On Philosophy's (lack of) Progress:From Plato to Wittgenstein (and Rawls)

Read, R. (2010) On Philosophy's (lack of) Progress:From Plato to Wittgenstein (and Rawls). Philosophy, 85 (03). pp. 341-367. ISSN 1469-817X

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Abstract

I argue that the type of progress exhibited by philosophy is not that exhibited by science (as analysed e.g. by Thomas Kuhn), but rather is akin to the kind of progress exhibited (say) be someone becoming 'older and wiser'. However, as actually-existing philosophy has gotten older, it has not always gotten wiser. As an illustration, I consider Rawls's conception of justification. I argue that Rawls's notion of what it is to have a philosophical justification exhibits no progress at all from Euthyphro's. In fact, drawing on a remark of Wittgenstein's, I suggest that Rawls's conception is inferior to the situation as depicted in Plato's famous dialogue - because at least in the case of Plato's Euthyphro, there is no illusion of justification. Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2010.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Philosophy
University of East Anglia > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy and the Arts
University of East Anglia > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy of Nature and the Environment
University of East Anglia > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Wittgenstein and the Wittgensteinian tradition
University of East Anglia > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
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Depositing User: EPrints Services
Date Deposited: 01 Oct 2010 14:58
Last Modified: 25 Jul 2018 04:12
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/10012
DOI: 10.1017/S0031819110000203

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