington suburb interconnected to the city centre. The headquarters impacted local political life as Fairfax saw its Democratic grip loosen with the election of three Republicans, one was voted in solely for his opposition to the Langley site. Other federal

organisations such as the AEC joined in the exodus from downtown Washington to the suburbs. The allure of downtown D.C. as an effective place of government efficiency had vanished by the end of the 1950s.³⁶¹

Rather than the openness of Foggy Bottom where secret documents were handled in plain sight, Langley symbolised an open secret, a visible periphery between publicity and secrecy. Its physical appearance and location were easily identifiable from the coverage it received. However, Langley served as a place where covert operations were planned, and in the conventional sense of concealing intelligence methods, required a high level of security. Reporters came to regard Langley as a seismic event which they questioned the Agency's standing in American democracy. They saw the new building as a phase of crucial development for CIA, and as one *NYT* reporter noted, Langley had "brought out of official hiding an important Federal agency."³⁶²

No longer was the CIA a young intelligence organisation, it was now a functioning arm of the U.S. government. The physical appearance of Langley meant reporters could connect the building to CIA's status, whereas the various dilapidated buildings at Foggy Bottom harboured no focal point where reporters could hone their questions regarding CIA secrecy. "Despite the secrecy," the *SLPD* reporter Marquis Childs remarked, "there is one public clue to the number of employees...two parking lots...will provide for 3000 cars."³⁶³ The "existence of such a large organization," *WP* declared, "with many of its operations in the secret category, raises some perplexing questions for diplomacy and some philosophical questions for democratic theory."³⁶⁴

From the McCarthy attacks in 1953 to the cornerstone laying at Langley in 1959, press coverage centred around the concept of security. As this chapter explores, the interpretation of security resulted in a fierce protection of CIA operational secrecy. Because the Agency was only six years old at the time McCarthy accused it of harbouring communists, press reaction was raw in its defence of the young organisation against the Senator. It aided the Agency that most journalists already despised McCarthy. It was also fortunate that the popular Allen Dulles took over the same year. His public appearances, close connections to reporters, and strong relationship with Eisenhower hindered any ground McCarthy might have made in his CIA attacks.

³⁶¹ Mary Lou Werner, "Three Republicans Break Fairfax Democratic Grip," *ES*, November 9, 1955, p. 25; George Beveridge, "The City's Growing Pains Lead into a New Era," *ES*, December 27, 1959, p. B4.

³⁶² Felix Belair Jr., "President Hails Heroes of C.I.A.," *NYT*, November 4, 1959, p. 30.

³⁶³ Childs, "Great Expansion of Secret CIA Emphasized by Its New Building," *SLPD*.

³⁶⁴ "Eyes and Ears," *WP*, November 4, 1959, p. A18.

The chapter argues that public secrecy is essential to understanding why officials and the press defended CIA operational secrecy. Dulles and Grogan were key in driving this deliberate approach to cultivate a positive public image. The DCI shaped public debate by detailing certain aspects of his Agency he wanted to disclose whilst withholding information that he deemed would incite questions over its intelligence effectiveness or statutory authority. Grogan aided the DCI's efforts by expanding CIA's capabilities at surveying press coverage. He maintained a list of press contacts and recommended who were the most influential figures for Dulles to talk too to effectively enact their PR strategy.

Newspapers discussed public secrecy as they began to call for a JC to offset McCarthyite investigations. They argued the publicity surrounding these investigations would unearth critical CIA secrets. Only oversight conducted by a responsible, hidden group of legislators could maintain CIA secrecy. Press coverage shifted from instant protection in the face of McCarthy towards accommodating a broader discussion involving CIA secrecy and accountability amidst moderate Congressional reforms. Except *NYT*, who consistently supported closer supervision, other papers were not criticising, but highlighting, the CIA-Congress relationship.

The construction of Langley was profoundly linked to the theme of public secrecy. Despite its apparent secret status, CIA's relocation attracted immense press coverage. It was a large, loud project that required wider public rejuvenation in the area such as the rerouting of traffic, road widening, bridge-building, the installation of electric, water and sewage treatment. CIA could not hope to keep eager reporters away as the location provided a focal point for them to hone their questions regarding the Agency. Press coverage highlighted CIA's spatial dynamics. The public debate featured discussions over national security concerns such as emergency procedures if an atomic bomb impacted Washington.

Langley showed CIA's emerging role within the U.S. government, but it also symbolised the public nature of the Agency, for it had to adapt to reporters highlighting its massive structure along the Potomac River. CIA was now out in the open and vulnerable to domestic and foreign criticism. From McCarthy to Langley, the Agency was a young organisation, and the press were adamant in protecting its secrecy. But debates soon turned to highlighting its secrecy as CIA would face its biggest PR test yet after the Bay of Pigs. Agency officials recognised that maintaining the institution's secrecy meant continuing the work Dulles and Grogan established in assessing its press coverage.

3. Maintaining Headlines: Positive Public Discussions after the Bay of Pigs

"We have, by our peculiar genius for bad-taste publicity, made the CIA into something it was not supposed to be, and it should not be. It ought to have remained a secret agency. Its existence could not have been unknown, but it very well could, and should, have remained undiscussed." - *Ralph McGill, 1961* ³⁶⁵

"The C.I.A., more than any other single agency, represents the dilemma modern America faces in a world where it proclaims the Democratic ethic but where the consequences of nuclear miscalculation and surprise are intolerable." - *Ben H. Bagdikian, 1963* ³⁶⁶

"Experience has demonstrated that it is impossible to prevent the information media from acquiring knowledge of the Agency's activities." - *Anonymous CIA Official, 1966* ³⁶⁷

The 1961 Bay of Pigs led to broader CIA coverage from the press. Scholars argue the event was a turning point as CIA faced press and Congressional criticism that questioned its compatibility with American democracy. The Agency became a "lightning rod for the public's wider anxieties regarding US government secrecy."³⁶⁸ Columnists such as Drew Pearson and Arthur Krock were critical of it. *ES* popular foreign affairs reporter and Agency defender Constantine Brown even joined the anti-CIA rhetoric. Its secrecy "can all too easily get out of hand...when the supersleuths begin to make their own policy...they begin to become a government within a government." CIA could not block the arrival of critical books including Andrew Tully's *CIA: The Inside Story*, and David Wise and Thomas B. Ross's critical *The Invisible Government*. Members of Congress also sought CIA oversight. Congressmen John V. Lindsay, Eugene McCarthy and J. William Fulbright rejuvenated Mike Mansfield's JC proposal that had gained support from *NYT*, *WP*, and *SLPD*.³⁶⁹

This chapter argues that this period reflected greater continuity in CIA-press relations. The Bay of Pigs heightened public attention on CIA, and the press probed into it, but secrecy continued to be a hallmark of the Agency's activities because it was now an embedded institution within the U.S. government. Its completed move to a new forty-six million headquarters in the Washington

³⁶⁵ Ralph McGill, "CIA Held Too Well Publicized," *ES*, April 26, 1961, p. 22.

³⁶⁶ Ben H. Bagdikian, "Unsecretive Report on the C.I.A.," *NYT*, October 27, 1963, p. 208.

³⁶⁷ CIA, "Memorandum for: Deputy Director for Support from Richard Helms," May 24, 1966, CIA-RDP84-00780R001500050039-1.

³⁶⁸ Richard Aldrich, "CIA History as a Cold War Battleground: The Forgotten First Wave of Agency Narratives," in *Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography Since 1945*, ed. Christopher R. Moran and Christopher J. Murphy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 19-21; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 87; Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer*, 233-234; Willmetts, "The Burgeoning Fissures of Dissent," 171.

³⁶⁹ Drew Pearson, "No One Holds CIA Pursestrings," *WP*, May 10, 1961, p. D15; Arthur Krock, "A Check on the C.I.A. That Worked Well," *NYT*, April 25, 1961, p. 34; Constantine Brown, "Cuban Picture Not All Black," *ES*, May 6, 1961, p. 9.

suburbs demonstrated that CIA was now a prominent organisation. The construction of Langley shows that it was not withdrawing from the public spotlight, it was here to stay. It became a public celebrity, and its visibility meant it had to continue engaging with the press. CIA did not hide behind the cloak of secrecy; instead, it grew obsessed with its public image. The Bay of Pigs led to reform including the resignation of Allen Dulles, but the Agency persisted in surveying press coverage. There was a concerted internal effort to expand Stanley Grogan's press clipping service under the new DCI John McCone, as CIA attempted to stay ahead of critical material. Dulles, now a private citizen, contributed to the Agency's effort in shaping public debate but soon discovered he did not have the same influence he once did as DCI.

CIA public secrecy continued to influence what the press published, and mainstream outlets aided the organisation in preserving secrecy because they never questioned its existence. They maintained a rigid defence of its intelligence collection capabilities as they argued secrecy was necessary in the Cold War effort. But occasionally public secrecy went too far, and officials became concerned that maintaining public fascination about CIA could lead to security issues or increased press scrutiny. Public access to the new Langley site, traffic congestion, travel to the site, and highway signs were all cited by officials as risks compromising the Agency's secretive nature. Likewise, the release of critical CIA books, such as *The Invisible Government*, prompted swift action from officials who bemoaned that too much CIA material was in the public domain, and could instigate entrenched press criticism.

Press Reaction to the Bay of Pigs

Reporters adopted a sympathetic rhetoric aimed at diverting criticism after the Bay of Pigs as the mainstream press argued CIA was a necessary intelligence outfit in the Cold War. Initially, the press did not acknowledge the operation took place. But when it could no longer be contained, journalists grappled with the notion of self-censorship and began to extensively report on the event. "The official line in Washington was that this was a 'secret' operation, but it was about as secret as opening day in Yankee Stadium," declared James Reston in *NYT* on 26 April 1961. A week after the Bay of Pigs operation, Reston notes that the failed Cuba invasion became public knowledge long before it was implemented.³⁷⁰ In January, *NYT* reported the training of exiles in Guatemala who were opposed to Cuba's leader, Fidel Castro.³⁷¹ The paper's foreign affairs correspondent, Tad Szulc reported in Miami in early-April that training camps were being used in Florida. He recalled the "men

³⁷⁰ James Reston, "Washington: The Arts of Black Magic and the Press," *NYT*, April 26, 1961, p. 38.

³⁷¹ Paul P. Kennedy, "U.S. Helps Train an Anti-Castro Force at Secret Guatemalan Air-Ground Base," *NYT*, January 10, 1961, p. 1.

IN TODAY'S ISSUE: THE ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL TRADE REVIEW AND FORECASTS

The New York Times.

U. S. Weather Bureau Report (Page 34) forecasts
Fair, not so cold today,
tonight and tomorrow.
Temp. range: 35—14; yesterday: 29—19

© 1961 by The New York Times Company.

NEW YORK, TUESDAY, JANUARY 10, 1961

10 cents beyond 50-mile zone from New York City

FIVE CENTS

NEW FRENCH MOVE FOR EARLY PEACE IN ALGERIA IS SEEN

PRESIDENT IS SATISFIED

The New York Times Jan. 10, 1961
Guatemala is building her military strength at a U. S.-equipped base at Retalhuleu (1) in anticipation of an

Special to The New York Times.

**4 Cuban Diplomats
Ask Asylum in U. S.
After Break in Ties**

Downloaded from <http://ajphaphysocpharm.sagepub.com/> at 10:06 11 November 2014

reported to be bitter, discouraging.

By E. W. KENWORTHY 1,500 Trees Are Welcomed

Special to The New York Times.

fact that fewer than 20 per

When the United States

By PAUL HOFMANN
Special to The New York Times

of these Europeans into a
awareness of their isolat

requested that Cuba withdraw National Army supporting Patrice Lumumba, the imprisoned

requested that Cuba withdraw National Army supporting Patrice Lumumba, the imprisoned

Final figures on the ballot in France and Algeria show

involved was 101, of whom only

involved was 101, of whom only

ballots amounted to 2.4 per cent. The combined abstention rate

ates had requested that they

ates had requested that they

re. ter | dent's policy and 24.7 per c

According to unconfirmed information reaching here, 1,2

According to unconfirmed information reaching here, 1,2

President's proposal to g

110

The aim of the Bay of Pigs was to stifle communist influence in Cuba. Its proximity was a concern for officials. CIA trained and funded anti-Castro rebels whilst the Eisenhower and JFK administrations attempted to distance broader U.S. involvement. However, pressure to continue led to a recall on military action. JFK reduced air support and eventually cancelled air strikes. The absence of air cover resulted in a humiliating defeat and surrender for the Cuban anti-Castro Brigade 2506. CIA involvement was confirmed by Szulc's source in Miami, but the *NYT* refused to disclose any connection to the Agency in the days leading up to the invasion.³⁷³ *NYT* editor Turner Catledge took the decision to withhold details of the operation because he disputed Szulc's prediction that the invasion was "imminent," and orchestrated by CIA. Broadly, refusal to publish the story stemmed from an act of self-censorship because editors and publishers felt an obligation to suppress information relating to national security.³⁷⁴

Arthur Hays Sulzberger's successor and de facto publisher, Orvil Dryfoos, wanted to avoid the story altogether. In a "continuing gentlemen's agreement," DCI Allen Dulles urged Reston to not publish any information containing CIA involvement. He also met with Szulc and attempted to persuade him to do the same, but the reporter declined and persevered to get *NYT* editors to include CIA in his scoop. The uncertainty surrounding publication led the paper to withhold any acknowledgment that the Agency was training, funding, and directing the operation.³⁷⁵ "If the press had used its freedom," remarked Reston, "it might have been influential even in the White House."³⁷⁶

The *WP* and *ES* followed the government line by withholding coverage. It was not until a day after the initial landings that *WP*'s national security correspondent, Chalmers M. Roberts, confirmed the U.S. government was involved.³⁷⁷ *WP* "performed miserably," Roberts recalled. Not only did it fail to send reporters to Miami, but critical articles were pulled by Philip Graham, a move not questioned by the apparent crusader of press freedom, Russell Wiggins, as both supported the operation.³⁷⁸ An editorial defended it and CIA's role was not disclosed until 23 April.³⁷⁹ Similarly, the *ES* did not mention CIA's involvement until subsequent investigations into why the operation failed

³⁷³ Aldrich, "American Journalism," 195-197; Ranelagh, *The Agency*, 364-369; Immerman, *The Hidden Hand*, 54; Willmetts, "The Burgeoning Fissures of Dissent," 168.

³⁷⁴ Catledge, *My Life and the Times*, 261-262; Reston, *Deadline*, 325.

³⁷⁵ Salisbury, *Without Fear or Favor*, 149-150; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 81-82; McGarr, *City of Newsmen*, 207-210.

³⁷⁶ James Reston, "The President and the Press," *NYT*, May 10, 1961, p. 44

³⁷⁷ Chalmers M. Roberts, "U.S. Deeply Involved in Cuba Outcome," *WP*, April 18, 1961, p. A15; Chalmers M. Roberts, "Cuba is Forerunner of Many Explosions," *WP*, April 23, 1961, p. A20.

³⁷⁸ Roberts, *In the Shadow of Power*, 349-350.

³⁷⁹ "The Crisis in Perspective," *WP*, April 22, 1961, p. A10.

were underway.³⁸⁰ Connections between the JFK administration and Washington outlets represented the political culture in D.C., as David Halberstam notes, “the government’s norms were more sacred in Washington.”³⁸¹ *ES* loyalty to JFK was shown in the “seventeen pages of articles, photographs, and words devoted to his inauguration.”³⁸²

The *NYT* included CIA connection with the Bay of Pigs operation as Szulc remarked five days after the initial landings, this “has been an open secret in Florida and Central America for months...the C.I.A. planned, coordinated and directed the operations that ended in the defeat on a beachhead in southern Cuba.” Despite CIA’s “inexcusable” and “stupid miscalculations,” *NYT* editorials maintained the paper’s internationalist view by arguing that Cuban regime change was a necessity. The U.S. should “lay down a positive policy which will promote the cause of freedom in this hemisphere” and a “great power must take setbacks as well as victories.”³⁸³

Ralph McGill, an *ES* correspondent, lambasted the openness of the operation and the attacks on the Agency that followed. The CIA is afforded the “same sort of glamour treatment given our movies stars, and the public has become accustomed to soap operas in which our spies always outdo the wicked ones who are against us.” He said CIA was too publicised and linked the organisation with the public’s longtime acknowledgment of the FBI, stating Dulles was “as familiar to the American people as...Hoover, whose FBI is not secret.”³⁸⁴ Hoover implemented various PR campaigns to manage his and the FBI public image. On the one hand, the FBI domestic intelligence role meant it had to establish some form of PR. On the other, CIA activities were abroad, and it was under less public pressure to develop a similar campaign. But Dulles pushed for a proactive PR approach to cultivate a profile he felt was appropriate for CIA.³⁸⁵

A longtime friend of Dulles, David Lawrence, framed the Bay of Pigs aftermath as a call to protect CIA at the hands of communists he argued have infiltrated the nation. Soviet agents “look with satisfaction at the controversy they have helped to stir up in this country over the activities of the CIA.”³⁸⁶ Lawrence’s anticommunist rhetoric resembles the private conversations he held with Dulles. The DCI sent him copies of his speeches on the Soviet economy and translated excerpts from

³⁸⁰ “All Kennedy Advisors Agreed on Invasion,” *ES*, April 22, 1961, p. 1.

³⁸¹ Halberstam, *The Powers That Be*, 373-374.

³⁸² Haskins, *The Evening Star*, 184.

³⁸³ Tad Szulc, “C.I.A. is Accused by Bitter Rebels,” *NYT*, April 22, 1961, p. 1; “The Lessons of Cuba,” *NYT*, April 22, 1961, p. 24; “The Cuban Disaster,” *NYT*, April 23, 1961, p. 192.

³⁸⁴ McGill, “CIA Held Too Well Publicized,” *ES*.

³⁸⁵ Beverly Gage, *G-Man: J. Edgar Hoover and the Making of the American Century* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2022).

³⁸⁶ David Lawrence, “The Campaign Against the CIA,” *ES*, July 14, 1961, p. 17.

the Soviet magazine *Pravda*.³⁸⁷ Lawrence wrote another article highlighting concern from foreign powers over CIA. "It was rather disquieting to have some of the European officials...say privately that they are worried about the future of the...Agency...above all, this correspondent is impressed with the observation made to him repeatedly that it would be a mistake for the...Government to...take the risk of turning back the clock...to America's intelligence achievements during the last decade or more."³⁸⁸

JFK established temporary executive groups to investigate why the Bay of Pigs failed. Headed by General Maxwell Taylor, the Taylor committee criticised the government for the invasion's poor planning whilst Robert F. Kennedy's group investigated the implementation of CIA's clandestine operations.³⁸⁹ Overall, the committees failed to address questions over CIA power and influence. JFK continued to support covert operations, and the final Taylor report stated CIA intelligence was not to blame for the operation's failure.³⁹⁰ The Agency "came out looking much better than it should have." The President effectively barred Congress and any legislative reforms for oversight by keeping CIA authority at the behest of the executive. Although it did push outlets to argue for a JC, they were confident that the executive would provide adequate CIA reforms.³⁹¹

The *NYT* and *ES* supported JFK's appointments. They praised Taylor's "unquestioned ability, experience and perception" when he was picked to be JFK's military advisor. The new head of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), James R. Killian Jr., was admired because he had the "highest quality advice" available.³⁹² Establishing executive groups also served to deflect unwanted publicity. Mainstream outlets understood details surrounding the invasion and proposed CIA reforms would be concealed. Reporters could only make guesswork from the partial information released. They were convinced that meaningful change would occur from the executive. Rumours circulated from the Taylor report that Dulles would leave, CIA would be stripped of its functions and only remain as an intelligence collecting outfit. The final report was sent to JFK in June with no major

³⁸⁷ "MEMORANDUM FOR: Col. Stanley Grogan," February 23, 1962, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 38, Folder 3; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 19, 83; Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer*, 228.

³⁸⁸ David Lawrence, "How Europeans Assess the CIA," *ES*, August 28, 1961, p. 13.

³⁸⁹ Jack Raymond, "Taylor to Review U.S. Intelligence:," *NYT*, April 23, 1961, p. 1; James Reston, "Robert Kennedy Joins C.I.A. Study:," *NYT*, April 24, 1961, p. 1; Ranelagh, *The Agency*, 379.

³⁹⁰ Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 129-130.

³⁹¹ Prados, *Safe for Democracy*, 266; Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 205.

³⁹² "New Presidential Advisor," *ES*, June 28, 1961, p. 26; "C.I.A. Under the Microscope," *NYT*, May 9, 1961, p. 38.

reforms. Former official Richard Bissell, who was responsible for the operation, recalled that it was “very fair...reasonable” and “mild.”³⁹³

CIA was aware news outlets were focusing on the investigations. An internal memorandum from Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, demonstrates the PFIAB could implement changes to CIA “if for no other reason than public consumption.” It stated the administration believed operations have become too publicised. To prepare for potential CIA reorganisation, Kirkpatrick issued five proposals for CIA reorganisation. These included moving the office of the DCI out of the headquarters and into the WH to quell the view put forward by mainstream papers that CIA held a dominant position within the executive branch and actively shaped foreign policy.³⁹⁴

Rumours continued to mount that the Agency would be radically changed. Reporters were concerned and highlighted the investigations would go too far and argued CIA became a scapegoat to distract from the executive’s poor decision-making. *SLPD* assured its readers America “must have an intelligence agency...it should be the world’s best...there is no question that the...mission is a necessary one.” In his Matter of Fact column, Joseph Alsop wrote that CIA has “been used as a kind of general fire brigade” for mistakes made by the executive’s lack of foresight in foreign policy. “What is amazing is that this agency stood up so well for so long under the burden it was improperly required to carry.”³⁹⁵ Initially mainstream newspapers adhered to comply with self-censorship and protect CIA operational secrecy that stemmed from the early Cold War years. But as the operation became harder to ignore, outlets argued it should have remained secret and depicted CIA in a sympathetic manner. They proclaimed its secrecy was an essential component in maintaining its crucial fight in the Cold War. This argument was used by Allen Dulles who, after leaving CIA, saw his chance to improve the Agency’s image as a private citizen.

“Works 16 Hours a Day”: The Resignation of Dulles and Shaping the Public Debate

Allen Dulles continued to mould the public debate after the Bay of Pigs. His forced resignation made him a private citizen and freed him from the constraints he had as DCI at

³⁹³ John G. Norris, “CIA Expected to Lose Some Top Functions,” *WP*, April 26, 1961, p. A12; Earl H. Voss, “Officials’ Views Clash on CIA Role in Cuba,” *ES*, April 26, 1961, p. 7; “Reappraising the C.I.A.,” *NYT*, April 26, 1961, p. 38; Jack Bell, “CIA Shakeup Expected; Dulles’ Ouster Hinted,” *ES*, May 14, 1961, p. 7; Warren Rogers, “Kennedy Expected to Cut Back CIA to Purely Intelligence Operations,” *WP*, June 1, 1961, p. A21; Bissell quoted in Prados, *Safe for Democracy*, 266.

³⁹⁴ CIA, “Possible Proposals for CIA Reorganization,” July 6, 1961, CIA-RDP80R01580R001603270031-1, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01580R001603270031-1.pdf>, accessed 14th November 2024.

³⁹⁵ “A Look at the CIA,” *SLPD*, April 25, 1961, p. 28; “The CIA Mission,” *SLPD*, May 5, 1961, p. 16; Joseph Alsop, “The Future of the CIA,” *WP*, June 21, 1961, p. A19.

promoting his former Agency. Dulles sought to promote intelligence as an effective practice to protect the U.S. with the aim of emphasising that CIA was a vital statecraft organisation needed for the nation's defence. Between the aftermath of the Cuban invasion and his official resignation in November, Dulles was given responsibility to oversee recommendations brought forward by the Taylor committee. His presence on the board allowed him to promote the CIA, urging the committee not to dismantle the Agency.³⁹⁶ The imminent departure of Dulles brought his CIA legacy into the public debate. He acted as its spokesperson, and the press linked his persona with the Agency. Outlets were filled with praise and admiration for Dulles, and positive coverage reflected wide support for the CIA.

Dulles sought to mitigate the fallout from the Bay of Pigs by testifying *in camera* at a Senate hearing. He refused to talk with reporters after the sessions concluded.³⁹⁷ His Congressional appearances limited further criticism. He relied on legislators who vehemently supported the Agency. Representative Charles Bennett, who served on the House's Armed Services, spoke to the *Miami Herald* stating CIA should not be blamed for the invasion. Dulles wrote to Bennett shortly after to thank him for his support "at this time when we are the target of so much uninformed press hostility." Likewise, Dulles also depended on the House Appropriations chair, Clarence Cannon, who wrote to JFK to declare that he has been "exceptionally reliable, efficient, and competent."³⁹⁸

Dulles recognised he could limit damage to his Agency's image by promoting the rhetoric that press criticism risked national security. He aimed to convince the WH that CIA was under attack from overzealous reporters. He sent a memorandum to a presidential advisor, urging the creation of a "committee of senior press representatives to receive background briefings on sensitive and classified matters."³⁹⁹ He wrote to the President's Special Counsel on 8 May to include a memorandum be presented to JFK when he met the press the following day, "stressing the types of instances where damaging information has been published."⁴⁰⁰ He also replied to a public letter

³⁹⁶ CIA, "Memorandum for General Maxwell D. Taylor from Allen W. Dulles," June 8, 1961, CIA-RDP85-00664R000400080008-2, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85-00664R000400080008-2.pdf>, accessed 7th July 2022.

³⁹⁷ "Rusk, Dulles Accept Senate Call Over Cuba," *ES*, April 30, 1961, p. 1; "Dulles Telling Senate Group of CIA Role in Cuban Fiasco," *SLPD*, May 2, 1961, p. 2.

³⁹⁸ David Kraslow, "Dissent Dept.: Bennett Backs Goofless CIA," *The Miami Herald*, May 1, 1961, p. 7; "Dulles Story on Cuba Satisfies One House Committee Member," *SLPD*, May 24, 1961, p. 2; CIA, "Letter to Honorable Charles E. Bennett from Allen W. Dulles," May 20, 1961, CIA-RDP80B01676R000700200043-8, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R000700200043-8.pdf>, accessed 13th November 2024; "Dear Mr. President," May 15, 1961, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 11, Folder 11.

³⁹⁹ CIA, "U.S. Press Articles," May 5, 1961, CIA-RDP80B01676R000800050011-9, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R000800050011-9.pdf>, accessed 27th July 2022.

⁴⁰⁰ CIA, "Letter to the Honorable Theodore C. Sorensen from Allen W. Dulles," May 8, 1961, CIA-RDP80B01676R000800050013-7, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R000800050013-7.pdf>, accessed 14th November 2024.

urging JFK to not dismantle the Agency. Dulles argued it was important CIA does not acknowledge press coverage for fear of disclosing “information of considerable significance affecting our national security.”⁴⁰¹

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000800050011-9



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Ralph A. Dungan
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT : U. S. Press Articles

1. In accordance with your request for some examples of press articles prejudicial to the national security and for recommendations to assist in the establishment of a program which would help remedy this situation, attached are representative press releases considered to be detrimental to the intelligence collection efforts and to the national security of the United States.

2. On the matter of recommendations, it is suggested that the United States Government and public information media representatives jointly develop agreed upon policies and procedures necessary to protect information which, if published, would be detrimental to the security of the United States. Points of consideration in developing such procedures are:

a. A joint understanding between the Government and the press of the nature of intelligence sources and methods and their relationship to the national security.

b. The formation of a committee of senior press representatives to receive background briefings on sensitive and classified matters to assist them in deciding on what press coverage should be given to information which might possibly affect the national security.

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000800050011-9

Figure 4.2 Dulles used CIA public secrecy. Whilst he provided CIA information to the press in public interviews, statements, and speeches, he also noted the press prints too much information about the Agency. In this memorandum to one of JFK's advisors, he argued the press could print sensitive national security material. Source: CIA, "U.S. Press Articles," May 5, 1961, CIA-RDP80B01676R000800050011-9.

⁴⁰¹ CIA, "Letter to Robert E. Wilson from Allen W. Dulles," July 22, 1961, CIA-RDP80B01676R003500270022-3, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R003500270022-3.pdf>, accessed 14th November 2024.

Public discussion featured the DCI's personality and his public secrecy approach. Papers commented how he retained CIA secrecy whilst remaining within the public eye. Coverage linked Dulles's tenure to a broader notion of American patriotism and its democratic ethic. The liberal *Herald Tribune* noted Dulles's "itch" to reveal secrets was symbolic of the American "extroverted, ebullient, and ambitious" nature.⁴⁰² *NYT* said Dulles utilised "public speeches...newspaper men in his office and at his home, and travelled abroad without concealment."⁴⁰³ Whilst other outlets argued that publicity hindered Dulles and his CIA. They stated the Agency could not be effective due to America's obsession in having its secret intelligence agencies made public. It could result in the disclosure of intelligence agents' identities and the "members of free society," are "unwilling" to admit that CIA secrecy is necessary in the Cold War.⁴⁰⁴

Newspapers created a narrative that characterised Dulles as a spymaster and covert action hero by highlighting his background and personal accolades. It proved successful in preserving his and CIA's prestige. The *Herald Tribune* and *Miami Herald* recalled his OSS service. Both praised his work in intelligence, for they "are still talked of with awe" where he "matched wits daily with Gestapo agents."⁴⁰⁵ The CIA also publicly circulated a report to promote the pro-Dulles narrative. Picked up by the *NYT*, it stated how Dulles's wartime role in intelligence contributed to the surrender of German troops in Northern Italy.⁴⁰⁶ The narrative served to promote the successes of prior covert operations and push the view that the CIA was a vital organisation. As the military analyst for *SLPD* declared, CIA is "one of the most effective intelligence systems in the world."⁴⁰⁷

Dulles stepped down as DCI on 28 November 1961. At the ceremony marking his departure, JFK awarded him the National Security Medal. "Your successes are unheralded," whilst "your failures are trumpeted," declared the President. He praised the outgoing DCI as an "outstanding public servant." *WP* declared his exit "should not be allowed to obscure long-range achievements...[he] is entitled to a generous salute from the American people."⁴⁰⁸ Now a private citizen, Dulles adapted to

⁴⁰² "Allen Dulles had to Find, Keep Secrets," *New York Herald Tribune*, April 9, 1961.

⁴⁰³ Wallace Carroll, "New Era in Intelligence:," *NYT*, September 28, 1961, p.20.

⁴⁰⁴ "Service in Silence," *Kalamazoo Gazette*, August 11, 1961, p. 6; "The Tough Job of Allen Dulles," *Decatur Herald*, September 29, 1961; "Of Hard Facts" *Lincoln Star*, September 30, 1961, page unknown.

⁴⁰⁵ Warren Rogers Jr., "Trouble Comes to C.I.A. and Dulles Must Talk," *New York Herald Tribune*, April 30, 1961; Victor Wilson, "The Philosophical Cloak and Dagger Man," *New York Herald Tribune*, May 5, 1961; William McGaffin, "He Matched Wits with Foes' Best," *Miami Herald*, October 8, 1961.

⁴⁰⁶ Alvin Shuster, "C.I.A. Circulates Account of Itself," *NYT*, July 9th, 1961, p. 38.

⁴⁰⁷ Thomas R. Phillips, "CIA Head Dulles Retiring After 20 Years of Espionage," *SLPD*, December 3, 1961, p. 33.

⁴⁰⁸ "Allen Dulles Gets Security Medal," *NYT*, November 29, 1961, p. 33; Edward T. Folliard, "Retiring Dulles gets Unheralded Send-Off," *WP*, November 29, 1961, p. A1; "Allen Dulles Retires," *WP*, November 29, 1961, p. A16; CIA, "Mr. Dulles Received the National Security Award Presented by President Kennedy on 28 November 1961 at the Langley Headquarters Building," November 28, 1961, CIA-RDP78-03894A000100230001-5, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-03894A000100230001-5.pdf>, accessed 14th November 2024; Willmetts, "The Burgeoning Fissures of Dissent," 172.

a post-CIA life as he continued to promote the organisation's public image through press contacts he cultivated as DCI. Likewise, his departure did not stop the press from systematically covering the Agency as it maintained other contacts across the wider national security establishment. But his resignation briefly marked a moment where eager reporters were uncertain as to where they could secure an inside look of the CIA. The completion of the Langley site had alleviated these concerns.

Langley: The Finished Product

The Langley headquarters firmly established the CIA within American political and cultural life. Its construction shortly after the Bay of Pigs fiasco demonstrated that executive and press support for CIA remained strong. It was now an intelligence service that held a prominent position within the U.S. government. It was an open secret, and it acted as the quintessential example of CIA public secrecy. The site satisfied public fascination because it was a new location that acted as a focal point, and it served to offer reporters a chance to ask how a secretive organisation could operate within an open society. Public secrecy was designed to provide the press with an inside, exclusive story about CIA so it did not expose sensitive material, but sometimes it offered the press too much information. The decisions made after Langley's construction conflicted with the suggestions made by Agency officials who wanted it as a secure building, away from outsiders, and made only for the use of CIA employees.

Langley was Dulles's greatest legacy as it acted as "the spatial articulation" of his "philosophies of intimacy, secrecy, security, and efficiency."⁴⁰⁹ JFK allowed Dulles to continue his tenure until the site was finished so he could resign on a "high note." Just as its construction received immense coverage from Washington's *ES* and *WP* during the 1950s, the finished product, built within the forests of McLean, continued to receive wide press attention.⁴¹⁰ The site resembled Dulles's public secrecy approach. The careful disclosures of information he provided to reporters whilst reprimanding unofficial leaks and stating the U.S. releases too much national security material can be compared to the structure at Langley. Details of CIA's covert operations would be held in rigid secrecy, in this instance hidden behind sealed doors requiring the use of staff passes and badges, but the public image of the Agency became increasingly visible because it now occupied a massive building along the Potomac. Pictures of its ongoing construction and final form featured in newspapers constantly.

⁴⁰⁹ Friedman, *Covert Capital*, 29.

⁴¹⁰ Immerman, *The Hidden Hand*, 55.

Dulles saw Langley as the optimum space to uphold what Andrew Friedman refers to as bureaucratic efficiency. The relocation of CIA into the wooded areas of McLean, away from close-knit downtown D.C., and the consolidation of all operational branches into one integral, secure building aligned with Dulles's desire to gain desired results from less expenditure. Langley also complemented his successor, John McCone, in his approach to improve communication internally and further consolidate his authority as DCI.⁴¹¹ The site offered minimal administrative waste and cheaper methods to produce and analyse intelligence whilst reinforcing CIA security. The coverage it received encapsulated the inherent conflict between Langley's secrecy and its visibility.⁴¹²

In August 1961, Sheffield Edwards, the head of the Agency's Office of Security, sent a memorandum to Dulles. "There are definite security advantages to be achieved by the relocation of Agency personnel under the present plan at the new headquarters site...that will tend to correct a series of security deficiencies which are inherent in the separation of the Agency components in a total of [redacted] buildings located throughout the metropolitan area." Edwards was concerned about the number of couriers who constantly transferred sensitive documents to separate CIA buildings in downtown D.C. He argued they could be reduced alongside the guards required to protect both them and classified material because all transfers would take place at Langley. The site provided "complete building control, both of the ground surrounding the building and the building itself, on a full 24 hour basis."⁴¹³

Edwards stated the site enabled CIA to control visitation and cover the identities of officers due to limited access available through the "main thoroughfares" supplied with "adequate protection over the surrounding grounds." The high volume of traffic on the highways would make it "practically impossible" for the public to identify officers as they enter and leave the site. He insisted Langley is for CIA use only. Other government agencies "effectively destroy the elaborate security controls over the new building. No other agency employs the same type of security control as CIA."⁴¹⁴ His desire for a secure CIA-only space ran contrary to the decision the Agency took several months later to allow the public to dine at the headquarters' cafeteria. As Friedman notes, the cafeteria was designed to be visible from the nearby access road and was featured in numerous

⁴¹¹ David Robarge, "John McCone as Director of Central Intelligence 1961-1965, Part 1," *Studies in Intelligence* (CIA), January 1, 2005, 55, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001262720.pdf.

⁴¹² Friedman, *Covert Capital*, 63-64.

⁴¹³ CIA, "Security Factors of the Feasibility Study in the Occupancy of the New Headquarters at Langley, Virginia," August 3, 1961, CIA-RDP80B01676R000800060018-1, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R000800060018-1.pdf>, accessed 14th November 2024; CIA, "Changes to Present Courier System," January 1, 1962, CIA-RDP70-00211R000800090020-1, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP70-00211R000800090020-1.pdf>, accessed 5th November 2024.

⁴¹⁴ CIA, "Security Factors," August 3, 1961, CIA-RDP80B01676R000800060018-1.

Langley photographs. It held a small public section and a “larger, secret side” behind doors that required badges for CIA officers. An *ES* correspondent, Myra MacPherson, visited the public section and experienced dining at the site.⁴¹⁵

A renowned journalist, MacPherson documented political life in Washington. She was sent by the *ES* to report on the public opening of Langley. Arriving at the site, she remarked that a “guard smiled at the gate of the barbed wire fence where a posted sign said in big red letters only authorized personnel could enter.” She describes the cafeteria as a place where outsiders and CIA officers shared the same space. “They talked in soft tones,” often about Dulles, whilst she noticed “outside the cafeteria, are two double doors and one guard.” She asked a nearby guard if she could make a phone call to her friend, “‘certainly,’ he said, letting me by...for a brief moment I was in restricted territory...I went inside the phone booth and called a friend and said, ‘I thought you might like to know, I’m at CIA.’ It impressed very little.” She found another door, “one four times larger...that must surely be where the real important conversations go on, for that area was...off-limits.”⁴¹⁶

The MacPherson story encapsulates CIA public secrecy. It is an example that demonstrates how reporters viewed Langley with a melodramatic fascination and depicted it as a quintessential location for getting the inside story about the hidden work of a national security institution. But MacPherson did not unearth anything new or secretive about the Agency. Instead, the article served only to satisfy the public’s desire to know more about the Langley complex. The article succeeded in advancing CIA’s aims to make it appear as a transparent organisation by opening the cafeteria to the public. The Agency today continues to allow reporters to dine at the site where they are still allured to the open secrecy of Langley. “Everyone pulls out cash to keep from blowing any covers with credit cards,” a food critic for *WP* attested, “I assume any flies on the wall have been vetted or swatted.”⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁵ Friedman, *Covert Capital*, 61, 71.

⁴¹⁶ Myra MacPherson, “Getting into CIA Easy if You’re Real Hungry,” *ES*, April 29, 1962, p. 1.

⁴¹⁷ Tom Sietsema, “Short Ribs, Soup and Secrets: Our Critic’s Exclusive Lunch at the CIA,” *WP*, February 24, 2025, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/food/2025/02/24/cia-dining-room-agency-restaurant/>, accessed 15th July 2025.



Figure 4.3 An extract of the MacPherson article and where she would have dined, the public cafeteria building.
Source: MacPherson, "Getting into CIA Easy if You're Real Hungry," *ES*; 50 Years in Langley, 21.

Despite Edwards's aim for optimal CIA security, Langley generated a wave of public discussion. The new headquarters, its secret agents and officers, had become part of the debate around the broader public sector rejuvenation surrounding the nation's capital.⁴¹⁸ The Agency was measured in *ES* special edition pieces that frequently mentioned Langley as a reoccurring component and theme to the architectural and commercial development of McLean and D.C. Describing Langley as Fairfax County's "Big Secret," and a spot which tourists are eager to see, *ES* praised the development of the site in promoting the DC area, "McLean is on the map of current history—socially, politically, and all very hush-hush—internationally, too." It revealed, "in the last few years something very close to a miracle has been happening in Washington." It asserted DC was "bustling with a perfectly phenomenal number of new developments of every conceivable nature—perhaps the greatest period of activity in its history."⁴¹⁹

Langley's development was highlighted as an example of the suburban sprawling life. As occurred during the 1950s, reporters campaigned and promoted for the removal of the Tempos. The old buildings received hostile coverage. A desire to see them demolished fuelled support for the

⁴¹⁸ Phil Casey, "Federal Government on Big Building Spree," *WP*, January 14, 1962, p. B2; Jerry Kluttz, "Space Agency Wins Approval to Add 849 Employees Here," *WP*, June 11, 1962, p. B1; Dorothy McCardle, "McLean has been a 'New Frontier' of History Ever Since the Frontier Days," *WP*, April 23, 1961, p. F1.

⁴¹⁹ "Metro Center: Key to Area Vigor and Unity," *ES*, September 17, 1961, p. 119.

Agency's relocation. Rumours of their destruction by the General Services Administration (GSA) was used as an indicator to reveal when the CIA moved into Langley. Correspondents hated the idea that the remaining Tempos would still be standing after CIA staff vacated the premises. D.C. federal land expansion and gradual movement of Agency employees during the 1950s and early 1960s stalled any hope for removing the buildings. It was not until 1964 that five of the Tempos were destroyed.⁴²⁰

The press favoured CIA relocation, but Langley was not without its critics. It became a focal point for public grievances. Protests occurred outside its entrance after the failed Bay of Pigs operation and local McLean residents frequently opposed the opening of "Langley Lodge," an exclusive social club for senior CIA staff.⁴²¹ Local citizens were concerned that the CIA site and broader federal incursion into their suburban land brought commercial encroachment. They campaigned to preserve land, parks, recreation areas, and older apartments such as the Potomac Palisades. Planning permissions and rezoning applications for apartment projects alarmed the community and Congressmen feared that federal expansion would pave the way for future infringement, impacting the Potomac River's "scenic beauty."⁴²²

The CIA shared Washington residents' distaste over apartment rezoning but in the interest of security. It informed GSA amidst concern that citizens living in the new higher apartments would be within "spying distance" and able to observe the headquarters. GSA contacted the landowners who occupied the twenty-six acres close to Langley and offered to buy their land. One stated that GSA "said something about national security," because "our house is directly in front of the CIA building...but we're too low to see much." The *SLPD* quipped "wouldn't it be cheaper to move DCI's office? And still cheaper just to pull down the shades?"⁴²³

⁴²⁰ Grace Bassett, "Simple Approach in Big Affairs," *ES*, April 16, 1961, p. 44; Roberta Hornig, "9 More Tempos Slated for Demolition Here," *ES*, June 27, 1961, p. 1; Roberta Hornig, "U.S. Jobs Up, Space Lacking," *ES*, August 27, 1961, p. 1; "Demolition Set for Five More Tempos," *WP*, May 11, 1964, p. A7.

⁴²¹ "Non-Violent Rally Slated Today at CIA Building," *ES*, May 13, 1961, p. 10; Elsie Carper, "Neighbors of CIA Trying to Sabotage Plans for 'Restricted' Bottle Club," *WP*, October 4, 1961, p. A1.

⁴²² John Lawson, "Counties to Discuss Potomac Apartments," *ES*, May 6, 1962, p. 84; "Restore Trails, State Group Asks," *ES*, May 22, 1962, p. 18; "Park Area is Urged Near CIA at Langley," *ES*, June 10, 1962, p. 67; John Barron, "The Merrywood Deal," *ES*, June 17, 1962, p. 1; John Barron, "Second Apartment Unit Proposed for Palisades," *ES*, June 18, 1962, p. 1; Alex R. Preston, "Broyhill Assails Reuss on Merrywood Threat," *ES*, July 15, 1962, p. 14.

⁴²³ Allan D. Henry, "Three Sisters Bridge: Dream or Nightmare?," *ES*, July 28, 1962, p. 4; William Duke, "Federal 'Eyesores' Hit," *ES*, September 27, 1962, p. 21; Richard Homan, "CIA to Add to McLean Property," *WP*, February 18, 1963, p. B1; "Pull the Shades," *SLPD*, March 18, 1963, p. 14; Helen Dewar, "High-Rise Zone is Sought Near Secretive CIA," *WP*, December 31, 1963, p. B1.




Figure 4.4 Reporters used the CIA building as a focal point to measure the ongoing commercial and residential development within the surrounding area. *Source: "Potomac Hills Offering," ES, June 23, 1962, p. 30.*

The movement of CIA employees from crowded areas of downtown D.C. to the suburbs was highlighted by the Agency as a security issue. The movement was difficult to conceal and reflected the growing disillusionment CIA employees held. Officials spurned the site's publicity and thought it "was too big and ostentatious for a secret organization." They held a profound nostalgia for the old Tempo buildings.⁴²⁴ "The real trouble with this new building," one officer recalled, "is that it tends to make an honest woman of the old madam—you know, no spittoons, keep the antimacassars clean, and no champagne in the morning. We ought to be lurking in scrabby old hide-outs, with the plaster peeling and stopped-up toilets. There's something about the atmosphere of this building that leads to too many memos, too many meetings, and not enough dirty work."⁴²⁵

Unlike Edwards who envisioned a secure Langley, various officers only saw a building compromised with numerous security risks. It was "at odds with the anonymity, closed social networks, and unsupervised freedom abroad through which clandestine operators had come to understand their work."⁴²⁶ On 19 September 1961 Stanley Grogan contacted the Deputy Director for Administration, Lawrence K. White. He stated he received a call from a reporter who was inquiring if CIA had begun to move into the new building. White responded, asking Grogan to inform the

⁴²⁴ Wallace Carroll, "C.I.A. Study Held to Limit Changes," *NYT*, June 5, 1961, p. 6.

⁴²⁵ CIA officer quoted in Alsop and Braden, *Sub Rosa*, 263.

⁴²⁶ Friedman, *Covert Capital*, 74-75.

journalist that CIA staff were moving in small groups until the site was completed in 1962. White insisted no further publicity continue about the relocation of CIA staff.⁴²⁷

Press coverage continued as reporters measured the completion of Langley and the transfer of staff by monitoring the level of traffic congestion on nearby highways and bridges.⁴²⁸ Estimates provided a rough number of CIA staff by monitoring their travel patterns. This ran contrary to Edwards's claim that Langley was secure because the highways provided necessary cover to Agency officers. The Arlington County Board recommended that CIA stagger their working hours whilst CIA proposed rerouting traffic. Both agreed that additional bridge construction would help relieve congestion.⁴²⁹ Reporters highlighted humorous stories surrounding growing frustration of Agency officers who used canoes to cross the Potomac River rather than face traffic jams.⁴³⁰ In the 1950s reporters feared CIA's relocation led to traffic congestion and urged the extension of bridges and highways, notably the Parkway. By 1961 these discussions similarly featured in *ES* and *WP*. After Langley's completion, reporters blamed the influx of traffic to the increase in CIA staff.⁴³¹ They supported new highways, bridges and road widening to link Langley to the rest of Washington. The papers argued that bypasses could connect CIA to the Washington Beltway, a major ring road completed in 1964, and link all major federal government institutions.⁴³²

⁴²⁷ CIA, "Diary Notes," September 19, 1961, CIA-RDP76-00183R000300110216-2, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP76-00183R000300110216-2.pdf>, accessed 6th November 2024.

⁴²⁸ William Chapman, "Historic Highway in Virginia to Play Key Area Traffic Role," *WP*, May 30, 1961, p. A14; "Contract Let for CIA Link of Parkway," *ES*, June 13, 1961, p. 30; "Urgently Needed Bridge," *ES*, August 20, 1961, p. 28.

⁴²⁹ John Barron, "Arlington Urges CIA to Shift Work Hours," *ES*, September 24, 1961, p. 25; William Chapman, "CIA Traffic Stirs Worry in Arlington," *WP*, September 26, 1961, p. A18.

⁴³⁰ Anthony Lewis, "C.I.A. Men Beat Traffic Jams; They Cross Potomac by Canoe," *NYT*, November 6, 1961, p. 39; "2 CIA Men Escape Jams, Now Commute by Canoe," *WP*, November 7, 1961, p. A3.

⁴³¹ "Canal Rd. Widening Visioned to Cut Chain Bridge Jams," *WP*, November 29, 1961, p. C2; Helen Dewar, "CIA Puts Kinks in Chain Bridge Traffic," *WP*, December 6, 1961, p. C1; "CIA to Stagger Shifts to Cut Traffic Snarls," *WP*, February 16, 1962, p. B1; "New Parkway Section Seen Open in a Year," *ES*, July 6, 1962, p. 19.

⁴³² "Beltway Section, Span to Open in December," *ES*, August 19, 1962, p. 48; Jack Eisen, "Socially and Businesswise, the Beltway Becomes a Hub," *WP*, January 5, 1964, p. K1.



Figure 4.5 Traffic congestion increased due to the Langley project, but it was also a way for the press to measure the movement of CIA staff to and from the site. The *ES* supported the construction and extension of bridges, such as the Cabin John Bridge because it would alleviate traffic. Source: "Another Maryland-Virginia Link Forges Ahead," *ES*, May 4, 1962, p. 75.

Agency officials grew concerned by other security issues. These included the use of local D.C. bus firms that meant members of the public arrived directly at the site and highway signs that marked the entrance to Langley. Reporting focused on a decision made by Arnold Lines, the northern Virginian bus company, in suspending a proposal to increase its fares for travel to the site whilst another company established transit buses to arrive at Langley, making it quicker for Washington citizens residing in the northwest.⁴³³ The *ES*, the Arlington County Board, and a member of Congress called it "ridiculous" that the National Park Service allowed public buses to Langley, a supposedly secret destination, whilst it refused travel to the publicly open new Dulles International Airport.⁴³⁴

⁴³³ "Arnold Bus Fare Raise Suspended," *WP*, January 9, 1962, p. B4; Willard Clopton, "New Express Bus Route Authorized Between Friendship Heights and CIA," *WP*, August 17, 1962, p. C1; "One-Purpose Parkway," *ES*, November 12, 1962, p. 38; Morton Mintz, "Bus Line Prepares Parkway Ban Test," *WP*, November 15, 1962, p. D1; "Park Service Ban on Buses Stirs Storm," *ES*, November 18, 1962, p. 43; "Bus Makes Dulles Run on Parkway Despite Ban," *ES*, November 19, 1962, p. 1.

⁴³⁴ Lee Flor "Broyhill Charges Park Service Flouts Congress in Bus Dispute," *ES*, December 2, 1962, p. 57.

The CIA became the “only secret intelligence organization in the world situated on a four-lane highway with large signs pointing the way to its doors.”⁴³⁵ In 1962, the Attorney General Robert Kennedy disapproved of the signs, declaring they “did not blend with the hush-hush atmosphere” and warned they brought unnecessary publicity. JFK ordered Dulles to remove them stating “if you don’t get those signs down, I’m going to come out there and take them down myself.” Dulles initially disagreed, stating he “regarded publicity and accessibility as assets for an intelligence service.” Eventually he gave the order to Lawrence K. White to quickly remove the signs, White contacted the National Park Service to take them down quietly, stating “we don’t need any publicity.”⁴³⁶ It failed to work; reporters noted the signs were removed and cited a CIA officer who “said the agency decided that by now everyone who needs to know how to get to the new building should know the directions.”⁴³⁷ The Agency reinstated the signs in 1973 under DCI James Schlesinger only for them to be repeatedly stolen.⁴³⁸

Langley dominated the minds of reporters and Agency officials alike. For the CIA it was a momentous achievement yet uncertainty over security issues continued to occupy internal discussion. For the press, Langley was not only a symbol of an entrenched, stronger national security state, it also presented an opportunity to discuss why a nominally secretive organisation could reside in a visible, public building. The site provided a focal point for journalists to measure the prestige and reputation of CIA whilst contemplating the larger questions surrounding its relationship to democracy. The move provoked a longing from correspondents to extract specific details such as deciphering the Agency’s phone number and estimating how many employees it housed, leading to a confirmation provided by the Soviet embassy.⁴³⁹ In 1963 *NYT* reporter Ben H. Bagdikian proclaimed the CIA “occupies one of the most imposing new buildings in the Washington area,” as it enters its “middle-aged respectability.”⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁵ Carroll, “C.I.A. Study Held to Limit Changes,” *NYT*.

⁴³⁶ “C.I.A. a Secret Again as Guide Signs Vanish,” *NYT*, February 6, 1962, p. 8; James Hanrahan, “An Interview with Former CIA Executive Director Lawrence K. ‘Red’ White,” *Studies in Intelligence*, 43, no. 3 (Winter, 1999-2000), 37-38; Grose, *Gentleman Spy*, 533-534.

⁴³⁷ “CIA Takes Down Road Signs,” *SLPD*, February 6, 1962, p. 1; Rowland Evans Jr., “Post Office Gets Cost Conscious, Cuts Signs,” *LAT*, February 18, 1962, p. 67.

⁴³⁸ Moran, *Company Confessions*, 184.

⁴³⁹ “CIA Figures? Soviet Embassy has an Answer,” *ES*, March 6, 1962, p. 1; “Need Data About C.I.A.? Ask the Soviet Embassy,” *NYT*, March 7, 1962, p. 4; “Reds Provide Data on CIA Employment,” *WP*, March 7, 1962, p. A3; “CIA Phone Number Revealed,” *SLPD*, May 3, 1962, p. 1.

⁴⁴⁰ Bagdikian, “Unsecretive Report on the C.I.A.,” *NYT*.




Figure 4.6 Langley serves as the prime example of CIA public secrecy. Its construction received extensive press coverage throughout. *Source:* “New Home for Intelligence Agency,” *ES*, July 6, 1962, p. 21; “CIA Headquarters: The Finished Product,” *WP*, July 6, 1962, p. A1.

Dulles Post-CIA and *The Craft of Intelligence*

Dulles’s tenure emphasised CIA public secrecy. He shaped the Cold War consensus by meeting with the press and offering selective pieces of CIA information to push forward a positive image of his Agency. He cultivated press alliances with a view that demonstrated CIA was essential for the Cold War effort. Dulles made the point clear that press self-censorship was important in shielding material he did not want published. He consistently made the argument that the press talks too openly and leaks too much CIA material. As a private citizen, Dulles continued to argue that the Soviet Union takes advantage of the press’s openness. Informally he advocated a de-facto British D-Notice where the government requests that editors delay or not publish material considered sensitive. “Governments do not have to tell all the facts all the time...I believe we...are inclined to talk too much...to give away too many secrets voluntarily...we go ahead year to year and say all this information...and I don’t think we ever looked into whether it is necessary.” He acknowledged the

U.S. could not pass legislation like the British Official Secrets Act because of the First Amendment; however, he remarked that “this is a broad field which should be studied.”⁴⁴¹

Post-CIA, Dulles continued shaping the narrative that his Agency was a vital component of national security. He wrote an entry for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* about intelligence in late-1962. Receiving help from other officials, it showed that the entry was a broader CIA PR strategy to emphasise the point that intelligence was an essential statecraft component. The HIC’s Walter Pforzheimer, the Director of Security Sheffield Edwards, and spokesman Stanley Grogan all contributed. Pforzheimer provided the historical knowledge, Edwards checked potential security ramifications, and Grogan acted as liaison to the now private citizen Dulles.⁴⁴² Edwards noted the material used had been “publicly disclosed by open sources,” and concluded it did not reveal CIA sensitive material.⁴⁴³ Grogan informed Dulles that CIA checked and approved it. But he was concerned that Dulles, writing as a former DCI, “could...cause some people to erroneously believe that this is an authoritative account participated in by the...Agency,” and stated CIA “disclaim any and all responsibility for its content.”⁴⁴⁴ Dulles proposed publishers insert a forward removing any CIA acknowledgement.⁴⁴⁵

The article covered the history of intelligence methods, and it allowed Dulles to argue the press discloses too much CIA material. He reinforced the view that the Soviet Union takes advantage of press freedom. “We are faced with an antagonist that has raised the arts of espionage to an unprecedented height,” whilst the “press is overzealous in seeking ‘scoops.’” He states the Second World War demonstrated “the importance of secrecy,” but the Cold War shows “our adversary takes every advantage of what we divulge openly or make publicly available.”⁴⁴⁶ *WP* were not convinced as it declared “no objective person could read Mr. Dulles’ formidable defense of the CIA without

⁴⁴¹ “Dulles Urges Federal, Press Self-Censorship,” *ES*, February 25, 1962, p. 10; Clarence Hunter, “Ex-CIA Chief Warns Against Secrecy Abuse,” *ES*, September 28, 1962, p. 43; “Dulles Favors Limits on News,” *Washington Star*, March 25, 1963, page unknown.

⁴⁴² CIA, “(Untitled),” December 11, 1962, CIA-RDP70-00058R000200080005-6, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP70-00058R000200080005-6.pdf>, accessed 10th December 2024.

⁴⁴³ CIA, “Draft of ‘Study on Intelligence’ an Article by Allen W. Dulles for the Encyclopaedia Britannica,” December 20, 1962, CIA-RDP70-00058R000200080002-9, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP70-00058R000200080002-9.pdf>, accessed 10th December 2024.

⁴⁴⁴ “Dear Mr. Dulles,” January 14, 1963, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 30, Folder 1.

⁴⁴⁵ CIA, “Dear Stan:,” January 17, 1963, CIA-RDP70-00058R000200090187-4, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP70-00058R000200090187-4.pdf>, accessed 3rd August 2022.

⁴⁴⁶ “Dulles Opposes New C.I.A. Curbs:,” *NYT*, February 18, 1963, p. 4; “Dulles Urges No Stronger Curbs on CIA,” *WP*, February 18, 1963, p. A1.

acquiring the conviction that the organization is of the greatest importance to the country's survival."⁴⁴⁷

Nevertheless, the entry served as a stepping stone to Dulles's book *The Craft of Intelligence*. Published in 1963, it was written alongside other CIA officials as Dulles sought to reinforce the narrative that intelligence has deep U.S. historical roots. Dulles uses this to show CIA is a necessary organisation in the Cold War. Repeating his *Britannica* article, he wrote "fortunately, there is a growing awareness of the dangers we face in the Cold War...national security requires us to resort to secret intelligence operations."⁴⁴⁸ Promoting the CIA led to fears that *The Craft* could prompt reporters to scrutinise its secrecy. Galley proofs highlighted the fear that a former DCI writing about prior CIA operations "gives some credence to any speculation...a broader question of policy is raised as to whether this is in the best interests of all concerned." John McCone, Dulles's successor, uttered to Grogan he did not want CIA involvement "if there is a question of security or violation of security." The CIA's PR man was fearful that the organisation's attribution might damage its image. He was concerned that the book could be seen as pro-CIA propaganda and draw too much public attention to the Agency.⁴⁴⁹

Shortly after extracts were published in *Harper's* magazine, Grogan sent a memorandum to McCone concerning Hollywood producers who asked him if they could make a CIA documentary series. Dulles "had told a great deal, [and] I explained...that CIA is a secret and silent organization...we could not in any way cooperate in this venture...I pointed out that were we to see their writers...I could be sure that I would be reading in various columns that CIA has assisted in this program." White also reminded his fellow colleagues that the Agency should not promote the *Harper's* article for the benefit of recruiting employees, "we must not mail it to libraries or others in the CIA envelope."⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁷ "Checking Intelligence," *WP*, February 20, 1963, p. A16.

⁴⁴⁸ Willmetts, "The Burgeoning Fissures of Dissent," 176-177; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 89; Dulles, *The Craft*, 181.

⁴⁴⁹ CIA, "Galley Proofs of 'The Craft of Intelligence' by Allen W. Dulles – Publication Clearance," July 15, 1963, CIA-RDP70-00058R000200090031-6, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP70-00058R000200090031-6.pdf>, accessed 12th December 2024; CIA, "John A McCone (DCI) – Awd Craft of Intelligence Clearance," July 16, 1963, CIA-RDP70-00058R000200090028-0, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP70-00058R000200090028-0.pdf>, accessed 14th November 2024.

⁴⁵⁰ Allen Dulles, "Craft of Intelligence," *Harper's Magazine*, April 2, 1963, 50; CIA, "Memorandum for the D/DCI from Stanley J. Grogan," April 3, 1963, CIA-RDP88-01365R000300150012-8, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01365R000300150012-8.pdf>, accessed 12th December 2024; CIA, "(Untitled)," June 4, 1963, CIA-RDP70-00058R000200090058-7, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP70-00058R000200090058-7.pdf>, accessed 12th December 2024; Willmetts, "The Burgeoning Fissures of Dissent," 178; Moran, *Company Confessions*, 120.

Grogan continued to distance the former DCI's personal remarks from CIA. As a private citizen, Dulles discussed press censorship without ramifications he would otherwise face as DCI. He intended to publish a draft chapter from the book for the *Saturday Evening Post*. It explored the inherent conflict within the U.S. surrounding press freedom and secrecy. Dulles flaunted the idea of the British D-Notice system in the paper, "I think this...would be worthwhile studying to see whether any of its features could usefully be adopted in this country."⁴⁵¹ In a memorandum to McCone, Grogan stated he held no issues regarding publication if the CIA was not attributable, "I see no reason why Mr. Dulles should not publish this highly controversial article as his own and without any CIA connection." However, "it will not be popular with the Press...I think Mr. Dulles...will have to run for cover." Dulles contacted Stewart Alsop to proceed with publication, but the article was rejected by the paper as "Dulles was no longer in high demand."⁴⁵²

Grogan's assertions were correct as reviews of *The Craft* began to emerge. They were mainly critical as reporters saw past the public secrecy approach. Journalists were disappointed nothing new was being unearthed from Dulles about CIA that was not already known from public sources. The former DCI's avoidance of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and his accusation that the press was mistaking "the actual role in intelligence," were depicted by newspapers as nothing more than CIA propaganda.⁴⁵³ "He believes the organization sacrosanct, and any criticism, heresy," one correspondent noted, whilst another called him "almost childish," in his dismissal of CIA criticism. *WP*'s Chalmers Roberts accused Dulles's view of the press as a "highly limited one" for expressing thought towards the D-Notice system declaring "here one must disagree completely." Dulles aims to shape public debate because press freedom and the press's right to know is the "crux of the CIA problem."⁴⁵⁴

Despite the negative reviews, Dulles sent copies of *The Craft* to his close friends and associates as gifts. Aiming to shape a narrative that argued CIA was a vital organisation, Dulles wanted advice about publishing a revised edition that could be presented as a school and university textbook for students. He contacted former President Harry Truman and asked if he could offer any comments about the book. He praised *The Craft* but emphasised the main aim of intelligence is to

⁴⁵¹ CIA, "Security in a Free Society," March 23, 1963, CIA-RDP70-00058R000200090091-0; <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP70-00058R000200090091-0.pdf>, accessed 29th July 2022.

⁴⁵² CIA, "(Untitled)," April 5, 1963, CIA-RDP70-00058R000200090090-1, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP70-00058R000200090090-1.pdf>, accessed 29th July 2022; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 89.

⁴⁵³ Dulles, *The Craft*, 157-158.

⁴⁵⁴ Joseph J. Edlin, "Between Book Ends," *SLPD*, November 16, 1963, p. 4; Percy B. Mills, "Mr. Dulles Spills the Beans," *New Republic*, February 25, 1964, pp. 20-22; Chalmers M. Roberts, "Dulles Tells of CIA Craft But Buttons Lip on Secrets," *WP*, October 9, 1963, p. 4.

keep the President informed.⁴⁵⁵ These comments were echoed in an *WP* article, written by Truman in December 1963. It criticised the Agency's obsession with covert operations. "For some time I have been disturbed by the way CIA has been diverted from its original assignment...I never had any thought that when I set [it] up...that it would be injected into peacetime cloak and dagger operations...I...would like to see...CIA...restored to its original assignment as the intelligence arm of the President...and...its operational duties...terminated or properly used elsewhere."⁴⁵⁶

Truman's comments gained traction. The *Washington Daily News* wrote "Mr. Truman knows whereof he speaks...he knows that unfettered and unaccountable power such as is vested in...CIA is bound to feed upon itself." It was a "diatribe" article, a letter sent to Dulles proclaimed. A *WP* editorial emphasised that the CIA's covert operations be removed. "What is at issue is the wisdom of combining...functions that should be separate."⁴⁵⁷ Upon reading Truman's article and the *WP* editorial, Dulles sent a letter to the former WH counsel and Truman's liaison, Clark Clifford. In the letter, the former DCI stated he emphasised CIA was Truman's "baby...a point he may well have overlooked in the fifteen years which has elapsed." Dulles said he was "deeply disturbed" about Truman's comments and explained the former President presided over CIA expansion into covert operations. "To destroy the expertise which has been developed...since 1948...would...seriously prejudice our national security."⁴⁵⁸

In early-1964, CIA officials were concerned that the weight of a former President's criticism would increase calls for it to be dismantled. A former CIA officer wrote to Dulles stating he called on the *WP* to withhold its editorial, and "much to my surprise...they did [publish]." Annoyed, he wrote in a public letter to refute *WP*. "There is too much talk about CIA. It is not a topic for public discussion...President Truman's statement should have been underplayed and not again brought in public attention by an editorial."⁴⁵⁹ Clifford urged Dulles to meet with Truman to clarify his comments and mitigate any further press criticism. As Dulles noted, the CIA experienced a "chorus

⁴⁵⁵ "Dear Mr. Truman," September 30, 1963, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 55, Folder 12; "Dear Mr. Dulles," November 6, 1963, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 55, Folder 12; "Dear Mr. Truman," November 13, 1963, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 55, Folder 12.

⁴⁵⁶ Harry S. Truman, "Limit CIA Role to Intelligence," *WP*, December 22, 1963, p. A11.

⁴⁵⁷ Richard Starnes, "CIA Under Fire," *Washington Daily News*, December 24, 1963, page unknown; "Truman and the CIA," *WP*, December 28, 1963, p. A8; "Dear Mr. Director," December 30, 1963, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 55, Folder 12.

⁴⁵⁸ "Dear Clark," December 31, 1963, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 55, Folder 12; "Dear Mr. Truman," January 7, 1964, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 55, Folder 12.

⁴⁵⁹ K. L. London, "Truman and the CIA," *WP*, January 13, 1964, p. A14; "Dear Mr. Dulles," January 21, 1964, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 55, Folder 12.

of attacks...which have followed HST's article." The pair met in April and Dulles said Truman "seemed quite astounded at it...he said that this was all wrong."⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁶⁰ "Dear Clark," January 22, 1964, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 55, Folder 12; "Dear Allen," January 25, 1964, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 55, Folder 12; "Memorandum for Mr. Lawrence R. Houston," April 21, 1964, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 55, Folder 12.

NOW AVAILABLE

SOLEMN, HISTORIC FILMS
For 16mm & 8mm Home Viewers

A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY,
THE DEATH AND FUNERAL
OF OUR BELOVED
PRESIDENT

JOHN F. KENNEDY
A TEN-MINUTE NEWSREEL SUMMARY
OF THE TRAGIC EVENT THAT
STUNNED THE ENTIRE WORLD

Distributed in black and white by
CAPITAL FILM LABORATORIES
Room 209, 470 E. St. S.W., Washington, D.C.

SEND CHECK WITH ORDER

8mm Slide	16mm Slide	16mm Sound
\$5.95	\$11.95	\$19.95

PRICES INCLUDE SHIPPING
D.C. Residents add 3% Sales Tax

PLEASE ALLOW 10 DAYS FOR DELIVERY

Harry Truman Writes:

Limit CIA Role To Intelligence

By Harry S. Truman

INDEPENDENCE, MO., Dec. 21—I think it has become necessary to take another look at the purpose and operations of our Central Intelligence Agency—CIA. At least, I would like to submit here the reasons why I thought it necessary to organize this Agency during my Administration, what I expected it to do, and how it is to operate as an arm of the President.

I think it is fairly obvious that by and large a President's performance in office is as effective as the information he gets. That is to say, the information he has and the information he gets. That is to say, the information he has and the information he gets. That is to say, the information he has and the information he gets.

But their collective information reached the President all too frequently in conflicting confusion. At times, the intelligence reports tended to be so contradictory as to establish positions of a given department. It is on a confusing and what's worse, such intelligence is of little use to a President in reaching the right decisions.

Therefore, I decided to set up a special organization charged with the collection of all intelligence reports from every available source, and to have those reports reach me as President without departmental "treatment" or interpretation.

I wanted and needed the information in its "natural raw" state and in as comprehensive a volume as it was practical for me to make full use of it. But the important thing about this move was to guard against the chance of intelligence being used to influence or to lead the President into unwise decisions—and I thought it was necessary that the President do his own thinking and evaluating.

Since the responsibility for decision making was his—then he had to be sure that no information is kept from him for whatever reason at the discretion of any one department or agency, or that unpleasant facts be kept from him. There are always those who would want to shield a President from bad news, misjudgments to spare him from being "smoked."


For some time I have been disturbed by the way CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times a policy-making arm of the Government. This has led to trouble and may have compounded our difficulties in several expensive areas.

I never had any thought that I would set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime claims and danger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassment that I think we have experienced are in attributable to the fact that this quick intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role that it is being interpreted as a symbol of sinister and mysterious foreign intrigue—and a subject for cold war enemy propaganda.

With all the nonsense put out by Communist propaganda about "Yankee imperialism," "exploitive capitalism," "war-mongering," "monopolists," in their name-calling assault on the CIA, Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg and Allen Dulles. These were men of the highest character, patriotism and integrity—and I assume this is true of all those who continue in charge.

But there are now some searching questions that need to be answered. I, therefore, would like to see the CIA be returned to its original assignment of the President, and that whatever else it can properly perform in that special field—and that its operational duties be terminated or properly used elsewhere.

We have grown up as a nation, respected for our free institutions and for our ability to maintain a free and open society. There is something about the way the CIA has been functioning that is creating a shadow over our historic position and I feel that we need to correct it.



Diamonds are a man's best friend

There are a number of occasions after the wedding when an ordinary gift just won't do. Anniversaries and special birthdays are obvious ones, but you'll think of others that have special meaning for you. At such times diamond jewelry is indeed man's best friend, and his logical gift choice. Consider remounting or replacing the diamond on her present engagement ring in view of changing ring styles and your own improved circumstances. A simple, graceful diamond pendant is an elegant accompaniment to a dressy dress. A diamond, even a small one, in a pin or brooch or bracelet says something no other jewel can. We have many good diamond ideas and many intelligent salespeople to show them. May we have the pleasure?

Ask for our 1963 Christmas Catalog

Chas. Schwartz & Son
Since 1885
Member American Gem Society
Park Inn—1313 F Street, Northwest

Open Every Weekday Night Until 9 p.m. Until Christmas

AT ALL 4 BIG HUB STORES!

For Those Last-Minute Santas!

Gifts You Can Carry!

ADMIRAL

23" 282 sq. in. viewable picture

PORTABLE TV

\$169.95

Big screen portable with console performs almost four speakers, stereo, antenna, etc. portable!

No Money Down!

19" 172 sq. in. viewable picture

SLIMLINE PORTABLE TV

\$129.95 No Money Down!

Lightweight Ten and four cabinet with luggage type handle, monopole antenna. Right picture!

Easy Terms!

'TELECTRO' Tape Recorders

MADE BY Emerson RADIO CORP.

TAPE RECORDER with ALL ACCESSORIES, TAPE

Carrying case, 5" speaker, 1 microphone, 7" reel, tape, take-up reel.

\$69.95 No Money Down!

QUALITY TAPE RECORDER WITH BUILT-IN RADIO

Record 240 program 2 speakers, crystal microphone, 1 hour tape on 7" reel, case.

\$189.95 No Money Down!

Perfect Home Gift!

TOASTMASTER 2-SLICE TOASTER

Smart chrome-plated finish, top-heat controls. Durable.

\$19.98 No Money Down!

GENERAL ELECTRIC WAFFLE MAKER & GRILL

Grills, fries and waffles without any supervision.

\$19.99 No Money Down!

AUTOMATIC STAINLESS COFFEEMAKER

Simply, when ready, coffee pours itself into your cup.

\$29.99 No Money Down!

Sunbeam DELUXE HAND MIXER

Efficient, easy-to-use, large volume mixer.

\$17.98 No Money Down!

MIXMASTER with 3 Beaters

12 speeds, double beaters, easy-to-use, large volume mixer.

\$29.98 No Money Down!

ALL 4 HUB STORES OPEN MON. 'TIL 9 P.M.

TUESDAY 'TIL 6 P.M.

PARK FREE AT ALL STORES

The HUB

Division 70 & N.W. MC 5533
4515 G Street NE, ARLINGTON, VA 22203
Branching & Highway 110, NORTHEAST 110
7013 New Hampshire, LANGLEY PARK, VA 22006

Pilgrims' Road

The route that Mary and Joseph took from Nazareth to Bethlehem today comes to a dead end at the Jerusalem border. But pilgrims—including, in January, the Pope—will may traverse the Holy Land.

See Travel & Resorts, G10

60 YEAR OLD HERZOG'S—MEN'S STORE IS

GOING OUT OF BUSINESS

\$190,000 STOCK

OF FINE MERCHANDISE WILL BE SACRIFICED AT DRASTIC SELL-OUT PRICES

- Arrow Shirts • Arrow Sportshirts • Arrow Underwear
- Van Heusen Shirts • Van Heusen Sportshirts • Coopers Jockey Underwear • Swank Jewelry • Stetson Hats
- Nunn Bush Shoes • Goshire Suits • Nottingham Suits
- Clipper Craft Suits • Mavest Sport Coats • Barron Anderson • Topcoats • Alligator Raincoats • Slacks

COME IN FOR THE GREATEST BUYS IN OUR 60-YEAR HISTORY... ALL FIXTURES FOR SALE

HERZOG'S MEN'S WEAR

CORNER 10th STREET & F, NORTHWEST

Hours: 9:30 A.M. to 9 P.M. Monday to Friday
Saturday 9-6

USE YOUR CENTRAL CHARGE

D. C. License No. 2635

Figure 4.7 Titled "Limit CIA Role to Intelligence," Truman's article caused a stir between the former President and Dulles. CIA officers were concerned the piece would bring the organisation unnecessary public scrutiny after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Truman however insisted he was shocked at how the article was published. *Source:* Truman, "Limit CIA Role to Intelligence," WP.

The Truman incident encapsulated Dulles's attempts to defend his Agency, a strategy he utilised until he died in 1969. He used public secrecy to argue the press leaks too much information. As DCI, Dulles managed the press effectively because he could release selective pieces of information he knew would not compromise CIA but provide enough information to keep reporters satisfied. Post-CIA, Dulles thought he wielded enough influence to convince the press that the U.S. could adopt a form of stricter censorship. But as a private citizen he soon discovered that he did not have the same authority he once did. He had lost public influence. The former DCI tried to shape public debate with publication of *The Craft*, but negative headlines harmed its public image. After Dulles, the CIA continued its press relations. Its approach evolved under a new DCI.

John McCone and the 1964 PR Disaster

Dulles's departure did not slow the CIA's momentum. It was publicly recognised as a key part of the government. It was a celebrity, "and like all celebrities," it had to promote its public image through "continuous media engagement."⁴⁶¹ McCone knew CIA had to continue its press relations. Although he often spoke about tightening security and further restricting the flow of Agency information to the press, notably in one example he said, "I certainly am not worried about the comments made in the press," in response to a critical article by syndicated columnist Doris Fleenon. It was nevertheless under his leadership that CIA expanded its press survey capabilities.⁴⁶² Like Dulles, he wanted to monitor press coverage immediately as he was provided a "ring binder of press clippings dealing with his appointment," but McCone proved less effective.⁴⁶³ His experience as chair of AEC meant he took a stricter approach to secrecy. He still held contacts with the Washington press corps but unlike Dulles's affinity for publicity, McCone did not have a close press relationship.⁴⁶⁴

He stressed that reporters should focus less on covert operations because it risked CIA secrecy and he emphasised the Agency's compatibility with the National Security Act.⁴⁶⁵ He wanted

⁴⁶¹ Willmetts, "The Burgeoning Fissures of Dissent," 173.

⁴⁶² CIA, "Letter to Mr. Preston Hotchkis from John A. McCone," November 20, 1961, CIA-RDP80B01676R003500110009-5, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R003500110009-5.pdf>, accessed 14th November 2024; Doris Fleenon, "Opposition to McCone as CIA Head," *SLPD*, November 9, 1961, p. 26.

⁴⁶³ CIA, "Letter to Mr. Terence M. Lee," October 13, 1961, CIA-RDP80B01676R002700070011-6, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R002700070011-6.pdf>, accessed 14th November 2024.

⁴⁶⁴ Robarge, "John McCone as Director of Central Intelligence," 80.

⁴⁶⁵ CIA, "Agency Relations with News Media," February 12, 1964, CIA-RDP84-00780R000600210002-3, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84-00780R000600210002-3.pdf>, accessed 16th December 2024; CIA, "Agency Relations with News Media," January 16, 1964, CIA-RDP80M01048A001500110040-2,

his name stripped from any publication and wrote to *This Week's* publisher stating he intends "to follow the recommended policy of not making public speeches, receiving honorary degrees, attending Commencement exercises or writing articles for the press."⁴⁶⁶ Even collaborating with CIA-defender Stewart Alsop in 1963 over an article, he urged any attribution be removed from the record.⁴⁶⁷

Press coverage continued under McCone. Reporters were keen to see what changes he would introduce as DCI. His nomination and appointment were followed with great interest in reporters who wanted to know what the CIA's next steps were after Dulles. Agency defender Joseph Alsop applauded McCone's nomination as a triumph against the "soft-boiled ideas" that argued the Agency is "immoral, illiberal, and un-American."⁴⁶⁸ Patriotic hyperbole characterised his nomination, labelling him as a figure who would steer the CIA on the right track in the Cold War. Coverage measured how McCone adapted his CIA as it adjusted to its new Langley surroundings, as Chalmers Roberts put it, the new DCI "thinks that the agency can become more anonymous even though it is impossible to hide its shiny new multimillion dollar headquarters."⁴⁶⁹

McCone's coverage was overwhelmingly positive. His background as a former AEC chief was highlighted and praised when JFK nominated him in September 1961.⁴⁷⁰ *NYT* Tom Wicker, a notable CIA critic, remarked McCone was "decisive and strong-willed" whilst an editorial declared he had "shown in his past governmental posts that he has the qualities needed for effective performance in Washington: high administrative ability, driving energy and the capacity to get along well with Congress."⁴⁷¹ *ES* asserted that the Agency will be more efficient because McCone was "no stranger to big, secret Government operations" and his "record inspires confidence."⁴⁷² His "credentials are

<https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80M01048A001500110040-2.pdf>, accessed 16th December 2024.

⁴⁶⁶ CIA, "Letter to Mr. William I. Nichols from John A. McCone," November 20, 1961, CIA-RDP80B01676R003500190001-5, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R003500190001-5.pdf>, accessed 14th November 2024.

⁴⁶⁷ Stewart Alsop, "CIA: The Battle for Secret Power," *Saturday Evening Post*, 236, no. 27 (July 27, 1963), 17-21; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 90-91.

⁴⁶⁸ Joseph Alsop, "No Soft-Boiled Egg," *WP*, September 29, 1961, p. A17.

⁴⁶⁹ Marquis Childs, "What Mr. McCone Confronts at CIA," *WP*, October 9, 1961, p. A14; Chalmers M. Roberts, "McCone has Passion for CIA Anonymity," *WP*, January 14, 1962, p. E1.

⁴⁷⁰ Edward T. Folliard, "CIA Reins are Handed to McCone," *WP*, September 28, 1961, p. A1; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 90.

⁴⁷¹ Tom Wicker, "McCone Reported Choice as C.I.A.'s New Director," *NYT*, September 27, 1961; "Changeover in the C.I.A.," *NYT*, September 29, 1961, p. 34.

⁴⁷² "McCone Experienced in Top Secret Work," *ES*, September 27, 1961, p. 2; "New Man at CIA," *ES*, September 29, 1961, p. 16.

impeccable,” and he “looks like a good choice,” proclaimed the *NYDN*, whilst the *LAT* declared “he has a deserved reputation.”⁴⁷³

McCone experienced some backlash to his appointment, but it did not gain any traction.⁴⁷⁴ Senator Eugene McCarthy consistently questioned him for his lack of qualifications and argued that an inexperienced candidate should not be considered for an agency that required further Congressional oversight. Despite support from *SLPD* into McCarthy’s criticism, the Senator’s opposition did not prevent McCone’s appointment.⁴⁷⁵ Similarly, the liberal correspondent, Drew Pearson, featured McCone in several of his “Merry-go-round” columns. He highlighted McCone’s financial stake in Standard Oil that he said were in direct conflict with his upcoming role as DCI.⁴⁷⁶

LAT criticised Pearson as their editorial declared his “treatment...is sheerly vindictive,” and “answers the question why many men of ability are reluctant to serve the government.” A reader supported it, stating “if you are under contract to publish his stuff can’t you bury it where it is difficult to find?”⁴⁷⁷ McCone was officially appointed DCI in February 1962. Pearson continued to accuse him of possessing “great power” in “molding U.S. foreign policy,” but his disapproval went unnoticed as the *ES* congratulated the new DCI, remarking his appointment is “more desirable since there seems to have been a studied effort in some segments of the press to discredit him and destroy public confidence in his fitness for the job.”⁴⁷⁸

McCone’s relationship with the press had demonstrated that CIA remained obsessed with their portrayal. At a time when the organisation was under public scrutiny, McCone maintained and even extended its offensive PR strategy. In August he sent a memorandum reviewing CIA-press policy as he reminded employees to declare any contacts with press members weekly to senior officials. Another surfaced in 1965 repeating the order near the end of his tenure.⁴⁷⁹ Lyman B.

⁴⁷³ Michael O’Neill, “Capital Circus,” *NYDN*, September 28, 1961, p. 508; “Our New Spymaster,” *NYDN*, September 29, 1961, p. 159; “A Top Man for a Tough Job,” *LAT*, September 29, 1961, p. 52.

⁴⁷⁴ Richard Dudman, “Confirmation of CIA Head to be Opposed,” *SLPD*, January 11, 1962, p. 14.

⁴⁷⁵ “Making Sure About the CIA,” *SLPD*, January 14, 1962, p. 31; David M. Barrett, “Explaining the First Contested Senate Confirmation of a Director of Central Intelligence: John McCone, the Kennedy White House, the CIA and the Senate, 1962,” *Intelligence and National Security*, 31, no. 1 (2016), 79-80.

⁴⁷⁶ Drew Pearson, “McCone Seen Almost Certain to Pass the Senate Inspection,” *LAT*, January 17, 1962, p. 46.

⁴⁷⁷ “John McCone, Public Servant,” *LAT*, January 17, 1962, p. 44; Owen J. Myers, “Readers Praise and Pan Editorial in Defense of CIA Chief McCone,” *LAT*, January 21, 1962, p. 29.

⁴⁷⁸ “McCone Gets Approval of Committee,” *WP*, January 23, 1962, p. A2; Drew Pearson, “Head of Central Intelligence Agency Possesses Great Power,” *LAT*, January 29, 1962, p. 46; “Confirming Mr. McCone,” *ES*, February 4, 1962, p. 32.

⁴⁷⁹ CIA, “Memorandum for: General Carter, DDCI from John A. McCone,” August 14, 1962, CIA-RDP80B01676R001300050041-0, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R001300050041-0.pdf>, accessed 10th December 2024; CIA, “Contacts with the Press,” January 22, 1965, CIA-RDP68R00530A000100100023-1, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP68R00530A000100100023-1.pdf>, accessed 27th May 2020.

Kirkpatrick, now Executive Director, wrote to other senior officials proposing CIA centralise Stanley Grogan's press clipping service. This proposal echoed the call for greater efficiency and reduced wastage that aligned with the Langley relocation to "better serve the needs of everybody more economically."⁴⁸⁰ He instructed HIC's Pforzheimer to "conduct...a factual survey of what clipping is going on in the Agency." His survey concluded the service should be centralised and expanded.⁴⁸¹

Under McCone's leadership, senior officials took active steps to go beyond the Dulles era by dramatically increasing CIA collection and analysis of press coverage. Succeeding Grogan, Paul M. Chretien was the new CIA PR official. He found the Agency was not adequately collecting press clippings. He called for more employees to aid in collating and reviewing major and local newspapers. Gaps were also persistent in analysing foreign press periodicals, but Chretien asserted "it may be wise to defer action in this area until we have the system, procedures and capability of properly handling the domestic press." The survey recommended that the DCI receive a daily clipping book, alongside other senior officials. Clippings featuring former and current employees "will be indexed and filed in the press personalities files," including individuals who are named in papers' "society" sections.⁴⁸²

Expanding the clipping service aligned with the Agency's move to conduct a rare press conference in January 1964. It aimed to bolster McCone's aim to shift coverage on the CIA's analytical branch rather than its covert operations. The DCI reiterated Dulles's PR approach. He authorised *ES* reporter Charles Bartlett to cite a CIA report on an estimate of the Soviet economy in December 1963. By early-January details of the conference were published by *LAT* and coverage focused on why the CIA had decided to conduct the event in the first place. McCone's strategy backfired because the press were accustomed to his nonattributable approach, and reporters held little interest in the information he provided.⁴⁸³ The Deputy Director of Intelligence, Ray S. Cline, who

⁴⁸⁰ CIA, "Agency Clipping Service," November 26, 1963.

⁴⁸¹ CIA, "Press Clip Project," May 26, 1964, CIA-RDP80B01676R000600130007-7, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R000600130007-7.pdf>, accessed 10th December 2024.

⁴⁸² CIA, "Press Clip Project Meeting 2:00, 2 June 1964 – DCI Conference Room," June 2, 1964, CIA-RDP80B01676R000600130005-9, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R000600130005-9.pdf>, accessed 10th December 2024; "Chretien Named Advisor to CIA," *WP*, November 12, 1963, page unknown.

⁴⁸³ "Soviet Economy in Bad Shape, CIA Discloses," *LAT*, January 8, 1964, p. 1; Matthew Cecil, "Unveiling the 'Sick Elephant': CIA Public Relations and the Soviet Economic Forecast Controversy of 1964," *American Journalism*, 36, no. 2 (2019), 184-185.

briefed journalists at the event, recalled that reporters were only involved in the conference because it included a tour at Langley where they could write “colorful stories” about CIA.⁴⁸⁴

The press argued the conference served as nothing more than an attempt at CIA propaganda. The satirical writer for *WP* George Dixon remarked the Agency “called in a batch of reporters and became as garrulous as Little Orphan Annie.” Whilst *ES* declared, “the Langley seminar directors aren’t even trying to manage the news. All they want is to create a better institutional image...the best image for an intelligence agency remains no image at all.”⁴⁸⁵ It was a “blunder,” the *NYT* remarked, as it hoped the PR event would be the CIA’s last. The Agency “has gone completely off its rocker,” the *LAT* said, “it is a sick elephant. And a sick elephant is a formidable danger.”⁴⁸⁶

The CIA surveyed the negative coverage it received. A memorandum instructed other departments to provide their feedback.⁴⁸⁷ The Director of Security and Lawrence K. White stated the conference endangered CIA’s sources and methods, staff morale, and led to an impetus for closer Congressional oversight including the creation of a JC.⁴⁸⁸ The medical staff chief reported that the conference’s coverage “has served to perpetuate an internal uneasiness that had been subsiding” whilst the Director of Training feared the negative publicity “could deter qualified young men and women from seeking a career in the Agency.”⁴⁸⁹ The Director of Finance replied scathingly that colleagues were “disappointed to think that CIA would feel it necessary to try to improve their image to the public since...the public, had learned to accept...that an intelligence agency was expected to...never brag about accomplishments and remain anonymous individually!”⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁴ Ray S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA* (Washington D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1976), 205.

⁴⁸⁵ George Dixon, “The CIA’s ‘New Image,’” *WP*, January 27, 1964, p. A13; “The Image at CIA,” *ES*, January 14, 1964, page unknown.

⁴⁸⁶ “That C.I.A. Press Conference,” *NYT*, January 16, 1964, p. 24; Henry J. Taylor, “CIA ‘Completely Off Its Rocker’ in ‘Guessing’ on Soviet Economy,” *LAT*, January 15, 1964, p. 29.

⁴⁸⁷ CIA, “Relations with News Media and the CIA ‘Image,’” January 21, 1964, CIA-RDP78B05708A000200150011-4, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78B05708A000200150011-4.pdf>, accessed 12th December 2024.

⁴⁸⁸ CIA, “Agency Relations with News Media,” January 1, 1964, CIA-RDP84-00780R000600210003-2, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84-00780R000600210003-2.pdf>, accessed 12th December 2024.

⁴⁸⁹ CIA, “Agency Relations with News Media,” January 28, 1964, CIA-RDP84-00780R000600210011-3, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84-00780R000600210011-3.pdf>, accessed 12th December 2024; CIA, “Agency Relations with News Media,” January 29, 1964, CIA-RDP84-00780R000600210012-2, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84-00780R000600210012-2.pdf>, accessed 12th December 2024.

⁴⁹⁰ CIA, “Agency Relations with News Media,” January 1, 1964, CIA-RDP84-00780R000600210009-6, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84-00780R000600210009-6.pdf>, accessed 12th December 2024.

Other responses from the conference demonstrated a split between officials and a broader uncertainty that shows how conflicting views have frequently persisted over CIA public secrecy. On the one hand, Cline, who briefed the press under McCone, proposed the Agency ease its secrecy surrounding its agents and let them be identified to CIA rather than the “US Government (a tag which is often either meaningless or ridiculous.)”⁴⁹¹ On the other, two officers who were often suspicious of the press used the conference’s negative publicity to argue CIA should further increase its secrecy.

The Office of National Estimates’ Sherman Kent, and Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms opted for limits in CIA-press relations. Kent responded “I have long held the American press and the people who work for it in the very lowest esteem. An Agency such as ours cannot possibly win by having any dealings whatsoever with the press. It is my honest opinion that over the long run we will do better by taking the knocks as they come and maintaining a dignified silence.”⁴⁹² Helms argued the press often cover the clandestine service as “a motley crew of adventurers intent upon taking U.S. policy into their own hands.” He proposed that CIA never again be attributable and instead issue “extremely selective, informal, off-the-record conversations by senior CIA officials with a limited number of key reporters.”⁴⁹³

McCone acknowledged that coverage focused on the CIA’s sudden shift toward making its information attributable rather than on the value of the material obtained. He recognised the conference’s publicity opened old wounds such as the call for increased Congressional oversight.⁴⁹⁴ As the heads of CIA departments were writing their responses to the initial memorandum, McCone, Kirkpatrick, Cline, Helms, and Chretien drafted a new policy that echoed the DCI’s aim of controlling CIA information. It established a tighter network between CIA and the executive branch, whilst proposing the creation of “a committee on public relations,” headed by Kirkpatrick, “to review and approve all activities in press relations.” It stated that CIA does not release any intelligence estimates in the future and it should be under no obligation to make information attributable. “It would appear wise,” McCone declared, “to return to a steadfast and stringent policy of no open news

⁴⁹¹ CIA, “Agency Relations with News Media,” January 16, 1964, CIA-RDP80B01676R000100130041-4, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R000100130041-4.pdf>, accessed 12th December 2024.

⁴⁹² CIA, “Memorandum for the Acting Director from Sherman Kent,” January 27, 1964, CIA-RDP79R00904A001000050044-0, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R00904A001000050044-0.pdf>, accessed 12th December 2024,

⁴⁹³ CIA, “Agency Relations with News Media,” January 16, 1964, CIA-RDP80B01676R000100130041-4.

⁴⁹⁴ CIA, “Agency Relations with News Media,” January 16, 1964; CIA, “Recent CIA Publicity,” January 13, 1964, CIA-RDP80B01676R001500050003-0, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R001500050003-0.pdf>, accessed 12th December 2024.

releases or conferences.” He did however allow CIA attribution if it adhered to a “sound security approach.” He included this in a memorandum sent to President Lyndon Johnson on 29 January.⁴⁹⁵

McCone’s tenure reflected greater continuity in CIA-press relations. He recognised the Agency could not hide behind the shadows and had to engage with reporters. He tried to change some approaches such as instilling more control over CIA material that was noted by the investigative reporter Jack Anderson.⁴⁹⁶ But McCone could not stop the press from systematically covering his CIA. He and other senior officials were adamant on surveying it by maintaining and expanding its press clipping service. McCone realised he could not dramatically shift CIA-press relations after Dulles’s long tenure which was fuelled by the former DCI’s publicity.

Reaction to Congressional Scrutiny

The public debate over Congressional oversight intensified after the Bay of Pigs but two events provoked distinct reactions from the press and CIA. The first was Dulles’s *Britannica* entry. In it he opposed further supervision, asserting the current system involving Congress’s Appropriations and Armed Services was adequate and concealed sensitive CIA material. He warned more committees or a JC risked compromising CIA secrecy because its budget and operations could be revealed. He wanted to limit a public discussion on supervision, but the opposite occurred. JC supporters such as Senators Wayne Morse, William Fulbright, Eugene McCarthy, and Mike Mansfield all saw their commitments for increased oversight gain support due to Dulles’s statements.⁴⁹⁷

The press was not uniform in its support over increasing oversight. On the one hand, *NYT* continued its JC advocacy referring to Dulles’s “mistaken” remarks on the matter whilst *SLPD* responded that further supervision limited the “broad authority” that “may induce secret agents to act on their own assumptions.”⁴⁹⁸ On the other, the *ES* and *LAT* warned against increased CIA checks because it would damage the organisation’s secrecy. A JC proposal is “unimpressive to say the least,” *ES* said, whilst a JC would increase the “chances of a serious information leak” imperilling the lives of agents, “certainly no thinking congressmen wants that to happen.”⁴⁹⁹

⁴⁹⁵ CIA, “Effects on CIA Resulting from Publicity caused by News Release on Soviet Union’s Economy,” January 1, 1964, CIA-RDP84-00780R000600210004-1, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84-00780R000600210004-1.pdf>, accessed 11th June 2020; Cecil, “Unveiling the ‘Sick Elephant,’” 190-194.

⁴⁹⁶ Jack Anderson, “John McCone: Secrecy is his Business,” *SLPD*, December 16, 1962, p. 161.

⁴⁹⁷ Richard L. Lyons, “Congressman Asks Watchdog Group on CIA,” *WP*, February 28, 1963, p. A11.

⁴⁹⁸ “Intelligent Intelligence,” *NYT*, February 25, 1963, p. 8; “State Within a State?” *NYT*, October 6, 1963, p. 194; “A Watchdog for the CIA,” *SLPD*, October 10, 1963, p. 21.

⁴⁹⁹ “No Watchdog Wanted,” *ES*, October 14, 1963, p. A10; “CIA and Congressional ‘Watchdogs,’” *LAT*, November 8, 1963, p. A4.

The second event was the publication of two articles by Senator Eugene McCarthy and Representative John V. Lindsay both advocating a JC. Shortly after Truman's critical *WP* article, McCarthy published an article in the *Saturday Evening Post*. He argued CIA receives "superficial" oversight and limited executive supervision. Readers praised the Senator. "Thank goodness someone had the courage to challenge the all-powerful-all-knowing...Agency," one said, whilst another remarked "McCarthy is to be commended for his courage."⁵⁰⁰ In contrast, CIA defender Stewart Alsop wrote a reply refuting McCarthy's article as "hogwash." The Agency "is rather like the boy in school who always gets slapped around because everybody knows he won't hit back...CIA is unquestionably the most supervised agency in the Government," and it is "just plain silly...to suppose that...CIA is 'a law unto itself.'"⁵⁰¹

A month after McCarthy's article, Lindsay produced a scathing attack in *Esquire*. General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston knew the Congressman would criticise CIA a year before the article's publication. He was cited as an example of a broader "congressional problem" that could be rectified by changing the CIA's "negative attitude" to one which the Agency "should be able to have some discussion and...improve our general congressional relationship." Lindsay's annoyance with McCone and the CIA's reluctance to share information led him to support and propose a JC.⁵⁰² Like McCarthy, Lindsay outlines the failure of current oversight procedures. He describes the organisation as an "immensely powerful and extremely expensive secret organization" at the heart of government which uses excessive secrecy to influence foreign policy. A JC would effectively safeguard CIA whilst maintaining the concealment of its operations.⁵⁰³

McCone denounced the articles. A public discussion over a JC infuriated the DCI as he criticised "this continued prattle about a watchdog committee." He referred to the authors as "sons of bitches," and called the accusations "a series of absolute misstatements." He threatened to resign in protest if Lindsay and McCarthy continued to gain press and Congressional support.⁵⁰⁴ Dulles

⁵⁰⁰ Eugene McCarthy, "The CIA is Getting Out of Hand," *Saturday Evening Post*, 237, no. 1, (January 4, 1964), pp. 6-10; Janice Shadman, "Trench-Coat Diplomacy," *Saturday Evening Post*, 237, no. 5 (February 8, 1964), 4; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 95.

⁵⁰¹ Stewart Alsop, "Hogwash about the CIA," *Saturday Evening Post*, 237, no. 6 (February 15, 1964), 15.

⁵⁰² CIA, "Congressional Relations-John V. Lindsay (R., New York)," April 4, 1963, CIA-RDP90-00610R000200080023-3, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00610R000200080023-3.pdf>, accessed 6th January 2025.

⁵⁰³ CIA, "Congressional Relations-John V. Lindsay (R., New York)," April 4, 1963, CIA-RDP90-00610R000200080023-3, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00610R000200080023-3.pdf>, accessed 6th January 2025; John V. Lindsay, "An Inquiry into the Darkness of the Cloak, the Sharpness of the Dagger," *Esquire*, March 1, 1964, 106.

⁵⁰⁴ McCone quoted in Snider, *Congress and the CIA*, 23; McCone quoted in John Prados, *The Family Jewels: The CIA, Secrecy, and Presidential Power* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013), 197; Robarge, "John McCone as Director of Central Intelligence," 75-76.

likewise feared CIA scrutiny would increase and sent a letter to both Congressmen. To McCarthy, he reiterated his statement he made to Truman a few weeks prior. He was “deeply disturbed” by the Senator’s article and wanted to set a meeting with him to discuss what Dulles claimed were incorrect statements. On a JC, the former DCI concluded “I respect your position here although I do not wholly agree with it.”⁵⁰⁵

Months before the article was published, Dulles wrote to Lindsay to say he disagreed with his argument that Congress were kept in the dark about the Agency. “Over the last decade...Congress and...CIA are on the right track.” A JC, “seems to me hardly consistent either with security or with the executive functions in the field of intelligence.” The ex-DCI took a similar approach and offered to meet with him to “talk the matter over.” He sent another saying he was “deeply disturbed” about the article’s promotion in the *NYT* with the headline “N.Y. Congressman Blasts the CIA. What is wrong with the CIA? Will its secret powers upset the democratic processes of our nation?” Dulles criticised Lindsay for not meeting with him sooner.⁵⁰⁶ Unbeknownst to Lindsay, the advertisement of his article shocked him. He wrote to *Esquire* saying he was “astonished and concerned.” The article was “quite complimentary,” and offered “a very moderate reasoned discussion of a recognized problem.”⁵⁰⁷

The Agency’s Legislative Counsel analysed both articles. It contended that McCarthy claimed CIA usurped foreign policy. “McCarthy attacks only the CIA,” a memorandum noted, portraying it as an “invisible government.”⁵⁰⁸ The *Esquire* article was adapted from a Congressional speech Lindsay gave prior as his earlier accusations that CIA shaped foreign policy did not appear in the article. In response CIA established a task force involving Paul Chretien to “gather any possible information which will shed light on the origins of Lindsay’s thoughts and phrases.” Despite apologising to Lindsay for failing to provide him with CIA material, McCone ensured that he worked closely with the

⁵⁰⁵ CIA, “Dear Senator,” January 21, 1964, CIA-RDP75-00149R000500040065-5, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00149R000500040065-5.pdf>, accessed 13th September 2022.

⁵⁰⁶ “Dear John,” November 6, 1963, February 23, 1962, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 39, Folder 19; CIA, “Letter to John V. Lindsay from Allen W. Dulles,” February 24, 1964, CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050087-9, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050087-9.pdf>, accessed 2nd June 2020.

⁵⁰⁷ CIA, “Letter to Harold Hayes from John V. Lindsay,” February 20, 1964, CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050090-5, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050090-5.pdf>, accessed 6th January 2025.

⁵⁰⁸ CIA, “Analysis of Senator Eugene McCarthy’s Article in the 4 January 1964 Issue of the Saturday Evening Post,” February 27, 1964, CIA-RDP75-00149R000500040053-8, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00149R000500040053-8.pdf>, accessed 7th January 2025.

current oversight procedures and encouraged members to meet him more frequently to suppress proposals for a JC. Dulles worked behind the scenes to ensure further legislative oversight failed.⁵⁰⁹

Dulles maintained contact with Congressional members as a private citizen to examine whether support was growing for a JC which he reiterated back to the Agency. He received a letter from the House's Armed Services member, Leslie Arends. A fervent CIA supporter, he said "I do not find myself in agreement" with Lindsay's article, "too many people are beginning to take 'pot shots' at...CIA...Suffice to say I do not like the trend."⁵¹⁰ Arends gave a speech on the House floor where he declared the Agency provided valuable intelligence in the Cold War.⁵¹¹ "Much of the criticism...is not constructive," he said as he praised the current oversight procedures as satisfactory and stated CIA supervision remain secret. Dulles wrote back to the Congressman, congratulating him on his speech, "I thought it was excellent."⁵¹²

McCone, Dulles, and other senior officials recognised CIA could not distance itself from press and Congressional criticism. It had to respond if it wanted to curb further scrutiny. The Agency did succeed in stifling proposals for increased oversight because it could rely on friendly Congressional stalwarts to counter any momentum for a JC. CIA's position was aided because the press was split over introducing reform. *NYT* continued their support, but *LAT* raised concerns over the impact to CIA effectiveness whilst *NYDN* argued CIA material could become public knowledge that would benefit U.S. adversaries, a line parroted from Dulles's *Britannica* entry.⁵¹³ CIA dealt with Congressional scrutiny behind the scenes but they took a more forceful approach against critical publications.

Surveying the Narrative: CIA Reaction to the *Invisible Government* and the *NYT* Series

The 1964 publication by journalists David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government*, relied heavily on publicly available sources. The extent of accessible open information the authors obtained could be easily gleaned from material in the public domain. It emphasised how

⁵⁰⁹ CIA, "Comments on Representative John V. Lindsay's Article in the March 1964 Issue of Esquire Magazine," February 25, 1964, CIA-RDP75-00149R000400500009-7, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00149R000400500009-7.pdf>, accessed 7th January 2025.

⁵¹⁰ Richard Pearson, "Leslie C. Arends, 89, Dies," *WP*, July 17, 1985, p. C10; "Dear Allen," March 10, 1964, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 1, Folder 3.

⁵¹¹ Jason U. Manosevitz, "The Intelligence Politics of Early Congressional Oversight of CIA," *Intelligence and National Security*, 38, no. 5 (2023), 710-711.

⁵¹² "Arends Defends C.I.A. Against Critics," *NYT*, March 27, 1964, p. 8; "Dear Les," April 10, 1964, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 1, Folder 3.

⁵¹³ "C.I.A. Super-Government?," *NYT*, September 3, 1965, p. 26; "Supervising the C.I.A.," *NYT*, July 16, 1966, p. 18; "How Much Supervision of CIA?," *LAT*, April 7, 1966, p. 40; "Hurray for Rep. Mills," *NYDN*, May 14, 1966, p. 265; "Reds Would Love It," *NYDN*, May 19, 1966, p. 340.

much CIA material was available to any journalist who wanted to write an account of the Agency. It demonstrated that CIA public secrecy went too far because it undermined Agency efforts in portraying a positive public image. The book argued CIA operated without supervision within the broad authority given to it by the President and the executive. The organisation works “outside of the normal Constitutional checks and balances,” whilst it “has grown rapidly and...has increased proportionately.”⁵¹⁴

Despite the authors claim that “much of the material has never been printed anywhere else before,” *The Invisible Government* used press articles and public Congressional records to write a history of CIA covert operations. It exposed the inherent CIA conflict between secrecy and publicity. Marquis Childs exclaimed, “where is the dividing line between secrecy and the right to know?” Whilst Ben Bagdikian wrote “the existence of institutionalized secrecy poses problems of judgement on books like this one. The authors draw from the open record of indisputable accuracy, but they also provide missing links and draw inferences presumably based on information whose source is not cited because the best sources on secret operations don’t talk for the record. This leaves the public uncertain.”⁵¹⁵

Other reviews were more critical by arguing it failed to unearth new CIA information. “No ordinary citizen could read the book without learning much that he never knew before,” one *NYT* reporter stated, whilst intelligence scholar Harry Howe Ransom commented “this book will be less revealing to the Kremlin than to the American public.”⁵¹⁶ Conservative coverage depicted the authors as unpatriotic liberals whose only aim was to damage CIA’s reputation. Writing in the *National Review*, William Buckley called it “so palpably absurd,” the purpose of the book was to “simply to make a little scandal and make a little money.” He accused the authors of compromising CIA security by revealing the names of agents, a foreshadow of criticisms to emerge in the next two decades.⁵¹⁷

Despite *The Invisible Government* not revealing new material to the press, CIA, now in “panic mode,” attempted to censor it because they characterised it as a radical publication that could disclose sensitive CIA information. The Agency already acquired the book’s galley proofs and

⁵¹⁴ Wise and Ross, *The Invisible Government*, 6, 350.

⁵¹⁵ Marquis Childs, “Issue of Secrecy: Books on the CIA,” *WP*, May 20, 1964, p. A18; Ben H. Bagdikian, “Working in Secret,” *NYT*, June 28, 1964, p. BR3.

⁵¹⁶ Orville Prescott, “The Secret Power of Secret Services,” *NYT*, June 15, 1964, p. 27; Harry Howe Ransom, “‘Top of Iceberg’ View of CIA No News in Kremlin,” *WP*, June 24, 1964, p. A4.

⁵¹⁷ Jenkin Lloyd Jones, “Fact and Fear about the CIA,” *Washington Star*, July 30, 1964; William F. Buckley, “Hate CIA Enterprise,” *National Review*, 16, no. 26 (June 30, 1964), pp. 541-542; Wise and Ross, *The Invisible Government*, 6.

McCone established a task force to examine any potential security breaches.⁵¹⁸ CIA argued that whilst the book relies on public sources, it compromises the organisation's security because it is combined with uncited material. "This book is a classic case of the whole being a far more damaging security erosion than the individual parts which compose it," Richard Helms wrote to the DCI. "Soviet intelligence might be able to compile this kind of compendium out of individual items which have appeared in print, but they would not have access to those knowledgeable individuals in Washington who have contributed to the mortar between the bricks."⁵¹⁹

The Office of Security could not identify any violations and concluded that prosecution would be unlikely. In a meeting with the authors, McCone stated the book risked national security and provided "a vast stockpile of material for critical speeches and editorials." He urged the authors to remove ten potentially damaging security breaches, but Ross and Wise refused to comply. Fearing the book would damage its public image and endanger the lives of its agents, McCone contacted the editor of *Look*, Mike Cowles, to remove their planned excerpts of it and threatened the editor of the book's publisher, Random House, with prosecution under the Espionage Act.⁵²⁰

McCone could not stop publication. CIA attempted to plant fake reviews in *Life* and *Reader's Digest* as well as leaking information to journalists that claimed the book harboured security breaches. The combined effort failed, and publication ensued. The Agency surveyed press reaction and discovered the term "invisible government" was already gaining traction before the book was released with Harry Howe Ransom and Senator Eugene McCarthy having mentioned the term. With publication however, Paul M. Chretien noted that numerous articles, editorials, and columnists were now highlighting and using it more frequently as the focus of their CIA criticism.⁵²¹

The CIA continued to survey the impact of *The Invisible Government* and ordered a report on the "usages" of it abroad. McCone aimed to show journalists the book resulted in attacks on CIA and was "a favourite source of Soviet propagandists." Helms' assertions the book benefitted Soviet intelligence was correct but CIA's intention to ban the publication caused more damage for its public image. The reviews of it demonstrated the book did not disclose anything new about CIA, but the

⁵¹⁸ Simon Willmetts, "Forbidden History: CIA Censorship, *The Invisible Government*, and the Origins of the 'Deep State' Conspiracy Theory," *Intelligence and National Security*, 39, no. 2 (2024), 287-288.

⁵¹⁹ CIA, "The Invisible Government," May 4, 1964, CIA-RDP80B01676R001300140022-1, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R001300140022-1.pdf>, accessed 8th January 2025.

⁵²⁰ Ibid; "C.I.A. Said to Charge Book is Inaccurate," *NYT*, June 10, 1964, p. 48; Donald Grant, "M'Cone Tried to Stop New Book on CIA," *SLPD*, June 18, 1964, p. 1; Prados, *The Family Jewels*, 204-205.

⁵²¹ CIA, "The Invisible Government," June 22, 1964, CIA-RDP80B01676R001600040008-5, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R001600040008-5.pdf>, accessed 26th June 2020; CIA, "Press References to the Invisible Government," June 15, 1964, CIA-RDP80B01676R001300140005-0, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R001300140005-0.pdf>, accessed 8th January 2025; Willmetts, "Forbidden History," 288.

Agency's efforts to see it removed increased its appeal, allowing it to become part of a broader conspiracy theory that argued the Agency dictated American foreign policy.⁵²²

The growing use of the term "invisible government" led reporters to eye more scoops on CIA. *NYT* published a five-part, front-page series in April 1966. Correspondents Tom Wicker, Jack Raymond, Max Frankel, Robert Phelps and Edwin Kenworthy met with McCone to discuss publication and any potential security breaches in July 1964. Because of its national reach and prestige, the *NYT* were cautious in its portrayal of the Agency. Editors Harrison Salisbury and James Reston stressed they were careful not to reveal sensitive CIA material. It played a role in their decision to comprise the articles with "such great care and...remarkable attention to the views of the agency involved." Maintaining close connections with Agency officials and their reliance on valuable CIA information had played an important part in the publication of the *NYT* series. The CIA remained non-attributable, echoing the aims of McCone and other senior officials, whilst Reston and Wicker were able to keep their journalistic privileges with access to CIA information.⁵²³

Cooperating with the *NYT* shifted McCone's approach to the press as he came to the end of his tenure. The outgoing DCI no longer relied on a reactive strategy or attempted to censor stories he felt damaged CIA's image. But *NYT* cautiousness played into McCone's hands as the articles "raised probing questions but no alarms."⁵²⁴ The first article sympathised with the Agency, stating it has "been accused of almost anything anyone wanted to accuse it of." It was controlled effectively, Wicker and others argued and did not resemble an "invisible government." The second and third articles delved into CIA's covert operations and intelligence capabilities. CIA received praise for its activities in the Congo, and its use of electronic spying was described as "extremely good." The fourth article concluded that there was "widespread feeling" that a JC "would do the agency's vital functions more harm than good," whilst the fifth reiterates the notion that CIA was not out of control and the executive branch should be held accountable if the Agency exceeds its statutory authority.⁵²⁵

Despite the *NYT*'s tame commentary, former press officer Stanley Grogan was cautious to cooperate with the paper. After retiring due to ill health, he was retained for consultative advice for Chretien. Grogan disapproved of the upcoming series in a memorandum to Helms which he titled

⁵²² Ibid, 291-292.

⁵²³ Salisbury quoted in McGarr, *City of Newsmen*, 224; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 98-101.

⁵²⁴ Pressman, *On Press*, 190.

⁵²⁵ Tom Wicker et al., "C.I.A.: Maker of Policy, or Tool?," *NYT*, April 25, 1966, p.1; "How the C.I.A. put 'Instant Air Force' into Congo," *NYT*, April 26, 1966, p. 1; "Electronic Prying Grows:," *NYT*, April 27, 1966, p. 1; "C.I.A. Operations: A Plot Scuttled:," *NYT*, April 28, 1966, p. 1; "The C.I.A.: Qualities of Director Viewed as Chief Rein on Agency," *NYT*, April 29, 1966, p. 1.

“NEW YORK TIMES Threat to Safety of the Nation.” In it, Grogan emphasised the threat to national security if *NYT* published the series and added it may provide impetus for Congress to limit CIA power.⁵²⁶ He proposed the Agency establish a counter effort led by the current DCI William Raborn and Helms to converse with *NYT* editors to “create a preventive atmosphere.” McCone reiterated Grogan’s concerns about the dangers to national security and insisted that certain passages were changed to prevent the exposure of agents. Other corrections suggested removing references to Truman’s *WP* article and the Agency’s ties with the anticommunist organisation, the Congress for Cultural Freedom. These suggestions were ignored, nevertheless, Grogan was successful because the CIA persuaded the *NYT* not to publish a book based on the series.⁵²⁷

The Invisible Government and *NYT* series demonstrated CIA could not avoid the public spotlight. McCone’s attempts to shape the narrative by curbing critical publications and articles was not radically different from Dulles. But CIA was a celebrity now and had to maintain an offensive, proactive PR strategy. It could not censor critical publications, as doing so caused more harm towards the Agency’s image. *NYT* series revealed to many officers that reporters were eager to learn more about CIA, and it could no longer afford to distance itself from the press. These thoughts were handed to Helms as he instructed officers to forward their views on the CIA’s publicity. “The newspaper medium is anxious to establish closer relations with the Agency,” expressed one officer. “We must develop better personal relations with key figures in TV, radio and the press,” exclaimed another, “we must realize that CIA is no longer in the shadows, it is in the public domain.”⁵²⁸

This chapter argues the CIA maintained its obsession with its public profile amidst increasing press scrutiny during this period. Three key themes emerge from it. First, the Bay of Pigs did not break the Cold War consensus. Despite systematic reporting, CIA’s existence was never questioned after the invasion as the press argued it remained a vital organisation in fighting the Cold War. Its relocation to the Washington suburbs emphasised its influence and role within the U.S. government. The move increased press coverage because reporters were eager to understand how a supposedly secret intelligence institution could be situated in a large, visible building.

Second, this period demonstrates the DCI’s image is linked to CIA. After his tenure, Dulles knew that as a private citizen he could use his speeches, television, newspaper interviews, and *The*

⁵²⁶ Grogan quoted in Salisbury, *Without Fear or Favor*, 519-521.

⁵²⁷ Catledge, *My Life and the Times*, 289; Salisbury, *Without Fear or Favor*, 523; Prados, *The Family Jewels*, 198.

⁵²⁸ CIA, “Memorandum for: Deputy Director for Support from Richard Helms,” May 24, 1966, CIA-RDP84-00780R001500050039-1.

Craft, to portray a romanticised view of the Agency. It made him a magnet for the press who wished to know more about it. With this he could shape the public debate by establishing a narrative that argued national security is in danger if further press and Congressional scrutiny occurred. He also learnt that this approach could only go so far. His insistence that the U.S. could adopt a model akin to the British D-Notice system revealed a clear division between the perspectives of secrecy-minded officials and a free press. It demonstrated that Dulles could never discuss extreme censorship as DCI without incurring strident press criticism that would be directed solely at the CIA. John McCone, portraying the image of the sombre bureaucratic leader, in contrast, could not afford to debate such issues as DCI.

Third, despite McCone's attempts to keep the press distant, its press coverage dominated internal discussion. Stanley Grogan, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Walter Pforzheimer, and Paul Chretien expanded its press survey capabilities whilst multiple internal recommendations were put forward to make the Agency more proactive in its press relations. They argued CIA's PR strategy should continue to be on the offensive, as it needed to be ahead of the curve to combat negative coverage and shape the narrative. Coverage was measured after CIA's own ventures into publicity and the emerging critical publications about it. Agency officials recognised the importance of its image for reasons such as recruitment, morale, and bureaucratic survival. The aftermath of the Bay of Pigs served as CIA's first major PR test dealing with an eager press who wanted to write more about it. Its functions and activities were widely documented as it now became an entrenched institution within the U.S. government. It had to manage its secrecy whilst maintaining its public persona. It was a PR skill that became incredibly useful that William Colby sought to exploit in the 1970s.

4. Managed Transparency: William Colby and Public Secrecy after the Hersh Revelations

“The almost hysterical excitement that surrounds any news story mentioning C.I.A., or even referring to a perfectly legitimate activity of C.I.A., has raised the question whether secret intelligence operations can be conducted by the United States.” - *William Colby, 1975* ⁵²⁹

“The careful reader will also notice certain inconsistencies or even inaccuracies in some of Colby’s statements. Although many were challenged, I have no way of knowing what Colby’s sources are or whether future researchers can prove him right or wrong.” - *Playboy, 1978* ⁵³⁰

“I thought that if I could be responsive on things that were proper, that Congress had a proper interest in knowing, that I could convince the congressmen not to get into the more sensitive stuff. And I think that essentially worked.” - *William Colby, 1983* ⁵³¹

A memorandum was sent to William Colby on 20 December 1974 from CIA’s Director of Political Research Lewis J. Lapham about a recent interview Colby gave to *U.S. News and World Report*. He reminded the DCI that CIA needed to tell the public more effectively its overt intelligence capabilities. “It should have been possible...to place appropriate emphasis on the non-collection, non-operational aspects of CIA’s mission.” It shows that CIA wanted to place less emphasis on “the...exclusive focus on clandestine collection” because the Agency was entering a period where it had to confront adversarial reporters and members of Congress. In this period of intelligence accountability, debate over its covert operations risked the exposure of CIA operational secrets Colby wanted to protect.⁵³²

Lapham’s memorandum was sent two days before the investigative journalist Seymour Hersh revealed MHCHAOS, a CIA covert operation established in the late 1960s. Designed to expose foreign communist influence within the U.S., the surveillance program intensified, targeting civil rights groups, anti-Nixon figures, and anti-Vietnam War demonstrators. Hersh’s article portrayed the Agency as a sinister organisation, whose excessive power resulted in overreach that held a complete disregard for the rights of American citizens.⁵³³

⁵²⁹ William Colby quoted in James M. Naughton, “C.I.A. Chief Says Charges Imperil Intelligence Work,” *NYT*, February 21, 1975, p. 1.

⁵³⁰ “Playboy Interview: William Colby,” *Playboy*, July 1, 1978, p. 70.

⁵³¹ William Colby quoted in Frank J. Smist, *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1994* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1994), 180.

⁵³² CIA, “Public Relations,” December 20, 1974, CIA-RDP80T01002A000200010002-2, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T01002A000200010002-2.pdf>, accessed 3rd April 2024.

⁵³³ Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 132; Immerman, *The Hidden Hand*, 95.

This chapter argues that Colby utilised an approach of managed transparency to limit the fallout from the Hersh article and to protect CIA secrecy. The Agency was entering a crucial period where it had to employ PR more effectively. Managed transparency was designed to repair the Agency's tarnished image by making it appear open about past misdeeds. The DCI aimed to maintain CIA secrecy by directing the press and Congress's attention to a reformed CIA. He reiterated in several public appearances, speeches and interviews that his Agency changed. It was no longer an organisation fuelled by the OSS old-boy clandestine culture that relied on complete institutional secrecy. It would not stray into illegal activities or use excessive secrecy to shield itself from public accountability. It espoused the virtues of a professionalised, moral institution that remained "within the Constitution and the laws of our country."⁵³⁴

Colby recognised his Agency had to cooperate with a new era of Congressional oversight. He used CIA public secrecy to disclose pieces of material to the press and legislative investigators whilst keeping the most sensitive secrets shielded. The historian Christopher Moran argues the DCI was willing to share the CIA's "bad secrets" to save its "good secrets."⁵³⁵ Managed transparency revealed CIA's "bad secrets," for example Colby admitted his Agency overstepped its statutory authority when it conducted domestic surveillance. But in providing these concessions, Colby hoped the press and Congress would be less likely to probe into the "good secrets" he wanted protection over, such as CIA's collection capabilities and the identities of undercover agents. "A public convinced of the CIA's value," Colby writes in his memoir *Honorable Men*, "will help protect its true secrets."⁵³⁶

Colby relied on a press that were reluctant to challenge CIA secrecy. Although Hersh symbolised a new wave of investigative journalists who wanted to expose the hidden national security state, much of the press remained broadly positive towards CIA. Scholars often highlight this period when the Agency experienced intense scrutiny and attack from the whole press. However, Colby utilised mainstream press hesitancy to bolster his managed transparency approach. The DCI argued a reformed, professionalised CIA required press self-censorship and reminded reporters of their responsibility in withholding sensitive material. Journalists agreed with Colby that shielding the "good secrets" was vital in protecting CIA secrecy. Newspapers defended CIA's collection capabilities during the Glomar Explorer project, an operation to raise a sunken Soviet nuclear submarine. Whilst debate over CIA's existence never gained traction. Opinion pieces and editorials supported

⁵³⁴ "Statement W.E. Colby Director of Central Intelligence Before Committee on Government Operations of the United States Senate," January 23, 1976, William E. Colby Papers, 1935-1996, Series 2: Congressional Testimony and Speeches, 1970-1996, "Congressional testimony, 1970-1992 May," Box 8, Folder 1-3, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University (hereafter Colby Papers).

⁵³⁵ Moran, *Company Confessions*, 187.

⁵³⁶ Colby, *Honorable Men*, 21.

Congressional oversight because it aided in clarifying the intended purpose of CIA outlined in the National Security Act.

Colby had mixed success in halting publication of CIA activities and unlike Allen Dulles he failed to prevent further Congressional oversight. He knew Hersh well and, from previous experience, had built a friendly relationship with the reporter to keep sensitive material withheld. He recognised that Hersh was representative of a more intrusive press, one less likely to stop writing critical articles simply because the DCI demanded it. Colby met several times with him and persuaded him to withhold publishing the details of the Glomar Explorer project in late-1973. A year later Colby failed to suppress publication over CIA activities in Chile.⁵³⁷ The article led to the Senate establishing a committee on 27 January 1975 under chairman Senator Frank Church. Impetus for a thorough investigation grew after President Ford mentioned CIA conducted foreign assassinations in an off-the-record remark.

The House also began its work in July under Representative Otis Pike. The prospect of Congress investigating CIA brought former officials such as David Atlee Phillips, Ray S. Cline, Harry Rositzke and Lyman B. Kirkpatrick to contribute to public debate. They represented the old guard and complicated Colby's managed transparency because they feared his approach would destroy their Agency. Whilst they agreed that he had to cooperate with the Congressional committees, they saw Colby's approach as eroding CIA secrecy to overzealous legislators. Rositzke and Cline argued that working with Congress was a delicate issue. Congressional investigations hindered the CIA's work as disclosures presented a danger to U.S. national security.⁵³⁸

Managed transparency offered Colby a way to appease both an intrusive press and Congressional investigators. The DCI used it to go on the offensive after Hersh's article. Appearing forthcoming in his public Congressional sessions and public statements about CIA's past indiscretions aided the DCI's image as many reporters saw him as a responsible leader who reformed it for the better. Colby did want to change the CIA, he realised it could not stay silent during this period, but his managed transparency approach had helped to preserve CIA secrecy. The newspapers examined in this chapter show that they did not support investigative, adversarial reporters such as Hersh. Colby meanwhile, had found it easier to shape a narrative that advocated press sympathy and support for CIA.

⁵³⁷ John Prados, *Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 267, 291-292; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 137.

⁵³⁸ Harry Rositzke, "Controlling Secret Operations," *NYT*, October 7, 1974, p. 35; Ray S. Cline, "The Value of the C.I.A.," *NYT*, November 1, 1974, p. 39; Prados, *Lost Crusader*, 306; McCarthy, *Selling the CIA*, 24.

Reaction to the Hersh Article

Titled “Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces,” Hersh’s *NYT* article accused CIA of “violating its charter” by conducting “a massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon administration.” Hersh stated CIA breached their legal authority by violating the National Security Act. Under the Agency’s counterintelligence chief, James Jesus Angleton, CIA targeted anti-Vietnam war protestors and collected thousands of files on American citizens obtained by mail surveillance, break-ins and wiretapping. The article instigated public discussion over CIA and brought its role within American democracy to the forefront of the debate.⁵³⁹

Two events took place that demonstrated that the CIA needed to adapt to a new period of intelligence accountability. The first was Watergate. Agency officials feared the ongoing 1972 political scandal implicated the organisation because of former officer E. Howard Hunt. His involvement drew press coverage linking CIA with Watergate. However, press reaction was sympathetic for the Agency because it argued the Agency was used as a scapegoat at the hands of a corrupt Nixon government.⁵⁴⁰ Colby realised that the rigid secrecy the former DCI Richard Helms relied upon was damaging the CIA’s public image. He recalled he wanted officials to “keep cool, do not get lured into any speculation, don’t volunteer any information, and just stay the hell away from the whole damned mess.” Colby later criticised Helms in creating “the very climate of suspicion and implied culpability that we have been, justifiably, trying to avoid.”⁵⁴¹

The second event concerned a memorandum sent on 9 May 1973 from Colby’s predecessor James R. Schlesinger. It instructed current and former officials to inform him of “activities now going on, or that have gone on in the past, which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter.” A list of these activities from 1959 to 1973, known as the “family jewels,” was assembled by Colby. This 693-page document detailed CIA covert activities including domestic operations.⁵⁴² Colby knew it would be damaging because of the ongoing Watergate scandal. He repeatedly told the Senate during his confirmation hearings that CIA would not conduct illegal activities under his leadership.

⁵³⁹ Seymour M. Hersh, “Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years,” *NYT*, December 22, 1974, p. 1.

⁵⁴⁰ “Watergate and the CIA,” *WP*, May 18, 1973, p. A30; “The CIA,” *NYT*, June 7, 1973, p. 44; Laurence Stern, “CIA Gets Watergate Vindication,” *WP*, August 7, 1973; William Greider, “Aftergate,” *Esquire*, September 1975, p. 100; Walter Pincus, “Helms, the C.I.A. and Public Trust,” *NYT*, October 2, 1974, p. 47; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 127-128.

⁵⁴¹ Helms, *A Look Over My Shoulder*, 6; Colby, *Honorable Men*, 392.

⁵⁴² “Memorandum For All CIA Employees,” 9th May 1973, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; “Questionable Activities,” 29th August 1973, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4.

He wanted to construct an image that the Agency changed, and this involved avoiding scrutiny of past misdeeds. Colby ordered an internal investigation into the “family jewels” and fired Angleton, but he asserted that “family skeletons are best left...in the closet.”⁵⁴³

HUGE C.I.A. OPERATION REPORTED IN U.S. AGAINST ANTIWAR FORCES, OTHER DISSIDENTS IN NIXON YEARS



Richard Helms



James R. Schlesinger



William E. Colby

FILES ON CITIZENS

Helms Reportedly Got Surveillance Data in Charter Violation

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21—The Central Intelligence Agency, directly violating its charter, conducted a massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon Administration against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the United States, according to well-placed Government sources.

Figure 5.1 Hersh's *NYT* article on CIA engaging in domestic surveillance. The article spurred public debate on the Agency. Source: Hersh, "Huge C.I.A. Operation," *NYT*.

⁵⁴³ Hersh, "Huge C.I.A. Operation," *NYT*; Jeffrey-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 191; Ranelagh, *The Agency*, 554.

The Hersh story did not trigger a hostile press reaction. Despite scholars calling it “devastating” and a “turning point” where it “shocked public opinion and played into the hands of the covert-operational doves,” a broader negative press response to the article aided Colby’s managed transparency approach.⁵⁴⁴ There was no outcry over it because the public already knew of CIA’s domestic activities. *Ramparts*, a local Californian magazine, disclosed in 1967 that the CIA were covertly funding the National Student Association and other private organisations.⁵⁴⁵ Stuart Loory’s 1974 article in the *Columbia Journalism Review* revealed how Agency officials infiltrated and manipulated the press.⁵⁴⁶ Hersh “alone did not produce a groundswell of support for changes in the oversight of intelligence,” Cynthia Nolan writes. Nearly three-thirds of participants in public opinion polls proclaimed the Hersh scoop was “blown up out of proportion.”⁵⁴⁷ Kathryn Olmsted also explains how the revelations did not lead to further anti-CIA rhetoric. Instead, the press was reluctant to challenge the secrecy of the national security state and criticised journalists for doing so.⁵⁴⁸

Many reporters disapproved of what they saw as Hersh’s arrogant demeanour, and his story became the subject of ridicule amongst his and the *NYT* competitors. Uncertainty revolved around *NYT* executive editor Abe Rosenthal, who was neither known nor liked by members of the Washington press elite. Across the political spectrum, the press downplayed the story. Correspondent Walter Pincus, writing in the liberal *New Republic*, a publication that once called for the abolishment of CIA a decade earlier, criticised Hersh. He stated the findings were “hardly fresh” and lacked importance.⁵⁴⁹ *WP* editor, Benjamin Bradlee, accused Hersh of sensationalism. An *WP* editorial echoed these criticisms, “so far...no solid evidence has been produced.” Whilst Laurence Stern wrote it contained “haziness of detail.”⁵⁵⁰ Liberal reporters argued CIA was at the behest of a corrupt Nixon administration that was willing to drag it into committing illegal activities, whilst conservatives declared CIA became the nation’s “whipping boy.” Both sides argued that unearthing

⁵⁴⁴ Immerman, *The Hidden Hand*, 95; Ranelagh, *The Agency*, 575; Prados, *Safe for Democracy*, 431-432; Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 198.

⁵⁴⁵ Prados, *Safe for Democracy*, 370.

⁵⁴⁶ Stuart H. Loory, “The CIA’s Use of the Press: A ‘Mighty Wurlitzer,’” *Columbia Journalism Review*, 13, no. 3 (1974), 9-18.

⁵⁴⁷ Cynthia Nolan, “Seymour Hersh’s Impact on the CIA,” *Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 12, no. 1 (1999), 19, 21-22.

⁵⁴⁸ Kathryn S. Olmsted, *Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 38.

⁵⁴⁹ Walter Pincus, “Covering Intelligence,” *New Republic*, February 1, 1975, p. 11.

⁵⁵⁰ “The CIA’s ‘Illegal Domestic Spying,’” *WP*, January 5, 1975, p. 26; Laurence Stern, “Exposing the CIA (Again),” *Columbia Journalism Review*, 13, no. 6 (1975), 55; Salisbury, *Without Fear or Favor*, 534; Olmsted, *Challenging the Secret Government*, 34.

CIA secrecy did nothing but leave it vulnerable to the benefit of the Soviet Union's intelligence services.⁵⁵¹

Colby knew Hersh was going to publish his findings. The *NYT* reporter collected information over two years and pressured the editors to publish. In December 1974, minutes from internal CIA meetings show that the Agency was investigating Hersh.⁵⁵² Colby met with and prepared Congress's Appropriations and Armed Services on 19 December and said Hersh "planned to write a lengthy article in Sunday's *New York Times* on alleged CIA activities."⁵⁵³ But Colby realised he could not discredit Hersh through investigation. He had to adapt the Agency's response away from its prior reaction to the *Ramparts* exposure. The CIA aimed to discredit the magazine by finding any communist connection. It soon expanded through MHCHAOS, an operation combined with the FBI's counterintelligence program, COINTELPRO, that saw CIA survey and spy on hundreds of critical publications and citizens. The unearthing of the "family jewels" blew this widespread operation out in the open and CIA could not maintain it.⁵⁵⁴

Colby used managed transparency to provide a response to the charges. The article stated the domestic operations were "massive." Immediately, this claim was disputed by the DCI. Colby told President Ford prior to the article's publication it would be embarrassing for CIA and the administration. Two days after the story broke, he sent a report to the President. He argued the operations listed fell within the CIA's statutory authority. Some actions were "improper," Colby confessed, but he asserted they were terminated when the "family jewels" were collated the

⁵⁵¹ Smith Hempstone, "CIA's Problems Are a Joy to the KGB," *PI*, January 2, 1975, p. 7; "Proceed With Caution," *NYDN*, January 7, 1975, p. 124; Christopher S. Wren, "Disclosures of Spying By CIA Feed Soviet Propaganda Mill," *SLPD*, January 13, 1975, p. 15; "CIA Domestic Spies Spoofed in Pravda," *WP*, January 20, 1975, p. A7; "CIA Under Pressure While KGB Is Thriving," *U.S. News and World Report*, February 24, 1975, 46.

⁵⁵² CIA, "Journal-Office of Legislative Counsel," December 10, 1974, CIA-RDP81-00818R000100060038-7, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81-00818R000100060038-7.pdf>, accessed 3rd April 2024; CIA, "Journal-Office of Legislative Counsel," December 17, 1974, CIA-RDP79-00957A000100020010-7, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00957A000100020010-7.pdf>, accessed 3rd April 2024;

⁵⁵³ "Cong. Nedzi & F. Slatinshek," December 19, 1974, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; CIA, "Journal-Office of Legislative Counsel," December 20, 1974, CIA-RDP79-00957A000100020001-7, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00957A000100020001-7.pdf>, accessed 3rd April 2024.

⁵⁵⁴ Richard J. Aldrich quoted in "Fifty Years of Family Jewels: Roundtable on the CIA Scandal," *Journal of Intelligence History*, 24, no. 1 (2025), 80; Kaeten Mistry, "Narrating Covert Action: The CIA, Historiography, and the Cold War," in *Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945*, ed. Christopher Murphy and Christopher Moran (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 117-118; Tity de Vries, "The 1967 Central Intelligence Agency Scandal: Catalyst in a Transforming Relationship between State and People," *The Journal of American History*, 98, no. 4 (2012), 1086-1087.

previous year. In a public statement, Ford reiterated Colby's remarks whilst Hersh reported the DCI admitted the charges.⁵⁵⁵




Figure 5.2 Colby's report to Ford refuting Hersh's charges. Part of the managed transparency approach was to emphasise the CIA did not exceed its statutory authority. Source: "Dear Mr. President," December 24, 1974, Colby Papers.

⁵⁵⁵ "Dear Mr. President," December 24, 1974, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; Gerald R. Ford, *A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 229; Seymour M. Hersh, "Colby Said to Confirm C.I.A. Role in U.S.," *NYT*, January 1, 1975, p. 37.

Papers and reporters portrayed Colby as a responsible DCI who steered CIA in the right direction. Managed transparency limited further press investigations into CIA. It argues against scholars who have viewed the Hersh revelations as a turning point. John Ranelagh notes how the Hersh article “was the start of the public scrutiny of the history of the CIA,” and Loch K. Johnson says the article changed the “state of ignorance” the public held. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones states it was “open season on the CIA,” whilst David Hadley describes how CIA became a “partisan issue” either criticised by liberals or defended by conservatives. However, CIA’s image was tied closely to Colby, and his actions reflected how the press portrayed it regardless of political affiliation.⁵⁵⁶

Colby was admired by the press because of his candid attitude. *NYT* argued it was “reassuring” that the DCI said CIA terminated domestic operations whilst Joseph Kraft declared that these operations were implemented under the Nixon administration and are now disbanded. “No one should be under the impression that the spirit of the Nixon presidency is still dominant in Washington.”⁵⁵⁷ Conservative newspapers rallied around the CIA. The *ES* defended the use of domestic spying, claiming “in this wicked world we have to be as wicked as everyone else,” America is “lucky to have the self-sacrificing agency spooks available to do our wickedness for us.” Correspondent William Buckley published an article condemning the charges as anti-American. It was an “ideological fuss,” as he turned the blame towards Hersh who has “no particular quarrel with America’s enemies.”⁵⁵⁸

William A. Rusher, another reporter who joined Buckley as publisher for his conservative magazine *National Review* condemned Hersh’s piece as “political propaganda” from the “liberal media.” Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, conservative *WP* and *PI* columnists consistently argued that CIA secrecy had to be protected from what they characterised as the press’s unwarranted attacks. They condemned Hersh for impacting Agency morale and compromising its ability to “fulfil necessary functions in a still dangerous world.” The columnists declared CIA was not at fault because it was subjected to government interference and ordered to follow a directive by former President Lyndon B. Johnson.⁵⁵⁹

⁵⁵⁶ Ranelagh, *The Agency*, 572; Loch K. Johnson, *America’s Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 3; Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence* (2nd ed., New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 212; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 135.

⁵⁵⁷ “Unguarded Intelligence,” *NYT*, December 24, 1974. p. 18; Joseph Kraft, “The Colby Case,” *WP*, December 26, 1974, p. A25.

⁵⁵⁸ Frank Getelin, “The Price of Probing the CIA,” *Washington Star*, December 27, 1974; William F. Buckley Jr., “Ganging Up on the CIA,” *ES*, January 2, 1975, page unknown.

⁵⁵⁹ Adam Weintraub, “Political Strategist W. Rusher,” *PI*, April 20, 2011, https://www.inquirer.com/philly/obituaries/20110420_Political_strategist_W__Rusher.html, accessed 2nd December 2020; William A. Rusher, “How War Against CIA Grew,” *PI*, December 28, 1974, p. 4; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “The Tragedy of the CIA,” *WP*, January 6, 1975, p. A19; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 141.

Reaction across the political spectrum to the Hersh scoop benefitted Colby's managed transparency. Positive CIA coverage placed the DCI in a good position to defend his Agency. The attacks on Hersh led Colby to proclaim that under his responsible leadership, CIA was going to change. The press portrayed it as a victim to the excessive and reckless powers of the executive branch. An uncontrollable Agency was seen as the outcome of decisions made by previous administrations. Managed transparency allowed Colby to dispute the charges of a "massive" operation whilst admitting prior misdeeds his Agency committed. But, like the press, he declared the "family jewels" was old news, and part of a bygone era of CIA culture that held no influence in the current organisation and political climate. With the aid of the press who were quick to minimise Hersh's charges, another revelation benefitted Colby.

The Glomar Explorer

Press hostility to Hersh placed Colby in a strong position to deflect scrutiny from CIA's collection capabilities. In contrast to Helms who stayed silent during the *Ramparts* and Watergate scandals, Colby went on the offensive. Whilst Hersh faced negative coverage over unearthing the CIA's domestic collection methods, another CIA operation was leaked in the spring of 1975. Articles published details of the Glomar Explorer project. It provided Colby another opportunity to use managed transparency to protect CIA secrecy. He argued the operation's cover was paramount to shielding the Agency's "good secrets" and it provided valuable intelligence in the broader context of the Cold War. When Glomar Explorer was leaked, it unified reporters who declared it should never have been revealed. Correspondents stated it served as an example of CIA technical ingenuity and brilliance. The operation rallied press support of the CIA and dismissed Hersh's allegations outright.

Press reaction to the Glomar Explorer placed CIA in a strong position to maintain its secrecy. Project Azorian involved the raising of a Soviet nuclear submarine that sunk in the Pacific Ocean in 1968. The aim was to obtain the Soviet nuclear warhead and ballistic missile codes for intelligence purposes. CIA constructed a ship, named the Glomar Explorer, to recover the sunken sub from the ocean floor. To prevent disclosure of the project, CIA contacted entrepreneur Howard Hughes to cover the operation behind a commercial business venture. The project however was fuelled with leaks because the size of the operation was difficult to conceal as "hundreds of...government officials and private contractors already knew."⁵⁶⁰

⁵⁶⁰ M. Todd Bennett, *Neither Confirm Nor Deny: How the Glomar Mission Shielded the CIA from Transparency* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2023), 1-3.

Coverage demonstrates the leaks benefitted CIA because revealing the story bolstered efforts from reporters to protect its collection capabilities. Todd Bennett explains that the project revelation challenges “just how transformative the 1970s really were when it came to matters of national security. Unauthorized disclosure of the still active operation provoked a backlash by foreign policy hawks concerned that transparency was moving too far, too fast, and resulting in the indiscriminate release of sensitive information...That backlash restrained the congressional and journalistic revolutions before they could expose more intelligence secrets, and...was among the reasons *Glomar* played a pivotal but unappreciated role in saving the CIA from the clutches of transparency.”⁵⁶¹

Investigative reporters Hersh and Jack Anderson learnt details of Glomar Explorer through leaks. Colby worked behind the scenes to ensure the operation remained secret. Hersh knew the operation in 1973, and Colby feared he would publish details of it the following January. He called a U.S. official to advise him on what to do. The unnamed individual said the DCI could talk to someone within the *NYT* to “come down on him” because “appealing to that guy’s sense of discretion will do you no good.” He called Hersh “not to talk about it anymore,” but became concerned when the story appeared on the front page of the *LAT* in February.⁵⁶² He spoke to Brent Scowcroft, the Deputy National Security Advisor, to state he had been in contact with *LAT*, *NYT*, and *WP* to persuade them not to publish. Colby also talked to the CIA’s PR officer, Angus Thuermer, the following month to praise the lack of coverage. The DCI instructed Thuermer that if he heard the words “CIA” and “ocean” together, to inform him immediately.⁵⁶³

⁵⁶¹ Ibid, 12.

⁵⁶² “Telephone Conversation Between DCI Colby and...” January 28, 1974, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; “Telephone Conversation Between DCI Colby and Seymour Hersh,” January 30, 1974, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; William Farr and Jerry Cohen, “U.S. Reported After Russ Sub,” *LAT*, February 7, 1975, p. 1.

⁵⁶³ “Continuation of Telephone Conversation Between DCI Colby and General Scowcroft,” February 14, 1975, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; “Telephone Conversation Between DCI Colby and Angus Thuermer,” March 17, 1975, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; Bennett, *Neither Confirm nor Deny*, 162-163; Olmsted, *Challenging the Secret Government*, 63.

Fed Chairman 'Optimistic'

PART 1, PAGE 2

CLOSING
N.Y. STOCKS

Los Angeles Times

LARGEST CIRCULATION IN THE WEST, 1,045,479 DAILY, 1,236,066 SUNDAY

FRIDAY
**LATE
FINAL**

VOL. XCIV FIVE PARTS—PART ONE

★★★

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1975

106 PAGES

Subscription and
Advertising Prices

DAILY 10c

U.S. REPORTED AFTER RUSS SU

Stocks Off

NEW YORK—Prices declined and trading slackened in the stock market today after investors were confronted with the news of a post-World War II high in unemployment.

The closing Dow Jones average of 30 industrial was down 2.26 at 711.91.

New York Stock Exchange volume was 20 million shares compared with 32 million Thursday.

Complete tables in Financial Section

Levi Takes Oath of Office as New Attorney General

WASHINGTON (UPI)—Edward H. Levi was sworn in as attorney general today and praised by President Ford as a distinguished lawyer who would "carry out the laws of this country . . . and protect the rights of individuals."

Without mentioning the Watergate scandal, Mr. Ford said the Justice Department experienced a "period of great difficulty and turbulence" in recent years during which there had been a quick succession of four attorneys general.

He thanked the Justice Department staff for carrying on and praised previous Atty. Gen. William French Smith, named U.S. ambassador to India, for his job during 13 months in office.

Levi, formerly president of the University of Chicago and known as a legal scholar, took the oath administered by Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. He said the Justice Department staff had the "will and determination" for the agency to achieve its highest goals.

Also not mentioning Watergate, Levi said:


"We have lived in a time of change and creative skepticism and cynicism concerning the administration of justice."

Mr. Ford told the audience of hundreds of FBI and other Justice Department workers that Levi was his choice for "protecting the rights of individuals, protecting the rights of the government, making the department great."

Mr. Ford said the Senate approved Levi more easily than his own nomination as Vice President. "You did much better than I," he said.

FEATURE INDEX

ART. View, Page 8
ASTROLOGY. Port 2, Page 24
BOOK REVIEW. View, Page 24
BRIEFING. View, Page 1
CLASSIFIED. Port 5, Page 1-18
CROSSWORD. Port 5, Page 18
EDITORIAL. COLUMBIA. Port 2, Pages 6, 7
FILMS. View, Pages 10-12
FINANCIAL. Port 5, Pages 17-24
METROPOLITAN NEWS. Port 2
MUSIC. View, Pages 10, 11, 13
SPORTS. Port 5, Page 19
STAGE. View, Page 18, 19
TELEVISION. View, Pages 22, 23
VITALITY WEATHER. Port 5, Page 16
WOMEN'S. View, Page 1-5



DEEP MISSION—A Russian submarine—similar to the one above—which sank in the Atlantic ocean, reportedly was the object of a Central Intelligence Agency contract with Howard Hughes' Summa Corp. Its Glomar Explorer, below, is designed for ocean floor recovery.



Sunken Ship Deal by CIA, Hughes Told

BY WILLIAM FAIR AND JERRY COHEN

Howard Hughes contracted with the Central Intelligence Agency to raise a sunken Russian nuclear submarine from the North Atlantic, according to reports circulating among local law enforcement officers.

The operation reportedly was carried out—or at least attempted—by the crew of a supersonic marine training vessel owned by Hughes' Summa Corp. and designed by a Los Angeles firm.

Confidential files on the operation are believed to have been among the documents stolen by saboteurs from Summa's Hollywood offices at 7020 Romaine St. last June.

The thieves reportedly are presently holding the documents and demanding a ransom of what one source put at \$1 million.

Negotiations for the highly sensitive files went on for several months, it is understood, but recently were suspended.

The ship involved, according to reports, is believed to be the Long Beach-based Glomar Explorer, the most advanced marine mining vessel in the world which still is in the experimental stages.

It was designed and is operated for Summa Corp. by Global Marine, Inc., with offices in downtown Los Angeles and Century City.

Global Marine Board Chairman R. P. Bauer denied Friday any knowledge of the reported operation.

Although the vessel was built at Chester, Pa., he said, it has worked only Pacific waters.

The Los Angeles County Grand Jury is scheduled to begin an investigation into the Romaine St. theft next week and reports of the alleged extortion will be a part of that inquiry.

If the submarine-raising operation was indeed carried out, it is likely to have involved one of two Soviet submarines.

A nuclear-powered attack submarine of the Soviet November class which the Pentagon believes sank off Spain in April, 1970.

Another nuclear submarine which foundered in March, 1972, about 900 miles southeast of Newfoundland. The \$12 class boat is equipped to carry three missiles.

Former U.S. Atty. Gen. William French Smith, FBI director Clarence Kelly and top CIA officials reportedly have conferred with Dist. Atty. Joseph Burch and Police Chief Edward Davis because of possible national security ramifications connected with the investigation.

Neither Bauer nor Davis would comment on the case, but Corde Pater Hagan, the department's public information chief, confirmed that grand jury hearings have been scheduled for next week on the Summa Corp. saboteuring.

"Beyond that, I can say anything because Bauer has forbidden everybody involved to make any comments," Hagan said.

An estimated \$60,000 was stolen by the Romaine St. theft last June 5, along with a number of documents, the nature of which Summa officials declined to disclose.

Telephone Conversation Between DCI Colby and [at 6:40 p.m., on 28 January 1974] (Note: Although the stenographic notes of this conversation were taken on 28 January 1974, the transcription that follows was not made until 27 October 1977, as the result of an FOIA request.)

Mr. Colby: I wanted to talk to you about our problem with Hersh.
Go see

Mr. Colby: That will not do it because Hersh is writing a book.
: There is not much work we can do on that.

Mr. Colby: The problem is if he keeps talking. All they need is the (oral) statement, and they can
: You should have someone in the Times organization come down on him. Appealing to that guy's sense of discretion will do you no good. Reconnoiter the problem with

Mr. Colby: Is he the guy, or should I go to New York?
: Most of the guys up there -- a naked appeal will do you no good at all.

Mr. Colby: If you go in with the top level with you -- that is a good point. I think I should do something. Just hoping it will not happen isn't much.
: Right.

(Note: The conversation continued on other matters and has been omitted.)

Figure 5.3 The LAT's front page on Glomar Explorer, and Colby's phone call with an unnamed official instructing the DCI to get NYT to prevent Hersh from publishing details of it. Source: Farr and Cohen, "U.S. Reported After Russ Sub," LAT; "Telephone Conversation Between DCI Colby and..." January 28, 1974, Colby Papers.

Despite Colby's efforts, journalists revealed the operation in March.⁵⁶⁴ Reluctance to publish beforehand demonstrated that press responsibility was still prevalent. It demonstrates how journalists were caught between publishing for the sake of public interest or risk wider accusations

⁵⁶⁴ Seymour M. Hersh, "C.I.A. Salvage Ship Brought Up Part of Soviet Sub Lost in 1968," NYT, March 19, 1975, p. 97; Jerry Cohen and George Reasons, "CIA Recovers Part of Russian Sub," LAT, March 19, 1975, p. A1; Thomas O'Toole, "CIA Recovered Part of Soviet A-Sub," WP, March 19, 1975, p. A1; Colby, *Honorable Men*, 416.

that the press was deliberately sabotaging CIA. Reporter Jack Anderson stated he felt some reservation over potentially revealing the operation, but he recalled he published because the Soviets already knew about the project.⁵⁶⁵ The press reacted favourably to the Glomar Explorer leak. Editorials argued it was evidence of an effective use of CIA intelligence collection that benefitted U.S. national security. Reporters used the operation to distinguish between unethical CIA activities that violated the law, like domestic surveillance, and honourable activities that were directed against foreign adversaries such as the Soviet Union, emphasising the Cold War consensus. Coverage portrayed the operation as an example of technical ingenuity and risk-taking that would otherwise not exist if the CIA was abolished. Editorials were filled with patriotic undertones and a sense of triumphalism after the project was revealed.

“This really brilliant effort,” labelled *NYT* is “a useful reminder of how essential good intelligence is for the national security,” CIA “is only to be commended for this extraordinary effort to carry out its essential mission.” The *WP* likewise said CIA “was performing its prime function brilliantly.” The *LAT* disagreed that the operation, costing around \$350 million, was money wasted. “The project was intrinsically worthwhile...this technological breakthrough to harvest the ocean floor for a more universal good is extraordinary.” The operation is a reminder to those who would dismantle the CIA over its domestic surveillance activities. “It would be a mistake to let the national outrage over these mistakes divert resources from the vital task of maintaining an excellent intelligence apparatus...to implement one of the most astonishing salvage operations in marine history.”⁵⁶⁶

The *NYDN* applauded the “alert, imaginative, energetic and ingenious” CIA whilst *CT*, no longer an anti-CIA paper, called Glomar Explorer “a bold and proper CIA effort” that “warrants pride and comfort.” The *NYDN* criticised the publicity surrounding the operation, stating it “jeopardized plans for a renewed effort to raise the rest of the sub.” It argued the event raises a “perplexing question: How can the U.S. reconcile the public’s right to know and the press’ duty to inform with the CIA’s legitimate need for secrecy?” Positive coverage reinforced Colby’s managed transparency approach because it argued that disclosing the operation undermined CIA’s intelligence capabilities, *NYDN* concluded the “tell-all treatment accorded the sub-salvage effort shows that there are ample grounds for worry.”⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶⁵ Jack Anderson and Daryl Gibson, *Peace, War, and Politics: An Eyewitness Account* (New York: Forge, 1999), 278.

⁵⁶⁶ “Project Jennifer,” *NYT*, March 20, 1975, p. 38; “The Glomar Explorer,” *WP*, March 23, 1975, p. B6; “The Spies in the Deep,” *LAT*, March 20, 1975, p. 13.

⁵⁶⁷ “Stranger Than Fiction,” *NYDN*, March 20, 1975, p. 155; “A Bold and Proper CIA Effort,” *CT*, March 21, 1975, p. 22.

Opinion pieces also joined in the pro-CIA coverage. The event demonstrated “the amazing expertise of the United States in science and technology,” reporter Bob Wiedrich declared, “some day that same recovery vessel might rescue a couple hundred sunken American submariners. And that will have been worth \$350 million twice over.” Joseph Kraft remarked the Glomar Explorer “should impart a modicum of balance and sanity to the raging debate about this country’s black operations.” The operation “fully justifies secrecy,” and “the rest of the United States, including the press, is not embarked on a relentlessly hostile, indiscriminating effort to get security agencies.”⁵⁶⁸ Carolyn Lewis similarly argued the press needs to “settle down” and stop portraying CIA as “evil,” whilst Bill Anderson feared continued leaks would blow the cover of agents.⁵⁶⁹

Liberal and conservative papers celebrated CIA’s use of technical intelligence collection. The press made the case why CIA secrecy was important and criticised disclosures of the operation. The press’s reaction to the Hersh charges placed Colby in a strong position but the coverage of Glomar Explorer reinforced it. Press hostility towards the leaks demonstrated there was a growing sense CIA staved off the worst from Hersh and the pendulum shifted towards protecting CIA secrecy. The submarine mission was as a guide for what reporters could not reveal for fear of damaging the Agency’s core objective which was the gathering of foreign intelligence. It represented a consensus between the mainstream press and CIA on the need for protecting intelligence capabilities.

Colby Shapes the Narrative

Colby’s managed transparency attempted to shift CIA’s public image away from the previous culture of clandestinity. He argued CIA changed from the days of the “old boys,” who were trying to revive “the halcyon past of their OSS and early Cold War derring-do days” and the strict secrecy accompanying it. This new approach, Colby states, was a task for CIA “to know the past and correct what could not be justified under today’s standards.” He hoped by appearing forthcoming in interviews and writing articles on the work of intelligence, he would be able to drag his CIA out of the public spotlight by downplaying the sensationalism surrounding it.⁵⁷⁰

Colby argued the Agency was necessary to fight the Cold War, and its effectiveness was impeded by investigative reporters who were keen on unearthing its secrecy. He declared the Agency changed; it was now a moral organisation that would no longer commit unlawful acts. Colby

⁵⁶⁸ Bob Wiedrich, “CIA’s Sub Feat a Coup for U.S.” *CT*, March 28, 1975, p. 17; Joseph Kraft, “Affair of the Soviet Submarine Gives Balance in the CIA Debate,” *TBS*, March 23, 1975, p. 133.

⁵⁶⁹ Carolyn Lewis, “The Scandal Habit,” *WP*, March 31, 1975, p. A18; Bill Anderson, “CIA’s Bombshell Rocks Washington,” *CT*, March 22, 1975, p. 12.

⁵⁷⁰ Colby, *Honorable Men*, 332, 342, 376.

stated in a New Orleans speech to news executives and editors in April 1975 that the Agency transformed under his leadership, into a professionalised arm of intelligence that was willing to conform to American “open society.” But this change required a professional, responsible press that should protect the “good secrets.” The press has “enormous power and freedom under our Constitution, choose which subjects to call to public attention and which ones to ignore.” It must reduce its “sensational headlines” and “consider carefully whether CIA really should be the sensational lead in any story in which it is mentioned even incidentally.”⁵⁷¹

Colby effectively demanded the press keep sensitive CIA material withheld. He instigated a PR offensive where he met with the editor of Pennsylvania’s *Lebanon News*, Ted Gress, for an exclusive interview at Langley. The “United States needs the CIA more than ever right now,” Gress declared. Colby reiterated it was a changed organisation. “Spying” was associated with the “old days,” and the Agency was “in the process of re-evaluation.” Prior “exaggerations” about CIA and “transgressions” were in the past, “I’m pretty sure we are clear...people here want to do the right thing.” Gress used material from the interview and provided a three-part series on the Agency in which he argued that it was under attack “mostly by the leftist-liberal news media.”⁵⁷²

The DCI replied to negative comments regarding his Agency. In April, former CIA official Tom Braden wrote in the *WP* and argued it should be dismantled. Braden’s position was curious because it contrasted with what he published earlier. He wrote a *Saturday Evening Post* article in 1967 where he fervently defended CIA covert operations after the *Ramparts* scandal. Braden provided extensive details about his and the Agency’s collaboration with private citizen groups, trade unions, and front organisations. The extent to which Braden revealed these sensitive details caused discontent within CIA. Former DCI Allen Dulles called the article “atrocious,” and severed all communication with Braden. In 1975, after Dulles died, Braden continued his feud by stating his former boss made CIA a “gargantuan monster,” built on “power” and “arrogance.” He recommended it be “shut down,” and Langley left “standing empty.”⁵⁷³

⁵⁷¹ CIA, “Intelligence and the Press Address to the Associated Press Annual Meeting by William E. Colby on Monday, 7 April 1975,” April 7, 1975, CIA-RDP91-00901R000500030011-1, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91-00901R000500030011-1.pdf>, accessed 17th July 2024; Martin Arnold, “Colby Tells Publishers That C.I.A. Is Jeopardized by Sensational Headlines,” *NYT*, April 8, 1975, p. 10; “Sensational Headlines Imperil CIA, Colby Says,” *LAT*, April 8, 1975, p. 4; Colby, *Honorable Men*, 19.

⁵⁷² Ted Gress, “CIA’s Big Problem is Seen as Attacks from All Sides,” *Lebanon News*, April 15, 1975, p. 18; Ted Gress, “Notes From A Newsmen’s Notebook,” *Lebanon Daily News*, April 15, 1975, p. 18; Ted Gress, “Colby Sees CIA as Vital Function,” *Lebanon Daily News*, April 17, 1975, p. 38; Ted Gress, “CIA Reworking Philosophy To Avoid Errors Of Past,” *Lebanon Daily News*, April 21, 1975, p. 18.

⁵⁷³ Thomas W. Braden, “Why I’m Glad the CIA is ‘Immoral,’” *Saturday Evening Post*, 240, no. 10, (1967), 10-14; “Dear Don,” July 28, 1967, Dulles Papers, Series 1, Box 8, Folder 27; Tom Braden, “CIA: Power and Arrogance,” *WP*, April 17, 1975, p. C2; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 104-106; Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer*, 244-245.

Colby was reluctant to reply to Braden's original article that featured in *Saturday Review* but after it gained traction and was reprinted in *WP*, Colby stated he felt "I must challenge its accuracy and its wisdom." In his response the DCI declared CIA has changed. It "is no longer a sacred establishment." The words "power" and "arrogance," have been replaced with "a new and American concept of responsible intelligence." He finds it "strange" Braden's comments contrast with his prior 1967 article. Braden would dismantle CIA and "retreat" from its critics, instead of revealing the "untold story of modern intelligence in the best journalistic tradition." Braden's call for its abolishment was the outlier and one of the most extreme Colby faced. The article aided Colby's argument that CIA was a new organisation because it served as a personal indictment against the previous Dulles leadership.⁵⁷⁴

Daniel Tyler Moore, the head of the International Platform Association (IPA) was a former OSS officer. He urged Colby to speak at IPA because he was concerned that the press and Congress could "cause a public reaction which may seriously damage and curtail...intelligence activities." The IPA convention provides a "determined and probably successful effort" to argue for CIA reform. He promised Colby the event would receive broad media coverage. It presented an opportunity to highlight "the historic facts concerning the numerous nations that have been ushered off the world's stage because they lacked an effective intelligence service." Moore stressed the event would hold considerable influence because reporters across the political spectrum would be in attendance.⁵⁷⁵

Angus Thuermer recommended Colby go to the event because it provided a chance for CIA "to move over to the attack," and pave the way for other officials to speak, "if the audiences seemed significant enough." The event offered an opportunity for Colby to inform the press about the workings of intelligence with the aim of diverting attention from CIA's past mistakes. The DCI confirmed he would appear and discuss "the real nature of modern American intelligence, as distinct from the sensational misconceptions which are widespread." Moore replied he would ignore time limits that were usually placed on speakers so that Colby could argue "that any reforms of the intelligence community do not cut down to the muscle of its critical and important functions."⁵⁷⁶

Colby was able to shape the narrative and dispel criticism by arguing his Agency changed. He realised he could eliminate the stigma from previous illegal activities and restore a new CIA era

⁵⁷⁴ W.E. Colby, "CIA: 'Things have Changed,'" *WP*, May 4, 1975, p.34.

⁵⁷⁵ CIA, "Letter to Mr. Dan Tyler Moore from W. E. Colby," May 2, 1975, CIA-RDP88-01315R000300320006-1, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01315R000300320006-1.pdf>, accessed 16th November 2020.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid; CIA, "Letter to Director William E. Colby from Dan Tyler Moore," May 23, 1975, CIA-RDP88-01315R000300320005-2, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01315R000300320005-2.pdf>, accessed 16th November 2020.

involving public education about the workings of intelligence whilst repeating the days of mistakes were well and truly behind. He used public secrecy to argue CIA was receiving unwarranted publicity. For example, he invited *WP* reporter George Lardner to Langley to state that CIA was receiving too much publicity.⁵⁷⁷ And he said power and influence in the Agency's early years was nothing like CIA now as its "mistakes" was the "the old image of 1947." Colby proudly proclaimed this "climate...no longer exists." He mentioned this in a speech at the Naval War College in June and it gained attention in newspapers who referred to the event as a monumental shift in CIA's public image. It will fit "the new reality of 1975," the DCI concluded. Managed transparency was used to shape press coverage, and it was designed to deflect Congressional scrutiny.⁵⁷⁸

The Rockefeller Commission

President Ford established an executive commission chaired by the Vice President Nelson Rockefeller shortly after the Hersh revelations on 4 January 1975. It was given a narrow mandate to investigate the extent of CIA's domestic activities to avoid other scandals that might lead to extensive press coverage. The commission was created with the aim of asserting executive control of the investigation and restricting further calls for Congressional involvement. Ford selected the commission's pro-CIA members and worked alongside former DCI Helms and the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with the aim of deliberately limiting potential damage from the Hersh charges. Ford's attempts to keep the CIA issue within executive control was viewed with suspicion by the press who argued it restricted reform.⁵⁷⁹

Liberal papers loathed the Rockefeller commission because it was an executive group they argued would "whitewash" CIA. "The real initiative for enforcing effective oversight on the nation's intelligence community, continues to lie in Congress," *NYT* said, whilst the *SLPD* noted "it is time for Congress to assume its primary responsibility for investigating the CIA investigators." Joseph Kraft wrote "the committee will be virtually helpless." He also questioned Rockefeller's nomination because of his links to the WH. The call for a JC deepened with editorials in *NYT* and *TBS* arguing it would provide clearer legislative guidelines for the CIA.⁵⁸⁰

⁵⁷⁷ George Lardner Jr., "Colby Explains 'Missteps' of the CIA," *WP*, June 22, 1975, p. A1.

⁵⁷⁸ "Colby Admits CIA Has Erred, But Says Agency Is Changing," *SLPD*, June 27, 1975, p. 9; "Colby Says CIA Needs New Image," *The Boston Globe*, June 27, 1975, p. 24; "Colby Seeks Shift in Agency's Image," *Hartford Courant*, June 27, 1975, p. 14; "Colby Attempting to Alter CIA Image," *Princeton Daily Clarion*, June 27, 1975, p. 2; "Colby Wants to Change CIA Image," *The Macon Telegraph*, June 27, 1975, p. 27; Willmetts, "The CIA and the Invention of Tradition," 122.

⁵⁷⁹ Olmsted, *Challenging the Secret Government*, 49-50.

⁵⁸⁰ "Investigating the C.I.A.," *NYT*, January 7, 1975, p. 32; "Intelligence On Intelligence," *SLPD*, January 5, 1975, p. 38; Joseph Kraft, "A Sad Commission," *WP*, January 7, 1975, p. A15; "Commission And Congress," *SLPD*,

Colby knew CIA was entering into an era of accountability and personally responded to the revelations and appeared before the commission. He could afford to talk to the commission members about CIA's previous mistakes whilst protecting its "good secrets." His willingness to be forthcoming about the Agency's past ran in contrast to Ford, Kissinger, and Helms's aim to cover it up. It even served as a surprise to Rockefeller who pulled Colby aside and told him not to divulge too much information.⁵⁸¹ The CIA's "old boys" and Ford's inner-circle could not decipher why Colby was being honest. They did not grasp his aim to change the image of his Agency and it angered Kissinger that the DCI was no longer "a political nonentity who could be controlled."⁵⁸²

The commission provided Colby a perfect opportunity to make the point explicit that his Agency moved on from the past. He met Ford on 13 January 1975 to discuss the next steps and was accompanied by former DCIs Schlesinger and Helms where he testified for the first time before the commission.⁵⁸³ Colby used public secrecy by arranging meetings with members to cultivate a positive relationship. He gave Rockefeller a courtesy call in late January and invited members for a tour at Langley. In late-February he arranged an informal breakfast meeting with David Belin, the commission's executive director, who wanted an independent inquiry.⁵⁸⁴

The Rockefeller report released in June. It benefitted public secrecy because it maintained executive power over CIA and it shifted public discussion away from Hersh's charges towards attention on why the section detailing foreign assassinations was not included. Reporters focused on why this information was withheld as they blamed the WH instead of the CIA. Despite prior warnings that the commission would be a whitewash exonerating the Agency, editorials in mainstream newspapers praised the "trenchant" report which provided a "strong indictment of many CIA actions." *WP* hoped the Church committee would continue to unearth CIA-sponsored assassinations.⁵⁸⁵

January 7, 1975, p. 10; Joseph Kraft, "About Those Rockefeller Rumors," *TBS*, January 9, 1975, p. 19; Seymour M. Hersh, "And the First Is: Whose Inquiry Should Take Precedence?" *NYT*, January 5, 1975, p. E2; "On Intelligence," *NYT*, January 13, 1975, p. 28; "Investigating the CIA," *TBS*, January 14, 1975, p. 12; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 145-146.

⁵⁸¹ Prados, *The Family Jewels*, 33-34.

⁵⁸² Dafydd Townley, "A Blue Ribbon Goat: The Rockefeller Commission, Public Opinion, and the Ford Administration's Intelligence Reform Failure," *Intelligence and National Security*, 39, no. 6 (2024), 1013-1015; Dafydd Townley, *The Year of Intelligence in the United States: Public Opinion, National Security, and the 1975 Church Committee* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 41; Prados, *Lost Crusader*, 301; Immerman, *The Hidden Hand*, 109.

⁵⁸³ "Dear Mr. President," December 24, 1975, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; "President's Commission on CIA Activities in the U.S.," January 13, 1975, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4.

⁵⁸⁴ "Rockefeller Commission Members and Staff," February 19, 1975, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; "David Belin, Rockefeller Comm.," February 25, 1975, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4.

⁵⁸⁵ "The Rockefeller Report on the CIA," *WP*, June 11, 1975, p. A18.

The report concluded CIA's activities were "improper," but argued against broader changes to the National Security Act and "ambiguities have been partially responsible for some...of the Agency's deviations within the United States from its assigned mission." Ultimately the report defended the Agency. It noted CIA required protection from "public allegations that a democracy does not need an intelligence apparatus."⁵⁸⁶ And whilst news outlets criticised the executive commission, they agreed CIA was an essential statecraft organisation. *NYT* stated, "in this dangerous world, the United States must have a well-run agency to gather information about foreign nations...The excesses and aberrations of the C.I.A. do not erase that necessity, nor do they cancel out the useful work the agency has performed at times."⁵⁸⁷

The *SLPD* commented "we are not prepared to advance this contention if there is any prospect of restoring the CIA to its original purpose." *TBS* acknowledged that whilst the Agency were guilty of violations, Congress should not reduce "the need for its expertise in information gathering...Just as liberty must be protected from the excesses of our own government, so must it be protected from foreign systems opposed to our democracy." The *SLPD* latched on the Commission's finding that CIA was used by the Nixon government to cover for Watergate by implicating it.⁵⁸⁸ Many left-leaning reporters believed it was involved at the time. Only an investigation by David Wise and the Commission led journalists to argue CIA was abused for political purposes by Nixon.⁵⁸⁹

Colby and the Church Committee

Colby experienced minimal hostility from the Rockefeller Commission, largely because it did not want him to disclose too much information. But the Congressional investigations gave Colby his biggest PR test yet. The Senate formally started their investigation on 27 January 1975 with the Church committee. The group investigated the broader aspect of CIA's leadership, structure, and received favourable newspaper coverage because it was seen to be a responsible inquiry that raised serious questions regarding CIA's covert operational functions whilst arguing not to dismantle it. The committee was seen by newspapers as a measured and reliable investigation compared to the Pike

⁵⁸⁶ Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, *Report to the President*, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1975), 7, 12, Townley, "A Blue Ribbon Goat," 6.

⁵⁸⁷ "Ford Gets Commission Report On CIA Spying," *SLPD*, June 6, 1975, p. 1; "Releasing Most Of CIA Report," *SLPD*, June 8, 1975, p. 2; "No Time for Cover-Up," *NYT*, June 8, 1975, p. 198; "The C.I.A.," *TBS*, June 9, 1975, p. 10; "Operation Chaos," *NYT*, June 11, 1975, p. 42; "Controlling The CIA," *SLPD*, June 11, 1975, p. 22; "...C.I.A. Reform...," *NYT*, June 11, 1975, p. 42.

⁵⁸⁸ Lawrence E. Taylor, "CIA Reported Perverted By Nixon In 1971," *SLPD*, June 11, 1975, p. 19; "(C)learly (I)llegal (A)ctivities," *TBS*, June 12, 1975, p. 22; "Instrument Of Cold War," *SLPD*, June 15, 1975, p. 28; James Deakin, "CIA Report Wide Open For Interpretation," *SLPD*, June 12, 1975, p. 21.

⁵⁸⁹ David Greenberg, *Nixon's Shadow: The History of an Image* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 217-221.

Committee, that many in the press loathed.⁵⁹⁰ As a former member of the Church committee, Loch K. Johnson stated, “the more criticism the House got, the more responsible we looked.”⁵⁹¹

Colby already met six times with Congress’s oversight committees before he testified at the Church committee. Its domestic activities and budget were only discussed three times during this period. At these meetings Colby attempted to shape the narrative to argue CIA was under attack. He testified publicly on 15 January before the Senate’s Appropriations Committee to “restore public confidence.” The DCI repeated his statement he sent to Ford shortly after Hersh’s article that stated the charges were “not accurate.” As Colby recalls, coverage after his public testimony was “enormous” which featured on the front pages of *NYT* and *WP*.⁵⁹²

Colby states that press reaction was unfavourable to his testimony because journalists wanted to dig deeper into CIA. The opposite was true, Colby’s Congressional appearances resulted in positive coverage and a call for some secrecy to remain. *NYT* praised his testimony as a “good example of how the public interest in disclosure can be served without violating the intelligence community’s legitimate responsibilities for secrecy.” Joseph Kraft focused on the DCI’s statements that leaks were emerging from within the Agency before Hersh’s scoop. CIA secrecy was in peril because its biggest weakness were leaks of sensitive material. “Genuine national secrets may be revealed, so is the precious principle...that officials not be beaten over the head for acts committed in the totally different atmosphere of 15 years ago.”⁵⁹³ Colby used managed transparency to informally meet with Congressmen. He provided a briefing detailing the CIA’s budget, in which Senator John Tower later recalled that Colby “was much more open...than I would have wanted.”⁵⁹⁴

Some of the Church committee’s hearings were publicised and televised. Church often briefed reporters and detailed the heated exchanges between his committee, CIA, and the WH. Colby used his managed transparency approach by discussing, at length, the extent of CIA covert

⁵⁹⁰ “The Intelligence Inquiry,” *SLPD*, January 23, 1975, p. 18; Smist, *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community*, 188; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 146-148.

⁵⁹¹ Loch K. Johnson, *A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 180.

⁵⁹² “Dear Mr. President,” December 24, 1975, Colby Papers; “President Ford,” January 3, 1975, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; Seymour M. Hersh, “C.I.A. Admits Domestic Acts, Denies ‘Massive’ Illegality,” *NYT*, January 16, 1975, p. 1; “Text of Report by Colby in Response to Charges of Domestic Spying,” *NYT*, January 16, 1975, p. 30; “Colby Admits CIA Spying in U.S.,” *WP*, January 16, 1975, p. A1; Colby, *Honorable Men*, 399-402.

⁵⁹³ “Intelligence in Review,” *NYT*, January 22, 1975, p. 34; Joseph Kraft, “CIA’s Weaknesses Outweigh Its Menace,” *TBS*, January 19, 1975, p. 119; Joseph Kraft, “Some Electing to ‘Tell All’ Are Playing on Gullibility,” *TBS*, January 23, 1975, p. 19.

⁵⁹⁴ “Senate Select Committee,” 1st May 1975, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; “Senate Appropriations Intelligence Operations Subcommittee,” 1st May 1975, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; “Senators Church & Tower,” 15th May, 1975, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; “Colby Gives Hearing Testimony Under Oath,” *SLPD*, May 16, 1975, p. 5; Colby, *Honorable Men*, 402; Tower quoted in Smist, *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community*, 60.

operations to the committee because it limited any Congressional momentum towards unearthing CIA's "good secrets."⁵⁹⁵ Newspaper coverage and Church's hyperbole benefitted Colby because it shifted press attention away from the Agency's domestic operations to the public's fascination over CIA-backed assassinations.⁵⁹⁶ Church's comments like the Agency were "behaving like a rogue elephant on a rampage," and his unearthing of a CIA-issued poisoned dart gun in a televised session made headline news but did not reveal the "good secrets" Colby wanted hidden. The DCI was pleased for Church to turn the publicly admired investigation into a media frenzy.⁵⁹⁷

Colby was able to use the dart gun hearing to present "a briefcase full of exotic CIA weapons" and engage in a lengthy, public testimony with Church about the origins and capabilities of the weapon. Colby used his testimony to appeal to the press and public's fascination with the clandestine nature of biological warfare. The DCI talked extensively about CIA's laboratory storage facilities housing shellfish toxin and cobra venom. More importantly, the hearing provided Colby the opportunity to state that intelligence under his leadership was modernising. He made the point explicit that his Agency had changed. "We are engaged...in resolving the dilemma between the necessary secrets of intelligence and the equally necessary exposure of our government's workings to our people...In former times, this contradiction was resolved in favor of almost total intelligence secrecy." Colby however declares CIA cannot afford to be too open otherwise "we risk seriously and unnecessarily injuring our intelligence."⁵⁹⁸

Church compromised with the Ford administration and CIA for the release of classified material. The Senator's desire to run for President had quickened the committee's proceedings

⁵⁹⁵ John M. Crewdson, "Senate Unit Seeks 'Vail Report' on C.I.A. Role in U.S.," *NYT*, p. 22; Nicholas M. Horrock, "Panel Asks Ford to Speed Study on Colby," *NYT*, April 10, 1975, p. 12; "White House Gives Secret C.I.A. Data to Senate Inquiry," *NYT*, April 16, 1975, p. 9; Nicholas M. Horrock, "White House Lag on Spy Data Seen," *NYT*, April 24, 1975, p. 8.

⁵⁹⁶ John M. Crewdson, "Senator Reports CIA Death Plots," *NYT*, June 5, 1975, p. 1; "Head of Senate Espionage Inquiry Rejects Suggestion that C.I.A. Assassination Links be Kept Secret," *NYT*, June 19, 1975, p. 15; John M. Crewdson, "Church Doubts Plot Links to Presidents," *NYT*, July 19, 1975, p. 1; Joseph Kraft, "CIA: The Assassination Hot Potato," *WP*, August 17, 1975, p.35; Nicholas M. Horrock, "Senate Spy Panel to Open Sessions," *NYT*, September 6, 1975, p. 10.

⁵⁹⁷ United States Congress, Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Interim Report*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rep. 94-465, (Washington, D.C.: 1975), 256; United States Congress, Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities*, September 16, 1975, 94th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington D.C., 1976), 'Volume 1: Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents.', 16-20; Townley, *The Year of Intelligence*, 179, 187; Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 214-215; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 161; Prados, *Lost Crusader*, 306; Olmsted, *Challenging the Secret Government*, 83; Smist, *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community*, 188.

⁵⁹⁸ "Statement by W. E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence before United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities," September 16, 1975, Colby Papers, Series 2, Box 8, Folder 1-3.

because he could not mount a presidential campaign whilst chairing it. This resulted in a rushed investigation that did not effectively question issues surrounding CIA reform and it increased press scepticism because the committee was seen to only further Church's own political career. When the committee began in January 1975, Church was already receiving public letters encouraging him to run for President. By the time of its 1976 final report, the public mood had shifted, it benefitted Colby because it ended with a sense of "national weariness at hearing any more about wrongdoings of the past."⁵⁹⁹

The report put forward several findings including the extent of CIA's domestic surveillance program, "where there was tangible evidence that illegal conduct was likely to occur," and failures by Congress "to define the scope of domestic intelligence activities...to uncover excesses, or to propose legislative solutions." It resonated with the opinions of columnists and reporters who desired stronger oversight so CIA could operate within clear legal guidelines, but they wanted to retain CIA as they saw it as an important integral part of the national security establishment. It proposed a "substantial curtailment of the scope of domestic surveillance," but it blamed CIA's lack of clear guidelines at the hands of the executive and Congress.⁶⁰⁰

Colby welcomed the report's conclusions. The findings complemented his argument that his Agency changed. The committee criticised the family jewels report and the older culture of intelligence secrecy. It helped Colby maintain CIA's "survival," because the group never recommended dismantling it. The committee's impact was marginal because it failed to unearth the "good secrets" Colby wanted shielded and resulted in limited CIA reform.⁶⁰¹ Whilst it paved the way for increased oversight with the establishment of the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), which "acted as the nation's conscience," Colby proudly noted it would make sure the "essential secrets are kept."⁶⁰² Church's hyperbole, his headline-grabbing comments and actions all effectively diluted the scope and impact of his committee. By the end of its investigation, the press impetus for CIA scrutiny weakened.

⁵⁹⁹ Richard Dudman, "Secrecy, Pressure Limited Panel's Spying Report," *SLPD*, April 27, 1976, p. 7; Dafydd Townley, "Too Responsible to Run for President: Frank Church and the 1976 Presidential Nomination," *Journal of Intelligence History*, 21, no. 2 (2022), 222, 226.

⁶⁰⁰ United States Congress, Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report together with additional, supplemental, and separate views*, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rep. 94-755, "Book II: Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans," (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976), 14, 167, 277.

⁶⁰¹ Brent Durbin, *The CIA and the Politics of Intelligence Reform* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 146.

⁶⁰² "Intelligence Oversight," *NYT*, May 23, 1976, p. E16; Colby, *Honorable Men*, 443.

Colby and the Pike Committee

The correspondence between Colby and the Pike committee was fuelled with animosity and suspicion on both sides. On the one hand Colby called the House member a “jackass,” who was nothing more than a publicity seeker, and eager to pry open sensitive CIA secrets. Whilst Agency officers referred to the Pike group as “a miserable bunch...really irresponsible...terribly inexperienced and naïve.”⁶⁰³ On the other, the representative from New York argued that the DCI and CIA were deliberately using secrecy to obstruct details that ought to be within the public’s interest.⁶⁰⁴ Colby previously taken the opportunity to release a public statement to the House Appropriations committee on 20 February 1975. He stated the “exaggerations and misrepresentations” from Hersh have caused “irreparable harm to our national security apparatus” by hampering relations with foreign intelligence services, risking the lives of intelligence agents, and reducing Agency morale. He asked that Congressional investigations are conducted in a responsible manner.⁶⁰⁵

Colby’s statement before the House committee led to reaction within the press. The *LAT* focused on the rare occasion that a DCI has publicly appeared to defend the Agency whilst a *TBS* editorial called Colby “forthcoming,” who has told Congress, “more than they thought they were asking.” Compared to Helms, whose reliance on secrecy had led the former DCI “into a series of embarrassing changes of testimony under congressional questioning...Mr. Colby seems to realize that only thorough co-operation with Congress and the Rockefeller Commission can he re-establish public confidence in his agency.”⁶⁰⁶

Otis Pike formed the Committee in July 1975 after Lucien Nedzi was replaced due to his prior knowledge of the family jewels.⁶⁰⁷ The committee experienced press hostility from its inception because of constant leaks. His appointment was initially praised but leaks of the group’s proceedings angered investigative reporters such as *CBS* reporter Daniel Schorr because it diverted attention from CIA onto the mishandling of sensitive information from the committee. “The issue of leaks

⁶⁰³ Prados, *Lost Crusader*, 319; Rogg, *The Spy and the State*, 313.

⁶⁰⁴ Townley, *The Year of Intelligence*, 99; Colby, *Honorable Men*, 431.

⁶⁰⁵ “Defense Subcommittee of House Appropriations,” February 20, 1975, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; “Colby Denounces Attacks on CIA,” *SLPD*, February 20, 1975, p. 2.

⁶⁰⁶ “CIA Critics Hinder World, Colby Warns,” *LAT*, February 21, 1975, p. 1; “Ugly but Necessary Mechanism,” *TBS*, February 25, 1975. p. 14.

⁶⁰⁷ “Move In Panel To Oust Nedzi,” *SLPD*, June 6, 1975, p. 7; “Nedzi Said To Suspect ‘Runaway’ CIA Inquiry,” *SLPD*, June 13, 1975, p. 6; “CIA Told Symington, Nedzi Of Its Acts,” *SLPD*, July 9, 1975, p. 1; “More CIA Tentacles,” *SLPD*, July 13, 1975, p. 94.

versus national security reached a climax.”⁶⁰⁸ It provided President Ford an excuse to undermine it and block the final report’s publication which Pike referred to as a “cover-up.” Parts were already leaked as Schorr noted when he received sparse sections of it after a closed committee session in January 1976, “there won’t be much news left when it is released.”⁶⁰⁹ The *WP* argued the committee could not be trusted with national security material, “Pike’s cry of ‘cover-up’ will only become reality if he is allowed to make it so.”⁶¹⁰

Pike’s attempt to unearth CIA secrets and his use of frequent subpoenas aided Colby’s efforts to obstruct proceedings. He could utilise the press’s hostility and Pike’s aggressive strategy to argue CIA’s “good secrets” were under threat of exposure. The DCI used every opportunity to discredit the committee. Pike sent a letter to the DCI in July asking for details surrounding the Agency’s budget.⁶¹¹ Colby replied that the group was already briefed and reiterated his concern that members did not have security clearances. Colby met with Pike, alongside Mitchell J. Rogovin, a lawyer hired by CIA to limit both the Pike and Church committees’ access to CIA material.⁶¹² The meeting “turned into a confrontation” as the House member pushed the notion that Congress had the right to know about CIA whereas Rogovin saw it as Pike “trying to avoid charges of having been coopted” by the Agency.⁶¹³

Colby assured Pike in a private meeting he would cooperate in providing details of CIA’s budget if “current reviews will conclude that the main thrust of U.S. intelligence activity is good, solid and trustworthy.” Pike replied that he had no intention of damaging CIA’s reputation but believed its expenditures should be open to the public. Colby responded that briefings, provided by “sanitized key documents,” protected CIA.⁶¹⁴ Shielding the “good secrets” also fell to the Ford administration as Pike was keen to unearth the budget. In the committee’s first public hearing on 4

⁶⁰⁸ Richard L. Madden, “Investigator with Wit,” *NYT*, July 19, 1975, p. 37; “Tough Questioner For CIA,” *SLPD*, July 20, 1975, p. 46; Laurence Stern, “Intelligence Debate Moves to Hill,” *WP*, January 18, 1976, p. 3; Smist, *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community*, 156-158, 188; Daniel Schorr, *Clearing the Air* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 185.

⁶⁰⁹ John M. Crewdson, “House Unit on Intelligence Votes, 9-4, to Issue Report,” *NYT*, January 24, 1976, p. 13; “Report on CIA Blocked,” *WP*, January 29, 1976, p. A1; “Secrecy Issues Put Before Full House,” *SLPD*, January 29, 1976, p. 41; “Cover-up Charged On CIA Report,” *SLPD*, February 2, 1976, p. 5; Schorr, *Clearing the Air*, 192; Townley, *The Year of Intelligence*, 110.

⁶¹⁰ “The Basis of CIA Oversight,” *WP*, January 30, 1976, p. A22.

⁶¹¹ CIA, “Letter to the Honorable Otis G. Pike from W. E. Colby,” July 28, 1975, CIA-RDP89B00552R000100100107-0, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP89B00552R000100100107-0.pdf>, accessed 24th July 2024.

⁶¹² “Congressman Pike,” July 25, 1975, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; “CIA Retains Law Firm For Inquiry Hearings,” *SLPD*, July 3, 1975, p. 34.

⁶¹³ Prados, *Lost Crusader*, 319.

⁶¹⁴ CIA, “House Select Committee,” July 24, 1975, CIA-RDP89B00552R000100100110-6, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP89B00552R000100100110-6.pdf>, accessed 24th July 2024.

August, the head of the government's Office of Management and Budget (OMB), James T. Lynn, refused to provide details of intelligence expenditure. He argued due to its classification, Colby as DCI could only determine how to release the material.⁶¹⁵ Accompanied by Rogovin, Colby declared he wanted to keep the Agency's budget secret. Pike spoke to the press after and recounted his anger at Colby and Lynn, remarking "we got absolutely nothing."⁶¹⁶

The tension between Colby and Pike came to a head in September because frequent subpoenas were issued to the DCI which erupted into a row between Congress and the administration over who should have access to classified material. The committee demanded CIA Presidential briefings of prior operations in Vietnam and the Middle East. Pike states the IC did submit information but accused it of not sending the relevant material requested. Colby sided with Ford in refusing to send intelligence material on the 1973 Arab-Israeli War after the committee leaked parts of the intelligence report provided in a closed session.⁶¹⁷ An internal survey was released, demonstrating that the Pike investigation was having a detrimental effect on staff morale. Those who responded commented that the committee "is looking primarily for the sensational, and going about it in an amateur and disorganized manner."⁶¹⁸

⁶¹⁵ CIA, "Statement of James T. Lynn Director of the Office of Management and Budget Before the House Select Committee on Intelligence," August 1, 1975, CIA-RDP82B00871R000100070002-3, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82B00871R000100070002-3.pdf>, accessed 25th July 2024.

⁶¹⁶ "House Select Committee on Intelligence," August 4, 1975, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; "Balks At Public Disclosure Of U.S. Intelligence Costs," *SLPD*, August 2, 1975, p. 2; "Colby Wants To Keep CIA Budget Secret," *SLPD*, August 4, 1975. p. 3; John M. Crewdson, "Rep. Pike Angry as C.I.A. Bars Data," *NYT*, August 5, 1975, p. 8.

⁶¹⁷ House Select Committee on Intelligence, *US Intelligence Agencies and Activities*, pt. 4, *Committee Proceedings*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., September 10, 1975, 1225-1226; George Lardner Jr., "Return of Data Sought," *WP*, September 13, 1975, p. A1; "Executive Privilege and Secrecy," *TBS*, September 16, 1975, p. 14.

⁶¹⁸ CIA, "Office of Logistics Personnel Attitudes Concerning Current Investigations," September 24, 1975, CIA-RDP85-00759R000100160012-6, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85-00759R000100160012-6.pdf>, accessed 26th July 2024.

Administrative - Internal Use Only

24 SEP 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Office of Logistics Personnel Attitudes Concerning
Current Investigations

STAT

1. At your request, an attitudinal survey among Office of Logistics (OL) personnel was conducted on 22 and 23 September. This survey sample consisted of personnel of all grade levels of responsibility in the clerical, professional, technical, and wage board categories of employees. Their attitudes, reactions, and opinions were gathered by interview, questionnaire, and written narrative. The basic questions asked for their reactions to and opinions of:

- a. The conduct of both the Senate Select Committee (SSC) and the House Select Committee (HSC) and their respective staffs,
- b. Coverage of the investigations by the news media,
- c. Future of the Agency,
- d. Employee morale,
- e. Mr. Colby's handling of the investigations.

2. Understandably, most of our personnel feel resentment that the investigations are being conducted at all, but what is particularly upsetting to them is the way in which they are being conducted. Some feel that the SSC is attempting to be objective and is searching for real problems in an organized, businesslike way. This reaction might be because we have had less contact with that committee. On the other hand, they feel that the HSC is looking primarily for the sensational, and going about it in an amateur and disorganized manner at that. Overwhelmingly, our personnel feel that the actions of both committees are a struggle for political recognition and prestige and that those goals are being abetted by the media.

3. With very few exceptions do OL personnel feel that the media are handling the coverage of the investigations without bias. While few have been able to follow the proceedings on television, other than excerpts in the scheduled news broadcasts, all react to the press. The same label of "sensationalism" prevails in their opinions. They believe that any headline with "CIA" in it will sell newspapers and magazines and that, as far as the press is concerned, is more important than the security and integrity of our nation. Some point out that our questionable and damning activities make the front page and, where we do have a supportive reporter, those articles are usually buried deep inside the publication.

~~Administrative - Internal Use Only~~

SUBJECT: Office of Logistics Personnel Attitudes Concerning
Current Investigations

4. With regard to the future of the Agency, all believe that the Agency will survive but expect that it will be reorganized and tightly controlled. One respondent fears that those controls might limit or adversely affect our imagination and creativity. Others think that functions will be transferred to other agencies and that the "central" intelligence agency will, in effect, disappear. Most have faith, however, that the Congress and the American people recognize the value of our work and will not permit us to become a public library of intelligence information.

5. Morale is high among the rank and file employee, but there is a sense of frustration among the senior personnel who are required to spend so much time on "unproductive work" at the expense of doing their regular jobs. Questions were structured to elicit not only the feeling of the respondent himself but that of his associates. Only three rank and file respondents indicated any waning of morale or erosion of pride. On the contrary, our personnel generally seem to feel like a family under attack, and have developed a resolve because they recognize the importance of what they have done and what they want to continue to do in spite of the unknown future of the Agency.

6. Mr. Colby's image receives nothing but high praise. Comments on his candor, patience, brilliance, and good humor under obvious stressful conditions were almost universal. Several feel that he might have revealed too much information to the committees and to the press but, at the same time, admit that he probably had no other option in an already hostile environment. Others feel that he might have been able to respond to questions more convincingly had he been given more complete and accurate information before his appearances. Still others feel that it is unfair that he has to defend, and be subject to ridicule for, Agency activities which did not occur "on his watch." It is a continuing inspiration, however, that in spite of the great amount of his time and concern that must be devoted to the investigations, he still finds time and concern to devote to "his own people" in the Agency and its work. Our feeling might be summed up in the written comment of one of our employees, "Throughout this whole fiasco, Mr. Colby has been a perfect gentleman and has shown the patience of a saint and the endurance of an Apache Indian. In spite of all of the unwarranted and unfortunate publicity, Mr. Colby has given me reason to be more proud than ever before to be a member of this elite organization."

EGIB

7. As the Director of Logistics, it gives me a great deal of pride also to stand on their dedication and loyalty

/s/ Michael J. Malanick
Michael J. Malanick
Director of Logistics

Figure 5.4 This CIA internal survey shows Agency employees viewed the Church committee as objective whilst they characterised the Pike committee as unprofessional and looking for the "sensational." They believe the press does not care about the "security and integrity" of the nation, and whilst they expect CIA to survive the investigations, they fear it will be reorganised. Finally, on Colby, officers have nothing but praise in how he has handled CIA scrutiny.
Source: CIA, "Office of Logistics Personnel," September 24, 1975, CIA-RDP85-00759R000100160012-6.

Pike's actions allowed Colby to argue that its investigation was damaging CIA. The DCI held a press conference which he reiterated a *NYT* article he wrote previously, "clarifying to the American people the real nature of modern intelligence and to get us away from some of the old myths about

it,” but he stressed preserving sensitive secrets from the group.⁶¹⁹ Colby made various trips to meet press editors in St. Louis, New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Boston to argue the leaks were having “a very adverse effect” on the Agency.⁶²⁰ Pike issued another subpoena, holding the DCI and the Ford administration in “contempt of Congress,” if they did not provide information relating to CIA operations in Vietnam. The CIA’s legal counsel, Rogovin, replied and assured that Colby has been forthcoming with the committee.⁶²¹ The DCI also published a public statement refusing to supply the requested information, remarking that Pike conducts the investigation in a “fashion...which protects the essential secrets of intelligence.”⁶²²

Kathryn Olmsted highlights this was part of the DCI’s compromise. Colby submitted the minimum amount of information with the aim of avoiding charges of contempt, whilst Pike agreed not to disclose CIA classified material.⁶²³ This agreement angered some committee members who argued it was vague and could be applied to all documents the CIA wanted hidden. Despite the agreement, the committee continued to leak CIA information, and it negatively impacted its press coverage. Reporters argued that revealing prior Agency operations in the Middle East and Angola was deliberate and reckless. Editorials and opinion pieces stated the leaks led to the disclosure of sensitive CIA information that benefitted adversaries.⁶²⁴ More troubling for Pike, was that this sentiment was being echoed by members of the public in numerous letters to the editors. Combined with a recent Harris poll that indicated eighty percent of the public did not want stringent CIA reform or its abolition. It emphasised the Agency had “staved off the worst” from the investigating committees.⁶²⁵

⁶¹⁹ CIA, “Press Conference Held By Mr. William E. Colby in CIA Auditorium on 12 September 1975,” September 12, 1975, CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100020-9, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100020-9.pdf>, accessed 26th July 2024; William E. Colby, “Modern Intelligence: Myth and Reality,” *NYT*, August 3, 1975, p. 157.

⁶²⁰ Richard K. Weil Jr., “Hearings Hurt U.S. Intelligence Work, Colby Says Here,” *SLPD*, September 24, 1975, p. 19.

⁶²¹ Dave Binder, “Pike to Request Contempt Action in C.I.A. Inquiry,” *NYT*, September 26, 1975, p. 77; John M. Crewdson, “Pike Panel Seeks House Vote in Bid for Secret Files,” *NYT*, September 30, 1975, p. 77; John M. Crewdson, “C.I.A. Yields Data to House Inquiry,” *NYT*, October 1, 1975, p. 93; “Dear Chairman Pike,” September 29, 1975, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4.

⁶²² “Statement by William E. Colby,” September 29, 1975, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4.

⁶²³ Olmsted, *Challenging the Secret Government*, 115.

⁶²⁴ James Reston, “Chairman Pike’s Pique,” *NYT*, October 1, 1975, p. 45; Ernest B. Furgurson, “Irresponsibility and the System,” *TBS*, October 2, 1975, p. 18; Nicholas M. Horrock, “Intelligence Hearings,” *NYT*, October 10, 1975, p. 21; Thomas Pepper, “Revamping the Spy Game: Can the Old Mold be Broken?” *TBS*, October 19, 1975, p. 122; “Neo-McCarthyism?” *NYT*, October 19, 1975, p. 204; John Herbers, “Pike-Kissinger Dispute,” *NYT*, October 26, 1975, p. 204; “Mr. Pike Goes Too Far,” *WP*, November 19, 1975, p. A14;

⁶²⁵ C. Warsawer, “Reflections on the C.I.A.,” *NYT*, October 22, 1975, p. 44; Louis Harris, “Majority Says Save the CIA,” *CT*, September 1, 1975, page unknown.

Despite Church and Pike's investigations still ongoing, the pendulum shifted towards Colby and the Ford administration's protection of intelligence secrets by the end of 1975. Public animosity against the Pike committee allowed Colby to air his "sharpest criticism yet." In October, a day before the Church committee resumed its hearings, the DCI posed the question: "Is our intelligence to become mere theater?" In calling out the "sensational reruns...for amusement," Colby charged the Church committee with unearthing old CIA stories regarding domestic surveillance. But he focused on Pike for the "irresponsible exposure of true intelligence secrets." Despite Pike's negative coverage, Colby asserted the investigations aided an adversarial press.⁶²⁶ As he gave his speech denouncing the leaks, the DCI established a task force to evaluate the CIA's public image.⁶²⁷

The task force advocated Colby's managed transparency because it required "a more open and forthcoming attitude" with the media by briefing reporters and editors before they publish any CIA article because the Agency's recent publicity, "has not resulted in a rounded story." Echoing managed transparency, it stated that only the Agency's future would be mentioned to avoid digging up its past. However, as Christopher Moran notes, the DCI rejected the recommendations made because he wanted to initiate his own PR strategy by continuing to appear at Congressional testimonies and media briefings. Fearful of a backlash where reporters might accuse CIA PR as a form of propaganda, Colby refuted the report, stating "we're just going to have to take the heat."⁶²⁸

In November 1975, Colby recalled that "a very real calming note began entering the national debate over intelligence" where reporters and legislators began to "distinguish between the sensational and the real, the legitimate secrets and the boondoggles." The public was acknowledging the "nation's need for intelligence and grew increasingly uneasy that those services were in danger of being destroyed." Colby knew the public mood was shifting, and his forthcoming persona could be scaled back to make the point explicit that CIA secrecy needed protection. It was in this moment he limited CIA material to the Pike committee by attempting to persuade members that the Agency's effectiveness would be undermined by disclosures.⁶²⁹

On 19 November he met with the chairman of the House Appropriations committee, a "long-time friend" of Colby and "protector of the CIA," George H. Mahon, to highlight his concern over the protection of CIA information.⁶³⁰ A month later he met with the Pike committee for the last

⁶²⁶ "Colby Calls Inquiries Sensational Reruns," *SLPD*, October 21, 1975, p. 14.

⁶²⁷ CIA, "Telling the Intelligence Story," October 30, 1975, CIA-RDP77M00144R001200060014-1, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP77M00144R001200060014-1.pdf>, accessed 12th October 2020.

⁶²⁸ Ibid; McCarthy, *Selling the CIA*, 23; Colby quoted in Moran, *Company Confessions*, 187-188.

⁶²⁹ Colby, *Honorable Men*, 449-450.

⁶³⁰ "Congressman Mahon," November 19, 1975, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4.

time in an open session where he warned that Agency and U.S. national security were in danger if future leaks continued. He sought to ban the publication of CIA prior operations in Italy, Angola, and Iraq in the final Pike Report.⁶³¹ In late-December, he sent a letter to the House speaker, Carl Albert, which he remarked he was “greatly concerned” about the “serious problem” involving the extent of Pike’s disclosures.⁶³²

After parts of the Pike report were obtained and printed by *NYT*, Colby issued his last speech at Langley on 26 January, the day before he would be succeeded by George H. W. Bush.⁶³³ Colby set up this press conference because he feared the whole report would be released. In his speech he scolds it as “biased and irresponsible,” that is “bursting...the dam protecting many of our secret operations and activities,” and declared “this report should not be issued!” In an interview with Oriana Fallaci, in which he turned down initially due to fear of criticism from the foreign press, he stated the report was “biased, and done to give a false impression of CIA...He did not publish things we did right. He chose what we had done wrong.”⁶³⁴

His argument that the committee’s leaks had damaged CIA effectiveness was also echoed by reporters who targeted Daniel Schorr’s release of the final report. Published in the *Village Voice* with information provided by Schorr in February 1976, it demonstrated a key issue regarding journalistic ethics and press responsibility. Although the committee continually leaked throughout its investigation, Schorr’s action caused contention. In a *NYT* editorial he was accused of “selling secrets” for a “cash sale,” and *CT* referred to the disclosure as “a back door deal with a payoff attached.” Even the reporter Charles B. Seib, who wrote for the liberal *New Republic*, argued Schorr’s publication was driven by financial motives, stating that the “cause of free journalism has been damaged.”⁶³⁵

⁶³¹ Dean Mills, “Colby Warns of Intelligence Crippling,” *TBS*, December 13, 1975, p. 7; “CIA Objects To Making 3 Covert Actions Public,” *SLPD*, December 19, 1975, p. 10; Harold P. Ford, *William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence, 1973–1976* (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1993), 170.

⁶³² CIA, “Letter to Honorable Carl Albert from W. E. Colby,” December 24, 1975, CIA-RDP78M02660R000200040019-3, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78M02660R000200040019-3.pdf>, accessed 5th April 2024; Colby, *Honorable Men*, 407.

⁶³³ John M. Crewdson, “Secrecy is Cited,” *NYT*, January 26, 1976, p. 49.

⁶³⁴ CIA, “Miss Oriana Fallaci,” January 19, 1976, CIA-RDP88-01315R000400340032-9, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01315R000400340032-9.pdf>, accessed 22nd August 2024; Oriana Fallaci, “The CIA’s Mr. Colby,” *New Republic*, March 13, 1976, pp. 12-21; Gerald K. Haines, “The Pike Committee Investigation and the CIA,” *Studies in Intelligence*, 42, no. 5 (Winter 1998-1999), 89; Schorr, *Clearing the Air*, 193.

⁶³⁵ “Selling Secrets,” *NYT*, February 15, 1976, p. E12; “A Payoff for a Secret,” *CT*, February 17, 1976, p. 14; Charles B Seib, “The Secret Report Capers,” *WP*, February 20, 1976, p. A19.

The Schorr case demonstrates that the press argued investigative journalism was going too far and mainstream outlets were onside with CIA secrecy. The press criticised Schorr and were quick to portray themselves as instigators of a responsible fourth estate who would not leak sensitive material. The case shows the press's attempts to clamp down on journalists who exposed intelligence secrets rather than support their findings, "I got hit by a swinging pendulum," Schorr recalled. He was suspended from *CBS* and had to appear before the House Ethics Committee.⁶³⁶ The Pike committee's press-relationship was poor when proceedings began, but the fiasco over the release of its final report symbolised a dramatic shift in coverage. It now focused on the extent of CIA damage the leaks caused, rather than any new revelations.

Former DCI Colby defended Schorr's publication of the Pike report. He stated he was doing his duty as an investigative journalist but concluded his actions "convinced the world that Americans cannot keep a secret."⁶³⁷ Colby's statement perfectly encapsulates managed transparency because whilst Colby recognised CIA would have to contend with adversarial reporters, he argued that press irresponsibility posed a threat to national security. It was a reoccurring feature of CIA public secrecy. The publication of the Pike report shifted the public debate toward the committee's mishandling of CIA information rather than the report's findings and recommendations.⁶³⁸ It did not lead to effective reform. "It all lasted too long," Pike recalled, "and the people lost interest." The issue that the report was not released by the House itself but by Schorr, an outsider, weakened the committee's competency. Pike's own actions, combined with the assassination of a CIA officer, held ramifications that undermined public interest in the investigations.⁶³⁹

The Impact of Richard Welch's Assassination

Richard S. Welch, a CIA station chief, was shot and killed in Greece by a terrorist organisation on 23 December 1975. His death held a profound effect on the CIA secrecy debate. It provided Colby with a "golden opportunity to argue that enough was enough." Revealing the identity of CIA employees, or "naming names," was "tantamount to treasonous murder...the campaign against the CIA had gone too far."⁶⁴⁰ It allowed Colby to highlight that the protection of agents' identities, one of the "good secrets" he wanted to shield, was compromised. It meant he could shift the public

⁶³⁶ Richard D. Lyons, "House Ethics Committee Begins Inquiry on Schorr," *NYT*, February 25, 1976, p. 10; "Schorr Intimates Trouble with CBS," *NYT*, February 26, 1976, p. 13; Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 212; Olmsted, *Challenging the Secret Government*, 165-166.

⁶³⁷ "Colby Defends Schorr in Release of Document," *NYT*, March 30, 1976, p. 9.

⁶³⁸ Townley, *The Year of Intelligence in the United States*, 116.

⁶³⁹ Leslie H. Gelb, "Spy Inquiries, Begun Amid Public Outrage, End in Indifference," *NYT*, May 12, 1976, p. 20.

⁶⁴⁰ Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *A Question of Standing: The History of the CIA* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 98.

spotlight from the CIA's prior misdeeds to the dangers of exposing agents.⁶⁴¹ Welch's death came shortly after a public poll showed fifty-two percent of the participants claimed the investigations leaked too much material. It echoed Colby's statements that Pike's actions endangered the Agency. It helped Colby because Welch's murder resulted in the press portraying a rhetoric of CIA sympathy and defend the necessity of its secrecy.⁶⁴²

Colby blamed *CounterSpy*, a left-leaning publication, and former CIA employee turned whistleblower, Philip Agee, for Welch's exposure.⁶⁴³ The magazine served as an outlet for former dissatisfied intelligence officers who argued the Agency's fascination with covert operations distracted from its intended role. *CounterSpy* identified and listed numerous overt CIA officers including over one-hundred station chiefs in its 1975 winter edition.⁶⁴⁴ Colby declared the magazine held no "expression of human sympathy," and urged the Justice Department to investigate whether it violated federal laws. The magazine adopted a methodology by a former State official John Marks, who deciphered how to uncover CIA employees from the American embassy staff. This story about uncovering the identities of Agency employees remarkably featured in *CT*.⁶⁴⁵

Marks's methodology was out in the public domain, and Philip Agee was soon to follow with his book, *Inside the Company*. The appendix listed officers and agents he worked with. Colby argued it compromised the Agency's "good secrets," and feared it provided an impetus for unearthing CIA operational secrecy. Agee however did not reveal Welch's identity but was blamed for causing his death. Welch was previously identified in the Peruvian press where he was stationed. His name and personal details were also published within an Athens newspaper, and he received warnings from CIA about his lack of cover, but the Agency failed to act on prior concerns from former officer Richard Bissell in 1968.⁶⁴⁶

Welch's death featured prominently in *WP*. The paper argued in opinion pieces and editorials that criticism of CIA can lead to irreparable harm to the lives of its employees. Under its slogan, the "Independent Newspaper," *WP* was criticised by reporter Nick Thimmesch shortly after

⁶⁴¹ Angus Mackenzie, *Secrets: The CIA's War at Home* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 65.

⁶⁴² Louis Harris, "CIA, FBI Lose Faith of Public," *CT*, January 22, 1976, p. 19.

⁶⁴³ "U.S. Aide Is Killed in Greece," *WP*, December 24, 1975, p. A1; Laurence Stern, "CIA Agent's Murder Spurs Accusations," *WP*, December 25, 1975, p. A1.

⁶⁴⁴ Kaeten Mistry, "A Transnational Protest against the National Security State: Whistleblowing, Philip Agee, and Networks of Dissent," *Journal of American History*, 106, no. 2 (2019), 373.

⁶⁴⁵ John Marks, "How to Unmask CIA Spies Hidden in our Embassies," *CT*, January 19, 1975, p. 43.

⁶⁴⁶ "CIA Was Alerted in 1968 About Danger to Agents," *WP*, January 4, 1976, p.3; "Statutes Studied in Leak on C.I.A.," *NYT*, January 6, 1976, p. 14; Mistry, "A Transnational Protest against the National Security State," 374, 388; Olmsted, *Challenging the Secret Government*, 151; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 140; Prados, *The Family Jewels*, 222.

Seymour Hersh's 1974 article for their editorials which "tilted toward the besieged CIA."⁶⁴⁷ After Welch's death, *WP* correspondent Dan Morgan led the question as to whether *WP* was as independent and objective as it proclaimed. Titled on the front page, "Slain Agent Feared for CIA Lives," Morgan quoted comments from former CIA official and defender David Attlee Phillips to portray Welch as a "CIA martyr" whose "talents that were highly regarded in the intelligence bureaucracy."⁶⁴⁸

Morgan made the point explicit that Welch was a loyal CIA officer who cared for his colleagues because he constantly warned them to be cautious about their cover.⁶⁴⁹ Not only were CIA members at risk, *WP* proclaimed, but the Agency's morale took a hit. *WP* continued to praise Welch, in an editorial they painted him as an ordinary "American citizen serving his government." Criticism focused on *CounterSpy* and his death was seen as an "entirely predictable result of the disclosure tactics chosen by certain American critics of the agency as part of their effort to destroy it." It was an "open invitation" to Welch's assassination, "just as the rest of the country comes to the view, which the government has already formally embraced, that assassination is an unacceptable abuse of power."⁶⁵⁰

Welch's funeral was a successful PR campaign, carefully orchestrated by Colby, CIA, and the Ford administration with the aim of suppressing Congressional investigations and reiterating Colby's point that "sensationalism" in the press and Congress led to the loss of CIA personnel. After his tenure, Colby appeared before the House's investigation into CIA and the media. He laid the blame at those who exposed the identities of officers, declaring "the root cause" of Welch's death was "the hysteria and sensationalism about...CIA...Greece was not the only country with terrorists." An ex-CIA official went further. "Moscow must be very pleased with some of the things that have appeared in the American press." Marks and Agee's excessive coverage, he argued, made them "instant celebrities" jeopardising Welch's life.⁶⁵¹ Morton Halperin, a civil liberties lawyer, accused CIA of manipulating the press. He contended its PR effort succeeded because it pushed the narrative towards arguing that CIA critics went too far. Halperin also published a *WP* article calling Welch's

⁶⁴⁷ Nick Thimmesch, "The Overripe Fish Smell Still Pervades Washington," *TBS*, January 24, 1975, p. 15.

⁶⁴⁸ Dan Morgan, "Slain Agent Feared for CIA Lives," *WP*, December 26, 1975, p. A1.

⁶⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵⁰ "CIA Tried to Rally Its Agents," *WP*, December 26, 1975, p. A21; Lou Cannon, "Fears for Other Agents' Lives," *WP*, December 28, 1975, p. 1; "Richard S. Welch," *WP*, December 29, 1975, p. A16; Townley, *The Year of Intelligence*, 217; McCarthy, *Selling the CIA*, 34-35.

⁶⁵¹ U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *The CIA and the Media*, 95th Cong., 1st and 2^d sess., 27-29 December 1977, 4-5 January and 20 April 1978, 38, 52-53, 194-195.

death “part of CIA mythology” that highlighted “the dangers of permitting an intelligence agency to use the flow of information to distort public debate on vital issues.”⁶⁵²

The funeral was an “unprecedented fanfare” declared Loch Johnson, that carried Colby’s rhetoric “throughout the country.” Church stated “the Welch murder was the event. It was stage-managed...there was a big public funeral which the president attended. An attempt was made to lay the responsibility on the congressional investigations.” Church’s priority was protecting his committee against any potential backlash. He attempted to deflect criticism by blaming the press for “playing reckless games with human lives.”⁶⁵³ The press was barred from attending the service, as Schorr scribbled in his notes during the memorial because it “is somehow held to blame for his death...This is the CIA’s first secret agent to come a public national hero.”⁶⁵⁴

Buried at Arlington, normally reserved for those who served in the U.S. military, *SLPD* remarked “it was a rare procedure for a CIA agent.”⁶⁵⁵ His funeral was covered in *WP* as front-cover photographs focused on his distraught family. The photos served to promote CIA’s campaign in undermining the investigations. Ford led the crowd of five-hundred mourners alongside Colby and future DCI Bush. The paper commented on the “unusual and emotional private ceremony that included eulogies and the singing of the National Anthem,” whilst Laurence Stern described it as a “rare and glittering tableau of the American national security establishment.”⁶⁵⁶

⁶⁵² Morton H. Halperin, “CIA News Management,” *WP*, January 23, 1977, p. 30.

⁶⁵³ Church quoted in Smist, *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community*, 64; “Senator Chides Press in C.I.A. Man’s Death,” *NYT*, January 3, 1976, p. 4.

⁶⁵⁴ Johnson, *A Season of Inquiry*, 161-162; Schorr, *Clearing the Air*, 191; Hadley, *The Rising Clamor*, 162-163; Olmsted, *Challenging the Secret Government*, 151-152.

⁶⁵⁵ “Body Of Slain CIA Agent Returned With Full Honors,” *SLPD*, December 30, 1975, p. 34.

⁶⁵⁶ Eugene L. Meyer, “Slain CIA Agent Receives Unusual Honor,” *WP*, December 31, 1975, p. A1; “Slain C.I.A. Man Honored,” *NYT*, December 31, 1975, p. 1; “Colleagues Pay Tribute to Welch,” *WP*, January 1, 1976, p. A6; Laurence Stern, “CIA Agent Welch Buried,” *WP*, January 7, 1976, p. A1; James M. Naughton, “Ford at Funeral for C.I.A. Officer,” *NYT*, January 7, 1976, p. 8; Olmsted, *Challenging the Secret Government*, 134.

The Weather
 WEDNESDAY—Mostly cloudy, high in the
 mid to upper 40s. The chance of
 precipitation is 20 per cent. Thursday
 —Chance of rain, high near 50.
 Friday—Chance of rain, high near 50.
 Saturday—Chance of rain, high near 50.
 Low temp. range, 40 to 50. Details, 1st

The Washington Post

FINAL

40 Pages • 4 Sections
 Amusements B 3 Financial C 4
 Classified D 4 Metro D 1
 Comics D 20 Observers D 3
 Crossword B 2 Sports C 3
 District Line D 20 Style B 2
 Editorials A 10 TV Radio B 4

99th Year • No. 26

© 1975, The Washington Post Co.


WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1975

Phone (202) 223-6000

Classified: 223-6000

Subscription: 223-6000

15c



The body of Richard Welch is taken past the casket that includes White House counsel Philip Bucher (left, right center), Welch's son-in-law with Patricia, daughter Molly and CIA Director William E. Colby.

Md. Nearly Drained of Jobless Aid

By Fred Barham
 Baltimore Post-Examiner Staff Writer
 After 11 months of record unemployment compensation payments to almost 100,000 Maryland residents, state officials say the system is nearly broke and a large increase in taxes paid by most employers is needed to keep it running.

Slain CIA Agent Receives Unusual Honor

By Eugene S. Meyer
 Washington Post Staff Writer
 Richard S. Welch, the Central Intelligence Agency station chief whose slaying last week in Greece shocked the American intelligence community, came home yesterday in a flag-draped coffin in an unusual reception by government officials and high CIA officials.

The body of the 46-year-old CIA agent, accompanied by his 25-year-old son, Warren 25 Lt. Philip Timothy Welch, arrived in a C-141 Air Force transport at Andrews Air Force Base shortly after 1 a.m.

Those who gathered in the cold dawn to pay tribute to the slain agent included the highest officials in the U.S. intelligence establishment, CIA Director William E. Colby, and presidential counselor Philip W. Bucher, Jr.

Ford Hopeful Of Solution For Angola

Vows to Stay In '76 Race

By Lou Cannon
 Washington Post Staff Writer

President Ford, declaring himself better qualified than any other candidate in either party, yesterday vowed that he would remain a candidate no matter what happens in the presidential primary elections.

"Any disappointment in early primaries instead of making me less enthusiastic would probably stimulate me to work harder," Mr. Ford said. "Anyone who thinks I'm going to quit is underestimating I love Jerry Ford."

Assails Senate For Aid Slash

By David S. Broder
 Washington Post Staff Writer

President Ford yesterday expressed cautious optimism about a compromise solution to the conflict in Angola and said the Soviet Union appears to understand that détente could be destroyed by a "head-to-head" conflict in that country.

Emphasizing three times that there is "nothing on the surface" to indicate that Russia has moved to support one of the contending groups in the former Portuguese colony, Mr. Ford said he was "optimistic" that all parties are working for a compromise.

"All the News That's Fit to Print"

The New York Times

NEW JERSEY PAGES

LATE JERSEY EDITION

New Jersey news, Page 25.

March: Chance of rain early today; cloudy, cold tonight. Temp. range 60-68. South: Mild, chance of rain early today; showers tonight. Temp. range 38-50. Details on Page 44.

VOL. CXXV, No. 41,015

© 1975 The New York Times Company

NEW YORK, WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1975

35 cents (except N.Y. area, 40c) New York, N.Y. only, 10c

000047 20 CENTS



C.I.A. MAN'S BODY IS BROUGHT FROM ATHENS: Upon the arrival of the body of slain Richard S. Welch, his son, Patrick, a Marine Corps Sergeant who accompanied it, was greeted by his mother, left, and sister Molly. At right is William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence. The scene is Andrews Air Force Base, Md., Page 3.

LA GUARDIA BLAST YIELDS NO LEADS IN INVESTIGATION

Locker Area Reconstructed in a Search for Clues—Death Toll Put at 11

By PETER KIRNS
 Investigators were reconstructing yesterday a locker area where one of the most lethal bombs ever exploded in New York City killed 11 persons and injured about 75 at La Guardia Airport's main terminal Monday evening. But they appeared still to be without a clue to the bomber or his motive.



Governor Carey with Michael F. Armstrong at Albany news conference. Mr. Carey called for appointment of Mr. Armstrong as Acting Special Prosecutor for 90 days.

CAREY DENOUNCES HINTS BY NADJARI ABOUT A COVER-UP

Calls Them "Despicable" and Asserts He Is Willing to Testify Under Oath

HE ORDERS AN INQUIRY
 Governor Favors Michael Armstrong as a Special Corruption Prosecutor
 By SELWYN RAAB
 Albany, Dec. 30—Governor Carey, denouncing suggestions made by Maurice Nadjari as "despicable," today ordered a special inquiry into Mr. Nadjari's implication that the Governor had dismissed him because he was investigating high figures in the Democratic Party.

Judge Rules City Can Defer

Figure 5.5 Welch's coffin, his distraught family, and Colby appeared on both WP and NYT front pages. It was used by CIA to show the Congressional investigations risked the lives of CIA employees. Source: Meyer, "Slain CIA Agent," WP; "Slain C.I.A. Man Honored," NYT.

The orchestration of Welch's funeral was not lost on reporters. The debate over disclosures will "persist over the next few months," and CIA will use this event to argue that Congressional oversight risked Agency security, remarked *NYT* John Crewdson. Anthony Lewis stated Colby used Welch's death "to make the case that the C.I.A. needs more secrecy in general than it has been getting lately."⁶⁵⁷ Whilst reporter Charles B. Seib called the event manipulated, to be used as a "counterattack" to limit CIA criticism. Mary McGrory described it as "being exploited by those who see in investigators of agency wrongdoing disturbers of the peace." Evans and Novak noted the WH and CIA were already lobbying hard for legislation to protect the Agency against future disclosures before Welch's death, this event had accelerated it.⁶⁵⁸

The Welch assassination shifted public debate towards blaming those who compromised the CIA's "good secrets." Reporters and papers distanced themselves from *CounterSpy* whom they argued endangered CIA. They wanted to show they were responsible holders of sensitive CIA material, unlike the radical dissenters they characterised as reckless. In an example that demonstrates how far the debate changed were comments raised at the House committee by Tad Szulc. The investigative reporter who blew the lid on the Bay of Pigs invasion argued that "it is really bad practice to disclose names of CIA people."⁶⁵⁹ *WP* also wanted to certify their position on "naming names," by replying to *CounterSpy*'s William Wheaton who wrote in to justify it. The editorial responded, "we find this an appalling and morally opaque process by which to dispose of a human life."⁶⁶⁰

Papers across the political spectrum supported CIA secrecy. *SLPD* argued *CounterSpy*'s actions "can be harmful to proper intelligence activities and dangerous to the agents involved."⁶⁶¹ The *ES* featured comments from David Atlee Phillips who argued *CounterSpy* "may have played some role" in the murder whilst reporter Charles Bartlett directed the blame at the Church group. The killing was "a direct consequence of the stagey hearings," where the "prolonged focus on CIA activities in Greece left agents there exposed to random vengeance."⁶⁶² Colonel Robert D. Heinl Jr.,

⁶⁵⁷ John M. Crewdson, "Slaying of C.I.A. Officer Stirs a Debate on Identity Disclosures," *NYT*, January 4, 1976, p. 2; Anthony Lewis, "Death and Secrecy," *NYT*, January 8, 1976, p. 31.

⁶⁵⁸ Charles B. Seib, "Media Manipulation," *WP*, January 16, 1976, p. A19; Mary McGrory, "The Minefield is Detonated," *CT*, January 5, 1976, p. 20; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Restructuring the CIA," *WP*, January 1, 1976, p. A15.

⁶⁵⁹ U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *The CIA and the Media*, 59th Cong., 1st and 2^d sess., 27-29 December 1977, 4-5 January and 20 April 1978, 116.

⁶⁶⁰ Philip E. Wheaton, "Counterspy: An Anti-Democratic System," *WP*, January 7, 1976, p. A10; "Mr. Welch and Mr. Wheaton," *WP*, January 7, 1976, p. A10.

⁶⁶¹ "Why List Spies?" *SLPD*, January 8, 1976, p. 28.

⁶⁶² David Atlee Phillips, "The Death of Richard Welch," *ES*, January 28, 1976, page unknown; Charles Bartlett, quoted in Johnson, *A Season of Inquiry*, 161.

writing in the conservative *Detroit News* accused *NYT*, of declaring “war” on the Agency, whilst the Church committee “bartered state secrets,” and the Pike group was a “tormentor in the House.”⁶⁶³ Former CIA official, Mike Ackerman wrote in the conservative *PI* to blame the Congressional committees who were “guilty” of his death. *CT* said the assassination “does – and should – raise new questions about the careless manner in which Congress has been conducting its investigation.”⁶⁶⁴

The CIA sympathy rhetoric was cutting through to its readers. Letters demonstrated that the public were adamant on protecting the Agency. Disillusionment was increasing against the Congressional investigations. A letter in the *PI* said the Church committee vilified the Agency. “If I were a member of the family of Richard Welch...I would be very bitter...we all should feel bitter.” *LAT* featured public responses after Welch’s death. “Can the brutal slaying...in Athens be connected indirectly with Sen. Church’s committee ‘open disclosure’ of CIA activity?” asked a reader. “I should think the consciences of Sen. Frank Church...and Rep. Otis Pike...will cause a great deal of lost sleep,” declared another.⁶⁶⁵

Pike committee members were also concerned of being tarred with the same brush as *CounterSpy*. “I would never propose anything or write anything in a final report that would in anyway ever expose an agent,” Searle Field declared.⁶⁶⁶ Colby acknowledged the effect after Welch’s death “was enormous.” The DCI argued in his final testimony to the Senate’s Government Operations committee that legislation should be adopted to protect intelligence secrets. He noted Welch’s death resulted in friendlier press coverage.⁶⁶⁷ *NYT* reporter Nicholas Horrock remarked the assassination instigated a turning point in public opinion “which has left Congressional critics...in confusion and disarray and...threatens to materially hamper an effort to legislate new controls of intelligence activities.”⁶⁶⁸ Welch’s assassination provided the foundation for IIPA in the next decade.

Ford’s EO and Colby Post-CIA

⁶⁶³ Colonel R. D. Heintz Jr, “Law’s Laxity Helped Point Gun at CIA Agent in Athens,” *The Detroit News*, January 1976.

⁶⁶⁴ Mike Ackerman, “Farewell to a Decent Man who Served his Country,” *PI*, December 31, 1975, p. 9; “The Murder of a CIA Chief,” *CT*, December 26, 1975, p. 30.

⁶⁶⁵ Norma Fayne, “CIA Agents are Entitled to Protection,” *PI*, January 7, 1976, p. 6; Frank Thomas Murphy, “Letters to the Times,” *LAT*, December 29, 1975, p. 32; H. M. Caldwell, “Richard S. Welch,” *LAT*, January 8, 1976, p. 43.

⁶⁶⁶ House Select Committee on Intelligence, *US Intelligence Agencies and Activities*, pt. 6, *Committee Proceedings II*, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., February 4, 1976, 2169-2170.

⁶⁶⁷ “Senate Government Operations,” January 23, 1976, Colby Papers, Series 4, Box 12, Folder 4; Laurence Stern, “Colby Scolds Hill For Data Leaks,” *WP*, January 24, 1976, p. A1; Laurence Stern, “CIA’s Colby Makes Way for Bush,” *WP*, January 31, 1976, p. A1; Colby, *Honorable Men*, 450-451; Ford, *William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence*, 154.

⁶⁶⁸ Nicholas M. Horrock, “Reform of Intelligence is No Longer a Certainty,” *NYT*, February 29, 1976, p. 136.

President Ford removed Colby in November 1975 but allowed him to stay until the new year. Press coverage supported Ford's claims that CIA needed a new public image, but newspapers stressed Colby was removed too early before the end of the Congressional investigations. His ousting was "unnecessarily brutal," exclaimed *NYT*, while *WP* remarked his "honorable act of self-sacrifice" did not deserve "being unceremoniously and abruptly dumped." Noted CIA critic and liberal reporter Anthony Lewis said, "whatever one thinks of Colby, it can hardly create confidence in...Ford's commitment to reform the CIA to have him fired in the middle of the investigation process."⁶⁶⁹ In his final month as DCI, Colby aimed to influence Ford's intelligence reform.

Colby proposed a new Congressional group in a Pike committee hearing that would penalise members who disclosed CIA information and grant the President final authority to decide whether the material can be made public. He also sought to pressure the President, and James T. Lynn, the head of OMB, to highlight the risk of CIA disclosures. Welch's death led Colby to promote the "immediate clearance" of a proposed bill protecting sensitive CIA material.⁶⁷⁰ "I have long felt that this nation's vital foreign intelligence effort has been severely handicapped by the lack of an effective deterrent against the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods information," Colby wrote to Lynn.⁶⁷¹ To Ford he asserted, "the intelligence community has been under attack for real, exaggerated and alleged abuses. The lessons of the year can...be summed up in the need for better guidelines, better supervision and better secrecy."⁶⁷²

Colby's concerns over protecting CIA secrecy were influential in Ford's EO 11905, signed on 18 February 1976. Designed to ensure executive control and limit Congressional oversight, it showed how far the impetus to protect the CIA progressed after Welch's death.⁶⁷³ "I will not be a party to the dismantling of the CIA," Ford stated at a press conference and whilst campaigning for the next

⁶⁶⁹ "Schlesinger and Colby Fired," *SLPD*, November 3, 1975, p. 1; "...Kissinger Up," *NYT*, November 4, 1975, p. 34; "The Shake-Up," *WP*, November 5, 1975, p. A26; Anthony Lewis, "Helms Survives," *SLPD*, November 7, 1975, p. 17; Ford, *A Time to Heal*, 324-325.

⁶⁷⁰ "Colby Would Limit CIA Supervision," *SLPD*, January 23, 1976, p. 40; CIA, "Letter to Mr. Philip W. Buchen From W. E. Colby," January 8, 1976, CIA-RDP78M02660R000800040054-8, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78M02660R000800040054-8.pdf>, accessed 14th August 2024.

⁶⁷¹ CIA, "Letter to Honorable James T. Lynn from W. E. Colby," January 8, 1976, CIA-RDP78M02660R000800040052-0, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78M02660R000800040052-0.pdf>, accessed 15th April 2024.

⁶⁷² CIA, "Letter to President Ford from Director W. E. Colby," January 8, 1976, CIA-RDP78B02992A000100070005-6, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78B02992A000100070005-6.pdf>, accessed 22nd March 2024.

⁶⁷³ Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," February 18, 1976, *The American Presidency Project*, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-11905-united-states-foreign-intelligence-activities>; "Text of Ford Plan on Intelligence Units and Excerpts from his Executive Order," *NYT*, February 19, 1976, p. 30; John M. Crewdson, "Ford Asks Intelligence Disclosure Curb," *NYT*, February 19, 1976, p. 1; Townley, *Year of Intelligence*, 63-64.

election he proclaimed “I’ll be darned if we’re going to let the leakers ruin our intelligence community.” The EO granted the power to prosecute CIA officials for disclosing sensitive material. Editors were concerned that information would be restricted and reporters may have to reveal their sources if they were subpoenaed.⁶⁷⁴

Ford’s EO “rekindled the debate” over future oversight. It was praised by newspapers because it sought to rein in CIA domestic surveillance, but many outlets were concerned that it would increase secrecy in an effort to conceal future abuses of power.⁶⁷⁵ The EO was covered differently in *NYT* and *WP* editorials. On the one hand, *NYT* criticised it for its lean towards executive overreach. It argued that a temporary EO would not be effective in guaranteeing Congress has responsibility.⁶⁷⁶ On the other, *WP* favoured it, stating “if you believe, as we do, that there is a place in this imperfect world for secret government activities...you may find the President’s proposals a reasonable starting point.” Shielding the identities of CIA employees is the kind of “information we think the government has a legitimate need and, as far as secret agents are concerned, a moral obligation to keep secret.” Unlike the *NYT*, *WP* stated the EO avoided “First Amendment problems” because it only contains secrecy contracts for government staff.⁶⁷⁷

Colby continued to highlight the importance of shielding CIA after his DCI tenure. His managed transparency approach involved making speeches, appearing before Congress, and publishing articles with the aim of preserving CIA’s essential secrets whilst releasing snippets of information to maintain press and Congress support. The former DCI travelled the country where he provided lectures and speeches at the Reserve Officers Association, Cornell University, UCLA, and numerous conventions in St. Louis. Throughout these speeches, he reiterated his aim of protecting sources and methods from disclosure. “We can’t continue to run our intelligence service if our secret operations are immediately leaked and put in the newspapers.” He spoke to a hostile student audience at Cornell after he said CIA briefed too many legislators, and urged for a stronger secrecy system, “to keep the secrets we need to keep.” In St. Louis he repeated his promise that CIA changed from the old days, insisting it had been “on the right track since 1973.”⁶⁷⁸

⁶⁷⁴ “New Policemen to Battle Abuses,” *Time*, 107, no. 9, (March 1, 1976), 11; Martin Arnold, “Editors Fearful of Ford’s Proposals,” *NYT*, February 20, 1976, p. 67; Ford, *A Time to Heal*, 366.

⁶⁷⁵ Nicholas M. Horrock, “Intelligence: Ford Plan May Have Rekindled Debate,” *NYT*, February 21, 1976, p. 11; “Lessons From Experience?” *SLPD*, February 19, 1976, p. 18; “Piling Secrecy on Secrecy,” *LAT*, February 20, 1976, p. 149.

⁶⁷⁶ “Reforming the C.I.A.,” *NYT*, February 20, 1976, p. 31.

⁶⁷⁷ “The President’s Secrecy Legislation,” *WP*, February 23, 1976, p. A18.

⁶⁷⁸ Richard Dudman, “Plugging The Dike And Damming The Abuses,” *SLPD*, February 22, 1976, p. 99; “Better Secrecy System Advocated by Colby,” *SLPD*, March 9, 1976, p. 4; “Former Chief of CIA to Speak,” *LAT*, October 3, 1976, p. 492; “Bond, Colby, Connally to Speak Here,” *SLPD*, May 2, 1976, p. 147; Robert J. Kelly, “Colby

Colby used his Congressional appearances to protect CIA secrecy. Post-CIA he succeeded in opposing the 1974 Hughes-Ryan amendment that demanded Congress were kept informed of covert operations.⁶⁷⁹ Congress repealed it and left the authority to the new intelligence committees established by the Church group. Colby preferred this because it shielded “the necessary secrets of intelligence work.”⁶⁸⁰ He argued against making the CIA’s budget public in 1977 because he said it would lead to press suspicion. Whilst he supported “a change from the centuries old tradition of total secrecy about intelligence,” he highlighted a *NYT* article that inflated the projected 1978 intelligence budget. If the budget was public, he said it would lead to further investigation into the CIA. “If you decide to make this...public,” Colby told the chair, “I confidently predict that you will be inundated by a series of questions...it would be destructive to our future intelligence operations.”⁶⁸¹ His speech was denounced by *SPLD* who labelled him as a hypocrite because he withheld material deemed in the public interest whilst advancing the view that the public needed greater insight into the CIA.⁶⁸²

Colby testified before a House intelligence subcommittee investigating CIA’s use of the press as cover for its agents. He used Welch’s death as a reminder that future intelligence reform needed to protect the “good secrets.” CIA reform should provide legal protection against the disclosure of sensitive material. “I ask this committee to compensate for barring our intelligence from the use of American journalist credentials by reversing the tide of prohibition with respect to official cover.”⁶⁸³ Colby proposed a year later that Congress enact prosecutions for individuals who disclose material after being given authorised access to them. His testimony, alongside George H.W. Bush, “amounted to a strong pitch for strengthening the CIA in contrast to controlling it.”⁶⁸⁴

The Agency survived the Congressional investigations under his leadership, and Colby wanted to highlight it would not shut-up shop and revert to “total secrecy...the institution is simply too big and too obvious. Attempts to conceal what cannot be concealed are not only self-defeating,

Concedes Need of Guidelines on CIA,” *SPLD*, May 26, 1976, p. 18; “Colby Will Lecture Here,” *SPLD*, September 5, 1976, p. 117.

⁶⁷⁹ Prados, *Lost Crusader*, 335.

⁶⁸⁰ Colby, *Honorable Men*, 404.

⁶⁸¹ “Statement of William E. Colby (Director of Central Intelligence 1973-1976), Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” April 27, 1977, Colby Papers, Series 2, Box 8, Folder 1-3;

⁶⁸² “Not Accountable?” *SPLD*, April 30, 1977, p. 4.

⁶⁸³ “U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Testimony of William E. Colby Director of Central Intelligence – 1973 to 1976, Colby, Miller & Hanes, Washington D.C.,” December 27, 1977, Colby Papers, Series 2, Box 8, Folder 1-3.

⁶⁸⁴ Norman Kempster, “Identity of U.S. Spies Harder to Hide, Colby Says,” *LAT*, December 28, 1977, p. 1; Nicholas M. Horrock, “Ex-C.I.A. Directors Urge Senate Panel to Protect Secrets and Agents,” *NYT*, April 6, 1978, p. B11; George Lardner Jr., “2 of 3 Former CIA Directors Oppose Too Many Restrictions of Covert Acts,” *WP*, April 6, 1978, p. A2.

they are injurious.” He doubled down on protecting CIA’s “good secrets” whilst proclaiming that it was no longer an organisation wrapped in complete secrecy.⁶⁸⁵ He spoke to the Senate in 1978 and declared “we must resolve how to keep the necessary secrets.” Post-CIA, Colby aimed to maintain CIA secrecy by stating it needed to adapt to the U.S. constitutional framework. He supported revising the National Security Act, arguing that it should protect “the Constitutional rights of Americans” whilst ensuring that “certain forms of abhorrent behaviour” would never reoccur.⁶⁸⁶

Colby wrote an *NYT* article assessing the impact of the Congressional investigations. He stated they were necessary in ensuring effective intelligence in the future. However, he called them damaging for their “sensational atmosphere” which “frightened...foreign friends of American intelligence,” and leaks that resulted in attacking “our country and its friends for years to come.” Colby claimed CIA secrecy improved since the investigations, because the public now see them as “necessary ones for the protection of our democracy.” The article was criticised by a reader who replied that Colby seized on the shifting political climate to assume the American public favoured CIA secrecy.⁶⁸⁷

Colby used public secrecy because he wanted to dictate what material should be released into the public domain. “A new theory of secrecy can begin by approaching the question from its other side, defining what needs to be exposed rather than what needs to be kept secret,” he stated in an article for *International Security*. The “flow of legitimate secrets” increased whilst he was DCI that had undermined CIA intelligence.⁶⁸⁸ He wrote in *CT* on the need to replace the romanticised “James Bond” image of intelligence with a public understanding of it. The investigations into CIA were because “of the climate of the 1950s and 1960s.” The public must recognise the importance of intelligence and CIA for “it would result in a public less fascinated by sensationalism and stories of...CIA’s prior misdeeds. At that time...I hope...CIA and intelligence will drop from the sensational headlines and become the sources of solid page 2 stories about world affairs.”⁶⁸⁹

Reporters positively reviewed Colby’s tenure as DCI when his memoir was released in 1978. According to the columnist Joseph Kraft, he resembled a “supersharper bureaucrat,” who “anticipated the storm breaking over...CIA...disclosed to the press and Congress...in the hope of winning points to

⁶⁸⁵ “United States House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Oversight, Testimony of William E. Colby,” October 22, 1979, Colby Papers, Series 2, Box 8, Folder 1-3.

⁶⁸⁶ “United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Charters and Guidelines, Testimony of William E. Colby,” April 5, 1978, Colby Papers, Series 2, Box 8, Folder 1-3.

⁶⁸⁷ William E. Colby, “After Investigating U.S. Intelligence,” *NYT*, February 26, 1976, p. 30; Richard K. Scharf, “Colby and Semantics,” *NYT*, March 12, 1976, p. 31.

⁶⁸⁸ William E. Colby, “Intelligence Secrecy and Security in a Free Society,” *International Security*, 1, no. 2. (1976), 6, 13-14.

⁶⁸⁹ William E. Colby, “An Intelligent Guide to Intelligence,” *CT*, September 15, 1977, p. 40.

limit the damage done to himself and the agency...he wants to be...on the side of the angels.”⁶⁹⁰

Other reviews called him open and forthright in his approach. A reporter from *LAT* labelled him a “hero,” whilst another from *CT* remarked he knew his Agency’s “old days,” were over, “he has been frank enough to help us understand its danger.”⁶⁹¹ He even received admiration from investigative journalists, David Wise and Daniel Schorr. Wise stated Colby cooperated with Congress “in an era of ‘stonewalling,’” and Schorr reflected on his interview with him at Langley as the “signs that the cloak...started coming off,” he was “the most candid American spymaster in history.”⁶⁹²

Like Allen Dulles, Colby shaped public debate post-CIA. He used Welch’s assassination to influence the formulation of Ford’s EO to protect CIA secrecy. He sought to continue his managed transparency strategy to install a new CIA history by ridding its past mistakes from public memory. He used public secrecy to emphasise the Agency’s intelligence capabilities to the public because it alleviated Colby’s concern that the press would delve deeper and compromise CIA’s “good secrets.” Post-CIA he recognised the Agency had to maintain a level of transparency to avoid another bout of “sensationalism.” But as public secrecy shows, Colby did not reveal anything new to the press. His various speeches, testimonies, articles, and his memoir all served to keep press criticism at bay and present an image that CIA moved on from the 1974 Seymour Hersh revelations. The lack of mainstream press hostility demonstrated that his managed transparency approach was successful.

Journalists praised Colby’s character during the Agency’s troubled period. Scholars and ex-CIA officials have spoken positively of him for “opening up” the Agency. Their view was that his Congressional testimonies, his contribution to the public debate on articles about CIA’s use of intelligence, his argument that more oversight was needed, and his memoir have all attributed to his aim in making CIA publicly accountable. Colby decided “to disclose some of the nation’s darkest secrets” recalls Tim Weiner, he “committed to a more forthright, open CIA,” one former official stated, while another applauded him for refusing to “hide behind executive branch prerogatives and the shield of secrecy, instead accepting as legitimate congressional demands for reform and accountability.”⁶⁹³

⁶⁹⁰ Joseph Kraft, “On the Side of Angels,” *LAT*, May 18, 1978, p. 39.

⁶⁹¹ John Weisman, “William Colby Brings a Hot Topic in from the Cold,” *LAT*, July 9, 1978, p. 322; Milton Viorst, “Colby: a ‘Nice Guy’ Who Didn’t Last,” *CT*, May 21, 1978, p. 201.

⁶⁹² Daniel Schorr, “Without Cloaks or Daggers,” *The New Leader*, June 5, 1978, 16-17; David Wise, “The Great Minimizer,” *Politics Today*, c. 1978, 63.

⁶⁹³ Tim Weiner, “William E. Colby, 76, Head of C.I.A. in a Time of Upheaval,” *NYT*, May 7, 1996, p. B7; Ford, *William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence*, 110, 129; Garthoff, *Directors of CIA*, 88; McCarthy, *Selling the CIA*, 23-24.

The Hersh revelations brought CIA secrecy into the public debate. Colby intentionally prolonged it through his testimonies, speeches, writings and interviews whilst masking the Agency's past because he wanted to persuade the public that it could be harmed through the irresponsible exposure of its "good secrets." His memoir demonstrates that he held no issues regarding the morality of the CIA's domestic surveillance, only that the secrecy behind the operations provided an excuse for the press and Congress to scrutinise the Agency. The media "seized on the CIA with an investigative intensity," whilst a "press and political firestorm immediately erupted" when all "the tensions and suspicions and hostilities that had been building about...CIA since the Bay of Pigs...had risen to a combustible level during the Vietnam and Watergate years, now exploded."⁶⁹⁴

Colby committed to a CIA public image change. Echoing his Catholic beliefs, this change involved washing the CIA's sins away as it served as a cornerstone to his managed transparency approach. Maintaining secrecy was a priority for him, for he consistently warned the press, and Congress that it could go too far in dismantling his Agency. Just as Allen Dulles did, Colby emphasised public education about the workings of intelligence with the aim of diverting attention from unearthing CIA secrecy. Amidst a period of intelligence accountability, public secrecy in the 1970s required telling the story of intelligence and covering the Agency's past mistakes by making the point that it was a changed organisation. It allowed Colby to shape the narrative that he was "opening up" CIA by appearing forthcoming.

External factors aided Colby's efforts. Newspapers helped him through their reluctance to pursue and scrutinise CIA secrecy for fear of damaging it. The consensus over supporting the Glomar Explorer project whilst discrediting the leaks surrounding it served as the first signifier that the post-Watergate press was not as adversarial as Colby first thought. Congress also preserved CIA secrecy. This was due to three reasons. Firstly, the investigations took too long. The public mood shifted from "outrage" after Hersh's allegations, to "indifference" because of the longevity of the investigations, "people lost interest," reporter Leslie H. Gelb recalls.⁶⁹⁵ Second, the competing political motives and desired public recognition from Church and Pike played into Colby's hands. The DCI was happy to indulge in the egos of the committees' leaders to avoid further scrutiny. Third, intentional and unintentional Congressional leaks shifted public attention away from CIA abuses of power towards the mishandling of CIA material. The press stated Agency employees were in danger. Papers cited

⁶⁹⁴ Colby, *Honorable Men*, 12-13, 391.

⁶⁹⁵ Laurence Stern and Walter Pincus, "Hill Reform of CIA Review Stymied," *WP*, April 19, 1976, p. A1; Leslie H. Gelb, "Spy Inquiries, Begun Amid Public Outrage, End in Indifference," *NYT*.

Richard Welch, through the help of the Agency and the Ford administration, to consistently portray a sympathetic tone supporting the organisation.

“I hate to say this, but I think we’ve won too much,” proclaimed a CIA official after the investigations ended. This quote perfectly encapsulates the success of managed transparency. It argues against prior narratives that have characterised this period as a time when CIA was under attack. Colby limited the Agency’s damage, and he relied on a tentative post-Watergate press who did not want to compromise CIA secrecy. The press and public turned their attention towards the investigations. The portrayal of Church as a serious legislator and investigator declined whilst Pike developed a McCarthyite reputation. But the CIA under DCI William Casey in the next decade adopted a more hardline approach in a bid to return to an earlier era of CIA secrecy.

5. Regaining Lost Ground: William Casey and the Reconstruction of CIA Secrecy

"Nowadays having survived everything from the Bay of Pigs to Congressional investigations, to bitter memoirs, to its own glamor, intelligence has become a comfortable old Washington institution." - *Henry Allen, 1981* ⁶⁹⁶

"We can have both a free press and national security, but without national security we will lose our freedom." - *William Casey, 1986* ⁶⁹⁷

"This country can have a free press—it certainly needs one—and a superb intelligence service...We have to work together—you in the media and we in the intelligence business—to iron out our problems. That takes a willingness to listen, not lecture. The media tends to be better at the latter than the former in matters of this type." - *George Lauder, 1986* ⁶⁹⁸

"We're not here to serve the public," explained the head of the Agency's Office of External Affairs (OEA) in a 1983 interview to *WP*, "our most-often-used phrase is no comment." William Doswell's role, as was outlined by DCI William Casey, was to keep CIA out of the public spotlight. Doswell managed Casey's press and Congressional relations, trying to keep a check on increasing public interest in CIA and adhere to Casey's demands that the press was kept at a distance. Limits on background briefings were brought in. The *WP* correspondent, George Lardner, reported that a "trust us" atmosphere has emerged. The CIA "decided to go underground again." Casey wanted to return to what he saw as the "good old days."⁶⁹⁹

Doswell failed. As throughout its history, the CIA could not stay away from public controversy. This time it was the exposure of a covert operation to remove the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Casey was targeted. Burned out and stressed, Doswell left the OEA in 1982. The DCI wanted a return to CIA's earlier days when it operated under a stricter form of secrecy. It shocked him to see what his Agency went through in the 1970s. He saw William Colby's public appearances and Congressional testimonies as a dark time for CIA when it had to justify its actions. When he became DCI in 1981, he saw the CIA as a shell of its former self, it "was a patient

⁶⁹⁶ Henry Allen, "The Keepers of the Secrets," *WP*, April 22, 1981, p. B1, B8.

⁶⁹⁷ CIA, "Leaks," August 21, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R000903760003-7, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88B00443R000903760003-7.pdf>, accessed 26th January 2023.

⁶⁹⁸ CIA, "Letter to Strobe Talbott from George V. Lauder," May 8, 1986, CIA-RDP90-00845R000201160004-4, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00845R000201160004-4.pdf>, accessed 30th January 2023.

⁶⁹⁹ Michael Isikoff, "Keeping the Lid on Tight at the 'No-Profile Agency,'" *WP*, April 29, 1983, p. A27; George Lardner, Jr., "CIA is Lowering the Blinds, Closing More Shutters," *WP*, June 30, 1981, p. A3; George Lardner, Jr., "The Assault on Watergate Reforms," *WP*, July 5, 1981, p. C1; Joseph E. Persico, *Casey: From the OSS to the CIA* (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 270, 299-300.

on the convalescent ward,” that had been repeatedly pushed into the public spotlight.⁷⁰⁰ He argued it was a clandestine organisation and needed to be treated as such, as he sought to regain lost ground by ensuring its secrecy was respected and protected. But Casey underestimated that key members of the press and influential Congressmen held similar views. They wanted a strong CIA and argued that the previous decade damaged its ability to defend the nation in the Cold War.

An expansion of CIA secrecy was already underway by the time Casey and Ronald Reagan took office. The Agency’s “unleashing” began under the Carter administration. In late 1980, Casey’s predecessor, Stansfield Turner and legislators wanted to limit CIA restraints from the 1970s. SSCI members Daniel Patrick Moynihan and John H. Chafee proposed legislation that repealed the 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment, allowing the IC to brief two Congressional committees instead of eight. The legislation included CIA FOIA exemptions. And it included separate reform that permitted the prosecution for current and ex-government officials who disclosed the identities of intelligence officers. Public interest organisations and reporters criticised it. They argued it attacked the First Amendment rights of the press.⁷⁰¹

The ASNE expressed “deep concern” over Moynihan’s bill.⁷⁰² Investigative journalists Tom Wicker and Tad Szulc warned that Carter was giving in to CIA demands. The administration was “going limp on the sidelines,” and the debate “shifted in recent years from the dominant concern over individual rights to the traditional struggle for power between Congress and the executive branch.” In response to public outcry, Moynihan clarified reporters would not be prosecuted for publishing agents’ identities.⁷⁰³ Congress eventually passed the Intelligence Oversight Act in June 1980. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment was repealed, relieving the Agency from stringent Congressional oversight. But CIA wanted two issues rectified. First, FOIA remained a significant obstacle for the Agency. Casey attempted to make material unrelated to national security exempt from it. The second was the cover of intelligence agents. Casey wanted to see legal enforcement that protected the identities of CIA agents against disclosure.

This chapter demonstrates how CIA regained lost ground from the 1970s. It adds to our understanding of the CIA’s “unleashing” because it moves beyond works that focus on its power abroad under Reagan and instead argues that it sought to rollback its 1970s reforms and gain

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid, 212.

⁷⁰¹ Charles Mohr, “Senators Ask Curb on Scrutiny of U.S. Intelligence,” *NYT*, January 25, 1980, p. A9; Charles Mohr, “C.I.A. Seems Likely to Get A New Hunting License,” *NYT*, February 10, 1980, p. E3.

⁷⁰² Deirdre Carmody, “Press is Concerned Over Bills on C.I.A.,” *NYT*, February 17, 1980, p. 38.

⁷⁰³ Tom Wicker, “The C.I.A. Triumphant,” *NYT*, May 6, 1980, p. A27; Tad Szulc, “Putting the Bite Back in the C.I.A.,” *NYT*, April 6, 1980, p. SM7; Irvin Molotsky, “Moynihan will Seek to Eliminate Press Penalties in Intelligence Bill,” *NYT*, February 21, 1980, p. 1.

legislative advantages at home. Under Casey the CIA initially attempted to distance itself from the press. However, the DCI and officials soon discovered that it needed to engage with reporters if the Agency wanted to return to an earlier time when it operated under a stricter form of secrecy. Casey recognised he could use public secrecy to ensure the CIA received enough press support to remove prior constraints and restore the Agency back to its late-1940s and 1950s heyday. This chapter shows four key moments that explain how Casey's CIA shaped public debate.

The first moment is EO 12333 in 1981. It eased CIA's restrictions on domestic surveillance. CIA deliberately leaked drafts of it to use as a testing ground for press reaction. Initial coverage led to a turning point within CIA that shifted Casey's motive for restraining press relations towards engagement. The press negatively reported on the first draft because it completely reversed former CIA restrictions, but it soon accepted the final version because it was depicted as a successful compromise between the Agency and Congress. EO 12333 was a victory for Casey because it reversed some of the 1970s reforms. The second was the IIPA in 1982. IIPA made it a federal crime to intentionally reveal covert intelligence officers through either classified material or material in the public domain. The death of CIA officer Richard Welch in 1975 and an attack on a CIA residence in Jamaica led Casey to make the point clear that the Agency needed legislative support.⁷⁰⁴ It was a major success for the DCI because it reinforced CIA secrecy by dictating what the press could publish, and it provided a stronger defence in shielding Agency material because it was backed through litigation and state power.⁷⁰⁵ It was supported by the *NYT* and the *WP* as long as it targeted former government officials and did not undermine First Amendment rights of the press.

The third moment was Casey's push to have CIA totally exempt from FOIA. National security material has always been exempted from it, but Casey wanted FOIA weakened even further so it protected any material relating to CIA. Initially the Agency followed the same steps as EO 12333. Casey publicly argued for total exemption that led to negative press coverage which the OEA surveyed. The argument shifted from total exemption towards a moderate stance of partial relief which was achieved with the passage of the Central Intelligence Information Act (CIIA) in 1984. Key members of Congress, the ACLU and *WP* supported it because they argued it did not interfere with the public's right to know. The final moment examines Casey's threats to prosecute news outlets in 1986 to prevent publication of a covert operation. CIA initially went on the offensive and Casey wanted to make an example of the press to make the point clear it was damaging national security but he soon accepted the notion that prosecution was complicated due to the First Amendment. He

⁷⁰⁴ Mackenzie, *Secrets*, 84.

⁷⁰⁵ Mistry, "Anti-Imperial Whistleblowing in the Long 1970s," 141-142.

recognised the importance of press engagement in ensuring restraint was met. The press was a symbiotic partner to CIA and Casey's threats were not beneficial in shaping public debate.

Initial Leaks of EO 12333

Leaked drafts of EO 12333 provided the CIA a means to assess press reaction. Easing the restrictions on CIA's domestic surveillance powers demonstrated the pendulum was shifting towards a strident form of secrecy Casey wanted. He and senior government officials despised what occurred in the previous decade and promised to regain CIA secrecy. On 10 March 1981, *NYT* released details of a proposed new EO. It stated CIA "may engage in electronic surveillance within the United States." This included gathering, storing, and disseminating data on a person "who is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power." The EO reduced the Attorney General's authority to review the "legality of an intelligence agency's procedures instead of the broad powers of review given by the existing measure" and permitted CIA to "infiltrate domestic organizations."⁷⁰⁶

The information obtained by *NYT* was the result of a leak. The order was drafted by CIA, but the leak's source remained unknown. On the same day *NYT* ran the story, the Deputy Director, Bobby Ray Inman, invited the press to Langley to mitigate potential uproar over the proposed changes. Inman stated the meeting will not be "a frequent occurrence" due to a "very strong view that we need to lower the profile of the leadership of the Intelligence Community." Inman criticised the *NYT* article, calling it "vastly exaggerated." He claimed he was unaware that Casey approved and signed it. Attempting to calm the press, Inman assured CIA was not renewing domestic powers, "there is not a proposal to change it," as it was only a "first draft" and emphasised that he and the DCI were opposed to it.⁷⁰⁷

⁷⁰⁶ Robert Pear, "Intelligence Groups Seek Power to Gain Data on U.S. Citizens," *NYT*, March 10, 1981, p. A1.

⁷⁰⁷ Charles Mohr, "C.I.A. Deputy Denies Seeking Change on Surveillance," *NYT*, March 11, 1981, p. A13; George Lardner Jr., "Reagan to Ease Curb on Domestic Spying," *WP*, March 11, 1981, p. A1; "CIA Goes Public to Deny Spy Charges," *United Press International*, March 10, 1981 page unknown; CIA, "Inman, Adm. Interview with the Press (Headquarters)," March 10, 1981, CIA-RDP91-00901R000500280007-9, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91-00901R000500280007-9.pdf>; Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 118.

Inman and the CIA played the long game, as Matthew Jones explains, to dupe the press with the aim of gradually reducing Agency restrictions.⁷⁰⁸ The March leak of EO 12333 was designed to cause a public outcry so revisions could be put in place to make it appear that later drafts were not like the original. Inman wanted to limit Reagan's newly appointed conservatives within the National Security Council (NSC). The new appointees viewed the 1970s as a period when overzealous Congressmen, radical reporters, and advocates of intelligence reform scrupulously targeted CIA, undermining its effectiveness and morale. They wanted to remove prior Congressional restraints, but Inman feared their dogmatic approach would lead to renewed calls to limit the Agency's intelligence capabilities. Gradually, the goal remained for Inman and CIA to rollback restrictions and outplay both the press and NSC.⁷⁰⁹

Editorials criticised the proposed changes. Extending the CIA's domestic authority reignited fears of a secret national security state abusing its power. Mainstream newspapers warned of the impact the proposed EO would have on the privacy rights of citizens. *NYT* reminded their readers "the circulating proposal would revive the time, not long past, when...C.I.A. thought nothing of opening the mail of innocent civilians, illegally searching homes and infiltrating political organizations." The EO would result in "an open call for Government lawlessness...in the name of decency, the President should shoot it down."⁷¹⁰ *WP* stated it "raises the specter of the 1980s anti-terrorist equivalent of 'Operation Chaos.'" The EO draft "suggests that some people have not properly absorbed the experience of the last decade."⁷¹¹

Conservative newspapers shared similar concerns, but they were reluctant to completely criticise the proposed changes. The *PI* asserted that whilst CIA domestic spying could be considered a "necessary evil under certain circumstances," prior reforms should not be removed as "they were put there to curb abuses and protect basic constitutional rights."⁷¹² Although *CT* criticised it, reminding readers of the 1970s "bloodletting" where CIA was "publicly pilloried in the press and the Congress." Agency restrictions are "important in a free society...because such agencies always threaten to violate individuals' political liberties...it is also important because the agencies are themselves threatened whenever the political climate changes."⁷¹³

⁷⁰⁸ Matthew L. Jones, "Creating Uncertainty, Casting Doubt: U.S. Intelligence Leaks from Reform to Spyware for Sale," in *Whistleblowing Nation : The History of National Security Disclosures and the Cult of State Secrecy*, ed. Kaeten Mistry and Hannah Gurman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 243-245.

⁷⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 255.

⁷¹⁰ "Son of Operation Chaos," *NYT*, March 12, 1981, p. A22.

⁷¹¹ "The CIA at Home." *WP*, March 16, 1981. p. A18.

⁷¹² "Domestic Spy Proposals: A Chill Wind is Blowing," *PI*, March 12, 1981, p. A14.

⁷¹³ "The Rules of Espionage" *CT*, March 27, 1981, p. C8.

Negative press reaction from the March leak led to revisions. Drafts were leaked in the following months implying stronger protections to civil liberties and limits on the Agency's domestic powers. CIA and NSC were involved in a bureaucratic turf war over the revisions. NSC wanted to remove more restrictions than Inman and Casey allegedly proposed. The group was "working on a totally different approach" whilst CIA were considering additional revisions. Inman was involved in adjusting it and played down fears the Agency would be conducting domestic surveillance. Inman defended CIA after the leak. He stated during a press conference that it was only to judge public opinion on the Agency's future.⁷¹⁴

A Turning Point at CIA: The OEA's Recommendations and Press Reaction to EO 12333

Continued leaks led to a turning point at CIA. Initially Casey wanted to increase secrecy and keep the press at a distance. But less than a year as DCI, he recognised CIA had to engage with the press. He followed OEA recommendations that argued the Agency should care about its public image. Its lack of response to EO leaks were leading to unnecessary negative coverage. It needed to be proactive and respond quickly to avoid further criticism and scrutiny. In September 1981, it was reported the Reagan administration "backed off significantly" to the original draft.⁷¹⁵ The intelligence advisor to the Attorney General, Richard Willard, wanted to repeal the "ill-considered restrictions." He explained the EO was worded in a way that "was not as precise as it should have been...the language made things look worse than they really were. No one contemplates any changes such as getting the CIA involved in domestic spying."⁷¹⁶ The conservative *Christian Science Monitor* reported the revisions have been "significantly watered down... [and] resolved areas of ambiguity regarding the CIA and thus...not altered current CIA restrictions." By removing the "stringent" Carter EO, the revisions grant "fewer layers of approval for various US spy operations." It said these proposals to remove CIA limitations, were crafted to appear "cosmetic...designed as a gesture to...the political right."⁷¹⁷

The following months constituted more leaks showing CIA support for the original draft. It was reported the EO allowed the Agency to infiltrate domestic organisations, gather information on citizens, and work with domestic law enforcement organisations.⁷¹⁸ The House Permanent Select

⁷¹⁴ George Lardner Jr., "New Intelligence Plan Reportedly Splits Key Aides," *WP*, May 22, 1981, p. A10.

⁷¹⁵ Mary Thornton, "U.S. Backs Off on Easing Spy Rules," *WP*, September 19, 1981, p. A6.

⁷¹⁶ Richard K. Willard, "Law and the National Security Decision-Making Process in the Reagan Administration," *Houston Journal of International Law*, 11, no. 1 (1988), 131.

⁷¹⁷ "Easing US Spy Rules – with Caution," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 9, 1981, p. 24.

⁷¹⁸ Judith Miller, "Reagan Draft Said to Allow Intelligence Activity in US," *NYT*, October 6, 1981, p. A1; Michael J. Sniffen and Robert Parry, "Draft Order Reportedly Let CIA Infiltrate Domestic Groups," *WP*, October 6, 1981,

Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and SSCI conducted hearings. Led by the SSCI chairman Barry Goldwater and vice chairman Daniel Patrick Moynihan, it recommended President Reagan reject recent CIA proposals. Former Senator and the SSCI's first chair, Frank Church, described the EO as "unwise as it is unwarranted," CIA "are trained to break the law (abroad)...when you bring those people home, you invite trouble."⁷¹⁹

Recent proposals to ease restrictions fuelled anger and confusion. Despite key CIA and administration officials denying the Agency will be given domestic surveillance powers, the leaked information stated the opposite. It raised concerns over what the new EO included. *NYT* and *WP* reported on the conflicting information. Referencing George Orwell's *1984*, correspondents accused officials of misleading the press. George Lardner explained the contradictory statements. "The answer appears to be straight out of...Orwell's Ministry of Truth. The proposed executive order...does not really mean what it says. Nothing in it...would expand the CIA's ability to engage in domestic espionage...The publicity...has been 'doubleplusungood' and in need of 'rewrite fullwise.'"⁷²⁰

The *NYT* and the *WP* both focused on oversight as a crucial process to limit the restoration of CIA domestic powers. *NYT* praised the increase of CIA supervision under Carter. It explained that it "makes the Agency and the White House squirm." It defended the findings of the Church committee. The report "nailed the C.I.A. for collecting dossiers on thousands of law-abiding Americans," and it urged the President not to sign the EO. If Reagan did, it underlined "the danger of an unchecked spy service turned inward."⁷²¹ *WP* criticised government officials for creating a "double bind." Details of the EO were not discussed or defended by CIA, and Congress was not permitted to go public with their grievances due to its secrecy. The paper hoped Congress could block it. "The fact that the processes of consultation and internal discussion were still going on as late as this week offered what prospect there was that...CIA will not be put back in the path of the temptations to which it succumbed in earlier years."⁷²²

p. A7; George Lardner Jr., "Draft Order Apparently Let CIA Resume Police Ties," *WP*, October 13, 1981, p. A1; Michael Wright and Caroline Rand Herron, "Coming Down on the C.I.A.'s Side," *NYT*, October 11, 1981, p. E4.

⁷¹⁹ George Lardner Jr., "Hearings Scheduled on Lifting CIA Ban," *WP*, October 24, 1981, p. A3; George Lardner Jr., "Retain Domestic Spying Curb, Senate Panel Urges Reagan," *WP*, October 28, 1981, p. A1; Judith Miller, "Reagan is Urged to Block Spying by C.I.A." *NYT*, October 28, 1981, p. A1; George Lardner Jr., "Boland Urges CIA to Draft Stricter Domestic Spy Rules," *WP*, October 31, 1981, p. A4; George Lardner Jr., "Proposed Order on CIA Faulted at Hill Hearing," *WP*, November 13, 1981, p. A18.

⁷²⁰ Judith Miller, "Putting it all Together, Critics Spell 'Big Brother,'" *NYT*, November 15, 1981, p. E2; George Lardner Jr., "CIA Doublespeak Cloaks Proposals for Homespy and Datahide," *WP*, November 13, 1981, p. A19.

⁷²¹ "Listen to the C.I.A. Watchmen," *NYT*, November 9, 1981, p. A20.

⁷²² "Controls on the CIA," *WP*, November 18, 1981, p. A18.

The EO leaks preoccupied key individuals overseeing the changes. In framing public debate over civil liberties, Edward P. Boland, the HPSCI member, criticised a *Wall Street Journal* editorial that urged Reagan to sign the EO. The article stated it was Carter's appointees who were to blame for the compromises taking place. Inman was cited because he threatened to resign if the EO was passed. "If anyone in the CIA wants to resign, so be it." Boland argued the EO undermined civil liberties, and it should provide clear CIA guidelines in echoing Ford and Carter's reforms.⁷²³

The OEA sent two memorandums to recommend how CIA respond to the leaks. They proposed more background briefings with reporters and a quicker coordinated response to negative coverage. OEA highlighted comments made by the SSCI's John H. Chafee and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Both raised concerns over the Agency's lack of response to the "many misinformed and inaccurate media stories." Moynihan stated CIA was "paying a heavy price by not responding." Chafee recommended the SSCI assist it by publicly replying to any negative media coverage after factoring in the CIA's response. The memorandum states that whilst the Agency's aim is to keep a "low profile," this approach has not helped in mitigating damage to CIA's image. A new "modestly assertive" PR approach was needed, where the Agency would be "forthcoming."⁷²⁴

OEA depicted the Max Hugel affair as a PR success the Agency should learn from. The appointment of Hugel was a difficult scenario for CIA. He was head of the clandestine division but was shortly accused of insider trading and eventually resigned. The document argued CIA response to the Hugel situation was effective because it took "quick action," utilising "candid statements" to the press to avoid a PR disaster. The memorandum described the EO as "a politically explosive issue" where CIA "silence" made matters worse. The "Agency has suffered...unnecessarily" and the "deeper and more permanent concern is the impression the public continues to receive that the Agency is untrustworthy, devious and intent on intruding into their privacy."⁷²⁵

A series of proposals were sent to improve CIA's public image. It urged the Agency abandon its current polarising "media policy" of "no comment [versus] full disclosure." Senior officials including the DCI should meet reporters through "monthly breakfasts," beginning "immediately." CIA only engaged with journalists deemed "responsible," deciding which reporters could handle "discussions of important issues." OEA recommended a more responsive tone with the press. PR staff were to ensure CIA was "in front of the day's news instead of belatedly trying to insert an

⁷²³ "Suppression at the CIA," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 5, 1981, p. 28; Edward P. Boland, "Hazards of Domestic Role for CIA," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 24, 1981, p.53.

⁷²⁴ CIA, "Media Policy," November 16, 1981, CIA-RDP84B00148R000100100009-6, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00148R000100100009-6.pdf>, accessed 3rd March 2023.

⁷²⁵ Ibid; McCarthy, *Selling the CIA*, 57-60.

Agency position after the story is in print.” OEA’s director bickered, “we are always on the defensive-reacting.”⁷²⁶

Lastly, OEA recommended a closer relationship with the WH. The Agency’s silence contrasted with the WH’s public statements. The WH’s press office was “prepared to defend the EO” in public whilst CIA failed to prepare any press responses. Proposals of effective dialogue and coordination between the two, combined by communicating with selected reporters “would have helped immensely,” to limit negative coverage.⁷²⁷ This was achieved in 1983 through a “hotline” between CIA and other departments. It was intended to protect the Agency by preventing leaks rather than building constructive press relations.⁷²⁸

⁷²⁶ CIA, “Media Policy,” November 16, 1981, CIA-RDP84B00148R000100100009-6.

⁷²⁷ Ibid.

⁷²⁸ CIA, “Public Affairs Cooperation to Prevent Unauthorized Disclosures,” June 27, 1983, CIA-RDP85M00364R002304490092-2, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85M00364R002304490092-2.pdf>, accessed 27th January 2023.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Office of Policy and Planning

FROM: [REDACTED]
Director, External Affairs

STAT

SUBJECT: Media Policy

1. On 4 November 1981, the SSCI received an update briefing from the DDO and the IG on the Wilson-Terpil affair. During the briefing, Senator Chafee addressed questions directly to me indicating his concern that the Agency, by not responding to the many misinformed and inaccurate media stories about Wilson-Terpil and the draft Executive Order, was taking a terribly unfair beating in the media. Following the hearing, Senators Chafee and Jackson further expressed their dismay over the unfair treatment. Senator Moynihan added, "You are paying a heavy price by not responding."

2. In exploring the issue further in informal conversation, Senator Chafee observed that maybe the SSCI could assist--perhaps by responding publicly after coordinating their reply with us. Senator Moynihan asked specifically, "How can we help?" (You will recall Wyche Fowler volunteered the same offer at our breakfast.)

3. Both points raised by the Senators have underscored my concern that has grown steadily since my arrival. "Low profile" is something to strive for, but the fact is it has not been helpful in past months on crucial issues such as the Executive Order and Wilson-Terpil. Indeed, on such issues the Agency has suffered and, in my opinion, unnecessarily. Of deeper and more permanent concern is the impression the public continues to receive that the Agency is untrustworthy, devious and intent on intruding into their privacy. There is an immediate need to find a way to allay their misimpressions while, at the same time, protecting our sources and methods.

Media policy of the CIA appears to be polarized: no comment vs. full disclosure. There is a lot of space in between these poles; I believe we can find a "between pole" area that serves the media, public and CIA better.

4. With that in mind, I propose we accept the Senator's offer to help and I urge a more aggressive, but still judicious, media program to include:

Dialogue with the Media:

- ✓ (1) --Monthly "breakfasts" with responsible media representatives for background discussions of important issues, alternately hosted by DCI and DDCI. This to start immediately.
- ✓ --A more determined effort to be "in front" of the day's news instead of belatedly trying to insert an Agency position after the story is in print. We are always on the defensive--reacting.
- ✓ --More responsiveness by the Public Affairs staff to media queries under the close guidance of the DDCI.

Oversight Committees:

- Enlistment of the SSCI's assistance in responding to intelligence issues when it is inappropriate for the Agency to do so.
- Carefully coordinated statements on the Wilson-Terpil affair for use, as appropriate, by Senate Select Committee spokesman.

Coordination with White House Press Office:

- (6) --Informed dialogue with White House Press Office for better coordination of public responses that bear on Agency issues (Public Affairs participates in daily telephone conference for discussion of appropriate responses to queries).

STAT

Figure 6.2 An OEA memorandum urging CIA rethink its reaction to the EO leaks. Staying silent would not help it. The organisation needed to be more proactive with the press to get ahead of critical commentary. *Source:* CIA, "Media Policy," November 16, 1981, CIA-RDP84B00148R000100100009-6.

Inman and CIA were successful in outflanking their opposition. The Agency achieved their goal: the easing of domestic surveillance restrictions. Reagan signed the EO on 4 December 1981 as it replaced Carter's EO 12036. Engaging "in electronic surveillance within the United States," it permitted CIA to obtain information on citizens who are "reasonably believed to be potential sources."⁷²⁹ Unlike the original draft in March that drew unified criticism from *NYT*, *WP*, and Congressional bipartisan opposition, the EO fractured the earlier consensus. "The public relations aspect of it worked beautifully," *TBS* claimed, "congressional intelligence committee members hailed this final version because they compared it to last spring's draft rather than to the existing rules."⁷³⁰

The *NYT* asserted the EO was moderate than its former drafts. It said CIA was not at fault because it was dragged into prior domestic operations by the Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon administrations. *NYT* argued the EO 12333 did not "turn back the clock to the days when Presidents decreed no limits at all." It continued its support of CIA supervision from the early-Cold War by praising Reagan for recognising Congressional oversight, "the rule of law thus remains embedded in the strange soil of intelligence."⁷³¹ Boland replied and said there was "some cause for cautious optimism." He concluded the EO was a successful compromise between the administration and Congress.⁷³²

The *WP* supported the EO's signing into law because it did not deviate from Carter's. Its editorial moderated the charges that restoration of CIA's domestic powers undermined civil liberties. It argued the EO shifted "the marker a bit to the right on the individual liberty-national security scale." Nevertheless, it "takes a rather vivid imagination...to think that [Reagan] has moved it much." The paper argued the ongoing press coverage and SSCI investigation into Casey's financial affairs, involving his failure to report loans to companies he represented as a lawyer, had diverted his attention from implementing key passages in the EO.⁷³³ By excluding CIA's position, the editorial stated the administration and Congress kept the Agency "on the intelligence straight and narrow, out of the domestic political swamp."⁷³⁴

Barry Goldwater, serving as the chair of SSCI, was sympathetic to CIA. He criticised *WP* and called out other editors for their remarks that CIA was out of control during the 1970s. Goldwater

⁷²⁹ Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," *National Archives*, December 4, 1981, <https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html>; George Lardner, Jr., "President Eases Restrictions on Gathering of Intelligence," *WP*, December 5, 1981, p. A1.

⁷³⁰ Ernest B. Furgurson, "In the CIA We Trust," *TBS*, December 13, 1981, p. K5.

⁷³¹ "Looser Reins for the C.I.A.," *NYT*, December 9, 1981, p. A30.

⁷³² Edward P. Boland, "From Reagan to C.I.A., to Treat with Care," *NYT*, December 20, 1981, p. E16.

⁷³³ Persico, *Casey*, 267-268.

⁷³⁴ "Mr. Reagan and the CIA," *WP*, December 6, 1981, p. C6.

admitted the Agency exceeded its legal boundaries, only because “at that particular time” they were ordered to conduct domestic operations by previous administrations. He agrees with the EO, stating “I don’t think it goes far enough.” Goldwater’s influence was pivotal in shifting SSCI’s stance from opposition to the EO to supporting it. Although Goldwater criticised *WP*, it was the paper’s moderate view on the EO that prompted him to air his conservative rhetoric protecting CIA. “Remember...this well: all of the enemies of the United States do not live outside its borders.”⁷³⁵

Subsequent leaks led to conflicting accounts over what the new EO contained. *NYT* and *WP* were quick to point out the EO’s confusing and inconsistent provisions. Assessing press reaction was vital because it led the CIA towards engaging with the press. The Agency had to continue surveying press coverage. Its silence in response to the leaks throughout the majority of 1981 damaged its image because the press and Congress were concerned its domestic powers would be revitalised. CIA’s internal documents are telling: the Agency’s PR shifted immediately. Casey’s aim to increase secrecy faltered at the first hurdle because CIA could not afford to hide behind the shadows.

The EO was watered down from its initial leaked version back in March 1981. Its moderated form passed because the press and Congress compared it to the excessive proposals within the original draft. Mainstream newspapers and key legislators saw it as a successful compromise between the administration and Congress that clarified the CIA’s role and ensured civil liberties were protected. *NYT* supported the EO because it recognised “the right of the Senate and House...to obtain confidential oversight information.”⁷³⁶ *WP* supported it because it demonstrated Reagan’s backing of CIA, reflecting “the president’s traditional pride and confidence in them and his conviction that their public image deserves burnishing.”⁷³⁷ This editorial gave impetus for Goldwater to voice his defence of the EO. Even Boland, a staunch critic of the original leak, felt some progress was made to produce a less excessive document. EO 12333 represented a broader political and cultural shift as conservative appointees occupied the highest echelons in government. The press and Congress recognised that they no longer could oppose legislation that weakened the 1970s intelligence reforms.

Senator Chafee and Press Reaction to IIPA

CIA secrecy expanded under the 1982 IIPA that made it a federal crime to reveal the names of covert intelligence agents. It shaped public debate because it set guidelines for what the press

⁷³⁵ Barry Goldwater, “Looking at the CIA,” *WP*, December 22, 1981, p. A16; Jones, “Creating Uncertainty,” 255.

⁷³⁶ “Looser Reins for the C.I.A.” *NYT*.

⁷³⁷ “Mr Reagan and the CIA,” *WP*.

could publish and it enforced state retaliation against actions CIA deemed as dangerous to national security. Unlike the consensus which broke apart after the EO signing, there was a rigid consensus between the press and Congress to support the Agency's view that legal punishment be enforced to deter individuals who they argued were deliberately compromising the covert identities of agents. *NYT* and *WP* supported IIPA because it targeted what they described as a small group of individuals, some former intelligence employees, who systematically attempted to undermine CIA by deliberately disclosing the identities of intelligence officers.⁷³⁸ *NYT* and *WP* claimed they were distinct to the actions of lone wolves and renegades because the mainstream newspapers supported CIA secrecy and adhered to a strict line of press responsibility.

The leading Congressional supporter of IIPA was Senator John H. Chafee.⁷³⁹ A liberal Republican whose views contrasted with his conservative colleagues. His support of IIPA differed from his political views. Chafee's proposal demonstrates that CIA secrecy encapsulated the public debate across the political spectrum as he sought to pass the IIPA in the broadest language possible. It not only punished those who worked with and disclosed classified information, but Chafee's provision also targeted individuals who gained information from public sources. His amendment permitted prosecution on the grounds of pursuing a "pattern of activities" which leads to the identification of an agent. The IIPA therefore indiscriminately targeted both government "insiders" and "outsiders."⁷⁴⁰

Chafee's positive view of intelligence began during his military service in the Second World War. Stationed in Guadalcanal in 1942, he remarked the vital role intelligence played for his unit. The exposures of covert agents had angered him. He joined SSCI in 1977 and spoke to numerous intelligence officers abroad. He saw CIA disillusionment and low morale during the era of intelligence accountability. He said he repeatedly told, "how can America let this happen?" His views on press coverage over intelligence were explicit as he argued First Amendment rights to the press were not absolute if intelligence material is compromised. "They say my bill will inhibit the press and that's true, but the press accepts inhibitions in wartime...I don't want to equate this situation with war, but intelligence is a dangerous business...[it] is a very valuable tool in peacetime."⁷⁴¹

⁷³⁸ Jennifer K. Elsea, "Intelligence Identities Protection Act," *Congressional Research Service*, April 10, 2013, 2.

⁷³⁹ Mistry, "The Rise and Fall of Anti-Imperial Whistleblowing," 141.

⁷⁴⁰ Andrew M. Szilagyi, "Blowing Its Cover: How the Intelligence Identities Protection Act Has Masqueraded as an Effective Law and Why it Must be Amended," *William and Mary Law Review*, 51, no. 6 (2010), 2280-2281.

⁷⁴¹ Steven V. Roberts, "On the Intelligence Bill's Tightrope," *NYT*, April 10, 1982, p. 10.

Earlier IIPA drafts split Congress. Legislators differed over what constituted an impairment to the intelligence services.⁷⁴² Edward Boland argued “intent” was needed as proof of conviction. The Senate gave a broader interpretation, adopting Chafee’s “pattern of activities” and a “reason to believe,” making it easier to prosecute journalists. John Shattuck, the ACLU’s legislative director, wrote a scathing *WP* article. In it, he argued that targeting reporters for using public information grants the CIA sweeping authority to determine what constitutes a “reason to believe.” He concluded IIPA would “strike a blow at the heart of a free press.” Democratic Senator, Joseph Biden supported Boland. He warned Chafee’s provision is “vague” and “unnecessary broad,” with the fear of prosecution “enough to dissuade many news organizations.”⁷⁴³

Casey appeared at a Senate hearing to offer his support for Chafee, praising him for highlighting the “tragic results of these unauthorized disclosures.”⁷⁴⁴ The “reason to believe” clause, the DCI stated, does not impede First Amendment rights of the press because “it is not related to alleged abuses. It does not bring clarity to issues of national policy. It does not enlighten public debate. It does not contribute to an enlightened and informed electorate.” He also contacted the Justice Department to reiterate his support for the Senate’s bill; he was hopeful it would lead to successful prosecutions and deter unauthorized disclosures.⁷⁴⁵ In a *WP* article titled “Why Should We Endanger Our Spies?” Chafee echoed Casey’s assurances, citing his provision “is well established in espionage law and has been upheld in the courts on a number of occasions.” Despite opposition from liberal legislators and the ACLU, the Senate passed the IIPA on 18 March 1982.⁷⁴⁶

What did Chafee’s amendment mean for reporters who could be reprimanded for uncovering potential CIA abuses? On the one hand *NYT* and *WP* were willing to support legislation that penalised those who exposed intelligence agents. A *NYT* editorial called the whistleblower Philip Agee the “villain of all seasons.”⁷⁴⁷ On the other, they warned IIPA could infringe First Amendment

⁷⁴² Charles Mohr, “House Panel Softens Bill on Identifying U.S. Agents,” *NYT*, August 27, 1980, p. A13; Charles Mohr, “House Panel Clears Bill to Ban Naming of Covert Agents,” *NYT*, September 4, 1980, p. A1; Charles Mohr, “Senate Panel Acts to Narrow Intelligence Identity Bill,” *NYT*, September 18, 1980, p. A21; Charles Mohr, “New Action Likely on C.I.A. Legislation,” *NYT*, November 10, 1980, p. A19; Charles Mohr, “Disclosing Intelligence Agents’ Names,” *NYT*, February 6, 1981, p. A10; Stuart Taylor Jr., “Bill to Protect Agents’ Names Nears Vote in Senate,” *NYT*, March 3, 1982, p. A19.

⁷⁴³ John Shattuck, “Trying to Spook the Press,” *WP*, September 19, 1980, p. A17; Joseph R. Biden Jr., “A Spy Law that Harms National Security,” *Christian Science Monitor*, April 6, 1982, p. 26.

⁷⁴⁴ CIA, “Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1981—S.391,” May 8, 1981, CIA-RDP85-00003R000200040002-0, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85-00003R000200040002-0.pdf>, p.27, accessed 8th March 2023.

⁷⁴⁵ CIA, “Letter to Honorable Edward P. Boland from William J. Casey,” April 29, 1981, CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060012-5, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060012-5.pdf>, accessed 8th March 2023.

⁷⁴⁶ John H. Chafee, “Why Should We Endanger Our Spies?” *WP*, October 4, 1981, p. C7.

⁷⁴⁷ “Secrecy is Not the Only Security,” *NYT*, July 21, 1981, p. A14.

rights of the press. "A swipe at the First Amendment," the *WP* exclaimed.⁷⁴⁸ Legislation strengthening CIA secrecy seemed to irate mainstream newspapers when press freedom could be undermined. They drew a firm distinction between conventional journalism exposing CIA abuses and outsiders who were reckless, irresponsible and deliberately attempting to undermine intelligence capabilities. "If Congress were content to attack those who so callously violate their oaths of secrecy," *NYT* claimed, "it could probably succeed without trampling on First Amendment values."⁷⁴⁹

WP editorials and replies demonstrated this distinction. In the last months of the Carter administration *WP* separated the actions of Agee and Louis Wolf, a private citizen who revealed details about agents operating in Jamaica using public sources. He was blamed for the subsequent attack on a CIA house in the region. Its editorial said Agee released sensitive CIA material. "With the Agee part," the paper claimed, "we have no quarrel." However, Wolf identified agents by acquiring unclassified information. *WP* argued that the Wolf case could spiral into prosecution for journalists who publish articles exposing intelligence activities. "How can they be punished for publishing such information without punching a hole in the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and expression?" Whilst against Wolf's actions, which was described as "ugly mischief," it concludes, "his mischief cannot be the cause of an abridgement of the freedoms that the population as a whole enjoys."⁷⁵⁰

The following year *WP* asked what the implications for journalists would be if the ongoing Wolf case resulted in prosecution. As debate continued in Congress over the IIPA, the paper criticised the House's "intent" provision, which it argued did not protect journalists as "intent compels an inquiry into belief and opens a gaping hole in the protections guaranteed by the First Amendment." Chafee's "reason to believe" was scrutinised. *WP* claimed it "is no less well-meaning but no more satisfactory." Protections to journalists were still "flimsy." *WP* wanted to distance itself from the "contemptible" Wolf. "The Louis Wolfs do not want to merely embarrass...CIA, they are terrorists in spirit, and their true purpose is to destroy democracy."⁷⁵¹

Wolf responded to *WP*, as did the editors of the *Covert Action Information Bulletin* and Edward Boland. Wolf criticised the "diluted editorial" accusing it of lending "credence to the CIA's cause." By labelling him a terrorist, he states *WP* "will allow the passage of this act" and it will be "a significant blow against democracy." CIA will target anyone who exposes their activities, he argues, and there will be no protections or distinctions between the press and individuals under IIPA. "How

⁷⁴⁸ "A Swipe at the First Amendment," *WP*, September 25, 1981, p. A30.

⁷⁴⁹ "Secrecy is Not the Only Security," *NYT*.

⁷⁵⁰ "Naming the CIA's Names," *WP*, July 30, 1980, p. A20.

⁷⁵¹ "The Philip Agees, the Louis Wolfs," *WP*, July 20, 1981, p. A12.

could any journalist expose a major CIA operation...without wittingly understanding that the story would impede CIA activities?...We are journalists in the traditional sense...just as much as your reporters are...no way a law can distinguish between us.”⁷⁵²

Boland criticised the “lack of understanding” by *WP* over comments made on the absence of journalist protections. He explains the House and Senate’s interpretations of IIPA are different because of the impact to press freedom. Chairing the HPSCI, Boland is supportive of the House’s “intent” amendment, claiming it protects the First Amendment rights of the press as compared to the Senate’s “reason to believe” which “allows the jury to find guilt if it is satisfied not that the defendant intended a bad result.” He argues this is crucial because the Senate’s bill could “have a chilling effect on investigative reporters who seek to expose governmental abuses.”⁷⁵³

The Senate’s IIPA interpretation led to several opinion pieces. Conservative government officials wanted it to be signed as soon as possible. Richard Willard wrote in *WP* to urge legislators to pass IIPA. He previously consulted with legislators to grant IIPA with the broadest possible language to ensure easier and quicker prosecutions. He supported Chafee’s amendment and argued editorial criticisms delayed its passage. Claiming IIPA criticisms were “unfair” and “inaccurate,” he cites Chafee’s provision to assert there is a clear distinction in the legislation which will not target journalists. The First Amendment however does not extend to all speech, Willard writes. Protection “does not preclude legislation that prohibits the systematic exposure of agents’ identities.” Both Congressional interpretations of the IIPA, “intent” and “reason to believe,” are constitutional, “this legislation has been delayed long enough, and one version or the other deserves speedy enactment.”⁷⁵⁴

On the other side of the debate was an article written by CIA whistleblower Frank Snepp in *NYT*. He referred to his own court case as he weighed in on the issue. The 1980 *Snepp v. United States* required government employees seek prior review before submitting any publication. It revoked First Amendment rights of any individual who worked with classified information. Censorship could be enforced purely on the notion the government employee breached their “position of trust.”⁷⁵⁵ Snepp writes the Supreme Court ruling offered protection to reporters whereas IIPA includes public information as a reason to prosecute. “So much for the sanctity of investigative journalism,” the House and Senate versions of the Act amount to little more than a

⁷⁵² Ellen Ray, William H. Schaap and Louis Wolf, “To Call Us Terrorists is a Dangerous Flimflam,” *WP*, August 29, 1981, p. A21.

⁷⁵³ Edward P. Boland, “Protecting Our Spies—and Our Rights,” *WP*, September 15, 1981, p. A23.

⁷⁵⁴ Richard Willard, “Enough Delay on the Spy Bill,” *WP*, November 17, 1981, p. A19.

⁷⁵⁵ Mistry, “The Rise and Fall of Anti-Imperial Whistleblowing,” 140; Mackenzie, *Secrets*, 87.

“litmus test of a journalist’s intent (if he’s demonstrably anti-C.I.A., he gets clobbered).” The bill should be scrapped, he writes, as the *Snepp* ruling provides the administration “more than enough legal firepower,” IIPA amounted to a “massive and totally gratuitous assault on the press and the First Amendment.”⁷⁵⁶

The *NYT* accused Congress and the administration of jingoism as they wrapped “this bill in the flag.” It argued Chafee does not understand IIPA restrictions to a free press. The “reason to believe” makes prosecuting journalists “too easily charged,” as IIPA is “offensive to the Bill of Rights.”⁷⁵⁷ The Senate passed IIPA on 11 June 1982 and it was signed by Reagan on 23 June at Langley. Just as Eisenhower visited in 1959 to lay the cornerstone at Langley in a huge PR event to demonstrate the Agency’s status, Reagan’s appearance was constructed as a PR event to symbolise CIA regaining and strengthening its secrecy. His presence not only showed support for IIPA but also emphasised his administration’s aim to restore the Agency.

The “US Army Band filled the air with patriotic songs” as Reagan was greeted by Casey and CIA officials. Reagan delivered his speech to an audience of CIA employees and the press, the event at the “normally closed and secretive compound” resembled something of a “Fourth of July picnic.”⁷⁵⁸ Reagan commended the work of Chafee “whose outstanding leadership guided this bill through the Senate.” IIPA “recognizes that the revelation of names of secret agents adds nothing to the legitimate public debate over intelligence policy.” And he said it was a step in the right direction to rebuild the CIA from a “decade of neglect and sometimes overzealous criticism.”⁷⁵⁹

Reagan’s comments demonstrated that IIPA shifted public debate as naming agents was not considered “legitimate” nor within the public interest. IIPA led to press discussion over the First Amendment, which itself became subjective. *NYT* and *WP* were quick to denounce First Amendment rights to the likes of Agee and Wolf. There was no controversy over the issue of targeting them, however they were willing to fight against potential press censorship and IIPA prosecution. A “pattern of activities” and a “reason to believe” were so vague that reporters did not understand what they could be prosecuted for. As Chafee put it, “they’ll just have to be careful about exposing names of agents.”⁷⁶⁰

⁷⁵⁶ Frank Snepp, “The Noose Media Bill,” *NYT*, December 6, 1981, p. E23.

⁷⁵⁷ “The Spy Bill Wrapped in the Flag,” *NYT*, March 4, 1982, p. A22; “The Right to Name Names,” *NYT*, March 22, 1982, p. A14.

⁷⁵⁸ Herbert H. Denton, “President Signs Bill Making Disclosure of Agents a Crime,” *WP*, June 24, 1982, p. A3.

⁷⁵⁹ CIA, “Remarks of the President at Bill Signing Ceremony at Headquarters Building,” July 2, 1982, CIA-RDP85B01152R001001330001-1, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85B01152R001001330001-1.pdf>, accessed 13th March 2023.

⁷⁶⁰ Taylor Jr., “Bill to Protect Agents’ Names,” *NYT*.

President Signs Bill Making Disclosure Of Agents a Crime

By Herbert H. Denton
Washington Post Staff Writer

In a festive outdoor ceremony at CIA headquarters in McLean yesterday, President Reagan signed into law a bill making it a crime to disclose the names of U.S. intelligence agents, even if the information is obtained from public records.

Reagan said the law would send a signal to the world that while we aid this democratic nation remain resilient and flexible, we also retain our good sense and our resolve to protect our own security.

Hundreds of CIA analysts, secretaries and other personnel gathered in a grand hall to hear Reagan.

While they waited, the U.S. Army band filled the air with patriotic songs, and CIA employees served punch to the press, giving the event at the normally closed and secret CIA compound something of the feel of a Fourth of July picnic.

Reagan landed controversial CIA Director William J. Casey, whom he referred to affectionately as "Director Bill," and he praised the employees, calling them "heroes of a grim twilight struggle."

"You are the tripwire across which the forces of repression and tyranny must stumble in the quest for global domination," he said.

CIA agents stayed in the "twilight" yesterday because of concern that they might be caught by the television cameras.

Before the bill-signing ceremony, Reagan spoke at a closed session to a number of them—precisely how many was kept secret. One CIA spokesman said there were "several hundred"; another said, "We wouldn't acknowledge how many there are," but Casey acknowledged

that the room where Reagan spoke holds about 1,000 and it was full.

The new law was prompted by the practices of former agent Philip Agee and publications such as the Covert Action Information Bulletin, which regularly published the names of CIA officers stationed overseas with the avowed aim of destroying their effectiveness.

The law, called the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, imposes maximum penalties of 10 years in prison and fines of \$50,000 for unauthorized disclosure by government employees with access to classified information.

Private citizens, such as journalists and scholars, could be sentenced to three years in prison and fined \$15,000 if they "name names" in the course of a "pattern of activities in order to identify and expose covert agents" and if they have "reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States."

Reagan said the measure was necessary to help rebuild the CIA—after "nearly a decade of neglect and sometimes overzealous criticism"—in order for the nation to meet the "grave challenges" of an era "fraught with danger."

The American Civil Liberties Union has criticized the law as a "clearly unconstitutional infringement on the right of free speech."

Morton H. Halperin, director of the ACLU's Center for National Security Studies, said the organization would provide legal assistance to those whose ability to speak or write is threatened by this legislation or effort to enforce it by the Justice Department.



Leaving for CIA headquarters to sign the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, President Reagan blows a kiss to the press.

Hill Clears Voting Law

Associated Press

In an impressive victory for civil rights groups, the House adopted yesterday a 25-year extension of criminal enforcement sections of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

"This extends the right to vote to every black American and every language minority American," said Rep. Peter W. Rodino Jr. (D-N.J.), chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.

The unanimous vote ends a 15-month drive for renewal of the landmark civil rights law, under which more than a million blacks, and other minority voters have, registered to vote.

Important parts of the voting rights law, enacted at the height of the 1960s civil rights movement, would expire Aug. 6 without the extension.

Last week, the Senate approved identical legislation, 85 to 8, and House acceptance of the Senate version eliminates the need for lengthy negotiations between the two houses in a conference committee.

Reagan, who once opposed some of the provisions contained in the bill, has said he will sign it into law.

SUMMER SALE

SAVE **20% to 35%**

SEE ALL THE EXCITING VALUES LISTED ELSEWHERE IN TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST

MEN'S CLOTHING

SUMMER SUITS, SPORT COATS AND SLACKS BY

- BROOKSTREET • HART SCHAFFNER & MARX • DENMAN & GODDARD
- HICKEY-FREEMAN • JACK NICKLAUS • RALEIGHS
- HUNTER-HAIG • HASPEL • BOTANY '500' • CHRISTIAN DIOR
- ATWOOD • JACQUES ANDRE • PIERRE CARDIN • LEBOW

MEN'S FURNISHINGS

- DRESS SHIRTS • NECKWEAR • SPORT SHIRTS • SLACKS
- WALK SHORTS • SWIMWEAR • TOPS • CAPS • BELTS
- SLEEPWEAR • UNDERWEAR • HOSIERY • SHOES

WOMEN'S FASHIONS

- DRESSES FOR MISSES & PETITES • SPORTSWEAR
- SEPARATES • MISS RALEIGH DRESSES, SEPARATES, BLAZERS & COORDINATES • SUITS & BLAZERS • JEWELRY

MAQUET
LOUNGE
 Live working band
 and dancing. Tonight!
 31 The Shiloh Inn
 224-0718

RENT
USED CARS
 TRUCKS, WATCO
 "You Can't Buy
 STANDBY
 RENT-A-CAR
 499-1009

HAIR
REMOVED
 WITHOUT
 PAIN
 686-9833

CELEBRATE!
DULLES EXPO '82
JUNE 26th & 27th
Saturday 10:00-7:00 Sunday 10:00-6:00

FAMILY FUN FREE
Dulles International Airport

PLENTY OF FREE PARKING AIRLINE TICKET DRAWINGS-FREE

Aviation Features:

- World's longest transport plane, the C-5A
- British Royal Marines Championship
- Free Fall Parachute Team
- Photo Rights and "Hot" Signs
- The Concorde SST
- The Eagle 1, U.S. Park Police Rescue Helicopter
- The Flying Circus, with antique biplanes
- Hot Air Balloons
- Model airplane demonstrations and (RC)E
- Over 40 other military and civilian aircraft displays
- Confidential Air Force

Highlights:

- Authentic show-three country baroque & pop rock
- "Big" international rock band: Keanu Burt's
- Internationally loved blues singer John
- Also, the Blumenthal Music Team, the Loudoun Chorus, Caribbean Fire
- Groundswell Band, the Free State Band
- and more!
- Plus, refreshments and special events
- Those whose ability to speak or write is threatened by this legislation or effort to enforce it by the Justice Department

DULLES EXPO '82 is sponsored by the Loudoun County Chamber of Commerce with assistance from the FAA and the Washington Dulles Task Force.

Figure 6.3 Reagan signs the IIPA at Langley. In the picture he blows a kiss to the press.

Source: Denton, "President Signs Bill," WP.

FOIA and CIA: The Shift to Total Exemption

Casey desired to see CIA return to its early-Cold War years. He wanted to exempt non-national security material from FOIA thereby cloaking the CIA in deeper secrecy. Casey argued FOIA processes were costly, time-consuming, and distracted Agency employees from vital intelligence work. He found exempting non-national security material more challenging than IIPA because there was stronger press support for FOIA. Like EO 12333, CIA played the long game. By wanting total exemption, a move that inspired press and public uproar immediately, the Agency could instigate a compromise, minimising criticism to gradually free themselves from FOIA. Key CIA officials such as the DCI, Inman and John McMahon, who took over Inman's role as Deputy DCI in 1982, were

staunch advocates for restricting FOIA whilst legislators who supported the Agency, such as the SSCI chair Barry Goldwater, pushed for FOIA relief. FOIA was a landmark piece of legislation passed in 1966 that granted any citizen the right to request government documents. The U.S. government is bound by FOIA to disclose information, and the courts could legally enforce disclosure. But national security material was exempted, and agencies can decide to withhold information.⁷⁶¹

The press supported FOIA because it aided journalists and papers in investigating government wrongdoing through the acquisition of material. The legislation upholds the public's right to know.⁷⁶² It was also supported by Congress because legislators implemented amendments in 1974 after Watergate to strengthen and expand it. These reforms, however, were modest according to Ted Galen Carpenter.⁷⁶³ CIA stuck regimentally to national security exemptions during the 1970s. After the Glomar project, the Agency used the exemption to withhold material investigative reporters wanted. The phrase "neither confirm nor deny," became the "Glomar response," as the Agency rejected numerous FOIA requests, frustrating journalists.⁷⁶⁴ The Reagan administration targeted FOIA. In April 1982, EO 12356 made it simpler for government officials to classify information. Cutting requests, the administration used national security to dictate how long material could be classified for. This deviated from the Carter government that established a timeframe when certain pieces of information were going to be released. Under Reagan, information requested by FOIA could be re-classified to prevent disclosure.⁷⁶⁵

CIA began to make its case against FOIA during the Carter administration.⁷⁶⁶ The Agency argued the DCI should decide what files to exempt from FOIA. Between 1979 and 1980, the Agency supported an amendment to the 1949 CIA Act that it wanted to include in the "Intelligence Reform Act" in 1980.⁷⁶⁷ It failed to pass but the Deputy DCI Frank Carlucci pushed for CIA operational files to be exempt by citing Philip Agee's exposures of intelligence agents. "It is frankly disgraceful that we are required to assist him in his endeavors." Agee's lawyer noted CIA have "been working the Agee

⁷⁶¹ Daniel J. Sheffner, "The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): A Legal Overview," *Congressional Research Service*, August 24, 2020, 22, 25.

⁷⁶² Mark Fenster, "FOIA as an Administrative Law," in *Troubling Transparency: The History and Future of Information*, ed. David E. Pozen and Michael Schudson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 57.

⁷⁶³ Carpenter, *The Captive Press*, 81-82.

⁷⁶⁴ Bennett, *Neither Confirm Nor Deny*, 256.

⁷⁶⁵ Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information," April 2, 1982, *The American Presidency Project*, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-12356-national-security-information>.; David H. Morrissey, "Disclosure and Secrecy: Security Classification Executive Orders," *Journalism and Mass Communication Monographs*, 161, (February 1997), 29.

⁷⁶⁶ George Lardner Jr., "CIA Asking Hill to Cut Back Public Access to Agency's Files," *WP*, February 29, 1980, p. A2; Mohr, "Panel Backs Review," *NYT*; George Lardner Jr., "Senate Panel Seeking to Cut Public Access to CIA Data," *WP*, January 24, 1980, p. A8.

⁷⁶⁷ Karen A. Winchester and James W. Zirkle, "Freedom of Information and the CIA Information Act," *University of Richmond Law Review*, 21, no. 2 (1987), 255-257.

angle in order to destroy the Freedom of Information Act.”⁷⁶⁸ The Agency attempted to include exemption of operational files into the Intelligence Oversight Act however the amendment was dismissed. The debate over FOIA exemption was delayed until 1981.⁷⁶⁹ The Deputy DCI knew CIA had to cooperate with it because in the age of “the whistleblower and the investigative reporter...people talk about openness.” But in a speech to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers in 1980, Carlucci stated the conservative shift in Congress and U.S. politics will provide CIA with enough support for FOIA relief, “we are going to press just as hard as we can for the protection of sources and methods.”⁷⁷⁰

The aim of partial FOIA exemption from Carlucci shifted to total exemption under Casey in the summer of 1981. Deputy DCI Bobby Inman argued for the “total exclusion” of CIA files from FOIA. Speaking to SSCI in July, he criticised FOIA for undermining the Agency’s intelligence capabilities. He stated foreign governments were reluctant to share information with the U.S. “on the basis that they would be afraid...they would ultimately read about it in the newspaper.” Exemption ended “the wasteful and debilitating diversion of resources...eliminate[d] the danger of court-ordered release of properly classified information...regain[ed] the confidence of human sources and foreign intelligence services.”⁷⁷¹ His comments drew criticism from the American Newspaper Publisher Association (ANPA) who called it “especially disturbing,” considering Casey’s earlier move to close CIA’s PR department, the Office of Public Affairs and limit background briefings for reporters. A representative from the Society of Professional Journalists, argued that FOIA has kept CIA accountable. “Even the minimal access to CIA information...has permitted the press to render what we consider a valuable service to the American people.”⁷⁷²

The ACLU also responded. The group was one of FOIA’s staunchest defenders. Its staff attorney Mark Lynch opposed Inman’s comments that Congressional oversight alone can provide CIA accountability. It is a “very dangerous idea...and that this committee should think long and hard about before it accept[s] that notion.” Lastly a ASNE statement opposed CIA arguments that FOIA led to national security disclosures. The group highlighted exemptions that allow the Agency to avoid disclosing potentially sensitive material that harms its image. “The CIA is not being forced to disclose

⁷⁶⁸ George Lardner Jr., “CIA Uses Agee Case in War on Freedom of Information Act,” *WP*, March 15, 1980, p. A2.

⁷⁶⁹ Winchester and Zirkle, “Freedom of Information,” 257.

⁷⁷⁰ CIA, “Remarks by the Honorable Frank C. Carlucci Deputy Director of Intelligence,” October 2, 1980, CIA-RDP91-00901R000100180003-8, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91-00901R000100180003-8.pdf>, accessed 23rd March 2023.

⁷⁷¹ U.S. Congress, *Intelligence Reform Act of 1981*, 97th Cong., 1st sess., July 21, 1981.

⁷⁷² George Lardner Jr., “CIA Attacks Freedom of Information Law at Senate Hearing, Asks to be Exempted,” *WP*, July 22, 1981, p. A4.

information that would be dangerous...Moreover...CIA is certainly not shovelling out mounds of information unwillingly as a result of FOIA requests by the Soviet Embassy or by foreign agents.”⁷⁷³

Casey argued for total exemption. In his appearances to the Senate Judiciary subcommittee, he wanted CIA immunity alongside exemptions for other intelligence services. Complete exemption conflicted with other key individuals within the administration. Due to strong opposition from key opponents such as Senators Patrick Leahy, David Durenberger, and the ACLU’s Morton Halperin, the government insisted on a wider strategy to gradually weaken the scope of FOIA. A series of letters between Casey and the Attorney General, William French Smith demonstrated this different approach and highlights the broader bureaucratic turf struggle in limiting FOIA. Casey writes that a government-wide strategy should focus on FOIA’s impact on intelligence services. He argues there is a strong case to present in the hope of bypassing Congressional and departmental opposition through emphasising foreign services are reluctant to share information with the U.S. due to FOIA requests. He highlights one of the administration’s core aims was to aid the intelligence services. “It is time to fulfil this commitment by removing...CIA...from...FOIA.” The government’s current aim of partially weakening the Act “will not contain effective relief for the CIA.”⁷⁷⁴

Smith replied, stating CIA cannot be put ahead of other agencies. “We intend to propose language which is strong enough to satisfy the substantive concerns of...CIA, but do not believe...that it is necessary or politically desirable to attempt to single out...CIA...to become wholly exempt from the Act.” He says the administration’s strategy is to present to Congress a “single, comprehensive revision of the entire Act” rather than permitting each agency to voice their own grievances with FOIA. This would lead to division and increase criticisms from “those who cloak themselves in the public’s right to know.”⁷⁷⁵ Casey did not waver and pointed to a 1980 Act granting the Federal Trade Commission a FOIA exemption. “This is a rather significant exemption for a regulatory agency...certainly...CIA...should be in no less a position to seek a satisfactory exemption.” He urged the government to act, “full relief is essential now.”⁷⁷⁶

⁷⁷³ U.S. Congress, *Intelligence Reform Act of 1981*.

⁷⁷⁴ “CIA Chief asks Exemption from Disclosure Law,” *WP*, September 25, 1981, p. A10; CIA, “Letter to the Honorable William French Smith from William J. Casey,” May 14, 1981, CIA-RDP84B00890R000700030077-6, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00890R000700030077-6.pdf>, accessed 15th March 2023.

⁷⁷⁵ CIA, “Letter to Honorable William J. Casey from William French Smith,” May 22, 1981, CIA-RDP84B00890R000700030076-7, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00890R000700030076-7.pdf>, accessed 15th March 2023.

⁷⁷⁶ CIA, “Letter to the Honorable William French Smith from William J. Casey,” June 15, 1981, CIA-RDP84B00890R000700030075-8, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00890R000700030075-8.pdf>, accessed 15th March 2023.

CIA exemption was rejected. In December 1981, the Senate's Judiciary subcommittee approved legislation that advanced Smith's proposals by excluding ongoing government investigations into organised crime and terrorism from FOIA. Reporters and editors were concerned that the proposed legislation limited FOIA. "It's going to be a disaster for the concept of public accountability of Government," said a spokesman for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. The Senate voted to keep FOIA intact in May 1982. Casey's demands were dismissed. The proposals for complete exemption never left the committee.⁷⁷⁷

⁷⁷⁷ David Shribman, "Panel Ends Work on Disclosure Act," *NYT*, December 15, 1981, p. A13; David Shribman, "Panel Sets Aside Plan to Weaken Information Act," *NYT*, May 21, 1982, p. A1.

15 June 1981

The Honorable William French Smith
Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your letter of 22 May regarding the CIA and Justice Department legislative proposals on the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

As I have mentioned to you before, the difficulties created by the FOIA for the Central Intelligence Agency have been very serious. This Agency's special problems with the FOIA will not be resolved or even appreciably alleviated by merely strengthening our partial exemption from the Act. It is only by a total exclusion from the Freedom of Information Act that CIA will obtain adequate legislative relief.

I am advised by my General Counsel that, pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, the FTC obtained a total statutory exemption from the FOIA for any material received in any investigation being conducted to determine whether FTC administered laws have been violated. This is a rather significant exemption for a regulatory agency like the FTC. Certainly, CIA and NSA, with their critical roles in this Nation's intelligence efforts, should be in no less a position to seek a satisfactory exemption from the Act. We cannot wait for a government-wide approach which will not contain effective relief for CIA and NSA. Full relief is essential now.

I have requested my General Counsel, Stanley Sporkin, to arrange a meeting with Deputy Attorney General Edward C. Schmults in order to explore fully the substantial equities that underlie our position. If still unresolved, I will drop by to see you.

With best regards,

Yours,

Bill
William J. Casey

cc: Secretary of State

Figure 6.4 Casey's letter to the Attorney General William French Smith over restricting FOIA.
Source: CIA, "Letter to the Honorable William French Smith," CIA-RDP84B00890R000700030075-8.

Casey's Speech to Scrap FOIA and the Goldwater Bill

Casey's desire to exempt non-national security material from FOIA generated Congressional and press reaction. Editorials and opinion pieces defended the legislation. Writing in the *WP*, Senator Jim Sasser recalled the various attempts to undermine FOIA after the 1974 amendment. He notes around two-hundred proposed exemptions were presented to Congress. These suggested exemptions, "are considered in the form of amendments to other laws," that impact the public's right to know because they precede the "interests of the general public." He defends FOIA as

“basically sound” and argues only a “sensible” government-wide strategy can provide improvements to it.⁷⁷⁸

Investigative reporter Jack Anderson said CIA attacks on FOIA was creating a “new curtain of secrecy.” The administration was looking to exempt “virtually all CIA operations” under a proposed EO that sought to expand classification. He argued it would make it easier for the Agency to hide abuses of power, “while few would argue that many legitimate CIA activities must be kept secret, it takes no great imagination to conjure up a whole new generation of dirty tricks that would be hidden from the public.”⁷⁷⁹ *NYT* argued FOIA and CIA “coexisted handsomely since 1966 with immense benefits to democracy.” But the Reagan administration’s enthusiasm over classifying materials presents a new danger to FOIA.⁷⁸⁰

WP reported on a speech Casey gave to veterans in August 1982. In it he stressed that FOIA was damaging CIA’s intelligence capabilities. Reiterating his aim for total exemption he remarked “I question very seriously whether a secret intelligence agency and the Freedom of Information Act can coexist for very long...The willingness of foreign intelligence services to share information and rely on us fully and of individuals to risk their lives and reputations to help us will continue to dwindle unless we get rid of the Freedom of Information Act.” Casey echoed a similar argument Allen Dulles used when he shaped public debate in the early-Cold War years: the government and the press talk too freely about sensitive CIA material. He claimed FOIA aids the Soviet Union in stealing “information that has helped it improve the accuracy and power of weapons.” He declared, “secrecy is essential.”⁷⁸¹

Casey’s comments were met with fierce press reaction. “Essential to what?” the *PI* questioned. It argued secrecy and national security are terms used to cover “embarrassing or inconvenient” operations. FOIA is already weak, it stated, “the public is not allowed enough access to the workings of the federal government.” Whilst removing it completely provides CIA with “license to operate without the expectation of public accountability.” *CT* likewise wrote a scathing editorial that remarked Casey fails to acknowledge the importance of the public’s right to know. “He does not...seem to have noticed a striking fact about the government he is employed to defend: that

⁷⁷⁸ Jim Sasser, “Undermining Our Right to Know,” *WP*, December 20, 1981, p. B7.

⁷⁷⁹ Jack Anderson, “A New Curtain of Secrecy,” *WP*, December 20, 1981, p. B7.

⁷⁸⁰ “Pious Deceptions,” *NYT*, September 12, 1982, p. E20.

⁷⁸¹ “Information Act Injures Security, CIA Director Casey Tells Veterans,” *WP*, August 25, 1982, p. A14; McCarthy, *Selling the CIA*, 70.

it is obliged by its own Constitution to protect its citizens access to information...for an intelligence director, that's a strangely unintelligent argument."⁷⁸²

Casey's FOIA comments caused unease within the Agency. Reacting to press criticism, OEA recommended Casey clarify his remarks because it feared further backlash. In urging a PR strategy to quell criticism, OEA outlined how the Agency should respond. "We believe it would be a good idea for the DCI to make note" that his comments, "get rid of the law," was "taken out of context." The memorandum highlights an alternative approach to limit FOIA, the CIA's position "is as its always been—to seek some relief from the Act." The phrase "some relief" is revealing. It implies CIA was shifting away from Casey's push of total exemption towards pursuing partial relief from FOIA. The Agency were willing to compromise after calls for total exemption failed to gain traction.⁷⁸³

Casey sent a standardised reply to the editors of *CT* and *NYT*. The letter echoed recommendations put forward by OEA. It states that his remarks on exempting CIA from FOIA "have been repeatedly distorted" and he has never advocated full Agency exclusion. Nevertheless, the letter suggests that FOIA cannot coexist with CIA, "there is an inherent incompatibility in applying openness in government law to intelligence agencies whose missions must be carried out in secrecy."⁷⁸⁴ Rather than clarifying, Casey's letter to the editors only led to further assumptions he would scrap FOIA. Morton Halperin replied that Casey "seems once again to call for the C.I.A.'s total exemption," whilst an editor noted that Casey's comments on FOIA's "inherent incompatibility" suggests he does support its complete repeal.⁷⁸⁵

⁷⁸² "Secrecy and Security," *PI*, c. 1982, page unknown; "Mr. Casey Makes It All Easy," *CT*, August 27, 1982, p. 10.

⁷⁸³ CIA, "FOIA," September 14, 1982, CIA-RDP84B00049R000802050017-4, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00049R000802050017-4.pdf>, accessed 14th March 2023.

⁷⁸⁴ CIA, "Letter to John T. McCutcheon from William J. Casey," September 18, 1982, CIA-RDP83M00914R002800050020-9, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83M00914R002800050020-9.pdf>, accessed 16th March 2023; William J. Casey, "Freedom of Information Harmful to the C.I.A." *NYT*, October 1, 1982, p. A30.

⁷⁸⁵ Morton H. Halperin, "An American Freedom the C.I.A. Can Afford," *NYT*, October 10, 1982, p. E16; Charles S. Rowe, "C.I.A. vs. Freedom of Information," *NYT*, October 26, 1982, p. A28.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

14 September 1982

NOTE FOR: Special Assistant to the DCI for
Interdepartmental Affairs

FROM: Deputy Director, Office of
External Affairs

SUBJECT: FOIA

The Agency's policy on FOIA may come up at the Committee breakfasts due to the publicity about the DCI's remarks in Chicago. We believe it would be a good idea for the DCI to make note of the fact that the phrase "get rid of the law" was taken out of context and that the Agency's policy is as it's always been -- to seek some relief from the Act for the CIA. The Agency has never advocated repeal of the Act.

Attachment

Figure 6.5 An OEA memorandum urging Casey clarify his remarks to the speech he gave to veterans. After surveying press coverage after Casey's speech, OEA recognised that removing CIA from FOIA would invite unnecessary press scrutiny. *Source:* CIA, "FOIA," September 14, 1982, CIA-RDP84B00049R000802050017-4, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00049R000802050017-4.pdf>, accessed 14th March 2023.

The hostile press reaction to Casey's demands led to a compromise instigated by Barry Goldwater. Like Carlucci's proposal, the "Intelligence Information Act of 1983" or the "Goldwater Bill" exempted the Agency's "operational files" from FOIA search and review. These were documents relating to CIA material within foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. Other unclassified files would still be under FOIA's search and review. Goldwater and CIA argued operational files were rarely released due to classification and by removing them from search and review it would speed

up FOIA processing, making it easier and quicker to release material deemed fit for public interest.⁷⁸⁶ In April 1983, the SSCI chairman wrote to Reagan with the aim of obtaining the President and Justice Department's full support for partial FOIA relief.

In the letter he criticises the procedures of FOIA because it burdened the CIA by requiring it to check and process numerous requests. Goldwater states over the next month he will propose legislation, backed by Casey, that will take a "moderate approach" to FOIA relief. Winning ACLU support was a different matter, but Goldwater confirmed the group would also back his legislation.⁷⁸⁷ This agreement between the ACLU and the CIA was due to meetings that took place the previous year. The ACLU agreed not to oppose partial FOIA relief if the Agency does not seek total exemption. The Republican sweep in Congress led the ACLU to advocate for a compromise because they feared CIA would win enough legislative support for total exemption.⁷⁸⁸ In his reply, Reagan issued his full backing of Goldwater.⁷⁸⁹ Casey and CIA still desired total exemption, John McMahon made this clear in his speech to the Senate, but he realised the Agency, like the ACLU, had to compromise to overcome staunch opposition from the press and Congress.⁷⁹⁰

There was still caution and uncertainty over the "Goldwater Bill." Senator Patrick Leahy, a SSCI member wrote in *WP* where he praised the compromise as a potential solution to the ongoing issue regarding CIA and FOIA, but he acknowledged the bill was not perfect. He argues that previous calls for exemption have damaged CIA's image, potentially leading to a call for further Congressional oversight. The bill, however, provides an "acceptable way to alleviate genuine CIA problems while protecting the public's right to access to information about national policy." Leahy was reluctant in offering partial FOIA relief, but he remarks that Congress must discuss the "Goldwater Bill" and offer amendments before passing it. He argues operational files needed a clearer definition to prevent the Agency from withholding information, to avoid it covering past abuses and release information quicker, to satisfy FOIA requesters.⁷⁹¹

Public interest groups voiced concerns and urged for greater clarification to the Goldwater Bill. The *NYT* highlighted these concerns which were voiced by editors, historians, and journalists.

⁷⁸⁶ Snider, *Congress and the CIA*, 150.

⁷⁸⁷ CIA, "Letter to Ronald Reagan from Barry Goldwater," April 11, 1983, CIA-RDP85M00364R001502640028-7, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85M00364R001502640028-7.pdf>, accessed 17th March 2023.

⁷⁸⁸ MacKenzie, *Secrets*, 105-106.

⁷⁸⁹ CIA, "Letter to Barry Goldwater from Ronald Reagan," CIA-RDP88B00443R001304050125-4, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88B00443R001304050125-4.pdf>, accessed 17th March 2023.

⁷⁹⁰ Robert Pear, "C.I.A. is Nearer Pact on Release of Certain Files," *NYT*, May 30, 1983, p. 1; Paul Taylor, "Limited Exception for CIA Under FOIA Now Acceptable," *WP*, May 31, 1983, p. A2; George Lardner Jr., "CIA Seeks to Avoid File Scrutiny," *WP*, June 22, 1983, p. A8.

⁷⁹¹ Patrick Leahy, "Don't Let the CIA Clam Up," *WP*, July 14, 1983, p. A15.

These groups provided comments and suggestions for amendments at a SSCI hearing. They argued similarly to Leahy that urged for a clearer definition of operational. Speaking on behalf of the ANPA, the head of a Virginian newspaper Charles E. Rowe stated that whilst the language was an improvement from earlier drafts, the DCI and CIA held broad authority to distinguish what constituted an operational file. Rowe concluded the DCI's authority from this bill "does not upset the delicate balance of the government's need for secrecy, the public's right to know and an individual's right to privacy."⁷⁹²

Meanwhile, historians wanted shorter CIA time limits to release information, an issue that has plagued CIA historians after the Cold War and continues today.⁷⁹³ The head of the Society of Professional Journalists remarked that partial FOIA relief amounted to a trend under Reagan's presidency where the public's right to know has been "whittling away."⁷⁹⁴ In contrast, *WP* asserted the Goldwater Bill does not infringe on the public's right to know because the material is already classified. "It is important to understand...the bill would not add to the agency's authority to withhold information; it addresses the problems of search and justification." Whilst acknowledging the "bill is not perfect," *WP* argues the conflict surrounding secrecy and democracy "is not easily resolved," however, "in this case, progress is being made."⁷⁹⁵

The proposed amendments from SSCI were passed unanimously by the Senate in November 1983. Despite further negotiations between both intelligence oversight committees, particularly over the authority given to the DCI to decide what files to exempt from FOIA, the Central Intelligence Agency Information Act was passed and signed into law on 15 October 1984. The bill received crucial support from the ACLU.⁷⁹⁶ The bill's passage split the group with dissidents arguing that Morton Halperin and Mark Lynch weakened FOIA by compromising with the Agency. Defenders of the ACLU negotiation asserted the group had to cooperate because of the increasing conservative shift in the U.S. They argued they had to rely on Congress to achieve a compromise, and it promoted the public's right to know because it quickened CIA's response to FOIA requests.⁷⁹⁷

⁷⁹² CIA, "State of (Sanitized) for the American Newspaper Publishers Association Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on S1324, The "Intelligence Information Act of 1983" June 28, 1983," June 28, 1983, CIA-RDP91B00135R000500820006-2, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91B00135R000500820006-2.pdf>, accessed 21st March 2023.

⁷⁹³ Karabell and Naftali, "History Declassified," 626.

⁷⁹⁴ Robert Pear, "C.I.A. Data Access Runs into Snags," *NYT*, September 4, 1983, p. E16.

⁷⁹⁵ "Searching CIA Files," *WP*, September 15, 1983, p. A22.

⁷⁹⁶ Stephen Engelberg, "C.I.A. and A.C.L.U. Support Curb on Information," *NYT*, May 11, 1984, p. A15.

⁷⁹⁷ David Burnham, "The Increasing Dissent Within the A.C.L.U.," *NYT*, August 14, 1984, p. A16; Ira Glasser, "The Time the A.C.L.U Got the Better of the C.I.A.," *NYT*, February 4, 1985, p. A18; Winchester and Zirkle, "Freedom of Information," 257-260.

The ACLU-CIA compromise supported CIA secrecy because it showed how far the pendulum shifted towards the Agency during this period. The group had to compromise over FOIA relief. The ACLU were reacting to conservative ascendancy, but the Agency were also responding to press and Congressional criticism. Whilst the aim of total exemption from FOIA did not come to fruition, any weakening of it was still considered a victory for CIA. The Agency overcame opposition from the ACLU and key members of the intelligence oversight committees. At Langley, like the passage of the IIPA, the CIA Information Act was celebrated by employees and the DCI as another triumph against what they perceived was overzealous restrictions placed on the IC in the previous decade.

The public uproar over FOIA exemption led CIA, under direction from OEA, to moderate their strategy. Casey's speech to veterans was a pivotal point that led to this PR change. Casey's demand for complete exemption "was a classic bargaining tactic...he knew the importance of demanding more than you expect to receive during negotiations."⁷⁹⁸ However, like OEA's response to EO 12333, it urged Casey to reach out to the press and Congress to mitigate the impact to CIA's image. Just as it had throughout the Cold War, PR dominated the minds of Agency officials. Casey and John McMahon reiterated their aim for FOIA total exemption but both realised that engagement with press and Congress was needed to protect CIA secrecy. Partial relief from FOIA and strong protections under IIPA meant CIA secrecy was regaining lost ground. Such a dramatic shift provided the impetus for Casey to target the press.

Perusing the Press: Casey and News Leaks

The events in 1986 serve as the hallmark in which Casey approached the press. By exaggerating claims of national security breaches, he initially went on the offensive, threatening to prosecute the press for disclosing intelligence sources and methods. However, he moderated his stance because he recognised he could not pursue prosecution due to First Amendment rights of the press. He realised CIA needed to engage with the press to enhance its secrecy. Threatening outlets with prosecution only led to further scrutiny and unwarranted attention on his CIA. Initially Casey and Reagan's aim was to prevent the press from gaining material from leaks. In January 1982, Reagan publicly announced he would ramp up efforts to curb government leaks. With the help of his National Security Advisor, William P. Clark, he attempted to limit contacts between government officials and the press. Reagan increased the use of polygraph tests and expanded secrecy contracts in the hope to discourage government disclosures.⁷⁹⁹

⁷⁹⁸ McCarthy, *Selling the CIA*, 71.

⁷⁹⁹ Howell Raines, "Reagan Defends Policies to Curb News Disclosures," *NYT*, January 20, 1982, p. A21.

Three months later, EO 12356 was signed to limit public access to CIA information by permitting the reclassification of national security documents. And by 1983 Reagan approved and implemented National Security Decision Directive 84. The document's second section restricted contact between the administration and the press.⁸⁰⁰ Casey conferred with CIA officials on how the Agency should respond when the press obtained material through leaks.⁸⁰¹ An internal study was conducted that found leaks were increasing year after year between 1979 and 1983.⁸⁰² By 1984 the Agency was doubling efforts to monitor contacts with the press. It was shocked to learn that *NYT* reporter Philip Taubman admitted CIA employees provided him with classified information. A memorandum stated that unauthorised disclosures with the press "are a serious breach of trust...security education efforts throughout the Community should be revised to incorporate warnings about the damage that can result from discussing classified...or even unclassified information about CIA business with the media." Any information given to the press would be subject to evaluation.⁸⁰³

A conversation between Casey and CIA's Inspector General, James H. Taylor emphasises the concern between senior CIA officials and the press. The resulting survey and taskforce claimed the press were the "principal villains in the disclosure business." When leaks occur, instead of a "defensive, reactive, and tongue-tied" attitude, CIA should be on the "offense as well as...defense...to get things in better balance." A list of suggestions proposed an offensive CIA PR approach. Amongst them included the Agency recognise press restraint is not "undemocratic," and CIA should be prepared to ask editors, "whether there are any situations, short of war, where they would be willing to exercise self-restraint." Another recommendation urged CIA comprise a list "of examples of foolish media disclosures...ones that have cost the country or individuals substantially." Casey supported these solutions and wanted to prepare a statement "on the whole issue to be used as a basis for alerting the senior officials of the government...it is an issue which needs to be seriously addressed and/or a public speech."⁸⁰⁴

⁸⁰⁰ Mistry, "The Rise and Fall of Anti-Imperial Whistleblowing," 145; Mackenzie, *Secrets*, 107-108.

⁸⁰¹ CIA, "Intelligence Leaks and Counterterrorism Capabilities," March 23, 1984, CIA-RDP88B00443R001500050024-4, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88B00443R001500050024-4.pdf>, accessed 23rd March 2023.

⁸⁰² CIA, "Leak Study," July 31, 1984, CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010042-8, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86M00886R002800010042-8.pdf>, accessed 23rd March 2023.

⁸⁰³ CIA, "Leaks," April 4, 1984, CIA-RDP94B00280R001200010019-5, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP94B00280R001200010019-5.pdf>, accessed 23rd March 2023.

⁸⁰⁴ CIA, "Leaks," June 8, 1984, CIA-RDP94B00280R001200020015-8, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP94B00280R001200020015-8.pdf>, accessed 23rd March 2023.

15 May 1984

Jim,

1. This is to comment on Eloise Page's paper re initiatives to combat unauthorized disclosures.

2. In short, her measures look pretty good--particularly the legislation, FBI unit and special prosecutor. If they are politically feasible, their very existence may help. A single well-publicized, high-level conviction would do a lot.

3. One thing missing from the paper is a strategy for dealing with the media. Yet they are principal villains in the disclosure business.

4. We can just accept the idea that the media have an unlimited license to hunt and publish, that the public has an unlimited right to know, that government secrets are fair prey for media watch-dogs, that the First Amendment inhibits any restraints, and that the proper, democratic relation between government and media is adversarial. Conversely, we can quietly observe that absolute power corrupts absolutely, that the power of the media to publish in this country is nearly absolute, that other people besides the media have the job of promoting the general welfare and providing for the common defense, and that the freedom of the media among others hangs directly on the success of those people. Also, as officers of CIA we can bear personal witness to the massive cost--in cancelled programs, in lost opportunities, in opposition countermeasures and in threats to (loss of - ?) life--that media exposure has brought. More, we can cite precise parallels in methods and results, if not in motivations, between the media's attempts to penetrate us and our opposition's attempts to do the same. Maybe we have an obligation as citizens and taxpayers with knowledge that is important to the nation's welfare to give voice to our fears.

5. The Agency's posture toward the media is basically defensive, reactive and tongue-tied. What we say is: "no comment"; "that disclosure was wrong and outrageous." Next we wring our hands, send emissaries out to brief key people in the Administration and Congress and correct the record, then hunker back awaiting the next blow. Maybe it's time for an offense as well as a defense and an attempt to get things in better balance. Here are some personal thoughts as to do's and don'ts on this score.

25X1

SECRET

DON'T

- Don't believe we should, or can, frontally attack the concepts listed at the start of paragraph 4.
- Don't announce a program to curb the media's excesses.
- Don't expect much help from Congress in the way of legislation, e.g., an Official Secrets Act.
- Don't assume that World War II slogans ("Loose Lips Sink Ships") will do much; they are nostalgia.
- Don't expect much help from Congress when it comes to CA; there's a lot of political mileage in exposure; besides, it's too easy to argue there's a public interest in debating actions that could lead to war.
- Don't believe the media are monolithic, all with the ethics of an alley-cat; they have owners, Boards, managers, editors, broadcasters, reporters, et al.; most of them have as big a stake in the U.S. as anybody else.
- Don't forget that public confidence in the press is low; per Time magazine in December only 13.7 percent of the public reportedly had confidence in the press; the latter have their own reasons for wanting to improve the image.

DO

- Think long-term, expect that self-discipline is probably all we can hope for from the media in the foreseeable future.
- Remember that the problem is not ours alone; it extends to the whole Community; the latter should want to help.
- Let it be known that we, the nation, are getting hurt; admit the pain; professional stoicism isn't getting us anywhere.
- Recognize the need for outside allies; a Presidential statement and a Commission are good ideas; so would be the formation of some successor organization to maintain a continuity of effort; direct CIA sponsorship would be pilloried.
- Prepare a sanitized list of examples of foolish media disclosures--ones that have cost the country or individuals substantially.

25X1
25X1

Figure 6.6 As part of an internal survey and task force, the listed "Don'ts" and "Dos" illustrate how senior Agency officials continued to view CIA PR as a vital asset in maintaining their public presence. Old PR recommendations resurfaced. Such as emphasising the notion that leaks damage national security. And reintroducing the Allen Dulles strategy of establishing a CIA group to provide guidance on what the press should publish without inciting Congressional and press criticism. *Source:* CIA, "Leaks," CIA-RDP94B00280R001200020015-8.

Casey outlined his concerns over unauthorised disclosures to the press in a speech to the National Security Planning Group, an executive committee overseeing covert action in 1985. He explicitly argued leaks damaged national security. He proclaimed, “we appear to be approaching anarchy in the widespread disregard of security by cleared people.” He called for action to enact legislation prosecuting government officials who leak. Reprimanding those who disclosed classified material instead of targeting journalists who published it appeared feasible to Casey. He said it is “exceedingly difficult” to balance press freedom alongside the protection of classified material. Any effort to do the latter “will be attacked in the press” which “poses a substantial political risk.”⁸⁰⁵

Casey’s proposal was ignored by the Reagan administration. Newspapers praised the government’s decision. Editorials remarked the government “deserves points for prudence” and it “is not a good time for that debate...you probably could not have an informed public debate on national security without leaks.”⁸⁰⁶ They warned the proposal “burden[ed] free speech” and “that current laws are adequate to protect true national secrets.” The executive and CIA were adamant on stifling government leaks. Casey and Reagan stated it was a government only problem and aimed to severely restrict public information as a result. However, when the cases of Vitaly Yurchenko and Ronald Pelton occurred, Casey quickly instrumented a shift to target journalists through the threat of prosecution.⁸⁰⁷

Pursuing government leakers shifted to targeting reporters and outlets. Amidst the backdrop of Casey’s intention to prosecute government officials, 1985 was a year when the nation experienced several counterintelligence failings. One of these was the case of Vitaly Yurchenko, a KGB defector who eluded CIA and travelled back to Moscow. Before leaving, he exposed an intelligence officer, Ronald Pelton, who worked for the National Security Agency. Pelton sold technical intelligence to the Soviet Union. He compromised a covert wiretapping operation in the Sea of Okhotsk codenamed Operation Ivy Bells.⁸⁰⁸ Yurchenko’s evasion and the Pelton story resurfaced tensions between the press and CIA material. Casey was keen to use both cases to reinforce CIA secrecy.

Like EO 12333, IIPA, and FOIA, the DCI exaggerated the dangers to national security. He used the counterintelligence failings to provide an excuse to challenge the public’s right to know by

⁸⁰⁵ CIA, “Unauthorised Disclosures of Classified Information,” July 23, 1985, CIA-RDP87M00539R000400550007-8, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87M00539R000400550007-8.pdf>, accessed 23rd March 2023.

⁸⁰⁶ “Cool Heads, Wrong Time and Place,” *NYT*, March 29, 1985, p. A34.

⁸⁰⁷ “Leaking Isn’t Spying,” *TBS*, March 28, 1985, p. A15; “Second Thoughts,” *LAT*, March 29, 1985, p. 6.

⁸⁰⁸ Woodward, *Veil*, 423; Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and how they won the Cold War* (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1996), 362-365.

accusing Congressional intelligence committees of leaking sensitive material. SSCI never trusted Casey, because the relationship was filled with suspicion and negativity from both sides. The Yurchenko affair exposed the differences between Casey and SSCI. Just as he publicly criticised the DCI for failing to consult with Congress over the EO 12333 leaks, SSCI member David Durenberger reprimanded CIA and Casey in *WP* for “lacking a sense of direction.”⁸⁰⁹

The Casey-Durenberger interaction emphasises the limits to CIA public secrecy under the DCI. Part of the uneasy relationship with Congress was the DCI’s contempt for oversight. He routinely blamed the SSCI for disclosing material. He responded to the Senator’s comments in a public letter to *WP*, but Durenberger recognised the DCI’s attempt to shape public debate and called him out for it. Casey accused Durenberger of holding a “off-the-cuff” meeting with the press. In his letter, Casey repeated these assertions, accusing Durenberger of leaking sensitive CIA material and stating the system of oversight “has gone seriously awry.” Casey said that whilst he heard Durenberger’s comments were taken out of context, he concludes, “that’s not the point. Public discussion of sensitive information and views revealed in a closed session of an oversight committee is always damaging and inadvisable...if the oversight process is to work at all it cannot do so on the front pages of American newspapers. The cost in compromise of sources...is simply too high.”⁸¹⁰

Durenberger said the DCI’s statement “raises a very troubling issue for the American people,” because intelligence “is a subject of public knowledge and public discussion.” Durenberger noted Casey had spoken previously to *Time* where he discussed sensitive information about counterterrorism and intelligence. If Casey could brazenly talk about the hidden world of intelligence, Durenberger said, then Congress should be able to discuss similar matters more freely. Casey replied to the Senator only because the article’s title expressed anti-CIA rhetoric. If the headline read “CIA, Casey Praised by Hill Chairman,” he would not have responded, Durenberger wrote. Amidst the tensions between Casey and Congress, the executive editor of *WP*, Ben Bradlee, was eager to print the Pelton story.⁸¹¹

Casey loathed *WP*, because of their role unearthing the Max Hugel affair. With Pelton arrested and placed on trial, Casey and the head of the National Security Agency, William Odom, held numerous negotiations with *WP* to prevent it publishing details of Operation Ivy Bells. Reagan

⁸⁰⁹ David B. Ottaway, “CIA, Casey Criticized by Hill Chairman,” *WP*, November 14, 1985, p. A1.

⁸¹⁰ CIA, “Letter to David F. Durenberger from William J. Casey,” November 14, 1985, CIA-RDP88B00443R001804370029-1, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88B00443R001804370029-1.pdf>, accessed 19th January 2023; Patrick E. Tyler, and David B. Ottaway, “Casey Accuses Durenberger of Compromising CIA,” *WP*, November 15, 1985, p. A1.

⁸¹¹ Dave Durenberger, “The Public Must Know that it Works,” *WP*, November 17, 1985, p. 43; Gates, *From the Shadows*, 213-214.

was also personally involved and contacted the owner, Katherine Graham, to argue for press restraint. Details of it were known by the Soviet Union, presumably from Yurchenko years prior, and they were also printed from information obtained by government leaks. Bradlee was frustrated by the administration and Casey's demand for censorship. He met with him to discuss publication. During this meeting, the DCI threatened *WP* with prosecution if the story ran.⁸¹²

Casey felt prosecution was viable. Regardless, Bradlee decided to continue with publication and ran the story on 21 May 1986. The article, written by members of Bradlee's intelligence investigation unit, Bob Woodward, and Patrick Tyler, detailed the U.S. wiretapping operation alongside Casey's threat of prosecution.⁸¹³ The *WP* was not the only news outlet to receive a threat of prosecution. George Lardner reported that Casey targeted four other news organisations. This included *Time*, *Newsweek*, *NYT*, and the *Washington Times* for publishing information related to intelligence collection from intercepted communications.⁸¹⁴ Casey however never intended to prosecute any newspaper, as Woodward notes in his study, the DCI was bluffing. A CIA official even recalled at the time, "it seems as if Bill Casey was shooting with an automatic weapon against the Washington Post and forgot to release the trigger...It is not a CIA-vs.-the-press campaign."⁸¹⁵

Casey selected George Lauder as CIA's PR officer. Like Casey, Lauder was a clandestine officer and shared the DCI's support for press restraint. He was tasked to correspond with other leading editors of the outlets Casey threatened to prosecute. In a move that characterised Lauder's tenure as press officer, he sent a letter to Strobe Talbott, a bureau chief at *Time*. In it he cited Casey's determination to pursue leaks. He asserted the press were responsible for preventing leaks. "I have tried for two and a half years to bring the media to an understanding that this is their intelligence service and that it helps protect the very freedoms the media enjoys. I have had some success. Nonetheless, with others it is like peeing into a gale. There is a lot of arrogance out there and total contempt for the need to protect intelligence agents."⁸¹⁶

Lauder discussed possible charges against *Time*. He accused the editor, Henry Grunwald, of issuing a public statement of Casey's charges before CIA could respond. "Since he appears to know everything," Lauder remarked, "perhaps we should let his omnipresence take precedence over our

⁸¹² James Kelly, Anne Constable, and David Halevy, "Shifting the Attack on Leaks: The CIA Director Hints at Prosecution of News Organizations," *Time*, 127, no. 20 (May 19, 1986), p. 91; Bob Woodward and Patrick Tyler, "Eavesdropping System Betrayed," *WP*, May 21, 1986, p. A1; Richard J. Aldrich, "Secrets, Spies and Editors in Cold War America: Ben Bradlee and the Washington Post," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 34, no. 5 (2021), 664-667.

⁸¹³ Ibid, 664.

⁸¹⁴ George Lardner Jr., "U.S. Weighs Prosecuting Press Leaks," *WP*, May 7, 1986, p. A1.

⁸¹⁵ Woodward, *Veil*, 460.

⁸¹⁶ CIA, "Letter to Strobe Talbott from George V. Lauder," CIA-RDP90-00845R000201160004-4.

decision-making process.”⁸¹⁷ Talbott replied, it was “unfair and inappropriate” for CIA to “float this kind of accusation...without telling us what we did that you believe to have been a violation of the law...we have a right to know the basis of the charge.” Recalling the earlier years between the paper and CIA, he concludes “I look forward to a restoration of the friendlier tone of the recent past.” Lauder responded, asserting that Casey did not “float” prosecution. He said the DCI’s comments should not have been public and accused Bradlee of leaking the conversation “in order to whip up support among the media for the [WP] when it makes public the information it holds.”⁸¹⁸

⁸¹⁷ Ibid.

⁸¹⁸ CIA, “Letter to William Casey from George V. Lauder,” May 15, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R000903760030-7, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88B00443R000903760030-7.pdf>, accessed 31st January 2023; Woodward, *Veil*, 265; McCarthy, *Selling the CIA*, 59-60; Willmetts, “The CIA and Time Magazine,” 728-732.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Phone: (703) 351-7676

13 May 1986

Mr. Strobe Talbott
TIME Magazine
1050 Connecticut Avenue
Suite 850
Washington, D.C. 20036-5334

Strobe,

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of 9 May. I greatly appreciate the tone in which it is written and understand the concerns expressed in it.

I want you to know that the CIA did not "float" any kind of accusation against TIME Magazine. During a confidential discussion--one of several--with Ben Bradlee on a subject of critical national security importance, the Director mentioned en passant the concerns that the intelligence community has regarding the damage done to national security by stories in certain publications. The Director's focus, however, was on THE WASHINGTON POST and the story that it was about to run which could critically damage certain vital intelligence collection capabilities. He did not intend to have his remarks become public. Bradlee, of course, published the Director's confidential talk in order to whip up support among the media for the POST when it makes public the information it holds. An old gimmick. It was Bradlee, not the Agency, who "floated" the story in Lardner's article.

I am strongly in favor of a dialogue with you and other intelligent and objective leaders in the media about our problems, and welcome the prospect that, as you suggested, the Director and I might at some point come to New York and talk to senior TIME officials about these matters. As I mentioned to you, my previous efforts to arrange such a meeting met with, shall we say, a less than enthusiastic response.

Best regards,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Lauder".

George V. Lauder

Figure 6.7 George Lauder's flippant response to *Time* editor Strobe Talbott over Henry Grunwald's public statement that the CIA charged it with unearthing national security material. *Source:* CIA, "Letter to William Casey," CIA-RDP88B00443R000903760030-7.

Bradlee countered Lauder's claims. He wrote an article stating *WP* consulted with Casey for months prior to publishing the story and the Soviet Union knew the information Pelton passed to them. In his piece, he highlighted the tension between Casey's efforts to increase secrecy and the function of a free press to publish material it deemed was in the public's interest. "The role of a

newspaper in a free society is what is at issue here...the press must continue its mission of publishing information that it...determines to be in the public interest...serving society, not government.”⁸¹⁹

Casey’s private conversation with Bradlee and threats to prosecute others angered journalists. A journalist claimed unfair attacks on the rights of press freedom and accused the government of leaking CIA material. “We, the press, know...the government are handing out this information...but we can’t tell the poor saps who are the readers.”⁸²⁰ Edwin Yoder Jr., noted a “very real barrier to reform is that the possession of secrets, if only for the purpose of leaking them, is a prized badge of power in Washington.”⁸²¹ An editorial repeated Bradlee’s comments regarding press responsibility. In conferring with CIA before publishing the Pelton story, it stated, “sensitive information that comes this newspaper’s way is regularly and conscientiously screened for its possible value to an enemy...even as journalists rise to protest the hint of official ‘cautions,’ they apply cautions of their own.”⁸²²

Conservative papers argued similarly. *CT* and *Washington Times* wrote threats of prosecution were unclear and the material obtained was not stolen or gathered illegally. On the one hand conservative reporters despised Bradlee’s gung-ho approach to publish sensitive CIA material but on the other they defended First Amendment rights of the press as they declared the government leaks material.⁸²³ Former DCI William Colby supported press responsibility. In the Pelton case, he argued the government released material “without specific identification” but he urged the press adopt a new “set of standards” advocating responsibility. He concludes recent legislation protecting disclosure of material has not undermined press freedom.⁸²⁴

Under Casey, CIA-press relations echoed the conservative shift in the 1980s. Senior CIA officials in taskforces and surveys emphasised a stricter PR approach to show that the press were primarily responsible in leaking material. To prevent this, Casey used national security to threaten outlets with prosecution. He initially thought he could pressure outlets to adopt a stronger notion of press responsibility to protect CIA secrecy further. But it was unsuccessful because key reporters and members of Congress knew Casey was attempting to shape public debate. They called him out and

⁸¹⁹ Benjamin C. Bradlee, “The Post and Pelton: How the Press Looks at National Security,” *WP*, June 8, 1986, p. F1, F4.

⁸²⁰ Jim Anderson, “The Pot Calls the Kettle Black,” *WP*, May 11, 1986, p. D5.

⁸²¹ Edwin M. Yoder, Jr. “Secrets Curbed,” *WP*, June 1, 1986, p. A19.

⁸²² “Leaks and ‘Cautions’” *WP*, June 1, 1986, p. C6.

⁸²³ “William Casey’s Obsession,” *CT*, May 22, 1986, p. 12; Wesley Pruden, “A Mighty Tempest for a Thimble,” *Washington Times*, May 9, 1986, p. 2.

⁸²⁴ William E. Colby, “The Ripple Effect,” *WP*, June 15, 1986, p. F7.

asked why he was trying to sabotage delicate CIA-press relations. It served the DCI no good to float prosecution and Casey recognised he could not pursue charges due to First Amendment rights.

“I believe very strongly in operating in an open society,” explained William Doswell in his 1983 *WP* interview, “I think most people in the agency think that way. But I don’t think they want to give away the family store.” Doswell’s remarks illustrate the conflict between CIA and the press under Casey’s tenure. After his inauguration, Casey sought to increase CIA secrecy and gradually reduce restrictions from the 1970s intelligence reforms. However, his aim to revitalise a bygone era of CIA-press relations failed because Casey had to make some concessions to the press. He realised shortly after Doswell left OEA that he could not cut out the press completely.⁸²⁵

This led to two key outcomes. The first was that CIA secrecy was reinforced because the press prioritised its First Amendment rights above government whistleblowers. There was fierce press reaction when these rights were challenged through Casey’s comments regarding total FOIA exemption or his threat to prosecute news organisations for disclosing sensitive material. There was a consensus with liberal and conservative newspapers that vilified government officials who disclosed sensitive CIA material. In distancing themselves from the actions of government insiders, the press did not challenge legislation such as IIPA. The Agency’s secrecy endured and was revitalised because the press was on the defensive and focused on potential attacks against their rights to press freedom. As a result, the debate shifted from highlighting CIA’s functions and role within the U.S. democratic system towards defending the public’s right to know against Casey. The image of the DCI again became the focal point which the press measured their relationship with CIA.

The second outcome is that the events of the 1970s led to the Agency maintaining a Colby-style approach with the press. Casey was less forthcoming than his predecessor, but he recognised he could not deviate completely and found that CIA had to engage with the press if it wanted to restore some of its secrecy. Whilst dismantling the Agency’s Office of Public Affairs and restricting press background briefings made the headlines, it did not illustrate the approach taken by Casey’s CIA. The DCI was adamant on conferring with other CIA departments, specifically OEA. They provided vital recommendations for improving the Agency’s image, which remained a major concern for the DCI despite his desire to increase secrecy. The popular narrative argues that Casey “unleashed” CIA, but he was still cautious not to break bridges with the press. He recognised, much like every other DCI, that the Agency needed the press, and the press needed it.

⁸²⁵ Isikoff, “Keeping the Lid on Tight,” *WP*; Persico, *Casey*, 300.

Conclusion

"The CIA knows everyone is laughing, but maintains there are good reasons for the cloak and dagger stuff. What the reasons are specifically, it won't say, but apparently the agency believes a few extra precautions are worth the general merriment." - *Richard Fryklund, 1956*⁸²⁶

"The very nature of the Central Intelligence Agency, where 'hush-hush' is the magic word, makes it the object of a lot of suspicion in what we like to think of as our 'open society.' The only way it can operate efficiently is under a cloak of secrecy and, much as we love to read about such doings in paperback mystery books, we somehow seem to disapprove of it when we ourselves hold the responsibility." - *Bill Henry, 1963*⁸²⁷

"The CIA...is said to be an 'Invisible Government' yet it is the most visible, most externally scrutinized, and most publicised intelligence service in the world. While the CIA is sometimes able to refute publicly allegations and criticism, usually it must remain silent. The result is a contradictory melange of images of the CIA and very little knowledge or understanding of its functions or real role in American government." - *Robert M. Gates, 1988*⁸²⁸

"Judge, let me ask you this. Do you have any concerns about the image of the Agency or the public perception of it? To elaborate...let's take the popular literature, the movies and so on...the Agency does not come out looking too good. Does that concern you?" The accredited journalist and author of *Serpico*, Peter Maas posed the question to DCI William Webster in 1991. Webster's response perfectly encapsulates CIA public secrecy. "It's a concern that we must never forget that people easily worry about things that they are not allowed to know about and so you have to tell as much as you can."⁸²⁹

Webster used the "basic axiom," of CIA PR in that his statement reflected what previous DCIs have said before and it echoed what JFK remarked thirty years earlier at Allen Dulles's leaving ceremony. CIA's successes are largely unknown whereas its failures tend to feature in the public debate.⁸³⁰ CIA public secrecy involved assessing press coverage and cultivating a positive public image during the Cold War. But what about after the Soviet Union collapsed? How would it continue to balance its secrecy alongside a public fascinated by it?

⁸²⁶ Richard Fryklund, "Product of CIA Expenses Queried on Capitol Hill," *ES*, February 21, 1956, p. 11.

⁸²⁷ Bill Henry, "CIA Shudders at Neighborliness," *LAT*, February 27, 1963, p. 27.

⁸²⁸ CIA, "The Traditional Functions of National Intelligence," April 11, 1988, CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410008-2, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP99-01448R000301410008-2.pdf>, accessed 3rd July 2025.

⁸²⁹ CIA, "Transcript of DCI's Interview with Peter Maas Parade Magazine," February 25, 1991, CIA-RDP99-01448R000401670001-0, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP99-01448R000401670001-0.pdf>, accessed 3rd July 2025.

⁸³⁰ McCarthy, *Selling the CIA*, 97.

In 1991, the CIA faced questions regarding its longevity as an organisation. New global threats emerged in the post-Cold War world that brought its existence to the forefront of public debate.⁸³¹ The Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, once a proponent of abolishing the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, introduced a bill in January to reassign CIA functions to the State Department in a move that was reminiscent of the bureaucratic turf wars the Agency contended with in its initial years. This was followed by a *NYT* opinion piece from Moynihan in May titled “Do We Still Need the C.I.A.?” The Senator queried the role of the CIA in the post-Cold War world.⁸³²

It was a rare moment when a mainstream newspaper questioned the existence of the Agency. But abolishing it fell on deaf ears. This is because CIA’s status in 1991 can only be understood through its press support in the Cold War. Moynihan’s argument was not new as it echoed the anti-CIA rhetoric from *CT* and *NYDN* during the early Cold War arguing the State Department could do the job instead. Just as the outlets criticised the early CIA in their isolationist rhetoric, their opinion pieces agreed with Moynihan.⁸³³ Despite initial support calling for limits to CIA’s authority and its budget reduced, standalone articles like Moynihan’s never gained traction because the argument that CIA was a vital component of U.S. statecraft remained prevalent in influential papers.

Press support from the Cold War meant the Agency was in a strong position to preserve its survival as a government institution. It learnt that questions surrounding its existence could never materialise and it could employ an offensive PR approach to offset such criticisms. During his confirmation hearings, Robert M. Gates recognised that the CIA needed to continue to be forthcoming and proactive with its relationship to the press. Gates urged the Agency increase its “openness.” But this effort was prompted largely because Gates himself faced serious questions over his role in politicising intelligence during the 1980s.⁸³⁴

Gates’s predecessor, William Webster, had oversaw recommendations by an internal CIA working group led by the Agency’s PR man Joseph DeTrani. Improving PR resembled what Allen

⁸³¹ For works that focus on the CIA in the post-Cold War world, see: Bruce Hoffman, “Intelligence and Terrorism: Emerging Threats and New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War Era,” *Intelligence and National Security*, 11, no. 2 (1996), 207-223; William J. Daugherty, “Approval and Review of Covert Action Programs Since Reagan,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 17, no. 1 (2004), 62-80; Richard Aldrich, “‘A Profoundly Disruptive Force’: The CIA, Historiography and the Perils of Globalization,” *Intelligence and National Security*, 26, no. 2-3 (2011), 139-158; Loch K. Johnson, *The Threat on the Horizon: An Inside Account of America’s Search for Security after the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁸³² Daniel P. Moynihan, “Do We Still Need the C.I.A.?” *NYT*, May 19, 1991, p. E17; Moran, *Company Confessions*, 249-251; Mackenzie, *Secrets*, 183.

⁸³³ William Pfaff, “The U.S. Needs an Intelligence Agency, But Must it be CIA?” *CT*, July 28, 1991, p. 47; Lars-Erik Nelson, “Gates: Wrong Then and Wrong Now,” *NYDN*, October 2, 1991, p. 31.

⁸³⁴ McCarthy, *Selling the CIA*, 79.

Dulles desired when CIA moved to Langley. It was to be seen as a professional and bureaucratic institution. The memorandum declared that CIA must serve “its customers well,” implying the organisation should act like a company, “performing its mission of educating the public.” This echoed William Colby in his aim to teach the public about intelligence to shape a positive CIA narrative in public debate. Enhancing PR required expanding public speaking opportunities for officials, including a proposed “Speaker’s Bureau” aimed at dispelling the “myths and misconceptions about the Agency.”⁸³⁵

⁸³⁵ CIA, “Agency-Wide Public Relations Program,” January 24, 1991, 0005519754, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005519754.pdf, accessed 15th July 2025.

1. The Working Group met frequently this fall and determined that the following goals are key to the CIA public relations effort:

- Build and maintain a positive image of the CIA, based on a foundation of trust and accountability
- Explain and clarify the CIA's mission and activities
- Support CIA's recruitment program
- Maintain a CIA workforce knowledgeable about public relations objectives and policies

2. To achieve these goals, the Working Group devised five general strategies and suggested some 60 action items relating to these strategies:

- Expand public speaking and appearance opportunities for selected Agency officers
 - Suggested action items included: having DDs and Independent Office Heads handle selected overflow of speaking invitations received by the DCI and DDCI, making selected senior Agency officials available to the media, and cooperating on a very selective basis with the media on the making of documentaries concerning the Agency.
- Make available and increase access to unclassified information
 - Suggested action items included: the development of brochures addressing specific issues, such as the Agency policy on the hiring of homosexuals, the examination of DI publications for possible declassification, and broader distribution of unclassified DCI speeches.
- Make maximum use of formal and informal briefing and exchange programs with academia, business/industry, and other government organizations
 - Suggested action items included: exploring the possibility for a DCI program for CEOs (modelled on the DCI Program for Deans), finding more opportunities for employee exchange with industry, and using Agency reservists to reach a wider military audience.
- Better inform the CIA workforce about public relations initiatives and "official positions" on controversial issues
 - Suggested action items included: publication and distribution of the Q&A Package (official Agency answers to the most often asked questions of our speakers), making DCI speeches available to employees via internal Agency computer networks, and distributing "Agency views" which detail the Agency's official position on current news items.
- Consider minority issues in conjunction with other strategies
 - Suggested action items included: consulting with firms specializing in minority relations, attempting to reach predominantly minority media, and developing brochures to reflect concerns of minority communities.

Figure 7.1 Calling the CIA a "company," DeTrani's group emphasised maintaining "a CIA workforce knowledgeable about public relations objectives and policies." With no main adversary, the CIA needed to justify its existence in the post-Cold War climate. *Source:* CIA, "Agency-Wide Public Relations Program," 0005519754.

Robert Gates's PR venture was not original but was described as a new era of openness. During his confirmation hearings he made the point explicit that under his leadership, the Agency will adhere to a strategy of openness in the post-Cold War world. The declassification of old documents, an increase in public appearances and interviews from senior officials sold this "new"

approach with the aim of justifying the existence of CIA. However, Gates appeared forthcoming, but he continued to retain the “good secrets.” He wanted to shape public debate about intelligence and put forward a specific view of the Agency. For example, the DCI allowed *LAT* to interview senior officials, but reporters were accompanied by an Agency PR officer who sat in on each discussion.

Unlike the wide press support Allen Dulles and William Colby enjoyed, *LAT* represented a growing suspicion within the press toward CIA PR in the post-Cold War climate. The article describes Gates as “ambivalent about openness...he will not tear down the thick walls of secrecy.” Gates echoed Colby’s managed transparency when he spoke at a newspaper association in Tulsa. Whilst he acknowledged there needed to be a change in CIA’s “overarching attitude toward secrecy,” Agency employees “will be expected to maintain discipline and refer all press inquiries to our public affairs office...There will be no press room at CIA...we still must be able to keep secrets in order to do our work.”⁸³⁶

To examine how the Agency could respond to press coverage in the post-Cold War, Gates asked DeTrani to establish a taskforce to “use openness to learn from others outside the Agency...to improve our capabilities and our people.”⁸³⁷ The group’s suggestions during their first meeting on 25 November 1991 did not deviate from previous CIA PR such as Colby’s managed transparency and OEA recommendations to William Casey. It was noted that CIA needed to be proactive in its press relations. Senior Agency officials were required to respond through contributing to the public debate themselves, either through writing opinion pieces, or letters to the editor to get CIA’s view across. Gates reflected the normalisation of CIA secrecy after his time at the Agency where he continued to defend it and became a vocal bipartisan figure outspoken on several intelligence, political and social issues. However, as DeTrani’s findings were released it noted that the Public Affairs Office, which grew under Webster, was reduced by thirty-three percent. Shaping the narrative that benefitted the favourable side of the CIA’s mission and capabilities was the main goal in preserving the Agency’s “mystique.”⁸³⁸

⁸³⁶ John M. Broder, “Mysteries and Secrets: Director Gates Knows the Central Intelligence Agency Must Change. But How—and How Much?” *LAT*, April 19, 1992, p. 16.

⁸³⁷ CIA, “Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness,” December 20, 1991, 0005524009, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005524009.pdf, accessed 15th July 2025.

⁸³⁸ Gates, *From the Shadows*, 551; McCarthy, *Selling the CIA*, 79-82.

All agreed that an effective public affairs program for the CIA was necessary and that whatever changes were made to increase openness, all would expect the CIA to keep the secrets it is charged to protect.

4. In whatever program we pursue, we should:

- get our employees on board first
- be consistent
- be excellent
- be credible--admit when we are wrong
- personalize the Agency
- preserve the mystique

We should also ensure a coordinated PAO-OCA effort for this program. It will be important to get the Hill on board with the Agency's public position on various issues and to articulate the overall Agency strategy to Congress to honor your commitment to openness.

5. Before we can pursue greater openness, it is important to understand the Agency's current program in this area to put down a marker for possible change in the future. To provide some context you should be aware that while PAO grew during Judge Webster's tenure to meet the needs of increased requirements and an expanded program, PAO is now being told to downsize by about 33%. We recognize that a program of increased openness will require commitment of additional resources, not only for PAO but for other parts of the Agency. The Directorates will need to assess the resource implications of these recommendations.

6. In most of our discussions with outsiders as well as within the task force there was substantial agreement that we generally need to make the institution and the process more visible and understandable rather than strive for openness on specific substantive issues. To do this, we need to develop a strategic vision of what we want to be open about, why we want to be more open and to whom we want to be more open. Our suggestion for such a vision statement is:

CIA, the most open intelligence agency in the world, wants to be recognized as an organization of high caliber and culturally diverse people who achieve technical and analytic excellence and operational effectiveness in fulfilling their mission with integrity and the trust of the American people. We believe that it is important for

the American public to see CIA as a law-abiding organization whose role supporting national security policymakers continues to be important in an even more complex and dangerous world.

Formal acceptance of this statement by the Agency, or one similar to it, will provide a necessary and well-understood framework for taking the steps to achieve greater CIA openness.

7. We have an important story to tell, a story that bears repeating. We are the most open intelligence agency in the world which is proper in our form of democracy. (In fact, several foreign intelligence organizations have sought advice from PAO on how to establish a mechanism for dealing with the public.) That said, many Americans do not understand the intelligence process and the role of intelligence in national security policymaking. Many still operate with a romanticized or erroneous view of intelligence from the movies, TV, books and newspapers. These views often damage our reputation and make it harder for us to fulfill our mission. There are steps we can take which will benefit us and the American people.

8. To increase CIA openness and signal a change in how we do business, we need to take initiatives to share our history through the declassification of old records, explain our mission and functions in a changing world through an expanded briefing program within and outside of government, and develop a strategy for expanding our work with the media as a means of reaching an even broader audience. Our major recommendations

Figure 7.2 DeTrani's taskforce examined ways on how to improve CIA openness. The findings repeated the CIA's Cold War PR approach by stressing the Agency tell their side of the story to an American public. The organisation is the "most open intelligence agency in the world" and the taskforce urged CIA to utilise it. *Source:* CIA, "Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness," 0005524009.

Protecting this "mystique" resembled the aim of CIA public secrecy. Despite numerous workgroups and taskforces established during the Cold War, the outcome has always been the same. The CIA had to employ a proactive approach to survey press coverage with the aim of shaping public debate to gain legitimacy at home as a national security institution. Major press support throughout the Cold War made cultivating a positive CIA image easier to achieve. Through internal actions and external support, CIA secrecy was able to emerge and endure throughout this period. The deliberate public secrecy approach perfectly encapsulates how to understand CIA culture and history. The Agency is often referred to as "the most open secret organisation in the world," a portrayal favoured and flouted by many of its leaders who are proud of its ability to remain within the public spotlight whilst implementing its covert mission. But this depiction led officials and reporters to support maintaining its secrecy.

Secrecy and publicity aided the Agency in the Cold War. The press consistently legitimised it throughout the Cold War. It allowed the Agency to avoid having to answer questions over its

existence, and its broad support of its intelligence capabilities ensured CIA maintained a strong position to defend itself from sustained criticism. From its early years, influential reporters campaigned for its independence and strength. Individuals such as the Joseph and Stewart Alsop and Constantine Brown promoted it as the nation's first line of defence. Its first confrontation with Senator McCarthy in 1953 proved how fierce press support was for the Agency.

The press argued that as a young organisation it needed to be shielded from exposures that harmed its security. When it was revealed that CIA was involved in foreign and domestic blunders and overreach such as the Bay of Pigs and Operation MHCHAOS, influential correspondents and mainstream outlets quickly rallied support and protected the Agency as it matured, and its reputation grew within the U.S. government. The mainstream press's own concern with its First Amendment rights in the 1980s meant CIA could silence dissenters and strengthen its secrecy through litigation and government support.

CIA secrecy was treated as sacrosanct by outlets across the political spectrum examined in this thesis. Its meaning shifted from an intense protection during the early Cold War years and the 1950s towards a sympathetic rhetoric. *NYT* support for Senator Mike Mansfield's proposals defended the Agency against unwarranted exposure. Even when debates over Congressional oversight intensified after the Bay of Pigs, it was to restore faith in CIA to continue its intelligence efforts in the Cold War. After the 1974 Seymour Hersh revelations, outlets argued that whilst domestic surveillance was morally wrong, it occurred because CIA was dragged into committing these acts due to the abuses of power by previous administrations. And in the 1980s, papers often questioned the autonomy of the Agency as William Casey used it to gain a stronger foothold in the Reagan administration.

The CIA's own obsession with its public portrayal dictated how it approached and reacted to coverage to ensure its public profile remained untainted. The role of CIA press officers, directors of security, inspector generals, and executive directors all provided an insurmountable campaign to survey the press. Just as wide press support aided CIA secrecy, its publicity benefitted its image. CIA public secrecy meant DCIs often stated the press knows too much about it. DCIs used the public secrecy approach to depict CIA as under attack from unwarranted press scrutiny or as a misunderstood organisation where only the negative stories about it surfaced in the public sphere.

Allen Dulles and Stanley Grogan set the benchmark for CIA PR. They raised the importance of analysing press coverage through memorandums and took measures to dramatically increase its press clipping capabilities. Focusing on its portrayal made the Agency aware about its presence in the public spotlight and successive DCIs recognised they could not abandon the Dulles-Grogan

approach. DCIs who immediately attempted to alter the dynamics of CIA-press relations and enforced a stricter line of secrecy found themselves under intense press scrutiny. Leaders like John McCone and William Casey soon discovered that they could not keep the press distant. They needed to adapt to a public fascinated about CIA as it grew and matured as an institution.

CIA officials shaped public debate. Dulles wanted to shape it by highlighting the Agency's covert operational side. But after the Bay of Pigs, PR shifted towards a focus on showcasing the overt analytical capabilities, as internal recommendations argued that highlighting the Agency's clandestine work only increased public suspicion of its secrecy. Successive DCIs were reluctant to publicly discuss the clandestine nature of the Agency unless doing so served to benefit its public image. William Colby was cautious not to mention CIA's covert side for fear of reigniting debate over the Agency's past mistakes. He did however use public fascination of covert operations to limit the Congressional investigations in the 1970s.

The preservation of CIA secrecy during the Cold War was twofold. CIA was portrayed immediately as a great boon for the U.S., a modernised intelligence organisation that protected the nation. Through key public discussions mentioned in this thesis, the thought of dismantling such a powerful institution was unthinkable for many reporters and news outlets. The Agency was able to shape public debate in ways that maintained its secrecy. Preserving a public profile was crucial in ensuring this. CIA officials realised the benefits of publicity because they could use PR to shape an image that displayed the best of the Agency whilst closely monitoring and correcting criticism. An internal CIA document shows "the public images of the Agency, its successes and failures, attacks on [it] and praises of its actions...are...a vital part of [CIA] history."⁸³⁹ As the document reveals, publicity helped define the CIA. Public secrecy was an effective approach and it is essential to understanding CIA history in the Cold War.

⁸³⁹ CIA, "Agency Clipping Service," November 26, 1963.

Abbreviations

ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIG	Central Intelligence Group
<i>CT</i>	<i>Chicago Tribune</i>
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
EO	Executive Order
<i>ES</i>	<i>Evening Star</i>
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
IIPA	Intelligence Identities Protection Act
JC	Joint Committee on Intelligence
JFK	John F. Kennedy
<i>LAT</i>	<i>Los Angeles Times</i>
<i>NYDN</i>	<i>New York Daily News</i>
<i>NYT</i>	<i>New York Times</i>
OEA	Office of External Affairs
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
<i>PI</i>	<i>Philadelphia Inquirer</i>
PR	Public Relations
<i>SLPD</i>	<i>St. Louis Post-Dispatch</i>
SSCI	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
<i>TBS</i>	<i>The Baltimore Sun</i>

WH

White House

WP

Washington Post

Bibliography

Archives

Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library. Princeton, NJ.

Colby, William E. Papers.

Dulles, Allen W. Papers.

Government Records

Central Intelligence Agency Records Search Tool (CREST).

CIA History Staff. "50 Years in Langley: Recollections of the Construction of CIA's Original Headquarters Building." *Center for the Study of Intelligence*. January 2012.

Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States. *Report to the President*. Washington, D.C. GPO. 1975.

Dulles, Allen W., William H. Jackson, and Mathias F. Correa. *The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence*. Report to the National Security Council. 1 January 1949. National Security Archive.

Elesa, Jennifer K. "Intelligence Identities Protection Act." *Congressional Research Service*. April 10, 2013. pp. 1-8.

Ford, Harold P. *William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence, 1973–1976*. Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency. 1993.

House Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities. Pt. 4, *Committee Proceedings*, 94th Cong., 1st sess. September 10, 1975.

House Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities. Pt. 6. *Committee Proceedings II*. 94th Cong., 2nd sess. February 4, 1976.

"Report of the Special Study Group on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency." September 30, 1954. Declassified April 1, 1976.

Robarge, David. *John McCone as Director of Central Intelligence, 1961–1965, Part 1*. Washington, D.C.: CIA History Staff. 2005.

The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. Task Force Report on National Security Organization. January 1949.

National Security Act of 1947. Pub. L. 253. 80th Cong., 1st sess., July 26, 1947.

Sheffner, Daniel J. "The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): A Legal Overview." *Congressional Research Service*. August 24, 2020. pp. 1-57.

U.S. Congress. *Congressional Record*. 84th Cong., 2nd sess., 1956. Vol. 102, pt. 5.

U.S. Congress. *Congressional Record*. 84th Cong., 2nd sess., 1956. Vol. 102, pt. 10.

U.S. Congress. Senate. *Intelligence Reform Act of 1981*. 97th Cong., 1st sess., July 21, 1981.

U.S. House of Representatives. Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. *The CIA and the Media*. 59th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess. 27-29 December 1977. 4-5 January and 20 April 1978.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *Final Report together with additional, supplemental, and separate views*. 94th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rep. 94-755. "Book II: Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans." Washington, D.C. GPO. 1976.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities*. September 16, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D.C. 1976. 'Volume 1: Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents.'

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. *Interim Report*. 94th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rep. 94-465. Washington, D.C. 1975.

Presidential Documents

Eisenhower, Dwight D. "Remarks at the Cornerstone-Laying Ceremony for the Central Intelligence Agency Building, Langley, Virginia." November 3, 1959. *The American Presidency Project*. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-cornerstone-laying-ceremony-for-the-central-intelligence-agency-building>.

Executive Order 11905. "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities." February 18, 1976. *The American Presidency Project*. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-11905-united-states-foreign-intelligence-activities>.

Executive Order 12333. "United States Intelligence Activities." December 4, 1981. *National Archives*.
<https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html>.

Executive Order 12356. "National Security Information." April 2, 1982. *The American Presidency Project*. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-12356-national-security-information>.

Periodicals

Asheville Citizen

Baltimore Sun

Boston Globe

Chicago Tribune

Christian Science Monitor

Columbus Citizen

Decatur Herald

Detroit News

Evansville Courier

Evening Star

Hartford Courant

Kalamazoo Gazette

Lansing State Journal

Lebanon Daily News

Lincoln Star

Los Angeles Times

Macon Telegraph

Memphis Press-Scimitar

Miami Herald

New York Daily News

New York Herald Tribune

New York Times

Philadelphia Inquirer

Pittsburgh Press

Playboy

Princeton Daily Clarion

St. Louis Post-Dispatch

United Press International

Wall Street Journal

Waterloo Daily Courier

Washington Daily News

Washington Post

Washington Star

Websites

“George Beveridge of The Evening Star, Washington D.C.” <https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/george-beveridge-0>.

J.J. Green. “How the CIA Headquarters Broke New Ground in Langley, Va.” *WTOP News*. October 31, 2014. <https://wtop.com/j-j-green-national/2014/10/how-the-cia-headquarters-broke-ground-in-langley-va/>.

Sietsema, Tom. “Short Ribs, Soup and Secrets: Our Critic’s Exclusive Lunch at the CIA.” *Washington Post*. February 24, 2025. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/food/2025/02/24/cia-dining-room-agency-restaurant/>.

Weintraub, Adam. “Political Strategist W. Rusher.” *PI*. April 20, 2011.

https://www.inquirer.com/philly/obituaries/20110420_Political_strategist_W__Rusher.html.

Memoirs

Agee, Philip. *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*. London: Stonehill. 1975.

Alsop, Stewart. *The Center: The Anatomy of Power in Washington*. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1968.

Anderson, Jack and Daryl Gibson. *Peace, War, and Politics: An Eyewitness Account*. New York: Forge. 1999.

Brown, Constantine. *The Coming of the Whirlwind*. Chicago: Regnery, 1964.

Catledge, Turner. *My Life and the Times*. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.

Cline, Ray S. *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA*. Washington D.C.: Acropolis Books. 1976.

Colby, William, and Peter Forbath. *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA*. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1978.

Dulles, Allen. *The Craft of Intelligence*. New York: Harper and Row. 1963.

Ford, Gerald R. *A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford*. New York: Harper & Row. 1979.

Helms, Richard with William Hood. *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency*. New York: Random House. 2003.

Kirkpatrick, Jr., Lyman B. *The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities*. New York: Hill and Wang. 1973.

Reston, James. *Deadline: A Memoir*. New York: Random House. 1991.

Roberts, Chalmers M. *First Rough Draft: A Journalist's Journal of Our Times*. New York: Praeger. 1973.

Roberts, Chalmers M. *In the Shadow of Power: The Story of the Washington Post*. Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks Press. 1989.

Schorr, Daniel. *Clearing the Air*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1977.

Snepp, Frank. *Irreparable Harm: A Firsthand Account of How One Agent Took on the CIA in an Epic Battle Over Secrecy and Free Speech*. New York: Random House. 1999.

Stockwell, John. *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story*. New York: Norton. 1984.

Books

Alsop, Stewart, and Thomas Braden. *Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 1964.

Alwood, Edward. *Dark Days in the Newsroom: McCarthyism Aimed at the Press*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 2007.

Andrew, Christopher. *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. 1995.

Aronson, James. *The Press and the Cold War*. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1970.

Barrett, David M. *The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2005.

Bates, Stephen. *An Aristocracy of Critics: Luce, Hutchins, Neibuhr, and the Committee that Redefined Freedom of the Press*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2020.

Bennett, M. Todd. *Neither Confirm Nor Deny: How the Glomar Mission Shielded the CIA from Transparency*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2023.

Boyer, Paul. *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age*. New York: Pantheon Books. 1985.

Brinkley, Alan. *The Publisher: Henry Luce and His American Century*. New York: Knopf. 2010.

Carpenter, Ted Galen. *The Captive Press: Foreign Policy Crises and the First Amendment*. Washington D.C.: Cato Institute. 1995.

Connelly, Matthew. *The Declassification Engine: What History Reveals about America's Top Secrets*. New York: Pantheon Books. 2023.

Cullather, Nick. *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 1999.

Davies, David R. *The Postwar Decline of American Newspapers, 1945-1965*. Westport, CT: Praeger. 2006.

Davies, Deborah. *Katherine the Great: Katherine Graham and the Washington Post*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 1979.

Dean, Robert D. *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 2001.

Durbin, Brent. *The CIA and the Politics of Intelligence Reform*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2017.

Friedman, Andrea. *Citizenship in Cold War America: The National Security State and the Possibilities of Dissent*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 2015.

Friedman, Andrew. *Covert Capital: Landscapes of Denial and the Making of U.S. Empire in the Suburbs of Northern Virginia*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2013.

Gage, Beverly. *G-Man: J. Edgar Hoover and the Making of the American Century*. London: Simon & Schuster. 2022.

Gardner, Lloyd C. *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 1970.

Garthoff, Douglas. *Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005*. Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc. 2007.

Gates, Robert M. *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and how they won the Cold War*. New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks. 1996.

Greenberg, David. *Nixon's Shadow: The History of an Image*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 2003.

Grose, Peter. *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1994.

Hadley, David P. *The Rising Clamor: The American Press, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Cold War*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 2019.

Halberstam, David. *The Powers That Be*. New York: Knopf. 1979.

Hallin, Daniel C. *The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1986.

Hartz, Louis. *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution*. New York: Harcourt, Brace. 1955.

Haskins, Faye. *The Evening Star: The Rise and Fall of a Great Washington Newspaper*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 2019.

Hemmer, Nicole. *Messengers of the Right: Conservative Media and the Transformation of American Politics*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2016.

Herken, Gregg. *The Georgetown Set: Friends and Rivals in Cold War Washington*. New York: Vintage Books. 2015.

Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky. *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon Books. 1988.

Hersh, Burton. *The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA*. New York: Scribner. 1992.

Hogan, Michael J. *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1998.

Immerman, Richard H. *The Hidden Hand: A Brief History of the CIA*. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell. 2014.

Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. *A Question of Standing: The History of the CIA*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2022.

_____. *Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence*. Second Edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2002.

_____. *The CIA and American Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1989.

Johnson, Loch K. *A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation*. Lexington: University of Kentucky. 1985.

_____. *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1989.

_____. *The Threat on the Horizon: An Inside Account of America's Search for Security after the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011.

Jenkins, Tricia. *The CIA in Hollywood: How the Agency Shapes Film and Television*. Austin: University of Texas Press. 2012.

Jurdem, Laurence R. *Paving the Way for Reagan: The Influence of Conservative Media on US Foreign Policy*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky. 2018.

LaFeber, Walter. *America, Russia, and the Cold War*. New York: Knopf. 1985.

Lebovic, Sam. *Free Speech and Unfree News: The Paradox of Press Freedom in America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2016.

_____. *State of Silence: The Espionage Act and the Rise of America's Secrecy Regime*. New York: Basic Books. 2023.

Leffler, Melvyn P. *Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-2015*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2017.

Lovelace, Alexander G. *The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy During World War II*. Lawrence: University of Kansas. 2022.

Lucas, Scott. *Freedom's War: The U.S. Crusade against the Soviet Union 1945-56*. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1999.

Mackenzie, Angus. *Secrets: The CIA's War at Home*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1997.

Marchetti, Victor, and John Marks. *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*. New York: Knopf. 1974.

May, Elaine Tyler. *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*. New York: Basic Books. 1988.

McCarthy, David Shamus. *Selling the CIA: Public Relations and the Culture of Secrecy*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2018.

McCormick, Thomas J. *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1989.

McGarr, Kathryn J. *City of Newsmen: Public Lies and Professional Secrets in Cold War Washington*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2022.

McPherson, James Brian. *Journalism at the End of the American Century, 1965-present*. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group. 2006.

_____. *The Conservative Resurgence and the Press: The Media's Role in the Rise of the Right*. Evanston, IL. 2008.

Melley, Timothy. *The Covert Sphere: Secrecy, Fiction, and the National Security State*. Ithaca. Cornell University Press. 2012.

Moran, Christopher R. *Company Confessions: Revealing CIA Secrets*. London: Biteback Publishing. 2015.

Olmsted, Kathryn S. *Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1996.

Olson, James C. *Stuart Symington: A Life*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 2003.

- Persico, Joseph E. *Casey: From the OSS to the CIA*. New York: Penguin Books. 1990.
- Prados, John. *Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2003.
- _____. *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 2006.
- _____. *The Family Jewels: The CIA, Secrecy, and Presidential Power*. Austin: University of Texas Press. 2013.
- Pressman, Matthew. *On Press: The Liberal Values That Shaped the News*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2018.
- Preston, Andrew. *Total Defense: The New Deal and the Invention of National Security*. Harvard University Press. 2025.
- Ranelagh, John. *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1986.
- Ritchie, Donald A. *Reporting from Washington: The History of the Washington Press Corps*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2005.
- _____. *The Columnist: Leaks, Lies and Libel in Drew Pearson's Washington*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2021.
- Rivers, William L. and Wilbur Schramm. *Responsibility in Mass Communication*. Rev. Ed. New York: Harper & Row. 1969.
- Robey, Sarah E. *Atomic Americans: Citizens in a Nuclear State*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 2022.
- Rogg, Jeffrey P. *The Spy and the State: The History of American Intelligence*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2025.
- Rudgers, David F. *Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1943-1947*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2000.
- Salisbury, Harrison E. *Without Fear or Favor: An Uncompromising Look at the New York Times*. New York: Ballantine Books. 1980.
- Saunders, Frances Stonor. *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War*. London: Granta Books. 1999.

Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 1998.

Schroeder, Richard E. *The Foundation of the CIA: Harry Truman, the Missouri Gang, and the Origins of the Cold War*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 2017.

Schudson, Michael. *The Power of News*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1995.

_____. *The Rise of the Right to Know: Politics and the Culture of Transparency, 1945-1975*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2015.

Smist, Frank J. *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1994*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. 1994.

Snider, L. Britt. *The Agency and the Hill: CIA's Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004*. Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence. 2008.

Stamm, Michael. *Dead Tree Media: Manufacturing the Newspaper in Twentieth-Century North America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2018.

Stone, Geoffrey R. *Top Secret: When Our Government Keeps Us in the Dark*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2007.

Townley, Dafydd. *The Year of Intelligence in the United States: Public Opinion, National Security, and the 1975 Church Committee*. Palgrave Macmillan. 2021.

Troy, Thomas F. *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency*. Maryland: University Publications of America. 1981.

Wellerstein, Alex. *Restricted Data: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the United States*. Chicago: The University of Chicago. 2021.

Warner, Michael. *The CIA Under Harry Truman*. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific. 2005.

Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*. London: Penguin Books. 2007.

Whitfield, Stephen J. *The Culture of the Cold War*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1991.

Wicker, Tom. *On Press*. New York: Viking Press. 1978.

Wilford, Hugh. *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2008.

Willmetts, Simon. *In Secrecy's Shadow: The OSS and CIA in Hollywood Cinema 1941-1979*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 2016.

Wise, David, and Thomas B. Ross. *The Invisible Government*. New York: Random House. 1964.

Woodward, Bob. *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987*. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1987.

Yarrow, Andrew L. *Look: How a Highly Influential Magazine Helped Define Mid-Twentieth-Century America*. Lincoln: Potomac Books. 2021.

Yoder, Edwin M., Jr. *Joe Alsop's Cold War: A Study of Journalistic Influence and Intrigue*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1995.

Articles and Chapters in Edited Books

Aldrich, Richard J. "'A Profoundly Disruptive Force': The CIA, Historiography and the Perils of Globalization." *Intelligence and National Security*. 26, no. 2-3. 2011. pp. 139-158.

_____. "American Journalism and the Landscape of Secrecy: Tad Szulc, the CIA and Cuba." *History*. 100, no. 340. 2015. pp. 189-209.

_____. "CIA History as a Cold War Battleground: The Forgotten First Wave of Agency Narratives." In *Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography Since 1945*. Ed. Christopher R. Moran and Christopher J. Murphy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 2013. pp. 19-46.

_____. "Secrets, Spies and Editors in Cold War America: Ben Bradlee and the *Washington Post*." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. 34, no. 5. 2021. pp. 653-672.

Alsop, Stewart. "CIA: The Battle for Secret Power." *Saturday Evening Post*. 236, no. 27. July 27, 1963. pp. 17-21.

Alsop, Stewart. "Hogwash about the CIA." *Saturday Evening Post*. 237, no. 6. February 15, 1964. p. 15.

Aviki, Allison, Jonathan Cedarbaum, Rebecca Lee, et al. "The Pentagon Papers Framework, Fifty Years Later." In *National Security, Leaks and Freedom of the Press: The Pentagon Papers Fifty Years On*. Eds. Lee C. Bollinger and Geoffrey R. Stone. New York: Oxford University Press. 2021. pp. 1-21.

Barbas, Samantha. "The Enduring Significance of New York Times v. Sullivan." In *The Future of Press Freedom: Democracy, Law, and the News in Changing Times*. Eds. RonNell Andersen Jones and Sonja R. West. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2025. pp. 247-256.

- Barrett, David M. "Explaining the First Contested Senate Confirmation of a Director of Central Intelligence: John McCone, the Kennedy White House, the CIA and the Senate, 1962." *Intelligence and National Security*. 31, no. 1. 2016. pp. 74-87.
- Bates, Stephen. "Prejudice and the Press Critics: Colonel Robert McCormick's Assault on the Hutchins Commission." *American Journalism*. 36, no. 4. 2019. pp. 420-446.
- Bessner, Daniel and Frederik Logevall. "Recentring the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations." *Texas National Security Review*. 3, no. 2. 2020. pp. 38-55.
- Braden, Thomas W. "Why I'm Glad the CIA is 'Immoral.'" *Saturday Evening Post*. 240, no. 10. 1967. pp. 10-14.
- Buckley, William F. "Hate CIA Enterprise." *National Review*. 16, no. 26. June 30, 1964. pp. 541-542.
- Cassel, Elke van. "In Search of a Clear and Overarching American Policy: The Reporter Magazine (1949-68), the US Government and the Cold War." In *The US Government, Citizen Groups, and the Cold War: The State-Private Network*. Eds. Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford. London: Routledge. 2006. pp. 149-176.
- Cecil, Matthew. "Unveiling the 'Sick Elephant': CIA Public Relations and the Soviet Economic Forecast Controversy of 1964." *American Journalism*. 36, no. 2. 2019. pp. 171-195.
- "CIA Under Pressure While KGB Is Thriving." *U.S. News and World Report*. February 24, 1975.
- "Cloak and Dagger for John A. McCone." *Life Magazine*. October 6, 1961.
- Cohen, Deborah. "The Man Who Told All." *Atlantic Monthly*. 329, no. 3. 2022. pp. 84-95.
- Colby, William E. "Intelligence Secrecy and Security in a Free Society." *International Security*. 1, no. 2. 1976. pp. 3-14.
- Daugherty, William J. "Approval and Review of Covert Action Programs Since Reagan." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*. 17, no. 1. 2004. pp. 62-80.
- Douglas, Ann. "Periodizing the American Century: Modernism, Postmodernism, and Postcolonialism in the Cold War Context." *Modernism/Modernity*. 5, no. 3. 1998. pp. 71-98.
- Dulles, Allen. "Craft of Intelligence." *Harper's Magazine*. April 2, 1963.
- Fallaci, Oriana. "The CIA's Mr. Colby." *New Republic*. March 13, 1976. pp. 12-21.

Fenster, Mark. "FOIA as an Administrative Law." In *Troubling Transparency: The History and Future of Information*. Ed. David E. Pozen and Michael Schudson. New York: Columbia University Press. 2018. pp. 52-70.

Foran, John. "Discursive Subversions: Time Magazine, the CIA Overthrow of Mussaddiq, and the Installation of the Shah." In *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966*. Ed. Christian G. Appy. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press. 2000. pp. 157-182.

Gleijeses, Piero. "Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs." *Journal of Latin American Studies*. 27, no. 1. 1995. pp. 1-42.

Greider, William. "Aftergate." *Esquire*. September 1975.

Gunther, John. "Inside CIA: the Story of Our Spy Network." *Look*. August 12, 1952.

Gurman, Hannah, and Kaeten Mistry. "The Paradox of National Security Whistleblowing: Locating and Framing a History of the Phenomenon." In *Whistleblowing Nation: The History of National Security Disclosures and the Cult of State Secrecy*. Eds. Kaeten Mistry and Hannah Gurman. New York: Columbia University Press. 2020. pp. 9-44.

Haines, Gerald K. "The Pike Committee Investigation and the CIA." *Studies in Intelligence*. 42, no. 5. Winter 1998-1999. pp. 81-92.

Hanrahan, James. "An Interview with Former CIA Executive Director Lawrence K. 'Red' White." *Studies in Intelligence*. 43, no. 3. Winter, 1999-2000.

Hoffman, Bruce. "Intelligence and Terrorism: Emerging Threats and New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War Era." *Intelligence and National Security*. 11, no. 2. 1996. pp. 207-223.

Immerman, Richard H. "From the Mundane to the Absurd: The Advent and Evolution of Prepublication Review." In *Whistleblowing Nation: The History of National Security Disclosures and the Cult of State Secrecy*. Eds. Kaeten Mistry and Hannah Gurman. New York: Columbia University Press. 2020. pp. 187-212.

Johnson, Loch K. "Harry Howe Ransom and American Intelligence Studies." *Intelligence and National Security*. 22, no. 3. 2007. pp. 402-428.

Jones, Matthew L. "Creating Uncertainty, Casting Doubt: U.S. Intelligence Leaks from Reform to Spyware for Sale." In *Whistleblowing Nation: The History of National Security Disclosures and the*

Cult of State Secrecy. Ed. Kaeten Mistry and Hannah Gurman. New York: Columbia University Press. 2020.

Kaplan, Roger. "Allen Drury and the Washington Novel." *Policy Review*. 97. Oct/Nov 1999.

Karabell, Zachary, and Timothy Naftali. "History Declassified: The Perils and Promises of CIA Documents." *Diplomatic History*. 18, no. 4. 1994. pp. 615-626.

Kelly, James, Anne Constable, and David Halevy. "Shifting the Attack on Leaks: The CIA Director Hints at Prosecution of News Organizations." *Time*. 127, no. 20. May 19, 1986.

Lindsay, John V. "An Inquiry into the Darkness of the Cloak, the Sharpness of the Dagger." *Esquire*. March 1, 1964. pp. 106-109.

Lockheart, James, Francesca Akhtar, Richard J. Aldrich, et. al. "Fifty Years of Family Jewels: Roundtable on the CIA Scandal." *Journal of Intelligence History*. 24, no. 1. 2025. pp. 77-91.

Loory, Stuart H. "The CIA's Use of the Press: A 'Mighty Wurlitzer.'" *Columbia Journalism Review*. 13, no. 3. 1974. pp. 9-18.

Manosevitz, Jason U. "The Intelligence Politics of Early Congressional Oversight of CIA." *Intelligence and National Security*. 38, no. 5. 2023. pp. 706-725.

McCarthy, Eugene. "The CIA is Getting Out of Hand." *Saturday Evening Post*. 237, no. 1. January 4, 1964. pp. 6-10.

Mellinger, Gwyneth. "Washington Confidential: A Double Standard Gives Way to The People's Right to Know." *Journalism and Mass Communications Quarterly*. 92, no. 4. 2015. pp. 857-876.

Mills, Percy B. "Mr. Dulles Spills the Beans." *New Republic*. February 25, 1964. pp. 20-22.

Mistry, Kaeten. "A Transnational Protest against the National Security State: Whistleblowing, Philip Agee, and Networks of Dissent." *Journal of American History*. 106, no. 2. 2019. pp. 362-389.

_____. "Approaches to Understanding the Inaugural CIA Covert Operation in Italy: Exploding Useful Myths." *Intelligence and National Security*. 26, no. 2/3. 2011. pp. 246-268.

_____. "Narrating Covert Action: The CIA, Historiography and the Cold War." In *Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945*. Ed. Christopher R. Moran and Christopher J. Murphy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 2013. pp. 111-128.

_____. "The Hollow Archive: The CIA's Digitized Declassified Records." *H-Diplo Forum on Scholars and Digital Archives: Living the Dream?* 2021-2. pp. 13-19.

- _____. "The Rise and Fall of Anti-Imperial Whistleblowing in the Long 1970s." In *Whistleblowing Nation: The History of National Security Disclosures and the Cult of State Secrecy*. Ed. Kaeten Mistry and Hannah Gurman. New York: Columbia University Press. 2020. pp. 123-152.
- Morrissey, David H. "Disclosure and Secrecy: Security Classification Executive Orders." *Journalism and Mass Communication Monographs*. 161. February 1997. pp. 1-51.
- Moseman, Scott A. "Truman and the Formation of the Central Intelligence Agency." *Journal of Intelligence History*. 19, no. 2. 2020. pp. 149-166.
- Moss, John E. "The Crisis of Secrecy." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. 17, no. 1. 1961. pp. 8-35.
- "New Policemen to Battle Abuses." *Time*. 107, no. 9. March 1, 1976.
- Nolan, Cynthia M. "Seymour Hersh's Impact on the CIA." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*. 12, no. 1. 1999. pp. 18-34.
- Pincus, Walter. "Covering Intelligence." *New Republic*. February 1, 1975.
- Pozen, David E. "Deep Secrecy." *Stanford Law Review*. 62, no. 2. 2010. pp. 257-340.
- Pressman, Matthew. "The New York Daily News and the History of Conservative Media." *Modern American History*. 4, no. 3. 2021. pp. 219-238.
- Ransom, Harry Howe. "Secret Intelligence in the United States, 1947-1982: the CIA's Search for Legitimacy." In *The Missing Dimension: Governments and the Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century*. Ed. Christopher Andrew and David Dilks. Macmillan: London. 1984. pp. 199-226.
- Robarge, David. "CIA in the Spotlight: The Central Intelligence Agency and Public Accountability." *Journal of Intelligence History*. 9, no. 1-2. 2012. pp. 105-126.
- Schorr, Daniel. "Without Cloaks or Daggers." *The New Leader*. June 5, 1978. pp. 16-17.
- Schudson, Michael. "General Introduction: The Enduring Book in a Multimedia Age." In *A History of the Book in America: Volume 5: The Enduring Book: Print Culture in Postwar America*. Ed. David Paul Nord, Joan Shelley Rubin and Michael Schudson. pp. 1-22.
- _____. "The Multiple Political Roles of American Journalism." In *Media Nation: The Political History of News in Modern America*. Eds. Bruce J. Shulman and Julian E. Zelizer. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2017. pp. 212-227.
- Schudson, Michael, and Katherine Fink. "The Rise of Contextual Journalism, 1950s-2000s." *Journalism*. 15, no. 1. 2014. pp. 3-20.

- Shadman, Janice. "Trench-Coat Diplomacy." *Saturday Evening Post*. 237, no. 5. February 8, 1964.
- Straight, Michael. "The Fanaticism of Joseph McCarthy." *New Republic*. June 28, 1954. pp. 6-9.
- Szilagyi, Andrew M. "Blowing Its Cover: How the Intelligence Identities Protection Act Has Masqueraded as an Effective Law and Why it Must be Amended." *William and Mary Law Review*. 51, no. 6. 2010. pp. 2269-2312.
- Townley, Dafydd. "A Blue Ribbon Goat: The Rockefeller Commission, Public Opinion, and the Ford Administration's Intelligence Reform Failure." *Intelligence and National Security*. 39, no. 6. 2024. pp. 1009-1027.
- _____. "Too Responsible to Run for President: Frank Church and the 1976 Presidential Nomination." *Journal of Intelligence History*. 21, no. 2. 2022. pp. 213-231.
- Unna, Warren. "CIA: Who Watches the Watchmen?" *Harper's Magazine*. April 1, 1958. pp. 46-53.
- Valero, Larry. "'We Need Our New OSS, Our New General Donovan, Now': The Public Discourse over American Intelligence, 1944-53." *Intelligence and National Security*. 18, no. 1. 2003. pp. 91-118.
- Vries, Tity de. "The 1967 Central Intelligence Agency Scandal: Catalyst in a Transforming Relationship between State and People." *The Journal of American History*. 98, no. 4. 2012. pp. 1075-1092.
- Wallace, Robert Daniel. "Eberstadt, Dulles and NSC 50: The Impetus for CIA Evolution through 1953." *Intelligence and National Security*. 26, no. 5. 2011. pp. 620-638.
- Wark, Wesley K. "Great Investigations:" The Public Debate on Intelligence in the US after 1945." *Defense Analysis*. 3, no. 2. 1987. pp. 119-132.
- "We Tell Russia Too Much; Interview with Allen W. Dulles." *U.S. News and World Report*. March 19, 1954. pp. 62-68.
- Wilford, Hugh. "'Essentially a Work of Fiction': Kermit 'Kim' Roosevelt, Imperial Romance, and the Iran Coup of 1953." *Diplomatic History*. 40, no. 5. 2016. pp. 922-947.
- Willard, Richard K. "Law and the National Security Decision-Making Process in the Reagan Administration." *Houston Journal of International Law*. 11, no. 1. 1988. pp. 129-142.
- Willmetts, Simon. "Forbidden History: CIA Censorship, The Invisible Government, and the Origins of the 'Deep State' Conspiracy Theory." *Intelligence and National Security*. 39, no. 2. 2024. pp. 281-297.

_____. "Reconceiving Realism: Intelligence Historians and the Fact/Fiction Dichotomy." In *Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945*. Ed. Christopher R. Moran and Christopher J. Murray. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 2013. pp. 146-171.

_____. "The Burgeoning Fissures of Dissent: Allen Dulles and the Selling of the CIA in the Aftermath of the Bay of Pigs." *History*. 100, no. 340. 2015. pp. 167-188.

_____. "The CIA and the Invention of Tradition." *Journal of Intelligence History*. 14, no. 2. 2015. pp. 112-128.

_____. "The CIA and *Time Magazine*: Journalistic Ethics and Newsroom Dissent." *Diplomatic History*. 48, no. 5. 2024. pp. 719-743.

_____. "The Cultural Turn in Intelligence Studies." *Intelligence and National Security*. 34, no. 6. 2019. pp. 800-817.

Winchester, Karen A. and James W. Zirkle. "Freedom of Information and the CIA Information Act." *University of Richmond Law Review*. 21, no. 2. 1987. pp. 231-302.

Wise, David. "The Great Minimizer." *Politics Today*. c. 1978. 63.